Hunger Hotspots
FAO‑WFP early warnings
on acute food insecurity
October 2022 to January 2023 Outlook

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKREQUIRED CITATIONWFP and FAO. 2022. Hunger Hotspots. FAO‑WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity:
October 2022 to January 2023 Outlook. Rome.
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion on the partof the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) or the World Food Programme (WFP), concerning the legal or development
status of any territory, country, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
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All rights reserved. Reproduction and dissemination of material in this information product for educational or other non‑commercial uses areauthorized without any prior written permission from the copyright holders provided the source is fully acknowledged. Reproduction of material
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should be addressed to the Director, Communications Advocacy and Marketing Division, e‑mail: wfp.publications@wfp.org.
Cover Photo: © WFP/Samantha Reinders, Kabasa Health Center, Dolow, Gedo Region, Somalia, 2022
Photo page vi: © WFP/ Brian Sokol, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mole refugee camp, Equateur Province, 21 January 2015
FAO and WFP encourage the dissemination of the material contained in this publication on condition that reference is made to the source.
The report is developed jointly by the FAO Global Information Early Warning System Team (GIEWS), FAO Office of Emergencies andResilience (OER), FAO regional and country offices, WFP Emergency Operations Division (EME), WFP Research, Assessment and Monitoring
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© WFP and FAO, 2022

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HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKContents
iv

Early warning hunger hotspots (October 2022 to January 2023)v

Acronymsvii

Executive summary

01

Introduction

03

Upcoming trends of acute food insecurity drivers

09

Highest concern: Hotspots with catastrophic conditions

13

Very high concern: Hotspots with deteriorating critical conditions

15

Other countries requiring monitoring

17

Country narratives

17

Asia and the Pacific20

Latin America and the Caribbean

22West Africa and the Sahel

26

East Africa

31

Southern Africa

35

Near East, North Africa and Europeiii

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOK

Early warning hunger hotspots
October 2022 to January 2023
Key drivers and aggravating factors
Displacement

Conflict/insecurity
Flood

Political instability/unrest

Dry conditions

Economic shocks

Tropical cyclone
REGIONAL RISK

Sahel(Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger)

Syrian Arab
Republic

Pakistan

Sudan
Haiti

Yemen

REGIONAL RISK

Somalia

Central America(Guatemala and Honduras)

Ethiopia

Nigeria
Central African Republic

Kenya

Hotspots of highest concern1
Hotspots of very high concern2
Hotspots of high concern

3

Sri Lanka

South Sudan

Democratic Republicof the Congo

1

Afghanistan

Madagascar
Malawi
Zimbabwe

This category includes hotspots already with populations in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5), as well as hotspots at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions. At risk are those hotspots where an extremely vulnerable population in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is facing

severe aggravating factors – especially access constraints – that indicate a further deterioration and possible occurrence of Catastrophic conditions in the outlook period. Per definition, this category also includes hotspots with Famine or Risk of Famine.
2

These are hotspots with sizeable populations – over 500 000 people – estimated or projected to be in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity or identified as severely food insecure as per WFP’s Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security(CARI) or remote CARI (rCARI)methodology; or hotspots with more than 10 percent of the analysed population in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or severely food insecure, and at least 50 percent of the population analysed. In the included countries, life‑threatening conditions are
expected to further intensify in the outlook period.
3

Other countries, in which acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate further during the outlook period, and which were identified as hunger hotspots.

Source of data: FAO and WFP. 2022. Hunger Hotspots analysis (October 2022 to January 2023). Source of map: United Nations. 2020. Map of the World. Cited 20 September 2022. www.un.org/geospatial/content/map‑world
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these map(s) in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO and WFP concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, orconcerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. Dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan.
The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Sudan and South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

iv

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKAcronyms

CARI

Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security

rCARI

remote Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security

CH

Cadre Harmonisé

FAO

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FEWS NET

Famine Early Warning Systems Network

GAM

Global acute malnutrition

HRP

Humanitarian Response Plan

IDP

Internally displaced person

IMF

International Monetary Fund

IPC

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification

NSAG

Non‑state armed group

LGA

Local government area

SNNPR

Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region

WASH

Water, sanitation and hygiene

WFP

World Food Programmev

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OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKHUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKExecutive summary
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

people already acutely food insecure. Overall, in 2022, 20.4 million(FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) warn that acute foodpeople were estimated to be acutely food insecure and in need ofinsecurity is likely to deteriorate further in 19 countries or situations

urgent assistance; this included more than 13 million food‑insecure– called hunger hotspots – during the outlook period from Octoberpeople in northern Ethiopia.

2022 to January 2023.

Record‑high acute food insecurity in Nigeria, projected at

Acute food insecurity globally continues to escalate. According to19.5 million people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) up

the recently published Global Report on Food Crisis 2022 Mid-year

to August, is likely to persist during the outlook period, despite theUpdate, up to 205 million people are expected to face acute foodend of the lean season. Importantly, the vast majority of criticallyinsecurity and to be in need of urgent assistance (IPC/CH Phase 3

food‑insecure people (CH Phase 4) are in conflict‑affected states,or above or equivalent) in 45 countries. If additional data from latest

where access to life‑saving assistance remains challenging. Almost

available analysis of 2021 is included for 8 countries and territories,

half of these people (43 percent) are in communities currently

this number is estimated to reach up to 222 million people in 53

inaccessible to humanitarian groups, in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe

countries/territories covered by the GRFC 2022. This is the highest

states.xxi In 2022, 1 million people nationally are estimated to be in

number recorded in the seven-year history of the report. Aroundareas inaccessible to international humanitarian groups.

45 million people in 37 countries are projected to have so little to eatthat they will be severely malnourished, at risk of death or alreadyfacing starvation and death (IPC/CH Phase 4 and above). This
includes 970 000 people projected to face Catastrophic conditions(IPC/CH Phase 5) in 2022, if no action is taken.

In Somalia, a likely fifth below‑average rainy season, combined withhigh food prices and persistent conflict, is rapidly driving an extreme
deprivation of food, with parts of Bay region likely to experience
Famine in the context of critical gaps in funding levels to support
humanitarian assistance in the last quarter of the year. Several otherAfghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia and Yemen

areas of central and southern Somalia are projected to face anremain at the highest alert level, as they all have populations facing

increased Risk of Famine between October and December. Overall,or projected to face starvation (Catastrophe, IPC Phase 5) or at

6.7 million people are expected to face high levels of acute foodrisk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions as they haveinsecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) between October and December

already critical food insecurity (Emergency, IPC Phase 4) and are2022, including 2.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and at

facing severe aggravating factors. These countries require the mostleast 300 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

urgent attention.

In South Sudan, a fourth‑consecutive year of flooding is a major

In Afghanistan, the severity of food insecurity suggests thatconcern because most people estimated to face starvation

significant loss of life may already be occurring in the outlook(IPC Phase 5) are located in the flood‑prone areas, in counties inperiod, as nearly 6 million people are expected to be in Emergency

Jonglei, Lakes and Unity states, and Greater Pibor. Coupled withconditions (IPC Phase 4) by November. After this, the risk of extreme

macroeconomic challenges and impacts of prolonged conflict,food insecurity and significant loss of life will likely grow, as anothernew floods are expected to keep food insecurity at extreme levels,

harsh winter coincides with the lean season. In the last lean season,outbalancing the beneficial effects of a forthcoming harvesting

the IPC reported that 20 000 people faced starvation in central

period.

highlands regions – the first time that Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5)
results were reported since the introduction of IPC in the country.

In Yemen, the outlook on food insecurity is expected to be less grim
than the 19 million people projected at the beginning of 2022 to

In Ethiopia, while more people have become acute food insecure inreach Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3

Tigray since November 2021, humanitarian access has stalled again

and above) by the end of the year. Some assumptions for thesedue to renewed hostilities. In the absence of updated IPC analysis

projections – that conflict would intensify and humanitarianin Ethiopia, recent WFP assessments have indicated an increase

assistance would significantly reduce due to insufficient funding —of food insecurity inside Tigray. The situation remains of highest

were disproved while the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine on theconcern as the drivers behind the risk of famine warning issued ininternational markets had not been fully considered in the analysis.

2021 continue to prevail. The Famine Review Committee warned ofCurrently, the IPC analysis is being updated.

a Risk of Famine in Tigray through December 2021, driven by limited
humanitarian assistance, intense conflict levels and low availabilityof commercial goods and services. In addition, concerns over severe
levels of acute food insecurity in Amhara and Afar remain high due
to continued insecurity and conflict, impeding humanitarian access.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kenya, the Sahelregion, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic remain of very highconcern, as in the previous edition of this report. In this edition, thealert is extended to the Central African Republic and Pakistan. All
these hotspots have a high number of people facing critical acute

In southern and eastern Ethiopia, a fifth consecutive failed rainy

food insecurity, coupled with worsening drivers that are expected toseason will be aggravating the most severe drought in recent history,

further intensify life‑threatening conditions in the coming months.

further compromising the fragile livelihoods of almost 10 millionvii

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Guatemala, Honduras, and Malawi have been added in the list of
hotspot countries, since the June 2022 edition. Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe
and Madagascar remain hunger hotspots.
Organized violence and conflict remain the primary drivers of
acute hunger, with key trends indicating that they both continued
to increase in 2022. Moreover, weather extremes such as tropicalstorms, flooding and drought remain critical drivers in some regions.
Of particular concern, the drought in the Horn of Africa, alreadypersisting for two years, is highly likely to further worsen due to alooming unprecedented fifth poor rainy season.
On the economic front, elevated global prices for hydrocarbons andagricultural commodities continue to cause increases in domestic
food and energy prices. Monetary‑tightening measures enacted bynumerous central banks – including major advanced economies –to curb rising inflation rates have enhanced the cost of credit andcurbed financial inflows directed towards developing countries.
Combined with growing risks of recession, or a significant slowdown
in major economies such as the European Union and China, these
dynamics are boosting macroeconomic risks for developing
economies. This is in turn causing increasing difficulties for several
countries in financing the import of essential items and servicing
their debt loads, which for many economies have increased rapidly
over the last decade. Many governments are compelled to introduce
austerity measures that affect households’ incomes and purchasing
power. As a result, poverty and acute food insecurity rates areon the rise, as well as risks of civil unrest driven by increasingsocioeconomic grievances, which are likely to further increase in theupcoming months.
Funding shortfalls and rising operational costs have reduced
humanitarian assistance across many of these hunger hotspots.
Without additional funding, humanitarian assistance is likely to befurther reduced across the board in the outlook period.
Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives andlivelihoods in the 19 hunger hotspots. Moreover, in six of thesehotspots – Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan
and Yemen – humanitarian actions are critical in preventing
further starvation and death. This report provides country‑specificrecommendations on priorities for emergency response, as wellas anticipatory action to address existing humanitarian needs
and ensure short‑term protective interventions before new needs
materialize.

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OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKHUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKIntroductionin 37 countries are projected to have so little to eat that they will be
For the outlook period of October 2022 to January 2023, the Foodseverely malnourished, at risk of death or already facing starvation

and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) andand death (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above).4

the World Food Programme (WFP) are issuing an early warningThis includes 970 000 people projected to face Catastrophic

for urgent humanitarian action in 19 hunger hotspots. These are
17 countries and 2 regional clusters where parts of the population
will likely face a significant deterioration of already high levels of
acute food insecurity, putting lives and livelihoods at risk.
Identified through forward‑looking analysis, these hotspots havethe potential for acute food insecurity to rise during the outlook
period, under the effects of multiple overlapping drivers, interlinked
or mutually reinforcing. These fall under the categories of organizedviolence and conflict, economic shocks, weather extremes andclimate variability, and animal and plant pests and diseases.
Organized violence and armed conflict remain the primary driverconditions (IPC/CH Phase 5) in 2022, if no action is taken – 301 000of them in Somalia, and the remaining in Afghanistan, Ethiopia,
South Sudan and Yemen.5
Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives andlivelihoods in the 19 hunger hotspots. Moreover, in six of these –Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen –humanitarian action is critical to prevent starvation and death.
To this end, the present report provides country‑specificrecommendations on priorities for:•implemented before new humanitarian needs materialize; andof acute food insecurity across regions and in the majority of
the hunger hotspots. This reflects a global trend where conflict•or worse levels of acute food insecurity (Integrated Food Security
Phase Classification [IPC]/Cadre Harmonisé [CH] Phase 3 andabove) were living in conflict‑affected countries,1 and key trends
indicate that conflict levels and violence against civilians havecontinued to steadily increase in 2022.2

emergency response – actions to address existing
humanitarian needs.

continues to affect the largest share of people facing acute foodinsecurity. In 2021, more than 70 percent of people facing Crisis

anticipatory action – short‑term protective interventions to be

Given a strict set of methodological parameters, the hunger hotspot
countries and situations were selected through a consensus‑based
process, which involved FAO and WFP Rome‑based and field‑based
technical teams, as well as analysts specialized in conflict,economic risks and natural hazards. The parameters used in theforward‑looking analysis included:

Economic concerns are additionally driving acute food insecurity.
The world economy – still recovering from the COVID‑19 pandemic•

Assessed projections of acute food insecurity for the outlook
period, based on analysis of:– has slowed down due to monetary‑tightening measures adopted•

by major economies to curb rising inflation rates, new global

political violence, economic shocks, adverse climate

supply‑chain disruptions, and mounting macroeconomic risks

conditions and weather shocks, and outbreaks of animal

in developing economies. The war in Ukraine has put an upward

and plant pests and diseases; andpressure on already elevated food and energy prices, with major•

effects on acute food insecurity and operational costs.

among others, debt stocks, foreign‑exchange reserves

flooding, drought and increased climate variability remain significant

and exposure to balance‑of‑payment crises), and thedrivers in some countries and regions. Recurrent La Niña conditions

current rise of international and national food prices

since late 2020 are causing crop and livestock losses, particularly(especially for countries importing large shares of theirin East and West Africa, Central Asia and Central America and thefood requirements).

Caribbean.
•

Absolute numbers of people projected to be in Crisis or worse(IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) and the prevalence of these levels

the recently published Global Report on Food Crisis 2022 Mid-yearof acute food insecurity in the overall population analysed.

Update, up to 205 million people are expected to face acute foodinsecurity and to be in need of urgent assistance (IPC/CH Phase 3

the socioeconomic parameters of each country basedon assessments of macroeconomic stability (including,

Weather extremes such as heavy rains, tropical storms, hurricanes,

Acute food insecurity globally continues to escalate. According toprimary and secondary drivers, namely conflict and•Presence of natural hazards, conflict and economic risks, thator above or equivalent) in 45 countries. If additional data from latest

are likely to have a direct impact on acute food insecurity (suchavailable analysis of 2021 is included for 8 countries and territories,

as unforeseen weather shocks) or an indirect one (for example,

this number is estimated to reach up to 222 million people in 53

increased internal displacement) over the outlook period.

*, 3

countries/territories covered by the GRFC 2022.

This is the highest

number recorded in the seven-year history of the report. Acute food•January period, and existing or likely disruptions caused by

insecurity also increased in severity, and almost 45 million people*

The eight countries/territories covered in the GRFC 2022 for which the latest data wasproduced in 2021, indicating that 17 million people were facing high levels of acute foodinsecurity, are: Bangladesh, Liberia, Libya, Palestine, Rwanda, the Syrian Arab Republic andSyrian refugee populations in Egypt and Lebanon.

Ongoing or planned agricultural activities for the October–different events or risks.

•

Presence of significant operational and humanitarian accessconstraints.
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HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKThe report prioritizes the use of IPC and CH as data sources on

FEWS NET and IPC use the same scale although FEWS NET figures

Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 andmay differ as it uses a different approach. Populations that are

above). When recent IPC/CH is not available, alternative sourcesclassified as ‘moderately acute food insecure’ and ‘severely acutehave been considered such as the Famine Early Warning Systems

food insecure’ as per WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an

Network (FEWS NET), the WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting

approximation to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above.

Indicators of Food Security (CARI), including its application toremotely collected data (rCARI), or Humanitarian Needs Overviews(HNOs) an Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs).

The cut‑off date for the analysis and information contained in thisreport was 12 September 2022.

This report is part of a series of analytical products produced under the Global Network Against Food Crises initiative, to enhanceand coordinate the generation and sharing of evidence‑based information and analysis for preventing and addressing food crises.
In May 2022, the Global Network, in collaboration with the Food Security Information Network, released the 2022 Global Report on Food
Crises, which highlights the number of people estimated to be in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) and the prevalence of
these numbers within the population analysed in 2021. The report is available at fightfoodcrises.net and fsinplatform.org.

IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives
PHASE

TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONPRIORITY RESPONSE OBJECTIVE

1 None/MinimalHouseholds are able to meet essential food and non‑food needs without
engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food andincome.

Resilience building anddisaster risk reduction.

2 StressedHouseholds have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable
to afford some essential non‑food expenditures without engaging instress‑coping strategies.

Disaster risk reduction andprotection of livelihoods.

3 Crisis

Households either:•
Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above‑usual
acute malnutrition; OR•
Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting
essential livelihood assets or through crisis‑coping strategies.

URGENT ACTIONREQUIRED
to protect livelihoods andreduce food consumption
gaps.

4 Emergency

Some households either:•
Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very highacute malnutrition and excess mortality; OR•
Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by
employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.

URGENT ACTIONREQUIREDto save lives andlivelihoods.

5 Catastrophe/
Famine*Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs evenafter full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution
and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine
classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acutemalnutrition and mortality).

URGENT ACTIONREQUIRED
to revert/prevent
widespread death and totalcollapse of livelihoods.

* Some households can be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) even if areas are not classified as Famine (IPC Phase 5). Given the severity and implications of classifying
Famine, specific IPC protocols have been developed, and special considerations are identified in the IPC Technical Manual 3.1 (see p. 24‑25 for more details on
criteria) https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en
The classification of areas in Famine Likely is permitted when all IPC protocols for Famine classification are met, except for the existence of reliable evidence forall three outcomes – food consumption or livelihood change, global acute malnutrition (GAM), and crude death rate. Areas can be classified as Famine Likely ifminimally adequate evidence available indicates that a Famine may be occurring or will occur. Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe, the only difference isthe amount of reliable evidence available to support the statement.

2

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Upcoming trends of foodinsecurity drivers

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKUnity, Warrap and Jonglei states, and insecurity is poised to further
deteriorate following the United States of America’s decision towithdraw from the systems that monitor the peace process.13
In the Syrian Arab Republic, a resumption of conflict is possible,
with the Government of Türkiye signalling a new military operation

To identify hunger hotspots, FAO and WFP have assessed how key

against remaining pockets of Syrian Democratic Forces, which would

drivers of acute food insecurity are likely to evolve and their potential

lead to significant new displacements.14, 15

combined effects across countries in the coming months; the related

In Haiti, gang violence, which has reached unprecedented levels, isrisks of deteriorations are also assessed. Below is an overview oflikely to further constrain business activities, curtail fuel and food

key findings.

supplies – affecting prices – impact humanitarian operations, andOrganized violence and conflict risks
Organized violence and armed conflict are key drivers of acute foodinsecurity in Haiti, the Central African Republic, eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, northern Nigeria, Central Sahel,
Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic andYemen.

impede people’s access to markets and essential services.16
Conflict continues to disrupt livelihoods in Somalia, particularly incentral and southern areas. Al‑Shabab has been scaling up attacks
and this trend is likely to continue in border regions including with
Ethiopia.17 For its part, Ethiopia saw an intensification of conflictand interethnic violence in several regions, particularly Oromia andAmhara, where violence is likely to further escalate;18 in addition,

Since the start of the year, the number of global violence incidents

conflict resumed along the border between Tigray and Amhara

has followed a steadily increasing trend month to month, with

region after the collapse of the fragile, five‑month ceasefire.19

12 088 events in July compared to 8 668 in January, based on data

Conflict is among the main drivers of acute food insecurity in thesefrom the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.6, 7 The
impact of violence on acute food insecurity is likely to continue or
intensify in these countries in the outlook period, particularly given
stretched government capacities in the context of global debt
distress and food and fuel price shocks, putting additional strain
on their ability to constrain violence. Meanwhile, continuing highfood prices, resulting from supply disruptions related to the war
in Ukraine, and the resulting aggravation of acute food insecurity,
can constitute a reciprocal driver of violence in various arenas,
particularly in the form of food riots.8

countries. It also tends to play a key role in contexts with some ofthe highest – critical or catastrophic – levels of acute food insecurity
in the world, including Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and
Yemen, despite an ongoing truce since April 2022. This highlights
the importance of the human‑induced factor in pushing hunger
crises to their most extreme levels.

Natural‑hazard risks
The ongoing La Niña event, which has been recurring since late2020, is expected, with at least 60 percent chance, to continue

Despite already unprecedentedly high levels of insecurity, violence inthrough December 2022 before transitioning to El Niño/Southern

Central Sahel is likely to deteriorate further, given political instability

Oscillation‑neutral conditions in early 2023 (January–March).

across the region and the withdrawal of foreign counter‑insurgency

This La Niña event will continue to negatively impact agriculturaloperations from Mali and Burkina Faso. With violence spreading toactivities, causing crop and livestock losses in many parts of the

new regions within the Sahel, new waves of forced displacements

world including Afghanistan, Western and Eastern Africa, and theare likely, adding to the nearly 3 million internally displaced persons

Syrian Arab Republic.

(IDPs) in the region, while further reducing humanitarian access.9
Northern Nigeria is also impacted by a gradual but continuous
intensification of violence, which has already spread to multiple
areas across the north and more recently spilled over to the centre
and south of the country.10, Similarly, in the eastern provinces ofNorth Kivu and Ituri of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, aresurgence of non‑state armed groups (NSAG) is stretching theability of humanitarian operations to assist some 160 000 newly

In Afghanistan, the ongoing La Niña is likely to result in
below‑average rainfall during the upcoming September to February
period, coinciding with the wheat‑planting and mid‑growing season.
In addition, expected warmer‑than‑average temperatures andpotential low snowpack in winter could reduce water availability for
irrigation. This will come on top of two consecutive dry seasonssince late 2020.

displaced persons.11 In the Central African Republic, violence is

Catastrophic monsoon floods hit 116 districts of Pakistan at thelikely to intensify in the outlook period, with NSAGs likely to seek

end of August, affecting 33 million people. The government declared

territorial advances following a drastic reduction in the fighting

72 districts as calamity‑hit, with approximately 6.4 million people

12capacity of some of the government’s key allies.

In the Sudan, interethnic violence, and fighting between rival armed
groups, is likely to further worsen, particularly in Darfur, South
Kordofan and Blue Nile states, against a backdrop of politicaldeadlock. Intercommunal violence slightly increased recently inSouth Sudan, compared to the first quarter of 2022, mostly inseverely impacted. Additionally, around 2 million acres of crops/
orchards are affected, and there are an estimated 719 000 livestock
losses.20
In the Syrian Arab Republic, the forecast indicates anotherbelow‑average rainfall season, likely to last throughout the wintercereal season and adversely affect the main cropping areas in the3

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOK

north and northeast, resulting in reduced yields and crop losses.

these are likely to threaten the second maize harvest, as well as

In southern and central provinces of Sri Lanka, the Maha season –delaying planting activities for the third rainy season in many areas.

accounting for about 60 percent of the national paddy production

In Guatemala and large parts of Honduras, the second (September– is likely to see below‑average rainfall during the planting and

to November) and third (November to January/February) rainy

mid‑growing season, which is likely to further reduce yields in someseasons are expected to see average to above‑average rainfall,areas.

leading to good prospects for crops, but also increasing the chances

In Eastern Africa, another below‑average Deyr season (October–of flooding in low‑lying areas. Through November, above‑average

December) is considered highly likely by forecasts. This would be an
unprecedented fifth‑consecutive drought in some areas since late2020; it would be likely to further worsen the food‑security situation,
particularly in the arid and semi‑arid lands of Kenya, southernrainfall could be enhanced by heavy rains that could result fromhurricane activity, as this period coincides with peak hurricane
activity in the Atlantic and Pacific basins; potential floods threaten
the main maize harvest, ending in September, and the second maize

and central areas of Somalia, and southern and eastern Ethiopia

planting and growing season.

(including Oromia, Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’

Economic risks

Region [SNNPR], South West Region and Somali regions), where thelast rainy seasons were extremely poor, with rainfall deficits of up to

After partially recovering in 2021 from the pandemic‑induced

70‑80 percent in the worst‑affected areas.

contraction of 2020, the global economy has been facing a new

In South Sudan, despite some below‑average rains recorded
in western bimodal areas of the country, the forecast points toan above‑average rainfall for the remainder of the season until
October in southern and southeastern areas, including Jonglei, withincreased chances of flooding. This could be the fifth‑consecutive
above‑average rainy season in some areas, resulting in displacement
and crop damages, with southern and eastern areas at highest risk.
In Western Africa, the Sahelian countries, including Burkina Faso,
Chad, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger, are expected to see continued
above‑average rainfall until the end of the season in October. Manyof these countries have been experiencing flooding since early
July, resulting in the displacement and destruction of cropland andlivestock grazing; this is likely to result in reduced yields, and cropand livestock losses. In northern Nigeria, above‑average rainfall
is expected to continue through the end of season, resulting in
displacement and reduced yields, and further aggravating thefood‑security situation of vulnerable households.
In Southern Africa, forecasts point to another season of
below‑average rainfall in southern Madagascar, in areas whichhave already suffered from drought and crop failure in the past two
years. Another below‑average season could further deteriorate thefood‑security situation for vulnerable people, particularly in southernand southeastern areas.

slowdown during the first half of 2022, reflecting the combined
impacts of the global fallout of the war in Ukraine, rapid monetary
tightening to contain rising inflation rates, and renewed supply‑chain
disruptions due to COVID‑19 outbreaks in China. Global growthis expected to remain at a low level throughout 2022 – reaching
only 2.9 percent – and 2023.21 The mounting risk of recession forseveral major economies including the European Union, and a riskof prolonged economic slowdown of China, are likely to exacerbate
macroeconomic risks for low‑income countries.22, 23, 24
Despite softening from the peaks reached in the aftermath of thewar in Ukraine, global food prices are likely to stay significantly
higher than the previous five‑year average during the outlook period.
The FAO Food Price Index was 138.0 points in August, more than
20 points (13.6 percent) below the record level of 159.7 points in
March 2022, but still 10 points (6.2 percent) higher compared to thesame month of the previous year.25 However, domestic food‑inflation
rates have continued to rise around the world in the last months.
In 59 economies, year‑on‑year food inflation surpassed 15 percent
in the most recent available figure of 2022.26 At the same time,elevated hydrocarbon prices, while a positive development forhydrocarbon‑exporting countries, represent a major burden forhouseholds and state budgets of importing countries, adding onenergy and transportation bills, boosting national inflation rates andwidening current‑account deficits. The price of oil saw a 45 percent

In large parts of Malawi, the forecast for the upcoming season isincrease year on year as of August, while the price of natural

also indicating below‑average rainfall, which is likely to reduce yields

gas soared by 130 percent.27 While energy prices have entered aand lead to crop losses. This follows an already erratic and unevenslight downturn due to enhanced risks of economic recessions in

distribution of rainfall during the 2021/22 agricultural season.

several major economies, they are expected to remain high overThe north Atlantic hurricane season is entering its peak activity
and expected to have a 60 percent chance of being above average

the next months; this will continue to negatively affect inflation andhouseholds’ purchasing power.28

through the end of the season in late November; there is an

Economies of low‑income countries might additionally be struggling

increased chance of hurricanes moving towards the northern andwith the heavy monetary‑tightening measures introduced bywestern Caribbean Sea, threatening Haiti, and the Atlantic coast ofcentral banks in a number of advanced economies, as they can

Central American countries, including Guatemala and Honduras.

increase the cost of credit.29 Particularly exposed are countries

In Haiti, the tendency is mostly for average to below‑average
conditions to persist throughout the second and third rainy season;

4with large current‑account deficits and high indebtedness levels.
If foreign‑exchange reserves need to be used for debt servicing in

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

these countries, rising credit cost could lead to their depletion, adestabilized currency and ultimately constrained imports of essential
items. Around 60 percent of low‑income countries are at high risk of,30

or already in, debt distress. Consequently, several countries haverequested external support from multilateral organizations suchas the International Monetary Fund or bilateral donors.31 However,
the required austerity measures adopted to stabilize economies
are also likely to have an adverse impact on households’ incomes.
These macroeconomic dynamics have led to a rapid food‑security
deterioration and political instability.32 Also, as domestic inflation is

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKAnimal and plant pests and diseases
The desert locust situation remained calm during August. Only low
numbers of solitarious adults were seen in a few places in southeast
Mauritania, Niger and Yemen. The seasonal rains continued inAugust in the summer breeding areas from Mauritania to Eritrea.
Heavy rain fell in southeast Pakistan and in parts of the Red Sea
coastal plains in Yemen, as well as in a few places in the Sahel.
Vegetation became green from the beginning of August in mostplaces.

not yet under control in many countries, additional hikes to interest

Until mid‑October, small‑scale breeding will occur in the northernrates in advanced economies could further destabilize economies.

Sahel of Mauritania, Mali, the Niger and Chad, and may be in

Increasing food and energy prices in several countries are alreadyhaving extended effects on political stability across all regions in
the form of protests, particularly in Southern Africa, Asia and the
Middle East.33 In several instances, such dynamics add to preexisting
political grievances and could exacerbate existing conflicts.
In the Middle East and North Africa, the protracted economic impact
of COVID‑19 and the repercussions of high international food andenergy prices have overlapped with socioeconomic damage causedby the ongoing conflicts in Yemen and the Syrian Arab Republic;
this has led to expectations of significant increases in poverty andacute food insecurity. Aggravated by the increase of internationalcommodity prices and the stalemate of the process of politicaltransition, the protracted economic hardship in the Sudan is likely toincrease acute food insecurity in the outlook period.

progress and will continue in the summer breeding areas in theinterior of the Sudan, and in the interior and Red Sea coastal plainsof Yemen. Small‑scale breading will also occur in Pakistan along theborder with India. This will cause locust numbers to increase slightly,
but remain well below threatening levels.34

Aggravating factor: humanitarian accessconstraints
Urgent and scaled‑up assistance is required in all 19 hunger
hotspots, to protect livelihoods and increase access to food. Thisis essential to avert a further deterioration of acute food insecurity
and malnutrition. In countries with highest concerns, the provisionof humanitarian assistance is crucial to save lives and prevent
starvation, death and the total collapse of livelihoods (Catastrophe/
Famine, IPC/CH Phase 5). Humanitarian access is limited in various

In Latin America and the Caribbean, lagged effects of COVID‑19,

ways, including through insecurity due to organized violence or

coupled with climatic disasters, debilitated the fiscal capacity ofconflict, the presence of administrative or bureaucratic impediments,

governments to respond to new shocks. The Haitian economy

movement restrictions, and physical constraints related to theis expected to remain in a state of crisis in the outlook period,

environment.

reflecting the weak currency and increasing international foodprices. In Guatemala and Honduras, a steep increase in fertilizer
prices combined with flooding risks inflationary pressures.

Among the hunger hotspots, Yemen was identified with a further
deterioration in extreme access constraints as of July 2022
compared to the end of 2021, according to the July 2022 ACAPSIn Asia, renewed supply‑chain disruptions and emerging

Humanitarian Access Overview.35 Despite some improvements inmacroeconomic difficulties are affecting the economic stability

critical areas as a result of the adoption of the humanitarian truceof several countries such as Sri Lanka, where debt default andin April, movement restrictions continue to constrain humanitarianfinancial collapse have spurred a dramatic political crisis. Similarly,

access, particularly in the north of the country. Ongoing insecurity,high international commodity prices are putting additional weightinterference with humanitarian operations and large distanceson Pakistan’s import bill and accelerating the country’s fiscal andbetween humanitarian hubs and affected areas hamper aid delivery.

current account deficit. In Afghanistan, the economic contractionthat followed the Taliban takeover, coupled with the impact of
below‑average harvests, is increasing levels of hunger across thecountry.

Ten hotspot countries are classified as having very high accessconstraints, according to the July 2022 ACAPS overview.36 In
Afghanistan, decreased conflict levels have slightly improved
the access of humanitarian organizations to people in need, but

In nearly all African countries flagged in this report, high food andthe presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices andfuel prices are a key driver of acute food insecurity, with the situation

explosive remnants of war, operational challenges, and poor

expected to worsen during the outlook period. Due to the large

infrastructure continue to constrain humanitarian access. The

fuel and food‑import dependencies of many countries, elevated

July 2022 ACAPS analysis reports a deterioration of humanitarian

international prices could further destabilize economies. Ethiopia,

access in Chad, due to insecurity, movement restrictions and

Kenya and Malawi are already in macroeconomic distress andchallenging bureaucratic procedures for humanitarian organizations.

struggle with the refinancing of high debt levels and/or an instable

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, conflict and frequentcurrency. In Zimbabwe, the population is facing triple‑digit inflation

attacks against humanitarian workers, especially in the North Kivu

rates.

and Ituri provinces, disrupt the implementation of humanitarian5

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOK

operations, and humanitarian access constraints are very high dueof humanitarian agencies to people in need has significantly

to the increasing use of explosives. In Ethiopia, a humanitarian

deteriorated, due to insecurity and violence against humanitariantruce enabled access to Tigray in April, but the implementation

workers, checkpoints and related taxes, and interferencesof humanitarian activities is complicated by insecurity as well aswith humanitarian activities. In the Sudan, the military coup of

bureaucratic and logistical impediments. Humanitarian access

October 2021 has led to a deterioration in humanitarian access,remains highly constrained in Mali, due to insecurity, and movement

and insecurity and contamination with landmines, as well as

restrictions and blockades in certain areas. In Nigeria, persistentinterferences leading to high access constraints. In the Syrian Arab

insecurity and movement restrictions limit humanitarian access,Republic, humanitarian access continues to be challenging as aespecially in the northeast, and administrative impediments andresult of conflict, the presence of explosive remnants of war, andscarcity of fuel hamper aid delivery. In Somalia, humanitarian

areas being besieged, while administrative obstacles have hampered

access is highly restricted by conflict, interference with humanitarian

the delivery of essential aid to IDPs in the southeast of the country.37

operations, poor infrastructure in rural areas, and road closuresin the southern and central regions. In South Sudan, accessDrought in East Africa

There are several implications of another failed rainy season, adding

The longest drought in over 40 years is forecast to continue in theHorn of Africa, with another failed rainy season likely. This will bringabout an unprecedented worsening of the food crisis by the end of2022, with up to 26 million people expected to slide into Crisis or
worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) levels of food insecurity in Somalia,
northern and eastern Kenya, and eastern and southern Ethiopia.38, 39

deficits have had on vulnerable households since late 2020.45
First, severe water scarcity is observed in most drought‑affectedareas, forcing pastoralists to move longer distances in search ofsustenance, or to resort to unusual outmigration.46 Second, in the
agricultural areas of eastern and coastal Kenya, southern Somalia
and central and eastern Ethiopia, the recently gathered harvests

Rains in the Horn of Africa have failed for four consecutive seasons.

have been well below average, with crop failures reported in someCountries in the Horn of Africa have two rainy seasons: theareas.47 In southern Somalia, the 2022 July Gu harvest, which

October–December short secondary season rains and the March–normally accounts for 60 percent of total annual production, is

May long main season rains. In 2020, the October–December rainy

estimated to be 50 percent below the 1995–2021 average.48 This isseason was below average, and in 2021 both seasons were equally

the fifth‑consecutive poor harvest on record.49 In southeastern andpoor. Then the 2022 March–May season brought the lowest rainfall

coastal marginal areas of Kenya, the production of maize, green

on record for much of the region. At the same time, the region has

grams and cowpeas is estimated to be at 78–95 percent below

endured extremely warm air temperatures – linked to the negative

average.50 In Ethiopia, the Belg harvest gathered in southern Tigray,Indian Ocean Dipole.40, 41, 42

eastern Amhara, eastern Oromia and northeastern SNNPR had

Latest forecasts by international climate centres predict a higha dismal performance.51 Third, poor rainfall prevents rangelands

chance of below‑average October–December short rains, making it
43

the fifth‑consecutive failed rainy season.

Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia are the most affected countries, withareas already facing an exceptionally long, multi‑season drought
amplified by warmer‑than‑normal temperatures. Other countries in
the region are also affected, such as northern Uganda and Djibouti.

recovering from the dry seasons, with grazing resources notregenerated. Lack of pasture, coupled with scarce access to water,
leads to deteriorating livestock body conditions and livestock
deaths. At least 8 million heads of livestock have died since thedrought started in the area, while 22 million more are at risk.52 Asof mid‑July, about 3.5 million livestock deaths have been reported
in southern and southeastern Ethiopia.53 In Somalia, over 3 million

In Kenya, forecasts indicate not only a more than 60 percent chance

livestock deaths have occurred since mid‑2021, while in Kenyaof below‑average short rains (October–December) in eastern andaround 2.4 million animals have starved.54, 55 Moreover, poor

northeastern regions, but the possibility that these will start later

livestock conditions push families to distress sales that lower

than usual. Poor rains are highly likely for large parts of southern

livestock prices, eroding the purchasing power of households andand central regions of Somalia, with most models indicating about

hampering people’s access to milk.56

a 65 percent likelihood during the October–December period. In
Ethiopia, the forecast indicates a moderate‑to‑high likelihood of
below‑average rainfall in the agropastoral areas of southern andeastern regions, including Oromia and Somali. As a result, drought
conditions are expected to persist in southern and southeastern
pastoral areas.44

6

to the cumulative, devastating effects that successive rainfall

Severe shortages of food and water have forced many people toleave their homes. With a peak of over 1.3 million in 2020, large
numbers of Somalis are becoming internally displaced due todrought. This year, by mid‑September, 857 000 drought‑related
displacements were recorded, and the number is expected to risefurther.57

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKIn Ethiopia, drought‑related displacements are occurring in Afar,

At least 22 million people are expected to slide into Crisis orGambella, Oromia, SNNPR and Somali regions.58 As of April 2022,

worse levels by end of the year, if the October to December rain

there were 581 952 IDPs as a result of drought, up from 318 992

fails to materialize and humanitarian assistance is not scaledin April 2021 and 381 426 in April 2020.59 With pastoralists

up.66 Malnutrition levels are at an all‑time high: by July, moremoving for longer distances in search of sustenance, andthan 7.1 million children were acutely malnourished across thewater resources drying out, the risk of intercommunal violence

three countries, including about 2 million who were severely

and resource‑based conflict is increasing.60 In Kenya, around

acutely malnourished.67

29 000 people had been displaced up to March 2022, following
resourcebased conflicts.61

In Kenya, around 4.4 million people are projected to face
Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3

Food prices are increasing in many drought‑affected areas,

and above) between October and December 2022, including

due to the below‑average harvests and rising prices on

1.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).68 This representsinternational markets. Increased international food and energy

an 84 percent increase compared to the same time last year.

prices are causing high food inflation and fuel shortages across

In Ethiopia, already critical food‑insecurity levels – 9.9 million

the region.62 Additionally, increasing import bills are raisingpeople estimated to be facing Crisis or worse levels of acuteconcerns about the capacity of the country to finance imports,

food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) due to drought, mainly

despite increasing internal needs. In 2021, Ethiopia applied tolocated in Somali, SNNPR, Oromia and Amhara – are likely to

the G20‑sponsored Common Framework for Debt Treatments, inworsen. At the same time, widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4)

order to restructure its debt and avoid default. Debt restructuringclassifications across these areas are emerging, alongside theis under discussion at the creditors’ committee.63 Also, Kenya,

possibility that some populations are already in Catastrophe

one of the best‑performing countries in the region, has been

(IPC Phase 5).69 In Somalia, 6.7 million people are expected tofacing increasing macroeconomic risks due to increased importface high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above)

bills, a heavy debt load and diminishing investment inflows;

between October and December 2022, including 2.2 million

this is depleting foreign‑exchange reserves and causing rapid

people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and at least 300 000

64currency depreciation. This led to the International Monetary

people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).70 Furthermore, Famine

Fund suspending the payment of a USD 2.34 billion package of(IPC Phase 5) is projected among rural residents in Baidoa andextended credit and fund facility, while it awaited the introduction

Burhakaba districts and displaced people in Baidoa town of Bayof stabilizing measures by the new executive.65

region in southern Somalia, where malnutrition and mortality

Across the region, under the effects of the drought and othershocks, an estimated 18.4 to 19.3 million people were facing
Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 andlevels are already at alarming levels. In addition, several areas incentral and southern Somalia face an increased Risk of Famine
through at least December.

above) before June 2022.

7

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOK

Number of people in acute food insecurity
in hotspot countries
In 2022 (most recent projection), in millions

IPC 3+%8

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

25.9 M

25%

ETHIOPIA (including Tigray)1

20.4 M

20%

NIGERIA
21 states + Federal Capital Territory

19.5 M

12%

YEMEN

19.0 M

60%

AFGHANISTAN 2, 3

18.9 M45%

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC4

12.0 M

55%

SUDAN2

7.7 M

16%

SOUTH SUDAN

7.7 M

63%

SOMALIA

6.7 M

41%

SRI LANKA

6.3 M

30%

PAKISTAN5

4.7 M

26%

HAITI

4.5 M

45%

NIGER

4.4 M

18%

KENYA5

4.4 M

29%

MALAWI

3.8 M

20%

BURKINA FASO

3.5 M

16%

ZIMBABWE6

3.4 M

35%

GUATEMALA2

3.2 M

19%

2.6 M

28%

2.2 M

45%

IPC/CH PHASE 5

2.1 M

13%

MODERATELY FOOD INSECURE PEOPLE (WFP CARI SCALE)7

2.1 M

39%

SEVERELY FOOD INSECURE PEOPLE (WFP CARI SCALE)7

1.8 M

8%

PEOPLE IN NEED (FOOD SECURITY AND LIVELIHOODS), HRP

0.9 M

20%

3 provinces

Arid and semi‑arid lands region

HONDURASCENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICCHADMADAGASCAR5Grand Sud/Sud‑Ouest
MALI
MAURITANIA

IPC/CH PHASE 3
IPC/CH PHASE 4

The data presented is most recent projection, data is from 2022 except for Syrian Arab Republic and Zimbabwe (all 2021). For the remaining hotspots, no recent IPC/CH or WFP CARI data is available. 1HRP 2022 (July 2022).
According to the latest IPC analyses, 4.3 million people were in IPC Phase 4 (IPC Dec 2020, January ‑ June 2021, IPC June 2021 for Tigray, May‑June 2021) and 0.4 million were in IPC Phase 5 (IPC June 2021 for Tigray, July ‑September 2021). Refers to the number of People in Need (PiN) of food security and livelihood assistance. 2Most current data reported is non‑peak. Peak numbers are presented in the graph on page 19. 3 20 000 people are in
IPC Phase 5 in the March–May 2022 analysis. 4Based on WFP CARI. Data is from 2021. Severely food insecure include 1.8 million people residing in camps who are considered food insecure and in need of full support. 5Less than
50 percent of the population covered by IPC/CH. 6IPC data is outdated (projection for January to March 2021). In the country narrative, 2022 food security data is reported, which was collected by the government. 7Populations
that are classified as ‘moderately acute food insecure’ and ‘severely acute food insecure’ as per WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above).
Prevalence of the population analysed expressed in percentage terms.

8

The IPC technical manual provides guidance on where each indicator sits within the IPC analytical framework. For details see: ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/manual/IPC_Technical_Manual_3_Final.pdf.

8

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Rationale for inclusion of anticipatory actions
Anticipatory actions are short‑term disaster risk management
interventions implemented during the critical time window between
an early‑warning trigger – the point in time when forecasts show thata hazard is likely to occur in the future – and the actual impact of theforecast hazard on lives and livelihoods. The objective is to protect
the most vulnerable people and their livelihoods from the expected
impacts of the hazard.
This report features recommendations for anticipatory actions
and emergency response actions, tailored to the flagged risks.
Anticipatory action recommendations are only included if the risk
analysis indicates a hazard/shock that has yet to materialize. Whena hazard/shock has already affected agricultural livelihoods and/or food security, the window of opportunity for anticipatory action
has closed, even if the impacts of the hazard/shock are expected
to continue in the present and the future. In such cases, only
emergency response recommendations are made in this report.

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKImportantly, while the current IPC analysis outlook for June–
November 2022 shows no population facing starvation or a very
high rate of mortality (Catastrophe, IPC Phase 5), the scale of criticalacute food insecurity suggests that loss of life may already beoccurring. The risk of extreme food insecurity and significant loss oflife will likely grow from November onwards, as another harsh wintercoincides with the lean season which typically starts in February.
This will further stretch the already severely reduced capacity ofvulnerable families, while access to remote areas will become more
complicated or, in some cases, impossible.
In the last lean season, for the first time since its introductionin the country more than a decade ago, the IPC reported that
20 000 people were facing starvation (IPC Phase 5) in Ghor province
in Afghanistan’s Central Highlands region. The two other provincesin the chronically food‑insecure region (Bamyan and Daykundi) –where access constraints are very high – were also classified as
Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Despite continuing and unprecedented
levels of humanitarian assistance, concerns remain that the situationin these areas could be dire during the approaching winter season.72

Highest concern: Hotspots
with catastrophic conditions

Compared to the same period last year, the number of people
expected to face acute food insecurity up to November has risen
significantly: an additional 4.3 million people are now facing Crisis
levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3), while over 2.4 million
people more are estimated in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).73, 74, 75

This category includes: (i) countries with populations alreadyin Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5); and (ii) countries at risk ofdeterioration towards catastrophic conditions, i.e. where an
extremely vulnerable population in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is

From June to November 2022, during the harvest season,
18.9 million people (45 percent of the population) in Afghanistan’s
34 provinces are expected to face Crisis or worse levels of acutefood insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), including nearly 6 million

facing severe aggravating factors – especially access constraints –(14 percent) in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).76, 77

which indicate the possibility of a further deterioration and possible

The 2022 harvest of staple crops, particularly wheat, was estimatedoccurrence of catastrophic conditions in the outlook period. By

to be below average due to the ongoing drought.78 Forthcoming

definition, this category also includes countries with Famine or Risk

crop harvests are similarly expected to be poor, while unfavourableof Famine.

pasture conditions will strain livestock production. Poor rainfall will

Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen

affect the wheat‑sowing and mid‑growing period, compounded byremain hotspots of highest concern for the October 2022 toforecasted above‑average temperatures and low reservoir levels.79

January 2023 outlook. These countries all have segments ofOn the economic front, labour‑market pressures are expected topopulations identified or projected to experience starvation orcontinue (with the International Labour Organization predicting up

death (Catastrophe/Famine, IPC Phase 5), or at risk of deterioration

to 900 000 jobs lost since August 2021), while real wages have been

towards catastrophic conditions. They require the most urgent

declining due to inflation.80 By May 2022, year‑on‑year food inflation

attention. No updated IPC analysis is available for Ethiopia, the latest

stood at 23.2 percent, amid rising fuel prices due to the ripple effects

being from May 2021. This lack of information is a major concern.

of the war in Ukraine.81 Food prices are also impacted by ripple

Afghanistan
Concerns remain at the highest level for Afghanistan, with nearly
6 million people projected in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) up toeffects of the war in Ukraine. Average prices of wheat flour, rice,cooking oil and sugar were between 13 and 52 percent higher in July,compared to last year.82

November 2022. Continuing drought in many parts of the country

Ethiopia

is projected to extend into a third‑consecutive year – something

While acute food insecurity in the Tigray region increased between

that has not happened in the last 20 years. In addition, the country

the end of 2021 and June 2022, the flow of humanitarian supplies

is feeling the effects of a deep economic crisis, exacerbated bycontinued to be slow – due to insecurity, bureaucracy and lack ofincreasing food, fuel and agricultural input prices, the freeze ofessential services, as well as fuel shortages83 despite five months

Afghan assets and very high levels of accumulated householdof access improvement during the truce. Since the end of August,debt.71

the resumption of hostilities in southern parts of Tigray, as well as

9

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

in Amhara and Afar regions, has once again stalled humanitarianaccess.

84

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKThe scale of the deterioration over a year is staggering: an additional
2 million people are estimated as being acutely food insecure andWithout a recent IPC analysis, no information is available on thecurrent number of people in catastrophic conditions – projected
at 401 000 between July and September 2021 – and concerns

in need of urgent assistance reaching a new high of more than
20 million people – this includes more than 13 million people innorthern Ethiopia.100

remain very high.85 In July 2021, the Famine Review Committee

Moreover, food assistance is likely to decrease due to funding

warned of a risk of famine in Tigray through December 2021, driven

shortfalls and rising operational costs. Rations for a large number ofby limited humanitarian assistance, increasing conflict levels andrefugees, in a country where 85 percent of them are fully dependent

low availability of commercial goods and services.86 The situation

on assistance, have been reduced already.101

remains of highest concern as these drivers behind the risk offamine warning continue to prevail. Up to the end of August, only

Nigeriapart of the required assistance had arrived and critically low fuelExtremely high levels of food insecurity – projected at 19.5 million

supplies have limited the scale of the response. Interruptions ofcommunications, electricity and other services have slowed down
or stopped operations. Meanwhile, availability of commercial
goods and services has remained extremely limited, as has market
functionality. In addition, concerns over critical levels of acutefood insecurity in Amhara and Afar remain high due to continued
insecurity and conflict, impeding humanitarian access.87
In 2021, main‑season production was at 40 percent of normal, but
still amounted to about seven to eight months of the total annual
requirements in Tigray, due in part to humanitarian response. Thiswas crucial for food security and livelihoods, considering the highdependence on agriculture. The main agricultural season (Meher)
harvest, starting in October, will be key and expected to provide
some relief in the outlook to rural communities. However, resumptionof fighting inside Tigray is likely to have a negative impact.

people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) between June andAugust – are likely to persist in the outlook period, despite the leanseason finishing at the end of August.
A key concern is that the vast majority of critically food‑insecurepeople are in conflict‑affected states where access to life‑saving
assistance remains challenging. A total 588 000 people in thenortheast and 400 000 people in the northwest are expected to be in
Emergency (CH Phase 4) as of August 2022. Among these, around43 percent (423 900) are in communities that are inaccessible
due to insecurity in 16 local government areas (LGA) in Borno,
Adamawa and Yobe states.102 Areas in Borno state classified as
Emergency (CH Phase 4) have been growing, including those thatare inaccessible. Across northern Nigeria, conflict and security are
expected to deteriorate further in the coming months, as a result of
escalating attacks by armed non‑state actors, kidnap‑for‑ransom

Scaled‑up and sustained food assistance are also required

and intercommunal violence.103 Additionally, with the end of

immediately in southern and eastern areas and pastoral areas,

the rainy season in September and rural topography becoming

where a likely fifth‑consecutive failed rainy season will aggravate

more permissive to militant movements, violence is likely to

88, 89the most severe drought in recent history.

experience a seasonal jump, disrupting food systems, creating newThis will further

compromise fragile livelihoods, with more livestock deaths and crop

displacements and hampering humanitarian access.104 According

losses.90 This is atop of limited food stocks in neighbouring croppingto the 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview, there are an estimatedareas of eastern Oromia and northeastern SNNPR regions, where the

1 million people in inaccessible areas, an estimated 733 000 of

91, 92, 93

secondary season (Belg) harvest was poor due to lack of rain.
Conflict has intensified in Oromia and Amhara, and is likely toescalate, disrupting humanitarian access and trade, and displacing

whom are IDPs. Households in difficult‑to‑access areas are reported
to mainly depend on wild foods.105
While strong efforts are needed to reach the most vulnerable

more people. Critical acute food‑insecurity levels are likely topopulations, the response is hampered by the HRP being only

worsen, with nearly 10 million people already acutely food insecure

52 percent funded as of August 2022.106 Without additional funding,– mainly located in drought‑affected Somali, SNNPR, Oromia andthe number of people targeted in October–December is likely to be

94

Amhara regions. Although no IPC analysis is available, compatible

reduced.

analyses show that life‑threatening conditions (likely IPC Phase 4

While grain prices have increased 30 percent year on year due

95

equivalent and worse) are expected to be widespread across theseareas, with the possibility that some population are already facing
starvation and death (IPC Phase 5) as increasing numbers of people
are displaced.96

to rising transport costs and below‑average availabilities, foodinflation is likely to remain high through 2022 due to global supply
disruptions and soaring global commodity prices.107, 108 Over40 percent of households in northeast Nigeria had inadequate food

Increasing borrowing costs and elevated international commodity

consumption at the start of the recent lean season (May 2022),

prices are adding to the national import bill. As a result, depleting

marking a 10 percent increase from the previous year.109 The same

foreign‑exchange reserves have caused fuel shortages and theglobal supply chain disruptions have also led to increases in the97

depreciation of the currency on the informal market. In the firstprice of agricultural inputs, especially fertilizer and fuel. This is likely

half of 2022, year‑on‑year food inflation was estimated at about

to significantly reduce farm productivity and limit irrigated food98

99

40 percent, with prospects of further rises.

10

production during dry season cultivation.

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

Somalia
Between October and December, Famine is most likely to happen
in two districts in Bay region, while several areas in central andsouthern Somalia face a Risk of Famine if humanitarian assistanceis not sustained.110 Alarming levels of mortality and malnutrition
are already occurring.111 Country‑wide, admissions for severe andmoderate acute malnutrition continue to be at an all‑time highcompared to the previous three years.112
The IPC Famine Review Committee confirms that the thresholds for
Famine will most likely be breached between October and December
among rural residents in Baidoa and Burhakaba districts anddisplaced people in Baidoa town of Bay region.113 Bay was one of
the areas in which the last famine in Somalia, in 2011, was declared.
Despite recent scaling up of humanitarian assistance, needs far
outweigh current funding levels.114 In addition to the contextual
drivers of drought, insecurity and high prices, the Risk of Famine
is linked to an anticipated funding deficit for aid agencies in thelast quarter of 2022. Famine will be prevented only if funding andsubsequent assistance are sustained.
Overall, 6.7 million people are expected to face high levels of
acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) between Octoberand December 2022, including 2.2 million people in Emergency(IPC Phase 4) and at least 300 000 people in Catastrophe(IPC Phase 5). This represents a significant increase in magnitude
and severity of acute food insecurity compared to June and
September. An exceptionally severe multi‑season drought anda likely fifth below‑average rainy season, combined with highfood prices and persistent conflict, is rapidly driving this extreme
deprivation of food, on top of expected funding gaps by the end of
the year.115

South Sudan
The April–July lean season showed higher levels of food insecurity,
including 87 000 people facing starvation and death (IPC Phase 5),compared to last year.116 A fourth‑consecutive year of flooding
and macroeconomic challenges, coupled with the lingering impactof the national conflict and heightened intercommunal violence,are expected to keep food insecurity at extreme levels. Moreover,increasing funding shortfalls and rising operational costs have
reduced food assistance, likely further diminishing in the coming
months.
The seasonal improvement in food security during harvest
is expected to be lower than usual. This applies especially toflood‑affected areas, where crop and livestock losses due to floods
is likely to overshadow the benefits of harvested crops.

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKMost people expected to face starvation (IPC Phase 5) are inflood‑prone areas, including counties in Jonglei, Lakes and Unity
states, and Greater Pibor Administrative area, where up to 80 percentof the population are food insecure. Additionally, Unity and Jonglei
states have seen a slight increase in violence compared to the firstquarter of 2022.122 Insecurity may deteriorate in the coming months,
following the United States of America’s decision to withdraw fromsystems that monitor the peace process.123
Insufficient supplies and a difficult macroeconomic situation are
driving exceptionally high food prices, which constrain access tofood.124 Maize and sorghum prices in June were almost 90 percent
higher than a year ago. In central and northern areas, where
significant cereal‑production shortfalls were recorded in 2021 due
to floods, food‑price increases have been sharper due to a rapid
depletion of already meagre stocks.125 As the country heavily relies
on imports of food and fuel, there is concern that high international
prices, linked to the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine, may further
constrain households’ access to food and increase production
costs.126
During the April–July lean season, 7.74 million people, almost
two‑thirds of the total population, were facing Crisis or worse
levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), including
2.89 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 87 000 people
in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).127 This represents an 8 percent
increase of the population in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 andabove) compared to the 2021 lean season.128 Malnutrition remains
a major concern, with global acute malnutrition (GAM) levels at or
above the 15 percent emergency threshold in six assessed areas.
Severe acute malnutrition admissions are also higher than the past
three years.129, 130 Through December, over 1.3 million children are
projected to be acutely malnourished, the majority of whom live in
Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity and Western Bahr el Ghazal states.131
While the famine‑likely situation that was present in some areasof Pibor country in 2021 was averted by improved coordination ofhumanitarian assistance, the situation remains of highest concern.

Yemen
Early this year, critical levels of acute food insecurity were estimatedas likely to deteriorate severely, starting in June until the end of2022. In fact, according to IPC analysis released in March 2022, over
19 million people were expected to experience acute food insecurity(IPC Phase 3 and above) between June and December 2022 –including 7.1 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 161 000 in
Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).132 Of greatest concern was a Risk ofFamine in the districts of Abs and Hayran in Hajjah governorate
under a worst‑case scenario; also the warning that should a

Forecasts indicate above‑average rains for August to October –worst‑case scenario materialize for a protracted period beyond

particularly in Nile and Jonglei states, which are likely to exacerbate

December, Al Hali and Al Hawak districts in Al Hudaydah governorate

the current flooding.117, 118 119, 120 Flood‑prone areas are experiencing

could shift into Famine too.133

the largest floods on record assessed in June 2022, with additional
areas affected compared to a year ago; this is especially the case in
the southern parts of the Sudd Wetlands.121

11

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKAcute food insecurity trends in the hotspots of highest and very high concern
2019–20221 peak numbers and prevalence
NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN IPC/CH 3+ OR EQUIVALENT (IN MILLIONS)PREVALENCE IPC/CH 3+ OR EQUIVALENT 2

Democratic Republicof the Congo

Afghanistan3

Ethiopia4

Nigeria(16/21 states + FCT)

Yemen8

Sudan5South Sudan

Somalia

Pakistan6

Haiti

Kenya9Burkina Faso

Syrian Arab Republic7

Central African Republic

Data for 2022 is considered as expected peak based on information available as of August 2022. For the Syrian Arab Republic and Zimbabwe no peak data is available for 2022 as of August2022.
2
Prevalence of the population analysed expressed in percentage terms.
3
Based on Flowminder population data. 2021 and 2022 peaks are based on the same projection (November–March).
42022 number is HRP (previous numbers are from IPC analyses). 2021 peak number is a combination of the December 2020 IPC covering entire Ethiopia and the May 2021 IPC covering
Tigray, Amhara and Afar. The IPC analysis released in May 2021 is an IPC global product. It is based on the conclusions reached by the Ethiopia IPC analysis team. This report has not beenendorsed by the Government of Ethiopia.
5
2019: state of West Darfur was not analysed.
6
Geographical coverage varies significantly over time: 2019: Sindh and Balochistan; 2020: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; 2021: Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh; 2022: Balochistan, Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh.
7
Based on CARI.
82022 number pertains to IPC analysis released in March 2022. Numbers will change following forthcoming IPC analysis, with publication scheduled after the cut‑off date of the present
report.
9
Arid and semi‑arid lands region.
1

Comparison over time indicates a general trend however comparability issues exist in terms of:(i) geographical/population coverage for Afghanistan (significant increase of population analysed), Democratic Republic of the Congo (significant increase of population analysed), Ethiopia(significant increase of population analysed), Haiti (significant increase in population covered), Kenya (significant increase of population analysed), Nigeria (only part of the population
covered. Significant increase of population analysed between 2020 [16 states + FCT] and 2021 [21 states + FCT]), Pakistan (significant increase of population analysed), Somalia (significant
increase of population analysed), the Sudan (significant increase of population analysed), Syrian Arab Republic (significant increase of population analysed) and Yemen (significant increaseof population analysed); and(ii) analysis time periods for Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and Zimbabwe.
Caution in reading and using this analysis should be observed. Trends of prevalence and total numbers can diverge due to changes in population covered.

12

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKThese projections were based on assumptions that humanitarianIn this edition, the alert is extended to also include the Central

assistance would significantly reduce due to insufficient funding,African Republic and Pakistan.

conflict would intensify, and domestic economic decline would
further deepen. Additionally, the projections did not factor in theeffect of the war in Ukraine on food prices and operational costs.
Some assumptions were unfounded: the conflict in Yemen eased
considerably after parties agreed on a truce from April.134 Also,
funding for food assistance slightly improved and major cuts in thenumber of beneficiaries were prevented.

In the Central African Republic, 2.2 million people are projected to
face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3
and above) from April to August 2022, including 638 000 people
in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).137 This marks a slight decrease from
2.3 million in the same period in 2021, albeit with a largely stable
number for people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), at 633 000.138
With insecurity likely increasing, and limited access to nutritious

In light of this changing context, the IPC analysis is being updated

foods, along with high prevalence of infectious diseases, acuteand the outlook on food‑insecurity levels in Yemen is expected to bemalnutrition could further deteriorate in conflict‑affected areas.139, 140less grim.

Humanitarian access constraints remain high as of July 2022, albeit

However, Yemen remains a country at the highest concern level.
The economic crisis is likely to last, due to continued politicalinstability, lack of external revenues and elevated global commodity
prices. These factors compound the depletion of foreign‑exchange

marking a slight improvement from the end of 2021.141 Besides theimpact of high fuel prices, armed clashes and direct targeting of
humanitarian assets and facilities remain key obstacles, causing
frequent restrictions on humanitarian operations.

reserves, which underpins elevated currency volatility – particularly

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 25.9 million people arein areas controlled by the Internationally Recognized Government.135

projected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity

Ultimately, this affects the country’s capacity to import essential(IPC Phase 3 and above), including 5.4 million people in Emergency

items. The weak currency and globally increased cost of food led to(IPC Phase 4) between January and June 2022.142 While this would

a severe increase in local prices, as Yemen has a high dependency

mark a slight improvement from 27.3 million for the same period

on imports. Annual increases of 74 percent for the minimumin 2021, it does not consider the full impact of the deterioration

food basket, in areas controlled by the Internationally Recognizedin the eastern provinces and below‑average rainfall across theGovernment, and 38 percent in areas controlled by Sana’a‑based

country. This means that the magnitude and severity of acute foodauthorities, severely cut households’ purchasing power; this was

insecurity could increase, particularly in regions afflicted by conflictoften exacerbated by the absence of regular salaries.136

and below‑average rainfall, such as eastern, northeastern and

Rising operation costs and protracted funding shortfalls are likely

southeastern provinces.

to further reduce food assistance. Moreover, although access has

In Haiti, amid worsening macroeconomic conditions, persistentimproved in some critical areas, the truce remains fragile. As apolitical stalemate, rising insecurity due to gang violence, andresult, the ability of humanitarian actors to prevent catastrophic

reduced agricultural production, food security is highly likely

conditions remains at risk.

to further deteriorate in the remainder of 2022, surpassing the

Very high concern: Hotspots
with deteriorating criticalconditions

record‑high of 4.5 million people estimated to face Crisis or
worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above)in March–June 2022, including 1.3 million people in Emergency(IPC Phase 4).143 In addition, reduced access to humanitarianassistance – due to a shortfall in humanitarian funding andincreasing costs of delivery of assistance resulting from high prices
of fuel and goods as well as access constraints – poses further
challenges.144, 145

Several other hunger hotspots need urgent action to avert extreme
hunger or death. These are countries with sizeable populations– over 500 000 people – estimated or projected to be facing
Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 4) or
identified as severely food insecure as per WFP’s CARI or rCARI
methodology; or countries with more than 10 percent of the analysed
population in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or severely foodinsecure, and at least 50 percent of the population analysed.

In Kenya, the prolonged drought in eastern and northern areas
is highly likely to worsen further, as another below‑average rainyseason is forecast between October and December.146 This marks
an unprecedented fifth poor rainy season. Around 4.4 million people
are projected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity(IPC Phase 3 and above) between October and December 2022,
including 1.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). This
represents an 84 percent increase compared to the same time last

In the included countries, life‑threatening conditions are expected

year. The nutrition situation remains extremely concerning. GAM

to further intensify in the outlook period. Most of the hotspots withprevalence in seven counties with arid and semi‑arid lands is above

deteriorating critical situations were already highlighted in the last

15 percent, and even exceeds the critical 30 percent threshold inedition of the report: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti,

three subcounties in Marsabit and Turkana.147

Kenya, the Sahel region, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic.

13

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

In Pakistan, the impact of catastrophic floods is likely to compound
the rapid deterioration of the macroeconomic situation driving
food insecurity. According to preliminary results of IPC acute foodinsecurity analysis conducted in the first week of July 2022 – prior
to flooding – in 17 of the 59 districts subsequently affected by theflood, around 3.5 million people were estimated to be acutely foodinsecure and in need of urgent assistance (IPC Phase 3 or above).
Of these around 2.5 million people are in Sindh and 1 million in
Balochistan. However, these levels are likely to increase substantiallyin the outlook period as a result of the flooding and the economic
vulnerabilities amid rising food and energy prices.
In the Sahel region (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and the
Niger), most of the underlying drivers of the current food crisis –conflict and insecurity, political instability, climate shocks and highfood prices – are likely to worsen further and thereby raise foodinsecurity. During the June–August 2022 period, over 13 million
people were projected to be acutely food insecure (CH Phase 3 andabove), including 1.4 million people in Emergency (CH Phase4). These figures mark a near 50 percent increase compared to2021 and are over 120 percent higher than the 5‑year average.
Eight administrative areas or population groups are classified in
Emergency (CH Phase 4) – some for the first time ever.
In the Sudan, economic decline and rising food prices, coupledwith tight supplies, increasing intercommunal violence and floods,
underpin an alarming food‑security situation amid very high andincreasing humanitarian access constraints.148 Between October
2022 and February 2023, 7.7 million people are expected to be in
Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) – an increase of almost
2 million compared to last year; of this number, 1.5 million are
expected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).149 Throughout 2023,
food insecurity could worsen compared to levels seen in 2022,
when 11.7 million people were expected to be in Crisis or worse(IPC Phase 3 and above) between June and September.
In the Syrian Arab Republic, despite a substantial cooling downof the conflict over the last two years, the humanitarian crisishas been driven by the deteriorating economic environment,
including drought‑constrained 2022 agricultural production.150 The
combination of deteriorating economic conditions and abating
agricultural production is likely to worsen further the conditions ofover 12 million Syrians currently estimated to be food insecure;151
this includes 2.5 million severely food insecure, based on WFP’s
CARI methodology.152

14

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKHUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKOther countries requiring monitoring
Several other countries or situations, while not identified as

terms of rising costs of inputs – fertilizer prices increased byhunger hotspots in this report, merit close monitoring. These

over 140 percent compared to last year – and disturbance ofinclude: i) countries or situations where data was insufficient orvalue chains, resulting in decreased planted areas and a likely

not available to allow for a comparative assessment based on

significant decline in output. The most recent estimates fromthe applied methodology, but which were flagged as concerning

May 2022 identified that about 11 million people, or 20 percent ofduring the discussions on the basis of other evidence, as

the population, were facing acute food insecurity, based on WFP’s

described below; and ii) countries or situations in protracted

rCARI methodology.158

crisis with high numbers of people in acute food insecurity, but
without clear evidence for a likely food‑security deterioration ofa level comparable with trends observed in countries selected as
hunger hotspots. Such situations of concern include, but are notlimited to, the following countries:

In the Republic of Colombia, concerns remain high aboutsignificant levels of food insecurity – as determined in
2022 through WFP’s rCARI methodology – with moderate andsevere acute food insecurity affecting 19 million and 1.1 million
people respectively.159 Currently, the vulnerability of migrants

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is experiencing

and IDPs, with high proportions of food insecurity, requires

persisting economic constraints, exacerbated by the lasting

specific attention.160 Transit migration also remains a key issue,

impact of the COVID‑19 pandemic. Imports have been

as migrants on the move show significant food‑consumption

significantly reduced – including critical agricultural inputs andgaps and specific vulnerabilities. The Colombia‑Panama borderhumanitarian goods – maintaining the population’s vulnerability

registered an 85 percent increase in the number of migrants in

to food insecurity. Overall, despite a lack of recently updated data,

the first half of 2022 compared to 2021, putting further pressure

available analyses and trends suggest that a large proportion of

on humanitarian assistance.161 On the economic front, foodthe population might suffer from low levels of food consumption

inflation recorded a 25 percent year‑on‑year increase in Julyand poor dietary diversity.

2022.162 It is expected to remain elevated, with high international

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic is facing growing risks

commodity prices transmitted to local consumer prices,of a balance‑of‑payments crisis, as high food and energy prices
coupled with a significant external debt load rapidly deplete
the country’s foreign‑exchange reserves. Strong currency

constraining household purchasing power and underpinningongoing currency depreciation. Overall, no significant
deterioration in food security is recorded since the last edition ofdepreciation and shortages of essential goods, including fuel andthe report, nor is it anticipated in the outlook period.

agricultural inputs, are likely to affect food security; they are also

In Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), the situation remains

likely to increase poverty, particularly as the country has one ofof high concern despite the lack of recent comparable data.

the lowest per‑capita incomes in Asia. Agricultural production

Available evidence points towards relative stabilization of

costs have risen significantly: prices of livestock inputs havethe economic situation, though inflation remains very high.163

increased by up to 300 percent, and the cost of rice production

Although food is generally available, high prices and low

more than tripled in July 2022 (year on year). Furthermore, as apurchasing power hinder access, particularly in a context

result of high prices, fertilizer sales have declined 20 times, whichof elevated global and regional food prices. Food‑security

is expected to lead to a drop in production. Although no updated

interventions plan to reach 2 million people under thedata on food security in the country were collected in 2022, a2022–2023 HRP.164

qualitative assessment conducted in August 2022 points to a
deterioration of the situation, which may further worsen during
the lean season (August–October).153

In Lebanon, the food‑security situation did not improve during
the first half of 2022. Over 1.7 million people were estimated to
face acute food insecurity at the end of 2021, based on WFP’s

Myanmar’s food‑security situation is still of very high concern.

rCARI methodology.165 Although new parliamentary elections

The economic crisis is showing signs of continued deterioration,

took place without major incidents in May, no substantial steps

which is reflected by an ongoing sharp devaluation of thehave been carried out for the formation of a new government;

currency and increasing inflation.154, 155 Compared to one year

neither has there been progress on negotiations with theago, the average cost of a basic food basket has increased

International Monetary Fund for financial assistance and theby 34 percent,156 while fuel prices have more than doubled.

introduction of economic reforms aimed at tackling the ongoing

Furthermore, the armed conflict, more recently in west (Rakhine)crisis.166 Accordingly, prospects for the improvement of the

but also in the northwest, north (Kachin) and southeast areas ofsocioeconomic situation remain weak. Increasing global foodthe country, has been escalating in 2022; it is expected to worsen

prices, and the resulting deterioration of purchasing power,

further. Almost 1 million people have been internally displaced

affect in particular vulnerable groups including refugees; food

due to conflict and insecurity, since the military takeover last

supply‑chain shortages may also occur.

year.157 Agricultural production is facing serious challenges in15

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

The acute food‑security situation in southern Angola
remains of concern, due to the compound effects ofconsecutive years of dry weather conditions, including in
2022. However, despite the lack of updated data, there aresome indications that national cereal production might haveincreased moderately in 2022 compared to the previous year,
evidenced by near‑average vegetation conditions in the main
cereal‑producing central provinces. In addition, given the
country’s role as an oil exporter, high hydrocarbon prices arelikely to result in an increase in foreign‑currency reserves anda small rebound in economic growth.167 The positive termsof trade have already led to a strengthening of the currency,
helping to temper inflation amid high global prices.168 However,inflation remains in double digits, while expected shortfalls
in agricultural production in 2022 could exacerbate risks offood‑security deterioration.169
In Mozambique, although no updated comparable data isavailable, the food‑security situation is expected to deteriorate
due to the combined effects of increased displacement in
Cabo Delgado, a rise in food and fuel prices, and localized
shortfalls in cereal production in areas affected by extreme
weather events.170, 171, 172 In addition, a Data in Emergencies
monitoring survey by FAO in May 2022 found that about
64 percent of producers faced difficulties in producing theircrops, and 54 percent had a decrease in harvest compared toa normal year.173 The latest IPC analysis from December 2021
projected that 1.4 million people were facing Crisis or worse
acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) during April to
September 2022.174

16

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKHUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKCountry narratives
Asia and the PacificAfghanistan
Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, recurring weather shocks, high food and fuel prices
Extremely high levels of acute food insecurity are likely to continue,

From June to November 2022, during the harvest season,

under the effects of the economic crisis. This has been exacerbated

34 provinces are expected to face Crisis or worse levels of acuteby the freeze of Afghan assets and very high levels of accumulated

food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), including nearly 6 million

household debt, as well as the impact of continuing drought. The(14 percent) in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).186, 187 This represents an

drought is projected to extend to the main 2022 growing season –increase of 4.3 million people in Crisis levels of food insecurity andunprecedented in the last 20 years.175

over 2.4 million in Emergency levels compared to the same period in

On the economic front, market pressures are expected to continue,
while real wages have been declining due to inflation. By May

2021.188 A total 4.7 million children and nursing women are expected
to be acutely malnourished in 2022.189

2022, year‑on‑year food inflation stood at 23.2 percent amid rising

Importantly, while the current IPC projection shows no populationfuel prices.176 Food prices are feeling the ripple effects of the war

facing starvation or a very high rate of mortality (IPC Phase 5), thein Ukraine.177 The average price of a food basket in August wasscale of severe food insecurity suggests that loss of life may already178

26 percent higher than last year.

Wheat prices alone increased

44 percent over the same period.179 Substantial pressure on
humanitarian funding for food assistance compounds the negative
outlook, as funding is significantly less than that required to assist
the people targeted.180, 181 Winter and summer crop harvests are
expected to be below‑average due to recurring drought, while scarce
pasture constrains livestock conditions.182 The ongoing La Niña
event is likely to result in below‑average rainfall in late 2022 and early
2023, coinciding with the wheat‑sowing and mid‑growing period.183
This, combined with forecasted above‑average temperatures andlow reservoir levels, is likely to affect the main 2022/23 agricultural

be occurring.
The levels of food insecurity and significant loss of life will likely
grow from November, as another harsh winter coincides with thelean season – typically beginning in February. For the first timesince its introduction in the country more than a decade ago, the IPC
reported that 20 000 people were facing starvation (IPC Phase 5)
during the last lean season in Ghor province in Afghanistan’s Central
Highlands region.190 Despite continuing and unprecedented levels ofhumanitarian assistance, concerns remain that the situation in thisarea could be dire during the approaching winter season.

season;184 2022 has also seen a spike in unseasonal summer flash
floods in several provinces.185 Capacity to respond before the main
winter wheat‑planting season may be limited.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions

•
•
•

•
•

•

Preposition livelihood and food assistance in locations with the highest levels of food insecurity, that arelikely to be rendered inaccessible by winter conditions.
Monitor the consequences of the global food crisis, rising food prices and security environment on thehumanitarian situation; ensure that interventions are adapted to contextual changes.
Develop and distribute market and agroclimatic bulletins at the national and community levels, to highlightthe evolving climate situation/potential dry conditions; provide tailored advice on actions to be taken toprotect agricultural livelihoods.
Distribute agricultural inputs, including stress‑tolerant wheat seeds, backyard vegetable‑cultivation packages
and fertilizers (where possible) for the upcoming winter cereal season.
Scale up food and cash assistance for asset‑creation and livelihoods activities, including the buildingof vocational skills and improvement of community infrastructure; this should include the creation and/or rehabilitation of infrastructure to improve access to water during drought, such as water catchments,
improved water storage, irrigation and kareez (underground canal systems). Such programmes also ensure a
critical income source to the population.
Implement cash‑for‑work activities by building and rehabilitating water storage and water‑source
infrastructure to provide income sources for the most vulnerable.

17

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKThe 2022 HRP called for USD 4.4 billion in 2022. This includes USD 2.66 billion for food security and agricultural
livelihoods for people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above), and USD 287.4 million for nutrition‑related
interventions. As of August, the HRP is funded at just over 40 percent.
•Scale up humanitarian assistance as the winter lean season approaches and hunger and malnutrition rates
peak in the next six months. This means ensuring that enough food and nutrition products are prepositioned
ahead of snowfall; adjusting cash‑based transfer values to compensate for domestic price fluctuations; andscaling up coverage of assistance.
•
Scale up prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition as part of an integrated package of food security,
health, nutrition and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services in rural and urban areas through mobile
teams and functioning health facilities.
•
Provide nutritious school meals that contribute to children’s health and nutrition and keep them in school andable to learn.
•Complement and combine food assistance with livelihood and vocational training, where possible, to enablecrisis‑affected communities to meet their basic food needs while building resilience against recurrent shocks
and stressors.
•
Engage with humanitarian actors, civil society and authorities to ensure unhindered humanitarian access for
implementation and monitoring of emergency assistance programmes.
•
Expand the reach and capacities of existing food security and nutrition monitoring and early warning systems,
to ensure that early action is triggered ahead of an emerging urgent situation and prevent catastrophe.

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, monsoon flooding
The dire economic crisis – exacerbated by elevated costs of foodThis added upward pressure on food prices, which is likely to remain

and energy commodities, coupled with the catastrophic impact offor the outlook period.

monsoon floodings – is set to worsen already critical levels of acutefood insecurity in parts of the country.

The difficult economic and food‑security situation has been
aggravated by catastrophic floods which hit 116 districts at the end

Pakistan’s macroeconomic stability has rapidly deteriorated over theof August, affecting 33 million people. The government declared

last two years, with the unsustainable expansion of the fiscal and

72 districts as being calamity‑hit, with approximately 6.4 million

current‑account deficit driven by the prolonged impact of COVID‑19

people severely impacted. Additionally, around 2 million acres of

191

and the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine.

Pakistan, traditionallya wheat‑exporting country, currently relies heavily on imports fromthe Russian Federation and Ukraine (importing approximately
75 percent of wheat from the two countries combined).192 The aim
is for the government and traders to bolster supplies, amid highdomestic prices driven by the upsurge in international commodity
prices and its impact on the import bill. As a result, foreign reserves
rapidly declined in the first half of 2022.193 The Pakistani currency
slid 26 percent, while year‑on‑year food inflation rose to 28.8 percent
in August.194, 195 Additionally, spikes in fertilizer and energy prices,
combined with drought in early 2022, reduced wheat production by
4 percent.196

crops/orchards are affected, and there are an estimated 719 000
livestock (animals/poultry) losses.197
According to preliminary results of IPC acute food insecurity analysis
conducted in the first week of July 2022 – prior to flooding – in 17of the 59 districts subsequently affected by the flood, around 3.5
million people were estimated to be acutely food insecure and in needof urgent assistance (IPC Phase 3 or above). Of these around 2.5
million people are in Sindh and 1 million in Balochistan.198 However,the scale of the flood emergency, with ongoing rains and economic
vulnerabilities amid rising food and energy prices, means it is highly
likely that food insecurity will increase substantially in the outlook
period. Acute food insecurity IPC analysis was forthcoming at thetime of writing, which will take into account the impact of the floods.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions

18

•
•
•
•

Continue monitoring inflation trends and adapt the value of cash‑based assistance as required.
Distribute inputs for off‑season production (e.g. vegetable seeds, herbs, spires) among the most vulnerable
farmers.
Distribute animal feed and supplements to the most vulnerable households.
Promote and support early destocking through identification of potential markets, coordination andidentification of potential buyers, support for the sale of animals (i.e. transport), provision of advice tofarmers for opening bank accounts to deposit earnings, and support to farmers to restock during normal
period.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

•

•
•

•
•

•

•

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKSupport the use of existing social‑protection mechanisms and systems (Benazir Income Support
Programme) to transfer cash to flood‑affected populations – to meet their immediate food and otheressential needs – and provide direct livelihood and food assistance to populations not reached throughgovernment programmes.
Continue to provide food assistance to people displaced by floods and other vulnerable populations heavily
impacted by high food prices.
Support the extension of nutrition services to prevent and treat acute malnutrition among children under
5 years of age and pregnant and lactating women in flood‑affected districts, especially those areas with high
GAM prevalence
Establish a logistics‑augmentation unit to work with the National Disaster Management Authority, to help withstorage, management and dispatch of relief items.
Upon concluding the relief response, support full‑recovery activities and the immediate restoration of
livelihoods and infrastructure, especially in vulnerable borderland areas, to help communities recover as
quickly as possible and contribute towards their resilience against extreme weather events and other shocks
and stressors.
Provide technical assistance to the multisectoral rapid needs assessments in flood‑affected districts,
specifically those with impeded access, in support of government efforts to enhance targeting of vulnerable
populations.
Enhance advocacy for flexible funding mechanisms, to ensure rapid scale‑up to respond to urgent needs.

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, political instability
Due to the ongoing financial collapse, which has initiated the worst

deterioration of living conditions has exacerbated political instability.

economic and food‑security crisis since the country’s independence

Daily protests took place over the last months, in some instancesin 1948, and persisting political uncertainty delaying a resolution oftransforming into violent confrontations with the security forces.204

the economic situation, acute food insecurity is expected to worsen

The resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in July has

over the outlook period.199

partially calmed the political situation, although tensions remain

After defaulting on its debt in May 2022, the country has been facing
increasing shortages of essential items, rapid currency depreciation
and booming food inflation.200 The Sri Lankan Rupee has lost

high. Mounting political uncertainty has been delaying negotiations
with the International Monetary Fund and international donors forfinancial support, exacerbating the economic crisis.205

44 percent of its value since March, while food inflation amounted to

According to WFP, as of July 2022, 6.3 million people (corresponding

over 90 percent year on year as of July.201

to three in ten households) are moderately acute food insecure, andThe 2022 aggregate paddy production, the country’s main staple
food, is forecast to contract by at least 40 percent compared with the2021 level. This is mostly due to a sharp decline in yields, following
reduced application rates of chemical fertilizers and pesticides.202
The reduction resulted from the ban on imports and use of chemicalfertilizer and agrochemicals between May and November 2021,
203

creating severe market shortages and high prices.

In addition to the increasing economic difficulties, the dramatic

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions•••

66 000 people are severely acute food insecure based on WFP’s
CARI methodology.206 More serious levels of food insecurity arelikely if the crisis persists. An estimated 23 percent of households
are using crisis or emergency livelihood‑coping strategies that arelikely to severely impact their income‑generating activities. A totalof 2.43 million people are estimated to be in need of malnutrition
prevention and treatment services, including at least 56 000 children
with severe acute malnutrition.207

If feasible, conduct cash‑for‑work activities to improve paddy storage and community infrastructure to
support daily wage earners and labourers.
Seek multilateral and bilateral aid to import and provide chemical fertilizers and agrochemicals along withlocally produced organic fertilizers. This should be coupled with technical support on efficient plant‑nutrient
management for both growing seasons (Yala and Maha), and agricultural inputs such as maize and somevegetable seeds for vulnerable smallholder farmers.
Seek support to produce and supply high‑nutrient animal feed, vaccines and veterinary health kits to livestock
owners, including those who have cattle and poultry, to mitigate the impacts of the feed shortage due to theeconomic crisis.

19

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response•

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKScale up food assistance, through food, cash and vouchers, to ensure vulnerable groups are able to meet theiressential food needs amid the economic crisis.
Support the continued scale‑up and functioning of the national nutrition programme Triphosha, for prevention
and treatment of malnutrition, and support the improvement of targeting and accountability for beneficiariesof the programme.
Assist the government in ensuring school meals programmes continue to function, given their important role
as a social safety net in meeting nutrition, education and other needs during the current crisis.
Continue frequent monitoring of inflation as well as food, fuel and agricultural input prices, in order to ensurethat support to affected households remains adequate.
Engage in the extension of the Humanitarian Needs and Priorities Plan until the end of 2022, providing
strategic inputs into strategic objectives 1 and 2 ahead of planning for 2023.

•

•
•
•

Latin America and the Caribbean
Central America (the Republic of Guatemala and the Republic of Honduras)
Key drivers of food insecurity: high prices, flooding
Elevated food and fertilizer prices, forecasted above‑average rainfall

Above‑average precipitations, intensified by the La Niña phenomenon

and a high likelihood of a third above‑average hurricane season

and an above‑average hurricane season, are forecast in theaffecting crop production are likely to drive acute food insecurity inupcoming second cropping season (September–November).218, 219

the outlook period.

This could bring favourable conditions for crop development.

The rising cost of agricultural inputs will likely weigh on production
208

prospects in the second and third agricultural seasons.

The pricesof fertilizers hit a record high in March, rising 128 and 88 percent
in Guatemala and Honduras respectively, due to high international
209, 210

prices, supply chain bottlenecks and export restrictions.

In bothHowever, it also increases the risks of flooding and localized crop
losses in low‑lying zones on the western coast of Guatemala andHonduras. If materialized, this is likely to lower market supplies,
further exerting upward pressure on prices.
In Guatemala, 3.2 million people (19 percent of the population) arecountries, imports of fertilizers in the first five months of 2022 were

expected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity

15‑20 percent lower year on year, which reduced availabilities.211(IPC Phase 3 and above) from October 2022 to February 2023,

Amid soaring production costs, smallholder farmers resorted torepresenting a sharp increase from 2.5 million in the same periodorganic fertilizers and received government support, which maylast year;220 128 000 people are projected to be in Emergency

212, 213

partially offset restrictions.

However, lower availabilities remaina concern, as its reduced application could result in low yields.
Rising food inflation has strained the purchasing power of
low‑income households, constraining their access to the main
staples. In June, the year‑on‑year prices of white maize increasedby 45 and 70 percent in Guatemala and Honduras respectively.214
Similarly, the prices of beans jumped 23 and 32 percent in Guatemala
and Honduras on a yearly basis. Spiralling energy prices, which
recorded an 11 and 30 percent increase in Guatemala and Honduras
respectively, also diminished the purchasing power of vulnerable
households.215, 216 The inflation rate is expected to remain high during
the outlook period, due to the lingering effects of supply shocks andglobal‑markets uncertainty.217

20(IPC Phase 4). In Honduras, the latest IPC analysis released in
January 2022 estimated that 2.6 million people were facing Crisis
or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above)from June to August 2022, including 353 000 people in Emergency(IPC Phase 4). These projections did not consider the potential
spillover effects from the war in Ukraine. Elevated international
food prices and potential localized crop losses, the latter caused
by above‑average rainfall, are likely to underpin a deterioration of
acute food‑insecurity outcomes in both countries compared to lastyear. This applies especially to households still recovering from thenegative effects of the COVID‑19 pandemic, as well as hurricanes in
2020.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEANHUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions•••••

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

•
•

•
•

•

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKScale up hurricane preparedness by strategically prepositioning stock to facilitate timely delivery ofassistance and protect productive assets before a hurricane makes landfall.
Provide resources and technical assistance to strengthen seed processing and storage infrastructure ofcommunity seed banks, with emphasis on those led by women producer associations.
Support farming households with inputs and tools to cultivate short‑cycle crop varieties and backyard
gardening kits for rapid food production.
Strengthen existing forecasting systems aimed at providing technical recommendations to smallholder
farmers on reducing the effects of climate‑related events.
Support the national strategic food reserve at national and local level, though procurement, storage andsupply chain services.

Provide in‑kind livelihoods assistance by distributing seeds, small livestock (laying hens or goats), cuttings,
and agricultural inputs and tools.
Continue monitoring the prices of food, fuel and agricultural inputs (fertilizers), to plan timely support
to affected households ahead of the start of the agricultural season. Strengthen market and economic
monitoring, to inform any required adjustments to national and partner cash‑based transfer programmes.
Complement government support with cash and food assistance (hot meals) for affected populations inshelters not covered by national programmes, within the first 72 hours.
Support the national disaster management system throughout capacity strengthening at local level, inorder to respond to emergencies and build strong logistic capacities. Support national risk and contingency
management.
Strengthen monitoring of changes in the nutrition situation and anticipate response in the most food‑insecureareas.

The Republic of Haiti
Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, insecurity and political instability, below‑average agricultural production
Worsening macroeconomic conditions, sociopolitical instability and

The agricultural production of 2022 main crops is expected toreduced agricultural production are set to exacerbate alarming levels

be below average, due to poor rainfall between March and May,of acute food insecurity.

particularly in the key producing areas.226 The reduced output is
expected to lower farmers’ ability to purchase agricultural inputs

Households are expected to see their purchasing power further

for the second and third cropping seasons in 2022.227 A forecasted

eroded across the outlook period, as the annual inflation rate is
expected to register double‑digit growth for the seventh‑consecutive
year.221 Reaching 52 percent higher year on year in April 2022, prices

above‑average hurricane season would further erode farmers’
resilience and affect agricultural production.228

of the basic food basket have been on the rise and are expected toFood security is highly likely to further deteriorate in the remainder

remain so.222 This is due to several factors including the continuousof 2022, surpassing the record‑high of 4.5 million people (45 percent

depreciation of the Haitian Gourde, high levels of insecurity, andof the analysed population) who were estimated to face Crisis

elevated international food and fuel prices.

or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above)

Amid a persistent political stalemate, insecurity due to gang violence
is likely to further intensify – further constraining business activities,
curtailing fuel and food supplies, affecting prices, and hamperingin March–June 2022, including 1.3 million people in Emergency(IPC Phase 4).229 In addition, reduced access to humanitarianassistance – due to a shortfall in humanitarian funding andincreasing costs of delivery of assistance resulting from high prices

people’s access to markets and essential services.223 This may
224

further enhance social frustration, which is likely to result in unrest.

Insecurity has complicated road access from the capital to southernof fuel and goods as well as access constraints – poses further
threats.230, 231

areas, and recently also to the north, hampering reconstruction
efforts in areas affected by the 2021 earthquake, as well as thedelivery of humanitarian assistance.225

21

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions••••

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKProvide high‑nutrient animal feed and animal‑health treatments to vulnerable livestock herders, to anticipate
and mitigate the impact of forecasted above‑average rains on animal conditions, while conducting
animal‑health surveillance activities (with a particular focus on African swine fever).
Scale up hurricane preparedness by strategically prepositioning stocks throughout the country (urban andrural areas), to facilitate timely delivery of assistance to affected people.
Provide resources and technical assistance to strengthen seed processing and storage infrastructure ofcommunity seed banks, with emphasis on those led by women producer associations.
Support farming households with inputs and tools to cultivate short‑cycle crop varieties and backyard
gardening kits for rapid food production.

The 2021–2022 HRP updated version calls for USD 199 million for food security and nutrition interventions
targeting 2 million people – but at only 19.6 percent funded for 2022, the ability of the humanitarian community tomeet rising needs is severely constrained.
•
Scale up and sustain emergency food and livelihood assistance for people facing Crisis or worse levels of
acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), prioritizing populations in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in thewestern coastal area of the Sud Department. This includes ensuring an adequate level of assistance throughrevised transfer values, to compensate for the rapidly rising prices.
•
Reinforce capacities to ensure continued access to populations, including continued barge and expanded
air services; maintain negotiation of a humanitarian corridor with the Dominican Republic (both land and sea
routes), for faster food procurement in case of a large‑scale emergency.
•
Strengthen actor capacities in access negotiation and mapping and adapt emergency‑programming
approaches for urban context.

West Africa and the Sahel
The Central African Republic
Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, high fuel and food prices
With protracted conflict likely to intensify in the outlook period, andfuel shortages and high agricultural input prices are likely to reducehigh fuel and food prices impacting purchasing power, acute foodplanted agricultural land and yields, resulting in declining harvests.237

insecurity is set to worsen further.

The latest IPC analysis projected that, in the absence of assistance,

Conflict is driving massive displacements, aggravated by direct

some 2.2 million people faced Crisis or worse levels of acute foodexactions on civilians. About 1.3 million people, or one‑third of theinsecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) from April to August 2022, equal

population, were either internally displaced (610 000) or refugees

to some 45 percent of the population, including 638 000 people

in neighbouring countries (739 000), as of July 2022.232 The conflictin Emergency (IPC Phase 4).238 This marks a slight decrease fromalso constrains access to fields and forests to cultivate, gather, fish,

2.3 million in the same period in 2021, albeit with a stable number of

herd and hunt. This is partly due to the increasing use of explosive

people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), at 633 000.239 Given increasing

233

weapons, with the first use of landmines in April 2022.

Violence risks are likely to intensify in the outlook period. NSAGs
are likely to seek territorial advances following a drastic reduction

insecurity and limited access to nutritious foods, along with a highprevalence of infectious diseases, acute malnutrition could further
deteriorate in conflict‑affected areas.240, 241of private military contractor personnel in the country, reportedly

Humanitarian‑access constraints remain high as of July 2022,

dropping well below 1 500 from over 2 000 by March 2022.234, 235

although slightly improving from “very high” at the end of 2021.242, 243

Increasing food prices affected affordability in 2022, and they are
expected to further rise due to the elevated international prices of236

cereals and other imported goods.

22

Meanwhile, high fuel prices,High fuel prices, armed clashes and direct targeting of humanitarian
assets remain key obstacles which have resulted in frequent
restrictions on humanitarian operations.

WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHELHUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions•••

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKDistribute vegetable seeds and early‑maturing cassava cuttings to support food production during theoff‑season, targeting food‑insecure IDPs, returnees and host communities in areas experiencing Crisis or
worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above).
Distribute livestock kits, targeting in particular food‑insecure IDPs, returnees and host communities in areas
experiencing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above).
Preposition food prior to the rainy season, to ensure continuity of WFP assistance when requirements are attheir highest and need to be met rapidly.

The 2022 HRP calls for USD 163.4 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 29.8 million for nutritioninterventions.
•
Increase coverage of nutrition programmes and prioritize high‑risk areas jointly with food security, health,protection and water, WASH partners.
•
Provide and scale up unconditional cash transfers to displaced populations and host communities in theevent of new active hostilities, to mitigate the immediate consequences on food security.

The Federal Republic of Nigeria
Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, economic challenges, high food prices, flash floods
Acute food insecurity and malnutrition are likely to remain at critical

According to the latest available CH analysis, 19.5 million people

levels due to lingering conflict and insecurity, macroeconomic

were projected to be in Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity

challenges, flash floods – especially in Yobe state – and high food

(CH Phase 3 and above) between June and August 2022, including

prices, despite the end of the lean season in August. A key concern

1.2 million in Emergency (CH Phase 4).251 The number of people

remains the population facing Emergency levels of acute foodfacing acute food insecurity cannot be related to the figure publishedinsecurity (CH Phase 4), particularly in areas that remain inaccessible

for the same period in 2021, as it is obtained from a geographicallyto humanitarian operations.244

expanded CH analysis.252, 253, 254 According to a survey by WFP’s

Conflict remains a key driver of acute food insecurity acrossnortheast and northwest Nigeria, with the security situation
continuing its gradual yet steady deterioration since the previous
report. It is likely to further deteriorate in the outlook period, due toescalating hostilities between NSAGs, criminality and intercommunal
violence.245 There is furthermore a high risk of political violence inthe run‑up to the February 2023 general elections.246 With the end of
the rainy season in September and rural topography becoming more
permissive to armed movements, violence is likely to experiencea seasonal jump, disrupting food systems, limiting access tomarkets and creating new rounds of displacements. As of July
2022, 2.5 million people were displaced in northeast Nigeria, up
from 2.2 million in December 2021, on top of another 1 million in themobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping project, 28 percent ofsurveyed households had inadequate food consumption in the recent
lean season (July 2022), marking a 1 percentage‑point increase
from the previous year.255 In the northeast, more than 1.3 million
children and 152 000 pregnant and lactating mothers are projected
to be acutely malnourished until the end of the year.256 Deteriorating
acute malnutrition is also concerning in the northwest, with
16 local government areas (LGA) out of 38 showing GAM prevalence
above 10 percent. The situation is especially worrying in Sokoto
state, where three LGAs had GAM prevalence above the emergency
threshold of 15 percent, reaching 30 percent in Isa LGA.257 Without
additional funding, the number of people planned for assistance in
October–December is likely to be reduced.

northwest and northcentral regions as of March 2022.247, 248
Year‑on‑year food inflation reached 22 percent in July and islikely to remain elevated through 2022, due to global supply
disruptions and high commodity prices.249 Domestic grain prices
increased 30 percent year on year, due to rising transport costs andbelow‑average availabilities.250

23

WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHELHUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions•••

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKDistribute home‑gardening inputs to IDPs and host communities, to support low‑mobility agricultural activities(e.g. backyard vegetable gardening) in order to mitigate the impact of further hikes in food prices.
Support agricultural‑based livelihoods activities for the upcoming dry‑cropping season, focusing on
vegetables, rice and maize, starting in October/November and targeting vulnerable households with access toland and water for cultivation.
Strengthen government capacity on emergency preparedness and response, with training and simulation for
staff (notably on duty in the northwest) from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, and Federal Ministry of
Humanitarian Affairs Disaster Mitigation Social Development.

The 2022 HRP calls for USD 451 million for food security, USD 59 million for livelihood and USD 144 million for
nutrition interventions. Funded only at 41.9 percent so far, the ability of humanitarian actors to respond is still
constrained.
•
Sustain humanitarian assistance to conflict‑affected areas in the northeast, particularly Borno state and thenorthwest, allowing for the lean‑season scale‑up.
•
Provide cash transfers to displaced populations (especially communities in the northwest and northeast) andhost communities, leveraging national systems.
•
Undertake a scoping mission in the northwest to have a comprehensive assessment of the nutrition situationand needs.
•
Scale up acute‑malnutrition prevention and treatment programmes in the northeast and northwest, incoordination with government, nutrition, food security, WASH and health partners.

Sahel (the Republic of Burkina Faso, the Republic of Chad, the Republic of Mali,
the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, the Republic of the Niger)
Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict and insecurity, political instability, climate shocks, high food prices
Despite the countries in the Sahel entering their annual harvest

the increase in transportation costs and the drop in production, withseason during the outlook period, most of the underlying drivers ofan upward trend in reported prices due to pressure on grain markets.

the current food crisis – conflict and insecurity, political instability,

Rampant inflation limits access to food, particularly for the poorest

climate shocks, high food prices and limited access to agropastoral

households and conflict‑affected populations.

inputs – are likely to aggravate further and raise acute food insecurity
levels. Moreover, without additional funding for the humanitarian
response, the number of people receiving food assistance will haveto be reduced from October 2022 onwards.

The security situation is likely to deteriorate further, except in
Mauritania, leading to new displacements, market disruptions anddisrupted agricultural activities.263, 264 Political instability in Burkina
Faso and Chad, and a recent string of coordinated attacks by NSAGs

Above‑average rainfall and and high river levels increase thein Mali, highlight the precariousness of the security situation.265

risk of floods this season, which may destroy crops and affectForced displacements are expected to increase further, adding to

production.

258

However, a risk of severe drought has been identified

in some localities in the Niger, which could have a critical impact259

on livelihoods.

Driven by regional and international markets,food prices are likely to remain at very high levels – for example,
the prices of basic staples in Mali are up to 80 percent above
the five‑year average. More than 90 percent of markets in theregion experience unusually high food prices.260 The region is
also facing a major fertilizer deficit due to elevated global prices.
Up to 88 percent of fertilizer needs for the 2022 season are notcovered, which could significantly affect crop production and further
increase food prices.261 Some countries strongly depend on foodimports, and elevated international prices will likely further drive up
domestic inflation – for instance, Mauritania has a cereal‑importdependency of more than 80 percent, of which around 50 percent
was imported from Ukraine or the Russian Federation in 2021.262
Supply of cereal markets in Chad remains in atypical decline due to24nearly 3 million IDPs.266 The security situation is also expected tofurther reduce humanitarian access.267 High to very high accessconstraints prevail in all countries, except for Mauritania.268
During the June–August 2022 period, around 13 million people
were projected to be acutely food insecure, at Crisis level orworse (CH Phase 3 and above), including 1.4 million people in
Emergency (CH Phase 4). This is a nearly 50 percent increase
compared to 2021, and over 120 percent higher than the five‑year
average. In particular, a 72 percent increase of people in Emergency(CH Phase 4) is observed, compared to the same time in the previous
year. Eight administrative areas or population groups are classified
in Emergency (CH Phase 4) – some for the first time ever. The
prevalence of acute malnutrition remains high, above 10 percent,especially in conflict‑affected areas; it exceeds 15 percent in Gao
region.269

WEST AFRICA AND THE SAHELHUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKRECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions

•
•
•
•
•

•

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

Distribute inputs for market gardens to most‑vulnerable households, to protect their agropastoral livelihoods.
Distribute home‑gardening inputs to IDPs and host populations, to support low‑mobility agricultural activities.
Rehabilitate/install water‑conservation infrastructure, equip market‑garden wells with solar energy andrehabilitate/develop harvesting systems for crops and market gardening.
Raise awareness on commercial destocking, when biomass indicators show a decline in grazing and accessto water.
Promote fodder crops and river‑water drainage systems in pastoral areas, to limit transhumance movements
and livestock destocking, and strengthen the capacity of herders to produce food supplements for theirlivestock.
Strengthen seasonal vaccination programmes for livestock, to limit epizootics.

The 2022 HRP calls for:Burkina Faso: USD 224.9 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 40.3 million for nutrition interventions;
Chad: USD 216.7 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 66.3 million for nutrition interventions;Mali: USD 234 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 66 million for nutrition interventions;
the Niger: USD 173 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 99.7 million for nutrition interventions;
Mauritania: USD 94.7 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 7.8 million for nutrition interventions.
•
Increase coverage of nutrition programmes and prioritize high‑risks areas jointly with food security, health,protection and WASH partners.
•
Scale up life‑saving assistance to meet the vital needs of crisis‑affected populations. Prioritize a cash+
strategy to assist vulnerable households facing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3
and above), to meet their immediate food and livelihood needs.
•
Develop and expand nutrition‑sensitive social‑protection programmes targeting the most‑at‑risk households.
•
Ensure access to a nutritious and affordable diet and to adequate services and practices for pregnant andlactating women, infants and young children, through actions in the food, health, WASH and social‑protection
systems.
•
Distribute livestock feed (including mineral blocks) and vaccinations, establish fodder plots and rehabilitate
pastoral wells of agropastoral households affected by the 2021 drought.
•
Maintain coverage of acute‑malnutrition prevention and treatment programmes, especially in priority areas
identified by the regional food security and nutrition hotspot analysis.
•
Strengthen capacities of national actors to respond to climate shocks.

25

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKEast Africa
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
Key drivers of food insecurity: drought, macroeconomic challenges, conflict and interethnic violence
In southern and eastern areas, the upcoming Deyr rains (October–

CARI methodology, over the last seven months; 2.8 million people

December) are forecast as below average, setting the stage for a(47 percent) were severely acute food insecure.282, 283 No recent

fifth‑consecutive failed rainy season. Fragile livelihoods will be further

information is available on the number of people in catastrophic

compromised by a reduction of yields, crop losses and by moreconditions, but concerns remain very high.284 In July 2021, the Famine

270

livestock deaths.

The last rainy season was extremely poor, which

Review Committee warned of a risk of famine in Tigray throughis expected to significantly affect harvests in the regions of southern

December 2021, driven by limited humanitarian assistance, intense

Tigray, eastern Amhara, eastern Oromia, and northeastern Southern

conflict, and low availability of commercial goods and services. 285

271, 272, 273

Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR).

Macroeconomic difficulties are likely to worsen, due to the combined
effects of increasing borrowing costs and elevated internationalcommodity prices, adding to the national import bill.274 As a result,depleting foreign‑exchange reserves have already caused sporadic
fuel shortages and the depreciation of the currency on the informal
market.275 In the first half of 2022, food inflation was 40 percent
higher than last year, with prospects of further rises.276
Conflict and interethnic violence intensified in several regions,particularly Oromia and Amhara where violence is likely to further
escalate.277, 278 Since the end of August, hostilities have resumed insouthern Tigray as well as parts of Amhara and Afar.279
The lack of updated IPC data remains a major concern. The
latest‑available IPC projections were valid up to September 2021,
indicating around 401 000 people in Tigray faced death andstarvation.280 More recent information shows deteriorating foodsecurity.

The situation remains of highest concern as the drivers behind therisk of famine warning continue to prevail. In fact, despite access
improvements between March and the end of August, the inflow ofhumanitarian supplies into Tigray was slow and hindered by barriers
such as insecurity and bureaucracy.286 Additionally, critically low
fuel supplies limited the scale of the response while interruptions ofcommunications and electricity slowed down or stopped operations.
Availability of commercial goods and services remains extremely
limited due to disruption of trade routes.287 Since 24 August, withhostilities resumed in Tigray and along its borders, humanitarianassistance has stalled.288 In addition, concerns over severe levelsof acute food insecurity in Amhara and Afar remain high due tocontinued insecurity and conflict, impeding humanitarian access.289
With drought conditions forecast to persist, already criticalfood‑insecurity levels are likely to worsen. Overall, 9.9 million people
are estimated to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity(IPC Phase 3 and above) due to drought, mainly located in Somali,
SNNPR, Oromia and Amhara.290 While IPC information is lacking,In 2022, 20.4 million people are estimated to be acutely foodcompatible analyses show life‑threatening conditions (Emergency

insecure and in need of urgent assistance, including more than

[IPC Phase 4 equivalent] or worse) are expected to be widespread

13 million food‑insecure people in northern Ethiopia – an increaseby October, with the possibility that some people are already facingof 2.4 million compared to last year.281 WFP assessments show that,starvation and death (IPC Phase 5).291 The number of severely

inside Tigray, the number of people in acute food insecurity increased

acutely malnourished children admitted for treatment is at record

from 4.6 million (83 percent), as determined based on WFP’s

high levels in 2022, compared to the last three years.292, 293 Moreover,rCARI methodology, to 5.4 million (89 percent), based on WFP’s

due to protracted funding shortfalls, food assistance is likely tofurther reduce in the outlook period.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions

26•

Provide support to individuals and communities affected by failed rainfall season, through: early‑warning
communication; fodder production/rangeland management; prepositioning; livestock treatment andvaccinations; investments for irrigable areas; access to multiple climate risk management support activities,
including microinsurance schemes; insurance for pastoralists; savings and lending schemes; financial
literacy; and small‑scale entrepreneurial training.

EAST AFRICA

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKThe 2022 HRP calls for USD 1.684 billion for food security and livelihoods, USD 176.8 million for agricultureinterventions, and USD 305.4 million for nutrition interventions.
•
Prioritize and support drought and conflict‑affected populations through life‑sustaining food and nutrition
assistance, including unconditional cash in areas where monitoring shows that markets are functional.
•
Provide emergency crop and livestock support to agricultural households affected by conflict, drought andother hazards, in order to increase crop and livestock production, provide access to seeds and tools, andprotect livestock health.
•
Provide water‑trucking interventions for domestic and livestock use, with distribution of water‑storage tanks
in drought‑affected areas.
•
Scale up nutrition assistance to women and children in areas with high malnutrition rates, continue to
implement the Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme, and reinforce integration with WASH and healthpartners.
•
Continue coordinated efforts on humanitarian access and leverage every opportunity to scale up food andnutrition assistance to people in worst‑affected areas.
•
Advocate for government commitments to allow relief agencies to acquire the goods and services necessary
for humanitarian operations in the Tigray region.
•
Advocate for and negotiate humanitarian access in cross‑line, conflict‑affected areas.

The Republic of Kenya
Key drivers of food insecurity: prolonged drought, rising food prices
The prolonged drought in eastern and northern Kenya is likely to

by increasing international commodity prices, as the country imports

further worsen, with another below‑average rainy season forecast

nearly 50 percent of its cereal requirements.300 Food inflation has

between October and December.294 This marks an unprecedented

been increasing steadily since March, reaching 15.3 percent year on

fifth poor rainy season, with cumulative effects from the previous

year as of August.301 Prices have increased even more in some areas.

four poor seasons.

For example, in southeastern cluster and especially in Meru North
and Embu counties, maize prices increased 80-90 percent compared

The last March–May rainy season in the arid and semi‑arid lands

to last year.302

performed extremely poorly. As of late July, the drought affected
between 25 and 85‑plus percent of grassland,295 as pasture

Around 3.5 million people are estimated to face Crisis or worse

regeneration was impaired by the poor rainfall conditions. Livestocklevels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) between

body conditions are currently poor due to limited pasture andJuly and September 2022, including around 785 000 in Emergency(IPC Phase 4).303 Between October and December 2022, foodwater, while herd sizes have significantly declined as 2.4 million
296

animals starved, and households have engaged in distress sales.

insecurity is expected to worsen, with 4.4 million people projected to

In southeastern and coastal marginal areas, as of mid‑July, up

face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 andto 78-95 percent of cropland was affected by drought, rendering

above), including 1.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).304

the prospects for cereal harvest unfavourable.

297

For example, theThis represents an 84 percent increase compared to the same

production of maize, green grams and cowpeas is estimated totime last year. The GAM prevalence in seven counties with arid and

be 7895 percent below the long‑term average.298 Resource‑basedsemi‑arid lands is above 15 percent; it exceeds the critical 30 percent

conflicts are also on the rise.299 Rising food prices are compoundedthreshold in three subcounties of Marsabit and Turkana counties.305

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions••••

Disseminate early‑warning information and advisories on risk‑management actions, to lessen the impact ofan anticipated fifth‑consecutive failed rainfall season.
Scale up availability and access to nutritious and diversified food.
Scale up availability and access to water and livestock feeds.
Resource mobilization needed to enhance capacity for effective restoration of livelihoods.

27

EAST AFRICA

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

•
•

•
•
•
•

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKScale up life‑saving food and nutrition interventions (including cash‑based assistance) to meet the immediate
food needs of populations at high risk, and protect the livelihoods of those affected by the drought.
Safeguard the livelihoods of farmers, pastoralists and agropastoralists, and support the quick recovery ofseasonal food production and their self‑reliance. Context‑specific livelihood packages should be provided,
consisting of cash, productive inputs and subsidies for basic productive services (e.g. tractor and irrigation
hours).
Support infrastructure rehabilitation, including water points and feeder roads.
Support national social‑protection systems, including Kenya’s Hunger Safety Net Programme, to respond to
the impacts of the drought on the most vulnerable categories of the population.
Scale up nutrition assistance to women and children in areas with high malnutrition rates, and reinforce
integration with WASH interventions and with health partners.
Implement acute malnutrition prevention activities, especially in counties with high GAM prevalence(over 15 percent).

The Federal Republic of Somalia
Key drivers of food insecurity: severe and prolonged droughts, conflict, rising food prices
A further intensifying drought due to a likely fifth‑consecutive poor

Some 6.7 million people are projected to face high levels ofrainy season, combined with high food prices and persistent conflict,acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) between Octoberis rapidly driving an extreme deprivation of food, with parts of Bay

and December 2022, including 2.2 million people in Emergency

region likely to experience Famine and several other areas of central(IPC Phase 4) and at least 300 000 people in Catastropheand southern Somalia projected to face an increased Risk of Famine(IPC Phase 5).321

between October and December, if humanitairan assistance is notsustained.

The IPC Famine Review Committee confirms that the thresholds for
Famine will most likely be breached between October and December

The current drought, already exceptionally prolonged as seasonal

among rural residents in Baidoa and Burhakaba districts andrains have been consecutively poor since late 2020,306, 307 is likely todisplaced people in Baidoa town of Bay region.322 Several other areas

worsen in the coming months given a high probability of anotherin central and southern Somalia also face a Risk of Famine should

below‑average October–December Deyr season.308 This would

the performance of the next rainy season be worse than currently

amplify the dramatic effects of the previous poor rainy seasons.

forecast and humanitarian assistance does not reach the mostFor example, the poor March–June 2022 Gu 309, 310, 311, 312 reduced

vulnerable populations.

cereal harvests by an estimated 50 percent compared to the 1995
‑ 2021 average in southern Somalia. Poor pasture conditions andwater scarcity also led to over 3 million livestock deaths since
mid‑2021.313, 314 Reduced availability of food, water and pasture
has also triggered the displacement of 857 000 people this year
alone.315 Consecutive failed local harvests and reduced supply fromneighbouring countries due to the regional nature of the drought
compound the effects of the sharp increase in global food andfuel prices, as the country imports over 90 percent of its cereal
requirements. This has resulted in sorghum, maize and wheat prices
reaching near‑record to record levels in July, beyond the reach ofmost poor households who depend heavily on market purchases toaccess food.316, 317 Conflict and insecurity also continue to disrupt
market access and functionality, and impede access to livelihoods
and humanitarian assistance, particularly in central and southernareas where food insecurity is spiking.318, 319, 320

28

Country‑wide, admissions for severe and moderate acutemalnutrition continue to be at an all‑time high compared to theprevious three years.323 The recent post‑Gu assessment found thatthe majority of surveyed population groups had a GAM prevalence
exceeding 15 percent, with the highest rates amongst Mogadishu
IDPs (26.6 percent), Baidoa IDPs (28.6 percent), and in agropastoral
areas of Baidoa and Burhakaba districts (24.9 percent). Crude
death rates and/or death rates for children under 5 years of age
met emergency thresholds for several groups in Bay region, as wellas amongst Shabelle riverine and agropastoral groups.324 A failed
rainfall season in late 2022 would leave no prospects for recovery
until at least the start of the next rainfall season in April 2023.
Consequently humanitarian needs are expected to remain high wellinto 2023.

EAST AFRICA

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKRECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions

•

•
•
•
•

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

Enhance the expansion of the national social safety net (Baxnaano), to protect more vulnerable people fromfurther livelihood losses, food insecurity, malnutrition and displacement. Expansion of the safety net to coverboth rural and urban populations. This is in anticipation of a potential fifth‑consecutive failed rainfall season
that will exacerbate the current drought situation.
Support social protection and humanitarian programming to avert loss of livelihoods and asset depletion
through sustainable long‑term livelihood programming.
Build social cohesion to reduce tension over access to dwindling common resources such as water (forhuman and livestock) and pasture.
Negotiate for increasing access in hard‑to‑reach areas through an enhanced access strategy and strategic
partnership with humanitarian actors and key stakeholders.
Scale up gender and nutrition sensitive programming.

The 2022 HRP calls for USD 624.4 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 178.8 million for nutritioninterventions. In response to years of back‑to‑back drought, an interagency June–December 2022 Somalia Drought
Response and Famine Prevention Plan calls for an additional USD 610 million for food security and livelihoods, and
USD 60 million for nutrition interventions. The System Wide Scaling Up protocol was activated mid‑August 2022.
•
Scale up integrated lifesaving emergency food, cash+ emergency livelihoods, health, WASH and nutrition
services through more proactive approaches, including mobile health and nutrition services in hotspot
districts. Vulnerable rural communities whose livelihoods have been devastated by the drought and facing awater crisis should also be targeted to stem the increasing levels of drought‑induced displacement.
•
Expand delivery of life‑saving food and nutrition assistance to populations living in hard‑to‑reach areas andareas that have remained inaccessible so far, through implementation of rapid response mechanism.
•
Continue scaling up life‑saving emergency responses through unconditional food and cash‑based transfers
to vulnerable populations, prioritizing assistance in areas that have experienced significant influxes of newly
displaced populations to avoid large‑scale loss of life, and populations exhibiting acute food insecurity andwho are at risk of Emergency or Catastrophe levels of food insecurity (IPC Phases 4 and 5) with focus on
marginalized populations and minority groups.
•
Scale up nutrition assistance to women and children in areas with high malnutrition rates, and reinforce
integration with WASH interventions and with health partners.
•
Support the Government of Somalia, through the Ministry of Labour and Social and Affairs in scaling up
its shock response efforts to alleviate the sufferings of the affected people. This involves leveraging theshock‑response delivery systems of the Safety Net for Human Capital Development Project, for the delivery ofcash‑based humanitarian assistance.
•
Augment logistics coordination and services, and in particular, the transportation capacity of government andpartners to deliver urgent humanitarian assistance into and within Somalia, especially to rural areas.
•
Maintain and scale up school meals programmes to keep children in schools, improve girls’ enrolment andlearning outcomes, improve heath and nutritional status and provide a safety net for vulnerable households
and mitigate the worst impacts of the drought.

29

EAST AFRICA

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKThe Republic of South Sudan
Key drivers of food insecurity: flooding, macroeconomic challenges, subnational conflict
Four consecutive years of flooding, macroeconomic challenges(August–October), particularly in Nile and Jonglei states, which may

and prolonged conflict drive extreme acute food insecurity.

improve crop conditions but could also increase flooding.336, 337, 338

Intercommunal and subnational violence have increased

Recent flooding in South Sudan was assessed in late June 2022 asslightly compared to the first quarter of 2022, mostly in Upper

the worst on record.339

Nile, Unity, Warrap and Jonglei states. The total IDP population
has reached around 2.2 million people, up from 1.71 million in
August 2021.325, 326, 327 The compromise between parties to the peaceagreement to extend the transitional period by 24 months reduces
the threat of widescale conflict. However, insecurity may deteriorate
following the United States of America’s decision to withdraw fromthe peace process.328

From April to July, 7.74 million people, almost two‑thirds of thetotal population, faced Crisis or worse levels of food insecurity(IPC Phase 3 and above), including 2.89 million people in Emergency(IPC Phase 4) and 87 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).340 This
represents an 8 percent increase in the number of people in Crisis
or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) compared to a year ago.341
Malnutrition remains a concern, as GAM levels were recently found

Food prices remain very high and volatile, severely constraining

to be at or above the 15 percent emergency threshold in six assessedfood access.329 Nationally, June prices of maize and sorghum wereareas. Severe acute malnutrition admissions since January are also

330

almost 90 percent higher than a year ago.

Contributing factors

include insufficient cereal supplies, low foreign‑currency reserves, aweak national currency and high fuel prices.331 As the country heavily
relies on food and fuel imports, high international prices may further
constrain food access and increase production costs.332
In the southern bimodal areas of western, central and eastern
Equatoria, the first season (March–June) rains were slightly below
average.333, 334 As of early August, rainfall has generally been below
average in the central and northern areas of Unity, Warrap andLakes states, causing crop‑water stress.335 Forecasts indicate
above‑average rains for the remainder of the season

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions
RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

30••

higher than the past three years.342, 343
Seasonal improvement in food security during the harvest period is
expected to be lower than usual, especially in flood‑affected areas.
Below‑average rains in several areas are also likely to affect crop
yields and reduce harvests.344 In parallel, increasing funding shortfalls
and rising operational costs have reduced food assistance.
Humanitarian access constraints remain very high.345 Access topeople in need has deteriorated due to interferences, insecurity andthe presence of checkpoints. 346 The highest number of aid workers
killed globally in the first half of 2022 was in South Sudan.347

Disseminate last‑mile, tailored early‑warning information and advisories on how to protect lives andlivelihoods ahead of a flood.
Distribute flood‑proof storage systems to protect valuables and agricultural assets.

The 2022 HRP calls for USD 650 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 230 million for nutritioninterventions.
•
Scale up unconditional food and cash transfers and emergency livelihood assistance to vulnerable
populations, returnees and IDPs, particularly women and children, in areas with populations in Emergency andCatastrophe (IPC Phases 4 and 5).
•
Scale up nutrition assistance to women and children in areas with high malnutrition rates, and reinforce
integration with WASH, health and protection partners (including prevention of gender‑based violence).
•
Scale up multisector humanitarian assistance in all locations in Emergency and Catastrophe (IPC Phases 4
and 5), complemented by effective nutrition, WASH and health services.
•
Advocate for, and negotiate, humanitarian access in conflict‑affected areas; this should include unimpeded
supply corridors for the movement of essential goods and personnel, allowing civilians to receive
humanitarian assistance and services, and aid agencies to operate freely and safely.

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKSouthern Africa
The Democratic Republic of the Congo
Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, below‑average rainfall
The ongoing deterioration of the security situation in the eastern

up to 30 percent in March–June led to lower harvests inprovinces is likely to drive new displacements in the outlook period,

June–July.357 The forecast for the September–December season

with impacts on acute food insecurity. This is likely to compound

also indicates below‑average rainfall. In unimodal areas ofrainfall deficits during the 2022 March–June season in northeastern

southern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including Katanga,provinces, while a below‑average rainfall is forecast for the upcoming

which accounts for up to 21 percent of national maize production,

September–March season in the southeast.348, 349

below‑average rainfall is expected in September–March.358

The conflict in North Kivu and Ituri provinces has further intensified.

The latest IPC analysis, from September 2021, projected that

This is due to NSAGs operations in Rutshuru and Beni territories

25.9 million people – 25 percent of the population analysed – faced

in North Kivu, and Djugu and Irumu in Ituri, which have stretched

Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 andthe capacity of humanitarian operations due to increased needs,

above) from January to June 2022, including 5.4 million people inincluding 160 000 newly displaced persons on top of 6 million

Emergency (IPC Phase 4).359 While this marks a slight improvement

350, 351, 352

existing IDPs.

Meanwhile, large offensives by the Armedfrom 27.3 million for the same period in 2021, it does not fully

Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and regional

consider the impact of conflict and below‑average rainfall, which ismilitaries have failed to curtail NSAGs attacks, pushing fighters into

likely to increase acute food insecurity in eastern, northeastern andnew areas as they avoid showdowns.

353, 354, 355

This has resulted

in new displacements. Moreover, the region suffers from very
high access constraints, due to the proliferation of explosives andfrequent attacks on humanitarian workers.356

southeastern provinces.
A negative outlook is also likely for acute malnutrition, especiallyin conflict‑affected areas. GAM prevalence exceeds 10 percent inseveral zones of Kwango, Tshuapa, Sud Kivu and Ituri.360

In northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which accounts
for about 18 percent of national maize production, rainfall deficits ofRECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions•••

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

Preposition agricultural stocks in strategic locations, to provide rapid support to households impacted by new
episodes of conflict.
Provide cash+ livelihoods assistance to vulnerable, rural households in conflict‑affected regions, as a meansof mitigating a potential deterioration in food security.
Prepare a prioritization plan to respond to acute food insecurity, following preliminary IPC results whichindicate that the food‑insecurity situation in the country remains same as the prior period.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo Emergency Response Plan 2022 calls for USD 764.8 million for foodsecurity, and USD 258.6 million for nutrition interventions. At 33 percent funded as of mid‑August, organizations
are unable to deliver the level of coverage required to ease and mitigate hunger and malnutrition.
•
Sustain and adapt conflict‑sensitive approaches, to ensure continuity of humanitarian assistance that cansave the lives and livelihoods of people projected to face acute food insecurity in 2022.
•
Scale up agriculture‑based emergency livelihood activities targeting the most vulnerable, food‑insecurehouseholds.
•
Scale up nutritional‑support interventions, including treatment of acute malnutrition and malnutrition
prevention.
•
Maintain wasting treatment and scale up wasting‑prevention activities, especially in the most food‑insecureareas.

31

SOUTHERN AFRICA

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKThe Republic of Madagascar
Key drivers of food insecurity: drought and cyclones, low food supplies, high food prices
Low food supplies, due to consecutive droughts and cyclones, andFurthermore, elevated global energy prices are likely to amplify

high food prices continue to drive acute food insecurity in the outlook

inflationary pressure. Consequently, and amid existing high rates

period.

of poverty, households’ access to food is expected to be severely

Multiple, consecutive years of drought have cumulated in a very
tight food supply for rural households in the Grand Sud, and curbed

constrained by the end of year, and a key driver of an anticipateddeterioration in acute food insecurity.

incomes from crops. The impact of successive cyclones and tropicalAccording to the latest IPC figures, an estimated 1.94 million people

storms, which predominantly affected eastern and southeastern

are expected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity

areas, also caused extensive losses and damage to food and(IPC Phase 3 and above) in Grand Sud and southeast regions

cash crops. There are serious concerns that rural households will

between September and November 2022.361 This number is projectedexhaust their own production supplies earlier than normal in affected

at 2.1 million people between December 2022 and March 2023.

areas, and adopt negative coping strategies to meet consumption

The number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), in the Grandneeds in the outlook period. In addition, forecasts point to anotherSud, is projected to decline; this reflects the results of humanitarian

below‑average rainfall season in 2022/23 (November–March) in

assistance and support to farming households which is expectedsouthern areas, risking a fourth‑successive poor harvest.

to have contributed to keeping agricultural production in 2022 atMoreover, food prices are expected to increase seasonally by theend of 2022 – trends that are likely to be amplified by elevated global
commodity prices and a depreciation of the currency in mid‑2022.

near‑average levels in the targeted areas.362 Concurrently, some
improvements can be seen in the malnutrition rates. Malnutrition
screening results of the second trimester showed a proxy GAM of
7.7 percent, lower than the rates in the same period last year, with nodistrict in emergency.363

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions••••

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response32••

Increase the number of water points and improve the management of permanent water points, for the
installation of market gardening as well as irrigated crops and seed-production plots.
Support farming households with inputs and tools to cultivate short‑cycle and drought‑tolerant crop varieties
and market gardening kits for rapid food production. This can mitigate the impact on food insecurity ofrainfall deficits during the main agricultural season and of expected increases in food prices.
Provide livestock keepers with animal‑health support to reduce drought‑induced mortality and morbidity, suchas vaccination kits and treatments. Disseminate early‑warning information for drought‑risk awareness, andstrengthen coordination and technology for a strong early‑warning system for drought areas. Provide rations
for children’s nutrient products (nutrition/prevention).
Preposition food and adapted seeds in strategic locations in the southern and southeast regions, to provide
rapid responses to populations affected by drought and cyclones/flooding.

Increase unconditional cash transfers for vulnerable individuals, as a short‑term income supplement to meettheir immediate food, nutrition and other needs, while protecting and supporting livelihood early recovery.
Provide nutritional support to prevent acute malnutrition prevention among pregnant and lactating womenand children under 5 years of age, and to manage cases of moderate acute malnutrition among children.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKThe Republic of Malawi
Key drivers of food insecurity: low food stocks, currency depreciation, below‑average rainfall, food and fuel inflation, rising input costs,
projected economic slowdown
Acute food insecurity – mainly driven by rising food, fuel and fertilizer

for agricultural labour and a reduction in cereal production in theprices, and low household food stocks – is expected to worsen

upcoming agricultural season (October 2022–March 2023).370

significantly in the outlook period, which coincides with the lean

Irrigated production is expected to be below average, owing to theseason.

possible decrease in residual moisture and low uptake of agricultural

Malawi’s headline inflation rate has been steadily increasing since2021; in June, it surpassed 20 percent, the second highest in the364

region.

Food inflation is rising due to the devaluation of the local

currency.365 The national average price of maize has doubled in
the 12 months to June 2022, underpinned by reduced output in
2022.366 In May, the price of the food basket increased, year on year,by 55 percent, while fuel prices increased year on year by almost
50 percent.367 In May, fertilizer prices were already 130‑160 percent
higher than in 2020.368

inputs due to their high cost. This will increase the production cost ofirrigated crops during the next agricultural season and might reduce
productivity. The recent outbreak of the new serotype O of foot andmouth disease is likely to further reduce livestock‑related income.371
Together with a projected slowdown in economic growth, thesefactors are expected to deplete coping mechanisms and worsenhouseholds’ ability to purchase staple foods; this in turn could trigger
a rapid deterioration of household food security conditions.372
Between October 2022 and March 2023, 3.8 million people are

In the southern region, where food stocks already ran out in August,rather than the usual October, farming households already rely onmarkets to access food.369 High fertilizer prices are likely to influence

expected to face Crisis levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3)– an increase from 9 to 20 percent of the total population in Crisis(IPC Phase 3), compared to last year.373

planting decisions. Combined with forecasted below‑averagerains, this could result in smaller planted areas, lower demand

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions

•

•
•
•
•

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

•

•
•

•

Strengthen the productive capacity of farming households for the main agricultural season, through provisionof inputs and extension support, particularly in areas where an increased risk of high prices or scarcity of
inputs and climatic hazards could affect rural agricultural livelihoods.
Facilitate operational support for the functioning of the different surveillance systems in place.
Provide livestock support to mitigate disease‑induced mortality and morbidity (foot and mouth disease andother prevalent animal diseases), such as vaccination kits and treatments.
Increase water harvesting and storage, and set up new micro‑irrigation systems, to support the mostvulnerable farmers in cultivating crops during periods when dry spells occur.
Mount campaigns to promote dietary diversification among communities, to improve poor food‑consumption
patterns.

Prioritize humanitarian response to the upcoming 2022/23 lean season with a focus on cash transfers
and in‑kind support for urban and rural households facing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity(IPC Phase 3 and above).
Urgently advocate for resources to provide unconditional transfers to refugees impacted by rising food prices.
Work with other social protection stakeholders to decide on vertical expansion (top‑ups) in areas with theongoing government‑led Social Cash Transfer Programme, to reduce vulnerability; this should be in addition
to adding new caseloads (horizontal expansion).
Provision of livelihoods support in the areas most affected by food insecurity, providing complementary input
packages to those provided by the Government of Malawi through the Agriculture Input Programme.

33

SOUTHERN AFRICA

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKThe Republic of Zimbabwe
Key drivers of food insecurity: food inflation, macroeconomic challenges, localized dry conditions
Persistent economic challenges, high food and fuel prices, and thethe currency, combined with increased interest rates, could make itimpact of localized dry conditions on 2022 crop production are

more costly for businesses to operate, impacting investment andexpected to worsen acute food insecurity conditions during theconsumption prospects.376

outlook period.

Below‑average rainfall during the 2021/22 agricultural season

Continued currency depreciation has contributed to a steep rise in

resulted in a decline in cereal production, reducing farming

annual inflation rates, significantly eroding households’ purchasing

households’ own food supplies and their incomes.377 Production

power and constraining their economic access to food. Furthermore,

prospects for the forthcoming 2022/23 season are being constrained

elevated global prices of essential commodities including cereals

by elevated prices of agricultural inputs. Coupled with fertilizer

and fuel – which were pushed sharply higher by the ripple effects

shortages, this could result in a reduced planted area and lower cropof the war in Ukraine – have both amplified inflationary pressures

yields.378

and increased the country’s import bill; this is straining the financesof a country in debt distress. In July, the annual food‑inflation rate
exceeded 300 percent.374 In response, the central bank increased
the benchmark interest rate to 200 percent – the highest in theworld – and reintroduced US dollars as a legal tender and gold coins
as a store of value.375 Macroeconomic challenges also remain a risk
to households’ incomes and livelihoods. The sharp depreciation of

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions

•
•
•
•
•
•

•

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

•
•
•
•
•

34

During the upcoming peak lean season (January–March 2023),
an estimated 3.8 million people are projected to face acute foodinsecurity, based on the government’s assessment – a deteriorationof 29.8 percent compared to last year.379 This figure is likely torise further, due to the abrupt decrease in the value of the national
currency and persistent macroeconomic challenges.

Protect agricultural livelihoods from forecasted dry periods, through the installation or rehabilitation ofwater‑harvesting systems. Set up temporary water points for livestock.
Promote drought‑tolerant crops and drought‑sensitive farming practices.
Support the provision of key agricultural inputs (seeds and fertilizers) to smallholder farmers, in preparation
for the 2022/23 cropping season.
Increase supplemental feeding stock, for improved nutrition.
Preposition food commodities in hard‑to‑reach, remote districts and close to flood‑prone areas, to facilitate
timely delivery of unconditional assistance.
Promote communities’ access to early‑warning and climate information through enhanced collaboration
with national and subnational government departments and active participation in existing coordination
structures.
Scale up training and awareness on conservation agriculture (Pfumvudza) practices, in order to minimize crop
losses during dry spells in the upcoming season.

Provide emergency food and livelihood assistance for people facing Crisis or worse levels of acute foodinsecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above).
Maintain and bolster analysis and monitoring systems to track price fluctuations and other indicators of
economic instability, in order to inform both preventative action and response programming.
Sustain and scale up livelihood, food and nutrition assistance, both in rural and urban areas.
Sustain and support analysis and monitoring systems to track price fluctuations and other indicators of
economic instability, to inform anticipatory action as well as response programming.
Strengthen interventions to minimize post‑harvest losses and conserve the potentially reduced harvest.

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKNear East, North Africa and Europe
The Republic of the Sudan
Key drivers of food insecurity: inflation, conflict and intercommunal violence, floods
Economic decline and rising food prices, coupled with tight supplies,

Conflict or intercommunal violence is likely to further worsen,

increasing intercommunal violence and conflict as well as floods, aremainly in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, amid political

driving a significant deterioration in acute food insecurity, amid very

deadlock.384, 385, 386, 387 The number of IDPs, estimated at 3.2 million, is

380high and increasing humanitarian access constraints.

expected to increase.388

The economic situation is expected to further worsen, amid political

Between October 2022 and February 2023 – coinciding with the

instability and the suspension of international financial assistance,

post‑harvest period – 7.7 million people are expected to be facing

which has exacerbated shortages of foreign‑exchange reserves. The

Crisis or worse levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above); an

local currency has plummeted by 22 percent since January 2022,

increase of almost 2 million people compared to last year.389 Beyond

and rising fuel and food shortages have boosted inflation. By Junethe outlook period, numbers are likely to further increase significantly

2022, year‑on‑year prices of cereals had nearly tripled, and ripple

as the lean season approaches. Throughout 2023, food insecurity

effects of the war in Ukraine had contributed to increasing fuel andcould worsen compared to 2022 when 11.7 million people werealready‑rising fertilizer prices.381, 382

expected to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) between

As forecasted, the June–September rains have been above average,

June and September.390, 391

benefiting crop yields. However, the abundant rains triggered floods

Without additional funding for the humanitarian response, thethat affected 146 000 people; these were mainly in the Greaternumber of people targeted for food assistance will likely reduce from

Darfur and Greater Kordofan regions and in River Nile, White Nile andOctober onwards.

Khartoum states, resulting in localized crop losses. Macroeconomic
challenges and high production costs are likely to affect yields
and keep food prices 400‑500 percent above the five‑year averagethrough the beginning of 2023.383

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions•••

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

Scale up cash‑for‑work activities (including rehabilitation of dykes and flood barriers, and clearing of canals)
and the distribution of unconditional cash for the most vulnerable households at high risk of flooding,especially in low‑lying and riverine areas alongside the River Nile and its tributaries.
To protect agricultural assets and valuables, distribute flood‑proof storage systems to the most vulnerable,
including IDPs and refugees. If an early‑warning threshold has been surpassed, share early‑warning
messages, including agricultural advice ahead of a likely flood event.
Disseminate flood early‑warning information before subsequent flooding events.

The 2022 HRP calls for USD 708.3 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 160 million for nutritioninterventions.
•Continue life-saving support to the most vulnerable population as identified by relevant food‑security
assessments.
•
Provide host communities with inputs to boost their agricultural livelihoods and food assistance, throughin‑kind cash and cash transfers.
•
Sustain life‑saving assistance to IDPs and refugees who have fled into the Sudan from Ethiopia’s Tigray andBenishangul‑Gumuz regions.
•
Provide comprehensive food security and nutrition programming in vulnerable areas, especially in South
Kordofan and Blue Nile states, where humanitarian access is possible for the first time in ten years.
•
Provide unconditional cash to farmers affected by the below‑average March 2022 wheat harvest, ensuring
they have the capacity to continue agricultural activities in the next season.
•
Provide livestock supply and services to vulnerable pastoralists and agropastoralists from October toDecember.
•
Provide comprehensive food security and nutrition programming in vulnerable areas, in South Kordofan andBlue Nile states, where humanitarian access is possible for the first time in ten years.
•
Implement the newly started the Sudan Emergency Safety Nets Project with the provision of cash and foodtransfers to more than 2 million people, including IDPs and residents, across the Sudan.

35

NEAR EAST, NORTH AFRICA AND EUROPE

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKThe Syrian Arab Republic
Key drivers of food insecurity: protracted economic crisis, erratic rainfall patterns, decreased agricultural production, conflict
Despite a substantial cooling of the conflict, over the last two years

The large fuel deficit increased production and transportation costs.

the humanitarian crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic has been driven

Long‑term weather forecasts for the 2022 growing season – winterby the deteriorating economic environment, including weather

cereals to be planted from November onwards – indicate additional

anomalies and drought‑like conditions which constrained 2022

rainfall deficits.

agricultural production.392, 393 Such factors are exacerbated over
the outlook period by further diminishing domestic agricultural
production caused by structural lack of inputs and forecast rainfall
deficits, particularly towards the end of the outlook period.

Risks of humanitarian disruption are particularly acute in northern
Syrian Arab Republic, where the United Nations mandate forcross‑border aid from Türkiye has been reduced to six months by the
Security Council.397 A resumption of conflict in northern Syrian Arab

Already feeble macroeconomic conditions have deteriorated at an

Republic is possible, which would lead to significant new population

accelerated pace since the start of the war in Ukraine and are likely

displacements.398, 399

to deteriorate further over the outlook period. The Syrian pound has
lost 20 percent of its value since February.394 Currency depreciation,
coupled with increased international food and energy prices, hasboosted inflation of essential items, with food recording a 93 percent
increase year on year in June.395

In the face of dramatically increasing humanitarian needs, funding
has been stagnating, impairing humanitarian organizations’ ability
to increase the number of beneficiaries.400 At the same time,
humanitarian access is highly constrained.401 Without additional
funding, the number of people targeted for food assistance will likely

In the 2021/22 season, the Syrian Arab Republic had low rainfall andreduce from October onwards. As a result, deteriorating economic

dry spells, which constrained crop yields for the second consecutive

conditions, coupled with diminishing agricultural production, areseason, amid expensive inputs including fuel to operate irrigation

likely to worsen the conditions of over 12 million Syrians estimatedpumps. This resulted in a further decline of cereal harvest, which was

to be food insecure in late 2021, as determined based on WFP’s CARI

completed in late July.396

methodology.402

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions

•
•
•
•
•

•

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

36

Provide vulnerable and affected farmers (particularly those affected by two consecutive drought‑likeseasons) with agricultural‑production inputs (certified wheat seeds and fertilizers).
Provide farmers with cash assistance to prepare their fields for planting and other operational costs(irrigation, harvesting, labour and transportation).
Provide special training on climate‑smart agriculture and the sustainable use of natural resources.
Rehabilitate irrigation systems and wells in strategic agriculture locations, and introduce solar panels
especially for collective irrigation, to guarantee power where fuel is expensive or unavailable.
Provide rainwater‑harvesting systems and the development of the use of non‑conventional water (treatedwater), coupled with improved soil management and crop management through improved selection of crop
species and planting dates.
Support the maintenance of agricultural drainage systems in public irrigation areas.

The 2022–2023 HRP calls for USD 1.7 billion for food security and agriculture, USD 247.6 million for early recovery
and agriculture, and USD 124.1 million for nutrition interventions.
•Continue the provision of in‑kind food assistance to food‑insecure families across the country and increasehybrid cash assistance to the most vulnerable among them, to support their eroded purchasing power.
•
Increase crossline food delivery into the northwest, to complement cross‑border modalities.
•
Provide animal feed, concentrated feed, animal fodder seeds, artificial insemination for the re‑establishmentof herds, and veterinary services against parasites and viral and transboundary diseases, combined withcapacity building on good rearing and livestock production practices to support already‑vulnerable livestock
owners facing harsh, drought‑like conditions.
•
Provide timely multipurpose cash assistance to enhance agricultural production, with productive inputs andassets like poultry, small animals or seeds to quickly restore household food production.
•
Support agriculture‑based livelihoods, as well as food processing, in order to enhance food stocks and foodsecurity for rural households.

NEAR EAST, NORTH AFRICA AND EUROPE

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKThe Republic of Yemen
Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, conflict
Although the food security outlook in Yemen is unlikely to be as grim

Of greatest concern were 161 000 people expected to reachas previously projected, acute food insecurity remains at critical

Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) between June and December 2022,

levels. The economic crisis persists, while improvements in accessand a Risk of Famine in the districts of Abs and Hayran in Hajjah

might be reversed as the ongoing truce remains fragile.

governorate, under a worst‑case scenario.405

The economic crisis is likely to last due to continued political

These projections were based on assumptions that humanitarian

instability, lack of external revenues, and elevated global commodity

assistance would significantly reduce due to insufficient funding,prices. These factors compound the depletion of foreign‑exchange

conflict would intensify and domestic economic decline would

reserves, which underpins elevated currency volatility – particularly

deepen. Some assumptions were disproven: the conflict in Yemen

in areas controlled by the Internationally Recognized Government.403

eased considerably after parties agreed on a truce from April,

Ultimately this affects the country’s capacity to import essential

which was extended until October.406 At the same time, funding foritems. The weak currency and global increases of the cost offood assistance slightly improved and major cuts in the number offood led to a severe increase in local prices, as Yemen has a highbeneficiaries were prevented. In light of this changing context, thedependency on imports. Annual increases of 74 percent for the

IPC analysis is being updated and the outlook on food‑insecurity

minimum food basket, in areas controlled by the Internationallylevels is expected to be less grim.

Recognized Government, and 38 percent in areas controlled by
Sana’a‑based authorities, severely cut households’ purchasing power;
this was often exacerbated by the absence of regular salaries.

Even as the truce is likely to further mitigate conflict, expectedeconomic repercussions at the household level – including increased
availability of fuel, improved human capital mobility and better

Early this year, critical levels of acute food insecurity were estimatedaccess to goods and services – are yet to manifest fully.407 Moreover,as likely to deteriorate severely from June until the end of 2022.

access constraints were extreme as of July 2022. Access has

In fact, according to IPC analysis released in March 2022, over

improved in some critical areas but the truce is fragile; the ability of

19 million people were expected to experience acute food insecurity

humanitarian actors to prevent catastrophic conditions remains at(IPC Phase 3 and above) between June and December 2022 –risk.408 Finally, the rising cost of operations, and protracted funding

including 7.1 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 161 000 inshortfalls, might reduce current levels of food assistance.

Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).404

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory
actions••••

Provide seeds and agricultural inputs to vulnerable smallholder farmers ahead of the wheat planting season
in December to mitigate the impact of constrained import of wheat.
Provide conditional cash and/or food assistance to vulnerable households affected by the economic crisis tohelp jumpstart income‑generating activities and mitigate the impact of increasing food and fuel prices.
Provide actionable timely information to humanitarian stakeholders and governmental institutions bymonitoring climatic shocks through flood and drought forecasts (erratic rain patterns).
Provide crop and livestock inputs to support sustainable intensification of production systems and contributeto reducing the risks of rural population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) sliding into Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

37

NEAR EAST, NORTH AFRICA AND EUROPE

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

RECOMMENDATIONSEmergency
response

38

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKThe Yemen HRP calls for USD 2.1 billion for food security and agriculture sector and USD 442.9 million for thenutrition sector. A total USD 888.3 million was received for agriculture (42 percent of appeal) and USD 97 million
for nutrition (22 percent).
•
Provide unconditional food and cash transfers and implement cash‑for‑work activities to mitigate the impactof food‑price inflation on the most vulnerable people.
•
Expand nutrition interventions for children under 5 years of age, pregnant and lactating women, andschoolchildren in areas where prevalence of acute malnutrition is a major concern (GAM prevalence above
10 percent).
•
Improve access to livelihood opportunities and rehabilitate food security assets and infrastructure in areas
with high levels of food insecurity.
•
Continue to provide fuel to health centres and local WASH facilities through the Bilateral Service Provision
activity.
•
Provide key farming inputs to the most food‑insecure farmers, including crop and vegetable seeds,
agricultural tools, and irrigation equipment such as solar water pumps, drip irrigation and water tanks toovercome the high cost and scarcity of fuel.
•
Increase resilience of livestock owners by providing animal feed, fodder seeds and feeding equipment toincrease animal production and productivity and cash value.
•
Provide conditional and season‑specific cash transfers (adopting cash‑for‑work methodology) to rehabilitatecommunity water assets and infrastructure.
•
Support livelihood assets restoration and assistance to help establish microbusinesses, and support skills
training to enhancing employability.
•
Conduct a countrywide beneficiary retargeting, registration and prioritization exercise, to ensure humanitarianassistance reaches the most vulnerable amid limited funding.

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKGlossary

Acute food insecurity
Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food deprivation that threatens lives or livelihoods regardless of the causes, context or duration.
The IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale categorizes acute food insecurity into five Phases of severity, ranging from IPC Phase 1, corresponding
to No/Minimal acute food insecurity, to IPC Phase 5, corresponding to Catastrophe/Famine. Each of these phases has important and distinct
implications for where and how best to intervene.

Chronic food insecurity
Chronic food security refers to food insecurity that persists over time, largely due to structural causes. Chronic food insecurity has relevance inproviding strategic guidance to actions that focus on the medium‑ and long‑term improvement of the quality and quantity of food consumption
required for an active and healthy life.

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)
The IPC results from a partnership of various organizations at the global, regional and country levels, and is widely accepted by theinternational community as a global reference for the classification of food insecurity.
(For further details, please see http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Factsheet_2020.pdf.)

Cadre Harmonisé (CH)The Cadre Harmonisé is the multi‑dimensional analytical framework used by the Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the
Sahel (CILSS), for the analysis and identification of areas and groups at risk of acute food insecurity in the Sahel, West Africa and Cameroon.
(For further details, please see http://ecoagris.cilss.int/index.php/analyse‑cadre‑harmonise/)

Emergency – IPC/CH Phase 4 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale
Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is a level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale at which households either have large food‑consumption gaps –which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality – or are able to mitigate large food‑consumption gaps by employing
emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. Households face critical levels of acute food insecurity/critical acute food insecurity.
Urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods. If nothing is done, the population could face starvation or death.

Catastrophe – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale
Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is a level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale at which households face an extreme lack of food and/or other basic
needs, even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels areevident. Urgent, immediate action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death, and the total collapse of livelihoods. Households can bein Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) even if areas are not classified in Famine (IPC Phase 5).

Famine – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale
Famine is the highest level of the Acute Food Insecurity scale. Famine exists in areas where at least one in five households has, or is most
likely to have, an extreme deprivation of food and face starvation, death, destitution. Extremely Critical levels of acute malnutrition (at least
30 percent of children malnourished) and significant mortality, directly attributable to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutritionand disease (at least 1 person for every 5 000 dies each day), are occurring. Urgent action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death.

Famine Likely – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale
Famine Likely is the highest level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale (Phase 5), used to classify situations when Famine is likely occurring.
If there is insufficient data for Famine classification, usually because either nutrition or mortality data are lacking, but the available information
indicates that Famine is likely occurring or will occur, then the Famine classification is called Famine Likely. Famine and Famine Likely are
equally severe; the only difference is the amount of reliable evidence available to support the statement.

39

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKRisk of Famine
Risk of Famine refers to the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine in the projected period. While this is not perceived necessarily
as the most‑likely scenario, it is a worst‑case scenario that generally has a realistic chance of occurring.

Food security
A situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food thatmeets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. There are usually four dimensions of food security: foodavailability, food access, food utilization and stability over time.

Food access
Access by households/individuals to adequate resources for acquiring appropriate foods for a nutritious diet.

Food availability
The availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports.

Livelihoods
People's capabilities, assets – both material and social – and activities required for a means of living linked to survival and future well‑being;
and the policies and institutions that shape or constrain access to assets and choices about activities.

Coping strategies
Activities to which people resort in order to obtain food, income and/or other essential goods or services when their normal means of
livelihood have been disrupted or other shocks/hazards affect their access to basic needs.

Malnutrition
Malnutrition is an umbrella term that covers undernutrition and overweight, obesity and diet‑related noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) suchas heart disease, stroke, diabetes and cancer. Undernutrition is a consequence of inadequate nutrient intake and/or absorption, and/or illness
or disease. Acute malnutrition, stunting, underweight and micronutrient deficiencies are all forms of undernutrition.

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improved nutrition and affordable healthy diets for all. Rome, FAO. https://doi.org/10.4060/cb4474en
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IPC. 2022. What is Famine? In: IPC. Rome. Cited 10 May 2022. ipcinfo.org/famine‑facts/
IPC. 2022. Famine Factsheet. April 2022. Rome. ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo‑website/resources/resources‑details/en/c/1152968/
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40

HUNGER HOTSPOTS | FAO-WFP EARLY WARNINGS ON ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKEndnotes
1

GNAFC & FSIN. 2022. Global Report on Food Crises 2022. Rome. www.fightfoodcrises.net/fileadmin/user_upload/fightfoodcrises/doc/resources/GRFC_2022_

FINAl_REPORT.pdf
2

ACLED. 2022. Incident Dashboard. In: ACLED. Cited 29 April 2022. https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard

3

GNAFC & FSIN. 2022. Global Report on Food Crises 2022 Mid‑Year Update. Rome. www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC%202022%20

MYU%20Final.pdf
4Based on GRFC 2022 Mid‑Year Update. This number additionally includes 5.1 million using 2021 IPC/CH estimates for Ethiopia, Liberia and Zimbabwe, as no

IPC estimates were available for these countries in 2022.
5This number includes 401 000 people in Ethiopia (projection July–September 2021) (to note: data is outdated, disaggregated data for Ethiopia were notavailable for 2022), 161 000 in Yemen (projection June–December 2022), 87 000 in South Sudan (projection April–July 2022), 301 000 in Somalia (projection
October – December 2022, based on the IPC analysis published on 12 September 2022) and 20 000 in Afghanistan (March–May 2022).
6

ACLED. 2022. Incident Dashboard. In: ACLED. Cited 16 August 2022. https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard

7

Violence destroys or disrupts livelihoods, including agricultural activities and commercial trade, as people are either directly attacked or flee the prospectof attacks, or face movement restrictions and administrative impediments. When displaced, people abandon their land and other livelihoods, reducing also theavailability of food for their communities and markets.
8

Barbet‑Gros, J. & Cuesta, J. 2022. Food Riots: From Definition to Operationalization. World Bank. Washington, DC. www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Poverty%20documents/Introduction%20Guide%20for%20the%20Food%20Riot%20Radar.pdf
9

UNHCR. 2022. Coordination platform displacements in Sahel. Cited 14 September 2022. https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/sahelcrisis

10International Crisis Group. 2022. Nigeria: Crisis Watch Update July 2022. In: International Crisis Group. Cited 2 August 2022. www.crisisgroup.org/

crisiswatch#nigeria
11

OCHA. 2022. Democratic Republic of the Congo – North‑Kivu Displacement trends: Rutshuru‑Nyiragongo crisis. Geneva Switzerland. www.humanitarianresponse.

info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/20220628_v100_rutshuru_nyiragongo_factsheet_vf_en.pdf
12

Le Monde. 2022. L’implication russe en Centrafrique bousculée par la guerre en Ukraine. Le Monde, 29 March 2022. Paris. Cited 29 August 2022. www.

lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2022/03/29/l‑implication‑russe‑en‑centrafrique‑bousculee‑par‑la‑guerre‑en‑ukraine_6119688_3212.html
13

U.S. Department of State. 2022. The United States Stands with the People of South Sudan and Calls for Urgent Progress From

South Sudan’s Leaders. In: U.S. Department of State, Press Release, 15 July 2022. Washington, DC. Cited 29 August 2022. www.state.gov/
the‑united‑states‑stands‑with‑the‑people‑of‑south‑sudan‑and‑calls‑for‑urgent‑progress‑from‑south‑sudans‑leaders
14

HRW. 2022. Turkey’s threatened incursion in northern Syria. Human Rights Watch, 17 August 2022. Cited 14 September 2022. hrw.org/news/2022/08/17/

questions‑and‑answers‑turkeys‑threatened‑incursion‑northern‑syria
15

HIU (Humanitarian Information Unit). 2022. Record Number of Conflict‑Affected IDPs: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence. Cited 17 July 2022.

https://hiu.state.gov/#global,U2607
16

Da Rin, D. 2022. New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists. In: International Crisis Group, 27 July 2022. Brussels. Cited 16 August 2022.

www.crisisgroup.org/latin‑america‑caribbean/haiti/new‑gang‑battle‑lines‑scar‑haiti‑political‑deadlock‑persists
17

ACLED. 2022. Subnational Threat Surge Tracker. In: ACLED. Cited 29 August 2022. https://acleddata.com/early‑warning‑research‑hub/

subnational‑threat‑surge‑tracker
18

International Crisis Group. 2022. Crisis Watch Digest, August 2022, cited 12 August 2022, ethiopia‑august‑2022.indd (crisisgroup.org)

19

Reuters. 2022. Fighting along border of Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region. Reuters, 24 August 2022. Cited 5 September 2022. www.reuters.com/world/africa/

fighting‑resumes‑along‑border‑ethiopias‑northern‑tigray‑region‑resident‑tigray‑2022‑08‑24
20

OCHA. 2022. Pakistan 2022 Floods Response Plan: 01 Sep 2022 – 28 Feb 2023 (Issued 30 Aug 2022). Geneva, Switzerland. https://reliefweb.int/report/

pakistan/pakistan‑2022‑floods‑response‑plan‑01‑sep‑2022‑28‑feb‑2023‑issued‑30‑aug‑2022
21

World Bank. 2022. Global Economic Prospects. Washington, DC. www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global‑economic‑prospects

22

Jana Randow. 2022. Europe Slips Toward Recession as ECB Mulls Steps Ahead. Bloomberg, 22 August 2022. New York, USA. Cited 29 August 2022. www.

bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022‑08‑20/europe‑slips‑toward‑recession‑as‑ecb‑mulls‑steps‑ahead‑eco‑week?sref=RqRj603m
23

Al Jazeera. 2022. China’s economy slows sharply, fanning global recession fears. Al Jazeera, 15 July 2022. Doha. Cited 29 August 2022. www.aljazeera.com/

economy/2022/7/15/chinas‑economy‑grows‑at‑slowest‑pace‑since‑start‑of‑pandemic
24

World Bank. 2022. Global Economic Prospects. Washington, DC. www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global‑economic‑prospects

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FAO. 2022. FAO Food Price Index. In: FAO. Rome. Cited 22 August 2022. www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en

26

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documents/WFP‑0000141001/download
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41

Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology. 2022. Climate Driver Update. Indian Ocean Dipole, 16 August 2022.

42

NASA. 2022. Deep Concern About Food Security in Eastern Africa. In: Earth Observatory. 17 August 2022. Washington, DC. Cited 29 August 2022. https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/150217/deep‑concern‑about‑food‑security‑in‑eastern‑africa
43

Climate Prediction Center (CPC) of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI),

and the European Centre for Medium‑Range Weather Forecasts.
44

FEWS NET. 2022. Ethiopia Food Security Outlook: June 2022 to January 2023, Food aid remains insufficient amid very high levels of hunger and malnutrition, June

2022. Washington, DC. https://fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/Ethiopia‑Food%20Security%20Outlook‑June%202022‑Final.pdf
45

WFP. 2022. Status of drought and outlook for the second half of 2022 across Eastern Horn of Africa. Presentation, 6 July 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/

documents/WFP‑0000141001/download
46

WFP. 2022. Status of drought and outlook for the second half of 2022 across Eastern Horn of Africa. Presentation, 6 July 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/

documents/WFP‑0000141001/download
47

WFP. 2022. Status of drought and outlook for the second half of 2022 across Eastern Horn of Africa. Presentation, 6 July 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/

documents/WFP‑0000141001/download
48

IPC. 2022. Nearly 6.7 million people across Somalia face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse acute food insecurity outcomes. Mogadishu. https://fsnau.org/downloads/

Multi-Partner-Technical-Release-on-Somalia-2022-Post-Gu-Assessment-and-IPC-Analysis-Results-12-Sep-2022.pdf
49

WFP. 2022. Status of drought and outlook for the second half of 2022 across Eastern Horn of Africa. Presentation, 6 July 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/

documents/WFP‑0000141001/download
50

NDMA. 2022. KFSSG 2022 Long Rains Food and Nutrition Security Assessment Findings, presented on 4 August 2022.

51

FEWS NET. 2022. Ethiopia Monitoring Report Kiremt/Long Rain Seasons 2022. Washington, DC. https://data.chc.ucsb.edu/people/diego/Ethiopia_dekadal_

monitoring_reports/Latest_Ethiopia.pdf

42

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52

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKOCHA. 2022. Horn of Africa Drought: Regional Humanitarian Overview and Call to Action (July 2022). Geneva, Switzerland. https://reliefweb.int/report/

ethiopia/horn‑africa‑drought‑regional‑humanitarian‑overview‑call‑action‑business‑brief‑july‑2022
53

OCHA. 2022. Horn of Africa Drought: Regional Humanitarian Overview and Call to Action (July 2022). Geneva, Switzerland. https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/

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54

IPC. 2022. Somalia faces increased Risk of Famine as acute food insecurity, malnutrition and mortality worsen, 4 June 2022. Mogadishu. https://fsnau.org/

downloads/Somalia‑Updated‑IPC‑and‑Famine‑Risk‑Analysis‑Technical‑Release‑4‑Jun‑2022.pdf
55

NDMA. 2022. National Drought Early Warning Bulletin, July 2022. www.ndma.go.ke/index.php/resource‑center/national‑drought‑bulletin/

send/39‑drought‑updates/6556‑national‑monthly‑drought‑bulletin‑july‑2022
56

WFP. 2022. Status of drought and outlook for the second half of 2022 across Eastern Horn of Africa. Presentation, 6 July 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/

documents/WFP‑0000141001/download
57

UNHCR. 2022. Somalia Internal Displacement. In: UNHCR. Geneva, Switzerland. Cited 7 September 2022. https://data.unhcr.org/en/dataviz/1?sv=1&geo=192

58

UNHCR. 2022. Internally Displaced Persons Regional Overview, East and Horn of Africa. Geneva, Switzerland. https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/

details/94940
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IOM. 2022. Ethiopia: National Displacement Report 12 (March–April 2022). Grand‑Saconnex, Switzerland. https://dtm.iom.int/reports/

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OCHA. 2022. Kenya Drought Flash Appeal: October 2021–October 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/

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UNHCR. 2022. Internally Displaced Persons Regional Overview, East and Horn of Africa. Geneva, Switzerland. https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/

details/94940
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Cotterill, J. 2022. Fuel shortages across Africa hit motorists, airlines and radio stations. Financial Times, 6 June 2022. London. Cited 29 August 2022. www.

ft.com/content/5f5e1550‑f750‑4ca6‑8c10‑873e3372d73e
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Shalal, A. 2022. Ethiopia creditors to discuss debt restructuring on Monday. Reuters, 12 July 2022. London. Cited 29 August 2022. www.reuters.com/world/

africa/ethiopia‑creditors‑discuss‑debt‑restructuring‑monday‑source‑2022‑07‑12
64

Cohen, M. & Malingha, D. 2022. Kenya Vote Backdrop Is Anger Over Living Costs, Debt. Washington Post. 8 August 2022. Washignton, DC. Cited 29 August2022. www.washingtonpost.com/business/kenya‑vote‑backdrop‑is‑anger‑over‑living‑costs‑debt/2022/08/04/125e2762‑13b3‑11ed‑8482‑06c1c84ce8f2_story.html
65

Aloo, H. 2022. Kenya: IMF sets new loan conditions, limiting choices of next government. The Africa Report, 6 August 2022. Paris. Cited 29 August 2022.

www.theafricareport.com/228794/kenyas‑9‑august‑elections‑imf‑sets‑new‑loan‑conditions‑limiting‑choices‑of‑the‑next‑government
66

WFP. 2022. Status of drought and outlook for the second half of 2022 across Eastern Horn of Africa. Presentation, 6 July 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/

documents/WFP‑0000141001/download
67

OCHA. 2022. Horn of Africa Drought, Regional Humanitarian Overview and Call to Action. Geneva,Switzerland. https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/

horn‑africa‑drought‑regional‑humanitarian‑overview‑call‑action‑business‑brief‑july‑2022
68

IPC. (forthcoming). Kenya: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, July–December 2022. Rome.

69

FEWS NET. 2022, Ethiopia, Key Message Update. July 2022. In: FEWS NET. Washington, DC. Cited 29 August 2022. https://fews.net/east‑africa/ethiopia

70

IPC. 2022. Somalia: Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Snapshot, June–December 2022. Rome. https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo‑website/alerts‑archive/

issue‑69/en/
71

EM‑DAT Public. 2022. International Disaster Database. In: EM‑DAT Public. Louvain, Belgium. Cited on 2 September 2022. https://public.emdat.be/data

72

IPC. 2022. Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, March–November 2022. Issued in May 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/

ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_AcuteFoodInsec_2022Mar_2022Nov_report.pdf www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_
AcuteFoodInsec_2022Mar_2022Nov_report.pdf
73

IPC. 2022. Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, March–November 2022. Issued in May 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/

docs/IPC_Afghanistan_AcuteFoodInsec_2022Mar_2022Nov_report.pdf
74

IPC. 2022. Afghanistan: Acute Food Insecurity Analysis March–November 2021 and Projection for June–November 2021. Issued in April 2021. In: IPC. Rome.

Cited 16 August 2022. www.ipcinfo.org/ipc‑country‑analysis/details‑map/en/c/1154300/?iso3=AFG
75

Based on Flowminder population data. 2021 and 2022 numbers are based on the June–November forecast period.

76

FEWS NET. 2022. Afghanistan Seasonal Monitor: Poor production outcome during current year will worsen food security situation in 2022‑23. Washington, DC.

https://fews.net/central‑asia/afghanistan/seasonal‑monitor/june‑2022
77

IPC. 2022. Afghanistan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, March–November 2022. Issued in May 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/

docs/IPC_Afghanistan_AcuteFoodInsec_2022Mar_2022Nov_report.pdf
78

FEWS NET. 2022. Afghanistan. In: FEWS NET. Washington, DC. Cited 8 August 2022. https://fews.net/central‑asia/afghanistan

79

FEWS NET. 2022. Afghanistan. In: FEWS NET. Washington, DC. Cited 8 August 2022. https://fews.net/central‑asia/afghanistan

43

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OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKILO. 2022. Employment prospects in Afghanistan: A rapid impact assessment. Briefing Note, 19 January 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. www.ilo.org/asia/

publications/issue‑briefs/WCMS_834525/lang‑‑en/index.htm
81World Bank. 2022. Afghanistan Economic Monitor (July 2022). Washington, DC. https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/

ba0c782d2cb3a62f1f41356e978eb2cf‑0310062022/original/Afghanistan‑Economic‑Monitor‑19‑July‑2022.pdf
82

WFP. 2022. Afghanistan: Countrywide Weekly Market Price Bulletin. Issue 116, 21 August 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000142035/

download
83

WFP. 2022. Tigray Emergency Food Security Assessment: Tigray Crisis response. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000141881/download

84

Al Jazeera. 2022. UN condemns deadly air raid that ‘hit kindergarten’ in Tigray. Al Jazeera, 27 August 2022. Doha. Cited 6 September 2022. www.aljazeera.

com/news/2022/8/27/un‑condemns‑tigray‑airstrike‑that‑killed‑children
85

IPC. 2021. Ethiopia: Acute Food Insecurity Situation May‑June 2021 and Projection for July‑September 2021. In: IPC. Rome. Cited 15 August 2022. www.

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86

IPC. 2021. Famine Review of the IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis. Conclusions and recommendations for Tigray region, Ethiopia. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/

fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Ethiopia_Famine_Review_2021July.pdfwww.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Ethiopia_Famine_
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87

OCHA. 2022. Ethiopia Situation Report – 6 September 2022. In: WFP. Cited 6 September 2022. https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/

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88

Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology. 2022. Climate outlooks, Issued 30 August 2022. In: Australian Government. Cited 1 September 2022. www.

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European Centre for Forecast. 2022. Precipitations October 2022. In: ECMWF. Cited 1 September 2022. https://apps.ecmwf.int/webapps/opencharts/

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WFP. 2022. Market Watch Ethiopia, June 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000141077/download

91

FEWS NET. 2022. Ethiopia Monitoring Report Kiremt/Long Rain Seasons 2022. Washington, DC. https://data.chc.ucsb.edu/people/diego/Ethiopia_dekadal_

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FSNWG. 2022. FSNWG Drought Special Report, 29 July 2022. www.icpac.net/fsnwg/fsnwg‑drought‑special‑report‑29‑july‑2022

93

WFP. 2022. Status of drought and outlook for the second half of 2022 across Eastern Horn of Africa. Presentation, 6 July 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/

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International Crisis Group. 2022. Crisis Warch Digest, August 2022, cited 12 August 2022. ethiopia‑august‑2022.indd (crisisgroup.org)

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FSNWG. 2022. FSNWG Drought Special Report, 29 July 2022. www.icpac.net/fsnwg/fsnwg‑drought‑special‑report‑29‑july‑2022

Note: the figure is based on a multi‑agency estimate of populations in acute food insecurity situation, specifically driven by drought, that are in need of urgent
humanitarian assistance.
96

FEWS NET. 2022. Ethiopia: Key Message Update, July 2022. In: FEWS NET. Washington, DC. Cited 17 August 2022. https://fews.net/east‑africa/ethiopia

97

Jones, M. 2022. The big default? The dozen countries in the danger zone. Reuters, 15 July 2022. London. www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/

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Tadesse, F. & Marks, S. 2022. Dollar Squeeze, Accelerating Inflation Pummel Ethiopian Currency. Bloomberg, 9 June 2022. New York, USA. Cited 1 September

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Trading Economics. 2022. Ethiopia Flood Inflation. In: Trading Economics. New York, USA. Cited 1 September 2022. https://tradingeconomics.com/ethiopia/

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100

OCHA. 2022. Ethiopia: Humanitarian Response Plan – July 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ethiopia/document/ethiopia‑humanitarian‑response‑plan‑jul‑2022‑enwww.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ethiopia/document/
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FSNWG. 2022. Food Security and Nutrition Working Group, East and Central Africa Region Meeting presentation, 28 July 2022. https://mcusercontent.

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102

CH. 2022. Cadre Harmonisé for Identification of Risk Areas and Vulnerable Populations In 21 States and Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of Nigeria. https://

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IOM. 2022. Nigeria – Mobility Tracking IDP and Returnee Atlas (July 2022). Abuja. https://displacement.iom.int/reports/

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FEWS NET. 2022. Nigeria: Food Security Outlook Update. In: FEWS NET. Washington, DC. Cited 17 August 2022. https://fews.net/west‑africa/nigeria

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OCHA. 2022. Appeals and response plans 2022. In: OCHA, Financial Tracking Service. Geneva, Switzerland. Cited 17 August 2022. https://fts.unocha.org/

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107

FAO. 2022. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis: FPMA bulletin #6, 12 July 2022. Rome. www.fao.org/3/cc0908en/cc0908en.pdf

108

Trading Economics. 2022. Nigeria Food Inflation. In: Trading Economics. Cited 17 August 2022. https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/food‑inflation

109

WFP. 2022. Nigeria: mVAM Bulletin. July 2022 – Lean Season Food Security Outlook. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000141726/download

110

IPC. 2022. Somalia: Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Snapshot ‑ June ‑ December 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/

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FAO & FSNAU. 2022. Somalia 2022 Post Gu Seasonal Food Security and Nutrition Assessment: Key Nutrition Results Summary. Mogadishu. https://fsnau.org/

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FSNWG. 2022. Drought Special Report July 2022. https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/fsnwg‑drought‑special‑report‑july‑2022

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IPC. 2022. Somalia: Famine Review of the IPC Analysis. Conclusions and recommendation for Burhakaba and Baidoa Districts (Rural Population) and IDPs in

Baidoa – Bay Region, Somalia. Rome. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Review_Report_Somalia_Sept2022.pdf
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FSNAU/FEWS NET. 2011. Expanding famine across southern Somalia. Nairobi. Expanding famine across southern Somalia ‑ Somalia | ReliefWeb

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IPC. 2022. Somalia: Acute Food Insecurity and Malnutrition Snapshot ‑ June ‑ December 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/

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IPC. 2022. South Sudan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis, February–July 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/

ipcinfo/docs/South_Sudan_IPC_Key_Messages_February‑July‑2022_Report.pdf www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/South_Sudan_IPC_Key_
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IGAD & ICPAC. 2022. Statement of the 61st Greater Horn of Africa Climate Outlook Forum (GHACOF16). Addis Ababa. https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/

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FSNWG. 2022. Food Security and Nutrition Working Group, East and Central Africa Region Meeting presentation, 28 July 2022. https://mcusercontent.

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FAO. 2022. GIEWS Country Briefs: South Sudan. In: FAO, 22 July 2022. Rome. Cited 16 August 2022. www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=SSD

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WFP. 2022. South Sudan: Seasonal Monitor (June 2022). Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000141577/download

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UNMISS. 2022. UNMISS Brief on Violence Affecting Civilians (April‑June 2022). https://reliefweb.int/report/south‑sudan/

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U.S. Department of State. 2022. The United States Stands With the People of South Sudan and Calls for Urgent Progress From

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WFP. 2022. South Sudan: Seasonal Monitor (June 2022). Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000141577/download

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FAO. 2022. GIEWS Country Briefs: South Sudan. In: FAO, 22 July 2022. Rome. Cited 16 August 2022. www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=SSD

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FAO. 2022. GIEWS Country Briefs: South Sudan. In: FAO, 22 July 2022. Rome. Cited 16 August 2022. www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=SSD

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IPC. 2022. South Sudan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analysis, February–July 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/

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IPC. 2020. South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for October–November 2020 and Projections for December 2020–March 2021 and April–July 2021.

Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/ipc‑country‑analysis/details‑map/en/c/1153003/?iso3=SSD
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130

Assessed areas include Fashoda, Fangak, Canal Piji, Juba PoC, Bentiue PoC and Budi.

131

IPC. 2022. South Sudan: IPC Food Security and Nutrition Snapshot. January–December 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/

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132

IPC. 2022. Yemen: Acute Food Insecurity Situation January–May 2022 and Projection for June–December 2022. In: IPC. Rome. Cited 16 August 2022. www.

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IPC. 2022. Famine Review of the IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analyses; Conclusions and Recommendations for Five

Areas in Yemen (Abs, Haradh and Midi in Hajjah Governorate and Al Hali and Al Hawak in Al Hudaydah governorate). Rome. https://reliefweb.int/
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OCHA. 2022. Cash Consortium of Yemen ‑ Flash Update 49: YER Exchange Rate Volatility June Week 4 & July Week 1. Geneva, Switzerland. Cited 16 August2022. https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/cash‑consortium‑yemen‑flash‑update‑49‑yer‑exchange‑rate‑volatility‑june‑week‑4‑july‑week‑1
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WFP. 2022. Yemen food security update, August 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000141880/download

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OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKIPC. 2022. Central African Republic: Acute Food Insecurity Projection, Update April–August 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/ipc‑country‑analysis/details‑map/

en/c/1155567/?iso3=CAF
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IPC. 2021. Central African Republic: Acute Food Insecurity Projection, Update April–August 2021. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/ipc‑country‑analysis/details‑map/

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IPC. 2021. Central African Republic: Acute Malnutrition Situation September 202–February 2022 and Projection March–August 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/

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OCHA. 2022. Central African Republic: Situation Report. In: OCHA. Geneva, Switzerland. Cited 29 August 2022. https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/car

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ACAPS. 2022. Humanitarian access overview, July 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/acaps_humanitarian_access_overview_july_2022_0.pdf
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IPC. 2022. Democratic Republic of Congo: Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Situation September 2021–August 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/

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IPC. 2022. Haiti: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update March–June 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_Acute_

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144

WFP. 2022. Multiple crises and surging gang violence set to worsen hunger in Haiti. In: WFP, 12 July 2022. PortauPrince. Cited 16 August 2022. www.wfp.

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OCHA. 2022. HAITI: Impact of the deteriorating security situation on humanitarian access. Background note, 8 July 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. https://haiti.

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WMO Lead Centre for Long‑Range Forecast Multi‑Model Ensemble. 2022. Probabilistic MME. In: WMOLC. Cited 29 August 2022. www.wmolc.org/

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ACAPS. 2022. Humanitarian Access Overview, July 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/acaps_humanitarian_access_overview_july_2022_0.pdf
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IPC. 2022. Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation April–May 2022 and Projections for June–September 2022 and October 2022 ‑ February 2023. In: IPC. Rome.

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ECHO. 2022. ECHO Daily Flash of 18 July 2022: Syria ‑ Severe Drought. In: ERCC – Emergency Response Coordination Centre. Brussels. Cited 16 August 2022.

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152

WFP. 2022. WFP Syria Country Brief, June 2022. Rome. https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian‑arab‑republic/wfp‑syria‑country‑brief‑june‑2022

Note: Populations that are classified as ‘moderately acute food insecure’ and ‘severely acute food insecure’ as per WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an
approximation to populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above).
153

FAO. 2022. Lao People’s Democratic Republic Rapid Assessment, 1 August 2022. Vientiane.

Note: The rapid assessment was conducted in major agricultural provinces: Loung Namtha, Savannakhet, Champasack and Vientiane, as well as in the capital city
Vientiane. It took place between 27 and 31 July 2022 and used a focus‑group discussion approach; a detailed open‑ended questionnaire facilitated the discussion.
The interviews included approximately 80 farmers from the selected villages and retail traders of agricultural inputs at district level. Due to the qualitative nature of
the study, the results should not be interpreted in terms of statistical significance nor should they be generalized for the entire country.
154

Trading Economics. 2022. Myanmar Kyat. In: Trading Economics. Cited 6 September 2022. https://tradingeconomics.com/myanmar/currency

155

Trading Economics. 2022. Myanmar Inflation Rate. In: Trading Economics. Cited 6 September 2022. https://tradingeconomics.com/myanmar/inflation‑cpi

156

WFP. 2022. Myanmar: Market Price Update July 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000142155/download

157

OCHA. 2022. Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 21 | 2. September 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/

myanmar‑humanitarian‑update‑no‑21‑2‑september‑2022
158

FAO. WFP. 2022. Myanmar, DIEM – Data in Emergencies Monitoring brief, round 3 Results and recommendations, July 2022. Rome https://data‑in‑emergencies.

fao.org/documents/hqfao::myanmar‑diem‑monitoring‑brief‑round‑3/explore.
Note: the WFP remote‑CARI (rCARI) methodology is implemented through remote surveys (phone or web‑based) and rests on a reduced questionnaire adjusted
for remote data collection compared to the traditional WFP CARI methodology. Comparability studies between the results of rCARI analyses and the results oftraditional CARI methodology are ongoing.
159

46

WFP. 2022. Colombia ‑ rCARI update. Rome.

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160

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKREACH. 2022. Multisectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA), Evaluación de Necesidades Multisectoriales. Resultados preliminares, August 2022. www.

reachresourcecentre.info/country/colombia/theme/multi‑sector‑assessments/cycle/49206/#cycle‑49206
The results of the 2022 Multisectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) show that a high proportion of the population affected by internal displacement is food insecure(71 percent). Two out of ten IDP households demonstrated severe levels of acute food insecurity based on WFP’s CARI methodology, indicating extreme gaps inhousehold food consumption and loss of livelihoods. Half of the food insecure households are moderately acute food insecure (52 percent), revealing significant
gaps in food consumption or a limited ability to meet their minimum food needs.
161

R4V. 2022. GIFMM Colombia: Factsheet ‑ Movimientos mixtos en tránsito en Urabá ‑ Enero a Julio 2022. www.r4v.info/es/

document/gifmm‑colombia‑factsheet‑movimientos‑mixtos‑en‑transito‑en‑uraba‑enero‑julio‑2022www.r4v.info/es/document/
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162

Trading Economics. 2022. Colombia Food Inflation. In: Trading Economics. Cited 12 August 2022 https://tradingeconomics.com/colombia/food‑inflation

163

IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2022. Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). In: IMF. Washington, DC. Cite 2 September 2022. www.imf.org/en/Countries/

VENwww.imf.org/en/Countries/VEN
164

OCHA. 2022. Humanitarian Response Plan Venezuela: Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2022 (issued August 2022). Geneva, Switzerland. https://reliefweb.int/

attachments/6ceed08c‑8dbd‑4020‑8110‑e436e59cf777/HRP_VEN_EN_FINAL.pdffile:///C:/Users/POLAK/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/Content.
Outlook/5EHIQFXT/Venezuela HRP Overview
165

WFP. 2021. Lebanon Annual Country Report 2021. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000137877/download

166

Azakir, M. 2022. Lebanon parliament speaker says no presidential vote without IMF laws. In: Reuters, 30 July 2022. London. Cited 2 September 2022.

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle‑east/lebanon‑parliament‑speaker‑says‑no‑presidential‑vote‑without‑imf‑laws‑2022‑07‑30/
167

IMF. 2022. Angola. In: IMF. Washington, DC. Cited 2 September 2022. www.imf.org/en/Countries/AGO

168

Trading Economics. 2022. Angola Kwanza currency. In: Trading Economics. Cited 29 August 2022. https://tradingeconomics.com/angola/currency#:~:text=The%20Angolan%20Kwanza%20is%20expected,451.46%20in%2012%20months%20time
169

Trading Economics. 2022. Angola Inflation Rate. In: Trading Economics. Cited 29 August 2022 https://tradingeconomics.com/angola/inflation‑cpi

170

MSF. 2022. Three new developments in the Cabo Delgado crisis. In: MSF, 12 July 2022. Cited 29 August 2022. https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/three‑new‑developments‑cabo‑delgado‑crisis
171

FEWS NET. 2022. Mozambique: Food Security Outlook, June 2022 to January 2023. Washington, DC. https://fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/

MOZAMBIQUE_Food_Security_Outlook_June_2022_Final.pdf
172

FAO. 2022. GIEWS. Country Briefs: Mozambique. In: FAO, 16 August 2022. Rome. Cited 2 September 2022.

173

FAO. 2022. Data in Emergencies Hub. In: FAO. Rome. Cited 2 September 2022. https://data‑in‑emergencies.fao.org/pages/monitoring

Note: FAO Data in Emergencies (DIEM) Monitoring survey was conducted using computer assisted telephone interviews with a combination of panel and random
digit dialling. The survey is statistically representative at Provincial level (Admin 1).
174

IPC. 2022. Mozambique: Acute Food Insecurity Situation, December 2021. Rome. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/Mozambique_

IPC_Food_Security_2021Nov_2022Sept_Report_Portuguese.pdf
175

United Nations Human Rights. 2022. Afghanistan: UN experts call on US Government to unblock foreign assets of central bankto ease humanitarian impact. In: UNOHCR, Geneva, Switzerland. Cited 29 August 2022. www.ohchr.org/en/press‑releases/2022/04/
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World Bank. 2022. Afghanistan Economic Monitor (July 2022). Washington, DC. Cited 29 August 2022. https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/

ba0c782d2cb3a62f1f41356e978eb2cf‑0310062022/original/Afghanistan‑Economic‑Monitor‑19‑July‑2022.pdf
177

UN News. 2022. Afghanistan: World Bank provides $150 million lifeline to stem rural hunger. In UN News, 13 June 2022. New York, USA. Cited 8 August2022. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/06/1120242
178

WFP. 2022. Afghanistan: Countrywide Weekly Market Price Bulletin. Issue 116, 21 August 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/

WFP‑0000142035/download
179

WFP. 2022. Afghanistan: Countrywide Weekly Market Price Bulletin. Issue 116, 21 August 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000142035/

download
180

OCHA. 2022. Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan 2022. In: OCHA, Financial Tracking Service. Geneva, Switzerland. Cited 8 August 2022. https://fts.

unocha.org/appeals/1100/summary
181

IPC. 2022. Afghanistan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for March‑May 2022 and Projection for June‑November 2022. In: IPC. Rome. Cited 8 August 2022.

www.ipcinfo.org/ipc‑country‑analysis/details‑map/en/c/1155595/?iso3=AFG
182

FEWS NET. 2022. Afghanistan. Key Messages Update July 2022. In: FEWS NET. Washington, DC. Cited 8 August 2022. https://fews.net/central‑asia/

afghanistan
183

FEWS NET. 2022. Afghanistan: Poor production outcome during current year will worsen food security situation in 2022‑23. Rome. Washington, DC. https://fews.

net/central‑asia/afghanistan/seasonal‑monitor/june‑2022

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OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKFEWS NET. 2022. Afghanistan: Poor production outcome during current year will worsen food security situation in 2022‑23. Rome. Washington, DC. https://fews.

net/central‑asia/afghanistan/seasonal‑monitor/june‑2022
185

Bloomberg. 2022. Heavy Rains Set Off Flash Floods, Killing 182 in Afghanistan. In: Bloomberg, 25 August 2022. New York, USA. Cited 29 August 2022. www.

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186

FEWS NET. 2022. Afghanistan: Seasonal Monitor “Poor production outcome during current year will worsen food security situation in 2022‑23”. June 2022.

Washington, DC. Cited 8 August 2022. https://fews.net/central‑asia/afghanistan/seasonal‑monitor/june‑2022
187

IPC. 2022. Afghanistan IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis March‑November 2022. Issued in May 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/

ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_AcuteFoodInsec_2022Mar_2022Nov_report.pdf
188

IPC. 2022. Afghanistan IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis March‑November 2021. Issued in April 2021. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/

ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_AcuteFoodInsec_2021MarchNov_report_Updated.pdf
189

OCHA. 2022. Afghanistan: Humanitarian Needs Overview (2022). Geneva, Switzerland. www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/

document/afghanistan‑humanitarian‑needs‑overview‑2022
190

IPC. 2022c. Afghanistan IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis March‑November 2021. Issued in April 2021. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/

ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Afghanistan_AcuteFoodInsec_2021MarchNov_report_Updated.pdf
191

The Economist. 2022. Pakistan may be able to avoid a full‑blown economic crisis. Economist, 28 July 2022. London. Cited 18 August 2022. www.economist.

com/asia/2022/07/28/pakistan‑may‑be‑able‑to‑avoid‑a‑full‑blown‑economic‑crisis
192

FAO. 2022. Possible Impacts of Conflict between Russian Federation and Ukraine on Food and Agricultural Markets in Pakistan. 22 April 2022. Rome. https://

fscluster.org/pakistan/document/possible‑impacts‑conflict‑between
193

FAO. 2022. Possible Impacts of Conflict between Russian Federation and Ukraine on Food and Agricultural Markets in Pakistan. 22 April 2022. Rome. https://

fscluster.org/pakistan/document/possible‑impacts‑conflict‑between
194

XE.com. 2022. 1 USD to PKR: Convert US Dollars to Pakistani Rupees. In: XE.com. Cited 17 August 2022. www.xe.com/currencyconverter/

convert/?Amount=1&From=USD&To=PKR
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Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. 2022. Monthly Review on Price Indices (August 2022). Islamabad. Cited 17 August 2022. www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/

price_statistics/cpi/CPI_Monthly_Review_August_2022.pdf NULL
196

Food Security Cluster. 2022. Pakistan Food Security & Agriculture WG Newsletter (Quarter‑2), May 30 2022. Rome. https://fscluster.org/pakistan/document/

pakistan‑food‑security‑agriculture‑wg‑1
197

OCHA. 2022. Pakistan 2022 Floods Response Plan: 01 Sep 2022‑28 Feb 2023 (Issued 30 August 2022). Geneva, Switzerland. https://reliefweb.int/report/

pakistan/pakistan‑2022‑floods‑response‑plan‑01‑sep‑2022‑28‑feb‑2023‑issued‑30‑aug‑2022
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OCHA. 2022. Pakistan 2022 Floods Response Plan: 01 Sep 2022 ‑ 28 Feb 2023. (Issued 30 August 2022). Geneva, Switzerland. https://reliefweb.int/report/

pakistan/pakistan‑2022‑floods‑response‑plan‑01‑sep‑2022‑28‑feb‑2023‑issued‑30‑aug‑2022
199

FAO & WFP. 2022. Hunger Hotspots FAO‑WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity June to September 2022 Outlook. Rome. www.wfp.org/publications/

hunger‑hotspots‑fao‑wfp‑early‑warnings‑acute‑food‑insecurity‑june‑september‑2022
200

Perera, A. 2022. Sri Lanka: Why is the country in an economic crisis? In: BBC News, 14 July 2022. London. www.bbc.com/news/world‑61028138

201

Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 2022. CCPI based headline inflation recorded at 60.8% on year‑on‑year basis in July 2022. In: Central Bank of Sri Lanka. Cited

29 August 2022. www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/news/inflation‑in‑july‑2022‑ccpi#:~:text=Headline%20inflation%2C%20as%20measured%20by,from%2054.6%25%20in%20
June%202022
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Sri Lanka Government, Department of Census and Statistics. 2022. Agriculture. In: Statistical website of Sri Lanka. Cited 17 August 2022. www.statistics.

gov.lk/Agriculture/StaticalInformation/new
203

Jayasinghe, U. 2021. Sri Lanka rows back on chemical fertiliser ban, but yields may not rebound. In: Reuters, 24 November 2021. London. Cited 29 August2022. ww.reuters.com/markets/commodities/sri‑lanka‑rows‑back‑organic‑farming‑goal‑removes‑ban‑chemical‑fertilisers‑2021‑11‑24
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United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner. 2022. Sri Lanka: UN human rights experts condemn repeated use of

emergency measures to crackdown on protests. In: OHCHR. 8 August 2022. Cited 29 August 2022. www.ohchr.org/en/press‑releases/2022/08/
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Jayasinghe, U. 2022. Sri Lanka to restart IMF bailout talks, president calls for unity government. In: Reuters, 3 August 2022. London. Cited 29 August 2022.

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206

WFP. 2022. WFP Sri Lanka: Situation Report 6 July 2022. Rome. https://reliefweb.int/report/sri‑lanka/wfp‑sri‑lanka‑situation‑report‑6‑july‑2022

207

OCHA. 2022. Sri Lanka Food Security Crisis – Humanitarian Needs and Priorities 2022 (June‑Sept 2022). Geneva, Switzerland. Cited 29 August 2022. https://reliefweb.int/report/sri‑lanka/sri‑lanka‑food‑security‑crisis‑humanitarian‑needs‑and‑priorities‑2022‑june‑sept‑2022‑ensita
208

FAO. 2022. Crop Prospects and Food Situation. Rome. www.fao.org/giews/reports/crop‑prospects

209

IPC. 2022. Guatemala Acute Food Insecurity Situation March to May 2022 and Projections for June‑September 2022 and October 2022‑February 2023. Issued inJune 2022. Rome. https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc‑country‑analysis/details‑map/en/c/1155665/?iso3=GTM

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OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKFHIA.2022. Sistema de Información de Productos Agrícolas de Honduras. Tegucigalpa. Cited 5 August 2022. http://historicos.simpah.hn/reportes_varios/

index.php?dir=Reportes%20SIMPAH%20‑%202022/Reportes‑%20Tegucigalpa/03%20Marzo%202022/Zonal%20B%C3%A9len%20Insumos
211

Trade Data Monitor. 2022. In: TDM. Cited 3 August 2022. www.tradedatamonitor.com

212

FAO. 2022. GIEWS Country Briefs: Honduras. In: FAO. Rome. Cited 4 August 2022. www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=HND

213

FAO. 2022. GIEWS Country Briefs: Guatemala. In: FAO. Rome. Cited 4 August 2022. www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=GTM

214

FAO. 2022. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis: FPMA bulletin #6, 12 July 2022. Rome. www.fao.org/3/cc0908en/cc0908en.pdf

215

MEM. 2022. Informe Semanal del Sector Energético del 01 al 07 de agosto de 2022, Guatemala. https://mem.gob.gt/blog/

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CREE. 2022. Evolución de la Tarifa Promedio. Historial de Tarifas, Honduras. www.cree.gob.hn/historial‑de‑tarifas

217

IMF. 2022. World Economic Outlook, Update July 2022. Washington, DC. www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2022/07/26/

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CPC/NOAA. 2022. NMME Precipitation Forecast, September‑November 2022. In: CPC/NOA. Cited 6 August 2022. www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/

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CPC/NOAA. 2022. NOAA 2022 Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook. In: NOAA. Cited 12 August 2022. www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/outlooks/hurricane.

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IPC. 2022. Guatemala. Análisis de inseguridad alimentaria aguda, Marzo 2022‑Febrero 2023. June 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/

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IMF. 2022. Haiti. In: IMF. Washington, DC. Cited 16 August 2022. www.imf.org/en/Countries/HTI

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CNSA (Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire). 2022. Panier alimentaire et conditions de sécurité alimentaire. Mai 2022. Port‑au‑Prince. www.

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Da Rin, D. 2022. New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists. Brussels. In: Crisis Group, 28 July 2022. Cited 16 August 2022. www.

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OCHA. 2022. HAITI: Impact of the deteriorating security situation on humanitarian access. Background note, 8 July 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. https://haiti.

un.org/sites/default/files/2022‑07/20220708_Humanitarian%20Access%20in%20Haiti.pdf
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OCHA. 2022. HAITI: Impact of the deteriorating security situation on humanitarian access. Background note, 8 July 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. https://haiti.

un.org/sites/default/files/2022‑07/20220708_Humanitarian%20Access%20in%20Haiti.pdf
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FEWS NET. 2022. Haiti: Food Security Outlook. June‑September 2022. In: FEWS NET. Washington, DC. Cited 16 August 2022. https://fews.net/

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FEWS NET. 2022. Haiti: Key Message Update. July‑September 2022. In: FEWS NET. Washington, DC. Cited 16 August 2022. https://fews.net/node/26634

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NOAA. 2022. NOAA still expects above‑normal Atlantic hurricane season. In: NOAA, 4 August 2022. Washington, DC. Cited 16 August 2022. www.noaa.gov/

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IPC. 2022. Haiti: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update March‑June 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_Acute_

Food_Insec_Update_2022MarJun_Report_French.pdf
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WFP. 2022. Multiple crises and surging gang violence set to worsen hunger in Haiti. In: WFP, 12 July 2022. Port‑au‑Prince. Cited 16 August 2022. www.wfp.

org/news/multiple‑crises‑and‑surging‑gang‑violence‑set‑worsen‑hunger‑haiti
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OCHA. 2022. HAITI: Impact of the deteriorating security situation on humanitarian access. Background note, 8 July 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. https://haiti.

un.org/sites/default/files/2022‑07/20220708_Humanitarian%20Access%20in%20Haiti.pdf
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IOM. 2022. Displacement Tracking Matrix – Central African Republic. Monthly Dashboard #3. 31 July 2022. Grand‑Saconnex, Switzerland. https://migration.iom.

int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1461/files/reports/RCA%20CRISIS_DASHBORD%20TEMPLATE_JULY%202022_v1.3%20VE.pdf
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OCHA. 2022. Central Afrfican Republic: The ever‑growing threat of explosive devices. In: OCHA. Geneva, Switzerland. Cited 29 August 2022. https://reports.

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Bensimon, C. 2022. L’implication russe en Centrafrique bousculée par la guerre en Ukraine. Le Monde, 29 March 2022. Paris. Cited 29 August 2022. www.

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OCHA. 2022. Central African Republic: Situation Report. In: OCHA. Geneva, Switzerland. Cited 15 September 2022. https://prod‑reports‑unocha‑org.ahconu.

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236

FEWS NET. 2022. République Centrafricaine: L’inflation alimentaire aiguë affecte les ménages pauvres en ce début de la saison de pluies, Juin 2022. Washington,

DC. https://fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/CAR_RMU_Juin_2022_KM_FINAL_fr.pdf
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FEWS NET. 2022. République Centrafricaine: L’inflation alimentaire aiguë affecte les ménages pauvres en ce début de la saison de pluies, Juin 2022. Washington,

DC. https://fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/CAR_RMU_Juin_2022_KM_FINAL_fr.pdf

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OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKIPC. 2022. Central African Republic: Acute Food Insecurity Projection, Update April‑August 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/ipc‑country‑analysis/details‑map/

en/c/1155567/?iso3=CAF
239

IPC. 2021. Central African Republic: Acute Food Insecurity Projection, Update April‑August 2021. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/ipc‑country‑analysis/details‑map/

en/c/1154874/?iso3=CAF
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IPC. 2021. Central African Republic: Acute Malnutrition Situation September 2021‑February 2022 and Projection March‑August 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/

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241

OCHA. 2022. Central African Republic : Situation Report. In: OCHA. Geneva, Switzerland. Cited 29 August 2022. https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/car

242

ACAPS. 2022. Humanitarian Access Overview, July 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/acaps_humanitarian_access_overview_july_2022_0.pdf
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ACAPS. 2022. Humanitarian Access Overview, July 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/acaps_humanitarian_access_overview_july_2022_0.pdf
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IOM. 2022. Nigeria – Mobility Tracking IDP and Returnee Atlas (July 2022). In: IOM. Grand‑Saconnex, Switzerland. Cited 29 August 2022. https://

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252

The total population surveyed was expanded from 107 585 705 in the March 2021 Cadre Harmonisé survey (covering June–August 2021) to 158 784 429

in the March 2022 survey, covering the same period in 2022. However, the prevalence of acute food insecurity in the same period remained nearly constant with
11.9 percent in 2021 and 12.2 percent in 2022.
253

CH. 2021. Cadre Harmonisé for Identification of Risk Areas and Vulnerable Populations In 21 States and Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of Nigeria. Abuja. https://

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CH. 2022. Cadre Harmonisé for Identification of Risk Areas and Vulnerable Populations In 21 States and Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of Nigeria. Abuja. https://

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255

WFP. 2022. Nigeria: mVAM Bulletin, July 2022 – Lean Season Food Security Outlook. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000141726/download

256

IPC. 2022. Northeast Nigeria: IPC Acute Malnutrition Analysis January–December 2022. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/

IPC_Nigeria_Acute_Malnutrition_2022Jan_Dec_Report.pdf
257

FMH, PHCDA & NBS. 2022. SMART Surveys January 2022. Abuja.

258

WFP. 2022. West Africa Seasonal Monitor: 2022 Season – July Update. Rome. Cited 29 August 2022. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000141076/

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259

WFP. 2022. West Africa Seasonal Monitor: 2022 Season – July Update. Rome. Cited 29 August 2022. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000141076/

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260

WFP. 2022. Food Price Forecasting and Alert for Price Spikes. In: WFP vam. Rome. Cited 29 August 2022. https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/

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261

ECOWAS, FAO & WFP. 2022. Assessment of the risks and impact of the Russian‑Ukrainian crisis on agricultural production in the ECOWAS region. June 2022.

Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000139841/download
262

FAO. 2022. The importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for global agricultural markets and the risks associated with the war in Ukraine. Information

Note: 10 June 2022 Update. Rome. www.fao.org/3/cb9013en/cb9013en.pdf
263

WFP. 2022. Security Dashboard. In: WFP. Rome. Cited 16 August 2022. https://analytics.wfp.org/t/Public/views/SecurityDash‑Events_Fatalities

264

See for instance WFP. 2022. Summary Note: Cropland change analysis in hard‑to‑access areas due to insecurity in 2021 in Mali. Bamako. https://docs.wfp.org/

api/documents/WFP‑0000139370/download
265

Institute for Security Studies. 2022. Chad’s political transition lags behind deadline. In: Institute for Security Studies, 21 July 2022. Pretoria, South Africa.

Cited 16 August 2022. https://issafrica.org/iss‑today/chads‑political‑transition‑lags‑behind‑deadline

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OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOK

266

UNHCR. 2022. Operational data portal: Refugee situations. In: UNHCR. Geneva, Switzerland. Cited 16 August 2022. https://data.unhcr.org/en/countries

267

UNHCR. 2022. Operational data portal: Refugee situations. In: UNHCR. Geneva, Switzerland. Cited 16 August 2022. https://data.unhcr.org/en/countries

268

ACAPS. 2022. INFORM Severity Index, July 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/crisis/gcsi‑download/2022‑08/20220804_inform_

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269

UNICEF. 2022. Joint Note on the Nutrition Situation in the West and Central Africa Region. New York, USA. www.unicef.org/wca/reports/

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270

WFP. 2022. Market Watch Ethiopia. June 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000141077/download

271

FSNWG. 2022. FSNWG Drought Special Report, 29 July 2022. www.icpac.net/fsnwg/fsnwg‑drought‑special‑report‑29‑july‑2022

272

WFP. 2022. Status of drought and outlook for the second half of 2022 across Eastern Horn of Africa. Presentation, 6 July 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/

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273

FEWS NET. 2022. Ethiopia Monitoring Report Kiremt/Long Rain Seasons 2022. Washington, DC. https://data.chc.ucsb.edu/people/diego/Ethiopia_dekadal_

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274

Jones, M. 2022. The big default? The dozen countries in the danger zone. Reuters, 16 July 2022. London. Cited 29 August 2022. www.reuters.com/markets/

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Tadesse, F. & Marks, S. 2022. Dollar Squeeze, Accelerating Inflation Pummel Ethiopian Currency. Bloomberg, 9 June 2022. New York, USA. Cited 29 August2022. www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022‑06‑09/dollar‑squeeze‑accelerating‑inflation‑pummel‑ethiopian‑currency?sref=RqRj603m
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Trading Economics. 2022. Ethiopia Food Inflation: Cost of food in Ethiopia increased 35.50 percent in July of 2022 over the same month in the previous

year. In: Trading Economics. Cited 29 August 2022. https://tradingeconomics.com/ethiopia/food‑inflation
277

OCHA. 2022. Ethiopia: Situation Report. In: OCHA, 5 August 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. Cited 29 August 2022. https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/

ethiopia278

ACLED. Ethiopia Peace Observatory, Organized Political Violence dashboard. In: Ethiopia Peace Observatory. Cited 29 August 2022. https://epo.acleddata.

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IPC. 2021. Ethiopia: Acute Food Insecurity Situation, May‑June 2021, and Projection for July‑September 2021. In: IPC. Rome. Cited 29 April 2022. www.ipcinfo.

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281

OCHA. 2022. Ethiopia: Humanitarian Response Plan. July 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ethiopia/document/

ethiopia‑humanitarian‑response‑plan‑jul‑2022‑en
Note: HRP data, endorsement by government is pending.
The OCHA 2022 HRP estimate for food security and livelihood People in Need estimate is mainly built on Household Economy Analysis results using survival
deficit thresholds in line with IPC, and on WFP Emergency Food Security Assessment for Tigray. While this estimate is not directly comparable to IPC, it is deemed
the best estimate that could be developed to assess the 2022 acute food insecurity situation in Ethiopia through a consensus‑based process given available data.
It compares to 18 million people acutely food insecure in need of urgent assistance reported in 2021 as per the OCHA Humanitarian Response Plan 2021 Mid‑Year
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282

WFP. 2022. Emergency Food Security Assessment: Tigray Region, Ethiopia, January 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000136281/

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284

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IPC. 2021. Famine Review of the IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis. Conclusions and recommendations for Tigray region, Ethiopia. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/

fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Ethiopia_Famine_Review_2021July.pdf www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Ethiopia_Famine_
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287

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288

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OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOK290

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Note: the figure is based on a multi‑agency estimate of populations in acute food insecurity situation, specifically driven by drought, that are in need of urgent
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292

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293

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Trading Economics. 2022. Zimbabwe Food Inflation. In: Trading Economics. New York, USA. Cited 2 August 2022. https://tradingeconomics.com/zimbabwe/food‑inflation
375

Chingono, N. 2022. UPDATE 2‑Zimbabwe doubles interest rates to fight inflation. In: Reuters, 27 June 2022. London. Cited 2 August 2022. www.reuters.com/

article/zimbabwe‑economy‑idAFL8N2YE1YN
376

Ndlovu, R. & Marawanyika, G. 2022. World’s Most Aggressive Central Bank Raises Key Rate to 200%. In: Bloomberg, 27 June 2022. New York, USA. Cited 2

August 2022. www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022‑06‑27/world‑s‑most‑aggressive‑central‑bank‑raises‑key‑rate‑to‑200#xj4y7vzkg

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377

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKMinistry of Lands, Agriculture, Water and Rural Resettlement. 2022. Second Round Crop and Livestock Assessment Report. Harare. https://fscluster.org/

zimbabwe/document/2022‑second‑round‑crop‑and‑livestock
378

FEWS NET. 2022. Zimbabwe: Food Security Outlook Update. Key Messages. June 2022. In: FEWS NET. Washington, DC. Cited 2 August 2022. https://fews.

net/southern‑africa/zimbabwe/food‑security‑outlook/june‑2022
379

Southern African Development Community (SADC). 2022. Synthesis Report on the State of Food and Nutrition Security and Vulnerability in Southern Africa

2022. Gobarone. www.sadc.int/latest‑news/sadc‑release‑synthesis‑report‑state‑food‑and‑nutrition‑security‑region
Note: these government‑led assessment results have not been reviewed as part of an IPC analysis.
380

ACAPS. 2022. Humanitarian Access Overview, July 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/acaps_humanitarian_access_overview_july_2022_0.pdf
381

IPC. 2022. Sudan: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Snapshot, April 2022–February 2023. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/

docs/IPC_Sudan_AcuteFoodInsecurity_2022Apr2023Feb_snapshot.pdf
382

FAO. 2022. GIEWS Country Briefs: Sudan. In: FAO, 11 July 2022. Rome. Cited 16 August 2022. www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.

jsp?code=SDN&lang=en
383

IPC. 2022. Sudan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, April 2022–February 2023. Rome. www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Sudan_

AcuteFoodInsecurity_2022Apr2023Feb_report.pdf
384

FEWS NET. 2022. Sudan: Food Security Outlook, June 2022 to January 2023. In: FEWS NET. Washington, DC. Cited 16 August 2022. https://fews.net/

east‑africa/sudan/food‑security‑outlook/june‑2022
385

UN. 2022. Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan. Report of the UN

Secretary‑General, 17 May 2022. New York, USA. www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B‑6D27‑4E9C‑8CD3‑CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/N2234107.pdf
386

FEWS NET. 2022. Sudan: Food Security Outlook, June 2022 to January 2023. In: FEWS NET. Washington, DC. Cited 16 August 2022. https://fews.net/

east‑africa/sudan/food‑security‑outlook/june‑2022
387

ACAPS. 2022. Sudan: Displacement due to conflict in the Blue Nile state. Briefing note, 28 July 2022. Geneva. Switzerland. www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/

products/files/20220728_acaps_briefing_note_sudan_displacement_in_blue_nile_state_0.pdf
388

IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre). 2022. Country Profile: Sudan. In: IDMC. Geneva, Switzerland. Cited 6 16 August 2022. www.

internal‑displacement.org/countries/sudan
389

IPC. 2022. Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Situation April–May 2022 and Projections for June–September 2022 and October 2022–February 2023. In: IPC.

Rome. Cited 16 August 2022. www.ipcinfo.org/ipc‑country‑analysis/details‑map/en/c/1155716/?iso3=SDN
Note: the increase corresponds to an increase of three percentage points of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). An increase in the population analysed is observedin the projection period from October 2022 to February 2023 (47 881 430) compared to October 2021 to February 2022 (46 568 825), which is not judged tocompromise the validity of the comparison.
390

IPC. 2022. Sudan: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, April 2022–February 2023. Rome. https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/

IPC_Sudan_AcuteFoodInsecurity_2022Apr2023Feb_report.pdf
391

According to the latest Humanitarian Needs Overview, 10.9 million people are expected to require food and livelihood assistance in 2022. At the same time,over 15.9 million people were estimated to be food insecure during the first quarter of 2022, as determined based on WFP’s CARI methodology.
OCHA. 2022. Humanitarian Needs Overview Sudan. Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2022, issued December 2021. Geneva, Switzerland. https://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan_2022_HNO_En.pdf
WFP. 2022. Sudan: Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment (CFSVA)‑ Summary Report, Q1 2022, June 2022. Rome. https://fscluster.org/sudan/
document/sudan‑comprehensive‑food‑security‑and392World Bank. 2022. Syria Economic Monitor, Spring 2022. Lost Generation of Syrians. Washington, DC. www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/publication/

syria‑economic‑monitor‑spring‑2022‑lost‑generation‑of‑syrians
393

ECHO. 2022. ECHO Daily Flash of 18 July 2022: Syria ‑ Severe Drought. In: ERCC – Emergency Response Coordination Centre. Brussels. Cited 16 August 2022.

https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ECHO‑Products/Echo‑Flash#/daily‑flash‑archive/4544
394

Christou, W. 2022. Syria currency nosedives after Russian invasion of Ukraine. The New Arab, 4 March 2022. London. Cited 6 September 2022. https://

english.alaraby.co.uk/news/syria‑currency‑nosedives‑after‑russian‑invasion‑ukraine
395

WFP. 2022. WFP Syria Price Bulletin ‑ June 2022. Rome. https://fscluster.org/syria/document/wfp‑syria‑price‑bulletin‑june‑2022

396

WFP. 2022. Global Climate Context of the Ukraine War. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000140462/download

397

UN. 2022. Syria: Security Council extends cross‑border aid delivery for six months. In: UN News, 12 July 2022. New York, USA. https://news.un.org/en/

story/2022/07/1122332
398

Al Jazeera. 2022. Turkey plans Syria operation as long as threat remains: Erdogan. Al Jazeera, 20 July 2022. Doha. Cited 6 September 2022. www.aljazeera.

com/news/2022/7/20/new‑turkish‑offensive‑in‑syria‑still‑a‑possibility‑erdogan‑warns

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399

OCTOBER 2022 TO JANUARY 2023 OUTLOOKHIU. 2022. Record Number of Conflict‑Affected IDPs: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence. Cited 17 July 2022. https://hiu.state.

gov/#global,U2607
400

OCHA. 2022. 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic. Geneva, Switzerland. www.humanitarianresponse.info/ru/operations/whole‑of‑syria/

document/2022‑humanitarian‑needs‑overview‑syrian‑arab‑republic
401

ACAPS. 2022. Humanitarian Access Overview, July 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/acaps_humanitarian_access_overview_july_2022_0.pdf
402

WFP. 2022. WFP Syria Country Brief, June 2022. Rome. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP‑0000141222/download

403

OCHA. 2022. Cash Consortium of Yemen ‑ Flash Update 49: YER Exchange Rate Volatility June Week 4 & July Week 1. Geneva, Switzerland. Cited 16 August2022. https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/cash‑consortium‑yemen‑flash‑update‑49‑yer‑exchange‑rate‑volatility‑june‑week‑4‑july‑week‑1
404

IPC. 2022. Yemen: Acute Food Insecurity Situation January–May 2022 and Projection for June–December 2022. In: IPC. Rome. Cited 16 August 2022. www.

ipcinfo.org/ipc‑country‑analysis/details‑map/en/c/1155479/?iso3=YEM
405

IPC. 2022. Famine Review of the IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Analyses; Conclusions and Recommendations for Five

Areas in Yemen (Abs, Haradh and Midi in Hajjah Governorate and Al Hali and Al Hawak in Al Hudaydah governorate). Rome. https://reliefweb.int/
attachments/5e9b4a1f‑9362‑35bb‑b02c‑a368ccf9946c/IPC_Yemen_Famine_Review_2022March.pdf
406

ACLED. 2022. The UN‑mediated truce in Yemen ‑– Impacts of the first two months. In: ACLED Data, 14 June 2022. Cited 16 August 2022. https://acleddata.

com/2022/06/14/the‑un‑mediated‑truce‑in‑yemen‑impacts‑of‑the‑first‑two‑months
407

FAO. 2022. Yemen: Quarterly Food Security Report: Global Events, Inflation and Erosion of Livelihoods

Driving Food Insecurity in Yemen (April–September 2022). Sana’a. https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/
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ACAPS. 2022. Humanitarian Access Overview, July 2022. Geneva, Switzerland. www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/acaps_humanitarian_access_overview_july_2022_0.pdf

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The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food
Programme (WFP) are the founding members of the Global Network Against Food Crises,
together with the European Commission for International Cooperation and Development(DG DEVCO) and European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO).
The Global Network seeks to better link, integrate and guide existing programmes
and policy processes to sustainably address the root causes of food crises along thehumanitarian‑development‑peace (HDP) nexus.
Within the Global Network’s approach and framework, FAO and WFP, together with relevant
partners, have established a coordinated monitoring system for food security, livelihoods andvalue chains in order to identify and inform critical anticipatory actions.
This report is part of a series of Global Network’s analytical products contributing to thegeneration and sharing of consensus and evidence-based information for preventing andaddressing food crises.

Follow on Twitter:

Website:@fightfoodcrises

fightfoodcrises.net#fightfoodcrises

Contact information
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Viale delle Terme di Caracalla
00153 Rome, Italy
T +39 06 57051 fao.org
Office of Emergencies and Resilience OER-Director@fao.org

World Food Programme
Via Cesare Giulio Viola 68/70
00148 Rome, Italy
T +39 06 65131 wfp.org
wfpinfo@wfp.org

This publication has been produced with the assistance of theEuropean Union through the partnership agreement contributing
to strengthen the Global Network Against Food Crises. The
contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of WFP
and FAO and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of theEuropean Union.

CC2134EN/1/09.22