IEEJ e-NEWSLETTER
No. 242(Based on Japanese No. 233)

Published: February 21, 2023
The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan(As of February 16, 2022)

Sources:(1) DOE-EIA(2) Investing.com

Sources:(1) Ministry of Finance "Japan Trade Statistics"(2) Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (arrival month basis)(3) Estimated by World Bank (Netherland Title Transfer Facility)(4) DOE-EIA, NYMEX (Front-month Futures)

Source: x-rates.com

Sources:(1) Finance. Yahoo.com(2) Investing.com

Contents
Summary【Energy Market and Policy Trends】
1. Developments in Nuclear Power
2. Recent Developments in the Oil and LNG Markets
3. Update on Climate Change, Energy Conservation, and Renewable Energies【Global Monitoring】
4. Europe and US: European Gas Market in a Temporary Reprieveand Moves Surrounding the IRA in the US
5. China: NEV Shift Accelerates, Sales May Surpass 10 Million Units This Year
6. ME: Concerns about the New Israeli Coalition Government
7. Russia: Developments in Russia during the Transition to the Price Cap Mechanism

1Summary
1. Developments in Nuclear PowerIn Japan, discussions on the operational lifetime of plants have begun. Overseas, majorcountries are taking concrete action to promote nuclear power, such as extending the operational
lifetime of plants and shifting policies toward promoting nuclear power.
2. Recent Developments in the Oil and LNG Markets
Oil and natural gas prices are relatively stable in January, but there is concern about the
impact of the price cap on Russian petroleum products imposed on February 5.
3. Update on Climate Change, Energy Conservation, and Renewable Energies
The green growth strategies of Europe and the US are at a financial crossroads. There is also
growing interest in the future demand and current prices of raw materials that are essential for
decarbonization technologies.
4. Europe and US: European Gas Market in a Temporary Reprieveand Moves Surrounding the IRA in the US
The European gas market is calm, partly due to the unusually warm winter. However, this is nota fundamental easing of supply and demand; the risk of instability remains. The IRA in the US
is attracting growing attention, but various issues have been pointed out.
5. China: NEV Shift Accelerates, Sales May Surpass 10 Million Units This Year
In 2022, NEV sales increased by 93.4% to 6.89 million units, and their ratio of sales grew by
12.2 percentage points to 25.6%. CAAM expects the sales volume in 2023 to be 9.3 million
units, and it could even surpass 10 million units.
6. ME: Concerns about the New Israeli Coalition Government
2023 marks the 50th anniversary of the oil crises in the 1970s. A new government was
inaugurated at the end of 2022 in Israel, but the hardline policies of right-wing members could
make the situation volatile.
7. Russia: Developments in Russia during the Transition to the Price Cap Mechanism
Russia announced measures to counter the price cap mechanism on Russian oil and petroleum
products introduced by the EU and others. The National Welfare Fund, whose balance peakedin May 2022, is being diverted to cover the fiscal deficit.

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1. Developments in Nuclear Power

Emiri YOKOTA, Senior Researcher
Nuclear Energy Group, Strategy Research Unit

The basic policy for realizing a decarbonized society was formulated at the Green
Transformation (GX) Implementation Council held on December 22, 2022. The policy declaredthat nuclear power “will be utilized sustainably into the future.” The plants that are slated fordecommissioning will be replaced, and the operational lifetime of plants will be extended fromthe current limit of a maximum of 60 years.
Meanwhile, on December 21, 2022, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA) approved theoutline of the proposed safety regulation framework which is compatible with the extended
operational lifetime of nuclear power plants. Operating licenses will be reviewed at least every
10 years when 30 years have passed since the start of operation. Revisions to the Act on theRegulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors will be drawn up
after gathering input from power companies for submission to the regular Diet session in
February 2023. The debate on the extension of operational lifetime should be closely watched.
In Japan, on December 20, 2022, the Osaka District Court issued a temporary injunction
rejecting calls to halt Kansai Electric’s Mihama Unit 3, the only nuclear power plant in Japan
operating beyond 40 years. It was the first judicial decision in the country over a nuclear power
plant that has been operating beyond 40 years.
Overseas, on January 9, the Belgian government announced that it had signed a preliminary
agreement with France’s Engie on key matters related to extending the operational lifetime of
two nuclear reactors (Doel Unit 4 and Tihange Unit 3) by 10 years to 2035. The government
had decided in March 2022 to keep the two plants in operation until 2035 in response to thedrastic changes in the energy situation after the invasion of Ukraine. The present announcement
marks the first step toward actually implementing the operational extension.
On January 11, the Swedish government announced an amendment to the environmental law
to remove the provisions that prohibit the construction of nuclear reactors outside of thepremises of existing nuclear power plants as well as the provisions that limit the number ofnuclear reactors in operation to 10. At a press briefing, the prime minister said that the country
needs more clean electricity with the ongoing electrification of industry and transport and theshift to non-fossil fuels. The bill is due to be proposed after a three-month public comment
period, and the government hopes to implement the amended law in March 2024.
On January 12, South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy released the 10th Basic
Plan on Electricity Demand and Supply, which includes the basic direction of electricity supply
and demand, a long-term supply-demand forecast, power generation andtransmission/distribution plans, demand management, and distributed power sources for theperiod from 2022 through 2036. Whereas the previous Basic Plan, the 9th, set “an energy
transition centered on renewable energy” as its basic policy, the direction was modified in the
new Basic Plan to “a feasible and well-balanced power source mix” and “utilization of nuclear
power and an appropriate level of renewables,” considering economic efficiency,
environmental compatibility, and safety in a comprehensive manner and giving top priority toa stable supply.

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2. Recent Developments in the Oil and LNG Markets
Tetsuo MORIKAWA, Senior Economist, Manager
Oil Group
Fossil Energies & International Cooperation Unit
After falling as low as $76/bbl in early December 2022, Brent price is hovering around the
mid-80 dollars as of late January 2023. The number of new cases of Covid has exploded in
China reportedly over 1.1 billion after the Zero-Covid policy was lifted and restrictions on
movement were greatly eased on December 7, 2022. Speculation that oil demand will recoveras a result of this policy change is pushing up oil prices. It also became clear on January 12,2023 that the CPI in the US slowed in the previous month, raising market expectations that
inflation may ease and a recession may be averted. This is also propping up oil prices.
Reflecting less uncertainty over demand, the International Energy Agency revised its 2023
global demand forecast upward to 101.7 mb/d, up 1.9 mb/d from 2022 (1.9%) to its highestever level, in its Oil Market Report. Russia’s exports remain high at 7.8 mb/d as of December.
Among these, 3.1 mb/d are petroleum products, which, like crude oil, will be subject to a pricecap from February 5. The introduction of the cap is yet to impact prices significantly, but it
could affect market prices especially for gasoil, which is the main product exported to Europe.
In the natural gas market, since late January the US Henry Hub price has been around$3/Mbtu, Dutch TTF around $20, and spot LNG prices for Asia around $25. The average importprice for Japan is estimated around $16/Mbtu. Gas prices are fairly stable due to a generally
warm winter, increased production in the US, high storage levels in Europe, and stable oil prices.
In response to the extreme rise in the TTF price after Ukraine was invaded, the EU isconsidering developing new price indexes. As LNG is likely to replace Russian pipeline gas,
the new price indexes are expected to be driven by international LNG prices. However, TTF
and other European prices have emerged as a result of liberalization of gas market, particularly
unbundling of the gas businesses, and therefore it will not be easy to develop new indexes while
keeping the liberalized gas framework intact.
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the first oil crisis in 1973. What sets the current
energy crisis is that it involves not only oil but also natural gas and electricity, and requires therebuilding of energy security while tackling decarbonization, within the framework ofliberalized energy markets. As the West strives to break away from Russian oil and natural gas,
Japan’s longstanding goal of diversifying supply sources is becoming more important than ever,though the country still heavily depends on the Middle East. Developing resources in relatively
low-risk regions such as North America and Australia will become important for Japan, but inthe short to medium term, the Middle East will undoubtedly remain key supplier. Even in themedium and long term, the Middle East will remain a key energy trade partner for Japan,
considering not only oil and natural gas but also hydrogen and ammonia. Though Japan’s
demand for oil and natural gas is declining, it goes without saying that it must continue tostrengthen ties with key energy suppliers including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar,
especially when considering hydrogen and ammonia.

43. Update on Climate Change, Energy Conservation, and Renewable Energies
Takahiko TAGAMI, Senior Coordinator, Manager
Climate Change Group
Climate Change and Energy Efficiency Unit
On February 10, 2023, the Basic Policy for the Realization of GX (green transformation) wasapproved by the Cabinet. To secure the enormous funds required for investing in GX through publicprivate sector collaboration, the Basic Policy sets out, under the growth-oriented carbon pricing initiative,
three measures, including bold measures to support up-front investment (including investment stimulus
combining regulations and support) using GX economy transition bonds (tentative name). The plan is
to issue 20 trillion yen of GX economy transition bonds in total for 10 years starting in FY2023. The
bonds are backed by the proceeds from the carbon pricing system and will be issued each year within
an amount approved by the Diet.
On January 17, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed a faster and simpler
process for the European Commission to approve state aid by Member States, in a bid to counter the US
Inflation Reduction Act. She also stated that to support the clean tech transition at the EU-level, aEuropean Sovereignty Fund will be prepared. Behind the proposal to launch the European Sovereignty
Fund are (1) concerns expressed by smaller Member States that merely revising state aid rules will allow
only the largest EU states to support their domestic industries and create unfair competition in the EU
market, and (2) France and others are under pressure to cut their national debt, and therefore cannot
provide new funding for their industries and are supporting new EU-level measures. The Fund was
initially expected to be agreed upon at the European Council summit on February 9. However, theCouncil concluded that existing EU funds should be deployed in a more flexible manner, and only took
note of the Commission’s intention to propose a European Sovereignty Fund before summer 2023, due
to opposition from 10 Member States including Germany, which argued that the EU should not solicit
new contributions.
Meanwhile, the US government reached its debt limit of 31.4 trillion dollars on January 19, and the
Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund and the Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund began
to be used as extraordinary measures till June to prevent a default. If the debt limit is not raised inCongress, the government will need to reduce the budget and set priorities among social security,
Medicare, energy security and climate change, and so on.
The green growth strategies of Europe and the US are now at a financial crossroads.
There is growing concern over the raw materials that are essential for decarbonization technologies.
In the Transition Metals Outlook, Bloomberg NEF forecasted that the demand for key metals such ascopper and aluminum will grow five-fold by 2050 and their market value will triple. The prices of these
raw materials are currently rising: according to the IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP) 2023
released on January 12, the price of lithium, a raw material used to make rechargeable batteries, nearlyquadrupled from 2019 to 2022, while the prices of silicon and copper, which are used in solar panels,
have roughly doubled since 2020. A stable supply of raw materials is essential to prevent the clean
energy transition from slowing down.
ETP-2023 also analyzes the risks and opportunities surrounding the development of clean energy andtechnology supply chains in the years ahead. Aside from prices, ETP-2023 points out, including: (1) the
current supply chains of clean energy and technologies present risks in the form of high geographic
concentration of resource mining and processing as well as technology manufacturing, and (2) the
current global pipeline of announced projects would fall short of demand for wind components, heatpumps, and fuel cells.

54. Europe and US: European Gas Market in a Temporary Reprieve and Moves
Surrounding the IRA in the US
Ichiro KUTANI, Senior Research Fellow
Manager, Global Energy Group 1
Assistant to Managing Director, Strategy Research Unit
The European gas market has calmed somewhat. Although gas prices remain high, as a result of thewarm winter, sufficient underground gas storage levels, and China’s LNG demand remaining below
initial expectations, the price is around $20/MMBtu (at the time of writing). On the supply side, afloating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) arrived in Finland at the end of 2022, and Germany
began operating a new FSRU and signed a contract for another one in January. The volume of gas
imported from Russia (pipeline + LNG) has dropped greatly and accounted for only 16% of total gas
imports as of 3Q 2022, down 27% year-on-year. Europe is increasing imports from the US and others
to cover the shortfall, but the situation is now more reassuring because new import infrastructure willsoon commence operation. It is interesting to note that, in Germany, all FSRUs installed since the crisis
are managed by state-run companies. Germany is striving to improve its energy self-sufficiency throughenergy conservation and renewable energies. As such, FSRUs will eventually become unnecessary, andby putting them under the management of state-run companies, it will be easier for the government toexit the business. Perhaps this scheme was designed to not only launch LNG imports rapidly as an
emergency measure but also to facilitate a smooth exit in the future.
However, this scheme is not enough to guarantee the safety of the European gas market. The
Netherlands is considering closing a gas field in 2023, though not a big one. The drop in Russian pipelinegas exports will continue to cause the natural gas supply to tighten worldwide. Without additional LNG
supply sources, the supply crunch will continue and take several years to resolve. In addition, there is
the risk that rising natural gas demand in China may cause the supply-demand balance to further tighten
as businesses recover following the abandonment of the Zero-Covid policy. Large-scale LNG
production facilities are currently being installed or planned in Qatar and the U.S.; steady progress ishighly anticipated.
There are developments in the U.S. related to the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). For example, Google
and automakers GM and Ford announced that they will join forces to develop standards for virtual power
plants (VPP), whose business opportunities are expected to grow with the IRA. The small modular
reactors (SMRs) developed by US NuScale have received a standard design approval and are reportedly
likely to be eligible for IRA tax breaks when plants are actually built. There is growing attention on theimpact of the IRA on other countries. As stated by the CEO of Yara, a major Norwegian fertilizer
company that also handles ammonia, “the business environment of the US is better than Europe,”
companies are coolly weighing which region to invest in. Clean energy investment is certain to gain
momentum in the US driven by the enormous funds mobilized under the IRA.
Meanwhile, some point to labor shortages as an issue for clean energy investment. According to a
study by the University of Massachusetts Amherst, the IRA will create 9 million jobs in total in the nextten years. The labor market is currently rather tight, with an unemployment rate of 3.5% as of December
2022. Also, there are reports that average wages in the clean energy industry tend to be lower than in
the oil and natural gas industries. While the labor market is likely to adjust to structural changes inindustry over time, it may struggle to keep up with the rapid changes caused by the IRA, which poses a
risk.

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5. China: NEV Shift Accelerates, Sales May Surpass 10 Million Units This Year
Li ZHIDONG, Visiting Researcher
Professor at Graduate School
Nagaoka University of Technology
According to the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM), both automobile production
and sales (including exports) increased in 2022 to 27.02 million and 26.86 million units, up 3.4% and 2.1%,
respectively, both increasing for the second consecutive year. Of these numbers, the production of new energy
vehicles (NEVs: including EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs but not HVs) increased by 96.9% to 7.06 million units,
while sales grew by 93.4% to 6.89 million units (including 3.57 million EVs). The percentage of NEVs incar sales rose by 12.2 points to 25.6%, surpassing the government’s target of reaching 20% in 2025 by 5.6
points, three years earlier. Driven by last-minute purchases before the purchase subsidy introduced in 2009
ends in January 2023, 814,000 NEVs were sold in December 2022, accounting for 31.8% of the month’s car
sales. Meanwhile, annual sales of internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) fell by 12.2% to 19.98 million
units, declining for the fifth consecutive year after peaking in 2017 with 28.1 million units and falling below
20 million units for the first time in 10 years. The 50% cut in the acquisition tax for ICEVs introduced inJune 2022 was not sufficient to stem the move away from ICEVs; the accelerating shift to NEVs has driven
the growth of the auto market since 2021.
Behind this trend is the advantage of NEVs over ICEVs in China (refer to the November 2022 edition ofthis Newsletter). As a result of preferential treatment policies such as acquisition tax exemption and purchasesubsidies, as well as corporate efforts, the acquisition and ownership costs of NEVs are now estimated to be
20,000-50,000 yuan (1 yuan ≒ 20 yen) lower than those of gasoline vehicles. When gasoline prices surged
temporarily due to the Ukraine crisis, the cost of driving EVs dropped to 15% (normal charging) and 38%(rapid charging) compared with gasoline cars because electricity prices remained stable. The increasing
convenience of charging is also having a significant impact. According to the China Electric Vehicle Charging
Infrastructure Promotion Alliance and the Ministry of Public Security, the number of chargers rose to 5.21
million by the end of 2022, up 2.59 million units from the previous year, and the NEV fleet grew to 13.1
million units, up 5.26 million units year-on-year. The ratio of NEVs to chargers improved from 3 as of theend of 2021 to 2.5 on a stock basis and to 2 on an increment basis.
Meanwhile, the impact of growing exports resulting from higher international competitiveness cannot beignored. According to CAAM, the number of vehicles exported in 2022 increased by 54.4% year-on-year to
3.11 million units, and the number of NEVs increased by 199% to 679,000 units, with their share of the total
rising by 6.4 percentage points to 21.8%.
In 2023, there are concerns about the negative impact of the last-minute purchases at the end of last year
and the spread of Covid to rural areas resulting from the exodus of 2.1 billion people traveling to thecountryside during the Lunar New Year. Under such circumstances, CAAM forecasted that auto sales willgrow by 3% to 27.67 million units in 2023, of which NEV sales will expand by 35% to 9.3 million units.
Meanwhile, some expect that NEV sales may surpass 10 million units. The main reasons include (1) China’s
supply capacity of NEVs that stably meet diverse needs, (2) the compatibility of NEVs with autonomous
driving and ICT, and improved cost competitiveness, (3) higher convenience resulting from longer cruise
distance and more extensive charging infrastructure, (4) China’s economic recovery from 3% growth lastyear to 5%, and (5) an increase in exports to Japan and other countries due to higher brand recognition
overseas and improved international competitiveness. Also, (6) demand is expected to increase sharply insmaller cities and rural areas where cars can be charged at home. A survey of 2,000 respondents in 49 inland
cities by Fidelity International showed that 60% of car owners who are planning to replace the old car witha new car within a year, and 84% of potential new car purchasers who are planning to buy a new car within
a year, prefer a NEV (January 12).
Will NEV sales exceed 10 million in 2023? The strength of their sales, along with the impact of the rapid
spread of Covid and subsequent recovery, merit attention.

76. ME: Concerns about the New Israeli Coalition Government
Akiko YOSHIOKA
Senior Researcher, JIME Center
2023 marks the 50th anniversary of the 1970s oil crisis. In the early 1970s when global oil
demand was growing quickly, resource nationalism rose in the Middle Eastern countries
spurred by outcries against the West’s rule over their oil resources. This led to higher posted
prices of oil, greater participation in development projects as organizers, and nationalization.
When the Fourth Arab-Israeli War broke out in October 1973, Arab oil producers announced
an oil embargo against pro-Israel countries, sparking turmoil in many consumer countries
including Japan. The war ended in about a month, but the world was shocked to see oil being
used as a strategic product and realized that oil was now ruled by the oil producers, not the oil
majors.
Fifty years later, oil producers are once again at a turning point amid the global trend toward
decarbonization. Already, several oil producer countries have declared carbon neutrality goals
and are stepping up environmental measures, and the development and utilization of clean
energy have become key policy issues. Oil producers are also becoming more supportive of
higher prices as they need to secure oil revenues to ensure a smooth energy transition. Oil andgas producer countries are focusing on securing short- and medium-term investments to fully
utilize their oil and gas reserves. As the importance of Middle Eastern oil and gas comes under
the spotlight amid the Ukraine crisis, it is important for Japan’s energy security to support theinitiatives of these oil producers during their energy transition.
US-Saudi relations have been cooling since OPEC Plus decided on a major production cut
last October, but efforts are now being made to mend relations. In late December, theCommander of the United States Central Command emphasized that there has been behind-thescenes bilateral cooperation in formulating Saudi Arabia’s national and regional security policy.
Apparently, this has been prompted by rising Saudi-Iran tensions fueled by Iran suspecting
Saudi Arabia of involvement in the anti-government rallies by young protesters since lastSeptember. Although these rallies in Iran are weakening due to regulatory clampdowns, thesituation remains volatile. Furthermore, the clampdowns on protesters and the execution in
January of a British-Iranian dual national suspected of spying are hampering progress in the
nuclear deal talks between Iran and the West.
In Israel, the sixth Netanyahu government was inaugurated at the end of December following
the fifth general election in three and a half years. However, being a six-party coalition, thegovernment is unstable. To prevent the Supreme Court from invalidating the inauguration of
Minister of Interior and Health Aryeh Deri, who has received a suspended sentence, thegovernment has submitted a bill to revoke the Supreme Court’s decision. However, this bill iscausing controversy in politics and Israeli society as it threatens the democratic principle ofmutual independence of the three powers. Furthermore, Finance Minister Smotrich, who is also
a second Defense Minister in charge of civilian affairs, and National Security Minister BenGvir are both heads of ultra-right political parties. Their hardline stance toward Palestine may
fuel further volatility in the Middle East.

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7. Russia: Developments in Russia during the Transition to the Price Cap Mechanism
Sanae KURITA, Senior Researcher
Global Energy Group 2, Strategy Research Unit
Western countries critical of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine jointly introduced a price cap
mechanism for Russian oil. On December 27, 2022, President Putin signed a presidential decreebanning exports of oil and petroleum products to all foreign corporate and natural persons
directly or indirectly using this mechanism. Oil exports were banned immediately starting
February 1, 2023, while the ban on petroleum products will become effective on the datespecified by the government after the presidential decree takes effect. The ban will last for fivemonths through July 1, though the target countries other than the United States have not been
specified. However, there are also exemption clauses to the decree that allow Russian oil andpetroleum products to be supplied based on a special decision by the president.
Russia’s Ministry of Finance announced on January 18 that the balance of the National
Welfare Fund was $148.4 billion in dollar terms as of January 1, 2023 (equivalent to 7.8% of
the GDP forecast for the 2022-2024 federal budget), down $38.1 billion from the previous
month. The media has reported that the Russian government has drawn $35.1 billion from theFund in cash to cover the fiscal deficit last December (January 19, Reuters). Of the balanceremaining, only $87.2 billion or 4.6% of the GDP forecast are liquid assets (note by the Central
Bank of Russia: the funds in the account with the Bank). The Fund has been built byaccumulating part of the tax proceeds from the oil and gas sectors, but the balance has been
declining since peaking at $210.6 billion in May 2022.
The World Economic Situation and Prospects 2023 of the United Nations released on January
25 estimates Russia’s real GDP growth rate for 2022 at minus 3.5%, not plunging by minus 1015% despite initial forecasts. The report considered that the impact of the tighter economic
sanctions against Russia after it invaded Ukraine was alleviated by strong revenues from therapid growth of oil exports to China, India, and Turkey and the high oil prices, a stable banking
division, and the change in policy from the initial sharp monetary tightening to easing. The
report predicts that Russia’s real GDP growth in 2023 will be minus 2.9%.
According to the Central Bank (January 25), Russia’s current account balance was a surplus
of $227.4 billion for 2022, up 86% year-on-year and marking a record high. The trade surplus
grew to $282.3 billion as imports from the West shrank due to the sanctions, while foreign
currency continued to flow in from oil and natural gas exports (up 66% year-on-year from$170.1 billion). The Bank cited preliminary Eurostat data and said that oil and petroleum
product exports to the EU for October-December 2022 decreased 23% year-on-year, thatmarine transport to Northern Europe was closed, marine transport to Southern Europe decreased
to 200,000 barrels/day from December, and that the price cap mechanism banning the provisionof marine insurance has slowed Russia’s exports to Asia. Gas exports to the EU in OctoberDecember 2022 dropped 64% year-on-year but the decline was partially offset by larger gas
exports to China than the contracted amounts. The transitional period for the EU’s price cap
mechanism on Russian oil ended on January 19 and the mechanism will now be applied to
Russian petroleum products starting February 5. Will negative GDP growth be kept within
minus 2.5% in 2023 as President Putin hopes? The situation will continue to be watched.

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