Perspectives on Global Risks: the 3rd JEF Global Risk Symposium 1

Author Eva Pejsova

By Eva Pejsova

The European Union and Japan have never been closer. Although
they have always been like-minded partners, sharing the values of
democracy, rule of law and human rights, their bilateral relations
have almost exclusively focused on trade and economic issues,neglecting the potential of closer political and security cooperation.
However, the last two years saw an important shift. The signing of
the EU–Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement in June 2018
signaled the willingness to deepen consultations and cooperation on
global security issues. The EU–Japan Economic Partnership
Agreement, in force since February 2019, created the world’s
greatest free trade zone, connecting almost a third of the global
market. Finally, on the occasion of the visit of Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe to Brussels at the end of September 2019, theEU and Japan signed a “Partnership for Sustainable Connectivity” topromote “free, open, rules-based, fair, non-discriminatory andpredictable regional and international trade”, outlining a concreteroadmap for functional cooperation in the domain.
These upward developments are not only a sign of a maturing
relationship; they are a result of a growing number of shared security
concerns. First, the current Washington policy of putting “America
first” has led to the realization by many of its traditional allies,
including Europe and Japan, of the need to bolster their own security
profiles to defend their interests. The expanding influence of China in
Europe and its neighborhood, accelerated in the context of its Beltand Road Initiative (BRI), has made the EU more aware and moreconcerned about Beijing’s global strategic ambitions. Finally, thenegative impacts of the strategic rivalry between China and theUnited States and the polarizing effect it has on the broader IndoPacific region is another reason for like-minded countries to defend
more proactively the current multilateral rules-based order.
What role can the EU and Japan play in this changing strategic
environment? This paper first analyzes the emerging security
dynamic within the Indo-Pacific, defined by a new type of great
power politics, and the dangers it poses for regional stability. Itfurther highlights the type of foreign policy action that could ease
down these tensions, broadly defined by the concept of “middlepower diplomacy”. Finally, it suggests some concrete areas for the
EU and Japan to deepen their cooperation beyond connectivity, in thefield of maritime security and security in Africa.

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The Indo-Pacific: a New Playing Field
Ever since Japan first officially presented its vision for a “Free andOpen Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) in 2016, the concept has become asynonym for the changing strategic dynamic in the region.
Geographically, the Indo-Pacific underscores the natural
confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, shifting the regional
strategic balance westwards. It reflects the emergence of new
security actors and policies, including China’s BRI, the growing roleof India as a regional player, the diplomatic rapprochement between
Japan and India, and the increasing relevance of Europe.
Functionally, it focuses on boosting trade and connectivity togenerate growth, prosperity and cooperation, noting also theimportance of the African continent to Asian countries for trade andnatural resources. Finally, the concept is loaded with ideology,emphasizing values and principles that should underpin it, such as
freedom of navigation, free trade, and rule of law.
Although Japan’s original idea was to promote an inclusive andcooperative regional architecture, it has been widely interpreted by
China as an attempt to control its rise. Indeed, there is little doubtthat the FOIP concept has been formulated in response to China’s
growing strategic influence across the region. Since its launch in2015, large-scale investments in strategic infrastructure (ports,
telecommunications, energy) along its BRI in the Indian Ocean,
Africa and Europe have enabled Beijing to exert pressure on
governments to achieve political goals. Culminating debt-traps havebecome a growing concern for the international community.
After Washington formulated its own “Indo-Pacific Strategy” in
2016, the region has become a theatre for a rising great power
rivalry between the US and China. The decision of the US, Japan,
India and Australia to revive the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in2017 is a sign of democratic powers stepping up in defense of thecurrent rules-based order. Albeit it is only an informal consultation
mechanism, it further added to the growing divide and tensions
between the status quo powers and Beijing.

Theatre of Power Politics
Discussions about the regional strategic dynamic quickly shift to abroader debate on the emergence of a new world order, dominatedby a new type of great power relations. In a recent opinion piece
published in the New York Times, a group of distinguished former
https://www.jef.or.jp/journal/

Perspectives on Global Risks: the 3rd JEF Global Risk Symposium 1

world leaders warn of the grave impact of a US–China trade war on
the global economy and stability, and the risk of recession it posesfor developed countries (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/
opinion/china-trade.html). Using the example of the Cold War, theyraised concerns about the divisive character of the dispute, forcing
many nations to choose between the two powers. While the current
trade tensions have indeed accelerated this trend, polarization of the
Indo-Pacific started even before, dividing countries along thecompeting spheres of influence through investments, historicallinkages and ideological proximities. Many small and middle-sizedcountries in Southeast and South Asia feel the growing pressure tochoose their strategic camps.
The impact of the current tensions is not limited to trade andsecurity. The competition takes place on all fronts – including inresearch and technology – with implications for the broad spectrumof human and economic activities. It shifts attention away fromeveryday functional security issues, such as transnational crime,
environmental or human security issues, which need to beaddressed through cooperative efforts. Finally, it undermines theachievements and the potential of existing multilateral structures in
the region – whether the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or the Indian
Ocean Rim Association – to provide some form of regional
governance.

Time for “Middle-Power Diplomacy”
The US-China rivalry tends to define the Indo-Pacific in binary
terms and limits the field of possibilities for other important regional
actors – Japan, India, ASEAN, South Korea or even the EU. All theseplayers maintain strong economic ties with China and close security
relationships with the US, and all try to navigate the growing tide ofpower politics to protect their interests. But they also need to step up
their efforts collectively to contain the risks stemming from theescalating competition. Importantly, some key global issues, such as
climate change, technological progress, or much needed institutional
reforms (such as the WTO) can only be addressed through effective
international cooperation, with the participation of both the US andChina.
This is where the concept of “middle-power diplomacy” offerssome useful guidance. The term “middle powers” was widely used in
the Cold War context to refer to countries that are neither great
powers nor small powers that would simply suffer the hegemony
imposed by others. They are usually stable, prosperous democracies
that do not have substantial military capabilities to be strategic gamechangers on their own, but can still exert influence on theinternational scene through economic and diplomatic means.
“Middle-power diplomacy” describes a specific form of foreign
policy: one that seeks multilateral solutions, peaceful settlement ofdisputes, adherence to international norms and preservation of arules-based global order as an essential prerequisite for global
stability. In other terms, it is the “good citizen” behavior that could
stabilize the global order through influence in international
institutions and promote principles of preventive diplomacy andcrisis management, but also human security and environmental
issues.
At times when many countries find themselves caught “in the
middle” of the US–China great power rivalry, joining forces inaddressing these challenges and bearing a collective responsibility toprotect the global order may be a way forward.

What Role for the EU?
The EU has been most overlooked in the Indo-Pacific debate. In
Asia, Europe has traditionally been viewed as a distant player withlittle influence over regional security. This was partly due to its
geographical distance, but mostly to its limited security toolbox anda profile of a solely economic power.
The EU decided not to adopt its own “Indo-Pacific” strategy for theregion and keeps referring to the Indian Ocean, Asia and the Pacificseparately. This is partly due to the EU’s heavy strategic baggage
implicitly contained in the term. In the minds of many diplomats inBrussels, the Indo-Pacific remains connected to the US strategy forthe region, which openly points fingers at China and Russia as main
enemies. Although the EU may share most concerns vis-à-vis theregional threat environment, it does not share the same strategic
culture. Its “strategies”, often criticized for being too vague and too
weak, do not refer to specific actors. Rather, they refer to the type of
behaviors and values it opposes and the kind of norms it wants topromote.
That does not mean it has not followed regional developments
closely. As a global trading power, it has legitimate interests insecurity and stability in Asia. Also, the EU has legal responsibilities
vis-à-vis its Asian partners stemming from its membership of the
ARF and its accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
2012. Finally, as a normative superpower, the EU has a strategicinterest in promoting norms and principles that underpin the current
rules-based order, including respect for international law and its
institutions.
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Perspectives on Global Risks: the 3rd JEF Global Risk Symposium 1

Over the past years, especially since its accession to the Treaty ofAmity and Cooperation, the EU has been most vocal about its
interest in playing a more proactive role in regional security.
Although it may not be considered a “middle power” as such, its
policy has always been to support the cooperative multilateral
security architecture and preventive diplomatic measures to easeregional conflicts. Finally, it has been using its technical expertiseand experience to build the capacity of regional countries inaddressing various non-traditional, functional security issues – fromtransnational crime to border management and environmental
issues.

EU–Japan Cooperation:
From Connectivity to Security
The current strengthening of EU–Japan ties beyond economic
cooperation is most timely. Both Japan and the EU are atypicalsecurity actors, with political constraints limiting their capacity to
project power through military means. However, together they
represent a third of the global market and weigh significantly inworld affairs through their economic and diplomatic leverage. They
share the same vision of building a stable and prosperous IndoPacific based on multilateral cooperation and the rule of law. Finally,
they possess significant human and technological resources andexpertise to address the many outlying non-traditional security
issues, as well as global challenges related to climate change,
research and innovation, and environmental governance.
Among the functional areas ripe for closer EU–Japan cooperation,connectivity has been the most logical starting point. Promoting
physical, people-to-people and institutional connectivity is the
backbone of the FOIP’s economic agenda, linking up to Tokyo’s
tradition of infrastructure investments in Southeast and South Asia.
The EU published its “Connectivity strategy” (“Connecting Europe
and Asia - Building Blocks for an EU Strategy”, Sept. 19, 2018,
accessible at https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_
communication_-_connecting_europe_and_asia_-_building_blocks_
for_an_eu_strategy_2018-09-19.pdf) partly as a response to China’s
BRI, to underscore the rules and principles that should govern all
connectivity projects in the region – namely, economic, social andenvironmental sustainability, transparency and the rule of law. The
recent conclusion of the EU–Japan Partnership for Sustainable
Connectivity, promoting high-quality infrastructure and free, fair,
open and rules-based trade and investments is a logical step in acommon direction and certainly most welcome. That said,
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connectivity can only flourish in a safe and stable environment. Even
the most environmentally friendly and efficient seaport, built
according to the highest quality standards, will not prosper if it islocated in a country torn by domestic conflicts or in waters affectedby geopolitical tensions. Joining forces to address the various
sources of instability across the Indo-Pacific is therefore essential toensure sustainable growth and prosperity in the region.

Maritime Security
Maritime security presents a vast array of opportunities forcooperation for both partners. The outbreak of piracy (whether inSoutheast Asia at the end of 1990s or in the Western Indian Ocean
since 2008) is one issue that has managed to bring the international
community together and steer an unprecedented level ofcooperation.
However, there are many other issues that need to be addressed
through concerted efforts. Unsustainable exploitation of marine
natural resources, environmental destruction and proliferation of
seaborne criminal activities (illegal fishing, drug smuggling andpeople trafficking) are lasting security challenges that keep
undermining the economy and stability in Southeast and South Asia
and Africa. Moreover, the region crucially lacks effective cooperative
institutional frameworks for multilateral governance.
While Japan has contributed most to enhancing maritime safety
and security in Southeast Asia, providing navigation systems,
countering piracy, building law enforcement capacity and enhancing
port security, the EU has been most active in similar activities inAfrica. Building capacity for maritime law enforcement has been a
key component of its comprehensive approach to countering piracy
in the Horn of Africa as well as in the Gulf of Guinea. Projects suchas E€OFISH have been targeting illegal, unreported and unregulated(IUU) fishing, and developing sustainable fisheries and viable blue
economies in East Africa and the Indian Ocean (bilaterally andthrough the Indian Ocean Commission), crucial for sustainablegrowth and stability in the region. (In 2018, the EU provided 28
million euros to promote sustainable fisheries in the region under the
E€OFISH program.) Finally, the EU has been investing most inenhancing shipping safety in the Indian Ocean and Africa through its
Critical Maritime Routes programs, providing technological tools forbetter Maritime Domain Awareness, capacity-building and training
for regional law enforcement agencies and setting up regional
information-fusion and information-sharing centers (https://www.
crimario.eu/en/the-project/rationale-objectives/). If the EU and Japan
aim to improve connectivity at sea, they also need to promote

Perspectives on Global Risks: the 3rd JEF Global Risk Symposium 1

multilateral cooperation and institutional mechanisms in the Indian
Ocean region. The Indian Ocean Rim Association is one such
structure, dealing with maritime safety and the development of blue
economies in the region. Although neither Japan nor the EU aremembers, they could consider gaining observer status to support
their activities. However, much can be done through bilateralchannels as well, in cooperation with individual regional countries.

Security in Africa
Another immediate concern for the EU and Japan to consider withregard to connectivity is security in Africa. East African countries
border the Indian Ocean and are implicitly concerned by the IndoPacific concept and its future connectivity architecture. Yet many ofthem still struggle with economic, social and environmental
challenges, organized crime, weak domestic institutions andsustainable governance.
East Africa has become known as the “Heroin Coast”, with up to
40 tons of the drug smuggled a year due to ineffective bordercontrols (https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/illicit-drugs/drugtrafficking-patterns.html). Wildlife trafficking, fueled by theincreasing demand from Asia, has become one of the world’s mostprofitable organized crimes (https://www.unodc.org/documents/
data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_East_Africa_2013.pdf). Finally, illegal
charcoal trade from Somalia to the UAE and Oman is anotherimportant destabilizing factor in the region, generating revenue forthe local terrorist group Al-Shabaab, with links across the East
African coast. (According to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia
report, illegal charcoal tax generates revenue of $7.5 million per year:
https://undocs.org/S/2018/1002). Due to its historical presence,
European nations maintain active diplomatic and economic relations
with countries across the African continent. The EU also deploys vast
resources to provide development, security and stability in theregion, as it is the first to be concerned by potential economic,
climate or conflict-driven emigration. At present, the EU maintains
eight civilian and military Common Security and Defence Policy(CSDP) missions and operations in Africa, including its counterpiracy naval operation ATALANTA off the Horn of Africa, militarytraining missions in Somalia and Mali, civilian capacity building
missions in Somalia, Mali and Niger, and a border assistancemission in Libya (https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations).
The newly established bilateral Strategic Partnership Agreement(SPA) between the EU and Japan is a promising framework forenhancing political and security relations. However, it still needs tobe completed with concrete initiatives of a practical nature. One
useful tool for deepening security cooperation with the EU is theso-called Framework Participation Agreement (FPA), which allows
third parties to take part in the EU’s CSDP missions for crisis
prevention and management. Two Asian countries – South Korea andVietnam – have signed the FPA so far. If Japan could consider suchan agreement with the EU, it would gain not only a foothold in
African security but also a closer operational experience with the EU
as a security partner, which could be of use in other parts of the
Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion
The EU and Japan have come a long way in fostering theireconomic and political ties. The emergence of the “Indo-Pacific” as a
newly defined geostrategic space constitutes a common playing field
and opens a vast array of opportunities also for closer security
cooperation.
For the longest time, the EU was not considered by Japan as a
useful security partner because of its low military profile,
geographical distance and seemingly little to offer in dealing with
Tokyo’s immediate security concerns, such as the military rise of
China or the North Korean threat. But times have changed, the EU
has become a more proactive security player, China’s strategic
influence has become a matter of global concern, and Japan has
stepped up its foreign and security policy beyond East Asia.
Both partners have much to offer to make the Indo-Pacific free,open, inclusive and prosperous. What the region needs today is notnecessarily more military power, but more common sense,
cooperation, development and sustainable management of
resources. It needs more responsible and resourceful “good citizens”
to take care of the global commons and to act in concert to containthe dangerous game of power politics currently at play – a role thatJapan and the EU could well exert together.

Eva Pejsova is a research associate at the French Foundation for Strategic
Research (FRS), specializing in security in East Asia, maritime security and
EU-Asia relations.

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