Afghanistan
Research Newsletter
Number 28, January/February 2011

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
Research for a Better Afghanistan

Afghanistan Research Newsletter

Wheat Research: A Crucial Prerequisite to Food Security in Afghanistan
Rajiv K. Sharma, M. Osmanzai and R. Ward.
International Maize & Wheat Improvement Centre(CIMMYT), Kabul, Afghanistan.

fao.org). Moreover, as of today only about a quarter ofAfghan agricultural land is irrigated, and much of thatinefficiently.

Wheat is the staple food in Afghanistan, accounting
for approximately 60 percent of the calorie intakeof the population. It also has the distinction of being
Afghanistan’s major crop, accounting for roughly 70
percent of the cultivated land area (Chabot and Dorosh,2007), however, the country’s domestic production ofwheat has never been sufficient for meeting demand,and is also prone to great weather-induced fluctuations(Fig 1). Wheat imports from neighbouring countries havebeen required to meet local demand. Approximately
45 percent of Afghanistan’s wheat acreage in a normal
year is irrigated, accounting for about 70 percent
of production. The remaining 55 percent of wheat
acreage relies on timely rainfall and typically provides
the remaining 30 percent of home production. Wintersnowfall in the mountain ranges of central Afghanistan
supplies over 80 percent of the country’s annual
precipitation, with snowmelt in the spring the major
source of irrigation water, running through rivers andstreams that originate in the mountains.

Early Wheat Research in Afghanistan:Concerted efforts to establish agricultural research weremade only towards the end of the fifties when a USAIDassisted Applied and Adaptive Unit was established in
1959 at Darulaman research station in the Department
of Extension (MAIL, 2007). Basic legislation establishingagricultural research in the Ministry of Agriculture andIrrigation was promulgated in April 1963. In order tobring about closer coordination and implementation ofagricultural programmes, the March 1966 reorganisation
brought both research and extension under theadministrative control of one President for “Agricultural
Research & Extension” (Anonymous, 1967). Later in
1965-66 the ministry decided that the major effortof the research organisation should be devoted to thewheat programme. Work on Mexican wheat resulted in
the identification of adapted genotypes like Lerma Rojo
64A, Kenya Mentana, Vilufen and Mexi-Pak.

Figure 1: Wheat production and productivity in Afghanistan from 1968 to 200965
4
3

Wheat Yield (t/ha)

2

Wheat Prod. (mtonnes)

1
0

1968

1978

1988

1992

1998

2002

2007

2008

2009

Source: FAOSTAT, 2010: http://faostat.fao.org/

In 2009, the most bountiful rainfall in 32 years brought
harvests that made Afghanistan nearly self–sufficientin cereals. The message was clear—there is muchagricultural potential in Afghanistan which irrigation
could realise. However, the year also told us that eventhe best of the years did not help us produce enoughto be self sufficient. Moreover, the disproportionately
large acreages devoted to wheat also make Afghanistan
import many other agri-products which can be produced
here, provided higher wheat productivity spares someland for growing other crops. The import of agricultural
produce by Afghanistan stood at a whopping US$ 830
million during 2007 (FAOSTAT, 2010: http://faostat.
2

Establishment of Research Programs and Institutions:
Agricultural research received a boost when the
research unit was upgraded to the level of a General
Directorate of Research and Soil Sciences in 1970.
The state of agriculture and agricultural researchwere reviewed by USAID through several committees(Anonymous, 1967; Anonymous, 1972 and Olson,
1988). The current Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigationand Livestock (MAIL) was known as the Ministry ofAgriculture and Irrigation (MAI) during the earlyseventies. In 1982, this directorate was upgradedto the level of a national-level research institute,January/February 2011

the Agricultural Research Institute of Afghanistan(ARIA), the name by which it is currently known. The
agricultural situation, however, had deteriorated
to a great extent and wheat production as such had
declined over the decade (Olson, 1988). The two
wheat varieties viz., Pak81 (also known as Veery 6)
and Pirsaback 85 were found suitable (Hepworth,
1988) for spring wheat areas which account for about
80 percent of wheat cultivation by area, whereas thevarieties Bestoya, Kavkaz, Bolal and Roussulka were
found suitable for winter wheat cultivation. The SIDA
(Swedish International Development Cooperation
Agency) and UNDP (United Nations Development
Programme) supported an enhanced crop productivity
project. Starting in 1996, this tested 3,881 wheat
genotypes in 15 provinces, leading to the developmentof Herat-99, Mazar-99 and Amu-99 for irrigatedproduction. For rainfed conditions, Dayma 96 andGhori 96 were found suitable (Wassimi, 1999). The
project also reported improved fertiliser rates andsowing dates for wheat cultivation.
At the fall of the Najibullah government in 1992,
thegovernment-supported
crop
improvement
programme collapsed. It was restarted in 1996 underthe management of the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), releasing 15 wheat varieties: 10
for irrigated areas and 5 for rainfed areas. Dennis etal. (2002) noted that most introduced varieties were
for irrigated areas, while families in rainfed areas
constituted some 44 percent of the total farming
households.
Outcome of Wheat Research:
Wheat research in the country has so far emphasised
only the release of new varieties. This has not involved

any home-grown breeding programme but rather theevaluation of introduced genotypes bred elsewhere.
The lists of wheat varieties introduced up to 2001 andbeyond are presented in Tables 1 and 2 respectively.
ARIA at present has 17 research stations in addition
to the head office at Kabul. New genotypes are being
continuously introduced by several organisations likethe International Centre for Research in Dry Areas(ICARDA) and CIMMYT which are then evaluatedin multi-location trials at several locations acrossAfghanistan to identify the best-yielding and mostdisease resistant ones for release as varieties. Table 2
lists the varieties released during this decade.
Table 1: Wheat Varieties Introduced into
Afghanistan from Abroad, 1989-2001
Crop

Wheat

Varieties
Pak-81, Pirsabak-85, Khyber-87,
Pirsabak-91, Ataya-85,
Zarghoon-79, Blue Silver, Sonalika,
Faisalabad-85, Zardana,
Zamindar, Rhotas-91, Pasban-91,
Bezostaya, Sonali, Kartaya,
Shaghesti, Inqilab-91, HD-2285,
HD-2329, HD-2232, Bakhtawar-92,
MH-97, PBW-154, HUW-234, WH542

Impact of Wheat Research:
The overall impact of research is reflected in productivity,
as measured by total production and production perunit area (t/ha). Wheat productivity increased from
1.15 t/ha in 1968 to 1.97 t/ha in 2009, an increase ofover 72 percent during this period (Fig 1). Total wheat

The Afghanistan Research Newsletter is a quarterly publication of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
(AREU). The purpose of the Newsletter is to alert readers to new research being undertaken on Afghanistan andto help disseminate research findings and analysis. Some of the resources cited are available on the internet;
most books and other publications are available at the AREU library, located in the AREU office (corner of
Flower Street and Street 2) and open to researchers Sunday to Thursday, 9am-12pm and 12.30pm-4pm. The
Newsletter is compiled by Royce Wiles. If you have ideas for books or other publications or resources thatshould be included in the Newsletter, please send an email to newsletter@areu.org.af.
The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent research institute based in Kabul.
AREU’s mission is to inform and influence policy and practice through conducting high-quality, policy-relevant
research and actively disseminating the results, and to promote a culture of research and learning. AREU
was established in 2002 by the assistance community working in Afghanistan and has a board of directors
with representation from donors, the United Nations and other multilateral agencies, and non-governmentalorganisations. AREU currently receives core funds from the governments of Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Specific projects have been funded by the Foundation of the Open Society
Institute Afghanistan (FOSIA), the Asia Foundation (TAF), the European Commission (EC) and the International
Development Research Centre (IDRC). All AREU publications are available at www.areu.org.af.
© 2011 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Some rights reserved. Contact: newsletter@areu.org.af

3

Afghanistan Research Newsletter

Table 2: Wheat Varieties Released in Afghanistan during the Current Decade
Variety
Solh-02
Parva 2
Ariana-07
Darulaman-07
Drukshan-08
Shishambagh-08
Autan
MHO304
ExoticSoissons
Andalou
Guadaloupe
Muqawim -09
Koshan -09
Baghlan -09

Year
2002
2002
2007
2007
2008
2008
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009

Seed Source
TCI
CIMMYT
CIMMYT
CIMMYT
CIMMYT
CIMMYT
FEAC
FEAC
FEAC
FEAC
FEAC
FEAC
CIMMYT
CIMMYT
CIMMYTType
Winter Wheat
Durum Wheat
Spring Wheat
Spring Wheat
Spring Wheat
Spring Wheat
Winter Wheat
Winter Wheat
Winter Wheat
Winter Wheat
Winter Wheat
Winter Wheat
Ug 99 Resistant Spring Wheat
Ug 99 Resistant Spring Wheat
Ug 99 Resistant Spring Wheat

Abbreviations: TCI: Turkey-CIMMYT-ICARDA initiative; CIMMYT: International Maize and Wheat
Improvement Centre; FEAC: French Embassy Agriculture Cooperation

production during the same period increased from 2.35
million metric tonnes to 5.06 million metric tonnes witha growth of 116 percent.
The lack of consistency in the trend in the figurereferred to above shows the vulnerability ofAfghanistan’s agriculture to weather. The production
and productivity were comparable in 1968 and 1978
but largely stagnated until beginning to fall in 2007,
followed by a major depression in 2008. 2009 proved tobe the best so far, achieving the highest recorded levelsof wheat production and productivity. If the depression
and stagnation spanning from 1978 till 2007 could be
attributed to political upheaval, that in 2008 was due
to unfavourable weather. The 2008 depression also
highlights the importance of research to help insulate
Afghan agriculture from the vagaries of weather. Since
this figure does not illustrate year to year variation, theone given below (Fig 2) displays five year averages atboth the ends of the thirty year period from 1978-79 to
2007-08.
Comparison with Neighbouring Countries:
The five year averages bring out the comparison
among the neighbouring countries, demonstratingthat Afghanistan lost ground in wheat production
and productivity during the last thirty years (andpresumably research pace as well) though its neighbours
maintained those. Afghanistan’s wheat productivity
averaged over 1975-79 was comparable to its
4neighbours, even beating that of Iran. However, wheat
productivity gains (150 percent and 79 percent) leading
to production gains (157 percent and 125 percent) havebeen phenomenal during the thirty year period for both
Iran and Pakistan respectively, whereas Afghanistan’s
average wheat productivity increased only by 25 percent
and average production by 54 percent during the same
period. In spite of the record production of wheat during
2009, the country still had a deficit of 191,000 tonnes ofwheat out of a total cereals deficit of 220,000 tonnes(Anonymous, 2009).
Research to Secure Stable Wheat Production in
Afghanistan:
The first and foremost priority is to develop and release
suitable varieties for rainfed and other suboptimalareas. However, this forms only part of the picture.
The performance of a variety at a given location is theresult of its interaction with the specific environment
there. The basic premise of releasing cultivars forcommercial cultivation is that the target region has
agroclimatic conditions similar to the one in which thereleased variety was tested. This warrants a carefulclassification of all wheat-growing regions of Afghanistan
into the appropriate agro-climatic zones. These would
subsequently form the basis for the release of suitable
wheat varieties for each zone based. Since we have
two important wheat seasons (spring and autumn), thenumber and size of zones may vary for each.

January/February 2011

Figure 2: Changes in wheat production (Pd) in million metric tonnes and productivity (Pdy) in
quintals per hectare over a thirty year span averaged over the starting and ending five year
periods for the three neighbouring countries of Iran, Pakistan (Pak) and Afghanistan (Af)

25
20
15

Av. 1975-79

10

Av. 2005-09

5
0

Iran Pd

PakPd

Af Pd

Iran Pdy

Pak Pdy

Af PdyOther important issues that need attention ofresearchers and policy makers are:Afghanistan. The Agricutural Research Review Team,
Kabul, Afghanistan, October 25, 1972.” Unpublished,
USAID.

1. Delineation of wheat-growing regions of thecountry into agroclimatic zones for both sowing
seasons by province or district.
2. Crop husbandry optimisation for each zone.
3. A disease and insect pest survey and surveillancesystem to enable a proactive response to
emerging pathogens or pests.
4. Socioeconomic measures such as credit tofarmers combined with insurance schemes toensure loan repayment in case of crop failure.
5. Guaranteed purchase of the produce from thefarmers at an economically viable price.

Anonymous, 2009. Agricultural Prospects Report.
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock.
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
Kabul, Afghanistan. http://www.fao.org/ES/esa/en/
pubs_tfr.htm (accessed 13 January 2011)

Conclusion:
The good rains of 2009 enabled Afghanistan to achieve
the best wheat harvest in recorded history. However,
the general impression that irrigation alone can solve
all issues of food security overlooks a number of othersolutions available. There are several huge gaps inwheat research and development in the country which,if plugged, could not only make Afghanistan selfsufficient in wheat production but also release large
areas for other crops to improve overall food security
for the country as a whole.
References:
Anonymous, 1967. Agricultural Development in
Afghanistan with Special Emphasis on Wheat. A Reportby the United States Agricultural Review Team. Kabul,
Afghanistan, July, 1967, Unpublished, USAID.
Anonymous, 1972. “Report of
Recommendations on Agricultural

Survey andResearch in

Chabot, P. and Paul A. Dorosh, 2007. “Wheat Markets,
Food Aid and Food Security in Afghanistan,” Food
Policy 32: 334–53.
Dennis, J., A. Diab. and P. Trutmann, 2002. “The
Planning of Emergency Seed Supply for Afghanistan
in 2002 and Beyond: a draft concept paper prepared
for the Tashkent Conference.” http://msa.eun.eg/
Hyperlink_files/2/15.pdf (accessed 13 January 2011).
Hepworth, H.M. 1988. Wheat Seed for Afghanistan.
Office of the USAID representative, Islamabad,
Pakistan.
ICARDA, 2005. “Afghanistan and ICARDA: Ties That
Bind.” No.21. ICARDA, Aleppo, Syria.
MAIL (Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock).
Annual Report. 2007 and 2009.
Olson, R.O., 1988. “Report on Review of Afghan
Agriculture and Redesign of Agriculture Sector
Assessment
Project.”
Islamabad,
Pakistan.
Unpublished, USAID.
Wassimi, N., 1999. “Second Technical Report on Cereals
and Food Legumes Varietal Selection in Afghanistan
1998-1999.” Kabul, Afghanistan. FAO.

Please note: this article is a lightly edited version of
the original.

5Afghanistan Research Newsletter

New Publications from AREU
November 2010, “Means to What End? Policymaking
and State-Building in Afghanistan,” by Sarah
Parkinson. Afghanistan has been in “state-building”
mode since 2001, and formal policymaking has been
an important tool for focusing and coordinating theefforts of the Afghan government and its international
supporters. This synthesis paper considers the rolethat high-level policymaking has actually played,through a comparative analysis of five different recent
examples of policymaking including the drafting of
the Afghan National Development Strategy and thecontroversial Shiite personal status law. It highlights
both the high level of donor influence on shaping
policy, and the limited effectiveness of policies
themselves.
November 2010, “Poverty in Afghan Policy:
Enhancing Solutions through Better Defining the
Problem,” by Paula Kantor and Adam Pain. Overthe past few years, Afghan policymakers have put
aside strategies encouraging pro-poor growth infavour of solutions that focus on expanding GDP. In
addition, existing solutions to poverty are becoming
increasingly technically-oriented and fail to take
local social realities and power structures into
account. This briefing paper calls for policymakers
and programmers to refocus on poverty and its social
causes as a way to ensure that efforts to improve thelives of rural Afghans meet with lasting success.
November 2010, “Governance Structures in
Nimroz Province,” by Anna Larson. This case study
examined popular perspectives on democracy andgovernance structures in Nimroz Province—an area
far removed from the political centre in Kabul andstrongly influenced by its proximity to neighbouring
Iran. Its remoteness has left it vulnerable to natural
disasters but largely shielded from the politicalinstability plaguing the rest of the country. The study
found that each of these factors has helped shape aunique set of local attitudes towards democratic andtraditional institutions of governance.
December 2010, “Podcast: The Future of
Democratisation in Afghanistan,” by Anna Larson.
This podcast discusses the findings of a multifaceted
study of representative governance in Afghanistan
conducted during 2009-10. Across a wide variety oflocations and against a backdrop of elections, theresearch closely observed electoral dynamics at a6

local and national level while deliberately expanding
the focus to include Afghan attitudes to democracy
and democratisation in general.
December 2010, “Podcast: Community Based
Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan,” by Deborah
J. Smith. This podcast discusses AREU’s researchon community-based dispute resolution. It presents
findings on the relationships between the state and
CBDR, the different processes and practices that areused across different areas of Afghanistan to resolve
disputes, and gender dynamics in these processes.
December 2010, “Securing Life and Livelihoods
in Rural Afghanistan: The Role of Social
Relationships,” by Paula Kantor and Adam Pain.
This paper examines how rural households’ positionin the web of social relationships that underpins
Afghan village life can have a defining effect on theirlivelihoods. These can vary from charitable relations
and informal exchanges of credit—in some cases
stretched to breaking point after a prolonged periodof drought and deprivation—to exploitative tenancy
agreements at the hands of predatory landlords.
Local elites—whether self-interested or socially
responsible—often play a central role in forging andperpetuating these networks. Households ascribe
great value to maintaining their place in village
communities as a way to ensure livelihood security,even if doing so may end up detrimental in the longrun. Programmes and policies that ignore this reality
thus run the risk of falling by the wayside or being
co-opted to serve the ends of elites.
December 2010, “Understanding and Addressing
Context in Rural Afghanistan: How Villages Differ
and Why,” by Adam Pain and Paula Kantor. This
paper explores how geography, politics, and history
conspire to shape the individual character of Afghan
villages. Broader regional identities—central or
peripheral, mountain or plain—are overlaid onto
local factors such as wealth distribution and ethnic
diversity to produce individual “village republics”
that are more or less capable of organising to deliver
both public goods and security. In this context, itsuggests that adopting a one-size-fits-all approachis an inefficient way of targeting development
resources, and proposes a basic set of tools that
can help programme-makers clump villages together
based on points of similarity or difference.

January/February 2011

Information Sources
The following websites present a range of papers, raw data, publications and internal documents about
Afghanistan. Some have controlled access (e.g., US Government only) while others require accounts andsome
are completely open.
•

INDURE—Contains Operational and Event Data, Unclassified Version of CIDNE: https://indtab.com•

TABULE—Political and economic development data, email and file attachment driven: https://indtab.com•

Ronna—Finished products fit for public dissemination, synced with Afghanistan Mission Network
Portal Wiki: http://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org•

CIMIC Web—Communications and information sharing with civilian populations, governments andmilitary: http://www.cimicweb.org•

HarmonieWeb—Unclassified multinational civil-military information sharing, communication duringstability operations, humanitarian, and disaster relief: http://harmonieweb.org•

APAN—Planning, collaboration crisis response and knowledge information, web portal structure:
http://community.apan.org•

ADIC—Geospatial data about infrastructure projects and security incidents: https://aiscs.ird-hrls.
org/aidc•

AfghanInfo—Statistical data about the people and economy of Afghanistan: http://www.cso.gov.af/
afghaninf.html•

Peace Dividend Marketplace—Data about local Afghan businesses, market information, businessverification: www.buildingmarkets.org•

PIMSS—Federated data about infrastructure, land tenure and governance for the purpose ofdevelopment; geospatial data: http://www.pimss.af/AboutPIMSS.html•

Intellipedia—US Government only, information about Afghanistan: https://www.intelink.gov/
wiki/Afghanistan_Provincial_Reconstruction_Teams, https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Stability_
Operations_and_Information_Center, https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Provinces_of_Afghanistan

New Research Publications
Agriculture
Parto, Saeed and Rozbih Mihran. “Value Chain
Governance and Gender: Saffron Production in
Afghanistan.” Kabul: Afghanistan Public Policy
Research
Organization(APPRO),
November
2010. 32 p. http://appro.org.af/downloads/
Saffron-VC_Governance_
and_Gender.pdf (2.2 MB).
“This study was undertaken
to identify constraints andexplore opportunities for
women to participate andimprove their position invarious stages of saffron
production. The findings
reported in this paper are

based on primary data collected through interviews
with key informants and focus group discussions andsecondary data from a review of the existing literature
on agricultural value chains, value chain analysis, andgender in/and agricultural development. The reviewof the literature was used to develop an analyticalframework to examine gender in/and value chain
dynamics in the case of saffron production.” (P. 1).

Antiquities, Conservation, etc.
Mojumdar, Aunohita with
Dilip Banerjee and Anne
Feenstra. Another Afghan
Story: Portraying Afghans
and
their
Cultural
Heritage. Leiden: Centre
for International Heritage
Activities, 2010. 37 p.
7

Afghanistan Research Newsletter

This book of portraits with associated notes frominterviews includes biographical notes, shows
individuals closely associated with the National Museumof Afghanistan and the restoration project underway
at the Bagh-e Jehan-Nama Palace (Tashqurghan).

Banking“Summary Analysis of Condition and Performance of
the Banking System as of Asad 1389 (August 2010).”[Kabul]: Da Afghanistan Bank, 2010. 16 p. http://info.
publicintelligence.net/AfghanBankingAugust2010.
pdf (472 KB). This report from the central bank outlines
the current state of the banking system, including
statistics on microfinance institutions. “The banking
system in Afghanistan consists of 17 duly-licensed andpermitted banking organizations: 2 relicensed stateowned banks, 10 private full-fledged banks, and 5
branches of foreign banks.” (P. 1).

Business and Finance
Cusack, Jake and Erik Malmstrom. “Afghanistan’s
Willing Entrepreneurs: Supporting Private-Sector
Growth in the Afghan Economy.” Washington,
D.C.: Center for New American Security, November
2010. 10 p. http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/
publications/CNAS_Kauffman_Entrepreneurs_
CusackMalmstrom.pdf (405 KB). “To better gain[a] perspective [on Afghan business conditions] fromthe people who matter most—Afghans themselves—
we traveled without security and maintained noorganizational affiliation. Our central goal was tounderstand the narratives, challenges and opportunitiesof Afghan business people in order to inform a more
effective strategy to empower them. Our findings,
distilled here, will be the subject of a December 2010
report published by the Kauffman Foundation, which
will present qualitative research that complements
quantitative business surveys conducted by the WorldBank and Center for International Private Enterprise.”(P. 1).
“Integrated Business Enterprise Survey 2009.”[Kabul]: Central Statistics
Organization, 2009. 65
p. This important survey(conducted by the Central
Statistics
Organizationfrom March to June 2009
in 32 of Afghanistan’s 34
provinces)interviewed
3,794
non-agriculturalbusiness establishments.
It shows that most of them
are small (over 90 percent
had five workers or less),8

are new (have operated for four years or less) andoperate with limited physical presence (with around 33
percent in temporary structures and about 1.6 percent
in no structure at all). Overall, the survey identified
over 402,000 businesses, where nearly 1.2 million
people work; about 70 percent of these establishments
are in rural areas and 30 percent in urban areas.
The majority of businesses had a single owner. Data
collected included: number of people employed, theircompensation, operating expenses and receipts, valueof fixed assets and outstanding loans. Also published in
Dari: 1388 ‫سروی موسسات افغانستان‬.
“Knowledge, Attitude, and Practice (KAP) survey of
Afghanistan Towards Trade: Final Survey Report.”
Shar-e-Naw, Kabul: TAFA Project Office, October2010. 64 p. Word documents (1.0 MB, 592 KB). “Thisreport focuses on Afghans’ knowledge, attitudes, andpractices related to trade and its potential benefits
for Afghanistan. In response to a request for proposal
by Chemonics/TAFA, AIR Consulting undertook thesurvey design, data collection, and analysis presented
here. It used surveys of the general Afghan population
across selected provinces and key sub-populations
who are involved with various facets of international
trade. In addition, in-depth interviews with selectedindividuals contributed to a deeper understanding oftrade issues from the perspective of the government,
traders, academia, producers, and other entities in
Afghanistan.” (Executive Summary).
“National Budget 1389” [Kabul]: [Ministry of Finance]
148 p. PDF (1.9 MB). The Ministry of Finance website(http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/NationalBudget/
Budget/Budget.html) has only the Dari version for 1389.

Conflict
Rassul,Khibar.
“Fractured
Relationships:
Understanding Conflict between Nomadic andSettled Communities in Wardak’s Pastureland.”[Kabul]: Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU),
October 2010. xii + 28 p. http://www.cpau.org.
af/Research/Docs_our_publications/CPAU%20
Report%20-%20Fractured%20Relationships.pdf (412
KB). This paper identifies tangible and intangible
vulnerabilities among nomadic and settled communities
as a key factor enabling conflict and violence between
them. The paper examines recent Afghan political
history and the relationship between nomadic andsettled communities during this period. This analysis
encourages a better understanding of the developmentof the relationship between the communities during
recent history and the role of Afghan politics in thisdevelopment. The paper also takes a look at recent
measures taken to remedy the conflict between nomadic
and settled communities and suggests potential ways
forward.

January/February 2011

Corruption“Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption:a National Survey 2010.” Kabul: Integrity Watch
Afghanistan, 2010. 130 p. http://www.iwaweb.
org/src/IWA%20corruption%20survey%202010.pdf(4.5 MB). “This is thesecond corruption survey
producedbyIntegrity
Watch
Afghanistan(IWA)...the survey was
conducted at the end of
2009 in 32 provinces of
Afghanistan and is the first
truly national corruption
survey...The
present
survey, which covered
6,500
respondents,arepresentative sample ofthe overall population of
Afghanistan, assesses theimpact of corruption on the relationship between
Afghan citizens and the state, the trust in stateand non-state institutions, the perceived supportof the international community for anti-corruption
efforts and the links of corruption and perceptionsof corruption with insurgency and conflict. While theprevious survey focused on perceptions of corruption,
the current survey provides a far more comprehensive
account of Afghan experiences of corruption.”(Executive Summary, P. 9).

Development
Adlparvar, Naysan. “Development in Conflict:the Politicisation of British Aid to Afghanistan.”[2010]. 27 p. Unpublished draft. “The findings ofthis research project pose questions about the British
model of development in Afghanistan and beyond.
First, they indicate that a portion of British Official
Development Assistance (ODA) to Afghanistan—legally
mandated for poverty reduction—is being prioritised
to meet foreign policy and security goals. This analysis
raises the question of whether current patterns of ODA
expenditure in Afghanistan would be palatable [to]British taxpayers...” (P. 2-3).
Fishstein, Paul. “Winning Hearts and Minds?:
Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security
in Afghanistan’s Balkh Province.” Medford, Ma.:
Feinstein International Center, November 2010. 64
p. https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/
attachments/38966405/WinningHearts-Afghanistan.
pdf?version=1 (PDF 2.0 MB). “The Balkh Province
case study is part of a larger five-province Afghanistancountry study looking at the assumption thathumanitarian and development assistance projects

can help to bring or maintain security in strategicallyimportant environments, and can help ‘win hearts andminds,’ thereby undermining support within the local
populace for radical, insurgent, or terrorist groups.
Afghanistan provided an opportunity to examine oneof the most concerted recent efforts to use ‘hearts
and minds’ projects to achieve security objectives. It
has been the testing ground for new approaches tousing reconstruction assistance as a counterinsurgency
tool. The assumption that aid projects improvesecurity has lead to a sharp increase in overall
development funding, an increased percentage ofactivities based on strategic security considerations,and a shift of development activities to the military. In
this light, it is essential that policy makers understandwhether and how aid projects can actually contributeto security. Balkh, a relatively secure and Pashtun
minority province, was included as a case study toprovide a counterpoint to more-insecure provincesby determining the response to aid in a more-secureenvironment. Also, the Provincial Reconstruction
Team (PRT), currently the responsibility of Sweden
and Finland, plays lessof a role in development
projects than do other
PRTs, primarily because of
the two countries’ policyof separating development
and security assistanceandchannelingmostdevelopment
funding
through the Afghan central
governmentin
Kabul.
Through interviews andfocus group discussions
with a range of respondents
in key institutions andin communities, views were elicited on the driversof insecurity, characteristics of aid projects and aid
implementers (including the military), and effects ofaid projects on the popularity of aid actors and on
security.” (Executive Summary).
Grissom, Adam. “Making it up as we go Along: Statebuilding, Critical Theory and Military Adaptationin Afghanistan.” Conflict, Security & Development(10:4) September 2010, p. 493-517. http://www.
informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a926
030798~db=all~jumptype=rss (on-line purchaserequired) PDF (187 KB). “This article examines themilitary aspects of international state-building effortsin Afghanistan through the lens of critical theory. It
outlines the conventional approach to state-building, as
it has evolved in recent decades, and briefly describes
the emerging ‘reflexive critique’ of that approachdeveloped by state-building scholars grounded in
critical theory. It then applies the reflexive critiqueto the Afghan state-building project, an exercise that9

Afghanistan Research Newsletter

substantiates key aspects of the critique but also reveals adivergence between the broadly conventional approachtaken in Kabul and the more adaptive approaches ofmany practitioners at the province and district levels. It
concludes with a discussion of the potential implicationsof this convergence for theory and practice of statebuilding in Afghanistan and beyond.” (P. 493).
Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan,
20 July 2010: Communiqué, the Kabul Process,Afghanistan
National
Development
Strategy
Prioritization and Implementation Plan, mid-2010mid-2013. Kabul: Ministry of Finance, Departmentof Policy, 2010. 2 v. http://www.mfa.gov.af/kcs/
ANDS%20PIP%20Vol%201%20-%20English.pdf(1.72
MB; v. 1 only). Volume 1 provides an overview of how
the new government cluster coordination mechanism
works, outlines the overall budget rationale for all
national priority programmes and the amounts allocatedper cluster, provides a summary of all major initiatives
in each cluster, and maps intended results. Volume 2“contains the national priority programme summaries
for Governance, Economic and Social Development andSecurity (the “Joint Framework for Inteqal: a Process forStrengthening Peace and Stability in Afghanistan and theRegion” and the “Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration
Programme”) and Regional Cooperation. (v. 2: P. 13).
“[National Priority Programs, Action Plans].” 2010.
[80 p.] Word documents and Excel sheets (total 4.0
MB). These Excel sheets document three sets of “sixmonth action plans” resulting from the move to form
“clusters” within the Afghan government at the recent
Kabul Conference (July 2010): (1) The Agriculture andRural Development Cluster (05 September 2010); (2) The
Human Resource Development Cluster (05 September2010); and (3) The Governance Cluster (05 September2010).
“National Solidarity Programme: Activity Profile July2010”. [Kabul]: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation andDevelopment (MRRD). 1 p. PDF (9.76 MB). A onepage summary of the National Solidarity Programme,
including a “Timeline” of the project (2002-2010),“Sector activities” (including a pie chart of sectors bypercentage), “Accomplishments,” “Beneficiaries speak”
and “International support.”“Picturing
Afghanistan:
Village
Views
ofDevelopment.” [Darul Aman, Kabul]: Ministry of Rural
Rehabilitaion and Development (MRRD), National
Solidarity Programme (NSP), 2010. 36 p. Booklet on
NSP work in each province of Afghanistan, with a pagefor each province (including a picture and a small inset
table showing the sectors for projects, e.g. “Transport,”“Irrigation,” “Power”).
Schmeidl, Susanne and Masood Karokhail. “’Prêt-aporter States’: how the McDonaldization of State10

building Misses the Mark in Afghanistan: a Response.”
In Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation(Dialogue no. 8). Berlin: Berghof Center, April
2009. p. 67-78. http://www.berghof-handbook.
net/documents/publications/dialogue8_schmeidl_
karokhail_comm.pdf (250 KB). “[T]his short comment
focuses on lessons drawn from Afghan statebuilding fromthe perspective of a hybrid scholar-practitioner looking
at states from the bottom-up, rather than from the topdown. The focus on Afghanistan is not only fitting due tomy own experience, especially while working with The
Liaison Office. The country also seems to provide some
perfect examples of hybrid political orders, albeit ones
that have been frequently associated with state failure(i.e. when the communist government fell in 1992 andwhen the Taliban fell in 2001).” (P. 68).
Schmitz, Gerald J. “Canadian Policy toward
Afghanistan to 2011 and Beyond: Issues, Prospects,
Options.” Ottawa, Canada: Library of Parliament,
27 September 2010. 46 p. http://www2.parl.gc.ca/
Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2010-26-e.pdf(551 KB). A summary of the involvement of Canada in
Afghanistan since 2001, highlighting previous reportingand examining progress in the priority areas identified
for Canadian assistance.
“The Voice of [the] Village [videorecording]:
documentary film, English.” [Darul Aman, Kabul]:
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitaion and Development(MRRD), National Solidarity Programme (NSP), Public
Communication Department, 2009. 10 minute video
about the work of the NSP (especially in Nangarhar
Province) with some mention of the role of Community
Development Councils (CDCs). Includes images of someprojects and comments by local officeholders.
Zyck, Stephen A. “Afghanistan: Economic Implicationsof the July 2010 Kabul Conference.” [Brussels?]:[North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)] CivilMilitary Fusion Centre, 01 October, 2010. 6 p. PDF(307 KB). “With media attention following the 20 July2010 Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan(the ‘Kabul Conference’) focused mainly on the politicaland security implications of the meeting, which
involved more than 76 world leaders, the economic andinfrastructure-related implications have received lessscrutiny. Yet a review of the Communiqué, which codified
the agreements established at the Conference, reflects
a range of potential economic effects. The commercial
ramifications of the event were also recognised by
the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries(ACCI), which released a statement regarding theprivate sector’s expectations for the Conference. Key
outcomes of the Conference are noted [here] alongsidea detailed description and analysis of their implications
for Afghanistan’s economy and the main stakeholders
engaged in the country’s development.” (P. 1).

January/February 2011

District Delivery Program (DDP)“Diagnostic of the District Delivery Program.” The
Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG);
Adam Smith International. [Kabul]: Adam Smith
International, 3 November 2010. 40 p. PDF (546 KB).
An assessment of the District Delivery Program whichaims to “rapidly deploy civilian government personnel
in recently cleared districts to begin providing public
services and establish the legitimacy of the state so the
population will stop supporting the insurgency.” (P. 6).
“District Delivery Program Secretariat: Support to theDistrict Delivery Program: Draft Version 2.3.” [Kabul]:
The Independent Directorate of Local Governance(IDLG), [2010?]. 53 p. http://info.publicintelligence.
net/AfghanDistrictDeliveryPlanSecretariat.pdf (1.0
MB). Foundation document for the setting up of theDistrict Delivery Program: background, overview,
strategy, design, management arrangements and termsof reference.
“Initial Lessons Learned.” Kabul: The Independent
Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), District
Delivery Program (DDP), 2010. 5 p. http://info.
publicintelligence.net/AfghanDDPLessons.pdf(1.2MB). “This paper attempts to analyze the initial lessons
learned after the launch of DDP in the districts of Nad Ali
and Marja in Helmand. The analysis covers four major
areas of program governance: organization, vision,leadership and stakeholder engagement, benefits
realization management, and planning and control. The
analysis is based on direct observations made during
IDLG field missions to Kandahar, Nad Ali and Marjaas well as a number of discussions held with various
stakeholders running regular DDP planning meetings
and a conference held at the UK Embassy on 11 April
2010.” (P. 1).
Omari, Abdul Baqi. “District Assessment Report:
Behsood District, Nangarhar Province.” Kabul:
The Independent Directorate of Local Governance(IDLG), District Delivery Program (DDP), 15 April,2010. 23 p. http://info.publicintelligence.net/
AfghanBeshoodAssessment.pdf (3.1 MB). This
assessment of Behsood was made on 15 May 2010 by theDistrict Delivery Program and examines governance,
politics, rule of law, economic conditions andgovernment service delivery in the district.

Education
Borchgrevink, Kaja. “Beyond Borders: Diversity
and Transnational Links in Afghan Religious
Education.” Oslo: Peace Research Institute (PRIO),
September 2010. 71 p. ISBN 9788272883620.
http://www.prio.no/sptrans/234636690/PRIO%20
Paper_%20Borchgrevink_%20Beyond%20Borders%20
Diversity%20and%20Transnational%20Links%20

in%20Afghan%20
Religious%20Education_
September%202010.pdf(612 KB). “Do madrasas
produce terrorists? Are all
madrasas fundamentalist?
In the aftermath of
9/11,
madrasas
have
become a subject of great
controversy. Yet little is
known about the madrasasofAfghanistan.
This
study sets out to find out
more about Afghanistan’s
religious schools and tomove beyond some of the most general stereotypes.”(Introduction, P. 9). A four-page summary based on themain report has also been released: Borchgrevinnk,
Kaja and Kristian Berg Harpviken. “Teaching
Rebellion, Taming Rebellion?; Religious Education
Reform in Afghanistan.” 4 p.
ILFE [Inclusive, Learning-Friendly Environment]
Toolkit: Adapted Afghan Version: Embracing
Diversity: Toolkit for Creating Inclusive, Learningfriendly Environments. Kabul: UNESCO Kabul, 2010.
19, 25, 22, 37, 28, 27
p. “This toolkit has beendeveloped by a groupof education specialists
to address [barriers to
education]...thatkeep
children away from school,and prevents them fromsucceeding
withintheformal education system. It
has been comprehensively
revised and adapted byteachers, student teachers,
teacher trainers, Ministryof Education officials, aswell as education activists
working within national and international organizations
to address these issues specifically from an Afghan
perspective and within an Afghan context.” (Book 1, P.
3). Included are diagrams of the Braille alphabet in Dariand Pashto, as well as sign language guide in both Dariand Pashto (see p. 12).
Lamie, Kathleen. “Afghan Rural Education Initiatives
and Analyses.” [Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: UnitedStates Army], 25 August, 2010. 24 p. PDF (583 KB).
This paper briefly surveys Afghanistan’s education
system in the twentieth century, then looks at female
education in Afghanistan. In addition it covers challenges
and obstacles to education from 2001 to the present
and includes a look at higher education and the placeof minorities in educational achievements.
11Afghanistan Research Newsletter

Braille and Sign Language Alphabets for Dari and Pashto
Braille: Dari

Braille: Pashto

Sign Language: Dari

Sign Language: Pashto

Source: ILFE [Inclusive, Learning-Friendly Environment] Toolkit: Adapted Afghan Version: Embracing
Diversity: Toolkit for Creating Inclusive, Learning-friendly Environments (see page 11).

12

January/February 2011

Elections“Opening up Elections in Afghanistan [website]”
http://afghanistanelectiondata.org/ The National
Democratic Institute (NDI) has established this usefulwebsite (including map downloads) containing data
for the four elections held since 2001 in Afghanistan(2004, 2009 Presidential Elections, and 2005, 2010
Wolesi Jirga Elections).
Map showing (by province) percentage of female
Wolesi Jirga candidates“The Preliminary List of Potential Winners of theWolesi Jirga Election [2010]. [2010]. [7] p. http://
hsrp.typepad.com/files/wolseijirga-preliminarylisto
fpotentialwinners.pdf (123 KB). A preliminary listing(in English) released around 20 October showing the
successful candidates in each province.
“Recommendations for Electoral Reform in
Afghanistan: a Compendium of Electoral Reform
Recommendations in Afghanistan,” prepared by
Jed Ober. [Kabul]: Democracy International, April
2010. 63 p. http://afghan2010.com/sites/default/
files/2010-04-DI-Consensus%20Electoral%20
Reform%20Recommendations-ENG.pdf (1.25 MB).
“The problems which plague Afghanistan’s election
system are complex and wide ranging. Similarly,
opinions for solutions to these problems are diverse.
This document presents a collection of electoral
reform recommendations in an attempt to identify
consensus among major international and domestic
stakeholders to Afghanistan’s election process. A wide
range of sources were consulted with dates of releasespanning the modern period in which elections havetaken place in Afghanistan. More than 50 sources wereconsulted which contain nearly 900 recommendations.
While the author went to great lengths to include
as broad a range of sources as possible, inevitably,
additional sources could inform the electoral reform

discussion in Afghanistan. Each source was assigned
a unique reference ID. Reform recommendations
are listed with source reference IDs, page numbers
where the recommendation can be found, and in
the event sources assigned specific numbers torecommendations, the recommendation number.
Recommendations are organized by categories withspecific relevance to Afghanistan’s election system.
While some recommendations could be grouped in
multiple categories, all effort was made to organize
recommendations in categories most relevant totheir substantive focus. Similar recommendations arethen grouped to show consensus, and in some cases,
variance of opinions. These groupings were then used
to produce a list of consensus recommendations.
These consensus recommendations are summarized in
the chart below and discussed in greater detail in a
separate document titled Consensus Recommendations
for Electoral Reform in Afghanistan.” (Overview).
“US Election Observation Mission to the Afghanistan
Presidential and Provincial Council Elections 2009:
Final Report Revised and Updated.” Bethesda,
Maryland: Democracy International, August 2010.
144 p. http://www.democracyinternational.com/
wp-content/uploads/2010/09/DI-Afghanistan2009-Final-Report-web.pdf (1.57 MB). “On August20, 2009, Afghanistan held critical presidential
and provincial council elections. Although thesewere not the first competitive elections held in
Afghanistan, they were the first elections run byan Afghan election commission since the fall of the
Taliban. The elections were a major test of thecountry’s prospects for democracy and politicalstability. Despite the threat of serious, widespread
violence, millions of Afghans turned out to vote in theelections, and initially it appeared they had engaged
in a reasonable democratic process, given the conflictthat afflicted the country. As the process continued
after election day, however, it became apparent thatfraud had been widespread. A controversial methodfor determining the final results further undermined
the integrity of the election. Ultimately, the process
set back the near-term prospects for a democratic
Afghanistan. Under a cooperative agreement with the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
Democracy International organized an international
election observation mission for the 2009 electionsin Afghanistan. The purpose of DI’s mission was toobserve and report on the electoral process—including
pre-election preparations, election day, and the postelection process—and, to the extent possible, toevaluate the degree to which the elections conformed
to international standards. In so doing, the mission
would help promote good governance by strengthening
democratic election systems and processes. The
project complemented ongoing efforts supportedby the U.S. government and others to help build a13

Afghanistan Research Newslettermore participatory, representative, and accountabledemocracy in Afghanistan. The DI observation mission
deployed a team of 62 long- and short-term observers,
including noted experts in election administration,
election monitoring, and Afghan politics. DI deployed
its core team and long-term observers (LTOs) to Kabul inlate July. LTOs were joinedby short-term observers(STOs) for the week aroundelection day. On election
day, the observers visited
13 provinces. DI also
conducted a postelection
assessment of the impactof the elections on thepolitical
climateinAfghanistan and has closely
monitored
postelection
developments.” (Executive
Summary, P. 1).

Electricity
South East Power System (SEPS) information
presentation, March 30, 2010. [Kabul?]: Black& Veatch, 2010. 33 p. PDF (880 KB). Outline of
the systems and work needed to restore parts ofthe electricity grid in Lashkar Gah, Kandahar andassociated areas.

Human Rights[UNAMA Mapping Report on Human Rights Abuses
in Afghanistan 1978-2001]. [2005]. 296 p.
Unpublished report. http://www.flagrancy.net/
salvage/UNMappingReportAfghanistan.pdf(1.77MB). “In 2003, UNHCHR initiated a...modest mapping
exercise in Afghanistan. Based on open source
material, most of it the UN’s own, a team of three
consultants compiled a 300 page report on humanrights violations and war crimes in Afghanistan in thecivil war years between 1978 and 2001. The reportcontains detailed accounts of indiscriminate bombings,
massacres, illegal detention, torture, rape and looting
from the communist period to the fall of the Taliban
regime. In January 2005, then UNHCHR commissioner
Louise Arbour travelled to Kabul to release themapping report simultaneously with the release of
the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission’s
national consultation about Afghans’ opinions about
how to deal with legacies of human rights violations
and war crimes, entitled “A Call for Justice.” At theeleventh hour a decision was taken not to release theUN mapping report. The UNHCHR participated in the
launch of the AIHRC’s “A Call for Justice” report, andhanded a copy of her report to the Commission as abasis for future documentation work. Commissioner
14

Arbour then met with President Karzai and presented
him with a copy of the report. The report has to date
not been officially released, but copies of it have done
the rounds of human rights organizations, embassies,
web sites etc.” (Afghanistan Analysts’ Network
website,http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.
asp?id=1217 [accessed 14 October 2010]).

Information Management[Papers from Knowledge Management Symposium,
Kabul, Afghanistan, October 5, 2010]. Kabul: [ISAF?],2010. PDFs (12.3 MB). Contents: “Afghan Geodesy& Cartography Head Office (AGCHO),” Hassibullah
Samadi (20 p.); “Central Statistics Office, Afghanistan:
Official Statistics and Information Products Developedwith the Support of the UN” (20 p.); “‘Civil-Military
Fusion Centre (CFC)’ and ‘CimicWeb’ Prototype,” Kjell
Aanensen (15 p.); “Rule of Law; Situational AwarenessSite” (9 p.); “Human Terrain System: Knowledge
Sharing and Challenges,” John H. Calvin (11 p.); “Joint
Knowledge Online (JKO) Courseware and Capabilities
Catalog” (126, A1-A5 p.); “Knowledge Management
Symposium: Telecom Presentation.” Antonio Loda (4p.); “AMN-U Transition to Operations,” NATO Training
Mission-Afghanistan, Combined Security Transition
Command-Afghanistan (10 p.); and “Finding andDistributing Data about Afghan-owned Businesses”(10 p.). Bound with “ISAF Joint Command Information
Dominance Center,” Guido Altendorf (8 p.).

Insurgency“Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual
Review.” [Washington, D.C.]: [Department of State],2010. 5 p. http://media.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/pdf/12.15.10_APAR_Overview_Final.pdf(39 KB). Outlining of the US strategy in Afghanistan,following a policy review in late-2010.
Peters, Gretchen. “Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal
areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.” West Point, New
York: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,
2010. 90 p. http://www.humansecuritygateway.
com/documents/CTC_Crimeand
InsurgencyintheTribalAreasofAfghanistanandPakistan.pdf (2.0 MB). “Insurgent and terror groups
operating in the tribal areas of Afghanistan andPakistan are deepening their involvement in organizedcrime, an aspect of the conflict that at once presents
enormous challenges and also potential opportunities
for Coalition forces trying to implement a population‐
centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. Withina realm of poor governance and widespread state
corruption, anti‐state actors engage in and protectorganized crime—mainly smuggling, extortion andkidnapping—both to raise funds and also to spread fear

January/February 2011

and insecurity, thus slowing
the pace of development
and frustrating attempts
to extend the rule of law
and establish a sustainable
licit economy. Militantgroups on either sideof the frontier function
like a broad network of
criminal gangs, not justin terms of the activities
in which they engage,
but also in the way they
are organized, how funds
flow through their command chains and how theyinteract—and sometimes fight—with each other. Thereis no doubt that militant groups have capitalized on
certain public grievances, yet their ties to criminal
profiteering, along with the growing number of civilian
casualties they cause on both sides of the frontier,have simultaneously contributed to a widening senseof anger and frustration among local communities.
Through a series of focused and short anecdotal casestudies, this paper aims to map out how key groups
engage in criminal activity in strategic areas, track how
involvement in illicit activity is deepening or changing
and illustrate how insurgent and terror groups impose
themselves on local communities as they spread to new
territory. It is hoped that a closer examination of thisphenomenon will reveal opportunities for disrupting
the problem, as well as illustrate how Coalition
forces, the international community and moderate
Muslim leaders might capitalize on an untappedpublic relations opportunity by better protecting
local communities who are the main victims of it.”
(Executive Summary).

JusticeAfghanistan. Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF).
“AnnualReport.”Kabul:
Communications
Directorate, Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF),
2010. 8 p. This report for 1388 summarises thecases and convictions achieved by this specialised
government agency. Their website is http://www.cjtf.
gov.af/.
Carter, Stephen and Kate Clark. “No Shortcut
to Stability: Justice, Politics and Insurgency
in Afghanistan.” London: Chatham House,
December 2010. 38 p. ISBN 9781962032408.
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/download/-/id/985/file/18074_1210pr_
afghanjustice.pdf (2.3 MB). “This report seeks
to investigate the relationship between issues ofjustice (including governance and respect for humanrights) and stability in Afghanistan, especially,

although not exclusively,
in relation to the rise ofviolent insurgency. It isbased on approximately
40
interviews,
carriedout between December
2009 and August 2010.
The authors spoke to awide range of Afghan andinternational interlocutors
andconducted
anextensive review of existing
documentarysources.
Except where specified, any
policy points in the text
are intended equally for the international authorities
and for the Afghan government, which of course has
the first responsibility for policy on justice issues.
When discussing the armed opposition, the authors
refer solely to the Taliban, who make up the bulkof insurgent forces, although they are far from amonolithic movement. However, most of our analysis
could also refer to other smaller groups, such as Hizb-e
Islami.”(Introdution, P. [1]).
“Confinement Conditions at a US Screening Facility on
Bagram Air Base.” [Kabul?]: Open Society Institute,
October 14, 2010. 16 p. http://www.soros.org/
initiatives/mena/articles_publications/publications/confinement-conditions-20101014/confinementconditions-20101014.
pdf (162 KB). Accounts
by Afghans about theirtreatment in a detention
centreon
BagramAir Base, near Kabul,
including allegations of
mistreatment and abuse.
The information comesfrom interviews in July2010 with more than 20
former detainees, 18 ofwhom stated that they
were detained in the Tor(“Black”) Jail.
De Lauri, Antonio, “Legal Reconstruction in
Afghanistan: Rule of Law, Injustice, and Judicial
Mediation.” 2010. Jura Gentium: Journal of
Philosophy of International Law and Global Politics,
6 (2010) 1, p. 1-28. http://www.juragentium.unifi.
it/en/surveys/wlgo/delauri/index.htm PDF (199 KB).
“The present article is based on field research carriedout in Afghanistan between 2005 and 2008. For themost part, the research was conducted at the Second
District Court of Kabul, the Provincial Office and theProsecutor’s Office of District 11. During my fieldwork
I directly observed twenty court cases (both criminal
15

Afghanistan Research Newsletterand civil), in order to examine the ordinary daily
practice of law. Thus, by the means of an ethnographic
analysis of ‘Afghan justice’, I have tried to investigate
the daily implications of a ‘legal expansion’ conveyed
by the international agencies. I also conducted
several interviews with judges and prosecutors,
whose point of view emerged as being crucial tounderstanding the ‘life’ of judiciary institutions. In
addition, the ethnographic analysis was prompted bya series of interviews carried out with aid workers,
administrative officials, international organizations
experts, and members of the customary assemblies.
My thoughts and observations are a critical reflection
on the legal reconstruction which the international
community and the Afghan government initiated in
2001.” (P. 1).
Hagerott, Mark R., Thomas J. Umberg and Joseph
A. Jackson. “A Patchwork Strategy of Consensus:
Establishing Rule of Law in Afghanistan.” JFQ Issue
59 (4th quarter) 2010, p. 143-146. http://www.
ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-59/JFQ59_TOC.pdf(640 KB). Description of legal reform processes in
Afghanistan, with some suggestions for improvements.
“The Huquq Department: an Analysis of its
Procedures, Functions and Needs”. [Kabul]:
UNAMA, UNDP, July 2010. 12 p. Word document(172 KB). “The Huquq Department of the Ministry ofJustice has important roles to play in resolving civil
disputes and enforcing civil judgments throughout
Afghanistan, and essential linkages with other partsof the formal justice system and traditional justice
networks. The role of the Department, however, is notalways clearly understood. This paper, prepared by theProvincial Justice Coordination Mechanism (PJCM), is
an attempt to fill that gap by considering how the
Huquq Department operates including its strengths
and limitations, to assess the legal framework, andthereby to encourage greater support and assistancefrom the donor community and the local institutions.
In carrying out this assessment, the PJCM met with
Huquq and justice officials throughout Afghanistan, as
well as with international partners, in order to obtaina sufficient cross-section of information on which tobuild general suggestions.” (P. 1).
“Linkages between State and Non-state Justice
Systems in Eastern Afghanistan: Evidence from
Jalalabad, Nangarhar and Ahmad Aba, Paktia.”
Kabul: TLO, May 2009. 28 p. http://www.tloafghanistan.org/sites/default/files/Working-PaperSeries/TLO-Linkages-between-state-and-non-statejustice-systems-in-eastern-Afghanistan.pdf(521KB). “Historically the Afghan state administration,
including the court system, has never had full control
over the entire country. For the vast majority ofrural Afghans, local governance, security and justiceadministration was and is provided through non16

state, religious and informal community bodies. The
relationship between state and non-state institutions
has often been conflictual, and attempts at effectively
expanding the jurisdiction of the state have frequently
sparked rebellion. At the same time, the relationshipbetween the two systems is often characterised bydegrees of recognition, coordination and cooperation.
Today as throughout the last century, the state justicesector suffers from a severe lack of capacity and is
mistrusted as corrupt and ineffective by the majorityof the population. As a result between 80-90 percent
of all civil disputes and criminal offenses in the
country are dealt with through informal institutions.
This report maps the formal and informal justiceinstitutions as well as the interactions and linkages
between them in two districts in the majority Pashtun
East and Southeast of Afghanistan, one urban (a nahia
of Jalalabad) and one rural (Ahmad Aba in Paktia).”(Executive Summary).
Merrell, David E. “State Engagement with Non-state
Justice: how the Experience in Kyrgyzstan can
Reinforce the Need for Legitimacy in Afghanistan.”
Central Asian Survey v. 29 (no. 2) June 2010: 205217. “Currently there is a question of whether andhow Afghanistan should engage non-state councils ofelders to resolve disputes. In order to harness theirbenefits (e.g. efficiency), control their abuses (e.g.
occasional controversial resolutions), and stabilize
the resolution of disputes, some have argued thatformal links should be established between the state
judicial system and non-state councils of elders in
Afghanistan. Others argue that mere informal links
between the two systems should be established. Stillothers suggest that prior models of state engagementin Afghanistan should be revived. In Kyrgyzstan, just65 miles north of Afghanistan, the Tsarist, Soviet andpost-Soviet administrations have used various methods
to engage non-state councils of elders. Despite thesevastly different attempts at controlling local dispute
resolutions, elders independently resolved disputes
outside of Tsarist and Soviet control and continue toresolve disputes outside of post-Soviet state control
in Kyrgyzstan. This phenomenon highlights the needfor legitimacy in any models of state engagementthat are considered for Afghanistan. If, as observedin Kyrgyzstan, people do not use state-sanctioned
local councils in Afghanistan, then their purposes may
be frustrated. Therefore, in addition to reviewing
the experience with state engagement in otherparts of the world, policy makers in Afghanistan
should also review the historical and contemporary
experience with state engagement in Kyrgyzstan. As
the need for legitimacy is reconsidered and applied
to the design of models for Afghanistan, it may be
more likely that those models will be used by more
people in Afghanistan and that their purposes will befurthered.” (P. 205).

January/February 2011

“Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary.”[Brussels]: International Crisis Group, 17 November
2010.
39
p.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/
media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/195%20
Reforming%20Afghanistans%20Broken%20Judiciary.
ashx PDF (2.6 MB). “Afghanistan’s justice system isin a catastrophic state of disrepair. Despite repeatedpledges over the last nine years, the majority ofAfghans still have little or no access to judicial
institutions. Lack of justice has destabilised thecountry and judicial institutions have withered tonear non-existence. Many courts are inoperable andthose that do function are understaffed. Insecurity,
lack of proper training and low salaries have driven
many judges and prosecutors from their jobs. Those
who remain are highly susceptible to corruption.
Indeed, there is very little that is systematic about
the legal system, and there is little evidence that theAfghan government has the resources or political will
to tackle the challenge. The public, consequently,
has no confidence in the formal justice sector amid
an atmosphere of impunity. A growing majority ofAfghans have been forced to accept the rough justiceof Taliban and criminal powerbrokers in areas of
the country that lie beyond government control. To
reverse these trends, the Afghan government andinternational community must prioritise the rule of law
as the primary pillar of a vigorous counter-insurgency
strategy that privileges the protection of rights equallyalongside the protection of life. Restoration of judicial
institutions must be at the front and centre of thestrategy aimed at stabilising the country.” (Executive
Summary).
“Restoring Justice in Afghanistan: Legal Traditions
and Current Problems.” Afghanistan Research
Reachback Center White Paper. Fort Leavenworth,Kansas: TRADOC G2 Human Terrain System, UnitedStates Army, July 2010. 36 p. PDF (310 KB). “Thispaper argues that current legal reforms in Afghanistan
favor western-styled statutory law over all else anddo not account for local realities. Instead, such
reforms are heavily biased foreign impositions thathave little connection to the well established forms ofdispute resolution and customary law in the country.
The significance of this from a policy perspective isthat, based on historical patterns and traditions in
Afghanistan, attempting to force a foreign system on
top of an existing one without regard for the local
context is likely to be rejected by the population. Thereis a universal agreement among NGOs, researchersand other organizations who have conducted primaryresearch in the country that the current situation calls
for a ‘bottom-up’ rather than a ‘top-down’ approach
towards legal reform. Due to their rooting in local
communities, customary dispute resolution bodies
are equipped to handle a myriad of cases with acontextual understanding of the issues and individuals

involved and require little or no infrastructure to
do so. Thus, emphasis and focus needs to be placedon working within local customary traditions before
any functioning national justice system can beestablished.” (P. 1); “This report is a review of existing
English language literature pertaining to customary,statutory and Shari’a law in Afghanistan. It does not
represent original research on this topic.” (P. 4).
Special Bulletin of the Supreme Court. [Kabul]:
Supreme Court [of Afghanistan]. This new periodicalhas been issued for the first time on 17 October
2010, with parallel text in English and Dari. The
first issue provides a very brief overview of the main
activities of the judiciaryin the past four years
and very brief notes onwork against corruption,legal document archives,
coordination
amongstjudicial entities, the workof the Counter Narcotics
Primary Court, etc. Title
in Pashto: ‫د قضائیه ځواک خاصه‬‫ خپرونه‬Available from the
Publications Directorateof the Supreme Court(ahmadi_s123@yahoo.com
ph. 020 230 0361 or 0700
456 453).
Tarzi, Amin. “Recalibrating the Afghan Reconciliation
Program.” Prism 1 (no. 4) [September 2010], p. 6778. http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism1-4/
Prism_67-78_Tarzi.pdf (540 KB). “In December 2001,
the framers of the Bonn Agreement laid out a plan toend conflict in Afghanistan, heal a divided, woundednation, and bring about lasting peace. However, nine
years later, stability remains elusive, and these goals
have yet to be fully realized. Theories abound but
are ever evolving as to how to make progress; brightnew ideas are mixed with transplanted success stories
but yield unsatisfactory results. One area that has
warranted much attention is the promotion of national
reconciliation. Reintegration and reconciliation
are recognized as key strategies to conducting a
successful counterinsurgency. Reintegration focuseson individuals within enemy ranks who can be
incentivized to abandon their allegiance to the cause;
reconciliation offers amnesty and political position toenemy leadership to bring them into the fold. Suchefforts have been under way in some fashion since
the Taliban lost control of Kandahar, its last major
stronghold. However, lacking a cohesive, cogent
strategy, the various local and international promotersof reconciliation often undermine each other’s efforts
and confuse their target audiences—the Afghan people
and insurgents—emboldening an otherwise fragmented17

Afghanistan Research Newsletter

enemy and forcing a large
segment of Afghans toseek alternative measures
for their future safety. A
critical eye on the pastand frank discussions withsenior Afghan government
officials should elucidate
the present and offer
lessons
learnedandinsights into how to realize
national reconciliation.”(P. 67-68).

Labour Supply“An Urban Based Study of Labour Supply and
Demand, and Public Opinion, Covering the Media,
Tourism and Hospitality Sectors.” [Kabul]: Ministryof Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled,
December 2009. [103] p. PDF (796 KB). “This study
was carried out...in five provincial capital cities ofKabul, Jalalabad, Balkh, Herat and Kandahar with thefollowing objectives: (1) to study labour supply anddemand in media, tourism, and hospitality sectors
in Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Balkh, and Nangarhar
provinces, the five biggest provincial capitals of
Afghanistan; (2) to obtain public opinions andpreferences related to media sector in Afghanistan;(3) to obtain tourist opinions on tourist facilities,
services, source of information, and perception ofvalue for money; (4) to obtain hotel clients opinions onprovision/services of hospitality sector.” (Foreword).

Land
Burke, Cristin A. “Origins, Impact, and Workings ofAfghan Land Mafias.” Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:
United States Army, 19 August 2010. 8 p. PDF(618 KB). “The difficult process of establishing landownership in Afghanistan is further complicated by thepractice of illegal land seizures by the ‘land mafia.’
Individuals involved with the land mafia are frequently
well-connected government officials or militarycommanders...there is little recourse and usuallyno compensation provided for those who had theirproperty confiscated. Little change can be expected
as long as high-ranking officials and powerbrokers failto recognize the property rights of citizens.” (P. 2).

Media“Afghan Media in 2010: Synthesis Report.” Kabul:
Altai Consulting, 12 October 2010. 178 p. http://
www.altaiconsulting.com/docs/media/ PDFs (total
9.2 MB). “In 2004-2005, the United States Agency
18

for International Development’s (USAID) Office ofTransition Initiatives commissioned Altai Consulting
to conduct the first comprehensive media evaluationof the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, looking at the
impact of the Afghan media on opinions and behaviors
three years after the beginning of the country’s
reconstruction. The evaluation found, among otherthings: that Afghans were avid and sophisticatedmedia users and that cultural barriers to media use
were less significant than previously expected; thatthe radio played a predominant role throughout thecountry; and that media are instrumental in social
progress and education. However, since publicationof that report, Afghanistan’s media sector has seenimportant changes. To inform future assistance fromthe international community to the Afghan media, it
was deemed necessary to assess the current state of
the Afghan media – by reflecting a full and accurate
audience profile, to determine program preferences,to measure the impact of the Afghan media on
local opinions and behaviors and to gauge Afghan
expectations in terms of programming and messaging.
A large-scale research project was thus planned andconducted from March to August 2010. This research
included a deep probe into the media sector and the
public’s behaviors and expectations. The methodology
used to achieved this included a combination of:literature review; direct observations; key informant
interviews with most relevant actors involved in the
media sector; 6,648 close-ended interviews in morethan 900 towns and villages of 106 districts, covering
all 34 provinces of the country; an audience survey
on more than 1,500 individuals run daily for a week;
about 200 qualitative, open-ended interviews; and 10
community case studies. Such an effort guarantees that
results presented here are fairly representative of the
Afghan population at large. This document provides acomprehensive synthesis of data collected during thesurvey. A database of media actors, 16 priority district
reports, 10 case study reports, a complete descriptionof the methodology and the original datasets from themain quantitative research and the audience research
are publicly available, allowing anyone interested toaccess more focused information as needed.” (P. 8).

Municipalities
RAMP UP East Public Opinion Survey, all Cities:
Asadabad, Jalalabad, Mehterlam, Parun, Panjshir,
Charikar, Mahmud Raqi, Ghazni, Gardez, Khost,
Sharana, Bamyan, Puli Alam and Maidan Shahr.
Regional Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban
Populations, Regional Command East (RAMP UP
East). Ii, 54 p.; charts; 30 cm. [Kabul?]: RAMP UP,
October 2010. PDF (480 KB). “Through the Regional
Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations(RAMP UP), USAID is supporting 14 municipalities inJanuary/February 2011

Eastern Afghanistan to improve local governance,
addressing infrastructure, service delivery, leadershipand management capacity. [RAMP UP East] started
in June 2010 with the purpose of creating effective,
responsive, democratic, transparent, accountable,municipal governance in the fourteen provinces thatcomprise the International Security Assistance Force’s(ISAF’s) Regional Command East. The provincial
municipalities are Asadadabad, Jalalabad, Mehtarlam,
Parun, Panjshir, Charikar, Mehmod Raqi, Ghazni,
Gardiz, Khost, Sharana, Bamyan, Puli Alam and
Maidan Shahr...To assess the success of the programsin these municipalities an annual survey of residentsof these 14 cities is being conducted to measure thechange in citizen perspectives about governance andservices. In the first year (2010) it was only possible
to conduct interviews in 13 of the cities; no surveys
were completed in Parun. This report outlines
the results for all of the cities where the baseline
survey was conducted. Interviews were completedwith 3,226 residents in August and September,2010. Demographics Enumerators visited 3,226
houses in eastern Afghanistan and interviewed one
representative in each home. Of those interviewed,
35% were women, 81% were married and 41% had
never attended school. Respondents spanned a wide
age range: 42% were 30 years old or younger, 28% were
31 to 40 and 30% were over 40. Most households (76%)
owned their homes and had an Oabala or other way ofshowing their ownership.” (P. 1).

Natural Resources
Afghan Hydrocarbons: Addressing Corruption to
Fuel Development?” Bergen, Norway: CMI-U4,
September, 2010. [4] p. http://www.cmi.no/
publications/file/3787-afghan-hydrocarbons.pdf(1.2 MB). “Use of Afghanistan’s oil and gas resources,
if properly handled, could have considerable spinoff
effects for development and reduce dependence on
high-cost energy from neighbouring countries. But
mistrust between local and central authorities, and aperception among domestic and international actorsthat corruption risks are widespread, suggests thatgoverning the country’s hydrocarbons will be far fromstraightforward. Specific corruption challenges arecompounded by insufficient skills and coordination
within the hydrocarbon sector, plus the ongoingfragility of security where resources are located. Given
these constraints, donors should seek further clarity
from Afghan authorities on how they aim to develop
and use their hydrocarbon resources, including how
they plan to address corruption risks.” (P. 1).
Bader, Harry R. [et al.] “The Afghanistan Timber
Trade: an Evaluation of the Interaction between
the Insurgency, GIRoA [Government of the Islamic

Repuoblic of Afghanistan] and Criminality in the Task
Force Bastogne Area of Operations (Nuristan, Kunar,
Laghman, and Nangarhar): a Report Released by the
Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell (NRCC),
Joint Civ-Mil Team Task Force.” [Nangarhar]: Natural
Resources Counterinsurgency Cell (NRCC), 21 July
2010. 30 p. PDF (524 KB). An assessment of the extent
of forest damage forms illegal logging and investigationof linkages between black market smuggling of timber,
the insurgency and social disruption in Nuristan, Kunar,
Laghman and Nangarhar.
“The Minerals Law, February 14, 2010.” [Kabul:
Ministry of Mines], 2010. 53 p. http://www.mom.gov.
af/uploads/files/English/Minerals%20Law-2010%20
Feb-16.pdf (231 KB). “This Law shall enter into force
as of the date of promulgation and shall be publishedin the Official Gazette. Upon its enforcement, theMinerals Law dated 20/05/1384 published in Official
Gazette number (859) and other provisions inconsistent
with this Law shall be void.” (Article 105).
“Mining Regulations, February 12, 2010.” [Kabul:
Ministry of Mines], 2010. 61 p. http://www.
mom.gov.af/uploads/files/English/Mining%20
Regulations-2010%20Feb-16.pdf
(264
KB).
Regulations governing all aspects of mining in
Afghanistan, enacted pursuant to Article 100 of theMinerals Law.

Opium
Afghanistan opium survey
2010: summary findings.
Vienna: UNODC, 2010.
29 p. http://www.unodc.
org/documents/cropmonitoring/Afghanistan/
Afg_opium_survey_2010_
exsum_web.pdf (3.2 MB).

Police“Afghan Local Police in Zeer-e-Koh Valley: Populace
Perspectives and a Linguistic Anthropological
Assessment.” [Herat?]: Human Terrain Team (HTT)
AF15, 24 August, 2010. Word document (140 KB).
10 p. “This report focuses on populace perceptions of
the Afghan Local Police (ALP) in Zeer-e-Koh Valley orof similar programs throughout Afghanistan.”
Caldwell, William B. and Nathan K. Finney. “Building
Police Capacity in Afghanistan: the Challenges of aMultilateral Approach.” Prism 2 (no. 1) (2010) p.
121-130.
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/
19Afghanistan Research Newsletter

prism2-1/Prism_121-130_Caldwell-Finney.pdf (688
KB). “From the Bonn Agreement in 2001 to today,at least seven non-Afghan organizations have beencreated by the international community to support
the reconstruction of a police force. The lack of unityof effort among these organizations created obstacles
to developing this necessary force. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission–
Afghanistan (NTM–A) was activated in November
2009 to overcome this lack of unity of effort, as
well as attempt to bring greater coherence to thegeneration, development, training, and sustainment
efforts for the ANP. Since its establishment, NTM–A has
embarked on a new approach that includes greater
synchronization of efforts with partner nations andorganizations. To prosecute the new approach, NTM–A
formed C3 relationships—not command, control, andcommunications—but cooperation, collaboration, andcoordination with all of these organizations.” (P. 121).

Politics and Government“Afghanistan: Exit vs Engagement.” Kabul/Brussels:
International Crisis Group (ICG), 2010. 11 p. http://
www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/
afghanistan/B115%20Afghanistan%20--%20Exit%20
vs%20Engagement.ashx PDF (400 KB). A critical
overview of the current security, development andpolitical situation in Afghanistan, particularly as it
relates to the current international military presence
and activities.
Goodhand, Jonathan and David Mansfield. “Drugsand (Dis)order: a Study of the Opium Trade, Political
Settlements and State-making in Afghanistan.”
London: Crisis States Programme, Crisis States
Research Centre, November, 2010. 48 p. http://
www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/
WP83.2.pdf (679 KB). “This paper represents one
contribution to a wider research project led by the
Crisis States Programme, which examines how patternsof resource mobilisation and rent appropriation, in war
to peace transitions, shape wider political relations andinstitutions. The research aims to test the hypothesisthat particular types and patterns of rent appropriation
may contribute to more inclusive/exclusive politicalsettlements which translates into more/less stabilityof the state. Here we are primarily concerned withthe political economy of post-Bonn Afghanistan, witha particular focus on the role of the drugs industry
and its impacts upon processes of state-building
and peace-building. Section one introduces [the]theoretical framework and background on the Afghancase. Section two gives an overview of the structuralcharacteristics and contemporary dynamics of thedrugs industry. Section three provides a comparative
analysis of the linkages between drugs, the political
20

settlement and post conflict state-building, throughthree provincial level studies. Section four buildingon the case studies and relevant literature draws
out some of the underlying relationships and broader
patterns connecting drugs, violence and politicalcoalitions in Afghanistan. Section five outlines sometentative conclusions and broader theoretical andpolicy implications.” (Introduction).
Harpviken, Kristian Berg. “Afghanistan in a
Neighbourhood Perspective: General Overview
and Conceptualization.” Oslo: Peace ResearchInstitute (PRIO), 2010. 28 p. http://www.prio.
no/sptrans/-2075913708/Harpviken,%20KB%20%282010%29%20Afghanistan%20in%20a%20
neighbourhood%20perspective.pdf
(494
KB).
“For over three decades, Afghanistan has been abattleground in which many of the states of the larger
neighbourhood have been involved. The importanceof fostering a concerted effort for Afghan peace andstability is increasingly agreed upon. Some analysts
emphasize states and their security relationships andsee Afghanistan as an ‘insulator’ caught between
different regional state systems, each with a strong
dynamic of their own. An
alternative perspective—
which also seems to informthe new US analysis—
emphasizes
varioustransnational
networks,
and sees Afghanistan asthe ‘core’ of a larger
conflict formation. This
paper takes the former
perspective—codified
byBarry Buzan and Ole Wæver
in the Regional Security
Complex approach—as its
starting point. It pursues
the security dynamics
of each of the core regions surrounding Afghanistan(South Asia, the Persian Gulf and [Central] Asia),
taking a comparative and historical perspective, with
an emphasis on the period since the late 1970s. It
concludes that each of Afghanistan’s three surrounding
regions is characterized by deep security concernsthat have little to do with Afghanistan. These concerns
nonetheless inform their engagement in Afghanistan,which comes to reflect conflicts and cleavages
specific to the region. One implication is that for
Afghanistan, it may be a more promising strategy toseek a unilateral non-offensive or neutral status,
rather than security integration with its neighbours.
While this would necessitate a forum of Afghanistan’s
neighbours in order to foster understanding for theAfghan position, it suggests a dramatic departurefrom mainstream policy proposals with their emphasison an integrated regional approach.” (Back Cover).

January/February 2011

Harpviken, Kristian Berg. “Caught in the Middle:
Regional Perspectives on Afghanistan.” Comparative
Social Research 27 (2010): 277–305. http://www.
prio.no/misc/Download.aspx?file=%2fadmin%2fPub
lication+File%2fHarpviken+(2010)+Caught+in+the+middle+-+Regional+Perspectives+on+Afghanistan.
pdf (248 KB). “For over three decades, Afghanistan
has been a battleground in which many of the statesof the wider neighbourhood have been involved. The
importance of fostering a concerted effort for Afghan
peace and stability is widely agreed upon, yet such a
process remains difficult to bring about. Some analysts
emphasize states and their security relationships,
seeing Afghanistan as an ‘insulator’ caught between
different regional state systems, each with a strong
dynamic of its own. Other analysts emphasize varioustransnational networks and see Afghanistan as the‘core’ of a larger conflict formation. This chapter takes
as its starting point the former perspective, which has
been codified by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003)
as the regional security complex (RSC) approach. The
chapter examines the security dynamics of each of
the regions surrounding Afghanistan—South Asia, thePersian Gulf and [Central] Asia—adopting a comparativeand historical perspective, with an emphasis on the
period since the late 1970s. It concludes that each of
Afghanistan’s three surrounding regions is characterized
by deep security concerns of its own. These concerns
nonetheless inform the engagement of neighbouring
countries in Afghanistan, which then comes to reflect
conflicts and cleavages specific to the respective
regions. One central implication is that a more promisingstrategy for Afghanistan might be to seek a unilateral
non-offensive or neutral status, rather than fullsecurity integration with its neighbours. Although sucha strategy would necessitate the creation of a forum
for Afghanistan’s neighbours to foster understanding for
the Afghan position, it represents a dramatic departurefrom mainstream policy proposals with their emphasison an integrated regional approach.” (Abstract).
Harpviken,
Kristian
Berg.
“Understanding
Warlordism: Three Biographies from Afghanistan’s
Southeastern Area.” Oslo: Peace Research Institute
Oslo (PRIO), 2010. 27 p. http://www.prio.no/Researchand-Publications/Publication/?oid=61303515(1.2MB). “How do ‘warlords’—defined in the Afghan
context both by their military skills and capacity to
strike a balance between local and external sourcesof support—respond when the war they are fighting
ends? Why do some choose compliance with the newpolitical order while others remain engaged in various
forms of opposition? The political biographies of three
longstanding warlords of the largely Pashtun southeast ofAfghanistan—Mullah Rocketi, Qari Baba, and Jalaluddin
Haqqani—enable us to explore the dynamics of quite
different responses. The 2001 US-led intervention

and the transitional challenges that followed led thethree men in different directions. Rocketi took up apolitical career, was elected to parliament in 2005,
and four years later remained an active player in legal
politics. Qari Baba served briefly as a governor but
was dethroned to the position of a security advisor
and then assassinated (probably by local Taliban).
Haqqani stayed with the Taliban to become one of its
most central commanders and by late 2009 led one of
the major militant groups in the insurgency. All three
had emerged as commanders during the anti-Soviet
jihad of the 1980s. Notwithstanding the considerablesocial and political similarities in the context where
they operated and the challenges they faced, theirpersonal trajectories diverged in the post-2001 period.
This paper will try to understand why this was so: Why
did one man lay down his arms to become a politician,another place his capacity for commanding violence atthe service of the new Karzai government, while thethird continued to challenge the new rulers with armed
force? The analysis of these trajectories will provide
an insight into the nature of violent warlordism during
the formal transition from war to peace and into thepostconflict period.” (P. 1).
“The Istanbul Declaration: Fourth Regional Economic
Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA IV):
(Istanbul, 2-3 November 2010).” [Kabul?]: Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010.
8 p. http://mof.gov.af/download/en/1289628636.pdf(928 KB). Recommendations released after Regional
Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan(RECCA IV) in Istanbul, relating to infrastructure
projects, trade, transit and border management,
educational and vocational training, agriculture, labour
migration, etc.
“Mizan District [Zabul Province]: the People, theEconomy and Development.” [Kandahar?]: Human
Terrain Team (HTT), AF8, August 2010. 37 p. PDF(3.3 MB). “This report covers the attitudes of the
population of Mizan District and the situation withregard to security, the economy, development and thegovernment. It also lists tribes, leaders and villages. The
report concentrates on the Mizan valley, which is where
the efforts of the government and security forces are
currently concentrated. This study is compiled from 28
in-depth interviews.” (Executive Summary).
“Model Province.” [IDC [?] Governance Team].
[Kabul?]: NATO, [2010]. 9 p. Bound with “Model
District.” (17 p.). Word documents (156, 284 KB).
Descriptions of the structures, functions and staffing(including salary levels and pay rates) of a model(ideal) Afghan province (and district), information for
security forces attempting to work with provincial
administrations.
21

Afghanistan Research Newsletter

Mukhopadhyay, Dipali. “Disguised Warlordism
and Combantanthood in Balkh: the Persistenceof Informal Power in the Formal Afghan State.”
Conflict, Security & Development 9:4 (2009) p.
535-564. “This paper considers disarmament efforts
in northern Afghanistan as a Tillyean bargaining
process between the state and its armed competitors
in the absence of strong, pre-existing formal
institutions. Contrary to the ambitious aims of DDR
and security sector reform, a political deal emergedin Balkh province that drew warlord-commander Atta
Mohammed Noor into the state in order to prevent
him and his subordinates from undermining it entirely
from the outside. Governor Atta has since establisheda significant degree of surveillance and penetration
as a function of managing loyalists who mightotherwise pose a threat to the province’s stability.
He has embraced formal institution-building to an
extent but maintains a degree of informal power that
ensures his dominance in the region and his influencevis-à-vis Kabul. While the result of this arrangement
does not represent ‘good governance’ in Weberianterms, it has yielded certain dividends for the state
and the international community, from security andreconstruction to counternarcotics, and may represent
the best that can be expected under the challenging
circumstances of post-2001 Afghanistan.” (P. 535).
Naqvi, Saeed. “Afghanistan Today & Tomorrow.”
New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation (ORF),
2010. 8 p. http://www.orfonline.org/cms/export/
orfonline/modules/orfdiscourse/attachments/
od5_1286780608411.pdf (750 KB). A summary of
the contemporary situation in Afghanistan drawn
from discussions with “political leaders, Taleban,
US officials, filmmakers, journalists, NGOs, religious
leaders and ordinary Afghans.” Some focus on theplace of Pakistan in Afghan affairs.
“Piecemeal or Peace Deal?: NATO Peace Talks anda Political Settlement in Afghanistan: NATO Heads
of Government Summit, Lisbon, 19-20 November
2010.” [London?]: Christian Aid, Open Society
Foundation, Oxford Research Group, 2010. 10 p.
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/
default/files/PiecemealOrPeaceDeal.pdf (306 KB).
“NATO leaders meet in Lisbon on 19-20 November fora summit overshadowed by the war in Afghanistan andjust weeks ahead of President Obama’s crucial review
of US strategy on the war expected in December. While
there has been a flurry of recent reports about talks
with the Taliban, underneath this surge of mood musichinting at a possible peace deal, a closer listening
reveals little real change to the underlying drum beaton Afghanistan in NATO capitals. As three organisations
working across the fields of development, conflict
resolution, and good governance and human rights
we have come together because we believe that the22international strategy on Afghanistan is at a criticalpoint of both risk and opportunity, and must change.
The Summit will be the last chance for NATO member
states to consider a change of course on Afghanistan
before next month’s US policy review. The Summit isexpected to announce a timetable for the transition
for Afghan security forces to take responsibility for thecountry’s security, province by province, from 2011 to
2014. But leaders should also be holding serious highlevel discussions on what it would take to achieve acomprehensive peace agreement which would ensurea real transition from war to peace. Instead NATOgovernments seem more comfortable focusing theirresources on a military-driven strategy, instead of apolitical settlement.” (P. 1).
Rubin, Michael. “Taking Tea with the Taliban:
Declassified State Department Documents Tella Sorry Tale of Diplomatic Engagement for its
own Sake—and Offer a Cautionary Lesson for the
Future.” Commentary, February 2010, p. 10-15.
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewpdf.
cfm?article_id=15344 (104 KB). An account of US
diplomatic involvement with the Taliban in Afghanistan(particularly under the Clinton administration).
Ruttig, Thomas. “The Ex-Taleban on the High PeaceCouncil.” [Berlin]: Afghanistan Analysts Network(AAN), 2010. 8 p. http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/
uploads/20101020TRuttig_ExT_in_HPC.pdf(234KB). This extremely useful paper “provides a first
analysis of the former Taleban members on the newlyestablished Afghan High Peace Council (HPC), of what
their possible role may be in this body, their politicaland historical background as well as the developmentof their positions vis-à-vis a possible process ofnegotiations. An analysis of the 70 High Peace Council
members reveals that 53 of them formerly belonged
or currently are linked to political groups that werearmed factions involved in the civil wars of the 198090s. Twelve members held positions in the Taleban
Emirate’s government between 1996 and 2001.”(Abstract).
Torjesen, Stina and Tatjana Stankovic. “Regional
Change: how will the Rise of India and China
shape Afghanistan’s stablization process?” Oslo:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010.
48 p. ISBN 9788270022915. http://english.nupi.
no/content/download/33576/173199/version/7/
file/NUPI+Report-Torjesen-Stankovic.pdf (1.1 MB).
“The report examines how regional developments
in Central/South Asia may affect the prospects forstabilization in Afghanistan. Given that the regional
security dynamics played an important role inaggravating the conflict in Afghanistan in the 1990s,
the report juxtaposes the situation in the 1990s
with the present state of affairs and aims to assess
the potential regional impact. The findings indicate

January/February 2011that the region, still marked by inter-regional rivalryand security concerns, has nevertheless undergone
substantial changes, most notably shaped by the riseof China and India, as well as by increasing regional
cooperation in trade, transport and energy, which adds
a nascent yet significant liberal element to regional
affairs. As such, the regional environment seems lessprone to exacerbate the internal security dynamics
of Afghanistan than was the case in the 1990s. The
report also maps regional alliances and rivalries,
examines the ambiguous role of Iran and provides an
overview of the relations between Afghanistan andCentral Asian states.” (Abstract).
Waldman, Matt. “Dangerous Liaisons with the Afghan
Taliban: the Feasibility and Risks of Negotiations.”
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute ofPeace (USIP), 2010. 15 p. http://www.usip.org/
files/resources/SR%20256%20-%20Dangerous%20
Liaisons%20with%20the%20Afghan%20Taliban.pdf(244 KB). “This report is based on six months of fieldresearch between January and June 2010, funded by
the U.S. Institute of Peace and Canadian Global Peaceand Security Fund. The research involved separate,
in-depth interviews with eighty individuals, mainly in
Kabul and Kandahar, including fourteen insurgents, aswell as former Taliban officials, diplomats, analysts,
community and tribal leaders, and civil society
representatives. It also involved forty interviews andten focus groups with ordinary Afghans. To encourage
frankness, and for safety reasons, most interviews were
nonattributable. The aim was to better understandinsurgent motivations and objectives, and in light of
this, to assess the feasibility, risks, and implicationsof negotiations. The field research, which focused on
the core Quetta Shura–led Taliban, faced constraintsof access, verification, and insurgent differentiation.
The findings should therefore be seen as a step toward
understanding the movement, rather than anything
more complete.” (P. 1).

Public Opinion“ABC News, BBC and ARD, Washington Post Poll [ofPublic Opinion in Afghanistan October 29-November
13, 2010]: Afghanistan: Where Things Stand:
Afghan Views Worsen as Setbacks Counter US
Progress in Helmand.” [New York?]: ABC News,
2010. 56 p.; 30 cm. http://www.langerresearch.
com/uploads/1116a1Afghanistan.pdf(482
KB)“This survey was conducted for ABC News, the BBC,ARD and The Washington Post by the Afghan Centerof Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR)
in Kabul, a subsidiary of D3 Systems Inc. of Vienna[Virgina]. Interviews were conducted in person, in Darior Pashto, among a random national sample of 1,691
Afghan adults Oct. 29-Nov. 13, 2010.” (Website).

Afghanistan in 2010: a survey of the Afghan
people. Kabul: The Asia
Foundation, 2010. 225
p. http://asiafoundation.
org/publications/pdf/797(3.55 MB). First started in
2004, this annual survey
interviewed 6,467 adult
Afghans between June 18
and July 5, 2010. This year
the survey has placed agreater emphasis on subnational governance, theeconomy,development,
women and society, anddemocratic values.
“Afghanistan Transition: Missing Variables: Field
Research Helmand, Kandahar, Panjshir and Parwan
Provinces, Afghanistan, October 2010.” Data analysis
London, United Kingdom; lead field researcher
Norine MacDonald; policy analysis AlexanderJackson, Primoz Manfreda; research fellows
Marco Picardi, Armand Steinmeyer. London: The
International Council on Security and Development(ICOS), November 2010. 102 p. http://www.
icosgroup.net/documents/afghanistan_transition_
missing_variables.pdf (5.4 MB). Based on interviews
with 1,500 men in Helmand, Kandahar, Panjshir and
Parwan Provinces of Afghanistan this report summarises
responses to questions about perceptions of NATO-ISAF
forces, the wider international community, attitudes
towards the Taliban, and opinions on international
development efforts in their community.
Gaston, Erica and Jonathan Horowitz. “The
Trust Deficit: the Impact of Local Perceptions on
Policy in Afghanistan.” [Kabul?]: Open Society
Foundations, October 7, 2010. 25 p. http://www.
soros.org/initiatives/mena/articles_publications/publications/policy-afghanistan-20101007/
perceptions-20101007.pdf (240 KB). “In late 2009
and 2010, the Open Society Foundations, in cooperation
with local Afghan civil society organizations, including
the Afghan Development Association, the Community
Health Association, The Liaison Office, and the Welfare
Association for the Development of Afghanistan,
conducted research to understand Afghan perceptions
about warring parties to the conflict. Over 250 Afghans
participated in focus groups or individual interviews
across Kabul and in six provinces: Herat, Khandahar,
Khost, Nangarhar, Paktia, and Wardak. Participants
were primarily male, although women from Kabul,
Kandahar, Khost, Nangarhar, Paktia, and Herat werealso interviewed. In addition to this research, theauthors consulted with independent human rights
monitors, researchers, and community representatives
23Afghanistan Research Newsletter

who have examined similar issues in other parts of thecountry, for example, in Kunduz, Logar, and Uruzganprovinces.” (p. 5-6). Summary in Dari: http://www.
soros.org/initiatives/mena/articles_publications/publications/policy-afghanistan-20101007/trustdeficit-dari-20101007.pdf (100 KB).

Refugees
Macdonald, Ingrid. “Afghanistan’s Reintegration
Challenges: Land and Housing.” Oslo: Norwegian
Peacebuilding Centre, May 2010. 3 p. http://
www.peacebuilding.no/eng/Publications/Articles/
Afghanistan-s-reintegration-challenges-land-andhousing PDF (210 KB). “Afghanistan’s decades ofconflict have forced millions of its people – a thirdof the population – from their homes, their land
and their country. Today, many face major problems
reintegrating back into society, which are made evenworse by escalating conflict and insecurity since themid-2000s. Two key problems are the lack of accessto land and adequate housing, without which many
returning refugees and internally displaced people
have been forced to live in poor, overcrowded andmakeshift conditions. The flaws of Afghanistan’s
legal systems (both formal and informal), and of thegovernment’s land allocation scheme, mean that
progress in delivering results on the scale needed has
been limited. This neglected issue, which a few aid
agencies such as the UNHCR and the Norwegian RefugeeCouncil are tackling, requires greater attention andsupport from the international community.” (P. 1).

that influence remittancesenders and recipientsto use the available
mechanisms; 3. Devise
policies to regulate theactivities of the emerging
new players such as moneytransfer
operators;
4.
Address the implications ofcompliance with standards
on anti-money launderingand terrorist financing; 5.
Identify opportunities for
introduction of financial
products in the mostly
heterogeneous remittance markets. Consistent withthe above, the results of this study are intended for use
by the Dutch Government to raise awareness amongbanks and financial institutions offering remittanceservices (e.g., Western Union and MoneyGram) of therelative importance of the Dutch-Afghan remittancecorridor. By stimulating the interest of the financial
sector, the Dutch Government hopes to promote
greater use of formal channels for transferringmoney to Afghanistan. This would reduce the risk ofappropriating the funds for illicit activities such as
the drugs trade or terrorism and make possible thelinking of the remittances sub-sector to development
aid, policymaking and innovation in product andservice provision such as loans and mortgages, savings
accounts, and microcredit by modern financial sector
operators.” (P. 1).

Majidyar, Ahmad and Ali Alfoneh. “Iranian Influencein Afghanistan: Refugees as Political Instruments.”
Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institutefor Public Policy Research, November 2010. 5 p.
http://www.aei.org/docLib/2010-11-MEO-g.pdf(164 KB). There are as many as 2.5 million Afghans
currently resident in Iran.This paper draws conclusions
about how they may figure in Iran’s relationship with
Afghanistan and by implication the United States.

Heydari, Nicole and Benoît Paré. “Road Compensationin Nijrab District, Kapisa Province: Final Report.”[Nijrab, Kapisa]: TF La Fayette, 2010. 16 p. PDF(1.0 MB). Description of a compensation scheme set
up to recompense landowners for land taken over for
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) road-building
projects in Nijrab District, Kapisa.

Remittances

Security

Parto, Saeed and Ahmad Shaheer Anil. “RemittanceCorridor Between the Netherlands and Afghanistan:an Overview.” Kabul: Afghanistan Public Policy
Research Organization (APPRO), May 2010. 14 p.
http://appro.org.af/downloads/Remittances.pdf(401 KB). “Recognizing the importance of remittancesin general and to gain more in-depth understandingof this mostly traditional and poorly understood
sub-sector, the World Bank has been commissioning
a series of studies with the following objectives: 1.
Gain new knowledge to better understand the size
and nature of remittance flows; 2. Identify incentives

Abbas, Hassan. “Militancy in Pakistan’s Borderlands:
Implications for the Nation and for Afghan Policy.”
New York: Century Foundation, 2010. 40 p.
http://tcf.org/publications/2010/10/militancy-inpakistan2019s-borderlands-implications-for-thenation-and-for-afghan-policy/pdf (1.1 MB). An outlineof the history of security and political conditions in
the area of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan (since
early-2010 known as Khyber Puhktunkhwa Province(KPP) formerly the North-West Frontier Province(NWFP)). The summary of the various recent peacedeals and truces is a useful compilation.

24

Roads

January/February 2011

Anand Gopal. “The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy
and Conflict in Kandahar.” Washington, D.C.: New
America Foundation, November 2010. 30 p. http://
newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/
policydocs/111010gopal_kandahar.pdf (3.7 MB).
“As Afghanistan’s cultural and political heartland,
Kandahar is a province of key strategic importancefor foreign forces, the Afghan government, and theinsurgency. A sizable chunk of the Taliban’s seniorleadership hails from the province, and the culturaland political dynamics of rural Kandahar shape aspectsof the movement’s character to this day. This study
attempts to understand the Taliban of Kandahar bylooking at the factors that spurred their rise and the
networks and structures through which they operate.”(Executive Summary).
Bijlert, Martine Van. “The Battle for Afghanistan:
Militancy and Conflict in Zabul and Uruzgan.”
Washington, D.C.: New America Foundation, 23
September 2010. 23 p. http://www.newamerica.
n e t / s i t e s / n e w a m e r i c a . n e t / fi l e s / p o l i c y d o c s /zabuluruzgan_0.pdf (1.4 MB). “This paper aims to
explore in more detail the roots and resurgence of
the Taliban in Zabul and Uruzgan, in an effort to teaseout some of the recurring themes. The first sectionof the paper discusses the area’s main loyalties andfault lines, as well as the evolution of the Taliban
movement in the two provinces, from the anti-Soviet
resistance to the establishment and fall of the Islamic
Emirate. The second section focuses on factors thatfacilitated the revival of the movement as a potent
insurgency. The third section discusses the current
nature and structure of the movement in Zabul and
Uruzgan. Finally, the fourth section discusses theimpact of the international military operations on thesituation in the provinces.” (P. 3).
Cordesman, Anthony H., Adam Mausner, Jason
Lemieux. “Afghan National Security Forces:
What it will Take to Implement the ISAF
Strategy.” Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic&
International
Studies(CSIS),
November
2010. 229 p. ISBN 9780892066087. http://
csis.org/files/publication/101115_Cordesman_AfghanNationalSecurityForces_Web.pdf (6.0 MB).
“President Obama’s new strategy for Afghanistan is
critically dependent upon the transfer of responsibility
for security to the Afghan National Security Forces(ANSF). His speech announcing this strategy called
for the transfer to begin in mid-2011. However,creating the Afghan forces needed to bring about
security and stability is a far more difficult problem
than many realize, and poses major challenges thatwill endure long after 2011. A successful effort tocreate effective Afghan forces, particularly forcesthat can largely replace the role of US and allied
forces, must overcome a legacy of more than eight

years of critical failures inboth force development
and training, and in the
broader course of the
US effort in Afghanistan.
Such an effort must also
be shaped as part of an
integrated
civil-militaryeffort, and not treatedsimply as an exercise ingenerating more Afghan
military and police forces.
Success will be equallydependent on strategic
patience. There is asignificant probability that the ANSF will not be
ready for any major transfer of responsibility until
well after 2011. Trying to expand Afghan forces
too quickly, creating forces with inadequate force
quality, and decoupling Afghan force developmentfrom efforts to deal with the broad weaknesses in
Afghan governance and the Afghan justice system,
will lose the war. America’s politicians, policymakers,
and military leaders must accept this reality—and
persuade the Afghan government and our allies toact accordingly—or the mission in Afghanistan cannot
succeed.” (Executive Summary).
Curtis, Lisa. “Taliban Reconciliation: Obama
Administration must be Clear and Firm.”
Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 11
March, 2010. 6 p. http://s3.amazonaws.com/
thf_media/2010/pdf/bg2384.pdf (353 KB). “As
30,000 additional American soldiers are deployed to
Afghanistan, the U.S. is also focusing on reintegrating
Taliban insurgents into Afghan society. There has been
speculation that this new focus is part of a quickexit strategy for the U.S. While reintegrating as many
local Taliban fighters as possible is a vital part of thecounterinsurgency strategy, premature negotiations
with Taliban leaders based in Pakistan could easily
backfire. The Obama Administration must bear inmind that insurgents are more likely to negotiate
if they fear defeat on the battlefield. The Taliban
have steadily regained influence in Afghanistan overthe last four years—and U.S. and NATO forces mustfirst weaken the Taliban on the battlefield before
engaging in serious negotiations with the leadership.”(Abstract).
“Dismantling the ‘Taliban’ One Non-Taliban Groupat a Time: Rethinking CF’s Over Usage of the Term
Taliban.” Kabul, Afghanistan: Human Terrain System(HTS)-Afghanistan, ISAF Headquarters, [2010].
12 p. PDF (250 KB). “For the past 9 years the US,
its allies and the Western media have consistently
referred to all the insurgents, including non-politicalcriminals, in Afghanistan as Taliban even though25

Afghanistan Research Newsletterthe conflict involves many different players andgroups. CF (Coalition Forces) leaders, from cabinet
members back in D.C. to military commanders in
the field, continue to indiscriminately apply theterm Taliban as a blanket term for all insurgents.
Further exacerbating the problem, Western leaders
have recently decided to divide the insurgents into
two basic camps, ‘extreme’ Taliban and ‘moderate’
Taliban. This is a very simplistic categorization of theinsurgents, not to mention extremely inaccurate.
There are major insurgent groups NOT under the
Taliban banner, not to mention various divisions
within the Taliban themselves. If we are to defeat
the insurgents, we must first understand who they
are and where their allegiances lie. As long as CF
continue to treat the plethora of insurgent groups
as a unified movement called The Taliban, successwill be very difficult to achieve. Taking advantage ofthe differences, existing conflicts and contradictions
between the various insurgent groups and commanders
both on ideological and personal levels could allow
CF to divide, dismantle and significantly weaken the
opposition. Although the pen is considered mightier
than the sword in the West, it is important tounderstand that in Afghanistan the tongue is mightier
than either the pen or the sword.” (P. 1).
Dorronsoro, Gilles. “Afghanistan at the Breaking
Point.” Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 2010. 49 p. http://
carnegieendowment.org/files/afghan_break_point.
pdf (1.6 MB). “The current strategy of defeating the
Taliban militarily is unrealistic. The coalition is on
the defensive across much of Afghanistan and, withcurrent troop levels, can at most only contain theinsurgency. On present course, the coalition is swiftly
heading toward an impasse. Just to retain the areas
currently controlled by the coalition would requiresignificant additional troops next year. Many more thanthat would be required for the coalition, with heavy
losses, to adopt an offensive stance and win backterritory. Such an escalation, though, is politicallyuntenable given the impending departure of European
forces and dwindling public support for the war. A newstrategy is required. Rather than committing more
troops, the United States should instead pursue a
political solution to the conflict, including a ceasefire
and negotiations with the insurgents. By insisting on
powersharing among the various Afghan factions andreserving the right to intervene militarily to prevent
Afghanistan from becoming a sanctuary for extremistgroups, the United States can still accomplish themore limited objective of preventing the return of alQaeda. However, the United States must act quickly.
Given the rapidly deteriorating security situation,
every passing month strengthens the position of the
Taliban. A viable exit strategy is still possible, buttime is not on America’s side.” (P. 5).
26“The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006-2010:
a TLO Socio-political Assessment.” Kabul: The
Liaison Office, August 2010. 73 p. http://www.
tlo-afghanistan.org/sites/default/files/The%20
Dutch%20engagement%20in%20Uruzgan%20%E2%80%93%20TLO%20Report%202010%20WEB.
pdf (1.0 MB). “On 1 August 2010, a four-year Dutch
civil-military engagement in Uruzgan came to an end.
The Dutch comprehensive ‘3D’ approach emphasizeddevelopment, diplomacy/governance, and defense/
security, and sought to diplomatically use development
where possible and to employ force only as necessary.
This TLO report assesses the impact of the Dutch
approach, supported by Australian and U.S. forces,on the political, economic and security situation in
Uruzgan. The withdrawal of their 1,600 troops raises
the question of whether momentum in Uruzgan has
been cut short and whether the changes the Dutch
introduced will prove to be durable. The continuityof successful momentum in Uruzgan depends on how
their successors (Australia and the U.S.) build upon
past work and follow-on the Dutch approach. Using
a 2006 TLO assessment conducted at the beginningof the Dutch civil-military mission in Uruzgan as abaseline, this report evaluates the changes that haveoccurred in Uruzgan over the past four years. It covers
the areas of: (1) Socio-economic development andreconstruction including agro-economic development,
health care, education, media/communication andgender equality; (2) Governance and the rule of law
including provincial and district level government,
elections, Afghan National Security Forces (ANA/
ANP), and the justice sector; (3) (In)security andthe insurgency including assessment of district levelsecurity and government control, road security andan overview of regional dimensions and conflict
lines exploited by the insurgency; (4) International
military actors and the Dutch withdrawal including
perception of International Military Forces (Dutch,
U.S. and Australians) and the local evaluation of
Dutch withdrawal; (5) Recommendations for Dutch
successors in the areas of development/reconstruction,
diplomacy/political engagement, and stabilization/
security. This report is based upon four years ofcontinuous research in the province including a 2009assessment and 64 interviews conducted between 1
June and July 2010.” (Website).
Ess, Brett van. “The Fight for Marjah: Recent
Counterinsurgency
Operations
inSouthern
Afghanistan.” 2010. 36 p. Small Wars Journal, 30
September 2010. http://smallwarsjournal.com/
blog/journal/docs-temp/563-vaness.pdf (332 KB).
“In early 2010...the International Security Assistance
Force and the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan began implementing a population-centriccounterinsurgency campaign. This strategy stands incontrast to the counternarcotics and counterterrorism

January/February 2011

focus in Marjah from 2001 to late 2009. Initial elementsof this new campaign plan were implemented in
February 2010 when Operation Moshtarak began in
Marjah. This paper details the counterinsurgency(COIN) operations in Marjah over the last year.” (P. 1).
“The Human Terrain of Shah Joy District, Zabul
Province, Afghanistan, September 2010: Village
Perceptions Concerning Security, Governance,
Development and the Economy.” [S.l.]: AF8 Human
Terrain Team, 2010. 60 p. PDF (3.6 MB). “In
September 2010, Human Terrain Team AF8, conducteda human terrain study of villages along Highway 1
that were within 10 km (the effective radius of GIRoA[Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]influence of the Shah Joy
DistrictCenter,
Zabul
Province. The purpose ofthis study was to assist
2SCR and the Romanian
812th Battalion Task Force
Hawks better understandlocal dynamics in relation
to GIRoA and increased ISAF
presence. In addition, thisstudy has identified areasin which Combined Team
Zabul could effectively
apply resources to assist
the population and its
government.” (P. 4). Includes details on education,2010 elections, agriculture, household numbers, etc.
Jackson, Ashley. “Nowhere to Turn: the Failure toProtect Civilians in Afghanistan: a Joint Briefing
Paper by 29 Aid Organizations working in Afghanistan
for the NATO Heads of Government Summit, Lisbon,
November 19-20, 2010.” [Kabul, Afghanistan]:Oxfam International, November 2010. 24 p. http://
www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/
OXFAM-Nowhere-to-Turn-Failure-to-ProtectCivilians-Afghanistan.pdf (1.54 MB). “Security forthe vast majority of Afghans is rapidly deteriorating.
As 29 aid organizations working in Afghanistan, weare deeply concerned
about the impact of theescalating
conflictoncivilians. It is likely that
increased violence in 2011
will lead to more civilian
casualties, continue tofuel displacement, cut off
access to basic services
and reduce the abilityof aid agencies to reachthose who need assistancemost. This paper does not
attempt to address all

aspects of the current conflict. It concentrates on
those that negatively impact civilians, particularlyin the context of transition to Afghan responsibility
for security. While this paper primarily focuses on
the actions and strategy of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF), it is important to remember that armed
opposition groups (AOG), who are stronger and control
more territory than at any time since 2001, also haveclear obligations under international humanitarian law(IHL) to protect civilians. As such, this paper will makereference to AOG actions and issue recommendations
to AOG where applicable.” (Introduction)“Life and Perceptions in Villages along Highway 1
North of Qalat, Zabul,
Afghanistan.”[Qalat?,Zabul]: Human Terrain
Team AF8, August 2010.
36 p. PDF (2 MB). “Thisdocument describes theperceptions of villagers
along Highway 1 north of
Qalat [capital of Zabul
Province], roughly in thearea running 3 kilometers
to 35 kilometers north of
Qalat City. It examines thearea with regard to security,
economics, development,
leaders and tribes. It also outlines possible coursesof action that can be taken by Coalition Forces (CF)and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to improvesecurity, the economy and people’s satisfaction with
their government amongst the population in the area.
It also lists some key leaders in the villages, generallywith pictures included.” (P. 2)“Lost in the Wilderness: HTT, AF01 Trip Report 12-20
October 2010, Gerda Serai District.” Khost, [Khost
Province]: Human Terrain Team AF01, 2010. 12 p.
PDF (476 KB). Brief reports of interviews (October2010) with residents of Gerda Serai in Paktiya about
security, governance, elections, reconciliation, theeconomy and development.
MacKenzie, Jean. “The Battle for Afghanistan:
Militancy and Conflict in Helmand.” Washington,
D.C.: New America Foundation, September 2010. 20
p. http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/
newamerica.net/files/policydocs/helmand2.pdf(1.1 MB). Useful overview and background on militaryhistory in Helmand, with a review of the situation
under the Taliban before 2001 and up to now.
Meyerle, Jerry, Megan Katt and Jim Gavrilis.
Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan:
how Different Units adapted to Local Conditions.
Alexandria, Virginia: CNA Analysis & Solutions,27

Afghanistan Research Newsletter

November, 2010. viii, 171 p. http://www.cna.org/
sites/default/files/research/Counterinsurgency%20
on%20the%20Ground%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf (6.3
MB). “This book provides a glimpse into what relatively
small military units—teams, platoons, companies,
and highly dispersed battalions—have done [against]
the insurgency in some of the more remote areas ofAfghanistan. The book includes 15 vignettes about
different units from the US Marines, Army, and Special
Forces, the British Army and Marines, the Dutch Armyand Marines, and the Canadian Army. The case studies
cover ten provinces in Afghanistan’s south and east.
They describe the diverse conditions these units faced,
how they responded to these conditions, what worked
and what did not, and the successes they achieved.”(Back Cover).
Noer, John N. “Tactical Operations in Support of
Afghan Reconciliation & Reintegration: Concepts for
Locally-focused Afghan Reintegration Operations.”
Khost, Afghanistan: Human Terrain Team AF01, August
2010. v, 30 p. PDF (573 KB). “As hope of reconciliation
with Taliban leadership wanes, the emphasis hasturned to reconciliation of insurgent fighters duringconflict. The Kabul government promotes peace byabsorbing insurgents, and ISAF has established a funding
mechanism. There is no guidance yet on what tacticaloperations to undertake to make the initiative work on
the ground. This document identifies numerous decision
factors and sketches a conceptual vision.” (Executive
Summary).
PRT Interagency Lessons Learned Project. [FortLesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.]: Center for
Complex Operations (CCO), October 2010. 144 p. PDF(1.7 MB). “The Center for Complex Operations (CCO),
in conjunction with the interagency Best Practices
Working Group (BPWG), has been coordinating a projectto gather lessons and best practices from civilian andmilitary members serving on Provincial Reconstruction
Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. The CCO partners with
the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) to conduct
interviews of recently returned civilian PRT members,
collaborates with the Services as they interview military
members of the PRTs, gathers interviews of civilian andmilitary personnel from other sources, and conducts field
trips to collect information from currently deployed PRT
personnel. In addition, CCO administers written surveys
to military and civilian PRT members. The interview andsurvey questions are standardized for both military andcivilian PRT members. This memorandum summarizes
the main observations derived from interviews
conducted between fall 2009 and summer 2010 andpresents issues for consideration to be reviewed by the
BPWG, the agencies, and the Services. The issues forconsideration are derived from PRT personnel feedback;they have not been subject to a full analysis and are notpolicy recommendations.” (P. 6).
28“Report on Progress toward Security and Stability
in Afghanistan [1 April to 30 September 2010].”
Washington, D.C.: [US Dept. of Defense], November
2010. 105 p. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/
November_1230_Report_FINAL.pdf (3.23 MB). This
report summarizes US Department of Defense views
on progress and challenges in Afghanistan under
the headings of Strategy, Afghan National Security
Forces, Security, Governance, Reconstruction andDevelopment, Counternarcotics, and Regional
Engagement.
“Sangin Population: Final Analysis Report.”[Delaram, Nimroz]: Human Terrain Team (HTT)
AF06, Regimental Combat Team-2, 16 November
2010. 45 p. PDF (1.2 MB). “On 07 October 2010,
eight members of Human Terrain Team (HTT) AF06
traveled to the Sangin District of Helmand Province,
Afghanistan, in support of the Regimental Combat
Team-2 (RCT-2) mission of securing and stabilizing
the Sangin District. Operationally, AF06 collaborated
with 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5) to analyze
key features of the Sangin population and resolve
the following information gaps: current tribal
dynamics, identification of influential actors, andidentification of influential persons associated with
key infrastructure and resources. AF06 conducted
this population analysis by interviewing 86 locals
over a three and a half week period.” (P. 2).
Schetter, Conrad and Rainer Glassner. “Neither
Functioning, nor Failing of the State! Seeing
Violence in Afghanistan from Local Perspectives.” In
From Fragile State to Functioning State: Pathways
to Democratic Transformation in Georgia, Kosovo,
Moldova, and Afghanistan, edited by Savine
Collmer. Berlin: LIT/Transaction Press, 2009,p. 137-156. http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/bib/
DOKUMENTE/06.staat-politik/schetter-glassner2009b.pdf (122 KB). “‘Warlordism’ and its connoted
perceptions in our view are not sufficient enough tocharacterize the structures of violence in Afghanistan.
While we do not deny the existence of warlordsin Afghanistan, the manifold forms of individual
leadership as well as the local differences regarding
security arrangements are too significant for them tobe positioned on a linear axis between warlords on
the one side and the modern state on the other. To
support our argument, we will discuss the balanceof power and influence between the center and the
periphery in Afghanistan. Based on this analysis we
will reveal the security situation on a provincial
level in three case studies—Kunduz, Kandahar andPaktia. Hereby, we intend to demonstrate that thevariety of security arrangements on the local level isenormous.” (P. 138)
Zimmerman, S. Rebecca [et al.]. “If you’ve seen
one VSP, you’ve seen one VSP: UnderstandingJanuary/February 2011

Best Practices in Village Stability Operations.”[Kabul]: Commander’s Initiatives Group, Combined
Forces Special Operations Component CommandAfghanistan (CFSOCC-A), September 2010. 31 p.
“Drawing upon field research and interviews withseveral teams conducting Village Stability Operations(VSO), this paper...highlights fourteen of the mostcommon problems and decision-points of Special
Forces (SF) Operational Detachments Alpha (ODAs),
Marine Special Operations Teams (MSOTs), and Sea,
Air, and Land (SEAL) Platoons conducting remotecounterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan throughVSO. For each of these it presents several teams’
approaches to the problem, highlighting the rangeof ‘right answers,’ the logical processes underlying
those answers and the salient factors considered by
the teams.” (Executive Summary).

Transport“Sherkhkan Bandar to
Herat Railway Line: Prefeasibility Study: Phase
II Final Report, Volume 1
Pre-feasibility Report.”
Dhaka, Bangladesh: HBConsultants, May 2010.
57 p. PDF (4.5 MB). A“pre-feasibility”
study
for the construction of arailway line from Sherkhan
Bandar (on Afghanistan’sborder with Tajikistan)through Kunduz and Mazar
to Herat, with connections from Aqina and Torghundi
on the Afghan-Turkmenistan border). In total around
1,000 kilometres of track costing an estimated US $7
billion. This proposed line would link to the newly
opened link from the Uzbek border (Hairatan) to
Mazar.

Women
Cortright, David and Sarah Smiles Persinger. “Afghan
Women Speak: Enhancing Security and Human
Rights in Afghanistan.” Notre Dame, Indiana: Kroc
Institute for International Peace Studies, Universityof Notre Dame, October 2010. 34 p. http://www.
nd.edu/~jfallon2/WomenAfghanistanReport.pdf(710 KB). “This report supports the negotiation of apolitical solution with insurgent groups and gradualdemilitarization to help stabilize the region andreduce armed violence. However, the process should
be gradual and linked to parallel diplomatic efforts andalternative security arrangements. Demilitarization
should be coupled with the deployment of an interim
protection force under the auspices of the United

Nations to provide transitional security protection
for civilians. To guard against a roll back in women’s
gains, the meaningful representation of women in
all peace negotiations and post-conflict recovery
planning is critical. As recognized in UN Security
Council Resolutions 1325 and 1889, women have avital role to play in building and preserving peace.
They must be fully represented in deliberations
over Afghanistan’s future. International donors must
use their leverage with the Afghan government
to ensure women’s inclusion in high-level peace
negotiation and reintegration bodies, making funding
for reintegration programs conditional on women’s
participation.” (P. 2).
“Family Law Reform and Women’s Rights in Muslim
Countries: Perspectives and Lessons Learned.”
Seminar Report. Montreal: Rights & Democracy, June
2010. 57 p. http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/
wp-content/uploads/2010/08/RightsDemocracy.
Family-Law-Seminar-Report.pdf (552 KB). The thirdinternational conference on family law was held in
Kabul in 2010, this publication summarizes thepresentations and discussions that took place. Topics
covered include reforming family laws (including
comparison with progress in Morocco), the process ofdivorce, as well as presentations about alimony, childcustody, polygamy and consent to marriage.
“From Resolution to Reality: Lessons Learned
from Afghanistan, Nepal and Uganda on Women’sParticipation in Peacebuilding and Post-conflict
Governance.” [London?]: CARE International, 2010.
43p.
http://www.care-international.org/Viewdocument/568-From-Resolution-to-Reality-Lessonslearned-from-Afghanistan-Nepal-and-Uganda.
html?format=raw&tmpl=component PDF (7.93 KB).
“UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325,
2000) was hailed a victory for women’s rights activists
around the world. The adoption of the resolution
represented a significant step forward in recognising
the strategic contribution that women can make topeace and security policy, as well as acknowledging theincreasing use of violence against women as a tacticof war. Yet a decade later, women are still largely
absent from peace negotiations. How can the policy
be turned into practice, which impacts on the lives ofwomen most affected by conflict? Ten years on fromthe initial adoption of SCR 1325, CARE International
launched this study to reflect on our own operational
experience, and the perspectives of our local partners
in civil society and the communities with which we
work...The research is driven by familiar questions
including: ‘what does meaningful participation look
like from the perspective of women in communities
caught up in conflict? What can aid agency, UN andnational government staff tell us about the realities ofturning the policy commitments into practice? How can29

Afghanistan Research Newsletter

different actors ensure more effective
strategies to enable women’s meaningful
participation in peace processes? How
could the next ten years of SCR 1325
implementation better deliver on theaspirations the resolution embodies?’
Our survey in Afghanistan, Uganda and
Nepal found that many thousands ofwomen have used SCR 1325 to mobilise
political action and resources in supportof their rights and participation in peaceand security policy. Yet despite all these
efforts, women remain largely absent
from the negotiating table.” (P. 1).
“Harmful
Traditional
Practicesand Implementation of the Law on
Elimination of Violence against Womenin Afghanistan.” Kabul, Afghanistan:
United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA), 9 December
2010. 2, vii, 63 p. This report “documents
particular customary practices that
violate the rights of women and girls
throughout Afghanistan, describes theGovernment of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan’s response to these practices

30

and makes recommendations to end suchpractices.” (Executive Summary, P. i).
“Know your Rights and Duties: theLaw on the Elimination of Violenceagainst Women.” [Kabul]: International
Development Law Organization (IDLO),
2010. 15 p. http://www.idlo.int/
Publications/EVAW%20ENGLISH.pdf (466
KB). “This booklet explains the following
topics: violence against women is against
the law; What are the punishments forcrimes against women?; What are crimesof violence against women? (physicalabuse, sexual abuse, emotional andpsychological abuse, crimes related tomarriage, deprivation of property &inheritance, denial of access to education,
work and healthcare); What are the rights
of a victim of violence against women?;
Who and where can one complain abouta crime of violence against women?”(Back Cover). Also published in Dari ‫ از‬:‫ قانون منع خشونت علیه‬: ‫حقوق و وجایب خویش آگاه شوید‬‫ ;زن‬Also published in Pashto: ‫د خپلو حقوقو او‬‫ د ښځو په وړاندې د تاوتریخوالي‬: ‫وجایبو څخه خبر اوسۍ‬‫د مخنیوي قانون‬

January/February 2011

New Laws Received
Officialgazette no.

Afghan date

International
date

1016

1389 Hamal 102010 March 30

Regulation on Arrangement of Pension Rights ofOfficers, Bridmalan and Satanmanan.

1020

1389 Saur 20

2010 May 10

Military Criminal Procedure Code1020

1389 Saur 20

2010 May 10

Amendment of Paragraph 1 of Article 30 of the
Cooperatives Law

1020

1389 Saur 20

2010 May 10

Omission [i.e. Deletion] and Amendment of Regulation
on Establishment of Private Aviation Companies

1020

1389 Saur 20

2010 May 10

Re-amendment of Article 48 of Regulation on Fuel
Expenses of Vehicles and Machines1025

1389 Jauza 24

2010 June 14

Law against Intoxicating Drinks and Drugs as well asControlling them

1026

1389 Jauza 25

2010 June 15

Regulation on Establishment and Registration of
Political Parties

1026

1389 Jauza 25

2010 June 15

Amendments to Paragraph 2 of Article 19 of Regulationon Land Vehicle Registration

1026

1389 Jauza 25

2010 June 15

Annex 2 of Regulation of General Department of
Geodesy and Cartography1030

1389 Saratan 232010 July 14

Omission, Addition and Amendment of some Articles of[the] Electoral Law

1030

1389 Saratan 232010 July 14

Regulation of Private Educational Institutes

1030

1389 Saratan 232010 July 14

Regulation of Vaccines and Immunity Products1033

1389 Asad 42010 July 26

Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of Special Courts

Title of law, regulation, etc.

Many law translations (all unofficial) are available at: http://www.asianlii.org/af/legis/laws/31Afghanistan Research Newsletter

Recent Publications from AREU
All publications are available for download at www.areu.org.af, and most in hardcopy for free fromthe AREU office in Kabul.
Dec 2010
		

Understanding and Addressing Context in Rural Afghanistan: How Villages Differ and
Why, by Adam Pain and Paula Kantor

Dec 2010
		Securing Life and Livelihoods in Rural Afghanistan: The Role of Social Relationships, byPaula Kantor and Adam Pain

Dec 2010

Podcast: Community Based Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan, by Deborah J. Smith

Dec 2010

Podcast: The Future of Democratisation in Afghanistan, by Anna Larson

Nov 2010		

Poverty in Afghan Policy: Enhancing Solutions through Better Defining the Problem, byPaula Kantor and Adam Pain

Nov 2010

Governance Structures in Nimroz Province, by Anna Larson

Nov 2010#

Means to What End? Policymaking and Statebuilding in Afghanistan, by Sarah Parkinson

Oct 2010#

Afghanistan Research Newsletter 27

Oct 2010

Community-Based Dispute Resolution Processes in Balkh Province, by Rebecca GangOct 2010#

Oct 2010

Does Women’s Participation in the National Solidarity Programme Make a Difference intheir Lives? A Case Study in Parwan Province, by Chona R. Echavez

Sept 2010

Capacity-Building Through Policymaking: Developing Afghanistan’s National Education
Strategic Plan, by Dana Holland

Sept 2010

The Impact of Microfinance Programmes on Women’s Lives: A Case Study in Parwan
Province, by Sogol Zand

Sept 2010

Afghanistan Livelihood Trajectories: Evidence from Faryab, by Batul Nezami with Paula
KantorSept 2010

Local Politics in Afghanistan: Elections and Instability II, by Noah Coburn

Sept 2010#

The Wolesi Jirga in Flux, 2010: Elections and Instability I, by Anna Larson

Sept 2010#

Afghan Election, 2010: Alternative Narratives, by Noah Coburn

July 2010

Is Capacity Being Built? A Study of Policymaking Process in the Primary and Secondary
Education Subsector, by Sayed Muhammad ShahJuly 2010#

June 2010#

June 2010#

May 2010

Afghanistan Livelihood Trajectories: Evidence from Sar-i-Pul, by Tom Shaw#

Peace at all Costs? Reintegration and Reconciliation in Afghanistan, by Tazreena Sajjad

Afghanistan Research Newsletter 26

The Wolesi Jirga in 2010: Pre-election Politics and the Appearance of Opposition, by M.
Hassan Wafaey with Anna Larson
Corrupting the State or State-Crafted Corruption? Exploring the Nexus between
Corruption and Subnational Governance, by Manija Gardizi, Karen Hussman and Yama
TorabiIndicates that the publication or a summary is or will be available in Dari and/or Pashto.

32