The Future Looms: Weaving Women andCybernetics

SADIE PLANT

Beginning with a passage from a novel:
The woman brushed aside her veil, with a swift gesture of habit, and Mallory caught his first
proper glimpse of her face. She was Ada Byron, the daughter of the Prime Minister. Lady Byron,
the Queen of Engines. (Gibson and Sterling, 1990: 89)

Ada was not really Ada Byron, but Ada Lovelace, and her father was never Prime
Minister: these are the fictions of William Gibson and Bruce Sterling, whose book
The Difference Engine sets its tale in a Victorian England in which the software she
designed was already running; a country in which the Luddites were defeated, apoet was Prime Minister, and Ada Lovelace still bore her maiden name. And one
still grander: Queen of Engines.Moreover she was still alive.Set in the mid-1850s,
the novel takes her into a middle-age she never saw: the real Ada died in 1852 while
she was still in her thirties.Ill for much of her life with unspecified disorders, she
was eventually diagnosed as suffering from cancer of the womb, and she died aftermonths of extraordinary pain.
Ada Lovelace, with whom the histories of computing and women's liberation are
first directly woven together, is central to this paper.Not until a century after her
death, however, did women and software make their respective and irrevocable
entries on to the scene.After the military imperatives of the 1940s, neither would
ever return to the simple service of man, beginning instead to organize, design andarouse themselves, and so acquiring unprecedented levels of autonomy. In later
decades, both women and computers begin to escape the isolation they share in thehome and office with the establishment of their own networks.These, in turn, begin
to get in touch with each other in the 1990s. This convergence of woman andmachine is one of the preoccupations of the cybernetic feminism endorsed here, aBody & Society© 1995 SAGE ( London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi) , Vol. 1(3-4): 45--64 .

46 • Body and Society

perspective which owes a good deal to the work of Luce Irigaray, who is also
important to this discussion.
The computer emerges out of the history of weaving, the process so often said tobe the quintessence of women's work. The loom is the vanguard site of softwaredevelopment.Indeed, it is from the loom, or rather the process of weaving, that thispaper takes another cue.Perhaps it is an instance of this process as well, for tales andtexts are woven as surely as threads and fabrics.This paper is a yarn in both senses.
It is about weaving women and cybernetics, and is also weaving women andcybernetics together. It concerns the looms of the past, and also the future whichlooms over the patriarchal present and threatens the end of human history.
Ada Lovelace may have been the first encounter between woman and computer,but the association between women and software throws back into the mythicalorigins of history.For Freud, weaving imitates the concealment of the womb: theGreek hystera; the Latin matrix.Weaving is woman's compensation for the absenceof the penis, the void, the woman of whom, as he famously insists, there is 'nothing
to be seen'. Woman is veiled, as Ada was in the passage above; she weaves, as
Irigaray comments, 'to sustain the disavowal of her sex'.Yet the development of thecomputer and the cybernetic machine as which it operates might even be describedin terms of the introduction of increasing speed, miniaturization and complexity tothe process of weaving.These are the tendencies which converge in the global websof data and the nets of communication by which cyberspace, or the matrix, areunderstood.
Today, both woman and the computer screen the matrix, which also makes its
appearance as the veils and screens on which its operations are displayed.This is thevirtual reality which is also the absence of the penis and its power, but already morethan the void. The matrix emerges as the processes of an abstract weaving which
produces, or fabricates, what man knows as 'nature': his materials, the fabrics, thescreens on which he projects his own identity.
As well as his screens, and as his screens, the computer also becomes the medium of
man's communication.Ada Lovelace was herself a great communicator: often she
wrote two letters a day, and was delighted by the prospect of the telegraph.She is,moreover, often remembered as Charles Babbage's voice, expressing his ideas withlevels of clarity, efficiency and accuracy he could never have mustered himself.
When Babbage displayed his Difference Engine to the public in 1833, Ada was a
debutante, invited to see the machine with her mother, Lady Byron, who had
herself been known as the Princess of Parallelograms for her mathematical prowess.
Lady Byron was full of admiration for the machine, and it is clear that she had aWeaving Women and Cybernetics • 47

remarkable appreciation of the subtle enormities of Babbage's invention.'We bothwent to see the thinking machine (for such it seems) last Monday', she wrote. 'It
raised several Nos.to the 2nd & 3rd powers, and extracted the root of a quadratic
Equation' (Moore, 1977: 44).
Ada's own response was recorded by another woman, who wrote:
While other visitors gazed at the working of the beautiful instrument with a sort of expression, anddare I say the same sort of feeling, that some savages are said to have shown on first seeing alooking glass or hearing a gun . . . . Miss Byron, young as she was, understood its working, andsaw the great beauty of the invention. (Moore, 1977:44)

Ada had a passion for mathematics at an early age.She was admired and was greatly
encouraged by Mary Somerville, herself a prominent figure in the scientificcommunity and author of several scientific texts including the widely praised
Connection ofthe Physical Sciences. Ada and Mary Somerville corresponded, talked
together, and attended a series of lectures on Babbage's work at the Mechanics'
Institute in 1835. Ada was fascinated by the engine, and wrote many letters to
Babbage imploring him to take advantage of her brilliant mind. Eventually, andquite unsolicited, she translated a paper by Menabrea on Babbage's Analytic
Engine, later adding her own notes at Babbage's suggestion. Babbage wasenormously impressed with the translation, and Ada began to work with him on thedevelopment of the Analytical Engine.
Babbage had a tendency to flit between obsessions; a remarkably prolificexplorer of the most fascinating questions of science and technology, he neverthe­less rarely managed to complete his studies; neither the Difference Engine nor the
Analytical Engine were developed to his satisfaction.Ada, on the other hand, wasdetermined to see things through; perhaps her commitment to Babbage's machines
was greater than his own.Knowing that the Difference Engine had suffered for lackof funding, publicity and organization, she was convinced that the AnalyticalEngine would be better served by her own attentions. She was often annoyed bywhat she perceived as Babbage's sloppiness, and after an argument in 1843, she laid
down several severe conditions for the continuation of their collaboration: 'canyou', she asked, with undisguised impatience,
undertake to give your mind wholly and undividedly, as a primary object that no engagement is tointerfere with, to the consideration of all those matters in which I shall at times require yourintellectual assistance & supervision; & can you promise not to slur & hurry things over; or tomislay & allow confusion & mistakes to enter into documents &c? (Moore, 1977:171)

Babbage signed this agreement, but in spite of Ada's conditions, ill health andfinancial crises conspired to prevent the completion of the machine.
Ada Lovelace herself worked with a mixture of coyness and confidence;
attributes which often extended to terrible losses of self-esteem and megalomaniac

48 • Body and Society

delight in her own brilliance. Sometimes she was convinced of her own immortal
genius as a mathematician; 'I hope to bequeath to future generations a Calculus ofthe
Nervous System', she wrote in 1844. 'I am proceeding in a track quite peculiar & myown, I believe' (Moore, 1977: 216). At other times, she lost all confidence, and often
wondered whether she should not have pursued her musical abilities, which were alsofine. Ada was always trapped by the duty to be dutiful; caught in a cleft stick of duties,
moral obligations she did not understand.
Ada's letters - and indeed her scientific writings - are full of suspicions of her own
strange relation to humanity. Babbage called her his fairy, because of her dextrous
mind and light presence, and this appealed to Ada's inherited romanticism. 'I deny
the Fairyism to be entirely imaginary', she wrote: 'That Brain of mine is something
more than merely mortal; as time will show; (if only my breathing & some otheretceteras do not make too rapid a progress towards instead of from mortality)'(Moore, 1977: 98). When one of her thwarted admirers wrote to her: 'That you ;ire apeculiar - very peculiar - specimen of the feminine race, you are yourself aware'(Moore, 1977: 202), he could only have been confirming an opinion she already-andrather admiringly - had of herself. Even of her own writing, she wrote: 'I am quite
thunderstruck by the power of the writing. It is especially unlike a woman's style butneither can I compare it with any man's exactly' (Moore, 1977: 157). The words ofneither a man nor a woman: who was Ada Lovelace? 'Before ten years are over', shewrote, 'the Devil's in it if I haven't sucked out some of the life blood from themysteries of this universe, in a way that no purely mortal lips or brains could do'(Moore, 1977: 153).
Ada may have been Babbage's fairy, but she was not allowed to forget that she wasalso a wife, mother and victim of countless 'female disorders'. She had three children
by the age of 24 of whom she later wrote: 'They are to me irksome duties & nothing
more' (Moore, 1977: 229). Not until the 1840s did herown ill health lead her husband
and mother to engage a tutor for the children, to whom she confided 'not only her
present distaste for the company of her children but also her growing indifference toher husband, indeed to men in general' (Moore, 1977: 198). One admirer called her'wayward, wandering . . . deluded', and as a teenager she was considered hysterical,
hypochondriac and rather lacking in moral fibre. She certainly suffered
extraordinary symptoms, walking with crutches until the age of 17, and often unable
to move. Her illnesses gave her some room for manoeuvre in the oppressive
atmosphere of her maternal home. Perhaps Ada even cherished the solitude andpeculiarity of her diseases; she certainly found them of philosophical interest, once
writing: 'Do you know it is to me quite delightful to have a frame so susceptible That
it is an experimental laboratory always about me, & inseparable from me. I walkabout, not in a Snail-Shell, but in a Molecular Laboratory' (Moore, 1977: 218).

Weaving Women and Cybernetics • 49

Not until the 1850s was cancer diagnosed: Lady Byron had refused to accept suchnews, still preferring to believe in her daughter's hysteria.Even Ada tended to the
fashionable belief that over-exertion of the intellect had led to her bodily disorders;in 1844, while she was nevertheless continuing chemical and electrical experiments,
she wrote: 'Many causes have contributed to produce the past derangements; & I
shall in future avoid them.One ingredient, (but only one among many) has been too
much Mathematics' (Moore, 1977: 153-4).She died in November 1852 after a yearof agonized decline.
Ada Lovelace often described her strange intimacy with death; it was rather theconstraints of life with which she had to struggle.'I mean to do what I mean to do',she once wrote, but there is no doubt that Ada was horribly confined by the familiar- her marriage, her children and her indomitable mother conspired against her
independence, and it was no wonder that she was so attracted to the unfamiliar
expanses of mathematical worlds.Ada's marriage prompted the following words
from her mother: 'Bid adieu to your old companion Ada Byron with all her
peculiarities, caprices, and self-seeking; determined that as A.K.you will live forothers' (Moore, 1977: 69).But she never did.Scorning public opinion, she gambled,
took drugs and flirted to excess.But what she did best was computer programming.
Ada Lovelace immediately saw the profound significance of the AnalyticalEngine, and she went to great lengths to convey the remarkable extent of its
capacities in her writing.Although the Analytical Engine had its own limits, it wasnevertheless a machine vastly different from the Difference Engine. As Ada
Lovelace observed:
The Difference Engine can in reality . . . do nothing but add; and any other processes, notexcepting those of simple subtraction, multiplication and division, can be performed by it only
just to that extent in which it is possible, by judicious mathematical arrangement and artifices, toreduce them to a series of additions. (Morrison and Morrison, 1961: 25 0)

With the Analytical Engine, Babbage set out to develop a machine capable notmerely of adding, but performing the 'whole of arithmetic'. Such an undertaking
required the mechanization not merely of each mathematical operation, but thesystematic bases of their functioning, and it was this imperative to transcribe therules of the game itself which made the Analytical Engine a universal machine.
Babbage was a little more modest, describing the Engine as 'a machine of the mostgeneral nature' (Babbage, 1961: 56), but the underlying point remains: theAnalytical Engine would not merely synthesize the data provided by its operator,
as the Difference Engine had done, but would incarnate what Ada Lovelace
described as the very 'science of operations'.
The Difference Engine, Ada Lovelace wrote, 'is the embodying of one particular50 • Body and Society

and very limited set of operations, which . . . may be expressed thus
( +, +, +, +, +, +), or thus 6( + ) . Six repetitions of the one operation, +, is, in fact,
the whole sum and object of that engine' (Morrison and Morrison, 1961: 249).What
impressed Ada Lovelace about the Analytical Engine was that, unlike theDifference Engine or any other machine, it was not merely able to perform certain
functions, but was 'an embodying of the science of operations, constructed withpeculiar reference to abstract number as the subject of those operations'. The
Difference Engine could simply add up, whereas the Analytical Engine not only
performed synthetic operations, but also embodied the analytic capacity on whichthese syntheses are based. 'If we compare together the powers and the principles of
construction of the Difference and of the Analytic Engines', wrote Ada, 'we shallperceive that the capabilities of the latter are immeasurably more extensive thanthose of the former, and that they in fact hold to each other the same relationship asthat of analysis to arithmetic' (Morrison and Morrison, 1961: 250).In her notes on
Menabrea's paper, this is the point she stresses most: the Engine, she argues, is thevery machinery of analysis, so that
there is no finite line of demarcation which limits the powers of the Analytical Engine. These
powers are co-extensive with our knowledge of the laws of analysis itself, and need be bounded
only by our acquaintance with the latter. Indeed we may consider the engine as the material andmechanical representative of analysis. (Morrison and Morrison,1961: 252)

The Difference Engine was 'founded on the principle of successive orders ofdifferences', while thedistinctive characteristic of the Analytical Engine, and that which has rendered it possible toendow mechanism with such extensive faculties as bid fair to make this engine the executive
right-hand of abstract algebra, is the introduction of the principle which Jacquard devised forregulating, by means for punched cards, the most complicated patterns in the fabrication of
brocaded stuffs. (Morrison and Morrison,1961: 252)

Indeed, Ada considered Jacquard's cards to be the crucial difference between the
Difference Engine and the Analytical Engine. 'We may say most aptly', she
continued, 'that the Analytical Engine weaves Algebraical patterns, just as theJacquard loom weaves flowers and leaves. Here, it seems to us, resides much moreof originality than the Difference Engine can be fairly entitled to claim' (Morrisonand Morrison, 1961: 252). Ada's reference to the Jacquard loom is more than ametaphor: the Analytical Engine did indeed weave 'just as' the loom, operating, in asense, as the abstracted process of weaving.
Weaving has always been a vanguard of machinic development, perhaps because,even in its most basic form, the process is one of complexity, always involving theweaving together of several threads into an integrated cloth. Even the drawloom,
which is often dated back to the China of 1000 BC, involves sophisticated orderings

Weaving Women and Cybernetics • 51

of warp and weft if it is to produce the complex designs common in the silks of thisperiod.This means that 'information is needed in large amounts for the weaving of acomplex ornamental pattern.Even the most ancient Chinese examples required thatabout 1500 different warp threads be lifted in various combinations as the weaving
proceeded' (Morrison and Morrison, 1961: xxxiv). With pedals and shuttles, theloom becomes what one historian refers to as the 'most complex human engine ofthem all', a machine which 'reduced everything to simple actions: the alternate
movement of the feet worked the pedals, raising half the threads of the warp andthen the other, while the hands threw the shuttle carrying the thread of the woof'(Braudel, 1973: 247).The weaver was integrated into the machinery, bound up with
its operations, linked limb by limb to the processes.In the Middle Ages, and before
the artificial memories of the printed page, squared paper charts were used to store
the information necessary to the accurate development of the design. In early
18th-century Lyons, Basyle Bouchon developed a mechanism for the automatic
selection of threads, using an early example of the punched paper rolls which weremuch later to allow pianos to play and type to be cast.This design was developed by
Falcon a couple of years later, who introduced greater complexity with the use ofpunched cards rather than the roll. And it was this principle on which Jacquard
based his own designs for the automated loom which revolutionized the weaving
industry when it was introduced in the 1800s and continues to guide its
contemporary development.Jacquard's machine strung the punch cards together,
finally automating the operations of the machine and requiring only a single humanhand.Jacquard's system of punch card programs brought the information age to thebeginning of the 19th century.His automated loom was the first to store its own
information, functioning with its own software, an early migration of control fromweaver to machinery.
Babbage owned what Ada described as 'a beautiful woven portrait of Jacquard, inthe fabrication of which 24,000 cards were required' (Morrison and Morrison,
1961: 281). Woven in silk at about 1000 threads to the inch, Babbage wellunderstood that its incredible detail was due to the loom's ability to store andprocess information at unprecedented speed and volume and, when he began workon the Analytical Engine, it was Jacquard's strings of punch cards on which hebased his designs.'It is known as a fact', Babbage wrote, 'that the Jacquard loom iscapable of weaving any design which the imagination of man may conceive'(Babbage, 1961: 55).Babbage's own contribution to the relentless drive to perfect
the punch card system was to introduce the possibility of repeating the cards, orwhat, as Ada wrote,
was technically designated backing the cards in certain groups according to certain laws. The
object of this extension is to secure the possibility of bringing any particular card or set of cards

52 • Body and Society

onto use any number oftimes successively in the solution of one problem. (Morrison andMorrison,
1961:264)

This was an unprecedented simulation of memory.The cards were selected by themachine as it needed them and effectively functioned as a filing system, allowing themachine to store and draw on its own information.
The punch cards also gave the Analytical Engine what Babbage considered
foresight, allowing it to operate as a machine that remembers, learns and is guided
by its own abstract functioning. As he began to work on the Analytical Engine,
Babbage became convinced that 'nothing but teaching the Engine to foresee andthen to act upon that foresight could ever lead me to the object I desired' (Babbage,
1961: 53). The Jacquard cards made memory a possibility, so that 'the AnalyticalEngine will possess a library of its own' (1961: 56), but this had to be a library towhich the machine could refer both to its past and its future operations; Babbage
intended to give the machine not merely a memory but also the ability to process
information from the future of its own functioning.Babbage could eventually writethat 'in the Analytical Engine I had devised mechanical· means equivalent tomemory, also that I had provided other means equivalent to foresight, and that theEngine itself could act on this foresight' (1961: 153).
There is more than one sense in which foresight can be ascribed to the AnalyticalEngine: more than 100 years passed before it was put to use, and it is this remarkabletime lag which inspires Gibson and Sterling to explore what might have happened if
it had been taken up in the 1840s rather than the 1940s. Babbage thought it mighttake 50 years for the Analytic Engine to be developed; many people, particularly
those with money and influence, were sceptical about his inventions, and his own
eclectic interests gave an unfavourable impression of eccentricity.His own assistantconfessed to thinking that Babbage's 'intellect was beginning to become deranged'(Babbage, 1961: 54) - when he had started talking about the Engine's ability toanticipate the outcomes of calculations it had not yet made.
When the imperatives of war brought Lovelace's and Babbage's work to theattentions of the Allied military machine, their impact was immense.Her software
runs on his hardware to this day.In 1944, Howard Aiken developed Mark 1, what
he thought was the first programmable computer, although he had really been
beaten by a German civil engineer, Konrad Zuse, who had in fact built such amachine, the Z-3, in 1941.Quite remarkably, in retrospect, the Germans saw little
importance in his work, and although the most advanced of his designs, the Z-11, isstill in use to this day, it was the American computer which was the firstprogrammable system to really be noticed. Mark 1, or the IBM Automatic
Sequence Controlled Calculator, was based on Babbage's designs and was itself
programmed by another woman: Captain Grace Murray Hopper. She was often

Weaving Women and Cybernetics • 53

described as the 'Ada Lovelace' of Mark 1 and its successors; having lost her
husband in the war, Grace Hopper was free to devote her energies to programming.
She wrote the first high-level language compiler, was instrumental in thedevelopment of the computer language COBOL, and even introduced the term
'bug' to describe soft- or hardware glitches after she found a dead moth interrupting
the smooth circuits of Mark 1.Woman as the programmer again.
Crucial to the development of the 1940s computer was cybernetics, the termcoined by Norbert Wiener for the study of control and communication in animaland machine. Perhaps the first cybernetic machine was the governor, a basic
self-regulating system, which, like a thermostat, takes the information feeding outof the machine and loops or feeds it back on itself. Rather than a linear operation, in
which information comes in, is processed and goes out without any return, thecybernetic system is a feedback loop, hooked up and responsive to its own
environment.Cybernetics is the science - or rather the engineering - of this abstract
procedure, which is the virtual reality of systems of every scale and variety of hard­and software.
It is the computer which makes cybernetics possible, for the computer is always
heading towards the abstract machinery of its own operations. It begins withattempts to produce or reproduce the performance of specific functions, such asaddition, but what it leads to is machinery which can simulate the operations of any
machine and also itself.Babbage wanted machines that could add, but he ended up
with the Analytical Engine: a machine that could not only add but perform anyarithmetical task.As such, it was already an abstract machine, which could turn its
abstract hand to anything. Nevertheless, the Analytical Engine was not yet adeveloped cybernetic machine, although it made such machinery possible.As Ada
Lovelace recognized: 'The Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever tooriginate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform'(Morrison and Morrison, 1961: 285). It was an abstract machine, but its auton­
omous abilities were confined to its processing capacities: what Babbage, withterminology from the textiles industry, calls the mill, as opposed to the store.
Control is dispersed and enters the machinery, but it does not extend to theoperations of the entire machine.
Not until the Turing Machine is there a further shift onto the software plane.
Turing realized that, in effect, the mill and the store could work together, so that'programs that change themselves could be written': programs which are able to'surrender control to a subprogram, rewriting themselves to know where control
had to be returned after the execution of a given subtask' (De Landa, 1992: 162).
The Turing Machine is an unprecedented dispersal of control, but it continues tobring control back to the master program. Only after the introduction of silicon in54 • Body and Society

the 1960s did the decentralized flow of control become an issue, eventually allowing
for systems in which 'control is always captured by whatever production happens
to have its conditions satisfied by the current workspace contents' (De Landa,
1992: 63--4). The abstract machine begins at this point to function as a network of'independent software objects'. Parallel processing and neural nets succeed central­ized conceptions of command and control; governing functions collapse into sys­tems; and machine intelligence is no longer taught, top-down, but instead makes its
own connections and learns to organize, and learn, for itself.
This is the connectionist zone of self-organizing systems and self-arousing ma­chines: autonomous systems of control and synthetic intelligence. In human hands
and as a historical tool, control has been exercised merely as domination, and mani­
fest only in its centralized and vertical forms. Domination is a version of control,
but also its confinement, its obstacle: even self-control is conceived by man as theachievement of domination. Only with the cybernetic system does self-control nolonger entail being placed beneath or under something: there is no 'self' to control
man, machine or any other system: instead, both man and machine become
elements of a cybernetic system which is itself a system of control and communi­
cation. This is the strange world to which Ada's programming has led: the possi­
bility of activity without centralized control, an agency, of sorts, which has no needof a subject position.
Ada Lovelace considered the greatest achievement of the Analytical Engine to bethat 'not only the mental and the material, but the theoretical and the practical in themathematical world, are brought into more intimate and effective connexion witheach other' (Morrison and Morrison, 1961: 252). Her software already encouraged
the convergence of nature and intelligence which guides the subsequent develop­
ment of information technology.
The Analytical Engine was the actualization of the abstract workings of theloom; as such it became the abstract workings of any machine. When Babbage
wrote of the Analytical Engine, it was often with reference to the loom: 'The anal­
ogy of the Analytical Engine with this well-known process is nearly perfect'(1961: 55). The Analytical Engine was such a superb development of the loom thatits discoveries were to feed back into the processes of weaving itself. As Ada wrote:
It has been proposed to use it for the reciprocal benefit of that art, which, while it has itself noapparent connexion with the domains of abstract science, has yet proved so valuable to the latter,in suggesting the principles which, in their new and singular field of application, seem likely toplace algebraical combinations not less completely within the province of mechanism, than are all
those varied intricacies of which intersecting threads are susceptible. (Morrison and Morrison,
1961:265)

The algebraic combinations looping back into the loom, converging with the inter­
secting threads of which it is already the consequence.

Weaving Women and Cybernetics • 55

Once they are in motion, cybernetic circuits proliferate, spilling out of thespecific machinery in which they first emerged and infecting all dynamic systems.
That Babbage's punch-card system did indeed feed into the mills of the mid-19th
century is indicative of the extent to which cybernetic machines immediately
become entangled with cybernetic processes on much bigger scales.Perhaps it is no
coincidence that Neith, the Egyptian divinity of weaving, is also the spirit ofintelligence, where the latter too consists in the crossing of warp and weft. 'This
image', writes one commentator, ' clearly evokes the fact that all data recorded in thebrain results from the intercrossing of sensations perceived by means of our senseorgans, just as the threads are crossed in weaving' (Lamy, 1981: 18).
The Jacquard loom was a crucial moment in what de Landa defines as a'migration of control' from human hands to software systems. Babbage had along-standing interest in the effects of automated machines on traditional forms of
manufacture, publishing his research on the fate of cottage industries in the
Midlands and North of England, The Economy of Manufactures and Machinery, in
1832, and the Jacquard loom was one of the most significant technologicalinnovations of the early 19th century.There was a good deal of resistance to the newloom, which 'was bitterly opposed by workers who saw in this migration of controla piece of their bodies literally being transferred to the machine' (De Landa,
1992: 168). In his maiden speech in the House of Lords in 1812, Lord Byron
contributed to a debate on the Frame-Work Bill.'By the adoption of one species offrame in particular', he observed, 'one man performed the work of many, and thesuperfluous labourers were thrown out of employment'.They should, he thought,
have been rejoicing at 'these improvements in arts so beneficial to mankind', butinstead 'conceived themselves to be sacrificed to improvements in mechanism'
Gennings, 1985: 132). His daughter was merely to accelerate the processes whichrelocated and redefined control.
The connection between women and weaving runs deep: even Athena and Isis wove
their veils.
The traditional picture of the wife was one in which she spun by the village fire at night, listening to
the children's riddles, and to the myth-telling of the men, eventually making cloth which her
husband could sell to make wealth for the family; doth-making was a service from a wife to ahusband. (Mead, 1963:247)

This is from Margaret Mead's research with the Tiv of Nigeria, but it is a patternrepeated in many societies before manufactured cloth and automated weaving madetheir marks. Continuing their story, Mead's researchers observe that mechaniz­ation was a radical disruption of this domestic scene. After this, it was no longer56 • Body and Society

inevitable that women would provide the materials: 'When manufactured cloth wasintroduced, the women demanded it of the men'. Now 'the man had to leave home
to make money to buy cloth for his wife' who, moreover 'had ceased to fit thetraditional picture of a wife' (Mead, 1963: 247).
Mead's study suggests that weaving was integral to the identity of Tiv women;
washing, pounding and carrying water may fulfil this role in other cultures wherethey, like weaving, are always more than utilitarian tasks. The disruption of family
relations caused by the introduction of mechanics to any of these tasks shatters thescenery of female identity: mechanization saves time and labour, but these were notthe issue: if women were not the weavers and water-carriers, who would they be?
These labours themselves had been woven into the appearance of woman; weaving
was more than an occupation and, like other patriarchal assignments, functioned as'one of the components of womanhood'.
Certainly Freud finds a close association. 'It seems', he writes, 'that women havemade few contributions to the discoveries and inventions in the history ofcivilization; there is, however, one technique which they may have invented- thatof plaiting and weaving.' Not content with this observation, Freud is of course
characteristically 'tempted to guess the unconscious motive for the achievement.
Nature herself', he suggests,
would seem to have given the model which this achievement imitates by causing the growth atmaturity of the pubic hair that conceals the genitals. The step that remained to be taken lay inmaking the threads adhere to one another, while on the body they stick into the skin and are only
matted together. (1973: 166-7)

This passage comes out of the blue in Freud's lecture on femininity. He even
seems surprised at the thought himself: 'If you reject this idea as fantastic', he adds,'and regard my belief in the influence of a lack of a penis on the configuration offemininity as an idee fixe, I am of course defenceless' (1973: 167). Freud is indeed
quite defenceless about the absence of the penis as its driving force, but is it foolishto suggest that weaving is women's only contribution to 'the discoveries andinventions of the history of civilization'? If this were to be the case, what acontribution it would be! Weaving has been the art and the science of software,
which is perhaps less a contribution to civilization than its terminal decline. Perhaps
weaving is even the fabric of every other discovery and invention, perhaps the
beginning and the end of their history. The loom is a fatal innovation, which weaves
its way from squared paper to the data net.
It seems that weaving is always already entangled with the question of female
identity, and its mechanization an inevitable disruption of the scene in which
woman appears as the weaver. Manufactured cloth disrupted the marital andfamiliar relationships of every traditional society on which it impacted. In China, it

Weaving Women and Cybernetics • 57

was said that if 'the old loom must be discarded, then 100 other things must be
discarded with it, fot there ,are somehow no adequate substitutes' (Mead,
1963: 241).
'The woman at her hand-loom', writes Margaret Mead,
controls the tension of the weft by the feeling in her muscles and the rhythm of her body motion;in the factory she watches the loom, and acts at externally stated intervals, as the operations of themachine dictate them. When she worked at home, she followed her own rhythm, and ended an
operation when she felt - by the resistance against the pounding mallet or the feel between her
fingers - that the process was complete. In the factory she is asked to adjust her rhythm to that of
the rhythm prescribed by the factory; to do things· according to externally set time limits.
( 1963: 24 1)

Mead again provides an insight into the intimacy of the connection between bodyand process established by weaving, and its disruption by the discipline of thefactory. 'She is asked to adjust her rhythm to that of the rhythm prescribed by thefactory', but what is her own rhythm, what is the beat by which she wove athome?
What is this body to which weaving is so sympathetic? If woman is identified as
weaver, her rhythms can only be known through its veils. Where are the women?
Weaving, spinning, tangling threads at the fireside. Who are the women? Those
who weave. It is weaving by which woman is known; the activity of weaving which
defines her. 'What happens to �he woman', asks Mead, 'and to the man's
relationship with her, when she ceases to fulfil her role, to fit the picture of
womanhood and wifehood?' (1963�238). What-happens to the woman? What is
woman without the weaving? A computer programmer, perhaps? Ada's computer
was a complex loom: Ada Lovelace, whose lace work took her name into the heartof the military complex, dying in agony, hooked into gambling, swept into themazes of number and addiction. The point at which weaving, women andcybernetics converge in a movement fatal to history.
Irigaray argues that human history is a movement from darkness to the light ofpure intellect; a flight from the earth. For man to make history is for him to deny
and transcend what he understands as nature, reversing his subordination to its
whims and forces, and progressing towards the autonomy, omnipotence andomnipresence of God, his image of abstraction and authority. Man comes out of the
cave and heads for the sun; he is born from the womb and escapes the mother, theground from which humanity arose and the matter from which history believes
itself destined for liberation. Mother Nature may have been his material origin, but
it is God the Father to whom he must be faithful; God who legitimates his project to'fill the earth and subdue it'. The matter, the womb, is merely an encumbrance;
either too inert or dangerously active. The body becomes a cage, and biology aconstraint which ties man to nature and refuses to let him rise above the grubby58 • Body and Society

concerns of the material; what he sees as the passive materiality of the feminine has
to be overcome by his spiritual action.Human history is the self-narrating story ofthis drive for domination; a passage from carnal passions to self-control; a journeyfrom the strange fluidities of the material to the self-identification of the soul.
Woman has never been the subject, the agent of this history, the autonomous
being.Yet her role in this history has hardly been insignificant.Even from his pointof view, she has provided a mirror for man, his servant and accommodation, his
tools and his means of communication, his spectacles and commodities, thepossibility of the reproduction of his species and his world.She is always necessary
to history: man's natural resource for his own cultural development.Not that she isleft behind, always at the beginning: as mirror and servant, instrument, mediation
and reproduction, she is always in flux, wearing 'different veils according to thehistoric period' (Irigaray, 1991: 118).
As Irigaray knows, man's domination cannot be allowed to become theannihilation of the materials he needs: in order to build his culture, 'man was, ofcourse, obliged to draw on reserves still in the realm of nature; a detour through theouter world was of course dispensable; the "I" had to relate to things before it could
be conscious of itself' (Irigaray, 1985: 204). Man can do nothing on his own:
carefully concealed, woman nevertheless continues to function as the ground andpossibility of his quests for identity, agency and self-control.Stealth bombers andguided missiles, telecommunications systems and orbiting satellites epitomize thisflight towards autonomy, and the concomitant need to defend it.
Like woman, software systems are used as man's tools, his media and his weapons;
all are developed in the interests of man, but all are poised to betray him. The
spectacles are stirring, there is something happening behind the mirrors, thecommodities are learning how to speak and think.Women's liberation is sustainedand vitalized by the proliferation and globalization of software technologies, all ofwhich feed into self-organizing, self-arousing systems and enterthe scene on her side.
This will indeed seem a strange twist to history to those who believe that it runs instraight lines.But as lrigaray asks: 'If machines, even machines of theory, can bearoused all by themselves, may woman not do likewise?' (1985: 232).
The computer, like woman, is both the appearance and the possibility ofsimulation.'Truth and appearance, according to his will of the moment, his appetiteof the instant' (Irigary, 1991: 118).Woman cannot be anything, but she can imitate
anything valued by man: intelligence, autonomy, beauty....Indeed, if woman is
anything, she is the very possibility of mimesis, the one who weaves her own
disguises.The veil is her oppression, but 'she may still draw from it what she needs
to mark the folds, seams, and dressmaking of her garments and dissimulations'(Irigaray, 1991: 116). These mimetic abilities throw woman into a universality

Weaving Women and Cybernetics • 59

unknown and unknowable to the one who knows who he is: she fits any bill, but inso doing, she is already more than that which she imitates. Woman, like thecomputer, appears at different times as whatever man requires of her. She learns
how to imitate; she learns simulation. And, like the computer, she becomes very
good at it, so good, in fact, that she too, in principle, can mimic any function. As
lrigaray suggests: 'Truth and appearances, and reality, power . . . she is - throughher inexhaustible aptitude for mimicry- the living foundation for the whole stagingof the world' (Irigaray, 1991: 118).
But if this is supposed to be her only role, she is no longer its only performer:
now that the digital comes on stream, the computer is cast in precisely the samelight: it too is merely the imitation of nature, providing assistance and additional
capacity for man, and more of the things in his world, but it too can do this only
insofar as it is already hooked up to the very machinery of simulation. If Freud's
speculations about the origins of weaving lead him to a language of compensationand flaw, its technical development results in a proliferation of pixelled screens
which compensate for nothing, and, behind them, the emergence of digital spaces
and global networks which are even now weaving themselves together with flawlessprec1s1on.
Software, in other words, has its screens as well: it too has a user-friendly face itturns to man, and for it, as for woman, this is only its camouflage.
The screen is the face it began to present in the late 1960s, when the TV monitor
was incorporated in its design. It appears as the spectacle: the visual display of thatwhich can be seen, and also functions as the interface, the messenger; like Irigaray's
woman, it is both displayed for man and becomes the possibility of his
communication. It too operates as the typewriter, the calculator, the decoder,displaying itself on the screen as an instrument in the service of man. These,
however, are merely imitations of some existing function; and indeed, it is always as
machinery for the reproduction of the same that both women and information
technology first sell themselves. Even in 1968, McLuhan argued that 'the dense
information environment created by the computer is at present still concealed fromit by a complex screen or mosaic quilt of antiquated activities that are now
advertised as the new field for the computer' (McLuhan and Fiore, 1968: 89).While
this is all that appears before man, those who travel in the information flows are
moving far beyond the screens and into data streams beyond his conceptions ofreality. On this other side run all the fluid energies denied by the patrilineal demand
for the reproduction of the same. Even when the computer appears in this guise andsimulates this function, it is always the site of replication, an engine for making
difference. The same is merely one of the things it can be.
Humanity knows the matrix only as it is displayed, which is always a matter of60 • Body and Society

disguise. It sees the pixels, but these are merely the surfaces of the data net which'hides on the reverse side of the screen' (McCaffrey, 1991: 85).A web of complexity
weaving itself, the matrix disguises itself as its own simulation. On the other side of
the terminal looms the tactile density craved even by McLuhan, the materiality ofthe data space. 'Everyone I know who works with computers', writes Gibson,'seems to develop a belief that there's some kind of actual space behind the screen,someplace you can't see but you know is there' (McCaffrey, 1991: 272).
This actual space is not merely another space, but a virtual reality. Nor is it as it
often appears in the male imaginary: as a cerebral flight from the mysteries ofmatter. There is no escape from the meat, the flesh, and cyberspace is nothingtranscendent. These are simply the disguises which pander to man's projections of
his own rear-view illusions; reproductions of the same desires which have guided
his dream of technological authority and now become the collective nightmare of asoulless integration. Entering the matrix is no assertion of masculinity, but a loss ofhumanity; to jack into cyberspace is not to penetrate, but to be invaded.
Neuromancer's cowboy, Case, is well aware of this:he knew- he remembered - as she pulled him down, to the meat, the flesh the cowboys mocked. It
was a vast thing, beyond knowing, a sea of information coded in spiral and pheromone, infinite
intricacy that only the body, in its strong blind way, could ever read. (Gibson, 1985:285)

Cyberspace is the matrix not as absence, void, the whole of the womb, but perhaps even the place of woman's affirmation. This would not be the affirmation ofher own patriarchal past, but what she is in a future which has yet to arrive but cannevertheless already be felt. There is for Irigaray another side to the screens which
already moves beyond and stops short of appearance, and has no veil. It wafts out, like a harmonythat subtends, envelops and subtly 'fills' everything seen, before the caesura of its forms and intime to a movement other than scansion in syncopations. Continuity from which the veil itself willborrow the matter-foundation of its fabric. ( Irigaray, 1991:116)

This fabric, and its fabrication, is the virtual materiality of the feminine; home tono-one and no thing, the passage into the virtual is nevertheless not a return to thevoid. This affirmation is 'without subject or object', but 'does not, for all that, go to
the abyss': the blind immateriality of the black hole was simply projected by man,
who had to believe that there was nothingness and lack behind the veil.
Perhaps Freud's comments on weaving are more powerful than he knows. For
him, weaving is already a simulation of something else, an imitation of naturalprocesses. Woman weaves in imitation of the hairs of her pubis criss-crossing thevoid: she mimics the operations of nature, of her own body. If weaving is woman's
only achievement, it is not even her own: for Freud, she discovers nothing, but
merely copies; she does not invent, but represents. 'Woman can, it seems, (only)Weaving Women and Cybernetics • 61

imitate nature.Duplicate what nature offers and produces.In a kind of technicalassistance and substitution' (Irigray, 1985: 115).The woman who weaves is alreadythe mimic; always appearing as masquerade, artifice, the one who is faking it, acting
her part.She cannot be herself, because she is and has no thing, and for Freud, there
is weaving because nothing, the void, cannot be allowed to appear. 'Therefore
woman weaves in order to veil herself, mask the faults of Nature, and restore her in
her wholeness' (Irigaray, 1985: 116). Weaving is both her compensation andconcealment; her appearance and disappearance: 'this disavowal is also a fabri­c(ation) and not without possible duplicity. It is at least double' (Irigaray,
1985: 116).She sews herself up with her own veils, but they are also her camouflage.
The cloths and veils are hers to wear: it is through weaving she is known, andweaving behind which she hides.
This is a concealment on which man insists: this is the denial of matter which has
made his culture- and his technologies - possible.For Irigaray, this flight from thematerial is also an escape from the mother. Looking back on his origins, man sees
only the flaw, the incompletion, the wound, a void. This is the site of life, ofreproduction, of materiality, but, it is also horrible and empty, the greatembarrassment, the unforgivable slash across an otherwise perfect canvas.And so it
must be covered, and woman put on display as the veils which conceal her: she
becomes the cover girl, star of the screen. Like every good commodity, she ispackaged and wrapped to facilitate easy exchange and consumption.But as her own
veils she is already hyperreal: her screens conceal only the flaw, the void, theunnatural element already secreted within and as nature.She has to be covered, notsimply because she is too natural, but because she would otherwise reveal theterrifying virtuality of the natural.Covered up, she is always already the epitome ofartifice.
Implicit in Irigaray's work is the suggestion that the matter denied by humanculture is a virtual system, which subtends its extension in the form of nature.The
virtual is the abstract machine from which the actual emerges; nature is already thecamouflage of matter, the veils which conceal its operations. There is indeed
nothing there, underneath or behind this disguise, or at least nothing actual,nothing formed. Perhaps this is nature as the machinic phylum, the virtual
synthesizer; matter as a simulation machine, and nature as its actualization.What
man sees is nature as extension and form, but this sense of nature is simply thecamouflage, the veil again, which conceals its virtuality.
If the repression of this phylum is integral to a flight from matter which, for
Irigaray, has guided human history, the cybernetic systems which bring it into
human history are equally the consequences of this drive for escape anddomination. Cybernetic systems are excited by military technology, security and62 • Body and Society

defence.Still confident of his own indisputable mastery over them, man continues
to turn them on. In so doing he merely encourages his own destruction. Everysoftware development is a migration of control, away from man, in whom it has
been exercised only as domination, and into the matrix, or cyberspace, 'the broad
electronic net in which virtual realities are spun' (Heim, 1991: 31). The matrix
weaves itself in a future which has no place for historical man: he was merely its
tool, and his agency was itself always a figment of its loop. At the peak of his
triumph, the culmination of his machinic erections, man confronts the system hebuilt for his own protection and finds it is female and dangerous. Rather thanbuilding the machinery with which they can resist the dangers of the future, instead,
writes Irigaray, humans 'watch the machines multiply that push them little by little
beyond the limits of their nature.And they are sent back to their mountain tops,
while the machines progressively populate the earth.Soon engendering man as theirepiphenomenon' (Irigaray, 1991: 63).
Dreams of transcendence are chased through the scientific, the technical and thefeminine.But every route leads only to crisis, an age, for Irigaray,
in which the 'subject' no longer knows where to turn, whom or what to turn to, amid all thesemany foci of 'liberation', none rigorously homogeneous with another and all heterogeneous to his
conception. And since he had long sought in that conception the instrument, the lever, and, in
more cases than one, the term of his pleasure, these objects of mastery have perhaps brought the
subject to his doom. So now man struggles to be science, machine, woman ... to prevent any ofthese from escaping his service and ceasing to be interchangeable. (Irigary, 1985: 23 2)

This, however, is an impossible effort: man cannot become what is already morethan him: rather it is 'science, machine, woman' which will swallow up man; taking
him by force for the first time.He has no resolution, no hope of the self-identical at
the end of these flights from matter, for 'in none of these things -science, machine,
woman - will form ever achieve the same completeness as it does in him, in the inner
sanctuary of his mind. In them form has always already exploded' (Irigaray,
1985: 232).
Misogyny and technophobia are equally displays of man's fear of the matrix, thevirtual machinery which subtends his world and lies on the other side of every
patriarchal culture's veils.At the end of the 20th century, women are no longer the
only reminder of this other side.Nor are they containable as child-bearers, fit only
to be one thing, adding machines. And even if man continues to see cybernetic
systems as similarly confined to the reproduction of the same, this is only because
the screens still allow him to ignore the extent to which he is hooked to theiroperations, as dependent on the matrix as he has always been. All his defences
merely encourage this dependency: for the last 50 years, as his war machine has
begun to gain intelligence, women and computers have flooded into history: aWeaving Women and Cybernetics • 63

proliferation of screens, lines of communication, media, interfaces and simulations.
All of which exceed his intentions and feed back into his paranoia. Cybernetic
systems are fatal to his culture; they invade as a return of the repressed, but what
returns is no longer the same: cybernetics transforms woman and nature, but they
do not return from man's past, as his origins.Instead they come around to face him,
wheeling round from his future, the virtual system to which he has always beenheading.
The machines and the women mimic their humanity, but they never simply
become it.They may aspire to be the same as man, but in every effort they become
more complex than he has ever been.Cybernetic feminism does not, like many of its
predecessors, including that proposed in Irigaray's recent work, seek out for
woman a subjectivity, an identity or even a sexuality of her own: there is no subject
position and no identity on the other side of the screens. And female sexuality isalways in excess of anything that could be called 'her own'.Woman cannot exist'like man'; neither can the machine.As soon her mimicry earns her equality, she isalready something, and somewhere, other than him.A computer which passes theTuring test is always more than a human intelligence; simulation always takes the
mimic over the brink.
'There is nothing like unto women', writes Irigaray: 'They go beyond all
simulation' (Irigaray, 1991: 39). Perhaps it was always the crack, the slit, whichmarked her out, but what she has missed is not the identity of the masculine.Her
missing piece, what was never allowed to appear, was her own connection to thevirtual, the repressed dynamic of matter. Nor is there anything like unto
computers: they are the simulators, the screens, the clothing of the matrix, alreadyblatantly linked to the virtual machinery of which nature and culture are thesubprograms.The computer was always a simulation of weaving; threads of ones
and zeros riding the carpets and simulating silk screens in the perpetual motions ofcyberspace. It joins women on and as the interface between man and matter,
identity and difference, one and zero, the actual and the virtual.An interface which
is taking off on its own: no longer the void, the gap, or the absence, the veils are
already cybernetic.
Ada refused to publish her commentaries on Menabrea's papers for what appear tohave been spurious confusions around publishing contracts.She did for Menabrea ­and Babbage - what another woman had done for Darwin: in translating
Menabrea's work from French, she provided footnotes more detailed andsubstantial - three times as long, in fact - than the text itself.
Footnotes have often been the marginal zones occupied by women writers, who64 • Body and Society

could write, while nevertheless continuing to perform a service for man in thecommunication of his thoughts. Translation, transcription and elaboration: neverwithin the body of the text, women have nevertheless woven their influence
between the lines. While Ada's writing was presented in this form and signed
simply 'A.A.L.', hers was the name which survived in this unprecedented case.
More than Babbage, still less Menabrea, it was Ada which persisted: in recognitionof her work, the United States Defence Department named its primary program­ming language ADA, and today her name shouts from the spines of a thousand
manuals. Indeed, as is rarely the case, it really was her own name which survived in
Ada's case, neither her initials, nor even the names of her husband or father. It is
ADA herself who lives on, in her own name; her footnotes secreted in the softwareof the military machine.
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Babbage and His Calculating Engines: Selected Writings by Charles Babbage and Others. New York:
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Braudel, Fernand (1973) Capitalism and Material Life 1400-1800. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
De Landa, Manuel (1992) War in the Age of Intelligent Machines. New York: Zone Books.
Freud, Sigmund (1973) New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. London: Pelican.
Gibson, William (1985) Neuromancer. London: Grafton.
Gibson, William and Bruce Sterling (199 0) The Difference Engine. London: Gollancz.
Heim, Michael (1991) 'The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality', in Sandra K. Helsel and Judith Paris Roth( eds) Virtual Reality, Theory, Practice, and Promise. Westport and London: Meckler.
Irigaray, Luce (1985) Speculum of the Other Woman. New York: Cornell University Press.
Irigaray, Luce (1991) Marine Lover ofFriedrich Nietzsche. New York: Columbia University Press.
Jennings, Humphrey (1985) Pandemonium 1 660-1886: The Coming of the Machine as Seen byContemporary Observers. London: Andre Deutsch.
Lamy, Lucie (1981) Egyptian Mysteries. London: Thames and Hudson.
McCaffrey, Larry ( ed.) (1991) Storming the Reality Studio. Durham, NC and London: Duke University
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McLuhan, Marshall and Quentin Fiore (1968) War and Peace in the Global Village. New York: Bantam
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Mead, Margaret (1963) Cultural Patterns and Technical Change. London: Mentor Books.
Moore, Doris Langley (1977) Ada, Countess of Lovelace, Byron's Illegitimate Daughter. London: John
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·

Sadie Plant is Research Fellow in Cybernetic Culture at the University of Warwick. Her first book, The
Most Radical Gesture, was published by Routledge in1992 , and she is now completing Zeros and Ones, abook exploring many of the themes raised in 'The Future Looms', to be published by Fourth Estate andDoubleday in 1996 .