I

Emissions Gap
Report 2019

Emissions Gap Report 2019© 2019 United Nations Environment Programme
ISBN: 978-92-807-3766-0
Job number: DEW/2263/NA
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Suggested citation
United Nations Environment Programme (2019). Emissions Gap Report 2019. UNEP,
Nairobi.

http://www.unenvironment.org/emissionsgap

Supported by:

Emissions Gap Report 2019
November 2019

IV

Emissions Gap Report 2019

V
Acknowledgements

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) would
like to thank the members of the steering committee, thelead and contributing authors, reviewers and the secretariat
for their contribution to the preparation of this assessment
report. Authors and reviewers have contributed to the reportin their individual capacities. Their affiliations are only
mentioned for identification purposes.

Project steering committee
Juliane Berger (German Environment Agency), John
Christensen (UNEP DTU Partnership), Navroz K. Dubash(Centre for Policy Research, India), Jian Liu (UNEP), Simon
Maxwell (Independent), Surabi Menon (ClimateWorks
Foundation), Bert Metz (European Climate Foundation), Katia
Simeonova (UNFCCC), Priyadarshi Shukla (Ahmedabad
University), Oksana Tarasova (World MeteorologicalOrganization), Merlyn van Voore (UNEP)

Chapter 1
Lead authors: Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership), John
Christensen (UNEP DTU Partnership)

Chapter 2
Lead authors: Takeshi Kuramochi (NewClimate Institute,
Germany), Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency), Glen Peters (CICERO, Norway)
Contributing authors: Andrzej Ancyger (Climate Analytics,
Germany), Ankit Bhardwaj (Centre for Policy Research,
India), Gabriel Blanco (National University of the Center ofthe Buenos Aires Province, Argentina), Taryn Fransen (World
Resources Institute, USA), Andreas Geiges (Climate Analytics,
Germany), Frederic Hans (NewClimate Institute, Germany),
Christopher Henderson (World Resources Institute, USA),
Niklas Höhne (NewClimate Institute, Germany), Kejun Jiang(Energy Research Institute, China), Maria Jose de Villafranca(NewClimate Institute, Germany), Kimon Keramidas (Joint
Research Centre/European Commissions), Joojin Kim(Solutions For Our Climate, Republic of Korea), Akihisa
Kuriyama (Institute for Global Environmental Strategies,
Japan), Leonardo Nascimento (NewClimate Institute,
Germany), Jos Olivier (PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency), Deger Saygin (SHURA, Turkey),
Ranping Song (World Resources Institute, China), Claire
Stockwell (Climate Analytics, Germany), Kentaro Tamura(Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Japan), Paola
Tanguy (NewClimate Institute, Germany), Heleen van Soest(PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency), Jorge
Villarreal Padilla (Iniciativa Climática de México), Ryan Wilson(Climate Analytics, Germany), William Wills (Centro Clima,
Brazil), Paola Yanguas Parra (Climate Analytics, Germany)

Chapter 3
Lead authors: Joeri Rogelj (Grantham Institute, Imperial
College London, UK; International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis, Austria), Michel den Elzen (PBL
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency)
Contributing authors: Daniel Huppmann (International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria), Gunnar
Luderer (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research,
Germany)

Chapter 4
Lead authors: Niklas Höhne (NewClimate Institute,
Germany), Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute, USA),
Frederic Hans (NewClimate Institute, Germany)
Contributing authors: Ankit Bhardwaj (Centre for Policy
Research, India), Gabriel Blanco (National University of
the Center of the Buenos Aires Province, Argentina), Jesse
Burton (University of Cape Town, South Africa), Michel
den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency), Markus Hagemann (NewClimate Institute,
Germany), Christopher Henderson (World Resources
Institute, USA), Maria Daniela Keesler (National Universityof the Center of the Buenos Aires Province, Argentina), Jiang
Kejun (Energy Research Institute, China), Akihisa Kuriyama(Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), Japan),Fu Sha (National Centre for Climate Change Strategy, China),
Ranping Song (World Resources Institute, China), Kentaro
Tamura (Institute for Global Environmental Strategies,
Japan), Jorge Villarreal (Iniciativa Climática de México),
William Wills (Centro Clima, Brazil)

Chapter 5
Lead authors: Nebojsa Nakićenović (International Institutefor Applied Systems Analysis and Vienna University ofTechnology, Austria), Charlie Wilson (Tyndall Centre for
Climate Change Research, UK)C ontribu ting au thors: Bill Colglazier (A merican
Association for Advancement of Science), Owen Gaffney(Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Germany),
Dirk Messner (United Nations University), Narasimha Rao(Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, USA),
Caroline Zimm (International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis, Austria)

Chapter 6
Lead Authors: Yacob Mulugetta (Department of Science,
Technology, Engineering & Public Policy, University College
London, UK), Pablo E. Carvajal (International Renewable

Emissions Gap Report 2019

VI
Energy Agency, Germany), James Haselip (UNEP DTU
Partnership), Thomas Spencer (The Energy and Resources
Institute, India)
Contributing Authors: Edo Abraham (Delft University ofTechnology, the Netherlands), Simon Batchelor (Gamos Ltd,UK), Brigitte Knopf (Mercator Research Institute on Global
Commons and Climate Change, Germany)

Chapter 7
Lead authors: Edgar Hertwich (Norwegian Universityof Science and Technology), Reid Lifset (Yale School ofForestry & Environmental Studies, USA), Stefan Pauliuk(Faculty of Environment and Natural Resources, University
of Freiburg, Germany), Niko Heeren (Yale School of Forestry& Environmental Studies, USA)
Contributing Authors: Saleem Ali (University of Delaware,USA), Peter Berrill (Yale School of Forestry & Environmental
Studies USA), Tomer Fishman (Interdisciplinary Center
Herzliya, Israel), Qingshi Tu (Yale School of Forestry &Environmental Studies USA), Paul Wolfram (Yale Schoolof Forestry & Environmental Studies, USA)

Reviewers
Lawrence Agbemabiese(U niversit y of D elaware),Juan Carlos Altamirano (World Resources Institute /New
Climate Economy), Birgit Aru (European Commission DG
CLIMA), Mohammed Awojobi (University of Delaware),
Christoph Ber tram (Potsdam Institute for Climate
Impact Research), Kathryn Jennifer Bowen (Australian
National University), Sylvain Cail (Enerdata), Rachel Chi
Kiu Mok (World Bank), Filippo Civitelli (UK Department
for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy), Robert
Ddamulira (University of Delaware), Maya De Souza(Resource Efficiency, DEFRA), Riyanti Djalante (United
Nations University – Institute for the Advanced Study of
Sustainability), Eric Fee (German Environment Agency),
Steve Forden (UK Department for Business, Energy andIndustrial Strategy), James Foster (UK Department for
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy), Sabine Fuß(Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons andClimate Change), Harikumar Gadde (World Bank), Manuela
Galan (UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial
Strategy), Mengpin Ge (World Resources Institute), Olivia
Grippner (European Commission DG CLIMA), ChristophHelbig (Augsburg University), Fintan Hurley (Institute ofOccupational Medicine), Yasuko Kameyama (National
Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan), Rakhyun E.
Kim (Utrecht University), Peter King (Institute for Global
Environmental Strategies), Almbana Kona (European
Commission DG CLIMA), Xavier Labandeira (Universityof Vigo), Gerd Leipold (Humboldt-Viadrina GovernancePlatform), Kelly Levin (World Resources Institute),
Shannon McDaniel (Global Covenant of Mayors), Apurba
Mitra (World Resources Institute), Miles Perry (European
Commission DG CLIMA), John Quinn (UK Department
for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy), Chandra
Shekhar Sinha (World Bank), Leena Srivastava (The Energy

Emissions Gap Report 2019

Resource Institute), Joel N. Swisher (Western Washington
University), Saara Tamminen (SITRA), Oras Tynkkynen(SITRA), Tom Van-Ierland (European Commission DG
CLIMA), Marion Vieweg (Current Future), Kenichi Wada
(Research Institute of Innovative Technology for the Earth),
Jim Watson (UK Energy Research Centre), Zhao Xiusheng(Tsinghua University)

Chief scientific editors
Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership), John Christensen(UNEP DTU Partnership)

Editorial support
Olivier Bois von Kursk (UNEP DTU Partnership)

Secretariat and project coordination
Ivana Audia (UNEP DTU Partnership), Olivier Bois von Kursk(UNEP DTU Partnership), Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership),John Christensen (UNEP DTU Partnership), Pinya Sarasas(UNEP), Maarten Kappelle (UNEP)Media and launch support
Keishamaza Rukikaire, Nancy Groves, Michael Logan, Josie
Raine, Sajni Shah, Moses Osani, Despina Kannaourou, David
Cole, Pooja Munshi, Gregory Mwaura, Richard Waiguchu,
Salome Mbeyu Chamanje, Florian Fussstetter, Joyce Sang,
Viola Kup, Alejandro Laguna, Mark Grassi, Charlotte De kruijk(UNEP), Mette Annelie Rasmussen, Lasse Hemmingsen(UNEP DTU Partnership)

Design, layout and printing
Joseph & Sebastian (Layout and cover), Caren Weeks(Figures), Cuartalinea (Printing), Despina Kannaourou(UNEP)

Language editing and translation of theexecutive summary
Strategic Agenda

Thanks also to:
Climate Transparency, Oras Tynkkynen (Sitra), Sandra
Aparcana, Jacob Ipsen Hansen, Pia Riis Kofoed-Hansen,
Susanne Konrad, Thomas Kragh Laursen, Daniel Puig,
Fatima-Zahra Taibi, Xianli Zhu (UNEP DTU Partnership),David Berman, Yunting Duan, Angeline Djampou, Lu Liu,
Daria Vasilevskaia, Ying Wang and Edoardo Zandri (UNEP)
Finally, the United Nations Environment Programme would
like to thank the ClimateWorks Foundation, the Danish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch Ministry of Economic
Affairs and Climate Policy, the Finnish Innovation Fund
(Sitra), the German Federal Ministry for the Environment,
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU), theNorwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment, and theSwedish International Development Authority (SIDA) for
their support to the work of the Emissions Gap Report.

VII
Contents
Acknowledgements
Contents
Glossary
Foreword
Executive Summary

V
VII
IX
XIII
XIV

Chapter 1

Introduction

1

Chapter 2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5

Global emissions trends and G20 status and outlook
Introduction
Current global emissions: status and trends
Assessment of G20 Member progress towards Cancun pledges and NDC targets
Recent policy developments of G20 members
Preparation of long-term strategies and the way forward

3
3
3
7
12
20

Chapter 3
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4

The emissions gap
Introduction
Scenarios considered for the 2030 gap assessment
The 2030 emissions gap
Implications of the emissions gap

21
21
21
23
25

Chapter 4

28

4.1
4.2
4.3

Bridging the gap: Enhancing mitigation ambition and action
at G20 level and globally
Introduction
The global opportunity to enhance ambition and action
Opportunities to enhance ambition in selected G20 members

Chapter 5
5.1
5.2
5.3

Bridging the gap: Transformations towards zero-carbon development pathways
The great transformation towards net zero greenhouse gas emissions
Multiple co-benefits of closing the emissions gap for sustainable development
Entry points for achieving SDGs with climate co-benefits

39
39
39
40

Chapter 6
6.1
6.2
6.3

Bridging the gap: Global transformation of the energy system
Key issues and options for transforming the global energy system
Options to decarbonize the energy sector
Beyond technical measures: pursuing system-wide transformation

46
46
46
54

Chapter 7

Bridging the gap: Enhancing material efficiency in residentialbuildings and cars
Introduction
Material-efficient housing
Material-efficient cars
Summary and link to policy

56

7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
References

28
29
36

56
57
60
62
63
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Glossary

This glossary is compiled according to the Lead Authorsof the Report drawing on glossaries and other resources
available on the websites of the following organizations,networks and projects: Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action,
United Nations Environment Programme, United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change and World
Resources Institute.
Baseline/reference: The state against which change ismeasured. In the context of transformation pathways, theterm ‘baseline scenarios’ refers to scenarios that are basedon the assumption that no mitigation policies or measures will
be implemented beyond those that are already in force and/or
are legislated or planned to be adopted. Baseline scenarios
are not intended to be predictions of the future, but rather
counterfactual constructions that can serve to highlight thelevel of emissions that would occur without further policy
effort. Typically, baseline scenarios are then compared
to mitigation scenarios that are constructed to meetdifferent goals for greenhouse gas emissions, atmosphericconcentrations or temperature change. The term ‘baseline
scenario’ is used interchangeably with ‘reference scenario’and ‘no policy scenario’. In much of the literature the termis also synonymous with the term ‘business as usual (BAU)
scenario’, although the term ‘BAU’ has fallen out of favour
because the idea of ‘business as usual’ in century-longsocioeconomic projections is hard to fathom.
Bioenergy: Energy derived from any form of biomass suchas recently living organisms or their metabolic by-products
Cancun pledge: During 2010, many countries submitted their
existing plans for controlling greenhouse gas emissions to
the Climate Change Secretariat and these proposals wereformally acknowledged under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Developed
countries presented their plans in the shape of economywide targets to reduce emissions, mainly up to 2020, whiledeveloping countries proposed ways to limit their growth ofemissions in the shape of plans of action.
Carbon dioxide emission budget (or carbon budget): Fora given temperature rise limit, for example a 1.5°C or 2°C
long-term limit, the corresponding carbon budget reflects
the total amount of carbon emissions that can be emitted
for temperatures to stay below that limit. Stated differently,

a carbon budget is the area under a carbon dioxide (CO 2)
emission trajectory that satisfies assumptions about limits
on cumulative emissions estimated to avoid a certain level ofglobal mean surface temperature rise.
Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO 2e): A way to place emissionsof various radiative forcing agents on a common footing
by accounting for their effect on climate. It describes, for agiven mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, the amountof CO 2 that would have the same global warming ability, whenmeasured over a specified time period. For the purpose ofthis report, greenhouse gas emissions (unless otherwise
specified) are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases
listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as CO 2 e
assuming a 100-year global warming potential.
Carbon intensity: The amount of emissions of CO 2 released
per unit of another variable such as gross domestic product,
output energy use, transport or agricultural/forestry products.
Carbon offset: See Offset.
Carbon price: The price for avoided or released CO 2 or CO 2eemissions. This may refer to the rate of a carbon tax or the
price of emission permits. In many models that are used toassess the economic costs of mitigation, carbon prices areused as a proxy to represent the level of effort in mitigation
policies.
Carbon tax: A levy on the carbon content of fossil fuels.
Because virtually all of the carbon in fossil fuels is ultimately
emitted as CO 2 , a carbon tax is equivalent to an emission tax
on CO 2 emissions.
Co-benefits: The positive effects that a policy or measure
aimed at one objective might have on other objectives,
without yet evaluating the net effect on overall social welfare.
Co-benefits are often subject to uncertainty and depend on,among others, local circumstances and implementation
practices. Co-benefits are often referred to as ancillary
benefits.
Conditional NDC: NDC proposed by some countries that arecontingent on a range of possible conditions, such as theability of national legislatures to enact the necessary laws,
ambitious action from other countries, realization of financeand technical support, or other factors.

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Conference of the Parties (COP): The supreme body of theUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
It currently meets once a year to review the Convention’s
progress.
Current policy trajectory: This trajectory is based on
estimates of 2020 emissions considering projected economic
trends and current policy approaches including policies atleast through 2015. Estimates may be based on either official
data or independent analysis.

long-term temperature goal of limiting warming to well below
2°C. Once a country has ratified the Paris Agreement, its INDC
is automatically converted to its NDC (see below), unless it
chooses to further update it. INDCs are thus only used in thispublication in reference to countries that have not yet ratified
the Paris Agreement.
Kigali Amendment: The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer aims
for the phase-down of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) by cutting
their production and consumption.

Deforestation: Conversion of forest to non-forest.
Economic mitigation potential: The mitigation potential,
which takes into account social costs and benefits and social
discount rates, assuming that market efficiency is improvedby policies and measures and barriers are removed.
Downcycling: A form of recycling that involves reusingmaterials in less demanding applications, accepting reduced
performance of the material in terms of specifications
such as hardness, tensile strength, or ductility. In its new
application, the downcycled material replaces a material oflower economic value than the original application.
Emissions gap: The difference between the greenhousegas emission levels consistent with a specific probabilityof limiting the mean global temperature rise to below 2°C
or 1.5°C in 2100 above pre-industrial levels and the GHG
emission levels consistent with the global effect of the NDCs,
assuming full implementation from 2020.
Emission pathway: The trajectory of annual greenhouse gas
emissions over time.
Global warming potential: An index representing the
combined effect of the differing times greenhouse gases
remain in the atmosphere and their relative effectiveness inabsorbing outgoing infrared radiation.
Greenhouse gases: The atmospheric gases responsible
for causing global warming and climatic change. The major
greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide (CO 2), methane (CH 4)
and nitrous oxide (N 2 O). Less prevalent, but very powerful,
GHGs are hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons(PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).

Kyoto Protocol: An international agreement, standing on
its own, and requiring separate ratification by governments,
but linked to the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol, among otherthings, sets binding targets for the reduction of greenhousegas emissions by industrialized countries.
Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF): A
greenhouse gas inventory sector that covers emissions andremovals of greenhouse gases resulting from direct humaninduced land use, land use change and forestry activities.
Likely chance: A likelihood greater than 66 percent chance.
Used in this assessment to convey the probabilities ofmeeting temperature limits.
Last-mile solution: A solution designed for the movement ofpeople and goods to the final destination of a multi-staged
journey. In a public transportation system, this refers to thelast leg of the journey.
Lock-in: Lock-in occurs when a market is stuck with astandard even though participants would be better off withan alternative.
Mitigation: In the context of climate change, a humanintervention to reduce the sources, or enhance the sinks ofgreenhouse gases. Examples include using fossil fuels more
efficiently for industrial processes or electricity generation,
switching to solar energy or wind power, improving theinsulation of buildings and expanding forests and other ‘sinks’
to remove greater amounts of CO 2 from the atmosphere.
Monitoring, reporting and verification: A process/conceptthat potentially supports greater transparency in the climatechange regime.

Integrated assessment models: Models that seek tocombine knowledge from multiple disciplines in the formof equations and/or algorithms in order to explore complex
environmental problems. As such, they describe the fullchain of climate change, from production of greenhousegases to atmospheric responses. This necessarily includes
relevant links and feedbacks between socio-economic andbiophysical processes.

Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC): Submissions
by countries that have ratified the Paris Agreement which
presents their national efforts to reach the Paris Agreement’s
long-term temperature goal of limiting warming to well below
2°C. New or updated NDCs are to be submitted in 2020 andevery five years thereafter. NDCs thus represent a country’s
current ambition/target for reducing emissions nationally.

Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC): INDCs
are submissions from countries describing the national
actions that they intend to take to reach the Paris Agreement’s

Non-state and subnational actors: ‘Non-state andsubnational actors’ includes companies, cities, subnational
regions and investors that take or commit to climate action.

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XI
Offset (in climate policy): A unit of CO 2 e emissions thatis reduced, avoided, or sequestered to compensate foremissions occurring elsewhere.

Sustainable development: Development that meets theneeds of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs.

Product lightweighting: A process of creating lighter
products through designs that require less material or
substitute heavier material with lighter and/or less energyintensive materials. Lighter material alternatives, both inweight or volume, can generate substantial energy savings in
the transport and building sectors.

Technical mitigation potential: Such potential is estimatedfor given scenarios assuming full implementation of the best
available pollutant reduction technology, as it exists today,by 2030 independent of their costs but considering thetechnical lifetime of technologies and other key constraints(e.g., cultural acceptance) that could limit applicability ofcertain measures in specific regions.

Ride sharing/car sharing: Two forms of arrangements in which
two or more people share a vehicle for transportation. In ridesharing, also known as carpooling, the driver takes a passenger
along for a ride that the driver gains utility from as well, often
for commutes or long distance trips. This arrangement isdistinguishable from ride hailing or ride sourcing, both ofwhich are a form of taxi service. In car sharing, a person hires
a car from another for a limited duration of time without theowner to undertake the desired trip.
Scenario: A description of how the future may unfold basedon ‘if-then’ propositions. Scenarios typically include an initialsocio-economic situation and a description of the key driving
forces and future changes in emissions, temperature or otherclimate change-related variables.

Uncertainty: A cognitive state of incomplete knowledge thatcan result from a lack of information or from disagreement
about what is known or even knowable. It may have many
types of sources, from imprecision in the data to ambiguously
defined concepts or terminology, or uncertain projections ofhuman behaviour. Uncertainty can therefore be represented
by quantitative measures (for example a probability density
function) or by qualitative statements (for example reflecting
the judgement of a team of experts).
Unconditional NDCs: NDCs proposed by countries without
conditions attached.
2020 pledge: See Cancun pledge.

Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP): Scenarios ofprojected socioeconomic global changes up to 2100. They
are used to derive greenhouse gas emissions scenarios
associated with different climate policies scenarios.
Source: Any process, activity or mechanism that releases agreenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhousegas or aerosol into the atmosphere.

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XIII
Foreword

Each year for the last decade, the UN Environment
Programme’s Emissions Gap Report has compared where
greenhouse gas emissions are headed, against where theyshould be to avoid the worst impacts of climate change.
Each year, the report has found that the world is not doing
enough. Emissions have only risen, hitting a new high of 55.3
gigatonnes of CO 2 equivalent in 2018. The UNEP Emissions
Gap Report 2019 finds that even if all unconditional
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris
Agreement are implemented, we are still on course for a
3.2°C temperature rise.
Our collective failure to act strongly and early means that wemust now implement deep and urgent cuts. This report tells
us that to get in line with the Paris Agreement, emissions
must drop 7.6 per cent per year from 2020 to 2030 for the
1.5°C goal and 2.7 per cent per year for the 2°C goal. The
size of these annual cuts may seem shocking, particularly for
1.5°C. They may also seem impossible, at least for next year.
But we have to try.
We have to learn from our procrastination. Any further delay
brings the need for larger, more expensive and unlikely cuts.
We need quick wins, or the 1.5°C goal of the Paris Agreement
will slip out of reach. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) has warned us that going beyond 1.5°C will
increase the frequency and intensity of climate impacts, suchas the heatwaves and storms witnessed across the globe in
the last few years. We cannot afford to fail.

the cuts we need, nations have to raise the ambition of theircurrent pledges over fivefold for the 1.5°C goal when they
revise their NDCs in 2020. To reach the 2°C goal, they must
triple ambition. They must then immediately follow up with
policies and strategies to implement their promises.
The report tells us that the major transformation of oursocieties and economies we need can still happen. Politicaland societal focus on the climate crisis is at an all-time
high, with youth movements holding us to account. There
are many ambitious efforts from governments, cities,businesses and investors. There are plentiful options
for rapid and cost-effective emission reductions. A shift
to renewable energy and energy efficiency in the power,buildings and transport sectors, for example, could deliver
reductions of over 16 gigatonnes of CO 2 equivalent eachyear by 2050. Using materials such as iron, steel and cement
more efficiently also offers opportunities.
This report gives us a stark choice: set in motion the radicaltransformations we need now, or face the consequencesof a planet radically altered by climate change. I hope thatits findings inspire governments to step forward with theincreased climate ambition the world so desperately needs.

Inger Andersen
The Climate Action Summit has increased momentum toaddress this global challenge. Now, in this critical period, theworld must deliver concrete, stepped-up action. To deliver

Executive Director
United Nations Environment Programme

Emissions Gap Report 2019

XIV
Executive summary –Emissions Gap Report 2019

Introduction
This is the tenth edition of the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap Report. It provides
the latest assessment of scientific studies on current andestimated future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions andcompares these with the emission levels permissible forthe world to progress on a least-cost pathway to achieve
the goals of the Paris Agreement. This difference between“where we are likely to be and where we need to be” hasbecome known as the ‘emissions gap’.
Reflecting on the ten-year anniversary, a summary
report, entitled Lessons from a decade of emissions gap
assessments, was published in September for the SecretaryGeneral’s Climate Action Summit.
The summary findings are bleak. Countries collectively failed
to stop the growth in global GHG emissions, meaning thatdeeper and faster cuts are now required. However, behind
the grim headlines, a more differentiated message emerges
from the ten-year summary. A number of encouraging
developments have taken place and the political focus on
the climate crisis is growing in several countries, with votersand protestors, particularly youth, making it clear that it istheir number one issue. In addition, the technologies for
rapid and cost-effective emission reductions have improved
significantly.
As in previous years, this report explores some of themost promising and applicable options available forcountries to bridge the gap, with a focus on how to createtransformational change and just transitions. Reflecting on
the report’s overall conclusions, it is evident that incremental
changes will not be enough and there is a need for rapid andtransformational action.
The political context in 2019 has been dominated by
the United Nations Secretary-General’s Global Climate
Action Summit, which was held in September and brought
together governments, the private sector, civil society, local
authorities and international organizations.
The aim of the Summit was to stimulate action and inparticular to secure countries’ commitment to enhance theirnationally determined contributions (NDCs) by 2020 and aim
for net zero emissions by 2050.
According to the press release at the end of the Summit,
around 70 countries announced their intention to submit

Emissions Gap Report 2019enhanced NDCs in 2020, with 65 countries and major
subnational economies committing to work towards
achieving net zero emissions by 2050. In addition, several
private companies, finance institutions and major cities
announced concrete steps to reduce emissions and shift
investments into low-carbon technologies. A key aim of
the Summit was to secure commitment from countries
to enhance their NDCs, which was met to some extent,
but largely by smaller economies. With most of the G20
members visibly absent, the likely impact on the emissions
gap will be limited.
As regards the scientific perspective, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued two special reports
in 2019: the Climate Change and Land report on climatechange, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land
management, food security and greenhouse gas fluxes
in terrestrial ecosystems, and the Ocean and Cryospherein a Changing Climate report. Both reports voice strong
concerns about observed and predicted changes resulting
from climate change and provide an even stronger scientificfoundation that supports the importance of the temperature
goals of the Paris Agreement and the need to ensure
emissions are on track to achieve these goals.
This Emissions Gap Report has been prepared by aninternational team of leading scientists, assessing all
available information, including that published in the context
of the IPCC special reports, as well as in other recent
scientific studies. The assessment production process
has been transparent and participatory. The assessment
methodology and preliminary findings were made available
to the governments of the countries specifically mentioned
in the report to provide them with the opportunity tocomment on the findings.

1.

GHG emissions continue to rise,
despite scientific warnings and politicalcommitments.

▶

GHG emissions have risen at a rate of 1.5 per centper year in the last decade, stabilizing only briefly
between 2014 and 2016. Total GHG emissions,
including from land-use change, reached a record
high of 55.3 GtCO 2 e in 2018.

▶

Fossil CO 2 emissions from energy use andindustry, which dominate total GHG emissions,grew 2.0 per cent in 2018, reaching a record 37.5
GtCO 2 per year.

XV
▶

▶

There is no sign of GHG emissions peaking in thenext few years; every year of postponed peaking
means that deeper and faster cuts will be required.
By 2030, emissions would need to be 25 per centand 55 per cent lower than in 2018 to put theworld on the least-cost pathway to limiting global
warming to below 2˚C and 1.5°C respectively.
Figure ES.1 shows a decomposition of the averageannual growth rates of economic activity (grossdomestic product – GDP), primary energy use,energy use per unit of GDP, CO 2 emissions per unitof energy and GHG emissions from all sources
for Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) and non-OECD members.

▶

Economic growth has been much stronger in
non-OECD members, growing at over 4.5 per centper year in the last decade compared with 2 percent per year in OECD members. Since OECD andnon-OECD members have had similar declines in
the amount of energy used per unit of economic
activity, stronger economic growth means thatprimary energy use has increased much faster in
non-OECD members (2.8 per cent per year) than inOECD members (0.3 per cent per year).

▶

OECD members already use less energy per unitof economic activity, which suggests that nonOECD members have the potential to accelerate
improvements even as they grow, industrialize

and urbanize their economies in order to meetdevelopment objectives.
▶

While the global data provide valuable insight forunderstanding the continued growth in emissions,
it is necessary to examine the trends of major
emitters to gain a clearer picture of the underlying
trends (figure ES.2). Country rankings change
dramatically when comparing total and per capita
emissions: for example, it is evident that China now
has per capita emissions in the same range as theEuropean Union (EU) and is almost at a similar level
to Japan.

▶

Consumption-based emission estimates, also
known as a carbon footprint, that adjust thestandard territorial emissions for imports andexpor ts, provide policymakers with a deeper
insight into the role of consumption, trade andthe interconnectedness of countries. Figure ES.3
shows that the net flow of embodied carbon isfrom developing to developed countries, evenas developed countries reduce their territorial
emissions this effect is being partially offset byimporting embodied carbon, implying for example
that EU per capita emissions are higher thanChinese when consumption-based emissions areincluded. It should be noted that consumptionbased emissions are not used within the context
of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Figure ES.1. Average annual growth rates of key drivers of global CO 2 emissions (left of dotted line) and components ofgreenhouse gas emissions (right of dotted line) for OECD and non-OECD members

Emissions Gap Report 2019

XVI
Figure ES.2. Top greenhouse gas emitters, excluding land-use change emissions due to lack of reliable country-level data,on an absolute basis (left) and per capita basis (right)

2.

G20 members account for 78 per cent of global
GHG emissions. Collectively, they are on track
to meet their limited 2020 Cancun Pledges,
but seven countries are currently not on track
to meet 2030 NDC commitments, and for afurther three, it is not possible to say.

▶

As G20 members account for around 78 per centof global GHG emissions (including land use), theylargely determine global emission trends and theextent to which the 2030 emissions gap will beclosed. This report therefore pays close attention to
G20 members.

▶

G20 members with 2020 Cancun Pledges arecollectively projected to overachieve these by about
1 GtCO 2 e per year. However, several individual G20
members (Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, the Republicof Korea, South Africa, the United States of America)
are currently projected to miss their Cancun Pledges
or will not achieve them with great certainty.
Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have not made2020 pledges and pledges from several countries
that meet their targets are rather unambitious.

▶

Australia is carrying forward their overachievementfrom the Kyoto period to meet their 2020 Cancun

Emissions Gap Report 2019

Pledge and counts cumulative emissions between
2013 and 2020. With this method, the AustralianGovernment projects that the countr y will
overachieve its 2020 pledge. However, if this ‘carryforward’ approach is not taken, Australia will notachieve its 2020 pledge.
▶

On the progress of G20 economies towards their
NDC targets, six members (China, the EU28, India,
Mexico, Russia and Turkey) are projected to meettheir unconditional NDC targets with current
policies. Among them, three countries (India,
Russia and Turkey) are projected to be more than
15 per cent lower than their NDC target emission
levels. These results suggest that the three
countries have room to raise their NDC ambition
significantly. The EU28 has introduced climate
legislation that achieves at least a 40 per centreduction in GHG emissions, which the European
Commission projects could be overachieved
if domestic legislation is fully implemented inmember states.

▶

In contrast, seven G20 members require further
action of varying degree to achieve their NDC:
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, the Republicof Korea, South Africa and the United States ofXVII
Figure ES.3. CO 2 emissions allocated to the point of emissions (territorial) and the point of consumption, for absoluteemissions (left) and per capita (right)

America. For Brazil, the emissions projections
from three annually updated publications were allrevised upward, reflecting the recent trend towards
increased deforestation, among others. In Japan,
however, current policy projections have been closeto achieving its NDC target for the last few years.
▶

▶

S tudies do not agree on whether Argentina,
Indonesia and Saudi Arabia are on track to meettheir unconditional NDCs. For Argentina, recent
domestic analysis that reflects the most recent
GHG inventory data up to 2016 projects that thecountry will achieve its unconditional NDC target,
while two international studies project that it will
fall short of its target. For Indonesia, this is mainly
due to uncertainty concerning the country’s landuse, land-use change and forestr y (LULUCF)
emissions. For Saudi Arabia, the limited amount of
information on the country’s climate policies has
not allowed for further assessments beyond thetwo studies reviewed.
Some G20 members are continuously
strengthening their mitigation policy packages,
leading to a downward revision of current policy
scenario projections for total emissions overtime. One example is the EU, where a noticeable

downward shift has been observed in current
policy scenario projections for 2030 since the2015 edition of the Emissions Gap Report.

3.

Although the number of countries
announcing net zero GHG emission targets
for 2050 is increasing, only a few countries
have so far formally submitted long-term
strategies to the UNFCCC.

▶

An increasing number of countries have set net
zero emission targets domestically and 65
countries and major subnational economies,
such as the region of California and major cities
worldwide, have committed to net zero emissions
by 2050. However, only a few long-term strategies
submitted to the UNFCCC have so far committed
to a timeline for net zero emissions, none of which
are from a G20 member.

▶

Five G20 members (the EU and four individual
members) have committed to long-term zero
emission targets, of which three are currently inthe process of passing legislation and two haverecently passed legislation. The remaining 15
G20 members have not yet committed to zero
emission targets.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

XVIII
Table ES.1. Global total GHG emissions by 2030 under different scenarios (median and 10 th to 90 th percentile range),temperature implications and the resulting emissions gap
Scenario(rounded to
the nearest
gigaton)Numberofscenarios
in setEstimated temperature outcomes
Globaltotal
emissionsin 2030[GtCO2e]
50%
66%
90%
probability probability probability

ClosestEmissions Gap in 2030
corresponding [GtCO2e]
IPCC SR1.5
scenario class
Below
2.0°C

Below
1.8°C

Below
1.5°C in2100

2005-policies 6

64(60–68)Current
policy860(58–64)18(17–23)24
35(23–29) (34–39)

Unconditional
11
NDCs

56
(54–60)15(12–18)21
32(18–24) (29–35)

Conditional
NDCs

12

54
(51–56)12(9–14)

1829(15–21) (26–31)

29

41(39–46)Peak:
1.7-1.8°C
In 2100:
1.6-1.7°C

Peak:
1.9-2.0°C
In 2100:
1.8-1.9°C

Peak:
2.4-2.6°C
In 2100:
2.3-2.5°C

Higher-2°C
pathways

43

35(31–41)Peak:
1.6-1.7°C
In 2100:
1.3-1.6°C

Peak:
1.7-1.8°C
In 2100:
1.5-1.7°C

Peak:
2.1-2.3°C
In 2100:
1.9-2.2°C

Lower-2°C
pathways13

25(22–31)Peak:
1.5-1.6°C
In 2100:
1.2-1-3°C

Peak:
1.6-1.7°C
In 2100:
1.4-1.5°C

Peak:
2.0-2.1°C
In 2100:
1.8-1.9°C

1.5°C withno or limited
overshoot

Below 2.0°C(66%
probability)
Below 1.8°C(66%
probability)
Below 1.5°C
in 2100
and peakbelow
1.7°C (bothwith 66%
probability)

4.
▶

▶

The emissions gap is large. In 2030, annual
emissions need to be 15 GtCO2e lower thancurrent unconditional NDCs imply for the 2°C
goal, and 32 GtCO2e lower for the 1.5°C goal.
Estimates of where GHG emissions should be in2030 in order to be consistent with a least-cost
pathway towards limiting global warming to thespecific temperature goals have been calculated
from the scenarios that were compiled as part of the
mitigation pathway assessment of the IPCC Special
Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C report.
This report presents an assessment of global emissions
pathways relative to those consistent with limiting
warming to 2°C, 1.8°C and 1.5°C, in order to provide aclear picture of the pathways that will keep warming in

Emissions Gap Report 2019the range of 2°C to 1.5°C. The report also includes an
overview of the peak and 2100 temperature outcomes
associated with different likelihoods. The inclusion of the
1.8°C level allows for a more nuanced interpretation anddiscussion of the implication of the Paris Agreement’s
temperature targets for near-term emissions.
▶

The NDC scenarios of this year’s report are based
on updated data from the same sources used forthe current policies scenario and is provided by 12
modelling groups. Projected NDC levels for somecountries, in particular China and India, depend on
recent emission trends or GDP growth projections
that are easily outdated in older studies. Thus, studies
that were published in 2015, before the adoption of
the Paris Agreement, have been excluded in this year’s
update. Excluding such studies has had little impact

XIX
Figure ES.4. Global GHG emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap by 2030

pathways limiting warming to below 2°C and 1.5°C islarge (see Figure ES.4). Full implementation of theunconditional NDCs is estimated to result in a gap of
15 GtCO2e (range: 12–18 GtCO2e) by 2030, comparedwith the 2°C scenario. The emissions gap between
implementing the unconditional NDCs and the 1.5°C
pathway is about 32 GtCO2e (range: 29–35 GtCO2e).

on the projected global emission levels of the NDC
scenarios, which are very similar to those presented
in the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2018.
▶

▶

▶

With only current policies, GHG emissions are
estimated to be 60 GtCO2e in 2030. On a least-cost
pathway towards the Paris Agreement goals in 2030,
median estimates are 41 GtCO2e for 2°C, 35 GtCO2e
for 1.8°C, and 25 GtCO2e for 1.5°C.
If unconditional and conditional NDCs are fully
implemented, global emissions are estimated toreduce by around 4 GtCO2e and 6 GtCO2e respectively
by 2030, compared with the current policy scenario.
The emissions gap between estimated total global
emissions by 2030 under the NDC scenarios and under▶

The full implementation of both unconditional andconditional NDCs would reduce this gap by around
2–3 GtCO2e.

▶

If current unconditional NDCs are fully implemented,
there is a 66 per cent chance that warming will belimited to 3.2°C by the end of the century. If conditional
NDCs are also effectively implemented, warming will
likely reduce by about 0.2°C.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

XX

5.

Dramatic strengthening of the NDCs isneeded in 2020. Countries must increase
their NDC ambitions threefold to achieve thewell below 2°C goal and more than fivefold toachieve the 1.5°C goal.

▶

The ratchet mechanism of the Paris Agreement
foresees strengthening of NDCs every five years. Parties
to the Paris Agreement identified 2020 as a critical next
step in this process, inviting countries to communicate
or update their NDCs by this time. Given the time lag
between policy decisions and associated emission
reductions, waiting until 2025 to strengthen NDCs will
be too late to close the large 2030 emissions gap.

▶

The challenge is clear. The recent IPCC special reports
clearly describe the dire consequences of inaction
and are backed by record temperatures worldwide
along with enhanced extreme events.

▶

Had serious climate action begun in 2010, the cuts
required per year to meet the projected emissions
levels for 2°C and 1.5°C would only have been 0.7 percent and 3.3 per cent per year on average. However,since this did not happen, the required cuts inemissions are now 2.7 per cent per year from 2020 for
the 2°C goal and 7.6 per cent per year on average forthe 1.5°C goal. Evidently, greater cuts will be required
the longer that action is delayed.

▶

6.
▶

▶

Further delaying the reductions needed to meetthe goals would imply future emission reductions
and removal of CO2 from the atmosphere at such amagnitude that it would result in a serious deviationfrom current available pathways. This, together
with necessary adaptation actions, risks seriously
damaging the global economy and undermining foodsecurity and biodiversity.

▶

Although many countries, including most G20
members, have committed to net zero deforestation
targets in the last few decades, these commitments
are often not supported by action on the ground.

▶

Based on the assessment of mitigation potential
in the seven previously mentioned countries, anumber of areas have been identified for urgent andimpactful action (see table ES.2). The purpose of therecommendations is to show potential, stimulate
engagement and facilitate political discussion ofwhat is required to implement the necessary action.
Each country will be responsible for designing theirown policies and actions.

7.
▶

If the multiple co-benefits associated with closing
the emissions gap are fully realized, the required
transition will contribute in an essential way toachieving the United Nations 2030 Agenda with its
17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

▶

Climate protection and adaptation investments
will become a precondition for peace andstability, and will require unprecedented efforts totransform societies, economies, infrastructuresand governance institutions. At the same time,
deep and rapid decarbonization processes imply
fundamental structural changes are needed within
economic sectors, firms, labour markets and tradepatterns.

▶

By necessity, this will see profound change in how
energy, food and other material-intensive services
are demanded and provided by governments,
businesses and markets. These systems ofprovision are entwined with the preferences, actions
and demands of people as consumers, citizens andcommunities. Deep-rooted shifts in values, norms,
consumer culture and world views are inescapably
part of the great sustainability transformation.

▶

Legitimacy for decarbonization therefore requires
massive social mobilization and investments insocial cohesion to avoid exclusion and resistanceto change. Just and timely transitions towards
sustainability need to be developed, taking
into account the interests and rights of people
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, ofpeople and regions where decarbonization requires
structural adjustments, and of future generations.

▶

Fortunately, deep transformation to close theemissions gap between trends based on current

Enhanced action by G20 members will beessential for the global mitigation effort.
This report has a particular focus on the G20 members,
reflecting on their importance for global mitigation
efforts. Chapter 4 in particular focuses on progressand opportunities for enhancing mitigation ambitionof seven selected G20 members – Argentina, Brazil,
China, the EU, India, Japan and the United States ofAmerica – which represented around 56 per cent of
global GHG emissions in 2017. The chapter, which was
pre-released for the Climate Action Summit, presents
a detailed assessment of action or inaction in key
sectors, demonstrating that even though there are a
few frontrunners, the general picture is rather bleak.
In 2009, the G20 members adopted a decision togradually phase out fossil-fuel subsidies, though nocountry has committed to fully phasing these out by aspecific year as yet.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

Decarbonizing the global economy will
require fundamental structural changes,
which should be designed to bring multiple
co-benefits for humanity and planetary
support systems.

XXI
Table ES.2. Selected current opportunities to enhance ambition in seven G20 members in line with ambitious climate
actions and targets
Argentina● Refrain from extracting new, alternative fossil-fuel resources● Reallocate fossil-fuel subsidies to support distributed renewable electricity-generation● Shift towards widespread use of public transport in large metropolitan areas● Redirect subsidies granted to companies for the extraction of alternative fossil fuels to building-sector measures
Brazil● Commit to the full decarbonization of the energy supply by 2050
● Develop a national strategy for ambitious electric vehicle (EV) uptake aimed at complementing biofuels and at 100per cent CO 2 -free new vehicles● Promote the ‘urban agenda’ by increasing the use of public transport and other low-carbon alternatives
China● Ban all new coal-fired power plants● Continue governmental support for renewables, taking into account cost reductions, and accelerate development
towards a 100 per cent carbon-free electricity system● Further support the shift towards public modes of transport● Support the uptake of electric mobility, aiming for 100 per cent CO 2 -free new vehicles● Promote near-zero emission building development and integrate it into Government planning
European Union● Adopt an EU regulation to refrain from investment in fossil-fuel infrastructure, including new natural gas pipelines● Define a clear endpoint for the EU emissions trading system (ETS) in the form of a cap that must lead to zero emissions● Adjust the framework and policies to enable 100 per cent carbon-free electricity supply by between 2040 and 2050
● Step up efforts to phase out coal-fired plants● Define a strategy for zero-emission industrial processes● Reform the EU ETS to more effectively reduce emissions in industrial applications● Ban the sale of internal combustion engine cars and buses and/or set targets to move towards 100 per cent of new
car and bus sales being zero-carbon vehicles in the coming decades● Shift towards increased use of public transport in line with the most ambitious Member States● Increase the renovation rate for intensive retrofits of existing buildings
India● Plan the transition from coal-fired power plants● Develop an economy-wide green industrialization strategy towards zero-emission technologies● Expand mass public transit systems● Develop domestic electric vehicle targets working towards 100 per cent new sales of zero-emission carsJapan
● Develop a strategic energy plan that includes halting the construction of new freely emitting coal-fired power plants,
as well as a phase-out schedule of existing plants and a 100 per cent carbon-free electricity supply● Increase the current level of carbon pricing with high priority given to the energy and building sector● Develop a plan to phase out the use of fossil fuels through promoting passenger cars that use electricity fromrenewable energy● Implement a road map as part of efforts towards net-zero energy buildings and net-zero energy houses
USA● Introduce regulations on power plants, clean energy standards and carbon pricing to achieve an electricity supply
that is 100 per cent carbon-free● Implement carbon pricing on industrial emissions● Strengthen vehicle and fuel economy standards to be in line with zero emissions for new cars in 2030
● Implement clean building standards so that all new buildings are 100 per cent electrified by 2030

Emissions Gap Report 2019

XXII
policies and achieving the Paris Agreement can be
designed to bring multiple co-benefits for humanityand planetary support systems. These range, forexample, from reducing air pollution, improving humanhealth, establishing sustainable energy systems andindustrial production processes, making consumption
and services more efficient and sufficient, employing
less-intensive agricultural practices and mitigating
biodiversity loss to liveable cities.
▶

▶

Implementing such major transitions in a numberof areas will require increased interdependency
between energy and other infrastructure sectors,
where changes in one sector can impact another.
Similarly, there will be a strong need to connect
demand and supply-side policies and include
wider synergies and co -benefits, such as job
losses and creation, rehabilitation of ecosystem
ser vices , avoidance of reset tlements andreduced health and environmental costs as aresult of reduced emissions. The same applies
for decarbonizing transport, where there will bea need for complementarity and coordination ofpolicies, driven by technological, environmental
and land-use pressures. Policies will need to beharmonized wherever possible to take advantage
of interdependencies and prevent undesirable
outcomes such as CO 2 leakage from one sector
to another.

▶

Any transition at this scale is likely to be extremely
challenging and will meet a number of economic,
political and technical barriers and challenges.
However, many drivers of climate action havechanged in the last years, with several options
for ambitious climate action becoming lesscostly, more numerous and better understood.
First, technological and economic developments
present oppor tunities to de c ar bonize theeconomy, especially the energy sector, at a costthat is lower than ever. Second, the synergies
between climate action and economic growthand development objectives, including options
for addressing distributional impacts, are better
understood. Finally, policy momentum acrossvarious levels of government, as well as a surge inclimate action commitments by non-state actors,
are creating opportunities for countries to engage
in real transitions.

▶

A key example of technological and economic
trends is the cost of renewable energy, which is
declining more rapidly than was predicted justa few years ago (see figure ES.5). Renewables
are currently the cheapest source of new power
generation in most of the world, with the global
weighted average purchase or auction price for
new utility-scale solar power photovoltaic systems
and utility-scale onshore wind turbines projected
to compete with the marginal operating cost of
existing coal plants by 2020. These trends are
increasingly manifesting in a decline in new coalplant construction, including the cancellation ofplanned plants, as well as the early retirement ofexisting plants. Moreover, real-life cost declines
are outpacing projections.

This year’s report explores six entry points for
progressing towards closing the emissions gap
through transformational change in the following
areas: (a) air pollution, air quality, health; (b)urbanization; (c) governance, education, employment;(d) digitalization; (e) energy- and material-efficient
services for raising living standards; and (f) land use,food security, bioenergy. Building on this overview, amore detailed discussion of transitions in the energy
sector is presented in chapter 6.

8.

Renewables and energy efficiency, in
combination with electrification of end uses,
are key to a successful energy transition andto driving down energy-related CO2 emissions.

▶

The necessary transition of the global energy sector
will require significant investments compared with abusiness-as-usual scenario. Climate policies that areconsistent with the 1.5°C goal will require upscaling
energy system supply-side investments to between
US$1.6 trillion and US$3.8 trillion per year globally on
average over the 2020–2050 time frame, depending
on how rapid energy efficiency and conservation
efforts can be ramped up.

▶

Given the important role that energy and especially theelectricity sector will have to play in any low-carbon
transformation, chapter 6 examines five transition
options, taking into account their relevance for a wide
range of countries, clear co-benefit opportunities andpotential to deliver significant emissions reductions.
Each of the following transitions correspond to aparticular policy rationale or motivation, which is
discussed in more detail in the chapter:●

Expanding Renewable Energy for electrification.

●

Phasing out coal for rapid decarbonization of theenergy system.

●

Decarbonizing transport with a focus on electric
mobility.

●

Decarbonizing energy-intensive industry.

●

Avoiding future emissions while improving energy
access.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

XXIIIA short summary of the main aspects of each transition is presented in table ES.3.
Table ES.3. Summary of five energy transition options
OptionMajor components

Instruments

Co-benefits

Annual GHG emissions
reduction potentialof renewables,
electrification, energy
efficiency and othermeasures by 2050

Renewableenergyelectricity
expansion● Plan for large sharesof variable renewableenergy● Electricity becomesthe main energy
source by 2050,
supplying at least 50
per cent of total final
energy consumption(TFEC)● Share of renewableenergy in electricity up
to 85 per cent by 2050
● Transition● Flexibility measures
to take on larger
shares of variable
renewable energy● Support for
deployment of
distributed energy● Innovative
measures: costreflective tariffstructures, targeted
subsidies, reverse
auctions, net
metering● Greater efficiency
in end-use energy
demand● Health benefits● Energy access andsecurity● Employment● Power sector: 8.1
GtCO 2● Building sector:
2.1 GtCO 2● District heat andothers: 1.9 GtCO 2

Coal phaseout● Plan and implement
phase-out of coal
● Coal to renewableenergy transition● Expand carbon capture
usage and storage
systems● Improve system-wide
efficiency● Regional support
programmes● Tax breaks,
subsidies● Carbon pricing● Moratorium policies● De-risking of clean
energy investments● Relocation of coal
workers (mines andpower plants)● Lower healthhazards (air, water,
land pollution)● Future skills andjob creation

Share of the power
emissions reduction
from a coal phaseout: 4 GtCO 2 (range:
3.6– 4.4 GtCO 2), with
1 GtCO 2 from theOECD and 3 GtCO 2
from the rest of theworld

Decarbonize
transport● Reduce energy fortransport● Electrify transport● Fuels substitution(bioenergy, hydrogen)● Modal shift● Pathways for nonmotorized transport● Standards forvehicle emissions● Establishing of
charging stations● Eliminating offossil-fuel subsidies● Investments inpublic transport● Increased publichealth from more
physical activity,
less air pollution● Energy security● Reduced fuelspending● Less congestion

Electrification oftransport: 6.1 GtCO 2

Decarbonize
industry● Demand reduction(circular economy,
modal shifts andlogistics)● Electrify heatprocesses● Improve energy
efficiency● Direct use of biomass/
biofuels● Carbon pricing● Standards andregulations,especially onmaterials demand
reduction● Energy security● Savings andcompetitiveness● Industry: 4.8 GtCO 2

Avoid future
emissions andenergy access● Link energy accesswith emission
reductions for 3.5
billion energy-poor
people● Fit and auctions● Standards andregulations● Targeted subsidies● Support forentrepreneurs● Better access● Meet basic needs
and SDGs● N/AEmissions Gap Report 2019

XXIV
Figure ES.5. Changes in global levelized cost of energy for key renewable energy technologies, 2010-2018

9.

Demand-side material efficiency offers
substantial GHG mitigation opportunities thatare complementary to those obtained throughan energy system transformation.

▶

While demand-side material efficiency widens the
spectrum of emission mitigation strategies, it haslargely been overlooked in climate policymaking
until now and will be important for the cross-sectoraltransitions.

▶

In 2015, the production of materials caused GHG
emissions of approximately 11.5 GtCO 2 e, up from
5 GtCO 2 e in 1995. The largest contribution stems
from bulk materials production, such as iron andsteel, cement, lime and plaster, other minerals mostly
used as construction products, as well as plastics andrubber. Two thirds of the materials are used to makecapital goods, with buildings and vehicles among themost important. While the production of materials
consumed in industrialized countries remained within
the range of 2–3 GtCO 2 e, in the 1995–2015 period,
those of developing and emerging economies havelargely been behind the growth. In this context, it isimportant to keep in mind the discussion about the
point of production and points of consumption (seefigure ES.6).

▶

Material efficiency and substitution strategies affectnot only energy demand and emissions during material
production, but also potentially the operational energy

Emissions Gap Report 2019use of the material products. Analysis of such strategies
therefore requires a systems or life cycle perspective.
Several investigations of material efficiency havefocused on strategies that have little impact on
operations, meaning that trade-offs and synergies
have been ignored. Many energy efficiency strategies
have implications for the materials used, such asincreased insulation demand for buildings or a shift tomore energy-intensive materials in the lightweightingof vehicles. While these additional, material-related
emissions are well understood from technology studies,
they are often not fully captured in the integrated
assessment models that produce scenario results,
such as those discussed in this report.
▶

In chapter 7, the mitigation potential from demand-sidematerial efficiency improvements is discussed in thecontext of the following categories of action:●

Product lightweighting and substitution of highcarbon materials with low-carbon materials to reducematerial-related GHG emissions associated withproduct production, as well as operational energy
consumption of vehicles.

●

Improvements in the yield of material production andproduct manufacture.

●

More intensive use, longer life, component reuse,remanufacturing and repair as strategies to obtain
more service from material-based products.

XXV
Figure ES.6. GHG emissions in GtCO 2 e associated with materials production by material (left) and by the first use ofmaterials in subsequent production processes or final consumption (right)●▶

Enhanced recycling so that secondary materials
reduce the need to produce more emission-intensive
primary materials.
These categories are elaborated for housing andcars, showing that increased material efficiency can
reduce annual emissions from the construction andoperations of buildings and the manufacturing anduse of passenger vehicles, thus contributing a coupleof gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent in emission
reductions to the global mitigation effort by 2030.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

1

1

Introduction

Authors:
Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership) and John Christensen (UNEP DTU Partnership)

This tenth edition of the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap Report provides an
independent scientific assessment of how countries’
climate pledges and actions are affecting the global
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) trend, comparing it withthe emission reductions necessary to limit global warming
to well below 2°C and 1.5°C in accordance with the Paris
Agreement. This difference between where we are likely to
be by 2030 and where we need to be has become known as
the ‘emissions gap’.
To mark the 10-year anniversary, a publication summarizing
the lessons from a decade of emissions gap assessments(Christensen and Olhoff 2019) was published to support theUnited Nations Secretary-General’s Climate Action Summit
in September 2019. This publication shows that despite adecade of increased focus on climate change, global GHG
emissions have not been curbed and the emissions gap is
now larger than ever. It is clear that the world cannot affordanother decade lost. Unless mitigation action and ambition
are increased immediately and profoundly through enhanced
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and supported
by ambitious long-term mitigation strategies, it will not be
possible to avoid exceeding the 1.5°C goal, and it will become
increasingly challenging to achieve the well below 2°C goal.
At the Climate Action Summit, countries and regions
announced their intention to improve national and subnational
action. For example, 70 countries agreed to submit enhanced
NDCs by 2020, with the number of commitments to zero GHG
and carbon emission targets at some point during the second
half of this century increasing from around 20 countries
and eight regions before the Summit to 71 countries and
11 regions after the Summit. However, these countries andregions account for just 15 per cent of global emissions,indicating that the scale and pace of climate commitments
and action is still far from what is required to keep the Paris
Agreement goals within reach.
The challenge for the twenty-fifth session of the Conferenceof the Parties (COP 25) to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the year
to follow is thus to bring about the necessary move fromincremental to transformational climate ambition and action.
The year 2020, which is when countries are requested tosubmit new or updated NDCs and invited to communicate
long-term mitigation strategies as part of the UNFCCC
process, will be defining in this regard.
As in previous years, this Emissions Gap Report has been
prepared by an international team comprising 57 leading
scientists from 33 expert institutions across 25 countries,
assessing all available information, including that publishedin the context of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) special reports. The assessment process
has been overseen by a distinguished steering committee
and has been transparent and participatory. The assessment
methodology and preliminary findings were made available
to the governments of the countries specifically mentioned in
the report to provide them with the opportunity to commenton the findings.
The report is organized into seven chapters, including thisintroduction, and is structured on the questions that guided
the 2018 Talanoa Dialogue: Where are we? Where do we want
to go? How do we get there? In this way, chapter 2 focuses on
where we are, providing an updated assessment of the status
and trends of current and projected global GHG emissions,and the progress of G20 members towards their Cancun
Pledges for 2020 and their NDC targets for 2030.
Addressing the issue of where we want to go and comparing
it with where we are likely to be, chapter 3 assesses what the
gap between estimated global emissions will be by 2030 if
NDCs are fully implemented, as well as the range consistent
with the well below 2°C and 1.5°C temperature goals. The
chapter also considers what the temperature implications
will be at the end of the century if current policies arecontinued, and whether global emissions by 2030 will bepermissible if the current level of ambition of NDCs is notincreased.
Finally, the second part of the report examines how thegap can be bridged. Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive
overview of recent ambitious climate actions by national andsubnational governments as well as non-state actors, andEmissions Gap Report 20192

a detailed overview of policy progress and opportunities forenhanced mitigation ambition for selected G20 members.
With the aim of informing the Climate Action Summit and the
preparation of new and updated NDCs, a special pre-release
version of chapter 4 was published in time for the Summit.
The chapter illustrates that collectively, the G20 members
have not yet taken on transformative commitments at thebreadth and scale necessary, highlighting that despite many
positive developments, commitments are still far from what
is required. Chapter 5 details the key transformations thatare needed to align global trends with the Paris Agreement

Emissions Gap Report 2019

goals and how such transformational pathways in manycases can be synergistic with achieving other development
priorities, including the Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs). Global transformation of energy systems is crucial
for bridging the emissions gap. Chapter 6 reviews fivetransition options that are relevant for many countries,
can be designed to achieve development and mitigation
goals simultaneously and are associated with significant
emission reduction potentials. Finally, chapter 7 assesses
how material efficiency strategies for residential buildings
and cars can contribute to bridging the gap.

3

2

Global emissions trends andG20 status and outlook

Lead authors:
Takeshi Kuramochi (NewClimate Institute, Germany), Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency), Glen Peters (CICERO, Norway)

Contributing authors:Andrzej Ancyger (Climate Analytics, Germany), Ankit Bhardwaj (Centre for Policy Research, India), Gabriel Blanco (National
University of the Center of the Buenos Aires Province, Argentina), Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute, USA),
Andreas Geiges (Climate Analytics, Germany), Frederic Hans (NewClimate Institute, Germany), Christopher Henderson(World Resources Institute, USA), Niklas Höhne (NewClimate Institute, Germany), Kejun Jiang (Energy Research Institute,
China), Maria Jose de Villafranca (NewClimate Institute, Germany), Kimon Keramidas (Joint Research Centre/European
Commissions), HYPERLINK "mailto:joojin.kim@forourclimate" Joojin Kim (Solutions For Our Climate, Republic of Korea),
Akihisa Kuriyama (Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Japan), Leonardo Nascimento (NewClimate Institute,
Germany), Jos Olivier (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency), Deger Saygin (SHURA, Turkey), Ranping Song(World Resources Institute, China), Claire Stockwell (Climate Analytics, Germany), Kentaro Tamura (Institute for Global
Environmental Strategies, Japan), Paola Tanguy (NewClimate Institute, Germany), Heleen van Soest (PBL Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency), Jorge Villarreal Padilla (Iniciativa Climática de México), Ryan Wilson (Climate
Analytics), William Wills (Centro Clima, Brazil), Paola Yanguas Parra (Climate Analytics, Germany)

2.1

Introduction

This chapter assesses the latest trends in greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions as well as progress of G20 economies
towards both the Cancun pledges for 2020 and Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) for 2025 and 2030. The
chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 takes stockof the current global GHG emissions status and trends.
Section 2.3 provides an assessment of whether G20
members are on track to meet their Cancun pledges and
NDC targets, while section 2.4 summarizes recent policy
developments of individual G20 economies. This section
also serves as a basis for chapter 4, which explores
opportunities for additional GHG emissions reductions
that could be considered in the NDC update processby 2020 and beyond. Section 2.5 provides an overview
of submitted long-term low emissions development
strategies to date.
In the 2019 report, all GHG emission figures are expressedusing the 100-year global warming potentials (GWPs) fromthe Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

Fourth Assessment Report1 , unless otherwise noted,
whereas United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
Emissions Gap Report 2018 used Global Warming Potential(GWP) values of IPCC Second Assessment Report.

2.2 Current global emissions: status
and trends
Total GHG emissions grew 1.5 per cent per year in the last
decade (2009 to 2018) without land-use change (LUC)
and 1.3 per cent per year with LUC, to reach a record
high of 51.8 GtCO 2 e in 2018 without LUC emissions and55.3 GtCO 2 e 2 in 2018 with LUC. GHG emissions growth
was 2.0 per cent in 2018 and there is no sign of a peak in
any of the GHG emissions 3 (figure 2.1). GHG emissions
have grown every year since the global financial crisis in
2009, with only slightly lower growth in 2015 due to big
declines in coal use in both the United States of America
and China. Fossil CO 2 emissions, from both energy use
and industry, dominate total GHG emissions and reacheda record 37.5 GtCO 2 per year in 2018, after growing 1.5

1This change was made to be more in line with the decisions made at the COP in Katowice. Parties agreed on the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) for
reporting reasons at COP 24 in Katowice. A full switch to AR5 GWP was not yet possible because the literature is still not up to date on this decision.

2

GHG emissions are 1.8 GtCO 2e higher than the emissions estimate in 2017 presented in recent UNEP Emissions Gap Reports. This is mainly due tothe impact of GWPs (1.5 GtCO 2e) and the change in LUC emissions (-0.7 GtCO 2e), whereas the yearly change in 2018 contributes 1.0 GtCO 2e.

3

GHG emissions are based on EDGARv5 (Olivier and Peters 2019) and LUC emissions are from Houghton and Nassikas (2017). In this report, GWPs
from the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report are used (25 for CH4 and 298 for N 2 O). This yields total GHG emissions that are 1 GtCO 2e higher in 1970
and 1.5 GtCO 2e higher in 2018.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

4
Figure 2.1. Global greenhouse gas emissions from all sources

Source: Olivier and Peters (2019), Houghton and Nassikas (2017) for land-use change emissions, and Friedlingstein et al. (2019) for updates
from 2016 to 2018

per cent per year in the last decade and 2.0 per cent in2018 4 . The growth in fossil CO 2 emissions was due torobust growth in energy use (2.9 per cent in 2018). CO 2
emissions from LUC are about 7 per cent of total GHGs
and have large uncertainty and inter-annual variability,
remaining relatively flat over the last decade (IPCC 2019).
Methane (CH 4) emissions, the next most important GHG,
grew at 1.3 per cent per year in the last decade and 1.7 percent in 2018. Nitrous oxide (N 2 O) emissions are growing
steadily, at 1.0 per cent per year in the last decade and
0.8 per cent in 2018. Fluorinated gases (SF6, HFCs, PFCs)
are growing the fastest, at 4.6 per cent per year in the last
decade and 6.1 per cent in 2018.

from all sources, for OECD (blue) and non-OECD (orange)
economies. Economic activity has been much stronger in
non-OECD economies, growing at over 4.5 per cent per year
in the last decade compared to just 2 per cent per year inOECD economies. Since the OECD (1.7 per cent per year)
and non-OECD (2 per cent per year) economies have had
similar declines in the amount of energy used per unit ofeconomic activity, economic growth means that that energy
use has grown much faster in non-OECD economies (2.8 percent per year) than OECD economies (0.3 per cent per year).
OECD economies already use less energy per unit economic
activity, suggesting that non-OECD economies have thepotential to accelerate improvements.

GHG emissions are growing globally, despite progressin climate policy, as the countries where emissions are
declining are not able to offset the growth in emissions
in other countries. A recent study found that there are 18
developed economies where CO 2 emissions are declining(Le Quéré et al. 2019), the United States of America andsome European countries. We extend several aspectsof that analysis to compare Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD
economies. Figure 2.2 shows a decomposition of thegrowth in economic activity (Gross Domestic Product,GDP), primary energy use, the energy use per unit of GDP,
the CO 2 emissions per unit of energy, and GHG emissions

Declining or flat energy use makes it easier for non-fossil
energy sources, like wind and solar, to displace fossil fuels in
the energy system. The flat energy use in OECD economies
is one key reason that emissions have decreased in thoseregions (Le Quéré et al. 2019), with the declines accelerated
due to a declining amount of CO 2 emitted per unit of energyuse (-0.8 per cent per year). In non-OECD economies,
slightly more CO 2 is emitted per unit of energy in the last
decade (0.2 per cent per year growth), meaning that CO 2
emissions have grown slightly faster than energy use. In
non-OECD economies, the rapid deployment of solar andwind power has not been strong enough to displace fossil
fuels, particularly in countries with growing energy use and4

In this report, CO 2 emissions from fossil-fuels and industry grew 2.0 per cent in 2018, using EDGARv5 (Olivier and Peters 2019). The Global Carbon
Budget estimates 2018 fossil-fuel and industry emissions to grow 2.1 per cent (Friedlingstein et al. 2019), while for combustion-related emissions
only, the Institute of Economic Affairs estimated growth of 1.7 per cent (IEA 2019) and BP estimated growth of 2.0 per cent (BP 2019).

Emissions Gap Report 2019

5
Figure 2.2. Average annual growth rates of key drivers of global CO 2 emissions (left of dotted line) and components ofgreenhouse gas emissions (right of dotted line) for OECD and non-OECD economies

Source: Olivier and Peters (2019) and Global Carbon Project (Friedlingstein et al. 2019) for energy and economic data

globally. In total, OECD economies have seen CO 2 emissions
decline by -0.4 per cent per year in the last decade, while
non-OECD economies have seen emissions growing at
nearly 3 per cent per year. In the near term, it is expected thatenergy use will continue to grow in non-OECD economies,
but more rapid improvements in energy intensity, together
with deployment of low-carbon energy sources, could leadto an earlier peak and then decline in CO 2 emissions.
GHG emissions are dominated by CO 2 , but the non-CO 2
emissions represent over 34 per cent of total GHG emissions
including LUC. OECD economies have only seen very limited
growth in CH 4 and N 2 O, but rapid growth in fluorinated gases,
leading to an overall slight decline in GHG emissions. NonOECD economies have seen strong growth in all non-CO 2
GHGs, leading to an overall increase in GHG emissions of 2.5
per cent per year in the last decade. While CO 2 dominates
GHG emissions, reductions in other components can help
achieve an earlier peak in GHG emissions.
While global emissions statistics provide important
information on collective progress, they mask the dynamics
at the country level (figure 2.3). The top four emitters (China,
EU28, India and the United States of America) contributeto over 55 per cent of the total GHG emissions over thelast decade excluding LUC, the top seven (including Japan,
Russia and international transport) account for 65 per cent,while G20 members contribute 78 per cent. China emits
more than one-quarter (26 per cent) of global emissions(excluding LUC), and despite contributing significantly to theslowdown in global emissions from 2014 to 2016, emissions

in the country are now rising again, growing 2.5 per cent in thelast decade and 1.6 per cent in 2018 to reach a record high13.7 GtCO2e in 2018. The United States of America emits 13
per cent of global GHG emissions, with a gradual decline in
GHG emissions of 0.1 per cent per year in the last decade,but an increase of 2.5 per cent in 2018 due to increased
energy demand from an unusually warm summer and cold
winter. The European Union emits 8.5 per cent of global GHG
emissions and has had a steady decline of 1 per cent per year
in the last decade and a decline of 1.3 per cent in 2018. India,
accounting for 7 per cent of global emissions, continues tohave rapid growth in emissions of 3.7 per cent per year in thelast decade and 5.5 per cent in 2018. The Russian Federation(4.8 per cent) and Japan (2.7 per cent) are the next largest
emitters, with international transport (aviation and shipping)
representing around 2.5 per cent of GHG emissions. If LUC
emissions were included, the rankings would change, with
Brazil likely to be the largest emitter.
The ranking of countries changes dramatically when
considering per capita emissions (figure 2.3, right), butless so when allocating emissions to consumption (figure2.4). Consumption-based emissions, also known as acarbon footprint, adjusts the standard territorial emissions.
As figure 2.4 shows, developed countries import more
emissions than they export, with the opposite holding true
in developing countries. In the 2000s, there was a growing
gap between consumption-based emissions in developed
countries and their territorial emissions. This gap was larger
than the reductions made under the Kyoto Protocol (Peters
et al. 2011). Since the global financial crisis in 2008, theEmissions Gap Report 2019

6
Figure 2.3. The top emitters of greenhouse gases, excluding land-use change emissions due to lack of reliable country-level
data, on an absolute basis (left) and per capita basis (right)

Figure 2.4. CO 2 emissions allocated to the point of emissions (territorial) and the point of consumption, for absoluteemissions (left) and per capita (right)

Source: Olivier and Peters (2019), Houghton and Nassikas (2017) for land-use change emissions, and Friedlingstein et al. (2019) for updates
from 2016 to 2018

Emissions Gap Report 20197
gap has stabilized, and even declined. China contributed tomost of the growth in the 2000s, but also the stabilization in
the 2010s (Pan et al. 2017). Consumption-based emission
estimates allow policymakers to focus on different policy
levers and may help deal with carbon leakage under
stringent climate policies.

2.3 Assessment of G20 Member
progress towards Cancun pledges
and NDC targets
GHG emissions projections were compiled and reviewed
to assess the emission levels expected for G20 members
under existing policies (“Current policies scenario”) andwhether they would meet their respective emissions
reduction targets for 2020 and 2030. We followed themethodology of den Elzen et al. (2019) to enable a faircomparison of projections from different data sources,
including both official data sources published by the G20
governments as well as sources published by independent
research institutions.
Up -to - date emissions projections published sinceNovember 2018 were collected from countries’ recently
published National Communications, the third biennial
reports of seven G20 members, several other new national
studies and the independent global studies Climate Action
Tracker (Climate Action Tracker 2019d), the Joint ResearchCentre (JRC) of the European Commission (Keramidas etal. 2018) and PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency (Kuramochi et al. 2018) for the current policies
scenario and NDC scenario projections (see appendix A,
available online, for scenario definitions). Several studies
on current policies scenario projections from the UNEP
Emissions Gap Report 2018 data set were excluded,
as these were concluded not to be representativeof the policies implemented to date (mostly thosepublished before 2017, depending on the G20 Member).
All data sources are presented in appendix A. Current
policies scenario projections from studies without NDC
quantification were compared to official NDC emission
values in absolute terms or – when official NDC emission
values are not available – to the median estimates of NDCemission levels across independent studies.
This section should be read with some important caveats
in mind (den Elzen et al. 2019). First, whether a country
is projected to achieve or miss its emissions reduction
targets with existing policies depends on both the ambitionlevel of the targets, which this study does not assess, andthe strength or stringency of existing policy packages.
Therefore, countries projected to achieve their NDCs withexisting policies are not necessarily undertaking more
mitigation action than countries that are projected to missthem. Chapter 3 of this report and the literature (Rogelj
et al. 2010; 2016) are clear that the NDCs are collectively
far from sufficient to keep warming to 2°C, let alone
1.5°C, and thus all countries have to raise the ambitionof their current NDCs significantly. According to the Paris
Agreement, countries are obligated to regularly update andstrengthen their NDCs. The assessment conducted in thissection is based on current NDCs, recognizing that they
are to be revised and should be strengthened considerably
by 2020 to meet the climate goal of the Paris Agreement.
Second, current policies scenario projections are subject
to the uncertainty associated with macroeconomic trends,
such as GDP and population growth and technology
developments, as well as with the impact of policies. Some
Cancun pledges and NDCs are also subject to uncertainty
of future GDP growth and other underlying assumptions.
It is also worth noting that the current policies scenario
projections do not reflect the likely impact of all policies
implemented to date for a number of reasons. First, there
is always a time lag between the date a new policy measure
was implemented and the date a scenario study thatconsidered this new policy was published. Second, it often
takes time for research institutions to assess whether a
new policy measure would be effectively implemented toachieve its intended objective, resulting in an even larger
time lag. Third, GHG emissions projection models have
limitations on the types of policies they can incorporate,
which may result in an under- or overestimation ofprojected emissions.
On the progress of G20 economies towards their 2020
pledges, they are collectively (those who have Cancun
pledges) projected to overachieve their Cancun pledges by
about 1 GtCO2e per year based on the assessments from the
Climate Action Tracker (Climate Action Tracker 2019d) andPBL (Kuramochi et al. 2018), the two studies that annually
update both the 2020 pledge emission levels and current
policies scenario projections. However, several individual
G20 members (Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, Republic ofKorea, South Africa, the United States of America) arecurrently projected to miss their Cancun pledges or will
not achieve them with great certainty. In Australia, theGovernment projects that they would overachieve their2020 pledge based on their carbon budget approach that
accounts for cumulative emissions between 2013 and2020 (Australia, Department of the Environment and Energy2018). Argentina, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have not made2020 pledges.
On the progress of G20 economies towards their NDC
targets, six members: China, the EU28, India, Mexico, Russia
and Turkey, are projected to meet their unconditional NDC
targets with current policies (table 2.1). Among them, thecurrent policies scenario emissions projections for three
countries (India, Russia and Turkey) are projected to be 15+
per cent lower than the NDC target emission levels. These
results suggest that the three countries have room for raising
their NDC ambitions significantly. The EU28 has introduced
climate legislation that achieves at least 40 per cent GHG
reductions and is projected by the European Commission(European Commission 2018b) to overachieve these, if
domestic legislation is fully implemented (figure 2.5).

Emissions Gap Report 2019

8
Figure 2.5. Greenhouse gas emissions (all gases and sectors) of the G20 and its individual members by 2030 under different
scenarios and compared with historical emissions
Figure 2.5a.

The change in assessment results for the EU28 from our2018 report is partially due to the differences in whether
and how the new policy packages adopted in recent months
were considered in GHG emissions projections (see also theEU28 section and an earlier paragraph in this section). All
three independent studies (Climate Action Tracker, JRC andPBL) do not take the recently adopted policy packages into
account. Also, along with official publications, the European
Environment Agency (EEA 2018) projects emissions basedon Member state-level policies5 and the third Biennial Reportof 2017 (“With Current Measures” scenario), which projects
that the EU28 would remain short of achieving its NDC
target, and does not cover policies implemented in last two
years. By contrast, the reference scenario in the 2018 analysis
produced by the European Commission supporting the longterm vision document, which reflects recent European Union(EU)-level policies and assumes their full implementation,
projects that the EU28 could reduce its GHG emissions by 48
per cent from 1990 levels including LULUCF. For this reason,
the EU28 has been classified as projected to overachieve its
NDC target in table 2.1, even though the independent studies
do not project the EU28 to achieve its NDC target (figures 2.5
and 2.6), as they are not fully updated.

5

Seven G20 members require further action of varying degree
to achieve their NDC targets: Australia, Brazil (new, changed
compared to UNEP (2018)), Canada, Japan (new), Republicof Korea, South Africa and the United States of America.
For Brazil, the projections from three annually updated
publications were all revised upward, reflecting, among
others, the recent turn of trends on deforestation. Japan’scurrent policies projections have been on the borderline ofachieving the NDC target for the last few years.
Studies do not agree on whether Argentina, Indonesia andSaudi Arabia (new) are on track to meet their unconditional
NDCs. For Argentina, a recent domestic analysis thatreflects the most recent GHG inventory data up to 2016
(Keesler, Orifici and Blanco 2019) projects that theunconditional NDC target – which was revised in 2016 witha more ambitious one – will be achieved including scenariosthat are less optimistic (see annex B for details), while twoother international studies project that the country will
fall short of achieving its unconditional NDC with existing
policies. For Indonesia, the lack of agreement is mainly
due to the uncertainty on land-use, LUC and forestry(LULUCF) emissions. For Saudi Arabia, the limited amount

Member States who are at different stages when it comes to implementing domestic measures to meet EU legislation. It is logical that progressionis achieved in these projections over time as Member States take additional actions.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

9

Figure 2.5b.

Notes: For reporting reasons, the emission projections for China, the EU28, India and the United States of America are shown in figure 2.5aand the other countries shown in figure 2.5b, using two different vertical axes.
The current policies and NDC scenario estimates are based on average GHG emission projections. The findings regarding whether countries
are projected to over- or underachieve their NDC targets under current policies may therefore differ from the assessment in table 2.1, which
is based solely on the number of independent studies.
As a conservative assumption, South Africa is not considered as having a firm commitment to peak, since there is no guarantee that theconditions upon which they made the pledge will be met.
* For the United States of America, the unconditional NDC is for 2025. For Brazil, we refer to the indicative target for 2030.
** South Africa’s NDC is based on an emissions trajectory with an emissions range of 398–614 MtCO 2 e including LULUCF over the2025–2030 period.

of information on the country’s climate policies did not allow
for further assessments beyond the two studies reviewed.
Some G20 members are continuously strengthening their
mitigation policy packages, leading to a downward revision ofcurrent policies scenario projections over time. One example
is the EU, where a noticeable downward shift in current
policies scenario projections for 2030 has taken place sincethe 2015 edition of the UNEP Emissions Gap Report (seesection on the EU28 below for recent policy developments).
Figure 2.5 provides a detailed comparison of estimatedemissions under current policies scenarios as estimated by
official and independent sources and the NDC scenario for
all G20 members except for the EU Member States, mappingthese against 1990, 2010 and 2015 emissions. For each of

the G20 members, average (median when more than fivestudies) GHG emission projections have been calculated
for current policies and full implementation of the NDC,
following the approach of den Elzen et al. (2019), the resultsof which were presented in the UNEP Emissions Gap Report2018 (UNEP 2018) including climate change. Countries willmeet again at the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
As mentioned, average GHG emission projections are presented
for the current policies scenarios in figure 2.5 and 2.6, whereas
the assessment in table 2.1 is based solely on the number of
independent studies that support a given country finding. As aresult, some countries may be classified as projected to meettheir NDC target according to the number of studies available(table 2.1), while they may be projected to miss their NDC

Emissions Gap Report 2019

10
Table 2.1. Assessment of progress towards achieving the unconditional NDC targets for the G20 under current policies
based on independent studies

Projected to meet the unconditional
NDC target with currently implemented
policies

Expected to meet the unconditional NDC target
with additional policy measures and/or stricter
enforcement of existing policies

Overachievementof the target bymore than 15 per
cent, suggestinga weak target

Overachievementof the target by lessthan 15 per centProjected emissions
0–15 per cent above the
NDC target

Projected emissions 15
per cent or more above
the NDC target● India(6 of 6 studies)● Russia(3 of 3 studies) 1)● Turkey(3 of 3 studies)● China(3 of 5 studies,
one uncertain) 2)● EU28(1 of 3 studies,
one uncertain)● Australia(3 of 4 studies) 1)● Japan(2 of 3 studies)● South Africa(3 of 3 studies) 1), 4)● Brazil(4 of 4 studies)● Canada(3 of 3 studies) 1)● Republic of Korea(3 of 3 studies)● United States ofAmerica (2025)(5 of 5 studies) 1)1),2),3)● Mexico(2 of 3 studies)

Uncertain or
insufficient
information● Argentina(1 of 3 studies
projected
to meet theunconditional
NDC; updated
NDC in 2016)● Indonesia(3 studies
disagree)● Saudi Arabia(2 studies
disagree)Notes: The assessment is based on the number of independent studies that support the findings (except for the EU28, see the note below
and the section analysis). These are compared to the available studies, as indicated in brackets.
1.

We also examined current policies scenario projections from official publications. The number of publications that support the abovefindings based on independent studies are Australia: 1 of 1; Canada: 2 of 2; Russia: 1 of 1; South Africa: 1 of 1; the United States ofAmerica: 1 of 1. For the EU28, three official publications disagree (see footnote 3).

2.

The Climate Action Tracker indicates that upper-end projections would miss the NDC target range.

3.

The EU assessment result is based on projections fully implementing adopted EU climate and energy legislation (European Commission
2018b). For the EU28, among the three independent studies and three official studies, the evaluation was made based on a study by
PBL that took into account the best recently adopted policy packages (Kuramochi et al. 2018) and projections from the most recent
official analysis by the European Commission (European Commission 2018b).

4.

South Africa’s current policies scenario projections were compared to the upper-bound estimate of the NDC range.

target based on the average emission projections under thecurrent policies scenario (and vice versa).
To supplement the findings presented above, table 2.2
presents projected per capita GHG emissions undercurrent policies and NDC targets based on independentstudies in both absolute and relative terms (compared to2010 levels) for all G20 members excluding the four EU
Member States. We find that nine G20 members, including
China, are projected to emit more than 10 tCO 2e per capita
annually (approximately the levels in 2010 for EU28 andJapan) in 2030 under current policies and seven members
could even achieve levels under unconditional NDC targets.
Among OECD members 6 , the EU28 performs well in both6absolute and per capita emission levels in 2030 and in theirchange rates compared to 2010 levels, even though theconsumption-based emissions are considerably higher, as
shown in figure 2.4. Mexico also performs well in termsof the projected development of per capita emissions
under both current policies and NDC scenarios. As table
2.2 shows, emissions per capita annually in 2030 under
the unconditional NDC targets are projected to decline
between 2010 and 2030 in all G20 economies except
China, India, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, Saudi
Arabia and Turkey. There are also large differences in percapita emission levels. The per capita emissions of India
are about half the G20 average, whereas Saudi Arabia
reaches three times the G20 average.

Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Turkey, the United States.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

11
Table 2.2. – Overview of G20 Member status and progress, including on Cancun pledges and NDC targets*

Country

Share in global GHG
emissions in 2017
excluding LULUCF andincluding LULUCF (inbrackets) 1)

Projected per capita GHG emissions including LULUCF in 2030
(tCO2e/cap) and change rates from 2010 levels (in brackets) 2) 3) 4)
Current policies scenario(central estimates 5) ofindependent studies)

Unconditional NDC (official
values whenever available,
otherwise central estimates of
independent studies)

Argentina

0.8% (0.9%)

10.6 (+4%)

10.2 (-1%)

Australia

1.2% (1.1%)

17.5 (-34%)

15.1 (-43%)

Brazil

2.3% (2.9%)

7.1 (-1%)

5.3 (-26%)

Canada

1.6% (1.8%)

16.0 (-17%)

12.6 (-35%)

China

26.8% (25%)

10.2 (+35%)

10.3 (+37%)

EU28

9.0% (7.9%)

6.1 (-31%)

5.9 (-33%)

India

7.0% (7.1%)

3.1 (+100%)

3.7 (+138%)

Indonesia

1.7% (4.9%)

7.4 (+56%)

7.1 (+50%)

Japan

3.0% (2.9%)

8.8 (-8%)

8.6 (-10%)

Mexico1.5% (1.5%)

5.4 (-9%)

5.3 (-10%)

Republic of Korea

1.6% (1.3%)

13.4 (+10%)

9.7 (-20%)

Russia

4.6% (4.3%)

15.0 (+61%)

18.5 (+99%)

Saudi Arabia

1.5% (1.4%)

22.7 (+16%)

22.2 (+14%)South Africa

1.1% (1.1%)

10.2 (-3%)

7.8 (-26%)

Turkey1.2% (1.0%)

7.3 (+63%)

10.4 (+132%)

USA

13.1% (12.5%)

16.5 (-14%)

11.5 (-40%)*Emission figures include LULUCF, unless otherwise noted.

Notes:
1.

Olivier and Peters (2018), excluding LULUCF/including LULUCF. LULUCF emissions based on the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO) data (Food and Agriculture Organization Corporate Statistical Database [FAOSTAT] 2018).

2.

The population projections are based on the medium fertility variant of the United Nations Population Prospects 2019 edition (United
Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs [UN DESA] 2019).

3.

For comparison, the G20 average per capita emissions in 2010 was 7.2 tCO 2 e/cap based on national GHG inventory reports submitted
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (supplemented by EDGAR and FAO (Kuramochi et al. 2018)).
Assumptions on LULUCF emissions presented in appendix A, table A - 2.

4.

Median estimates are used when more than five studies are available, otherwise average estimates.

5.

Historical data based on the second Biennial Report.

Emissions Gap Report 201912

Box 2.1. Comparing emission values across chapters
To compare these G20 estimates with the G20 sharesof the global greenhouse gas emissions estimatesof the current policies scenarios and 1.5- and2°C-consistent global emission levels, as presented
in chapter 3, we need to discuss the LULUCF CO 2
emissions. Given the difference in estimating the“anthropogenic sink” between countries and theglobal integrated assessment modelling community(Grassi et al. 2017), the LULUCF CO 2 estimates
included here based on inventory data are notnecessarily directly comparable with countries’
land-use CO 2 emissions estimates at the global
level used by the global model community. Grassi etal. (2017) find a current ±3 GtCO 2 e/year difference
in global LULUCF net emissions between country
reports (such as greenhouse gas inventories andNational Communications) and scenarios studies(as reflected in IPCC reports). Among the many

Figure 2.6 presents the additional effort needed according toestimates based on independent studies and shows that themain contributions would need to come in particular from theUnited States of America. If we assume a linear interpolation
between the NDC target year (2025) and the 2050 UnitedStates of America long-term target (80 per cent reduction
below 2005 levels indicated in the longterm low-carbon
development strategy (LTS) document – see section 2.5) toestimate an indicative 2030 target, the required additionalemissions reductions would halve if the 2030 target remainedat the same level as for 2025, instead of progressing linearly
towards its 2050 target as assumed in our analysis. The three
countries that are projected to significantly overachieve theirunconditional NDC targets (by more than 15 per cent), i.e.
India, Russia and Turkey, are expected to together exceed
their NDC targets by about 1.5 GtCO2e in 2030 with current
policies (compared to about 1 GtCO2e in the UNEP Emissions
Gap Report 2018). By contrast, the emission gaps are
noticeably larger than in the 2018 assessment for the twolarge LULUCF emitters, i.e. Brazil and Indonesia, reflecting
the recent increase of historical emissions and the politicaluncertainties in the two countries.
Overall, this study indicates that current policies of
G20 members collectively fall short of achieving theunconditional NDCs. The total GHG emissions for G20
members are projected to be 41.0 GtCO 2e/year (range:
35.1 to 47.6 GtCO 2e/year), which is slightly lower than the
projections by den Elzen et al. (2019) after correcting fordifferent GWPs.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

possible reasons for these differences, Grassi et al.
(2017) suggest that a key factor – which deserves
further analysis – relates to what is considered“anthropogenic forest sink”. At least two-thirds ofthe difference of 3 GtCO 2 e, about 2 GtCO 2 e, could be
attributed to the G20 members.
The G20 total emissions projections for 2030 alone
would be about 43 GtCO 2 e/year, after correcting
for the anthropogenic sink, which would exceed
the 2°C-consistent global emission levels of theintegrated assessment models presented in chapter
3. This G20 projected emissions level in 2030 isabout 72 per cent of global emissions of the current
policies (60 GtCO 2 e) in 2030 seen in chapter 3, which
is close to the 78 per cent share of G20 in the global
emissions in 2018. It is lower in 2030, which was to be
expected, given the increasing share of non-G20 andin-time international aviation and shipping emissions
until 2030.

G20 members as a whole will need to reduce their GHG
emissions further by about 1.1 GtCO2e/year by 2030 to achieve
unconditional NDC target emission levels and by about 2.9
GtCO2e/year to achieve conditional NDC target emission
levels. If we exclude the 1.6 GtCO2e/year overachievement of
unconditional NDCs by India, Russia and Turkey and assume
that these countries will follow their current policies trajectoryrather than that implied by their unconditional NDCs (as done inmany NDC scenario projections from global models presented
in chapter 3), then the G20 economies are collectively shortof the unconditional NDCs by about 2.7 GtCO2e/year against
unconditional NDCs and by about 3.7 GtCO2e/year against
conditional NDCs in 2030. The estimated difference between
the current policies scenario and NDC scenario projections forG20 members remains similar to that in the UNEP Emissions
Gap Report 2018, but some G20 members (i.e. the EU andSouth Africa) have lower current policies projections than in
the 2018 report (UNEP 2018), whereas others have higher
projections (i.e. Brazil, and to a lesser extent, China).

2.4 Recent policy developments of G20
members
This section presents selected policy developments
observed recently in individual G20 members and theirpotential implications on GHG emissions, where information
is available. Information on main sector-level policies inselected G20 members is presented in chapter 4 and inappendix B, which is available online.

13
Figure 2.6. Additional emissions reduction effort required in 2030 per G20 Member to achieve NDC targets, based on
current policies scenario projections of independent studies

Note: The NDC scenario projections from global models presented in chapter 3 assume that the countries that overachieve their NDCs
follow their current policies trajectory. The calculations for the United States of America are based on an interpolation between its 2025
NDC and the 2050 long-term target (80 per cent reduction from 2005 levels) and for Brazil, they are based on its indicative 2030 target. As
the current policies estimates of the independent studies are based on average GHG emission projections, the findings regarding whether
countries are projected to over- or underachieve their unconditional NDC targets may therefore differ from the assessment in table 2.1,
which is based solely on the number of independent studies.

Argentina
Unconditional NDC target projection: Uncertain or
insufficient information
Argentina submitted its first NDC in 2015 and a revised
version in 2016 where the country unconditionally committed
to emit no more than 483 MtCO 2e/year in 2030. Since then,the country has established a National Climate Change
Cabinet integrated by most of the ministries to design a
low-carbon strategy and ensure the coherence of policies
and measures. Under this institutional framework, theministries have prepared a set of sectoral plans describing
the mitigation policies and measures to be implemented toreach the NDC goals (Argentina, National Climate Change
Cabinet 2019).
Policies and measures in the energy sector include theconstruction of several large-scale hydropower plants,

7three new nuclear power plants 7, various types of largescale renewable energy power plants such as wind, solar
PV and biomass, smaller renewable energy systems for
distributed generation and residential solar water heaters.
Implementation of these actions is behind schedule(Compañía Administradora del Mercado Mayorista Eléctrico
S.A. [CAMMESA] 2019), mainly due to difficulties accessing
financial resources (Gubinelli 2018). The weak infrastructure
for electricity transportation is also a major barrier for the
expansion of renewable, grid-connected power plants(Mercado Eléctrico 2019; Singh 2019). At the same time,
the heavily subsidized exploitation of non-conventional
fossil fuels from the Vaca Muerta reservoir is adding GHG
emissions in a magnitude similar to the estimated emissions
reductions of the renewable energy plan (Iguacel 2018). The
initial exploration and future exploitation of offshore oil andnatural gas is adding to the burden (Baruj and Drucaroff
2018; Boletín Oficial de la República Argentina 2019).

One of these three nuclear power plants, Atucha II, is already operational. The other two are currently under development.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

14
Policies and measures have been developed for theindustry and transport sectors such as energy efficiency,
recycling and reuse of waste, renewable energy generation
for self-consumption, promotion of low-emission urban
mobility and public transport, intercity railroad restorationand efficiency improvements in road and railway
freight transportation. Some of these actions are being
implemented (for example, the initial implementation of
hybrid and electric buses in large cities and the use ofalternative fuels in cement kilns), while some other actions
are behind schedule. In relation to agriculture, forestry
and land-use, the key sectors for Argentina in relation totheir contribution to GDP and to GHG emissions, sectoralplans have been presented with policies and measures
such as conservation and restoration of native forests,
sustainable forest management and fire prevention,
increasing the forested area and promoting bioenergy fromdifferent biomasses. In addition to the measures proposed,
Argentina urgently needs to revise the technologies andpractices it has been using for decades in agricultural
production to avoid further soil degradation and the impact
on health of rural and suburban populations caused byusing agrochemicals (Instituto National de Tecnología
Agropecuaria (n.d).; Panigatti 2010). It also needs toprovide the due amount of funding to finance the law that
protects native forests and keep under control the rate of
deforestation that increased in 2017 after several years of
declination (Argentina, Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo
Sustentable 2018).

Australia
Unconditional NDC target projection: Emissions 0–15 percent above target
With the re-election of Australia’s conservative Government
in May, there has been no recent material change inAustralian climate policy. This will make achieving its NDC
of a 26 per cent to 28 per cent emissions reduction below
2005 levels by 2030 challenging. However, it appears
that the Australian Government intends to use carry-overpermits from the Kyoto Protocol to do so, and uses a carbon
budget approach that accounts for cumulative emissions
between 2021 and 2030 in order to assess progress against
its NDC (Australia, Department of the Environment andEnergy 2018). The dropping of the proposed National Energy
Guarantee in 2018 and that the renewable energy target
will not be raised for years after 2020 up to 2030 (Clean
Energy Regulator 2018) leaves Australia with no major policy
tool to encourage emission reductions from the electricity
sector in the short to medium term. There has been a 1.4
billion Australian dollar commitment to a 2 GW expansionof the Snowy Mountains hydroelectric project; however,
the emission reductions stemming from this project are
not expected to occur until well after 2030 (Marsden Jacob
Associates 2018). In 2017, the Government’s advisory
body, the Climate Change Authority, concluded that otherpolicies would be needed to deliver the structural changes
necessary for Australia to decarbonize (Climate Change
Authority 2017).

Emissions Gap Report 2019

The latest projection published by the Government showsthat emissions would remain largely unchanged up to 2030
(Australia, Department of the Environment and Energy 2018;
Climate Action Tracker, 2019a). To date, much of the support
from the Government’s signature climate policy, the recently
renamed “Climate Solutions Fund”, has gone to LUC projects(Clean Energy Regulator 2017). The current Government
decided earlier in 2019 to provide an additional 2 billion
Australian dollars to the Climate Solutions Fund. The AustralianGovernment estimates that these measures will contribute toan additional 100 MtCO2e of emissions reductions by 2030
(Australia, Department of the Environment and Energy 2019).

BrazilUnconditional NDC target projection: Emissions at least 15
per cent above target
After the strong reduction in deforestation rates from2004 (18,900 km2) to 2012 (4,656 km2), the deforestation
rate grew again to 7,900 km 2 in 2018 (+70 per cent).
Preliminary numbers indicate that in the first semester of2019 deforestation rates continued to grow relative to thesame period of 2018. President Bolsonaro significantly
reduced the Ministry of Environment’s budget for climatechange related activities; transferred the body responsiblefor identifying, defining, and registering Indigenous Territory
to the Ministry of Agriculture; relaxed the rules for converting
environmental fines into alternative compensations;extended deadlines for adequacy to registries that supported
enforcement measures; and abolished most committees
and commissions for civil participation and social control
in the Federal Government (Climate Action Tracker 2019b).
Given the key role of the LULUCF sector in Brazil’s NDC,
which aims to reduce the country’s GHG emissions by 37
per cent below 2005 levels by 2025 and to an indicative
level of 43 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030, and given
the huge global importance of its forests for environmental
services, biodiversity and carbon sequestration, the Brazilian
Government urgently needs to strengthen mitigation actionin this sector. Official projections still show a decreasing
trend (Programa Despoluição de Bacias Hidrográficas[PRODES] 2019), which is contrary to the observed trend.
If environmental regulations and deforestation control
policies are reversed or suspended, net emissions fromdeforestation could increase by 850-1,500 MtCO 2 e/year by2030 (Rochedo et al. 2018).
Despite the negative developments in climate policy andemissions regarding the forestry sector, Brazil has madeprogress in the energy sector. Market developments between
2015 and September 2019 seem to favour renewable energy
over fossil fuels. Although fossil capacity was eligible in thelatest auctions, no coal and only 4 GW of gas-fired power
generation have been contracted since 2015 in comparison
to 10 GW of renewables per cent. Wind has been the mostcompetitive technology with concessions of 4 GW, followed bysolar (3.3 GW), hydro (1.6 GW), and biomass (1.0 GW) (Brazil,
Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency [ANEEL] 2019).

15
In the transport sector, the Government has launched theRenovaBio programme (Decree No. 9.308) that aims toincrease the amount of biofuel in the national energy mix andhas already led to an additional production of 31.9 million m 3
in 2016 and 2017 (Brazil, Ministry of Science, Technology,
Innovation and Communications 2019); therefore the biofuel
production in the country will probably meet the indicative
targets mentioned in Brazil’s NDC. President Bolsonaro also
signed the first concession for the rail transport sector in
10 years. The project allows cargo to be transported from
the Midwest and flow through both the Port of Itaqui (inthe north) and the Port of Santos (in the southeast) (Brazil,
Investment Partnerships Program 2019). The Federal
Government plans to significantly increase the share that
railway transport constitutes in the next eight years (from15 per cent to 29 per cent).

CanadaUnconditional NDC target projection: Emissions at least 15
per cent above target
In its NDC, Canada pledged to reduce its GHG emissions
by 30 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030. With Royal
Assent of the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act inDecember 2018, carbon pricing will be in place across
all Canadian provinces and territories by September
2019, except the Province of Alberta, but is facing court
challenges from a number of provinces (Climate Action
Tracker 2019c). Alberta repealed its carbon tax in May
2019, however the federal carbon price will be applied
to that Province in January 2020 (Province of Alberta
Queen’s Printer 2019; Vigliotti 2019). The adoption of
performance standards on coal and gas-fired power
stations at the end of 2018 means Canada is on track tomeet its 2030 coal phase-out commitment, although it isexpected that many coal-fired plants will be replaced withnatural gas variants, creating a risk of future stranded
assets (Climate Action Tracker 2017; Government of
Canada, 2018b; 2018a). The 2019 federal budget included
a 300 million Canadian dollar investment in zero-emission
vehicles, while the Government has set sales targets of 10
per cent by 2025, 30 per cent by 2030, and 100 per centby 2040 (Canada, Transport Canada 2019). According to
Canada’s Greenhouse Gas and Air Pollutant Emissions
Projections (2018), when taking into account currently
announced federal, provincial and territorial policies andmeasures, Canada’s emissions in 2030 are projected at
592 Mt – or 223 Mt lower than what was projected before
the adoption of the Pan-Canadian Framework for Clean
Growth and Climate Change.

China
Unconditional NDC target projection: Overachievement of
the target by less than 15 per cent
China’s NDC targets include capping CO 2 emissions
around 2030 and making an effort to cap them earlier, as
well as a 20 per cent share of non-fossil fuels in the total
primary energy demand (based on the conversion factorof the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics for renewableenergy and nuclear power generation). Further targets
include reducing the carbon intensity of its GDP by 60 per
cent to 65 per cent below 2005 by 2030 and increasing
forestry stock by 4.5 billion m 3 by 2030 compared to the2005 level.
Since 2017, China’s National Energy Administration (NEA)
has developed a warning system for investment in coal
power plants, which evaluates the risks of new coal
power projects based on investment returns, electricity
demand and environmental concerns. The system rates
the feasibility of coal power projects in 38 regions as bad,moderate or good. New coal investment is banned, inprinciple, in regions with a bad rating. In April 2019, theNEA published the latest risk rating, which reduces thenumber of regions that ban new coal investment from 24
to 21 (NEA of China 2019). The change may encouragecoal power development and slow down power sector
decarbonization.
China’s renewable energy and new energy vehicle (NEV)
has experienced exponential growth in the past decade,in part thanks to generous subsidies. As the costs of thetechnologies fall and markets mature, China has started
to phase down relevant subsidies. The Government
suspended the approval of all new subsidized solar PV
projects in May 2018 (NEA, National Development andReform Commission [NDRC]; Ministry of Finance [MOF]of China 2019) and issued new regulations to reduce
subsidies for solar and wind projects in 2019 (NDRC
of China 2019a; 2019b.). The country also slashed thesubsidy standard of 50 per cent for new energy cars in2019 and plans to stop subsidies by the end of 2020 (Heand Cui 2019). In the short-term, the efforts would resultin a rush to develop renewable power projects or purchasenew energy cars before phase-out of subsidies. In themidterm, utility-scale solar PV and onshore wind power
can reach grid-parity by 2021 (Hang 2019; Tu et al. 2019).
In fact, China has already approved 21 GW of wind andsolar projects without subsidy (Hill 2019). The new policy
will also accelerate the marketization of the NEV industry
in China (Xiao 2019). In summary, the recent subsidy
reform is a necessary step for the large-scale adoption ofrenewable energy and NEV in China.

EU28
Unconditional NDC target projection: Overachievementof the target by less than 15 per cent
The EU has adopted climate legislation to implement its
NDC target of a 40 per cent reduction below 1990 levels by2030. It has reviewed its EU emission trading system andincreased its annual reduction of the cap. It has set nationalemission reduction targets for Member States for thesectors not covered in the EU emissions trading system.
It has put in place legislation that ensures accounted
LULUCF emissions are not resulting in a decrease of the
EU’s sink. Combined, these legislations meets the at least

Emissions Gap Report 201916
40 per cent greenhouse gas reduction target of the NDC.
In recent months, the EU has implemented a number ofimportant accompanying measures that would lead toan overachievement of its NDC target. The adoption of
the new renewable energy directive (Directive 2018/2002;
RED II) and the new energy efficiency directive (Directive
2018/2002) (European Commission 2018c) with therespective goals of increasing the share of renewablesin the energy mix and improving energy efficiency – ifeffectively implemented – would lead to emissions
reductions of at least 45 per cent by 2030 relative to 1990
(European Commission 2018a). These two directives wereparts of the package of measures called Clean Energy for
all Europeans presented by the European Commissionin November 2016. With the adoption of the Electricity
Regulation and Electricity Directive by the Council in May
2019, European institutions finalized the work on thispackage, which also included a directive focusing on energy
efficiency in the building sector (adopted in May 2018), anda Governance Regulation which obligates Member States
to present National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs)
describing measures they are going to implement tocontribute to meeting the EU’s energy and climate goals.
Collectively, the current draft NECPs are projected to fallshort of both renewable and energy efficiency targets(European Commission 2019b). Final NECPs, taking onboard recommendations by the European Commission
and featuring greater ambition where necessary, are dueby the end of 2019.
Significant progress has also been made in the transport
sector in which the adoption of CO 2 emissions standards
for passenger cars and vans in December 2018 was
followed by standards for new heavy-duty vehicles in early2019. According to the legislation, average emissions frompassenger vehicles sold by each manufacturer in 2030 will
have to be 37.5 per cent lower for new cars and 31 per centlower for new vans compared to 2021 levels (European
Council 2019). Emissions from new heavy-duty vehicles
should decrease by 15 per cent in the second half of thenext decade and by 30 per cent in 2030 and beyond – inboth cases in comparison to 2019 (European Commission
2019a). These regulations, however, may need to bestrengthened after 2030 if net zero GHG emissions by
2050 as proposed by the European Commission (European
Commission 2018a) are to be achieved.
Furthermore, an increasing number of countries arecommitting to the phase-out of coal-fired power plants;
Finland has agreed on a phase-out of coal-fired power
plants by 2029 (Europe Beyond Coal 2019) and Germany
is discussing a phase-out (a commission advised it todo so by 2038) (Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic
Affairs and Energy [BMWi] 2019). Other Member Statesthat committed to, or announced coal phase-outs, include
Austria (2025), Denmark (2030), France (2021), Ireland(2025), Italy (2025), the Netherlands (2030), Portugal(2030), Sweden (2022) and the United Kingdom (2025)(Europe Beyond Coal 2019).

Emissions Gap Report 2019

India
Unconditional NDC target projection: Overachievement of
the target by more than 15 per cent, suggesting a weak target
India’s NDC has three numeric targets for 2030: reduce
emissions intensity by 33 per cent to 35 per cent from 2005
levels, achieve an installed power capacity of 40 per centfrom non-fossil fuel sources and create an additional carbon
sink of 2.5–3.0 GtCO2e from forest and tree cover. India
has continued its efforts towards achieving its renewable
and intensity targets, though the previous year saw nosubstantial course change. In 2018, renewable deployment
exceeded conventional fuels (Buckley and Shah 2019), though
is projected to remain short of the 175 GW target by 2022
(Vembadi, Das and Gambhir 2018; Buckley and Shah 2019).
The deployment of renewables has been let down by unclear,
inconsistent taxation and import duty norms (Buckley andGarg 2019; Buckley and Shah 2019). Interrelated factors havestymied India’s uptake of fossil fuel infrastructure, including
a financial crisis that has led multiple coal power plants to
be deemed as non-performing or stressed assets (India,
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Energy 2018). In
addition, the National Clean Air Programme released in 2019aims to reduce PM2.5 and PM10 concentrations by 25 per centto 30 per cent, and provides additional motivation to shut
down old coal power plants (India, Ministry of Environment,
Forest and Climate Change [MoEFCC] 2019b).
India has simultaneously continued its efforts to broadenenergy access. India reported the 100 per cent electrificationof households in early 2019 (India, Ministry of Power 2019),
with likely implications for the future of India’s energy demand.
The Kisan Urja Suraksha evam Utthaan Mahabhiyan (KUSUM)
scheme launched in early 2019 is aimed at promoting solar
energy in rural areas with the target to install 26 GW of solar
agricultural pumps by 2022 (India, Cabinet Committee on
Economic Affairs 2018). India also released an India Cooling
Action Plan in 2019 to provide cooling services while keeping
their GWP minimal by reducing energy and refrigerant demand(MoEFCC 2019a).
India has also begun deliberating policies to electrify public andprivate modes of transport. The second phase of the Faster
Adoption and Manufacturing of (Hybrid &) Electric Vehicles(FAME) was launched in 2019, aiming to support the uptakeof electric two-wheelers, three-wheelers, four-wheelers andbuses, with projected cumulative savings of 7.2 MtCO2e (India,
Cabinet on Economic Affairs 2018). India is also deliberating
upon targets to ban sales of all fossil fuel powered two-, threeand four-wheeler vehicles in the next decade. India also aims
to electrify all its broad gauge railway routes by 2021–2022(India, Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs 2018).

Indonesia
Unconditional NDC target projection: Uncertain or
insufficient information
Indonesia’s NDC sets an unconditional 29 per cent and aconditional 41 per cent (with sufficient international support)

17
reduction target on the country’s GHG emissions below
business-as-usual by 2030. The National Energy Policy
referred to in Indonesia’s NDC aims to increase the share of
renewable energy in the total primary energy supply to 23
per cent by 2025 from the current 6.5 per cent (Republic ofIndonesia, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources [MEMR]
2017), but this target will likely not be met and the country’s
heavy reliance on coal-fired power will likely continue undercurrent policy measures (Climate Action Tracker 2019e).
The new Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) 2019–2028 adopted in January 2019 (Republic of Indonesia 2019)
also envisages the installation of almost 40 GW of fossil-fired
power plants, about 27 GW of which being coal-fired, in thenext 10 years. It is estimated that this 27 GW of coal-fired
power alone would annually emit up to 200 MtCO2e over the
next 40 years, unless they are decommissioned before theend of their lifetime.
In the land-use sector, Presential Instruction No 8 of 2018
(President of the Republic of Indonesia 2018) presents a threeyear moratorium on the entire licensing process for palm oil
plantations and an order for the relevant central Government
ministries and regional governments to conduct a massive
review of oil palm licensing data (Mongabay 2018). A recent
Presidential Instruction also made the temporary moratorium
on forest-clearing permits for logging and plantations issued
in 2011 permanent, but the historical development of landuse GHG emissions casts doubt on the effectiveness ofthese measures (Jong 2019). Although the Global Forest
Watch (2018) reported in 2017 that Indonesia was one of
the few tropical nations to reduce its deforestation rates in
2017, this was likely due, in part, to the national peat drainage
moratorium (Norway, Ministry of Climate and Environment
2016), in effect since 2016.

Japan
Unconditional NDC target projection: Emissions 0–15 percent above target
Under its NDC, Japan aims to reduce its GHG emissions
by 26 per cent by 2030 from 2013 levels. Japan’s total
GHG emissions seem to have peaked in the fiscal year
(F Y ) of 2013 before decreasing for four consecutive
years. In the power sector, decarbonization efforts arebeing strengthened only incrementally. In March 2019,
the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) announced three
new actions to accelerate decarbonization progress inthe power sector (MOE 2019), among which is stricter
enforcement of environmental impact assessments onplanned coal-fired power plants. However, the downsides
are the overall limited effectiveness of the measures, as
the MOE cannot veto the plans, and that coal-fired power
plants already under construction will be unaffected bythis action.
As for renewables, the Environmental Impact Assessment
Act will apply from April 2020 and will also be applicableto large-scale solar PV projects with capacities greaterthan 40 MW (or greater than 30 MW following a screening

process based on the current status of land-use on the
project site) (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry[METI] 2019b). The Government has also started reviewing
the scope of renewable projects to be supported under
the feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme, which contributed to thelarge increase of solar PV capacity in the last years, tocontrol the increasing surcharge (METI 2019c). These
new rules are likely to secure proper business disciplines
for solar PV in Japan, despite curbing the speed at whichlarge -scale solar projects can be deployed af ter thefull installation of capacity with FIT approval. For wind
power, the new law put into effect on 1 April 2019 (METI
2019a) allows offshore wind power developers to occupy
a registered area up to 30 years after consultation with
relevant ministries and local stakeholders. This will
promote the development of offshore wind farms.
For the transport sector, a panel under the METI published
an interim report on the long-term strategy for car
manufacturing (METI 2018), which establishes a longterm goal to reduce tank-to-wheel CO 2 emissions by 80
per cent below 2010 levels by 2050 for all new vehicles
produced by Japanese car manufacturers and by 90 per
cent by 2050 for new passenger vehicles. The goal for new
passenger vehicles assumes a near 100 per cent shareof electrified vehicles (including hybrids, plug-in hybrids,
battery electric vehicles and fuel cell electric vehicles).
With CEOs of major car manufacturers such as Toyota,
Nissan and Honda all being members of the panel, thedevelopment of these long-term goals can be considered
an important step towards decarbonization of Japan’stransport sector.

MexicoUnconditional NDC target projection: Overachievement of
the target by less than 15 per cent
Mexico’s NDC makes an unconditional commitment to
reduce GHG emissions by 22 per cent below business-asusual in 2030, implying a net emissions peak from 2026,
and a conditional commitment to reduce emissions by
36 per cent below business-as-usual in 2030. Mexico’s
new Administration has stalled years of progress in theenergy sector with decisions that threaten to reverse
progress made towards enhanced climate action through,for example, Mexico’s General Climate Change law of2012 (Mexico, Cámara de Diputados del H. Congresode la Unión 2012) or its Energy Transition law of 2015
(Mexico, Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la
Unión 2015). The National Electricity Outlook (PRODESEN)
2019–2033 adopted in June 2019 (Mexico, Ministry ofEnergy 2019) limits deeper deployment of clean energy(including efficient cogeneration) beyond the 35.1 per centby 2024 target (24.12 per cent in June 2018) by increasing
fossil fuel-fired generation, reducing wind power and notincreasing solar power growth rates. Furthermore, theMinistry has cancelled the 2018 long-term power auction
and cut-off the transmission lines to evacuate renewableenergy. There have been no announcements of further

Emissions Gap Report 201918
auctions. Despite the recognition of the importance of
reducing GHG emissions and increasing renewable energy
deployment, the National Development Plan adopted inJune 2019 (Mexico, Diario Oficial de la Federación 2019)adds a new additional refinery with the aim to increase
gasoline, diesel and fuel oil production.
After postponing Mexico’s 2018 long-term energy auction
round – a policy scheme introduced in 2015 after thecountry’s energy reform that aimed to increase its clean
energy share – President Lopez Obrador cancelled thefourth auction round in January 2019 Mexico, Centro
Nacional de Control de Energía 2018). Although the first
three rounds of electricity auctions had led to a substantial
amount of new renewable energy projects (Notimex2019), President Lopez Obrador’s plans for the power
sector include the modernization of gas and coal-fired
power plants previously planned for retirement and theconstruction of a 700 MW coal-fired plant in the short andmidterm (Solís 2018a, 2018b).
President Obrador has also presented a National Refining
Plan aimed at “rescuing” Mexico’s oil industry and achieving
energy independence through the rehabilitation of six
oil refineries and the construction of a new one in Dos
Bocas, Tabasco, and a plan for constructing a railroad in
the Yucatan peninsula (known as the Maya Train project)(Government of Mexico 2019). These three infrastructure
projects have faced national and international criticism(see, for example, Gurría (2019)).

Republic of Korea
Unconditional NDC target projection: Emissions at least 15
per cent above target
Dynamic discussions are taking place in the Republic ofKorea in relation to the adequacy of its 2030 power sector
emissions target. In its NDC, the Republic of Korea hascommitted to reducing its GHG emissions to 37 per centbelow business-as-usual or to 536 MtCO 2 e per year by2030 (UNFCCC 2018), and initially set up a road map in2016 to achieve this target. However, the plan in the initialroad map to procure 96 MtCO 2 e per year of international
credits was subject to environmental integrity andeconomic feasibility-related criticism. In July 2018, theroad map was amended, stating that 16 MtCO 2 e per
year will be reduced by international credits rather than
96 MtCO 2 e per year (Republic of Korea, Ministry ofEnvironment 2018).
Another important change to the road map was that
contemplated emission reductions from the power sector
were reduced from 64.5 MtCO 2 e per year to 23.7 MtCO 2 e
per year (Republic of Korea, Ministry of Environment2018), which is mainly attributable to the Moon JaeIn Administration’s nuclear policy, under which 8.8 GWof new nuclear power plant construction projects werecancelled. The amended GHG road map stated thatan additional emission reduction requirement of 34.1

Emissions Gap Report 2019

MtCO 2 e per year may be imposed on the power sector
depending on further discussions, which mostly relates
to how ambitiously the country will decommission its
operational coal power plant fleet by 2030. The additional
34.1 MtCO 2 e per year reduction issue has become thecentre of national climate and energy policy discussions
and was one of most contentious topics when establishing
the Third Energy Framework Plan, under which the country
aims to increase its renewables share in total electricity
generation from 7.6 per cent in 2017 to 35 per cent by 2040
and to phase down coal and nuclear power (KBS 2019).
Air pollution concerns, originating from the South
Chungcheong Province, where approximately 18 GW of coal
power plants (half of the Republic of Korea’s coal power
fleet) are located, may expedite the speed of coal power
plant retirements and lead to more ambitious reductions
from the country’s power sector. In early 2019, opposition
from this Province led to the suspension of retrofits of 4.5
GW of coal power plants (Chosunilbo 2019; Chung 2019).
If the retrofits were implemented, the life period of thesepower plants would have extended to until around 2040.
The Governor of South Chungcheong Province has also
committed to decommissioning coal power plants that are
older than 25 years, which, if successful, will result in 14
units being decommissioned by 2026 (Powering Past Coal
Alliance 2018) .

RussiaUnconditional NDC target projection: Overachievement of
the target by more than 15 per cent, suggesting a weak target
Russia pledged to limit GHG emissions by 15–25 per centbelow 1990 levels by 2020 and by 25–30 per cent below
1990 levels by 2030, and recently announced that it will
ratify the Paris Agreement (United Nations 2019). While
the ratification date is uncertain, a draft Decree of the
President on a new 2030 emission reduction target is to beprepared by December 2019, with a draft implementation
plan to achieve the 2030 target expected in the first half of2020 (UNFCCC 2019b). The Russian Action Plan mandates
the drafting of a “low-carbon strategy until 2050” by theend of 2019 (Sauer and Collett-White 2019). However, no
mention of the preparation of this draft has yet been made.
The fact that only draft documents are expected provides
a weak basis for tracking and assessing progress, as
they may just contain principles and approaches without
concrete mitigation measures and GHG targets. In
December 2018, the Government introduced new draft
legislation that would establish a cap-and-trade system
for major carbon emitters by 2025 (Sauer and CollettWhite 2019).

Saudi Arabia
Unconditional NDC target projection: Uncertain or
insufficient information
In its NDC, Saudi Arabia commits to reducing emissions
by up to 130 MtCO 2e per year below business-as-usual

19
by 2030 through actions that contribute to economic
diversification and adaptation. The country’s actions
to mitigate climate change are driven by its motive todiversify its economy (Al-Sarihi 2019). In 2016, Saudi
Arabia published its Vision 2030, which included arenewable energy target of 9.5 GW by 2023 and a phaseout of fossil fuel subsidies (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
2016). However, the implementation of this vision has
been delayed for both renewable energy and the fossil fuelprice reform (Nereim 2017; Krane 2019). Most recently, in
March 2018, Saudi Arabia and the SoftBank Group signed
a memorandum of understanding to build a 200 GW solar
plant, the largest single solar project worldwide, as part ofVision 2030 (Nereim and Cunningham 2018). However, theexpected tenders to implement the plan have been delayedsince January 2019 (Bellini 2019). Outside the power
sector, the Public Investment Fund announced in October
2018 its intention to locate an electric vehicle industry in
Saudi Arabia, following an agreement to invest more than
US$1 billion in an United States of America-based electricvehicle manufacturer (Torchia et al. 2018).

South Africa
Unconditional NDC target projection: Emissions 0–15 percent above target
In its Cancun Pledge, South Africa aims to reduce its GHG
emissions by 34 per cent below business-as-usual in 2020,and commits to achieving a peak, plateau and decline of
GHG emissions in its NDC, with emissions peaking between
2020 and 2025, before plateauing at 398–614 MtCO 2 e per
year between 2025 and 2030.
The South African Government released the long-awaiteddraft of its Integrated Resource Plan (Republic of South
Africa, Department of Energy 2018) in August 2018. The
revised plan aims to decommission 35 GW of Eskom’s
currently operational coal generation capacity (42 GW) by
2050, with 12 GW of this decommissioned by 2030, another
16 GW by 2040, and a further 7 GW by 2050 (Republic ofSouth Africa, Department of Energy 2018). The 5.7 GW
of coal capacity currently under construction would becompleted and another 1 GW of new coal capacity would
be commissioned by 2030. The significant volume ofcoal capacity to be decommissioned by 2030 and beyond
marks a significant shift away from previous planning. The
Government has not yet communicated a timeline for the
Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) update’s final adoption as
of September 2019.
South Africa approved a carbon tax in February 2019,
which covers fossil fuel combustion emissions, industrial
processes and product-use emissions, and fugitive
emissions (Reuters 2019). The tax has been implemented
since June 2019, but a basic tax-free threshold for around
60 per cent of emissions and additional allowances for
specific sectors means that tax exemptions will apply for
up to 95 per cent of emissions during the first phase until
2022 (KPMG 2019).

In addition, South Africa released a draft climate changebill in June 2018 for public comment (Republic of South
Africa, Department of Environmental Affairs 2018), but theGovernment has not yet communicated a timeline for the
law’s final adoption as of July 2019. The draft law aims
to establish a Ministerial Committee on Climate Change
to oversee and coordinate activities across all sector
departments. Under the proposed legislation, the Ministerof Environmental Affairs together with the Ministerial
Committee on Climate Change would have to set sectoral
emission targets for each GHG emitting sector in line with
the national emission target every five years.

TurkeyUnconditional NDC target projection: Overachievement of
the target by more than 15 per cent, suggesting a weak target
In its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC),
Turkey aims to limit its GHG emissions to 21 per centbelow business-as-usual or to 959 MtCO 2 e per year in 2030
(excluding LULUCF). Turkey’s current emissions are on thistrajectory. The energy sector is at the centre of the country’s
low-carbon transition debate, representing more than 85 percent of its total GHG emissions in 2017, with 40 per centof all energy sectors emissions resulting from electricity
generation.
At the start of 2018, Turkey put in place an ambitious
National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP) for the
2017–2023 period, which aims to reduce the its total energy
demand (in primary terms) by 14 per cent compared with the2017 level. The six-year plan includes the six sectors that
supply and demand energy, covering a comprehensive listof 55 actions. The renewable energy FIT mechanism thatwill still be available for new projects until the end of 2020
was successful in raising the wind and solar PV share in
total electricity demand to 10 per cent (and around a third of
the total demand supplied from renewables). Following the
global trend, Turkey is diversifying its policy portfolio. Since
2017, three rounds of auctions have taken place for onshore
wind (twice) and solar PV with favourable prices and local
content requirements. The Government has indicated that
auctions will be the key mechanism for renewable energy
investments in the coming decade.
The Government has set an ambitious plan for new coalfired power plants, with purchase guarantees and subsidies
to investors. Among the G20 members, Turkey ranks thirdfor new coal-fired power plant capacity being planned (37GW), following China and India (as at January 2019). Thisis twice as much as Turkey’s current operational capacity.
However, planned capacities are not being constructed
due to a lack of financing, with around only 1 GW currently
under construction. More than 40 GW in planned coal-fired
power plant capacity was cancelled over the 2010–2018
period. Nuclear energy has been on Turkey’s agenda as analternative source for many years. The country’s first nuclear
power plant is planned to have four 1.2 GW reactors, with thefirst reactor planned to start operation by 2023.

Emissions Gap Report 201920
United States of America
Unconditional NDC target projection: Emissions at least 15
per cent above target
The current NDC target for the United States of America is
to reduce emissions by 26–28 per cent from 2005 levels
by 2025. However, President Trump’s Government is taking
actions to move the country’s emissions trajectory in the
opposite direction, cutting environmental regulations infavour of giving more freedom to industry. The Trump
Administration recently issued the final Affordable
Clean Energy (ACE) rule, its replacement for the Obama
Administration’s Clean Power Plan, which was meant to
reduce emissions from power plants in order to achieve
the country’s NDC target. While the Clean Power Plan
would have reduced power sector emissions by roughly
32 per cent, the ACE rule is expected to reduce them byroughly 1 per cent (Natural Resources Defense Council[NRDC] 2018).
The Trump Administration has also frozen the vehicle
emissions and fuel economy standards for cars and lighttrucks until 2026, meaning that the average fuel economy
will remain at 35 miles per gallon (mpg), rather than rising
to 54 mpg. According to analysis by the Rhodium Group,
this will increase emissions from the transportation
sector by 28–83 MtCO 2 e per year by 2030, with theultimate amount dependent upon the effect of oil prices
on consumption (Larsen et al. 2019). However, a groupof automakers recently struck a deal with the state ofCalifornia to strengthen standards for gas mileage andemissions from their vehicles (Van Sant 2019).
However, despite the Trump Administration’s actions,market trends have resulted in a significant drop inemissions over the past decade. The country’s energyrelated CO 2 emissions fell by 14 per cent between 2005
and 2017, while the economy grew by 20 per cent (U.S.
Energy Information Administration [EIA] 2018). Action atstate and local levels has also grown significantly since
President Trump’s announcement that the United Statesof America would leave the Paris Agreement. A groupof 25 governors representing over half of the country’s
population and US$11.7 trillion in GDP have joined the U.S.
Climate Alliance, a coalition committed to reducing GHG
emissions in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement(U.S. Climate Alliance 2019).

Emissions Gap Report 2019

2.5 Preparation of long-term strategies
and the way forward
Another important ongoing policy process is the preparationof long-term low emissions development strategies under
the Paris Agreement. As of October 2019, only seven G20
members (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America) had submitted
their strategies to the UNFCCC and another two (the EU28 andSouth Africa) had published their draft strategies (UNFCCC
2019a). Of the seven long-term strategies submitted by G20
members to the UNFCCC, only Japan committed to achieving
long-term net zero GHG emissions as early as possible in thesecond half of this century, though France and the United
Kingdom have passed bills that commit to net zero GHG
emissions by 2050. A few other members, including the EU28,
are in the process of revising their domestic and international
long-term goals. For non-annex I G20 members, there havebeen some indications to suggest that they would establish
long-term strategies that contain timelines for achieving net
zero GHG emissions. For comparison, to keep warming below
1.5°C in 2100 with a 66 per cent chance, global total net CO2
emissions would need to be reduced to zero by around 2050
(IPCC 2018). There is an increasing number of countries thathave set or are in the process of setting net zero emissions
targets domestically (Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit 2019).
More long-term strategies are expected to be submitted to the
UNFCCC in the coming months, which will provide a better
understanding of the level of collective long-term ambitionand how it will affect the pathways towards achieving theParis Agreement’s long-term temperature goals. It will also be
important to scrutinize the consistency between the (revised)
NDCs and long-term strategies to ensure that countries’ longterm low-carbon development pathways are feasible.

21

3

The emissions gap

Lead authors:
Joeri Rogelj (Grantham Institute Imperial College London, UK; International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria),
Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency)

Contributing authors:
Daniel Huppmann (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria), Gunnar Luderer (Potsdam Institute for Climate
Impact Research, Germany)

3.1

Introduction

This chapter updates the annual assessment of theemissions gap in the year 2030. Consistent withprevious reports, the emissions gap in 2030 is definedas the difference between projected emissions under full
implementation of the nationally determined contributions(NDCs) and emissions under least-cost pathways that are
in line with the Paris Agreement goals of limiting global
average temperature increase to well below 2°C andpursuing to limiting it to 1.5°C. The chapter first presents
the various scenarios used for the assessment of theemissions gap (section 3.2), that is, reference scenarios,
NDC scenarios and scenarios consistent with limiting
global warming to a specific temperature limit. The next
section updates the 2030 emissions gap (section 3.3). Thisis followed by a discussion of the temperature implicationsof the emissions gap (section 3.4) and the potential impact
of non-state actions on the gap (section 3.5).

3.2 Scenarios considered for the 2030
gap assessment
This section will provide an update on the scenarios
considered for the year-2030 gap assessment which
comprise reference scenarios, NDC scenarios and least-cost
mitigation scenarios consistent with specific temperaturetargets.

3.2.1

Reference scenarios and updates

Reference scenarios are used as benchmarks against
which progress in emission reductions can be tracked.
Two reference scenarios are considered: the 2005 policies
scenario and the current policy scenario.

1

The 2005 policies scenario projects global greenhousegas (GHG) emissions assuming no new climate policies
are put in place from around 2005 onwards1. For 2019,
the data for this scenario are updated and based on
projections from six modelling studies that are also used
for the current policy scenario projections from the samedata source (the CD-LINKS Scenario Database, version1.0) to maintain consistency (McCollum et al. 2018).
Data for this scenario was available from the followinginternational modelling groups: International Institute forApplied Systems Analysis (IIASA using the MESSAGE–GLOBIOM model), Joint Research Centre (JRC using
the POLES model), National Institute for Environmental
Studies (NIES using the Asia-Pacific Integrated [AIM]model), PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency (PBL using the IMAGE model), Potsdam Institutefor Climate Impact Research (PIK using the REMIND–
MAgPIE model) and RFF–CMCC European Institute on
Economics and the Environment (RFF–CMCC using the
WITCH model).
The current policy scenario projects GHG emissions
assuming all currently adopted and implemented policies(defined as legislative decisions, executive orders, or
equivalent) are realized and that no additional measures
are undertaken. Updated data from eight modelling groups
were available for this scenario. These include updated
estimates from four modelling groups also consideredin the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2018 (United Nations
Environment Programme [UNEP] 2018): Climate Action
Tracker (CAT) (CAT 2019), JRC (Tchung-Ming et al. 2018),
PBL (CD-LINKS Scenario Database) (McCollum et al.
2018), and the International Energy Agency (IEA) (2018). In
addition, four new modelling groups (IIASA, NIES, PIK and
RFF–CMCC) provided data for this scenario, available in
the CD-LINKS Scenario Database (McCollum et al. 2018).

This scenario is the same as the “no policy scenario” of previous reports.

Emissions Gap Report 201922
3.2.2 NDC scenarios and updates
The NDC scenarios estimate the levels of global total
GHG emissions that are projected as a result of theimplementation of the mitigation actions pledged bycountries in their NDCs. In line with previous gap reports,
two NDC scenarios are considered: the unconditional andthe conditional NDC scenario. The unconditional NDC
scenario assumes countries only implement the mitigation
actions specified in their NDCs that have no conditions
attached. Parties that do not have an NDC or solely have a
conditional target in their NDC are assumed to follow theircurrent policy scenario. The conditional NDC scenario
assumes full achievement of Parties’ mitigation pledges(both the conditional and unconditional actions listed aspart of the mitigation contribution in their NDCs). Parties
that do not have conditional mitigation targets in their NDC
follow their unconditional target. Appendix A.1 (available
online) provides a full overview of the studies considered
for the reference and NDC scenarios.
The NDC scenario of the 2019 report is based on updated
data from the same data sources as the current policies
scenario and is provided by 12 modelling groups. Projected
NDC levels for some countries, in particular China andIndia, depend on recent emission trends or gross domestic
product (GDP) growth projections that quickly become
outdated. Therefore, studies that were published in 2015,
before the adoption of the Paris Agreement, have been
omitted from the 2019 update. The emission projections ofChina and India for the current policies and NDC scenarios
have been lowered in most studies that have updated
projections of current policies on an annual basis, suchas IEA, Climate Action Tracker, PBL and JRC. For China inparticular, the projected peak level of CO 2 emissions has
also decreased in the most recent studies compared toprojections published in 2015. Nevertheless, the impact
of excluding studies published before 2015 is small. The
projected global emissions levels of the NDC scenarios
are very similar to the levels assessed in the 2018 UNEP
Emissions Gap Report 2 .

3.2.3 Least-cost mitigation scenarios consistent
with the Paris Agreement’s temperature
limits and updates in light of the IPCC Special
Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C
Estimates of where GHG emissions should be in the year
2030 in order to be consistent with a least-cost pathway
towards limiting global warming to specific temperature
limits are calculated from the scenarios that were compiled
as part of the mitigation pathway assessment of theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Reporton Global Warming of 1.5°C (IPCC SR1.5) (Rogelj et al. 2018),
and are available online (Huppmann et al. 2018a; Huppmann
et al. 2018b). Similar to the UNEP Emissions Gap Report
2018, least-cost mitigation pathways – or pathways that
aim at limiting warming to specific temperature limits at
the lowest overall cost 3 – are selected and grouped into
three temperature scenario groups according to theirmaximum cumulative CO 2 emissions from 2018 onwards.
This approach ensures that all scenarios in a specifictemperature scenario group result in similar maximum
warming and that there is limited overlap between thevarious groups. Moreover, this approach is consistent withthe approach of the IPCC SR1.5 that groups scenarios in
different categories based on their maximum temperature
outcome (IPCC 2018; Rogelj et al. 2018).
Peak warming is achieved around the time of net-zero
CO 2 emissions (Ricke and Caldeira 2014; Joos et al. 2013;
Zickfeld and Herrington 2015) and current technicalassessments of mitigation pathways show that somedegree of carbon-dioxide removal (CDR) is required tocompensate for ongoing emissions in sectors that are hardto decarbonize (IPCC 2018; Rogelj et al. 2018). After peakwarming, global temperature rise could potentially be slowly
reversed through the continued deployment of global CDR
to achieve net negative CO 2 emissions (Allen et al. 2018;
Zickfeld, MacDougall and Matthews 2016; Tokarska andZickfeld 2015). However, CDR deployment at such scales
is associated with important risks, as highlighted in earlier
UNEP Emissions Gap Reports (for example, UNEP (2010))
and other assessment (de Coninck et al. 2018; Roy et al.
2018; Fuss et al. 2018).
The three temperature scenario groups describe a rangeof pathways that keep warming in the range of below
2°C–1.5°C and allow the identification of the consequencesof strengthened or weakened action at various degrees ofambition, from limiting warming to roughly around 2°C overpotential interpretations of “well below 2°C”, to pursuing tolimit warming to 1.5°C, and their corresponding emission
reductions (see table 3.1). Each scenario considers aleast-cost climate change mitigation pathway that starts
reductions from 2020. The temperature outcomes of thesescenarios are estimated using the climate model set up
used in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (Meinshausen etal. 2009; Meinshausen, Raper and Wigley 2011; Rogelj et al.
2014; Clarke et al. 2014).
▶

Below 2 .0°C scenario: This scenario limits
maximum cumulative CO 2 emissions from 2018
until the time net-zero CO 2 emissions are reached2

Assuming 100-year global warming potential (GWP) values of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) for both datasets.

3

More specifically, least-cost pathways are calculated with integrated assessment models (that is, models that combine representations of theenergy, economic, land and environment systems), and distribute the emission reductions across regions, sectors and gases in such a way that the
global discounted reduction costs are minimized over time and the climate target is achieved with varying probability (see also box 3.1 in the UNEP
Emissions Gap Report 2017).

Emissions Gap Report 201923
(or until 2100 if net-zero is not reached before 4)
to between 900 and 1300 GtCO 2 , and cumulative
2018–2100 emissions to at most 1200 GtCO 2 . It isconsistent with limiting end-of-century warming
to below about 2.0°C with about 66 per cent or
greater probability, while limiting peak global
warming during the twenty-first century to below
2.0°C with about 66 per cent or greater probability.
The median estimate of 2030 GHG emissions forthis scenario is 41 GtCO 2 e, which is consistent withthe median 40 GtCO 2 e estimated for the “lower 2°C”
scenario category of the IPCC SR1.5 (see table 2.4
in (Rogelj et al. 2018)).
▶

▶

Below 1.8°C sce nario: This scenario limits
maximum cumulative CO 2 emissions from 2018
until the time net-zero CO 2 emissions are reached(or until 2100 if net-zero is not reached before)
to between 600 and 900 GtCO 2 , and cumulative
2018-2100 emissions to at most 900 GtCO 2 . It isconsistent with limiting peak and end-of-century
warming to below about 1.8°C with about 66 percent or greater probability. This scenario is included
to provide additional, more granular information
about how emissions reduction requirements in
2030 change with gradually increasing stringencyof global mitigation action.
Below 1.5°C in 2100 scenario: This scenario limits
maximum cumulative CO 2 emissions from 2018
until the time net-zero CO 2 emissions are reached(all model realizations in this scenario reach net-zero
before 2100) to below 600 GtCO 2 , and cumulative
2018–2100 emissions to at most 380 GtCO 2 , when
net negative CO 2 emissions in the second half of the
century are included. It is consistent with limiting
global warming to below 1.5°C in 2100 with about
66 per cent probability, while limiting peak global
warming during the twenty-first century to 1.6–
1.7°C with about 66 per cent or greater probability.
This class of scenarios is consistent with thescenarios in the IPCC 1.5°C Special Report that limit
warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (asexplained in box 3.2, UNEP Emissions Gap Report
2018; see also characteristics in table 3.1). The
median estimate of 2030 emissions of 25 GtCO 2 e
is well within the median estimate range of 22–28
GtCO 2 e of the IPCC SR1.5 for the 1.5°C with no or
limited overshoot (see table 3.1).

Table 3.1 shows the 2030 global GHG emission levels forthe three scenarios.

3.3 The 2030 emissions gap
In line with previous reports, the emissions gap for 2030 isdefined as the difference between global total GHG emissions
from least-cost scenarios that keep global warming to
2°C and 1.5°C with varying levels of likelihood and theestimated global total GHG emissions resulting from a full
implementation of the NDCs. To allow for a more nuanced
interpretation of the Paris Agreement’s temperature targets,
this assessment includes a below 1.8°C scenario. Thissection updates the gap based on estimated levels of GHG
emissions in 2030 for the scenarios described in section 3.2.
Table 3.1 provides a full overview of 2030 emission levels forthe seven scenarios considered in this assessment, as wellas the resulting emissions gap. A change compared to 2018is that all emission projections have been aggregated withthe 100-year global warming potential (GWP) values of the
IPCC AR4 5 , whereas UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2018 used
the GWP values of the Second Assessment Report of theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC SAR). The
difference between SAR and AR4 GWPs leads to a difference
in both scenarios for 2°C, 1.8 °C and 1.5°C and current policy
and NDC levels (typically 1–2 GtCO2e), so that the effect on
the size of the emissions gap will be limited.
Table 3.1 indicates that in the absence of further climate
action since 2005 – that is, under a 2005-policies scenario– the global total GHG emissions in 2030 would be 64 GtCO2e(range of 60–68 GtCO2e). Current policies are estimated toreduce global emissions in 2030 to around 60 GtCO2e, whichis 4 GtCO2e lower compared to the 2005-policies scenario.
The estimates of global emissions in 2030 under the current
policy scenario have decreased slightly since 2015, when
the UNEP Emissions Gap Report first introduced the current
policies emission projection until 2030. The UNEP Emissions
Gap Report 2015 estimated global emissions under a current
policy scenario projection of about 62 GtCO2e6 (range of
59.5–63.5 GtCO2e) in 2030 (UNEP 2015), which has been
lowered to 60 GtCO2e (range of 58–64 GtCO2e) in 2019,indicating that studies show slight progress of about 2 GtCO2e(range of 0.5–2 GtCO2e) in policy implementation since theadoption of the Paris Agreement. The emissions projectionsof the current policies scenario of the Climate Action Tracker
and PBL show a similar decrease over time. The current policy
scenario estimate for 2030 is around 0.5 GtCO2e lower thanthe 2018 report estimate, when the implications of switching
to the GWP values of the IPCC AR4 are taken into account,which is similar to the updated estimates of individual studies
from the Climate Action Tracker and PBL. Overall, this implies
that countries are still not on track to deliver their NDCs (seechapter 2 and chapter 4 for a discussion of G20 members’

4

If a scenario does not achieve net-zero CO 2 emissions before 2100 while still holding warming to below a specific temperature threshold, it isassumed that global CO 2 emissions will reach net-zero emissions immediately or shortly after 2100.

5This change was made to be more in line with the decisions made at COP24 in Katowice, where the Parties agreed on AR5 for reporting reasons. A
full switch to AR5 GWP was not yet possible because the literature is not yet up-to-date regarding this decision.

6

The numbers are based on the estimates of UNEP (2015) of 60 GtCO 2e (range of 58–62 GtCO 2e), assuming 100-year GWP values of the IPCC SAR.
Here, these estimates are converted using 100-year GWP values of the IPCC AR4, leading to an adjustment of 1.5 GtCO 2e.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

24
Table 3.1. Global total greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 under different scenarios (median and 10th to 90th percentile
range), temperature implications and the resulting emissions gap.

Scenario(rounded to
the nearest
gigaton)Numberofscenarios
in setEstimated temperature outcomes
Globaltotal
emissionsin 2030[GtCO2e]
50%
66%
90%
probability probability probability

ClosestEmissions Gap in 2030
corresponding [GtCO2e]
IPCC SR1.5
scenario class
Below
2.0°C

Below
1.8°C

Below
1.5°C in2100

2005-policies 6

64(60–68)Current
policy860(58–64)18(17–23)24
35(23–29) (34–39)

Unconditional
11
NDCs

56
(54–60)15(12–18)21
32(18–24) (29–35)

Conditional
NDCs

12

54
(51–56)12(9–14)

1829(15–21) (26–31)

29

41(39–46)Peak:
1.7-1.8°C
In 2100:
1.6-1.7°C

Peak:
1.9-2.0°C
In 2100:
1.8-1.9°C

Peak:
2.4-2.6°C
In 2100:
2.3-2.5°C

Higher-2°C
pathways

43

35(31–41)Peak:
1.6-1.7°C
In 2100:
1.3-1.6°C

Peak:
1.7-1.8°C
In 2100:
1.5-1.7°C

Peak:
2.1-2.3°C
In 2100:
1.9-2.2°C

Lower-2°C
pathways13

25(22–31)Peak:
1.5-1.6°C
In 2100:
1.2-1-3°C

Peak:
1.6-1.7°C
In 2100:
1.4-1.5°C

Peak:
2.0-2.1°C
In 2100:
1.8-1.9°C

1.5°C withno or limited
overshoot

Below 2.0°C(66%
probability)
Below 1.8°C(66%
probability)
Below 1.5°C
in 2100
and peakbelow
1.7°C (bothwith 66%
probability)

Note: The gap numbers and ranges are calculated based on the original numbers (without rounding), and these may differ from the rounded
numbers (third column) in the table. Numbers are rounded to full GtCO 2 e. GHG emissions have been aggregated with 100-year GWP
values of the IPCC AR4 (to be consistent with Table 2.4 of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, whereas UNEP Emissions Gap
Report 2018 used GWP values of IPCC SAR). The NDC and current policy emission projections are updated from the presented numbers incross-chapter Box 11 of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (Bertoldi et al. 2018), with new studies that were published after
the literature cut-off date of IPCC. Pathways were grouped into three categories depending on whether their maximum cumulative CO 2
emissions were less than 600, 600–900 or 900–1300 GtCO 2 , respectively, from 2018 onwards until net-zero CO 2 emissions are reached, or
until the end of the century if the net-zero point is not reached before. The estimated temperature outcomes represent estimates of global
average surface air temperature (GSAT), most consistent with the impact assessment of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report. Pathways
assume limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation thereafter. Estimated temperature outcomes are based on the IPCC AR5
method (Meinshausen, Raper and Wigley 2011; Clarke et al. 2014).

Emissions Gap Report 201925
Box 3.1. The remaining carbon budget as a tool for
scenario classification
The IPCC SR1.5 provided an updated assessment of
the remaining carbon budget, that is, the total amountof carbon dioxide that can be emitted if global warming
is to be kept to a specific level relative to pre-industrial
levels (Rogelj et al. 2018). Owing to advances andimprovements in methods to estimate remaining carbon
budgets, the IPCC SR1.5 reported median estimates thatwere larger than those reported five years earlier by the
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (Stocker et al. 2013; IPCC
2014). Despite these larger estimates of the remaining
carbon budget by the IPCC, the emission pathways
corresponding to the Paris Agreement limits used in the
UNEP Emissions Gap Reports did not require a strong
adjustment. How can this be the case?
The updates of the remaining carbon budget estimates in
the IPCC SR1.5 were based on three main methodologicaladvancements (Rogelj et al. 2018; Rogelj et al. 2019): (i)accounting for the latest estimates of anthropogenic
global warming to date (Allen et al. 2018); (ii) a moreformal description of the uncertainty in the ratio of global
warming projected per cumulative ton of CO2 (Stocker et
al. 2013); and (iii) a more precise estimate of the warming
due to emissions other than CO2 at the time of peakwarming (Rogelj et al. 2018; Huppmann et al. 2018a).

status and progress). Full implementation of the unconditionaland conditional NDCs is estimated to reduce global emissions
in 2030 by about 4 and 6 GtCO2e, respectively, compared to thecurrent policy scenario (table 3.1).
The emissions gap between estimated total global
emissions in 2030 under the NDC scenarios and underpathways limiting warming to below 2°C and 1.5°C is
illustrated in Figure 3.1. The full implementation of theunconditional NDCs is estimated to result in a gap in 2030
of 15 GtCO 2e (range of 12–18) compared to the below 2°C
scenario with a 66 per cent probability that warming stays
below 2°C. The emissions gap between unconditional NDCs
and below 1.5°C pathways is about 32 GtCO 2e (range of
29–35). Taking into consideration the full implementationof both unconditional and conditional NDCs would reduce
this gap by about 3 GtCO 2e. The estimates are similar to
the gap assessed in the 2018 UNEP Emissions Gap Report.
The only change compared to the 2018 report is that the
gap between the conditional NDCs and the 2°C scenario is
1 GtCO 2e lower in 2019.

7

However, each of these methodological improvements
were to some degree already taken into account in theemission pathways of the UNEP Emissions Gap Reports,
which previously used a reduced-complexity climate
model set up (Meinshausen et al. 2009; Meinshausen,
Raper and Wigley 2011; Rogelj et al. 2014; Clarke et al.
2014). This model set up applied the methodologicalimprovements that formed the basis for updating
the IPCC SR1.5 carbon budgets. Specifically, it (i)accounted for recent estimates of warming to date by
expressing temperature projections relative to a recent
reference period (the 1986–2005 period) (Clarke et al.
2014); (ii) had a better coverage of the uncertainty
in the ratio of global warming to cumulative CO 2
emissions by using an observationally constrained
probabilistic climate model set up (Meinshausen et al.
2009); and (iii) used integrated assessment mitigation
scenarios with internally consistent evolutions of all
GHGs, also at the time of peak warming (Clarke et al.
2014). Previous UNEP Emissions Gap Reports werethus based on assumptions regarding temperature
projections that were to some degree consistent
with the methodological improvements implemented
for the SR1.5 remaining carbon budget assessment,
explaining why the emission pathways of the UNEP
Emissions Gap Reports have not changed so much.

In summary, the updated analysis and review of the progress
set against national commitments under the Paris Agreement
makes clear that the current pace of national action is
insufficient for achieving the Paris Long-term Temperature
Goal or even for achieving the emissions reductions impliedby the NDC pledges. Increased emissions and lagging action
mean that the gap figure for the 2019 report remains verylarge, and similar to the 2018 report. Translated into climate
action, the analysis reconfirms that nations must triple theircurrent efforts, – as reflected in the difference in projected
emissions between current policies and conditional NDCs –to limit warming to 2°C and multiply their current efforts by atleast five times to align global climate action and emissions
with limiting warming close to 1.5°C7.

3.4 Implications of the emissions gap
3.4.1 Implications of postponing action
There are several implications of the projected 2030 GHG
emissions under the current policies scenario and theThis statement is based on the quantitative evidence that conditional NDCs would reduce global GHG emissions relative to projections of current policies by
6 GtCO2e, while the gap between current policies and the 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios amounts to 18 and more than 30 GtCO2e, respectively (see table 3.1). Thistranslates in the efforts that are currently being made to move from current policies to the conditional NDCs having to be multiplied by a factor of three andgreater than five for global GHG emissions to be in line with a pathway towards limiting warming to around 2°C and 1.5°C, respectively.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

26
Figure 3.1. Global greenhouse gas emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030 (median estimate
and 10 th to 90 th percentile range).

NDC scenarios. The high GHG emissions until 2030 resultin a higher reliance on CDR, stronger potential trade-offs
with sustainable development goals and lock-in of carbonintensive infrastructure, which will make subsequentemissions reductions harder and more costly. Section 3.5 of
the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2018 provides an overview
of these issues.
The long-term implications and the inadequacy of thecurrent policies and NDCs are also apparent if viewed froma slightly broader perspective and when considering therequired global emissions reductions until mid-century. The
lower (“zoom-out”) part of figure 3.1 indicates how a failure
to reduce GHG emissions adequately in the next decade will
frustrate and undermine the possibility of achieving the deep

Emissions Gap Report 2019

emissions reductions that are required by 2050 in order tokeep emissions in line with the temperature goal of the Paris
Agreement.
The implications of postponing adequate climate action
are clear from the past decade of UNEP Emissions Gap
Reports. The data underlying the gap assessment indicatethat had serious climate action begun in 2010, the emissions
reductions required per year to meet the emissions levels in
2030 consistent with the 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios would only
have been 0.7 per cent and 3.3 per cent per year on average.
However, since this did not happen, the required cuts inemissions are now 2.7 per cent per year from 2020 to year2030 for the 2°C goal and 7.6 per cent per year on average forthe 1.5°C goal.

27

Box 3.2. Comparing emission estimatesacross chapters - Part II
Under the current policies scenario used for theassessment of the emissions gap, global GHG
emissions in 2018 are estimated to be about 53.2
GtCO 2 e. This is lower than the 2018 estimate of global
GHG emissions of 55.3 GtCO 2 e provided in chapter 2(see also box 2.1). Although this difference is relatively
small and well within the uncertainty range surrounding
the emissions estimates, it is worth exploring. Bothestimates show a similar increase of about 10–15 percent compared with 2010 levels.

3.4.2 Temperature implications
Emissions until 2030 do not fully determine the warming
until the end of the century, but the trend until 2030 canbe used to project the warming, assuming this trend would
continue until 2100. As in previous UNEP Emissions Gap
Reports, this report uses internally consistent long-termemissions projections and relates the GHG emissions in
the year 2030 to outcomes over the entire century (Rogelj
et al. 2016). This approach provides temperature estimates
for a wide range of 2030 GHG emissions levels (Jeffery
et al. 2018) that are consistent with the wider integrated
scenario literature.
Assuming that climate action continues consistently
throughout the twenty-first century, a continuation ofcurrent policies would lead to a global mean temperaturerise of 3.5°C by 2100 (range of 3.4–3.9°C, 66 per centprobability). This corresponds roughly to a tripling of
the current level of warming as assessed by the IPCC
(2018). The current unconditional NDCs as assessed inthis report are consistent with limiting warming likely to
3.2°C (range 3.0–3.5°C) by the end of the century (66per cent probability). These values are reduced by about
0.2°C if both conditional and unconditional NDCs are
implemented. It is clear that neither current policies nor
NDCs are adequate to limit warming to the temperature
limits included in the Paris Agreement.

There could be multiple reasons why the medianemissions projections of the models are lower thanthe estimates of the historical emissions database.
Some models may be calibrated to an earlier baseyear. For example, for 2010, the calibration may bebased on other emissions databases (such as IEA or
PRIMAP), or the models may not include all emissions
sources, or use the latest emissions factors. The six
global models used for the current policies scenarioof the UNEP Emissions Gap Report show a wide range
in global GHG emissions in 2010 of [46;50] GtCO 2 e,
whereas the historical emissions database has an
estimate of 50 GtCO 2 e.

IPCC SR1.5 reported that for limiting warming to 1.5°C with
50 per cent probability, the remaining carbon budget from2018 onward amounts to 580 GtCO 2 . This would be further
reduced to 420 GtCO 2 for having a 66 per cent probabilityof success of limiting warming to 1.5°C. Further taking
into account reinforcing Earth-system components, suchas permafrost thawing, could reduce these estimates by afurther 100 GtCO 28 . Starting from a current level of global
CO 2 emissions of 41.6 GtCO 2 in 2018 (Le Quéré et al. 2018)
and assuming a straight trajectory to 2030, the current
unconditional NDC scenario implies cumulative emissionsof about 510 GtCO 2 (range of 495–528 GtCO 2) until 2030.
Therefore, current unconditional NDCs until 2030 alreadygo beyond the carbon budget limits set for 1.5°C. Together
with the knowledge that the current status of policies andmeasures that are being implemented by countries would
lead to even more emissions, this leaves no doubt thatthe current NDCs are blatantly inadequate to achieve theclimate goals of the Paris Agreement.

Temperature implications of the current NDCs can also be
looked at from the perspective of the carbon budget thatwould be emitted until 2030 under the current NDCs. The

8

Note that the “below 1.5°C in 2100“ scenario category applies a peak carbon budget limit of 600 GtCO 2 , which in itself is not sufficient to limit
warming to 1.5°C with a high likelihood, but it limits peak warming with greater than 66 per cent probability to no more than 1.7°C (see table 3.1).
In addition, the “below 1.5°C in 2100” scenario category applies an end-of-century carbon budget limit of 380 GtCO 2 to limit warming to 1.5°C witha high likelihood. This reflects the 420 GtCO 2 remaining carbon budget for limiting warming to 1.5°C with 66 per cent probability, which is further
reduced by specific Earth system feedbacks. A value of about 40 GtCO 2 is applied for this correction because the stringency of these scenarios
suggest a lower impact of these processes than the 100 GtCO 2 that was assessed for warming up to 2°C.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

28

4

Bridging the gap: Enhancing mitigation ambition andaction at G20 level and globally

Lead authors:
Niklas Höhne (NewClimate Institute, Germany), Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute, USA), Frederic Hans (NewClimate
Institute, Germany)

Contributing authors:
Ankit Bhardwaj (Centre for Policy Research, India), Gabriel Blanco (National University of the Center of the Buenos Aires
Province, Argentina), Jesse Burton (University of Cape Town, South Africa), Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency, the Netherlands), Markus Hagemann (NewClimate Institute, Germany), Christopher Henderson (World
Resources Institute, USA), Maria Daniela Keesler (National University of the Center of the Buenos Aires Province, Argentina),
Jiang Kejun (Energy Research Institute (ERI), National Development and Reform Commission, China), Akihisa Kuriyama(Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), Japan), Fu Sha (National Centre for ClimateChange Strategy, China),
Ranping Song (World Resources Institute, China), Kentaro Tamura (IGES, Japan), Jorge Villarreal (Iniciativa Climática deMéxico, Mexico), William Wills (EOS Estratégia e Sustentabilidade, Brazil).

4.1

Introduction

In the lead-up to the 2019 Climate Action Summit, United
Nations Secretary-General António Guterres called onleaders to “announce the plans that they will set next year to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for 2030 and to achieve
net zero emissions by 2050” (Farand 2019). The SecretaryGeneral’s message echoed the growing popular movement
for transformative, ambitious climate action.
The focus on ambition and action is well founded, as illustrated
by the gap assessment in Chapter 3. This chapter provides acomprehensive overview of recent ambitious climate actions
by national and subnational governments as well as nonstate actors, and a detailed overview of policy progress andopportunities for enhanced mitigation ambition for selected
G20 members. The objective is to inform the preparation of
new and updated nationally determined contributions (NDCs)
that countries are requested to submit by 2020. The chapter
addresses the following questions:▶

How has the global situation changed since the Paris
Agreement was adopted and how does this affectopportunities to increase ambition?

▶

How many and what type of ambitious climate
commitments have been adopted by national
governments, as well as by cities, states, regions,companies and investors to date?

1▶

Among selected G20 members, what progress has
been made recently towards ambitious climate action
and what are the key opportunities for additional
action?

The primary focus of this chapter is on ambitious climate
targets and actions, which are defined as those thatunambiguously contribute towards the transformations
required to align global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
pathways with the Paris Agreement goals. Section 4.2
summarizes the global opportunity to enhance ambition andaction and provides an overview of the status of ambitious
climate mitigation commitments made by G20 members aswell as countries and non-state actors globally.
As G20 members account for 78 per cent of global GHG
emissions, they largely determine global emission trends
and the extent to which the 2030 emissions gap will beclosed. This chapter therefore also pays particular attention
to G20 members, with section 4.3 focusing on progressand opportunities for enhancing mitigation ambition of nineselected G20 members: Argentina, Brazil, China, the European
Union, India, Japan, Mexico, South Africa and the UnitedStates of America, which represented around 56 per centof global GHG emissions in 2017.1 The selection of the G20
members was based entirely on the availability of expertisein the author team. Supplementing this chapter, annex B
provides a detailed overview of the status of ambitious
climate mitigation commitments made by G20 members as

Using the latest inventory data for all G20 members in the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) (Olivier and Peters 2018) andlatest reported national inventory data for each country for LULUCF emissions.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

29
well as countries and non-state actors globally, while annex
C provides a detailed update of recent policy developmentsof the nine selected G20 members, considering ambitious
climate actions, as well as actions that are incremental.
Both annexes are available online.

4.2 The global opportunity to enhance
ambition and action
4.2.1 The scale and type of transformation needed toenhance climate ambition and action are clear
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] 2018)concluded that limiting the temperature increase to 1.5°C
with no or limited overshoot would mean reducing global
CO 2 emissions by about 45 per cent from 2010 levels by
2030 and reaching net zero around 2050. To align with the
2°C limit, global CO 2 emissions would need to decline byabout 25 per cent from 2010 levels by 2030 and reach net
zero around 2070.
Under the Paris Agreement, countries are invited to submit
long-term low GHG emission development strategies by2020 and are requested to submit updated or new NDCs
also by 2020. Considering the update of NDCs in the context
of the development of long-term mitigation strategies is an
important means to ensure consistency between short-term
mitigation policies and targets and long-term goals. The IPCC
Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C provides clear
guidance on the economy-wide and sector transformations
that are needed to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C by
the end of the century (see also chapter 5).
Although the time frame for global emission reductions
consistent with the 2°C limit is slightly longer, the major
long-term sectoral transformations needed to reach net
zero GHG emissions globally are essentially the same andcan be summarized under the following headings:▶

Full decarbonization of the energy sector, basedon renewable energy and electrification acrosssectors – this includes phasing out coal-fired
power plants.

▶

Decarbonization of the transport sector in parallelwith modal shifts to public transportation, cycling
and walking.

▶

Shifts in industry processes towards electricity andzero carbon and substitution of carbon-intensive
products.

▶

Decarbonization of the building sector, including
electrification and greater efficiency.

▶

Enhanced agricultural management as well as
demand-side measures such as dietary shifts tomore sustainable, plant-based diets and measures
to reduce food waste.
▶

Zero net deforestation and the adoption of policies toconserve and restore land carbon stocks and protect
natural ecosystems, aiming for significant net CO 2
uptake in this sector (IPCC 2018; UNEP 2017).

Transformations in these areas will require major shifts ininvestment patterns and financial flows, as well as several
sectoral and economy-wide policy targets. The ambitious
climate targets considered in section 4.2.3 are based onthese overall areas of transformation and important subtargets. A full overview is provided in annex B.

4.2.2 Drivers of ambition have evolved since theParis Agreement
Compared with the run-up to the Paris Agreement in 2015,
when countries prepared their intended NDCs, many drivers ofclimate action have changed, with several options for ambitious
climate action becoming less costly, more numerous andbetter understood. Changes within three main categories inparticular could facilitate greater NDC ambition today (UNEP2018) including climate change. Countries will meet again at
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC). First, technological and economic developments
present opportunities to decarbonize the economy, especiallythe energy sector, at a cost that is lower than ever. Second,
the synergies between climate action and economic growthand development objectives, including options for addressing
distributional impacts, are better understood. Finally, policy
momentum across various levels of government, as well as asurge in climate action commitments by non-state actors, iscreating opportunities for countries to enhance the ambitionof their NDCs.
The cost of renewable energy is declining more rapidly
than was predicted just a few years ago. Renewables are
currently the cheapest source of new power generationin most of the world, with the global weighted averagepurchase or auction price for new utility-scale solar power
photovoltaic (PV) systems and utility-scale onshore windturbines projected to compete with the marginal operating
cost of existing coal plants by next year (International
Renewable Energy Agency [IRENA] 2019. See also Chapter
6). These trends are increasingly manifesting in a decline
in coal plant construction, including the cancellation ofplanned plants, as well as the early retirement of existing
plants (Jewell et al. 2019; Smouse et al. 2018). Moreover,real-life cost declines are outpacing projections. The 2019
costs of onshore wind and solar PV power are 8 and 13 percent lower respectively than IRENA predictions from just
one year ago in 2018 (IRENA 2019). These cost declines,
along with those of battery storage, are opening possibilities
for utility-scale solar power.
Although technological progress has been uneven acrosssectors, with the industry and buildings sectors in particularlagging behind (International Energy Agency [IEA] 2019), theEmissions Gap Report 201930
benefits extend beyond power generation. For example, as aresult of falling battery costs, predictions forecast that electricvehicles will achieve price parity with internal combustion
engine vehicles by the mid-2020s and lead global sales
between 2035 and 2040 (Bloomberg NEF 2018).
Aside from advancements in technology, a growing bodyof research has documented that ambitious climate action,
economic growth and sustainable development can go
hand-in-hand when well managed. Analysis by the Global
Commission on the Economy and Climate estimates thatambitious climate action could generate US$26 trillion ineconomic benefits between now and 2030 and create 65
million jobs by 2030, while avoiding 700,000 premature
deaths from air pollution (The New Climate Economy 2018).
Similarly, the IPCC (2018) found that, if managed responsibly,
most mitigation options consistent with limiting warming
to 1.5°C could have strong synergies with the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), especially those related tohealth, clean energy, cities and communities, responsible
consumption and production, and oceans (IPCC 2018. See
also chapter 5).
Momentum at all levels of government and parts of thebusiness sector increases the potential to reflect greater
ambition in the NDCs. At the subnational level, for example,
over 70 large cities housing 425 million people havecommitted to go carbon-neutral by 2050 or sooner (see tableB-1). At the national level, 13 countries have communicatedlong-term, low GHG emissions development strategies
to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2019), with many more underdevelopment or developed at the national level but notcommunicated internationally (WRI 2019). At the international
level, the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol outlines
phase-down schedules for production and consumption ofhydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). Businesses are increasingly
moving towards zero emissions, 100 per cent renewables and
100 per cent emission-free transport (see annex B).
Taken together, cost-competitive technologies, potential
synergies with development and economic growth, andstrong action from the subnational to international levels
provide a strong basis for more ambitious NDCs by 2020.

4.2.3 An increasing number of countries andregions are adopting ambitious goals in linewith the transformation needed, but the scale
and pace are far from sufficient
Several national and subnational governments andnon-state actors have embarked on ambitious climate
action in different policy areas that can help initiate thetransformational change required to meet the longterm goals of the Paris Agreement. Although recent
developments send promising signals, the adoption of
ambitious climate targets is far from the scale and rateurgently required.

2

This section presents an overview of the extent to which
G20 members, as well as and countries and regions
worldwide, have committed or are in the process ofcommitting to ambitious climate targets and actions.
These targets and actions are defined as unambiguously
supporting a move towards the major long-term sectoraltransformations required to meet the well-below 2°C
and 1.5°C temperature limits of the Paris Agreement, as
outlined in section 4.2.1. Expanding on the key types ofpolicy targets and actions that would support such majortransformations, this section provides an overview of thestatus of commitments to the following ambitious climate
targets organized in six main categories (table 4.1). A
detailed overview of commitments made as of October
2019 for the above targets by individual countries, regions,businesses and investors is provided in annex B.
It should be noted that the overview of targets andcommitments provided in this section and in the annex
is not exhaustive. Rather, it builds on a broad range ofliterature to identify ambitious climate action in the
different categories (Kuramochi et al. 2018), but given
the scope of existing policies and rapid changes inpolicymaking, the overview may not be completely up-todate. The list of targets is also incomplete. Notably, it isbeyond the scope of this chapter to provide an overview
of ambitious climate targets and commitments for
agriculture. Finally, no attempt has been made to assess
whether individual commitments are aligned with global
least cost-effective emissions pathways to the 1.5°C or
2°C targets. Commitments differ in various respects,
including the extent to which they are legally binding,the percentages and target years adopted, whether theyrefer to GHG or CO 2 emissions and whether they are net
targets. 2 These specifications are important for a detailed
picture of the individual commitments and are provided
in annex B.
Ambitious climate targets and actions adopted by countries
and regions to date are prime examples of climate actionthat others can follow. Dynamics to adopt legally binding
targets differ between target categories and sectors.
Most of the recent increase in national and subnational
commitments is related to the adoption of economy-widezero emission targets by 2050 or sooner (see figure 4.1),
100 per cent renewable energy or electricity targets (seefigure 4.2) and a 100 per cent share of new zero-emission
motorbikes, cars and/or buses (see figure 4.3). To date,countries, regions and subnational actors have mostly
refrained from adopting legally binding ambitious targets
in other sectors, such as industry, buildings or heavytransport, except for a few first movers.
Overall, the number of countries and states that arecommitting to zero emission targets is increasing fast,though it is still far from the scale and pace required, as

For this reason, reference is made to ‘zero emissions targets’ and the reader is referred to annex B, table B-1 for further detail.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

31
Table 4.1. Overview of the number of ambitious climate actions and targets by countries, regions, cities and businesses
Overarching economy-wide climate actions

Countries

Regions

CitiesBusinesses

Achieve zero emissions by year x

71

11

>100

>500

Implement ambitious comprehensive CO 2
pricing in all sectors by year x(32 but notcomprehensive)(25 but notcomprehensive)

Phase out all fossil-fuel subsidies by year x(Decision by G20
in 2009 yet to be
implemented)

Make all finance flows consistent with the Paris
Agreement goals by year x(>1 initial steps)>10

Electricity production
Reach 100 per cent renewable electricity or 100
per cent carbon-free electricity by year x

53

33

>120

>180

Phase out coal-fired power plants by year x withjust a transition plan

13

16

6

28

Stop financing and insuring coal-fired power
plants elsewhere as of year x->20

Stop new fossil-fuel explorations andproduction as of year x

6>5Commit to zero fugitive emissions target foryear x(32 support zeroroutine flaring)>14

Ensure all new installations are low- carbon/
zero-emission and maximize material efficiency
as of year x->3

Implement ambitious carbon pricing forindustry by year x

1-

Shift to x per cent public transport by year x

4

-

>5

Shift to 100 per cent share of new zeroemission motorbikes, cars and/or buses as ofyear x21

5>52

Shift to 100 per cent carbon-free heavy goods
transport and ships as of year x

-

-

>10

Shift to 100 per cent carbon-free aviation as ofyear x(1 short haul)(1 domestic)-

Shift to 100 per cent (near-) zero energy
buildings for new buildings as of year x

3

7

>23

>23

Fully decarbonize the building sector by year x

1

6

>23

>23

Phase out fossil fuels (for example, gas) for
residential heating by year x

1

-

>3

Increase the rate of zero-energy renovations tox per cent per year

(1 publicbuilding)

-

>67

21

Other energy industry

Industry

Transport>50

Buildings

Agriculture and forestry
Zero net deforestation by year x>12Note: Greyed cells indicate that no (relevant) data is available. For full details, see annex B. Given the scope of existing policies and rapidchange in policymaking, the table makes no claim to be exhaustive.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

32
Figure 4.1. Overview of ambitious overarching economy-wide climate actions and targets by G20 members, countries andregions (for full details, see annex B)

OVERARCHING
An increasing number of countries and regions are commiting to zero carbon dioxide or
greenhouse gas emission targets, but not at the scale and pace required. Other economywide climate action such as completely phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, introducing
comprehensive and ambitious carbon pricing and making all finance flows consistent
with the Paris Agreement remains inadequate.
Target categories

G20 countries

Country level

Regional level

Zero emissions
by year x

2 G20 members (France, UK) have passed
legislation

71 countries

33 regions

3 G20 members (EU and Germany and
Italy as part of EU1) currently in process of
passing legislation
15 G20 members have no binding (net-)
zero-emission targets

Ambitious
comprehensive
CO2 pricing inall sectors by
year x 2

No G20 member has implemented
ambitious comprehensive CO 2 pricing
in all sectors, but 9 G20 members have
implemented carbon pricing as ETS or
carbon tax with partial coverage and/or
lower CO 2 prices (as at August 2019)

No country

No regions

Phase out all
fossil fuel subsidies by year x

No G20 member has existing reform plansto fully phase out all fossil fuel subsidies,but the G20 took a decision in 2009 togradually phase out fossil fuel subsides
with an annual peer-review among G20
members

No country

No regions

Make all financeflows consistent
with the Paris
Agreement goals
by year x

No G20 member has made all financeflows fully aligned with the Paris
Agreement goals, but the UK has
published a Green Finance Strategy
in 2019 as an example of intermediate
actionNo country

No regions

*

6

6

6

6

6

6

* Non-state actor example

10 Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) arecurrently working towards aligning theirfinancing activities with the Paris
Agreement goals. The MDBs willdevelop relevant methods and tools
with the objective of presenting a joint
Paris alignment approach and individual MDB
progress towards alignment at COP 25 in 2019.

More information: 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/784141543806348331/JointDeclaration-MDBs-Alignment-Approach-to-Paris-AgreementCOP24-Final.pdf

Zero emissions targets
The zero emissions targets include legally binding targets,legally binding targets that are currently under consideration,and non-legally binding targets.

Note: 1 Italy is not currently pursuing a process to pass national legislation on a zero-emissions target, but will be covered under the European
Union target, if adopted.
2
The Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices of 2018 recommends an average economy-wide price of at least US$40–80/tCO 2
by 2020 and US$50–100/tCO 2 by 2030 to close the emissions gap in order to meet the 2°C target (High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices
2017; UNEP 2018). For this reason, economy-wide carbon prices would need to be higher in the respective years to close the emissions gap
in order to meet the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal of “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above
pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”.

33
illustrated in figure 4.1. To date, 71 countries and 11 regions,accounting for about 15 per cent of global GHG emissions
in total 3, have long-term objectives to achieve net-zeroemissions, differing in scope, timing and the degree to which
they are legally binding. Before the 2019 Climate Action
Summit, the number of countries and states committing tozero emission targets was 21 and 8 respectively. Five G20
members have committed to long-term net-zero emissions
targets, of which three (the European Union, and Germany
and Italy, as part of the European Union) are currently inthe process of passing legislation, with two G20 members(France and the United Kingdom) having recently passed
legislation. The remaining 15 G20 members have not yet
committed to net-zero emission targets.
Economy-wide climate action remains extremely limited inother areas, such as a complete phase-out of fossil-fuelsubsidies, comprehensive and ambitious carbon pricing andmaking finance flows consistent with the Paris Agreement.
In 2009, the G20 members adopted a decision to graduallyphase out fossil-fuel subsidies, though no country has yet
committed to fully phasing these out by a specific year.
Similarly, while carbon pricing is expanding, no country has
established a comprehensive and ambitious system forthis. At present, carbon tax and emissions trading system
initiatives at the national and regional levels represent about
20 per cent of global GHG emissions (World Bank 2019).
However, only 10 per cent of global emissions from fossil
fuels are estimated to be priced at a level consistent withlimiting global warming to 2°C (UNEP 2018). Furthermore,no country has explicitly committed to making their financeflows consistent with the Paris Agreement, though several
multilateral development banks are currently working
towards aligning their financing activities with the Paris
Agreement goals (World Bank 2018).
In terms of electricity production (figure 4.2), 53 countries
have committed or are in the process of committing to a
100 per cent renewables target. The number of countries
increased from 10 countries before the 2019 Climate
Action Summit. However, these countries accounted
for less than 1 per cent of global CO 2 emissions fromelectricity generation in 2016. 4 Five G20 members havealso committed to long-term net-zero emissions targets
and, in turn, to fully decarbonizing their electricity sectors.
In addition, 33 states and regions, including California (by2045), and accounting for around 1 per cent of global fromelectricity generation 5 , as well as an increasing numberof cities and companies, have committed to 100 per centrenewable electricity targets.

The 13 countries that have currently committed or are in theprocess of committing to a full phase-out of coal accounted
for around 5 per cent of global CO2 emissions from coalbased electricity generation in 2016.6 Five G20 members areamong these 13 countries: Canada, France and Italy havealready passed legislation, while Germany and the United
Kingdom are in the process of passing legislation. A few
non-state actors show high ambition, including 22 banks thathave stopped direct financing to new coal mine projects and23 banks that have stopped direct financing to new coal plant
projects worldwide.
An increasing number of countries, states and cities arepledging to phase out combustion engines for vehicles andinitiate substantial modal shifts towards public transport,though to date, no such commitments have been made foraviation, shipping and freight transport (figure 4.3). However,there are several interesting examples of non-state actors
committing to ambitious climate action for these transportmodes, as the figure shows. For example, Norway is aiming
to make domestic flights carbon-free by 2040 and several
companies are working on zero-emission tanker and port
infrastructure.
At present, countries and states are largely refraining fromambitious target-setting in the heavy and extractive industry
sector (see annex B). Six countries, including one G20 member(France), are currently committed to stopping new fossil-fuelexplorations and production. In addition, a few European (re-)
insurance companies have recently implemented policies tostop investments, insurance cover and underwriting for new
and ongoing fossil-fuel projects. No countries have committed
to zero fugitive emissions targets or to ensuring that all new
installations are low-carbon or zero emissions and maximize
material efficiency. Only Sweden has set a target for ambitious
carbon pricing in the industry sector. Some major steel andcement producers have recently pledged to zero emissions by
2050 for their operations. Such commitments and technology
road maps could serve as a starting point to define targets inthe entire industry sector, following the frontrunners.
The buildings sector shows only scattered policy action at highlevels of mitigation ambition, mainly centred on policymaking
in the European Union (see annex B). In addition, six states andmore than 23 cities have recently committed to zero targets
for the buildings sector as part of the World Green Building
Council’s Net Zero Carbon Buildings Commitment by 2050. In
general, there is a lack of targets for phasing out fossil fuelsin heating, zero emissions in the sector and deep retrofits ofexisting buildings.

3

The zero emission targets considered cover legally binding, legally binding but under consideration, and non-legally binding pledges and participation in respective alliances. The share of these countries has been calculated on latest available EDGAR data and FAO data for LULUCF emissions(FAOSTAT 2018; Olivier and Peters 2018). For regions, their self-reported were used.

4

The share of these countries has been calculated on emissions data for CO 2 emission from electricity generation provided by IEA’s CO 2 emission
form fuel combustion dataset (IEA 2018).

5

The share of these regions has been calculated based on self-reported values.

6

The share of these countries has been calculated on emissions data for CO 2 emission from coal-based electricity generation provided by IEA’s CO 2
emission from fuel combustion dataset (IEA 2018).

Emissions Gap Report 2019

34
Figure 4.2. Overview of climate actions and targets in the electricity generation sector by G20 members, countries andregions (for full details, see annex B)

ELECTRICIT Y PRODUCTION
Several countries and regions have communicated 100% renewable electricity targets tofully decarbonize their electricity supply sector. Several are phasing out coal-fired power
plants, but these are predominantly countries with already low shares of coal.

Target categories

G20 countries

Country level

Regional level

100% renewableelectricity or
100% carbon
free electricity
by year x

No G20 member has committed to a
100% renewable electricity or 100%carbon-free electricity target, but someregions within G20 members such as
California (by 2045) or Fukushima (by2040) have done so.

53 countries

22 regions

Phase out
coal-fired power
plants by year x
with justtransition plan

3 G20 members (Canada, France, Italy)
have passed legislation

13 countries

16 regions

Stop financing
and insuring of
coal-fired power
plants elsewhere
as of year x

No G20 member with legally binding
legislation to fully stop financing andinsuring of coal-fired power plants
elsewhere

No country

No regions

2 G20 members (Germany, UK) currently
in process of passing legislation
15 G20 members have no binding phaseout plan, but some have initiated action
to limit coal use (e.g. China and India)

6

6

*

* Non-state actor example

22 banks have stopped providing direct financing to new coal mine projects worldwide and23 banks have stopped directly financing new coal plant projects worldwide as at August
2019. Some more banks and (national) development banks are currently in the process ofmaking such commitments.

More information: https://www.banktrack.org/page/list_of_banks_which_have_ended_direct_
finance_for_new_coal_minesplants#_

Emissions Gap Report 2019

35
Figure 4.3. Overview of ambitious overarching economy-wide climate actions and targets by G20 members, countries andregions (for full details, see annex B)

TR ANSPORT
While an increasing number of countries, regions, and cities pledge to phase out
combustion engines and initiate substantial modal shifts towards public transport, nosuch commitments have been made for aviation, shipping, and freight transport to date.

Target categories

G20 countries

Country level

Regional level

100% shareof new zeroemission motorbikes, cars and/or buses asof year x

5 G20 members (Canada, France, Japan,
Mexico, UK) have announced target

21 countries

5 regions

Shift to x%
public transport
by year x

3 G20 members (China, India, Indonesia)
with distinct modal shift targets

4 countries

No regions*

2 G20 members (India, Indonesia) haveannounced target but confirmation ispending
13 G20 members have not announced
target for 100% new zero-emission
motorbikes, cars and/or buses

6

No conclusion possible for all other G20
members

100% carbonfree heavy transport and ships asof year x**

No G20 member with legally binding
target for 100% carbon-free heavytransport and ships

No country

No regions

100% carbonfree aviation asof year x***

No G20 member with legally binding
target for 100% carbon free aviation

No country

No regions

6

6

6

6

* Non-state actor example

52 cities have targets for 100% electric cars and/or busses, e.g. Shenzen has already electrified all busses and taxis,

Paris aims for 100% fossil free cars and busses in the city by 2025. 49 companies have pledged to accelerate theirtransition to electric vehicles under the EV100 initiative.

More information: https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/dec/12/silence-shenzhen-world-first-electric-bus-fleet
https://www.theclimategroup.org/ev100-members** Non-state actor example

Several companies have recently announced their plans to develop zero emission container ships, for example byentirely powering tankers by hydrogen produced from renewable energy sources. For example, Maersk, the world’s
largest container shipping company, has committed to making carbon-neutral vessels commercially viable by2030 by using energy sources such as biofuels and will cut its net carbon emissions to zero by 2050.

More information: https://www.maersk.com/news/articles/2019/06/26/towards-a-zero-carbon-future*** Non-state actor example

Norway and Scotland both aim to decarbonize their domestic aviation sector by 2040. Avinor, Norway’s airport
operator, has announced a switch to electric air transport for all domestic flights as well as those toneighbouring Scandinavian capitals. Scotland plans to becoming the world's first net-zero aviation region by
2040, with trials of low or zero emission flights to begin in 2021.
More information: http://www.airport-business.com/2019/06/avinor-domestic-air-transport-norwayelectrified-2040/
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-49556793?utm_
source=CP+Daily&utm_campaign=66d62ab006-CPdaily03092019&utm_
medium=email&utm_term=0_a9d8834f72-66d62ab006-110247033

36
Many countries, including most G20 members, havecommitted to zero net deforestation targets in the last
decades (see annex B), though these commitments areoften not supported by action on the ground. Countries,
states, business and investors urgently need to ensure thatthey implement their various commitments, including thoseunder the New York Declaration on Forests, the World Wide
Fund for Nature’s (WWF) call for zero net deforestation by2020 and the Soft Commodities Compact.
To summarize, G20 members urgently need to step up theircommitments on ambitious climate action. As this section
shows, there are many opportunities to adopt economywide and sector-specific climate action targets as called forby the United Nations Climate Summit in September 2019,
and to reflect such targets in the upcoming ambition-raisingcycle and submission of long-term strategies under theParis Agreement by 2020.
The G20 members could follow other national andsubnational frontrunners driving ambitious climate action
in several areas. Only a few G20 members, includingFrance and the United Kingdom, have recently adopted
legally binding legislation in multiple sectors, such asenergy, transport and buildings, in addition to an economywide net-zero emissions target by 2050. The national andsubnational actors already committed to ambitious climate
action should inform policymakers in G20 member nations
to accelerate their target-setting in different sectors of

the economy. This is particularly true for sectors that are
difficult to decarbonize, where subnational actors areshowing promising frontrunner action aimed at long-term
decarbonization in line with the Paris Agreement.

4.3 Opportunities to enhance ambition in
selected G20 members
This section provides a summary of country-specificopportunities for enhanced climate ambition and action ofnine selected G20 members: Argentina, Brazil, China, theEuropean Union, India, Japan, Mexico, South Africa and theUnited States of America. The selection of G20 members
is based entirely on the availability of data and expertiseof the author team. The country-specific opportunities
represent possible next steps in the policymaking process
based on the current situation. The list of actions is not
exhaustive and other actions, including those identified in
the previous section and in annex B, would also need to be
implemented to achieve global emission reductions at thescale required to maintain progress towards achieving thetargets set out in the Paris Agreement.
Several steps were followed to identify the opportunities.
First, an overview of the main policies affecting GHG
emissions was generated for each country. Annex C,available online, provides a detailed update for each G20
member covered in this chapter. To the extent possible,

Table 4.2. Selected current opportunities to enhance ambition in seven G20 members in line with ambitious climate actions
and targets as identified in annex B. For details, see annex C.

Argentina● Refrain from extracting new, alternative fossil-fuel resources● Reallocate fossil-fuel subsidies to support distributed renewable electricity-generation● Shift towards widespread use of public transport in large metropolitan areas● Redirect subsidies granted to companies for the extraction of alternative fossil fuels to building-sector measures
Brazil● Commit to the full decarbonization of the energy supply by 2050
● Develop a national strategy for ambitious electric vehicle (EV) uptake aimed at complementing biofuels and at
100 per cent CO 2 -free new vehicles● Promote the ‘urban agenda’ by increasing the use of public transport and other low-carbon alternatives
China● Ban all new coal-fired power plants● Continue governmental support for renewables, taking into account cost reductions and accelerate development
towards a 100 per cent carbon-free electricity system● Further support the shift towards public modes of transport● Support the uptake of electric mobility, aiming at 100 per cent CO 2 -free new vehicles● Promote near-zero emission building development and integrate it into Government planning

Emissions Gap Report 2019

37
European Union8● Adopt an EU regulation to refrain from investment in fossil-fuel infrastructure, including new natural gas pipelines● Define a clear endpoint for the EU emissions trading system (ETS) in the form of a cap that must lead to zero emissions● Adjust the framework and policies to enable 100-per cent carbon-free electricity supply by between 2040 and 2050
● Step up efforts to phase out coal-fired plants● Define a strategy for zero-emission industrial processes● Reform the EU ETS to more effectively reduce emissions in industrial applications● Ban the sale of Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) cars and buses and/or set targets to move towards 100-per cent of
new car and bus sales being zero-carbon vehicles in the coming decades● Shift towards increased use of public transport in line with the most ambitious Member States● Increase the renovation rate for intensive retrofits of existing buildings
India● Plan the transition from coal-fired power plants● Develop an economy-wide green industrialization strategy towards zero-emission technologies● Expand mass public transit systems● Develop domestic electric vehicle targets working towards 100 per cent new sales of zero-emission carsJapan
● Develop a strategic energy plan that includes halting the construction of new freely emitting coal-fired power plants,
as well as a phase-out schedule of existing plants and a 100 per cent carbon-free electricity supply● Increase the current level of carbon pricing with high priority given to the energy and building sector● Develop a plan to phase out the use of fossil fuels through promoting passenger cars that use electricity fromrenewable energy● Implement a road map as part of efforts towards net-zero energy buildings and net-zero energy houses
Mexico● Increase the share of clean energy power generation in the electricity mix up to 48 per cent by 2027, 53 per cent by
2030 and 60 per cent by 2050, which will require the reactivation of the electricity market and the expansion of theinterconnection grid infrastructure● Phase out coal-based power generation by 2030
● Expand sustainable mass public transport and non-motorized options, as well as a transportation demand
management policy to reduce the motorization rate
● Reach the 0 per cent deforestation target by 2030
South Africa● Halt new proposed coal-fired power plants contained in the draft Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) for electricity● Commit to a 2040 target for the phase-out of coal in the power sector● Develop a climate-compatible industrial development plan for the long-term decarbonization of industry● Accelerate the shift of freight transport from road to rail and to low-carbon road transportation such as hydrogen andelectricity-powered options● Continue to tighten standards to reach zero-emission buildings by 2030 and enforce existing and future standards
USA● Introduce regulations on power plants, clean energy standards and carbon pricing to achieve an electricity supply
that is 100 per cent carbon-free● Implement carbon pricing on industrial emissions● Strengthen vehicle and fuel economy standards to be in line with zero emissions for new cars in 2030
● Implement clean building standards so that all new buildings are 100 per cent electrified by 2030

8

As policies in the European Union are already quite advanced, many of the opportunities to enhance ambition are evidently ambitious.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

38
changes in policies since the adoption of the Paris
Agreement that are expected to be associated with thehighest emissions impacts are highlighted in annex C,
supported by quantitative estimates from the literature
reviewed to give a sense of the magnitude of the actions.
No attempt has been made to provide mitigation potential
per G20 member, as it is difficult to provide values that arecomparable across members.
Using the current policy situation in each country as astarting point, political areas that would be obvious topursue for development of the next steps were identified.
For example, consideration was given to whether policy
proposals had already been put forward by relevant actors.
Subsequently, the opportunities were checked against the
major actions that must be taken to put the world on apath that is compatible with the Paris Agreement longterm temperature goal as summarized in section 4.2.3 andlisted in annex B. Finally, the opportunities were crosschecked with several country experts.
Table 4.2 provides an overview of selected opportunities forenhancing mitigation ambition identified for the seven G20
members considered in this publication. The selection isbased on expert judgements regarding the extent to whichthese opportunities are in line with ambitious climate
actions and targets as defined and outlined in section
2.3. The country sections provide additional examples ofcountry-specific opportunities.
We find that the G20 members have ample opportunity toincrease the ambition of their climate and energy policies,
considering where they are today. There are some common
features. For almost all analysed countries, a logical next
step would be to plan for a 100 per cent emission-freeelectricity sector and an associated phase-out of coalfired power plants. All the analysed countries could also
work on incentivizing modal shift in transport, supporting
electric vehicles or working towards zero - emissionbuildings. In other areas, the logical next steps are very
country-specific, for example, prohibiting new fossil fuelextractions, eliminating fossil fuel subsidies, enhancing
action in industry or taking action to reduce deforestation.

Emissions Gap Report 201939

5

Bridging the gap: Transformations towards zero-carbon
development pathways

Lead authors:
Nebojsa Nakićenović (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and Vienna University of Technology, Austria),
Charlie Wilson (Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, UK)

Contributing authors:
Bill Colglazier (American Association for Advancement of Science), Owen Gaffney (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact
Research, Germany), Dirk Messner (United Nations University), Narasimha Rao (Yale School of Forestry & Environmental
Studies, USA), Caroline Zimm (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria)

5.1

The great transformation towards
net zero greenhouse gas emissions

The previous chapters and the underlying studies ofdevelopment pathways aligned with the goals of the Paris
Agreement indicate alarming inconsistencies between
current nationally determined contributions (NDCs) andthe long-term goal of reaching net zero emissions by
mid-century.
Closing the emissions gap in 2030 and reaching net
zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050 will
require unprecedented efforts to transform our societies,
economies, infrastructures and governance institutions.
By necessity, this will require profound change in how
energy, food and other material-intensive services aresupplied. These systems of provision are entwined with thepreferences, actions and demands of people as consumers,
citizens and communities. Deep-rooted shifts in values,
norms, consumer culture and underlying worldviews
are inescapably par t of the necessary sustainability
transformation.
Such transformations are disruptive and cannot be
achieved through an accumulation of incremental andgradual improvements, as Schumpeter indicates in his vivid
example “add as many mail-coaches as you please, you will
never get a railroad by so doing” (Schumpeter 1935).
Past and current mitigation efforts have been insufficient
to slow the global growth of emissions. Chapter 2 showedthat global GHG emissions increased by 2 per cent in
2018, which is almost exactly aligned with the longterm exponential growth rate since the beginning of theIndustrial Revolution. For many decades, science has madeit clear that stabilizing temperatures at any level requires
net zero emissions, as the global mean temperature isin the first approximation propor tional to cumulativeemissions (see chapter 3).

Countries are exceedingly late for achieving pathways toclose the emissions gap, with most policies and measures
so far having been incremental and gradual. As a result, deeptransformations are now needed to peak global emissions
immediately and commence the rapid decline towards net
zero emissions by 2050. This has been termed the ‘carbon law’(Rockström et al. 2017) for halving emissions every decade,starting with a 50 per cent decline by 2030 (Intergovenmental
Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] 2018).
Closing the gap in this way could, with proper policy design,
also enhance the United Nations 2030 Agenda with its 17
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which provides aholistic vision of a sustainable future for all humanity within
planetary boundaries, and thus acts as a new social contract
for the world.

5.2. Multiple co-benefits of closing
the emissions gap for sustainable
development
There are thousands of pathways in the literature reviewedthat show which strategies, policies and measures would
enable fundamental transformations towards complete
decarbonization. Constructing alternative pathways is an
important way to understand inherent complexities anduncertainties of transformations and to develop robust
strategies to navigate them. Multiple pathways could
therefore be taken to achieve global decarbonization acrossspatial and temporal scales.
Pathways can be generated by narrative storytelling, modelbased quantification or a combination of both. Integrated
modelling is particularly useful for characterizing andquantifying interlinkages between options for meeting
SDGs (IPCC 2018; Nakićenović et al. 2000; Riahi et al. 2017;
The World in 2050 [TWI2050] 2018; TWI2050 2019; vanVuuren et al. 2017).

Emissions Gap Report 2019

40
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
recently synthesized evidence on the sustainable development
impacts of pathways which limit warming to 1.5°C (Rogelj et
al. 2018). Figure 5.1 distinguishes interactions between SDGs
and three sectoral climate change mitigation strategies: (a)energy supply (e.g. biomass and non-biomass renewables,
carbon capture and storage with bioenergy or fossil fuels);(b) energy demand (e.g. fuel switching and efficiency intransport, industry, and buildings); and (c) land use (e.g.
sustainable diets and reduced food waste, soil sequestration,
livestock and manure management, reduced deforestation).
Despite remaining uncertainty about the magnitude andlikelihood of interactions in some areas, figure 5.1 provides
two important insights. First, there are multiple benefits fromachieving climate change goals for other SDGs, with thesesynergies being more pronounced than trade-offs, especially
if implementation is holistic and concurrent (McCollum et al.
2018). Second, energy demand-related mitigation strategies
are most consistently and strongly associated with broader
sustainability benefits. The World in 2050 (TWI2050) reports
demonstrate in more detail the synergies between achieving
deep decarbonization and SDGs in unison (Sachs et al. 2019;
TWI2050 2018; TWI2050 2019).
The basic strategies for closing the emissions gap are clear. In
the case of energy supply, a rapid ‘exponential’ transformationis required towards zero-emission energy resources,
particularly renewables (Global Energy Assessment [GEA]
2012; Rockström et al. 2017). In the case of energy demand,a rapid shift is required towards more energy and materiallyefficient services that raise or maintain living standards(Grubler et al. 2018) (See also chapter 6 and chapter 7). In
terms of land, sustainable agriculture and the ‘return’ of land
to nature are important measures that can also result in net
negative emissions.
In all cases, advanced technologies and sustainablebehaviours are essential for delivering the transformationalchange required. The digital revolution could become an
important enabler of this transformation if it proves amenable
to ‘social steering’ towards decarbonization (TWI2050 2019).
The remainder of this chapter explores six exemplary entry
points for closing the emissions gap through transformationalchange. These entry points are derived from the six majortransformations developed in TWI2050 (2018): (a) air
pollution, air quality, health; (b) urbanization; (c) governance,
education, employment; (d) digitalization; (e) energy- andmaterial-efficient services for raising living standards; (f) landuse, food security, bioenergy.

5.3. Entry points for achieving SDGs withclimate co-benefits
5.3.1 Air pollution, air quality, health
Indoor air pollution is responsible for around 4 million
premature deaths each year, with outdoor air pollution

Emissions Gap Report 2019accounting for a similar number according to the World
Health Organization (WHO) (2019). Clean cooking anduniversal access to electricity improves health and also
reduces GHG emissions if traditional fuels are replaced byrenewables, electricity, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) or
natural gas (see chapter 6).
Fossil fuel-related emissions account for two thirds of theexcess mortality rate attributable to outdoor air pollution.
A global fossil fuel phase-out could avoid over 3 million
premature deaths each year from outdoor air pollution,
or well over 5 million premature deaths per year if otheranthropogenic GHGs, including non-fossil emissions fromagriculture and industry, are also controlled (Lelieveld
et al. 2019).
Transformational pathways show huge synergies between
eliminating air pollution and limiting climate change, as
well as improving energy security. One study found that theannual policy costs of achieving these three energy-related
challenges together would be about 40 per cent lower than
the sum of the policy costs for each challenge pursued
independently (GEA 2012; McCollum et al. 2011).
However, policy has to be done right as there are alsosignificant trade-offs. Reducing air pollution from endof-pipe particulate matter, sulfur and nitrous oxides canincrease CO 2 emissions. Small particles and sulfur aerosols
also mask anthropogenic temperature rise. Removing all
pollution particles could result in an increase of warming
by around 0.7°C globally, reaching around 2°C regionallyover North America and North-East Asia, according to one
estimate (Lelieveld et al. 2019). However, a reduction intropospheric ozone and methane will significantly moderate
this rise by around 0.35°C.

5.3.2. Urbanization and settlements
Urban areas are currently home to around 55 per cent of
the world’s population and 70 per cent of global economic
output, though these figures are projected to grow to 70 per
cent and up to 85 per cent respectively by 2050, particularly
in small to medium-sized cities in the developing world(United Nations, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, Population Division 2018). Cities are hotspots ofthe global carbon cycle, with considerable fossil fuel andcement-related emissions from the provision (9.2 GtCO 2 e)
and use (9.6 GtCO 2 e) of urban infrastructure equivalent toaround half of current GHG emissions (Creutzig et al. 2015).
What happens in existing and emerging cities, towns andmunicipal regions will therefore determine the prospects forsustainable development and closing the emissions gap.
Many rapidly growing urban areas are following the least
sustainable model of all: urban sprawl (Grubler et al. 2012;
Seto et al. 2014). Sustainable transformation is needed
across all settlements, not merely in mega-conurbations,such as the Tokyo-Osaka corridor, Pearl River Delta or the
Boston-Washington corridor. Many cities lack the basic
urban infrastructure needed for economic productivity,

41
Figure 5.1. Potential synergies and trade-offs between the sectoral climate change mitigation options and the SDGs

Length shows strength of connection

Shades show level of confidence
The shades depict the level ofconfidence of the assessed potential
for Trade-offs/Synergies.

The overall size of the coloured bars
depict the relative potential for synergies
and trade-offs between the sectoral
mitigation options and the SDGs.
Low

Very HighEnergy supply

Energy demandLand

Trade-offs

Trade-offs

Trade-offs

Synergies

Synergies

Synergies

SDG1
No poverty
SDG2
Zero hunger
SDG 3
Good healthand well-being
SDG 4
Qualityeducation
SDG 5
Genderequality
SDG 6
Clean waterand sanitation
SDG 7
Affordable andclean energy
SDG 8
Decent workand economic
growthSDG 9Industry,
innovation andinfrastructure
SDG 10
Reducedinequalities
SDG 11
Sustainable
cities andcommunities
SDG 12
Responsible
consumption
and production
SDG 14Life
below water
SDG 15Lifeon land
SDG 16
Peace, justiceand strong
institutions
SDG 17
Partnerships
for the goals

Note: The strength of positive connections (synergies) and negative connections (trade-offs) across all individual options within a sector
are aggregated into sectoral potentials for the whole mitigation portfolio. The (white) areas outside the bars, which indicate no interactions,have low confidence due to the uncertainty and limited number of studies exploring indirect effects. The bars denote the strength of theconnection and do not consider the strength of the impact on the SDGs.
Source: Figure SPM4 in IPCC (2018)

Emissions Gap Report 201942social inclusion and the promise of basic services, suchas sanitation, electricity, clean heating and cooking fuels,
education, mobility, security and health care. Informal cities
and slums account for a quarter of the urban population.
The transformation to sustainable cities and communities
requires an integrated set of actions in urban areas aroundthe world. Transport, buildings and industry are the key
sources of energy demand and emissions within cityboundaries. Certain characteristics of urban transformation
are likely to be shared widely.
First, more compact urban form tends to reduce energy
consumption and increase opportunities for more efficient
district heating and cooling systems (Lucon 2014),
transportation infrastructure and energy supply networks,
and integrated management across different vectors(mobility, electricity, gas, heat).
Second, low-carbon infrastructure, including emissions-freeelectricity, public transportation, broadband connectivity
and efficient road networks, is essential for delivering highquality, affordable and universally accessible public services
from health care and education to security and utilities(power, water, connectivity).
Third, short journeys account for two thirds of transport
emissions in urban areas and could be replaced by activemodes (Preston et al. 2013). Electrification of the vehicle
fleet alongside mass transit and micromobility can replace
diesel and petrol cars, making cities more liveable with lower
pollution levels.
These examples of urban transformations demonstratethat there are many opportunities for integrating climate
protection with initiatives to improve human well-being.

5.3.3. Governance, equity and social mobilization
for change
Governance for sustainable development needs to build
alliances for change, overcome vested interests, invest in
new governance capacities, create visions of attractive
futures, ensure justice and promote equity, and adopt a rangeof economic policy instruments to steer the economy andsociety towards the SDGs (TWI2050 2018). Transformative
governance includes three critical elements.
First, economic instruments and political innovations are thetools or means of government. Road maps linking means todesired ends help create clear and stable expectations forthe private sector and citizens alike, and therefore serve as
coordination mechanisms within government to leveragesystemic changes.
Second, the legitimacy of sustainable transformation
depends on equity, justice and fairness in the distributionof costs and benefits at an individual, sectoral or regional
level (Sachs et al. 2019). A particular challenge fortransformative governance is how to respond to disruptive

Emissions Gap Report 2019changes in technologies, economic sectors and labour
markets (TWI2050 2019). Disruption creates uncertainties,
instabilities and losers as well as winners, who – if organizedand powerful – can act as strong barriers to change. In
other cases, safety nets are needed to manage adverse
distributional effects until the transformation towards
sustainability can be achieved for all.
Third, new constellations of actors, partnerships andopportunities for citizens, cities, businesses and science
are needed to drive proactive change and overcome inertias
and path dependencies in incumbent systems. Large-scaletransformation depends on social movements to build andreflect widespread public acceptance. This, in turn, depends
on compelling visions of the multiple benefits of sustainable
lifestyles, an area where research to-date has fallen short(Creutzig et al. 2016).
These elements of transformative governance can createa virtuous cycle: social movements depend on a wideningarc of public awareness and understanding in which
effective science communication can play an importantrole. Widespread social and moral commitment tosustainable development challenges interests vested in theunsustainable status quo. Civic engagement and popularsupport underpin the strong national alliances needed
for sustainable development. Likeminded cooperationoriented actors – governments, city alliances, civil society
organizations, scientific institutions – can scale up
coordinated action, embed joint learning processes andsupport vulnerable populations impacted by climate change.
Global governance beyond the local and national levels is
also a necessity to achieve carbon neutrality globally by midcentury. Joint action and global rules are needed to stabilize
planetary commons, such as the oceans, biodiversity andagricultural soil. Broad-based support for global governancecomes from transnational alliances of pioneering actors oftransformative change.

5.3.4. Digitalization and disruptive technologicalchangeDisruptive technological change can enable sustainable
development with co-benefits for closing the emissions gap,
but can also exacerbate unsustainable patterns of resourceuse. This is most clearly evidenced by the promises and risksof the digital revolution, constituted by ongoing advances
in information and communication technologies, machinelearning and artificial intelligence, connectivity, the Internet ofThings (IoT), additive manufacturing (3D printing), virtual andaugmented reality, blockchain, robotics and synthetic biology.
TWI2050 (2018; 2019) analysed in depth the impacts
of digitalization on consumption and production, andresulting GHG emissions. Three trends are particularly
important.
First, additional units of information-based services canbe provided at an almost zero marginal cost, increasing

43
Figure 5.2. The energy and material benefits of accessing services via a multipurpose smartphone (left) over owning anarray of single-purpose goods (right)

Note: In-use power savings are factor 90 (blue circles), standby power savings are factor 30 (orange), embodied energy savings are factor
25 (green) for a weight reduction of factor 250 (grey).
Source: Grubler et al. (2018), based on a visualization by Tupy (2012) array of single-purpose goods (right)

affordability for poorer segments of society. Virtual
communication and interaction can also potentially replacea large fraction of long-distance and carbon-intensive
business travel.
Second, the possibility of matching supply and demand inreal time through digital coordination platforms offers stepchange improvements in asset utilization, improved qualityof service and potentially lower emissions. This is also theunderlying principle of a service-based economy in which‘ownership’ of goods shifts to ‘usership’ of services (e.g.
shared vehicle fleets and ride-sharing services, see chapter7). Figure 5.2 illustrates the potential resource savings fromdisplacing the ownership of many single-purpose analogue
devices if equivalent services can be accessed through asingle multifunctional interface.
Third, global communication infrastructures and the next
generation of virtual spaces can connect people around theglobe, accelerate global learning processes and support
transnational alliances for sustainable futures. Just as
the printing press enabled learning, science, the era ofenlightenment, democracy and the Industrial Revolution,
digital infrastructures can pave the way towards a global
sustainable society.

However, as with all transformational strategies,
digitalization also carries significant risks. A lack ofaccess to digital infrastructure and services reinforcesthe digital divide, marginalization and inequality ofopportunity. Conversely, cheaper and more accessible
ser vices could lead to ‘ take - back ’ (or economic‘rebound’), which further increases in-service demandwith resource impacts. Digitalization and automation also
further reduce the need for human labour. Big data-driven
applications and services raise privacy concerns andenable social control by governments or monopolistic
technology providers.
Clear governance and ethical and management strategies
are needed to minimize these risks and avoid digitaldystopias. Public policy is critical, particularly in theearly formative phase of developing new technologies
and business models, in terms of regulating standards,
data access and privacy, competition, and, above
all, infrastructure development, as well as ensuring
equitable access. Effective governance of digitalization
towards sustainability requires a comprehensive andrapid investment in the digital capabilities of public andregulatory organizations.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

44
5.3.5. Resource-efficient services for raisingliving standards
A recent low energy demand (LED) scenario explored thepotential for closing the emissions gap while raising living
standards in the global South through radical changes inthe type and efficiency of energy services (Grubler et al.
2018). Unlike other 1.5°C pathways, the LED scenario shows
how the ambition of the Paris Agreement is reachable bylowering energy demand by 40 per cent, while at the sametime increasing the provision of energy services without
having to rely on negative emission technologies or carbon
capture and storage (Rogelj et al. 2018). The LED scenario
was found to have the strongest synergies with other SDGs.
This is consistent with other analysis, which shows thatenergy, land and material-efficient pathways impose thefewest trade-offs with other SDGs (Bertram et al. 2018).
The sustainable transformation described by the LED
scenario is immensely challenging, with the same services
and quality of life taken for granted in modern developed
economies becoming available to more people. Thisdepends on seven main strategies for resource-efficientdevelopment: (a) electrify energy end use, including
vehicles and heat pumps to improve end-use efficiency; (b)digitalize energy-using products and services to optimize
infrastructure and resource use; (c) converge onto fewer
numbers of multifunctional goods to improve service quality
and convenience; (d) shift from ownership to usership toreduce material needs; (e) utilize consumer goods, vehicles
and physical infrastructures at higher rates to accelerate theintroduction of improved alternatives; (f) innovate businessmodels offering low energy services to appeal to consumers,
while making sense commercially; and (g) tighten efficiency
standards continually upward to deliver cost, performance,
health and other benefits.
The resulting expansion of energy services in the Global
South would address historical inequalities created by
GHG-intensive development in industrialized countries,
where 2 billion people lack improved sanitation (World
Health Organization [WHO] and United Nations Children’s
Fund [UNICEF] 2017), 800 million people go hungry every
night (Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] et al. 2018),
roughly the same number of people do not have accessto electricity, and almost 3 billion cook and heat withsolid fuels (International Energy Agency [IEA] 2018). This
striking global inequality in living standards is reflected in
the marked global inequality in GHG emissions (figure 5.3).

Figure 5.3. Lorenz curves showing inequality in the global distribution of annual per capita GHG emissions for selected
past years and two NDC scenarios

Note: The diagonal represents perfect equality. Half of the global population accounts for only 15–20 per cent of global emissions.
Source: Zimm and Nakićenović (2019)

Emissions Gap Report 2019

45
This emissions inequality has reduced slightly in recent
history (1990-2015) and looks set to continue through the
NDCs. Strengthened action to close the emissions gap
can be consistent with social and economic development
objectives, if the emissions-intensive development pathwaysof the top emitters can be avoided.

5.3.6. Sustainable land use, food security
and bioenergy

A revolution is also needed in food consumption culture
and practices to improve diets and reduce waste, as arounda third of food produced currently ends up being wasted(Gustavsson et al. 2011). Healthier diets can be promoted
by removing subsidies for harmful production techniques,public awareness campaigns and careful managementof land use, oceans and other environmental resources(TWI2050 2018).

The biologist and naturalist E.O. Wilson has called forprotecting half the Earth’s land and seas, a project known as
Half-Earth (Wilson 2016). Feeding humanity while mitigating
human-caused environmental degradation must essentiallyoccur on already transformed and existing agricultural land.
This allows the remaining ‘Half-Earth’ to be safeguarded as
natural forest and other ecosystems providing essential
services, protecting biodiversity and ensuring resilience.

This agricultural revolution, encompassing both production
and consumption, must unfold alongside a massive
programme of returning land to nature, including tree planting
on degraded land (Bastin et al. 2019). For example, overthe last 40 years, China has undertaken major projects toenhance soils and regenerate and reforest land (Bryan et al.
2018). To close the emissions gap, land use must transition
rapidly from being a net source of emissions to a net sink.

The global sustainable transformation of agricultural
systems and fisheries faces the challenge of providing
more and healthier food through sustainable intensification
on existing farmland and reducing food waste (TWI2050
2018). For land in agricultural use as croplands, pasturesand managed forests, this means widespread adoption ofagricultural practices that minimize environmental damage
and maximize resilience, including: precision farming toeconomize on resource inputs while boosting yields; notill farming to protect soil quality; agroecology to optimize
the crop mix in order to sustain biodiversity and resist thedangers of pests and pathogens; and improved harvestingand storage practices to reduce post-harvest losses.

There are clear potential synergies between SDG 2 (zerohunger), SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy) and SDG 13(climate action). Strategies include increasing agricultural
productivity, reducing forest clearance for agriculture andshifting diets to healthier, less land-intensive and lower
carbon foods. Conversely, the singular pursuit of SDG 13
to close the emissions gap without pursuing sustainable
development more holistically can lead to trade-offs.
Conversion of agricultural and forest land for bioenergy crop
production negatively impacts food security. Such tensions
are a particular hallmark of climate mitigation pathways
reliant on negative emissions from combining bioenergy
combustion with carbon capture and storage.

Emissions Gap Report 201946

6

Bridging the gap: Global transformation of the energy
systemLead authors:
Yacob Mulugetta (Department of Science, Technology, Engineering & Public Policy, University College London, UK), Pablo
E. Carvajal (International Renewable Energy Agency, Germany), James Haselip (UNEP DTU Partnership), Thomas Spencer(The Energy and Resources Institute, India)

Contributing authors:
Edo Abraham (Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands), Simon Batchelor (Gamos Ltd, UK), Brigitte Knopf (Mercator
Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change, Germany)

6.1

Key issues and options fortransforming the global energy
systemThe energy sector will be essential in the enhanced global
mitigation efforts required to bridge the emissions gap
in 2030 and reach net-zero emissions by 2050. This will
necessitate a complete transformation of the way energy is
produced and consumed.
To illustrate the scale of the challenge, coal-fired power plants
were the single largest contributor to emissions growth in 2018,
an increase of 2.9 per cent compared with the previous year andsurpassing annual total emissions of 10 GtCO2 (International
Energy Agency [IEA] 2019a).
The transformation will be challenged by the fact that demandfor energy services will grow 30 per cent by 2040, according to
the IEA (2018a). However, primary energy demand will grow bya lesser rate or actually fall, depending on the achieved rate ofenergy efficiency improvement.
The current global energy system is still highly carbonintensive with coal, oil and natural gas meeting 85 per cent of
all energy needs (IEA 2019e). If the necessary transition does
not occur, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will continue toincrease year-on-year.
In light of this, what needs to happen? Long-term scenarios all
point to rapid upscaling of renewables and energy efficiency, in
combination with electrification of many new end-uses, as the
key ingredients of a successful energy transition driving downenergy-related CO2 emissions (Gambhir et al. 2019; Bogdanov
et al. 2019).
This chapter reviews five key transition options, based on
their relevance to a wide range of countries, clear co-benefit
opportunities and potential to deliver significant emission
reductions. Each transition corresponds to a particular policy
rationale or motivation, namely:

Emissions Gap Report 20191)

Easy wins: expanding renewable energy forelectrification

2)

Broad policy consensus: coal phase-out for rapid
decarbonization of the energy system

3)

Large co-benefits: decarbonizing transport

4)

Hard to abate: decarbonizing energy-intensive
industry

5)

Leapfrogging potential: avoiding future emissions
and ensuring energy access

6.2 Options to decarbonize the energy
sector
The energy transition will include several elements, while
approaches to transition will vary from one region and country
to another. Transition strategies will need to be developed andadapted to fit the specific context, as few parts can be directly
copied. Sharing and learning will be important for rapid action.

6.2.1 Easy wins: expanding renewable energy forelectrification
Technologically speaking, the three pillars of any strategy
to decarbonize the power sector are: i) a vast expansion ofrenewable electricity generation; ii) a smarter and much more
flexible electricity grid, and iii) huge increases in the numbersof products and processes that run on electricity (in buildings,
transport and industry). The basic technologies neededfor expanding electrification based on renewable energy
technologies already exist and thus represent a relatively “easywin” for substantial short-term reductions of energy-related
CO2 emissions.
Regarding renewable energy expansion, the world addeda record 167 gigawatts (GW) of new capacity in 2018

47
(excluding large hydropower), with solar photovoltaic (PV)additions hitting a record of 108 GW and wind power an
estimated 50 GW. Global investment in renewable energy
capacity in 2018 was US$272.9 billion, which was about
three times higher than investment in coal and gas-fired
generation capacity combined. This allowed for renewableenergy (excluding large hydropower) to raise its share of
global electricity generation to 12.9 per cent in 2018, helping
the world to avoid an estimated 2 gigatons of carbon dioxide
emissions (Frankfurt School-United Nations Environment
Programme [UNEP] Collaborating Centre and BloombergNEF[BNEF] 2019). Yet, renewables need to grow six times fasterto meet climate targets (International Renewable Energy
Agency [IRENA] 2019a).
The main enabler for the accelerated deployment of
renewable energy in the last decade has been thecontinued and rapid decline in capital costs. In most partsof the world today, renewables have become the lowestcost source of new power generation and are generallycompetitive without incentives when directly comparedwith fossil alternatives. Since 2010, the global weightedaverage levelized costs of electricity (LCOE) from solar
photovoltaic, onshore and offshore wind projects, bioenergy
and geothermal, have all reduced and are approaching thelower range of fossil-fuel-fired power generation costs(figure 6.1). Continued cost declines are expected during

the following decades (IRENA 2019c). The key to integratinglarger shares of variable renewable energy into the power
supply is system flexibility. Electricity systems with large
shares of renewables require investments to address theshort- and medium-term variability of both solar and windenergy. There are several categories of power systemassets that can be utilized to provide flexibility. Conventional
power plants, gas-fired generation and hydropower withreservoirs are currently the predominant sources of system
flexibility in modern power systems, but other options
will increasingly become important such as electricity
networks, battery storage, distributed energy resourcesand enhanced predictability. Studies show that the cost offlexibility to integrate variable renewable energy is generally
quite small (+5 to +13 US$/MWh), with higher values for
inflexible systems with dominant shares of coal or nuclear
generation (Agora Energiewende 2015). However, beyond
enhanced power infrastructure, measures to support powersystem flexibility can be readily applied and adapted to
power systems. These include modifications to “energy
strategies, legal frameworks, policies and programmes,
regulatory frameworks, market rules, system operation
protocols, and connection codes” (IEA 2019c). There are
now several examples of countries that have achieved 100
per cent renewable energy electricity for short periods oftime (days), with large shares of variable solar and wind(for example, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ireland and Uruguay).

Figure 6.1. Global LCOE of utility-scale renewable power generation technologies, 2010-2018

Source: International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (2019c).

Emissions Gap Report 2019

48
Box 6.1. Germany’s coal phase-out
Despite growing its share of renewables in electricity
generation from 20 per cent in 2011 to 37.8 per centin 2018, Germany is Europe’s largest coal consumer,
accounting for 35 per cent of total power sector
emissions in 2018, with 42.6 GW of lignite and hardcoal-fired power generation capacity. This means that
Germany will most certainly not reach its nationaltarget of 40 per cent GHG reduction by 2020 comparedwith 1990 levels (Federal Ministry for the Environment,
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety [BMU] 2018).
In January 2019, following a long consultation process,a Government-appointed commission proposed a total
phase-out of coal in Germany by 2038 (Federal Ministry
for Economic Affairs and Energy [BMWi] 2019). The
proposed decommissioning road map foresees a net
reduction of 12.5 GW of coal capacity by 2022. By
2030, total coal power capacity should be reduced
to a maximum of 17 GW, equal to a total reduction of

25.6 GW compared with 2017. Reviews are proposedfor 2023, 2026 and 2029 to take stock of progress andto address concerns over security of supply, especiallysince Germany has committed to decommission all
nuclear power by 2022.
The most important proposed measures to implement
the coal phase-out are to cancel the industry’s CO 2
certificates issued within the European Emission
Trading Scheme and to ensure the expansion ofrenewable electricity to a share of 65 per cent by 2030.
The phase-out plan includes a €40 billion economic
package offered to affected coal regions, including
alternative industry investment projects and state aid
for coal workers.
The Commission’s proposal is now in the legislative
process. The federal Government has already decided on
the law for financing structural change in the coal regions
and will officially adopt the decision to phase-out coal by2038 in November (Cabinet of Germany 2019)

Harnessing the synergy between low-cost renewable powerand enhanced end-use electrification is key to driving downenergy-related CO2. According to the International Renewable
Energy Agency (IRENA), renewable energy and electrification
can deliver 75 per cent of the required emission reductions
to bring the temperature rise to the well-below 2°C climate
goal (IRENA 2019a). This means that by 2050, 86 per centof electricity generation would need to be renewable andthat the share of electricity in final energy would increase
from just 20 per cent today (IRENA 2019a) to almost 50 per
cent by 2050. The share of electricity consumed in industry
and buildings would need to double (mainly through electricheating and cooling), with transport seeing potentially thelargest transformation (see section 6.2.3).

generation (BP 2019). After declining consecutively for three
years, global coal production increased by 2.8 per cent to 7,428
Mt in 2017 and then rose again by a marginal 0.2 per centto 7,575 Mt in 2018 (Enerdata 2019), resulting from stronger
global economic growth leading to increased industrial output
and electricity use. This highlights two obvious but criticalpoints: i) much of the growth in demand was concentrated in
Asia, showing a regional shift in consumption and production
and thus some headroom for growth; ii) the rapid rate of
growth in electricity demand limits the pace at which thepower sector can decarbonize, even with high uptake rates
of renewables, which reinforces the importance of energy
efficiency to keep total demand within the reach of achievable
renewables growth.

The electrification of the energy system creates the needfor enhanced digitalization of end-use technologies, largescale electrical and heat storage technologies and the needto develop “electro fuels” with green electricity, to be able
to substitute liquid fossil fuels (IRENA 2019b). All thesetechnologies exist and are rapidly spreading, especially within
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD) economies, and also serve to mitigate the risk of
blackouts caused by unfavourable weather.

If operated until the end of their lifetime and not retrofitted withcarbon capture and storage (CCS), “committed emissions”
from existing coal-fired power plants, built before the end of
2016, are estimated to emit roughly 200 GtCO2 by 2050 (Rogeli
et al. 2018). Coal-based power plants that are planned or underconstruction would add a further 100–150 GtCO2 (Edenhofer
et al. 2018), effectively using up a large share of the remaining
carbon budget to stay below two degrees.

6.2.2 Broad policy consensus: coal phase-out for
rapid decarbonization of the energy system
The combustion of coal currently accounts for 30 per cent of
global CO2 emissions (IEA 2019a). Behind these figures is thereality that globally, about 27 per cent of primary energy needs
are met by coal, including around 40 per cent of all electricity

Emissions Gap Report 2019

Therefore, one of the main challenges for the requiredenergy sector transformation will be to find nationallyappropriate solutions for the fast and socially responsible
reduction in coal-fired power generation by 2030 and aphase-out by 2050 (Rogeli et al. 2018). Box 1 illustrates
the complexity of such a phase-out process, using theexperience of Germany.

49
Policies should also look beyond the demand-side
considerations to include supply-side inter ventions(Spencer et al. 2018; table 6.1). Supply- oriented
considerations are critical given the importance of the coalmining sector in terms of employment, revenues and its
place within broader regional economies. Hence, managing
coal transitions means not just focusing on “stranded
assets”, as relating to physical or financial capital in the
demand-side policy literature, but also to paying attention
to the notion of “stranded regions” where workers, regional
governments and the regional economy more broadly are
dependent on the coal sector (Spencer et al. 2018). Thisholistic vision is at the heart of a “ just transition” thatconsiders the impact of technological change on workers
and communities (Caldecott et al. 2017), as well as thecoal owners and industry, as a way to negotiate a politicallyfeasible reduction in coal power generation, and eventuallyphase it out altogether (Jordaan et al. 2017).

6.2.3 Large co-benefits: decarbonizing transport
Transport accounted for 28 per cent of global final energy
demand and 23 per cent of global energy-related CO 2
emissions in 2014 (IEA 2017b). Transport sector emissions
are growing rapidly and increased by 2.5 per cent annually
between 2010 and 2015 (Rogeli et al. 2018), largely driven
by economic growth, behavioural changes and population
increase. The sector accounts for about 65 per cent of
global oil demand, with 92 per cent of final transportenergy demand consisting of oil products, making it theleast diversified of the major energy end-use sectors.
Deep decarbonization of the transport sector will requirea radical shift in the nature and structure of transportdemand, major improvements in energy efficiency,changing vehicle types and significant and rapid transitionsin the energy mix used (see also chapters 4 and 7).
Aggressive action now would lay the foundation andmaintain a healthy momentum towards the longer-term goal.
Some of the transport-related climate change mitigation

actions that can yield substantial decarbonization as wellas economic benefits include: i) compact urban planning; ii)
reducing passenger travel demand; iii) shifting passenger
travel modes and expanding public transit; iv) improving
passenger car efficiency and shifting to electrical engines;v) improving freight logistics; and vi) improving freightvehicle efficiency and electrification (Dhar, Pathak andShukla 2018; Gouldson et al. 2018).
One of the key technical mitigation options, namely
electrification of the transport sector, is projected toplay a major role in meeting ambitious climate targets.
Rapid growth in electric passenger vehicles (EVs) acrossthe members of the G20 has been occurring since 2010,
with global cumulative sales of light-duty plug-in vehicles
exceeding 5 million units at the end of December 2018
(Vieweg et al. 2018; Watson 2019). This amounts to amarket share of 2.1 per cent (compared with less than 1
per cent in 2016). China has the largest fleet of EVs withover 2.2 million units, while Norway leads in terms ofthe market share for new cars, approaching 60 per cent(Williams 2019). In road freight transport (trucks), systemic
improvements (for example, in supply chains, logistics, androuting) would also benefit from these innovations, butwould need to be combined with efficiency improvementof vehicles.
Shipping and aviation account for 40 per cent of alltranspor t-related emissions but will be significantly
more challenging to decarbonize and electrify than roadtransport (Martinez Romera 2016). Both modes will see
high demand growth and would need to pursue ambitious
efficiency improvements and use of low-carbon fuels. This
would mean the use of advanced biofuels and low-carbon
liquid fuels (synthetic fuels) in the near and medium term,with hydrogen fuel for shipping a likely solution in thelonger term (IRENA 2019a; IEA 2017b).
While progress has been made, it is far from the scalerequired to decarbonize transport. Specifically, it will

Table 6.1. Framework of policy challenges related to coal transition

Supply side

Policy challenge

Example policy approach

Importance of the coal sector as a (regional)
employer and generator of added value

Regional diversification plans or coal sector
restructuring plans

Importance of export revenues from coal export

Economic diversification strategies

Economic and technological aspects ofsubstitution to move away from coal use

Payments for closure of coal plants; carbon pricing;renewables support schemes

Demand side

Source: Spencer et al. (2018)

Emissions Gap Report 201950
require the share of electricity in final energy for transport
to increase from just 1 per cent today to 40 per cent by
2050 (IRENA 2019a) 1.
At the same time, decarbonizing transport can deliver
multiple significant co-benefits and is one of the sectors
in which there are strong links between local andglobal pollution and human well-being. Specifically, thetransportation sector is a major source of particulatematter (PM 2.5), ozone and nitrogen dioxide concentrations,which are major causes of premature deaths. In 2015,
emissions attributed to transport contributed to 385,000
premature deaths out of which 114,000 and 74,000 werein China and India, respectively (Anenberg et al. 2019).
With vehicle numbers projected to double by 2040, thecosts associated with premature mor tality are likely
to increase in both these countries. However, somesolutions are beginning to emerge. For example, there issignificant potential for electric two- and three-wheelers
as a short-distance transport solution in India, which could
enable India to develop a large EV industry and stimulate
investment in charging infrastructure that can facilitate
diffusion of larger EVs (Dhar, Pathak and Shukla 2017;see also chapter 7).

6.2.4 Hard to abate: decarbonizing energy-intensive
industries
Energy-intensive industries, such as steel and cement, accountfor about 17 per cent of total CO 2 emissions from energy
and industrial sources (Energy Transitions Commission[ETC] 2019). These sectors are difficult to decarbonize for anumber of reasons. Firstly, there are technical barriers, due tothe lack of cost-effective mitigation technologies to reduce
emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels to provide
high-grade process heat or from the industrial process itself.
Secondly, there are political economy barriers, due notably tothe international competition for some of these industries andhence the risk of “carbon leakage”, as well as the low level ofinnovation and stock turnover in these sectors2 . As a result,energy-intensive industries have typically been exemptedfrom national climate policies. Competitiveness pressuresand the importance of energy as an input have, however,driven significant energy efficiency improvements, but thishas not been enough to move towards decarbonization ofthese sectors. For example, while the CO 2 intensity of global
electricity production has declined by 9.3 per cent between
2000 and 2016, the CO 2 intensity of global crude steel
production has increased by 2.8 per cent in the same period 3 .
This is concerning because the significant demand formaterials will continue, as countries like India and many
African countries develop the infrastructure and housing
required as a result of their development. Without further
1

policy, emissions from the heavy industry sectors could
increase from 17 per cent of global emissions today to 20
per cent by 2050 (ETC 2019). Mitigation of energy-intensive
industries requires going beyond incremental improvements
in energy efficiency and moving towards more fundamental
mitigation options.
Broadly speaking, these options can be broken down into
three categories. The first is demand reduction throughrecycling, materials substitution and dematerialization(see chapter 7). An example of the latter would belightweighting of automobiles while improving fuel economy
and downsizing the powertrain, in order to reduce steel
consumption. Significant potential exists to reduce virginmaterial demand, which could cut emissions from heavy
industry by 40 per cent by 2050, compared with a businessas usual (BAU) case (ETC 2019; also discussed extensively
in chapter 7). This can have the benefit of reducing relianceon more costly mitigation options like carbon capture andstorage/use (CCSU) (IEA 2019b).
The second category involves mitigation of emissions in
the context of the existing industrial process, the archetypal
example of which is the deployment of CCSU. Whilealternatives to CCSU are emerging in some heavy industry
sectors, the deployment of CCSU is likely to be necessary
in the cement industry, even given aggressive deploymentof clinker substitutes and the development of currently
non-commercial alternative cement technologies 4 . The
third category of options entails a fundamental transitionin the industrial process itself, an example of which would
be the substitution of coking coal as a fuel and reducing
agent in steel manufacture with hydrogen produced fromzero-carbon electricity (Vogl et al. 2018).
Therefore, what are the prospects for energy-intensive
industry mitigation? The first point to note is that the available
technological options are currently at a low level of commercial
readiness, necessitating significant progress in research,demonstration and commercialization. Secondly, unlike inother sectors where zero-carbon options may be economicallycompetitive with their fossil alternatives (for example,
renewable electricity or electric vehicles), decarbonization ofenergy-intensive industry appears likely to entail net costs.
These costs are likely to be negligible at the level of themacroeconomy and the end-consumer, but significant at the
producer level (ETC 2019). This raises questions of managing
the implementation of stringent policies to decarbonize heavy
industry in the absence of stronger global climate policies anda level playing field. Some form of trade protective measures,such as border adjustments, may be required. Finally, acomprehensive portfolio of policies is likely to be required,ranging from carbon pricing and research and demonstration

This is consistent with REN21 (2018) as the bulk of renewable energy used in the sector is biogasoline at 2.5 per cent; biodiesel at 1.4 per cent; andrenewable electricity at 0.3 per cent of demand in 2016.

2

For an excellent summary of the challenges of mitigation in the energy intensive industries, see Bataille et al. (2018).

3

Calculated on the basis of data from Enerdata (2019) and World Steel Association (2018).

4

For a comprehensive survey of cement mitigation options, see Scrivener et al. (2018).

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Box 6.2. Clean cooking as an important mitigation
optionThe Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Special Report on 1.5°C (IPCC SR1.5) states thatlack of access to clean and affordable energy
for cooking is a major policy concern in many
countries where major parts of the population still
rely primarily on solid fuels for cooking (Roy et al.
2018). The amount of fuelwood burned across Africa
is estimated to be over 400 million m 3 a year (MayTobin 2011), releasing over 760 million tons of CO 2 e
into the atmosphere * , and globally non-renewablebiomass fuels alone account for signif icant
emissions. This will continue to increase with therise in population, as the population of sub-SaharanAfrica is projected to double by 2050 (United Nations
Depar tment of Economic and Social Affairs [UNDESA] 2019). Black carbon from residential solid*

fuel burning is estimated to add the equivalent ofanother 8–16 per cent of the global warming caused by
CO 2 (Bailis et al. 2015). It is also important to recognize
the complexity associated with accounting in terms ofthe time it takes for replacement trees to sequester
the CO 2 emitted by burning a felled tree, and the rateof change in CO 2 sequestration as trees mature. Clean
cooking solutions address the most basic needs of thepoor. Furthermore, reducing black carbon, methaneand other short-lived climate pollutants would havesubstantial co-benefits on health and local air quality,
but can in the short-term contribute significantly tolimiting global warming to 2°C and 1.5°C (de Coninck
et al. 2018; Batchelor et al. 2019). A key driver is the
trajectory of costs that show “clean” cooking (i.e.
with electric or gas) has the potential to reach a pricepoint of affordability with associated reliability andsustainability within a few years.

Burning 1 kg wood emits 1.9 kg of CO 2 . See https://www.transitionculture.org/2008/05/19/is-burning-wood-really-a-long-term-energydescent-strategy/.

funding to standards and regulation, for example, to promotematerial demand reduction. For all of this to occur, thesalience of energy-intensive industry decarbonization needs
to increase in global and national policy discussions.

6.2.5 Leapfrogging potential: avoiding future
emissions and ensuring energy access
The issue of energy access and energy poverty is now on topof the global policy agenda. Among Least Developed Countries(LDCs), over 60 per cent of the population have no access toelectricity with the figure rising to 80 per cent for people inrural areas (Least Developed Countries Renewable Energy andEnergy Efficiency Initiative for Sustainable Development [LDCREEEI] 2019). In non-LDC developing countries, the figure is
still significant, at 10 per cent of the population. Those who dohave access to electricity often endure problems of unreliable
access and frequent blackouts. Beyond electricity, nearly threebillion people rely on traditional fuels (such as wood or charcoal)and technologies for cooking and heating. This has severe
implications for health (especially the health of women andchildren), economic livelihoods and the environment, both at a
global and local level (Batchelor et al. 2019). The burning of nonrenewable biomass fuels5 alone generates a gigaton of CO2e
per year (Bailis et al. 2015), about a 2 per cent share of global
emissions (see chapter 2). Box 2 discusses the GHG emissions
associated with cooking and potential trends for the future.

Improving access to reliable energy services for households
and for productive purposes is thus a central policy objective
in many LDCs and developing countries. This is explicitly
recognized by United Nations Sustainable Development Goal
7 (SDG 7) that calls for action to “ensure access to affordable,
reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all”, which include
targets on renewable energy and energy efficiency. As such,there is evidence of synergies between about 85 per cent of
the SDG targets and efforts to achieve SDG 7, as well as someevidence of trade-offs between SDG 7 and about 35 per centof the SDG targets (Fuso-Nerini et al. 2018). However, despite
the energy sector’s large share of global GHG emissions,achieving universal access to modern energy does not leadto increases in global GHG emissions (Dagnachew et al.
2018; IEA et al. 2019). Using two scenarios, the New Policies
Scenario (NPS) and the Sustainable Development Scenario(SDS)6 derived from the IEA’s World Energy Outlook, reflect
the simultaneous pursuit of universal access in sub-SaharanAfrica for both electricity and clean cooking solutions yielding
net savings of GHG emissions amounting to 45 MtCO2e and
200 MtCO2e, respectively.
Going beyond addressing energy for basic human needs (i.e.
lighting and cooking) to pushing mechanical power, mobility
and energy for other productive uses required to drive
development and transformation will generate increasing

5

To imply the extraction of biomass from a land area is not sustainable where carbon stocks on the land area decrease over time.

6

The NPS accounts for current and planned policies with a high likelihood of being implemented, including the GHG- and energy-related components of the NDCs pledged under the Paris Agreement. The SDS combines the fundamentals of sectoral energy policy with three closely associatedbut distinct policy objectives related to the SDG 7 (energy access), SDG 3 (air pollution) and SDG 13 (climate action).

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Table 6.2. Transition options and their elements

OptionMajor components

Instruments

Co-benefits

Annual GHG emissions
reduction potentialof renewables,
electrification, energy
efficiency and othermeasures by 2050

Renewableenergyelectricity
expansion● Plan for large sharesof variable renewableenergy● Electricity becomesthe main energy
source by 2050,
supplying at least 50
per cent of total final
energy consumption(TFEC)● Share of renewableenergy in electricity
up to 85 per cent by
2050● Transition● Flexibility measures
to take on larger
shares of variable
renewable energy● Support for
deployment of
distributed energy● Innovative
measures: costreflective tariffstructures, targeted
subsidies, reverse
auctions, net
metering● Greater efficiency
in end-use energy
demand● Health benefits● Energy access andsecurity● Employment● Power sector: 8.1
GtCO 2● Building sector:
2.1 GtCO 2● District heat andothers: 1.9 GtCO 2

Coalphase-out● Plan and implement
phase-out of coal
● Coal to renewableenergy transition● Expand carbon
capture usage andstorage systems● Improve system-wide
efficiency● Regional support
programmes● Tax breaks,
subsidies● Carbon pricing● Moratorium policies● De-risking of clean
energy investments● Relocation of coal
workers (mines andpower plants)● Lower healthhazards (air, water,
land pollution)● Future skills andjob creation● Share of the power
emissions reduction
from a coal phaseout: 4 GtCO 2 (range:
3.6–4.4 GtCO 2), with
1 GtCO 2 from theOECD and 3 GtCO 2
from the rest of theworld

Decarbonize
transport● Reduce energy fortransport● Electrify transport● Fuels substitution(bioenergy, hydrogen)● Modal shift● Pathways for nonmotorized transport● Standards forvehicle emissions● Establishing of
charging stations● Eliminating of fossilfuel subsidies● Investments inpublic transport● Increased publichealth from more
physical activity,
less air pollution● Energy security● Reduced fuelspending● Less congestion● Electrification oftransport: 6.1 GtCO 2

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Decarbonize
industry● Demand reduction(circular economy,
modal shifts andlogistics)● Electrify heatprocesses● Improve energy
efficiency● Direct use of biomass/
biofuels● Carbon pricing● Standards andregulations,especially onmaterials demand
reduction● Energy security● Savings andcompetitiveness● Industry: 4.8 GtCO 2

Avoid future
emissionsand energy
access● Link energy accesswith emission
reductions for 3.5
billion energy-poor
people● FiT and auctions● Standards andregulations● Targeted subsidies● Support forentrepreneurs● Better access● Meet basic needs
and SDGs● N/A

Source: Energy Transitions Commission (2017, 2018); International Renewable Energy Agency (2019a); Climate Analytics (2016)

Emissions Gap Report 201954
energy demand. Poor but fast-growing countries in eastand south-east Asia have traditionally deployed emissionsintensive coal to meet this demand. However, for countries
and regions that host the world’s energy-poor, there remains
significant scope to shape their energy transitions as they
are yet to be locked into a particular pathway (Mulugetta, Ben
Hagan and Kammen 2018). Moreover, rapid technologicalprogress in renewable energy is opening up an unprecedented
opportunity for a wide range of applications and businessmodels, including electrification through decentralized
generation and mini-grids, with rapidly declining costs forphotovoltaic modules, batteries, LEDs, smart metering,mini-grids and pay-as-you-go technology (United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] 2017).
Policymakers in developing countries understand that making
a rapid transition sometimes relies on a much slower processof technological and organizational change, for example,
to build capacities and knowledge about the technologies
required to ‘leapfrog’. Moreover, the quality of the transition
matters in terms of creating additional value beyond theprovision of energy such as good quality jobs and building
industrial capacity. For example, while the growth in solar
PV markets across Africa is to be welcomed from an energy
delivery perspective, a significant proportion of the global
value chain for PV has been captured elsewhere, for example,
in manufacturing (principally China), as well as financing andengineering services, often provided by institutions in OECD
countries (Byrne, Mbeva and Ockwell 2018; Lema et al. 2018;
Ockwell et al. 2018).
More broadly, effort is required to actively connect private
business leaders with government-led and donor-backed
forums to communicate and unlock new commercial
opportunities in PV systems, as has occurred successfullyin Kenya and Uganda (Bhamidipati, Haselip and Hansen2019). However, this requires building innovation systems
with the mission to strengthen knowledge and skills base,raise patient capital and mobilize technical assistance,
to build strong partnerships with financial providers anddomestic entrepreneurs with a deep interest in new andclean technologies (Truffer, Murphy and Raven 2015;
Wieczorek 2017).

6.3 Beyond technical measures:
pursuing system-wide
transformation
There is a qualitative difference between past energy transitions
and the necessary future transition. For one thing, previoustransitions were not constrained by time as a key factor for
rapid change. More concretely, historical transitions were more
“opportunity-driven”, whereas low-carbon transitions are more“problem-driven” – the problem being the collective good (i.e. theclimate) (Sovacool and Geels 2016). Furthermore, historically,energy “transitions” have occurred only in percentage terms(firstly, coal displacing biomass, then oil displacing coal andnow natural gas and renewables displacing oil and coal). In

Emissions Gap Report 2019

terms of total energy use, the trends have more accuratelyreflected energy “additions” as all forms of energy rise tomeet growing energy demand. Today we consume more coal,gas, oil, nuclear and renewables than ever before. Reducing
emissions, however, requires that total hydrocarbon use
decline with great expansion of renewable energy (along withtechnologies to capture or remove their emissions) (Universityof Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy 2019).
The depth of technological and institutional lock-in of
the incumbent energy system is so profound it createsmajor obstacles or inertia, holding back much needed
structural change (Jackson 2016). The rapid and systemicchanges needed are radically different from what
institutions are accustomed to withstanding. For example,
switching to EVs requires multiple changes in the sociotechnical system, which involve multi-actor processes ofinteractions across and between energy and transport
regimes. Given the need for these complex and systemicchanges, a sector-focused or silo approach will needto give way to decisions and policies that reach acrosssectoral, geographical and political boundaries. One way
to do this is through mission-oriented policies, defined assystemic public policies that draw on frontier knowledge
to attain specific goals, often to address “big problems”
such as climate change that demand radical innovations
and a multi-actor coordination (Mazzucato 2018). This
also recognizes the catalytic role that governments canplay in creating policies that can shape markets and direct
them to meet major societal goals.
Given that energy is an enabler, and thus cuts acrosssectoral boundaries, low-carbon energy transitions canbe well served by being directly linked to opportunities inother sectors such as electrifying transport and heating(including cooking) and decarbonizing energy-intensive
industries. Equally important will be linking transitions with
their associated co-benefits and costs and how these canbe evaluated to provide supplementary information to serveas additional impetus for policymakers, decision makers
and civil society to co-own and build consensus around theoptions (table 6.2).
The sheer scale of investment needed for acceleratingenergy transitions is very large. Global renewable energy
investment in 2018, excluding large hydroelectric projects,
exceeded the US$250 billion for a fifth successive year
Frankfurt School-UNEP Collaborating Centre and BNEF
2019). However, climate policies that are consistent withthe 1.5°C target require upscaling of energy system supplyside investments (resource extraction, power generation,
fuel conversion, pipelines/transmission and energy
storage), reaching levels of between US$1.6–3.8 trillion peryear globally on average over the 2016–2050 time frame(McCollum et al. 2018).
The call to redirect investment to low-carbon energy
systems raises a number of issues. Firstly, the highupfront capital outlay and low operating costs of55

renewables is a new terrain in finance where further
innovation is required. Secondly, while the historically
low interest rates over the past 10 years have provided avery conducive environment for investment in renewableenergy technologies (RETs), energy investment was
mostly concentrated in high and upper-middle income
countries (IE A 2019d). Thirdly, the high investment
requirement in developing countries is being hamperedby the high perception of risk, little opportunity for patient
capital, and unstable political and regulatory regimes. To
this end, multilateral, regional and national developmentbanks could play a major role in leveraging larger financeby helping to de-risk investments. However, this would
need to be co-developed where country policymakers
play a deeper role by creating stable policy and regulatory
conditions to encourage investment. This would alsomean appealing to the immediate concerns of decisionand policymakers, for example, integrating transport
policy with air quality and climate policy and with vehicle
emissions regulation. Policies should be harmonized
wherever possible to take advantage of interdependencies
and prevent undesirable outcomes such as CO 2 “leakage”
from one sector to another.

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7

Bridging the gap: Enhancing material efficiency
in residential buildings and cars

Lead authors:
Edgar Hertwich (Norwegian University of Science and Technology), Reid Lifset (Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies,
USA), Stefan Pauliuk (Faculty of Environment and Natural Resources, University of Freiburg, Germany), Niko Heeren (Yale Schoolof Forestry & Environmental Studies, USA)

Contributing authors:
Saleem Ali (University of Delaware, USA), Peter Berrill (Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies USA), Tomer
Fishman (Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel), Qingshi Tu (Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies USA), Paul
Wolfram (Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, USA)

7.1

Introduction

The production of materials is a significant source ofgreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (figure 7.1). In 2015,
materials production caused GHG emissions of 11
GtCO 2 e, up from 5 GtCO 2 e in 1995, with the contributionof such production increasing from 15 per cent to 23 percent of total global emissions over this period (Hertwich2019). The largest contribution stems from bulk materials
production, such as iron and steel, cement, lime andplaster, other minerals mostly used as construction
products, as well as plastics and rubber (figure 7.1). Twothirds of the materials are used to make capital goods,
with buildings and vehicles among the most important(figure 7.1). While the production of materials consumed
in industrialized countries remained within the range
of 2–3 GtCO 2 e in the 1995-2015 period, there was rapid
growth in material-related emissions among developing
and emerging economies (Hertwich 2019). Growth ininvestments is associated with a strong growth in metal
consumption. Developing countries have stronger growth
in metal consumption with gross domestic product (GDP)than industrialized countries, as a higher share of their GDP
comprises investments (Zheng et al. 2018).
Options to mitigate emissions from materials production
include supply-side measures, such as improved energy
efficiency in production processes, the use of alternative
production routes and raw materials with lower embodied
GHG emissions, a shift towards cleaner energy sources
and reductants, and CO 2 capture. Reducing the demand formaterials is also an option to mitigate emissions and can beachieved through improving their efficiency (International
Energy Agency [IEA] 2019a; Worrell et al. 2016).

Emissions Gap Report 2019

Recent efforts have been made to evaluate the potential
contribution of material efficiency to meet climate targets
more broadly. In the Clean Technology Scenario of theInternational Energy Agency (IEA), compared with thebaseline, steel demand is reduced by 24 per cent, cementby 15 per cent and aluminium by 17 per cent, which in total
comprises around 30 per cent of the combined emission
reductions for these materials. Other emission reductions
were due to energy efficiency, innovative processes,
cleaner energy and CO 2 capture and storage (IEA 2019a).
Despite their effectiveness, material efficiency strategies
have been systematically overlooked in climate policies(Hernandez et al. 2018).
Research on and development of demand-side material
efficiency and substitution strategies has progressed
substantially in the past decade (Allwood et al. 2017; Worrell
et al. 2016; Zhang et al. 2018). Such research addresses the
specific technical application of materials in buildings andother structures (Serrenho et al. 2019; Dunant et al. 2018),
machinery (Milford et al. 2013) and vehicles (Løvik et al.
2014). Recent research combining insights from several
bottom-up studies across different applications has identified
that material efficiency could reduce emissions from steel
production by half (Milford et al. 2013).
Material efficiency and substitution strategies affect not only
energy demand and emissions during material production,
but also potentially the operational energy use of the material
products. Analysis of such strategies therefore requires asystems or life cycle perspective. Several investigations
into material efficiency have focused on strategies thathave little impact on operations, meaning that trade-offs
and synergies have been ignored. Many energy efficiency

57
Figure 7.1. GHG emissions in GtCO 2 e associated with materials production by material (left) and by the first use of materials
in subsequent production processes or final consumption (right)

Note: The data excludes emissions from land-use change and credits for carbon storage.
Source: Based on Hertwich et al. (2019).

strategies have implications for the materials used, such asincreased insulation demand for buildings or a shift to moreenergy-intensive materials in the lightweighting of vehicles.
While these additional, material-related emissions are wellunderstood from technology studies, they are often not fully
captured in the integrated assessment models that produce
scenario results, such as those discussed in this report(Pauliuk et al. 2017).

2)

Improvements in the yield of material production
and product manufacture, thus reducing the shareof material that becomes waste in the production
process.

3)

More intensive use, lifetime extension, component
reuse, remanufacturing and repair as strategies toobtain more service from material-based products.

In this chapter, focus is placed on residential buildings andcars, which are the most important individual products in termsof materials and energy use. Material efficiency strategies
are reviewed with quantitative results presented of a recent
modelling exercise for the implementation of such strategies
in the G7 members (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, theUnited Kingdom and the United States of America), China andIndia, based on findings from an International Resource Panel
study (International Resource Panel forthcoming). These
countries were selected because they represent individuallysignificant economies with varied development levels.
The following demand-side strategies for increased material
efficiency in product design and manufacturing, use and endof life are considered for both residential buildings and cars
(Allwood et al. 2011)

4)

Enhanced recycling and reuse so that secondary
materials reduce the need to produce more
emission-intensive primary materials.

7.2

Material-efficient housing

1)

Product lightweighting and material substitution ofhigh-carbon materials with low-carbon materials to
reduce material-related GHG emissions associatedwith product production, as well as operationalenergy consumption of vehicles.

Global construction of buildings and infrastructure and theassociated material supply caused 7 GtCO2e of GHG emissions
in 2015, of which 4 GtCO2e were associated with the use ofmaterials in construction (Hertwich 2019). In comparison,
direct CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in buildings were
3 GtCO2, while emissions associated with the production ofelectricity consumed in buildings were 6.5 GtCO2 (IEA 2019b).
Although current statistics do not disaggregate constructionrelated emissions into residential and commercial buildings orconsider infrastructure at a global scale, country-level results
and material-use data suggest that residential buildings
contribute 50–65 per cent of such emissions (Hertwich etal. 2019). In 2015, about 70 per cent of construction-related
emissions were from developing countries (Hertwich 2019).

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Despite this, studies of material efficiency options almost
exclusively focus on industrialized countries, with just a few
studies addressing China. Housing demand, construction
style and building lifetimes are important drivers for materialrelated emissions of residential buildings. Research provides
insight on the scope of various material efficiency strategies
for residential buildings.

7.2.1 Product lightweighting and material
substitution
Buildings often contain more energy-intensive materials suchas concrete, steel and glass than technically required. Thereis a documented tendency for overdesign in larger steelframe structures of around 20–30 per cent (Dunant et al.
2018). Cement, a major building material, is often used morethan necessary in various applications, including concrete
mixing, where fillers and other cementitious materials
can substitute part of the cement with fewer emissions(John et al. 2018; Shanks et al. 2019). Finally, instead ofusing reinforced cement, masonry or steel frames, timber,bamboo and other plant fibres can be used as building
materials, which has the potential to significantly reduce
lifecycle GHG emissions in materials production and carbon
storage, even when considering a potential trade-off with
operational energy use (Heeren et al. 2015). New technology
allows for a wider use of timber, even for tall structures. In
some regions, building codes are being adapted to recognize
these advances and facilitate the increased use of wood inbuildings (Mahapatra et al. 2012). Large-scale use of woodas construction material necessitates that the forests fromwhich the timber is obtained are managed sustainably (Kaneand Yee 2017; Oliver et al. 2014). The International Resource
Panel (forthcoming) estimates that through lightweighting
structures, 8–10 per cent of GHG emissions related tomaterials in residential building construction in the G7
and China can be saved, with an even larger share in India(figure 7.2). An increased market penetration of wood could
also reduce emissions or sequester carbon, corresponding
to 10 per cent of GHG emissions from residential building
materials, with savings reaching up to 30 per cent in India.
At present, the country hardly uses timber in construction
and lacks local resources and expertise.
Building codes, which have long been used to improveenergy efficiency, present a potential model and platform fordeveloping policies that support lighter-weight structures,the reuse of components and timber-based construction.
The rapid growth of certification systems for construction
and building, such as Leadership in Energy and Environmental
Design (LEED) and Building Research Establishment
Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM), and theiradoption into building codes by governments worldwide has
been an important policy driver for changes in construction
practices (de Wilde 2014; Doan et al. 2017; Menezes etal. 2012). At present, certification is more widely applied
to commercial buildings than to residential dwellings.
However, the spread of certification systems and their use
in building codes presents an opportunity to introduce orEmissions Gap Report 2019enhance material efficiency policies for homes that might
not otherwise be politically feasible. The details of suchcertification systems therefore need to be monitored andevaluated and explicit attention should be given to the use ofbuilding codes as a policy instrument for material efficiency.
At the residential level and particularly for single family
homes, minimum standards for energy efficiency, such as
the International Energy Conservation Code (IECC) in the
United States of America (International Code Council [ICC]2012), have great potential to reduce operational energy
consumption at the cost of increased material use. However,increased energy efficiency in buildings is achievedby adding additional or better insulation material andadditional building technology, such as heat exchangers inventilation systems. Compared with conventional buildings,
energy-efficient buildings have lower lifecycle emissions,as energy demand is typically the main driver (Karimpour
et al. 2014; Kristjansdottir et al. 2018). Some suggestions
have been made to include embodied carbon in codes for
new construction, with a focus on cement in concrete in
California as one example (King 2018). Although it is unclear
how quickly such stipulations will be adopted globally, they
could significantly enhance reduced material use and theutilization of low-carbon materials.

7.2.2 Improvements in the yield of material
production and product manufacturing
The use of building information systems and of
prefabrication can reduce waste in the construction
process, thus reducing the amount of primary materials
required (Hertwich et al. 2019).

7.2.3 More intensive use and lifetime extension
Housing demand tends to increase with a growing income,but varies widely across similar GDP/capita levels, from
34 m 2 per person in the United Kingdom to 68 m 2 in the
United States. Such demand is influenced by tradition,planning rules, tax laws and available space. Multifamily
and urban residences tend to be smaller than single family,
suburban and rural residences. In most countries, thetrend is shifting towards a smaller household size, whichis leading to an increase in required space as facilities
are shared between fewer people. Several studies showthat future floor area demand is a crucial variable for
GHG emissions and that more intensive use can resultin significant reductions of both material and energy
related emissions (Serrenho et al. 2019; Cao et al. 2018;
Pauliuk et al. 2013). Such a reduction might be the resultof urbanization (Güneralp et al. 2017), with populations
moving from single family rural and suburban residences
to multifamily houses in denser urban areas, increases
in household size or cohabitation, the smarter design ofbuildings that allow resizing and tax or other incentives
that encourage residents to downsize their residence after
changes in family size (Lorek and Spangenberg 2018). The
International Resource Panel (forthcoming) suggests that
reducing per capita floor space by 20 per cent comparedwith a scenario that converges an industrialized-country’s

59
floor space could reduce the emissions associated withthe production of building materials for homes in G7
members by 50–60 per cent by 2050, given the alreadyexisting building stock. It would also reduce heating
and cooling demand by up to 20 per cent, pending theretrofitting of existing buildings.
Policies that support homeownership may have theundesirable effect of subsidizing large residences throughtax breaks and other measures. In some locations,spatial planning prevents the construction of multifamily
residences and locks in suburban forms at high socialand environmental costs. A reform of planning rules could
bring about multiple benefits in this regard (Jones et al.
2018). One mechanism to increase the intensity of use is tostrengthen incentives for older residents to downsize whenchildren move out. Property taxes as well as an eliminationof taxes on property transactions, such as the stamp dutyin the United Kingdom, can have such an effect.
There is a wide variation in building lifetimes, from less than
25 years in some East Asian countries to more than 100
years in Europe. Extending building lifetimes can therefore
have widely different effect. In China, extending the lifespanof buildings to 50 years could reduce CO 2 emissions by 400
Mt per year or about 20 per cent of construction-related
emissions (Cai et al. 2015). In Europe, new buildings havelower energy use due to improvements in building standards
and technology, with lifetime extensions resulting in higher
total emissions compared with replacement buildings,
unless the building are retrofit to a high energy standard(Serrenho et al. 2019). If only new, efficient buildings have

Figure 7.2. Annual emissions from the construction and operations of buildings in the G7 and in China and India, in a
scenario that follows Shared Socioeconomic Pathway SSP1 to mitigate emissions to below 2°C

Source: International Resource Panel (forthcoming).

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60
their lifetime extended, more modest savings will be had(figure 7.2) (International Resource Panel forthcoming).
Policies requiring energy retrofit during building renovations,such as those of the European Union, could alleviate thetrade-off between emissions savings from lifetime extension
and operational energy use (International Energy Agency
2019b), though optimal strategies can only be identified ona case-by-case basis (Itard and Klunder 2007).

7.2.4 Enhanced recycling and reuse
Recycling of valuable materials is already widespread; reuseof building components is less common. When I-beams arereused, GHG savings can be significant, though there is
the substantial logistical challenge of matching supply anddemand, with reuse practices currently in decline (Densley
Tingley et al. 2017). The recycling of construction anddemolition waste from residential buildings offsets about
13–19 per cent of GHG emissions from building-material
production in the G7. Metals are widely recycled and there
is some recycling of timber and plastics. The use of concreteand other minerals as aggregates can still be improved, butemission savings are less.
Some policy levers are both well-studied and subject toovert policy worldwide. As is the case for recycling of
construction and demolition waste (Brantwood Consulting
2016; Deloitte 2017), many are regulated to achieve othersocial or environmental goals (for example, limits on shortterm lodging in residences), though some are still largely atthe exploratory stage (disassembly of buildings).

7.3

Material-efficient cars

In 2015, light-duty vehicles (LDVs) contributed around 14
per cent or 7.5 GtCO 2 e to global GHG emissions. Of theemissions, 4.7 GtCO 2 e occurred during the operation of thevehicles (International Transport Forum 2019), 1.4 GtCO 2 e
was associated with the production of fuels and another
1.4 GtCO 2 e was associated with the production of thevehicles (Hertwich 2019). Only about half of new vehicles
replaced retired vehicles, with the remainder reflecting a
growth in vehicle stock. G7 members were responsible forclose to 40 per cent of the LDV-related GHG emissions, with
the United States of America representing one quarter ofglobal LDV emissions.

7.3.1 Product lightweighting and material
substitution
Under a business-as-usual scenario, lightweighting vehicles
with materials such as high-strength steel, aluminium or
carbon fibre offers significant emission reductions of
3–6 per cent, if proper recycling of these materials canbe instituted (Løvik et al. 2014; Milovanoff et al. 2019).
The relative emission reductions from lightweighting aresmaller for electric vehicles due to their lower operationalemissions. Fuel-efficiency standards, fuel taxes andregistration fees tied to the fuel economy are policy
instruments that support vehicle lightweighting.

Emissions Gap Report 2019

Downsizing the average size of vehicles is anotherimportant opportunity. In recent years, there has been atrend towards larger, heavier vehicles, such as sports-utility
vehicles (SUVs) and pick-up trucks, which require morematerials and higher operational energy use. Reversingthat trend would reduce emissions substantially. Reducing
the share of SUVs and light trucks in the United States ofAmerica from the current 53 per cent to 32 per cent by 2050
would reduce emissions from the production and operationof cars by 10 per cent. Registration fees tied to CO 2
emissions in some European countries have successfully
reduced the CO 2 emissions rating of the average newvehicle, in part through shifting demand to smaller vehicles(D’Haultfœuille et al. 2016; Yan and Eskeland 2018). Fleetsof shared vehicles tend to be smaller, but still provide users
with transport capacity when it is needed. Encouraging
collective rather than individual vehicle ownership could
therefore help reduce vehicle mass and with this bothmaterial-related and operational emissions.

7.3.2 Improvements in the yield of material
production and car manufacturing
Improvements in the yield of material production and car
manufacturing can contribute modest reductions in material
use and associated emissions (Milford et al. 2013).

7.3.3 More intensive use and lifetime extension
Car sharing, ride sharing and other measures to reduce
individual automobility in favour of shared and collective
transport can substantially reduce material use (Shaheen
and Cohen 2019). Early evidence suggests that car sharing
reduces household vehicle ownership and the averagevehicle size (Chan and Shaheen 2012; Nijland and van
Meerkerk 2017), though it also attracts users of public
transport (Becker et al. 2018). There is also evidence tosuggest that ride-hailing services, such as Uber and Lyft,
can have an adverse effect and lead to increased trafficand vehicle size (Schaller 2017; Yin et al. 2018). Policies
that discourage low-occupancy shared vehicles or penalize
the increased congestion resulting from ride hailing, suchas priority lanes for cars with three or more occupants
or congestion pricing, can improve their environmental
impact and material efficiency (Schaller 2018).
The International Resource Panel (forthcoming) estimatesthat having 25 per cent of drivers shift to car sharing would
reduce emissions by 10 per cent, while shifting 25 per centof trips to shared rides would reduce emissions by 20 per
cent (figure 7.3). In some rich countries, car ownership isalready starting to reduce, especially among younger urban
populations, a trend that can be furthered by tax policies,
parking fees and regulatory and institutional support forshared mobility. Most policies on shared mobility, however,currently focus on regulating drivers and services, rather
than on environmental impacts and use of resources.
Extending the life of materials, through repair, reuse andremanufacturing, may reduce material-related emissions,but could also increase operational emissions when a61
newer car may be more efficient or use a cleaner fuel(Kagawa et al. 2013; Lenski et al. 2013). Much vehicle reuseis connected to the export of vehicles from wealthier topoorer countries, where vehicle recycling is not as wellestablished or sophisticated. In such cases, reuse may
meet unmet needs but at the expense of increasingmaterial-related emissions.
In the future, it is anticipated that individual car ownershipmay be replaced by fleets of self-driving vehicles (Greenblattand Saxena 2015; Jones and Leibowicz 2019), which could
result in a decrease in the number of vehicles needed and anincrease in the use of such vehicles. If unregulated, such atrend will also likely increase driving distances which would
impact emissions and may move people away from using
more efficient public transport. With a policy that discourages
individual ownership and enhances interoperability among

public transport systems, self-driving cars could offer moreride-sharing services and be used as last-mile solutions inpublic transport systems (Hertwich et al. 2019).

7.3.4 Enhanced recycling and reuse
Current recycling of metals from end-of-life vehicles (ELV)
is well established. The International Resource Panel(forthcoming) estimates that recycling of ELV offsets
about half of the emissions in the primary productionof the materials used to make the vehicle. Strengthening
the reuse of components also offers significant savings(International Resource Panel forthcoming; Milford et al.
2013). Within policies, recycling is typically measured interms of recycling rates and landfill diversion rather than
GHG emissions (Sawyer‐Beaulieu and Tam 2006). Adjusting
ELV policies to incorporate considerations of embodied
carbon warrants attention. The recovery of vehicle parts

Figure 7.3. Annual emissions from the manufacturing and use of passenger vehicles in the G7 and in China and India, in a
scenario that follows the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway SSP1 to mitigate emissions to below 2°C

Source: International Resource Panel (forthcoming).

Emissions Gap Report 201962
and the alloy-specific (closed-loop) recycling of metals may
have a larger emissions pay-off than current shredding
practices (Ohno et al. 2017; Sato et al. 2019). This could
be achieved by developing reuse regulations and throughmore standardization across manufacturers. Some GHG
reduction potential is missed because much of the steel
in cars is downcycled to uses that are tolerant to copper
contamination generated in the shredding of ELVs, such as,
for example, reinforcing bar (Daehn et al. 2017). If the mixingof steel and copper in the recycling process were reduced,
recycled steel could be used for higher value uses, such as
car bodies, thereby reducing GHG emissions.

7.4

Summary and link to policy

Research has shown that demand-side material efficiency
offers substantial GHG mitigation opportunities that arecomplementary to those obtained through an energy systemtransformation (see chapter 6). The potential of purely
technical strategies is limited, but considered relatively easy
to achieve, whereas the more intense use of housing andvehicles has larger potential, though it would impact social
structures and lifestyles. Demand-side material efficiency
widens the spectrum of emissions mitigation strategies andmay therefore reduce the need for other risky, contested,unproven or expensive technologies.
Knowledge gaps regarding the link between material
efficiency and climate change mitigation continue toexist, especially regarding the efficacy of policies where
the focus of material efficiency has largely been confinedto the end-of-life stage, such as targets for increased
recycling. Socioeconomic transformations are crucial
to harnessing the full potential of material efficiency, as,for example, greater intensity of use implies significant

Emissions Gap Report 2019changes in use patterns or car ownership. The feasibilityof and pathway towards such transformations in a carbonconstrained world requires further investigation. Moreintensive use is likely have a rebound effect, with money
saved on car ownership being used for vacation travels orother high-emission activities (Makov and Font Vivanco
2018; Underwood and Fremstad 2018). Carbon pricing isa policy tool that can help minimize a rebound effect. It is
important to gain a better understanding of other products
and the coupling of sectors and cascading of materials,
including implications to material quality resulting fromincreased reuse and recycling. Furthermore, the influenceof the urban form, land-use planning and policies onservice demand and consumption patterns need to bebetter understood.
Demand-side material efficiency and related reductions inenergy consumption and GHG emissions could be achieved
through a number of policies, including carbon taxation
on bulk materials (Neuhoff et al. 2016), eco-design laws
(Official Journal of the European Union 2009), green public
procurement (Organisation for Economic Co-operation andEconomic Development [OECD] 2015) or circular economy
strategies (Material Economics 2018), as well as sectorspecific approaches, such as changes in building codes(ICC 2018). However, not all policies aimed at resource
efficiency or circular economy automatically have cobenefits with climate change mitigation. For example, aprolonged product lifetime as a result of policies may undercertain circumstances actually delay the introduction of
more efficient products, thus leading to higher systemwide emissions. Use of life cycle assessments and related
forms of systems measurement, as well as careful andintegrative policy design and evaluation are necessary forthe more efficient use of resources, which will also lead to
reduced emissions.

63
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