Perspectives on Global Risks: the 3rd JEF Global Risk Symposium 2

By Mark Fitzpatrick

Introduction
My career has focused on the North Korea nuclear issue for 30
years, and on Iran’s for two decades. With regard to North Korea, I,
like everyone else, failed. After six nuclear tests, North Korea can
produce thermonuclear bombs. It can probably miniaturize thewarheads and attach them to missiles that can reach as far as
Florida. With regard to Iran, we have not failed – not yet anyway,
although with the 2015 nuclear deal in shatters, Iran is beginning
slowly to resume its march to a nuclear weapons capability.
Both North Korea and Iran can be called “outlaw states” in thateach violates many international norms. They are notorious for their
nuclear programs, ballistic missiles, human rights abuses,
aggressive actions and detention of foreign citizens. They are thus
often cast in the same category. And why not, since they havecooperated in developing ballistic missiles and possibly in sharing
some nuclear data, though the evidence for this is far lessconclusive.
But Iranians, seeing themselves as culturally and economicallysuperior, dislike being grouped with the backward hermit state. And
to be fair, North Korea is a far worse actor. Unlike Iran, it hasdeveloped and tested nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic
missiles; it has stockpiled and used chemical weapons, and it
employs cybercrime as a regular tool of statecraft. While Iran has
elections, however circumscribed, gender equality in many respects
and religious principles, North Korea’s dynastic system lacks civilrights and principles of any kind.
And yet, today, North Korea is treated far better. While both states
are subject to extensive economic sanctions, North Korea has strong
partners who provide a diplomatic shield and acquiesce in its
sanctions-evasion techniques. Its alliances with China and Russia areless dependable than in the past, but having them on its side gives
North Korea diplomatic options. Russia and China have friendly
relations with Iran, and cooperate tactically, but they protect Iran to a
far lesser degree.
Meanwhile, North Korea is courted by every major player with thesole exception of Japan. In the past two years, Chairman Kim Jong
Un has met with the leaders of China, Russia, South Korea and theUnited States – three times in both of the latter two cases. I expect
there will be yet another with President Donald Trump before long.
The US president excused North Korea’s mid-2019 series of
missile tests on grounds that they were only short-range and thus
66 Japan SPOTLIGHT • January / February 2020

Author Mark Fitzpatrick

not contradictory to Kim’s moratorium on intercontinental ballistic
missile launches. The rest of the US government knows that thosetests were a violation of UN Security Council sanctions. They also
know the missiles pose a threat to US military personnel and othercitizens working and living in Northeast Asia, not to mention the
combined 180 million citizens of Japan and South Korea. But Trumpis trying to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough with North Korea thatwould redound to his glory, and thus he is willing to overlook
evidence which strongly suggests that Kim has no intention of giving
up his nuclear arsenal.
In Singapore last year, Trump agreed to suspend large-scale
US-South Korea joint military exercises, and he excused North
Korea’s human rights violations, among other concessions. In a
post-summit press conference, he even declared his willingness tounilaterally withdraw US forces. Trump stopped describing US policy
toward North Korea as one of “maximum pressure” and he treats
Kim with fawning affection, even going so far as saying that they “fellin love”. He was speaking metaphorically, of course, but what an odd
metaphor to describe partnership with a despot.

Comparison to Recent Past
This coddling of North Korea is a new phenomenon – at least in
the case of the US and South Korea. China and Russia were always
willing to look the other way when North Korea broke the rules. Up
until 2018, China did go along with tougher UN measures. WhenSouth Korean President Moon Jae-In and Donald Trump pursued astrategy of engagement, however, China relaxed its sanctions
implementation. Japan, by contrast, has been consistently tough. But
it can do little on its own. Hence, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s
persistent courtship of Trump, encouraging him to remain firm.
Unfortunately, this courtship has gone largely unrequited. Trump
pays lip service when he meets with Abe, then often does the
opposite in his interactions with Kim.
Only in Hanoi in February 2019 did Trump refuse to give in to Kim.
There, both sides overplayed their hands. Kim insisted on an end to
all UN sanctions, in exchange for an ambiguous offer to close down
the Yongbyon nuclear center while leaving other undeclared facilities
producing enriched uranium. Trump demanded complete
denuclearization before the US would offer sanctions relief. He does
not understand that North Korea will not unilaterally disarm. Nuclear
weapons are vital to the regime’s sense of self-preservation. It would
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Perspectives on Global Risks: the 3rd JEF Global Risk Symposium 2

be better to pursue more limited objectives, such as verified
dismantlement of all fissile material production and an end to missile
tests, while maintaining the goal of denuclearization.

Tough on Iran
Meanwhile, Trump has been exceedingly tough on Iran. Calling the2015 Iran nuclear agreement the “worst deal ever”, he walked out on
it in May 2018 even though Iran had been faithfully abiding by its
conditions. Trump then imposed the harshest ever sanctions, which
he has continued to tighten, even putting Iran’s Foreign Minister
Javad Zarif on the US Treasury’s black list in August 2019. Trump’s
claim to want negotiations with Iran is incompatible with blackballing
Iran’s top negotiator. I believe the real purpose of the “maximum
pressure” campaign is to weaken Iran and to encourage regimechange.
America’s best friends are nevertheless still trying to mediate
between Washington and Tehran. Abe offered to carry a message
from Trump when he traveled to Iran in June. Unfortunately, theeffort came to naught. Although Iran made a gesture by releasing an
American resident whom it had detained, Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei rebuffed Abe’s effort, saying: “I do not see Trump as
worthy of any message exchange, and I do not have any reply forhim, now or in the future.”French President Emmanuel Macron then tried. He twice sent his
top adviser to Tehran and he invited Zarif to the G-7 Summit in
Biarritz, in hopes of arranging a meeting at the UN between Trumpand Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. But Iranians are notinterested in such “photo-ops”. Unlike Kim, who derives international
legitimacy by sitting at the table as an equal of the US president, it
would be politically dangerous for Rouhani to appear friendly to a US
leader who is trying to kill the 2015 nuclear deal. Rouhani was evenunable for political reasons to shake President Barack Obama’s handat the UN in 2013. After the G-7 meeting, Rouhani insisted that
before there can be any positive diplomatic development, the US
must first abandon its sanctions. Trump is highly unlikely to do this.

Why the Different Approaches?
There are several reasons why the US treats Iran more harshly
than North Korea. One factor is psychological. Americans have notgotten over the anger and humiliation we felt when Iran seized ourembassy in 1979 and held 52 US diplomats hostage for 444 days.
We often forget that North Korea did something similar a decade
earlier, when it seized the USS Pueblo spy ship, keeping its 83 crew
members hostage for 11 months, even torturing them. North Korea
still holds on to the Pueblo, using it as a propaganda museum. Yet
Iran’s hostage taking is more seared into our memory because thedrama of it was aired daily on television news. By contrast, there
were no foreign TV crews in Pyongyang to witness the humiliation of
the Pueblo.
America’s history with North Korea suggests a second reason fordifferent treatment. Having fought an inconclusive costly war in the
Korea Peninsula, the US is not inclined to do so again. Hence, it ismore willing to seek diplomatic solutions. America does not wantanother war in the Middle East either. Yet its main partners in theregion – Israel and Saudi Arabia – often appear eager for the US todeal Iran a military blow. Leaked US diplomatic cables from 2008
recounted Saudi King Abdullah’s repeated call for the US to attack
Iran to put an end to its nuclear weapons program. He urged
Washington to “cut off the head of the snake” – meaning tooverthrow the Islamic republic. In Northeast Asia, America’s allies
are not similarly calling for the US to attack North Korea or to
remove its regime. To the contrary, they advocate peaceful
diplomacy.
Actually, of late, Saudi Arabia has not been calling for the US to
attack Iran, even after Trump asked what they wanted him to do,after the Sept. 14, 2019 attack on the Saudi pipeline and oil refinery.
The Saudis are wary about direct military engagement with Iran. As
former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, the Saudis
always want to “fight the Iranians to the last American”.
Interestingly, Japan distanced itself from the US on this matter.
While US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo expressed confidence Iranwas responsible, Defense Minister Taro Kono expressedagnosticism. I have not seen the evidence, but I believe Iran had amotive: it made clear for months that if it cannot export oil, thenneither should its Arab rivals. Iran does not want the Saudis to plug
the oil supply gap caused by the sanctions on Iran. The US says it
has high confidence about Iran’s culpability. If so, the evidence
should be shared with Japan and other key allies.
Thirdly, Iran’s antagonism toward Israel adds to Americans’ senseof grievance. Iran’s call to “wipe the Zionist state off the map” should
not be taken literally. It means if all Palestinians are allowed to vote,
Israel could not remain Zionist. Yet such apparent calls forannihilation, sometimes expressed more luridly, evoke memories ofthe Holocaust and make Americans determined to protect Israel by
any means. Most fervent in their protectiveness, America’s large
community of evangelical Christians finds common cause with
Americans of Jewish faith. Combined with the 1 million-strong
Iranian diaspora in the US, many of whom came when the Shah was
overthrown in 1979, the anti-Islamic Republic of Iran political lobby
is formidable. Neither Iran nor North Korea has any friends in the US,
but Iran has more avowed enemies, many of whom are well-placed
to promote policies of antipathy.
Fourthly, there are factors involving geography. The most obvious
is oil; over half of the world’s oil reserves are in the Middle East, andJapan SPOTLIGHT • January / February 202067

Perspectives on Global Risks: the 3rd JEF Global Risk Symposium 2

Iran ranks fourth in the world in this regard. That makes it
intrinsically more important than oil-deprived North Korea.
The other geographic factor is that South Korea’s capital and one
quarter of its population are within range of enemy artillery. Even
before North Korea’s nuclear tests, its conventional weapons held
Seoul hostage. Despite repeated North Korean provocations over theyears, South Korea and the US avoided a kinetic response that could
have rekindled the Korean War. Now that Pyongyang has nuclear
weapons, it has an even stronger means of deterring attack. In the
Middle East, Iran troubles its neighbors in many ways, but it does
not pose a similar existential threat. So that it can never pose such a
threat, Washington is determined by any means to prevent Tehran
from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
Defense thinkers in Japan and South Korea once thought that the
US would similarly do everything necessary to block North Korea
from getting nuclear weapons. Americans failed in this regard,
because we and South Korea were not willing to go to war to stop
the nuclear program. The cost seemed to be too high. In the Middle
East, the cost of war appears to be lower.
A fifth reason for treating Iran more firmly is the nature of thethreat it poses. Although North Korea is a worse actor, its bad
actions are limited geographically. Iran’s regional activities, including
its patronage of non-state militias and promotion of a so-called“Shiite crescent”, collide with US interests from Lebanon to Yemen.
Because of its support for groups like Hezbollah that conduct
terrorist acts, Iran is judged by the US to be the world’s greatest
sponsor of terrorism. By contrast, North Korea’s juche ideology has
no appeal beyond its immediate borders – and even many of thecitizens within those borders surely see through the falsehood of theself-reliance slogan.
North Korea’s bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 in 1987 landed thecountry on Washington’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, but it
was removed in 2008 to promote a diplomatic breakthrough andbecause it had not conducted more recent acts of terrorism.
There were legitimate grounds for restoring the state sponsor of
terrorism designation in 2017. North Korea’s use of chemical
weapons to assassinate the leader’s half-brother Kim Jong Nam at
Kuala Lumpur airport that year was an act of terrorism by almost any
definition. Why else use such a gruesome means of murder unlessthe purpose was to evoke terror? North Korea’s cyber hack of Sony
Pictures in 2014 and its cyber thefts from banks and cryptocurrency
exchanges to the amount of $2 billion, according to a new UN report,
also qualify as terrorism by some definitions. Failure to fully accountand make amends for its abduction of citizens from Japan and othercountries add to the list of grievances among concerned states. Yet,
to Washington at least, North Korea is seen as a less formidable foe,a more contained threat, in comparison with Iran.
A final reason for treating the two states differently is personal.
68 Japan SPOTLIGHT • January / February 2020

Trump is determined to outshine his predecessor Obama and to
undo the latter’s accomplishments. In Trump’s mind, the Iran deal isbad because it was Obama’s deal. And since Obama was unable to
make any progress with North Korea, Trump wants to show theworld that he is the one who can.

Prospective Deal with North Korea
Looking ahead, I see grounds for both optimism and cynicism.
Given Trump’s egocentricity and his need for a diplomaticachievement before the 2020 presidential election, I believe he will be
inclined to try to strike a limited deal with North Korea. The
prospects for this have improved now that John Bolton is no longer
in the White House. He opposed engagement with North Korea andinsisted on an all-or-nothing deal, surely knowing that North Korea
will not give up its nuclear weapons entirely. The Hanoi summit thus
failed.
The deal that might be possible with Pyongyang would not
eliminate its nuclear weapons program, nor its missiles. And theverification measures would be limited. The deal would not address
the other problems North Korea presents, including its chemical
weapons, its human rights violations, its cybercrimes, its
counterfeiting and its smuggling. The agreement I foresee would
contain and reduce the nuclear threat to some degree. In many
respects, it would resemble the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, althoughwith fewer constraints and less detail. It would be worse than what
Trump repeatedly calls “the worst deal ever”.
He is wrong to say so. In light of the alternatives, and the state of
the Iran nuclear program before it was stopped, the 2015 agreement
was good. It blocked any potential for an Iranian nuclear weapon fora number of years and thus also obviated the likelihood of war. So, I
will not prematurely cast judgement on an imperfect deal with North
Korea. To quote Voltaire, we should not let the perfect be the enemyof the good.
This essay is drawn from the author’s presentation at the Third
International Symposium on Global Risks, on Sept. 19, 2019 held by
the Japan Economic Foundation in coordination with Komatsu
Research and Advisory.

Mark Fitzpatrick is an associate fellow at the International Institute forStrategic Studies (IISS). He headed the IISS non-proliferation and nuclear
policy program for 10 years at the London headquarters and then ran theinstitute’s Washington office from 2015-2018. He is the author or editor of 10
books about proliferation issues concerning Iran, North Korea and othercountries and regions of concern.