DBJ Discussion Paper Series, No.1102

On the Function of Key Currency

Masayuki Otaki(Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo)

November

2011

Discussion Papers are a series of preliminary materials in their draft form. No quotations,reproductions or circulations should be made without the written consent of the authors inorder to protect the tentative characters of these papers. Any opinions, findings,
conclusions or recommendations expressed in these papers are those of the authors and do
not reflect the views of the Institute.

On the Function of Key Currency
Masayuki Otaki
Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo

7-3-1 Hongo Bukyo, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan.
E-mail: ohtaki@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Phone: +81-3-5841-4952

Fax: +81-3-5841-4905

Abstract
Some studies (e.g., Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993)) assert thatthe selection of a currency as a key currency is a kind of hysteresis dominatedby contingencies. However, historical evidence suggests that this selection
depends on some plausible and inevitable economic factors.
This study examines the following factors: overwhelming industrial power
and possession of huge amounts of foreign assets and gold. On the basisof these ample economic potentials, the key-currency country enjoys her
seigniorage in return for the bearing the sovereign risk of the surrounding
countries that accept her currency. Thus, the key-currency system can be
regarded as an international insurance system that relies on the economic
power of the key-currency country.

Key Words: Key-Currency as an Insurance System, Seigniorage,
Sovereign Risk

1

Introduction

Key currencies such as dollar, previously pond-starling, are indispensable
for facilitating the international clearing of numerous deals. However, thecomposition of the selection of the implicit concordance on the selection of
the key currency is not necessarily clear. The paper analyzes this problem.
Some research (e.g., Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993)) suggeststhat the selection of the key currency is determined by an inertia that arises
some contingencies (a kind of hysteresis).1 However, historical evidence
indicates that the selection of a new currency depends on some deﬁnitive
factors.
First, the key-currency country possesses overwhelming industrial powerthat can monopolize even the whole world market. Such power alleviates
the anxiety that the currency mutates only on paper. In other words, money
issued by the key-currency country is implicitly and suﬃciently endorsed bydurable the goods produced by that country. In this sense, holding the key
currency can play the role of insurance as for the other countries (referred
to as surrounding countries hereafter) that face serious domestic production(supply) risks such as sovereign ones.
Second, key-currency countries own huge amounts of foreign assets orgold, which in addition to the huge potential supply capacity, helps in guaranteeing the substantial value of the key currency and enhancing its circulation. These factors seems to be in favor of surrounding countries that accept
the key currency.
On the other hand, the key-currency country also enjoys her own prerogative, that is, seigniorage. Thus, the key-currency system can be regarded asa kind of international insurance system, in which the key-currency country
is implicitly in charge of an insurance company and the surrounding countries are her insurants. In other words, the seigniorage is the insurance fee,and the key currency that is circulated among and within the surrounding
countries correspond to the insurance security.
In what follows, on the basis of Otaki (2007, 2009, 2011), we construct1

See Fukao and Otaki (1993) for the rigorous deﬁnition of hysteresis.

1

an open-economy macroeconomic model which possesses a rigorous microeconomic foundation with a key-currency country, as mentioned above.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we construct amodel that describes the economies of n+1 countries (n is the number of thesurrounding countries and can adequately represent large numbers, and 1 isthe number of the key currencies), and show how the aforementioned implicit
insurance system works. Section 3 deals with the comparative statics andthe welfare analysis of the change in the key-currency supply. Section 4contains the brief concluding remarks.

2

The Model

2.1

Structure of the Model

The model is a two-period overlapping-generations model based on Otaki(2007). Each country produces the same diﬀerentiated goods by monopolistic entrepreneur iz, where i generically refers to the characteristics of thecountry and z refers to that of the good. Each country contains mλi entrepreneurs who receive all earned proﬁts and the seigniorage and (1 − m)λi
employees whose incomes come from only nominal wages.
The key-currency country K is diﬀerentiated from other surrounding
countries S only with respect to the fact that K has an enormous population
λk per generation, while the population of each S is limited by λs (nλs = λk ).
Since the only production resource is labor, which is supplied by that young
generation, this asymmetric assumption implies that the economy of the
key-currency country has a huge potential production power as comparedto the surrounding countries.
In addition, each surrounding country faces a serious supply shock, thoughtemporary, or sovereign risk. However, the key-currency country runs nosuch risk, implies that the production process is far more reliable. For simplicity, when the supply shock is induced, the surrounding country cannot
produce any goods. The probability that is allotted to such a disaster isassumed to be ϵ (0 < ϵ ≪ 1).

2

All individuals possess an identical lifetime utility function Ui :Ui ≡ U (c1ijt , c2ijt ) − δij α,chijt ≡

h{∑−1

[clijt (z)]1−η dz}

1
1−η −1,

η > 1, (1)z=1where U is a well-behaved homothetic function. chijt (z) denotes the consumption of good z of individual j with age l in i th country during periodt. α is the disutility of labor, and δij is a deﬁnition function that takes value
unity when individual j in country i participates and zero when he/she isunemployed. Unit labor produces unit good.2
In this situation, the incentive of insurance emerges between the keycurrency and surrounding countries. That is, instead of allowing the domestic circulation of the key currency and handing over their seigniorage, thesurrounding countries import goods in exchange for the currency when theyexperience the aforementioned problem. Thus, an almost one-sided capitalﬂow (deﬁcit in the key-currency country, surplus in the surrounding countries) emerges, and the key-currency system becomes incentive compatible
and hence sustainable.

2.2
2.2.1

Construction of the Model
Individuals

Since the lifetime consumption utility function is homothetic, the corresponding expenditure function Ψ is represented asΨ ≡ ψ(pt , pt+1 )f (u),

pt ≡

h
{∑

[pt (z)]1−η dz

} 1

1−η

.

(2)

z=1

u is the ﬁxed utility level, and ψ( · ) is an increasing linear homogenous
function of (pt , pt+1 ). To introduce risk aversion into the utility function,
we assume that f ′′ > 0.
2

The assumption the utility function of all individuals in the world are identical isrestrictive. Nonetheless, our main concern is to show that the imbalance in the current
account, namely, the international capital movement, is caused without the diﬀerence ininﬂation rates across countries owing to the diﬀerence in time preferences. From thisperspective, aforementioned assumption seems to be admissible as a simpliﬁcation device.

3

As long as economies are located at the imperfect employment equilibrium, as Otaki (2007, 2009) shows, the equilibrium nominal wage is kept
equal to the nominal reservation wage WtR . The latter wage is easily induced
from Equation (2) as
WtR = ψ(pt , pt+1 )f (α).
2.2.2

(3)

Firms

From the assumption about the instantaneous utility function, the demand
function Dzt for good z that is monopolistically produced by some ﬁrm
becomespt (z) −η] yt ,
pt
where yt is the real GDP in terms of current goods. From the proﬁt maxiDzt ≡ [mization condition and Equation (3), we obtain the following fundamental
diﬀerence equation concerning the evolution of the price level:pt =ψ(pt , pt+1 )f (α)
pt ψ(1, π ∗ )f (α)=,
1 − η −1
1 − η −1

π∗ ≡

pt+1
.
pt

(4)

We must note that Equation (4) holds for all countries including the keycurrency country. Accordingly, the purchasing power of the key currency
can be preserved worldwide because the same equilibrium inﬂation rate π ∗is attained in every country, independent of the nominal money supply of
the key currency.3
In other words, the ﬁxed exchange rate system is sustainable even under perfect capital mobility. Hence, for simplicity, we can assume that thenominal exchange rate is ﬁxed to unity worldwide.
2.2.3

Governments

The government of the key-currency country adopts the following two segregated monetary-ﬁscal policies:
1. The key-currency country supplies domestic money through wasteful government expenditure. The expenditure per capita amounts to
λk G(≡ λk · P g).
3

Otaki (2011) deﬁnes that money as credible in a situation where the nominal money

supply does not aﬀect the price level.

42. Money towards foreign countries (surrounding countries) is deliveredby importing the composite good deﬁned by Equation (1). All imported goods are transferred to young entrepreneurs in the key-currency
country equally.
To keep the analysis as simple and clear as possible, we conﬁne thediscussion into stationary equilibrium. Hence the monetary authority inthe key-currency country sets each real money supply constant. Let us
denote these values as mλk md , mnλs mfj , respectively. j denotes the statesof economy. In state 1, no disturbance occurs and country s enjoys her
consumption. When state 2 occurs, serious supply shock assaults country s,
and she can never produce any good.
First, the key-currency country decides her money supply mf1 before
which state occurs. Second, if state 2 happens, she adjusts money supply
from mf1 to mf2 including economical aid for the surrounding country.
Accordingly, seigniorage per capita S(md , mf1 , mf2 ϵ) enjoyed by the keycurrency country is
S(md , mfj : ϵ) = [1 −= g + {[1 − ϵ][1 −1nmλs fnmλs f]m1 ] − ϵm][md + [1 − ϵ][
∗
π
mλk
mλk 2

1
]mf − ϵmf2 } ≡ g + s(mf1 , mf2 : ϵ).
π∗ 1

(5)

s( · ) on the right-hand side of Equation (5) represents the seigniorage percapita from the surrounding countries which is equal to the transfer to ayoung entrepreneur in the key-currency country.4′5

2.3

Market Equilibrium

Three kinds of markets exist in our model: goods markets, labor markets
and money markets. We can conﬁne our attention to the former two markets
as per the Walras’ law. Each labor market is in interior equilibrium if the

4

Even if the real money stock mf is directly transferred to the young entrepreneurs,

not by indirect transfer assumed in the text, the obtained results are entirely unchanged.
5
The number of surrounding countries n is assumed to be large enough that the law oflarge numbers approximately holds.

5equilibrium nominal wage is equal to the nominal reservation wage WtR .6
Eventually, only the analysis concerning goods markets remains.
Since the lifetime utility function of the consumption stream is assumed
to be homothetic, the consumption function of a young individual in eachcountry Cq is
Ci ≡ c(π ∗ )yqd ,q = k or s,

where yqd is the per capita disposable income of country q. Thus, combining
Equation (5), the equilibrium condition for the aggregate good market in
key-currency country isỹk + s( · ) = c(π ∗ )[ỹk + s( · )] + g += c(π ∗ )[ỹk + s( · )] + md .

1 d
m
π∗
(6)

ỹk is the per capita real GDP in the key-currency country. The third termof the right-hand side on Equation (6) is the per capita real expenditure ofold individuals.
Solving Equation (6) on ỹk , the equilibrium GDP of the key-currency
country isỹk∗ =md− s( · ).
1 − c(π ∗ )(7)Note that the same amount of equilibrium GDP per capita ỹk∗ decreases
with the seigniorage from foreign countries s( · ), while the disposable
income is invariant as long as the real domestic money supply md is kept
constant. The reason for this is that the increment of the savings of young
individuals from real GDP should be entirely crowded out by the increaseof imports funded by the seigniorage, given that the total purchasing powerof the government and old individuals is unchanged.
The equilibrium of the aggregate goods market in each surrounding country is conditional on whether the emergent sovereign risk is induced. Thatis, c(π ∗ )ỹ + mf , with probability 1 − ϵ,
s
1
ỹs =

mf , with probability ϵ.
2

6Regarding the properties of boundary equilibrium, see Otaki (2011).

6

(8)

2.4

Key Currency as an Insurance Device

The indirect utility function Ũ is identical across all countries asŨ = f −1

(

xqj )
,
ψ(1, π ∗ )where xqj is the nominal gain of country q (k, s ∈ q) in state j (j = 1, 2)
obtained from the key-currency system. We must note that the existence of
the utility of employees can be neglected since the world economy is assumed
to have uniformly fallen into the imperfect employment equilibrium where all
employees are indiﬀerent to whether they are employed. By some elementary
calculus (see Otaki (2007, 2009)), the proﬁts earned by an entrepreneur areη −1 ỹ.
Hence xkj and xsj is deﬁned from Equations (6) and (8) as7
 xk1 =

 xs1 =1
η −1
[1 − ∗ ]mf1 ,1 − c(π ∗ )πxk2 = −mf2 ,
η −1
mf1 ,
∗
1 − c(π )xs2 = η −1 mf2 ,with probability 1 − ϵ,(9)with probability ϵ,with probability 1 − ϵ,(10)with probability ϵ.

Since the key-currency country is free from the surrounding countries’
sovereign risks by the law of large numbers, she can behave as if risk-neutralin this matter. In contrast, since f ′′ > 0, each surrounding country becomesaverse to such a risk. In addition, when state 2 occurs, entreprenuers andemployees share the amounts of money mf2 in accordance with the income
distribution rate, η −1 : 1 − η −1 .
Thus, the key currency becomes an implicit insurance device. Thatis, when some urgent necessity leads to a sovereign crisis, the key-currency
country exports her goods in return for her currency hoarded sovereign countries, rather than importing goods in exchange for her seigniorage. Since
7

In addition, in the key-currency country, full-employment equilibrium is desirable.

Since the decision regarding how much money she should supply for this purpose can beseparated from that regarding how much seigniorage she will receive, we can concentrateon the seigniorage problem without discussing the domestic economic problem in the key
currency.

7

small surrounding countries are risk averse, such a system is incentive compatible with both countries.
Figure 1 shows the optimal insurance contract for the key-currency
country. This ﬁgure is a square Edgeworth’s box diagram with sides ofη −1 λs which is equal to the maximal proﬁts of a surrounding country.
η −1 λs (λs ≤ λs ) is the upper bound of the real proﬁts that a surrounding country can earn without the help of the key-currency network.
Line IKC is the break-even contract for the key-currency country. The
downward shift of the line indicates that the key-currency country gains
more advantage and proﬁts from this contract.
Curves ISA , ISB , ISC are indiﬀerence curves of the representative surrounding country in terms of real income. Since f ′′ is assumed to be positive,
the curves become strictly concave.
The incentive-compatible optimal contract that maximizes the gain of
the key-currency is depicted by Point Ehigh in Figure 1. The representative surrounding country completely hedges against the sovereign risk andobtains a ﬁxed real GDP.8 Moreover, the concavity of the utility function
indicates that surrounding countries can improve by the negotiation withthe key-currency country.

3

Comparative Statics

3.1

Sovereign Risk and the Supply of the Key Currency

Here we consider a comparative static analysis concerning the sovereign risk
ϵ. Whenever such a risk is mitigated and ϵ takes smaller value, as illustrated
by Point Elow in Figure 1, the key currency country purchases more goods,
resulting in more money being supplied to surrounding countries. Thus, thereal GDP increases in every surrounding country. In contrast, the real GDP
8

From Equation (10),η −1 mf1= η −1 mf2
1 − c(π ∗ )⇔mf1 = [1 − c(π ∗ )]mf2 ,holds. It implies that the ex-ante real money supply is always kept mf1 independent of
the state of the previous period. Therefore, the description of equilibrium is consistent.

8

in the key-currency country decreases owing to complete crowding out by
increased imports (see Equation (7)).
In addition, Figure 1 clearly shows that surrounding countries improvetheir economic welfare by reducing the risk. On the other hand, the welfareof the key-currency country is( η −1 y + s(mf , mf : ϵ) )( [1 − η
k
−1
1
2
f −1
=
f
ψ(1, π ∗ )−1 ]s(mf , mf : ϵ) +1
2

ψ(1, π ∗ )η −1 md
1 − c(π ∗ ) ).

(11)
The ﬁrst term of the bracket represents the utility derived from seigniorage.
Since the key-currency country can get various goods without working, andeconomize wage payments, of which distribution ratio is 1 − η −1 . Thus,
although the increasing in money supply to the surrounding countries improves key-currency country’s welfare, and the current account imbalance
and unemployment become prominent.

3.2

The International Common Currency

First, we shall deﬁne the international common currency comparing it withthe key-currency system.
Deﬁnition 1 The international common currency is diﬀerent from the keycurrency system with the respect to the fact that the net gain per capita
from issuing currency towards surrounding countries s(ϵ) is attributed tothe common property, not the monopoly prerogative, as in the case of the
key-currency system.
Under this deﬁnition, the proﬁt-maximizing point Ehigh is no longer eﬃcientbecause the monopoly rent should be distributed among the surrounding
countries equally. This implies that the combination of the origin Ok on
the break-even line IKC and the indiﬀerence curve ISC of the representative
surrounding country oﬀers the most eﬃcient allocation. Every country canhedge against her sovereign risk and earn a larger real GDP, since suﬃcientcurrency is supplied to enhance the eﬀective demand.
However, the conﬂict of interest emerges between the former key-currency
country, now which turns to the founder of the world common currency, and9surrounding countries. This is because the monopolized seigniorage has
saved labor force and wage payment. It is clear from Equation (11) thatthe welfare of the former key-currency is lessened by the construction of theinternational common currency.9

3.3

Vulnerability of the Key-Currency System

Insurance cannot be eﬀective against macroeconomic synchronized shocks.
War is the most illustrative example. In World War II, the U.K. was heavily
indebted to the U.S. for the munitions for Egypt, India, and herself. In
addition to the weakened industrial power, such indebtedness resulted in aserious outﬂow of gold from the U.K. This is considered to be one of the
primary reasons that the U.K. abdicated the right to be the key-currency
country.
Although, strictly speaking, this example may be considered beyond
the scope of this theory because the unlimited emancipation of capital ﬂow
strengthens the international cohesion of the business cycle. In this situation, experiencing diﬃculties in sustaining the key-currency system is expected.

4Concluding Remarks

This article describes the key-currency system as a kind of international
insurance against idiosyncratic sovereign risk. The results obtained are as
follows.
First, the risk is completely hedged under the key-currency system. As
the risk decreases, the key-currency country supplies more money, resulting
in the expansion of the surrounding countries. In this sense, the means of
reduce the sovereign risk is crucial for developing the economy. However
this, in turn, indicates that the of trade balance deﬁcit in the key-currency
9

The problem regarding the ownership of the worldwide seigniorage is a very sensitive

problem. For example, at the Bretton Woods conference, the proposal for the worldcommon currency, Unitas, was not accepted after all. Furthermore, Keynes strived hard
to maintain pond starling as a key currency. See Moggridge (1992, Ch.28, 29) for details.

10country becomes prominent.
Second, the world common currency founded by the former key-currency
country can provide more money and improve the worldwide economic welfare except for the key-currency country. This is partly because the net
seigniorage that the key-currency country receives is entirely distributed tothe surrounding countries and stimulates their economies, partly becausesuch emancipation of the monopolized seigniorage is harmful to the economic welfare of the key-currency country.
Finally, we must consider the threat of serious macroeconomic shocks.
When the surrounding countries simultaneously fall into a serious slump
and move to convert the key currency into goods (or gold), the key-currency
system cannot be sustainable.

References[1] Fukao, K., and Otaki, M., ‘Accumulation of human capital and thebusiness cycle’, Journal of Political Economy 101 (1993), pp.72-99.
[2] Matsuyama, K., Kiyotaki, N., and Matsui, A., ‘Toward a theory ofinternational currency , Review of Economic Studies 60 (1993), pp.
283-307.
[3] Moggridge, D. E. Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography, (1992),
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[4] Otaki, M. ‘The dynamically extended Keynesian cross and the welfare
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11η −1 λs

xk1
xs2

IKA

Ok

IKB
ISC

IKC
Elow

η −1 λs

Ehigh
ISB
ISA

45◦
Os

1−ϵ
ϵ

Figure 1xk2
η −1 λ12s

xs1

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松本和幸・吉川洋「高齢化と消費需要」2002年3月．
Hanazaki, Masaharu and Akiyoshi Horiuchi, "The Ups and Downs of the Financial System in Postwar Japan―Evidence from the Manufacturing Sector－,"December 2001.
古泉忠宏「情報の非対称性と投資・金利設定の選択」2001年10月．
松本和幸・吉川洋「需要構造の変動と経済成長」2001年4月．
Okubo, Masakatsu, "Econometric Evaluation of the Lack of Risk Sharing and Imperfect Financial Integration,"
March 2001.
Sakurai, Kojiro, "How Does Trade Affect the Labor Market? Evidence from Japanese Manufacturing,"
March 2001.
松本和幸「ITと生産性に関する実証上の諸問題」2001年3月．
Hanazaki, Masaharu and Akiyoshi Horiuchi, "Efficiency of the Japanese Financial System in the Postwar
Period," July 2000.
Matsumoto, Kazuyuki, "A comparison of Japanese and U.S. price indexes and a new approach to theirmeasurement," June 2000.
Dekle, Robert, "Exchange Rates and Corporate Exposure: Evidence from Japanese," April 2000.
松本和幸「サービス価格の推計手法について」2000年3月.
松本和幸「日米経済と国際競争」2000年1月.

ii

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JDB Discussion Paper Series
9904
9903
9902
9901
9804
9803
9802
9801
9703
9702
9701
9602
9601
9501

9407
9406-39406-2
9406
9405
9404
9403
9402
9401
9317
9316
9315
9314
9313
9312
9311
9310
9309
9308

Ong-Giger, Kim, "Japanese IT Development: Implications for FDI in Southeast Asia," September 1999.
松本和幸「国際競争力に関するサーベイと実証」1999年8月.
瀬名浩一「ゴールドプラン政策の分析と評価」1999年6月.
Hanazaki, Masaharu and Akiyoshi Horiuchi, "A Vacuum of Governance in the Japanese Bank Management,"
April 1999.
Sakurai, Kojiro, "Biased Technological Change and Japanese Manufacturing Employment," March 1999.
Learmount, Simon, "Approaching Japanese Corporate Governance," July 1998.
斉藤孝「戦間期日本における農工間賃金格差」1998年7月.
Hanazaki, Masaharu and Akiyoshi Horiuchi, "Financial Fragility in Japan: A Governance Issue, " June 1998.
Sakashita, Noboru, "An Analytical Model of the Tiebout Process: Numerical Simulations," December 1997.
中里透「地域間所得移転と経済成長－開発政策の政治経済分析－」1997年11月.
Sena, Koichi, "A Comparative Study of Japan and the US Regarding Taxation Policy on Non-Profit
Organizations in the Medical Industry," October 1997.
浅子和美・國則守生・井上徹・村瀬英彰「設備投資と土地投資：1977-1994」1997年3月.
高橋正博「アジアにおける地域の国際ネットワーク化試論－ネットワークの論理的考察とその応用としてのアジア重層ネットワーク構想－」1996年8月.
鈴木和志・小川一夫「土地価格の変動と設備投資－日本の製造業に関するパネルデータによる分析－」
1995年4月.
Hilpert, Hanns Günther, "The Market, the State and the Dragon: A Contribution to the Debate on Economic
Growth in the Asia-Pacific Region," March 1995.
森谷英樹「大都市私鉄の運賃改定とその過程の研究－1985～1995年－」1995年10月.
森谷英樹「大都市私鉄の運賃改定とその過程の研究－1966～1984年－」1995年8月.
森谷英樹「大都市私鉄の運賃改定とその過程の研究－1966～1995年－」1995年2月.
Kuo, Wen-jeng, "Japan at the Crossroads: Perspectives of a Foreign Economist," September 1994.
Callon, Scott, "Different Paths: The Rise of Taiwan and Singapore in the Global Personal Computer Industry,"
August 1994.
Callon, Scott, "Unleashing Japan’s Venture Business Sector: Problems and Policies for Reform," August 1994.
Suzuki, Kazuyuki and Kazuo Ogawa, "The Structure of Adjustment Costs and Investment Behavior under
Uncertainty in Heavy Industry: Evidence from Japanese Panel Data," July 1994.
森谷英樹「大都市私鉄の運賃改定とその過程の研究－1945～1965年－」1994年4月.
Selover, David D., "Interdependence Between the United States and Japan: A Vector Autoregression
Approach," January 1993.
杉原弘恭「日本のコモンズ「入会」」1994年3月.
Suzuki, Kazuyuki, "Production Technology and Productivity Growth in the Japanese Electrical Machinery
Industry," November 1993.
茂木愛一郎「世界のコモンズ－スリランカと英国の事例を踏まえて－」1994年3月.
Matsumura, Toshihiro, "Endogenous Timing in Switch of Technology with Marshallian Externalities," March
1994.
Selover, David D., "The Japanese Saving Rate: Another Literature Review," January 1994.
Selover, David D., "The Japanese Household Saving Function: A Time Series Econometric Analysis, " January
1994.
Yamane, Linus, "A Stylized Macroeconomic Comparison of the U.S. and Japan," June 1993.
Yamane, Linus, "The Effect of Unions on Employment in Japan and the United States, " June 1993.
Yamane, Linus, "Differences in Economic Fluctuations in Japan and the United States: A New Keynesian
Perspective," June 1993.

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9307
9306
9305
9304
9303
9302
9301
9214
9213
9212
9211
9210
9209
9208
9207
9206
9205
9204
9203
9202
9201
9108
9107
9106
9105
9104
9103
9102
9101
9008
9007
9006
9005
9004
9003
9002
9001
8905
8904

Suzuki, Kazuyuki and Kazuo Ogawa, "The Structure of Adjustment Costs and Investment Behavior under
Uncertainty in Heavy Industry: Evidence from Japanese Panel Data," June 1993.
茂木愛一郎「東欧における金融政策について」1993年6月.
宮川努「『貸し渋り』と審査機能－非製造業中小企業の設備投資を中心として－」1993年5月.
Matsumura, Toshihiro, "A Bargaining Approach to Borrowing Diversification: A Study of the Japanese Main
Bank System," May 1993.
根津智治「わが国の金融史と企業の資金調達（メモ）」1993年3月.
森谷英樹「大都市私鉄の投資と公的助成－地方鉄道補助法とその評価－」1993年1月.
Miyagawa, Tsutomu, and Jyoji Tokui, "An Open Economy Approach to the Growth of Tertiary Industries inJapan," January 1993.
竹田陽介「景気循環における中央銀行の政策スタンス」1992年11月.
宮川努・玄田有史・出島敬久「就職動向の時系列分析」1992年10月.
Sharkey, John, "The Political and Economic Impact of Japanese Cotton Piece-Good Competition in India,
1918-1933," October 1992.
竹田陽介「設備投資と株式市場」1992年9月.
Rebick, Marcus E., "Rewards in the Afterlife: The Importance of Late Career Job Placements as Incentives in
the Japanese Firm," July 1992.
Matsumura, Toshihiro, "Piece Regulations and Strategic Investment," June 1992.
千明誠・竹田陽介「80年代における完全雇用経常収支の動向」1992年6月.
吉田健一郎「親会社業績と関係会社の配当－関係会社株式の評価基準に関連して－」1992年6月.
森谷英樹「鉄道運賃・収支と設備投資－運賃改定と設備投資の実証分析（その1）－」1992年5月.
根津智治「アメリカの金融制度改革における銀行隔離論」1992年4月.
Matsumura, Toshihiro, "Market for Lemons and Forward Induction," March 1992.
宇沢弘文「農業自由化と近代経済学」1992年2月.
宮川努「設備投資分析の新展開－誤差修正モデルによる設備投資関数の検証－」1992年2月.
Matsumura, Toshihiro, "Dividends as a Coordination Device," January 1992.
浅子和美・堀内行蔵・茂木愛一郎「大都市の財政問題－ニューヨークと東京－」1991年11月.
Werner, Richard A., "Japanese Capital Outflows and the Role of Land Asset Appreciation," September 1991.
小川善弘「最適都市の構造－都市間の均衡と社会的共通資本－」1991年7月.
Tokui, Jyoji, and Tsutomu Miyagawa, "Price competitiveness and the Investment Behavior in Japanese
Manufacturing Industries," May 1991.
Genda, Yuji, "Does the Performance Bond Work in the Japanese Labor Market?," May 1991.
竹村弘「東京が豊かで地方が貧しいか」1991年5月.
森谷英樹「大都市圏私鉄の設備投資について」1991年5月.
根津智治「日米主要企業の資本構成」1991年5月.
浅子和美・國則守生・井上徹・村瀬英彰「設備投資と資金調達－連立方程式モデルによる推計－」
1990年9月.
Uzawa, Hirohumi, "Theory of Imputations and Global Warming," November 1990.
照山博司・村瀬英彰「日本の銀行貸出市場の不均衡計量分析－サーベイ・データによる局面分離を用いて－」1990年8月.
Tokui, Jyoji, and Tsutomu Miyagawa, "The Real Effective Exchange Rate and the Investment Behavior inJapanese Manufacturing Industries," August 1990.
堀内行蔵「日本の製造業のパフォーマンス」1990年8月.
徳井丞次・宮川努「わが国製造業の国際競争力と設備投資」1990年8月.
根津智治「貯蓄・投資と金利機能」1990年4月.
冨田博一「わが国企業のＭ＆Ａ」1990年2月.
浅子和美・國則守生・井上徹・村瀬英彰「土地評価とトービンのｑ／Multiple qの計測」1989年9月.
根津智治「セキュリタライゼーションと公的部門の金融活動」1989年5月.
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8903
8902
8901
8805
8804
8803
8802
8801

堀内昭義「証券化－金融システムの構造変化についての分析－」1989年5月.
桜井宏二郎「金融構造と実体経済」1989年5月.
堀内行蔵「レーガノミックスの乗数分析」1989年3月.
岡田羊祐「技術移転論の動向－プロダクトサイクル論を中心として－」1988年12月.
Suzuki, Kazuyuki, and Jyoji Tokui, "Misalignment of the Yen-Dollar Exchange Rate and the International
Competitiveness of the Manufacturing Industries in Japan and the United States," November 1988.
Murase, Hideaki, "Monetary Policy Games in a Stochastic Environment: Does Discretionary Monetary Policy
Cause Stagflation?," November 1988.
國則守生「経済的償却率の推計－我が国建設機械の例－」1988年10月.
石黒隆司・堀内行蔵「先進国の現状と問題点：1980年代－変化と不均衡の時代－」1988年9月.

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JDB Discussion Paper Series