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The Denuclearization of North Korea and the Restoration of Peace in the Korean Peninsula― Correct Perceptions and Eight Proposals on Japan’s North Korea Diplomacy
I. An Assessment of the US-North Korea Summit(Agreement on a large framework)
There are varied assessments of the June 12, 2018 US-North Korea Summit and of the Joint
Statement (“Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America andChairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit”)
derived from the Summit. The most predominant views are that the Summit and the Joint
Statement fell short of expectations that the US and North Korean leaders could reach someconcrete agreement on the denuclearization of North Korea, and that CVID (complete, verifiable
and irreversible denuclearization) might be referred to in the text of the Statement. As for the most
focal issue of North Korea’s denuclearization, the Summit barely included a short statement,“Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The Joint Statement maintains completesilence about the definition of “denuclearization,” a possible road map, or a specific timeline.
Although the Joint Statement does not include any reference to concrete procedures for North
Korea’s denuclearization, its significance lies in the fact that the document specifies a large
framework for the US-North Korea deal. The Joint Statement draws attention to its fourcommitment clauses.* However, the most important part of the document is the statement in apreceding paragraph, “President Trump committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK,
and Chairman Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” This represents a scheme of trading “security
guarantees” with “complete denuclearization.” Also important is that the Joint Statement specifies
the continuation of negotiations to implement the outcome of the bilateral Summit.
*Four Clauses of the US-North Korea Joint Statement
1. The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new US-DPRK relations in accordancewith the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity.
2. The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime
on the Korean Peninsula.
3. Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work towardcomplete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
4. The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including theimmediate repatriation of those already identified.”

The Singapore Summit was unprecedented and historic in the sense that the leaders of the twostates met for the first time and signed a joint statement. The United States and North Korea
concluded some agreements in the past --- the Geneva Agreement in October 1994 and the “LeapDay” Agreement in February 2012. Unfortunately, however, since those agreements lacked thecommitments of the state heads of the two nations, the contents of the agreements were not
implemented. Considering these past experiences, it is of a special significance that the US andNorth Korean leaders signed the Joint Statement in Singapore --- particularly that the North
Korean supreme leader himself signed the document.
(Time-consuming denuclearization process)
The Joint Statement suggests the trading of “complete denuclearization” with “security
guarantees,” but includes no reference to any specific procedures to achieve the goal. However, if,
as reported by the June 13 issue of “The Rodong Sinmun,” the United States and North Korea
shared the recognition of the importance of abiding by the principle of step-by-step andsimultaneous action, the future process of denuclearization would span long periods of time. It islargely up to relevant political leaders including President Trump to judge the completion of North
Korea’s denuclearization. There is much likelihood that the Trump administration will be driven
by a US domestic political timetable into declaring the achievement of denuclearization with acertain progress in a certain period of time. Secretary of State Pompeo said the denuclearizationof North Korea would be completed by January 2021 --- the end of the first term of the Trumpadministration ---, and that the denuclearization would be followed by a lasting and stable peace
regime on the Korean Peninsula --- a US-North Korea peace treaty or the normalization of
diplomatic relations between the two nations.**Secretary of State Pompeo’s press statement of September 19, 2018

The third paragraph of the Joint Statement reads: “(the two leaders recognize) that mutual
confidence building can promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” In other words,
both sides share a common recognition that the realization of the Peninsula’s denuclearization

would be difficult without confidence-building between the United States and North Korea.
(Security guarantees and peace regime)
The two leaders share the awareness that they have made “a new start” at the June 12 Summit, butthere is a discrepancy in recognition between them about how to proceed with the future process.
For the international community including the United States, the issue of North Korean
denuclearization is the focal point of the process. For North Korea, on the other hand, the primaryissue is peacebuilding in the Korean Peninsula inclusive of security guarantees.
Concrete measures for North Korean “security guarantees” may be discussed in three different
dimensions --- a political guarantee, a military guarantee, and an economic guarantee. Principal
measures under each of the three categories may be summed up as below.* In the future processof North Korea’s denuclearization, these measures will be implemented along with thedenuclearization efforts of North Korea. When “security guarantees” are realized, the “complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” will also be completed --- North Korea seems toenvisage such a development of events as the establishment of a “peace regime” in the Korean
Peninsula.
*North Korean Security Guarantees, according to the categorization by Moon Chung-in, South
Korean Special Advisor on Unification, Diplomacy and National Security Affairs
Political guarantee:
Normalization of the US-North Korea relations (Step-by-step measures from the creation of aliaison office to the establishment of diplomatic ties) / Step-by-step multilateral measures froma declaration of ending the Korean War to a peace treaty
Military guarantee:
Suspension of US-ROK joint military drills / Non-deployment of strategic weapons around the
Korean Peninsula / a US-North Korea non-aggression agreement / a downward review of the
USFK presence
Economic guarantee:
Relaxation and cancellation of economic sanctions (both United Nations Security Council
resolution sanctions and member states’ independent sanctions) / Economic cooperation andsupport by foreign countries / North Korea’s admission to international organizations (IMF,
World Bank, etc.) and relevant support to that end

(The Joint Statement and the Panmunjom Declaration --- an inseparable set)In the process of implementation of the Joint Statement, the Panmunjom Declaration signed by
the two Korean leaders on April 27, 2018 is to also be implemented. We can learn this from thefact that the US-North Korea Joint Statement refers to the complete denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula by reaffirming the Panmunjom Declaration.
The content of the Panmunjom Declaration consists of the following three pillars.*(1) Promote common prosperity and reunification of Korea through dramatic improvement anddevelopment of inter-Korean relations.
(2) Elimination of military tension and substantial elimination of war risk.
(3) Establishing a permanent, solid peace regime for the Korean Peninsula.
Particularly, the third pillar, or the building of a permanent, solid peace regime, encompasses
gradual disarmament, a declaration of ending the Korean War, and a peace treaty --- the most vital
topics related to the North Korean relations with South Korea and the United States.
*Three Pillars of the Panmunjom Declaration(1) Promote common prosperity and reunification of Korea through dramatic improvement anddevelopment of inter-Korean relations.
1) Implement all existing agreements and declarations adopted between the two sides thus far. 2)
Hold dialogue and negotiations in various fields including at high level, and take practicalmeasures for the implementation of the agreements reached at the inter-Korean summit. 3)
Establish a joint liaison office in the Gaeseong region. 4) Encourage more active cooperation,exchanges, visits and contacts at all levels. 5) Resolve the humanitarian issues that resulted fromthe division of the country, and to solve various issues including the reunification of separated
families. 6) Implement the projects previously agreed to in the October 4 Declaration (issued fromthe 2007 inter-Korean summit), in order to promote balanced economic growth and co-prosperityof the nation.
(2) Elimination of military tension and substantial elimination of war risk
1) Transform the DMZ into a peace zone. 2) Devise a practical plan to turn the areas around theNorthern Limit Line in the West Sea into a maritime peace zone. 3) Ensure active mutual
cooperation, exchanges, visits and contacts, and hold frequent meetings between military
authorities.
(3) Establishing a permanent Korean Peninsula peace regime

1) Reaffirm the Non-Aggression Agreement. 2) Carry out disarmament in a phased manner, as
military tension is reduced and substantial progress is made in military confidence-building. 3)
Pursue during the year 2018 trilateral meetings or quadrilateral meetings with a view to declaring
an end to the Korean War, turning the Korean Armistice Agreement into a peace treaty, andestablishing a permanent and solid peace regime. 4) Confirm the common goal of realizing,through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

The Pyongyang Declaration issued on September 19, 2018 after the third 2018 North-South Korea
Summit went further than the Panmunjom Declaration. President Trump made favorable remarks
on it.
(Japan’s Response 1 – Engage in North Korean security guarantees to solve thedenuclearization issue by diplomacy)
The meaning of “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” has yet to be defined.
The states concerned share a recognition that it would take North Korea a considerable
length of time to dismantle its nuclear program. The current process, if destroyed
prematurely without reaching the goal, would bring about the danger of allowing North
Korea to make their possession of nuclear weapons an accomplished fact. The longer time
elapses without completing the North Korean denuclearization, the more danger we will faceof eventually neighboring with a nuke-armed North Korea, never being free from the main
source of our security anxiety. Above all, it is necessary to immediately take actions fordenuclearization against North Korea’s nuclear developments past and present.
It is difficult to realize the denuclearization of North Korea by means of sanctions andpressure alone; it could not be realized unless combined with North Korea’s security
guarantees. Japan should actively engage in North Korea’s security guarantees depending
on its behavior, and seek the solution of the problem through diplomacy. We will have tocollaborate not only with the United States but also with South Korea, China, Russia, etc.,
and pursue diplomatic efforts, foreseeing a direct dialogue with North Korea.
II. From the Viewpoint of Japan’s National Security(Keep watch over North Korea’s further actions)
The denuclearization of North Korea should be discussed from the viewpoint that it is one of themost urgent issues concerning Japan’s national security.
Many people point out the ambiguity of the June 12 Joint Statement. However, the largest problem
is that the leaders of the United States and North Korea came up with an agreement which
represents a substantial regression from the previous agreements. Noteworthy is the fact that theagreement was reached after North Korea’s declaration of her “completion of nuclear power.” A
few years after a North-South leaders talks in 2000, North Korea declared her withdrawal fromthe NPT; and in the year following the Six-Party Talks in 2005, North Korea conducted its firstnuclear test. Such painful experiences in the past lead us to keep a closer watch over North Korea’s
future actions.
(The importance of the USFK)What is of utmost importance in relation to the Japan-US alliance and with the regional security
structure is the USFK (United States Forces Korea) issue. It is quite clear that the mission of the
USFK is to serve as deterrence against North Korea. We should note two things in this context.
First, the USFK is the only US military presence in the continental Asia, and it has a major impact
on the balance of power in East Asia as a whole. Second, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
United States and the Republic of Korea extends its coverage to the Pacific area and is not confinedto the Korean Peninsula. This is why Japan’s awareness about the importance of the USFK military
is serious.
In this sense, Japan’s recognition that “the security of South Korea is vital for the safety of Japan
itself” in Article 4 of the Japan-US Joint Statement between Prime minister Sato and President
Nixon dated November 1969, and Japan-US bilateral recognition that “the security of South Korea
is critical for maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula and the maintenance of peace on the
Korean Peninsula is essential to the peace of Asia including Japan” in Article 3 of the Joint
Announcement to the press issued from the Miki-Ford talks in August 1975, are all still valid
today.
(Japan’s Response 2 - Address the changing security environment of the Korean Peninsula
and transition to a peace regime)
In addition to paying attention to North Korea’s denuclearization process, Japan should
focus more than ever its concern on the process of establishing a peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula. If the state of armistice from the Korean War comes to an end and a peace treaty

is concluded to replace the present Armistice Agreement, the current order in the Korean
Peninsula lasting for 65 years will shift to a new one. Although this is basically a desirable
move, we will face yet another question of addressing the state of instability and uncertainty
accompanying an orderly transition period. Furthermore, turning the Korean ArmisticeAgreement into a peace treaty would entail a complex process of coordinating interests
involving South and North Korea, the United States and China. There is a possibility thatduring the transition period, international politics in Northeast Asia will be characterized
by tension.
To safeguard its security, Japan should prepare for the following three developments:
First, if the military tension in the Korean Peninsula is reduced in the mid- to long-term, theUnited States and South Korea will eventually have to consider a downward review of the
USFK’s quantitative and qualitative presence. The downsizing of the USFK presence might
not only entail the instability of the regional situation but an increase in Japan’s security
expenses.
Second, the conclusion of a peace treaty between South and North Korea is highly likely toresult in the dismantlement of the United Nations Command (UNC), which oversees theimplementation of the Armistice Agreement. In that case, the role and raison d’être of theseven UN-designated bases in Japan, including UNC-Rear at Yokota Air Base, will undergoa review.
Third, a transformation of the ROK-US Combined Defense System will take place alongwith the above. The latter half of 2000s witnessed full-scale preparations for transferring
OPCON (wartime operational control) of the Korean army to the Korean side. Once the
OPCON transfer has been realized, the chain of command of the US and South Koreanarmies will alter a great deal, and the ROK-US Combined Forces Command will likely bedissolved as parts of reform efforts.
These three changes can be said to represent a major transformation of the security
mechanism in Northeast Asia which has been in existence for nearly 70 years. The
transformation will call for a full review of Japan’s security policy. In addition, if a Korean
Peninsula peace regime has the possibility of becoming a reality, Japan will be asked adifficult question on how to help build the regime or, in other words, what contribution itwill make toward peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. It is time that Japan
should prepare her answer to this question and be ready for action at any time.
(Continuance of deterrence and sanctions)
At the China-North Korea summit held in May 2018, Chairman Kim Jong-un said that if hostile
policies toward North Korea and threats to its security are dropped, there will be no need for North
Korea to retain nuclear weapons and that North Korea wishes that the countries concerned shouldtake step-to-step and concurrent measures. It is unimaginable that North Korea will accept thedenuclearization unconditionally; nonetheless, it is necessary to carefully and patiently observe
whether these remarks of Kim Jong-un suggest a fundamental change in North Korea’s position.
Japan should continue to maintain pressure through deterrence and sanctions, without loosening
her basic policy.
If North Korea had really “completed” its nuclear force and furnished itself with ICBMs, the timeleft for us to respond to a potential crisis would be extremely limited. And we cannot be optimistic
about the possibility of a short-time solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. Japan, theUnited States and the international community will have to fight a “cold war” with North Korea
over a long period of time. Effective sanctions of a kind should be implemented that would makeNorth Korea aware that nuclear weapons will not guarantee its existence. Japan should prepare
her own contingency plan to address contingencies in the Korean Peninsula, which should beconstrued as part of deterrence efforts in the sense that it represents Japan resolution.
(Japan’s Response 3 - Strengthen the Japan-US alliance and the US extended deterrence)
The most fundamental point in this context is to strengthen the Japan-US alliance. Thenfollowing three points should be taken into consideration.
First, policy coordination between the United States and Japan is a must. In other words,
some input from Japan will be essential to help the United States to formulate a proper North
Korea policy. There was an increase in an almost excessive expectation around the world for
the US-North Korea Summit, because there had been expectations for the United States asa sensible nation --- not for Trump. Some concrete measures should be taken to dissuade theUnited States under the spell of the America-firstism from weakening its soft power; fromjeopardizing the alliances, and from destabilizing the world.
Secondly, the improvement in the credibility of the US extended deterrence is required morethan ever. It is a truism that the United States and Japan are important allies for each other,
but they are different, independent states. How could Japan ever possibly entirely depend
upon the US extended deterrence? Now that North Korea has virtually succeeded in its
ICBM development, the Japanese government should help improve the credibility of the US
extended deterrence through measures intelligible to the public.
Thirdly, what is necessary to improve the reliability of the United States from the Japanese
viewpoint is to enhance the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. alliance through strengthening theJapan-US joint defense posture by increasing the role of Japan. As long as the threat ofNorth Korean missile attacks is hanging over us, we must not relax efforts of upgrading ourown critical functions including missile defense. Regarding Japan’s counter-attack
capability, we should conceptualize it as a medium- to long-term challenge, while
concurrently pursuing efforts to acquire the capability.
These efforts will eventually support diplomatic solutions.
(Japan’s response 4 – Moratorium of military options)
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 obliged the United States to consider thecontainment of the Soviet Union primarily in military terms, but in today’s international
community, a similar idea would not be endorsed even in the case of North Korea. In
addition, military options are not readily rewarded by expected achievements, nor do they
fail to have a quite serious impact not only on Japan’s security but on the United States’. For
this reason, Japan is in a position to dissuade the United States from exercising military
power in the last resort.
We should recognize the limitations of a policy based on pressure, as well as the likelihoodthat pressure-based diplomacy will function instead. The present developments can be viwed
as such.
(Japan’s response 5 - Establishment of Japan-South Korea cooperative relations)South Korean President Moon Jae-in stated that he has pursued his efforts so that Japanand South Korea can overcome their historical issues in a sensible manner; meanwhile, he
has consistently adopted a position to promote a future-oriented cooperation, separatelyfrom their historical issues. It is Japan that has so far advocated such a two-track approach.
Amidst the current movements surrounding the North Korean problem, Japan and SouthKorea should make utmost efforts to solve their long-standing historical issues. Since bothcountries are US allies, their coordinated efforts will lead to strengthening the Japan-US andthe South Korea-US alliances as well as the US presence and its engagement in this region -- all of which will greatly help the solution of the North Korean issues.
For solution of the North Korean issues, including the abduction issue, it is imperative forJapan to strengthen ties and to establish a cooperative system with South Korea.
III. Moves in the Countries Concerned(The Trump administration’s peculiar way of decision-making)
At the White House the year 2018 began with the resignation in January of Dina Habib Powell,Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy. Director of the National Economic Council Gary
Cohn, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster, and WhiteHouse Staff Secretary Rob Porter, all of whom tried to bring President Trump nearer to the
traditional Republican realistic line, also departed the White House. The summit meetings withDPRK Chairman Kim Jong-un and Russian President Putin were decided by President Trump
without consultation with his advisors and cabinet members.
On June 12, a historic US-North Korea summit meeting took place in Singapore. President Trump
and Kim Jong-un, chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party, signed a joint statement. Much concern
is expressed about President Trump’s distinctive “deal” style of doing things, but at the same time
there is also a recognition and expectation that the Trump administration has succeeded in reachinga starting point, which conventional diplomatic approaches of the past administrations could not.
It should be appreciated that the United States and North Korea have actually started negotiations
at the recent Summit and agreed on security guarantees for North Korea in exchange for thedenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. President Trump’s timetable for policy implementationis quite short-lived. The Trump administration has, therefore, limited the negotiating period to theend of its first term, as indicated by Secretary of State Pompeo to North Korea. This is what Japan
can endorse.
On the other hand, if North Korea is capable of making a reasonable judgement, there is no reason
for them to miss the offered opportunity. For North Korea, President Trump, confident of his “deal”
diplomacy, is a valuable gateway to negotiations, and at the same time he might be the only person
to negotiate with on the issue of security guarantees.

It is hard to imagine that President Trump will spend much time in negotiations with North Korea
on denuclearization. On the contrary, there is a good possibility that he should conduct
negotiations intensively within a limited space of time to achieve the goal. Realistically, however,it will be a decisive step toward the denuclearization of North Korea rather than the completion of
the denuclearization.
(Japan’s Response 6 – Take actions taking into account future developments including the
progress of the US-North Korea talks)
It is of paramount importance for Japan not to miss the timing for a solution of the abduction
issue. For Japan, the regional security balance is also another point of consideration. Japan
should take into account the possibility that the US-North Korea talks will make accelerated
progress, and should work out effective responses to move on to action accordingly.
Given the singularity of the Trump administration, there may emerge a possible scenario of
new military tensions resulting from the suspension of negotiations. Taking broadly into
account future developments, Japan should formulate effective responses to address a widearray of possible scenarios. (See Japan’s Responses 1 to 5.)(China and North Korea agree on the denuclearization and the restoration of peace in the Korean
Peninsula against the background of historical amicable relations)
The following four points are important regarding the relationship between North Korea and China.
First, China is North Korea’s most important trading partner and donor, and this made China thechairman of the Six-Party Talks. For China, losing economic ties with North Korea means losing
influence over the Korean Peninsula.
Secondly, the relationship between China and North Korea is that of Socialist states, so it is athree-part relationship of party/military/government, rather than one of normal diplomatic
relations.
Thirdly, China is not against the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and United Nations
resolutions, because it is one of the permanent members of the Security Council and it obtains
benefits from the NPT regime. At the same time, China was a party involved in the Korean War.
Lastly, it serves the national interest of China that US troops stationed in South Korea would be
cut and withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese government supports North Korea atpresent because they believe its support serves China’s national interest.

Since Kim Jong-un succeeded to power in 2011, North Korea repeated its missile launch
experiments and nuclear tests, and China-North Korea relations temporarily stagnated. Basically,
however, the friendly traditional relations of the two countries have been maintained. There
gradually strategic elements were woven. When Kim Jong-un visited China in March 2018, Xi
Jinping stated: “China-North Korea traditional friendship is an important legacy which former
leaders of the CCP and the KWP formed and developed.” With this statement, he emphasized the
tradition and the right strategy to take “based on the tradition and reality.” Xi also revealed to Kim
four points to consider, which were to be referred to as “Four Principles.”**Four Principles: 1) to continue summit meetings, 2) effective use of the traditional legacy, thestrategic communications, 3) high promotion of peace, and 4) to foster the friendship based on
public opinion.

On May 8, 2018, Kim Jong-un visited China again and held talks with Xi Jinping in Dalian. Kim
insisted on the importance of traditional friendship, while Xi admired Kim’s efforts toward thestabilization of the Korean Peninsula and supported the Peninsula’s denuclearization and the USNorth Korean talks. Kim stated that “denuclearization is feasible, if hostile policies toward North
Korea and the threat to its security disappear.” This was North Korea’s basic point of view.
The Chinese government has proposed two plans regarding the problems on the Korean Peninsula.
The first plan is that the United States suspends its large scale military exercises while North Korea
stops the development of nuclear weapons. The other is to advance the two processes together --the denuclearization and the peace process. As North Korea is amenable to the Chinese proposal,
the Chinese government seems to have decided to provide its active support to North Korea interms of the denuclearization and the restoration of peace in the Korean Peninsula; economic
development, and the improvement of the people’s livelihood, while emphasizing the special
relationship of the two countries, employing the word ‘tradition’ to embellish the bilateral relations.
After the June 12 US-North Korea Summit in Singapore, the Chinese spokesman praised the resultof the summit as it was exactly what the Chinese government proposed. Regarding the United
Nations’ economic sanction against North Korea, China claimed the necessity for a gradualsuspension or reconsideration.

(Japan’s response 7 – Explore cooperation with China)
China has been consistently claiming to concurrently advance the denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula and the peace process. It can be said that the US-North Korea Summit
and the subsequent process are in line with this claim. Although the relationship between
China and North Korea was temporarily stagnant, it has been firmly maintained based on
the friendly traditional relationship between the two countries. China served as the chair of
the Six-Party Talks which are now suspended. If the conference be resumed, it is desirable
for Japan. There are hard-to-overlook differences between China and Japan regarding
recognition about the threats of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles. Nonetheless,to solve the North Korean problem and the abduction issue --- a top priority agenda item forJapan ---, Japan should strengthen cooperative relations with China, a key actor along with
the United States.
(EU states and Russia --- Pressure and Critical Engagement --- and the Resumption of the Six
Party Talks)
Currently, 26 out of 28 EU member states excluding France and Estonia have diplomatic relations
with North Korea. The EU takes an approach of “Critical Engagement” toward North Korea --an approach which requires of the North strict efforts of denuclearization, while criticizing North
Korea’s repeated missile and nuclear tests.
At the same time, however, the EU’s continued diplomatic efforts prevent such tensions fromleading to war. In September 2017, a group of seven EU member states --- the United Kingdom,
Germany, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria --- held official talks twicewith the North in Pyongyang.
Given that the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear problem is a non-proliferation issue affecting
significantly the entire international community, the United Kingdom and France, permanent
members of the UN Security Council, can be said to have a limited yet a noticeable influence overthe situation. While welcoming the US-North Korea Summit, the UK categorically emphasizes
the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula based on CVID.
The French government which does not have diplomatic relations with North Korea has been
consistently harsh toward North Korea because of, among other things, the abject human rights
situation in North Korea. Wary of an easy compromise with the North, President Macron said,“The international community must maintain its unity for tough talks with North Korea to pavethe way for a denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
Along with Japan, Russia as a member of the Six-Party Talks has agreed to CVID. Mikhail Galuzin,
Russian Ambassador to Japan, expressed clearly that CVID is desirable. He remarked as follows:
Russia demands complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
The Six-Party Talks is the optimum venue to hold concrete discussion to realize CVID, because
all the stakeholders --- North and South Korea, the United States, China, Russia and Japan --participated in the talks and achieved some positive results in the past. It is not until the Six-Party
Talks are held following the US-North Korea talks that peace and stability will be established in
the region. The Russian government shows some understanding to the Japanese government
position of taking a hard-lined attitude toward North Korea, but prefers to take a more moderate
approach.
(North Korea and Russia)
North Korea was established as a state amidst the anti-Japan warfare of the Soviet Red Army (the25th Division) and the Soviet occupation of the portion of the Korean Peninsula north of the 38th
parallel. The Korean War was initiated on June 25, 1950 by Kim Il-sung with the approval of
Stalin and Mao Zedong. Since the Soviet Union did not participate directly in the war, it did not
become a signatory country to the ceasefire agreement. The Soviet Union had the intention of
acquiring uranium resources in North Korea that were then in short supply at home. After the
downfall of the Soviet Union, China and the Soviet Union recognized South Korea. However,Japan and the United States did not agree to a cross-recognition of North Korea. Moreover, as thethen Yeltsin administration adopted a pro-South Korea policy, the North resorted to thedevelopment of nuclear weapons and missiles. This eventually led to a nuclear crisis in 1994.
Subsequently, Russia came to advocate a North-South balance of power in the Korean Peninsula,and concluded with the North a Good-Neighborly Friendship, Cooperation Treaty in 2000, toreplace an alliance treaty that had already expired.
Russia heightened its eastward shift after the 2004 border demarcation with China. Seeing that theUnited States would not exclude military options from its responses to the North Korean nuclear
crisis, China and Russia have jointly proposed a step-by-step solution and called for the
resumption of the six-party talks (July 2017). Now that the United States and North Korea haveagreed to the complete denuclearization of North Korea, the next step will be CVID of North

Korea’s nuclear program --- verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement. On the other hand, it
will be necessary for the international community to provide economic aid for North Korea. In
such a situation, Russia’s engagement will be meaningful, for Russia may be able to play animportant international role in, among other areas, the control of warheads. The framework of
economic cooperation agreed upon in the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration will be ofimportance for Russia to become involved in the solution of the North Korean energy problem
and in the reconstruction of the North Korean economy. If it becomes possible for Japan to be
involved in pipeline transportation of energy resources that is Russia’s specialty, and in NorthSouth Korean cooperation in the railway project, Japan will contribute to the rapid elimination of
the North-South gap and the development of infrastructure such as railroads, ports and harbors.
(Japan’s Response 8 – Resumption of the Six-Party Talks in tandem with human rights
diplomacy)
The major actors addressing North Korea’s nuclear development are indisputably theUnited States, China, North and South Korea. Both Russia and Japan are also member statesof the Six-Party Talks, and historically they have been concerned with and involved in issues
in the Korean Peninsula. However they actually exert no more than limited influence. Japanneeds to be deeply involved with this problem. The best option for Japan is to restore theSix-Party Talks. In this respect, since Japan’s interests basically coincide with those of Russia,
Japan should explore a close cooperation with Russia by narrowing their differences
concerning the denuclearization process. The two countries’ effective cooperation would also
be indispensable to advance security guarantees for North Korea.
Since Japan is aligned with EU countries, especially the UK and France, as for North Korea
strategy of “pressure and critical engagement,” Japan should strengthen cooperative
relations with those countries. In particular, France has been consistently harsh toward
North Korea because of, among other things, the abject human rights situation in North
Korea. Wary of an easy compromise with the North, President Macron said, “Theinternational community must maintain its unity for tough talks with North Korea to pave
the way for a denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Regarding the abduction issue,
relying on President Trump’s deal diplomacy alone is not rational. Rather, cooperation withcountries that emphasize human rights like France would be extremely effective. To promote
the denuclearization of North Korea, the unity of the international community is important,and to this end Japan should advance cooperation with the EU countries and Russia.
September 2018
Society of Security and Diplomatic Policy Studies
Masahiro Akiyama
Yuichi Hosoya
Ken Jinbo
Matake Kamiya
Shin Kawashima
Junya Nishino
Makoto Ogata
Kazumasa Oguro
Bonji Ohara
Masao Okonogi
Nobuo Shimotomai
Hideshi Tokuchi
Tsuneo Watanabe