Copyright© Judy Wajcman 1991
First published 1991 in the United States by
The Pennsylvania State University Press,
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Second printing 1996
All rights reservedISBN 0-271-00801-6 (cloth)ISBN 0-271-00802-4 (paper)
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Wajcman, Judy.
Feminism confronts technology/Judy Wajcman.
p.
cm.
)and index.
Includes bibliographical references (p.
ISBN 0-271-00801-6 (cloth): $25.00. ISBN 0-271-00802-4 (paper): $11.95
1. Technology-Social aspects. 2. Feminist criticism.
I. Title.
HM221. W35 1991
91-18539
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Printed in Great Britain

Contents

Acknowledgementsvi

Prefaceviii

1

Feminist Critiques of Science"and Technology

2

The Technology of Production: Making a Job of
Gender27

3

Reproductive Technology: Delivered into Men's Hands

54

4

Domestic Technology: Labour-saving or Enslaving?

81

5

The Built Environment: Women's Place, Gendered
Space

110

Technology as Masculine Culture

137

Conclusion

162

Bibliography

168

Index

181

6

1

Acknowledgements

In acknowledging the help I received in producing this book, I must
begin with Jenny Earle. She not only read and expertly edited every
chapter, but discussed with me all the ideas, intellectual and political.
I am indebted to her for constant support and encouragement
throughout the entire process.
I started out intending to write an article - it was Donald
MacKenzie who suggested I might as well write a book. I have often
cursed him since! Now it is finished I can thank him for his suggestion
and for initially fostering my interest in this area. He and Tony
Giddens have seen the book through from beginning to end, promptly
reading its many drafts and exhorting me to continue through despondency and ill-humour. I am grateful to them both and relieved that
our friendships have survived. Cynthia Cockburn also read many
drafts and her belief in the project was likewise very important to me.
The research and writing for the most part took place while I wasa visitor at the Department of Applied Economics at Cambridge
University. As in the past, this was an excellent workplace for me. I
would like to thank Bob Blackbum, who arranged my visit, Ken
Prandy, Jeremy Edwards, Lucia Hanmer and Kath Wilson all of whom
made me welcome and were a continuing source of encouragement.
While in Cambridge, I was most fortunate to live in a householdwith Ros Morpeth and Loi Sullivan. They were both extremely
generous to me, from patiently engaging about the ideas in the bookto fixing my bicycle! In particular, I am grateful to Ros for her warm
hospitality and unswerving friendship. I am indebted to many otherfriends in Cambridge, London and Edinburgh and I would particularly like to mention Karen Greenwood, Lynn Jamieson, Archie
Onslow, Mary Ryan and Michelle Stanworth. For their helpfulcomments on particular chapters and for inspiring me with their own
work, I must thank Ruth Schwartz Cowan, Sandra Harding, Maureen
McNeil and others associated with the UK Gender and Information
Technology Network. The last stages of the manuscript wereAcknowledgements

vii

completed when I returned to Australia and I would like to thankPauline Garde, Richard Gillespie, Carol Johnson, Belinda Probert,
Stuart Rosewarne and especially Michael Bittman for helping me withthe final draft.
I had the benefit of a small research grant from the University of
New South Wales and the Australian Research Council. I am gratefulto Alex Heron, Karen Hughes, Jocelyn Pixley, Alison Tilson andespecially Mandy Wharton for their exemplary, if all too brief,
research assistance.
This is by no means an exhaustive list of contributors to my thinking
and writing on gender and technology. A project with as broad asweep as this, extending over an intensive two-year period, has ofcourse involved me in numerous conversations particularly with otherfeminists working in the area. Feeling part of a collective feminist
endeavour has sustained me and I hope the end product usefully contributes to this ongoing work, '::"'

Preface

Over the last two decades feminists have identified men's monopolyof technology as an important source of their power; women's lackof technological skills as an important element in our dependence onmen. From Women in Manual Trades, set up in the early 1970s to
train women in traditionally male skills, to the Women and Computing courses of the 1980s, feminist groups and campaigns haveattempted to break men's grip on technical expertise and to win greater
autonomy and technical competence for women. In the same period,
women's efforts to control their own fertility have extended fromabortion and contraception to. mobilizing around the new reproductive technologies. With dramatic advances in biotechnology and theprospect of genetic engineering, women's bodies have in some respects
become increasingly vulnerable to exploitation.
These and other political struggles around technology, and the difficulties they continue to confront, have opened up an exciting new
field in feminist scholarship. To date however, most contributions
to the debate on gender and technology have been of a somewhat
specialist character, focused on a particular type of technology. This
book represents an attempt at a more coherent approach, bringing
together under one theoretical framework a number of different sitesof technology. It is my intention both to explicate and to extend the
newly emerging feminist analysis.
Turning to social science debates about technology we find a preoccupation with the impact of technological change on society. Many
commentators, for example, claim we are in the midst of a microelectronic revolution, which will cause a radically new form of society
to emerge. Regardless of their theoretical or political perspectives,
women rarely enter their field of vision. Feminists have worked to put
women and gender relations back into this frame, highlighting thedifferential effects of technological change on women and men.
Although still largely concerned with 'effects', feminists also point
beyond the relations of paid production to a recognition that

Prefaceix

technology impinges on every aspect of our public and private lives.
While I will be engaging with these issues, I also intend to take theanalysis into less charted waters.
The technological determinism implicit in much of both thesociological and feminist literature on the impact of technology has
recently been subjected to criticism. The new sociology of technology
has turned th~ focus around to examine the social factors that shapetechnological changes. Rather than only looking at the effects of technology on society, it also looks at the effects of society on technology.
The Social Shaping of Technology (1985), which I co-edited with
Donald MacKenzie, was part of this project. As an edited collection,that book was to some extent deficient in its treatment of genderissues, reflecting the state of knowledge at that time. This book is
motivated by a desire to redress the balance, exploring in more depth
women's relationship to and experience of technology. Rather thanproviding a comprehensive>r~v• of the now burgeoning literaturein this area, I have selected research which can best exemplify the centrality of gender relations to the social shaping approach.
I have not attempted to encompass here all forms of technology.
I have not, for example, dealt with the technologies of surveillanceand political control, nor with energy technology. Various aspects
of information and communi~ation technologies have also beeri
excluded. I have chosen to concentrate on advanced industrial
societies, and the book has few references to the major issues concerning technology in the Third World. There is now an extensive
literature on how technology transfer to the Third World has a powerful tendency to reinforce male dominance. 1 In the end, the sheer
scope of the topic prohibited its inclusion.
The book begins with an overview of feminist theories of scienceand technology. In this first chapter, I argue that the feminist critiqueof science cannot simply be translated into a feminist perspective ontechnology. Although useful parallels can be drawn, technology needs
to be understood as more than applied science. The following chaptershave a less abstract focus and are organized around substantive areasof technology. Each chapter begins by looking at the impact of technological change on sexual divisions and goes on to develop the argument that technology itself is gendered. 2
Chapter 2 assesses the impact of production technologies on sexual
divisions in the sphere of paid work. It then looks at the extent towhich these divisions, and gender relations in the workplace, themselves profoundly affect the direction and pace of technologicalchange.

..

x Preface

Perhaps it is the new technologies of human biological reproductionthat have been most vigorously contested, both intellectually andpolitically, by feminists in recent years. Chapter 3 explores the arguments, placing them in the wider context of the growing supremacyof technology in Western medicine.
There is now a substantial body of feminist writing on domestic
technologies and their bearing on housework. Chapter 4 examines thisresearch in conjunction with more mainstream (malestream) sociological theories regarding the impact of technologies on the 'postindustrial' home.
Chapter 5 deals with the built environment. The first section considers the design of houses and their urban location. I argue thatsexual divisions are literally built into houses and indeed into thewhole structure of the urban system. The last section scrutinises transport technology and demonstrates how women in particular have been
disadvantaged by the design of cities around the automobile.
Picking up on issues from the previous four chapters, chapter 6
presents an analysis of technology as a masculine culture. I argue thatthe close affinity between technology and the dominant ideology ofmasculinity itself shapes the production and use of particular technologies. The correspondingly tenuous nature of women's relationshipto this technical culture is the subject of the second part of the chapter.
In the conclusion, I hope to convince the reader that a recognitionof the profoundly gendered character of technology need not lead topolitical pessimism or total rejection of existing technologies. The
argument that women's relationship to technology is a contradictory
one, c.ombined with the realization that technology is itself a social
construct, opens up fresh possibilities for feminist scholarship andaction.
NOTESI For an introduction to this literature, see McNeil's (1987, pp. 227-9)
bibliography on 'Development, The "Third World" and Technology'. See
also Ahmed (1985).
2 Throughout this book I use the term 'sex' and 'gender' interchangeably.
This is sym,ptomatic of the blurred boundaries that mark the distinction
between what is construed as 'natural' and what is construed as 'social'.

1
Feminist Critiques of Scienceand Technology
Writing in 1844 about relations between men and women, Marx said
that '[iJt is possible to judge from this relationship the entire level ofdevelopment of mankind' (1975, p. 347). More commonly it is thelevel of scientific and technological development that is taken as theindex of a society's advancement. Our icons of progress are drawn
from science, technology and'~edicine; we revere that which isdefined as 'rational' as distinct from that which is judged 'emotional'.
As we approach the twenty-first century however we are no longer
sure whether science and technology are the solution to world problems, such as environmental degradation, unemployment and war, or
the cause of them. It is not surprising therefore that the relationshipbetween science and society is currently being subjected to profoundand urgent questioning.
The development of a feminist perspective on the history and philosophy of science is a relatively recent endeavour. Although this field
is still quite small and by no means coherent, it has attracted moretheoretical debate than the related subject of gender and technology.
It will become apparent in what follows, however, that feminists
pursued similar lines of argument when they turned their attention
from science to technology. I will therefore start by examining someapproaches to the issue of gender and science, before moving on tolook at technology.
0

The Sexual Politics of Science
The interest in gender and science arose out of the contemporary
women's movement and a general concern for women's position in theprofessions. Practising feminist scientists have questioned the historical and sociological relationships between gender and science at least
since the early 1970s. The publication of biographical studies of great
women scientists served as a useful corrective to mainstream histories

2

Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

of science in demonstrating that women have in fact made important
contributions to scientific endeavour. The biographies of RosalindFranklin and Barbara McClintock, by Anne Sayre (1975) and Evelyn
Fox Keller (1983)respectively, are probably the best known examples.
Recovering the history of women's achievements has now become an
integral part of femini.()tscholarship in a wide range of disciplines.
However. as the extent and intransigent quality of women's exclusionfrom science became tnore apparent, the approach gradually shiftedfrom looking at exceptional women to examining the general patternsof women's participation.
There is now considerable evidence of the ways in which women
have achieved only limited access to scientific institutions, and of thecurrent status of women within the scientific profession. Many studies
have identified the structural barriers to women's participation, looking at sex discrimination in employment and the kind of socializationand education that girls receive which have channelled them away fromstudying mathematics and science. Explaining the under-representationof women in science education, laboratories and scientific publications, this research correctly criticises the construction and characterof Jeminine identity and behaviour encouraged by our culture.
However these authors mainly pose the solution in terms of getting
more women to enter science - seeing the issue as one of access to
education and employment. Rather than questioning science itself,such stu(lies assume that science is a noble profession and a worthy
pursuit .and that if girls were given the right opportunities and encouragement they would gladly become scientists in proportion to their
numbers in the population. It follows that remedying the current deficiency is seen as a problem which a combination of different socialization. processes and equal opportunity policies would overcome.
This approach, as Sandra Harding (I 986) and others have pointed
out, locates the problem in women (their socialization, their aspirations and values) and does not ask the broader questions of whether
and in what way science and its institutions could be reshaped toaccommodate women. The equal opportunity recommendations,moreover, ask women to exchange major aspects of their genderidentity for a masculine version without prescribing a similar 'degendering'process for men. For example, the current career structure for a professional scientist dictates long unbroken periods of intensive study
and research which simply do not allow for childcare and domestic
responsibilities. In order to succeed women would have to model themselves on men who have traditionally avoided such commitments. The

Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

3equal opportunities strategy has had limited success precisely because
it fails to challenge the division of labour by gender in the wider
society. The cultural stereotype of science as in1txtricably linked withmasculinity is also crucial in explaining the small number of womenin science. If science is seen as an activity appropriate for men, thenit is hardly surprising t.hat girls usually do not want to develop theskills and behaviours considered necessary for success in science.
When feminists first turned their attention to science itself, theproblem was conceived as one of the uses and abuses to which sciencehas been put by men. Feminists have highlighted the way in whichbiology has been used to make a powerful case for biologically determined sex roles. Biology has been central to the promotion of a viewof women's nature as different and inferior, making her naturally
incapable of carrying out scientific work. For example, sex differencesin visual-spatial skills are said t(.) explain why there are so many moremale scientists. ln confronti1'g biological determinists, many
feminists inquired as to how and why the study of sex differences had
become a priority of scientific investigation. They set out to demonstrate that biological inquiry, and indeed Western science as a whole,were consistently shaped by masculine biases. This bias is evident,
they argued, not only in the definition of what counts as a scientificproblem but alsoin the interpretations of research. It followed thatscience could not be genuinely objective until the masculine bias waseliminated. As we shall see below, this approach leaves unchallenged
the existing methodological norms of scientific inquiry and identifies
only bad science and not science-as-usual as the problem.
The radical political movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s
also began with the question of the use and abuse of science. In theircampaigns against an abused, militarized, and polluting science theyargued that science was directed towards profit and warfare. Initiallyscience itself was seen as neutral or value-free and useful as long as
it was in the hands of those working for a just society. Gradually,
however, the radical science movement developed a Marxist analysisof the class character of science and its links with capitalist methodsof production. A revived political economy of science began to argue
that the growth and nature of modern science was related to the needsof capitalist society. Increasingly tied to the state and industry, science
had become directed towards domination. The ideology of science asneutral was seen as having a specific historical development. One of
the most characteristic formulations of this position, associated withthe radical science movement, was that 'science is social relations'.

4

Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

The point was that the distinction between science and ideology could
not be sustained because the dominant social relations of society atlarge are constitutive of science.
During this same period a radical shift took place in the history,
philosophy and sociology of science, which added weight to the viewthat science could no lenger be understood simply as the discovery of
reality. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions ( 1970)
marked the beginning of what was to become a major new field ofstudy known as the sociology of scientific knowledge.' Its central
premise is that scientific knowledge, like all other forms of knowledge, is affected at the most profound level by the society in which
it is conducted.
Much research has examined the circumstances in which scientists
actually produce scientific knowledge and has demonstrated howsocial interests shape this knowledge. Studies provide many instancesof scientific theories drawing models and images from the wider
society. It has also been demonstrated that social and political considerations enter into scientists' evaluations of the.truth or falsity ofdifferent theories. Even what is considered as 'fact', established byexperiment and observation, is social. Different groups of scientists
in different circumstances have produced radically different 'facts'.
Numerous historical and contemporary studies of science, and thesocial processes through which inquiry proceeds, highlight the social
aspects of scientific knowledge.
Despite the advances that were made through the critique of science
inthe 1970s, gender-conscious accounts were rare. The social studies
of natural science systematically avoided examining the relationshipbetween gender and science in either its historical or sociologicaldimensions. Similarly, the radical science movement focused almost
exclusively on the capitalist nature of science ignoring the relationshipof science to patriarchy. In short, gender did not figure as an analytical tool in either of these accounts of science.
It is only during the last decade with writers such as Carolyn
Merchant (1980), Elizabeth Fee (1981), Evelyn Fox Keller (1985),
Brian Easlea (1981), Nancy Hartsock (1983), Hilary Rose (1983) andLudmilla Jordanova (1980) that Western science has been labelled as
inherently patriarchal. 2 As Sandra Harding (1986) expresses it,
feminist criticisms of science had evolved from asking the 'woman
question' in science to asking the more radical 'science question' in
feminism. Rather than asking how women can be more equitably
treated within and by science, they ask 'how a science apparently so
deeply involved in distinctively masculine projects can possibly beFeminist Critiques of Science and Technology

5

used for emancipatory ends' (p. 29). It is therefore time to consider
the main feminist critiques of science itself.

Scientific Knowledge as Patric rchal Knowledge
The concern with a gender analysis of scientific knowledge can betraced back to the women's health movement that developed in Britain
and America during the 1970s. Regaining knowledge and control over
women's bodies - their sexuality and fertility - was seen as crucial towomen's liberation. Campaigns for improved birth control and abortion rights were central to the early period of second-wave feminism.
There was a growing disenchantment with male medical theories andpractices. The growth and consolidation of male expertise at theexpense of both women's health: and women's healing skills was thetheme of an American study;'"Witches, Midwives and Nurses: A
History of Women Healers (Ehrenreich and English, 1976). This
documented how the growth and prof essionalization of maledominated medicine had led to the marginalization of female healthworkeri,. At the same time, critiques of psychiatry and the treatmentof women's depression as pathological were being expounded. Asking
why the incidence of mental illness should be higher among womenthan men, feminists exposed the sexist bias in medical definitions ofmental health and illness. Implicit in these analyses was a convictionthat women could develop new kinds of knowledge and skills, drawing
on their own experience and needs. The insights of the radical science
movement contributed to the view of medical science as a repositoryof patriarchal values.
If medical scientific knowledge is patriarchal, then what about therest of science? As Maureen McNeil (1987) points out, it was a shortstep to the emergence of a new feminist politics about scientific knowledge in general. Some feminists re-examined the Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, arguing that thescience which emerged was fundamentally based on the masculine
projects of reason and objectivity. They characterized the conceptual
dichotomizing central to scientific thought and to Western philosophy
in general, as distinctly masculine. Culture vs. nature, mind vs. body,reason vs. emotion, objectivity vs. subjectivity, the public realm vs.
the private realm - in each dichotomy the former must dominate
the latter and the latter in each case seems to be systematicallyassociated with the feminine. The general issue of whether conceptual
dichotomizing is itself distinctly masculine or part of the Western

6

Feminist

Critiques of Science and Technology

philosophical tradition is beyond the scope of this book. 3 My concern is with the way dualistic gender metaphors such as those used
above reveal the underlying social meanings in purportedly valueneutral scientific thought.
There has been a growing awareness of the use of female metaphorsfor nature and natural metaphors for women. An examination of thetexts of science highlights the correspondence between the way men
treated women in particular historical periods and the way they usednature. Some feminist historians have focused on the rape and torture
metaphors in the writings of Sir Francis Bacon and the other fathersof modern science. Merchant (1980) argues that during the fifteenth
to seventeenth centuries in Europe both nature and scientific inquiry
were conceptualized in ways modelled on men's most violent andmisogynous relationships to women and this modelling has contributed to the distinctive gender symbolism of the subsequent scientificworld view.
Eighteenth and nineteenth century biomedical science in France andBritain deployed similar gender symbolism to conceptualize nature:'. . . science and medicine as activities were associated with sexual
metaphors which were clearly expressed in designating nature as awoman to be unveiled, unclothed and penetrated by masculine science'(Jordanova, 1980, p. 45). Anatomically, males were depicted as representing active agents and females as passive objects of male agency.
From her study Jordanova concludes that biomedical science
intensified the cultural association of nature with passive, objectified
femininity and of culture with active, objectifying masculinity. This
strikingly gendered imagery of nature and of scientific inquiry is notjust an historical relic, as these same dichotomies and metaphors canbe found in contemporary writing on science. As Harding asks, is it
any wonder that women are not an enthusiastic audience for theseinterpretations?
Rather than pointing to the negative consequences of women's identification with the natural realm, some feminists celebrate the identification of woman and nature. This finds political expression in theeco-feminism of the eighties which suggests that women must and will
liberate the earth because they are more in tune with nature. For them,
women's involvement in the ecology and peace movements was evidence of this special bond. As Susan Griffin expressed it: 'those of
us who are born female are often less severely alienated from naturethan are most men' (1983, p. l). Women's biological capa-city formotherhood was seen as connected to an innate selflessness born of
their responsibility for ensuring the continuity of life. Nurturing andFeminist Critiques of Science and Technology

7~ing instincts are essential to the fulfilment of this responsibility.
ge>nversely,men's inability to give birth has made them disrespectful
ofhuman and natural life, resulting in wars agd ecological disasters.
ijrc9mthisperspective, a new feminist science would embrace feminine
i1;1tuitionand subjectivity and end the ruthless exploitation of natural<resources.Rejecting patriarchal science, this vision celebrates female
values as virtues and endorses the close relationship between women's
Qodies, women's culture and the natural order.
While eco-feminism sees women's values as having a biological'.t,ijsis,another approach to the question of women and science has
been informed by psychoanalysis. The object-relations school oftbaught has been particularly influential in the feminist concepJualizations of science. This theory describes the mechanisms throughwhich adult women and men come to model themselves and theirrelation to the world in different ways. To acquire his masculine
identity the boy must both rejei;t and deny his former dependencies,
attachment and identification with the mother. The resulting conflicts
in men over masculinity create a psychology of male dominance.
Using this theory Keller argues that girls and boys have different
cognitive skills. As the male distinguishes himself from the mother,he also learns to differentiate sharply between subject and object,between himself and others. A~cording to Keller, as scientists are men
this male mind set, obsessed with detachment and mastery, has been
written into the norms and methods of modern science. A radicallydifferent scientific method is described by Keller (1983) in her influential biography of Barbara McClintock. A Nobel prize-winning
geneticist, McClintock is described as a scientist who merged subject
and object in her 'feeling for the organism' and whose work was
imbued with a holistic understanding of, and reverence for, nature.
According to Keller, this woman's work provides us with 'a glimpseof what a gender-free science might look like' by combining masculine
and feminine characteristics. Rather than celebrating a womancentred science as do the eco-feminists, this project insists on thepossibility of a gender-neutral science produced by androgynous
individuals. 4
While emphatically rejecting the possibility of a neutral objective
science, other feminist writers have shared a concern with the exclusion of woman-centred values from science. However, they attributesuch values not to the individual psyche but to a socially and historically constructed gender division of labour. They trace the way inwhich, as the spheres of public and private life became increasingly
separated during the course of the eighteenth century, women became

8Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

confined to the private sphere of hearth and home. Skills such asreasoning and objectivity became associated with public life, andfeeling and subjectivity with private life. These dichotomies havebecome historically associated with the development of distinctive
feminine and masculine worldviews.
In a well-known article, Rose (1983) locates herself within theradical science tradition and endorses the Marxist characterization ofbourgeois science as a form of alienated and abstract knowledge. It
is the division of mental and manual labour, integral to capitalist production, which gives rise to this form of knowledge. Rose takes issue
wit1-this tradition however for its failure to question the impact of
the gender division of labour on science. The focus of the radical
science critique on the relations of production to the exclusion of
reproduction negates women's experience, which in turn impoverishes
science. Science has been denied the input of women's experience ofthe caring, emotionally demanding labour which has been assigned
exclusively to women. According to Rose, a feminist science would
need to encompass this emc,tional domain and thereby fuse subjective
and objective ways of knowing the world. It would thus be a more
complete, truer knowledge because it is based on women's 'sharedexperience of oppression'. Rose concludes that the reunification of'hand, brain and heart' would foster a new form of science, enablinghumanity to live in harmony with nature.
A Science Based on Women's Values?
These debates about science mirror the more general preoccupations
that have engaged feminists over the last two decades. Much earlysecond.wave feminism was of a liberal cast, demanding access for
women within existing power structures, such as science. In principle,
equality could be achieved by breaking down gender stereotypes:
for instance by giving girls better training and more varied rolemodels, and by introducing equal opportunity programmes and antidiscrimination legislation. Such feminist writing focused on genderstereotypes and customary expectations, and denied the existence ofany fundamental sex differences between women and men. This first
approach, liberal feminism, was based on an empiricist view of scienceas (gender) neutral. Sexism and androcentrism were therefore conceived of as social biases correctable by stricter adherence to theexisting methodological norms of scientific inquiry. I would argue
that the limitations of this approach have been made apparent by theFeminist Critiques of Science and Technology

9sociology of scientific knowledge and the profound critique of empiricismthat has occurred in the last few decades.
By the late 1970s however a new form of'.radical feminism, or:cwtural feminism as it is known in North America, had emerged
which exalted femininity for its own sake. These writers emphasize
gender difference and celebrate what they see as specifically feminine,such as women's greater humanism, pacifism, nurturance and spiritualdevelopment. Some of these authors abandoned the idea that what,was •specifically feminine' was socially produced and notions of
ineradicable difference have flourished.
•· This return to an emphasis on natural or psychological gender difference is a common thread in many of the feminist views of science.
They promote women's values as an essential aspect of human experience and seek a new vision of science that would incorporate thesevalues. At this juncture therefore, I think it appropriate to point to.
somefundamental problems wfth the general assertion of a sciencebased on women's values.
Essentialism, or the assertion of fixed, unified and opposed female
and male natures has been subjected to a variety of thoroughcritiques.5 The first thing that must be said is that the values being
ascribed to women originate in the historical subordination of
women. The belief in the unchanging nature of women, and theirassociation with procreation, nurturance, warmth and creativity, liesat the very heart of traditional and oppressive conceptions ofwomanhood. •women value nurturance, warmth and security, or atleast we believe we ought to, precisely because of, not in spite of, themeanings, culture and social relations of a world where men are more
powerful than women' (Segal, 1987, p. 34). It is important to see how
women came to value nurturance and how nurturance, associatedwith motherhood, came to be culturally defined as feminine within
male-dominated culture. Rather than asserting some inner essence of
womanhood as an ahistorical category, we need to recognize the ways
in which both •masculinity' and •femininity' are socially constructed
and are in fact constantly under reconstruction.
Secondly, the idea of •nature' is itself culturally constructed. Conceptions of the 'natural' have changed radically throughout humanhistory. As anthropologists like Marilyn Strathern and others havepointed out, 'no single meaning can in fact be given to nature orculture in Western thought; there is no consistent dichotomy, only amatrix of contrasts' (Strathern, 1980, p. 177). These feminist anthropologists have questioned the claim that in all societies masculinity is
associated with culture and femininity with nature. Moreover, they
.

-

.

~-·

10

Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

argue that there is no behaviour or meaning which is universally andcross-culturally associated with either masculinity or femininity.
What is considered masculine in some societies is considered feminine
or gender-neutral in others and vice versa. Indeed, they suggest thateven where the nature/culture dichotomy exists, we must not assume
that the Western terms '.nature' and 'culture' are adequate or reasonable translations of the categories other cultures perceive. The historical research by Merchant and Jordanova referred to above also points
to the historical specificity of these gender metaphors. As Harding
says: 'the effect of these studies is to challenge the universality of theparticular dichotomized set of social behaviors and meanings associated with masculinity and femininity in Western culture' (Harding,1986, p. 129).
If we look at other cultures such as those of African and Aboriginal
peoples, we find concepts of nature quite different from dominant
European ones. Their world views posit a more harmonious relationship between mankind and the living universe of nature which
strikingly parallels what is claimed to be a distinctively feminine world
view. And what the African and Aboriginal world views designate asEuropean is similar to what feminists designate as masculine. Even
within the traditions of Western philosophy there are schools ofthought which claim these values for themselves. Karl Mannheim(1953) describes romantic-conservatism as an anti-atomistic style ofthinking which advocates holism, organic unity, and the qualitative
rather than the quantitative as the preferred style of thought. Once
more it is difficult to claim that a holistic approach in harmony withnature is specific to gender.
These arguments cast serious doubt on the projects for a feminist
science presented above. Once it is recognized that 'masculinity' and'femininity•, as well as the idea of 'nature', are changing cultural categories then it no longer makes sense to base a science on feminine
intuition rooted in nature. Authors like Keller, Rose and Hartsock
also call for a science which incorporates women's values, although
they expressly dissociate themselves from this radical feminist essentialism. Harding groups these authors under the label of the 'feminist
standpoint epistemology'. This proposal argues that 'men's dominating position in social life results in partial and perverse understandings, whereas women's subjugated position provides the possibility ofmore complete and less perverse understandings' (Harding, 1986,
p. 26). These feminist critiques of science ground a distinctive feminist
science in the universal features of women's experience. Nevertheless,they all hover near the edge of biologism. Like the radical feminists,

Feminist Critiquesof Science and Technology

11

they endorse versions of a science based on subjectivity, intuition,
holism and harmony. While Rose and Hartsock in particular basetheir materialist analyses on the gender division of labour, they failtotake fully into account that 'nature' is not a fixed category and thatthe division of labour is not unchanging. Therefore women's subjecti:vity, caring, holism and harmony, to which they appeal, cannot beuniversal aspects of women's experience. Their identification between'women's caring labour and the new values to be incorporated into~ciencecannot be construed as fixed or in any way as arising 'naturally'.
... One attempt to overcome the limitations of the 'standpoint
approach' is the critique of a feminist science from the point of view
offeminist postmodernism or deconstructionism. Harding has correctly warned that the feminine qualities celebrated by feminists do
not accurately reflect the social experience of all women as theirexperience is divided by class, race and culture. If a new feminist
science is to be created from tlie ..standpoint of women's experience,:should there be a feminist science based on the experience of 'Black
women, Asian women, Native American women, working-classwomen, lesbian women?' Taking her cue from feminist postmodernism, Harding argues that the problem with feminist standpoint epistemologies is that they assume that there is a single
privileged position from which science can be evaluated. There is no'woman' to whose social experience the feminist empiricist and standpoint approaches can appeal; there are instead the 'fractured identities
of women'. This approach is useful in that it takes account of the differences between and within individuals, and highlights the tension
between a unitary and a fragmented conceptualization of the voice offeminism.
However the fact that there are class, race and cultural differences
between women and between men does not mean that gender difference is 'either theoretically unimportant or politically irrelevant'(Harding, 1986, p. 18). In virtually every culture, gender differenceis fundamental to social organization and personal identity. Qualities
associated with manliness are almost everywhere more highly
regarded than those thought of as womanly. Women have in common
the fact that they have been marginalized from every powerful institution of our society, especially from scientific institutions. Thisacknowledgement of the universality of women's subordination is notincompatible with a recognition of the specific and variable forms ofthis subordination. Different groups of women have different needs
and interests.
I share McNeil's (1987) view that rationality and intuition must

12

Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

themselves be seen as historically specific social products and that weshould engage in social practices to redefine them. Her essay expresses
well the spurious dilemma facing those feminists who feel forced tochoose between scientific rationality or feminine intuition. 6 Furthermore, it is important to stress that the basis of men's power is not
simply a product of the. ideas we hold and the language we use, butof all the social practices that give men authority over women. Ideas
are mediations of social relations and to transform them we need totransform the fundamental character of scientific institutions incontemporary society and the forms of political power that science
bestows on specific social groups.
It may be that the search for the most appropriate feminist
epistemology, however philosophically sophisticated (as Harding
indeed is), is misdirected. The more philosophically oriented feminist
work on science suffers from the problem of dealing with ideas
divorced from social practices. Indeed, as amply shown by theseauthors, statements of 'The Scientific Method' do typically containmale visions of what it is to know and what the world is really like.
Scientific practice is in no sense determined by statements of method.
The latter are better seen as political pronouncements, as legitimations, rather than as descriptions of what scientists actually do. They
serve to say something about the place of science in the wider society,or to bolster a more scientific speciality or discipline against its competitors (Richards and Schuster, 1989).7
It is in this light that we should see attempts to spell out a specifically feminist scientific method. They are politically useful in thatthey turn the feminist spotlight on the content of scientific knowledge
instead of simply highlighting questions of recruitment to science. We
need to be cautious in presuming that the adoption of a 'feminist'scientific method would lead to differences in scientific practice without a thoroughgoing change in the relations of power within science.
The danger is that what might parade as feminist science would simply
amount to the same scientific practice by another name.

From Science to Technology
While there has been a growing interest in the relationship of science
to society over the last decade, there has been an even greater preoccupation with the relationship between technology and social change.
Debate has raged over whether the 'white heat of technology' isradically transforming society and delivering us into a post-industrial

Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

13'.i:ge.A major concern of Jeminists has been the impact of new techi;tology on women's lives, particularly on women's work. The introq~tion of word processors into the office ptovided the focus forearly research. The recognition that housework was also work,fl~eit unpaid, led to studies on how the increasing use of domestic.~:nnology in the home affected the time spent on housework. The~~ploitation of Third World women as a source of cheap labour for~,: manufacture of computer components has also been scrutinized.
Most recently there has been a vigorous debate over developments in
J;eproductive technology and the implications for women's control
q:vertheir fertility.
Throughout these debates there has been a tension between the view
tp.at technology would liberate women - from unwanted pregnancy,
frqmhousework and from routine paid work - and the obverse viewthat most new technologies.are destructive and oppressive to women.
For example, in the early ~ties,
Shulamith Firestone ( 1970)
ijaborated the view that developments in birth technology held the key·tf)· women's liberation through removing from them the burden of
piological motherhood. Nowadays there is much more concern withtlle negative implications of the new technologies, ironically mostclearly reflected in the highly charged debate over the new reproductive technologies.
A key issue here is whether the problem lies in men's dominationof technology, or whether the technology is in some sense inherently
patriarchal. If women were in control, would they apply technology
to more benign ends? In the following discussion on gender and technology, I will explore these and related questions.
An initial difficulty in considering the feminist commentary on
technology arises from its failure to distinguish between science andtechnology. Feminist writing on science has often construed science
purely as a form of knowledge, and this assumption has been carriedover into much of the feminist writing on technology. However justas science includes practices and institutions, as well as knowledge,
so too does technology. Indeed, it is even more clearly the case withtechnology because technology is primarily about the creation ofartefacts. This points to the need for a different theoretical approachto the analysis of the gender relations of technology, from that being
developed around science.
Perhaps this conflation of technology with science is not surprising
given that the sociology of scientific knowledge over the last ten years
has contested the idea of a non-controversial distinction between
science and technology. John Staudenmaier (1985, pp. 83-120)<~qc:11

14

Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

comments that although the relationship between science and technology has been a major theme in science and technology studies, thediscussion has been plagued by·a welter of conflicting definitions of
the two basic terms. The only consensus to have emerged is that theway in which the boundaries between science and technology aredemarcated. and how ti\ey are related to each other, change from one
historical period to. another.
In recent years, however, there has been a major re-orientation of
thinking about the<form of the relationship between science andtechnology. The model of the science-technology relationship whichenjoyed widespread acceptance over a long period was the traditional
hierarchical model which treats· technology' as applied· science. Thisview that science discovers and technology applies this knowledge ina routine uncreative way is now in steep decline. 'One thing which
practically any modern study of technological innovation suffices toshow is that far from applying, and hence depending upon, the cultureof natural science, technologists possess their own distinct cultural
resources, which provide the principal basis for their innovative
activity' (Barnes and 'Edge, 1982, p;l49). Technologists build on,
modify and extend existing technology but they do this by a creativeand imaginative process. And part of the received culture technologists inherit in the course of solving their practical problems is nonverbal; nor can it be conveyed adequately bythe written word. Instead
it is the itu;ljvidua1practitio~er who transfers practical knowledge andcompetence to another. In short; the current lllOdel of the sciencetechnology relationshipeharacteri~s science and technology as distin'guishable sub-cultures in an interactive symmetrical relationship.
Leaving aside the relationship between technology and science, it
is most important to recognize that the word 'technology' has at least
three different layers,of meaning. Firstly, 'technology• is a form ofknowledge, as Staudenmaier emphasizes. 8 Technological 'things' aremeaningless without the 'know-how' to use them, repair them, design
them and make them. That know~how often cannot be captured inwords. It is visual, even tactile, rather than simply verbal or mathematical. But it can also be systematized and taught, as in the various
disciplines of engineering.
Few authors however would be content with this definition oftechnology as a form of knowledge. 'Technology' also refers to what
people do as well as what they know. An object such as a car or avacuum cleaner is a technology, rather than an arbitrary lump of
matter, because it forms part of a set of human activities. A computer
without programs and programmers is simply a useless collection of

Feminist Critiques of Science ond Technology

15

bits of metal, plastic and silicon. 'Steelmaking', say, is a technology:
W,ttthisimplies that the technology includes what steelworkers do, as~eRasthe furnac-esthey use. So 'technology' ref~s to human activities~ijpractices. And finally, at the most basic level, there is the 'harddefinition of technology, in which it refers to sets of physicalj~j~ts, for example, cars, lathes, vacuum cleaners and computers.
liln practice the technologies dealt with in this book cover all three~ects, and. often it is not useful to separate them further. My~seis not to attempt to refine a definition. These different layers
0,fmeaning of 'technology' are worth bearing in mind in what follows.
; J;he rest of this. chapter win review the theoretical literature on
1inder and technology, which in many cases mirrors the debates about~tjence outlined above. However, feminist perspectives on technology
tre more recent and much less theoretically developed than thosewhichhave been articulatedi11relation to science. One.clear indication
1,'lf;~s .is the preponderru:tce of4;«iited collections which have been~J)lished in this area. 9 As with many such collections, the articles
qo not share a consistent approach or cover the field in a comprebensive fashion. Therefore I will be drawing out strands of argument{r:omthis literature rather than presenting the material as coherent
positions in a debate.

,~~!

t,idden from History
l:'.ostart with, feminists have pointed out the dearth of material on
womenand.technology, especially given the burgeoning scholarshipin the field of technology studies. Even the most perceptive andhumanistic works on the relationship between technology, culture
apd societyrarely mention gender. Women's contributions have by andlji.rge been left out of technological history. Contributions to Technology and Culture, the leading journal of the history of technology,
provide one accurate barometer of this. Joan Rothschild's (1983,
pp..xii-xiv) survey of the journal for articles on the subject of women
foµnd only four in twenty-four years of publishing. In a more recent
book about the journal, Staudenmaier (ibid., p. 180) also notes thee~traordinary bias in the journal towards male figures and the strik~
ing absence of a women's perspective. The history of technology
represents the prototype inventor as male. So, as in the history ofscience, an initial task of feminists has been to uncover and recover the
women hi(jden from history who have contributed to technologicaldevelopments.

16

Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

There is now evidence that during the industrial era, women
invented or contributed to the invention of such crucial machines as
the cotton gin, the sewing machine, the small electric motor, theMcCormick reaper, and the Jacquard loom (Stanley, forthcoming).
This sort of historical scholarship often relies heavily on patent
records to recover women's forgotten inventions. It has been notedthat many women's inventions have been credited to their husbands
because they actually appear in patent records in their husbands'
name. This is explained in terms of women's :limited property rights,
as well as the general ridicule afforded women inventors at that time
(Pursell, 1981; Amram, 1984; Griffiths, 1985). Interestingly, it may
be that even the recovery of women inventors from patent records
seriously underestimates their contribution to technological development. In a recent article on the role of patents, Christine MacLeod( 1987) observes that prior to 1700 patents were not primarily about
the recording of the actual inventor, but were instead sought in thename of financial backers. 10 Given this, it is even less surprising that
so few women's names are to be found in patent records.
For all but a few exceptional women, creativity alone was not sufficient, In order to participate in the inventive activity of the Industrial
Revolution, capital as well as ideas were necessary. It was only in 1882
that the Married Women's Property Act gave English women legal
possession and control of any personal property independently of
their husbands. Dot Griffiths (1985) argues that the effect of this was
to virtually exclude women from participation in the world of theinventor-entrepreneur. At the same time women were being denied
access to education and specifically to the theoretical grounding inmathematics and mechanics upon which so many of the inventions
and innovations of the period were based. As business activities
expanded and were moved out of the home, middle-class women wereincreasingly left to a life of enforced leisure. Soon the appropriate
education for girls became 'accomplishments' such as embroidery andmusic - accomplishments hardly conducive to participation in theworld of the inventor-entrepreneur. In the current period, there has
been considerable interest in the possible contributions which Ada
Lady Lovelace, Grace Hopper and other women may have made to
the development of computing. Recent histories of computer programming provide substantial evidence for the view that women
played a major part. 11
To fully comprehend women's contributions to technological development, however, a more radical approach may be necessary. For astart, the traditional conception of technology too readily defines

Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

17

technology in terms of male activities. As I have pointed out above,the concept of technology is itself subject to historical change, anddifferent epochs and cultures had different mtmes for what we now
think of as technology. A greater emphasis on women's activities·immediately suggests that females, and in particular black women,
were among the first technologists. After all, women were the main
gatherers, processors and storers of plant food from earliest humantimes onward. It was therefore logical that they should be the ones
to have invented the tools and methods involved in this work such as
the digging stick, the carrying sling, the reaping knife and sickle,
pestles and pounders. In this vein, Autumn Stanley (forthcoming)
illustrates women's early achievements in horticulture and agriculture,such as the hoe, the scratch plow, grafting, hand pollination, and early
irrigation.
If it were not for the male bias in most technology research, thesignificance of these inventionf would be acknowledged. As Ruth
Schwartz Cowan notes:
The indices to the standard histories of technology ... do not containa single reference, for example, to such a significant cultural artifact
as the baby bottle. Here is a simple implement . . . which has
transformed a fundamental human experience for vast numbers ofinfants and mothers, and been one of the more controversial exportsof Western technology to underdeveloped countries - yet it finds noplace in our histories of technology.(1979, p. 52)

There is important work to be done not only in identifying women
inventors, but also in discovering the origins and paths of development of 'women's sphere' technologies that seem often to have been
considered beneath notice.

A Technology Based on Women's Values?
During the eighties, feminists have begun to focus on the genderedcharacter of technology itself. Rather than asking how women could
be more equitably treated within and by a neutral technology, many
feminists now argue that Western technology itself embodies patriarchal values. This parallels the way in which the feminist critique of
Science evolved from asking the 'woman question' in science to asking
the more radical 'science question' in feminism. Technology, likescience, is seen as deeply implicated in the masculine project ofthe domination and control of women and nature. 12 Just as many
feminists have argued for a science based on women's values, so too18 Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

has there been a call for a technology based on women's values. In
Joan Rothschild's (1983) preface to a collection on feminist perspectives on technology, she says that: 'Feminist analysis has sought toshow how the subjective, intuitive, and irrational can and do play a
key role in our science and technology'. Interestingly, she cites animportant male figure- in the field, Lewis Mumford, to support hercase. Mumford's linking of subjective impulses, life-generating forces
and a female principle is consistent with such a feminist analysis, as
is his endorsement of a more holistic view of culture and technologicaldevelopments.
Other male authors have also advocated a technology based on
women's values. Mike Cooley is a well-known critic of the current
design of technological systems and he has done much to popularize
the idea of human-centred technologies. In Architect or Bee? (1980,
p. 43) he argues that technological change has 'male values' built into
it: 'the values of the White Male Warrior, admired for his strengthand speed in eliminating the weak, conquering competitors and rulingover vast armies of men who obey his every instruction ... Technological change is starved of the so-called female values such as
intuition, subjectivity, tenacity and compassion'. Cooley sees it asimperative that more women become involved in science andtechnology to challenge and counteract the built-in male values: that
we cease placing the objective above the subjective, the rational above
the tacit, and the digital above analogical representation. In The
Culture of Technology, Arnold Pacey (1983) devotes an entire chapter
to 'Women and Wider Values'. He outlines three contrasting sets ofvalues involved in the practice of technology - firstly, those stressing
virtuosity. secondly, economic values and thirdly, user or needoriented values. Women exemplify this third 'responsible' orientation,according to Pacey, as they work with nature in contrast to the maleinterest in construction and the conquest of nature.
Ironically the approach of these male authors is in some respects
rather similar to the eco-feminism that became popular amongst
feminists in the eighties. This marriage of ecology and feminism restson the 'f emate principle', the notion that women are closer to naturethan men and that the technologies men have created are based on
the domination of nature in the same way that. they seek to dominate
women. Eco-feminists concentrated on military technology and theecological effects of other modern technologies. According to them,these technologies are products of a patriarchal culture that 'speaks
violence at every level' (Rothschild, 1983, p. 126). An early slogan of
the feminist anti~militarist movement, 'Take the Toys from the Boys',Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

19'drew attention to the phallic symbolism in the shape of missiles.
c However, an inevitable corollary of this stance seemed to be the?Lrepresentation of women as inherently nurturjng and pacifist. The
f .problems with this position have been outlined above in relation to;it'sciencebased on women's essential values. We need to ask how women}~"-11tecame
associated with these values. The answer involves examining!~:theway in which the traditional division of labour between women
men has generally restricted women to a narrow range of)~'aperience concerned primarily with the private world of the homeliandfamily.
fi• •Nevertheless,the strength of these arguments is that they go beyond(i?-.eusual conception of the problem as being women's exclusion fromprocesses of innovation and from the acquisition of technical,s. Feminists have pointed to all sorts of barriers - in social attimwdes, girls' education and the employment policies of firms - to/:account for the imbalance in t11itnumber of women in engineering.
But rarely has the problem been identified as the way engineering has
hen conceived and taught. In particular, the failure of liberal and!equal opportunity policies has led authors such as Cynthia Cockburn((1'985)to ask whether women actively resist entering technology. Why, have the women's training initiatives designed to break men's monorpoly of the building trades, engineering and information technology
lltOtbeen more successful? Although schemes to channel women into
technical trades have been small-scale, it is hard to escape thewnclusion that women's response has been tentative and perhaps
ambiYalent.
·•···•·
I share Cockburn's view that this reluctance 'to enter' is to do withthe sex-stereotyped definition of technology as an activity appropriate
for men. As with science, the very language of technology, its symbolism, is masculine. It is not simply a question of acquiring skills,'because these skills are embedded in a culture of masculinity that islargely coterminous with the culture of technology. Both at school andinthe workplace this culture is incompatible with femininity. Therefore, to enter this world, to learn its language, women have first to
forsake their femininity.
1

technology and the Division of Labour
l will now turn to a more historical and sociological approach to theanalysis of gender and technology. This approach has built on sometheoretical foundations provided by contributors to the labour

20

Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

process debate of the 1970s. Just as the radical science movement had
sought to expose the class character of science, these writers attempted
to extend the class analysis to technology. In doing so, they werecountering the theory of 'technological determinism' that remains so
widespread.
According to this a,ccount, changes in technology are the mostimportant cause of social change. Technologies themselves are neutral
and impinge on society from the outside; the scientists and technicians
who produce new technologies are seen to be independent of theirsocial location and above sectional interests. Labour process analysts
were especially critical of a tecbnicist version of Marxism in which thedevelopment of technology and productivity is seen as the motor forceof history. This interpretation represented technology itself as beyondclass struggle.
With the publication of Harry Braverman's Labor and Monopoly
Capital (1974), there was a revival of interest in Marx's contribution
to the study of technology, particularly in relation to work.
Braverman restored Marx's critique of technology and the division oflabour to the centre of his analysis of the process of capitalist development. The basic argument of the labour process literature whichdeveloped was that capitalist-worker relations are a major factor
affecting the technology of production within capitalism. Historicalcase studies of the evolution and introduction of particular technologies documented the way in which they were deliberately designed
to deskill and eliminate human labour. 13 Rather than technicalinventions developing inexorably, machinery was used by the owners
and managers of capital as an important weapon in the battle forcontrol over production. So, like science, technology was understood
to be the ·result of capitalist social relations.
This analysis provided a timely challenge to the notion of technological determinism and, in its focus on the capitalist division oflabour, it paved the way for the development of a more sophisticatedanalysis of gender relations and technology. However, the labour
process approach was gender-blind because it interpreted the social
relations of technology in exclusively class terms. Yet, as has been wellestablished by the socialist feminist current in this debate, the relationsof production are constructed as much out of gender divisions as classdivisions. Recent writings (Cockburn, 1983, 1985; Faulkner andArnold, 1985; McNeil, 1987) in this historical vein see women's
exclusion from technology as a consequence of the gender division oflabour and the male domination of skilled trades that developed undercapitalism. In fact, some argue that prior to the industrial revolution

Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

21••women had more opportunities to acquire technical skills, and that
QJpitalist technology has become more masculine than previous
S ~ologies.
.J have already described how, in the early phases of industrializai.tjpn, women were denied access to ownership of capital and access
IU) education. Shifting the focus, these authors show that the rigid;~ern of gender divisions which developed within the working-class
finthe context of the new industries laid the foundation for the male~inanceof technology. It was during this period that manufaci~ing moved into factories, and home became separated from paid
/wprlc.The advent of powered machinery fundamentally challenged
traditional craft skills because tools were literally taken out of thehands of workers and combined into machines. But as it had been men••··
who on the whole had technical skills in the period before theindustrial revolution, they were in a unique position to maintain amonopoly over the new skills er~
by the introduction of machines.
· Male craft workers could not prevent employers from drawing\\!'..«>men
into the new spheres of production. So instead they organized,~ retain certain rights over technology by actively resisting the entry~f women to their trades. Women who became industrial labourers
fpund themselves working in what were considered to be unskilledjpbs for the lowest pay. 'It is the most damning indictment of skilledworking..class men and their unions that they excluded women from
Jllembershipand prevented them gaining competences that could havesecured them a decent living' (Cockburn, 1985, p. 39). This genderdivision of labour within the factory meant that the machinery was
designed by men with men in mind, either by the capitalist inventor
or by skilled craftsmen. Industrial technology from its origins thus
i:eflects male power as well as capitalist domination.
The masculine culture of technology is fundamental to the way inwhich the gender division of labour is still being reproduced today.
By securing control of key technologies, men are denying women thepractical experience upon which inventiveness depends. I noted earlier
the degree to which technical knowledge involves tacit, intuitive
knowledge and 'learning by doing'. New technology typically emerges
not from sudden flashes of inspiration but from existing technology,
by a process of gradual modification to, and new combinations of,that existing technology. Innovation is to some extent an imaginative
process, but that imagination lies largely in seeing ways in which
existing devices can be improved, and in extending the scope oftechniques successful in one area into new areas. Therefore giving
women access to formal technical knowledge alone does not provide

22

Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

the resources necessary for invention. Experience of existing technology is a precondition for the invention of new technology.
The nature of women's inventions, like that of men's, is a function
oftime., place and resources. Segregated at work and primarily confinedto the private sphere of the household, women's experience has
been severely. restricted and therefore so too ha.stheir inventiveness.
An interesting illustrationof this pointlies in the fact that women who
were employed •inthe munitions factories during the First World War
are on record as having redesigned the weaponry they weremaking. 14 Thus, given the opportunity, womenhave·demonstrated
their>inventive capacity in what now seems the most unlikely ofcontexts.

Missing: The Gender Dimension In the Sociology ofTechnology
The historical approach is an advance over essentialist positions whichseek to base a new>technology on women's innate values. Women's
profound alienation>from technology is accounted for in terms of thehistorical and <cultµral construction of tecl)nology as •masculine. I
belie~e that woments exclusion from, and rejection of; technology ismade more explicable by an·analysis·of technology as a culture that
expresses and consolidates relations amongst··men: If· technical competence is an integral part of masculine gender identity. why should
women be expected to aspire to• it? ·Such an account of technology and gender relations, however; isstill at a general level.1~ There are few cases where feminists havereally got inside the ~blackbox' of technology to do detailed empiricalresearch, as some of the most recent sociological literature has
attempted. Overthelastfew years, a new sociologyoftechnology has
emerged which is studying the invention, development, stabilizationand diffusion of specific artefacts. 16 It·is evident from this researchthat technology is notsimplytheproduct of rational technical imperatives. Rather, •political choices are embedded in· the very design andselection of technology.
Technologies result from a series of specificdecisions made by particular groups of· people in particular places at particular times fortheir own purposes. As such, technologies bear the imprint of thepeople and social context in which they developed. David Noble(1984, p. xiii) expresses this point succinctly as follows: 'Because ofits very concreteness, people tend to confront technology as an

Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

23

irreducible brute fact, a given, a first cause, rather than as hardened
history, frozen fragments of human and social endeavor'. Technological change isa process subject to struggles f9r control by different
groups. As such, the outcomes depend primarily on the distributionpt>power and· resources within society.
i>Theie is now an extensive literature on the history of technology~dtheeconomicsof
technological innovation. Labour hlstorians and.s~logistshave.investigated the relationship between social change
AAdthe shaping of production processes in great detail and have also~concernedwith the influence of technological form upon social~l~tions. The sociological approach has moved away from studying~individual inventor and fr:om the notion that technological innovation is. a result of some inner technical logic. Rather, it attempts to~ow the effects of social··relations ·on·technology that range fromf<>steringor inhibiting particular technologies, through influencing
the choice between competifli~thsof technical development, to~ffecting the precise design characteristics of particular artefacts.
Jecbnological innovation now requires major investment and has
become a collective, institutionalized process. The evolution of a:technology is thus the function of a complex set of technical, social,·economic, and political factors. An artefact may be looked on as the1<;ongealedoutcome of a set ofp~gotiations. compromises, conflicts,~ntroversies and deals that were put together between opponents inr9oms filled with smoke, lathes or computer terminals' (Law, 1987,

p.406);·c Because social groups have different interests and resources, thedevelopment process brings out conflicts between .different views of
the technical>requirements of the device. Accordingly, the stability
and form' ofartef acts depends on the capacity and resources that thesalient social groups can mobilize.in the course of the development
process~ Thus inthe technology of production, economic and social
class+interests often <lie behind the development and adoption ofdevices. In the caseofmilitary technology, the operation of bureaucratic and organizational interests of state decision-making will beidentifiable, Growing attention is now being given to the extent towhich the state sponsorship of military technology shapes civilian
technology/
So Jar, however, little attention has been paid to the way in whlch
technological objects may be shaped by the operation of genderinterests. Thls. blindness to gender issues is also indicative of a general
problem with the methodology adopted by the new sociology oftechnology. Using a conventional notion of technology, these writers

24 Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

su1dy the social gro1,1pswhich actively seek to influence the form anddirection oftechnological design. What they overlook is the fact thatthe ab~nce of influence from certain groups may also be significant.
FOJ'them. women's absenceJrom observable conflict does not indicatethat gender interests are being mobilized. For a social theory ofgender,,hQwever, the ajmost. complete exclusion of women·from thet~hnological comJnunity points to the need to take account of theunderlying structure of gender relations. Preferences for different
teehn<>logies.
are shaped by. a set•of social arrangements that reflect
men's power in the wider society. The process of technologicaldevelopment is socially structured and culturally·patterned by various
sociaHnterests that lie outside the immediate context of technologicalinnovation.
More than ever before technological change impinges on every
as~t of QUf public and private lives, from the artificially cultivatedfood that> we eat to the increasingly sophisticated forms of communication we use. Yet, in coJnmon with theJabour process debate,
the sociology of technology has concentrated almost exclusively on
the relations of paid production, focusing in particular on the earlystages o( product development. In doing so ,they have ignored thespheres of,reproduction,•.consumption and the.unpaid production thattakes place in the home. ·By contrast, feminist analysis points us
beyon{i the factory, gates to see that technology is just as centrally
involved in these ,sph~es.
Inevitably perhaps, feminist work in this area has so far raised as
many questions as it has answered. Is technology valued because it
is associated with masculinity or is masculinity valued because of theassociation with technology? How do we avoid the tautology that'techn9logy is masculine ~ause men do it>?·Why is ,women's work
undervalued? Is there such a thing as women's knowledge? Is it different from 'feminine intuition'? Can technology be reconstructedaround women's interests? .These are .the questions that abstract
analysis has. so far failed to answer. The character of salient interestsand social groups will differ depending on the particular empiricalsites of technology being considered. Thus. we need to look in more
concrete and historical detail at how, in specific areas of work andpersonal life, gender relations influence the technological enterprise.
This book focuses on gender, although. it is often difficult to disentangle the.effects of gender from those of class and race. The chaptersthat follow are organized around substantive areas of technology the technology of production, reproductive technology. domestic
technology and the built environment.

Feminh1t Critiques of Science and Technology

25'Thr-0ughoutthe book I will be stressing that a gendered approach totechnology cannot be reduced to a view which treats technology as aset of·neutral artefacts manipulated by men iq their own interests.
:While it is the case that men dominate the scientific and technicalj~ijtutions, it is perfectly plausible that there will come a time when
w:Pinenare more fully represented in these institutions without transf()pning the direction of technological development. To cite just one
instance, women are increasingly being recruited into the American$pa,ce-defence programme but we do not hear their voices protesting
aip(lJltits preoccupations. Nevertheless, gender relations are an integr~ constituent of the social organization of these institutions andtheir projects. It is impossible to divorce the gender relations which
are expressed in, and shape technologies from, the wider social struc•tures that create and maintain them. In developing a theory of thegendered character of techtlology, we are inevitably in danger of either~opting• an essentialist positimf'that sees·technology ·as inherently
patriarchal, or losing sight of the structure of gender relations througha,11overemphasis on the historical variability of the categories of~omen' and 'technology'. In what follows I will try to chart anothercourse.
NOTES
1 For an introduction to this literature, see Barnes and Edge (1982) and
Knorr•Cetina and Mulkay (1983).
2 In order to map the field of gender and science, I have drawn heavily
on two excellent and comprehensive surveys by Harding (1986) and
Schiebinger (1987).
3 This issue is discussed in Harding (1986). For a fuller account of thedebate about whether Reason itself is male, see Lloyd (1984).
4 For an excellent discussion of Keller's work, see Dugdale (1988).
S For two useful socialist feminist critiques of universalist and essentialist
elements in some versions of radical feminist theory, see Eisenstein(1984) and Segal (1987).
6 For an account of the way the binary couple 'empiricism-inductivism' /'intuitive-speculative theory building' has been played upon since theseventeenth century, see Schuster and Yeo (1986).
7 For a clever comparison of the biographies of McClintock and Franklin
and their respective scientific methodologies, see Richards and Schuster(1989).
8 Staudenmaier (1985, pp. 103-20) outlines four characteristics of technological knowledge-scientific concepts, problematic data, engineering
theory, and technological skill.

26

Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology

9 A good cross-section of this material can be found in Trescott (1979);
Rothschild (1983); Faulkner and Arnold (1985); McNeil (1987);
Kramarae (1988). McNeil's book is particularly useful as it contains acom,prehensive bil>liography which is organized thematicaUy.
10 MacJ.,.eod(l987)suggests that although George Ravenscroft is credited
in the patent r~ords with being the 'heroic' inventor of lead-crystal glass,he.was rather the purchaser or financier of another's invention. Thisstud)'alerts us to the danger of assuming that patent records have always. represented the same thing.
.
11 For a biography of Lady Lovelace, which takes issue with the view ofher asa major contributor to computer programming, see Stein (1985).
However, both Kraft (1977) and more recently Giordano (1988) havedocumented the extensive participation of women in the development ofcQmputer ·programming.
12 Technology as the dQmination of nature is also a central theme in thework of critical theorists. such as Marcuse, for whom it is capitalist
relati<>ns(rather thanpatriarchal relations).which are builtinto the very
stri,Jcture of technology. 'N()t only the application of technology but
technqlpgy .itself i~ dc,i,nin~tio11(of natur~ and men) :- methodical,
sci~n~fic. calc~l~ted'. calc!lJating.control. Specific 1>urp()sesalld interestsof dorrnnation are
foisted upon technology 'subsequently' and fromthe outside; they enter the very construction of the technical apparatus'(Marcuse, 1968, pp. 223-4).
13 This point is elaborated in the next chapter. See also Part Two of
Mac.Kenzie and Wajcman (1985) for a collection of these case studies.
14 Amram (1984) provides a selection of the patents granted to women
during the First World War.
15 Cockburp's (1983, 1985) work is one important exception discussed atgre;:iter length in chapter 2.
16 For anintroduction to this literature, see MacKenzie and Wajcman(1985); Bijker, Hughes and Pinch (1987).

not

2

lft,e Technology of Production:
fllaking a Job of Gender
Capitalists as capitalists and men as men both take initiatives over>>technology.
Cockburn, The Material of Male Power

Ourimages of technology are starkest in the sphere of production andpaid work - from dark satanic mills to clean, automated factories run
almost entirely by robots. Afterfill, people depend for their livelihood
bn paid work and it is here thatthey spend most of their time. This~,where some of the fiercest battles over the costs and benefits oftechnological change have been fought. The most notorious involved
male weavers in nineteenth-century England destroying the new·machines and mills that threatened their jobs. Indeed, the term'!:t.;uddite'isstillused to denote tnose who oppose technological change
and thus stand in the way of progress.
The late twentieth century finds• us in another period of rapid
technological development. Fundamental· innovations in microelectronic and telecommunications technology are transforming thecharacter of work and the structure of the labour force. Existing
sex:ualtlivisions of labour are profoundly implicated in these changes,
and new terrain for the gendering of work is being opened up. Thesear.ethe issues which I will consider.in .this chapter.
Whether new technology is a liberating.force which will eliminate thedehumanizing aspects of work or whether it will inevitably lead to thedegradation, fragmentation,, and .intensification of technologicallypacedwork depends on your point of view. Theorists of post-industrial
society such as Alvin Toffler (1980), Barry Jones (1982) and Andre
Gorz (1982) are optimistic about the radical changes that they believeaJ:eemerging in industrial societies as a result of the 'microelectronic
revolution'. They argue that technological innovations mean lesslabour being expended on industrial developtttenty and a shift frommanufacturing to service~based economies. The jobs destroyed by
microelectronics in industry would be replaced by new occupationsin these new industries, and degraded and routine work would be

28

The Technology of Production

consigned to machines, releasing human beings to more creative andmore fulfilling work. In the future some of this work may even shift
to the home or 'electronic cottage', as computerization will eliminate
the need for people to work in large-scale units of production.
Another version of this optimistic view has recently emerged as thesociology of work has become increasingly concerned with the issueof 'flexible specialization' and 'neo-Fordism'. The focus here tends to
be on the potential for job enhancement presented by new technology.
To put it simply, automation will increase skill requirements. It isargued that technological change, especially in conjunction with theuse of Japanese management techniques, will require a smaller, but
skilled and flexible workforce, prepared to undertake ongoing training to facilitate the adaptation of skills to new technology. 1
Rising unemployment levels in advanced capitalist societies haveprompted a more pessimistic view of technology's impact on work.
In contrast to the 'post-industrial' scenario, such commentators
believe that automation is associated with degraded, deskilled, anddevalued jobs, stressful and dangerous work, employer monitoringof employees, and work speed-ups, in which workers are paid less fordoing more. As workers' skills are built into the technology, those
fortunate enough to retain a job are relegated to the position ofmachine minders. (This scenario is vividly depicted in Kurt
Vonnegut's science fiction novel Player Piano.) The increasing use bymanagement of surveillance systems built into the machinery itself tomonitor and record output will serve to intensify the exploitation oflabour.
Conducted in these terms, the debate begs many questions. Is thetechnology of production an independent force determining theorganization of work? In particular, does it affect the nature andexperience of work for women and men alike? Or is the development
and introduction of particular technologies itself shaped by existingsocial relations, including those of gender?
Although new technologies do represent a force for change, I will
be arguing that the outcomes are constrained by the pre-existingorganization of work, of which gender is an integral part. Technicalchange bas not substantially undermined sexual divisions in the labour
market and occupational segregation between women and men. This
raises the question of what has shaped particular technologicaldevelopments in the first place. If technology is designed with jobstereotypes in mind then it is hardly surprising that sex segregation
is being further incorporated into the workplace. Accordingly, thechapter will go on to explore the ways in which the sex of theThe Technology of Production 29

workforce and gender relations in the workplace themselves profinmdly affect the direction and pace of technological innovation.

··nae
Impact of Technology on the Sexual Division oflabour

9ffice Automation and Women's Employment

Whilst women have always worked in large numbers. it is over the last
three decades that they have come to comprise nearly half the labour
force in advanced industrial economies. Even so, many of the protagonists in the debate on work and technology have been oblivious
to gender issues, implicitly concerned only with those sectors of production in which male workers predominate. Since the mid-1970s,
however. feminist researchers and activists have addressed the effects
of automation on womews employment.
The introduction of computer-based technologies into of fices has
been the focus of one strand of this research, mainly because themajority of clerical and secretarial workers almost everywhere are
women. It is also the case that these groups are being disproportionately affected, as the office is the prime site of technologicallyinduced change. This research forms the basis for many of thegeneralizations about women's work experience.
Optimistic and pessimistic views can be discerned in the various
studies on office automation. 2 Some authors suggest that the introduction of word processing equipment is making the traditionalsecretarial job obsolete. But, rather than being deskilled, they see
the job of secretary as being replaced by different types of paraprofessional jobs. Routine typing would be minimized leaving theoffice worker to take on more skilled, satisfying work as well as
more responsible duties. Technological advances will improve thequality of work, reducing drudgery and promoting more integrated
work processes. This optimistic vision attaches great significanceto the liberating potential of new office technologies. seeing in thema solution to women's traditionally limited and limiting work
opportunities.
Much more common among feminist writers however has been a
pessimistic view of the impact of microelectronic technology on
women's wo:rk, often expressed in a strongly anti-technology stance.
A major concern in the women's movement has been the implications
for women's health and safety of widespread use of video display
terminals, from eye strain and headaches to the risks of radiation for

30

The Technology of Production

pregnant women. Many surveys of users have reported physical andpsychological symptoms, such as vision problems, tenosynovitis orrepetition strain injury, chest pain, tension, headaches, nausea anddizziness, digestive problems, and depression. This is particularly sofor those who were subject to computerized work monitoring suggesting that the i~tensity of work is a major cause of these stressrelated illnesses. Setting strict limits on the time spent at terminals has
therefore been a major international issue in trade union negotiations
over new technology.
More generally, fears have been expressed that computerization of
office work would lead to a huge reduction in the number of officejobs and the emergence of the 'paperless office'. Word processors wereseen as a threat to typists' skills which were being·incorporated into
the new machines. Secretarial work for those few who remained
would be increasingly fragmented into routine and standardized tasks
subject to the control of the machine.
To understand the genesis of this negative position we need to lookat the framework in which the debate has developed. The terms of
the feminist discussion have been influenced by what is known as 'thelabour process perspective' or the deskilling debate, discussed inchapter l. 3 Labour process theorists have criticized technologicaldeterminism, arguing. that, far from constituting an autonomous
force determining the organization of work, technology is itself
crucially affected by the antagonistic class relations of production.
According to this view, capitalism requires the continuous applicationof new technology to the fragmentation and cheapening of labour,
resulting in deskilling.
The introduction of information technologies into the office has
been seen as part of the general process of deskilling. The purpose is
to increase productivity and profit, in this case by deskilling typists
and incorporating the monitoring of work into the machinery itself.
Labour process analysis characterizes the office as a white-collar
replica of the assembly line, with office work broken into many subtasks, each performed by a specialized worker, who loses both contact
with the total product and variety in the tasks performed. With thisrationalization of the office, the conditions of white-collar work
become increasingly likefactory work. Hence the (well-known) term,
the l)roletarianization' of white-collar workers. Through this process,management reduces the skill requirements of office work and thus
reduces labour costs. The result is that workers have less and lesscontrol over the production process.
However, reality is more complex than the proletarianization thesis

The Technology of Production

31~-ests, as detailed empirical studies of technological change have
tedly shown. In particular, they have questioned the existence, •. < ysimple tendency towards either the deskilling or the upgrading.~ffl!lbour. Indeed, with respect to the skill levels required for given)lijijs;,opposing tendencies of increased complexity and of greater)~plification and standardization have coexisted. Some authors~edthat the machinery itself had some inherent logic which~~sed its impact to be uniform across the range of office jobs. In
fi~.identical equipment. in this case word processors, may have very*:~~rent effects on work experience.
~f~~{Any
analysis of office automation must consider the different posii3&9µs
of office workers within the white-collar hierarchy, the degree~£:fragmentation of office work before the introduction of word pro~ors, and the requirements of particular employers at particular~riods. Although the effects of particular technologies must vary ini~ferent contexts, it has becomeclear that the overall tendency is forit~hnology-Led changes to operate .within and reinforce preexisting'.(ljfferencesin the patterns of work. Technological change thus tends{ofurther advantage those who already have recognized skills and aije.greeof control over their work tasks. 4<The effects of new technology on typists and on secretaries in
Britain are a case in point. Juliet Webster's (1989) comparative study
found that rather than automation transforming these occupations it;«tntrenchedthe inequalities between them. The rationalization andf:ragmentation of clerical work had in fact long predated the advente{>computertechnology and its introduction reinforced this tendency
for typists to perform repetitive, standardized tasks. 5 At the sametime, however, word processors reduced the burden of routine workfor the secretaries, enabling them to continue to do a variety of relatively responsible tasks. Thus the introduction of word processors
exacerbated preexisting divisions between two groups of women
office workers, enhancing the position of some secretaries but not thatof typists.
The contradictory picture that emerges from attempts to develop
general theories of the evolution of office work is partly a result of
the fact that inappropriate comparisons are made between experiencesat different stages in the evolution of technologies. Given rapidchanges in the technology itself, in its uses, and in the cumulation of
its effects, conclusions from one wave of technology may not
generalize to later waves. An examination of the technological transformation of the American insurance industry is instructive here.
During the first wave of electronic automation, the computerization

32

The Technology of Productionof some aspects of underwriting and rating occurred without major
reorg~ization of production, leading to job loss amongst traditional
female clerical workers. Barbara Baran (1987) argues that it was in
the late 1970s that the insurance industry was radically restructured
and that this was accompanied by the feminization of that labour
force. While the early use of computers was based on, and reinforced,
the fragmentation of jobs within established hierarchies, the newer
applications of information technology integrated fragmented tasks
to create new jobs, while often eliminating old ones. By 1983, a newhighly skilled clerical position had been designed for women withcollege degrees. In this industry, automation had resulted in the
deskilling of male professional functions with female professionals
earning considerably less than the men previously did. However,
although skilled clerical positions had expanded, there was little
opportunity for career advancement. Furthermore, the increased
emphasis on college education, with the loss of unskilled clerical jobs,
was likely to narrow opportunities for less educated black and whiteurban working-class women.
This study shows how important it is to periodize the process oftechnological change. It also points to the different effects automation may have on different groups of women workers at different
times.
As I.said above, many of these studies of office automation wereheavily influenced by labour process theory. They concentrated on theway in which capitalist management used new technologies to deskill
and subordinate workers. The deskilling of craft workers was, andlargely still is, the central issue in this analysis of technical change.
Drawing on these studies of deskilling in male crafts, the studies on
office work tended to romanticize the typist's job before the introduction of word processors by depicting it as a combination of technical craft-type skills with control over the labour process.
Women's office work is not akin to craft work. Craft workers werean elite group who enjoyed a privileged position in the labour market
and considerable autonomy over the labour process. Not only is thisromanticized version wrong in the specific instance of office work,
but it is wrong in general terms. Women have traditionally been
excluded from craft labour. An analysis based on the loss of craft
skills is thus not a relevant one for women.
The more substantive problem reflected in these early studies was
the assumption that the social relations within which technology
developed could be understood simply in terms of relations between
worker and capitalist. This underestimated the continuing significanceThe Technologyof Production 33.tf,visions within the working class, such as those based on sex, race,:gett~dskill, in shaping the effects of technical change on the workeminist writers have been important in shifting the focus from·~cipal concern with class conflict. In particular, they havethe inappropriateness.of the craft model by highlighting the..
ityof craft unions as male preserves. Craft unions have playedtiif~~vepart in creating and sustaining women's subordinate position;~:tileworkforce. Any understanding of technology will be incompletei~ut
the recognition that the relations of production are con':~cted as much out of gender divisions as class divisions.

······•. >H'jA(
Technology and Gender Relations·:··;;:'.:;::"-'.:'.";<,Jt~;more recent work on gender and technology goes beyond looking· .••··· en workers as such. Rather it has taken up this issue of divi./.tween workers and,f~don the relationship between men,lmf~omen in the workplace, the implications for the construction
iJfi!~}:ls,and the sex-typing of occupations. This has been part of the'• •· recognition of the limitations of sociological accounts which...·....·.··yse women's position in the labour force primarily with reference>~ the domestic division of labour.
Y ffihis is not to deny that wqmen's disadvantaged position in the•J"bour market is in large part due to their greater responsibility for
4ependent care and household tasks, as I have explored elsewhere..(W.aj~an. 1983). However gender relations are embodied in thesphere of production, as well as in the sphere of reproduction. Thus
the gender stereotyping of jobs is not just a reflection of women's
trft~itional role within the family; it is also formed and reproduced·py the patriarchal relations of paid work.
· Some commentators have presumed that with technological developments, such as the elimination of much heavy physical work bymechanization, the boundaries between women's and men's work
would gradually disappear. From a different perspective, the labour.process literature presumed that women would become fully integrated into the labour force as technology led to its increasing homogenization (Liff, 1986, p. 75).
However, the gender stereotyping of jobs has remained remarkably
stable even when the nature of work and the skills required to perform
it have been radically transformed. The broad nature of genderdivisions in the labour market is well established: men and women aresegregated into different occupations, and this segregation is particularly marked within individual workplaces. Women are, on

34

The Technology of Production

average, paid about three-quarters of men's hourly earnings. What.
requires explanation is the contrast between the flexibility of the forat:
taken by occupational segregation by sex and its persistence.
It has been more common for women to enter new jobs requirinj
new skills than to break into traditional male preserves, as the exarnplj
of the insurance industry shows. Even the allocation of these com..:,pletely new jot;,s, ~here no gendered custom and practice has been:!
established, is a fundamentally gendered process. In new 'high-techr;
jobs, such as programming, women tend to be segregated into
positions at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy (Kraft andDubnoff, 1986). Much of the recent feminist work has addressed the.
issue of why there has been so little change in the degree of s~isegregation of the labour market and so little conflict over the con-{tinuing rigid sex-typing of occupations. 6
What role does technology play in the construction and reproduction ofthese gender relations, and in their potential transformation?
New technologies do disrupt established patterns of sex-typing andthereby open up opportunities for changing the sexual division oflabour. As technologies develop and displace each other, there is adisturbance among the technically skiUed strata. Some gain and somelose. Many male craft skills have been quite purposively made redundant by new technology that has radically transformed the nature of
the work. But technology is not an independent force; the way inwhich it affects the nature of work is conditioned by existing relationships. There are conflicts and negotiations over technologicalchange and the opportunities for changing the sexual division oflabour to women's advantage are often foreclosed by male power.
Women lose out in these struggles as powerful groups defend their old
skills or monopolize new ones. Craft workers, who have been seen as
the def enders of working-class interests in struggles over technicalchange, in part derive their strength from their past exclusionary practices. Their gains have often been made at the expense of less skilled
or less well-organized sections of the workforce, and this has in manycases involved the exclusion of women.
The entry of women into industrial work in Britain, America andAustralia during the First and, especially, the Second Wodd Wars wasfollowed by an equally deliberate process of their expulsion from thatwork once the immediate crisis had passed (see figure 2.1). Thus thegross under-representation of women in engineering and other industrial work, and the lack of confidence often felt by women faced withtechnology, are evidence of a deeper problem. Official plans to rectify
the under-representation of women in engineering often proceed as

The Technology of Production

35

l~l Mtu:titions worker during World War. II•~~·••••< Source: Australian War Memorial, negative no. 13178. From the··· film For Love or Money (1983) by Megan McMurchy, Margot Oliver,·• Jenni Thornley::t::Jfthe problem were simply a lack of self-confidence in women. But
lJUlledominance of technology has in large part been secured by theJ~tive exclusion of women from areas of technological work.
\ ;Printing and newspaper publishing in particular is an industry with~raft traditions of labour process control. Recent technological devel9pments, particularly in electronic typesetting technologies which
Jliwe the potential to undermine those traditions, have been resisted
by printing workers. Strikes and lockouts throughout the 1970s andearly 1980s have characterized attempts to introduce the new technology in the United States. Great Britain and Australia. The printing.{uqustry in Britain provides a contemporary illustration of the sexual
politics involved in such struggles over technology.
The violent dispute at the new technology newspaper plant at

36

The Technology of Production

Wapping in l,ondon dudng .1986was the final ptlasein.ate~g hi~tOfJ
of.inM3g~ent.at~in1't~Jo wrt~t.~ont,:olof·the Jal)c;>llf~f~f(l'9ffli
the··F;t• Stteet priJtt ..,,~i')ns.·.CopipJ.ttetjze<J..pbQtoqQ~~i~o11,f~telll$..,ll.id••·~na~bte>in• ..the•·..liJni~d•Stfi«$·~tinii~rcyf:l~

abo~J970.··This••technology·.enaJ>ledjoµrnalistian!il.adi~tis~g'~t,somi~ to .e11tercopydire<;(i)'intoiiCQinputer. Thei111tj<l~Pll~tUij~
newjjchnology re1.irese11t&l•a1tattacl{.on.the comppsii-.,wcont{~
ovi,t~eir• work l:lS
itmeant.t~atJ~irtttWitional
manual skills •W~;
beco~ technically reclu11dant~··•·.. . . . .
..•·. .
.•·.·•···•··.
'?'Jiigr:~tri~irepractices 9f qaft la~ig-,amt .the ~~~•Of ch~Jj
COJl~QJpad,
not.Slµl)nsitjgly,i11hil;,itecl
tlieintr:o~iOt(Of this.~~\off . . ... .. ..gicalinnovatiouillto the newspaperindIJstey btLondontjC
Fl~t •...··••.·..·.•·....Wcag~~flhe~craftsinenh~ve.~n'1:~zyhi~.inthe"p~+,war
Thoseof coinPQsitors,•WIJ<>.Pf:ep~ecl.tqe
type.in ~pf·•••·
me~;twere.fbehi~~ot~rtnher·bcw~<>n:tb,e4istpry;9f
twesettitlj
t~qf~inllritai~.··~~·.
q~kbµ111{l.9$3)Qe~q-ill~tbis~clle ..

.Riio4..

ty})iUilf~P<Qf~iU~•lllj~.~~kets~3•.tftey.werepeingnt~~un~f~.Ql~~~"~~l~!~J~~ni~l,fi½l8~~i9Jl.'f:7•.is~n•~•~f,•w9rlc•·f~4,~·•lui¥~;~
tt Jtt<>Jijijly~c ~.
~P <>yers,sa'Vtffis······;......
,,.....··Bt•\··/ .....• ··· r···? 6 •··•·····•····11:.···•···.·•.·.
.... .·.··..··•·.·•·•·.•.··••.·.·•.
e.~'~na..gi,g..·.th'·.
JQl'ep ,ce.t ..e::ll).e-1~t . eheJtper

7"Wom~i~worlc~s...~~>~~'past(leca~e.~he.cpmJ)Osi~Qf.$.,ba\'e:f
QllghttO:Cd~f~d tjeif;p()Sitjl)pj p~ havingsole.···rightstpuse.fue·.c-0mputer
typesetting equipment· - to retain keyboard work. To varying degreesthe}' managed to maintain their craft control even though their craft
was technologically redundant. However. their strategy. of resistancehas entailed the exclusion of unskilled women from the trade. It
should be noted that this exclusionary strategy has also involved racial
and religious prejudice. Skilled printing workers have a higher proportion of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants among them than the semiand unskilled.
Having pointed out the way in which organized male workers haveused technology to maintain power over women in the workplace, itneeds to be said that this is not a once-and-for-all achievement. Male
dominance over machinery is constantly under threat - both by
women's direct efforts to undermine it, and by actions of employers
in seeking to undermine skilled male workers and cheapen their labourcosts.
Under some conditions, skilled men do lose out and women enter
previously male jobs. The process of feminization is often part oftechnological change.•In such cases, women rarely perform exactly thesame tasks, under the same conditions, as the men formerly performed: inherent in this process of technological change is the trans-

The Technology of Production

37

of jobs. However, and this is the crucial point, theion of female labour is us11ally accompanied by a downof the skill content of the work and a ,onsequent fall in pay

and ·Technical Competence,. . en said that women are low paid because they are unskilled;~ijnlywomen's work tends to fall into the unskilled or semi-skilled
i~J'e~·ories,of official• classifications. But the crucial question is how!~tionsofskill
are established. To take a simple example, womenassemble digital watches and pocket calculators require con[~I'able manual dexterity ('nimble fingers'), the capacity for sus~<·~d attention to detail and excellent hand-eye co-ordination. Yet
capacities are not defined as 'skills'. Nurses provide another(?imPle of an occupation that':;~uires a great deal of training and.... . •.y, as well as technical knowledge. However nursing is not
i~Rbt of. as a technicaljob because it is women's work. Moreover,~~llse ·such• work bas been socially constructed as unskiJled it has!i~beenundervalued. Consequently 'women's work' is comparailly•low paid.Thework-0fwomenis often deemed inferior simply•~
it is women who do it~..
~~i\~sl::fo.whas
itcomeaboutthatwomen
have failed to achieve recogni!~"of .the skills required by their work? Although it is the case that;~en workers have generaHy.beenrefused access to training in tradi!~l'.lallymasculine areas of work, the basis for distinctions of skill in~men's and men's work is not a simple technical matter. Definitions(~~fskillcan have more todo with ideological and social constructions~withtechnical competencies which are possessed by men and not;~)Vomen. Itis a question of workers' collective efforts to protect and,~.etheir conditions of employment - by retaining skill designaitic;,nsfor their own work and def ending that skill to the exclusion oflillltsiders. These efforts have been predominantly by and on behalf~;the male working class. They have been directed against employers
whohave regularly tried to find ways of substituting cheaper workers~for expensive sldlled labour.
f; But men's Tesistance has also operated against women's interests.
:Pefendingskill, preventing 'dilution', has almost always meant blockingw.omen's access to an occupation. Moreover employers' own peri:eeptions,ofthe suitability of women for particular types of work must
hrpart be responsible for the craft• workers' success in excluding
women from skilled work (Liff, 1986). Otherwise one would expect

!I~

38

The Technology of Production

the sexual division of labour to be a much more contested area bothfor management and unions than it is. Skilled status has thus been
traditionally identified with masculinity and as work that women
don't do, while women's skills have been defined as non-technical andundervalued.
Thus there are impor.tant connections between men's power in theworkplace and their dominance over machinery. Likewise, there areimportant connections between women's relative lack of power andtheir l~ck of technological skills. In chapter l I said that technology
includes not just things themselves but the physical and mental knowhow to make use of these things. Know-how is a resource that gives
those who possess it a degree of actual or potential power and we haveseen above how this know-how has been central to the class politics
of technological work. It is also central to the sexual politics of technological work, as technical competence is a key source of men's
power over women - of the capacity, for example, to command
higher incomes and scarce jobs.
How can we begin to understand the enduring force of this identification between technical skills and masculinity without making themistake of treating technology as inherently masculine? We can start,
as Cockburn does, by taking seriously the requirement to understandthe masculinity of technology as a social product. Men's affinity withtechnology is then seen as integral to the constitution of male gender
identity. 'Technology enters into our sexual identity: femininity is
incompatible with technological competence; to feel technically competent is to feel manly' (Cockburn, 1985, p. 12).
Once we recognize that gender construction is an ongoing ideological and cultural process with a long history, then the focus shifts
to analyzing the social practices involved. The way in which thepresent technical culture expresses and consolidates relations among
men becomes an important factor in explaining the continuing exclusion of women.
This type of analysis stresses the importance of the cultural aspectsof gender relations, and shows the way that gender is an integral partof people's experience in the workplace. This is illustrated in
Cockburn's (1983) study of compositors. where she ascribes the centrality of the craft workers' ease with technology to their masculine
identity. The· industrial strength of craftsmen derived from theirknowledgeand competence with machines. The control over this typeof industrial technology has traditionally been the province of men,
and women workers have been excluded from these technical skills.
The technical change from linotype to electronic photocomposition,

The Technology of Production

39. however, literally makes the compositors feel emasculated. Because~e.work of composing now resembles typing and involves working•· paper instead of metal, that is, a shift from Ml.Ctorywork to the, the compositors no longer consider it to be real work. Tradicraft culture was associated with hot metal, dirt and physicalfj,pfk and the elimination of this not only diminishes their control overl)n,eirwork but it also represents a threat to their masculinity.
!}~Clearly. however, the appropriation of technical skills plays ani,mportant part in the reproduction of inequality among men as well/itretween men and women. Men do not have power over women in
Iffiesame sense as capitalists do over workers. In looking at thei•JJ:tiQnsof work one is inevitably looking at class relations. The male[#Wture.of craft know-how is the culture of an exploited group. Male~~ployees themselves vary considerably in their capacities to control~d0benefit from technologicahinnpyations. It is important to remem,ij~tthat this source of power is a:sti:oordinate one in that technology
is.fatso used by some men to dominate others.
':.)fhe class dimension is also significant in another sense. It is not the~se that all women have an identical relationship to machinecy and~,technical knowledge. There are obviously important differences
FWeen the technical skills of say women factory workers and thoset~f technically trained professional women. However, Cockburn
f.pund that what they had in common was that they were both to be\J~nd operating machinecy, but rarely in those occupations thatj.r:0lve knowing what goes on inside the machine. 'With few excepp'Qns, the designer and developer of the new systems, the people who
tm.ll'ket and sell, install, manage and service machinery, are men .
.Women may push the buttons but they may not meddle with thew;orks' (1985, pp.11-12). Women may well have considerable knowjdge about the machine that they work on, but the key to power is;l'lexible, transferable skills and these are still the property of men.
!To say that technical competence is part of male gender identity,!snot to presume that there is a coherent single form of masculinity.
2:Fhe:
masculine culture of technology may take a partially different
ft>frofor working-class and middle-class men. The cult of masculinity•revolving around physical prowess is closely associated with shopfloor culture among ·manual workers. Working-class men may bentore able when it comes to fixing cars and domestic machines, but
middle-class men have more power through their possession of
ilbstract and generalizable technical knowledge. Furthermore, it needs
to be stressed that ethnic and generational differences, as well as classdivisions, produce different versions of masculinity. If we are to avoid

AO The Technology of Production

essentialist constructions of 'men' and 'masculinity', we need topluralize the term and speak of 'masculinities'. I will return to a more
extensive discussion of the nature of masculine technological culturein chapter 6.
The Relocation of Work

It has been widely noted that the development of microelectronic andtelecommunication technology opens up the possibility of radical
changes in the location of work. White-collar work, for example, canbe decentralized and moved into suburban offices (with lower rents
and possibly lower wages) or it can be moved 'offshore' altogether.
Sending work off shore, while not new, is certainly much easier as aresult of greater satellite telecommunications capacity. An international sexual division of labour has emerged based on the breakdown of the production process in computer manufacture, withwomen perfarming the labour-intensive assembly of microchips
in various Third World countries. More recently, offshore officeservices have developed where low-wage female labour is used for data
entry and data processing work for firms based in the industrializedcountries. It should be noted, however, that just as in manufacturing
the development of advanced automation systems has reduced theneed for offshore assembly work, so developments in office automation (such as voice recognition and optical character recognition)suggest that the use of offshore office services will be a short-term
phenomenon.
The development of computer-based homework, which is also
referred to as 'telework' or 'telecommuting', illustrates further the
impact that technology has on the location of work. The combinationof computer and telecommunications technology has made it technically feasible for large numbers of workers whose jobs involve information processing to work at terminals in their own homes. The visionof what has become known as the 'electronic cottage', features in all
scenarios of the future of work. Although the number of people
involved in this new form of homework is still small, its potential isquite large. And, according to many writers from a wide variety ofpolitical persuasions, it is a paradigmatic casefor the future organization of work. According to post-industrial theory, the home as aworkplace liberates people from the discipline and alienation of industrial production. Homework offers the freedom of self-regulated
work and a reintegration of work and personal life. Moreover, an
expansion of homework will allegedly lead to much more sharing ofThe Technology of Production

41

paid and unpaid domestic labour. as men and women spend more time
tt home together.
Whereas the post-industrial theorists see electronic homework as~t of a positive future, for others it evokes the ugly spectre of\~eated' self-exploitative piecework. These writers approach telefw:orkwith a set·of assumptions derived from the study of traditional,~pmeworkers. They expect it to become more widespread because itls a method of production favoured by employers seeking to resist(C()mpetitionand protect profits by reducing wage costs. As such it isas part of a more general trend towards the casualization of theiJ,our force and the growth of the informal sector. Both perspectives~are a largely technologically determinist prophecy of the 'collapse
Of<work'.
\ ,white-collar and service sector homework, both traditional and~odem, have been increasing over the past two decades, even before
Jpe new information techn.ologfexerted its full influence on worki~rangements. From research carried out in Europe, America andi\ustralia, it is clear that important differences are already emerging~een
professional and clerical teleworkers. 7 Men predominate~ong the professionals, such as managerial staff, computer prolf81Dmersand systems analysts, while women are the great majority
clerical workers.
Most of these are married women with young children, for whombomework is especially attractive because of their household responjbilities and the lack of affordable quality childcare. However, in<::Pfactice,balancing childcare with paid work has proved difficult for~any of the women as they have only limited control over a flucetuatingworkload. They are often employed precisely for the flexibility
thatthis provides for employers. Like traditional homeworkers, elec.itonic homeworkers are typically paid at piece rates and earn substanµally less than comparably skilled employees working in offices, aswell as having to meet their own overhead costs. Moreover, as
employers do not give homeworkers employee status, they are notentitled to benefits such as sickness pay, and have no security of
employment. Electronic homework for clerical women, then, is ane,ctension of traditional homework with all its disadvantages.
The pattern of work of male professionals is quite different fromthat of clerical workers in that they work from home rather than at
home. American research has focused on managerial and professional
employees where firms turn to homework in order to retain highly
qualified workers such as computer programmers. Our Australianstudy looked at self-employed programmers who were also able to

,,een

of

42 The Technology of Production

exploit the skill shortage in their area. Most of these male prof essionals were earning more working at home, and many pointed to thelower overheads of running a business from home.
In our study we found that what they appreciated was not theopportunity to combine paid work with childcare but their flexible
and varied working patterns. In fact, the very long hours they worked
militated against any significant change to the balance between workand leisure, or work and family life. When we asked the programmers
and word processor operators in our sample how working from home
had changed their attitude to work, we found strong evidence of reinforced rather than transformed gender differences. Whereas the
majority of men had become more work-centred, the women weremore likely to have become less work-centred and more family-centred.
Thus even research on new technology homework fails to reveal
simple trends. Electronic homework may well mean very different
things for professional and clerical workers, and for men and women.
For women clerical workers, new technology homework still reflects
their labour market vulnerability - vulnerability that stems from theavailability of their skill and the domestic division of labour. It is only
for male professionals who possess skills which are in short supply
that new technology homework presents an unambiguously attractive
choice. But this hardly warrants the general enthusiasm for 'electronic
cottages' that characterizes so much of the literature about the futureof work.
Overall, then, new forms of computer-based homework would
appear to reinforce sexual divisions in relation to paid work andunpaid domestic work, as well as to the technical division of labour.
Once more we see women failing to gain the genuinely technical jobs,
in this case producing software for computers. It is a stark exampleof the reproduction of women's traditional position in the new electronic age.

The Social Shaping of Workplace Technology
In this chapter I have been examining the impact of technologicalchange on sexual divisions in the labour market and occupationalsegregation between women and men. Although new technologies
may be important levers of change in the social relations of production, the gendered character of work has inhibited major transf ormations in the sexual division of labour. In a period of vast technologicalchanges which have profoundly restructured work in every sphere, theThe Technology of Production

43/.resilience of the gendered character of the technical division and?hierarchy of labour has been notable.
:i >fwill now turn the focus round and consider die social factors thatr,;t~usetechnological change. The extent to which the invention and dif½iif~ion of particular technologies are themselves shaped by social
ftoi:ces will be explored. I will argue that the sex of the workforce and!i&tllder relations in the workplace themselves profoundly affect the;%lir-ectionand pace of technological change. It is only through an
3[lffl,alysisof the processes by which technology is itself gendered thatl(k'Jdnability to undermine gender divisions can be understood.
~{\Newtechnology typically emerges from modifications to and com\ijiJ1Btionsof existing technology. However this is not the only force.!?~ping technology. Industrial innovation is a product of an historiC~ty specific activity carried out in the interests of particular sociali;ltoups and against the interests<9f others.
}i/Technological systems are oriented to a goal and that goal is nor;~aJlyto reduce costs and increase revenues. When technologists focus{iPVentiveeffort on the 'inefficient' components of a system, for many{.p#:acticalpurposes inefficient means uneconomical. So technological{t~oning and economic reasoning are often inseparable.
;,:Avitalissue in technical change is the cost of labour, because much
mftovation is sponsored and justified on the ground that it saves
our costs. In a capitalist society, class relations are a major factor
ting the price of labour. Placing the class dimension at the centre
i.ofits analysis, labour process theory is an important and well estab1.ished approach to the study of technological change. Although
limited with respect to gender, it provides a useful starting point forthe development of a gender perspective.

1!f

Industrial Conflict and Technical Innovation)fne mechanization of craft work has commonly been presented as the:modelfor understanding major changes in the capitalist labour process. ·Historically, production was very dependent on the skills andltrlowledgeof craft workers, but over the first quarter of the twentiethcentury their jobs were subdivided, allowing employers to dispense
Withskilled labour. Rather than seeing deskilling as an inexorable
wndency, recent studies have emphasized the extent to which workerr,esistancemediated the deskilling process. 8 Craft skills provided theb~is for maintaining control over the utilization of machinery andhence the basis for worker organization. A key part of this strategy
was the exclusion of other non-craft workers who offered a threat to44

The Technology of Production

their position. As we have already seen, this mechanism of social
exclusion was often deployed at the expense of women workers.
Technological innovations have played a major role in these battles
for control over production. 9 •ln the early phases of capitalist development, machinery was used by the owners and managers of capitalas an important weapen in the battle for control over production.
Marx's classic account of the development of the automatic spinning'mule' (so-called because it was a hybrid of the spinning-jenny andwater-frame) in nineteenth-century Britain has, for example, been
re-examined from this perspective. In the early production processof spinning the skilled adult male spinner had a central role. The
spinner's centrality derived not only from his technical skills but also
from his supervisory role through the system of sub-contracting
labour. The spinners were highly unionized and their frequent strikes
were a direct challenge to the power and profits of the cotton-masters.
The self-acting mule was the employers' response to this threat.
A major strike in 1824 seems to have galvanized a number ofmanufactmers into recognizing their common interest in relation to
the spinners. They therefore approached Richard Roberts, a wellknown mechanical engineer and toolmaker. Roberts told· the Houseof Lords Select Committee in 1851: 'The self-acting mule was madein consequence of a turn-out of the spinners at Hyde, which had lasted
three months, when a deputation of masters waited upon me, andrequested me to turn my attention to spinning, with the view ofmaking the mule self-acting' (Bruland, 1982, p. 103).
The explicit purpose of this invention and its introduction was tobreak the power of the spinners. By changing the technology ofspinning they intended to replace men on the mules with the cheaper
labour of women and children. The self-actor was partially successful
in its aim of curbing the spinners' militancy. In the period following
the innovation, their wages were relatively depressed and strikes
declined markedly. This episode exemplifies the way in which particular arenas of industrial conflict may result in the development ofparticular kinds of technical innovations.
In fact, the diffusion of the self-actor was relatively slow and did
not have the anticipated effect of destroying the craft position of
the adult male spinners. Despite radical changes in the manual component of mule spinning, these workers retained their position. The
spinner-piecer system was merely replaced by an analogous minderpiecer system, which still left minders with responsibility for recruiting
assistants and controlling them on the shop floor. This hierarchicalThe Technology of Production

45

d,ivisionwithin the workforce persisted because it was the basis of the,~ting managerial structure in cotton spinning.
/ William Lazonick (1979) has shown that this reliance of the~mployers on a very effective form of labour management was morejjportant than the skills or organized strength of the male minders.
it was the hierarchical division within the working class which
j'\Qu.1s,:glnditioned technical change.
'4tmade it rational for capitalists to work with slightly Jess automated· ·/mules than were technically possible, so that failures of attention by
C .operatives led not to 'snarls' that could be hidden in the middle of spun
" •cops', but to the obvious disaster of 'sawney', where the several bun•
dred threads being spun all broke simultaneously, with consequent loss
piecework earnings for the minder. (MacKenzie, 1984, p. 497).

The history of the self-actingtnule demonstrates that an understanding of technical change as something that is based on relationsof production must include an account of divisions within the working
gass. It not only shows how workers' resistance depends on their.al,ility to control and restrict entry into their trade but also how.~mployerscan exploit these divisions. So the skilled worker typically
JQoks not just in one direction - towards the capitalist who is trying
to. undermine his position by incorporating his skills into themachine - but also towards the mass of the 'unskilled', who canequally be seen as a threat. Typically, this will involve older, male,white workers looking in the direction of those who have at least one
qf;the characteristics of being young, female, black or from an ethnic
mitlority.
>The development of technology cannot however simply be understood in terms of the needs of undifferentiated capital trying toc.ontrol labour as an undifferentiated mass. Recent labour process\"Orkhas repeatedly pointed to the weakness of assuming any simple
and ubiquitous trend in the social construction of technology forcontrol through deskilling. 111Further it has highlighted the need torecognize differences of interest and action amongst capitalists.
The focus has shifted to the interplay between competing
managerial strategies and priorities on the one hand, and various
patterns of worker response on the other. There are now many documented instances where occupational competition was settled infavour of enlarged control by craft workers as well as cases where
detailed control and deskilling by technology was the result

46 The Technology of Production(Wilkinson, 1983). Short-term competitive pressures between capitals
or motivational and flexibility concerns clearly lead to compromises;
over the deskilling potential of technologies.
Studies of how class relations shape technology are overwhelmingl1
preoccupied with traditional male unionized sections of manufa~
turing industry. Discussion about the impact of new technologies
the workplace· has focused to a remarkable degree on the automatio11
of machine tools. Perhaps this is.because many of these male authors,
like Braverman, are immersed in the romance of the skilled craftsman
tragically becoming obsolete. Skilled machinists, however, have neverbeen typical-of workers and certainly women workers do not figurein their number. As there·is little empirical analysis of technologicaldevelopment which explicitly challenges technological determinism,itis worth considering this example of a twentieth-century technology
to see if lessons can be drawn from it for a gender analysis.

on

The Automationof Machine Too/s: A Case Study of Choice

The evolution of automatically controlled machine tools is the subjectof a detailed study of the design, development and diffusion of a par-.
ticular technology, 'from the point of conception in the minds ofinventors to the point of production ontbe shop floor' (Noble, 1984; •p~xiv). This is a particularly daunting task to undertake for a modern
technology when the 'heroic inventor' has left the stage to be replacedby major institutions.
• The central argument of David Noble's classic study. Forcesof Production, is that patterns of power and cultural values shape the actual
processes of technological development. Noble argues that the concepts of 'economic viability' and·'technical viability'. which are often
used to explain technological change, are inherently political. By way ·of a detailed reconstruction of a lost alternative to numerical control,and by examination of variant forms of numerical control that havealso vanished, Noble shows that automation did not have to proceed
in the way it did. Rather, the form of automation was the result of
deliberate selection.
A major goal of machine tool automation was to secure managerial
control, by shifting control from the shop floor to the centralized
office. There were at least two possible solutions to the problem of
automating machine tools. Machining was in fact automated using thetechnique of numerical control. But there was also a technique of
automation called 'record-playback:' which was as promising as
numerical control yet it enjoyed only a brief existence. Why, asks

The Technology of Production

47~opli;. was numerical control developed and record-playback!:~~~ped? It was the post-war period of labour militancy that provided•W<·alcontext in which the technology of machine tool automation
loped.
ord;:,layback was a system that would have extended the)1ists'skill.Although the machines were more automated underem, the machinists still had control of the feeds, speeds,
r of cuts and output of metal; in other words, they controlled,AAhineand thereby retained shop floor control over production.
111.ericalcontrol on the other hand offered a means of dispensing:these well-organized skilled machinists. The planning and confunctions. were now carried out in an office because the·lles.operated according to computer programs. The machinist.a.button pusher. Numerical control was therefore a manage.system, as well as. atecllnology for cutting metals. It led to·zational changes in ·the fitctory which increased managerial
lover production because the technology was chosen, in part,
Jiust that purpose.
would be wrong to assume that managers' goals in pref erring"cal control to record-playback were necessarily realized. The
uction of numerical control on to the shop floor did not simply:eontrol to management. It,was met·with fierce resistance fromrkforce. At the.same time,.management found that it needed
tain skilled machinists to operate the new machines effectively.
~uently, management was never able to gain complete control
production. In reality, machines do not run themselves andforethe tendency to deskilling is always contradictory. Indeed,.. oble himself acknowledges, the subsequent development ofE~nine tool technology has made it technically feasible and poten[&r economical to institute shop floor programming. As technoadvances opened up new areas of application - in smaller
ltm.sinvolved in small batch or specialised production - it also
:P,royidedopportunities for craft workers to regain control over prolf.~mming. In fact, the operational requirements of these small firms
Jl{lYbe more compatible with shop floor programming than with ai.AAilgerial strategy oriented around deskilling.
iiNQblels studyis remarkable for its attempt to encompass many diffir.-tlevels of social determination of the technology. It does not~tn>,PlY
rely on treating technology as being determined by manage#1:enfs demand for control over workers. It goes beyond that to~elude the role and interests of the military in that post-war period,
aswell as the ideology and interests of engineers. Although it was the11~

48 The Technology of Productionsocial relations of production that tipped the balance in the choice oft
technology in Noble's example, he demonstrates how the demand for.
management control coincided· with the command and control go~of ·the military. He also shows how the ideology and• interests ti~
engineers who take the view that the most automated is the m.oJtl
advanced and that the human element should be eliminated from pt:~~
duetion because it is the potential source of 'human error' fits in wifilr
the idea of management control.
However, while emphasizing the various class forces that shape th~design and application of machine tools, Noble fails to consider th~fthere is also a gender dimension to these forces. This could have bee#.!
observed through the role of the state, capital and unions ·but it is pat{ticularly evident in his otherwise excellent account of the ideology an~culture of engineers. Engineering culture, with its fascination withcomputers and the most automated techniques, is archetypicallymasculine and would have provided an.excellent opportunity for ari
integration of class and gender perspectives on technological change/

The Gendered Relations of Technology
Class divisions have been central to the analysis presented so far, but
the relations between women workers and men workers are offundamental importance ·for any discussion of the··developmentof technology. ·One of the· ways that gender divisions interact withtechnological change is through the price of labour, in that women is
wage labour generally costs considerably less than men's. This may
affect technological change in at least two ways. Firstly, as we haveseen, employers may seek Jorms of technological change that enable
them to replace expensive··skilled male workers with low paid, lessunionized female workers. Secondly, because a new machine has topay for itself in labour costs saved, technological change may beslower in industries where there is an abundant supply of cheap
worn.en's labour.
There is some historical evidence that the rate of technical development has depended, at least in part, on the price and skill flexibilityof the available labour force. For example, the clothing industry hasremained technologically static since the nineteenth century with littlechange 1n the sewing process. There are no doubt purely technicalobstacles to the mechanization .of clothing production, such as the
floppy material involved and changing styles and fashions. However,leaving aside the technical difficulties, there will be less incentive toThe Technology of Production 49..... in automation if skilled and cheap labour power is available to

t.tJJjob.
.... s there is an important link between wome,i's status as unskilled·i~w
paid workers, and the uneven pace of technological develop->FJ1:ra,Jltionallyitis
women who sew and they have been available•wages, eitherin Third World countries or as migrant labour~~ern capitalist countries. The fact that clothing workers are-~asunskilled is due in large measure to their lack of industrial.,, which is in turn due to the large pool of women whose social· ••··•••·····.. fercesthem to compete in this area of work. It is not possible'~ybody to sit down at a sewing machine and sew a garment
iifflj.O:Ut
previous experience. To be a competent machinist demands
able knowledge and experience with the machine. Althoughiis()nearea.wherewomen are at ease with machines, this is seen
< • en's supposed natu.r!d"1ptitude for sewing and thus this tech}~$kill .is devalued and urideq,aid. 11t~!~~.e is.a more dire~· sense, however,. in which gender relations;~f<their imprint on technology. As I pointed out earlier, recent•·st work has emphasized that distinctions of skill between.• .·. en's and men's work have as much to do with job control and~e,,rev.els as they have to. do with actual technique. However, this·•··· · ation understates the tan~ble basis of skill. Men selectively
tools and machinery to match the te.chnical skills they havei~ated. Macbinery'is designed by men with.men in mind; industrial~ologyreflects male power as well as capitalist domination.
N•

V

•. ·

•

~'j~J1ronsformation of Typesetting: Building In Sex-Blas:~:;~~~:{~;,:;:;::,,,

i pest examples of the gendering of technology come from,. );)um':s.(1983).history-0ftypesetting, which provides a detailed(~tionof the technological evolution.of the computerized photo)[~P9Sition system. Like Noble, she shows that automation did not
1t~toproceed
in the way that it did. Rather, the form of automation
Ii~'fhe result of 'deliberate' selection. Cockburn suggests that thet~hnical choices made can only be understood by looking closely att~.(!()nflictual relations of production, including the central role ofl•qer relations.
~l ,~mputerized photocomposition technology has what is known ascl.i;tQw;ERTY
keyboard. Q-W-E-R-T-Y are the characters on the.~AAd ·top row left-hand side of. a conventional typewriter. This isj~l.Vthe standard keyboard incorporated into computers. However

50

The Technology of Production

there was nothing inevitable about this. Electronic circuitry is in fact
perfectly capable of producing a Linotype lay on the new-style board.
Linotype Paul have manufactured one. The lay of the Linotype keyboard differs greatly from QWERTY. Not only does it have 90 keys
in contrast to 44, the relative position of the letters of the alphabet
also differs from that of a typewriter and the keys are larger andspread further apart.
So what politics lie behind the design and selection of this keyboard? In choosing to dispense with the Linotype layout, management were choosing a system that would undermine the skill andpower basis of the Linotype operators, the highest paid of all thecraftsmen. All the operators would be reduced to novices on the newboard, as the inputting would now require little more than good typing
ability. This would render typists (mainly women) and Linotype
operators (men) equal competitors for the new machines; indeed, itwould advantage the women typists. The QWERTY technique wasdesigned with an eye to using the relatively cheap and abundant labourof female typists.
The history of mechanized typesetting offers another instance ofclear sex;.bias within the design of equipment. A nineteenth-century
rival to the Linotype was the Hattersley typesetter. Compositors hated
technical systems such as the Hattersley typesetter that separated thejobs of composing and distribution. It had a separate mechanism for
distributing type, designed for use by girls. The separation of thesetting (skilled) and distribution (the unskilled job of putting theletters back in their letter box) was devised as a means of reducing
overall labour costs. Compositors feared that employers would try to
expand this use of cheaper, unskilled labour once it got a foothold
into the composing room.
The Linotype machine on the other hand did not represent thedestruction but merely the mechanization of the compositors' setting
skills as a whole. The key aspect of this successful machine was that
it eliminated distribution as a task - since letters were formed anew
each time by the action of brass mould on molten metal. After thetype was used it was simply melted down ready to be re-used. The
compositors actually welcomed the Linotype machine because it did
not depend for its success on the employment of child labour. The
men's union, the London Society of Compositors, even wrote a letterto the Linotype Company Ltd. in 1893 congratulating them: 'The
Linotype answers to one of the essential conditions of trade unionism,in that it does not depend for its success on the employment of boy
or girl labour'. On the contrary, by cutting out the task of distribution,

The Technology of Production

51

f iLstopped any possible inroads that boys and women might make into

' the trade. Thus, in deference to the organizational strength of the!)union, the Linotype manufacturing company aaopted a technology
tl;lat was beneficial to the union men .
. ·.•··•·
Perhaps, finally, there is another level on which the technology of
I production
reflects male power. Feminists have understandably
i tended to under-emphasize the material realities of physical power,
given that women's exclusion from numerous occupations has been
l~gitimated in biological terms. It is often still said that men are[t>µatur.allystronger and therefore more suited to certain types of work.
~owever, as Cockburn (1983, p. 203) correctly stresses, 'the construc)ition of men as strong and capable, manually able and technologically[f~dowed, and women as physically and technically incompetent' is ait;~9Cial process. It is the result of different childhood exposure toj/f~hnology, the prevalence of di{~ent role models, different forms\X~fschooling, and the extreme sex segregation of the job market. The!8jJfect of this is an implicit bias in the design of machinery and job¢ontent towards male strength.
In composing work, the lifting and carrying of the forme is a case
A in point. The forme is heavy and in fact beyond the strength of not\p.nly women but also many men, particularly older men and youngerc:\)~pprentices. However, by defining this task as one that requires}~1uscle, women workers cannot threaten to undercut men's labour.
~~esize and weight of the forme is in fact arbitrary. Printing presses~~¥indthe printed sheet could have been smaller too. Tradition alone has
l~id.ed at what weight the use of hoists and trolleys to transport the/f~j;-me is introduced. There is nothing natural about units of work .
.1-~tper it is hay bales or 50-kilo bags of cement or plaster, they are![~iti~in their design. Capitalists and workers have a politicali~erestin the design of work processes. Employers prefer workers to}~ their brawn when it leads to more efficiency and lower production}<COSts,
Male workers use their bodily and technical eff ectivity to design
machinery and work tasks so as to constitute themselves as the capable>'wi',rkersand women as inadequate.
is overwhelmingly males who design technological process andi~u~trial machinery. It is the knowledge and experience of engineersof the workers who use the machines which filters through intoJb~~hapeof new technologies. Mechanical equipment is often manu(it.ured.and assembled in ways that make it just too big and heavy
jf9tthe 'average' woman to use. This need not be a conscious process~.conspiracy. It is rather the outcome of a pre-existing pattern of
power. This is not to imply that men always design technology for

J

//Jf
J8:4

52 The Technology of Production

their own use and in their own interests. It is more complex than that. ·.·••
Capital's interest cannot be supposed always to coincide with that of\men as a sex. As we have seen, some technologies are designed foruse by women in order to break the craft control of men. Thus genderj
divisions are commonly exploited in the power struggles between/
capital and labour·. In this way, the social relations that shape tech,,-}nology include those of gender as well as class.
···This chapter has argued that despite technology being seen as a driving
force it has not ushered in a new order but rather has been built into)
the pre-existing relations of sex, class and race that structure thelabour force and employment opportunities. Although there has been),an ~xpansion of job opportunities for women in some of the new/inf c,rmation services, 'women's jobs' and 'men's jobs' are as strongly }demarcated as ever. This is in part because social relations are
expressed in and shape technologies. The pace and direction of technological development reflect existing gender relations as much as
they affect the sexual division of labour.
··

I

NOTES
I

For a critical review of this literature, see Pollert (1988) who argues that.
what she calls the 'left-reformist' writing which advocates 'flexible
specialization' as a panacea has a conceptual affinity with management
literature on the 'flexible firm•.
2 Liff ( 1988)and Webst.er(1989) argue along similar lines in their excellent•·•
reviews of the literature on office automation. See also the major two-·•volume report commissioned by the American National ResearchCouncil, edited by Hartmann et al. (1986, 1987), which examines theeffects of technological change on both the quantity and quality ot
women's employment, particularly in clerical work.
3 I do not want to rehearse the various arguments contained in thisliterature, as several comprehensive reviews already exist. See Thompson(1983) for an excellent introduction to debates on the labour process.
4 To anticipate my argument about the gendered design of technology,
Juliet Webster has pointed out to me that the first word processing
systems were deliberately restricted to stand-alone, dedicated microcomputers rather than being developed in package form to be used on
mainframes or all-purpose micros. This particualr design was aimed at
the main users, women office workers who had formerly worked with
typewriters. Word processing machines were given dedicated keyboards
with text editing functions embedded in the hardware, and screens which
imitated pieces of paper, to make them resemble their mechanical

The Technology of Production53

predecessors. These features made them seem more accessible to womenwith skills and experience in operating office equipment (pink techno-

5 ~Y~::::~se!~oJ:::~:~~i~lue

technolo~.

}f Game and Pringle (1~83) and Cockburn (1985) both present case studiesof employment where technical developments have substantially altered
the skill and task range of jobs and yet the distinctions between 'men's'
work and 'women's' remain, with men still monopolizing the technical
if/;\";;;-:··\
jobs. See Purcell (1988) for a review of recent British research on thegendering of occupations.
See Wajcman and Probert (1988) for a report of our Australian study{Ji) on new technology homework, which includes a general literaturelrt;:;e;hompson(1983, chapter 4) for an extensive discussion of the~~·· r~~~::::t~~edevelopedat

greater length in MacKenzieand Wajcman

tf. (1985); especially see the extractjby Bruland and Lazonick.

itft •·.•
SeeElger's (1987) review of several recent studies.

l'JftFor a useful discussion of the undervaluing of skills in the clothing
fodustry, see chapter 5 of O'Donnell (1984).

3
R•productive Technology:
Delivered into Men's Hands
Nowhere is the relationship between gender and technology morevigorously contested than in the sphere of human biological reproduction. Women are the bearers. and in most societies the primary nur;.
turers, of children. This means that reproductive technologies are.of
particular significance to them. Birth control has been a major issue
for all movements for women's equality, and much feminist scholar,
ship ·has beell d,evoted to uncovering. women's struggle throughou~
history against the appropriation of medical knowledge and practice'.
by men.
Central to this analysis and of increasing relevance today is theperception that the processes of pregnancy and childbirth are directed
and controlled by ever more sophisticated and intrusive technologies.
Implicit in this view is a concept of reproduction as a natural process,inherent in women alone, and a theory of technology as patriarchal •.
enabling the male domination of women and nature.
The burgeoning debate about these issues has largely been conducted within the feminist movement on the one hand and within thefundamentalist Right on the other. Interestingly, socialists havegenerally. been silent on recent developments in reproductive techno ..
logy. perhaps because they primarily affect women, or perhaps
because they do not concern workplace production, the Left's tradi-tional obsession. But these are the technologies of life, raising complex moral issues about the role of human intervention in the worldof living beings. This chapter will explore feminist perspectives on
reproductive technologies, placing them in the wider context of thegrowing supremacy of technology in medicine.

Feminist Perspectives on Reproductive Technology
The literature on reproductive technology is rife with technologicaldeterminist arguments which assume that changes in technology areReproductive Technology

55..•·Source: Recycled Images~~most important cause of changes in society. 1 Perhaps here moreelsewhere, major technological advances are seen as having
ffir,.ectlytransformed women's lives for the better. The technologies ofm-.egnancya.ndchildbirth are said to have put an end to the dangerous~i painful aspects of giving birth. Healthy pregnancies and healthy~J;,ies are attributed to the wonders of modern antenatal care, now:t·bighly medicalized and technologized process. The new sophisti~t:ed techniques for monitoring foetal development in the early stages
Of••pregnancymean that some 'defective' foetuses can be aborted.
ll,'liertile women who previously had no options can now embark~riinfertility programmes that promise the chance of conceiving'naturally'. And. most common of all, advances in the technologies
fertility control are seen as the key to the massive social changes
that have occurred for women's equality. The widespread availability

'°f

56

Reproducfr,49 Technologyof reliable contraception and abortion, a right often fought for by
women, have meant that for the first time in human history women
are in control of their own bodies. 2
Technology as the Key to Women's Liberation

In the early period of the contemporary women's movement, reproductive technology was .s~n as particularly progressive because it
opened up the potential for finally severing the Hnk between sexuality
and reproduction. The much-cited advocate of the use of high technology to liberate women was Shulamith Firestone. In The Dialecticof Sex (1970) she eU1phasizedthe need to develop effective contraceptive and birth technologies in order to free women from the'tyranny of reproduction' which dictated the nature of women'-soppression. Patriarchy was seen to be fundamentally about the con-.
trol of women's bodie~. espei;iallytheir sexuality.and fertility, by men.
This view located Wcomen'ioppression in their own biology andposited a technologi9al,(ixiJlthe shapepf ectogenesis. The applicationof a neutral techm;~l9gywould bring.~ end to biological motherhood ·and thus make sexual ~quality possible.
Since then. femin~t~ysis
has not s~ed.Firestone's enthusiasm
for the artificial womb as the key to women's liberation. Instead,feminists have recently been more concerned either to oppose theexperimentation on women's bodies that the development of thesetechniques entails or to harness these techniques in the interests offulfilling women's maternal desires.
Genetic research, bio-technology and infertility treatment are now
making such dramatic advances that Firestone's ideas no longer seemto belong in the realm of fantasy. The organic unity of foetus andmother can no longer be assumed now that human eggs and embryos
canbe moved from body to body or out of and back into the same
female body. The major proponents of the possibilities of reproductive technologies are the scientists and medical practitioners developing the techniques as well as women who have benefited from them.
Leading infertility doctors argue thatembryo research promises thepossibility of eliminating some of the most crippling forms of hereditary disease and most importantly, gives hope to previously childlesscouples. As one Member of Parliament recently put it:
The object of our interest in medical research into embryology andhuman fertilisation is to help humanity. It is to help those who areinfertile and to help control infertility .... The researchers are notReproductive Technology

57.(;monsters, but scientists. They are medical scientists working ini'Jesponse to a great human need. We should be proud of them. The~}infertile parents who have been helped are grateful to them. (Pfeffer,~f;;J987, p. 81)

Ji>~owever, all over the world, the use of human embryos in scientific~rch
is becoming a major source of controversy. Governments are~iit~r. pressure to impose tighter regulation and define the limits ofIi~t is permissible. Ethical and religious objections have been
'jrp11slyyoiced to the inexorable advance of science and technology
iJoihe sacred realms of creation. The 'right to life' lobby calls for!I@sislationto ban research in human embryology and the practice oflm'~vitrofertilization. Just as they oppose abortion as an unnaturalm,terferencewith procreation, their concern is for the life and soul ofiffleJoetus. The intense public debate is centred around the question);Qfwhich, if any, of the pr«-ures and experimental programmes!]ilwuJ.dbe licensed and given resources.
II&)'cJii
Australia, Europe and North America there is growing debate~i~OilS feminists over the impact that these novel reproductive andfl-etic technologies will have on women's lives. This is a very divisive}a,:ea for feminists. Whereas abortion and contraception were about~)lalle11ging
thetradit.ional definition offemininity which equated it':~th motherhood, by contrast these new technologies are about fulfill~fus:irather than rejecting, thetraditional feminine role.
· f)C;Ashared concern is that techniques such as in-vitro fertilization, ~().(:Xist
with a powerful ideology of motherhood. Many feminists} ~gue that the in-vitro fertilization programme reinforces the defini~don of motherhood as a biological imperative rather than a social[relationship. As Christine Crowe (1987, p. 84) observes: 'IVF does not
1 ~:re infertility; it provides (and for a few women only) an avenue to' lljological motherhood through technological intervention'. 3 It is a~~nological fix' in the sense that it does not at any point address
f.:theinitial causes of infertility. Doctors and the media describe these. .~cllnologies as enhancing women's 'natural need' to mother, andln(ertile women as desperate. Much of the feminist discussion centres
ajlndte notion of choice and whether the right to choose to have an
tl:!ortion can be equated with the right to choose to have a child. 4 As·•··.. we shall see below, feminist support for techniques such as in-vitro
fertilization is founded in the belief that these technologies increase~001en's choices and that women do indeed have the right tor~produce.

58

Reproductive

Technology

Reproductive Technology as Potriarchal Domination

Most vocal in their opposition to the development and application Q(
genetic and reprQductive engineering are a group of radical feministi.
who in 1984 formed FINRRAGB (Feminist International Network of;Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering). Represented bj:(authors such as Gena Corea (1985), Jalna Hanmer (l985), Renatel:}l;t
Klein (1985), Maria Mies (1987) and Robyn Rowland (1985), they~C
the development of reproductive technologies as a form of patriarchil
exploitation of women's bodies;··\.
Whereas Firestone•saw women's reproductive role as the sourcet1f.i
their oppression, FINRRAGE writers want to reclaim the experien~}of mothethoQd as the foundation of women's identity. For, as Rooyl);J
Rowland (1985; p. 78) expresses it:'the qualities of mothering 6¥\imaternal thinking stand in opposition to the destructive, violenfari:diself-aggrandizing characteristics of men.' The previously celebrafed\1
technological potential for the complete separation of reproduction ··from• sexuality is now seen as an attack on women. Radical feminist
theory sees these techniques as an attempt to appropriate the reprol
ductive capacities which have been, in the past, women's uniqqe \source of power. It is about removing 'the last woman-centred process C}from us'. For Jalna Hanmer(1985, p.103), 'The dominanfmodeof[patriarchal} control is changing hands from the individual malethrough marriage to men as a social category; through science andtechnology ... /. Thelocus of control and struggle is shifting from sex~
uality to reproduction and childcare, i.e. motherhood.'<Fort.his group of feminists, who have criticized the ways in which
patriarchal society has ignored or sanctioned sexual and domestic violence against women, the new reprQductive and gene technologies>are'violence against·womeninyetanother form'. 'Gen~tic and reproductive engineering is another attempt to end self-determination over-0ur J~
bQdies'. According to this theory: techniques· such as in~vitro fertili:zatioll, egg donation, sex predetermination arid embryo evaluation
off er a powerful means of social control because they will become \tstandard practice. Just as other obstetric p'rocedures were first intro- ·.,.•.•··.\
duced for 'high risk' cases and are now used routinely on most birthing,
women,.th,ese authors fear that the new techniques will eventually be
used· on a large proportion of the female population.
FINRRAGE sees reproductive technologies as inextricably linked
with genetic engineering and eugenics. It is techniques such as in-vitro/
fertilization which provide researchers with the embryos on which to';:;~;:-:

Reproductive Technology

59~scientific research. A parallel is drawn between the way in which•have been increasingly controlling the reproduction of animals
i\~1,Jmprovetheir stock by experimenting on them, and the extension~fms form of experimentation to women. The female body is being
il~gpriated. fragmented and dissected as raw material, or providing
i~g laboratories' as Renate Klein puts it, for the technological pro. · n of human beings.
most powerful statement of this is Gena Corea's image of 'theuctive brothel' which extrapolates from the way animals areused like machines to breed, to a future in which women will~me professional breeders, 'the mother machine' at men's com..·· . Some writers argue that these techniques will actually replace
al reproduction, guaranteeing the fabrication of geneticallytbabies. According to this futuristic dystopia, men will achieve
e control of human. creation and women will be redundant.
M~allyfeminists have eJC:plai•. the patriarchal desire for control···• ;,reproduction in psychoanalytic or psychological terms, assoit with male fear of female procreativity and the quest forlity. The potential of this technology to disconnect the foetus
woman's body is seen as a specificform of the ancient mascuijijjimpulse/to confine and limit and curb the creativity and poten~J~p.olluting power of female.procreation' (Oakley, 1976, p. 57), in~t;male womb envy. Embedded in this approach, and mostf~ijcitin the work of Maria Mies, is a conception of science and~bnology as intrinsically patriarchal. FINRRAGE states that they~ta
new.feminist science based on 'a non~exploitativerelationship··· ···:eennature and ourselves'. Clearly, feminist philosophical theoabout the masculinist character of. scientific objectivity and~nality
is being heavily drawn on in current debates about reprol~q~tive.technologies.
fjf~iesargues that.it makes absolutely no difference whether it isiifflJinen:ormenwho apply andcontrol·thistechnology; this technology
i1!:!lntrinsicallyan instrument of domination. 'a new stage in thei~tnm;,chal war against women'. Technology is not neutral but isiwaysbased on/exploitation of and domination over nature, exploitationand<subjection of women, exploitation and oppression of other~les'(1987fp. 37). Mies argues that this is the very logic of the~r~l sciences and its model is the machine. For her the method of~nicalprogressis the violent destruction of natural links between
iffllBorganisms, the dissection and analysis of these organisms downt~their smallest elements, in order to reassemble them, according
to\the plans of the male engineers, as machines. The goal of the60 Reproductive Technology

enterprise is to become independent of the 'moods' of nature and .(tf•
the women out of whom life .still comes. Reproductive and .genet~/technologies are about conquering the 'last frontier' of me11tj!
3
domination over•nature.
i:'::(tij
Reproductive Technology as Neutral

Ratherthan seeing reproductivetechnologies as a sustained attacko~I
women,.another ·group of feminist commentators emphasi~
ambivalent effects that reproductive technologies have on the live$,~f:fi
women. According to Michelle Stanworth (1987, p. 3), a blan~\rejection· of these innovations is inadequate .as many of them foftiif
indispensable resources upon which women seek to draw accordint~to their circumstances•~These new technologies are seen as having thiltl
potential to empower. as,well as to disempower, women and-il
discussion is couc~ in terms of tthe costs and .the benefits'.
<WI
These authors argue that the women's movement has largelyf~
ignored theprobleJns of infertility and treated women whoparticipa.tiJiin·thesebigh-tech research programmes as fhlinded·by science' andp<ipassive victims of pronatal conditioning. Accordingto them, mostnf}fthe authors associated with InNRRAOE fail to consider women<as 'active . .agents who have generated demands for such .technologieil
because.of their authentic desire to bear children. As ai,esult, femhu(topposition to thesetechnolQgies has a tendency to •confuse masculine
rh~ric and fantasies with actual powef relations, /thereby sub.'.
IJl~~
WOIJlen'sown response to reproductive situations in the?)\d0IJ1itlant (f.llld.¥ictimizing) masculine text' (Petchesky. J987. p. 71)2 ft
R.epl'~u;ctive technQlogies may be the only <>pportunity infertile
wo!Jlen llave .to.fulfil .this need and therefore we should support their'right of reproductive· choice'.
This'Bf'QUPof writers take issue with the radical feminist view thattechoolpgies in themselves .have patriar<:hal political ..properties~
Instead, Jhey problematize the institutional setting in which these
medical/technical procedures occur. Whea.-eas the FJNRRAOE
authors are against these innovations because they inevitably disempower women, according to,R.osalind Pollack Petchesky,. ~e needto separate the power relations within which reproductive technologies •... are .applied fromthetechnologiesthemselves'(l 987, p. 79).
Similarly, for MichelleStanworth, the problem is not technology but
the way~hese technologies draw their meaning from the cultural andpolitical climate in which they are embedded' (1987. p. 26).
The feminist debate about the new reproductive technologies
0Reproductive Technology

61

ed here is a relatively recent one and, as a result, it is charac•·.·.••
by more sensitivity to 'the politics of difference' than some of'.Jierfeministliterature. There is now a much clearer realization
der, .that what itis to be a woman, is experienced everywhere•such.mediations as sexual. orientation, age, race, class, his,ifudcolonialism. The recognition that new technologies mayverydiffer:ent implications for Third World and First World. ·..•.··•• within and between countries, is a strength of much of the\ll'e.

.
ire(;ll dangers for women that accompany medical and scientificl~~sinthe sphere of reproduction are directly related to the dif••"· circumstances of women's position in society. Access to the·•···.···•·•.•·••·•·····s of expel'lsivetechniques such as in-vitro fertilization is heavily!lli~.to the ability to pay. Women who are poor and vulnerable will~~ve.accessto
theseJec~niques and furthermore, they will be least~igj,to.re.sist abuse.s of m~icatilower and techniques. For example,/~issues
over sex predeterni'ination have a special urgency given~mi~nce .that the technique of amniocentesis is.currently being used~iii~select female tetuses fQr abortion in India. Sterilization andflilss,su¢has I>epo-Provera, as well as hazardous experiments, have~particularly
targeted at coloured women.
:i~I~ .pQtential use. of increasingly sophisticated forms of genetic~~Ding is.likely to influence the (,lefinition of a 'genetic defect' and\mjy haV:eimplications f pr the way disability is seen in society.
;ft~chsuch as Wendy Farrands (1985) shows that the medicallif»~t;ment of.prenatal screeningin Britain has taken the form ofl•i~iJlg..
women's .consent Jor termination as a condition for beingii~~ the amniocentesis test. In this context, these techniques arelih~tPO.Pulation.control rather than about enabling women to make1ic>i~informed choices about reproduction.
1.jµereis 01oadagreement among feminists about these dangers. Forl,ilJ9~efeminists who dispute the FINRRAGE analysis, these dangers\~~seen not:as a function of the technologies themselves, but of their~~l,Jse.This position is summed up by Stanworth ( 1987, p. l 5), when~e says that.these technologies have ..been ~adouble-edged sword. On~eone ban~ they have offered women a greater technical possibility{t9decide if, when and under what conditions to have children; on the/gther, .the. qomination of so much reproductive technology by the~~cal profession and the state has enabled others to have an eveni{g~ter capacity to exert control over women's lives'. From thisperspective, therefore, the feminist. critique of reproductive techno/lQB.iesgoes no further than demanding access to knowledge and62 Reproductive Technology

resources so that women are able 'to shape the experience of reproduction according to their own definitions'.
An aspect of the politics of reproductive technology left out by thisaccount is that thetechnologies redefine what counts as illness. 'Infertility' now becomes not a biological state to which the woman must
adapt her life, but I.\medical conditipn - a problem capable of technological interveotion. The •very existence of. the•technologies changes
the situation even if the woman does not use·them. Her 'infertility'
is now treatable, and she must in a sense actively decide not to hetreated. In this way the technologies strengthen the maternal functionof all women,. and reinforce the internalization of that. role.for eachwoman.
Indeed, the emphasis placed on women's right to use these techno;.
logies to their own ends tends to obscure the way in which historicaland .social relations are built intothetechnologies·themselves. While
recognizing the .social shaping of women~s choices in the sense of
motivations.few participants in the debate see that the technologies
from which women· choose are themselves shaped socially.5
Techniques such as in..¥itro fertilization, egg donation. artificial
insemination, and surrogacy have the votential to place the whole
notion of genetic parenthood, and thus family relationships, injeopardy. :However, only those technologies that rein:force the value
ofhavingone~s 'own' childione that is genetically related to oneself,
are i'being developed and, as Patricia Spallone ( 198'7, pp.173""'4)
argues. these values determined the Warnock Committee's assessmentof •acceptable':risks to women's health; Despite the dangers,theCom-:.
mittee approved.the use .ofin-vitro. fertilization, where egg donation
provides an offspring which is genetically related to the•husband, Yet
the technique of egg.donation by uterinelavage.(embryo flushing•orsurrogate embryo transfer) was rejected on the basis of physical risks.
The medical risks involved in this pr:ocedure are no,greater, but it
carries the risk of unwanted pregnancy in the donor :woman. Two
women would then be sharing a•pregmmcy and the existence of thisdonor.mother ..to-bewouldchallenge the usual categories.of motherhood. This technology was rejected, not on the grounds •that it
endangers womews ·health, but•·because• of its socially disruptive
character to the identificationof blood ties with the family.
Women ..•are in fact· selecting. from the .very restricted range ..of
technological options which are available to them. This is glossed overby the .feminist critics of the FINRRAOE position. By.focusingon thesexual politics in which the new reproductive technologies areembedded, they pay insufficient attention to the technology itself. In

Reproductive Technology

63.~opting, implicitly or explicitly, the use/ abuse model of technology,··········.fail to appreciate the extent to which technologies have political. . . 'ties. This·is where the strength of the FINJ{RAGE analysis lies.
[fi~yview~ FINRRAGE are right to argue that gender relations have
'lpfoundiy structured the form of reproductive technologies thatha~ become available.
&[;!if~make this claim however one does not need to conceptualize it
jj:~~rms-0fa monolithic male conspiracy. As Langdon Winner (1980,!j!ft,lS)has said: 'to recognize the political dimensions in the shapes
iif'technologydoes not require that we look for conscious conspiracies>, i1t1alicious intentions'. Nor does it imply that men are a homous group. Whileit is evident that all the stages in the career of•···.........
edical technology, from its inception and development, throughI~~onsolidation as part of routine practice, are a series of interlocking
Iffi~eactivities, the male ~tere~ts involved are specifically those of/ • ·• middle-class prof essionali~The division of labour that produces
eploys the reproductive technologies is both sexual and prof es..
: women are the patients~ while the obstetricians, gynaecotjl~gmss
molecular biologists and·embryologists are men.
t;tf we regard technology as neutral• but subject to abuse we will be~.ijndedto the consequences of artefacts being designed and developed~~particular ways. To make sense of reproductive technology we need)examine the social and economic.forcesthat driveresearch forward.• ·.•·.·.··.·.
inhibitmore progressive.developments. Throughout this book~f~vearguedthatcertain
kinds oftechnology are inextricably linked
Il~.pardculardnstitutionalizedpatterns of power and authority, andcase of reproductive technologies is no exception. Men's appro~3,tion of technology here, as in the other areas we have examined,~$ been decisive in attempts to cteate and maintain control over
tw~men. This can best be demonstrated by.looking·at the emergencespecific technologies and how they figure in the historical estab;ifl~ent of male hegemony in Western medicine.

l,f./i;ftMedlcaUzaHon and Mechanl:Jatlon of Childbirth:J?ifliveredinto Men's Hands
major focus of feminist historians of medicine has been to docu····•···.··.t the central role of women healers and midwives before the r~I()f,modern.medicine. Up until the close of the seventeenth century:rattendance on childbirth had always been the preserve of women,· traditionally providing a livelihood for the wife and widow. It was

64

Reproductive Technology

midwives who came to women in labour and who assisted women in
the process of giving birth. Tjieir experience and knowledge aboutbirthing and about birth assistance was passed from one generationof women to the next. Throughout the eighteenth century a bitter and
weUdocumented contest took place between female midwives and theemerging male-dominated medical profession, as to who would havecontrol over intervention in the birth process (Ehrenreich and English,
1979 and Donnison, 1977). It emerges from these accounts that a particular technology played a crucial role in determining the outcome.
In England from the 1720s onwards an.increasing number of men
were entering midwifery in direct competition with women. Before
that time, surgeons (an exclusively male occupation) had only beencalled in for difficult cases where natural delivery was not possible.
They had carved out this work in the thirteenth century by forming
surgeons' guilds which gave them the exclusive right to use surgicalinstruments. Before the invention of forceps however there was little
they could do except to remove the inf ant piece-meal by the use ofhooks and perforators, or to perform a Caesarian section on the bodyof. the mother after her death (Donnison, 1977). Obstetric forceps
wer,e introduced by the Scottish apothecary William Smellie by the
1730s (see figure 3.2).
The forceps enabled its user to deliver live infants in cases wherepreviously either child or mother would have died, and also to shorten
tedious labour. According to custom, midwives were not allowed touse instruments as an accepted part of their practice. The use offorceps thus became the exclusive domain of physicians and surgeons,and was associated with the emerging profession of medicine. The
introduction off orceps gave these men the edge over female midwives
who were adept at the manual delivery of babies and who had all thepractical knowledge about birth and birthing. As soon as this technology was introduced it was seized upon by physicians, who used it far
too often, even in the contemporary opinion of the inventor himself.
The outcome of the struggle that ensued was that the midwives losttheir monopoly on birthing intervention, which became the provinceof the profession of medicine. For the first time in history childbirth,which had always been 'women's business', had been captured by men.
Clearly the ascendancy of male obstetrics was the result of a numberof interrelated factors, a critical element being the movement ofchildbirth from home into the newly established lying-in hospitals.
However, the invention of one of the first technological aids to birthing provided a crucial resource for male medical practitioners. It is
telling that the public debate precipitated by the entry of men into

Reproductive Technology

65

7

Obstetric forceps as 'artificial hands'
Source: William Smellie, A Sett of Anatomical Tables, 1754, plate 16.

::c11flt11,w1t,erv
pivoted aroundthe use of instruments such as obstetric} J:Or:1::eps:'the doctors• practice of midwifery was becoming distinguishby its very technical aspect• (Faulkner, 1985, p. 93). Young male....
wives were often incompetent and frequently used instruments
C~ecessarily to hasten the birth and save their time, often damaging
I mother and killing the child. The misuse of instruments was stillf>ebmmon enough to attract the following criticism from a leading'Pledical practitioner, a James Blundell of Guy's Hospital, who wrote} in 1834 that some men seemed to suffer from 'a sort of instinctive<impulse to put the level and the forceps into the vagina• (Donnison,)1917, p. 50). Thus technical intervention rapidly became the hallmark
of male medical practice.
/<•Thisis not to say that birthing women were necessarily hostile to\increased technical intervention. In the early decades of this century. there was considerable feminist agitation in favour of the use of. anaesthesia during labour, which male physicians were then opposing.
Women took up the cause of drug-induced 'twilight sleep• because
they saw it as 'the newest and finest technique available' to relieve theacute pain of childbirth. Physicians' objections to its use took various

the

66

Reproductive Technology

forms but ultimately they were defending their professional prerogative to determine the patient's treatment. As Judith Walzer Leavitt\shows, this episode is a good example of the complexity of argumenti'
about control. The doctors were resisting a process that would hay~!
reinforced their control over childbirth and the women were deman(IB;ing the right to be unconscious during delivery! Although the twilight~
sleep movement was motivated by a desire to increase women's controti
over the birthing process, it paradoxically 'helped change the definiition of birthing from a natural home event, as it was in the nineteentlr{
century, to an illness requiring hospitalization and physician atten~.\dance' (1986, p. 140).
Nowadays, in Western societies, childbirth is generally experienced
in hospital and is associated with increased and routine technologicalintervention; Under the aegis of the predominantly male medical pro-{fession, the trend has been towards the routine use of anaesthesia, the?
common resort. to forceps, the standard practice of episiotomy, andi}
the incr~e in· births, artificially induced as well as Caesarian sec-!
ti0µ.$.1 R:erhaps the most vivid image of women's treatment is 'the{rack:..likedelivery bed on which a mother is strapped, flat on her back ;with her legs in stirrups, in a position which might have been\
deliberately designed to make her own efforts to bear a child as inef. ;fectual as possible' (Donnison, 1977, p. 198). A number of feminist•<
authors, including Ann Oakley, have argued that this medical)'management' of pregnancy and childbirth by a powerful professional
male elite has reduced women to the status of reproductive objects~·.·engendering adverse emotional experiences for childbearing women.
Contemporary feminists. have been particularly critical of the extent
to which birth has been transformed from a,natural process into apathological one.
Until fairly recently it was generally assumed that maternal andneonatal deaths were reduced as a direct result of the increased proportion of hospital confinements and the application of technology
in pregnancy, labour and birth. This belief explains women's apparent
tolerance for a system that some have argued has transformed birth
into a passive and alienating experience. It is now widely acknowledged however that in many, if not in most, cases, massive technological intervention in childbirth is unnecessary. With the exceptionof risky births and women who need Caesarian sections, such inter~
vention is not a biological necessity; rather, it reflects the structureof power and decision making within obstetrical situations.
Recent sociological and medical literature has been reevaluating thecontribution of medical technology to the health of mothers andReproductive Technology

67'bies, in comparison with social factors such as the standard of~lltrition and sanitation. As Jill Rakusen and Nick Davidson (1982,p}l:52)put it: 'The single most significant contiibution to a cut in theand handicap rate among newborn babies would be a comit~b.ensive anti-poverty programme'. 7 Indeed, the women whose
W~fare might be most enhanced by these medical technologies haveaccess to them.
~iii'J'he·strength of the feminist critique of professional medical care
only its dissection of medical-technological treatments but its
g~ysis of the way scientific and medical knowledge is itself gendered.
l':~funderstand the medical treatment of birth, it is important to'~gnize that in the development of Western thought and medicine,!i~body came to be regarded as a machine. The Cartesian model oflffi~tiody as. a machine and the physician as technician or mechanic~J'lil;!tgedin the seventeenth century and was integral to the develop'~t1of the biomedical sciencesfThis mechanical metaphor continues
j~>ijominate modern medical practice and underlies the propensity totim,ly technology and to see surgery as the appropriate cure.
f:;~i\~sI noted in chapter 1, gender symbolism and representations of.·.···· ual difference were central to the scientific and medical texts of the.... . nth and nineteenth centuries. In contrast to the male norm,ii~µ:ien's bodies were depicted as frail and prone to physical and;~en,tal disease, the prime objects of medical intervention. Ludi
t\f~rdanova's recent book Sexual Visions contains fascinating material!~the depiction of the differences between women and men in the
ijipmedical sciences between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries.
if!iese sciences were associated with the idea of the unveiling of nature,i~dwoman, as the personification of nature and 'the other', was thus
itfleappropriate corpse for the male practice of anatomy. (Although
tifuagery of women's bodies was predominant, the unveiling of 'other~ess' also took a racial form.) Jordanova argues that gender is still'@central medical metaphor and by examining advertisements in a conLtemporary medical magazine she explores the ways in which illnesses~e visually tagged as 'male' or 'female'. 'Depression, anxiety, sleep.,..
µ,ssness and migraine are likely to be associated with women, while
ijisorders that can inhibit full movement and strenuous sporting~ivities are associated, metaphorically, with masculinity/ (l:989,:,p.144)• ii'The language of the biomedical sciences today is no less suff~
wlth implicit assumptions about and imagery of sexual. differefl~Through a detailed comparison of medical writings on the ten:Jllilif
reproductive system with those on the male equivalent,; Emily~

l~t

68

Reproductive Technology(l 987) found that the cultural grammar was radically distin~.'

Whereas the dominant metaphors used of the female system are
negative and demeaning to women, by contrast those used of the~system suggested power and positive qualities. The images con~in medical .descriptions of. menstruation and menopause are char~iteristically in tern.is of failed production, breakdown and decay;
sperm is depjcted as 'amazing ... in its sheer magnitude'.&.1~
obstetric literature, the uterus is regarded as the machine th~
produces the baby and the woman is the labourer supervised an~Jmanaged by the doctor. Even in the act of conception .the languag~of medicine assigns a passive role to women and an active role to themale.,Propelled by a powerful tail, sperm, that 'nuclear war-he~ ofpaternal genes', actively swims•upstream to.fertilize the waiting.eggcf
The profound gender-bias in the way medical science vieW:S:
women's and men's bodies, in its very way of seeing problems, h~consequences both in.the rate and kind ·oftechnological interventioll.,·
This is exemplified in the differential treatment of reproductiv~;
disorders in women and men. Infertility treatmentis primarily aim~
at women and male infertility is hardly visible or even acknowledgegr'Unlike the female reproductive system, which is served by gyn~.
logy, there. is no medical .specialty for the male reproductive syste.m(·.
(Pfeffer, 1985, p. 35). Far from being a sign of neglect, this is symp.r•
tomatic of the medical profession's refusal to see the male repr<'>iductive S;ystemas defective.
Much medical technology has no doubt been of physical benefit towomen, particularly interrns of pain relief, and this has been under.,.,emphasized in the feminist literature, which is highly criticaLof
modem. hospital-based obstetric practices.. This view equates theincrease in technological intervention with a corresponding loss 0cf>
women's power and control over a dehumanized birth process.. The
history of reproductive •technology is thus ·seen in terms of the ·.
oppression of women by science and medicine. Modern practices are·••·compared unfavourably with explicit or implicit conceptions of what ••·•
childbirth was like in earlier. periods or in primitive .societies. It is>presumed or asserted that until the advent of male medical control,. ·•childbirth was a safe, non-alienating and purely 'natural' physio~
logical process; that women midwivesand relatives attended in a sympathetic and supportive role.
However, as Sally Macintyre (1977. p. 18) points out: 'Childbirthis, of course, socially controlled in all societies.' Far from womenthemselves being individually in control, childbirth is invariably surrounded by rules, customs, prescriptions and sanctions. Indeed,Reproductive Technology

69~ftorically and cross-culturally it is evident that women commonly•~ce·the process themselves, not simply deferring to the expectant
f~ther's own wishes. To counterpose masculi~ technologized child,~<to women's 'natural' ways begs the question. The issue is not\~fchildbirth was or would be like for women without the controls[~
by modern technology, but why the technologies we have
ii:t.etheform they do. Thus we need to look at the social context in[Mnch the new reproductive technologies have developed.

~~t~i;ir:··•nology and Professlonallzation!i~I<allprofessions, claiming expert technical knowledge has been
itJ~pured<asa way of legitimating specialization. The unequal power~tions between medical practitioners and their female patients are
1l.'.edon a combination of factors, predominantly those of profes]~al qualification and gendertrr:Oakley
argues that the technologicali~,erative within reproductive medicineis intrinsic to the defence off~or~claims of professionalism. 'Indeed, retention of absolute/[¢ltrol-0vertechnical procedures is clearly an absolute necessity for~1urvival of modern medical power' (Oakley, 1987, p. 46). The term
j~~hnological imperative' was .originally ·Used by Fuchs (1968) to~~tthatthe addition of any.new technology generates an increase
llllurther use by its very existence, and this in turn generates still more
it~hnology.
I~liihere are a number of interlocking socio-economic factors which!la~eratethe.development and use of medical technologies before their)~pm:opriateness and efficiency are determined, even before theijQUnds for their increased use are established (McKinlay, 1981).
~~-atarethe dynamics of this process in accounting for the massive\fi,pansion of .medicalmachinery? Technology is central to claims of!Iifot'essionalism and this has two important related aspects: having
j~werin the doctor-patient relationship and having power within the{~fession. Let us turn to the doctor-patient relationship first.
~i':h>!fheprofessional hierarchy means that doctors are regarded as!k~s
who possess technical knowledge and skill that lay people
have. The doctor-patient relationship is also often a class one,f~~th a meeting between a middleMclass,highly educated professional;!~d a working-class patient. As well as being gendered, the relaI~ship is often characterized by racial inequalities. Technologyplays~,major role in consolidating this distancing of the doctor from ai ~sarily passive patient, leading to the dehumanization of health~C~e. The growing supremacy of technology in contemporary medical

70

Reproductive Technology

practice is not by any means confined to obstetrics, and both mat,and female patients find it an alienating experience.
In modern Western medicine, technological advances have traQ%~ifonned the methods of diagnosing illness, and these new meth.
have in turn altered the relationship between physician and pa
The ubiquitous sJethoscope has its origins in the doctor's wishto
the patient ~t a distance, overlaid with·the requirements of moas between men and women. According to the apocryphal story, distethoscope was invented in 1816by Laennec, during the examinatii, 1of a young woman who had a bafflingheart disorder. Restrai~4~~jthe patient's youth and sex from placing his ear to her heart he recail~~that<sound travelled through solid bodies. From rolling some sh~~of paper into a cylinder on.this occasion he went on to construct
first wooden stethoscope (Reiser, 1978, p. 25). The human ear
supplanted by the stethoscope not because of any technical deficiene#l\iJ
but because of prevailing social mores. io
Broadly speaking. since the nineteenth century there have ~p;)three stages in the historical development of the methods used t~Ii
diagnose illness, Physicians have moved 'from direct communication\with their patients' experiences, based upon a verbal techniqueinformation gathering, to.direct connection with the patients' bodi~I
through. techniques of physical examination, to indirect connectiQciji%with both the experience•.·and bodies of their patients througltl•ii~
machines and technical experts' (Reiser, 1978, p. 227).
During the course of the twentieth century doctors have increasff
ingly come to rely •on technologically generated evidence at t~?
expense of physical examination and history-taking. Machines inexor~ iably direct the attention of both·the doctor and the patient away front
experiential or 'subjective' factors and towards the measurable aspects ·of illness. Moreover, Reiser argues that many of the modern diag":
nostic machines which have supplanted the more traditional manuali
methods and simple instruments are of little real value~.The fact that <they are so commonly used is not an indication of the reliability of: 1
the 'objective' evidence they. produce but rather a result·of doctors'
insecurity and corresponding dependence on them. The skills involved
in medicine·may.actually be declining as a result. of this overdepen- •···
dence on technology as doctors become less willingto make indepen- ·••dent clinical judgements based upon their own abilities andexperience.
Obstetrics is a special case because the patients are uniformly
women, they are generally not ill, and it is clearly an area where male
doctors can have no personal experience of the 'condition' beingii~Reproductive Technology

71

So their claims to expertise might appear tenuous to women.
,argues that technology is particularly attractive to obstetri)because techniques such as the stethoscope and foetal monitor..ablemale doctors to claim to know more about women's bodies
itke women themselves .
.~.Jhe technology is available women as patients may well want
N ect high-technology treatment. This does not make women the!~v.#'victims of reproductive technologies and the male doctors who~m. Within limits, women who are already advantaged in the
structure may even experience 'a sense of greater control andpowerment than they would have if left to "traditional"
or "nature"' (Petchesky, 1987, p. 72).
... ever, the routine use of ultrasound imaging in pregnancy{i..iiluesdespite scepticism as to its medical benefits. Indeed the basic····· ue of ultrasound was not designed for obstetric purposes at all.
· ·ns date from attempt&fftodetect submarines through soundduring the First World War. The subsequent development of
und as a medical technology .was as an offshoot of a major~~chproject on acoustics at MIT financed by the US Navy (Yoxen,
fljti,~The concentration on pregnancy came several years after its use!i);~ther clinical diagnostic fields and the interest in foetal abnormality!~~~:rates of growth, with whicl) it is now mainly associated, came even
i~" The procedure serves to discredit and then displace women's~rienceof the progress of the foetus in favour of scientific~iatlit:on the monitor. Some feminist critics fear that these techniques
ill•, women into mere spectators of their own medically-managed
fJ,,.~ancy. As such they represent the ultimate appropriation by men~ftf;women's knowledge and expertise.
}i§IWithin Western medicine, the high technology activities are not
key to power at the level of doctor-patient relations, but also!~ ..power within the profession. Status, money and professional(1~m.within the medical profession are distributed according toilffie.technological sophistication of the speciality. To be seen to befi.veloping.and expanding high technology procedures signals successthe competition for scarce resources - as between specialists,
hospitals, and between individuals. 'Medical specialization
j~dtechnological innovation have a special feature: they are parallel;\.~• interactive. Medical specialization leads to technological irm~ak~n; then, as a given technology is used, physicians and indt1,~~~igners collaborate to improve it. As it is defined, that proces$;l~\ t() >ever more specialization and associated work and proc~""~l(Fagerhaugh et al., 1987, pp. 7-8).
WN

•

··

m~

1~a ..

;me

~itw~

72

Reproductive Technology

an,The evolution of the new techniques of in-vitro fertilizationembryo transfer illustrate this process. On the face of it. the currdl:ti
enthusiasm for the new techniques seems curious. After all. in-v.itrj)
fertilization and embryo transfer have proceeded without much fµ~¥ther work on establishing causes of infertility or improving othe(~treatments. Givi:n their low success rate, and the level of physicttl~
danger and psychological distress that accompany these new repr~J 1
ductive technologies, why the current concentration on in-vitr&'.
fertilization among infertility specialists? How does it happen th~lresources are allocated to this 'unsuccessful' technology?
··•)iWhilst it is true that new technologies generally have a high failute.i
rate until perfected, it is also the case that 'many roads' are not takenIin science. There is as yet no detailed description of the stages in theorigination of these procedures and techniques. We might ask, wiji,l:,jEdward Yoxen (1985, p. 143), what set of career choices led Edwards
and Steptoe into their collaboration, or why their interpretation of therisk studies in animals was much less cautious than anyone else's, or]
why there are so few data on the effects of the drugs and invasive pro,.\cedures used in in-vitro fertilization, or why there are so few data•on
the causes of infertility. Questions of inventive success and failure canbe made sense of only by reference to the goals of the people involved.:cProfessional interests explain a great deal about the developmentof these techniques. Before the introduction of in-vitro fertilization ,and embryo transfer. the investigation and treatment of infertility had)long been afforded low status in the medical·hierarchy. Many of the<procedures were carried out by general practitioners, as they required.)
little special knowledge. Naomi Pfeffer (1987) argues that the new/techniques of in-vitro fertilization and embryo transfer provide
gynaecologists with an exciting, high-status area of research as well ·••as a technically complex practice which only they can use. Status and ·substantial financial reward are to be had, as well as job satisfaction.
By 1982 in Britain, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists was already claiming that their fields had expanded so muchthat it should be divided into four sub-specialities. 'The pressures
towards sub-specialization within gynaecology and obstetrics, then,constitute another incentive for medical personnel involved in thetreatment of infertility to lay claim to new areas of expertise' (Pfeffer.
1987, p. 88). Official recognition of sub-specialization would attract
financial support for training and research. In many ways therefore
it is apparent that professional interests play a central role in determining the type and tempo of technological innovation in this area.
There are however wider economic forces at work. The commercial

Reproductive Technology

73.. ests of the vast biotechnology industry are particularly influen.
ch has been written about the 'new medical-industrial comd the way in which resources are systematically channelled into
Je areas that often have no connection with satisfying human
There is as yet little detailed information about the financial. of medical biotechnology corporations in the developmentenew reproductive technologies. Furthermore the potential com.······•········••···
applications of the products are as yet unclear, at least to the
public.U What is clear is that the needs of infertile women!liY•OnlYa small part in the research agenda envisaged. Embryos are· · · ·que source of information about human genetics, embryonic
opment and foetal growth. As Professor Robert Winston, of thesmith Hospital, West London, explained: 'We think that
fertilization is merely the first step. In the long term the!sil,lryo
could be removed fora.Jew hours and then be replaced. Thistion is not pie in the sky~~(quoted in The Guardian, 1 Januaryiiitra.l

March 1989, male embryos had been distinguished from female..·.fYOS within days of conception. The potential for genetic screenijjgis now immense and with it the possibility for gene transplant
1~r:iments, known as 'gene therapy'. The ultimate aim, which has""'•·· ed vast research funding in North America, Europe and Japan. ravel all the instructions contained in the human genetic code.
if~i$ome commentators have likened the scope of the biotechnology
r:(~<llution to that of the microelectronic revolution, seeing it as the
1~i~t.technology-based phase of capitalist development. 12 Already we
i~seethatthe human body is caught up in commerce in new ways,········ · ·human organs such as kidneys, eyeballs, frozen foetuses andetes being traded on the international market. Whatever one's~• don on the ethics of embryo research it is clear that it is always!!;~ct.med by relations of exploitation based on race, class and gender.
[,.etrafficin Korean foetuses for American military research into
!i~ological warfare is a case in point.
i~AJthough women are the prime targets of medical experimentation,·.· oductive technology cannot be analysed in terms of a patriarchal
piracy. Instead a complex web of interests has been woven here IU..Oseof professional and capitalist interests overlaid with gender. It
t:i.smore specifically to the operation of gender divisions that we now
The next section will examine the dynamics of a technology lessIr.ecent and better documented than those ref erred to above. Nowhere'•~e sexual relations more profoundly formative of a set of te(;hnO-. logies than in the sphere of contraception.
w!.tum.

74

Reproductive Technology

The Sexual Relations of Contraceptive

Technology

The perspectives from which most histories of fertility control att
written are redolent of technological determinism. The conventionalview shared by historians and demographers is that in pre-industrill)societies women were the victims of their own fecundity . 13 There ij,
a tendency to look back from our current 'Pill Era' and regard birth;
control as a nineteenth-century invention, representing the triumph ofthe progressive forces of technology over ignorance and prejudicei
The Pill. a technical invention, is credited with enabling women for{the.first time to control their fertility, and the massive social changes.
for women that accompanied its introduction are attributed to it~1r
It is assumed that earlier generations were prevented from pracf
tising birth control because they lacked the necessary technology,
Many accounts of the history of birth control begin with the inventio~)of the condom, arguing that it was only in the nineteenth century witlfi
the manufacture. of rubber devices that effective contraception wasmade possible (McLaren, 1984, p. 5). On closer analysis it is apparent
that the extent and openness with which birth control is practised, and}the form it takes, is as much dependent on a society's attitude to sex{
children and the status of women, as it is on effective technology. 'For}
the use of birth control requires a morality that permits the separation}of sexual intercourse from procreation, and is related to the extent\
to which women are valued for roles other than those of wife and?
mother' (Greenwood and King, 1981, p. 169). 15 Birth control has\always been a matter of social and political acceptability rather than/of medicine and technology. Like childbirth, its prevention has .always
been subject to elaborate regulation and ritual.
•····
In her book on birth control in America, Linda Gordon ( 1977)
argues that social institutions and cultural values, rather than medical )or technical considerations, have shaped modern contraceptive tech'- }nology. Like most feminists, Gordon began with the premise that ibirth control represented the single most important contribution to
the material basis of women's emancipation in the last century. How"'.
ever, she was quickly led to ask why the technology of contraception
developed when it did, and why, in our generation, the invention of
the Pill is seen as the key to liberation, For her, birth control was asmuch symptom as cause of larger social changes in the relations
between the sexes and in the economic organization of society.
The ability to transcend biology was present in the earliest known
societies. 'There is a prevalent myth, in our technological society, that

1

Reproductive Technology

75,Irth-control technology came to us with modern medicine. This is far
lfJ:()mth~ truth, as modern medicine did almost nothing, until the lastiiwfnty years, to improve on birth control devices that were literally
11tQrethan a millennium old' (Gordon, 1977, p. 25). In fact, most of~jijrpresent methods have had precursors in societies far less technoally sophisticated than ours. There is evidence from old medical
and from anthropological studies that women have almost unily sought to control their fertility. Far from being invented bytists or doctors, effective forms of birth control were devised and· istered by women in nearly all ancient societies.
eproductive knowledge and practice has always been part ofn's folklore and culture. The relatively recent establishment ofale hegemony in medicine has obscured the existence of earlier
ods that were more under women's control. Traditionally, knowabout techniques for bif:t;~;1;ontrol,like remedies for other comts, was developed and practised by wisewomen and midwives anded down from generation to generation. A wide array of birthol techniques were practised in the ancient world and in modern
dustrial societies including magic, herbal potions, infanticide,tion, coitus interruptus, vaginal sponges, douches, and pessaries.
t only did these techniques vary in their effectiveness, but they
very different implications for sexual relations. Some techniquesmore amenable than others to being used independently and evently by women; some give full control to men; others are more.
y to be used co-operatively. The point that needs to be emphasized
iidiat women and men might have conflicting concerns and goals in
ilind when contemplating fertility control and these are reflected in
iJdifferent techniques available. We will return to this point later.
'#iiGordon argues that it is only by looking at this heritage of birth~trol customs that we can comprehend the emergence of the birth
1~ptrolmovement, for that movement took its strength from women's~derstanding that traditional methods off ertility control were being
jijppressed. In particular, while abortion had hitherto been the subject:dtmoral controversy, it was not until the nineteenth century that it:iv.~•actuallycriminalized. These abortion laws were intended to elimiite doctors' rivals such as midwives and to undermine traditional;f()r:msof reproductive control. The result of the medical and legal
intervention in this crucial form of birth control was a decline in:women'sability to effectively limit their pregnancies. What was newbrthenineteenth century, then, was not the technology to control.fertility but the emergence of a political movement that campaigned forthe right to use contraception.
)

76

ReproductiveTechnology•ll9c{'

However, reprodu~tive self,,determination for women w~
primacy catalyst .of the birth control ,movement.··Equally im·
were the P9pulationist .movements inspired>by ·Malthusian thwhich sought.1)9pulation control as the ceure;.for wverty.
During the twentieth century, contraception and to alesser
abortion .have ·become respectable, and largely regulated •.··•
medical..profession...··However• the •·influence•.of··wpulation ..·ideology is still central to modern birth controlprogrammes.Si
1950s, birth· prevention·.bas become a major: international in
and .it Js linked with the politics,of state intervention•in wP
planJlllli..•Populatiomst ·ideology ···not>scientificdiscovery ....··••
catalyst for the maj.or financial investment in research on
prevention methods and~ according to Blkie Newman (1influenced the specific techniques which have become available~(technological prerequisites for the development ofan oral hor ...
contraceptive .bad existed by 1938· but popular morality andi.p
natalist paljcies delayed its,development until the late 1950s. A ·hls,}():c~e~,it was tile sudden• and popular••'fear of a•pol'i,Jl~tjon
e,xplosionwbiehlegitimated workonthe Pill andtr .. ·.•··•
in famlly planning services :becoming a major part of aid paclcag~
.
.
. .
.
·'
the .mbil'd World . 16·.liowcjbendo.we explain the emphasison<hormonal contrace ···.·
and~ .by;q:)ntrast~ the heavy neglect of barrier methods, whiclf .
cbts~'as oJd~fashioned?. 'Considering how much time; mon~y~J
eneI'$¥ iscnow spent on birth-control research,·we might expect ttl9~
ableto,~hoosefrom among; say, ten different kinds of barrierm ·or ~rhaps.arange·.of~morning ..after~•.methods. Instead.our oare C()}lfinedto essentially two barrier methods, the various horml.lP.I~
methods;
Jew IUDs and abortion techniques, and .a smal · ·····
increasingnmnberof sterilization techniques• (Newman, •1985,p~
Although the ,P,illis the .most reliable method of tontraceptio
is assoqated with dangerous health risks and side eff~for
wo111~J~
Nevertheless doctors favour the Pill ·because it helps to• avoid
dilemmas of dealing with unwanted pregnancyandabortipru;(land itrequiresamimmumof
time and skill while keeping contra~Iltionf"n11dyunder·their control. Fromthedoctor's••point ofview,:fiit
fact thatthis method does not require many visits to the. clinic~ ~4;,
doe,s not:need to be explained at great length to the patient are addj~)
tional advantages. It is also importantnotto underestimatethe signifi.ll;
cance of the Pill's profitability. It is economical to produce.aI1dmarket aild needs to be taken daily••thus generating vast profits fo~ .
the pharmaceutical industry that supplies it.
w

ethics··••·.!

ReproductiveTechnology

77

from the .corporate interests involved, most of the research:~.contr;:lCeptive methods is done by men on techniques for·.....
··.··.·.. Interestingly, the incentive for th&development of theW~n,qtbitthcontrol but rather men's need for protection,(tisease. Given that women and men have different. ~ual behaviour, might not these differences be reflected.......... :ofcContr;:lCeptivetechnologies? Indeed, Pollack (1985,,ijies:ihat these technologies 'are developed from a patriarchal· · ·e,.emphasizing the sexual enjoyment •Of men and underthe/costs: to women. Male sexual pleasure is the mostf {~tor.taken into account in the methods which become, a:µpin the ways in which contraceptives are used'.
x men pref er 111ethodsthat 'interfere' least with their expe····· even at the~penseof women's health and enjoyment.
:f~an~of<heter~~ual JU~nto either wear condoms (even in<et,a}or to. have vase«Pmy indicates the primacy of their· . gs over the medical risks women are taking. While some. .· hniques for men have been developed, the dangerous
t.efldto<be played down far Jess than is the case with female.:/?'la :fact men have· been very. reluctant to. volunteer for.ts.with male methods of any kind, just as they have been
: Y.teluctant··to. be. steri~~ The World. Health· Organization<Jit)Jdecided .not ..to. put .much ..money into research on male·•·.
·· ijl the fµture - th€:y simply .cannot persuade enough men to.. tr(Newyian. 1985, pp. 141-2).
JP-illis also thetechnology favoured by women. As women still
Jhe prime responsibility for pregnancy, the Pill is chosen for its. . ••.•egree of protection and for the control that women can exercise~tiii#.ts:llse;.Many women feeluneasy about touching parts of their(~jiij<podies and this is often linked to their anxieties about sexual...,,. ).y;Usingthis method does not involve touching one's genitals,
r.equire,male. cooperation or even knowledge, and it allows)Jl~i~~$pontaneous' ··sex. The Pin ···has the. additional .psychological· • t,a.geof separating contraception from sexual activity. both in.... . ll}ldanatollli~y.
It does not interfere with what is considered~}~~'ilomu1r romantic heterosexual sex, that is, for men to be lustful•i·• • l~~rtjy~ ~4f or \\'Omen merely tosurrender. By comparison, the•~................
·•g of caps ..c>rdiapllragms d.oes require some skill, and to use it
lfpj.AASJO.admi.tto a man and to cmeself that one is planning to have:~;::<<''::'
,\
N

.a

a

0

not

'.:>"'

fS~J{·::II 'Ibe .·definition of sexual activity as heterosexual intercourse.ivolving penetration provides the context in which contraceptives are

78

Reproduciive Technology

researched, developed, distributed and used. Contraceptive methods
are designed to flt in with male-defined sex. Freed from the respoq:~.
sibility and the practices involved in using the sheath or withdraw~
men have. been able to concentrate more on their enjoyment of s~
For women too the Pill has meant more effective birth control whici
in turn has been translatedinto more possibilities of sexual pleasuj
for women. However, women's increased sexual independence. ~½been at a high health cost. If the gains for women outweigh their los~it is because of the .achievements of the women's movement and,aqt
the technology per se. The Pill has not brought about women's libe~tion; women have gained control over their lives through social 3Jl4
political mobilization.
.....
The purpose of this section has been to suggest that sexual relatiojiJin combination with .population policies and market forces haii'.;
shaped contraceptive technology. And, in turn, the design or formijf~~
the technology has been crucial to its use. In order to understand whjj
particulartechnologies have the effects they do, this chapter has pr~j:vided an account· of the context in which reproductive technologi~~
have developed and diffused. We have seen the role that technol~~has had in the medicalization and .mechanization of medicine:_..~
general and in the area of human reproduction in particular. W~i'the.overalleffect of this has been the masculinization of an area
was previously a women's sphere, women who are already advantage<£!
in society have been in a position to.benefit from recent reproducti~~~techniques. In this area as elsewhere, technologies operate within ~;reinforce pre-existing social inequalities.
NOTES

I

See Stanworth (1987, pp. 10-11) for a categorization of the variou~

technologies that are grouped under the term 'reproductive technologif:ist,iI
2 As Michelle Stanworth pointed out to me, the pro-interventionist po~@tion is also endorsed by the historian Edward Shorter ( 1983) who shai:~\~.
with Firestone a belief that women are the victims of their bodies a~dthat twentieth-century medic11I
technology has released them to be eqU:11f:ito men.
3 According to a recent estimate (Rowland, 1988), the success rate§~~//;fin-vitro fertilization schemes is only about 10 per cent.
4 Of course, the belief that the maternal instinct is normal does not apply ;to single women or to lesbians. The Warnock Committee in Britain .:(set up to advise the UK Government on reproductive technologies) ~;:for example recommended restricting such techniques as in-vitro,_•.-J<

Reproductive Technology

79

fertilization, egg donation, embryo donation and artificial insemination
to stable, cohabiting heterosexual couples.
1~ I would like to draw the reader's attention to McNeil, et al. (1990) which
does locate reproductive technologies within the sociology of techno~f logy.The collection only came into my hands as this book went to press.
:6 Feminists have also been concerned to expose the increase in hystet. >rectomy, particularly for black and Third World women, as a form of
involuntary sterilization or as 'a simple solution to everything frombackaches to contraception' (Homans, 1985, p. 5).
11'(imedical imagery pervades~1> ~Qmen's own images. of their. bodies, involving extreme fragmentation

y,

:;::!

:~~:;~i;go:e::i~:~1:i:~:;:C:~~~~~~r:~~~~e::::;e~•~omen generate their own more self-respecting meanings for menstrua;f , tion, menopause, and birth. Interestingly she discovered that white
it middle-class women were flU' ~re likely to uncritically accept the'"' hegemonic medical model of their bodies than working-class women,/If}::ka:o:!;t:.
drawn from Reiser (1978). See also Foucault (1973) and· ·····Jewson (1976).
This is not to deny that subsequently the stethoscope did become tech" ·· rrlcally 'superior'.
lt recently emerged that Amerii;;<lninsurance firms are taking a keen<interest in the development of gertetic screening for its potential use in;,, ·.tl:le recruitment of employees.
Jn fact, Haraway (1985) and Yoxen (1986) argue that this biotechnology''
revolution is also a cultural revolution, in that the very meaning of life[~G.i,s being transformed. With the development of genetic engineering, thetfdominant image of nature becomes one of organisms as information. processing systems that can be reprogrammed. 'Thus our image of nature;js coming more and more to emphasise human intervention through a.process of design' (Yoxen, 1986, p. 30).
113 The classic study is Himes (1936).
Bven Rosenberg (1979, p. 50), normally such an astute critic of technol9gical determinism, falls into this trap: ' ... one might therefore wellargue that the women's liberation movement is essentially due to the
combination of declining fertility (in turn partly attributable to a morei'~~1k..~ffective technology of contraception), on the one hand, and the elec~¥f
If ~jfication of the household chores, on the other. One need not be ai,I · technological determinist to argue that. the social benefits of the newfound freedom of women in American society are, in large measure, the·· ······ product of technological innovation.'
That the invention of reproductive technologies often long predate their· " · widespread use is evidenced by, for example, artificial insemination. Although we think of this as a radical new means of separating

f(i,·

[ft

ff

I

!~,i

i,¥~

tlJ!

80

Reproductive Technology

conception from sex, it was actually first performed in 1776 (McLaren,
1984, p. 13).
16 See also Doyal (1979), especially chapter 7 on 'Medicine ancl
Imperialism'.
· ··..••
17 This point is well made in a parody of a new contraceptive techniq11~.
for men reprinted in Spare Rib (Vol. 93, April 1980, p. 9) reproduceifi
below.

SCROTAL INFECTION 'Only 2 died'
The newest development in male contraception was unveiled recently ft
the American Women's Surgical Symposium held at Ann Arbor Meditjd
Centre. Dr Sophie Merkin, of the Merkin Clinic, announced
preliminary findings of a study conducted on 763 unsuspecting mal(}undergraduate students at a large midwest university. In her report, l,)tl
Merkin stated that the new contraceptive - the IPD - was a bre~~fthrough in male contraception. It will be marketed under the trade-na~'Umbrelly'.
TheIPD (intrapenile device) resembles a tiny folded umbrella whiclj
is inserted through the head of the penis and pushed•into the scrot11fij:jwith a plunger-like instrument. Occasionally there is perforation oftti~,
scrotum but this is disregarded since it is known that the male has fe~fnerve endings in this area of his body. The underside of the umbreijj~
contains a spermicidal jelly, hence the name 'Umbrelly'.
.·.·.
Experiments on 1,000 white whales from the continental shelf (who~;•sexual apparatus is said to be closest to.man's) proved the umbrelly>tijJ
be 100 per cent effective in preventing production of sperm, a.µ4
eminently satisfactory to the female whale since it does not interfere
her rutting pleasure.
· }\Dr Merkin declared the umbrelly to be statistically safe for the humari.dmale. She reported that of the 763 graduate students tested with th~•device only two died of scrotal infection, only 20 experienced swelling(of the tissues. Three developed cancer of the testicles, and 13 were to&t
depressed to have an erection. She stated that common complaint&~
ranged from cramping and bleeding to acute abdominal pain. Shij~emphasized that these symptoms were merely indications that the man1i;
body had not yet adjusted to the device. Hopefully the symptoms woul~idisappear within a year.
··
One complication caused by the IPD and briefly mentioned by. Q(
Merkin was the incidence of massive scrotal infection necessitating th~
surgical removal of the testicles. 'But this is a rare case,' said MerkinJ'too rare to be statistically important.' She and other distinguished memf
bers of the Women's College of Surgeons agreed that the benefits faf>
outweighed the risk to any individual man. (reprinted from East Bay
Men's Centre Newsletter and The Periodical Lunch, Ann Arbor(
Michigan.)I~-f1111esticTechnology:
iliibour-saving or Enslaving?

~~:;}

Ii(;.

iflQutthereinlbe land of household work there are small industrial plants~f{i/~Jjichsit idle for the better part of every working day; there are!l1{~ive
pieces of highly mechanized equipment which only get used}j];~I~feor twice a month; there are consumption units which weekly
tti~m:lle out to their m.arkets to buy 8 ounces of this nonperishable~f~)i~~ctand l~ o~nces ~fthat~\~,There are also workers who do notiii~r~~e Job descriptions, time cloclts, or even paychecks.
it/@{:·
Cowan, From Virginia Dare to Virginia Slimsh/"'•'·,,,,,

1/lijintroduction of technology into the home has especially affected!ijf#tws lives and the work that goes on in the household. Indeed,been suggested that we sbpuld conceive of an industrial revo~ll~asha~ing occurred in the home too, that 'the change from the
····
·.•
·
tub to the washing machine is no less profound than the·.efrom the hand loom to the power loom' (Cowan, 1976,
9). Women's unpaid work in the home, servicing men, children
ers, has for a long time been seen by feminists as the key toert's <>ppression.Relieving women of this burden has been a
project of feminism. As in other spheres, considerable optii~-*lla&attached to the possibility that technology may provide the]:~jjo11to gender inequality in the home.
~~Kij~nce
thel970s housework has finally become the object of serious
study by historians, sociologists and even a few economists.
· was part of a general concern with the relationship between theging structures ofindustriat·capitalism and the shaping of everylife within the. household. The Sociology of Housework by Annt .·•·······
ey pu~lished·in 1974 marked an ·important break in treatingili~~work as work·within the framework of industrial sociology. In\~~~me year, Joann Vanek's article on 'Time Spent in Housework'Weo•pJred the findings of the US time use studies of housework from
.Jllel920sto the late 1960s. She argued that the aggregate time spent"{pn housework by full-time housewives had remained remarkablyemic82 Domestic Technology

constant throughout the period, although there had been some rl'\t1m1.:;
tribution of time between individual tasks. Her surprising concl
that the introduction of domestic technology had practically no eon the aggregate time speQt on housework, soon became thedoxy amongst feminists working in the area.
·
In recent •years ieminist scholars· in ·North America., Britaitl<
Australia have produced excellent material on the history of ·work and domestic technology . 1 Considerable attention has
devoted to countering the myth that housework is the creatio
discontented housewives in that it 'expands to fill the time avail
Feminists. (commonly quoting Vanek's data) hc:j.veemphasizeq •••,.i,
women's household tasks have not decreased with so-called 'l~jsaving' appliances. Much of this literature has pointed to the co·dictions inherent in attempts to mechanize the home and standdom.estic production. Such attempts have foundered on the natu ..
housework - privatized, decentralized and labour-intensive. Th:11~~1in the words of one writer .on the subject, 'substantial chang ··"Fhousehold technology left the sex, hours, efficiency, and statushousehold worker essentially unaltered' (McGaw, 1982, p. 8 ..•••
lll11rninatingas these historical works are, few of them have examiµ~\
the extent to which the technological changes described were the res.1.:tJ~~
ofeconomic imperatives or individual .choice. Neither have they q-u~~[tioned whether women welcomed or resisted these innovations. /\\The economic and social significance of the household has also ~j{ianalysed ·rrom a .different perspective, by 'post-industrial so · ··••.··•·
theorists (Gershuny, 1983, 1985; Toffler, 1980), whose concern a'de-indust.rialization' has led some to see the household replacing••
factory as the centre of social.and economic life .. Typically, they.~(technological change as the major cause of shifts in the provision{<:iii
needs.between the.informal household economy and.thefon;naJ··~~~••·
nomy. As I shall demonstrate, arguments based on technologi~
determinism play a central. role in both this and feminist streams o~thought.
·
This chapter begins by looking at feminist material on th~.
mechanization of housework and then considers the work of post:;'industrialists on the impact of technological innovation in the home/
By way of challenge to these latter theorists, I go on to examine somealternative approaches to individualized housework. In the la&t
section I look at some of the key factors operating in the design>
process of specific household appliances. My aim is to explore the waY
the design and promotion of domestic technologies have been shapedby existing ideologies of gender.
'

.

..

-

. .

-

··v~

Domestic Technology,> ,,.ializatlon

lfe

83

of the Home and Creation of the"/~~the relationship between the technological developments in~n<>myand those in the home? To what extent did new techno~pidustrialize•the home and transform domestic labour? Why.
·.·#Ja.&sivetechnological changes in the home, such as runninggasand electric cookers. central heating, washing machines.
rs, do studies show that household work in the indus•··. countries still accounts for approximately half of the total• gtime{Sirageldin, 1969)?
••·•.·,conventional wisdom is that the forces of technological change
growth of the market economy have progressively absorbed'the household's role<inpt:<>duction.The.classic formulation
position is to be found in Talcott Parsons' ( 1956) functionalistof the family. He. argues that industrialization removed
functions from the family system, until all that remains isption. For Parsons, the wife - mother function is the primary·on of children and the stabilization of the adult personality;
ecomes mainly expressive or psychological, as compared withumental male world of ~real'work. More generally, modern
logy is seen as having either eliminated or made less arduous
all women's former household work, thus freeing women to
the labour force. To most commentators, the history of house)f,isthe story of its elimination.
hough itis true that industrialization transformed households, thechanges in the pattern of household work during this period wereose that the traditional model predicts. Ruth Schwartz Cowan....~3:)/in her celebrated American study of the development of house,.·technology between 1860 and 1960, argued exactly that. 2 For~lij~j.the view that the household has passed from being a unit ofl]joduction to a unit of consumption, with the attendant assumption''· · 0women have nothing• left to do at home, is grossly misleading.
;ther, the processes by which the American home became indus·.••·.••••·.···.·zec1were much more complex and heterogeneous than this.
!j[;J"~i•..(;owan provides the following explanations for the failure of thel}~j~ustriaI··revolution in the home' to ease or eliminate household
filMlblslcs.
Mechanization gave rise to a whole range of new tasks which,,li)'a.lthoughnot as physically demanding, were as time consuming as the"llobsthey had replaced. The loss of servants meant that even middle(class housewives had to do all the housework themselves. Further,,

84

Domestic Technology

although domestic technology did raise the productivity of house;
work, it was accompanied by rising expectations of the housewif~!jrole which generated more domestic work for women. Fin .,mechanization has only had a limited effect on housework beca
it has taken place within the context of the privatized, single..fhousehold.
..
It is important to distinguish between different phases of indqs~;
trialization that involved different technologies. Cowan characte~'ltwentieth.,century technology as consisting of eight interloc~i
systems: food, clothing, health care, transportation, water, gas, el~~ili
tricity, and petroleum products. While some technological systems:4.iI
fit the model of a shift from production to consumption, others>ili>+:1;.
not.
Food, clothing, and health care systems do fit the 'production tij/
consumption' model. By the beginning of the twentieth century, ~,;~
purchasing of processed foods and ready-made clothes instead t;ff
home production was becoming common. Somewhat later, the healtb~;~
care system moved out of the household and into centralized insti~J~
tions. These trends continued with increasing momentum duringt~ifirst half of this century.
, ;iThe transportation system and its relation to changing consumptiq-~
patterns,. however, exemplifies the shift in the other direction. Duru,igI
the nineteenth century, household goods were often delivered, mai~~order catalogues were widespread and. most people· did not speni)
much time buying goods. With the advent of the motor car after t~;IFirst World War, all this began to change. By 1930 the automob'.U~f
had become the prime mode of transportation in the United States:~W
Delivery services of all kinds began to disappear and the burden °0J.]
providing transportation shifted from the seller to the buyer (Strassei:ii
1982). Meanwhile women gradually replaced men as the drivers Oj'itransport, more and more business converted to the 'self-service' con~J~
cept, and households became increasingly dependent upon hous~ft
wives to provide the service. The time spent on shopping task~)~
expanded until today the average time spent is eight hours per weekj}),fa
the equivalent of an entire working day.
In this way, households moved from the net consumption to the netil
production of transportation services, and housewives became the itransporters of purchased goods rather than the receivers of then1f '.l
The purchasing of goods provides a classic example of a task that is<J
generally either ignored altogether or considered as 'not work', in spite;of the time, energy and skill required, and its essential role in the inational economy.

Domestic Technology

85

charting the historical development of the last four household
Y$!1em:s,water. gas, electricity, and petroleum, Cowan reveals further
ncies in the 'production to consumption''model. These technochanges totally reorganized housework yet their impact was
biguous. On the one hand they radically increased the productivity
housewives: 'modern technology enabled the American housewife
1950 to produce singlehandedly what her counterpart of 1850
ed a staff of three·or four to produce; a middle-class standard
h and cleanliness' (1983, p. 100). On the other hand, whileating much drudgery, modern labour-saving devices did not
the necessity for time-consuming labour (see figure 4.1 ). Thus
e is no simple cause and effect relation between the mechanization
mes and changes in the volume and nature of household work.
lJtdeed the disappearance of paid and unpaid servants (unmarriedt~~ghters,·
maiden aunts, .gt'alldP@,rents
and children fall into the latter_,",>"•:<•">.
·>-..
-·:-.-,,..v<:~l~J~gory}as household workers;'and the imposition of the entire job
housewife herself, was arguably the most significant change.
~• proportion· of servants to households in America dropped fromJl~rvant to every 15 households in 1900, down to l to 42 in 1950
f1~wan, 1983, p. 99). Most of this shrinkage took place during thej){~-Os. The disappearance of domestic servants stimulated theti~hanizationof homes, which in turn may have hastened the disI~pearance of servants (see figure 4.2).
~jliT:his change in the structure of the household labour force wasf•ompanied by a remodelled ideology of housewifery. The developfl~ent in the early years of this century of the domestic scienceliovement, the germ theory of disease and the idea of 'scientifictlotherhood',
led to new exacting standards of housework and3~dcare.
As standards of personal and household cleanliness roset~g
the twentieth century women were expected to produce clean····
bathtubs and sinks. With the introduction of washingnes, laundering increased because of higher expectations ofeanliness. There was a major change in the importance attached to· d rearing and mother's role. The average housewife had fewer
fchildren, but modern 'child-centred' approaches to parenting involved
t~ in spending much more time and effort. These trends were1~loited and further promoted by advertisers in their drive to expand:Jl'temarket for domestic appliances.
\ Housework began to be represented as an expression of the
Mt,1Sewife'saffection for her family. The split between public andprivate meant that the home was expected to provide a haven frq~
the alienated, stressful technological order of the workplace and was·

86

Domestic l,x:hr,o!ogy,.

.., . ., , . .

, ..

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Y,·w•.11
m\iv.<.t',i::.ww:,1;11\,.,,.,,~11
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*'
'
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,
....
...
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"lo'
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":=-~
......
:.""'·'""OIi••.,;.••,,,ull. :~ ·~n,\),........

A!k,; . ....

...

,: :, ,,_.,"" " ·"''j)0\"1,• 11__,!••<;tt "ifl N l clr (t l l,0,$;,. >:;;;,~•·- •T.,.,, ;.
.,, 11),t:.

4.1"'"""" f .....~h U 11.0. ""'<»>~•{,...j~ ·. ... 1~..i,.... ;: ., , .. ...:<>.... , ....,, ...
-r,,.,.....,.,.,..,.,_.. ...,,,,. ,.........
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v.·.~.t .,; .,,..,..,. .«t, 01,l » <<-,,Wi:

Adver tisement from The Home, I April 1926

expected io provide entenainment, emotional suppon, and sexual
gra tification. The burden of satisfying these needs feU on the:housewife.
c:;
W"ithhome and housework acquiring heightened emotional signifi.f.
cance, it became impossible to rationalize household production alonif
the lines of industrial production (Ravetz, 1965). Cowan graphicallj;
captures the completely 'irrational' use of techno logy and labour,...

Domestic Technology

87~ithin the home, because of the dominance of single-family residences
i..Dcdthe private ownership of correspondingly small-scale amenities.
i~~~al million American women cook supper-each night in several~ion separate homes over several million stoves' (Cowan, 1979,~tef9).Domestic technology has thus been designed for use in single/~ily households by a lone and loving housewife. Far from liberating)i:omenfrom the home it has further ensnared them. This is not anj~~itable, immutable situation, but one whose transformation
ds on the transformation of gender relations.
relationship between domestic technology and household
i@~ur thus provides a good illustration of the general problem of;~nological determinism, where technology is said to have resulted
ffiisocialchanges. The greatest influences on time spent on houseworkj~,e in fact come from non-technological changes: the demise offfi)plesticservants, changing sta,ndards of hygiene and childcare, as
as the ideology of the houseWife and the symbolic importance of.home.4
0'·O:•nder Speciall:zation of Household Technology!~/domestic technology has not qirectly reduced the time spent on~g,usework,has it had any effect on the degree of gender specialization{if household labour? Is the generalrelationship women and men havetoJechnology itself a significant factor in determining the division of/labour in the home?
/Available evidence suggests that domestic technology has rein/forced the traditional sexual division of labour between husbands and{~¥es and locked women more firmly into their traditional roles. 5.~ause technologies have been used to privatize work, they havel;fumulativelyhindered a reallocation of household labour. Some'.pQusehold appliances may have been substituted for a more equal~ocation of household labour, in particular reducing the amount ofjµme men engage in housework.
1 •The allocation of housework between men and women is in fact
f much the same in households where the wife is employed and thoseQiinwhich she is not. Husbands in all social classes do little housework.
i)Where men do undertake housework, they usually perform non; r:outine tasks at intervals rather than continually, and frequently thefwork is outdoors. This is in marked contrast to women's housework,\the dominant characteristic of which is that it is never complete. 6
Task-specific technologies may develop in such a way that women

88

Domestic Technology

Domestic Technology

89

tJUUceover tasks previously done by other family members. For, Charles Thrall ( 1982) found that in families which had adisposal unit, husbands and young ooildren were signifis involved in taking care of the garbage and wives were more
to do it exclusively. Similarly with dishwashers, which are citedof the few appliances that do the job better and save time,·.·.···.
ds were less likely to help occasionally with the dishes. 7/iBiitber words, new technologies may reduce the amount of time,v
gage in housework and increase the time spent by women, awhich contradicts conventional wisdom' (Bose, et al., 1984,
Women have not been the prime beneficiaries of domestic
gy.
.....
·.·······
men's and men's relationship to domestic technology is a comof their relationship to housework and their relationship toilij~hines. Men's relationship t~,technology is defined differently toen's. Cultural notions of masculinity stress competence in the use
repair of machines. Machines are extensions of male power and:ti,al men's control of the environment. Women can be users of
ffi~ines, particularly those to do with housework, but this is not seen~:a competence with technology. Women's use of machines, unlike
l~J:'!'S,is not seen as a mark of their skill. Women's identity is not:;uhanced by their use of machines.
Jl.'Fchehousehold division of labour is reflected in the differential use:~{technologies, as Cockburn's (1985) study confirms. Few of the~i~men in her sample used a hammer or screwdriver for more than1~ng
the occasional picture or mending the proverbial plug. Fewer
j~µLwould use an electric drill or even a lawnmower, as 'men were~t.eprietorial about these tools and the role that goes with them•
ftp.f219). Generally, women used utensils and implements - the dish.asher, vacuum cleaner, car - rather than tools. The skills necessary
to•handle these utensils and implements are no less than the male skills\(jf.their husbands. But, as Cynthia Cockburn points out, women~ot
f'tx these utensils and implements when they go wrong and arejt~eref ore dependent on husbands or tradesmen, so that finally 'it is,!'P:enon the whole who are in control of women's domestic machinery
fand domestic environment' (p. 220).
/ Technologies related to housework are not the only technologies tobe found in the home. Indeed the extent to which the meanings and·•uses of domestic technologies have a gendered character is perhaps
even more clearly demonstrated with regard to the technology ofleisure. While for women the home is primarily defined as a sphereof work, for men it is a site of leisure, an escape from the world of

lPWtd

Y·

· ••

90

Domestic Technology

paid work. This sexual division of domestic activities is read .•.·
artefacts themselves.
.·••>
Fol'.example; television viewing reflects existing.struoti:u:~s;~an(l authority relations between household members. In al ··white, working ..class nuclear families in London, David~ ....
···•··
found thatcwomen and men gave. constrasting accoun~
experience of .television, .Men .pref er· to watch· television;at(>win silence, and without interruption; women it seems .are jµlj
watchtelevision ·distractedly.and guiltily,. becauseoltheitii~:
senseof their domestic responsibilities •.Malepower·was:· ·determinant of programme choice on occasions o.f confl•ctt
over, in families who had a remote control panel, it was not~used by women, Typically, the control •device was us~ .
exclusively by the father•·(orby the.son,inthe·father's abs
to some extent syrobolized his domestic. power.
Video recorders, like remote control panels, are the posses
fathers•·•and<.sons. In• order to • highlight the· ..'gender' ·of··hQuselloldt>bjects, Ann Gray. (19S7)a.sked women to im.a~nci .·.
o(;(lpJ.1:lestic
equipmentas ~Oloµredeither .pink,or .blue;·AJJh
unif~r~ly<pjnk ·.iro11s and bltte electric ~riH~,were .predi"table~ .··rni;~~in between were r~vealing~ l-l~~entertainment technp .··.·.
wer~ .not wholly a neutral lilac~ Bo.th
the tirller switch andJ.he<control switch•of video recor(J.ers were deep blue.that is, useqc•
controlled by men.
•WoQten's estrangement.fromthevideorecorderis
no simplem .. > .,of the technical difficulty of operating it ..~Although women roµµ~~tl
operate extremely sophisticated p(eces ofdomestic technology, of~nl~
requiring, in the first instance, the study and application of a ma1l"ij~1of instructions, they often feel .alienated from operating the VQj~il~(Gray, J:987, p. 43) Rather, women's experience with the video h · ·.··•·
be understood in terms of the 'gendering'Oftechnology. When a .........,
piece of technology arrives in :the home it is already inscribed \\f1f~W?)
gendered meanings and exp~tations. Assuming •himselfable toand op~ate home·equipment, the male of the householdquic~~,ii
acquire the requisite knowledge. Along with. television, the videQis I
incorporated. into the .principally masculine domain of domestici[Iileisure, Gray also points. out, however, thatsome women may have.:\developed what she calls a 'calculated ignorance' in relation to video/t
lest operating the machine should become yet another.of the domestic(~
tasks expected of them.
'.~t

ins:~!i~l\

willDomestic Technology

91

tti~'.~1.calInnovation and Housework Time•"c"·•,>·"•<;-,o/a',

,•/

'

'.

•

~9,>ost-industrialutopians' to conceive of the likely shape· :old in the future suffer from many of the intellectual..•.··•·•"1emisled analysts of domestic technology in the past.
tlte.work of these theorists is speculative. The British/lillld sociologist, Jonathan Gershuny (1978, 1983, 1985,
madethe most sustained attempt to give empirical weight· · predictions about the household .
.starting point has little in common with that of thementators. His work is directed at theories of postio~iety:which see the economy as being based increasingly.rather than on manufacturing production. By contrast,
yfs main thesisis that the economy is moving toward the· .of services within the~lmusehold, that is, to being a selfomy.

not•drawing on the feminist literature, Gershuny sharestcecognitionthat unpaid domestic production is in fact workcitseriously as such..He goes on to argue for a reorientation
M'RY
we study technical change. Instead of starting from thep•ce, as is typical for e~ple
in economics, sociology andmichi~tory, in his view we should start from the household.
···· ,ho:ldshave a certain range of needs, a set of 'service functions'wish to satisfy, such as 'food, shelter, domestic services,ent, transport, medicine, education, and, more distantly,
ent services, 'law and order' and defence' (1983, p. 1). His. y the<meansby which·households satisfy these needs changes .
. nydescribes a shift from the purchase of final services (going
cinema, travelling by train, sending washing to a commercialiY) to the purchase of domestic technologies (buying a televibuying a car, buying a washing machine). A degree of unpaid· work is necessary in order to use such commodities toyide services. This model is used to explain the economic expan:Q(tbe developed economies in the 1950s and 1960s, which wason the creation of new mass markets in consumer durables,onics and motor vehicles. In this way domestic technology is of~iiijQpnous economic significance, affecting the pattern of householdlI!~penditure, the industrial distribution of employment and the divi~¥Isio11of labour between paid and unpaid work.
till,:Like Cowan, Gershuny argues that people make rational decisions")!iµ this area. However, whereas her emphasis is on moral values and92

Domestic Technology

the social nature of human desires and preferences, his emphasisCJ
on prices. The household will choose between alternative techni~@fmeans of provision on the basis of the household wage rate,
relative prices of final services and goods, and the amount of u~ . •time necessary to use the goods to provide the service functioJ\i~
However, Gershlllly assumes that people have unchanging desires ....1
respond to market signals, making narrowly economic decis · . J
primarily in terms of prices but also in terms of domestic labour
per item. But human beings do change and the introduction ~imachines alters people's preferences and values. The main weak .........
in Oershuny's analysis is that he ignores the social and cul
dimensions of human desires.
.in>,
Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that the household.c~j
be treated as a unity of interests, in which household member{!
subordinate their individual goals to the pursuit of common hou~]hold goals. Gershuny shies away from any attempt to explain d~isions as to whether men or women should do domestic labour, inst~!
simply referring to 'the traditional segregation of domestic tasks''people's perception of their roles'. What this approach overlooks j mthat there are conflicts of interest between family members over th~i)differential distribution of tasks and money, and this may weli'i
influence how decisions actually come about.
< II
Let us see how this theory explains the widespread purchase an.qt/~
use of washing machines, as opposed to commercial laundries.:{~Gershuny's account differs quite sharply from Cowan (1983, p. llOlfi
who explicitly considers and rejects an economic-rationality argumel\(@on laundry. He argues that as the time needed to use a washing(~~
machine has fallen, and the price of washing machines relative to theJi
price of laundry has fallen so their popularity has increased. Thesc;.!idevelopments are not linear however. A central feature of Gershuny'sjj~
model is that it predicts first a rise, then a plateau, and then a decline ~Iin the time spent on domestic labour.
The first phase constitutes the shift from the service to the goods .:...tifor example from commercial laundries to domestic washing It
machines. According to the model this is a rational decision because
it is cheaper, even counting the housewife's labour. But clearly, the ··•·•~
domestic time spent on laundry goes up at this point. And precisely
because it is a cheaper form of washing clothes, it becomes rational Cii)
to wash more clothes more often. to satisfy (high) marginal desires ·•··••••~
for clean laundry.
In the second phase, where washing machines are fairly widely }:3
diffused, competition between manufacturers at least partly takes the ii

ti.

<i

Domestic Technology

93~ofoffering more efficient machines, replacing the twin tub withiliautomatic.
At the same time, the desire for clean laundry will~~tostabilize - slowing the rate of growth in.clothes to be washed.
eventually, time spent in laundry will start to fall. Thus,~llunyargues, an effect of this move to a self-service economy,
the amount of time spent on housework has declined since 1960..
p. 151).
,~ershuny is so convinced that new technologies increase thej[gQ4µctivityof domestic labour that, in a recent paper with Robinson
he takes issue with the feminist 'constancy of housework'•N·· · · • ••.•Whilst conceding that prior to the 1960s the time spent by
on domestic work did remain remarkably constant, he insists. .....i .a shift occurred at that point. Drawing on evidence from'!:~'."':budget surveys in the USA and UK, as well as Canada, Holland,t~ark
and Norway, he concludes that domestic work time forl,i•en has been declining since,the 1960s, and even that men do aiiie< more than previously. It is central to his argument that thisx,o, even after taking into account the effects of such socioaphic changes as more women having paid jobs, more men
J~ unemployed, and the decreasing size of families. Therefore thefusion ofdomestic equipment into households must have had some
. . t in reducing domestic work time. As Gershuny comments
1!~~here:'it would seem perverse to refuse to ascribe a substantial
1imitof this reduction to the diffusion of domestic technology' (l 985,

lii::e,il[ffl3t[118),~t{tSI).

f*illl.
fact on closer inspection, these findings are more in line withfffllinist theories about constancy of domestic work than the authors
ii:ould lead us to believe. Although the central argument is thatl~Qtnestic work time has been declining for women between the 1960s~-dthe 1980s, this is only the case with respect to 'routine' domesticl)i'Qrk. Unpaid work is subdivided into three categories: routine
Il4Qmesticchores (cooking, cleaning, other regular housework), shopP:i~ and related travel, and childcare (caring for and playing with~ildren). 8 While routine domestic work has declined, the time spent)11.childcare and shopping have substantially increased.
t J'his finding, however, is entirely consistent with the feminist}~phasis on the added time now devoted to shopping and childcare.
'.:¢ertainly the feminist concern with the constancy of housework has~tnployed a broader notion that includes childcare and shopping. To
l;U'guethat domestic labour time has reduced is only meaningful if itmeans that leisure or discretionary free time has increased. If however•·mechanization results in less physical work but more 'personal

94 Domestic Technology

services' work in the sense of increased time and quality of childcar:,~then surely this does not mean a real decrease in work. I presume thaJ'
Gershuny uses such a narrow definition of domestic work becaus~~f
his interest in the impact of domestic technology. However, itJ~iil
difficult to maintain that women's domestic work time·has.dedi~\
because of the djffusion of domestic•equipment whilst arguing~!
men's domestic work time has marginally increased at the sametirile~}
Men's increase is explained in terms of changing norms and tll~
inadvertently Gershuny calls into question any direct connecti(>:9between the domestic technology and the time spent on housewor:~{Indeed it seems that the preoccupation with increases in· produ¢ftivity due totechnological innovation blinds many analysts to mote!
fundamental social factors. For example, the presence or absence(}(children, their age and their number all have significantly great~teffects on time spent in housework than any combination of technd+\
logical developments. Similarly, the presence of men in a househol<:I,
increases women's domestic work time by at least a third. In contrast,
for men, living with women means that•they do less domestic work)(Wyatt et al., 1985, p. 39). Furthermore, it has repeatedly beenfoull4>
that the amount of time women spend on housework is reduced
proportion to the amount of time they spend in paid employment.'.9
A major problem with most time-budget research is that it does
not recognize that the essence of housework is to combine manythings, usually concurrently. Thfa has a profound bearing on th~interpretation of time spent in childcare and the apparent growth ofleisure time. For example, watching television or listening to the radio
can be combined with childcare, cooking, ironing and washing ·laundry. And, as I have pointed out with the case of television~ thisdata would be particularly revealing with regard to women. Timebudgets do not analyse whether activities are undertaken exclusively
or in combination with another activity. Perhaps, as Michael Bittman·(1988) suggests, the private and gendered character of the householdpromotes the kinds of technological innovations that maximize thenumber of tasks that can be performed simultaneously. To resolve
such issues we would need more detailed information about the extent
of use of consumer durables, the material output of services performed in the home and the social significance that these activities
have for people. Gershuny's focus on technological innovations andtasks per se seems indicative, once again, of a technicist orientation
which sees the organization of the household as largely determinedby machines.
A technicist orientation is also evident in much of the futuristicinDomestic Technology

95~ture on 'home informatics'. Ian Miles (1988), who collaborated...........
· Gershuny on the research into the self..service economy, hasi~:ppted oochart the next wave of technoloaical innovations, the!~Winfonnation and communication technologies. and their effects
Ii the household. He argues that the new consumer electronic;1rj~u9ts of the coming decade are of major economic and social
ij~jficance. There is much speculation about the fully automated~,,~ of the future known as a 'smart house' or 'interactive home.., where appliances will be able to communicate with each otherf~tothe house within an integrated system. Milespredicts that home
Iif:'9tmatics willbring substantial changes to people's ways of life, one
1~,~hichwill beto improve the quality of domestic work both in terms
IiQ.f:tbeconvenienceandeffort required. However, Miles (p. 134) givesi;~teasons whatsoever for his hope that this will result in 'the sexuali~h'ision of labour between men and women in families'.
I,.fffhe.sociologicalliterature oilfbe electronic, self-servicing home of
Juture remains remarkably insensitive to gender issues. In pari~~•ar~it ignores the way in which the home means very different
f~~.illgsfor men and women. Many of the new information and comim..unicationtechnologies are being developed for the increasing trend)~~ards home-centred leisure and entertainment. But leisure is deeply
i~v.ided along the gender.lines. Many of these technologies. such as
JJ~~home .computer, demand that the user spend considerable timef~. concentration mastering it.·.But women have a lot less time for
frplilyin the home than men and boys. Programming the electronic
ii$tem .for the 'smart house' may enhance men's domestic power.
if:.'w:thermore.
the possibilities of home-based commercial operations.
{~om 'telebanking' and shopping to 'teleworking', are likely to involve
m:orehousework for women in catering for other home-based familyi)Jnembers. Although Miles' subtitle is 'Information Technology and!~e Transformation of Everyday Life', what is striking about thesel:lewtechnologies is just how little power they have to transform(everyday life within the domestic world.

>

Alternatives

to Individualized

Housework(Even the most forward looking of the futurists have us living in· households which, in social rather than technological terms, resemble(the households of today. A more radical approach would be to trans~
form the social context in which domestic technology applies. In viewof what has been said about the shortcomings of domestic technology,

96 Domestic Technology

ODeis,.prompted to ask why so much energy and expertise has ~n;.
devoted to.the mechanization of housework in individual househol~radler than to its collectivization.
During the first few decades of this century there were a range of:.
alternative approaches. to housework being considered and expedf
mented with. These included the development of commercial servi~;
the establishment of alternative communities and co-operatives q4
the invention ofdifferenttypes of machinery. Perhaps the best knowti
exponent of the socialization· of domestic work was the nineteentlj.,H
century American feminist Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Rather t~'.
men.and women sharing the housework, as some early feminists anij(
utopian, socialists advocated. she envisaged a completely pl'Q~?
fe$Sionalized system of housekeeping· which would free women froui
the ties of cooking~ cleaning and childcare.
}
The caUfor the socialization of domestic work was not unique t~
the early feminist .movements. .Revolutionary socialists such ~':Engels, Behel and Kollontai also saw thesocialization·and collectivtt/
zation of housework .as a precondition for the emancipation
women. And they embraced the new forces of technology as making,this possible. Writing inthe 1880s, Bebe! saw electricity as the gr~fliberator: 'The small private kitchen is just like the workshop of th~ismall .master mechanic, a transition stage. an arrangement by whicJiltime, power and material are senselessly squandered and wastedt)(197l, .pp. 338-9). The socialization of the kitchen would expand ttt:>
all other. domestic work in a large-scale socialist economy •.The modem socialist states of Eastern •Europe took up ·some (:!:f\these ideas, establishing collective laundcy systems in apartmeni?
blocks and communal eating facilities. Whilst these initiatives cer .. ·.·.
tain:lyrepresentedadifferentuseoftechnology,theydid
not challenges
the sexual division of labour insofar as women remained responsi~ >for··the housework, albeit• collectivised. These policies on domestic ......
labour resulted,fromthe economic necessity.of drawing women into<
the workforce combined with the ideology of equality. It is still the····case that communal eating ·places are used· a great deal more in theGerman Democratic Republic than in the West, and in 1974 it was >estimated thatfamilies,who used these facilities saved nearly twoa half hours per day compared to families who did not (Kuhrig, 1978~\p. 31 l). Saving time, however, is not the sole motive as the housing J
crisis and overcrowded living conditions also encourage this pattern~ .J
History thus provides.us with many examples of alternatives to the:·single-family residence and the private ownership of household tools. ··Why then. in the USA .in particular, has the individualized household

A11

andi

t

Domestic Technology

97~Jlpiphed? In particular, why should women apparently be so comlffi~itin a process that was so damaging to them?

;:I/••••.••••~i.~Iwe believe that millions upon millions of women, for five or six!rfE~~t=.:o~E·:!~;;~~.l.i

I ~hose, when choices were available to them, to reside in single-family• ¥:lwellings,own their own household tools, and do their own houseljwork. (Cowan, 1983, p. 148)~: ;u.gue that women just welcomed the new domestic technologies~use they became available is to come perilously close to techno~caLdetermination. On the other hand, how can women have con~~ously and freely chosen to embrace the new methods when theyl,ire been so discredited asalib~rating force? It is tempting in these~f;umstances to see women •q•uped, as passive respondents to
mc:tustrialization,and as victims of advertisers. 10
Giowan argues ··•that women embraced these new technologies~use they made possible an increased material standard of living
lijisubstantially unchanged expenditure of the housewife's time. To
dlis. extent women were acting rationally in their own and theirfamilies' interests.
However, as the following passage illustrates, Cowan seems to findit.t,.emostconvincing explanation of the paths chosen in a set of values
t~which women subscribed - the 'privacy' and 'autonomy' of thefamily.

. . . . when decisions have to be made about spending limited funds,.·...most people will still opt for privacy and autonomy over technical•··• efficiency and community interest ... Americans have decided to live
jn apartment houses rather. than apartment hotels because they believe
t1-l:ltsomething criticaJ to family life is lost when.all meals are eaten inrestaurants or all food is prepared by strangers; they have decided tob11y.·w~hing machines rather .than patronize commercial laundries···.because they prefer to wash their dirty linen at home . . . When given. ···.·choices, in short, most Americans act so as to preserve family life and• family autonomy. The single-family home and the private ownership> of tools.are social institutions that act to preserve and to enhance theprivacy and autonomy of families.' (ibid., p. 150)

•Cowan does here depict women as active agents of their own destiny~ather than .passive recipients of the process. However, an approachthat gives such primacy to values and to the symbolic importance of98

Domestic Technology

the home inevitably plays down the material context of wo1neJ1
experience. It may be that the effectiveness of the professional
in imposing new notions ofdomestic life on behalf of the ruling claittlhas been overestimated, and the resistance they·engenderedot
Most of the available historical research is based on the rht~to111¢cthe experts and ideologues rather than the reality of working
wo111e11~s
lives .. The domestic science movement was never a~ <.J
accepted as its advocates hoped (Reiger, 1985; 1986). The evid~~!irather suggests that women negotiated the ideology of housew~~;
and motherhood according to their actual circumstances and t~!
major contradictions underlay this attempt to rationalize domes(~~
life. Similarly. when the advertisers were playing on these ideologi~(lelements in marketing the new domestic products,•. women acti'!~.liI
participated in accepting or rejecting this process.
?j
In Bdtain in the 1930s, there already existed an 'infrastructure' fQi
the communal provision of domestic appliances. There were munici~
pal wash-houses and laundries,. communal wash-houses in the olq
tenement blocks~ and at this time several local authorities experI11
mented witll building blocks .of flats, modelled on those built ii.ii
Russia,., and incorporating wash-houses. creches and commu~I
leisure ...-eas. However •.the communalprovision of amenities was net
always seen as progressive. It was associated in many people's min~with back,-to-back houses with their shared water supply and· sanita~tion, and a characteristic squalid view of rows of dustbins and WCs/
and the tap at the end of the· street. Interestingly, class diff erence.s
emerged over this issue on the Women's Housing Sub-Committ~; ·with some of the middle-class feminists on the committee moreinterested in the possibilities for communal childcare, laundries andother facilities. That working-class women favoured privacy and did
not favour communal arrangements may have been based on theirown experience of communal· living in conditions of poverty.
It is important to recognize the·extent to which individual choice
is constrained by powerful structured forces. The available alten;ia.;.
tives to single-family houses were extremely limited, especially for theworking; class. In fact, state policy in the area of housing and town
planning played a key role in promoting privatism. Without the extensive provision of differentoptions, it is not clear to what extent people
freely chose private domestic arrangements.
It is even less clear to what extent women, as opposed to men,
exercised the degree of choice available. Oddly Cowan separates thisAmerican preference for domestic autonomy from the sexual division of domestic labour. No role is granted to men in choosing thisuDomestic Technology

99

iQl!lle;-1ran1ily
home even though Cowan's own historical findings

men being well served by the private domestic sphere.
common feminist stress on the negative.effects of domestic
has contributed to the view that women have been duped.
is a tendency among some feminist scholars to assume an
ified.anti--:technologicalstanceand to imply that modern house~e worse.off than their grandmothers (Reiger, 1986, p. 110).
endency is evident in those authors who stress the increasing· n .ofthe domestic worker .and see domestic labour as having
uch of its creativity and individuality. Once we recognize that{ij:¢ir:~hanization of the home did bring substantial improvements!~~}iomen1s domestic working conditions, even while it also introiIIJ.~new pressures, women seem less irrational. 'When manuf acthen, in their own interests, marketed washing machines in,of ''make your automatic.rour clothes basket and wash every
they were tapping into women's experience of the problems ofij~izingJaundry
and the physical drudgery it entailed. They were············.•··. pening up greater flexibility in managing some domestic tasks'..../#ger,1986, pp.115-16).
j,~i~ainst this there is no doubt that people can be taken in by false~)IJ~mises,especially where advanced technology is involved. Wanting/'t~save•timeand improve the quaj.ityof their housework and in turnll'letquality of their home life, housewives are susceptible to well~-g~ed advertising about the capacity of new appliances to meet their
Theironyis that women have commonly blamed themselves;
the.failure of technology to deliver them from domestic toil, rather!ian.realizing that the defects lie in the design of technologies and thef;[~al relations within which they operate.
w

·· ·

lJ~~.

f

=-n•,. Da$1gns on Technology.}jhus far my discussion of the literature on domestic technology
Or.evealsa preoccupation with its effects on the organization of the:llouseholdand women's work in the home. However technologies are~th socially constructed and society.shaping. At a general level. I· ,have argued that the predominance of the single-family householdbas profoundly structured the form of technology that has become·· ~vailable. There has been much less attention given to the innova•tion, development and diffusion processes of specific technologies
themselves.
The forms of household equipment are almost always taken as

100

Domestic Technology

given~ rather than being understood in their social and culturllii
context. Yet there are always technological alternatives and a-q:y~specif'ic machine is the result of non-technological as well as techn~logical considerations. A society's choices among various possilll~
directions of technological development are highly reflective of t4~
patterns of political, social, and economic power in that society.,}'$'/
it possible to . detect these patterns in the design of dome~
technology?
' iGender relations are most obviously implicated in the developmemlof domestic technology because of the extent to which the sex1~l;division of labour is institutionalised. Most domestic technologyi~Idesigned. by men in their capacity· as scientists and ·engineers, peOJ>)~l
remote from·the domestic tasks involved, for use by women in.t~i;lcapacity as houseworkers. And, as we have seen, modern househql<l:1,
equipment is designed and marketed to reinforce rather than challeng~:['.< ;ithe existing household-family pattern.
.·It is not only gender relations that influence the structure •..~f I
domestic technology. Like other technologies, domestic.technology,i(\
big business. Particular technologies are produced not in relationt~J
specific and objectively defined needs of individuals, but largiilft
because they serve the interests of those who produce them. T:ij~f/design and manufacture of household appliances·is carried·out w:ith(1a view to profit on the market. And the economic interests involv~lare not simply those of the manufacturers, but also those ofth(~
suppliers of the energy needed by these appliances.
··,Household appliances are part of technological systems, such atj
electricity supply networks. The interests of the owners of these/J
systems have played an important part, along with those of the manu,,. ;facturers, in shaping domestic technology. There is nothing the owner. iof an electricity supply system, for example, likes better than thewidespread.diffusion of an electricity'-usinghousehold appliance thatwill be on at times of the day when the big industrial consumers ar,e.}
not using electricity. Residential appliances (including heating andcooling equipment) use about a third of the electricity generated in
the US today; the refrigerator alone uses about seven per cent. Unlike.)most other household appliances,· the refrigerator operates ·twentyJ
four hours a day throughout its life. In fact, many American kitchens ·.
now contain between 12 and 20 electric motors. Indeed the drive to )i
motorize.all household tasks··- including brushing teeth, squeezing/lemons and carving meat - is less a response to need than a reflection .;of the economic and technical capacity for making motors. 11
The failure or survival, on the basis of vested interests, of some

Domestic Technology

101

iachines at the expense of others has profoundly affected the way
ffllt ho~s and kitchens are both constructed and experienced. This·••:.•~is raised in many feminist histories of housework and Cowanp •.128)presents a detailed example. that of 'the rivalry between)i.e gas .. refrigerator (the machine that failed) and the electricit•f,.-igerator(the one that succeeded)'. There were initially designs for!i9~.and,. indeed, until 1925 gas refrigerators were more widespread?tl@.µtheelectric models. Cowan argues that electric refrigerators cameIi~dmninate the market as a result of deliberate corporate decisions·.· · · which machine would yield greater profit. The potential market
efrigerators, as well as the potential revenue for gas and electric~~µIltycompanies, was enormous. Large corporations, like Generali[-~ric, withvasttechnicaland financial resources, were in a position.!i,¢hoose.which type of machine to develop. Not sul"prisingly,with
ii~rests in the entire elecuicit}'Industry, General Electric decided to•fcect·the design •Ofthe elect~refrigerator. The manufacturers of.~.refrigerators, although they had a product with real advantagesr~inthe consumer's point of view, lacked the resources for develIipmg and marketing their machine.
Iti~ the demise of the gas refrigerator was not the result of~ficiencies in the machine itself; rather, it failed for social and~pnomic reasons. And in this, lt is structurally similar to the cases
i:f,.1Panyother abandoned devices intended for the household. This
~tocyillustrates that we have the household machines which we have,;~µtbecause of their inherent technical superiority. nor simply because
consumer preference, but also because of their profitability to large~mpanies. ·In this way economic relations shape domestic techno1~.IY•'Byitself, the gas refrigerator would not have profoundly alteredltedominant patterns of household work in the United States: but
i~t~liable refrigerator, combined with a central vacuum-cleaning sys... a•household incinerator, a fireless cooker, a waterless toilet, andptdividually owned fertilizer-manufacturing plants would certainlyl(ave gone a long way to altering patterns of household expenditure(Jnd of municipal services' (Cowan, 1983, p. 144).
· · What is so original about Cowan's work is that she goes beyond a
general account of technological change to present a concrete histori~lanalysis of contingency in the evolution, design and development<~fa specific technology. She demonstrates the possibility of alternative machines .and examines carefully the reasons for the pathitaken. However, itis disappointing that many of the wider concernsof her book disappear here. Her account is wholly in terms of theinterests of. and the power play between, the companies producing

it

102

Domestic Technology

the refrigerators, and the gender dimension is lost. Housewives
are relegated
the role of consumer - 'they bought electric re•"··gerators because they were cheaper'. Our understanding ,.,.m,,..
incomplete without research on design alternatives which show.sbgj!
the form of the household, and the sexual division of labour wit~~·:<-,:·•¾~~
it, actively shape artefacts. We need much more work of this kind~~l1iwhat shaped these machines in the first place. 12>,,;i
An important dimension glossed over in the literature on
development of domestic equipment is the culture of engine'
After all, engineers do not simply follow the manufacturers' di ..,'
tives; they make decisions about design and the use of new tecbnc:4!~
logies. playing an active role in defining what is technically possiblct~
As I discuss in greater depth in chapter 6, the masculinity of~I[
engineering world has a profound effect on the artefacts generateQ"~fiThis must be particularly true for the design of domestic technologi~ilmost of which are so clearly designed with female users in mind}/ij
When women have designed technological alternatives to tim~~iconsuming housework, little is heard of them. One such examplei~;~Gabe's innovative self-cleaning house (Zimmerman, 1983). Franc~~\~Gabe, an artist and inventor from Oregon spent 27 years building;at:J~
perfecting the self-cleaning house. In effect, a warm water mist doe~ 1
the basic cleaning and the floors (with rugs removed) serve as tb:ej
drains. Every detail has been considered. 'Clothes-freshener cup-->{boards' and 'dish-washer cupboards' which wash and dry. relieve the\tedium of stacking, hanging, folding, ironing and putting away. But>
the costs of the building (electricity and plumbing included) are no\more than average since her system is not designed as a luxury item}}Gabe was ridiculed for even attempting the impossible, but archit~ts
and builders now admit that her house is functional and attractive~ /One cannot help speculating that the development of an effective self"cleaning house has not been high on the agenda of male engineers:··.-/;!

:t;~~I

Domestic Technology: A Commercial Afterthought
The fact is that much domestic technology has anyway not been
specifically designed for household use but has its origins in very
different spheres. Consumer products can very often be viewed as'technology transfers' from the production processes in the formal
economy to those in the domestic informal economy.
Typically, new products are at first too expensive for application
to household activities; they are employed on a large scale by industry

Domestic Technology

103

l~ly.
until continued innovation and economies of scale allow sub-~p.tial reduction in costs or adaptation of technologies to household
iittumstances. Many domestic technologies were initially developed\ft~itt:ommercial,industrial and even defence purposes and only later,i~(inanuf acturers sought to expand their markets, were they adapted.~(~ihome use. Gas and electricity were available for industrial purl:Ji~sesand municipal lighting long before they were adapted for~µ,.estic use. The automatic washing machine, the vacuum cleaner'~~.the refrigerator had wide commercial application before being
1\~ed down for use in the home. Electric ranges were used in naval:~~4commercial ships before being introduced to the domestic
I~ket. Microwave ovens are a direct descendant of military radar'~~nology and were developed for food preparation in submarines
fii:t:he US Navy . 13 They were first introduced to airlines, institutions
pdcommercial premises.befor.j:.manufacturers turned their eyes toIithedomestic market.
··'")(iDespite the lucrative market that it represents, the household is not,~~Juallythe first area of application that is considered when new
f1~nologies are being developed. For this reason new domestici,l'1>liancesare not always appropriate to the household work that theyi.-e.supposed to perform nor are they necessarily the implements thatfw~uld have been developed if the housewife had been considered first~l'indeed if she had had control of the processes of innovation.
lt is no accident that most domestic technology originates from the\~mmercial sector, nor that much of the equipment which ends up in(the.home is somewhat ineffectual. As an industrial designer I inter}:viewedput it, why invest heavily in the design of domestic technology>Whenthere is no measure of productivity for housework as there is\for industrial work? Commercial kitchens, for example, are simple>andfunctional in design, much less cluttered with complicated gadgets•and elaborate fittings than most home kitchens. Reliability is at a\premium for commercial purchasers who are concerned to minimize·their running costs both in terms of breakdowns and labour-time. By· contrast, given that women's labour in the home is unpaid, the same
economic considerations do not operate. Therefore, when producing
for the homes market, manufacturers concentrated on cutting thecosts of manufacturing techniques to enable them to sell reasonably
cheap products. Much of the design effort is put into making
appliances look attractive or impressively high-tech in the showroom- for example giving them an unnecessary array of buttons andflashing lights. In the case of dishwashers and washing machines, amultitude of cycles is provided although only one or two are generally

1()4

Domestic Technology

used; vacuum cleaners have been given loud motors to impress peQp~
with their power. Far from being designed to accomplish a specifi
task 10 some appliances are designed expressly for sale as moder,a(j:fj
priced gifts from husband to wife and in fact are rarely used. In tij•ways the inequalities between women and men, and the subordinati'tj
of the private to the public sphere are reflected in the very d~Sffi
processes of domestic technology.
,i;tIn tracing the history of various domestic appliances, Forty (l~~lll
shows how manufacturers· have designed their products to repr~
prevailing ideologies of hygiene and housework. Thus, in the Ml~~
and<l 940s manufacturers styled appliances in forms reminiscent{~;
factory or industrial equipment· to emphasize the· labour-saving.:efi~~
ciency which they claimed for their products. At that time,domij~.
equipment was still intended principally for use·by servants. Howe~itisuch designs made housework look disturbingly like real work an~.m[lthe 1950s, when many of the people who bought these applianceswt/i\~
actually working in factories, the physical·appearance ofapplia~iIchanged •. A new kind of aesthetic for domestic appliances emec~
whieh was discreet" smooth, and with the untidy, mechanical wor~~!lings of the machine covered from view in grey or white boxes}4 :J)'l:i~!jnow standard domestic .style·of domestic appliances ' ... suited tti~
deceits and ceontradictions of housework well, for their appear~~'~iraised no comparisons with machine tools or office equipment ~ng{:Jpr,eserved the illusion that housework was an elevated and noiji1[
activity', of housework not being work (Forty, 1986, p. 219). < If:;
Throughout this chapter I have been examining the way in whidlt
the gender division of our society has affected technological chansii~
in the home. A crucial point is that the relationship between.tech:n~{illogical and social change is fundamentally indeterminate. ·ni~;&!
designers· and. promoters of a technology cannot completely prediq;
or control its final uses. Technology may well lead a 'double li:fe'' • { ()one which conforms to the intentions of designers and interests<ofipower and another which contradicts them - proceeding behind t~/
backs oftheir architects to yield unintended consequences and unanti~ff
cipated possibilities'(Noble, 1984, p. 325).
>
A good illustration of bow this double life might operate, and ho~·);women can actively subvert the original purposes of a technology, it •.
provided by the diffusion of the telephone. In a study of the American ·••••·
history of the telephone, Claude. Fischer ( 1988) shows.that there w~ x<a generation~long mismatch between .how.the consumers used the <telephone and· how the industry men thought •it should· be used~
Although sociability (phoning relatives and friends) was and still isDomestic Technology

105

use of the residential telephone, the telephone industry
such uses until the 1920s, condemning this use of the technoJor 'trivial gossip'. Until that time the telephone was sold as a-~calbusiness and household tool. When the promoters of thei~one,finallybegan to advertise its use for sociability, this was at· ····•·····partly in response to subscribers' insistent and innovative uses):Jltetechnology for personal conversation.
f}i,is~her explains this time lag in the industry's attitude towardin terms of the cultural 'mind-set' of the telephone men.
1~1ijlity' ·:people who developed, built, and marketed telephone systems· predominantly telegraph men. They therefore assumed that the.
J1one's main use would beto directlyreplicate that of the parent;ii~Qlogy, the telegraph. In this context, people in the industry
Wi~:nably considered telephone. 'visiting• to be an abuse or trivialil~~µ.of the service.It sQ'({ln9t fit with their understandings of what
l!Mtt~hnology wassupposed;cl&be used for.
~\iflf~issue.9fsociability was.also tied up with gender. Itwas women~Jiiipar:ticular who were attracted to the telephone to reduce their· liJlessand isolation and to free their time from unnecessary travel.
industry••men criticized.·'frivolous•. conversation on the tele>>>,·.<<
ji,~ne, they almost always referred to the speaker as 'she'. A 1930s
t~~Y found. that whereas•m~n mainly wanted a telephone for' ·.. ·ess reasons, women ranked talking to kin and friends first~' .:.. ~eF, 1988, p. 51).
?1,~-olllen's relationship to the telephone is still different to men's in)fib.•
won:i.enuse the telephone more because of their confinement at~~Ille with small children, because they have the responsibility fori;~tainingfamily
and social relations and possibly because of their/(~ ofctime. in the streets (Rakow, 1988). A recent Australian survey~ncluded that 'ongoing ..telephone communication .Qetweenfemale;~~ily members constitutes an important part of their support structl~eandcontributes significantly to their sense of well-being, secudty,;jijbility, and self-esteem' (Moyal, 1989, p. 12). The telephone has';irlJ;:reased
women's access to each other and the outsideworld.lnthis.
.the. telephone may well have improved the quality of wome:n;'sf:Ifiomelives more than many other domestic technologies. 15~,<itu.iJtu{way///,',',

1t:CPnch,1slon:
More Work for Social
I.started this chapter by noting how ..,..,...""""'•>11.is;:<J:H::eµ•..•.:t.~lkJ
domestic technology and household reliit101nt...

rm.

106

Domestic·Technology

substantial body of literature on the history of housework and tlii}
di~ision of labour ini the homes In recent years too there has ····''
srowing interest in domestic ·technology both· <among fe ...
theorists and, fronl a different> perspective, among·
society;theorists.c'fbis work is•·•still•·•·relatively:undetdevelop
much/of·• the·•literature·shares a··technicist orientation···.w
opµmistic or pessimistic in outlook. Technology is commonly\J~fll
tra.yed as the prime mover in, social change, carrying people liiii~
wake,•for .better or ,worse. But history is. littered •with··exampl~~jalternative ways.of organizing housework and with alternative ··· "'"for machines we•now take for granted~ In retrieving these lost . ...•.......
from tobscurity the centrality of people~s actions and clmi~i~ihighlighted and with. them the social·shaping of technology that .f~i~.hli--:·-::}:::*::::::::
ms es our ves.
.
.
.
?
An adequate analysis of the,social shaping of domestic techIIo}~_.fcannot be conducted only at the level of the design ofindivi~ll
technologies. •The ··signifreance of ·domestic ·technology Jies :i11/1~I
location at the interface. of public and private·The fact•}~~men>in°thepublic sphere of ·industry, inventionandcommerce.desigJ,
and, pr:oduce ,technology for use by women· in_the private dom~lsphere, reflects and embodies a complex web of.patriarchal ~1
capitalist• relations. ·Although mechanization ·.•·has·•transformed,~;]home, ..it has not liberated women from· domestic drudgery in .:straightforward way. Time budget research leaves uswond · ' 'whether technology has led to.moreflexibilityin housework or.
intensification. To further our understanding of these issues wemore:qualitative research on bow peopleorganizehousework am:l•ltechnology in·a variety of household forms.>Such research shoul~{
distinguish between different types of domestic technt>logy ag.cF
examine the, significance of gender in people's affinity. with tee~logy, Finally,· the designers of domestic technology themselves ha~~;so>far been subjected to very little· investigation; an examinationC9ifi
theirbackgrounds, interests, and motivation may'shedlight on]ijj
development of particular products. By refusing to take,technologi~
for gr.anted we help to make visible the relations of structura:1
inequality that give rise to them.

wodds;
..

n ...
••·

This portrait of domestic technology is certainly incomplete. In thischapter I have concentrated on domestic technology as a set pf
physical objects or artefacts and argued that gendered meanings are
encoded in the design process; This process involves not only
specifying the user but also the appropriate location of technologies

Domestic Technology•

107•the house. For example, domestic appliances 'belong' in the, along with women, and communications technology such as
ision are found in the 'family room'. 'this signals the way in.. the physical form and spatial arrangement of housing itself·••·< ass~mptions about the nature of domestic life - an issue to
i~n up inJhe next chapter .

1~vetz (1965} is one of the earliest articles inquiring into the historical~pactof,domestic
technology on housework. For detailed references,t C:owan's(1983) bibliographic .essays at the back of the book and/~N~l(l98:1, pp, 229,,.30).See also Bose et al. (1984), for a comprehen~iV:e,review<µf the.coJ!~~mporary resear.cb.. As they .point out, thisUt~i:chis limited •by,it.s<J~~~p the 'ideal', white middle-class family,".•]~M~d.
contains virtually µo evidence on variations across .class and ethnic~';(cfr~9ups:; •neith~ does it encompass single-parent households or peoplei~f.,.living
alone; The data is also limited by its failure to reflect different
i¥i1!,/iif,tagesof tile life cycle. A similar problem exists. with much of thef~,~1'.fllistorical literature, as McGaw.(1982, p.813) notes. This has led manyijl}ii(authors.to exaggerate the rate of diffusion of domestic devices.
jt.l>See also Ruth Schwartz Cowtn (1976 and 1979).
f~]ij;t'biere is now quite an extensive ,feminist literature on the domestic
fj:j.i\f..sciencemovement :andits attempt to elevate the status of housekeeping.
lJPt See, for example, Ehrenreich .and English (1975,1979) and Margolis
j1'{i<J,985) on Amedca; Davideff 0976) and Arnold and Burr (1985) on!iii , Britain; and .Reiger• (1985) for Australia. Reiger's book, The Dise~chQ.ntment>t.>fthe
Home, is the most interesting sociologically as she
attempts to comQine aJeminist analysis of the role of the professional

jtr

i!(i;l;'.
.•.
••:!o':~~~f:X:::1f~e:d~~~t:i~e:c~~~~=m~n:::~eu:::t~~~jf
ofa general extension of 'technical rationality' in the modern'.~~:::lit
I am only referring to domestic technology here, as clearly medical

technology is central to demographic changes in life expectancy and to,. .\ birth control.•,$, See Bose et al. (1984), Rothschild (1983), .and Thrall (1982).
,, ,6:••In my own qualitative study .(1983) in a small market town in Norfolk,
England, lfound that men always did the 'outdoor' jobs,- mowing t:bt':~f •· lawn, .gardening, fixing the car,. household repairs and, tCMilesser exten~..
~;[ii{painting and decorating. While the husbands did ha.vea respo .. · .•·.. ·for performing certain household tasks, these had . very differ.<,. characteristics from those the women performed. Of course, tbis,
trast is exaggerated and depends partly on conventional com::eptiqns;!i,i;ol'I~

108

7

8
9

10

11

12

Domestic Technology

lawn-mowing, for instance, is just as continuous as window
Nevertheless, there is a general distinction which is reinforced by pevaluations. Indeed, these evaluations are intrinsic to thedivision. of labour.
The microwave cooker is another interesting case where further r .·.·.·..
is needed to show whether it results in men being more prepared tQ.·.·.......Jup some cooking activities or whether it increases expectations so~i
mothers cook separate meals for different members of the familyi~
different times.
··•··
> '~
A fourth residual category, odd jobs, is not considered in the artic~\
This might lead one to expect that women in the paid labour force n:µ~~
use their income to substitute consumer durables for domestic l~ti.f~~;
Surprisingly however women in employment have slightly less d<,~~1
equipment than full-time housewiv.es. From an analysis of tl:ffll
Northampton household survey data, collected in 1987 as part oftljii
British ESRC Social Change in Economic Life Initiative, Sara Hor-r•ifound that there were no significant differences in the ownership ~t[
consumer durables between working women and non-working wome#~;In her 1976 essay, Cowan has a tendency to adopt this latter positiQittl
seeing the corporate advertisers 'the ideologues of the 1920s'as the a~~)l
which encouraged American housewives literally to buy the mechaniza;'?
tion of the home. The interest of appliance manufacturers in mas~i
markets coincided exactly with the ideological ·preoccupations oftb¢'.idomestic science advisers, some of whom even entered into employmeJJ;twith appliance companies. According to W. and D. Andrews (1914)IJ
nineteenth.century American women. anxious to ·elevate their. statµ~,:believed that technology was a powerful ally.
·
.·•
••·
.••••·•·The Australian Consumer Association magazine, Choice, recently fo11ndthat many appliances were useless and that a lot of jobs were better done.?
manually. For example, they found that a simple manual citrus squeezer<
was overall better than many of the electric gadgets.
A notable exception is Hardyment's (1988) book on domestic inventions)in Britain which documents· a multitude of discarded designs; such as··•sewing machines, washing machines, ovens, irons, wringers, mangles.·and vacuum cleaners, invented and developed between l850 and 1950.
Unfortunately, the book contains little analysis of the forces whichshaped their development. At one point, the author makes the intriguing
argument that it was the small electric motor (introduced in the 1920s)
more than any other invention which led to the development of domestic
machinery along private rather than communal channels. But
Hardyment concludes that 'the potential of any machine should lie in ·the mind of its user rather than its maker' (p. 199),echoing her earlier
statement that women should seize the technological means to liberatethemselves. It is disappointing that in a book devoted to the history ofdomestic machines so little attention is paid to the gender interests
involved in their production.

Domestic Technology

109:f)J?fhis point is made by Megan Hicks, 'Microwave Ovens' (MSc disserta·5;::/.

tion, University of New South Wales, 1987).

!,\~One can only speculate as to whether coveijng up the mechanicalJi/<workings of appliances assisted in alienating women from understandingm?.these machines and how to mend them.

!f,:{f{owever, the unintended consequences of a technology are not always!!fJpositive. The diffusion of the telephone has facilitated the electronic
itr '.intrusion of pornography into the home. Not only are abusive andi~Wharassing telephone calls made largely by men to women, but new sexual~ti"!1 ::~::~~c!e::::=!ft:~e~:::~-s~==n ~~::: :::~/{!:;;~o~:n:;!

i~\~n a massive 'pink message service' arise. When it was introduced overii ten.years ago, the Minitel system was intended to replace the telephone
directory. Since then it has developed thousands of services, the mostw

\popular being pornographic conversations and sexual dating via the: electronic mail. When complaints have been made the French post office;~; claim that they can do nothing;,to censor hardcore pornography as it isl?f··part of private conversations. One wonders how this might affect gender•relations in the home.

tft

-i{?·
..

5

The Built Environment:

Whether the private home is a free-standing house in Frank Lloyci/ 1
Wright's Broadacre City or a high tower flat in Le Corbusier's RadiantCity. domestic work·has been treated as a private, sex-stereotypeq •••activity, and most architects continue to design domestic work spacesfQI'
isolated female workers,
Hayden, The Grand Domestic Revolution ;>.••In · every culture and historical epoch, domestic. architectµi;~ \~uniquely revealing about prevailing social relations and nori:ns'.ifi
household organization. The design of houses is imbued with val:ill
and ideas that both reflect and exert tremendous influence over dilJ
patterns and quality of our lives. In this chapter I want to broa~
the discussion of household technology to include the house ~ia]technological construct, and the built environment more genenf ,,The· built environment is taken to mean •. . . our created surrou
ings, including homes, their arrangement in relation to one an
to public spaces, transport routes, workplaces and the layout of.<.<>0(Matrix, 1984, p. 1)
In what follows, I will be arguing that the built environment refl~t~
and reinforces a domestic ideal which emphasizes the importan~~.:the home as a woman's place and a man's haven. Sexual divisions:~(literally built into houses and indeed the whole structure of thesystem. Architecture and urban planning have orchestrated
separation between women and men, private and public, home
paid employment, consumption and production, reproduction
production, suburb and city. While people do not actually live accifi]
ing to these dichotomies, the widespread belief in them does influetiii
decision~ and have an impact on women's lives.
•·..f,~1~
The focus of much feminist literature has been housework an'1.\tli*
implications of technological developments within the home.
·· ··war sociology has chiefly considered housing as an aspect of.
distribution and transmission of social wealth and privilege, thatifj~
as an aspect of social stratification. At an economic level, housin8'.i~tt~!

The Built Environment

111'~iji,eommodity
and central to the generation of capitalist profits. It is{;;+<>:,,_,,*f•yrecently.that the structure and shape of the house itself has been
}fjbjectedto feminist analysis.
•!!li)lbephysical form of buildings is usually taken to be the inevitableif~uitoftechnological and engineering advances, for example, con[(lij':and steel gave us the high-rise tower block of modernist archi·~,e. Changes in the interior design of dwellings are likewise· ed in terms of mechanical innovations. A classic example cannd in explanations of the changing location of the kitchen,is often.attributed to the invention of the Rumford stove. Thised stove for cooking and heating eliminated odour andn :and is said to be thus responsible for the movement of therom the basement or rear of the house to its centre. 1
y innovations in building materials, engineering methods~mestictechnologies ille of major importance and make possible
development of new arclritec(:tiralforms. However, as with other• ologies, the design of the built environment is stamped withrsocial and economic relations. Historians of architecture pro:many •instances of physical structures and arrangements that···· rate explicit or implicit political purposes. One such example•WideParisian boulevard designed by Baron Haussmann to perfhe>movementof troops and.thus prevent any recurrence of street~g of the kind that took place during the revolution of 1848.
....· l Foucault's discussion of Bentham's Panopticon, an all:jarchitectural form,designed to keep prisoners under constantlance,:is a vivid illustration of how a building can itself embody.. . of control. Prisons though are not the only buildings that. be designed to institutionalize .patterns of power and order. The\Jl\M headquarters in Sydney is curiously reminiscent of theiticon. Its open-plan offices and clear glass internal walls are.·..· ed to give the appearance of a 'status-free environment'.
j~r,chiesseem to be dissolved where even managers' offices have
· walls and are located close to their staff. In fact of course, what:arrangementsachieve is the possibility for increased surveillance'f; who must feel watched even when they are not. In this sense,
itself does the looking. Like the Panopticon, then, there. of the ,building ensures that control is largely achieved
self;..discipline.
st domestic architecture may not provide us with such starkes .of the extent to which buildings incorporate techniques of;control, that women.are constrained in particular ways by theof the family dwelling is certain. The house both symbolizes

112

The Built Environment

patriarchal relations, and gives concrete expression to them;;
fir:Stpart of this•chapter I will chart the development of thehouse. In so doing, I will be arguing that architectural chdomestic arena are not· simply driven by technological ad¥
are about expectations of women and men, and in particular atthe domestication of women.

The Ideal Homa
Victorian Values

By the middle of the nineteenth century the key foundations,.
modern domestic ideal had already been laid. The sentimeof domestic life that occurred in the Victorian period in both E
and<America can be understood as an attempt to check whatperceived as the disintegration of values in a rapidly changing·s .
by placing the home, symbolically, in direct opposition to th~ .fa~.
Leonor.e Davidoff and Catherine Hall (l 987) have shown bQW
peri9dJ180.. J850saw the emergence of new conceptions of the .
in Victorian English society. The 'creation of the middle.,cla
invol\'edtheseparation of home and workplace, and theidentifica .
of thehome asa private place, in which family relationships wer
primary importance. It was women's responsibility to create a ti,
as.unliketheworld of business and industry as possible, a place:t~J]~
would be the centre of moral rectitu.de. In the responsibilities affl:l~i1i
buted to women in the home, it was the pursuit of beauty that w~C~
emphasized most strongly for the sake of its moral effects upti~lmembers of the household, especially the children. Located betw~)lthe aristocracy and gentry on the one hand and wagelabourers ontp~@
other• '[ilt was the middle ranks who erected the strictest boundatj~],
between private and public space' (p. 359).
;/ii[
The home was seen as the most appropriate setting Jor wome~ts;
lives, as a sanctuary from the. rigours and corruption of the outsi4~·.
world. Victorian ideology perceived women and children as especia}Jy'.
close to.nature, much more so than men who could withstand tll,•f.
dangerous influences associated with supposedly unnatural. city. lif~t
provided they had their retreat.at home. Thejdeology of the home••·as a haven had its corollary in the idealization of the rural village as\
the proper setting for community life. What has been called 'the Beau.···•
Ideal' was epitomized by the Victorian villa in a garden suburb. As
we shall see, this image has endured and been reproduced in twentiethcentury suburbia.

The Built Environment

113

ttal theme of feminist theory has been the spatial separation· a;nd private spheres, and the restriction of women to the..• .!)wever,the public/private dichotomy ct.¢sacross the work/·•·· ~on in many ways; for example, the 'private' home con·.··.·.•.·•.it public and private spaces. As the house was turned into
Jfpuring the Victorian period, the lay-out of the building was···..<transformed ..There was marked spatial segregation of the\both between husband .and wife and master and servant. The~\quarters were furthest ·from the .front door. - domestic ser,concealed from the public parts of the house.
•zoqeswere created for different activities such as cooking,•·•\w~hing,.·sleeping,•and formal social·functions, with public. e spaces clearly demarcated. One room at the •front of the?the,parlour,·•was now .set aside specifically for· social interiµld contained the b.e-t•fittingsand furniture. Eating now took{il..la separatedining room;.~ kitchen was isolated at the backj.ouseand was spacious enough to accommodate several womeng. ~~gregating the mess and smell of food preparation from'al,dtual of eating became an important hallmark of respectyand meant thatthe kitchen became ideally as remote as possible~elivingrooms, no matter the cost in servants', or wife's time;labour' (ibid., p. 383). Ove.i:.all,then, hierarchy and location... ,>~sreflected the stratified relationships within the home !1~l;l,cterized bythe·subordination of servants to the family, family!~:'Wife and wife to husband.
0,tif~@]!~ii~'''

Iit~Home as a Machine for LivingJi)!!({_"\:',,1~~.th9ughin certain respects nineteenth-century ideas about what conI~Jituteda home have permeated twentieth-century life and thought,~~¢has the physical and emotional division between public and private
lti~res, there have been major changesin our image of an ideal home.
ij14ostimportantly, the nineteenth-century view of the home as a(i~~onghold of beauty and spiritual virtue was replaced by the idea thattie home's main function was as the source of physical welfare andIlli@<;alth'(Forty, 1986,p. 114).Efficiency rather than beauty became theJi~ganizing principle of the home, and the relative importance(;:~itachedto the various rooms changed, with the kitchen becoming theseore of the. house.
;U These changes reflected the growth of a middle class without(servants and the mechanization of the home. The early years of the•••.twentieth century saw the development of the domestic science

114

The Built Environment

movement, the germ theory of disease and the idea of 'scientj.(ijmotherhood'. Standards of personal and household hygiene r··
did preoccupations with motherhood and children. The maturers and advertisers of domestic products exploited and prom
these•attitudes in their drive to expand the market for .dappliances •. These appliances were promoted as labour savi
therefore a solution to the 'servant problem' •. supposedly ena
women to 'manage' their own labour 'scientifically'.
.
These ideas about efficient home management which accompanj~lthe·.introduction of domestic technologies gradually· reshaped,·· 'design of the house itself. Houses were being built for single fa
occupation without maid's rooms. Great emphasis was placedinterior plan of the house in order to design efficient.spaces.to.n(mize the housekeeper's work. The idea that housework couldi!'I~
rationalized according· to the principles of scientific management\.····
architects to devote much time in the 1920sand 1930s to. studying,..·.
logical· sequence of work processes•in the kitchen.·.Metaphors •W::
described the kitchen as a laboratory prevailed. •These ideas off .......
.
ti0nal 11 labour-.saving ·homes became •associated·..with the mod9j
movein.ent in architecture. Le Corbusier's famous phrase 'theis<a machine for living' captured this new view. While espou#~I
emancipatory,.indeed•socialist~inspired politics, it seems the m~ii
ists'did not appreciate that machines need constant servicing. . }'"~
For women, the machine was to become a treadmill. The kitc~f!inow designed for the servantless family, was a compact fitted kite~!
with room for one worker. the housewife. Neither its small size
its location, sealed off from the rest of the house, were conduciv~t<Q.fthe sharing of kitchen duties. As with kitchens, internal bathroom'~/\became standard .in many households during this·.period becausetj!~
the mass production of cast iron enamelware, as well as the obsessi~{~with dirt and disease. This model was to become the prototype ..f~iworking•class as well as middl~class homes after the Second Wo ''War.

no,:lI

Public Housing for Private lives.

So far l have been concentrating on the development of a domestic))
ideal .based on the family and·o.n private life and its architectutajiembodiment in the single-family house. In the period between th~~wars most working-class families still lived, ate, cooked, and spentall'';their time in one main room~ with shared facilities. Large-scale state}intervention in the housing market in the aftermath of both world

The Built Environment

115

in Britain was to play a key role in ensuring that the single-family
old became the dominant form of housing. Concerns about
improvement for the working-class ancr fears about social
were the twin motives of state reforms. As Gittins has argued:e<state was actually defining what family structure and home
uld be; the size of council houses, for instance, betrayed what
ernment felt to be the normative, the "right", size of family'.
1982, p. 48)
d,ebate about what sort of housing should be provided for thegelassinthe inter-war period was one in which women themparticipated. Set up in 1918, the Tudor Walters Committee,· exclusively of male politicians, architects and technical,was influenced·by the architects associated with the Garden
Movement. 2 They recommended low-density terrace housing..·•wider frontages to prij~idc;ipore air and light, and ideally the
1ftoom from the front to the back/ room was to be a 'thr01.igli·e house. This room would maximize sun and ventilation in the. eand emphasize familytogetherness. The simplest and cheapest
model had a living-room with a range where most cooking
be done and a scullery with a gas cooker for occasional use,
copper and bath.
king-class women interviewed at the time by members of theen's Housing Sub-Committee insisted that a separate parlour beided wheretheycould·relaxand.escape from work unfinished in~tltest of the house. It has been said that: 'working-class women
Ifij.cely.defended their right to a room which expressed their pride in
Iifµsewifery ·and which also afforded additional privacy. a scarce:l~odity
in working class households' (Lewis, 1984, p. 29). 3 How~ifi:.>giventhat maintaining the neat appearance of the parlour added!1:1\\'Qmen'swork, it is not entirely clear why working-class womenfii.ireportedto have been such fierce advocates of its inclusion in theirfiiuses. The presence or absence of a parlour in working-class housing[~equite a political issue in the inter-war period. Influential archil#;s su,chasRaymond Unwin saw it as impractical to split the house)~-0various small rooms and attacked the respectable working-class~ire for a frontparlour that was rarely used as 'a desire to imitate
middle-class house'. Where the architects' views prevailed, there:ffi:.~variousstories ofoccupants dividing up the space themselves with~itions
to create a separate parlour, thus demonstrating thatw~rking-class people resisted architects views of proper home life.

s,

0

116

The Built Environment

Housing. the Symmetrical

Family·.··,·•·i,'./;,i\\If the Second World War posed a challenge·to·traditional~:>,this was to leave little trace on.the design.of houses. In factt···
war period saw the revitalization ofthe ideology of separatiJ
for women and men. The major housing construction progr
the 1950s and 1960s coincided with women being pushed
the home to tend their husbands and children.• The <howhich .predominates today dates from or bears theperiod. With the rapid growth of owner~occupation, greater
was placed on a more home:.centred lifestyle for men <a:$<women. :The idea of companionate marriage saw the fincreasingly sharing activities and cultivating intimate rela ·the comfort ofa private home.· Here 'good' communication;awarenessof the needs of others, shared leisure (often
sumption) gained a prominence previously accorded to hY ·nutdtlon. But fOF· all these apparent changes, the ¢ontinllitii~
Victorian middle~class domestic ideals was in many ways moti
found than the discontinuities;· · ··
Ttrisnew soci~psychological conception of familial.relations·its main expression in the open,,.plan housing designthatch
the pbst-wJif period. The dark divided house gave way to a pte
for;light and open space, breaking down traditional divisions
foFmality and informality in behaviour. Architects prom.otedt~
of multi-function spaces and 'zoned' planning in houses· ···•
noFm. Spaces were demarcated for certain functions, but th" /achieved without separate rooms. The 'activity area• of theJfroom~ dining area, and kitchen had few walls, providing. asf
space and togetherness as possible. The lack of walls We:\$thou ···promote the modem ideology of marital equality. Famousopen-plan interiors, Frank• Lloyd Wright's domestic •architectu
nevertheless faithful to the Victorian iconogaphy of family
placing a •massive hearth at the very centre of his house· desig
Domestic servants had finally completely bowed out of the•and consequently the illusion that meals simply arrived in theroom - as if from nowhere - could no longer be sustained.
therefore less reason to have a separate kitchen and dining r
the kitchen was now enlarged and opened up to the rest of theThis open design gavedomestic work a moreegalitarian·appea .··.··..
as·other members of the family shared the space, and·by implicad~~(the tasks, hitherto allocated to women alone. As we know,· 'th~;

The Built Environment

117

ic division of labour was not transformed by these architec1 However, they did obscure the extent to which women
to bear responsibility for servicing tbe family. Typically,
oow a table in the kitchen for eating at, again signifying
al lifestyle. The open-plan kitchen enabled mothers to. children while.cooking the meal, as children were now seen•c•; • 3 constant attention and companionship. This partially
emoveofthekitchen to the back of the house with a picture
oking out on the garden.
r for thisincreased concern with children's needs, the multim, whichlater:became known as the 'family room', came
'Although the family room most often served as a place
could do as they pleased in the midst of clutter and··wasalso an architectural expression of family togetherness.'•1981, p. 255) Vel')'ilittl~.Privacy is provided for individuals
house, which bec:omei~rimarily a place for shared activibedroomsnow provided for the children are generally small,.• that they will spend most of their time in the larger family\~dults in the house are assumed to need even less private•.g.
especially women. Even the parents' bedroom belongs to 'the··•·.,/Women do not have a room of their own, their spatial needs
i:subsumed into the family~~:if they have a domain it is the/last twenty years have witnessed major shifts in the social
n:ofwomen and in the way women see themselves. Paradoxicthi&.periodhas also .been characterized by a renewed rhetoric.·.•·\vomen as soft, feminine and housebound which is increasingly>,~with reality. The white plastic, clinical kitchen has given way·.·.·.•.
•.•. re cosy ~country kitchen' with pine-panelled walls and natural...:fmishes•.Laura Ashley patterned floral prints recall the cheerful· ·ty ,of rural.life. Although most new houses now have central
Jig, the fireplace remains the focal point of many living rooms,.
<
furniture grouped around it.' It is still the place of the most·· ·ve furniture, with faint echoes of the Victorian parlour.
e kitchen meanwhile has become the emotional centre of the
it is from here that the relaxed, informal, symmetrical family
letadiates. Power relations within the patriarchal family haveme submerged. by this ideology of togetherness. Thus the proto.<for the modern house prescribed the form of household thatp inhabit it, namely the white middle-class nuclear family. As·r.was not only oppressive to most women, but also a markedly
ocentric design, denying the existence and needs of other forms

118

The Built Environmentof family. The dominant modern housing design does not 1enia1i
to satisfying the housing needs of the majority of households
which are in fact no longer composed of nuclear families.
Symbolic values about domestic life are perhaps even mor~ c:
expressed in the external appearance of houses. The exterior.ofis the prime indicator of people's social status and extremely)ftant to their:·self-image. Houses are, after all, the major··
consumption and their exterior is what rounts most whenpurchased. Architects• prime concern has always been withface of buildings and the current debate on the nature of post,iarchitecture is reproducing this concern. The contrast
domestic and commercial architecture is interesting in this r~
Wbile non,,.residential architecture has.gone through massive
formations in style. building materials, and construction technoffiDj
the preference for Georgian and Victorian domestic arc:ht. >>'>
remains. The facades of old houses are retained while the igutted and modernized. There is even a market for new h0
are replicas of these styles, or in· America of colonial-style
While state,-of.the-art commercial buildings pride thebeing energy efficient ·and.••·maintenance•free,the house. st
traditional materials such as wood and bricks that are both.ex
and laborious to maintain. The assumption that women will.cto do much of this domestic work for free no doubt expl ·disregard for .efficiency in domestic architecture; However
explanation is clearly more complex: men too are involved intaining the exterior of the home, investing much of their•spare{and m<>neyin do-it-yourself home improvements. Furthermo~ ···preference for traditional architecture reflects an attachm~
traditional values and a desire that the home should be a ·h ·.··.·.·,·••.
resembling· the. workplace as little as·possible. High-rise towers
met with little objection.as offices but have proved very unpQI)
as homes.

'ttll

Semi-Detached in the Suburbs

For all that privacy within the house has diminished, the expecta
is tha.t families as a whole remain private from each other.
1984, p. 55) The Victorian ideal of the detached or semi-dhouse in a suburban or semi-rural setting remains essen
unchanged. The one-family house with a garden was regarded by;middle class and working class alike as the best place to bringchildren, offering a healthy environment away from the dirt, n:

The Built Environment

119~anger of the city. Developers encouraged the massive post-war
tothe suburbs, as low-density development meant more profit
building industry as well as providinJ a mass market forr durables. Although .women have paid a heavy price for~an development, they shared men's dreams of home ownerdisillusion with the city and hopes for a better life in thes" It took several deca1les forthe aridness and uniformity of
suburban life, and especially the isolation and boredom it
onthe housewife, to become immortalized in Betty Friedan'st of 'the problem with no name'.
sonant with this idea of the home as private space, the diseness of the home became enshrined in state zoning policies,
were.attheheart of post-war town planning. Cities and towns
begeogr:aphically segregated into their various activities, eachsappropriate locati()ij and setting. Zoning '. . . closely approxistereotypical ideas ab•t man's use of the environment'
1:984,p. 38). It was assumed that the home and the neighdwere the setting for most women's lives and that men wouldo work located elsewhere. The main function of transport
be to get men from home to work and back again.
impact that this would have on women's mobility was not.ered; As Susan Saegert(J980).has observed, the long-standing...olicdichotomy between'masculine cities and feminine suburbs'~entally shaped the actual.organization of the urban envi. 11t; tying women more closely to their immediate locality.
tial areas were and still are physically separated fromrial/ commer.cial .sites, distancing women from the 'economy'.
•....... .. g thus intensified the privatized nature of many women's lives
lit#l:their exclusion fromthe public. socially organized productive life.
(ifijt,urban zoning restrictions have also operated to separate different?· )uof housing development, limiting moderately priced high-density·· ~gs to inner-city sites. As such it has been an important tool inand race segregation - most infamously in South African urb'an
ning, ·where.black. people are expressly confined to certain parts·< . the city.
•~'.lf~ince at least the mid-1970s employers have responded to .tne<
on .of the workplace and·home by relocating certain kinds~fvities to the suburbs in order to capture the potential Iattput·~ft'i~rried wQmen.who reside. there. This has required the rezqQi;~1lf
f~e suburban space, especially in middle-class suburbs becauseifJt
middle-class wives that are wanted for.office work~Urb~~•ti$<
once more being restructured as the demand for cleri~;<,~1'.
w

··

•

lw~te

l 20

The Built Environment

expands - work traditionally done by women. Developmentl}i!i\information and communication technologies greatly facilitate·. ···•.'scale shifts in the nature and location of employment, adecentralization of workplaces. It is not only office work that is.~being 'suburbanized'. Industrial zones on the urban peripheryt~,lijbecome massive centres of development. And suburban spr···
stimulated the. development of regional retail complexes. Me....
administrative and financial activities - head office functi~~~)ti
remain located in the central city area. Overall this represents atJ~
a partial shift away from mono-functional zoning to a more··useof urban space.
>>,,
There is currently much interest in the contemporary restructurj:jj
of cities around 'service' sector work, and the rapid restructuringjll
manufacturing. Some of these analyses focus on .the spatial co~;tution of power, that is, how the spatial allocation of goods, se.rvicji,
and employment across a city act as hidden mechanisms for. ~Iunequal distribution of income among various groups in the··..•.·.•.
population. In Los Angeles, for example, it has been pointed out .., .,industrial restructuring has left the largely Chicano/Hispanic.u,•1Q~I
black industrial working class cut off from the new workplaces; (,?:I
While such studies··recognize the spatial construction of class a~;race differences, they generally ignore the issue of gender relatiO~ilaside•trom·theobligatory·listing of women with otherdisadvantag~
or oppressed 'minority' groups." There is little attempt to explore~4~jdifferent implications of such developments for women and men, tl~~ithe ways in which the contemporary restructuring of cities affects tht;:'.
social relations of reproduction as well as the relations of productb:n1//

Feminist Alternatives:
Differently?

Would Women Do It

If the built environment tends to institutionalize patriarchal relations/is this because it has been designed and constructed predominantly bymen? Would women. then, produce a different physical environment'!
Planning and architecture in Britain, North America and Australia
are indeed white, male-dominated professions. This is mirrored/
through all stages of building; even the production of the physicalbuilt structure is done by an almost all-male workforce. As .theifeminist designers' collective known as Matrix (1984, p. 3) comments,'women play almost no part in making decisions about or in creating
the environment. It is a man-made environment.' In their critiquesof modern architecture, urban planning and of public/private

The Built Environment

121

lstinctions, feminists have drawn attention to the sexual politics of~ce. They have suggested that the inevitable outcome of a pro~lon and an .industry inhabited and controlled by men is a male. · built space.
(t. he domestic architecture often cited as the epitome of a masculi•;.tpproach is the multi-storey residential block. This functionalist~t~tecture, which envisaged a vertical garden city with 'streets in the•f,has been discredited by feminists amongst others. 7 The fact that~eworkand childcare might be made more onerous and isolating:f~f\womenstranded at dizzy heights, without safe and accessible
ifaoor space, did not occur to the pioneers of the Modern Move,m~JJ:t,Apart from this obvious disregard for the quality of women's{.B~,{these towers have also been seen as products of a specificallyi;it~:vision (seefigureS.I). Modernism in architecture was obsessed
tiiiffi*~nological PT08f:(l~s.adppting technology as both its instruImiiltand ~boLThe det,e}o,Jientof the high-rise form was a monu[~ttotechnological innovation and a strikingly phallic symbol.
1t[/~e underlying theme •Ofsuch analyses is that women experience•••••~f;edifferently from men and would therefore create..different built
i~fr.mments. Margrit Kennedy, a Berlin-basedarchit~t. argues thatwould be a :sigµifi~ant difference between an environmenti'.j~pe\imainly by men ~dm,~e v~lues and an environment shaped
1i~inly by women and female<v.µues'(1981, p. 76). Whereas men
Iti~sna buildingfrom the outside in, women's greater preoccupation:I~ffiinteriors leads them to design buildings from the inside out.
i~~liiinedy suggests that there are the following male and female~,j~j~iples
in architecture:"•?:~t:-·;-; .

f j/ 1'heFemale Principles

H Cmore user oriented? ~ore ergonomic··iµorefunctional
more flexible
fuore organically ordered•.•••.•··.
more holistic/ complex)![~~~=:r::~
growing

than
than
than
than
than
than

!::

The Male Principles
designer oriented
large scale/monumental
formalfixed
abstractly systematized .•····....
specialized/one".dim~osj~q~•:~r::;::~cted

...

~IL

(~eseideas are echoedin many
feminist
critiques;;,.~-)} practice, which argue that whereas male subjectivity.is· ·.•······· ·?tall phallic towers, female buildings are round, enclosi11g,cul'.Yii low-rise. Such views are not the prerogative of fem,fui~s... ·..,
11' ....

s:1: l.e Corb ·usier's theme of ·,Stl'Cetsiii·tlre ·oo,,,f'inds exprel)sion in .
l'ai-k Hill, Sheffield .
So·urce: Architecture Ocpanmcnt, Unjvcr:,ity of Sydney

The Built Environment.) ·•·.

123

I

t{ftJ.City in History, Lewis Mumford proposed that in neolithic com-~'111itiespeople lived in round dwellings, the house and the village' '·woman writ large: with the development of the city '[m]ale
lisms and abstractions now become manifest: they show... ves in the insistent straight line, the rectangle, the firmly
ij~•n1dedgeometric plan, the phallic tower and the obelisk .. .' (1961,~:::/;;;:)\l.'''I'\ill'.~~~l'.i•~il;;I~espite
its initial appeal, there are a number of problems with thisfeminist position. To start with, the emphasis on universalized~fi'ai~ine and masculine traits in design cannot explain how it is thatwell as women have designed round and curving buildings.
need look no further than Gaudi's rippling architecture or thei?#alshaped Guggenheim museum of Frank Lloyd Wright (see figure··· · Neither can it explain women's involvement in the design of highAs Kenn~y herself remarks, in countries such as thethat have a high propijnion of women architects, the domiWestern models of architecture prevail. Even though there are~tilncreaLSirig
number of women practising architecture in Western•n<asInterior of Guggenheim Museum, New York, byFrank Lloyd WrightSource: Architecture Department, University of Sydney

124

The Built Environment

countries, their professional education and training means that· t~,work of women architects is not qualitatively different from that ~:male architects. That women architects have traditionallyassumed to be bestsuitedforthe design of domestic architecture:••~;
intetiors reflects their low status in the profession rather t~ft~
specifically female attribute. It is to do with the hierarchical rel ·"""•
ship between what is considered to be great 'architecture' of the p .
realm as opposed to the mere 'building• of houses.
. ..··•···••····•··••······On closer inspection several of Kennedy's characteristics ofdesign are features of architecture operating.within the constr~i~·by collllllercial imperatives. Women architects working under•···•···•
same market pressures tend to design like men. To sec central
office towers solely as the product ofmasculinist, phallocentric ..•..
•.. ...·..·
values is to present a very partial picture which ignores investwii
cal¢ulations, capital flows, global property markets and the Pri:V:'.itt\
ownership of land. The appearance of high-rise .office buildm~f
explained as much by economic ··processes which lead toaccumulated capital being invested in the central business district~
Mar~o Huxley (1988, p. 41) points out, these investments depemJJ~,'political actions to·retain the primacy of the central city and on:itb~
petyepUons of (male) co~ate
directors of the prestige and .~it.if
tha.t.isreflected.intaking occupancy of.thelatest high-rise,.higbf~i
office tower'. ···.• · . .· · ·. · ...
·. . ·. ·.•.
. /I@I'\¥hilt: an a~ount in terms of capitalistinve~tment demonstra~~t~basis of high ..towers, we still n~d an explanation oti~~\cultur~Jorces at work which give towers an assochttion with~
and.
Pf:~ge. I would argue that th~ culturalassociatjpn ~et~een~ii1
ri~ tow~s and male power is not only or pri~ly
at>oµtp~rsicalisbape ..but is .·also.because they represent·t}te triuui~IJ.{jfa<Wancedtechn<>logy.Perhaps this is why the radical fe~inist{~j~;..
.....forlow"'.rise'human scale' development presents a credib~':jfferen...ce
1.lllder:+adi.culated
alternative.
·· ·····.·· · .. < . }•,,tr'b~
Jisl(sinherent in the formulation of a specifically .femj~i~
arclpt~uf~ fie.in the temptation to reiard women·as a houic,~e#ni
gtoµp(~Matrix•·(1984)·emphasizes,. there is.atenclency.to S~ll~
reflectithe approach of white; middle-class womeninthe .professig~
Women~sexperience is very diverse, especially in terms .of class.
is one of the interesting.issuesthat is raised in Dolores ijayden's (l~~}cextensive research on nineteenth-century American feminist plansfor utopian communities. Alternative approaches to individualizeq
housework in single-family homes were proposed by an earlier
women's movement. This 'lost feminist tradition' identified thematerial··

The Built Environment

125~onomic exploitation of women's labour by men as the most basic}~use of women's inequality. The central object of their campaigningiWa&
to socialize household labour and childcare. Most significantly,•~•.sought to do this by a complete transformation of the spatial':fitmand material culture of American homes, neighbourhoods and~J'ies;Recognizingthat the exploitation of women's labour by men
1embodied inthe actual design of houses, these 'material feminists'~i~lieved that changing.the entire physical framework of houses andiijtishbouthoods was the only way to free women from domestic
Jiudgery" They therefore urged architects and urban planners to~r~pJoreradically new types of residential building.9~l~ill'wooftbe.more influential women were Melusina Fay Pierce andli~lotte Perkins Oilman. In 1868 Melusina Fay Pierce, a middle)~s Massachusetts woman, outlined plans for cooperative residential;j.eighbourhoods•made up;.of kitchenless houses and a cooperative\jilusekeeping centre. She sugjited that women organize to perform~~ir household tasks cooperatively,. building communal kitchens,[iJa~ndries,dining facilities and childcare centres as necessary. Freed)(tfdmthe domestic routine, they would then be able to develop otherl}jiterestsoutside the home. Writing in 1898, the economist Charlotte
Ee:tkins Gilman recommended kitchenless houses of a similar sort,~ggesting that they be linked in.urban rows or connected by covered
i:WJllkways
in a suburban block. Like Pierce, Gilman favoured thei~nstruction of kitchenless apartments with collectivedining facilities
women with families. For Gilman however, the socialization of;!d.~mesticwork, rather than cooperation in its execution, was thefmeans to economic independence for women. She envisaged a com~pletely professionalized system of housekeeping which would free'~pmen from the ties of cooking, cleaning and childcare.
/ Ultimately this domestic reform movement foundered on the diffii~lty of overcoming both sex and class divisions in their urban and~~burban communities. The problem of domestic service versust.~mestic cooperation could not be resolved. Many cooperative house~eeping societies accepted hierarchical organizational structures
winch put educated, middle-class managers at the top and paid.qishwashers and laundry workers rather poorly. 'Feminists with~ital who could afford the new physical environment for collective~jpmestic work never thought of voluntarily sharing that domestic
twork themselves' (Hayden, 1982, p. 201). Thus, the liberation of
professional middle-class feminists from domestic drudgery involved
exploiting .women of a lower economic class. The failure of this·experiment in architectural solutions to the problem of women's

?tor

126

The Built Environment

domestic oppression is instructive. It demonstrates the impossiof divorcing gender from class and other relations of inequalit ..
also demonstrates that new, egalitarian architectural forms ca.ml~i5
simply be superimposed on a preexisting social order and be tra!\~iformative in themselves.
··

Automobiles:

Technology in Motion

So far I have discussed the gender dimensions of housing design ;~urban layout. However, any discussion of the physical built envirq~~
ment is incomplete without discussing the transport technology thi~binds these spaces together. In particular the automobile is now a.P:ti~j\eminent feature of the urban environment.
··
The invention and mass production of the car has greatly influe .....
the shape of the modem city. One has only to think of cities like L9i~
Angeles and new planned towns like Milton Keynes, to be remind~i\of this. From the beginning of the modern movement in architecture~:~architects like Le Corbusier and Frank Lloyd Wright saw cars •iii
integral to the design of the city. In this section I will argue that tb!~transport system, and in particular the dominance of the car, restri~/jwomen's mobility and exacerbates women's confinement to the hon1~I%3:
and the immediate locality. Women's and men's daily lives trace verj~I
different patterns of time, space and movement, and the modern cityf;:
is predicated on a mode of transport that reflects and is organ· "around men's interests, activities and desires, to the detrimenti';~
women.
The manufacture of automobiles is the largest industry in the wod~Hi:
economy. It is dominated by a handful of American, Japanese an~lEuropean companies that control 80 per cent of global production. "In 1987, a record 126,000 cars rolled off assembly lines each working J
day. and close to 400 million vehicles are currently on the world'•
streets. 10 The automobile and its infrastructure dominate most Nortl;t)American and Australian cities in the literal sense that vast tracts oft
land are required to accommodate them. Not only for the motorways~ cbut also for roundabouts, bridges. service stations, and parking '!~spaces - at home, work, the supermarket and everywhere that people<
are supposed to congregate. Small wonder that in American cities, Cf
close to half of all urban space is dedicated to the automobile; in Los
Angeles, the figure reaches two-thirds.
···
For the individual, the mobility and convenience that the private
car bestows are unparalleled by any other means of transportation.

!

The Built Environment

127

il;lowever. what appears to be an ideal solution to individual needs isfm,creasinglyillusory as more and more people choose, or are forced:;>ke, similar decisions. In terms of individual mobility, the utility
e motor vehicle is diminishing as the number of cars on the roadates. The prosperous 1950s and early 1960s were characterized.. ooming car ownership and, at least in the US and Australia, the!~::was expected to be the future of urban transport. The land use[@I~transport planning procedures which emerged in the mid 1950s~pded from the outset to be strongly associated with planning for···· s and cars and pioneered the building of elaborate highway and....... ay systems. However it transpired that freeways themselves;jpawned more and more traffic, becoming badly congested very soon
liftertheir completion. The obvious response to traffic congestion was~:build more roads which were justified on technical grounds in terms\~ time, fuel and other. perceived saving to the community from't~iminating the congestion. ~'.:'ffllis
sets in motion a vicious circle or selffjulfilling prophecy of congestion, road building, sprawl, congestion?:~d more road building.' (Newman, 1988, p. 15)i\ The net result is that London rush-hour traffic averages about 7
miles per hour; in Tokyo cars average 12 miles and in Paris 17. By~omparison the average daily travel speed of 33 miles per hour inSouthern California, where there are probably more miles of freeways~an anywhere else in the world, may seem impressive. However as,~result of a much lower population density than European cities, theiJdvantage of speed is off set by the much longer distances required to
Ftravel to work. The irony is that a horse and buggy could cross'downtown Los Angeles almost as fast in 1900 as an automobile can:make this trip at 5pm today.
<~ptorway Madness>There is nothing inevitable about this rise and rise of the road. The<statehas played a major role in decisions about the extent to whichtransport investment is in roads as opposed to public transport. Again,by.comparison with Europe, American and Australian cities arecharacterized by a much heavier dependence on cars. Average
Australian cities have four times, and US cities three times, more road
~upply per person than average European cities (Newman, 1988, p; 6).
The politics of transport is dominated by conflict between road ~Iirail lobbies, and technical discussions about efficient tran~~\systems mask huge financial interests involved. The full extent of~~t~
subsidies to road transport are rarely exposed or documented. · ·expensive maintenance of motorways so heavily used by private•

128

The Built Environment

haulage companies is a case in point. The hidden subsidy to co~
car users via tax concessions and road maintenance is aflother ··Greater London Council study in 1986 found that the effgi
government contribution to company car users in London .···.·.
exceeded the revenue subsidy to London's public transport.
t;fjj
So far the story _ofthe triumph of the car over other forms oftr~Ji~
port technology may seem like another version of 'the paths notta~fiargument, where people actively chose one type of technology in~~ference to others. However, in many cities that we now associatec,wj:~
the car, other forms of transport were not so long ago both pre· ·and extensively used. Contrary to popular impressions, Los
is a sprawling metropolis not because of the automobile, but
beca1.1seit was built around the radial spurs of the electric ·ri.Q;tsystem. It is almost forgotten today that in the United States ·used to be a network of efficient and well-functioningurbanandi ·•···.•·....
urban rail systems in nearly every metropolitan area. By 1917, thji!
were nearly .45,000miles of trolley tracks which attracted biUiq~,~jI\
passengers. This transport system was not replaced by the mo~I~)
simply because of consumer choice. Rather. commercial inteire~ljrj
joined forces at a key moment to close off all other options and ens'lf:j~)that.· henceforth investment. would be channelled ·into automo~l!
}f~technology.
Beginning in the early 1930s, General Motors and other automob~J
tyre and oil interests, formed a holding company called National Gi~f
Lines, whose sole objective was to purchase electric rail systeliili
aro1.1nd.thecountry and convert them·tobuses, which were manuf~Ii
tured and fuelled by members of the holding company. They acquir~;}lmore than 100 rail systems in 45 cities, dismantled the electric lin£:i}and. paved over the tracks. By the late fifties, about 90 per cent of~trolley network had been eliminated. The ultimate objective of.ti®\
operation was to divert patrons of the earlier rail systems to Genet~~
Motors cars. According to Snell. the reasons for this were clear: to1,1~';
sub;way car or electric rail car can take the place of from 50 to 10(};
automobiles'. 11 In 1949 General Motors, Standard Oil of Californi~lland Firestone Tyres were found guilty of anti-trust conspiracy, b:ufJ
the damage had been done. By then, the political and economic pow:ei}of the road lobby had succeeded in making American cities complet~ly}
dependent upon the automobile. If there is a single force responsibltI
for preventing the development of a diversified, balanced and}ecologically-sound system of mass transportation, which was well;within the bounds of the technologically feasible, it is the automotive(
and petroleum industries.
···

TIMI Built Environment

,,

129

ain interests have conspired to make the motor car rule, theof certain social groups have been sacrificed to this end .
... assumption of car ownership discriminates against the poor and···'\V'Orking
class in general, and women constitute a disproportionate
ber of those affected. Older women and single mothers are among
poorest groups in society and have been literally left stranded in,
ffrbo.utside of, cities designed around the motor car. Although the~-.m;~mobiledid not create suburbia, it certainly expanded and accele·>·
this process. The promotion of mass motor-car ownership has..ed to exacerbate a greater dispersal of residential settlement often.out.any other mode of transport provided to service such areas.
ese developments in transport policy have affected women anddifferently . 12 Research, • automobile use in Britain, North... dca and Australia indicates.that proportionately more men than~~iimen have obtained drivers' licences, and that male car owners andifiivers far outnumber female. Furthermore, while most women reside~IJil(car-owning households, evidence shows that women have conlI~erably ·less access to the 'family car'. As a consequence of this,[f~,men are much more reliantJhan.men on public transport to meet!'.:ffieirtravel requirements.
ffjij J)espite women's low mobility, their travel needs are expanding as[~t-t)increasingnumber of married women are entering the paid labourI~(prceand as the location of health care, educational resources and~t,§:JJQpping
facilities become more dispersed. Changes in patterns of~i~nsumption and service provision have increased the importance of~~a,nsport access for women. For example, with the advent of the car,······-delivery services and corner stores gradually disappeared to be. . laced by car-oriented supermarket complexes resulting in aIl•ficantincrease in the proportion of time women spend on con;1;:.wnptionactivities. Even women who are not engaged in paid woi;k1tmust make frequent journeys to service the domestic needs .of the1~iliousehold.
·;~ <Although women are its primary users, in many ways public ti?~portis not suitable for their needs and seems tailored to men'$.~ny:~mence. Recent work by geographers has drawn attention to<~ ~!¥.
1,..Jhe •time.space maps' of the daily, weekly and overl\lllif~~tll~~'1dividuals in their interactions with one another act as~onstf:llin.,~a.lluman activity. It has pointed to the major discrepanc~ lletw~~
i within social communities in terms of fetters. on.,JDOl>jliiJ);~,

<

f

130

The Built Environment

communication. By emphasizing the critical connection betw~jwomen's domestic roles and considerations of time and space; thiAtime-geographic perspective adds a further dimension to our anal~~of women•s inequality. It has shown that the travel patterns ofthe-~~sexes are quite different and that, in response to domestic res···.·bilities, women elect to restrict the time spent on the journey. .... .
Given that family location is traditionally determined by its sp•jrelationship to the man's employment, women's opportunit•~>particularly restricted.
This is best illustrated by tracing the day-to-day activities of.~a single parent. 'Jane cannot leave home for work before a ..·.... .
hour of the day because of her child's dependence on her .for f~j
and other needs, and because the sole accessible nursery is
open. Jane has no car and hence is faced with severe capab·
coupling constraints in reaching the two 'stations' of the nut....•....
her place of work. Her choice of jobs is restricted by these co
and reciprocally the fact that she bas little chance of acquiringll'.i
holding down a well-paid occupation reinforces the other constrall'l!ijl!
she faces in the trajectory of her path thtougb the day. She ha$?ti~collect her child in mid-afternoon, before the nursery closes, and~':thus effectively restricted .to part-time employment ..Suppose shell~~a choice of two jobs, one better-paid and offering the cehancetort;t~~a car, making it possible for her to take her child to a nurseryfurtl:J~i'/away from her home. On taking the more remunerative job,>shethat the time expended in driving to the nursery, to and from .w .
and then back home again does not allow her time to do othernecei~fsary tasks, such ·as shoppiqg,· cooking and housework. She nt~~;/therefore feel herself 'forced' to leave the job for a low-paid, part-tifri~I
alternative nearer to home.'13
N , '.
This exposition of a mother's day emphasizes the role played b:1Jtransport facilities in constraining wonten•s access to employmen.1:fJ
services and social life. In particular, whether women are emplo~%~part~time, full~time or at all is to a significant extent contingent o~(:these spatial relations. Firstly, an increasing number of women worltJ
part-time and therefore travel more in off-peak periods when service$(
are more erratic. Yet public transport is still overwhelminglydesigned:/!
around the needs of full-time workers commuting to the central'.}business district. Secondly~ as Jane's story demonstrates, womeiif
journeys have been shown to be more complex or multi--purposethaq i
men's as a result of their roles as mothers, unpaid domestic worker~ ;and paid workers. This means that they do many more journeys of>shorter duration than men and thesejourneys are across the city. Even ··.

n:QtR~

nI

The Built Environment131

the journey can be accomplished by public transport it requires aher of changes and is therefore very time consuming andnsive. This is a major reason why the job. market for women ish more geographically restricted than that for men.
thermore, more women tharimenttavel with grocery bags, baby
and dependants. Waiting at bus stops,· climbing up andtfpwnbus steps or worse still underground stairs is a nightmare for·· ne who isn't young, able bodied and unencumbered (see figure• The dominance ofthe·car has also made.the city an alienating\::~~ironment for women and pedestrians. To get under motorways
divide cities requires pa~sins.tlJ:roughoften dark, dingy under~@'qundpassages where again.there are often many steps to negotiate.
;t~r:ban motonvays. and .rural trunk roads cut through women's lives,
jtjpving a noisy, polluting. dangerous wedge between their homes andil~rkplaces, schools.ancl~~\~fentres, causing them to walk round?itit>ut
routes; throu~h hostiltf:s~ays or over. windy bridges, divert[~ and len~henin:g bus journeys, a.pd creating JJ11Saf
e, no-go areas
iw;blank ~ails and.<:tereli~tspaces' (Women andTransport Forum,· ····· , p. 121). Women are more vulnerableto sexual harassment and...··.·.·• violencewhileusin~or waiting fotpublic transport. The Greater)'~don Council's<(l98S):su.~eyonwolllenand transport discovered
l1i~tnearl}'.a third of WOJllenin~nd9nnever go out alone after dark,('andfor Asi!t1t~p.1~11t~efig11,,-efs
40per cent. Of those who do traveli1fnight, blackartdetilnic:>mintuitywomen feel less safe than do white![w;omenas theyhave the additional fear of racist attack. As public~i~~P91't
1,ecomesmore ~lltomated, there are fewer staff on trains,and.<platfonns so women feel even more at risk. Interestingly*ffi.i,n:i:os{car-dolllinatedcities arethe most dangerous. Detroit has oneii;~ebigllestpe(
capitan,turderra1:esof any city in the West. In cities
thesf!:Carsare used as tllUChfor protection as for transportation.
~!mfnave-b~11eJllphasizil'lgJheVvayin which the organization of the~J)(Jlt-tat{9#system compouoos won1en'sinequality, virtually Iock~~themintoaw~rld
of.V(;\rylimited physical space, and exacerbates
unequatallocation of resourcefwithin the city. Perhaps the mostiU~~ation. of .the way reliance on public transport can
ftiitriciAle
certain groups to public amenities comes fromin.article>called "Do Artifacts Have··Politics?' by Langdon Winner
ift980). Winner tells us that anyone who has travelled the highways
ot':America and has become used to the normal•height of overpasses
JDaywell find something a little odd about some of the bridges overi~ parkways on Long Island, New York. Many of the overpasses are~raordinarily low, having as little as nine feet of clearance at the

rt~s

~JIJ

f~

•.

a~ess-0f

132

The Built En•ironmer,I.. ' .,

5.3 Urban planners i!lllore the nteds of !ht least mobile

Soum,: Production s.tWsfrom the film Serious UtuJertaking,11982)dir<Cli>dby He~ Grace. PholO(Uaph,liy S..ndy l,,'dw,ml.s· · ·{

The Built Environment

133

curb. Even those who notice this would not be inclined to attach any
special·meaning to it - we seldom give things like roads and bridges
any consideration.
•
In fact, the. two. hundred low-hanging overpasses on Long Island:weredeliberately designed to achieve a particular social goal. Robert~s.
the master builder of roads, parks, bridges and other public
worksfrom the 1920sto the 1970s in New York, had these overpasses'puilt to specifications that would discourage the presence of buses on!gs parkways; The reasons .reflect Moses's class bias and racial prejudice. Affluent whites would be free to use their cars on the parkways
f:qrrecreation and commuting. Poor people and blacks, who nonnallyused public transport, were kept off the roads because the twelve-footbigb buses could not get through the overpasses. One consequence was
Jolimit access of racial minorities and low-income groups to Jones{Beach, Moses's acclaimed public park. Although Winner does not·m.ention women, wo111en~s:8ependence
on public transport means that~ese physical arrangements also have a gender dimension.
) This story illustrates that, far from being neutral, even seemingly
innocuous technological forms such as roads and bridges embody andreinforce power relations. What is so significant about these vast techDI1logicalprojects is that they endure, such that for generations afterMoses has gone, the highw~ys and bridges he built to favour the useof the automobile over the development of mass transit continue to>giveNew York much of .its present form. 'Many of his monumental
F~tructures of concrete and steel embody a systematic social inequality.
<#way of engineering relationships among people that, after a time,?becomes just another part of the landscape' (Winner, 1980, p. 124).
\'fhe Car Culture,lustas. bridges may not be as innocent of political qualities as they
"1iiYappear. sotoo cars have been shaped by a plethora of social and.:tconomicfaetors. Above I stressed that the dominance of the car was~t simply about the efficient movement of people around cities but~as ensured by economic forces. Means of travelling - whether by.)c#ar~motorcycle or·bicycle .- are also consumer products charged with)/symbolic as well as economic and pragmatic meaning. The car is one·qfthe central cultural commodities of the twentieth century: precisely
because it is such a mass, commonplace technology, we often fail toappreciate its ideological significance. It is not simply technical efficiency that determines the design of cars but cultural forces that shape
them.

134

The Built Environment

Car manufacturers consciously design and style the appearance>Of
their products to express consumer dreams, desires and aspiration~;
In turn, consumers purchase, along with their car, an image ang{~social identity. Cars are infused with powerful visual messages a~i.#J
the·.age, sex, race, social class and lifestyle of the user. Cars ar,i~~major feature of conspicuous consumption for men and have a centi:j\place in male f.!ulture. The masculine fantasies they represent t~ij:
differentforms, as can be seen bythe contrasting designs of smootJl:;:
aerodynamic-style sports cars and the rugged, four-wheel-drive 'r•Jrovers'. These have in common their symbolization of individi~t
freedom and self-realization. Countless novels, films, popular son~and advertisements romanticize flight in a car and link cruising
the road withliberation. For men, cars afford a means of escapeft4m!i:domestic responsibilities, from family commitment, into a realm c0fY•
private fantasy, autonomy and control.
......
·..·.·•··•.•••••
Even more markedly than the car, the motorcycle is a symbolt¢'}
object that represents physical toughness, virility, excitement, speed.It
danger and skill. Their conspicuous bodywork and mecharii~t
resonate withtheir original military use, and speak of aggression an(f)virility. Along with leather jackets, riders wear grease-stained jean~dto express their technical competence. The experience of riding a bik~ }encapsulates the outdoor, roving life of the wanderer with no ties;.:It;';also symbolizes a form of man's.mastery of the machine; a powerfu1;imonster between•his legs which he must· tame. ·Trucks similarly ate\
the giant iron horses of independent men who refer to themselves'cowboys' and boast of sexual encounters on the road. It is no accid~n,tc~ithat cars, trucks and motorcycles are· usually personified as fem~land given women's names. They are after all the place where men f;:et{';most sexual, the vehicle for men's pursuit of sexual adventuJ;j.,<}iincluding their use of street prostitutes. In advertising their products~ itmanufacturers associate these products with women's bodies a,ndwiltt.Wt
animals. Nubile women are draped over cars in advertisements. Me~ t
are the possessors and women the possessed. 'Manufacturers encour~
age the male user to perceive his machine as a tempera.mental worn~~ S
who needs to be regularly maintained and pampered for highperfor-,/mance.' (Chambers, 1983, p. 308). Cars have long been a metapbo1:
for sex and something wild in the already tamed urban environment!
In recent years this imagery has become overlaid with new associationsof the latest high tech computerization, bringing to the fore men's
fascination with the power of technology - a theme further exploredin the next chapter.

al()ifa~/

The Built Environment 135

For all that I have been stressing that the car is a fetishized object
for men, this is not the whole story nor the full extent of the gender
felations embodied in the car. The design of t.he'family car' reflects~sumptions about the typical size of unit in whicll people wish to
ft'1!1Velaround. Furthermore, many cars are speciflcally(lesignedwith;f¢ntale drivers in mind. This is particularly explicitln tile small
Jiat:chback car for 'running around town' and shoppjn~. This .is~urned to be the familts second car for the wife an~mgtherte>meetl:touseholdneeds. The powerful large car is destined for~l:tentajehead
9f:the household, although increasinglyprofessionalw9111enarebeing~tgeted by manufacturers and advertisers as purcb~l'~;ixi thei,::QWn
fast andright. Given the opportunity, women too enjoy:~gglamorous cars. However, for most women cars ate ·· ·ca.111~. sity to which they aspire for relief from drudgery•a
efrom
Jhe
home. They are also a Je~tively safe means
violence and harassmerifto \VUichwomen are su
blic
tf&nsport. And despite the prevalence of jokes abp
in fact they are if anything more competent th~
likely to cause car accidents. Indeed the particular•.g:p-offers women sets up a tension for.constitutes a major environmental hazarc:t•.f9r w~i iti . .·.
i;he short term, demanding 'equal access! to.the;~~ij~i~tant assertion of their right to independence, m0:~mi,.~Pi~igtl
safety.

ofeco-fem~•~il

i~this chapter I have been concerned to estaillis~,:11•~ij'.$

between the built environment and patriarchy. lb~,-~iji:)j~fthe modern house and the organizationof>d()Ut~~~~,_.t~
Ux~
gje?~
reflects cultural assumptions about fantjly r:etQ.ti~~s~f
women's .pla<;eand women's place bein,gJpt):jeli9m,~(···· · · ···.•.·...·········
are not only physically built into houses, gu'.{j11tijf..
structure. The modern city is, furtherijQte;l/ci~~j-!~mode of transport that reflects and is org~aj.~J,m~~sfiitij-~~fthe detriment of women. Once we recqgnize>~ll~-e~~i~the design and production of the builtenv.itt.~ij9t,~.
longer seen as fixed, we can begin tomakes.~~f~\
...
<

<F

NOTES
l

According to W. and D. Andrews (1974, p.ll(itt~tj~~f~~~'made possible the literal centralization ofth~

136

2

3
4
5

6
7
8

9

10

11

12

The Built Environment

the house; technology, in short, placed the woman in the midst ofand not removed from them'.
For details of the Tudor Walters Report, see J. Burnett
pp. 218-221).
.
This quotation is taken from an excellent article by G. All~
Crow (1990). Fqr an account of the Women's Housing Sub-Co ·see B. McFarlane (1984) and A. Ravetz (1989).
Wright (1981, p. 256) notes that in the USA only 9 per cent of s11~
women worked in 1950 compared with 27 per cent of the
population.
To all intents and purposes of course the television is now the focal ·of most living rooms, but it has not displaced the hearth, often;
installed adjacent to the fireplace.
See D. Harvey (1989) and E. Soja (1989). One of the few articl
does attempt to draw out the implications of these changes foris E. Harman (1983}.
See A. Coleman (1985). For the classic critique, which is parti<;
interesting for its discussion of the consequences for bringiijj: ~!
children, see J. Jacobs (1962).
<ziti
Indeed, some of these architectural principles have even gained f P.tiI
approval! See The Prince of Wales (1989).
. f,;jj
In England too there was much enthusiasm for cooperative hon~{keeping among the more socialist-inclined members of the Garden Qijj'~
Movement. Ebenezer Howard organized extensive experiments?iijl
cooperative housekeeping, building quadrangles of kitchenless units~
the Garden Cities of Letchworth and Welwyn. According to Ravd
however, the demise of domestic service was an important factor. 'Itw~perhaps this strong male interest in getting the housework done witi'
minimum inconvenience to themselves that, more than any feminis~
inspiration, explains the interest of certain men or the garden city mov~-?
···
ment in collective housekeeping.' (Ravetz, 1989, p. 192).
The source of information for this paragraph is M. Renner (1988) ~4
the New InternationalistNo. 195, May 1989, issue on 'Car Chaos'. ··The elimination of the interurban rail systems is documented in detail ·by B. Snell, 'Report on American Ground Transport', Subcommitteeoll
Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate Judiciary Committee, 26 February
1~4.
.
The study of women and transportation is quite new and some interesting
themes are emerging. See M. Cichocki (1980) and S. Fava (1980);
L. Pickup (1988); Women and Transport Forum (1988) and V. Scharff(1988).

13 This summary of R. Palm and A. Pred (1978) is taken from A. Giddens(1984, pp. 114-15). In the original article, the authors make the impor-tant point that the daily prisms of women in various stages of the lifecycle and in various social classes are different.

hnology as Masculine· lturene JmK between technology and masculinity is commonly supposed
self-evident and in no need of explanation. But as this chapter
show, the relationship, although strong, is more complex thanat first appear.
f .have already argued that th~ traditional conception of technology~~~heavilyweighted against wom'en. We tend to think about technology.i~terms of industrial machinery and cars, for example, ignoring other1}f.hnologies that affect most aspects of everyday life. The very definiof technology, in other words, has a male bias. This emphasis}~ technologies dominated by men conspires in turn to diminish the!!significance of women's technologies, such as horticulture, cooking
arid childcare, and so reproduces the stereotype of women as techno[}ogically ignorant and incapable. The enduring force of the identifi ..
~ion between technology and manliness, therefore, is not inherce~t}m biological sex difference. It is rather the result of the historicaj,fA~
I{i)!:cultural construction of gender.
This chapter will examine the ideological and cultural pr~!~>Serve to make 'natural', and thereby help to generate,· connection between men and machines. That our pr~~·· · ·culture expresses and consolidates relations among· ·tant factor in explaining the continuing exclusion of.
as a result of these social practices, women may atmeanings and values to technology. To emphasize;•~!
ways in which the symbolic representation· of teclm
gendered is not to deny that real differences do exist
and men in relation to technology. Nor is itto iQl .
technologically skilled or knowledgeable. .
·it is the ideology of masculinity that has t~ ,mtechnology.
In order to understand the underlying n~llS\
and technology, I will now consider several.,this identification, and where technologyds~,

t~n

w.

··

138 Technology as Masculine Culture

activity in question. The chapter also examines women's relatio
to masculine cultural worlds.

Men and Machines
Giving Birth to the Bomb: Virility and the Technology ol
Destruction.b~iiContemporary feminist peace initiatives, like their forebears,
focused attention on the relationship between masculinity and.~~Jl
Warfare is traditionally a male preserve and the connection bet~.Qi)
physical violence and men in both the public and private spheresiJfi
strong. So strong in fact that much feminist writing assumes that ~iDin the same way as rape. is the result of men's inherently aggr~'i!
nature. The weaponry of war is seen as intrinsically masculine so.
cruise missiles have become a symbol of male power, thephall~.
is a paradigm of masculine practices because its pre-eminent valual'i~lof violence and destruction resonates throughout other male relati:~tships: relationships to other cultures, to the environment and, p~~~;,
larly, to women. Thus the threatened destruction of world civilizw;lqtii
by nuclear arms is seen as the culmination of male developed
controlled science and technology. Many feminists have trace<l t~·
source of the male fascination with weapons and war to biology ~1
psychology, arguing that men need a.substitute.for the babiest~
cannot conceive. 1 Ironically, the most comprehensive account ofd
fundamentally radical feminist position is by a man, Brian Easlea/~if
his Fathering the Unthinkable (1983).
%}
Drawing on tJJe feminist analysis of the development of science~(
a form of domination of both nature and women, Easlea explainsth~
creation of nuclear weapons. in terms of the masculinity of. scienc~
He argues that 'the nuclear arms race is in large part underwri\t~by masculine behaviour in the pursuit. and application of. scienti~
inquiry' (p. 5). The book details the story of the discovery of radio..;activity and the development of the atomic bomb and vividly describes
the excitement and intense competitiveness of the prominent scientists
who were involved. Easlea's purpose is to critique the kind of 'tech.ill":cal rationality' that dictated the making of the atomic bomb, reflecteif
so clearly in J. Robert Oppenheimer's statement that 'when you
something that is technically sweet you go ahead and do it and you
argue about what to do about it only after you have had your technic~
success' (p. 129).
What is striking is not only the compulsive nature of the work done~I

Technology os Masculine Culture

139

1I,1thisgroup of men but the·overriding pleasure and sheer joy they~~encedin achieving technological perfection. 'Nobody worked'filf~than 15, 16, 17 hours a day. There was nething else in your life
l:;.pqfthis passion to .getit done' (p. 84). They saw themselves as pioneersli(tthefrontiers of what was only just possible, on a 'fantastic adven'ftqre' to being the first to release the awesome power locked in the!Ii:m:Ieus.The Los Alamos physicists•·reaction to the dropping of thejrJ,Qmb•onHiros.hima makes particularly chilling reading. Prominent····· tists recalled the exultation, celebration and pride they felt in the·veness of the weapon, how Oppenheimer was cheered by thee staff oL the laboratory like a 'prize fighter', and how they
yed 'a hastily arranged champagne dinner'. 'The only reaction I
ber,' Richard Feynman recalls, '. . . was a very considerable!:~Won and excitement. . . . I was involved in this happy thing,·~inking and drunk, sitting on the bonnet of a jeep and playing drums,
i~itement running all over Los,itlamosat the same time as the people:wete dying and struggling in Hiroshima' (Easlea, 1981, p. 112). The
principal reason for the establishment of the Manhattan Project wasf;~feat that Nazi Germany would develop atomic weapons. Easlea
i'1akes much of the fact that work on the atomic bomb actually
httensifiedafter Nazi Germany had surrendered to the Allied armies.
Eor Easlea, this behaviour can be accounted for in terms of these!niitle scientists substituting for their lack of feminine procreative
fpewer,that is, 'womb envy'. Men 'give birth' to science and weaponslo compensate for their lack of the 'magical power' of giving birth topabies. He argues that this is demonstrated by their pervasive use ofiJggressive sexual and birth metaphors to describe their work, such)thatthe first uranium· bomb, which was.dropped on Hiroshima, wasµamed 'Little Boy'. This imagery signifies unconscious male motivations. 'phallic psychology•, which makes such technical inventions
p.ossible. Men are obsessed with gaining power and glory and he:approvingly quotes Simone de Beauvoir's view that male accomplishµients in the field of science and technology serve to bestow a virile
Slatus on the respective male achievers and thereby underwrite a claim
to·.masculinity.
.Unfortunately Easlea's account is strongly suggestive rather thananalytical. As Adam Farrar (1985, p. 61) comments, these birth and.rape metaphors 'only show.that the means of representing significant
practices in a male dominated culture are constructed in terms which
are significant to men. They don't show that the practices sol!epresentedare necessarily masculine'. Although thought-provoking,Easlea's examination of the arresting metaphors used by scientists

1.40 Technology as Masculine Culture

when describing their experiences of doing creative work does not •• i::itself, constitute grounds for arguing that male creativity is inhere~~·
about rape and violence. Individual motivations cannot be .r ·••.••
directly from the rhetoric of science any more than the inven ..·.....
the b<>mb can simply be explained in terms of the psycbo ..sex~~!
anxieties of its partkular male inventors.
'.) !I
Sexual imagery has always been part of the world of warfare ~ijt;
both the military itself and arms manufa<:turers are constantly ex.pl~ing the phallic imagery and promise of sexual domination that tfuljt•
weapons so conveniently suggest. This imagery however does Jtil
originate in particular individuals but in a broader cultural contEaslea's analysis misses the social processes that give rise to thisof masculinity and validate such scientific and technological pro'in the.first place. AsLudi Jordanova (1987. p.1S6) comments;
interesting questions are how and why creativity of all kinds has
defined in a gender-specific way. and what implications this has
power relations•. That the technological enterprise has develo
a distinctly masculine realm may be largely a reflection of the m~;domination of all powerful public institutions, rather than somethiij-.
specific to the male spirit.
The language used by defence intellectuals when discussing nu~
strategy is particularly revealing. Carol Cohn (1987) discoveredt~'
recently when she spent a year in the company of defence strate~#
Like Easlea she found the male world of nuclear planning suffu~;~with sexual and patriarchal imagery and sanitized abstracti()n; ;~language designed to talk exclusively about weapons and not a~'lhuman death. However, for her 'the interesting issue is not so m~J,i.;
the imagery's psychodynamic origins, as how it functions' (Co~{
1987, p. 695).She argues that this 'technostrategic' discourse serv~4~
reduce anxiety about nuclear war by providing a series of culturally.
grc>Undedand culturally acceptable mechanisms that distance the usi1(
from thinking of oneself as a victim, making it possible to think about
the unthinkable.
w

Language that is abstract, sanitized, full of euphemisms; language thatis sexy and fun to use; paradigms whose referent is weapons; imagery
that domesticates and deflates the forces of mass destruction; imagery
that·reverses sentient and nonsentient matter, that conflates birth anddeath. destruction and creation - all of these are part of what makes
it possible to be radically removed from the reality of what one is talking. about and from the realities one is creating through discourse.
(Cohn, 1987, p. 715)

Technology as Masculine Culture141

She correctly points out that it may be an illusion to assume that(tc;chnostrategic language literally articulates rather than hides the
1j~ualreasons for the development and deployment of nuclear
i1weapons. Rather than informing and shaping decisions, the discourse\.~ote often functions as a legitimation for political outcomes that have/)iQ1:eurred
for utterly different reasons. This language of patriarchal[~~IJl)hemisms
permeates many spheres of high technology.

fr>fheObsession with Control

In fact, there are many parallels between the ethos of the scientific•.~mmunity at Los Alamos and that of the computing fraternity. This)}~>stronglyreflected in Tracy Kidder's (1982) account of a group of);tuteninventing a new computer in The Soul of a New Machine. Hereragain we find the mixture of. professional competitive rivalry and[complete dedication in the engifl~rs• pursuit of the 'perfect computer'\and in doing so, winning the race. Again it is a world of men working
c9mpulsively into the small hours, enjoying being stretched to the>limitsof their capacity, where there is no space for or compromisewith life outside of work. It was 'the sexy job' to be a builder of newcomputers, and you had to be tough and fast; members of the group·often talked of doing things 'quick and dirty', and of 'wars', 'shoot:e,uts', 'hired guns', and people who 'shot from the hip'. Sexual meta.phors abound such that the excitement of working on the latest
computer was likened to 'somebody told those guys that they would
have seventy-two hours with the girl of their dreams'. It is surely no
coincidence that the protagonists of the story are almost exclusively
male.
·It is evident that men identify with technology and through theiridentification with technology men form bonds with one another.
Women rarely appear in these stories, except as wives at home providing the backdrop against which the men freely pursue their great
projects. This masculine workplace culture of passionate virtuosity is
typified by the hacker-style work so well described by Sherry Turkle(1984) in a chapter entitled 'Loving the Machine for Itself. Based on
ethnographic research at MIT, Turkle describes the world of computer hackers as the epitome of this male culture of 'mastery,individualism, nonsensuality'. 'Though hackers would deny that theirs
is a macho culture, the preoccupation with winning and of subjecting
oneself to increasingly violent tests make their world peculiarly malein spirit, peculiarly unfriendly to women: (1984, p. 216). Being in an
intimate relationship with the computer is also a substitute for, andl42Technology as Masculine Culture

refuge from, the much more uncertain and complex relationships{
characterize social life. According to Turkle, these young 111en ..
an intense need to master things; their addiction is not to cq
programming but to playing with the issue of control. It isi!a,exerting power and domination within the unambiguous··
ma,chinery.
Perhaps the ultimate illustration of.men pitting themselves
machines is the story of the Air Force test pilots who became th~:astronauts. What is absorbing about Tom Wolfe's account~
Right Stuff (l 980) is its focus on the psychology of the test pi·
flying aircraft higher and faster than they were designed·to bethese men were constantly testing the limits of the physica}ly po ..
pushing 'the outer edge of the envelope' until the limits of the{nology were reached and only having 'the right stuff' could ~J
man's life. This is the stuff that lets you function as a superb
when· you have pushed yourself beyond the edge of humannical possibility, the stuff that allows you to feel in control intions.that were set up in advance as.situations where control<
helost. And when they leftthe airfield these test pilots would
the outenedge in the male rituals of drinking and driving their ~ti
at.speeds almost out of control. The chances.of dying were astoµi'.~;ingly•high and yet these men actually were.delighted to take ons~~ ..
< • <•
odds and .prove their courage.
One of the interesting twists to the story is the contrast between~iJ
description of Chuck Yeager, who was the first man to fly throuii
the sound barrier and the trips .of the first astronauts. Whereas Yeagej
ranked foremost among the true brothers of the right stuff~\qI
astronaut was seen not as a pilot but a passive occupant of a rocket~
shown by the fact that the.first flight in a Mercury rocket was in fael:taken by a chimpanzee. Wolfe tells of an incident when the sev~,
astronauts insisted that a windowbe designed into the capsule·whicbi
they could open themselves. They even demanded manual controlsiC>.r
the rocket so that they would have control and function more likepilots. In this sense. the commQnly~drawn analogy between rockets
and missile and the phallus is somewhat inappropriate. For allthaf
the first astronauts were hailed as conquering heroes, according totheir own codes of masculinity they had actually become subordinaU}·
to elaborate computerized controls. and were denied the scope t<ldemonstrate their manliness. Real men fly planes. they don't just pushbuttons!

Technology as Masculine Culture

l 43

s of Masculinity.Dugh the above descriptions are all of relatively powerful groups
men developing or controlling key forms of technology, they
ly involve a wide variety of workplace cultures and practices.
ilffla.tthis points.to is the need to distinguish between different forms
iif:.lllasculinityin relation to different areas of technology. To say that· ··••·• over technology is a core element of masculinity is not to implyl;there is one masculinity or one technology. There are diverse
al expressions of masculinity just as there are diverse technos. Masculinity, like femininity, takes historically and culturallycific forms .. One need not presume that there is a single uniformI•haviour pattern in all men to argue that the culture of technology'masculine. These disparate versions of masculinity reflect class" •.·isions, as well as ethnic and generational differences.
~~;.j,,)Tite
study of the social construction of masculinity has become al~!AArongtheme in the sociology of gender. A major contributor in thisl~eai Bob Connell:(1985, 1987), distinguishes between the culturally~~(lominantforms of masculinity or 'hegemonic masculinity' and'!\~bordinated' or •marginalized' fOrms. By 'hegemonic' he means a~;~qcialascendancy achieved n<lt by force but by the organization of)private life and cultural processes. It is the dominant cultural ideal;}of masculinity, which need not· correspond closely with the actual},ersonalities of the vast majority of men. Although Connell uses thet~rin 'hegemonic masculinity• in the singular, I read him to ·suggest( thatthere is a core of dominant masculinity which is refleete(J .in\different variants. In contemporary Western society, begeinq.11jc'.,nasculinity is strongly associated with aggressivenessand theffl~i~t>for violence.
·· ·.. < (i i;
Of particular interest here is the extent to which .contr<Jl~.fft~·..'Pology is involved in this archetype of hegemonic •masc1•li~ffl'~·.cult .of masculinity which is based on physical. J()lfglliJ~t•·mechanical skills is particularly strong in the shop· · ····
working-class men. All the things that are ass<>ejat~.. labour and machinery - dirt, noise. danger ,i. ·•··.
·.masculine.qualities.2 Machine-related skills :and~~fundamental measures of masculine status ~·.·~·•·•·•·..
.·.·•.
···.
·
to this model of hegemonic masculinity~Bur~ ·••··••·•·•
the shop-floor is one form of the dominant,~.········
is not the only important one and in the.n~
to consider the ideologies and practices oflllili.-.-.....•,,_,..

>

'

144

Technology as Masculine Culture

are central to the techniques of violence and are almost entirelyi
hands of men.
Let us first return for a moment to the example of computerand look more closely at the way manliness is represented
might initially describe their form. of masculinity as the profized. calculative rationality of the technical specialist. What ·esting for O\Jr purposes is the way they mythologize·
activities in terms of the traditional 'warrior ethic' of hero1·c1
linity. The construction of the heroic is usually around mattetlli;~
combat and violence between men. In fact, these mainly white: · ···class men are nowhere near real physical danger yet they areon the culturally dominant form of masculinity for their n ·risk, danger and virility to describe their work. An apparent par:~!
emerges however when we look more closely at these descripti ··•·· '"·hackers. Seen through the eyes of Turkle or Weizenbaum.thes,.
technologists are pictured as unattractive and pathological:
young men of disheveled appearance. . . . Their rumpled eloffi~~!
their unwashed and unshaven faces, and their uncombed iu.i
testify that they are oblivious to their bodies and to the world in . . ;.
they move ..' (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 116) They are 'losers'and 'lo~tili
whoseimmersion in the world of machines has cut them offof~tother people, and they rely. on the hacker subculture for their :se~;~of identity.
2d;
The question that this poses is whether for these men techni
expertise is about the realization of power or their lack of it. 3
in different ways both things are true points to the complex relatio, ,;ship between ·knowledge, power and technology. An obsession \Vii13}5
technology may well be an attempt by men who are social failures.t~!
compensate for their lack of power. On the other hand, mastery
this technology does bestow some power on these men; in relation:<t~;other men and women who lack this expertise, in terms of the materiaJ.{
rewards this skill brings, and even in terms of their popular portra~
as 'heroes' at the frontiers of technological progress. By providing j}largely psychoanalytical account of hackers, Turkle's notion of failwe /is very individualistic and does not address the wider cultural context
within which backers operate. 4 In particular, there is little mentionof the extent to. which race, class, and age matter in what counts as
failure for men.
In our culture, to be in command of the very latest technology
signifies being involved in directing the future and so it is a highly
valued and mythologized activity. The mastery of other kinds oftechnology, such as that often found amongst working-,classlads who

Ib.g

ov~:S

Technology as Masculine Culture

145[,i'eadept with cars, does not convey the same status or agency .

..

ther in fact does hegemonic masculinity, which is more strongly>> sessed by working.class than ruling-clas~men. The exaggerated
linity found amongst working-class cultures must be viewed.stthe background of their relative deprivation, their low status. their comparative powerlessness in the broader society. The pointi&e is that although technical expertise is a key source of power!lnongst men, it does not override other sources of power, such as[lffisition in the class structure.
[!here is one final but crucial point to be made about theseuline cultures of technology. which is that the ideology of mascuty is remarkably flexible. 5 A good illustration of this point islliiovided by engineering. Of all the major professions, engineering
I~JJ,tains the smallest proportion of females and projects a heavily•asculine image hostile'to w,omen.6 Engineering is a particularlyliJa.ttiguingexample of an archelypically masculine culture because it
1!iitsacrossthe boundaries betweenphysicaland intellectual work andmaintains strong elements of mind/body dualism.
~fl Central to the social construction of the engineer is the polarity
3~tween science and sensuality, the hard and the soft, things and\people. This social construction draws on the wider system of symbols
land metaphors which .identif~. women with ·nature and men with
qllture. Sexual ideologies and stereotypes are diverse and fluid, but.such.opposites as 'male/female' and 'reason/emotion' are central toWestern culture. The notion that women are closer to nature than men
oontains various elements such as that women are more emotional,
less analytical and weaker than men. In the advanced industrial world,
where scientific and technical rationality are highly valued, these•associations play a powerful role in the ideological construction•of
women as inferior} Like Turkle, Sally Hacker (1981) found t~.
engineers attributed values in the social hierarchy on a conti1™•:i:.
giving most prestigeto scientific abstraction and technical com~*and least to feminine properties of nurturance, sensuality ·· ·····..........
•.··
body. Engineering seems to be the very epitome ofcooll' ·
antithesis of feeling. Yet, as Hacker (1989) remarkstandalready seen, 'technics can be exhilarating, a SOUice<pleasure, even arousal, at the core of innovation~~.i
Pleasuresof Engineering,Samuel Florman (lt?
and physical, as well as intellectual, pleasuresd
engineering.
Machines can clearly evoke powerful eiuotiO:
for men. One wonders if this is at least in part.

146

Technology as Masculine Culture

are referred to by the female pronoun! Similarly, the cou.tpl~.
values of hard/soft are also used to legitimate female exclusip
the world of engineering.s Masculinity is expressed bothiij
muscular physical strength and aggression, and in terms ofil
power. 'At one moment, in order to fortify their identifica:ti
physical engineering, men dismiss the intellectual worldas~.
the next moment, however, they need to appropriate>se
intellectual engineering work for masculinity too.' (Cockbu
p. 190)No matter how masculinity is defined according to t
adaptable ideology, it always constructs women as ill-suited:tological pursuits.
Combat, the Heroic and Masculinity

We have been considering examples of the sense of mast~>}>technology and its connection with masculinity. If there i~
institution in society that underwrites the ideology of heg~>/
masculinity, it is the military. Contemporary Western sociijl!
suffused with popular images of men as enthusiastic kil ·.•.·.•.·.··
Rambo-style fashions, war films, military toys and mag
Weapons and particularly guns are the epitome of masteryasa ..•.·.·.··of domination. Guns are intrinsically associated with deatb,Jg,~
danger. Here the sense of mastery is enhanced by the close
physical danger, it is seen as the pinnacle of manly daring. Thew·
ness of men to die - for their country, for their womenfolk, fotit
honour, is central to both military and manly values, War p
the ultimate test of manliness and is the legitimate expression ofviolence. In this sense, the armed forces represent and defend'
masculine ethic. Warrior values as expressed in armed combatD~;tcentral to military mythology, which in turn is imbued with ge•lideology.9 Both war and weaponry are seen as exclusively male'et>~jcerns. and the imagery surrounding them simultaneously portraii~
men as the brave warriors and women as the helpless wives-motb.~~idaughters, whose lives and honour the soldiers are fighting to prot~l
Ideas about femininity and the unsuitability of women for:,t~ei
military are almost universal. At the core of all arguments aga:i~;J
allowing women to perform combat roles are beliefs about ~iinferiority of the female body. Now that women are increasingly bepig;
recruited into the military, this search for sexual difference hasfcif
anything, intensified. 'Western armed forces now conduct official
studies of pregnancy, menstruation, and "upper body strength"inanpw•Technology os Masculine Culture147

desperate search for some fundamental. intrinsic (i.e. not open
~11if0litlciilldebate) difference between male and female soldiers.'
1983, p. 138) According to military logic, combat involves
and carrying heavy things and pulling oneself over formidable
In a mirror image of non-military workplace ideology,
ptions about women's physical weakness and higher absen..
are mobilized to exclude women from combat. As Cynthia
imfoe comments, the distinctions between 'combat' and 'non-combat',
1:jleifront•and the 'rear', which ultimately justify the military's sexual\ffivi~ionof labour, are increasingly difficult to sustain in the face of
fuijllern warfare.
It was never easy however. Enloe (1983, p. 123}provides a wonder~f:ulillustration of the delicate manoeuvres that have been performedit<>maintain a male definition of combat. During the Second World~ar several anti-aircraft batteries were set up in Britain comprising
Jnen and women. The idea was that women could operate the gunst.lruecontrol instruments and so 'free' male soldiers to actually fire the,gµns. Thus, in the new mixed artillery crews women.were assigned.tpi
ifi.recontrol, searchlight operations, targeting and hit confirmation/.
These artillery women were defined as 'non-combat' personnelw:hile
the men standing next to them, but assigned to firing the guns, wer~.
designated as 'combat' personnel!
The view that women are constitutionally predisposed towards
1

148 Technology as Masculine Culture

peace does not only feature in. anti-feminist arguments. \Y-~tancing themselves·from the ..ideology that defines womert~ically inferior to men, many feminists also see war a,nd soi·· •male and believe that women are naturally inclined to pacifis~f; .
noted at the beginning of this chapter that much feminist peace( :<conceives of war .and weaponry as the direct result of men~ >nature. Women, on.the other hand, are seen as nurturing, co~and non-violent. Their role as mothers is supposed to lead ·value growth and preservation, as against death and d ·.·.·.....
.
Some writers are influel}~ by CaroJ(iilligan's (1982) ·¥(~
women's cognitive and ~<>raldevelopment is distinctly differ~ithat of men. According to Gilligan, women's concrete and ....····
style of thinking and moral t.easoning involves an orientation>
nurturance and .ca.,e,Jhroijgh relationship and connectiQn.<
appeals are made to women's 'caring• morality. or 'maternal'tbi. 1 i'
in Sara Ruddick's (1983) version, to end war.
In constructing women as inherently peace loving, these ~•·are implicity reinforcing a traditional model of mascu ·femininity. As authors like Genevieve Lloyd (1986) and Lynn
(1981) have pointed out, it is rather ironic that those ideas ····
psychological sex differences that are central to patriarchalid ......
.
have now become so prevalent in popular feminist thinking.
Femininity, as we now have it, has been constituted within the W
intellectual traqition to be.what is left behind by idealsofm.,scu.· ·•citizenship and patriotism. But if that is so the idea of a special
patbybetween women and war has to be seen as jn some ways.a pr ·.
of the very tradition to wbkh it may now seem to. be a reaction. 'It:
be salutary to realise that the idea of the femi[)ine that figures inof the rhetoric of feminist peace groups springs from the same sout~as General Barrow's conviction that there is no place for women on thi\»»battlefield. (Lloyd, 1986, p. 75)
tt~s;,;)(Jfi

As Jean Elshtain (1987) indicates, tales of women warriors~lfighters are easily buried by the dominant narrative of bellicose ··•··•and pacific women. There are historical accounts of women m·leaders who have actively led soldiers on the battlefield as·contemporary examples of women combatants in national libera,ij~~
armies around the world. As non-combatants too, most.womenlltt~~readily supported war aims and efforts, as they did during theworld wars. Although men are responsible for most war and violenii
they are also responsible for most organized opposition to war. Manj0
men, such as the conscientious objectors and male pacifists of th~
0

,ti~t

Technology as Masculine Culture149

ld wars, have rejected war and the military. Despite these counter. g tendencies, the received cultural images of women, men andendure.
the recognition that the maleness of the military is only athrows this masculine ideology into sharp relief. The illusion
JUned by the refusal to acknowledge certain awkward facts.
• .the absence of women from the front lines, armed forces
tly depend upon women, both directly and indirectly as
workers,.nurses, domestic and sexual services to male soldiers.
•g tbe two world wars women· carried out technically skilled· ·ons work and even redesigned the weaponry they were making.
women are again playing an. important part in weapons pron~Yet this dependence on women is systematicallydenied in our'\inant cultural. understanding of militarism. In fact, as weapons•me more .and more heavily based on electronics, the role of· ·onal male military ~rtueris diminished - no enemy is evermuch less physically confronted -. while simultaneously thece of women's labour becomes ever·greater. For the electronics
y is largely a women's industry, at least as far as production
rned ..Enloe (1983, p. 195) gives the example of a modern navy.i~r. Forty per cent of the. cost of such a vessel is accounted for)selectronics, and without tho.Seelectronics it would be useless in~~rnnaval warfare. Thus, anarchetypally male artefact is in~ilJity .built inJarge part by women. 10 A durable ideology of mascu!!Et,.concealsthefact tbatalthoughdesigned and controlled by men,"/ .
technology is increasingly produced by women. For as thef&embattlefield becomes transformed by the destructive force ofautomated technology. the expression of masculinity as
strength and aggression is increasingly overshadowed.
r;f;!A.swe have seen repeatedly, technology is more than a set of~tiysicalobjects or artefacts. It also fundamentally embodies a culture
1ot>set of social relations made up of certain sorts of knowledge,t~liefs, desires and practices. Treating technology as a culture has:mfd>Iedus to. see the way in which technology is expressive ofliasculinity and how, in turn, men characteristically view>themselves~j~relation to these machines. I have also described how, in order>to
1Plaintain this male dominance over new and unfamiliar kinds ofm~chinery, men willingly adapt and modify tbei,r ideas about rpas:cu~.fuuty. I will now explore women's relation to, or more specificallytheir absence from, this technical culture.

150

Technology as Masculine Culture;:->/_::\\:t::;:'

Women and Machines: Cognition or Cultural.

{

Given the resilience of this association between technology=~\ness, how do women think about and experience techn9lq1~1(
are the mechanisms, both formal andinformal, thatfost~i~[duce the cultural stereotype of women as technologicallyiQ~> tindeed invisible in technical spheres?
The continuing male monopoly of weapons and mech~,m~
is perhaps not so difficult to understand given the w~ighttil
tradition and custom borne by these instruments .of war ..
duction. The old story that you had to be strong to wqi,Imachines had at least some credibility in this context)' ~ildominance of new technologies is,·at first sight, much mQr~
It was a commonly held expectation that with the deve~QPl!iffll
microelectronics, and the decreasing importance of heavy ij(l ''.
technology, the gender stereotyping of technology woul4> : ,w<Computing is a crucial example, because as a completely:iof. technology it had the potential to break the mould. In/ ...
sexual divisions, there are three distinct paths along whichJ~L
nology might have developed. Computing could have been
neutral with no basic.differentiation between female and ma~
Or, it could have been a technology that women appropriatedf
all, the image of new electronic computer technology fits.witlt•
ninity in thatit is clean, sedentary work involving rote tasks,'.
precision and nimble typing fingers. Yet recent evidence on the
gap in access to computers at school, at play and at home, sup
the idea that our culture has already defined computers?aseminently male machines. Numerous British, American and A9sttjiflij
surveys show that boys vastly outnumber girls wherever tll#ifr:ili
discretionary use of these machines such as in school computer c{l\ifi!
computer summer camps, at home and in games arcades:!~f ~,response to this disturbing trend, a number of feminist resear(. ··have recently investigated the relation of women and girls toputers. These studies afford useful insights into the marginali~ti
of women from technology more generally.
·····.·
Computing Inequality at Schoolif]((](

Although the work-related cultures which we have examined ha.v,¢1their own dynamics, they are also the result of cultural processes thijt
take place outside of work and that are carried into it. Technologies(

Technology as Masculine Culture151

ople, are already sex-typed when they enter the workplace.
women never approach the foreign territory of these masculine~is sex segregration at work reflects the,.fact that patriarchal
are an integral part of our entire social system. In modern
it is the education system, in conjunction with other social
ions, which helps to perpetuate gender inequalities from· n to generation. Schooling, youth cultures, the family andss media"alltransmit meanings and values that identify mascuwith machines and technological competence. These social
U:are intertwined and mutually reinforcing, but they should not
simply as external forces. Individuals actively participate in,and even help reproduce by resisting, these social practices. An
illustration of the relationship between sexuality, schooling,:eulturesand employment is provided by Paul Willis in Learning
our (1977). He describes how working-class boys end up in
g-class jobs by stressing~the role that the demonstration ofinity plays in valorizing low status labour. The class andered nature•of traditional manual labour is created, maintained
reproduced through these interconnected cultural processes.
pw does a completely new technology like computers, that may..•automatically· conform to preexisting patterns of·gender differ·•·.
)ttionr fitinto these processes;?Focusing on computers may enable··.Josee more clearly the social mechanisms through which a new
ology.becomes integrated into the masculine cultural system.
i,'."i.Scihools
are the most obvious places where young people first come)contact with computers. There is now an extensive literature on sex ·eotyping in general in schools, particularly on the processes by.... ·ch girls and boys are channelled into different subjects in second[if~and tertiary education, and the link between education and gender*[~~visionsin the labour market. As with scientific and technological]ijr.eas of tertiary education generally, the sex ratio of computer science
misvery marked. Since at least the mid-1970s there have been anti~l{giscriminationlegislation, equal opportunity programmes and otheri~.government and non-government initiatives in many countries to)redress this imbalance. Despite all this effort, the number of girls.taking computer science at British universities has been decreasing.
i The proportion of female applicants for undergraduate level com.·.·.•.puter sciencecourses dropped from approximately 28 per cent in 1978···to 13 per cent in 1986 (Hoyles, 1988, p. 9). In fact there are fewer.women applying for computer science courses now than nine years
ago although the subject has doubled in size. Similar situations arefound in other countries.

152

Te<:hnology as Masculine Culture

This drop appears to be linked to the widespread introduction of
microcomputers into schools. Here girls quickly learn that computets
are 'just for the boys'. Numerous investigations into the underb
representation of girls in science have indicated how the presentati<mof the subject alienates girls. 13 Computers have been linked to thin~scientific and mathematical, traditionally male subjects. There h~been a tendency to site school microcomputers in the science/ma~
department and computer studies is almost always taught by mathe-matics teachers, usually male. Even though it is now generally recogc
nized that ability in mathematics is not an indication of aptitude for ·computing, it is still taken into account for entry to computing COUI'se£at school. 'Thus computers tend to be conceptually assimilated to thecategory of science, mathematics and technology and acquire someof the traditional qualities of differentiated interest amongst boys andgirls' {Hoyles, 1988, p. 10).
Gender differences in educational experience are not simply the
result of what is taught in courses of formal instruction. In a mor.e
profound way the culture of the school is involved in constructing
gender and sexuality through the 'hidden curriculum' - teaching in an·
implicit way meanings and behaviours associated with femalenessand..<•maleness, with femininity and masculinity. Studies of classrooms
show that teachers behave differently to girls and boys, they speak
to them differently, they require different responses and different <behaviour from them. Gender identity is profoundly important to .
children's perception of themselves. Girls feel the need to display a\set of behavioural patterns that are perceived as being feminine: thesefeminine qualities are however incompatible with the qualities supposed necessary for a 'mathematical mind'. 14 Girls internalize thebelief that boys possess something that they lack; difference is lived
as inferiority. One study of primary school children reported, forexample, that '[g)irls actually believed that boys were natmallyordained with a profusion of masculine esoteric skills such as being
able to drive a car, tractor or helicopter' (Clarricoates, 1980, p. 39).
Computers are seen as belonging to the realm of machinery andmathematics - a daunting combination for girls.
However there is a danger here of implying that, in conforming to
the gender stereotype and thus rejecting technology, girls are theirown worst enemy. Feminists have now challenged this passive modelof female socialization, arguing that girls may well use their femi~
ninity as a form of resistance at school, or even resist feminine roles
themselves (Barton and Walker, 1983). Some girls are interested incomputers but it is difficult for them to pursue this because boys

Technology os Masculine Culture153

actively and aggressivelycapture computer time where, as is usually
the case, there is insufficient computer supply in schools. Thisharassment of girls interested in computing continues into tertiary~ucation. At this stage the harassment takes the form of obscene
oomputer mail or print-outs of nude women. Women students in~omputer science at MIT found this problem so pervasive that they
organized a special committee to deal with it.
'Space Wars' - Gomes for the Boys

.Children today are more likely to develop their interest in information
technology at home than at school. Schools reinforce the earlysocialization into gender roles that takes. place within the family.
Many children's toys encourage boys to be assertive and independent, to solve problems, experiment with construction and. more.recently, to regard the technological aspects of their toys with confidence and familiarity. The skills which children learn from these toys
lay the foundations of mathematical, scientific and technologicallearning. By contrast, 'girls' toys' such as dolls foster different skills
which are associated with caring and social interaction. Just as boys
often come to school with the advantage of having played withmechanical toys, or connectedqJ.nelectric train set, they now have.often played video games at home. Toys are an important part .of thedifferentiated learning experiencesbetween girls and boys. Thesetoys
in turn reflect the division of labour between women and men within
the family. In the chapter on domestic technology we saw the way:jnwhich household technologies are sharply gendered. TechnoJogiesof
external household and car maintenance are traditionally the hi!$:-·
bands' sphere, while women primarily use the technolQSies<ofi~ijf
kitchen and cleaning. Moreover, control of technologi~of~~~ment such as the television and video recorder are also~e~<~Computers all too easily fit in to this sex-stereotypedri•~~~~
nology. There is a tendency for the home microto·~~~'~f~·-~sons of the family. This is encouraged by advertisement.ft~~ ..
games and home computers which are aimedat•~~-i~
often feature pictures of boys looking raptly atthe~~~:fi-jcollected by the Equal Opportunities Commi~0Q*j... ,Jf-l~ithat of all British households owning micro CQm · ····· ..·.···•·.··•··· ···
times more likely than girls to be using
cent of micros are used by their mothers.
their parents which are the appropriF.lt
California survey in which school children we11u•Jifi.

154

Technology as Masculine Culture

they would use computers when they were 30 years old, 'the boys saut'they would use them for finances, data processing, and games; t~.'girls thought they would use them for housework. Wrote one si~i;
grade girl: "When l am thirty, I'll have a computer that has long,ru;ijJ@}and that can clean the house and cook meals, and another to pay,f~igroceries and stuff." ' (Kolata, 1984, p. 25)· ; ,Games are the primary attraction of computers for children. Giv:tijthat it is men (often computer hackers) who design video gamesantl.t
software, it is hardly surprising that their designs typically appeaj.t~
male fantasies. In fact video games began at one of the places wb~
computer culture itself got started. The first video game was .Sp~I'.
War, built at MIT in the early 1960s.15 Many of the most popul~I
games today are simply programmed versions of traditionally ~leinon-computer games, involving shooting, blowing up, speeding~(Oflzapping in some way or another. They often have militaristic titlijt
such as 'Destroy All Subs' and 'Space Wars' highlighting their th~.[\of adventure and violence. No wonder then that these games
frustrate or borethe non-macho players exposed to them. As a res
macho males often have a positive first experience with the comp .
other males and most females have a negative initial experience:; ;~i
It is this masculine narrative content of much computer···••.•.•
software that. has received the most attention in explanations
difference between female and male interest in video games. As
shall see below, many analyses focus on the private experience'intimate relation' with the machine ignoring the· social dimension of~interest in computing or in playing games. The predominantlyinterest in games isa function of time and a legacy ofmale adolesce~fi
culture. Overall, girls simply have fewer opportunities to use co~}puters than boys because the experience of leisure time is deepJj
divided along sex boundaries. Like their mothers, girls have a lot~sjf:1
time to play at home because of their domestic responsibilities. Y:ou.JlJilworking~class daughters are expected to help with childcare and c0thii1il
household tasks in a way that their brothers are not. Boyslearn.from,their fathers that it is their right to concentrate totally on the computei
if· they choose, oblivious of the surrounding domestic environment,
Males are more easily allowed to follow up interests which do not hav~;
to be justified as benefiting anyone else.
····•··In addition, girls' extracurricular activities are generally much morei
restricted than boys. Parents are cautious about allowing girls to<sta.f
after school in the unstructured environment of computer clubs. 1~{jPublic places like video arcades, which are central to the leisureculture of young male adolescents, are virtually off limits for most!~JTechnology os Masculine Culture155,girls.They are populated almost exclusivelyby males; the few females
in .evidence.are usually spectators. Leslie Haddon has shown that it
was the continuity from pinball machines that helped shape the arcade
game-playing world as a predominantly masculine one. Electronic~gamesdirectly appropriated the role of pinball and, within a few years
pf their introduction, pinball sales had declined by two-thirds. The
iQstitutions that these young males had built up around pinball - theJalues, rules, and rituals - were transferred to the video game. '[T}he'1ocation of video games within the arcade and certain other contexts
had meant that the new machines were incorporated into the existing
1'80Cial
activities of this milieu. Amusement parks, and many of the+other public sites where coin-operation machines were found, werepart· of street culture. They were mainly male, particularly young
imale, preserves.' 17 Thus the new technology was slotted into a pre::existingmale subculture and took on its masculine face.
Mastery of the Machine: Vive la Difference?

Throughout this chapter I have been arguing that cultural factors areimportant in understanding the masculinity of technology. By this I
Jnean that the absence of technical confidence or competence does';indeed become part of feminine gender identity, as well as being asexual stereotype. Using the instructive example of computers, I have
explored the interrelated social processes that make this technology
into an alien culture for girls. It is now time to consider an argumentthat has been·enthusiastically received by many Western feminists thattechnical.performance is a feature of fundamental cognitive difference. between the sexes.
There have been endless variations on the theme that men's superiorachievement demonstrates their greater physical and mental capacities. Traditionally, the significant discrepancy between the sexesill
their ability to work with technology was attributed to physical'Strength or weakness and feminists spent the best part of the l91Qs
discrediting this doctrine of natural difference. I am prompted (l:{wonder if it is merely an accident of history that, just as there is>amajor shift in the nature of technology from industrial to inf oriµ~tw.P
technology, an increasing number of feminist accounts of women~rcomputers are themselves emphasizing cognitive sex-diffe;en~',
These alleged differences between the sexes are conceptuali~f;~i)
opposed pairs which connect with other sets of oppositions. MaJ#~~;'
portrayed as·fascinated with the machine itself, being 'hard lll~~~~;
in terms of computer programming, followers of rule~N,~4

156

Technology as Masculine Culturecompetitive. Females are described as only interested in compute ...
tools for use and application, as 'soft masters', as more concreter ..
cooperative in orientation. 18 Thus it is argued that girls;arele$i'ij
to achieve, not simply as the result of biological differ
because of essential psychological differences. These argumelltti•~
reminiscent of two views that are by now somewhat discr · ····· ..
is the old sexual stereotype about women being too emoti; ·irrational and illogical, not to mention lacking the visual<sawareness, to be good at mathematics: the other is the l960sand. ·belief that working-class and black children were naturally ·less abstract or more concrete forms of learning. The
fundamentally feminist twist in the argument, as we shalt see, ·difference is no longer equated with inferiority or bierordering.
..· .·.·.•.···•·.···
By far the best exposition of this view, and one which is draw""'-:1iwidely by other authors, is to be found in the work of SherryTudillii(1984, also Turkle and Papert, forthcoming). 11> From her oq~jj},tions of young children programming at school, Turkle found·boys and girls tended to use two distinctive styles of computing,she ealls 'hard' and 'soft' mastery. Hard masters are overwheboys, imposing their will over the machine by implementi
structured, linear plan. The goal is to control the machine. Girls
to be soft masters, having a more 'interactive', 'negotiatingt;'.
'relational' style. They relate to the computer's formal system~illanguage for communication rather than as a set of rigid rules. TurWi{idraws a parallel with Claude Uvi-Strauss' distinction between We.i~®
ern science and the science of preliterate societies in terms oftl:ij\
contrast between planning and brico/age or tinkering. 'The formeii$/
the science of the abstract, the latter is a science of the concrete. Uk~':
the bricoleur, the soft master works with a set of concrete elemelltili
While the hard master thinks in terms of global abstractions, the.sijftl
master works on a problem by arranging and rearranging thes¢ii
elements, working through new combinations.' (Turkle, 1984, p.1-0,Ji\tTurkle is clear and emphatic that neither of these styles is superior•f,Qj:/
programming - they are different, and diversity or 'epistemologietJ.I,
pluralism' should be celebrated. The problem for women then is thJN
differential value accorded to the different styles. Computer expertise,'.
is defined as hard mastery; it is recognized as the only correct way':!
to programme. Soft mastery is culturally constructed as inferior. On~Xj
more women are not up to hard male mastery.
Turkle is correct to point out that when gendered styles of corn•.rputing are identified by teachers, they are valued accordingly. WhenTechnology as Masculine Culture

157t~i)Y9men
and girls do have a facility with programming, the categories······· r;,evaluating their performance are themselves gender-biased. They
esignated as getting the right·results by the wrong method. Only
mastery is identified as the rational, logical approach. However
uneasy when Turkle argues that male 'planners' versus female. erers' represent basic cognitive styles that are grounded in!)•J~hological sex differences. Here she is influenced·by the work offiivelynFox Keller (1983, 1985), Nancy Chodorow (1978) and perhaps~[~by Carol Gilligan (1982). Indifferent ways these authors all pose
essential theory of sexual difference in cognitive skills.
~fiffotbe extent that this signals 'the return to conventional ideas offlllndamental and comprehensive cognitive, emotional and moral dif\\lrence between women and men' (Segal, 1987, p. 146) I am uncon\~c:ed.Firstly, on purely empirical grounds I am sceptical about the~f~id.ence provided for tp.e exi.stence .of sex differences in cognitive
1l:iites..For example, Martin Hughes et al. ( 1988)found no such differl~s. Previous research on sex differences with regard to mathel~tical ability has always stressed the lack of confidence and the:;~nf.()fJIUtyof girls and the resulting tendency for them to follow theJ~es diligently. This would lead one to suppose that girls would be~ebard masters in computing. Are we now to believe that in compu:tms
boys follow the rules and girls are practising an alternative style?
i More generally the search for 'significant' sex differences in this or/llat.behaviour has a doubtful political pedigree and it is difficult toiv:oid the conclusion that such research finds what it has set out tof'md. Although studies do find evidence of differences between thes, the variation within the sexes is more important than the.Jferences between them. 20 Secondly, and more fundamentally, it is.increasingly clear that cognition cannot be stripped of its social content to reveal. pure· logical reasoning.
Over the last ten years or so developmental psychology has recognized that the development of children cannot be understood outside
the social context in which it occurs. 21 Social relationships, underm:andingsand practices play a constitutive role in the elaboration of~e child's conceptual knowledge. To present differences in programming style as differences of individual psychology, as Turkle does, isto assume an individualized account of learning (Linn, 1985, p. 95).
/µarning is a .collective, social process. Turkle's predominantly
psychological rather than sociological framework leads her to neglect
the histori~ and cultural context in which computing education.takes place. The pattern of boys being more independent and strategyoriented, and girls being more concrete and dependent, bears a158 Technology as Masculin, Culture

striking resemblance to the differences discussed byWalkerdine ( 1989)in the cognitive styles expected of. and enin, boys and girls by teachers in the primary school. In O\lft
the computer has become socially constructed as a malechildren learn from an early age to associate computers witk
men. This means that girls approach the computer less often' ..
less confidence than boys. It may also mean that there are si ·.·gender differences in how girls and boys relate to the mac·.·what it means to them. They may even have a tendency to w
use the machine for different things. But we should be extremelttof saying that because women have different ways of procee ·indicates a fundamental difference in capacity. Rather, such .·.·.·
pancies in cognitive style as can be observed are the consequenj> .•major sexual inequalities in power.
<%/)
In this connection it is salutary to note that the very first ~m,i~\'I
programmers were women. Between 1940, and 1950, many wq;
were engaged in programming, coding, or working as ma~ .
operators. Again it was due to the exigenciesof war that women..•
recruited by the military into both civilian and military positimii!i'j
work as trained mathematicians to calculate firing tables by hand ..:f'.fJj
rockets and artillery shells. When ENIAC (Electronic Num~~]
Integrator and Calculator), the first operational computer, wasl ··in the United States in the early forties, these women were assig . ....
to programme it and became known as the 'ENIAC girls' (K.raft, 1'1fJ§
p. 141). It was because programming was initially viewed as tedit,•[lclerical work of low status that it was assigned to women. As;tfjl
complex skills and value of programming were increasingly re~Ii
nized, it came to be considered creative, intellectual and demandi~,'men's work'. Thus, depending on the circumstances, different coglli~1
tive styles may be characterized as 'masculine' or 'feminine' accordin.g'
to the power and status that attaches.
c•Throughout this book I have been arguing that technology is more)than a set of artefacts. Technology is also a cultural product which.
is historically constituted by certain sorts of knowledge and social.
practices as well as other forms of representation. Conceiving oftechnology as a culture reveals the extent to which an affinity with .
technology has been and is integral to the constitution of male gender
identity. Masculinity and femininity are produced in relation to eachother and what is masculine, according to the ideology of sexual.
difference, must be the negation of the feminine. Different childhood
exposure to technology, the prevalence of different role models,Technology as Masculine Culture159

ent forms of schooling, and the extreme segregation of thearket all .lead to what Cockburn describes as 'the construction~n as strong, manually able and technologically endowed, andas physically and technically incompetent• (1983, p. 203).
·•···er is not just about difference but about power: this technicale is a source of men's actual or potential power over women .
.~so animportant part of women's experience of being less than,dependent on, men. However, it should be remembered that theruction of masculinity is a complex process. There is not one
olithic masculinity and not all men are competent with techno. , Rather, technical competence is central to the dominant culturalof masculinity, and its absence a key feature of stereotyped'ninity. The correspondence between men and machines is thus
essential nor immutable, and therefore the potential exists foren

For example, see Dorothy Dinnerstein's (1976) analysis of men's warmaking activities in terms of their desire to appropriate from women the
power of giving life and death.
Willis (1977) and Cockburn (1983) contain excellent discussions ofmasculinity in the industrial workplace.
Maureen McNeil (1987, p. 194) makes this point in a review of Cynthia
Cockburn's (1985) book.
See Pam Linn's (1985) interesting article on microcomputers in education
which makes these points in relation to Turkle's study.
See chapter 3 where I discussed the historical variability of the genderingof jobs. See P. Kraft (1977 )and J. Greenbaum (1979) on the history ofcomputing which provides an excellent illustration of this. Over· time,jobs that were firmly characterized as suitable for men become feminized
and 'women's work' becomes men's.
6 Although this is the case in most Western countries, the proportion of
women engineers in Eastern Europe is significantly higher.
7 It should be noted that there are also distinct national cultures of engineering. In a recent article, Eda Kranakis (1989) contrasts.Fren.chand
American attitudes towards manual labour throughout.the ni~eenth
century. Whereas machine builders and mechanical engineers in .f.ranC,C!
bore a certain social stigma, this was not the case in th~ Vfil~ St.ates.
In fact, the locomotive driver, Casey Jones, wasportrayedas.aberoi~,romantic figure in American folk culture. Although Kranidcjs
nottouch on gender, such national differences must infqrm>ster~t~ofmasculinity.

160

Technology as Masculine Culture

8 See also Game and Pringle's (1983, pp. 28-32) discussion of the polarjtf~~
of heavy/light, dirty/clean, mobile/immobile which are \;r~~i:;associated with masculinity and femininity.
/
9 It should be noted that the boys and men who are typically recruit~~;ipressed into service as foot soldiers or ships' crews are drawn frotlli~~
relatively powerless strata of societies. As Enloe points out, elite. ~1
who serve as officers try to use male camaraderie to reduce the a:II~~~obvious class and ethnic tensions among their troops. See Cynthia~~~:::~;;;:I::(1980) .
10 In Silicon Valley the majority of women are black, Hispanic, or~~j{
Furthermore, women electronics workers are also extensively
in countries such as the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Sii:ap~land Indonesia. For details, see Enloe {1983, chapter 7).
...· J,{f11 Although to my amazement I recently heard a chess expert argµtni
men were better than women at chess because of their superior •.•.•·..·.•·•··•.•.•.
spatial' ability. How one would account for the success of conip~~;
chess according to this line of argument is beyond me!
12 See, for example, Sex Roles, Volume 13, Nos 3-4, August 1985,
Issues: •women, Girls, and Computers'.
'.\
13 In Britain, Alison KeUy is well known for research in this area. See,{Qt;,example, her edited collection (1981). The Girls and Mathematics Utli#i
at the London Institute of Education has also done excellent workinthi~\area; see for example, V. Walkerdine (1989). In this book they disJll~/
the commonly held view that boys are better than girls at mathemaµc~;J'Girls, at the nexus of contradictory relationships between gender ~d (intellectuality, struggle to achieve the femininity which is the targe(9t}Iteachers' pejorative evaluation. They often try to be nice, kind, ~{~l]{and attractive: precisely the characteristics that teachers publicly hold uti\~
as good. . . . while privately accusing the girls of doing precisely. th~things. Thus they are put in social and psychic double-binds. Few•girls)
achieve both intellectual prowess and femininity.' (p. 203) Their centtal.
thesis is that girls' attainment is undervalued because the categories forevaluating performance and achievement are themselves gender-biased ..<·.
14 It should be noted that although we are talking about the developmentof femininity and masculinity as a general process, there is diversity ···within them, especially as they are modulated by class and racial diri~sions. This point is made in several of the articles in Rosemary(1980) and Madeleine Arnot and Gaby Weiner (1987).
15 Interesting discussions of video games are contained in chapter 2 of <Turlcle (1984) and Haddon (1988).
16 This may be particularly important in Britain where computers entered
the school curriculum later than in the USA. Often it was sch()()!
computer clubs which were first set up and were dominated by boys.> ..
Girls were more likely to be introduced to computers afterwards in theclassroom.
17 See Haddon (1988), p. 211. Haddon traces the roots of the home micro¥~em~t,«:
S~01

Technology as Masculine Culture161

back to both early hobbyist machines in the UK and USA and throughthe various lineages of interactive games. He particularly examines therise of games-playing as the dominant applica1ion and argues that themarketing strategy of the early British producers was geared to the strong
male hobbyist tradition.
For example, Deborah Brecher (1988) argues that there are gender-based
differences in learning computing; boys' style of learning is rule-based;
girls' style is holistic. At the conference on which the book is based there
was frequent discussion of the ways women's more human-oriented tool
approach would result in improved software design.
For two recent articles which draw on the work of both Turkle andGilligan, see L. Lewis (1987) and Sutherland and Hoyles (1988).
For an excellent critique of sex difference research, including Gilligan'swork, see C. Fuchs Epstein (1988), especially chapter 4.
The essays in Richards and Light (1986) share this perspective.

Conclusion

This book is intended as a contribution to both academic and polidebates about the connections between gender, technology
society. Drawing on perspectives from radical science to ····
feminism. I have argued that the use/abuse model that repr
technology itself as neutral, and asserts that it is the human acation of technology that determines whether it has benefici
destructive effects, does not go far enough. By contrast, the sshaping approach insists that technology is always a form of s
knowledge. practices and products. It is the result of conflicts
compromises, the outcomes of which depend primarily on ··.··..·.·.
distribution of power and resources between different groups.I~
society. Although there are other equally powerful forces shapiil;
technology, such as militarism, capitalist profitability, and racistl(~ithis book has concentrated on gender. Nuclear weapons, for exampli!5!
are the product of both the military-industrial complex and patriaf~
chal culture.
The sociology of technology can only be strengthened by a feminist.
critique. This means looking at how the production and use of tecli;
nology are shaped by male power and interests. It also means broa(l~jening the definition of technology, and tracing the origins an~{development of 'women's sphere• technology that have often been con~/sidered beneath notice. In common with most sociological research/
the sociology of technology still suffers from a male bias that is largely?
interested in manufacturing and, more recently, military technology./
However, the search for a general feminist theory of technology;/
or of science, is misguided. It is important to show that the develop•/
ment of technology has been mediated by gender power relations, but
the dangers of attempting a more general theory should be apparent
from the preceding chapters. Instead, I have argued that we need to ;analyse the specific social interests that structure the knowledge andpractice of particular kinds of technology. As more empirical work
is done, it may be possible to draw further links between the ways

Conclusion

163·[~en's interests influence different areas of technology. Such researchc\~in its infancy and I hope this book encourages its growth.
jJSociology's partial analysis of factors bearin& on the development
lr:ijftechnologyhas its corollary in an inadequate political response to~~hnology. The development of a critique of the technological deter~;~nism implicit in much of both the sociological and feminist
lj~rature is thus politically apposite. For the notion that technology~;i•taneutral force determining the nature of society is a depressing one,%'fibbingus of any power to affect its direction. Rather than seeing~nologyas the key to progress or, more recently, the road to eco[;f~ical or military destruction, the social shaping approach provides[~pe for human agency and political intervention.
~~mHavingsaid that, it may appear that the politics implicit in myi:i¢count are profoundly pessimistic. For if technology is imprinted~~th patriarchal designs, wh.at is to be done? To answer this I must
irstly reiterate that the relationsmp between technological and social\~
is fundamentally indeterminate. The designers and promoters
ijf:a technology cannot completely predict or control its final uses.
,here are always unintended consequences and unanticipated possibilities. For example when, as a result of the organized movement ofpeople with physical disabilities in the United States, buildings andC~vements were redesigned to improve mobility, it was not envisaged:tllat these reforms would help women manoeuvring prams aroundjties. It is important not to underestimate women's capacity to'r~ubvert the intended purposes of technology and turn it to their~llective advantage. Although the telephone was developed andill'l'Mketedto directly duplicate the functions of the telegraph, we haveseen how women primarily use the telephone for sociability. Recognition of such contradictions and the space they create for change is::particularly important in avoiding political pessimism.
;,Identifying the gendered character of technology need not lead to
arejection of existing 'patriarchal' technology. Neither does it require>Ustoabstain from working 'in' technology. This is where I part company with thosefeminists who adopt an essentialist position that seeks
to base a new technology on a fixed and universal set of women'svalues. For instance, eco-feminism maintains that women are closer:than men to nature and that the technologies men have created are
based on the domination of women as well as nature. This approach
locks us into a double bind: technology is irredeemably masculinist,eJ{ploitative and militarist, yet women need and want technological<skillsand competence. An appeal to an idealized femininity is no way
out of this dilemma; rather than simply going 'back to nature', we164 Conclusionneed to work from within and without to create anotherculture.
...........
.
I believe that there is room for an effective politics aroµmfi
access to technological work and institutions. There arfor disruption in the engine-rooms of technological pr~
involvement of more women in scientific and technologi~itechnology policy, education and so on, may brmg.
advances in redesigning technology and constitute. a ch · .·.
male culture of technology. Working in these spheres
necessarily entail cooption into the world of patriarchal
behaviour. As the proportion of women engineei:sexample, the strong relationship between the culture of .....
and hegemonic masculinity will eventually be dismantled1
new forms off emininity and new patterns of dominance U1aY
even small changes have a cumulative effect on gender relaµc:(
broadly. understood.
This is not to deny that women pay a high price for ven
such male-dominated territory. For many women the p~high - requiring them to sacrifice major aspects of their'
idcmtity.No equivalent sacrifice has been expected of men~Tb.....
.
tification. with technology has been taken for granted, \\(•
absence cast as women's problem. But women's problem is···have to learn that technology is not 'theirs' and give up the p
and power that go with this construction of masculinity. U
this depends on transforming gender power relations whic
requires changing the nature of work itself so that childhousework can be equally shared. Access politics ··alone ·succeed because the institutions themselves are founded oninequality.
Strategies to increase women's participation are anyway limi
the extent to which power.relations.are inscribed in the technthemselves. Women's reluctance 'to enter' cannot be seen as irr
given that so much technological development is devoted t
mongering and making a profit at the expense of human beinp .
the environment. Much of the research on electronics in this.chas been sponsored by the military. especially in the United
Military exigencies and military support have been crucial fu'.#jJ!idevelopment of 'civilian' technologies, such as the digital comput,~~'.ii~
Even apparently pure science is often funded for military purws~I]i
For example, one of the major reasons for research on the earth~(,,(,
gravitational field is how to make nuclear missiles more accurat~.~~that they can destroy opposing nuclear forces in a first strike.
··;,

s·

Conclusion

165

is points to the need for a more radical critique of technology
Certain kinds of technology are inextricably linked to particular
ionalized.patterns of power and authority.
., Despite the fact hat\>eenarguing against essentialist values, the radical feminist
tion to the debate has been important in politicizing. science
1t~hnology. However, in so far as their emphasis is exclusively·archal relations, they presume that if women were in control~bnology they would be able to apply these technologies in·.· · ways. For all that women might design better products,'gning at the level of the individual product is limited by wider
and economic structures.
integral part of these wider structures, which has been subjected\~riticalanalysis by the women's movement and the radical sciencef~ement,
is the notion of technical expertise. By unmasking tech~~~gy's supposed neutrality, the social .shaping approach demystifies
l'i:iayeys of expert knowledge--t are pivotal to the power of various~essions.
The feminist analysis reveals the extent to which expertise!~C,ponopolizedby men. Men's appropriation of technology is centrall,Jheir privileged position in paid production. For example, I have~gued that technology has been and is the key to consolidating the~erof the male medical profession. Technology plays a differenti\~ in different masculinities, but the power relation is still there.
t~f;ftain kinds of work experience, in particular men's, is recognizedl• 'technical' and legitimated as expertise. Women's knowledge and[ildlls have been traditionally undervalued. Contesting this involves
Ire;'Cxaminingthe accepted definitions ofexpertise and challenging theii~ual division of labour which sustains them. Technical competence{is;certainly not the only source of male power, but it is an importanttone, especially in relation to women.
\CBreaking the nexus between experts and technology is one of theprcojectsof the 'alternative technology' movement. Attempts to design!~sociallyuseful products' have opened up technology to wider public
participation. In doing so they have given rise to a profound questioning of the nature of technology itself, the design methods used.
· and the way work is organized. Although this movement has many
strands, its aim is to put social use and need before profit and involve
working people in the processes of technological planning, design andproduction. Although these initiatives have lent substance to thepossibility of developing different kinds of technology, they have concentrated on producing skill-enhancing technologies for male craft
workers. As such, they have questioned neither the masculinity of skill
definitions nor what counts as a product. 2 Women's interests andt.

~•t,•/-'<·

166 Conclusion

participation have been marginalized; a more democraticegalitarian society would be reflected in their increased involv
in decision-making about technology at the workplace, at ho~,.iin the community.
'
Designing alternative feminist technologies is, however, far:straightforward. Just as the campaign for socially useful prod~\~a capitalist context can only begin to specify the criteria by whi¢b:'.tl
judge social use and need, so too our conceptions of a techno~
based on women's interests in a patriarchal society are nec~dembryonic. Feminine values are themselves distorted by thedominated structure of society. Rejecting essentialist notions>gi
values as inherently masculine or feminine opens up debate abou,t·itli~
form that values. such as caring and nurturing, should take; T~-I
forms will be different from existing forms of femininity, suea"liputting men's and children's needs first, that have relations ofdination built into them. Rather than calling for a technology b~j
on feminine values, we need to go beyond masculinity and femil:utµtit(
to construct technology according to a completely different set ~lsocially desirable values.
·f:~J~
Feminist debates about political strategy concerning technol~~posit forms of action that break with conventional politics. They aiit
about making interventions in every sphere of life. This means COJlf:
testing the direction and use of technology around a whole range 9ft
particular locations - from the workplace to the health clinic, t~school canteen to the supermarket, from the design of housing an.Ii
vacuum cleaners to the design of sewerage systems. Small victories~I
make an enormous difference to people's experience and are politi.,.I
cally achievable - such as changing the design of buses so that womeri)
with prams can travel more easily.
··.
The time is ripe for reworking the relationship between technology(
and gender. The old masculinist ideology has been made increasingly
untenable by the dramatic changes in technology, by the challenge of..
feminism and by the new awareness of the vuinerability of the natural
world. I have argued that technologies reveal the societies that invent ·and use them, their notions of social status and distributive justice.
In so far as technology currently reflects a man's world, the struggle
to transform it demands a transformation of gender relati~ns.

if~suhoij~i

Conclusion

167

Ii

.Since World War II, as much as 40 per cent of research and developmentt,>/effort worldwide is devoted to the military. A recent calculation estimates
11? tnat 37 per cent of the British engineering industry is reliant on military

if!(markets. See David Dickson (1984) for a description of the ever-closerii

relationship between science institutions and military-industrial interestsin the USA.
See Pam Linn's (1987) instructive discussion of these schemes.

Bi.blio.graphy

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Unwin.
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gence of the modern home in post-war Britain' in Corr, H. and ..
L. (eds) Politics of Everyday Life: Continuity and Change in ffl.qr!§}·· <Family. London: Macmillan.
Amram, F. 1984: 'The Innovative Woman'. New Scientist, 24 Ml:iff
pp. 10-12.
Andrews, W. and D. 1974: 'Technology and the housewife in nine(·
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Arney ,.W. 1982: Power and the Profession of Obstetrics. Chicago: umver1of Chi~go Pr~s.
Arnold, E. and Burr, L. 198S: 'Housework and the Appliance of Sc:i~!ll(;eW. Faulkner, and E. Arnold (eds) 198S.
Arnot, M. and Weiner, G. (eds) 1987: Gender and the Politics ofScho
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Baran, B. 1987: 'The Technological Transformation of White-Collar \Viji'JS!
A Case.
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.....•lJifffi
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Sociology of Science. Milton Keynes: OPffl University Press.
Ifi
Barton, L. and Walker, S. (eds) 1983: Gender, Class and Education.~~)~:>:<:,f,,,,,,,,;
Falmer Press.
•I':s•;,
Bebel, A. 1971: Woman under Socialism. New York: Schoken Books. }If!\
Bereano, P., Bose, C. and Arnold, E. 1985: 'Kitchen Technology 811dqij
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Indexarchitecture
feminist perspectives 120-6
and modernism 113-14, 121
see also housing; urban
planning
automationof machine tools 46-8
office work 29-33
typesetting 49-51
automobiles
alternatives to 128
culture of 133-5
effects on urban space 12§-7gender differences in use
129-31
manufacture 126
see also transportation system
Baran, Barbara 32
biotechnology 73
birth control
see contraceptive technology
Braverman, Harry 20
see also labour process debate
buying patterns 84
carculture of 133-5
see also automobiles
childbirth management
male domination of 63- 73
midwives 63-5
class

divisions 43-6
intersections with gender andrace 11, 24, 36, 52, 61, 120,143
shape technology 43-8
clerical work
decentralization 40
deskilling of 29-32
feminization 32
Cockburn, Cynthia 19-21, 36,
38-9, 49-51, 89, 146cognitive sex difference 7, 155-8
Cohn, Carol 140
computers
as games 153-5
male culture of 141-2, 144-6,
153-5
programming styles 155-8
at school 150-3
Connell, Bob 143
contraceptive technology 7 4-8Cooley, Mike 18
Cowan, Ruth Schwartz 83- 7, 91,
92, 97-9, 101-2
craft unionism
and women 21, 32-3, 36, 38-9,
49-52
see also trade unions
craft workand technology 21, 36, 39,43-52
culture of workof engineering 34, 48, 102,145-6
of masculinity 38-40, 138-49

182

Index

Davidoff, Leonore and Hall,
Catherine 112-13
design choice
and profit 100-5
sex bias 49-52
des killing.
craft workers 43-8
office workers 29-33
domestic science movement 85,
98, 113-14
see also housework
domestic servants 85, 104, 116domestic technology
design of 99-105
and economics 91-5, 100-4
electrical appliances 103-4
gender specialization of 87-90
washing machines 92-3
see also housework; refrigerators
Easlea, Brian 4, 138-9
economics
and domestic technology 91-5,
100-1, 102-4
shape technology 43, 48, 72-3,
128electronic homework 40-2
engineersculture of 34, 102, 145-6
Enloe, Cynthia 147-9
familyconsumption 84
and industrialization 83
and work 33
see also housework; housing;
single-family household
femininity 2-3, 9, 19, 38, 152
Feminist International Networkof Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering(FINRRAGE) 58-63
feminist theory
cultural feminism 9
eco-feminism 6-7, 18, 135, 163

liberal feminism 8
postmodernism 11
radical feminism 9-10, 58-,.6lJ,i:'socialist feminism 20
Firestone, Shulamith 13; ..x,:., ;;iq,:z••iFischer, Claude 104- 5
flexible specialization 28
forceps 64-5
Forty, Adrian 104
fragmentation of worksee deskilling
Gabe, Frances 102
gendering of jobs 33-4,
Gershuny, Jonathan 91-4
Gilligan, Carol 148, 157
Gilman, Charlotte Perkins 1 .. ~1c,,,,Gordon, Linda 74-5
Gray, Ann 90
Hacker, Sally 145
hackers 141-2, 144
Haddon, Leslie 155
Harding, Sandra 2, 4, 10-11
Hayden, Dolores 124-5
ho mewor kingsee electronic homework
housework
domestic science movement 85,
98
gender specialization of 87-90
industrial revolution of 83-7
socialization of 96-8, 125
time spent on 81-2, 83-5, 91.-4
see also domestic technology
housing
public housing 114-15
suburban housing 118-20
in the twentieth century 113-20
in the Victorian period 112-13
industrial conflictmachinists 46-8
spinners 44- 5
and technological change 43-8
typesetters 49-51
see also trade unions

Indexinfertility treatment
medical interests 68
insurance industry
automation of 32
international division of labour
13, 40inventionand social process 22-4
and women 15-17, 22
in-vitro fertilization (IVF) 57-8,
61-2
Jordanova, Ludi 6, 67
Keller, Evelyn Fox 2, 7
Kennedy, Margrit 121-4
Kidder, Tracy 141
kitchendesign of 116-17
location of 111, 113-14
kitchenless houses 96, 125
know-how and skill 38-9
labour process debate 20, 30, 43
Lazonick, William 45
Leavitt, Judith Walzer 66
leisure technology
television 90, 94
video 90see also telephone
Lloyd, Genevieve 148
machine tool automation
managerial control 46-8
machineryand control of labour 43-8
see also automation
Martin, Emily 67-8
Marx, Karl I , 20
masculinityand engineering 102, 145-6
forms of 39-40, 143-6
and technical culture 21, 38-40,
141-6
and war 18, 138-41, 146-9
matrix 120, 124183

McNeil, Maureen 5, 11
medical knowledge
and gender symbolism 67-8
medical profession
male dominance of 63-6
role of technology 64-6, 69- 72
medical technology
see reproductive technologies
midwives 63-5
Mies, Maria 59
Miles, Ian 95
military 146-9
military technology 149-64
see also warfare
modernist architecture 113-14,
121
Morley, David 90
Moses, Robert 133
Mumford, Lewis 18, 123
Noble, David 22, 46-8
Oakley, Ann 66, 69, 71, 81
office automation 29-33
see also clerical work
Pacey, Arnold I 8Peirce, Melusina Fay 125
post-industrial theory 27-8, 82
printing industry 35-6
proletarianization
see deskillingraceintersections with class andgender I 1, 24, 36, 52, 61,
120, 143
radical science movement 3, 20
refrigerators
design choice 101-2
Reiger, Kereen 98-9
reproductive technologies
birth control 74-8
forceps 64-5
in-vitro fertilization 57-8, 61-2
Rose, Hilary 8

184 Indexsciencebarriers to women's participation 2-3
feminist critique of 1-12
and gender symbolism 5-6
and women's values 8- 12
science-technology relationship
13-14
Segal. Lynne 9, 148, 157
self-service economy 91-5
sex segregation 29-34
sex typing of jobs 33-4
see also gendering of jobs
single-family household
and domestic technology 95-9
and housing, architecture116-20skill
gender bias in 37-8
see also craft work; deskillingspinning technology
and labour control 44-5
and skilled workers 44-6
Stanworth, Michelle 60-1
stethoscope
invention of 70
technological determinism 20-4.
46, 54-5, 74, 82, Ill, 162
technology
culture of 21, 38-40, 137-49
definition of 14-17, 137, 162
history of 15-17, 23
and science 13-14
sociology of 23-4, 162-3
and women's values 17-19
telephonegendered use 105
history of 104-5
telework
see electronic homework
Third World ix, 13, 40, 61,
trade unions
exclusion of women 32, 4Y-':>.t::and skill 37-40
and technology 43-52
transportation system 84, 126-c8.·
see also automobiles
travel patterns
sex differences 129-31
Turkle, Sherry 141-2, 144, 156-c7
twilight-sleep movement 65-6 ·typesetting technology 49-51
ultrasound imaging 71
urban planning 119
see also architecture
Victorian values 112-13
warfareideology of 138-41
language of 140
see also masculinity
Webster, Juliet 31
Winner, Langdon 63, 133
Wolfe, Tom 142
women's movement viii, 1, 5, 8,
13, 29, 54, 56, 165
working classdivisions in 43-6
see also classzoning 119-20