平成 22 年度 日欧フォーラム（欧州）Europe – Japan Conference

報 告 書2010 年 12 月 10 日（金）（フランス パリ開催）

財団法人 国際経済交流財団

KEIRIN

この事業は、競輪の補助金を受けて実施したものです。
http://ringring-keirin.jp/

平成22年度 日欧フォーラム（欧州） 2010年12月10日（金）（於：フランスパリ）

日仏共催者によるセッション１

開催の辞

会議場の様子ランチョンスピーカー Jouyet氏

セッション１

会議場の様子セッション１

モデレーター

白井教授

セッション１ スピーカー

セッション１

スピーカー

八代教授

セッション１

堀井氏

質疑応答

セッション２

会議場の様子セッション２

会議場の様子セッション２

スピーカー

セッション２

小和瀬氏

質疑応答

セッション２ スピーカー

嶋田氏

セッション２

会議場の様子セッション２

会議場の様子セッション２

質疑応答

目

次

１． 開

催

趣

旨 ··········································································

1

２． 開

催

概

要 ··········································································

2

３． 詳

細

日

程 ··········································································

5

４． 出

者 ············································································· 7

席

歴 ··········································································· 8

５． 略
６． 議

事

要

旨

日本語 ·············································································· 33
English Summary ····························································· 40
７．発

表

資

果 ············································································ 98

８．成
９．事

料 ············································································ 48

務局 ··········································································· 100

１. 開催趣旨
アメリカ発の金融危機から 2 年が経過した。主要国が相次いで打ち出した大規模な財政出動が奏功し、世界経済は中国、インドなど新興国の高度成長にけん引され、アジア諸国
を筆頭に米国、欧州へと回復の兆しを見せつつある。一方、ギリシャ危機に端を発した欧州の債務危機が世界経済の回復や今後の成長にとって新たな障害として浮上し、短期的には大規模な財政赤字の削減や財政の健全化など危機対応策の出口戦略の策定が急務となっている。また、中長期的にはオバマ金融規制法案や GM の国有化などにみられるような政府介入の度合いの高まりから冷戦終結以降世界経済に君臨してきた自由主義市場経済あり方があらためて問われる事態になっている。
このたびの日欧コンファレンスでは経済金融危機が世界経済に与えた様々な影響の中から、今回の金融危機の出口戦略を探るとともに、中長期的な見地から「資本主義は変質していく①のか」、また「その将来モデルは如何なるものか」② 今回の金融危機は地域経済統合に如何なる影響を与えたか。ギリシャ危機が EU 統合に対するシステミック・リスクを顕在化させることになったのか。EU の経験はアジア太平洋地域の経済統合に如何なる教訓をもたらすか、また近年のアジア太平洋地域における自由貿易地域
設立の動きは日 EU 関係にいかなるインパクトを与えるかなど地域経済統合の求心力、遠心力を探るとともに G20 など国家を超えた問題解決の新たな枠組みはいかに深化していくのか③ 今回の経済危機を超えて日 EU が地球温暖化など地球規模の課題の解決のためにいかなる協力が可能か、日 EU 経済統合協定（EIA）の実現可能性とそのあり方などに焦点を当て、日欧の有識者が一堂に会し、率直な意見交換を行い、相互理解の促進と政策への提言として役立てることを目的として開催するものである。
こうした状況を背景に、国際経済交流財団はフランスアスペン研究所（Institut Aspen
France, 本部：フランス リヨン)と共催で、Europe‑Japan Conferenceをパリに於いて開催した。
なお、本事業は財団法人ＪＫＡより機会工業振興事業補助金の交付を受けて実施したも
のである。

1

２. 開催概要

１．テーマ“世界経済の展望～世界経済の回復は持続的か”セッション１： 世界経済の回復における日欧の対応
9:30-10:30 短期的課題への対応：財政金融の出口戦略
10:45-12:00 長期的課題への対応:資本主義は変質していくのか－金融規制、政府の介入、国有化、自由競争－資本主義の将来の方向性
セッション２： 進展する地域統合、グローバル・シフトにおける日欧関係のあり方
1:30-2:30

地域経済統合の求心力、遠心力と日欧関係へのインパクト－日 EU 経済統合協定（EIA）の実現可能性、そのあり方－経済危機と地域統合－アジア太平洋地域における自由貿易地域創設への動きと日欧関係に与えるｲﾝﾊﾟｸﾄ

2:30-3:30

中期的課題としてのグローバル・ガバナンスのあり方－マクロ経済政策－国家を超えた機関の役割（G20、国連、IMF、OECD 等）－地球温暖化などグローバルな課題の解決に向けての日欧協力

3:45-5:00

変貌する世界と日欧経済－日欧はいかにして技術革新を基盤とする新たな競争力を確立できるか。
－日欧の消費習慣を将来のマーケットの成長の推進力としてのみならず、類似した文化パターンを映し出すものとしていかにとらえることが出来るか。

２．主 催 者

３．開催場所

日 本 側：

財団法人 国際経済交流財団／Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)

フランス側：

フランスアスペン研究所／Institut Aspen France

French Economic, Social and Environmental Council(Conseil Économique, Social et Environmental)
住所：9, place d’Iena, 75775 Paris cedex 16Tel:+33-(0)1- 4443-6000

ホームページ
４. 会

期

Fax:

+33-(0)1-4443-6187

http://www.conseil-economique-et-social.fr

2010 年 12 月 9 日（木）19:30-21:30 ﾌﾗﾝｽｱｽﾍﾟﾝ研究所主催 Welcome Dinner2010 年 12 月 10 日（金）09:15-12:00
12:00-13:30
13:30-17:00
18:30-21:00

５．出 席 者

日欧の産・官・学界より 合計 25 名

【日本側】

７名

原岡 直幸

財団法人国際経済交流財団 専務理事

堀井 昭成

キヤノングローバル戦略研究所 特別顧問

Roundtable Meeting (セッション１)
Working Luncheon（ゲスト・スピーカー）
Roundtable Meeting (セッション２)
JEF 主催 Farewell Dinner（アルファベット順・敬称略）

2

小和瀬 真司

三菱商事(株) 国際戦略研究所

嶋田 隆

経済産業省

白井 さゆり慶応大学 総合政策学部 教授

八代 尚宏

国際基督教大学 教養学部 教授

井上

財団法人国際経済交流財団 業務部長

勝

【フランス側】

所長

通商政策局通商機構部部長

１8名

Mr. Franck BANCEL（アルファベット順）
Member of the executive committee of Institut Aspen France andprofessor at ESCP Europe business school

Ms. Noriko CARPENTIER-TOMINAGA Director, Comité d'échanges franco-japonais
Mr. Pierre CUNEO

CEO, Institute Aspen France

Mr. Jean-François DI MEGLIO

President of Asia Centre, Sciences-Po

Mr. Jean-Pierre DUPRIEU

Senior Vice President and Member of the General Management of
Air Liquide, and former Head of Air Liquide in Japan

Mr. Kiichiro FUKASAKU

Head of Division, Regional Desks, OECD Development Centre

Mr. Jacques GRAVEREAU

President of HEC Eurasia Institute

Mr. Renaud GUIDEE

Inspector of Finance, General Auditing Service, Ministry of
Finance and Economy

Mr. Raphaël HADAS-LEBEL

President of the Pension Advisory Council (Conseil d’orientation
des retraites, Paris) and member of the Advisory Board of Institut
Aspen France

Mr. Satoshi IMAI

President, Nomura France

Mr. Jean-Pierre JOUYETChairman, Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), Chairman of
the Supervisory Board, Institut Aspen France

Ms. Elisabeth MAEGHT-DAHAN

Director of international relations of the Economic Social andEnvironnemental Council

Mr. Olivier MELLERIO

Member of the Aspen supervisory board

Mr. Claude MEYER

Associate Professor, Sciences Po, and Senior Research Fellow,
G.E.M. Sciences Po

Mr. Thierry MOULONGUETFormer CFO of Renault and Nissan and Senior Advisor to the
President of the Renault Nissan Alliance

Mr. Mineaki SAITO

Deputy Chief Executive (marketing), Hermès International

Mr. Philippe WAECHTER

Head of Economic Research, Natixis Asset Management

Mr. Shigenobu WATANABE

Deputy managing director, JETRO Paris

６．形式

７．使用言語

クローズド・ラウンドテーブル
英語3８．主催者紹介

About Japan Economic Foundation
The Japan Economic Foundation (JEF) was established in July 1981 to deepen understanding
between Japan and other countries through activities aimed at promoting economic andtechnological exchange. It engages in a broad range of activities ; it provides information about
Japan and arranges opportunities to exchange ideas among opinion leaders from many countries
in such fields as industry, government, academia and politics in order to build bridges forinternational communication and to break down the barriers that inhibit mutual understanding.
URL: www.jef.or.jp

About Institut Aspen France
The Institut Aspen France, founded in 1983, is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit,
international forum designed to promote the exchange of ideas on economic, social and politicalissues. It has established a partnership agreement with the local authorities of the Rhône-Alpes
Region. It is affiliated with The Aspen Institute, which was created in 1949 in Aspen, Colorado andwhose head office is in Washington DC. The Institut Aspen France is part of an international
network, with other Aspen Institutes based in Germany, India, Italy, Japan and Romania.
It organizes international conferences, seminars, leadership programs and various meetings
enabling today’s and tomorrow’s decision-makers to discuss the challenges they face. Events heldin 2009 included a conference on globalization “New rules and regulations” and a seminar about
income inequalities, with a special focus on the working poor.
URL : www.aspenfrance.org

4

5

Detailed agenda of the conference

Welcome address

9:15 am
9:30 amBy Mr. Franck Bancel, member of the Managing Board, Institut Aspen
France, and professor, ESCP Europe Business School, and Mr. Naoyuki
Haraoka, Executive Managing Director, Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)

Moderator: Mr. Franck Bancel, member of the Managing Board, Institut
Aspen France, and professor, ESCP Europe Business School
Speakers (7 minutes each) :- Europe: Mr. Satoshi Imai, Chairman of the Board, Banque Nomura
France, and Mr. Jacques Gravereau, President of HEC Eurasia Institute- Japan: Mr. Naohiro Yashiro, Professor, International Christian University

In the short run: crisis exit strategies

In the longer run: is capitalism changing in
nature?
- Capitalism regulation (including financial
regulation), government intervention,nationalization, business competition- Future direction of capitalism

Working luncheon

9:30 am
10:30 am

10:30 am
12:00 pm

12:00 pm
1:30 pm

Hosted by Institut Aspen France and Japan Economic Foundation
Chaired by Mr. Jean-Pierre Jouyet, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of
Institut Aspen France and Chairman of the French securities regulator

Moderator: Ms. Sayuri Shirai, Professor, Faculty of Policy Management,
Keio University
Speakers (7 minutes each):- Europe: Mr. Thierry Moulonguet, Senior Advisor to the President ofRenault Nissan Alliance, and Mr. Philippe Waechter, Head of economic
research, Natixis Asset Management- Japan: Mr. Akinari Horii, Special Adviser to the President, Canon
Institute for Global Studies

9:30 am
Session 1 : How do Japan and Europe stand in the world economy’s tentative recovery?
12:00 pm

Welcome coffee

9:00 am
9:15 amDate : December 10 , 2010 - Location : Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental, 9 place d’Iéna, 75116 Paristh

３．詳細日程6

Moderator : Mr. Kiichiro Fukasaku, Head of Regional Desks, OECD
Development Centre
Speakers (7 minutes each) :- Europe: Mr. Jean-François Di Meglio, President of Asia Centre- Japan: Mr. Takashi Shimada, Director-General, Multilateral Trade
System Department, Trade Policy Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Tradeand Industry (METI)
Moderator: Mr. Naoyuki Haraoka, Executive Managing Director, Japan
Economic Foundation(JEF)
Speakers (7 minutes each) :- Europe: Mr. Claude Meyer, Associate Professor, Sciences Po, and SeniorResearch Fellow, G.E.M. Sciences Po- Japan: Ms. Sayuri Shirai, Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio
University, and Mr. Shinji Kowase, General Manager, Corporate Strategy &Research Department, Mitsubishi Corporation

The centripetal and centrifugal forces of theregional economic integration and theirimpact on Europe-Japan relations:- EU-Japan Economic integration agreement(EIA)- Regional integration in time of crisis- The latest Asia-Pacific free-trade
agreements movements and their impact
on Europe-Japan relations

Global political governance of macropolicies
in the medium run:
- Macroeconomic policies- The role of coordinating andsupranational bodies: G20, UN, IMF,
OECD…
- Europe-Japan cooperation forcontributing to solving global challenges
such as climate change

Coffee break

Japan and Europe as mature economies in achanging world- How can Europe and Japan build a newcompetitive edge based on innovation toenhance their growth potential?
- What can be said of consumer habits inJapan and Europe, not only as drivers for
future market growth, but also as
reflection of similar cultural patterns?

1:30 pm
2:30 pm

2:30 pm
3:30 pm

3:30 pm
4:00 pm

4:00 pm
5:15 pm

Moderator: Mr. Raphaël Hadas-Lebel, President of Pensions Advisory
Council (Conseil d’orientation des retraites, Paris) and Vice-President of theAdvisory Board of Institut Aspen France
Speakers (7 minutes each) :- Europe: Mr. Jean-Pierre Duprieu, Member of the General Managementof Air Liquide Group, and Mr. Mineaki Saito, Executive Vice President ofHermès International, in charge of Marketing- Japan: Mr. Naoyuki Haraoka, Executive Managing Director, Japan
Economic Foundation(JEF)

Session 2: Europe-Japan relations and positioning in a context of growing regional integration and global shifts

1:30 pm
5:15 pm

４．出席者
日欧の産・官・学界より合計 25 名
（アルファベット順・敬称略）
Franck BANCEL
Professor- ESCP EUROPE BUSINESS SCHOOL
Member of the Managing Board
INSTITUT ASPEN FRANCE

Shinji KOWASE
General Manager
Corporate Strategy & Research Department
MITSUBISHI CORPORATION

Noriko CARPENTIER-TOMINAGA
Director
COMITE D'ECHANGES FRANCO-JAPONAIS

Elisabeth MAEGHT-DAHAN
Director of international relations
ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND ENVIRONNEMENTAL COUNCIL

Pierre CUNÉOChairman of the Managing Board
INSTITUT ASPEN FRANCE

Olivier MELLERIO
President - MELLERIO INTERNATIONAL
Member of the Supervisory Board
INSTITUT ASPEN FRANCE

Jean-François DI MEGLIO
President
ASIA CENTRE

Claude MEYER
Associate Professor - SCIENCES PO
Senior Research Fellow
GEM-SCIENCES PO

Jean-Pierre DUPRIEU
Member of the General Management
AIR LIQUIDE GROUP

Thierry MOULONGUET
Senior Advisor to President Carlos Ghosn
RENAULT NISSAN ALLIANCE

Kiichiro FUKASAKU
Counsellor, Head of Regional Desks
OECD DEVELOPMENT CENTER

Mineaki SAITOExecutive Vice-President in chargeof MarketingHERMÈS INTERNATIONAL

Jacques GRAVEREAU
President
HEC EURASIA INSTITUTE

Takashi SHIMADA
Director-GeneralMultilateral Trade System Department
Trade Policy Bureau
MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY (METI)

Renaud GUIDÉE
Inspecteur des Finances
MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND BUDGET
Raphaël HADAS-LEBEL
President - PENSIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL(Conseil d’Orientation des Retraites, Paris)
Vice-President of the Advisory Board
INSTITUT ASPEN FRANCE

Sayuri SHIRAIProfessor, Faculty of Policy Management
KEIO UNIVERSITY
Philippe WAECHTER
Head of Economic Research
NATIXIS ASSET MANAGEMENT

Naoyuki HARAOKA
Executive Managing Director
JAPAN ECONOMIC FOUNDATION (JEF)

Shigenobu WATANABE
Deputy Managing Director
JETRO PARIS

Akinari HORII
Special Adviser to the President
CANON INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL STUDIES

Naohiro YASHIRO
Professor
INTERNATIONAL CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY

Satoshi IMAI
Chairman of the Board
BANQUE NOMURA FRANCE
Masaru INOUE
Director, International Affairs
JAPAN ECONOMIC FOUNDATION (JEF)
Jean-Pierre JOUYETChairman
AUTORITE DES MARCHES FINANCIERS (AMF)
Chairman of the Supervisory Board
INSTITUT ASPEN FRANCE

7

㧡⇛ᱧ㧔⊓ს㗅㧕

Pierre CUNÉOChairman, Managing Board, Institut Aspen France
Educational background:
Secondary Education: Lycée Louis-le-Grand, Paris
Statistics and Economics degree from ENSAE, Paris, 1998 ² passed recruitment contest for
French Statistics
Institute (INSEE) in 1999
Advanced Degree in Political Science from Institut d'études politiques (IEP), Paris, 1999
Advance Degree in Government Administration, Ecole nationale d'administration (ENA), Paris,
2003
Career:Jul. 1999-Feb. 2000:

French National Statistics and Economic Studies Institute (INSEE)
Head of "Company Demographics" Department

Developed proposal for modification of the regulatory framework for companies

Mar.-Dec. 2000:

French Ministry of Defence,Special Officer under the Deputy Director of Capital Expenditures

Apr. 2003-Nov. 2005:

Government Accounting Office (Inspection Générale des Finances):

Research missions and later project director and Secretary of the strategic steeringcommittee on Chorus (all-agencies budget and finance accounting co-ordination)
Strategic audit for government policy-making
Dec. 2005-May 2007: Special Officer in the Government Accounting Office;later became second deputy director, then part-time deputy director of the Accounting Office
and Secretary of the Association of government accountants
Took part in setting up the Postgraduate Course in European Studies of ENA intended
for European policy-makers

May 2007-June 2008:

Deputy Chief of Staff of Jean-Pierre Jouyet,State Secretary in charge of European Affairs

Co-ordinated the "economic, social, agricultural, budgetary and environmental, energy
and competition" unit of the Cabinet
Co-ordinated the preparation of the French Presidency of the Council of the European
Union (Council of Ministers)
June 2008-Apr. 2009:

Chief of Staff of Guillaume Pepy, Chairman of SNCF

Managed the corporate governance bodies, including the general management(executive) committee (COMEX)In charge of institutional relations with the French government, including the Ministryof Transport
May 2009-«:

SNCF Director of Railway Strategy and Regulatory Issues

Command of German and English languages

Contact : Pierre.cuneo@sncf.fr
8

Naoyuki HARAOKA
Executive Managing Director, Japan Economic Foundation

Naoyuki Haraoka is Executive Managing Director of Japan Economic
Foundation.

Born in Tokyo in 1955. After graduating the University ofTokyo in 1978 (Bachelor of Economics), he joined MITI (Ministry ofInternational Trade and Industry) of Japanese government. Having beenposted in the industrial policy section and the international trade policy
section for a few years, he was enrolled in a two year MPA (Master of Public
Administration) programme at Woodraw Wilson School of Princeton
University in the US on a Japanese government sponsorship. After having
acquired MPA at Princeton, he rejoined MITI in 1984 as an economist. Since
then he had been posted as Deputy Director and Director of a number of
MITI divisions including Research Division of International Trade Policy
Bureau.

He was also posted in Paris twice, firstly, Principal Economist of Trade
Bureau of OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development)from 1988 to 92 and secondly Counsellor to Japanese Delegation of OECD
from 1996 to 99. After coming back to MITI from his second stay in Paris, atthe occasion of the government structural reform in 2001 when MITI was
remodelled as METI (Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry) he joined theefforts to found METI research institute, Research Institute of Economy
Trade and Industry as its Director of Administration. He became Chief
Executive Director of JETRO San Francisco in 2003 and stayed in San
Francisco until 2006. He was Director-General of METI Training Institutefrom 2006 until July, 2007 when he left METI permanently and joined JEF as
Executive Managing Director.

Contact : naoyuki-haraoka@jef.or.jp
9Sayuri SHIRAIProfessor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University

Sayuri Shirai is Professor of Economics at Keio University. Her area ofspecializationisInternational

Finance,

GlobalEconomy,andMacroeconomics. She currently serves an expert on the Northeast AsianRegion (China, Japan, Taiwan, and Korea) for the APEC SME Crisis
Management Center, located in Taiwan. She received Ph.D. (economics) at
Columbia University in 2003 and subsequently worked for the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2003-08 as an Economist. While teaching at Keio
University, she also worked as a Visiting Scholar at Asian Development Bank
(ADB) Institute (2000-03) and also as a consultant for UN ESCAP (2004-09).

She was a Visiting Scholar at Science Po, Paris in 2007-08 and taught threecourses (Cotemporary Japanese Economic Policy, Economic Integration andInternational Finance) at both undergraduate and graduate levels. She
published 9 books on

QUAKING EUROPE, STRAY EUROPE, -$3$1·V

COMPETITITVENESS, RENMINBI AND CHINESE ECONOMY, MEGABANK CRISESAND IMF ECONOMIC POLICY, ECONOMICS OF CURRENCY BOARDS, MACRODEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, etc. She also published many academic articles(see http://www.paw.hi-ho.ne.jp/~sshirai/). Moreover, she also actively
participates in many international conferences on global economic crisis,
financial market developments, sovereign debt issues, exchange rate
regimes, Japanese economic issues, Chinese and European economic
performances, etc.

Contact : sshirai@sfc.keio.ac.jp10

Thierry MOULONGUET
Special Advisor to President Carlos Ghosn,
Renault Nissan AllianceThierry Moulonguet was born in 1951. Student of the Ecole Nationaled'Administration (ENA), he joined the Ministry of the Economy and Financein 1976 and embarked on a career in the civil service until 1991. He joined
Renault in February 1991 taking responsibility for group financial relations,
before being appointed Vice President, Capital Expenditures Controller, in
1996. In 1999, following the signing of the Renault-Nissan agreement, hemoved to Japan to join Nissan Motor as Senior Vice President, Finance. In
2000, he was appointed Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer of
Nissan. In September 2003, he joined the Renault Management Committee
as Adviser to the Chairman. In January 2004, Executive Vice President andChief Financial Officer as well as member of Renault's Group Executive
Committee. In July 2010, he became Senior Advisor to Carlos Ghosn,
President of the Alliance Renault ² Nissan.
He is Member of HSBC France and Fimalac boards, Chairman of the Volvo
Election Committee.

Contact : thierry.moulonguet@renault.co11Philippe WAECHTER
Chief Economist, Natixis Asset Management

Career1988 ² Economist in Asset Management Unit (Bred Banque Populaire)
1994 ² Appointed Head of Economic Research (Bred Banque Populaire)
1998 ² Head of Economic Research (Banque Populaire Asset Management,
which became Natexis Asset Management)

2007 ² Head of Economic Research Unit (Natixis Asset Management)
Associate professor at the 8QLYHUVLWp G·(YU\ in 2003 and co-author of"6XESULPHVWKHJOREDOEDQNUXSWF\µ Philippe Waechter is also a regular contributor to the media.

Contact : philippe.waechter@am.natixis.com
12

Akinari HORII
Special Adviser to the President,
Canon Institute for Global Studies

Akinari Horii is currently Special Adviser to the president of The Canon
Institute for Global Studies, a research think tank in Tokyo, Japan. He also
advises a few internationally active business firms. Akinari Horii was acentral banker until he stepped down as Assistant Governor of the Bank of-DSDQRU-DSDQ·VFHQWUDO EDQNLQ-XQH'XULQJWKHIRXU\HDUSHULRG
RI$VVLVWDQW*RYHUQRU0U+RULLZDVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKH%DQN·VLQWHUQDWLRQDO
activities and represents the Bank of Japan at international meetings
LQFOXGLQJ*'HSXWLHV *URXSRI6HYHQ)LQDQFH0LQLVWHUV·DQG&HQWUDO%DQN
*RYHUQRUV· 'HSXWLHV  * 'HSXWLHV 2(&':RUNLQJ 3DUW\  %,6&*)6
(Committee on Global Financial Systems) and FSB (Financial Stability%RDUG $OVRKHZDV&KDLUPDQRI(0($3 ([HFXWLYHV·0HHWLQJRI(DVW$VLDQ
andPacific central banks) Working Group on Financial Markets as well as%,6(0($3 )RUH[ )RUXP 0U +RULL EULHIHG WKH %DQN·V 3ROLF\ %RDUG RQ WKHglobal economy and financial markets at its Monetary Policy Meetings.

Before the appointment as Assistant Governor, Mr. Horii had worked at the
Bank for three decades, engaged himself in research on both global andJapanese economies and published a number of papers under the auspicesof the BIS, IMF, et al., in addition to the Bank of Japan. Outside the Bank of-DSDQKHDOVRZRUNHGDWWKH%,6LQ%DVOH6ZLW]HUODQG-DSDQ·V0LQLVWU\RI
Finance, and the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo. Mr. Horii received his MBA with distinction, and as a Beta Gamma Sigma, from theWharton School at the University of Pennsylvania and his BA in Economics
from the University of Tokyo.

Contact : horii.akinari@canon-igs.org
13

Franck BANCELMember of the Managing Board, Institut Aspen France
Professor, ESCP Europe Business School

Franck Bancel is Professor of Finance at ESCP Europe. Specialized inCor-porate Finance and Corporate Governance, he holds a Doctorate from the
University of Grenoble II and a post-doctoral degree (Habilitation à Diriger
des Recherches) from the University of Paris IX Dauphine. Professor Franck
Bancel has published several books (Fusions et acquisitions (2008), La gouvernance des entreprises (1997), etc.) and academic articles (inFinancial

Management, European Financial Management, etc.). Professor Franck Bancel managed the ESCP Europe Specialized Master in Finance in Paris and theparallel program at ESA (Beirut, Lebanon). He was Associate Dean for research from 2002 to 2006 and Director of the ESCP Europe Ph.D. program on
the Paris Campus from 2003 to 2006. He is now in charge of the ESCP Europe
Finance department. Professor Bancel is also a consultant for financial institutions and companies.

Contact : franckbancel@hotmail.com
14

Satoshi IMAI
Chairman of the Board, Banque Nomura France

First Name: Satoshi
Family Name: Imai

Age: 56 years old
Date of Birth: August 8th 1954
(Kyoto, Japan)

Satoshi Imai is Chairman of the Board of Banque Nomura France.
Prior to current position, he served in the following positions in various countries:

1989-1990

Associate Director, Nomura International plc (UK)

1992-1996

Acting Branch Manager, Nomura Bank Switzerland, Geneva Branch

1996 -1998

Managing Director, Banque Nomura France

1998-2001

CEO, Nomura Espana Sociedad de Valores

2001-2004

Managing Director, Nomura International plc, Madrid Branch

2004-2009

President & CEO, Nomura Malaysia Sdn Bhd

2010-

Chairman, Banque Nomura France

Contact : satoshi.imai@nomura.com
15

Jacques GRAVEREAU
President, HEC EURASIA INSTITUTE

Prof. Gravereau chairs the HEC EURASIA INSTITUTE, a think tank which he
IRXQGHG LQ  DW WKH +(& 6FKRRO RI 0DQDJHPHQW LQ 3DULV (XURSH·V 1Business School on the last four F. T. annual rankings), together withprominent corporations from Europe and Pacific Asia. In Europe, he is one of
the leading experts on Asian economies and on Europe-Asia relations.
Professor at HEC, and a visiting professor at Universities in the US, China
and Japan. He has published many articles, surveys and several reference
books, of which three on Japan.

Core Group Chairman of the Asia Europe Business Forum (ASEM). Past-Chairof the PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, France National
Committee). Board member of several Corporations and Institutions ofwhich : Foundation for advanced Economy (Japan), Institute of Global
Financial Studies (Japan), Institute for Trade and Investment (Korea),Center for Strategic and International Studies, EU-China Advisory Council.

Pr. Gravereau holds a Ph.D. in Economics, is a graduate of HEC and of theInstitute of Defense and Strategic Studies. Fluent in six languages. Married,with three children. Knight of the Légion d'honneur.

Contact : EURA@hec.fr
16

Naohiro YASHIRO
Professor, International Christian University

Naohiro Yashiro is Professor of Economics at International Christian
University.

Previously he worked as Senior Economist in the Economic

Department at OECD, Professor of Economics at the Institute forInternational Relations at Sophia University, and Chairman of the Japan
Centre for Economic Research. His previous positions also include posts inthe Economic Planning Agency in the Japanese Government. He was
Member of the Regulatory Reform Committee at the Japanese Government(2001-06), and Council of Economic and Fiscal Policy appointed by thePrime Minister Abe and Fukuda (2006-08). He holds a BA in liberal arts fromInternational Christian University, BA in economics from University ofTokyo, and Ph.D. in economics from University of Maryland. Naohiro<DVKLUR·VPDMRUSXEOLFDWLRQVLQFOXGHHealth Care Issues in the United States
and Japan, (Co-editor) University of Chicago Press, 2006, The Economic
Effects of Aging in the United States and Japan (Co-editor), University of
Chicago Press, 1997, -DSDQ·V 1HZ 6SHFLDO =RQHV IRU 5HJXODWRU\ 5HIRUP,
International Tax and Public Finance, Vo.12, 2005.

Contact : yashiro@icu.ac.jp
17Jean-Pierre JOUYETChairman, Autorité des marchés financiers,
President of the Supervisory Board, Institut Aspen France
Before being appointed as Chairman of the Autorité des marchés financiers(the French securities regulator) in December 2008, Jean-Pierre Jouyet was
Minister of State responsible for European Affairs (2007-2008). In thisfunction, he was responsible for the preparation of the French presidency of
the European Union and for seeing that it ran smoothly.
Prior to this Ministerial appointment, Jean-Pierre Jouyet held various
functions in the public sector (Principal Private Secretary initially to the
Minister of Industry, Foreign Trade and Town and Country Planning, then to
the Minister of Industry and Town and Country Planning, before becoming
the Deputy Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister -1997-2000-,Head of the French Trésor Directorate -2000-2004- and Head of audit
department of French public services -2005-2007. Between 1991 and 1995,
he was Deputy Principal Private Secretary, then Principal Private Secretary
to the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors. He was tohold two functions in the private sector (Partner in the French business law
ILUP ´-HDQWHW $VVRFLpVµ -1995-1997-, andNon-executive chairman of

Barclays Bank France in 2005).
M. Jouyet was lecturer at the ENA (National School for Administation) and is
YLVLWLQJ3URIHVVRUDWWKH3DULV,QVWLWXWG·(WXGHV3ROLWLTXHV ,(3 He has been a member of the board of the Fondation nationale des sciences
politiques since 2006 and chairs the Commission devoted to the reform of
the ENA.
He is the co-DXWKRU RI ´1·HQWHUUH] SDV OD )UDQFHµ, with Philippe Mabille(GLWLRQV5REHUW/DIIRQW DQG´8QH3UpVLGHQFHGHFULVHVµ with Sophie
Coignard, Editions Albin Michel, 2009) and the author of "Nous les avons tantaimés" (Editions Robert Laffont, 2010).
He chairs the Supervisory Board of the Aspen Institute.

Contact : a.romatet@amf-france.org
18

Kiichiro FUKASAKU
Counsellor / Head of Regional Desks,
OECD Development Centre(Jan 2008 - Present): Counsellor/Head of Regional Desks OECD Development Centre
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Kiichiro (Ki) Fukasaku is Head of Regional Desks, Development Centre. His Division
works on three regional economic outlooks: African Economic Outlook (AEO since2001), Latin American Economic Outlook (LEO since 2007) and Southeast Asian
Economic Outlook (SAEO).
The inaugural edition of SAEO was released in November 2010.
Ki Fukasaku holds Ph.D. in Economics from University of Sussex, United Kingdom  +H KDV  \HDUV· H[SHULHQFH DV D VHQLRU PDQDJHPHQW VWDII DW WKH
Development Centre. He joined the OECD as a senior economist at the Development
Centre in November 1990 and was appointed a Head of Division in December 1996.
Prior to joining the OECD, he was a staff economist at the GATT Secretariat (nowthe WTO) in Geneva (April 1983-October 1990). As a professional economist,
Ki Fukasaku has been working extensively in trade, investment and development
fields. Since 2007 he has been a guest professor at Keio University, Tokyo, teachinga summer course on development economics for both home and foreign students.
Born on 1 February 1952
(Place of birth: Tokyo, Japan)
Married with three children

Nationality:
Foreign Languages:

Japanese
English and French.

Studied at Keio University, Tokyo, Japan, (B.A. in Economics, 1971-75, and M.A. in
International Economics, 1975-77); and University of Sussex, Brighton, United
Kingdom (M.A. in Development Economics, 1979-80, and D.Phil. in Economics,
1980-83).
D.Phil. Dissertation: International Trade and Domestic Adjustment: the Case of theJapanese Textile Industry 1970-1985 ² A Study of Intra-Industry
Trade and Labour Adjustment (December 1989)
Award:

British Council Scholarship at University of Sussex (1979-1981).

Previous Work:Counsellor/ Coordinator (2003-2007)
Head of Division, OECD Development Centre (1996-2002)
Principal Administrator, OECD Development Centre (1990-96)
Economic Affairs Officer, Economic Research and Analysis Unit,
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT),
Geneva, (1983-1992, on special leave from 1990 to 1992);
Consultant to UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTORGANISATION (UNIDO), Vienna (1983);
Visiting Fellow at Economic Research Institute, ECONOMIC
PLANNING AGENCY (EPA), GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN (1979);
Research Associate at INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CENTER
OF JAPAN (IDCJ), Tokyo (1978-1979).

Contact : kiichiro.fukasaku@oecd.org
19Jean-François DI MEGLIO
President, Asia Centre« An alumni of Ecole Normale Supérieure (L76), and Beijing University,
Jean-François Di Meglio has spent over 25 years of his professional in
relation with Asia as a whole, including a posting in Japan (2001). He also
had been successively Head of Taiwan for BNP Paribs (1993-1997) and Headof Corporate banking Asia-Pacific (1997-2005), after which he was posted in
Mainland China (Beijing and China 2005-2008, Head of natural resources,
energy and commodity and export finance for China (BNP Paribas).
In 2005 he participated in the establishment of Asia Centre, a Paris-based
think-tank focused on contemporary issues in Asia, of which he has been the
President since 2009 (www.centreasia.org)
Jean-François Di Meglio also lectures at Sciences po, and in various teaching
SODFHV LQ )UDQFH +H LV D UHJXODU FRQWULEXWRU WR $VLD &HQWUH·V UHOHDVHV´&KLQD$QDO\VLV/HVQRXYHOOHVGH&KLQHµ DQGWRYDULRXV79DQGUDGLRFKDQQHOVZKHQLWFRPHVWRHFRQRPLFDQGILQDQFLDOLVVXHVLQ$VLDµ

Contact : jf.dimeglio@centreasia.org
20

Takashi SHIMADA
Director-General, Multilateral Trade System Department,
Trade Policy Bureau,
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)

TakashiShimadaisDirector-General,

Multilateral

Trade

System

Department, Trade Policy Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry(METI) since July 2010. His current portfolio includes WTO (DDA
negotiations and dispute settlement) and EPA strategies. Mr. Shimada wasborn in Tokyo, March 1960. After graduating the University of Tokyo(Faculty of Engineering), he joined the Ministry of International Trade andIndustry (MITI) in April 1982, starting his career in Petroleum Division,
Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. Having experienced several
positions in MITI, Mr. Shimada enrolled two years in MBA program of UCLA
and received MBA in 1988.

After rejoined the ministry, while having

DGYDQFHG KLV FDUHHU PDLQO\ LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUDGH HQHUJ\ DQG PLQLVWHU·V
secretariat, Mr. Shimada served several times as a political assistant to theHouse of Representative member Mr. Kaoru Yosano when he took the seatof the Minister of International Trade and Industry, the Minister of State for
Economic and Fiscal Policy, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, and the Minister ofFinance and Financial Service. After his consecutive assignments as apolitical assistant, Mr. Shimada was posted to Director General of Training
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry in 2009, which was his previous
position.

Contact : shimada-takashi@meti.go.jp
21Claude MEYER
Associate Professor, Sciences Po
Senior Research Fellow, G.E.M. Sciences Po
Present functions
Associate Professor, Sciences Po, Paris
Senior Research Fellow, G.E.M. Sciences Po (linked to the Brookings Institution)
Professor at the CFJM (French-Japanese Management Center), Rennes University
Member of the Scientific Committee, Europe-Asia Program, Sciences Po
Research and professorship abroad
Visiting Professor at Keio University, Tokyo (2008 and 2010)
Visiting Scholar at Columbia University, New York (2005) and at Chinese
University, Hong Kong (2006 and 2007)
Career Summary
Banking Sector: Deputy General Manager, Bank of Tokyo Group, Paris(until 2000)
Deputy General Manager, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi: business developmentwith French multinational companies and their foreignsubsidiaries, particularly in the USA and Asia
Previously, executive positions in Bank of Tokyo Group, Paris as Vice
President and Senior Vice President (International Financings and CapitalMarkets Department).
Academic sector : lecturing and research on Asian economies and international finance
Sciences Po, Paris: since 2004
Paris I Sorbonne University: 1994-2004
E.H.E.S.S. (Graduate School in Social Sciences), Paris: 1991-1994
Education and training
Ph. D. in Economics (E.H.E.S.S., Graduate School in Social Sciences, Paris
University)
M.A. in philosophy and sociology, (Sorbonne University, Paris)
B.A. in Japanese studies (INALCO, Paris School of Oriental Languages)
Specialized professional finance training in New-York, London and Tokyo
Main research areas
Economic, political and strategic relations between Japan , China and India
Japanese and Chinese finance, financial integration of Asia

Contact : claudemeyer@worldonline.fr
22

Shinji KOWASE
General Manager, Corporate Strategy
and Research Department, Mitsubishi Corporation

Shinji Kowase is General Manager, Corporate Strategy and Research
Department of Mitsubishi Corporation, Tokyo, Japan since April 2010. He
joined Mitsubishi Corporation in April 1981.

In June 1989 he was

WUDQVIHUUHGWR0LWVXELVKL&RUSRUDWLRQ·V-RKDQQHVEXUJ%UDQFKLQ6RXWK$IULFD
and was responsible for telecommunication, medical equipments, aircraft
leasing and private equity fund business in South Africa. He was also incharge of development projects in the neighbouring countries such as
Madagascar, Mozambique, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Namibia andAngola. He returned to Tokyo in February 1995 and was responsible forEurope and Africa at Marketing & Coordination Department of Mitsubishi
Corporation, Tokyo, Japan.

In February 1996 he was appointed as

Executive Assistant to the President, Mitsubishi Corporation, Tokyo, Japan.
In April 1998 he was appointed as Executive Assistant to the Chairman,
Mitsubishi Corporation, Tokyo, Japan. In April 1999 he was appointed as
Acting General Manager, responsible for the Americas and subsequently for
Project Coordination at Marketing & Coordination Department. In October
2001 he was appointed as Acting General Manager, responsible for Global
Strategy at Corporate Strategy and Research Department. In April 2005 he
was appointed as Deputy General Manager, Corporate Strategy andResearch Department. Concurrently he served as Director of Inter-Active
Inc., consulting company established with Mitsubishi Research Institute aswell as Director of Techno Associates, Inc., think-tank established with
Nikkei Business Publications Inc. During April 2007 ² March 2010 he was
President & CEO, Mitsubishi Canada Ltd. He graduated from the Faculty ofArts and Sciences, Tokyo University, Tokyo, Japan in March 1981 .

Contact : shinji.kowase@mitsubishicorp.com
23

Raphaël HADAS-LEBEL&KDPEHU3UHVLGHQW&RQVHLOG·(WDW
President, Pensions Advisory Council
Vice-President, Advisory Board, Institut Aspen France

Raphaël HADAS-/(%(/ LV KRQRUDU\ FKDPEHU 3UHVLGHQW LQ WKH &RQVHLO G·(WDW
the highest government legal advisory institution of France and President of
the Pensions advisory council.
*UDGXDWHRIWKH(FROH1DWLRQDOHG·$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ ILUVWLQWKHFODVV DQG
alumnus of the Harvard Busines school (AMP), he has previously served aslegal counsel for the French agency for EU affairs (1971-1974), then as
adviser to Prime Ministers Chirac and Barre (1974-1981). During twelve
years, he was active in French prominent companies (Senior VP Elf,Managing director of France 2 TV), before being appointed as Commissioner
at the French energy regulation commission and Member of the Economic
and Social Council, the third assembly of Parliament, representing theinstitutions of civil society. He has been president of the social chamber of
WKH&RQVHLOG·(WDWIURPWR
In parallel to his main activities, Raphaël Hadas-Lebel lectures at the Paris
University and has chaired two boards dealing with cultural activities (music
conservatory, movie distribution). He is member of the board of France
Television Co and Vice President of the advisory board of Institut Aspen
France.

Contact : raphael.hadas-lebel@cor-retraites.fr
24Jean-Pierre DUPRIEU
Member of the General Management, Air Liquide Group

Born in 1952 ² French nationality
0DVWHU·V GHJUHH LQ WKH ,QVWLWXWH 1DWLRQDO $JURQRPLTXHRI 3DULV-Grignon,
VSHFLDOL]HGLQ´)RRG,QGXVWU\µInstitut de Contrôle de Gestion de Paris.
Jean-Pierre Duprieu joined Air Liquide in 1976 : he has spent his entire
career with the Group, holding various commercial, operational andstrategic positions.
In 1985, he was appointed Assistant to the Chief Executive Officer of theGroup, a position which gave him the opportunity to work on many
strategic missions. The he spent 3 years as Vice-President of Sales andMarketing for the French Operations.
In 1991, he became General manager of the Industrial Gas Operations for
the Group in France.
In 1995, he supervised several subsidiaries within the Group (South$PHULFD&DQDGD,WDO\«In 2000, Jean-Pierre Duprieu has been Senior Vice-President and a member
RI WKH *URXS·V ([HFXWLYH &RPPLWWHH RYHUVHHLQJ (XURSH WKH 0LGGOH (DVWAfrica and Asia.
Early 2005, Jean-Pierre Duprieu has been based in Tokyo in charge of the
Asia-Pacific zone and the Electronics World Business line.
Effective January 1st 2010, Jean-Pierre Duprieu has been supervising(XURSHDQG+HDOWKFDUHDFWLYLWLHVZLWKLQWKH*URXS·V*HQHUDO0DQDJHPHQW

Contact : Jean-Duprieu@airliquide.com
25

Mineaki SAITOExecutive Vice President, in charge of Marketing,Hermès International
Born in Shizuoka (Japan) in 1952.
1971

Arrival in France.

1972-1975

Studies at the Faculty of Plastic Arts at the University of Paris I,
Panthéon-Sorbonne, leaving certificate.

1975-1980

Mitsukoshi France S.A.
- Responsible for the promotion of French tourism among
Japanese customers- Organisation of French cultural exhibitions in Japan.

1980-1992

Mitsukoshi Ltd., Paris- Manager of the French office

1992

Joins the Hermès Group.
Return to Tokyo, to take up the post of
Chief Executive Officer for Sales for Hermès Japon Co., Ltd.

1996

Director of Hermès Japon Co., Ltd.

1998

President of Hermès Japon Co., Ltd.

since 2008

Hermès International Paris
Deputy Chief Executive Officer in charge of Marketing.
Member of the Executive Committee.

Other current functions:- Chairman of Leica Camera Japon Co., Ltd.
- Vice President of Jean-Paul Gaultier Fusion Japon Co., Ltd.
- Visiting Professor at the University of Ritsumeikan in Kyoto- Member of the Board of the Franco-Japanese Exchange Committee
Distinction:- Knight of the National Order of Merit

Contact : renate.honer@hermes.com
26

Noriko CARPENTIER-TOMINAGA
Director,&RPLWpG·(FKDQJHV)UDQFR-Japonais (CEFJ)

6LQFHVKHKDVEHHQZRUNLQJDWWKH&RPLWpG·(FKDQJHV)UDQFR-Japonais,
and as Director since 2006. Her responsibility is to organize various types of
economic events, trying to serve as a bridge between France and Japan,
Europe and Asia, and the private and public sectors. The subjects every
field: finance, automobile, environment, energy, mode, food, electronics,
contents, etc.

In Japan, she worked first at the French Embassy (Economic Section), before
joining the Delegation of the European Commission in Japan as protocol
RIILFHU WKHQ DW 1LVVDQ DV LWV &(2·V SHUVRQDO DVVLVWDQW XQWLO VKH OHIW -DSDQfor France in 2004.

$ERXWWKH&RPLWpG·(FKDQJHV)UDQFR-Japonais (CEFJ):
Established in 1997 by the Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIP)
on the purpose of developing the exchange between French and Japanesebusiness communities in France, the CEFJ has 160 members which are theFrench and Japanese firms, and organizes conferences, seminars anddifferent kind of meetings to share experiences in business and to broaden

Contact : ntominaga@ccip.fr
27

Renaud GUIDÉE
Inspector of Finance, General Auditing Service,
Ministry of Finance and Economy

Renaud Guidée has been working since 2007 as inspecteur des finances in
the Inspection générale des finances, which is the body within the French
Finance Ministry in charge of carrying out strategic reviews and assessing
the cost-effectiveness of public policies. In his latest assignment in 2010,
he served as sherpa for former IMF managing director Michel Camdessus in
his chairmanship of a working group to set a budget balance rule in France.
A graduate from HEC and from ENA, he started working for JP Morgan in
London in 2001, in the investment banking division then in the equity
research media team, before joining the New-York based restructuring
SUDFWLFHRI(UQVW <RXQJ·VFRUSRUDWHILQDQFHGHSDUWPHQWLQ,Q
as part of the ENA training, he became a member of the private office of
the European commissioner for external relations and the European
neighbourhood policy, Ms. Benita Ferrero-Waldner. He is a jury member of
the affirmative action admission procedure to Sciences Po, where he serves
as assistant professor in economy. He is also a board member of Frateli, anassociation tutoring high-potential students from low-income suburbs.

Recent publication:&DPGHVVXV0DQG5*XLGpH´%\WKHUXOHµ International monetary fund,Finance & Development, Vol. 47, No. 3, September 2010.

Contact : renaud.guidee@igf.finances.gouv.fr
28

Masaru INOUE
Director, International Affairs,
Japan Economic Foundation

Masaru Inoue is the Director of International Affairs of Japan Economic
Foundation (JEF) since 2003. He joined Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO) in 1964. Having been posted in the Planning and Coordination
Department and the Trade Fair Department for several years, he wasseconded to Japan Consulting Institute where he served as the director ofJapan-Mexico Joint Investment Promotion Project from 1979 to 1982.
After coming back to JETRO, he served as the director of various
departments and divisions which include Special Trade Fair Division andMachinery and Technology Department from 1982 to 1988. He became
Senior Research Fellow and Senior Coordinator for Asia region as well as for
Latin America region from 1998 to 2000. During his tenure, he joined a joint
study group for Japan-Mexico FTA (JETRO-SECOFI) and Japan-Chile FTA(JETRO-DIRECON).

He was assigned to serve as the Director General and the Managing Director
RI VHYHUDO -(752·V RYHUVHDV RIILFHV LQFOXGLQJ -(752 6\GQH\ IURP  WR
2002, JETRO Hong Kong from 1994 to 1998, JETRO Lima from 1988 to 1991
and JETRO Bogota from 1970 to 1974. He was also appointed as the Directorof Japan Pavilion in the Universal Exposition in Seville, Spain in 1992.
Mr. Masaru Inoue graduated from Waseda University in 1964(Bachelor of Arts
in Law).

Contact : masaru-inoue@jef.or.jp
29

Elisabeth MAEGHT-DAHAN
Director of international relations of the Economic Social andEnvironnemental Council

Elisabeth MAEGHT-DAHAN is a carrer diplomat who is actually running theinternational relations of the Economic Social and Environnemental Council.
After graduating the French Institute of Political Studies in Paris in 1972, theUniversity of Paris in 1971 (master of Chinese) and the National School of modern
Oriental Languages in 1970 (Vietnamese and Indonesian), she joigned the french
Foreign Service in 1972.
Having also been seconded as official to the Ministry of cooperation (1990-1993),
she had different postings: in Republic of Korea, People’s Republic of China, Zaire,
Madagascar, Spain and Srilanka. She served as Deputy Director of Human
Ressources in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and as Ambassador.

30

Olivier MELLERIO
President, Mellerio International
Member of the Supervisory Board, Institut Aspen France

Since 1976, Olivier Mellerio has been Managing Partner of Interfinexa, aninternational

consulting

company

specializedininternational

joint

ventures, mergers and acquisitions.
Olivier Mellerio is also CEO of the Mellerio dits Meller Group, a finejewellery family company created in 1613.
From 2002 to 2006, he was the Chairman of Comité Colbert, the associationof the seventy most prestigious luxury brands of France. He has been on the
Board of Comité Colbert since 1976.
Since 2008, he is a board member of the Family Business network (FBNFrance).and of the Jewellery French Union.
In 1983, Olivier Mellerio founded Institut Aspen France and was president
for twenty years. When Institut Aspen France established its head office in
Lyon in 1993, former Prime Minister Raymond Barre became the Chairmanof the Advisory Board.
Since 2003, Olivier Mellerio is a member of the Conseil de Surveillance ofInstitut Aspen France. He is also a life time trustee of The Aspen InstituteUSA, a trustee of Aspen Institute Italia and a former member of the Board
of Aspen Berlin (1983-2003)
Born on July 15, 1945 in Paris, Olivier Mellerio is graduated of HEC andholds a MBA from the University of Columbia. Before joining Columbia, hespent two years in Madagascar and Senegal, serving in the Cooperation
service of France.
He is married to Laure Mellerio, former Director of the France-China
Committee and now president of the Victor Segalen Foundation.
+HLV2IILFLHURIWKH/HJLRQG·+RQQHXU

Contact : mellerio.olivier@wanadoo.fr
31

Shigenobu WATANABE
Deputy Director General,
JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization) Paris

Born on February 17, 1958 in Tokyo, Japan.
Graduated from Meiji University, Faculty of Law in 1980.

April 1981

Joined the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)

April 1994

2nd Secretary, Embassy of Japan, the Republic of Hungary

Aug. 2005

Director, Administrative Affairs Office of Trade Policy Bureau,
METI

Sept. 2007 Director, New and Renewable Energy Division,
Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, METI

July 2008

Director, Measurement and Intellectual Infrastructure Division,
METI

Aug. 2010

Deputy Director General, JETRO Paris

Contact : watanabe@jetroparis.fr
32

6．議事要旨

以下の要約は、フランスアスペン研究所が作成した英文サマリーを和訳したものである。

（日本語）「世界経済の回復は持続可能か？欧州と日本の視点から」
日欧フォーラム概要
2010 年 12 月 9 日〜10 日（於：パリ）

国際経済交流財団とフランスアスペン研究所は 2010 年 12 月 9 日〜10 日にパリの経
済社会環境評議会に於いて「日欧フォーラム」を開催した。会議には日欧の産・官・学界より合計 25 名が出席した。
グ ロ ー バ ル な 課 題 に つ い て の 各 国 間 の 共 通 点 （ convergence ） と 相 違 点（divergence）が議論の中心となった。また、日本と欧州で起こっている根本的な社会変化の要因も極めて重要な議論の的となった。
経済情勢は世界的に一律ではない。ブラジル、韓国、台湾、オーストラリアでは、
国内総生産（GDP）が世界金融危機の発生時より大幅に高い水準に達しているが、米国、欧州、日本は深刻な不況の影響を受けている。最新の根拠から、不況に伴う米国経済の経済産出の損失が恒常的なものとなるが、成長率は約 2.5%から変わらないことが分かった。2000〜2008 年期の成長率が 1.65%であった日本は、急激な落ち込みに見舞われたが、後に持ち直している。ユーロ圏の成長率は、1.2%であったが3.4%回復したドイツ経済と、経済危機以前の成長率が若干高く 1.8%であったが最近は約 1.5%の回復にとどまっているフランス経済との間で相違が見られる。
世界的な景気回復はもはや加速しておらず、一時的であったとさえ見なすことができる。特に、世界経済を牽引してきた米国の家計が依然として過剰借入の状態にあるため、最終需要は全体的に軟調である。可処分所得対比の家計負債比率は 1980 年
代初めから着実に上昇しており、現在ではもはや消費を促進できないほど高水準に達し、GDP に占める個人消費のシェアは 7 割強で不変である。金融危機のせいで企業は経費を切り詰め、黒字のフリーキャッシュフローなどの重要指標に重点を置くようになったため、企業側の民間負債ではそのような勢い不足を補うことができない。企業にとっては固定費の削減が最優先事項であり、1 回限りの在庫補充を安定した回復と見誤ってはならない。レバレッジ引き下げは金融サービス業界で特に自発的に行われ、金融機関に課せられる各種の税が原因で拡大しており、そのせいで銀33

行間の貸付が切り詰められている 1 。そのような状況を考慮して、いわゆる「スイス・フィニッシュ」による資本制約の厳格化はもはや冗長となっている可能性がある。
不確実性は成長経路だけでなく、コアインフレにも影響を及ぼす。短期的なデフレリスクが日本、そしてある程度まで米国にも迫りつつある。欧州にとっては遠く離れた脅威であるように思われる。デフレ圧力と労働市場の柔軟性のつながりが物議を醸し出している。日本では給与が名目的に低下し始めており、賃金の弾力性が高まっているようである。このような全体像は労働市場の不均衡と関係があるが、非正規労働者の弾力的賃金と正規労働者の非弾力的賃金との組み合わせから生じたと考えられる。同時に欧州では、深く根ざした労働組合のせいもあって賃金の硬直性が依然として強く、失業とインフレが同時に発生する可能性がある。米国に関して
は、インフレに対抗する 2 つの要素を特定できる。
-

帰属家賃を含む賃貸料が家計収入の 5 分の 1 以上を占めており、横ばいになりそ
うである。

-

弱含みの労働市場のせいで賃金に下方圧力がかかり、サービス価格が低下している。

このような状況により、米国、欧州、日本が協調的で、ますます革新的な金融政策をとるようになっている。ほぼゼロ金利の政策が当たり前となり、欧州中央銀行（ECB）によって設定された手段などの借り換え措置が金融危機に対する政策の一部を形成している。このように債務返済能力を十分に活用しないままベースマネーを増加させたせいで、資産価格の上昇に拍車がかかった。インフレ目標政策2によって、デフレの構造的リスクがどこまで抑えられるかは、いまだ疑問である。連邦準備銀行が開始した量的緩和から分かるとおり、インフレ予想を覆すにはさらに多くの取り組みが求められる。デフレは家計債務の実質価値を上昇させ、さらに厳しい結果を引き起こすことから、このような目標はますます重要になると思われる。この問題は民間だけの問題ではなく、公的債務の多い国では実質金利の水準も重要である。
金融政策も過剰債務を考慮しなければならないが、ポリシーミックスのうち財政政策でとれる余地は、ほとんどなくなっている。財政再建は避けて通れない。1930 年
代の米国と日本の金融政策からの教訓をもとに考えると、依然として緩慢な回復を維持することを視野に入れて調整を先延ばしにすることは無意味である。米国のニューディール政策では公的債務が増加し、体系的な成長を図ることができず失業率
は高止まりした。カナダ式の財政再建が行われていないため、公的債務のマネタイ
ゼーション（とそれに伴う結果）を回避する唯一の方法は、政策的な取り組みによ1
2

ただし、日本の金融機関は、欧米と比較して、銀行間の貸付に依存していないことに注意すべきである。
ECBは公式なインフレ目標を設定していないが、インフレ率を2%近くに維持することに成功している。

34

って税の抜け穴をふさいで財政赤字を徐々に減らすことである。日本ではこれに加えて、現在はわずか 5%にとどまっている消費税の引き上げを行うことができる。そのような引き上げにより、政府収入を増やし、インフレを促すことができる。1990
年代の間接課税の導入は否定的な反応を引き起こしたが、日本の平均的な消費者と納税者は消費税の引き上げを受け入れる準備ができているように思われる。そのような動きだけではまだ不十分である。政府の国債発行に上限を定めることも必要である。全体的に財政の安定性の鍵となるのは、マクロ経済データではなく信頼であるように見える。
過剰な債務水準は世界的な不均衡を反映している。アジアの 4 カ国で米国国債の約25%を保有していると推定される。今日では、国際準備高全体の 3 分の 2 ほどがアジアに集中している。米国が世界人口の 5%、世界消費の 30%を占めているのに対し、アジアは世界人口の 60%、世界消費の 20%を占めている。これらの相反するパターンのリバランシングは中期的にしか起こらないだろう。米国では家計と政府の貯蓄率を拡大させなければならない。この傾向が進んでいるが、特に税制の構造改革によって拡大せざるを得ないだろう。日本と欧州は米国の消費性向の抑制を目の当たりにし、新興国の経済的成功を国内消費の増加につなげることによって、これを相殺する必要がある。社会保障の確立はその目標に貢献することになるが、短期的に達成することはできない。
世界の不均衡の解消は、マンデルの不可能な三角形に導かれる政策のジレンマをもたらす3。中国の金利引き上げは、インフレ圧力と、国債準備高の蓄積によって刺激される資産バブルのリスクを緩和することにつながる。成長を妨げないようにする
ための微調整は必要である。国内の統治状況と意志決定プロセスが原因となって、そのような措置には時間がかかるだろう。米ドル（USD）に対する中国元（RMB）高については、問題は実際に調整が行われるかどうかではなく、調整のペースである。
中国元が自由化されれば、中国が 2005 年以降保有している巨額の黒字が引き金となって、現在よりも中国元高が進むことになる。それでも、米国と欧州の貿易赤字に関する平価切り上げの影響を過大に評価すべきではない。その点で、日本の 1980 年
代の経験は洞察に満ちている。1985 年から 1988 年にかけて日本円（JPY）は対米ド
ルで 2 倍近くの円高となったにもかかわらず、米国の対日貿易赤字は増加し続けた。
中国元高は緩やかなものとなりそうである。現在のところ、通貨取引における中国
元の利用はわずかなことにも注意すべきである。マレーシアリンギットやタイバー
ツにも後れをとっていると推計されている。一方で、通貨取引の 90%は依然として米ドル絡みである。最大の対外純債務国としての米国の地位は多くの債権国が懸念しているように、必ずしも価値が下落傾向にあり、だぶついている状態を意味する
わけではない。米ドル為替レートが崩壊すれば、債権国が保有する株式や債券の価3固定為替相場、自由な資本移動、自立的な金融政策の3つは同時に実現しえない。

35

値が急落してしまう。そうなれば世界経済は多極的な通貨制度に落ち着き、数種類の通貨の影響を受ける地域ブロックができあがる。民間の基盤を持たない特別引出権（SDR）は実際の通貨ではなく、会計の参考程度にとどまっている。
そのような背景における日本の経済状態はどちらかというと独自のものである。世界の相互依存からやや隔離されている一方で、アジアを中心とする世界成長のリバ
ランシングから利益を得ることに関して主流から外されている。大半の先進国よりも相互の結びつきが弱く、国際資本市場への依存度が低いために、日本は世界的な混乱をどうにか切り抜けることができた。国債残高は高水準であるが、その大部分
は国内投資家によって保有されている。これによって日本円の下方圧力が抑えられ、それと同時にますます上方圧力がかかっている。日本経済は制約が少なく投資の流動性が高いため外国資本を集めている。そのせいで新たな円高が発生し回復の進展が妨げられる可能性がある。一方で、日本は、アジア市場の成長から最も大きな利益を受けている国ではない4。中国の話は、今のところは基本的に供給のことである。
従って、工業製品と高付加価値製品の対中輸出を増やすことが肝要である。そのよ
うな貿易拡大は双方にメリットがある。
各国間の経済パフォーマンスの違いによって、マクロ経済政策とガバナンスのグロ
ーバルな調整が難しくなってきている。先進諸国ですら利害に関して足並みを揃えていない。GDP 比で貿易黒字に上限を設定することはドイツなどの国にとっては不利であり、そのためにドイツはこの件に関する米国の姿勢を批判する中国その他の新興国の仲間に加わっている。現在の G20 構成は、メキシコ、南アフリカ、ロシアなどの主要各国をグローバルガバナンスに加わらせた功績を認められている。ただし、各会議の結論となる合意と共に指示的目標を設定し、中期的な調整の枠組みを規定するには、さらに多くの作業が必要である。さらに抜本的なアプローチは、中国の通貨政策に対して何ら明らかな影響を及ぼしていないことなどから、現在のG20 には限界があり、調整に時間がかかるだけで効果的な結果を伴っていないと考えられる。参加国を 10 カ国に減らす提案は議論に値する。参加条件は、人口と GDPの割合を均等に組み合わせたものとする。そのような方式では、米国、中国、インド、日本、ドイツ、ブラジル、フランス、英国、イタリア、インドネシアが参加国となる。
欧州と日本が新しい枠組みで協力することで、より重点的な協力を実現することができる。日本の貿易は主に米国での出来事に左右されてきた。特に地域安全保障の面で米国は現在も重要なパートナーである。しかし、日本は同盟国を多様化しなくてはならない。環太平洋戦略的経済連携協定（TPP）への参加を表明することに加えて欧州連合（EU）と交渉中の経済統合協定の最終成立を目指している。世界貿易機
関ラウンドでの協議が行き詰まっていることから企業や世論がはっきり認めている
4

新興市場企業の台頭は、Fortune 500ランキングなどでも明らかである。

36

ように 2 つの持続可能なリーダー間の提携はますます重要性と必要性を帯びる。ゼ
ロサムゲームではなく双方に利益のあるイニシアチブとして幅広く構築すべきである。その対象範囲には環境問題も含まれる。これらの件に関する欧州と日本との協力の根拠は京都議定書に関連する決定次第である。環境への取り組みは多岐にわたる。二国間協定を締結することによって気候変動に関する国際連合枠組み条約（UNFCCC）への加盟を補うことができる。エネルギー効率に関する協力のための国際的パートナーシップも環境保護を意識して着手したプロジェクトの具体例である。
日本の提携戦略のもう 1 つの柱は、ASEAN+6 と東アジア共同体である。アジア諸国にはさまざまな文化的背景があることを考えると、異なる種類の共同市場が出現すると予想される。ただし、統合に伴う苦労や市場の役割に対する信頼の低下などから、さらに統合を進めることは次第に難しくなる可能性がある。
欧州と日本は、資本主義と企業統治について共通の考え方を推進することもできる。
ミシェル・アルベールが『資本主義対資本主義』で指摘しているとおり、市場が機能する方法を編み出してきたアングロサクソン社会の外側に位置する国々は類似性を生み出し、代替モデルを構築しようという意志を引き起こすだろう。冷戦終結後には、企業統治モデルは規模こそが重要であり利益の最大化が中心となる米国の支配パターンに収斂したが、9・11 事件、エンロンの粉飾決算、そして現在の金融危機などが発生した 2000 年代になると見方が変わってきた。間違った金融政策は別として、企業レベルでの不十分なリスク管理や公的機関による詰めの甘い監督に責任が求められるようになった。補償、統治、コンプライアンス、利害の衝突などへの一般的な手法に対する批判が高まり、転換期を迎えている。金融機関、大企業、富裕層にペナルティを科すことへの政治的圧力が高まっている。ウォール街改革法および消費者保護法（ドッド・フランク法）に規定された「自社保有義務」や格付け機関の監視強化などは、その答えの一部にすぎない。モラルハザードとコンプライ
アンスと共にビジネススクールでもっと広範に教えるべき倫理的次元について、利害関係者資本主義を奨励する時がやってきた。将来は思いやりの精神を持った資本主義に属するかもしれない。新しい市場基準を設定し、それらをできる限り均一に強化する取り組みを実証することは日本と欧州の義務である。これは過去の対立と見なされるかもしれないが、何もしないで静観することは選択肢にない。実際、新興国は独自のガバナンスモデルを推進している。これは上場してはいるが通常は支配株主（創業者一族や政府機関）が残り、政策決定プロセスに沿って国家の経済拡張に貢献するよう意図されている巨大企業に代表される。

37

代替の資本主義モデルを構築すると、市場の失敗と政府の失敗のリスクが相殺されるものの、政府介入が強くなる可能性がある。有益な政府の復活を示すいくつかの手がかりがある。中国などの新興国では、多くの成功企業は国有企業である。先進国では政府の金融機関支援は投資収益率が有望となり、利益が生じるようになると終了することが多い。過剰規制や不十分な政府介入などのリスクを考えると慎重でバランスのとれたアプローチを主流にする必要がある。例えば、有望な新しいベンチャー事業への公的資本投資からより多くの報酬が生じる一方で、ゾンビファンド
で労働集約的な斜陽産業を支えることについては、政治的動機や世論の圧力によって行われがちである。
社会での集合的選択は、ほとんどが人口動態から生じる。先進国、特に日本にとって、高齢化は由々しき問題であり、悪化する人口統計学的傾向は成長要因に負の影響を及ぼす。それ以外のすべてが同じであれば人口の減少に伴って縮小する需要に対して供給を調整しなければならない。簿外の公的債務は大部分が年金に関連しているため、既得権益がどうであれ、特に定年年齢を引き上げることによって年金制度を調整して、納付者を増やし、受給者を減らす必要がある。55 歳から 64 歳までの人口の労働力はフランスよりも日本のほうがずっと多い。ただし、どちらの国でも社会的一体感の問題が危機に瀕しており、世代間の所得移転の必要性が浮かび上がっている。
高齢化は顧客の期待と生活様式も形成する。日本の消費者は、1950 年代と 1960 年
代に西欧型の富の基準への収斂を求めた。1970 年代と 1980 年代には、特に百貨店
で大量消費が拡大し、顧客がますます製品に品質を求めるようになった。1990 年代
初めにはそのような拡大の傾向は続かず、より快適な生活を送ることが消費者の最優先事項となった。しかし、1997 年になると出費に変化が生じた。それ以降、他とは一切共有しない独自の規格を採用するガラパゴス現象が起こっている。日本の高齢人口は物言わぬ層となり、独自の文化を反映した生活を送ることを望んでいる。
将来についての不安は明治時代などへの郷愁につながるように見える。音楽や漫画の好みを見ても、若年層も内向き思考になっているのが分かる。
熟年市場がビジネスチャンスを生み出す。顧客は個人向けに提供されるサービスに注目するようになっている。注文仕立てのアプローチがフリーサイズに取って代わっている。顧客の期待は単なる消費にとどまらない。通常のコースを外れた旅行をしてみるなど、体験を重視した生き方を実践することである。ライフスタイルの多様化がビジネスの多様化を生み出している。さらに、顧客の責任感と環境・健康問
題への意識の高まりが持続可能な発展につながる。最後に、介護や製薬など、高齢化に関連する産業はビジネスチャンスが存在する分野である。高齢者市場はビジネ
スチャンスとなる。

38

高齢化社会に前向きな姿勢をもたらすことは依然として課題である。日本と欧州のビジネス環境は組織立っており概ね効率にすぐれるが、その根底ではリスクを嫌い、守勢に回りすぎである。米国は概して先進国で最も革新的であり、起業家精神では何歩か先を行っている。ビジネスは変わりつつあり、異端者が尊敬を集めるが、日本と欧州は斬新さや失敗を恐れるあまり自由を失っている。リスクを負って、初期段階でもっと迅速に新興企業の資金調達を行うよう心構えのバランスを取り直す必要がある。
企業の内部組織と外部対話をもっと協調的に行う必要がある。日本企業は階層の概念に支配されているが、迅速で能率的な横の関係が望ましい。取締役会は言うに及ばず、トップの役職から女性が排除されている。もっと多くの女性を労働市場に参加させるには、在宅勤務を許可し、介護ソリューションを設定することが肝要である。日本が得意とする社内での革新に加え、提携も革新を醸成する鍵である。その点で言うと、日本には、産学間の橋渡しをするベンチャー企業やインキュベーター
などの中間的な組織が欠けている。共同出資、人材交流、共同研究開発などを通じた欧州と日本との協力を増やしていくと生産的である。
成熟経済では革新が重要な成長要因である。サービス業や小売業では情報技術（IT）を適切に活用しているように、技術は全要素生産性に決定的に貢献する。全
体的に、日本が 9 つの知識群に関して行ったように選択的に対応することが成功の条件となる。日本と欧州が選択すべき適切な区分には、ライフサイエンス、画期的
新薬、IT、ナノテクノロジー、持続可能な製品、環境、エネルギー効率、エネルギ
ー効率の監視、社会基盤がある。根底をなす革新は科学技術であるが、サービスを志向したものでもある。そのような革新の条件を作り出すにはドイツの中企業のよ
うに、投資を刺激し、肥沃なビジネス環境を醸成することに重点的に取り組む必要がある。革新を通じて欧州と日本の経済および社会が直面しているジレンマと課題の多くを解消し、経済分野では競争力を上げ、社会分野では心構えのシフトを促進することができる。

39

(English Summary)“Is the world economy’s recovery sustainable?
A viewpoint from Europe and Japan”
Summary of the ninth edition of the Europe-Japan Conference,
held in Paris on December 9-10, 2010

25 participants attended the ninth edition of the Europe-Japan conference cohosted by Japan Economic Foundation and Institut Aspen France, which wasorganized in Paris on December 9-10, 2010, at the Conseil économique, social etenvironnemental, with the support of the Comité d’échanges franco-japonais.
The issue of global convergence and divergence among economies was central tothe debate. Also pivotal was the discussion about the drivers for transformationalchanges in society, both in Europe and in Japan.
The economic outlook is not uniform globally. While in Brazil, in South Korea, in
Taiwan, in Australia, the gross domestic product (GDP) stands at a much higher
level now than at the start of the global crisis, the US, Europe and Japan have been
severely hit by the downturn. The latest evidence available suggests that theoutput loss suffered by the American economy because of the recession will bepermanent; its trend growth rate should remain unchanged, however, at about
2.5%. Japan, where the trend growth rate over the 2000-2008 period amounted to
1.65%, experienced a sharp fall, followed by a catch-up. In the euro zone, adiscrepancy can be observed between the German economy, which grows by 1.2%
on trend, but has recently recovered by a 3.4% rate, and the French economy,
where the slightly higher pre-crisis trend growth rate of 1.8% most lately turned
into a sluggish recovery by about 1.5%.
The global recovery is no longer gathering pace and can even be deemed
tentative. Final demand remains weak overall, especially as the US households,
which are the traditional engine of the world economy, are still overleveraged. The
ratio of household debt to disposable income, which rose steadily since the early
1980s, has now reached highs where it no longer fosters consumption, whose shareof GDP remains stuck, slightly above 70%. Private debt on the corporate sidecannot make up for that lack of steam, as the crisis led companies to tighten theirbelts and to focus on key critical indicators such as positive free cash flows. Cutting
fixed costs is for them an utmost priority and one-off restocking should not be
mistaken for sustainable recovery. Deleveraging is especially spontaneous in thefinancial services industry and is enhanced by the various taxes levied on banks,

40

which cause a tightening of interbank lending 1 . In that context, the so-called“Swiss finish” sharpening capital constraints may be redundant.
Uncertainty does not affect only the growth path, but also the pace of core
inflation. The short-run risk of deflation is looming in Japan and, to some extent,in the US. It seems a more distant threat for Europe. The link between deflationarypressures and labour market flexibility is controversial. Wage flexibility appears tohave increased in Japan, as salaries have started to decline nominally. This overall
picture has to do with job market disparities, though: it could stem from a
combination of the flexible wages of non-regular workers and the non-flexible
wages of regular workers. Meanwhile, in Europe, wage rigidity remains stronger, inpart due to deep-rooted labour unions, which allows for simultaneous
unemployment and inflation. As for the US, two anti-inflationary drivers can be
identified:-rents 2 already capture over one fifth of household income and should thenplateau ;-prices of services are declining, because the weak labour market puts
downward pressure on unit labour cost.

This leads to accommodative and increasingly innovative monetary policies in
the US, in Europe and in Japan. Close to zero rate policy is now taken for granted,
and refinancing measures such as the facility set by the European Central Bank
(ECB) have formed part of the policy response to the crisis. This increase in basemoney while capacity remains underutilized has fuelled a rise in asset prices. How
inflation targeting 3 can prevent the structural risk of deflation remains a vexing
question. As the quantitative easing embarked on by the Federal Reserve shows,more can be needed to change inflation expectations. This latter objective seems
all the more pivotal because deflation would increase the real value of debt forhouseholds, which would have dire consequences. This issue is not only a private
one, however: the level of real interest rate is also key to public indebtedness incountries where it is high.
The debt overhang that monetary policy has to take into account leaves little
room for manoeuvre to the fiscal component of the policy-mix. Fiscal
consolidation cannot be escaped. Postponing that adjustment with a view topreserving a still fragile recovery would likely be pointless, as we can learn fromthe lessons of fiscal policies in the US and in Japan in the 1930s : the American New
Deal failed to engineer systemic growth despite the rise in public debt, and the1

It should be noted, though, that in Japan, banks do not rely as heavily on interbank lending as their Americanand European counterparts.
2
Including imputed rents.
3
The ECB has no formal inflation targeting but succeeds in keeping the inflation rate close to 2%.

41unemployment rate remained stubbornly high. For want of a Canadian-styleconsolidation, the only way to avoid monetization of public debt (and theconsequences that come with it) is to gradually decrease the budget deficit byreining in tax loopholes, which requires political commitment. In Japan, this could
be supplemented by a rise in the personal consumption tax rate, which still stands
at only 5%. Such a rise could both increase government income and foster inflation.
Although the introduction of indirect taxation caused strong negative reaction in
the 1990s, the average Japanese consumer and taxpayer now seem ready for an
increase in personal consumption tax. That move might yet not be enough. Capping
government debt by setting a ceiling could also be necessary. Overall, the key offiscal sustainability appears to be confidence, not macroeconomic data.
Excessive levels of debt reflect global imbalances. It is estimated that four Asian
countries hold about 25% of the total US public debt. About two thirds of theaggregate of international reserves now sit in Asia. With 60% of the world
population, Asia stands for 20% of global consumption, while the US is host to 5% of
the world population and accounting for 30% of worldwide consumption. The
rebalancing of these conflicting patterns can only occur over the medium run. In
the US, the saving rate of both households and the government has to be enhanced:
this trend is under way but may have to be enhanced by structural reforms,
pertaining notably to the tax system. Japan and Europe would then witness a curb
on spending habits in the US, which would need to be offset by turning the
economic success of emerging countries into a rise in domestic consumption.
Building social security nets will contribute to that goal – but cannot be achieved
over a short term.
Solving global imbalances poses a policy dilemma resulting from Mundell's
incompatibility triangle 4 . Raising the interest rates in China would help defuse
inflationary pressures and risks of an asset bubble fuelled by the piling-up ofinternational reserves. Fine-tuning would be needed, though, so as not to hamper
growth. Such a move may also take time because of the internal governancecontext and decision-process. As regards the appreciation of the yuan rinminbi(RMB) versus the US dollar (USD), what is at stake is less whether it will take placethan what the pace of the adjustment will be. Should the RMB be floating freely,
the huge current surplus run by China since 2005 would have triggered a stronger
appreciation of the RMB exchange rate than the one that actually occurred. Still,
the impact of this revaluation on the American and European trade deficits should
not be overestimated. Japan’s experience in the 1980s is insightful in that regard.
Even after the quasi-doubling of the exchange rate of the Japanese yen (JPY) to
the USD over the period 1985-1988, the US trade deficit with Japan continued toincrease. The appreciation of the RMB will most likely be gradual. It should also be
4

Its components are a fixed currency, free flow of capital and an autonomous monetary policy.

42noted that so far, the use of the RMB in currency transactions remains marginal. It
is estimated that it lags behind that of the Malaysian ringgit or the Thaï baht.
Meanwhile, 90% of currency transactions still involve the USD. The US position as
the largest net external debtor does not necessarily translate into a depreciative
overhang, as its numerous creditors share a cause for concern: any collapse in the
USD exchange rate would send the value of the stocks and bonds they own nosediving. The global economy could then fit in a multi-polar currency system – with
regional blocks being echoed by several currencies. Having no private base, special
drawing rights (SDR) look bound to remain only a reference of accounts, not an
actual currency.
Japan’s economic position in that context is somewhat stand-alone: whilerather insulated from the global interdependence, it also sidelined when it
comes to cashing in on the rebalancing of global growth, which is now Asiabased. As it is less interconnected and less reliant on international capital markets
than most advanced economies, Japan could somehow weather the global turmoil.
The stock of its public debt is high but largely held by domestic investors. This
prevents a downward strain on the JPY, all the more so as upward drivers are
simultaneously at work: the Japanese economy attracts foreign capital as it has tooffer few constraints and high liquidity to investment. A new endaka could thentake place, which would hinder progress towards recovery. Meanwhile, Japan is not
the country benefiting the most from growth in Asian emerging markets5. China’s
story is essentially about supply so far. An increase in manufactured and highvalue-added exports to China is therefore pivotal. Such a trade expansion would bemutually beneficial.
Divergence in economic performance makes it harder to coordinate globally onmacroeconomic policy and governance. Even advanced economies do not havetheir interests aligned: capping trade surplus as a percentage of GDP would be
detrimental to a country like Germany, which led it to joining China and otheremerging economies in criticizing the US stance on that matter. The current G20
format can be given credit for allowing on board key countries for global
governance, like Mexico, South Africa and Russia. However, more needs to be done
so that the concluding consensus of each meeting comes with indicative targets andprovides a framework for medium-term adjustment. A more radical approach
would be to consider that the current perimeter of the G20 causes time-consuming
coordination without effective results, for instance as it has no visible impact on
China’s currency policy. A proposal to reduce the number of member countries toten can then be put on the table: admission criteria would combine equally
population share and GDP share. In such a format, member countries would be the
US, China, India, Japan, Germany, Brazil, France, the UK, Italy and Indonesia.
5

Evidence of the rise of emerging market companies is given, for instance, by the Fortune 500 rankings.

43

More focused cooperation can be achieved through the partnership between
Europe and Japan, in a renewed framework. Japan trade used to be dependentprimarily on what happened in the US. The US is still a key partner, especially interms of regional security. However, Japan has to diversify its alliances: on top of
applying for membership to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), it is pushing forthe finalization of the Economic Integration Agreement currently under negotiation
with the European Union (EU). The stalling of talks in the World Trade Organization
round would make this alliance between two sustainable leaders all the more
relevant and necessary, as companies and the man on the street alike can clearly
perceive. It should be framed not as a zero-sum game, but as a win-win initiative,
with a far-reaching range. Its scope could include environmental issues. Evidenceof the cooperation between Europe and Japan on these matters will hinge on thedecision about the Kyoto protocol. The green involvement can be multi-fold: beinga member of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC) can be complemented by signing bilateral agreements. The International
Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation also provides concrete example ofenvironment-conscious projects put to work. Another pillar of the Japanese
partnership strategy is the development of ASEAN+6 and the East Asian Community.
Given that Asian countries have various cultural backgrounds, it should be expectedthat different types of common markets emerge. However, further integration can
get increasingly difficult to achieve, because of integration fatigue and diminishedconfidence in the role of the market.
Europe and Japan can also promote shared views on capitalism and corporate
governance. Being out of the Anglo-Saxon community, which traditionally frames
the way market works, can create an affinity and trigger the will to build analternative model, as depicted by Michel Albert in Capitalisme contre capitalisme.
While in the years following the end of the cold war, corporate governance models
converged towards the US dominant pattern, where size matters and profit
maximization is at the core, mindsets started to change in the 2000s, in the wakeof 9/11, the Enron fraud and the recent crisis – for which, apart from a wrong
monetary policy, poor risk management at firm level and lax supervision by the
public authorities were to blame. Criticism of the prevailing approach tocompensation, to governance, to compliance and to potential conflicts of interest
grew and reached a turning point: the political pressure is now strong to penalizebanks, big businesses and the rich. “Skin in the game” as provided for in the DoddFrank Act and a better monitoring of rating agencies are only part of the answer.
Time has come of the promotion of stakeholders’ capitalism, with moral hazard
and compliance awareness as well as an ethical dimension that should be more
extensively taught in business schools. The future may belong to capitalism withcaring spirit. It is up to Japan and to Europe to give evidence of their commitment
to set new market standards and make their enforcement as homogenous as

44possible. This might be deemed a battle of the past, but lying idle is not an option.
Indeed, emerging countries are promoting a governance model of their own,
epitomized by bulge-bracket large corporations that may be listed but usually with
controlling shareholders remaining (be it a founding family or a government
authority), are no alien the political decision process and are meant to contributeto national economic expansion.
Building an alternative capitalism model can lead to greater public intervention,although a trade-off has to be made between the risks of market failure and ofgovernment failure. There are several hints at a fruitful government comeback: inemerging economies such as China, many successful firms are state-owned; inadvanced countries, government support to banks most often ended at a profit
with a flattering return on investment. A cautious and balanced approach should
yet prevail, given the risks of overregulation or inadequate government
intervention. For instance, there can be political incentive and public opinion
pressure into supporting declining, labour-intensive industries, with zombie funds,
while a greater reward would come from public capital investment in promising
new ventures.
Collective preferences within the society stem largely from demography. Ageing
is a matter of concern for advanced economies, first and foremost Japan, where
the downward demographic trend results in a negative contribution to thebreakdown of growth factors. Supply has to adjust to demand that is, all otherthings being equal, shrinking due to the decline in population. Off-balance sheet
public debt relates mostly to pensions, hence the need to increase the number ofcontributors and decrease the number of recipients, by fine-tuning the set of
actuarial incentives and penalties, whatever the vested interests - especially byraising the retirement age. Labour force participation for the population aged
between 55 and 64 is much higher in Japan than in France. In both countries
however, the issue of social cohesion is at stake, outlining the need for income
transfers between generations.
Ageing also shapes customer expectations and consumer lifestyles. Convergencewith the Western wealth standards was sought by Japanese consumers in the 1950s
and the 1960s. The 1970s and 1980s saw an expansion of mass consumption,
especially in Japanese department stores, with clients increasingly demanding
product quality. While the early 1990s did not follow that expansion trend, making
life more comfortable was still the top on the consumer’s agenda. However, 1997
marked a shift in expenses; from then on, the Galapagos phenomenon, which
consists in using standards of their own, not shared elsewhere, rose. Japaneseageing population has become a quiet people and wants to live a life that reflects
its own culture. Doubts about what the future will look like lead to a nostalgic

45

feeling, for instance towards the Meiji era. Even the youth are inward-looking, as
their music tastes and their appetite for mangas show.
Mature markets can provide economic opportunities. Clients pay a growing
attention to the service offered, which should be personalized. The tailor-madeapproach has taken over the one-size-fits-all. Customer expectations go further
than mere consumption: it is about living an experience, for instance by travelling
off the tourist track. Exchanging art-de-vivre is an engine for exchanging businesswise. Moreover, customers’ greater sense of responsibility and awareness ofenvironmental and health issues refine their wishes, which now typically include
sustainable development. Lastly, ageing-related industries, like care andpharmaceuticals, are a field of business opportunities. The aim is to turn this silvermarket into gold.
Instilling a forward-looking attitude in ageing societies remains a challenge.
Japanese and European business environments are well-organized and mostly
efficient, but the underlying mood is risk-averse and too defensive. The US is byand large the most innovative of advanced economies, several notches ahead whenit comes to entrepreneurship spirit. Although business establishment is shifting andmavericks command increasing respect, Japan and Europe remain too often
crippled by the fear of novelty and failure. Mindsets should be rebalanced to morerisk-taking, which would translate for instance into more speedy, start-up fundingat an early stage.
Business internal organizations and external interactions should become morecollaborative. Japanese firms remain dominated by the concept of hierarchy,
whereas horizontal relationship, which is less slow and less bureaucratic, is now
desirable. Women are still largely excluded from jobs with top responsibilities, letalone companies’ boards. Allowing work-from-home and setting more day-caresolutions are pivotal to allow more women to take part in the job market.
Collaboration is also key to foster innovation, on top of the in-house innovation forwhich Japan fares well. In that respect, intermediary institutions like venture capital
firms and incubators, which build bridges between academics and businesses, aremissing in Japan. More cooperation between Europe and Japan, through joint
funding, people exchange, common research and development, would be productive.
Innovation is a key growth driver in mature economies. Technology can provide a
decisive contribution to total factor productivity, including in the services andretail industry with an appropriate use of information technology (IT). Overall,being selective, as Japan did with its nine knowledge clusters, is a condition forsuccess. Among the right segments for Japan and Europe to pick, stand life
sciences, innovative medicine, IT, nanotechnologies, sustainable products,
environment and energy efficiency as well as the monitoring thereof, and46

infrastructure. The underlying innovation can be scientific and technological, butalso service-oriented. To create the conditions for such innovation to happen,
governments should focus on stimulating investment and promoting a fertile
business environment – like Germany’s Mittelstand. Innovation can solve many ofthe dilemmas and challenges that are faced by Europe’s and Japan’s economies(leading to enhanced competitiveness) and societies (driving a shift in mindsets).

47

７. 発表資料（登壇順）
Session 1, Thierry Moulonguet, Senior Advisor to the President of Renault Nissan Alliance

48

49

50

Session 1, Philippe Waechter, Head of economic research, Natixis Asset Management

World Economic Outlook
Friday 10 December 2010
Friday,Philippe WAECHTER – Head of Economic Research

GDP Growth after a recession
Level of GDP - Constant Prices - First Half of 2008 = 100
Brazil106

South Korea
TaiwanA t li
Australia
Sweden
USA

100

FranceG
GermanyEuro AreaJapan
94

EnglandSpain
Greece
Italy
Ireland

88
2006

2

2007

2008

2009

Friday, 10 December 2010

51

2010

JapanJapan
610000Trend growth rate = 1.65 %590000570000550000530000510000490000470000
2000

3

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Friday, 10 December 2010

United States
United States
15000
Trend growth rate = 2.5 %
14500
14000
13500
13000
12500
12000
11500
11000
10500
10000
2000

4

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Friday, 10 December 201052

Euro Area
Euro Area
2050
Trend growth rate = 1.8 %
2000
1950
1900
1850
1800
1750
1700
1650
1600
2000

5

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Friday, 10 December 2010

Germany
Germany
580
Trend growth rate = 1.2 %
570
560
550
540
530
520
510
500
2000

6

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Friday, 10 December 2010

53

2009

2010

France
France440
Trend growth rate = 1.8 %
430
420
410
400
390
380
370
360
350
2000

7

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Friday, 10 December 2010

Economic Activity
World Industrial Production, World Trade and a Survey
30.00
20.00

60

10.00

55

0.00

50

-10.0045-20.0040
Ind.Prod. (Source CPB)World Trade (Source CPB)

-30.0035

Survey PMI/Markit - World Manuf. Sector Right Scale - Ech.D-40.002004

865

Quarterly Change - Annual Rate

2005

2006

2007

Friday, 10 December 2010

54

2008

2009

30
2010

Private debt in the US
USA - Consumption to GDP ratio and debt to Income ratio
72.00
Q2 2010Consumption to GDP ratio
70.00

68.00

From 1960 to 1969
From 1979 to 1979

66 00
66.00

From 1980 to 1989
From 1990 to 1999

64.00

From 2000 to Q2 2010

62.00
Households - Debt to disposable income
ti

60.00
50

9

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

Friday, 10 December 2010

Public debt issues in Euro Area
Ireland

Greece

60000

55000

Trend growth rate = 5.3 %Trend growth rate = 4.1 %

55000
50000
50000
45000
45000
40000
40000
35000

35000

30000

30000
2000

10

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2000

2010

Friday, 10 December 2010

55

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Public debt issues in Euro Area
Public Deficits (% of GDP) - 2006 - 2014
5
0
-5
- 10
- 15
- 20
- 25
- 30
- 35

Sourc e Eurostat - Barc lays Capital - Governments
Spain

11

Ireland

Greec ePortugalEuro Area

Friday, 10 December 2010

Public debt issues in Euro Area
Public Debt (% of GDP) - 2006 - 2014160

Sourc e Eurostat - Barc lays Capital - Governments

140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Spain

12

Ireland

Greec eFriday, 10 December 2010

56

PortugalEuro Area

Legal information
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13

Friday, 10 December 201057

Session 1, Naohiro Yashiro, Professor, International Christian University

Is capitalism changing
in nature?
JEF – Institute Aspen France Conference
December 10, 2010
International Christian University
Naohiro Yashiro
yashiro@icu.ac.jp1

Is capitalism changing in the longer
run perspective?
z Effects of bursting of bubble are wide-spreadingwith globalization of economic activities;z International coordination for supervising global
financial institutions is needed;z Better regulation is based on the trade-offbbetween““marketk failure”
f il ” andd ““government
intervention failure”;
z Capitalism is changing reflecting stages in
economic development, but the essence isunchanged.
58

2

Prevention of systemic risk in theworld financial markets
z Central banks’ “unconventional policy measures”
z Wider interpretation of the central bank’sbank s “lenderlenderof last resort” against the world economic crisisz Not only preventing the bankruptcy of banks but
securities or insurance companies;z ExpandingEdi th
the ttargett ffrom fi
financiali l iinstitutions
tit titto
small governments with heavy debt to GDP;z Preventing overshooting of asset prices falling
below the “fundamental level”.
3

Increasing gross debt to GDP ratios
in many OECD countries

459

From dis-intermediation to reintermediation in the financial markets
z Role of the financial intermediation shifts frombanks to hedge funds seeking for high risk &high return assets;z Financial innovation has made the market more
efficient, lowering the probability of financial
risks,, but expandedpthe scale of potentialpfinancial risks;z Speeding up of financial transactions andsynchronizing behaviors of financial institutions
have accumulated the tail risks.
5

Seeking for “optimum regulation” inthe globalized world
z Expansion in size of the financial sector withvolatile p
price changes;g ;z Recent information and communication
technologies allow huge amount of financial
trading to take place in a short time;z “Tobin
Tobin tax
tax” on international capital movements
to reduce the adjustment speed in the financial
markets relative to the product and labormarkets;
660

Post–Crisis World Economy
z The economic interdependence will increasewithith growing
i fforeigni didirectt iinvestments;ttz Convergence of institutions and regulations isrequired across countries.

7

Rise of China and India with large
population in the World Economyz Large population of China and India used to bea source for the poverty, but becomes a strength
for continuous economic development combinedwith the inflow of foreign capital.

861

Aging of the population in OECD will
increase the role of government throughythe social securityy system
Old dependency ratioa
80

70

60

%

50

40

30

20

10

0
1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

Cnina

India

2000

2005

Japan

2010

2015

UK

USA

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

9

Aging of the population as a key issue
in the post-crisis developmentsz Rapidly proceeding aging of population in OECD

countries: does it mean weakness or not?
z Reduction of the labor force may well be partly
offset by extending the retirement age;z Increase in tax and social security burden forsupportingti theth elderly
ld l could
ld b
be moderated;d t dz Aging expands the markets for the services forthe elderly, and stimulates the innovation
10

62

Reversing the earlier retirement is a key
to overcome the aging of the population

11

Lower LFP of the elderly is matched with thehigher penalty on work under the actuarially
unfair social security system

63

Economic growth strategy under the
aging of the populationz Aging society is gloomy for the public sector

through the higher burden of tax and social
security contributionsz An increasing number off the elderly implies
growing demand for health care and nursing careservicesi
provided
id d bby theh public
bli sectorz Regulatory reform for stimulating the competitionin the related sectors is a key for sustainableeconomic development
13

Making the age and gender-freesociety and the “Silver Markets”
z Extension of the retirement age would raise the

SS revenues while reduce expenditures;z Removing age-related regulations and practices in
the labor markets for the diversity
y of the elderly;y;z Reducing the “penalty to work” in the social
security system by achieving actuarially fairness;z Development of the markets for the elderly
meeting with a variety of value
value-added
added health careand nursing care services combined withuniformly provided government services
services.
1464

An image of the “age-free society” isto change the definition of the elderlyz For
F example,
l age 65 iin 2005
2005, age 70 iin

2017 and age 75 in 2033...
Ratios of the eldery in various definitions in Japan
45
40% of the total po
opulation

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
(2005)(2010)(2015)(2020)(2025)

65(2030)

70

75(2035)(2040)(2045)(2050)(2055)

80

15

65

Session 2, Jean-François Di Meglio, President of Asia Centre

J.F. DI MEGLIOG O
Asia Centre, Paris

Europe-Japan relations and positioning in acontext of growing regional integration andglobal shift
Main forces at play in regional integration and their influence on JapanEurope relations
Paris, Dec., 10th 2010E
Export
t and
d GDP

66

It’s the JPY, stupid !

Balancing and re-balancing

67China’s top
p import
p supplierspp
2009Country/region

Volume% change over 2008

Japan

130.9

-13.1

South Korea

102 6
102.6

-8 5
-8.5

Taiwan

85.7

-17.0

United States

77.4

-4.8

Germany

55.8

0.0

Australia

39.4

5.4

Malaysia

32.3

0.7

Brazil

28.3-5.3

Thailand

24.9

-3.0

Saudi Arabia

23.6

-23.9

Th exportt story
The
t

68

Japan, China and the region1
1.

Hatoyama first raised the “East
East Asia Community
Community” pet project with Chinese
President Hu Jintao just a few weeks after he became prime minister in
September 2009. The term refers was a regional free economic zone by
2020–one that covers covering trade, finance and perhaps even an East Asian
regional common currency
currency. Far
Far-fetchedfetched as it may sound now,
now economists at
one point laughed as late as the 1990s that Germany, France and Italy would
have common bills and coins.
2.
The regional agreement would also encompass energy, environment andh lth care–ideally
healthid ll tto shield
hi ld ththe membersbffrom an economic
i ddownturntiinNorth America or Western Europe. However, the Chinese view of themembership excluded India, Australia and New Zealand, whereas theJapanese list included the latter two countries, plus Japan, China and South
Korea and ASEAN members Brunei,
Korea,Br nei Cambodia,
Cambodia Indonesia,
Indonesia Laos,
Laos Mala
Malaysia,
sia
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. This“community” idea still needs many more negotiation cycles, since India is seen
as a potential economic rival to China, and is a major sticking point. This
Asian economic club idea may be an early casualty of the Hatoyama’s
departure. Without Chinese participation, it just won’t work.
(from « Forbes » magazine, June, 8th 2010

Japan, China and the region (2)….
Japan just released its trade data for October, with the monthly stats showing a tapering off in annual
growth, and negative growth vs September, with :-exports down -2% from September (up 8% vs 2009)- imports down -3% from September (up 9% vs 2009).
The growth in trade disappointed against expectations and is starting to make the trend look a little less thanpromising for the troubled Japanese economy.
For an economy faced with the dirty D’s of deflation, deficits, and debt… not to mention being caught on thewrong side of demographics, it is concerning that trade is appearing to taper off.
Without reliable and sustained demand from within, Japan is left very exposed to its international trade efforts.
But one interesting point in the data is that its exports to China not only grew faster than in September,but also at a much much faster pace than its exports to the US. In the medium term this is how you
would want to strategically position yourself with China expected to grow much faster than the US.
But even if Japan gets trade right, it’s still shackled by considerable demographic challenges (i.e. aging
population).
Before signing off, it’s worth checking in where markets are at in Japan. The yen has continued to strengthen
against the dollar, despite the recent yen intervention indeed this has likely started to show through in the
trade figures.

69Recent comments from JETRO•

According to a report released today by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Japan’s
total trade with China (imports and exports combined) rose 34.5% to US$138.4 billion in the firsthalf of 2010, setting a new record. This was the first increase (on half-year basis) since thesecond half of 2008. Japan’s exports to China rose by 47.1% to US$68.4 billion, while Japan’siimports
ffrom China
Chi rose 24.2
24 2 % to US$69
US$69.99 billibillion.
Overview of Japan-China trade in the first half of 2010p
trade with China p
posted p
positive ggrowth for eightg consecutive months,, from November
Japan’s
2009 to June 2010. The improvement was attributed to an increase in exports to China on theback of the country’s quick economic growth and a rise in Japan’s imports following its own
economic recovery.
In the first half of 2010,, Japan’spexportsp
to China set a record on a half-yearlyyy basis,, on theback of expanding domestic demand in China and an increase in Chinese exports to Japan, theUS and Europe. An increase was noted in exports of automobiles as well as parts and materials
for production of finished goods in China. Japan’s imports from China also set a record in the firsthalf of 2010 (on a first half-year basis). This improvement was due to an increase in imports offinished ggoods such as electrical machinery,y, fueled byyg
growingg demand in Japanp on the back of
its economic recovery. Imports of foodstuffs showed signs of recovery as well, while imports ofclothing and accessories showed signs of peaking due to a reduction in household spending on
clothing and relocation of production bases out of China by some companies.

The drop in Japan’sJapan s trade with China was smaller than that for the nation
nation’ssoverall trade. As a result, the share of Japan-China trade dropped to 20.2% of Japan’s total
trade. The share of Japan’s exports to China set a record, accounting for 18.9% of Japan’s totalexports, while Japan’s imports from China dropped to 21.5%. China, however, remains Japan’slargest trading partner in terms of imports, exports and total trade

Details on bilateral trade
Japan’s exports to China in the first half of 2010
Japan’s exports to China marked a quick recovery setting a record in the first half of 2010.
Exports of parts and materials and also finished goods were up due to growing demand in
China.
Fueled by increased infrastructure investment in China due to the government’s 4-trillionyuan (approximately 50 trillion yen) economic stimulus package,, exports of construction andpower generating machinery showed strong growth. Reflecting a rise in industrial production,
exports of semiconductors, electrical apparatus, metalworking machinery, plastic materials
and motor vehicle parts were all up. Exports of cars, video equipment and other finishedgoods increased substantially, fueled by China’s rising consumption.
Japan’s imports from China in the first half of 2010p
importspfrom China are showing
g a clear signg of recovery,y, pposting
gp
positive ggrowth forJapan’s
five consecutive months between February and June of this year. This was fueled byincreased imports of electrical machinery, personal computers and nonferrous metals.
Imports of cell phones (including smart phones) were up, as were imports of audio-visualapparatus
t suchh as LCD TV
TVs, on theth backb k off extensiont
i off Japan’sJ’ ““eco-points”
i t ” system,t
theth2010 FIFA World Cup and the switch in Japan to digital TV broadcasting. Imports offoodstuffs showed double-digit growth, backed by robust business use of food items,
reduced concerns over Chinese food safety and increased demand for vegetables caused byunseasonable weather in Japan.
Japan Imports of clothing and accessories declined slightly due tosluggish growth in Japan’s domestic demand and transfer of production bases of apparelitems to outside of China.

70

Details on bilateral trade (2)Outlook for 2010
Japan-China trade is predicted to post positive growth in 2010 as a whole, led by economic growth in China—where growthof over 9% is expected in the second half of 2010—and continued recovery of the Japanese economy. Japan-China trade in2010 isi expectedt d tot registeri t its
it first
fi t growth
th in
i two
t
years, possibly
ibl toppingt
i theth previousi
recordd sett iin 2008
2008.

Exports:
1)Increased exports of construction machinery and other infrastructure-related
infrastructure related goods are expected2)Developed economies, including Japan, the US and Europe, will likely continue to grow moderately, and Chinese exports
of finished goods to these regions are expected to increase, leading to a continued rise in Japan’s exports of high valueadded parts and materials to China. Also, as China’s consumer market expands, Japanese exports of machinery, consumer
goods and also pgparts and materials for p
production of finished ggoods in China will likelyyggrow.
3)In the second half of 2010, the Chinese economy is predicted to show a slower growth trend, and downside risks are risingin the US and European economies, China’s main export destinations. In addition, a stronger yen is blurring the outlook for
the Japanese economy. Therefore, given uncertainty in the global economic situation, Japan’s exports to China will likely
continue risingrising, although at a slower pace
pace.

Imports:
1)A spike in exports of LCD TVs is expected towards the end of 2010, when Japan’s “eco-points” program is scheduled topexpire.
2)As Japan’s deflation trend deepens, demand for low-cost food products and other consumer goods from China is
expected to increase; the growth of imports, however, will not be as high as that of exports on a value basis.

Where the growth lies, there are the buyers…

71

Japan’export story (sequel and conclusion)….

72

Session 2, Takashi Shimada, Director-General, Multilateral Trade System Department,
Trade Policy Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)A Paradigm Shift in the World Economy
and its implication towards Japan-EU Relations
２０１０．１２．１０
Ｔａｋａｓｈｉ Ｓｈｉｍａｄａ
Director General
M ltil t l TTrade
Multilaterald SSystemtD
Department,tt METI

１．Difficulty in Multilateral Negotiations
Duringg the first decade of ２1st century,y, the World has dramaticallyychanged.
• Expanded Presence of Emerging Countries.
• Difficulty in Multilateral Negotiations (WTO/Doha Round, UNFCCC)• Building International Economic Orders has become more and more difficult.

Rise of emerging countries.
• Nominal GDP of China, Brazil and India have grown 4, 3.5, 3 times respectively in thisdecade.
• the Responsible Stakeholder / the Game Changer？
• The “Belle Époque” days where the Quad or G7 could shape the future path of the global
economy are gone.
→EU and Japan must seek for the new trade policy to survive in the international
competition under the “New Normal”.
73

1２．A Paradigm Shift in the Global Economy

Neo mercantilism
Neo-mercantilism
High Unemployment Ratesg
Slow Progressin the Doha RoundGear Shift to EPAs
• Korea positioning itself as the “hub” in the global market.
• Korea completed the FTA negotiations with the UnitedStates and EU.
• Korea is also interested in FTA with China.
2

３．Basic Policy on Comprehensive Economic Partnerships
Japan’ss Self Reform - Back to basics as a “TradingJapan
Trading Nation”
Nation• The resolve to “open up the country” and “pioneer a new future.”• Drastic Domestic Reforms:• ①Agriculture• ②Regulatory Reforms• ③Movement of Natural Persons• Promotion of high level economic partnerships
Main Targets• TPP（the Trans-Pacific Partnership）• Japan-EU・EIA• East Asian Community（ASEAN+6 etc.）
743４．Implication Towards EU-Japan Relations
Japan and EU are “Sustainable
Sustainable Growth Leaders
Leaders”
with shared values.
• Green• Sustainability• Social Cohesion
The essential elements of EIA concluded between“Sustainable Growth Leaders”
• The
h WTO
O ““plus”
l ” structure whichhi h prevents neo-mercantilist
ili move.
• The most advanced model of “Green EPA”.
• “Expandability” to incorporate like-minded countries.
475

Session 2, Claude Meyer, Associate Professor,
Sciences Po, and Senior Research Fellow, G.E.M. Sciences Po

G20 Agenda under French Presidency

I.

Reform of the International Monetary System

II. Regulationgof the commodities markets– grains and other raw agricultural products, metals, oil, gas and CO2
quotas– Ambiguity
g y : regulationgvs. stabilization (role(of the “speculation”
p?))III. Reforms in Global Governance+ (Follow-up of Seoul Summit: Doha, development as per “Seoul
Consensus”,, etc.))© ASPEN-JEF / C. Meyer, 2010

1

Reform of the International Monetary System (“IMS”)

I.

Global financial imbalances

II. The “Yuan problem”
III. The US problem, hence the $ problem
IV. Which architecture for a new IMS ?

© ASPEN-JEF / C. Meyer, 2010762

I. Financial imbalances•

Current accounts surplus or deficits = + OR - balance between domestic savings andinvestments.

•

Gross national saving in China represent on average 50% of GDP against 15% for
the US (for households, respectively 38% of the disposable income for China and
4% for the US)•

Current account balance on average 2006-2009: China surplus of 333 Bil. $ p.a.
(9,5% of GDP) against US deficit of 650 Bil. $ (4,5% of GDP)•

4 Asian countries own 50% of the public US debt held by foreigners
foreigners, ii.e.
e 25% ofthe total public US debt. Asia owns 65-70% of the aggregate of international
reserves.

•

Asia with 60% of the world population represents only 20% of the worldconsumption market against 30% for the US (5% of the world population)

Detrimental effects :•These imbalances divert from Asia much needed savings for its own economic andhuman development•

They introduce volatility on the markets and instability in monetary and financial
policies© ASPEN-JEF / C. Meyer, 20103

II. The “Yuan problem”
A. Lessons from Japan’s experience in the ‘80s
Th
There
iis a similarity
i il it off patternttbbetweentth
the presentt iinternationalttil pressures ffor RMB
revaluation and pressures which were exerted on Japan in the ‘80s for Yen revaluation.
Two main lessons from Japan’s experience :1.

It is quite an illusion on the side of the US and Europe to expect that the RMB
revaluation would bring a substantial reduction of their trade deficit (the US trade
deficit with Japan continued to increase, even after the quasi-doubling of the Yen/$ rateover theth periodi d 1985
1985-1988).
1988)
9 The RMB reevaluation would only reduce marginally the US and European deficits (as they
are essentially linked to the production costs in China)
9 Cf. limited impact on the US deficit from the 25% appreciation RMB/$ since July 2005

2.

It does not seem in China’s own interest to put the brakes on the natural appreciationof its currency. A similar policy by Japan from 1981 to 1985 led to the Plaza agreement,which
hi h ttriggeredid an amplification
lifi ti bby ththe markets
k t lleading
di tto a monetarytpolicyli whichhi hfueled the asset inflation (stocks and real estate), followed by the “lost decade”.

© ASPEN-JEF / C. Meyer, 2010774

II. The “Yuan problem”
B - Still a sustained appreciation of the RMB is necessary for a rebalancing ofChinese economy
11.

China’ss huge current surplus since 2005 would have triggered a strong appreciation of
China
the RMB effective rate (25-30% ?), should it be floating freely

2.

The present situation is :- not sustainablebl ffor theh globall b l ffinanciall bbalancel: excessive savings in
China, insufficient savings in the US- structurally detrimental for China : delay for the rebalancing of China’s
growthth tto ddomestic
ti consumption
ti andd more added
dd d value
l exports,t risksi k off
bubbles, piling-up of int’l reserves, monetary policy (cf. Mundell's
incompatibility triangle: fixed currency, free flow of capital, autonomous
p y)monetaryy policy).

3.

What would be desirable…..
- Short term: sustained but progressive appreciation of the Yuan (which
would also alleviate inflation pressures)- Medium term: decrease of the saving rate (social security) and increase ofhousehold consumption

4.

….but coupled with increased saving rate in the US (household + government)© ASPEN-JEF / C. Meyer, 20105

III - The US problem, hence the $ problem
A – The US saving / investment structural imbalance

II.

© ASPEN-JEF / C. Meyer, 201078

6

© ASPEN-JEF / C. Meyer, 2010

III - The US problem, hence the $ problem
B – Which solutions ?
1.

US consumer has been the main engine of growth over the past decade and thesolutionsl ti
can onlyl b
be iimplementedlt d iin th
the mediumditterm, giveniththe presentt situation
it ti
of US and world economy.

22.

Over the medium term,
term higher consumption in emerging countries
countries, notably in China
China,
will hopefully take pressure off of the US consumer and stimulate exports.

3
3.

Some structural reforms will be needed in the US,
US in particular tax
tax-wise,wise in order tostimulate household savings, to curb down consumer credit and to rebalance theFederal budget.

© ASPEN-JEF / C. Meyer, 2010

798

IV - Which architecture for a new IMS ?
A –Better macro policies coordination within the present IMS
1.

US proposal for a limit on current account surplus or deficit (4% of GDP) Æ strong
opposition from surplus countries
countries, notably China and Germany
Germany.

2.

G20 enhance in Seoul the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP).
We will strengthen multilateral cooperation to promote external- “We
sustainability and pursue the full range of policies conducive to reducing
excessive imbalances and maintaining current account imbalances atsustainable levels.
- Indicative guidelines composed of a range of indicators would serve as amechanism to facilitate timely identification of large imbalances that
require preventive and corrective actions to be taken.
- we call on our Framework Working Group, with technical support from the
IMF and other international organizations, to develop these indicative
guidelines, with progress to be discussed by our Finance with progress tobe discussed by our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in thefirst half of 2011.
- In light of this, the first such assessment, to be based on the above
mentioned indicative guidelines
guidelines, will be initiated and undertaken in due
course under the French Presidency.”© ASPEN-JEF / C. Meyer, 2010

9

IV - Which architecture for a new IMS ?
A –Better macro policies coordination within thepresent IMS
3.

If implemented according to these guidelines, the reduction of structural
current account imbalances would slow down the accumulation of int’lreserves hence currencies volatility
reserves,II.

© ASPEN-JEF / C. Meyer, 201080

10

IV - Which architecture for a new IMS ?
B – How to structure a new IMS ?
Proposals from the most progressive to the more radical :1
1.

M l i l system
Multipolar• Enhanced role for, say, 2 or 3 “regional” currencies (Euro, Yen or later Yuan) for trade andcapital markets. These currencies would become progressively reserve currencies (itimplies economies comparable to the US: size
size, int’l
int l trade
trade, capital markets,
markets institutions…)
institutions )• Reduced role for the US$ (inc. US Bonds issue in foreign currencies, etc..)• But … so many objections , either operational or political !

II.

© ASPEN-JEF / C. Meyer, 201011

IV - Which architecture for a new IMS ?
B – How to structure a new IMS ?
2.

Extension of the use of SDR as an international “currency” , on which other currencies
would be anchored• Cf. PBC
PBC’ss Governor Zhou
Zhou’ss proposal to substitute the SDR for the dollar• If promoted, the SDR would gradually become the principal reserve asset in the systemthen allowing for a shift away from a dollar-centric system• For the SDR to take on a significant rolerole, however
however, its liquidity would need to be increased
massively
Advantages: Stability and redistribution of the US$ “exorbitant privilege”
Difficulties: operational and politicalpolitical.
N.B. Historical background• Cf. “Substitution account” discussed at the end of the ‘70s : conversion of international
reserves ini SDR
SDR, on a voluntaryl t bbasis.
i• Cf. Keynes “bancor”© ASPEN-JEF / C. Meyer, 201081

12

IV - Which architecture for a new IMS ?
B – How to structure a new IMS ?
3. IBRD Mr Zoellick ‘s “proposal” (or reflexion ?)• New IMS involving multiple reserve currencies and including a role for gold
as a reference point for market expectations of inflation and future
currency values• Not a return to the gold standard• Similar to 1. Multipolar system, but with reference to gold ??

© ASPEN-JEF / C. Meyer, 201013

“In a nutshell,
h ll theh concern bbrought
h to theh ffore b
by theh crisisi i iis theh tensionibetween(1) the scale and volatility of global capital flows, which motivates everlarger reserve buffers, and(2) questions about the desirability of anchoring the IMS on one country’s
currency (the U.S. dollar), given the origins of this crisis in the U.S. heart of
the global financial system.”

Source: Isabelle Mateos y Lago, Rupa Duttagupta, and Rishi Goyal,
IMF Staff position note SPN/09/26, November 11, 2009

© ASPEN-JEF / C. Meyer, 201082

14

Session 2, Sayuri Shirai, Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University

The Global Imbalance andGovernance of Macroeconomic Policy
Prof. Sayuri SHIRAIKeio University
http://www.paw.hi-ho.ne.jp/~sshirai/

Growing Global Current Account Imbalances(Unit: Billions of Dollars)(Unit: Billion US Dollars)

Source: IMF

83

Net International Asset by Country(Unit: Billions of US Dollars)

Source: IMF

䈜㻶㼍㼜㼍㼚㻌㼕㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼘㼍㼞㼓㼑㼟㼠㻌㼚㼑㼠㻌㼑㼤㼠㼑㼞㼚㼍㼘㻌㼏㼞㼑㼐㼕㼠㼛㼞US is the largest net external debtor

Rationale for the Renminbi Appreciation
Before the Global Economic Crisisy Growing US external debt may lead to a sharp and sudden capitaloutflows from US э collapse in the US dollar, stocks, and bonds эrecession in US э global recession <hard-landing scenario>y To avoid the scenario, the US current account deficit must be

reduced by depreciating the dollar/appreciating the renminbi (inaddition to a cut in US fiscal deficit)

84

After the Global Economic Crisis
Consensus Periody In 2008-09, the world was united with strong commitments to

conduct expansionary fiscal and monetary policies
Conflict Periody In 2010, growth performance has diverged between emerging

economies and advanced nations э tensions over appropriate
policy actions emerged

US and EU: Given domestic demand shortages in advanced
nations, China should shift its growth strategy from export- to domestic
demand-oriented by appreciating the renminbi
China: China wants to appreciate the renminbi only gradually not
to damage the export sector
э Rather, massive liquidity injected by US central bank (FRB) has
generated speculative capital inflows, thereby causing
inflationary and appreciation pressures in emerging economies

y The decision by the US FRB to further increase liquidity on Nov.

3 has intensified tensions at the G20 Summit
Germany: joined in China by criticizing the US monetary policy
and rejecting the idea of targeting current account surpluses anddeficits within 4% of GDP (proposed by Korea and US)

y European sovereign crisis also intensified conflicts between

surplus countries (i.e. Germany) and deficit countries.

85Divergent Output Gaps䈜㻻㼡㼠㼜㼡㼠㻌㼓㼍㼜㻌㼕㼚㼐㼕㼏㼍㼠㼑㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼐㼕㼒㼒㼑㼞㼑㼚㼏㼑㻌
Between actual and potential GDP

Source: IMF and World Bank

Why Difficult to Achieve a Consensus?
Stylized Facts about China:
y &KLQD·VFXUUHQF\LVKLJKO\undervalued
y &KLQD·Vforeign reserves ($2.6 trillion) are excessive э about 65% areinvested in dollar assets (making it difficult to appreciate the renminbi)
y &KLQD·VPDVVLYHLQWHUYHQWLRQLQWKHIRUHLJQH[FKDQJHPDUNHWLQFUHDVHV
liquidity in the market э risks of inflation and asset bubbles (but China
does not want to raise interest rates and appreciate the renminbi)
Stylized Facts about US
y US expansionary monetary policy is determined by the Fed inreference to two goals: employment maximization and price stabilityy US does not intervene in the foreign exchange market
y But the injection of liquidity leads to capital inflows to emerging
economies э depreciation of the dollar and appreciation of othercurrencies
86

Solution for Re-balancing the Global Imbalance?
Difficult to solve through the IMF
y China will become the 3rd largest shareholder of the IMF. BRICs will be
among the top 10 shareholders.
y EU will reduce the share of IMF quota and voting power with an
DEDQGRQPHQWRIH[HFXWLYHGLUHFWRUV·VKHHWVWRHPHUJLQJHFRQRPLHV
Difficult to solve through the G20
y Different stages of economic developmenty Different levels of maturity with respect to financial and capital
marketsy Different preferences toward the exchange rate policy

87Session 2, Shinji Kowase, General Manager,
Corporate Strategy & Research Department, Mitsubishi Corporation

Europe-Japan cooperation forcontributing
t ib ti tot solvingl i global
l b lchallenges
g such as climate changegShinji Kowase
General Manager
Corporate Strategy & Research DepartmentpMitsubishi Corporation
Proprietary and Confidential

1

Global Environment Business Development Group
Global Environment Business Development Group was established on April
April, 1st, 2010,2010 consisting of two divisions,divisionsseven business units and total 277 staffs.
Chairman :Yorihiko Kojima

President:

Ken Kobayashi

Directly overseen by President

Corporate Staff Section

Business Service
Group

Business Groups
Industrial Finance, Logistics& Development Group

Global Environment
Business Development
Group

Energy Business Group

EVP: Nobuaki Kojima

Machinery Group

Metals Group

Group CEO Office

Corporate Strategy &Research Department

GM: Yasuteru Hirai

Chemicals Group
Living Essentials GroupGM Shinji
GM:
Shi ji K
Kowase

New Energy
Power
Generation Unit

New Energy &Power Generation Div.

Environmental &Water Business Div.

SVP: Akinobu Ogata

SVP: Keiichi Asai

Global Power
Generation &Marketing Unit

Bio Energy
Business Unit

Emissions
Reduction
Business Unit

AutomotiveRelated
Business Unit

Water
Business Unit

Environmental
Solutions
Business Unit

Proprietary and Confidential

88

2

Activities in the Global Environment Business Group1
Alliance with Acciona
Jointly developing
renewable energy
projects globally,targeting 2 bil Euros
investment in total

6
Greenhouse Gas
E i i Reduction
EmissionR d ti
Credit
3rd largest developer inthe world

2
Moura PV Power
Generation Business

3
Thai PV Power
Generation Business

4
Thermal Power
Generation Business5
Hokkaido
Bio Ethanol

Operating 46MW PV
Plant in Moura, Portugal
with Acciona

World’sW
ld’ llargest 73MWPV Plant
under constructionin Lop Buri, Thailand

Develop own andDevelop,operate thermal power
plant worldwide
since 1988

First and largest bio
bioethanol production inJapan

7
Lithium Energy Japan
Manufacturing Lithium
Ion Batteries
for EV such as iMiEV,
the first commercialized
EV in the world

8
Ebara Engineering Service
CO LLtdCO.,
d (EES)

9Water Business
I AustraliaIn
A t liAcquired United Utilities
Australia in 2010,
the 2nd largest Australianp ywater business company

10
Bio-Energy

Invested to EES, a J/V
between MC, Ebara, andJGC, to combine eachcompany’ss strength incompany
water business

Owns an equity-stake in
BIOENERGY CORPORATION,
a biomass power
generation company
in Japanin operation since 2006

Proprietary and Confidential

89

3Session 2, Naoyuki Haraoka, Executive Managing Director, Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)

Japan and Europe as mature economies
in a changing world― How can Europe and Japan build a new competitive edge
based on innovation to enhance their growth potential ?
― What can be said of consumer habits in Japan andEurope, not only as drivers for future market growth,
but also as reflection of similar cultural ppatterns ?
Session2 3:45pm-5:00pm, December 10th , 2010
Naoyuki Haraoka
Executive Managing Director
Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)

Ⅰ How Can Japanp build a new competitivepedge
g based on
innovation to enhance their growth potential?
Answers:

1.
2.
3.

Full Exploitation of IT
Open Innovation
Full Exploitation of Womem

Ⅱ What can be said of consumer habits in Japan, not only as
drivers for future market growth, but also as reflection ofsimilar cultural patterns?
Answers:1
1.

2.

Aging and Environmental concern are
the keys to create new industries andmarkets.
Japanese contemporary cultural patterns
similar to French ones after the Revolution
could promote future market growth.

90

Ⅰ １
Ⅰ－１

Ⅰ ２
Ⅰ－２

Ⅰ－３

Ⅰ－５

Ⅰ－４

91

Ⅰ―６

Ⅰ―７

92

Ⅰ―８

Ⅰ―９

93

Ⅰ―１０

Ⅰ－１１

94

Ⅰ－１２

Ⅱ－１
The percentage of the population over 65 to the total population
%
35
30
25

Japan

20

China
K
Korea

15

FranceGermanyy

10

U.S.A.

501950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
World Population Prospects/The 2008 Revision

95

Ⅱ－２
The Percentage of the consumption of the people over 60
in Japan to the total consumption(Trillion yen)

(%)

80

60.0

70
60

42.3

39.7

44 9
44.9

43.5

47

40.0

35.1

50
40

24.6

30

58

20

50 0
50.0

67

75

74

72

77

30.0
20.0

33

10.0

10
0

0.0
1990

Ⅱ-３

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

International comparison of medical service
per 1,000 persons
number of
number of
doctors
nursesper 100 patients
number of
number of
doctors
nurses

JAPAN

2.1

9.3

14.9

66.8

U.S.A

2.4

10.5

76.3

331.2

U.K.

2.5

11.9

69.0

335.9

FRANCE

3.4

7.6

46.7

105.8

GERMANY

35
3.5

98
9.8

41 6
41.6

117 8
117.8

number of hospitalper 100 thousands
persons

number of
employees per
hospital

Number of
employees per
patient

JAPAN

7.0

183.0

1.0

U.S.A.

2.0

799.6

4.9

FRANCE

4.3

ーー

GERMANY

2.6

429.1

1.3

96

Trends of the world markets of medicine and medical equipments$1.3T$1,400$1,300$1,200$1,100$$1,000
$900
$800
$700
$600
$500
$400
$
$300
$200
$100
$0

120000USA
5.1%
100000

USS$ million

Total mmarket value ($ billion)

Ⅱ－４

Europe
7.1%

80000

60000

40000

Japan
6.1%
AsiaPacific
8 2%
8.2%

20000

2004 2005 2006 2007 202002006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Source:BurrilCompany; IMS H
Health;CoopersS
B il & C
lth Pricewaterhouse
Pi
t h
C

Ⅱ－５

IMF World Review 2006

Japan’s Five Strategically Important Sectors(The production amount to be targeted in 2020)① Inflastructure(atomic power
power, water supply,
supply railway etc
etc.))

140bil$② Green Business400bil$③ Health Care, Medical Service, Child care

400bil$④ Culture(fashion, contents, cuisine)

600bil$⑤ Robots & Space

500bil$Total 2,000bil$

Production

200→ 2007

2007→2020

500bil$3,100bil$

Increase(40% of the increase is brought aboutb thby
the iincrease off automobilestbilrelated production)

97(50% of the increase is brought aboutb thby
the iincrease off th
the above-mentionedbtidfive sectors)

８. 成果
今回のフォーラムの成果としては以下の点が挙げられる。
1）このたびの日欧フォーラムは、2008 月 9 月の米国リーマン・ショックに端を発した金融危機が世界経済に与えた様々な影響の中、世界経済を展望し、日欧双方の立場から世界経済の回復は持続的であるかをカンファレンスの大きなテーマとした。カンファレンスの開催においてテーマの設定は大変重要な要素であるが、金融危機後の世界経済は時とともに変化しているため、テーマ設定時の想定とは若干異なる方向へと状況が変わりつつある面もあったが、総じて関心が高いテーマであったといえる。カンファレンスは日欧双方から計 23 名の出席者によりラウンドテーブル形式で終日の日程で開催した。各セッション
では、質疑、コメントなど日欧双方の出席者の間で大変活発に意見交換が行われ、双方の関心の高さが伺われた。また、日欧ともにそれぞれの分野からテーマに適切な方々が一堂に会していたことがカンファレンスを活発な議論の場とするために大変よかった。
2）カンファレンスでは各セッションの冒頭に日欧双方のスピーカーより各７分程度の発言があり、引き続いて全体で議論を行った。
セッション 1 では、短期的な課題として財政金融の出口戦略、長期的な課題として資本主義は変質していくのかというサブ・テーマを設定し、金融システム、債務危機、政府介入、自由競争、インフレ・ターゲットを含む日本のデフレ構造とその対策、中小企業（SME）
支援等について、スピーカーの冒頭発言に引き続きラウンドテーブルで大変活発に意見交換が行われた。金融システムは回復傾向にあるが、いまなお調整過程であるという認識が一般的な見方であった。債務危機については、公的債務問題の解決策について各国の例を取り上げ、日欧の現状と対策について双方より見解が出された。資本主義については、アメリカ型（アングロサクソン型）とヨーロッパ型（フランス、ドイツ、スウェーデンなど）という二つのタイプに言及し、将来の方向性として日本型なるものはどのようなものかいった点などが様々に議論された。また、社会の高齢化により、労働力の減少を招き、社会保障制度を崩壊させる危険があり、高齢化問題は資本主義を質的に変化させる要因ともな
りうる、社会保障政策面においても、高齢者の定義を従来の 65 歳から、70 歳、75 歳へと
将来段階的に引き上げるべきだ（Age free society へ）という指摘があった。グローバル化時代においては、世界経済の相互依存関係は好むと好まざるとに関わらず一層増大する。
各国は立ち位置をきちんと定めることが重要であり、日欧双方の経験から学ぶことがあるという共通認識が示された。
セッション２では、地域経済統合と日欧関係へのインパクトを取り上げた。アジアにおける統合については、日中関係がキーではないかという意見があった。また、日本にとって98

EIA（日-EU 経済統合協定）は韓国への対抗措置として重要な役割を果たすものであり、日本の通商政策は 2010 年 11 月の APEC 横浜会合を契機に TPP への参加検討などを含めて大きな転換点を迎えているという言及があった。EIA は Green EPA などへのモデル
ケースとなるのではないかという意見があった。アジアはヨーロッパとは事情が異なることを踏まえても、地域統合においては先行する EU に、EU が直面している課題も含めて、その多くを学ぶことができる。
また、中期的課題としてのグローバル・ガバナンスの在り方、グローバルな共通課題に向けた日欧協力の在り方、日欧経済の将来などについて議論された。日欧の消費習慣を将来のマーケットの成長の推進力としてのみならず、類似する文化パターンを映し出すものとしていかにとらえることができるか、日欧間で異なる点への指摘も含め、経済を発展させるための将来の可能性について、日欧双方の立場から様々な意見が出され、総じて活発な意見交換の場を作ることができた。
3）また、日本側出席者に実施したアンケート回答より、会議の成果としては、「期待どおりであった」というコメントを全ての方からいただいた（総合評価では 5 段階中で平均 4+）。
また、参加者（日仏とも）の質が高く有意義な議論ができた、日仏の相互理解にプラス、成熟市場である日欧の共通点が再認識できた、中国を含める国際交渉の限界を欧州側が現実的に見据えていることが判明した、といったご意見を頂戴した。
また、会議の運営については、「効率的に行われた」というコメントをいただいた。「最後に全体の Wrap-up があれば更によかった」というコメントについては、今後の検討課題としたい。また、スピーカーの発表時間が 7 分であった点については、時間が短かすぎるので 10〜15 分が望ましいというご指摘、もう少しトピックスをしぼり同じトピックスを様々な角度から議論した方がいいと思うといったご意見をいただいた。
また、発表者の発表資料があると（特に英語の会議においては）有益であるというコメン
トもあった。こういった出席者から寄せられた貴重な意見は、今後の会議運営の際に十分に役立てていきたい。
会議成果の広報活動については、財団ホームページにおいてなるべく詳細な内容を掲載し、その成果を広く普及させるよう努めている。

99

９. 事務局＜日本側＞
財団法人国際経済交流財団（Japan Economic Foundation）
住所：
TEL：
URL：
担当：

〒104-0061 中央区銀座 5-15-8 時事通信ビル 11 階
+81 (0)3 5565 4824
FAX: +81 (0)3 5565 4828
http://www.jef.or.jp
業務部長
井上 勝 (email: masaru-inoue@jef.or.jp)
業務部交流事業課
渡辺 昌子 (email: masako-watanabe@jef.or.jp)
業務部交流事業課
丹羽 飛鳥 (email: asuka-niwa@jef.or.jp)[業務運営委託先]
近畿日本ツーリスト株式会社 ECC 事業本部カンパニー 第 5 営業支店
住所：〒101-0024

千代田区神田和泉町 1-13 住友商事神田和泉町ビル 13 階

TEL： +81(0)3 6891 9305
担当：

FAX：

+81(0)3 6891 9405

笹目

百合子

吉岡

光晶（株式会社イベント＆コンベンションハウス
（近畿日本ツーリストグループ））＜フランス側＞
フランスアスペン研究所 (Institut Aspen France)
Address: 119, rue Pierre Corneille, F 69003 LYON
Tel：+33-(0)4-7241 -9312（代表）Fax：+33-(0)4-7240-1041

URL：http://www.aspenfrance.org
担当

Mr. Renaud Guidée, Inspector of Finance, General Auditing Service, Ministry of
Finance and Economy
e-mail : renaud.guidee@igf.finances.gouv.fr
Tel：+33-(0)6-3162-9737 Tel：+33 (0)1-5318-1435 Fax ：+33-(0)1-5318-9562
Mr. Florent CANETTI, Director of development, Insitute Aspen France
Ms. Joëlle GANI, Project Manager, Institut Aspen France
e-mail: jgani@aspenfrance.org
Tel：+33-(0)4 -7241- 9312

Fax ：+33-(0)4-7842-1041

Mr. Grégoire PADILLA, Assistant Project Manager, Blue Fairy Communications –Institut Aspen France100平成 23 年 2 月
財団法人 国際経済交流財団
JAPAN ECONOMIC FOUDATION（JEF）© JEF Printed in Japan 無断の複写転載はお断りします。