DBJ Research Center on Global Warming
Discussion Paper Series No. 58 (4/2016)

Artisanship, Meritocracy, and Apathy

Masayuki Otaki

The aim of this discussion paper series is to stimulate discussion andcomment from academics and policymakers through a preliminary draft
form. This paper is included by permission of the author(s) as a tentative
material before publication in peer-reviewed journals or books. Copyrightand all related rights are maintained by the author(s). Views expressed inthis paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the views of the
Research Institute of Capital Formation or Development Bank of Japan.

2Artisanship, Meritocracy, and Apathy

Masayuki Otaki
Institute of Social Sciences, the University of Tokyo
ohtaki@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp

Abstract
This study presumes the bounded rationality of cognition concerning the way of life.
People called artisans feel higher felicity whenever they produce more refined goods. In
contrast, those dubbed as capitalists are devoted to maximizing their profits. People inan economy choose which way of life they send. We assume that meritocratic education
mostly nurtures capitalists. However, such education is superficial or even harmful inthe sense that the true happiness of a human being comprises not only pecuniary
benefits but also job satisfaction. In other words, efficiency pecuniary measurement ofefficiency is not impartial, and if people are apt to behave under such a standard ofvalue, some level of apathy prevails, as observed in the current world economy. This
study found that the state wherein all individuals become artisans is an evolutionary
stable set (ESS). People not merely achieve a higher satisfaction from completing theirjobs, but also prosper materialistically, as high-quality goods are produced andexchanged within the economy. This suggests an urgent need to reconstruct a social
norm, which controls meritocratic behavior through democratic education procedure.

Keywords: Artisanship; Meritocratic Education; Apathy; Social Norm; Bifurcation of
Equilibrium
JEL Classifications: I21; I28

3

1. Introduction
Today, most individuals in advanced economies are bothered by apathy. They are vague
about their job aims and finding positive values in life. Where does such apathy comefrom? This study examines why apathy is prevalent in advanced economies, based on
the concept of bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory.
As Otaki (2015) points out, it is a plausible assumption that no individual can fully
maximize his utility function because of the limit of cognition. Consequently, eachindividual must choose his lifestyle, which is defined by the factor maximized. Similar
to Otaki (2015), this study divides the way of life into two types; artisan and capitalist.
An artisan maximizes the quality of his producing goods to the extent that his minimalliving standard is guaranteed. On the other hand, the primary concern of a capitalist is
his profits and the quality of goods is secondary. The true total utility comprises the sumof the quality of produced goods and earned profits.
At least two Evolutionary Stable Sets (ESSs) exist. One is an economy where allindividuals are artisans. The other is an economy that entirely consists of capitalists.
The former is an ESS because every individual can consume high-quality goods, andthus, they can concentrate on how to achieve the fullness of life that is defined as
producing the most furnished goods. The latter is also an ESS. When an economy isfilled with capitalists, no individual moves to an artisan-type life because his
elaboration is not well-received and he is forced to exchange low-quality goods for his
refined goods. This is the main result of Otaki (2015).
Since the artisan-occupying ESS is Pareto dominant, individuals feel some vague
dissatisfaction whenever the economy remains in the capitalist-occupying ESS. Because
profit motive is the norm of the economy, individuals hardly find another type of
economy, in which social cohesion and confidence exist. We dub such vague
dissatisfaction as apathy. This is a type of alienation that hinders the accumulation ofmutual confidence in human behavior.
This study examines how an ESS is chosen in reality. The existing social norm andeducation play a crucial role. We also emphasize the tangibility of education. Social
norm is self-enforcing once it exceeds a certain threshold. Children are affected by theirparents because they observe and mimic the adults’ social and economic behavior. If aparticular behavior gains prominence and is frequently observed, it becomeswidespread among descendants. As such, a social norm is self-enforcing and becomes aspontaneous

order

in

Hayek’ssense.

The

foregoing

discussion

about

the

artisan-occupying and capitalist-occupying ESSs is a typical example.
Besides this self-enforcing mechanism, education plays an important role in directing
4

where the social norm evolves. In contrast with autonomous order, education isdesigned based on imperfect human knowledge. Metaphorically, it seems that there are
two types of education. One is the prevalent meritocratic education, which emphasizes
ability and achievement. The other to be accentuated is a new type of artisanship.
There is no denying that meritocratic education significantly contributes to themodernization or development of an economy. However, it should be noted that this typeof education is apt to exaggerate its own tangible fruits; for example, scores in
examinations and which college one graduates from. Such type of education nurtures
not only the nexus of useful abilities, which might be indispensable for the current
business world, but also lessens the ability to understand truth structurally from thebottom. Accordingly, such short-sighted education obliges people to become restless andpurposeless. Even politics and economics, few possess the deep and consistent insight ofsociety and economy, resulting in confusing society is disturbed by their hodge-podge
policies. As such, citizens who do not receive sufficient education also become restless
and aspire that their children rise through meritocratic education. Thus, all individuals
are entrenched by apathy.
Repetition and reconstruction are the vital concepts of this study. Dewey (1916)
emphasized the role of experience in education. As a prominent pragmatist, he proposedthat by systemizing experience for children, they can be given the structural knowledge.
Nevertheless, Dewey’s experimental elementary school was not sustainable. This factsuggests that his education program did not work well. Moreover, it is undeniable thatthe exiting artisanship demands unnecessary and unreasonable hardships for children.
In this sense, Dewey’s assertion is valid to reformulate the pre-modern artisanship.
However, what Dewey overlooks is the diversity of children. Even though income leveland social stratum to which their parents belong are affine, children’s cognition
patterns are quite diversified. Presuming such diversity, teachers have theresponsibility to help their students realize simple truth, and those which seemdifferent and/or unrelated are governed by simple principles.
To achieve the goal, repetition by elaborated variations of the same subject isdesirable. Hindering the saturation of students and concentrating on the same theme,
this kind of repetition is unavoidable. Ascertainment of the reconstruction ability of thelearned subject is also crucial for the new artisanship education. By reconstruction of
the concept taught, students acquire structural knowledge on the subject. This isbecause a student cannot achieve the reconstruction without understanding thecomposition of the subject and integrating the debris of experiences. The teacher mustnote that the expressions and presentations differ from one student to another. As long5

as these reconstructions are consistent, the teacher must not force the identicalexpression because such differences signify the diversity of students’ cognition pattern.
Initially, the dealt subject should be elementary in the sense that the distance
between inference and abstraction is not far. This is because students require sufficientaccumulation of learning experience to be patient to bear more complicated intellectual
training. We must acutely realize that the ultimate aim of this type of education is tonurture the intellectual curiosity in the true sense that education facilitates students tofind their own callings. As individuals, whose works are well-suited for themselves,increase, the social norm, which regards making money as only the consequence of theirsocial contribution, would prevail instead of meritocracy. Gradually, education affects
the social norm of an economy.
The dynamic manner in which education alters the social norm is depicted by thetheoretical bifurcation of equilibrium. For example, assume that there is an ESS
wherein artisans and capitalists coexist. In general, the tangibility of achievement ofeducation possibly prompts the meritocratic style rather than the new-artisan style.
This is because earned profits are a convenient measure for assessing individuals’
abilities in contrast with the evaluation of quality of produced goods. A government,
which strives to accelerate economic development (in developing economies), or is urged
to recover from a prolonged stagnation (in developed economies), is attracted to thistype of education.
Under such a situation, the artisan population gradually decreases because they
become more reluctant to trade with capitalists who produce low-quality goods due tothe meritocratic behavior. When a decrease in artisan population exceeds a certain
critical value, the foregoing equilibrium is unsustainable and vanishes, since artisanscannot be patient in such a situation due to their poor economic condition. Thus, thecoexisting equilibrium vanishes and all potential artisans metamorphose to capitalists.
In economic theory, such a drastic change in economic condition is called bifurcation. It
is evident that educational policy possibly evolves the social norm as such.
To summarize, a social norm is generated by the self-enforcing power. This
self-enforcing power originates from the high frequency of observation of a specific wayof life. For example, whenever meritocratic way of life becomes more prevalent,
individuals in the society have many opportunities to encounter and informally learnsuch a way of life, consequently, they become to regard this as the new norm.
Education is vital to determine toward which norm a society progresses. This isbecause education nurtures the foundation of value judgement and the rules of thumbin one’s life. If a society wishes to avoid the aforementioned apathy, whereby
6constituents cannot feel cohesion, new-artisanship should be introduced in the
education system. However, as the foregoing bifurcation theory tells us, unfatigued andintelligent efforts are required for such a reformation.
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs a model that shows how asocial norm is generated based on an evolutionary game with bounded rationality.
Section 3 considers the role of education in altering the social norm by using thebifurcation theory. Section 4 offers brief concluding remarks.

2. The Model
2.1 The Basic GameLet us consider a production economy in which self-consumption is prohibited. This
assumption implies that there exist infinite kinds of goods and that exchange isunavoidable to obtain the favorite goods. This means, in turn, producing high-quality
goods is a contribution to the overall society because this behavior is beneficial for
trading partners.
The total utility of an individual, U i , isU i  u(q j )  qi  c(qi ), i  j, q  0

u(0)  c(0)  0, 0  u'  1, u"  0, c' , c"  0, lim u'  0, lim c'  0, lim c'  , (1)
q

q0

q

where u is the utility obtained from exchanged goods and c denotes the cost for
producing goods. qi is the quality of goods. The second term of Equation (1) indicatesthat an individual feels felicity from producing high quality goods, which implies thathe potentially has the interest in contributing to society’s wellbeing through sincere
behavior.
Individuals are assumed to be bounded rational and cannot fully maximize theirutility. That is, two types of individual exist in this economy: artisan and capitalist. An
artisan concentrates on maximizing his partial utility obtained from producing highquality goods to the extent that he can manage his daily life, whoever his counterpart is.
This assumption implies that an artisan is more socialized in the sense that heindirectly contributes to the overall society by providing high-quality goods, although
this contribution is beyond his cognition.
Accordingly, his economic behavior is defined asmax  qi  c  qi  , s.t. u  q j   c  qi   0 .
qi

7

(2)

Whenever his counterpart belongs to the same type of individuals, the nonnegative
constraint is redundant by Inada condition in Equation (1) and the equilibrium strategy,q H , simply becomesc 'qH   1(3)Otherwise, by Kuhn-Tucker theorem, the equilibrium strategy, q , becomesAu(q j )  c(q A )  0, u(q j )  c(q H )  0(4)Equation (4) yields

q A  qH .

(5)

This inequality implies that the quality of goods exchanged among artisans is superior
to those between artisans and capitalists.
A capitalist is assumed to maximize joint utility whenever he encounters the same
type of individual, which implies that he is not directed to the widespread social concern,but the reciprocal relationship. Thus, the maximization problem when he encountersanother capitalist is

max u  q   c  q  .

(6)q

The corresponding necessary-sufficient condition isu ' qL   c ' qL .

(7)When a capitalist encounters an artisan, he writes the following contract with theartisan.

u  q A   c  q c  , s.t. (4),
max
C
A 


(9)

q ,q

where q and q are the quality of goods which an artisan and a capitalist produce,Acrespectively.
The equilibrium contract satisfiesu(q c* )  c(q A* )  0, u(q L )  c(q A* )  0 .

(10)where q is the optimal quality of a capitalist provides when he encounters an artisan.
c*q A* is that of an artisan when he matches a capitalist. It should be noted that, from
Equation (10), thatq c*  q L ,(11)is upheld.
Moreover, if qc*

 q H , all artisans produce quality q H goods, since their constraint (4)is redundant. However, the counterpart capitalist can consume such goods without
8

paying any compensation. Accordingly, the budget constraint of all artisans is violated.
Thus, this is a contradiction due to assuming qc*

 qH .

Therefore, it is clear thatq L  q c*  q H ,(12)is upheld.
Similarly, if qA* q L , by inequality (10),u(q L )  c(q L )  u(q L )  c(q A* )  0

holds.

This

inequality contradicts(13)

u  q L   c  q L   0 . Accordingly, q A*  q L .

Combining the above result with Inequality (5), we obtainq L  q A*  q H .

(14)Inequalities (12) and (14) imply that goods exchanged between artisans are superior in
quality to those exchanged between capitalists.
From Inequalities (5), (8), (12), and (14), we obtain the payoff matrix as shown in
Table 1. In addition, we assume that
Assumption 1.

The additional utility obtained by upgrading the quality is small enough andu(q L )  c(q L )  q A*  q L ,(15)holds.
This assumption implies that additional utility obtained by refining the skills for
production is less attractive than the remaining profit-centered motivation.
Based on Table 1, we obtain the following theorems1
Theorem 1.

Let  denote the ratio of artisans who occupy the economy. Then,   1 is an ESS of thisevolutionary game.
Proof.
Let the payoff function be denoted as   x, y  , where an individual strategy x and his
counterpart choses strategy y . x and y take the value 1 (play artisan) and 2 (playcapitalist), respectively. By definition, the necessary-sufficient condition for  1,1 being
1

Weibull (1995) is a useful textbook about evolutionary game theory.

9

an ESS is that there is a neighborhood  0,   such as (1, [1   ' ]  1  2   ' ),   (2, [1   ' ]  1  2   ' ),  '  .

(16)Inequality (15) is equivalent with 1,1    2,1 .

(17)

Since

 (1, 1)  u(q H )  q H  c(q H ),  (2, 1)  u(q A* )  q c*  c(q c* ) ,

 

(18)

 

Since q H  c q H  q c*  c q c* by definition, Inequality (16) is upheld. This completes
the proof.
Theorem 2.

  0 is another ESS.
Proof.
Similar to Theorem 1, the necessary-sufficient condition is (2, 1   ' 2  1   ' ),   (1, 1   ' 2  1   ' ),  '  .

(19)Then, Inequality (19) is equivalent with  2, 2    1, 2  .

(20)

Since

 (2, 2)  u (q L )  q L  c(q L ),  (1, 2)  u (q c* )  c(q A* )  q A*  q A*
 (2, 2)   (1, 2)  [u (q L )  c(q L )]  [q A*  q L ] 0,(21)

as far as Assumption 1 is satisfied, Inequality (20) holds. This completes the proof.
2.2 Formation of Social Norm and Multiple Frictional ESSs
Otaki (2015) analyzes the selection of the foregoing two ESSs by using the replicator
dynamics. However, this analysis is rather mechanical and lacks the background for thereason why such an equilibrium selection mechanism works. Rather than the replicator
dynamics, this study considers a more profound source of evolution of a society andpoints out the possibility of multiple frictional ESSs.
Frictional ESS is defined as follows:10Definition 1.

A frictional ESS is an ESS wherein some individuals still choose not to play theevolutionary stable strategy. That is, for some  '  0 and for all  such as 0 |  |  ' , exists that satisfies the following inequality: ( x, [   ]x  [1     ] y)   ( y, [   ]x  [1     ] y), 0    1 , (22)where x is an evolutionary stable strategy and y is the mutant strategy.
For clarifying the meaning of frictional ESS, let us classify how an individual’s
strategy alters in accordance with which type of player he encounters. There are four
matching cases: artisan versus artisan; artisan versus capitalist; capitalist versus
artisan; and capitalist versus capitalist. It is assumed that whenever the same type ofindividuals (artisan versus artisan and capitalist versus capitalist) encounters, their ortheir children’s behavior is unchanged because they achieve the best outcome thatsatisfies their bounded rationality.
The problem arises when different types of individuals are matched. In such a case,both types of individual encounter the conflict of the value of the way of life. It must be
noted that ethos exists, which is not easily affected by the short-run economic benefits.
Accordingly, even though the benefits earned by behaving as a capitalist dominate thoseas an artisan, when an artisan matches with a capitalist, only some artisans alter their
way of life. Let this staying ratio (the ratio of artisans who remains artisan for life) bedenoted as 1 t  . 1 is an differentiable function of  t . Similarly, when a capitalist
encounters an artisan and find that switching his way of life is meaningful, some ofthem change their lives. Let us denote the switching ratio  2 t  .  2 is also assumed to
be a differentiable function.
Thus, we define t   1 t    2 t (23)

It must be noted that(0)  1 (0)   2 (0)  0  0  0, (1)  1 (1)   2 (1)  1  1  2, (24)holds because   0,1 are ESSs. The dynamics of the occupying rate of artisan in theeconomy  t evolves by the following difference equation:

t 1  t2  t 1  t   t  ,(25)

The first term of Equation (25) is the probability of (artisan, artisan) pair being
11

combined. The second term is the sum of the probability that an artisan remains in thesame way of life even though he encounters a capitalist and the probability that acapitalist change his way of life by becoming aware of an alternative life style.
Equation (24) determines the dynamics of the social norm in the sense that which
way of life people are likely to prefer. Let function f be defined asf     2   1       .

(26)

From Equation (22), we obtainf ' (0)  0, f ' (1)  2  [1  2]  2  0 .

(27)

f is a continuous function within  0,1 . Accordingly, as illustrated in Figure 1, f has,at least, one other intersection with the 45 line than at   0,1 .
In such a case as shown in Figure 2, the economy converges to either artisan-occupying
ESS (   1 ) or capitalist-occupying ESS (   0 ). To which of the ESSs the economy
converges is determined by its history. Here, history means the initial occupying ratio  0 .
However, such an assertion is rather improper because there were some drastic shifts insocial norm, as Riesman (1950) summarizes succinctly. In addition, it is plausible toregard that artisanship and profit-centered motive coexist at any time. Therefore, more
prudent analysis is necessary. In the next section, we consider a more general case of
the evolution of social norm, and reveal how education affects the organization of social
norm.
In preparation for the study, the following theorem is convenient.
Theorem 3.

Artisan-occupying ESS (   1 ) dominates capitalist-occupying ESS (   0 ) in the
Pareto sense.
Proof.
Since (1, 1)  u(q H )  q H  c(q H ),  (2, 2)  u(q L )  q L  c(q L ) ,andqH  c  qH   qL  c qL 
holds,  1,1    2, 2  . This inequality completes the proof.

12

This theory implies that if profit-centered behavior prevails in the overall economy,
individuals feel some vagueness due to the alienation from the cohesion obtained bypursuing quality. We call this vagueness apathy. Nevertheless, once a society is
immersed by profit-centered motivation, owing to the bound rationality of humanbeings, most constituents cannot pursuit the origin of apathy; and thus, the society is
entrapped in a vicious cycle for a long time.

3. Coexistence of Artisan and Capitalist and the Role of Education
3.1 The Coexistence ESSs
Whenf   takes shape as shown in Figure 2, the coexistence of artisan andcapitalist can be depicted by Point C (    * ). 2 In such cases, Point C is a stable
frictional ESS as the arrows in the figure indicate. From Inequality (20), an elementary
calculation leads us to the following lemma:
Lemma 1.

If

0  *   2, 2    1, 2 , 1,1    2,1     2, 2    1, 2  

holds, the frictional ESS is dominated by the way of life of the capitalist. The dominanceimplies that capitalist type strategy is an evolutionary stable policy. In contrast,  2, 2    1, 2  * 1 1,1    2,1     2, 2    1, 2  
implies that the frictional ESS is dominated by the way of life of artisan.
The coexistence in capitalist-dominating frictional ESS comes from devotement toartisanship. Even though sticking to artisanship is economically disadvantageous when2

Since Point C is a stable fixed point, the following conditions must be satisfied. That is,  *   1,

f '  *   1   * 1   *   '  *   1   '  *   0.

 

It is assumed that   decreases at least locally because there are non-negligible
individuals who are not well-suited for accepting artisanship.

13

capitalist style prevails to some extent, as Theorem 2 advocates, some people emphasize
on keeping artisanship itself. However, artisanship in such situation disrupts the social
order, as will be proved in Theorem 4.
Conversely, if Point C is located at the artisan-dominating ESS, the economy faces toan opportunity to improve performance, at least locally. An increase in the number ofartisans provides more advantageous opportunities wherein high-quality goods are
distributed among artisans.
Although Theorem 3 clarifies that the artisan-occupying ESS dominates thecapitalist-occupying ESS, we do not know the economic welfare of the coexistence ESS
yet. The overall welfare of the society at an ESS (we assume that utility is cardinal),

TU   , becomes
TU ( )   (1,1) 2   (1, 2)   (2,1) [1   ]   (2, 2)[1   ]2(28)
 (1, 2)   (2,1)    (1,1)   (2,1)   (2, 2)   (1, 2)  2  2  (2, 2) 



(
2
,
2
).

2


Accordingly, from Assumption 13,

 (1, 2)   (2,1) 
TU ' ( )  2  (1,1)   (2,1)   (2, 2)   (1, 2)   2  (2, 2) 2 TU ' (0)  0, TU ' (1)  0(29)

Since TU '   is a continuous function, there is the minimal value of TU   within theinterval, 0    1 , as illustrated by Figure 3. This discussion is summarized by
Theorem 4.

There are coexistence ESSs that are inferior to the capitalist-occupying ESS. However,if the occupying ratio of artisans is sufficiently large, there are also superior frictional
ESSs to the foregoing capitalist-occupying ESS.
This theorem implies that there are cases that more uniformed the social order becomes,
the more efficient resource allocation is achieved even though such a society is akin to3

By Assumption 1,

 (1, 2)   (2,1)

q A*  u (q A* )  q c*  c(q c* )
2
2
h
c*
c*
A*
c*
c*
A*
c*
u (q )  q  c(q )  q
u (q )  c(q )  [q  q ]


 0,
2
2

 (1, 1)  u (q h )  q h  c(q h ) holds. Therefore, TU ' 1  0 .

14

capitalist-occupying ESS. The reason is that two juxtaposing different social orders
disrupt the principle of way of life.
Nevertheless, we must evoke Theorem 3. No matter how rich a society becomes, its
individuals are bothered by a kind of vagueness: apathy, as Riesman (1964) dubbed in
one of his books “Abundance for What?’’ Because there is one factor that cannot bealtered by such prosperity: social cohesion generated by sincere work and mutual
respect.
3.2 The Role of Education and Bifurcation TheoryAs

discussedintheIntroduction,

meritocratic

educationissuperior

to a

new-artisanship education on the point of tangibility. People, who are impoverishedinitially, possibly feel great felicity from increased economic surplus. This undeniable
fact implies that meritocratic education is easy to implement, especially in developing
economies which are located at the artisanship-dominated coexisting frictional ESS
wherein economic welfare is lower than that of the capitalist-occupying equilibrium.
Nevertheless, even though the prevalent meritocratic education might achieve ahighly industrialized and profit-centered economy, as aforementioned, residents in suchan economy are inescapable from apathy, which comes from the alienation from thesociety. This is because the first-best allocation is achievable only when the economy
reaches the artisan-occupying ESS. Accordingly, a new type of artisanship education,
which emphasizes the social contribution of one’s work via nurturing mutual
respectfulness caused by realizing widespread elaboration in the production process, isurgently desirable.
In general, that the effect of education is discontinuous and dominates once it exceeds
a threshold. Such a phenomenon is called bifurcation. Figure 4 illustrates thisbifurcation wherein the coexisting frictional ESS (Point C in Figure 2) vanishes, and theartisan-occupying equilibrium ensues.
The shift in function f in Figure 4 is the effect of a new type of artisanship education.
Whenever education is prompted to nurture artisanship, we can interpret that thevalue of function  increases for a given  ; thus, function f shifts upward (from thedotted curve to the real line). Bifurcation does not occur until the upward shift issignificantly large. Before the bifurcation happens, the society experiences a gradualincrease in the occupying ratio of artisan  even though the economic welfare might beaggravated conversely.
However,  exceeds a certain value, and the frictional ESS, which is expressed by
Point C , will disappear and bifurcation occurs. The society overcomes the wedge of15

capitalists and converges to the first-best outcome. This discussion suggests thatmeaningful education must endure the short-sighted criticism and be controlled andadapted from a long-term perspective that emphasizes on social cohesion sustained bysincere work.

4. Concluding Remarks
By assuming the bounded rationality of human beings, this study analyzes how a social
norm is created and evolves. Education plays a crucial role in constructing an efficientsocial norm while the efficiency is defined more general than usual in the sense that theobjective function includes not only profits but also job satisfaction. The following
results have been obtained.
First, owing to their bounded rationality, when people face the choice of artisanship or
capitalist life, two stable ESSs exist in a society: artisan-occupying ESS andcapitalist-occupying ESS. The former ESS is Pareto superior because high-quality goods
are exchanged within the society and every individual satisfied with their work.
Accordingly, how to achieve an artisan-occupying society is the ultimate aim ofeducation.
Second, artisans and capitalists coexist in reality. We have succeeded in showing theexistence of such kind of ESS by extending the concept of equilibrium (i.e., frictional
ESS). On the coexistence equilibrium, wherein the profit-centered strategy is theevolutionary stable strategy, an increase in the number of artisans harms the well-beingof the society at least in the short run. This is because the conflict between different
values becomes serious and social order is disrupted. In such a case, the society begins
to feel that artisanship is out dated, and meritocratic and capitalist-promoting
education gains prominence instead. This movement might be accelerated by thetangibility of meritocratic education. This phenomenon corresponds to the phase of theindustrialization that Veblen (1904) criticizes.
Finally, according to the bifurcation theory, when pragmatic and artisan-promoting
education is gradually immersed, the wedge of profit-centered motive, which hinders
the society from moving toward the artisan-occupying ESS, fades away. If such atendency reaches a certain point, the society autonomously begins evolving toward thefirst-best outcome: artisan-occupying ESS. In this sense, true education, which aims atsocial cohesion by nurturing mutual respectfulness to every sincere work, requires
generousness to the diversity of children and deep patience with the slow progress ofreformation by its nature.
16

References
Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and Education: an Introduction to the Philosophy of

Education, Reprinted by Free Press, New York, 1997.
Otaki, M. (2015). “On the Limit of Human Cognition: Is Artisanship always Dominatedby Profit Motive?’” International Journal of Humanities Social Sciences andEducation, Vol.2, Issue 6, pp. 49-57.
Riesman, D. (1950). The Lonely Crowd: a Study of the Changing American Character,
New Heaven, Yale University Press.
Riesman, D. (1964). Abundance for What? Revised version by Transaction Publishers,
New Brunswick, 1993.
Veblen, T. (1904). The Theory of Business Enterprise, reprinted by Cosimo Inc., New
York, 2005.
Weibull, J. W. (1995). Evolutionary Game Theory, Massachusetts, MIT Press.

17Figure1: Formation of Social Order18Figure 2: Coexisting Equilibrium

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Figure3: The Total Utility

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Figure 4: The Bifurcation

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Table1: The Payoﬀ Matrix

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