The Future of Japan’s Nuclear Fuel System:
Some Recommendations

Frank von Hippel, Co-chair
International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM)
Tokyo, 28 May – 1 June 2012

Why did civilian reprocessing begin in the 1970s?	

It was believed that there was only enough low-cost uranium
in the world to fuel about 500 current-generation Light
Water Reactors for 40 years.		

Much more uranium efficient plutonium breeder reactors
therefore would be required.		

Reprocessing of spent fuel from existing power reactors wasneeded to obtain the plutonium for initial cores of theplutonium breeder reactors, which were expected
imminently..

	2

Reprocessing and proliferation	

In 1974, India used its first separated civilian plutonium for a “peaceful” nuclear
explosion. Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Pakistan and Taiwan also wereseeking or building “civilian” reprocessing plants to support weapons
programs. Internal change and external pressure ended most of these programs.
Today, Japan is the only non-weapon state that reprocesses. 		

Since North Korea’s May 2009 nuclear test, however, South Korea has been
demanding “nuclear sovereignty,” i.e. the same right to reprocess as Japandespite its 1992 agreement with North Korea not to enrich or reprocess. South
Korea is currently in very tough negotiations with the U.S. on whether or nottheir new Agreement of Cooperation will allow South Korea to reprocess.		

Most separated civilian plutonium is not weapon-grade. In a Nagasaki design,
civilian plutonium would produce an explosion equivalent to at least 1000
tons of chemical explosive (vs. 20,000 tons for Nagasaki).* Using modern
weapon designs, there would be little difference in the explosive powers ofweapons using weapon-grade and power reactor plutonium. 		

*J. Carson Mark, "Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium," Science and Global Security,
4, 111-128, 1993. Mark headed the Theoretical Division at the Los Alamos National Laboratoryfor decades and played a major role in nuclear weapons design.	

But plutonium breeder reactors were not commercialized -- Nuclear capacity projections declined-- Estimates of global low-cost uranium resources grew	

Global Nuclear Capacity (GWe)

%#!!"
%!!!"

NEA-­‐IAEA,	  2009	  Projected nuclear 	capacity (1975, IAEA)	

$#!!"Estimated Low-cost Uranium	(40-year supply for LWRs)	

High				Low	$!!!"#!!"

IAEA,	  1975	  Projected band for nuclear 	capacity (2011, IAEA)	

!"$&'!"$&(!"$&&!"%!!!"

%!$!"

%!%!"

%!)!"

%!*!"

4%!#!"

“Halting the production of weapons-grade fissile material carries great significancefrom the perspective of both nuclear disarmament and nuclear security.
– Prime Minister Noda, Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, 27 March 2012

Civilian plutonium too – is weapon-usable
Countries thatreprocess

5,000-10,000
weapon equiv.

UK has decided tostop and dispose of
its plutonium.

Why Reprocessing facilitates nuclear-weapon proliferation	

Plutonium in spent fuel is protected by	a gamma radiation field produced by 	

long-lived fission products (cesium-137).

			

Separated plutonium 			is handled easily. 	

(450 kg 	

5 kg plutonium)	

1 m.	

50 years after discharge, lethal dose fromfuel assembly in 30 minutes (4 Sieverts). 	

Need remote processing behind thick walls
to recover plutonium (i.e. reprocessing)	

2.5 kg plutonium in light-weight container. Can
be processed in a glove box, enough in 3
containers for Nagasaki-type bomb.	

(Mayak Reprocessing Plant, 1994) 	

6

“We simply can’t go on accumulating huge amounts of the very material,
like separated plutonium, that we’re trying to keep away from terrorists.”– President Obama, South Korea, 26 March 2012

Separation of civilian plutonium too must end
As much civilian plutonium (250,000 kg) as weapons plutonium in the world– enough to make 30,000 Nagasaki bombs or 60,000 modern warheads.
Plutonium also very dangerous radiologically. One gram, if inhaled by thepopulation in a large city, would cause 10,000 cancer deaths.
U.S., Russia, the UK, France and China have ended production of plutonium
for weapons. Only India, Pakistan and perhaps Israel continue.
U.S. and Russia have committed to eliminate 90,000 kg of their weapons
plutonium – about one third of the global total.
Separation of civilian plutonium also must end. Today only three countries
have large plutonium separation programs: France, Japan and UK, which
has just decided to stop. (Also three other countries with smaller
reprocessing programs that also must end: China, India and Russia.)

Suggestion #1. Breeder reactor R&D
We suggest that Japan consider ending its fast-neutron
reactor R&D program – as most other countries have.
Civilian reprocessing was originally launched to supply startup
plutonium for plutonium breeder reactors, which would use
uranium much more efficiently.
But cost of uranium only a few percent of the cost of nuclear powerand breeder reactors are costly and unreliable (Monju).
Fast-neutron reactors could, over centuries, reduce significantly theamount of plutonium and other transuranics but“Estimates of changes in dose [from nuclear power and radioactivewaste] are small…none of the dose reductions seem large enough towarrant the expense and additional operational risk oftransmutation….”– U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations andTransmutation (1996) – also 23 May 2012 JAEC fuel cycle panel report.

Suggestion #2. Reprocessing and plutonium reuse
We suggest ending reprocessing.
Plutonium separation increases the danger of nuclear
proliferation: France, India, Pakistan, North Korea,Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan…
Increases nuclear power costs significantly (JAEC, ~ 1 yen/kWh)Does not reduce the cost or hazards of radioactive waste disposal.
The commitment to reprocessing only continues in Japanbecause of a lack of spent fuel storage. (JAEC, 2005)

SFinPool(No.)

292

587

514

1331 946

876

FFinPool(No.)

100

2852

20464

Suggestion #3. Dry Cask Storage

48

Decay March 0.18 0.62 0.54
2.26 1.00 0.87
HeatinWe suggest
an11,2010
intensive national-government program to construct
Poolstorage
dry cask
at Japan’spower plants
June110.16 nuclear
0.52 0.461.58 for
0.76safety
0.73 and as(MW) 2010

2.DryMetalCasksatFukushimaan alternative to reprocessing• AsofMarch11,theFukushimaPoolsPPThasstored9metalcasks
are dangerously
dense-packed.
Older spent(408BWRSF)inabuilding.
ConditionofUnit4‘sspent
fuelpool
Largeamountsofseawater,
fuel• shouldbe placed insandandrubblegushedinthe
dry cask
storage. (F-D #4)
buildingbythetsunami.
CRIEPI• Thecaskcoolingfunctionwas
notlostasthecaskswerecooledbynaturalairconvection.
• Sofar,noissuesontheir
integrityhavebeenidentified
fromtheexternalappearance.

Ref.3

3/25[Central	  research	  ins:tute	  of	  electric	  power	  CRIEPI industry	  of	  Japan	  brieﬁng,	  	  31	  January	  5 2012]	  Suggestion #4. Plutonium disposal
We suggest that Japan halt the construction of theRokkasho MOX fuel plant and that Japan launch anR&D program on a plutonium waste form that could
be disposed of directly with spent fuel.

Japan’s MOX plan has stalled for 10 years (U.S. program too).
There are only 4 tons of separated plutonium at Rokkasho.
Direct disposal would be less costly.

Summary
Japan should consider:
1. Ending its fast-neutron reactor R&D program.
2. Ending reprocessing.
3. Roving older spent fuel from spent-fuel pools to place insafe dry cask storage.
4. Halting construction of Rokkasho MOX fuel plant andlaunching an R&D program on a plutonium waste
form that could be disposed of directly with spent fuel.