2020 年度 第 7 回日中韓協力ダイアログ
The 7th CJK Cooperation Dialogue 2020
“CJK Co-Navigation and Emerging Opportunities
amid COVID-19 Pandemic”

報 告 書2020 年 11 月 25 日 (水)（オンライン開催）

一般財団法人 国際経済交流財団

2020 年度 日中韓協力ダイアログ 2020 年 11 月 25 日（水）（オンライン開催）

開会の辞

KIM Sung-Hwan 氏

開会の辞

開会の辞 JEF 会長 日下一正

CHI Fulin 氏

基調講演 MICHIGAMI Hisashi 氏
開会の様子

ﾓﾃﾞﾚｰﾀｰ HE Dongni 氏

ZHANG Yunling 氏

小林慶一郎氏KWON Soonman 氏

SEONG Baik Lin 氏

JIANG Ruiping 氏

セッション１の様子

ﾓﾃﾞﾚｰﾀｰ AHN Choong Yong 氏

QI Ye 氏KANG MoonJeong 氏

松下和夫氏

KIM Sang-hyup 氏

CHANG Xiuze 氏

セッション２の様子

ﾓﾃﾞﾚｰﾀｰ KIM Sang-hyup 氏

QIU Guohong 氏

稻邑拓馬氏

KIM Jung-Sik 氏

小黒一正氏

TIAN Xueyuan 氏

セッション３の様子

YI Insill 氏

吉野直行氏

ﾓﾃﾞﾚｰﾀｰ JEF 専務理事 原岡直幸

AHN Choong Yong 氏

深川由起子氏WU Shicun 氏

平井彰氏

KIM Do Hoon 氏

セッション４の様子

浦田秀次郎氏WU Hailong 氏

中国の会場の様子

GUO Yanjun 氏

韓国の会場の様子

フリーディスカッションの様子

オンライン会議の様子

目次
１．開催趣旨 ...........................................................................................................................1
２．開催概要 ...........................................................................................................................2
３．詳細日程 ...........................................................................................................................5
４．出席者 ...............................................................................................................................9５．略歴 ................................................................................................................................11
６．議事要旨（英語）...........................................................................................................31
７．発表資料 .........................................................................................................................98
８．活動と成果 ...................................................................................................................137
９．CJK 共催団体紹介 ........................................................................................................142
１0．事務局 .........................................................................................................................144

１． 開催趣旨
日中韓協力ダイアログは、当財団及び中国の China Foreign Affairs University（外交学院）、
韓国の East Asia Foundation それぞれの代表者（日下一正会長、ZHANG Yunling 教授、GONG
Ro-Myung 会長）が 2014 年 3 月に韓国・ソウルにて会合を開いた際に、東アジアのコミュ
ニティ意識の醸成と地域の平和と繁栄に貢献することを目的に、同３カ国による対話の機会を創設しようと決めたことに由来する。
本ダイアログの狙いは、日中韓の間に政府レベル（track 1）と民間レベル（track 2）に存在する様々な会合はあるものの、更なる発展を目指すためには各国政府の政策策定や世論形
成に影響力を持つ有識者による track 1.5 を開催し、各国が直面する共通課題や３カ国の国
境にまたがる課題、例えば「大気汚染」「酸性雨」「海洋汚染」などの解決に向け、協力することをテーマに議論して各国政府の施策に貢献することにある。
年次会合は３カ国がそれぞれ持ち回りで開催している。今回、2020 年の第７回会合は韓国の East Asia Foundation が 11 月 25 日（水）にオンライン形式にて “CJK Co-Navigation andEmerging Opportunities amid COVID-19 Pandemic”と題し主催した。

メインテーマ“CJK Co-Navigation and Emerging Opportunities amid COVID-19 Pandemic”
・セッション1： Pandemic Spread, Outlook, and Trilateral Cooperation
・セッション2： Climate Change, Green Energy, Environmental Industries, andTrilateral Cooperation Post COVID-19
・セッション3： Economic Impacts of Covid-19, Recovery Strategies, and SocialEconomic Policies for the Aged・セッション4： Trade, Tourism, FDI, Regional FTAs, Tourism post Covid-19
Recovery1２． 開催概要
1. 開催日時： 2020 年 11 月 25 日（水）10:30~16:50
2. 主催者：＜韓国＞

東アジア財団／East Asia Foundation

共催者：
＜日本＞

一般財団法人国際経済交流財団／Japan Economic Foundation＜中国＞

中国改革発展研究院／China Institute for Reform and Development
中国公共外交協会／China Public Diplomacy Association

3. 開催形式：オンライン（Zoom）
4. テ ー マ ： “ CJK Co-Navigation and Emerging Opportunities amid COVID-19
Pandemic”
セッション 1： パンデミックの見通しと三国間協力
Pandemic Spread, Outlook, and Trilateral Cooperation
セッション 2： コロナ収束後の気候変動、グリーンエネルギー、環境産業における三国間協力についてClimate Change, Green Energy, Environmental Industries, andTrilateral Cooperation Post COVID-19
セッション 3： コロナの経済的インパクト、回復戦略と高齢化に対する社会経済政策
Economic Impacts of Covid-19, Recovery Strategies, and SocialEconomic Policies for the Aged
セッション4： 観光、FDI, FTAの地域性、コロナ収束後の観光
Trade, Tourism, FDI, Regional FTAs, Tourism post Covid-19
Recovery25. 出席者＜日本側＞（敬称略/登壇順）

日下一正

一般財団法人 国際経済交流財団 会長

小林慶一郎

東京財団政策研究所 研究主幹／慶應義塾大学経済学部教授

松下和夫

京都大学名誉教授／地球環境戦略研究機関 ｼﾆｱﾌｪﾛｰ

稲邑拓馬

経済産業省

小黒一正

法政大学経済学部教授

吉野直行

慶應義塾大学名誉教授／政策研究大学院大学客員教授

原岡直幸

一般財団法人 国際経済交流財団 専務理事

深川由起子

早稲田大学政治経済学術院 副学術院長・教授

平井彰

一般社団法人 九州経済連合会 常務理事事務局長

浦田秀次郎

早稲田大学名誉教授

商務・サービスグループ ヘルスケア産業課長＜中国側＞（敬称略/登壇順）

CHI Fulin

President, China Institute for Reform and Development

HE Dogni

Vice President, China Institute for Reform and Development

JIANG Ruiping

Former Vice President, China Foreign Affairs University

ZHANG Yunling

Academician and Director-General, Department ofInternational Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

CHANG Xiuze

Professor of Academy of Macroeconomic Research of NDRC

QI Ye

Dean, Institute for Public Policy, the Hong Kong University of
Science and Technology

QUI Guohong

Former Ambassador of the P.R.C to the R.O.K

TIAN Xueyuan

Academician, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

WU Shicun

President, National Institute for South China Sea Studies

GUO Yanjun

Director, Institute of Asian Studies, China Foreign Affairs
University

WU Hailong

President, China Public Diplomacy Association3

<韓国側>KIM Sung-Hwan
MICHIGAMI Hisashi（敬称略/登壇順）

Chairman, East Asia Foundation / former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Secretary-General, Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat

GONG Ro-Myung

Honorary Senior Advisor, East Asia Foundation / former Ministry ofForeign Affairs
KNOWN Soonman
Professor and Former Dean of the School of Public Health, Seoul
National University
SEONG Baik Lin
Professor, Yonsei University / Director, Vaccine Innovative
Technology Alliance (VITAL)-Korea
AHN Choong Yong
Distinguished Professor, GSIS, Chung-Ang University
KANG MoonJeong
Head of Institute for Hydrogen Industry, Hyundai Motor GroupKIM Sang-hyup President, Jeju Research Institute
KIM Jung-Sik
Professor Emmeritus, School of Economics, Yonsei University
YI Insill
Professor, Graduate School of International Economics, Sogang
University
KIM Do Hoon
Professor, Sogang University, former President, Korea Institute for
Economics and Technology
6. 使用言語：日本語・中国語・韓国語

4

３． 詳細日程
The 7th CJK Cooperation Dialogue
CJK Co-Navigation and Emerging Opportunities amid COVID-19 Pandemic
Date/time: November 25th (Wed) 2020 / 10:30-16:30 (JST/KST)
9:30-15:30 (CST)
Venue: Virtual meeting
Co-hosted by
China Institute for Reform and Development
China Public Diplomacy Association
Japan Economic Foundation
East Asia Foundation
Organized by
East Asia Foundation
Sponsored by
Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat
Motivation and Objectives:
Having been hit early by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, China, Japan, and South Korea (CJK)
appear to recover early. Still, no one knows exactly when the post-COVID -19 phase will begin.
For the early advent of the post-COVID era, CJK should work together to achieve regional
economic reconstruction and eventual global recovery as well as to prevent the further spread of
COVID-19. CJK must not fall into inward-looking self-reliance but search for coordinated actions
for economic revival. CJK have accumulated rich database dealing with COVID-19 infections
and therapeutics. Timely data and information sharing are crucial to developing public goods
vaccines, cross-border health measures, and post-COVID recovery strategy. CJK as immediateneighbors should work out how to revive impaired supply chains and near halted tourism in the
short run and liberal trade and investment architecture in the medium and long term, seeking forthe sustainable and risk-resilient economic growth in the post-pandemic era. CJK should create
intraregional reciprocal demand by allowing business travel and select tourism to help boost
growth and bring back laid-off employees under newly agreed CJK protocols. Further, the current
5health crisis should be turned into renewed momentum in the post-COVID era for regional free
trade and environmental cooperation to climate change and green industries in a looming digital
un-tact society. Amid the Pandemic crisis and accompanied economic meltdown, CJK have also
experiencing rapidly aging population, which requires special socio-economic safety measures.
After completing two rounds of CJK dialogue, it is highly significant for the first year meeting ofthird CJK dialogue round to address these unprecedented challenging issues.
10:30-11:00 Opening Session
MC: KANG, Chan-koo (Senior Program Officer, East Asia Foundation) (2 min.)Opening Remarks
Korea: KIM, Sung-Hwan (Chairman, East Asia Foundation / former Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Trade) (6 min.)
China: CHI, Fulin (President, China Institute for Reform and Development) (6 min.)Japan: KUSAKA, Kazumasa (Chairman and CEO, Japan Economic Foundation) (6 min.)Special Welcoming Remarks
MICHIGAMI, Hisashi (Secretary-General, Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat) (4 min.)
GONG, Ro-myung (Honorary Senior Advisor and former Minister of Foreign Affairs) (2 min.)
11:00-12:00 Session One: Pandemic Spread, Outlook, and Trilateral Cooperation
Key words: Country COVID-19 Trends, Outlook, Specifics of Therapeutics, andDisease Prevention, Vaccine development, R&D, Public and Private Cooperation
Moderator: HE, Dongni (Vice president, China Institute for Reform and Development) (5 min.)JIANG, Ruiping (Former Vice President, China Foreign Affairs University) (5 min.)
KOBAYASHI, Keiichiro (Research Director, The Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research) (5 min.)
KWON, Soonman (Professor and Former Dean of the School of Public Health, Seoul National
University) (5 min.)SEONG, Baik Lin (Professor, Yonsei University Medical School / Director, Vaccine Innovative
Technology Alliance (VITAL)-Korea) (5 min.)ZHANG, Yunling (Academician and Director-General, Department of International Studies,
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) (5 min.)Free Discussion (30 min.)
12:00-13:00 Lunch
6

13:00-14:00 Session Two: Climate Change, Green Energy, Environmental Industries, andTrilateral Cooperation Post-COVID-19
Key Words: Climate Change and Pandemic, Energy Portfolio, Emerging Green Industries,
Hydrogen Fuel Cell, EVC, Power-Grid system Trilateral cooperation amid COVID-19
Moderator: AHN, Choong-yong (Distinguished Professor, Chung-Ang University) (5 min.)
CHANG, Xiuze (Professor, Academy of Macroeconomic Research of NDRC) (5 min.)
KANG, MoonJeong (Head of Institute for Hydrogen Industry(IHI), Hyundai Motor Group) (5min.)
KIM, Sang-Hyup (President, Jeju Research Institute) (5 min.)
MATSUSHITA, Kazuo (Professor Emeritus, Kyoto University/Senior Fellow, Institute for Global
Environmental Strategies(IGES)) (5 min.)
QI, Ye (Dean, Institute for Public Policy, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)(5 min.)Free Discussion (30 min.)
14:00-14:15 Break
14:15-15:15 Session Three: Economic Impacts of COVID-19, Recovery Strategies, and SocialEconomic Policies for the Aged
Key words: Economic Growth, Unemployment, Fiscal and Monetary Policies, Social Safety Net,
Socio-Economic Policies for the Aged, CJK silver economic cooperation
Moderator: KIM, Sang-hyup (President, Jeju Research Institute) (5 min.)INAMURA, Takuma (Director of the Healthcare Industries Division at Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI)) (5 min.)
KIM, Jung-Sik (Professor Emeritus, School of Economics, Yonsei University) (5 min.)
OGURO, Kazumasa (Professor, Faculty of Economics, Hosei University) (5 min.)
QIU, Guohong (Former Ambassador of the P.R.C to the R.O.K) (5 min.)
TIAN, Xueyuan (Academician, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) (5 min.)
YI, Insill (Professor, Graduate School of International Economics, Sogang University) (5 min.)YOSHINO, Naoyuki (Professor Emiratis, Faculty of Economics, Keio University, Visiting
Professor of GRIPS) (5 min.)7

Free Discussion (20 min.)15:15-15:30 Break
15:30-16:30 Session Four: Trade, Tourism, FDI, Regional FTAs, Toursim post Covid-19
Recovery
Key words: Regional Supply Chains, Inventory Management, Digital Trade, Trilateral FDIs,
Impediments, RCEP, and CCPTT, CJK free trade process, digital economy
Moderator: HARAOKA, Naoyuki (Executive Managing Director of JEF) (5 min.)
AHN, Choong-yong (Distinguished Professor, Chung-Ang University) (5 min.)
FUKAGAWA, Yukiko (Vice Dean, School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda
University) (5 min.)
GUO, Yanjun (Director, Institute of Asian Studies, China Foreign Affairs University) (5 min.)HIRAI, Akira (Managing Director, Chief Secretary, Kyushu Economic Federation) (5 min.)
KIM, DoHoon (Professor, Sogang University / former President, Korea Institute for Economics
and Technology) (5 min.)
URATA, Shujiro (Professor Emeritus, Waseda University) (5 min.)WU, Shicun (President, National Institute for South China Sea Studies) (5 min.)Free Discussion (20 min.)16:30-16:50: Wrap-up and Closing (not open to public)
Key words: Takeaways, Policy Recommendations, Agenda for Next meeting
Moderator: KIM, Sung-Hwan (Chairman, East Asia Foundation / former Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Trade) (5 min.)Closing remarks by WU, Hailong (President, China Public Diplomacy Association) (5 min.)Free Discussion (10 min.)8

４．出席者＜日本側＞（敬称略/登壇順）

日下一正

一般財団法人 国際経済交流財団 会長

小林慶一郎

東京財団政策研究所 研究主幹／慶應義塾大学経済学部教授

松下和夫

京都大学名誉教授／地球環境戦略研究機関 ｼﾆｱﾌｪﾛｰ

稲邑拓馬

経済産業省

小黒一正

法政大学経済学部教授

吉野直行

慶應義塾大学名誉教授／政策研究大学院大学客員教授

原岡直幸

一般財団法人 国際経済交流財団 専務理事

深川由起子

早稲田大学政治経済学術院 副学術院長・教授

平井彰

一般社団法人 九州経済連合会 常務理事事務局長

浦田秀次郎

早稲田大学名誉教授

商務・サービスグループ ヘルスケア産業課長＜中国側＞（敬称略/登壇順）

CHI Fulin

President, China Institute for Reform and Development

HE Dogni

Vice President, China Institute for Reform and Development

JIANG Ruiping

Former Vice President, China Foreign Affairs University

ZHANG Yunling

Academician and Director-General, Department ofInternational Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

CHANG Xiuze

Professor of Academy of Macroeconomic Research of NDRC

QI Ye

Dean, Institute for Public Policy, the Hong Kong University of
Science and Technology

QUI Guohong

Former Ambassador of the P.R.C to the R.O.K

TIAN Xueyuan

Academician, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

WU Shicun

President, National Institute for South China Sea Studies

GUO Yanjun

Director, Institute of Asian Studies, China Foreign Affairs
University

WU Hailong

President, China Public Diplomacy Association9

<韓国側>（敬称略/登壇順）

KIM Sung-Hwan
MICHIGAMI Hisashi

Chairman, East Asia Foundation / former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Secretary-General, Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat

GONG Ro-Myung

Honorary Senior Advisor, East Asia Foundation / former Ministry ofForeign Affairs
Professor and Former Dean of the School of Public Health, Seoul
National University
Professor, Yonsei University / Director, Vaccine Innovative
Technology Alliance (VITAL)-Korea
Distinguished Professor, GSIS, Chung-Ang University
Head of Institute for Hydrogen Industry, Hyundai Motor Group
President, Jeju Research Institute
Professor Emmeritus, School of Economics, Yonsei University
Professor, Graduate School of International Economics, Sogang
University
Professor, Sogang University, former President, Korea Institute for

KNOWN Soonman
SEONG Baik Lin
AHN Choong Yong
KANG MoonJeong
KIM Sang-Hyup
KIM Jung-Sik
YI Insill
KIM Do Hoon

Economics and Technology

10

５．略歴
Japanese participants

Kazumasa Kusaka
Chairman and CEO, Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)
Mr. Kazumasa Kusaka has been Chairman and CEO of the Japan
Economic Foundation (JEF) since April 1, 2013, and is also a
Professor at University of Tokyo Graduate School of Public Policy.
He previously served for 36 years in Japan’s Ministry ofInternational Trade and Industry (MITI), rising to become vice-minister for international
affairs in the reorganized Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in 2004.
During his long career in public service, Kusaka was seconded to the International Energy
Agency (IEA)/OECD and was Japan’s senior official for Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC). He played a central role in Asia’s economic integration, promoting
FTAs in the region as well as serving as a senior official negotiating the Doha development
agenda of the WTO. He was head of Japan’s Energy Agency and held director-general
positions in technology and environmental policy in addition to trade and investmentrelated areas within METI. He was also instrumental in finalizing the Kyoto Protocol, anddeveloping Japan’s energy and environment policies. Among many other posts Kusaka
has held are Special Adviser to the Prime Minister on Global Warming, senior vicepresident of Mitsubishi Electric, executive adviser to Dentsu Inc., and president of theJapan Cooperation Center for the Middle East.

Keiichiro KOBAYASHI
Ph. D. Research Director, Tokyo Foundation for
Policy Research/
Visiting Professor, Faculty of Economics Keio University【Concurrent position】
Professor, Faculty of Economics, Keio University.
Research Director, Canon Institute for Global Studies
11

Faculty Fellow, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry
Member of the New Coronavirus Infectious Disease Control Subcommittee
【Bio】
1991

Earned his master’s degree in engineering from the School of Engineering,

University of Tokyo, and worked at The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
(METI)
1998 Earned his doctorate in economics from the University of Chicago.
2010 Professor at the Institute of Economic Research of Hitotsubashi University.
2013 Professor in the Faculty of Economics, Keio University.
2019 Research Director, The Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research
Areas of Expertise : Macroeconomics, financial crises, economic philosophy

Kazuo MATSUSHITA
Professor Emeritus, Kyoto University/
Senior Fellow, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies(IGES)
Prof. Matsushita served as Professor of Global Environmental
Policy at the Graduate School of Global Environmental Studies,
Kyoto University, from 2001 to 2013. He graduated from the Tokyo University andobtained MA in political economy from the Johns Hopkins University. He joined theEnvironment Agency in 1972 and served as the Director of the Air Pollution Control
Division and the Global Environment Policy and Cooperation Division. He also served as
an administrator at the Environment Directorate of the OECD, Senior Environment
Planning Officer at UNCED (United Nations Conference on Environment andDevelopment) and as an Executing Deputy President of IGES. His research areas coverenvironmental policy, climate change policy as well as green economy and environmental
policy integration for sustainable society. His publications include “A Journey to Global
Environmental Studies”, “An Introduction to Environmental Policy”, “Environmental
Governance”, “Introduction to Environmental Politics”,“Environment in the 21stCentury and New Development Patterns” (in English). He is also Academic Adviser of
the Global Environment Forum (GEF) of Japan as well as a member of the Board ofTrustees of the Environmental Innovation and Communication Organization.
12

Takuma INAMURA
Director of the Healthcare Industries Division at METI
(Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry) of Japan
He joined METI in 1998 and has mostly worked on policy making
in areas such as energy, international trade and manufacturingindustries. Before taking up his current position, he was the
director in charge of a drastic revision of the Japanese legislation on the electricity supply
business in order to enable the cost effective deployment of renewable energy andsustainable investment in the power grid system. He also has government-wide
experience through his secondment to other Japanese ministries including the Ministryof Foreign Affairs (an Economy Counselor at the Permanent Delegation of Japan to theOECD) and Ministry of Finance (a Deputy Director in charge of port and airport
construction public works with an annual budget of 1 trillion yen).
He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Law from the University of Tokyo and a Master’s Degreefrom the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

Kazumasa OGURO
Professor, Faculty of Economics, Hosei University
Kazumasa Oguro graduated from the Faculty of Science of Kyoto
University and holds a PhD in economics from Hitotsubashi
University. In 1997, he joined the Ministry of Finance and worked
as Assistant to the Legal Examination Officer at the Administrationand Legal Division of the Minister’s Secretariat, Assistant at the
Enforcement Division of the Customs and Tariff Bureau, and Research Fellow at the
Policy Research Institute of the same ministry.

This was followed by a position as

associate professor at the Institute of Economic Research at Hitotsubashi University, after
which, he joined Hosei University in April 2015, and he has been there ever since. He is
also active as a Senior Visiting Researcher at the Ministry of Finance’s Policy ResearchInstitute, a Consulting Fellow at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
Professor Oguro is a member of the Japanese Cabinet Office’s Committee for Regulatory
Sandbox in Japan. Furthermore, he is Director at the Kajima Institute of International

13

Peace and the Institute for New Era Strategy, and a Senior Research Fellow at the Canon
Institute for Global Studies. His expertise is in Public Economics.

Naoyuki YOSHINO
Professor Emeritus of Keio University
Visiting Professor at GRIPS
Naoyuki Yoshino: Professor Emeritus of Keio University in TokyoJapan, Visiting Professor at GRIPS and Director of Financial
Research Center (FSA Institute, Government of Japan). Ph.D fromJohns Hopkins University (where his thesis supervisor was Sir Alan Walters (UK Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher’s Economic Adviser)). Assistant Professor of State
University of New York, Visiting scholar at MIT (USA), Visiting Scholar at the Central
Bank of Japan, Visiting Professor at the Univ. of New South Wales (Australia), Fondation
Nationale des Sciences Politiques (France). He received Honorary Doctorates from Univ.
of Gothenburg (Sweden) and Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg (Germany).
He was conferred Fukuzawa award from Keio University for his contribution to research.
He was chairing Financial System Council under Prime Minister and Foreign exchange
council under Finance Minister of Japan. He is currently chairing Financial education
council under the Central Bank of Japan and Financial Services Agency, Government ofJapan. He was the Dean/CEO of Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) in Tokyo(2014-2020).

Naoyuki HARAOKA
Executive Managing Director, Japan Economic Foundation(JEF)
Mr. Naoyuki Haraoka has been Executive Managing Director of theJapan Economic Foundation (JEF) since 2007. After graduating the
University of Tokyo in 1978 (Bachelor of Economics), he joined
MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) of Japanese
government.
Having been posted in the industrial policy section and the international trade policy
section for a few years, he was enrolled in a two year MPA (Master of Public
14Administration) programme at Woodraw Wilson School of Princeton University in the
US on a Japanese government sponsorship. After having acquired MPA at Princeton, herejoined MITI in 1984 as an economist. Since then he had been posted as Deputy
Director and Director of a number of MITI divisions including Research Division ofInternational Trade Policy Bureau. He was also posted in Paris twice, firstly, Principal
Economist of Trade Bureau of OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation andDevelopment) from 1988 to 92 and secondly Counselor to Japanese Delegation of OECD
from 1996 to 99. After coming back to MITI from his second stay in Paris, at the occasionof the government structural reform in 2001 when MITI was remodeled as METI
(Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry) he joined the efforts to found METI research
institute, Research Institute of Economy Trade and Industry as its Director of
Administration. He became Chief Executive Director of JETRO San Francisco in 2003
and stayed in San Francisco until 2006. He was Director-General of METI Training
Institute from 2006 until July, 2007 when he left METI permanently.

Yukiko FUKAGAWA
Dean and Professor, School of Political Science andEconomics, Waseda University
Yukiko Fukagawa is currently the Deputy Dean and Professor,
School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University.
After undergraduate program at Waseda, she studied at Yale
University for MA in International Development Economics, and finished Ph.D programat Waseda Graduate School of Business Studies. Her major interest lies in economic
development in East Asia, especially Korea. She worked for Japan External Trade
Organization (JETRO) and Long-Term Credit Bank Research Institute (LTCBR) before
joining the faculty member of Aoyama Gakuin University and the University of Tokyo.
She came back to Waseda in 2006. She was a visiting fellow at Cambridge University in2014, and Yonsei University in 2015.
She engaged in many consultation and advisory activities for the government, such as theCommittee for Industrial Structure in the Ministry of Economy and Industry etc.. Her
recent publication includes “Beyond “Abenomics”: Japan’s integration catch-up andprospects for Japan-UK cooperation”, Chatham House, 2019, Economic Development in15

East Asia, co-ed with Fumiyasu Mieno, Minerva publication, 2017, Japan’s FutureInternational Cooperation, Nihon Hyoronsha, 2015.

Akira HIRAIManaging Director, Chief Secretary of Kyushu Economic
Federation
Born in Fukuoka in 1956. After graduating from the Universityof Kyushu in 1980 (Bachelor of Economics), he joined Mitsubishi
Mining and Cement, Co.,Ltd. He was transferred to Mitsubishi
Coal Mining, Co.,Ltd and worked in Yubari, Hokkaido from 1981 to 1985.
He started working at the Kyushu Economic Federation in 1985. Since then he has held
positions in the planning, administration, public relations, and international affairs
departments.
He became the Director, Chief Secretary in 2009 and became the Managing Director,
Chief Secretary in 2015.
He has visited CK every year from 2001, when the first meeting was held, till now as theorganizer of the “Yellow Sea Rim Economic and Technology Exchange Conference”.
Specifically he has visited Beijing, Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and other
cities in China, as well as Seoul, Incheon, Busan, Daejeon, Gwangju, and other cities inSouth Korea.

They discussed trade, regional supply chains, and the creation of new

industries or new markets by innovation and tourism. His concerns are how to export
kyushu’s agricultural products to CK and to increase tourists from CK to kyushu post
Covid-19 recovery.

Shujiro URATA
Professor Emeritus, Waseda University
Shujiro Urata is Professor Emeritus, Waseda University. He wasProfessor of International Economics, Graduate School AsiaPacific Studies, Waseda University. He is currently Faculty
Fellow at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry(RIETI), Specially Appointed Fellow at the Japanese Centre for
Economic Research (JCER), Senior Research Advisor, Economic Research Institute for
16

ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), Visiting Researcher, Asian Development Bank Institute(ADBI) and Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Institute of Developing Economies.
Professor Urata received his B.A. in Economics from Keio University and his M.A. and
Ph.D. in Economics at Stanford University. He is a former Research Associate at the
Brookings Institution, an Economist at the World Bank. He specializes in International
Economics and Economics of Development. He has held a number of research andadvisory positions including senior advisor to the Government of Indonesia, consultant
to the World Bank, OECD, the Asian Development Bank and the Government of Japan.
He published and edited a number of books on international economic issues and is anauthor and co-author of numerous articles in professional journals. His recent bookpublications in English include Emerging Global Trade Governance, co-editor, Routledge,
2018, East Asian Integration, co-editor, Routledge, 2019 and others.

Chinese participants

CHI Fulin
President, China Institute for Reform and Development
Professor Chi Fulin is Chief Research Fellow and Ph.D student
supervisor, is currently President of China Institute for Reform andDevelopment (CIRD). He has been a member of the 11th and 12th
National Committee of CPPCC. He has been invited to be Vice
Chairman of China Society of Economic Reform, Vice Chairman of China Society of
Administrative Reform, and distinguished Professor at universities including Chinese
Academy of Governance, Peking University and Northeastern University. He has served
as a member of the National Experts Committee for Programming Economic and Social
Development in the 13th Five-year Plan Period, been appointed Vice Chairman of theExpert Committee for Market Supervision of the State Administration for Market
Regulation. He is also policy decision-making advisor for provincial governments such as
Guangdong, Shandong and Hainan. He was awarded renowned Sun Yefang Prize for
Economics and China Development Research Award and many others. He was selected
as one of the “100 Economists that have Influenced China’s Economic Construction in
the Last 60 Years”. He and his work were selected in Overview on the academic
17

achievements of famous Chinese social scientists in the 20th Century (Economics
Volume).

HE Dongni
Vice President and Associate Research Fellow of China
Institute for Reform and Development
He Dongni, Vice President and Associate Research Fellow of China
Institute for Reform and Development (CIRD). She studied at
Xiamen University, Nankai University, Maastricht School ofManagement in Netherlands and Northeastern University. She obtained a master's
degree in economics, a master's degree in business administration, and a PhD. degree inmanagement science and engineering. She participated in the completion of more than
30 national, provincial and ministerial-level projects, published more than 40 papers andreviews, she also participated in the research and compilation of Annual Report on China

Reform Studies by CIRD, and published 8 monographs (as deputy Editor and chief
editor). The projects she was responsible for including “Research on the Fiscal andTaxation System and Policy Options for the Expansion of Middle-Income Group in
China”, “The Path Selection and Institutional Arrangements for the Openness of
Hainan's Service Industry under the Background of International Tourism Island”, and“Research on the Sustainability of Hainan Provincial Local Debt Repayment andConstruction of Investment and Financing Platform”, etc. She also participated inprojects including “Structural Contradictions and Possible solutions in the Establishmentof China-Europe FTA”, “The Transformation and Reform Towards Consumption-led
Economy”,etc.

JIANG Ruiping
Former Vice President, China Foreign Affairs University
Professor Jiang is a member of the Economic and Trade Policy
Advisory Committee at MOFCOM and a member of Advisory
Group of East Asian Cooperation at Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He
also serves as Vice Chairman of National Association for Japanese
Economic Studies and Vice President of East Asian Forum for18

Peace and Development. He has been granted special government allowance and various
other honorable titles. His research interests cover international economics, Japanese
economy and China-Japan economic relations, East Asian economic cooperation andinternational political economy. He has published a number of books and articles, mostof which have wide influence within the academia and the policy sector. Before joining
his present organization, he worked at Hebei University as the Professor of economics
and served as Deputy Director of Institute of Japan studies.

ZHANG Yunling
Academician and former Director General, Department ofInternational Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Zhang Yunling, Professor and Academician of Chinese Academy ofSocial Sciences (CASS). He is a member of National Committee of
CPPCC. He is now President of Chinese Association for AsiaPacific Studies, Vice President of China Committee of PECC, Director of ResearchCenter for Regional Security. He was Director General of Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies,
CASS (1993.11-2007.8), Director General of Institute of Japanese Studies, CASS (cocurrent, 1995-2001). He served as a member of EAVG, China-ASEAN Cooperation
Official Expert Group, Task Force of ASEM and Chairman of Joint Expert Group for
Feasibility Study on EAFTA, and a Member of Joint Expert Group for Feasibility on
CEPEA.

QI Ye
Professor and Director, Institute of Public Policy at Hong Kong
University Science and Technology
Qi Ye is Professor of Public Policy and Director of Institute of Public
Policy at Hong Kong University Science and Technology, and Cheung
Kong Professor at Tsinghua University’s School of Public Policy andManagement. Prior to joining HKUST in January 2019, he was the Volkswagen Professorof Sustainability at Schwarzman College, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, andthe Director of Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy. He received a Ph.D. in
19

Environmental Science in 1994 jointly awarded by the State University of New York
College of Environmental Science and Forestry and Syracuse University.

QIU Guohong
Chief Research Fellow of Northeast Asian Affairs,
the Charhar Institute
After graduating from Shanghai International Studies University, he
was assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's
Republic of China. In 1991, he served as the Second Secretary andFirst Secretary of the Chinese Embassy in Japan, before serving as the First Secretary,
Deputy Director and Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1998 he wasappointed the Counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Japan before being promoted to
become the minister. In 2006, he served as deputy director of the Department of Asian
Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Later he was appointed Chinese Plenipotentiary
Ambassador to Nepal from 2008 to 2011, before taking the role of Director of Security
Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2011 to 2014. Since then, he has been the
Chinese Ambassador to South Korea. And most recently since June 2020, he has also
become the Chief Research Fellow of Northeast Asian Affairs at the Charhar Institute.

TIAN Xueyuan
Academician, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
Mr. Tian graduated from the School of Economics at Peking
University in 1964. He has been Guest Researcher at the East-WestCenter from 1982 to 1983, and been the Director of Institute ofPopulation and Labor Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences from 1984 to 1998. And he is also Member of the Expert Advisory Committeeof National Social Sciences Research.
Professor Tian has published more than 500 journal articles and 12 books. Three of his
books have been translated into English, Japanese, and Russian and other languages. He
has conducted innovative research in quite a few areas such as population development
strategy, cost-benefit study of children to a society, population and sustainable
20

development, and so on. He was among the first batch of “Young Expert with Outstanding
Contributions”, and he also has been awarded the first prize of National Science andTechnology for technological achievement, the Chinese Population Award (top prize in
Chinese population studies), National Book Award, International Intellectual Celebrity(awarded by the IBC in UK), and the World’s Five Thousand Celebrity (titled by the ABIin the US).

WU Shicun
President,
National Institute for South China Sea Studies
Mr. Wu has a PhD in history, and is president and senior research
fellow of China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies.
He is also the chairman of board of directors of China-Southeast
Asia Research Center on the South China Sea, vice president of China Institute for Free
Trade Ports Studies, deputy director of the Collaborative Innovation Center of South
China Sea Studies of Nanjing University. Mr. Wu’s research interests cover the history
and geography of the South China Sea, maritime delimitation, maritime economy,
international relations and regional security strategy. He has published widely inacademic journals and been the subject of frequent media interviews as a seniorcommentator on South China Sea, regional security issues, the Belt & Road Initiative andthe development of Hainan Province.

GUO Yanjun
Director,
the Institute of Asian Studies at China Foreign Affairs
University
Dr. Guo Yanjun is director of the Institute of Asian Studies at China
Foreign Affairs University. As a core member of the NEAT China(Network of East Asian Think-tanks), NACT China (Network of ASEAN-China Thinktanks) and NTCT China (Network of Trilateral Cooperation Think-tanks), he has
involved in a couple of track II diplomacies. He also serves as a research fellow at the21

Innovation Center on National Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and theInnovation Center on China’s Neighboring Diplomacy. He specializes in the study ofregional cooperation in East Asia and international rivers & transboundary water
resources management, esp. the Lancang- Mekong river water management. He has
published relevant writings and articles both at home and abroad in recent years.

WU Hailong
President,
China Public Diplomacy Association
Mr.Wu Hailong successively held the positions of Member of theInternational Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thePeople's

Republic

of

China

(1978-1981);

Permanent

Representative and Third Secretary to the United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Third Secretary and Second Secretary of theInternational Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1981-1986); Second
Secretary and First Secretary of the Permanent Mission to the United Nations (19881992); First Secretary and Deputy Director of the International Department of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1992-1996); Counsellor of the Embassy of the State of Israel(1996-1999); Deputy Director-General of the International Department of the Foreign
Ministry (1999-2001); Deputy Commissioner, Office of the Commissioner of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (2001-2004);
Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office at Vienna and other internationalorganizations,Ambassador

Extraordinary

andPlenipotentiary

andPermanent

Representative to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Permanent
Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Director of the International
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004-2006); Assistant Foreign Minister(2009-2011); Head of Mission to the EU, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary(2011-2014);

Ambassador

Extraordinary

andPlenipotentiary

andPermanent

Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva and other internationalorganizations in Switzerland(2014-2016); Member of the CPC Leading Group andPresident of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (2016-2019). Mr. Wu
Hailong is currently the President of China Public Diplomacy Association.

22

Korean participants

KIM Sung-Hwan
Chairman of the East Asia Foundation /Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the R.O.K
Sung-Hwan Kim was a career diplomat and served as the Ministerof Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea from
October 2010 to March 2013.
With a career spanning over 36 years, he held a number of senior diplomatic posts
including the Senior Secretary to the President for Foreign Affairs and National Security
and Vice Minister of MOFAT. He was ROK's ambassador to Austria and Permanent
Representative to the International Organizations in Vienna and the ROK's Ambassador
to Uzbekistan.
He was appointed as a Member of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel ofEminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda in July, 2010.
After retiring from the Foreign Service, he served as the Chair of Institute for Global
Social Responsibility and Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Seoul National
University until March 2015. He also taught at Hanyang University as a Distinguished
Professor and served as the Chairman of the Gangwon Art and Culture Foundation.
He is now working as the Chairman of the East Asia Foundation and the Chairman of
the Beautiful Mind Charity Foundation.

MICHIGAMI Hisashi
Secretary-General,
Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat
Education:
1983 Graduated from University of Tokyo, Faculty of Law ,19856 Studied at Graduate School of Seoul National University,1987
MA, Harvard University (International Relations of East Asia)
Professional Career:23

1983 Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
1987~97 Northeast Asian Affairs Division, Minister’s Secretariat, Economic Affairs
Bureau, Permanent Mission of Japan to International Organizations in Geneva (WTO)
1998~2000 Counselor, Embassy of Japan in Korea
2003~7 Director, Second Economic Affairs Division
2007~9 Minister, Embassy of Japan in China
2011 Minister, Embassy of Japan in Korea (February 2014, Minister and Deputy Chief ofMission) Aug. 2014 Consul General of Japan in Dubai,Jun. 2017 Consul General of Japanin Busan,Sep. 2019 Secretary-General, Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat
Publishment and Teaching Experience:
Published ３ books in Japan including “Japanese Diplomat in Korea”, “China Sees Japan
This Way” and ２ in Korea
Many articles on Korea, China, Trade, Culture and Mutual Understanding
50 articles and interviews on Korean Newspapers and Magazines
Lectured at Universities (85 times)
Lecturer at Seoul National University (2000) and Sophia University of Japan (2003~4)

GONG Ro-Myung
Former Korean Foreign Minister and former chairman of theEast Asia Foundation
Former Korean Foreign Minister and the chairman of the East Asia
Foundation, Ro-Myung Gong was a chair professor in the Divisionof International Studies of Dongseo University in Busan, Korea,
since 2007. He is also the advisor of the Korea-Japan Forum since after serving as
Chairman from 2003 to 2012. He was born on February 25, 1932. He is a graduate of the
Law College, Seoul National University and studied at the London School of Economics
and Political Science. He entered the Republic of Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
1958 and served at various overseas diplomatic missions of Korea, including inWashington DC, Tokyo, Canberra and Cairo. He was the Republic of Korea's Ambassador
to Brazil from 1983 to 1986, Consul-General in New York (1986-89), Ambassador to thethen-Soviet Union (1990-92), Director of the Institute of Foreign Affairs andSecurity(IFANS) (1992-93), Ambassador to Japan (1993-94), and became Minister of
Foreign Affairs from December 1994 to November 1996. After retiring from government,24

he served as a member of the Presidential Advisory Council on Unification in 1997. In
1992, he was also the representative of the 6th, 7th, and 8th round of high-level inter-Korean
talks and chairman of South Korea for the South-North Joint Nuclear Control
Commission. He was chairman of the 2010 PyeongChang Olympic Winter Games Bid
Committee (1992-93), chair professor of Dongguk University, Seoul (1997-2004) and of
HallymUniversityinChuncheon(2004-07),

andchairmanofthe

SejongFoundation/Sejong Institute (2008-11).

KWON Soonman
Professor and Former Dean of the School of Public Health,Seoul National University
Prof Kwon is a health economist and has worked over 30 years on
UHC, health finance, and health systems & policy. He has held
visiting positions at the Harvard School of Public Health, London
School of Economics, University of Toronto, University of Tokyo, Peking University, andUniversity of Bremen. He was the Chief of the Health Sector Group in the AsianDevelopment Bank (ADB) in 2016-2017. He is the founding director of the WHO
Collaborating Centre for Health System and Financing at Seoul National University. He
received the excellence in education award of Seoul National University in 2020.
He has served as president of the Korean Health Economic Association, the Korean
Association of Schools of Public Health, and the Korean Gerontological Society. He is thepresident-elect of the Korean Society of Health Policy and Management. He is the Asia
Region Editor of Health Policy (Elsevier) and International Journal of Health Economics

and Management (Springer), and was the editor of the Korean Journal of Public
Health and the Korean Journal of Health Economics. He holds PhD from the Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania (1993) and taught at the University of Southern
California School of Public Policy until 1996.

25

SEONG Baik Lin
Professor, Yonsei University Medical School, andDirector, Vaccine Innovative Technology Aliance (VITAL)Korea, Seoul, KOREA
Baik Lin Seong, PhD, established scientific experience from basic
molecular biology to pre-clinical development of vaccines andtherapeutic proteins. He received B.S. from Seoul National University (1977), M.S. from
KAIST (1979), PhD from MIT (1988). He worked as postdoctoral scientist at the
University of Oxford (1988-1992). As a research scientist at Aviron, California, he wasinvolved in developing live attenuated influenza vaccine, which later was developed asnasal spray type vaccine FluMist in MedImmune. Dr. Seong served as director of theInstitute of Biological Sciences at Hanhyo Institute (1993-1998), and represented the
Korean Government for Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in United Nations(2000-2008). He currently serves Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) member ofInternational Vaccine Institute (IVI). As professor at Yonsei University for the last 20
years, He continues to work on designing universal flu vaccine, and virus-like particle(VLP) vaccines against viral infections including norovirus, dengue, Zika and COVID19. He was recently asked by the Korean government to lead the VITAL-Korea fund (10years; 200M US$) for developing vaccines against infectious diseases.

AHN Choong Yong
Distinguished Professor,
Chung-Ang University
Dr. Ahn is currently Distinguished Professor, Graduate School ofInternational Studies, Chung-Ang University. Previously, he was the
Chairman, Korea Commission for Corporate Partnership (KCCP)
and responsible for inducing voluntary collaborations between Korea’s big businesses andSMEs, and also Chairman of the Board, Korea Electric Power Corporation. Before taking
his current post, he served as Foreign Investment Ombudsman (2006-2014) who is thetroubleshooter responsible for resolving grievances raised by foreign investors at the
Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency in Korea. He is former Chairman of the26

Presidential Regulatory Reform Committee (2010-2012). While on sabbatical from
Chung-Ang University, he also served several posts such as the President of the Korea
Institute for International Economic Policy (2002-2005); Chair of the APEC Economic
Committee; Chair of Board, Choheung Bank; consultant to the World Bank; UNIDO
Chief Technical Advisor to the Economic Planning Unit of Malaysia to design Malaysia's
industrial master plan; and served as President of several academic societies in Korea
including the Korea International Economics Association, Korean Association of Tradeand Industry Studies, and the Korea Econometric Society.
Dr. Ahn’s honors include the Economist of the Year Award from the Maeil Business Daily
Newspaper in Korea, the Okita Policy Research Award by the National Institute for
Research Advancement in Japan for his publication on “Modern East Asian Economy,”
and Free Economy Publication Award by the Federation of Korean Industries. Since
receiving his Ph.D. from Ohio State University, Dr. Ahn has published many articles ininternational journals including Review of Economics and Statistics, European Economic
Review, Japanese Economic Review, Journal of Asian Economics and Monograph papers
in North-Holland, Cambridge University Press, Springer and Edward Elgar, etc.

KANG MoonJeong
Head of Institute for Hydrogen Industry(IHI) of Hyundai
Motor Group
MoonJeong Kang is the Head of Institute for Hydrogen
Industry(IHI), Hyundai Motor Group’s think-tank coordinatinggroup-wide fuel cell and hydrogen agenda. With her extensive
expertise, she leads research and analysis in the area of global hydrogen value chain andpolicy dynamics. Her work further extends to policy recommendation to public authorities,
in order to realize the vision of hydrogen economy pursued both by Hyundai Motor Groupand the Government of Korea.
Prior to joining IHI, Ms. Kang served as the founding CEO of Potlatch Inc., an energy
technological startup. For 10 years, she successfully originated, engineered, financed,
built, commissioned, and operated biogas to bio methane for vehicle fuel project, biogas
to bio methane for pipeline injection project, and solar power plant at a wastewater
treatment plant, which were first attempts initiated in Korea.
Her proven track record of general management, strategic planning and business27

development attributes to her experience as the CEO of theCobaltSky, the firstmanagement consulting firm in Korea specializing in energy and carbon management.
She made a success in developing then world largest 11.2 MW fuel cell power plant in
Korea. During her earlier years at Arthur.D.Little, she was recognized for her reputable
expertise in various industries as a strategy consultant.
As a renowned speaker and writer, she was an adjunct professor of the Graduate Schoolof International Studies at Ewha Womans University for 11 years. She received her
Bachelor of Business Administration from Seoul National University, and MBA from
Bowling Green State University.

KIM Sang-hyup
President,
Jeju Research InstituteSang-Hyup Kim is the President of the Jeju Research Institute. He
is also the Director of the Global Strategy Institute of KAIST, a
Visiting Professor of the College of Business, KAIST and
Chairman of Coalition for Our Common Future. Prior to joining the KAIST (2013), Mr.
Kim worked at the Office of the President of the Republic of Korea from 2008 as the
Secretary for National Future and Vision, where he contributed in setting the historic“Low Carbon Green Growth” vision for Korea. In 2011, he became the Senior Secretary
to the President for Green Growth, coordinating the planning, developing, andimplementing Korea’s Green Growth strategy. Also, he served as a member of the Global
Agenda Council of World Economic Form and now he serves as a co-chairman of Jeju
Green Big Bang Committee.
Kim was formerly a Washington correspondent for Maeil Business Newspaper and cofounding member of the World Knowledge Forum and Vision Korea Project. He also
worked at SBS, Seoul Broadcasting System, during which he set up the future and visionprojects team in 2004, in addition to found and serving in the capacity of the Executive
Director of the Seoul Digital Forum.
Kim has a B.A and M.A in International Relations from Seoul National University. He
has been recipient of numerous awards during his career, including: Broadcaster of theYear; Korean Broadcasters Association (2007); Hongjo Order of Service Merit (2010);
Hwangjo Order of Service Merit (2012).
28

KIM Jung-Sik
Professor Emeritus at School of Economics,
Yonsei University
Jung-Sik Kim is Professor Emeritus at School of Economics, Yonsei
University. He was a Visiting Scholar of Department of Economics,
Harvard University and Institute for International Studies atUniversity of Cambridge. He worked as the Dean of the College of Business andEconomics and Dean of the Graduate School of Economics, Yonsei University.
He served as Adviser of Bank of Korea, and held the post of Chairman of Committee forFinancial Development in Financial Services Commission (FSC) and Chairman of Policy
Evaluation Committee of Ministry of Strategy and Finance. Kim was the President of
Korean Economic Association (KEA) and Korea International Economic Association(KIEA).
Kim is the President of Korea Social Science Research Council(KOSSREC) and Asia
Finance Society. He has published widely on open macroeconomics, international financeand East Asian financial cooperation. His most recent paper is “Korean Currency Crisisand Capital Flow Reversal: A Supply Side Approach of Currency Crisis”.

YI Insill
Professor,
Graduate School of Economics at Sogang University
Insill Yi is currently a Professor of Graduate School of Economics
and was a Director of Nam Duck-Woo Economic Research Institute
and Vice-President for Public Affairs at Sogang University.
She served for Korean government as the 12th Commissioner of Statistics Korea from theprivate sector also for the first time. She also served for National Assembly Budget Office
as a Chief economist of Economic Analysis Division. She also worked as asenior research fellow and director of the Center for Finance and Tax, for Korea
Economic Research Institute. She worked as a senior economist and team leader offinancial analysis team, for Hana Bank Research Institute.
She had been active in participating the governmental committees (such as Advisory29

Committee Member of National Assemble Budget Office, Member of Policy Advisor to
Minister of Justice, and Advisory Committee Member of Financial Supervisory Service,
Advisory Member of Ministry of Strategy and Finance). She is publishing books, articles
and expressing various opinions in academic journals and newspapers. She served for thepresident and is currently honorary president of the Korean Economic Association, theKorean Women Economic Association, and the President of the Association of Korean
Economic Studies. She has a bachelor’s degree in economics and geology from Yonsei
University and a doctoral degree from the University of Minnesota USA.

KIM Do Hoon
Professor,
Graduate School of International Studies at Sogang University
KIM, Do Hoon teaches “Korea’s Economic Development” and“international Business Strategy focused on Global Value Chain in
East Asia” at GSIS (Graduate School of International Studies),
Sogang University. He was former president of the Korea Institute for Industrial
Economics and Trade (KIET) from May 2013 to May 2016. Before being appointed aspresident of KIET, he worked as director of several research divisions in KIET, such as
division of industrial policy and division of industrial cooperation and globalization andserved as vice president for research, spanning the years from 1979 through May 2013.
He was detached from KIET to work for the OECD in Paris as principal administrator at
the trade directorate from September 1997 to September 1999. He worked for IERI at
University of Washington as a visiting scholar. He served as president of a couple of
Korea’s academic associations including KSRS (Korea Society of Regulatory Studies).
He has been also members for many government policy advisory committees such ascommission for corporate partnership, and advisory council for budget policy. His major
publications include “Six Decades of Korea’s Industrial Development, KDI, December
2010” and “An Impact Analysis of the Korea-US FTA and Korea-EU FTA on30

６．議事要旨（英語）English Summary drafted by East Asia Foundation.

The 7th CJK Cooperation Dialogue‘CJK Co-Navigation and Emerging
Opportunities amid COVID-19 Pandemic’25th of November 2020 (10:30-16:35) Virtual Meeting

Organized by:
East Asia Foundation
Co-hosted by:
China Institute for Reform and Development
China Public Diplomacy Association
Japan Economic Foundation
East Asia Foundation
Sponsored by:
Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat
31

Opening Remarks
November 25th, 2020 10:30-11:00

Remarks by:
KIM Sung-Hwan (Chairman, East Asia Foundation / former Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Trade)
CHI Fulin (President, China Institute for Reform and Development)
KUSAKA Kazumasa (Chairman and CEO, Japan Economic Foundation)
MICHIGAMI Hisashi (Secretary-General, Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat)
GONG Ro-Myung (Honorary Senior Advisor, East Asia Foundation / Former
Minister of Foreign Affairs)

KIM Sung-Hwan
Good morning! My name is Sung-Hwan Kim, and I have been serving as the chairmanof the East Asia Foundation since January of this year. I am honored to represent the
Korean side in the 7th CJK Cooperation Dialogue. Firstly, I would like to express deep
gratitude to the former Chairmen Ro-Myung Gong, President Fulin Chi, and Chairman
Kazumasa Kusaka for leading the dialogue for several years. Also, I would like to thankProfessor Choong Yong Ahn for serving the overall managing role for the conference
from the Korean side. I would also like to thank all the experts from the three countries
for their participation. Regrettably, we can meet this year only by an online meeting due
to the COVID-19 virus spreading throughout the world. For next year’s dialogue, I hope
to meet President Fulin Chi and Chairman Kazumasa Kusaka in person and exchange
warm greetings.

32

Due to the pandemic, all of humanity is facing unprecedented hardships across the globe.
Many countries are still struggling due to the social and economic problems brought onby the virus. What is worse is that the virus is projected to spread widely during thecoming winter periods. However, we also have news of vaccines being at the later stagesof development, which gives us hope for overcoming this difficulty.
I think the CJK dialogue, which started back in 2014, contributed significantly towards
promoting conversation within a region where there is an evident lack of multilateralexperience. China, Japan, and Korea take up about a quarter of the world's economy andone-fifth of global trade volume. Although the three countries are adjacent in terms ofgeography and culture, cooperation within the region has lacked due to historical andideological differences. However, I am glad that recent events have led to the promotionof cooperation among the three countries.
Firstly, on November 15th, 2020, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership,
which includes China, Japan, and Korea among 16 Asian countries, was formally signed.
Although India did not participate, the signing led to creating an economic bloc that
accounts for 30% of the global economy and trade. The signing opened up opportunities
for further economic growth for the three countries by promoting free trade within theregion. I hope that the signing of the RCEP can lead to the three countries agreeing on an
FTA deal, which has been in negotiation for the last ten years. Recently, China, Japan,
and Korea have declared that the three countries will reach carbon neutrality by 2050 or
2060. Responding to the worsening climate issue, there is a global consensus to achievecarbon neutrality by 2050. The three countries have firmly pledged to participate in thisglobal movement, which is expected to promote active cooperation among the three
countries in the environmental field.
With Joe Biden elected as the next president, it is expected that there will be significant
changes in the East Asian region. For the last four years, the Trump administration’s‘America First’ policy has led to US-China relations deterioration. The trade war that has
risen due to worsened relations also greatly influenced cooperation among the three
countries. I hope that the newly elected president's foreign policy will promote
cooperation among the three countries.
For the three countries’ cooperation to continue, governments and civic organizations
must continue the dialogue and expand cooperation. Regardless of the politicalcircumstances, I think we should continue developing cooperative efforts based on the33three countries’ geological and cultural closeness. Most importantly, we must promote
lively exchange between the growing younger generation of the three countries.
From this perspective, the CJK cooperation dialogue is critical. In the current state ofaffairs, with the global pandemic, a dialogue to create new opportunities is very important.
I hope that practical and fruitful dialogue can be held on tackling issues that we must face
together as a region, including climate change and the global pandemic.
Lastly, I would like to thank the experts and staff who have made this dialogue possible,
thank you.
CHI FulinThank you very much everyone, for today’s event. I am glad to participate in the annual
CJK Cooperation Dialogue amidst the ongoing COVID-19 Pandemic. To open up today’s
discussions, I would like to make three proposals for the trilateral trade agreement ofChina, Japan, and Korea. Firstly, I would like to emphasize that China’s double circulation
strategy would benefit the region’s trade agreement. The dual circulation strategy that
China is currently pursuing is an economic growth plan based on the domestic market.
This economic growth strategy will serve as a basis for higher levels of opening up to theregional market and benefit all parties involved. One prominent example of this would be
the semiconductor trade. Japan and Korea are the world's leading producers ofsemiconductors, and China is vastly expanding its demand for semiconductors. In
reflection of this situation, Korea’s exports to China have recorded the highest volume
recently. Secondly, I would like to propose an expansion of trilateral trade centering on
the service sectors. The volume of service-related trade in China is quickly increasing.
By 2019, China’s service sector rose 7.8% annually, double the amount in product trade.
Upgrades in the structure of the industry led to the improvement in R&D related fields.
Also, changes in China’s consumption market have led to increased demand for medical,
health, tourism, and education services. Japan and Korea are leading service providers in
the environment, pharmaceutical, and silver industries. This is why I believe theacceleration of FTA in the region is possible. Also, I would like to encourage Japaneseand Korean companies to enter the Chinese domestic market. When looking at theinterconnectedness of three countries in manufacturing industries, I believe there is a lotof room for improvement in the service sector.
For instance, digital commerce between the three countries can be improved byestablishing infrastructure and rules. Lastly, I would like to propose a mutual trade34

agreement that is beneficial for all parties involved. Not long ago, RCEP was officiallysigned, and during the APEC meeting, President Xi Jinping expressed that China is
actively considering joining the CPTPP agreement. Yesterday, Foreign Minister Wang Yi
made an official visit to Tokyo and reached an important trade agreement between Japanand China. The two sides agreed to an early effectuation of the RCEP agreement and thesigning of FTA between China, Korea, and Japan. I believe that this talk provided anessential basis for the future understanding of FTA. For signing such a deal, I have four
proposals that I would like to make.
First, we must begin negotiations in the service and intellectual property sectors. We must
promote digital interaction between the three countries in scientific research, medical
field, and the environment. Secondly, we must propose an early harvest list for the FTA
deal by beginning cooperation in service sectors such as environment protection,
expanding into a trade agreement of the three parties, and beyond. Third, we muststabilize the regional supply chain and achieve greater liberty for investment in various
industries. Lastly, I propose the previously mentioned service sectors, including medical
and environment, to Hainan free trade area. I would like to end my remarks by sayingthat the seven dialogues we had in the past greatly enhanced regional cooperation in East
Asia. In 2017, under Zhang Yuling’s leadership, we participated as one of the members.
In 2018, we were able to host the CJK Dialogue in Haikou. Next year, it is expected thatthe 8th dialogue will be held in China. I sincerely hope to meet all of you there.
KUSAKA Kazumasa
Thank you very much. Greetings, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to extend mygreetings to the Chairman of the East Asia Foundation, Sunghwan Kim; President ofChina Institute for Reform and Development, Chi Fulin; President of China Public
Diplomatic Association Wu Hailong; and Professor Zhang Yunling. Good morning toesteemed experts from China, Japan, and Korea who have gathered online today for thisevent.
There has been one good news and bad news for the region since last year’s Tokyo event.
The good news is that RCEP was officially signed. During times of global turmoil, East
Asian countries’ dynamic nature has led to investment, trade, and technologicaladvancement. This time, with India’s eventual participation anticipated, members of
RCEP are expected to build a healthy and prosperous economic environment. The badnews is that the COVID-19 pandemic is persisting with continued influence over the35various countries’ social and economic activities. Also, polarization in societies is
becoming more pronounced than ever recently. For instance, as we have seen recently,
opposing forces have battled over the United States presidential election this year. Someare still adamant about not accepting the results of the election. These circumstances canlead to severe damage to institutions that uphold democratic societies. In many countries,
criticism in response to COVID-19 by some governments and accelerating polarizationin communities weaken political leadership. In turn, such weakening is consuming many
leaders’ political attention and capital, forcing them to abandon common agendas on bothregional and global scales. The formerly mentioned RCEP is a regional plan that seeks tomove societies and economies forward. Today’s dialogue is about how the three countries
can respond to the rapidly changing regional and global environment.
From the early 1980s, Japan Economic Foundation has promoted dialogue between
governments, experts, and scholars from Europe and the United States. Afterward,
centering on ASEAN +6 countries, JEF hosted the Asian-Pacific economic forums.
Amidst these activities, JEF has conducted dialogues with Korea and China. Within these
dialogues, experts from all three nations discussed how countries’ domestic issues could
significantly influence the region. Out of such discussion arose a need for more dialogues
to better the economic environment of the area. Responding to this need, China’s
Professor Zhang Yunling, Korea’s Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ro-Myung Gong,and I started the CJK dialogue. All three countries have hosted the event in a cycle, andthis is the third time that Korea is hosting this dialogue.
Three countries share a long history with deep and multifaceted connections that bindthem. However, in profound relationships such as this, much like friendships andmarriages, conflict and disagreement are inevitable. Parties can still engage inconversations while having disagreements. It is a normal phenomenon, not an aberrant
situation. The three nations’ task is to carefully coordinate the relationship between thethree countries and prevent disagreements from shattering the longstanding trust between
China, Japan, and Korea. Conflicts allow parties to be honest with one another, which canlead to the deepening of relations. Also, the so-called 2.5 track relations can be beneficial.
The multi-layered relationship consists of governmental interaction between the three
countries at the first level. This is up to politicians. As an unofficial channel, our group
first seeks out pathways to solve the three countries’ problems. In this way, the dialogue
can become a public good for the region. I have been emphasizing a vision that I have
had since the beginning of this dialogue. That vision creates a continuing dialogue
between the three countries, in both best and worst of times. This time as well, thanks to36

our friends in Korea, we can face each other online. I think this vision has become a sortof DNA for this dialogue. Problems that have hindered the advancement of the economy
and society have been in existence even before the pandemic. These problems haveaggravated due to the pandemic. Tendencies such as anti-globalism, fervent nationalism,
and populism have gained strength through the pandemic.
Fortunately, however, the three countries overcame these challenges better than the restof the globe. We must then seek out ways to help other regions that are facing these
problems. To effectively effectuate the RCEP, expand the TPP agreement and promote
free trade in the region, there are challenges that we must overcome collectively.
Technology innovation and people falling behind in this aspect, and paradoxes in
economic development are some of these issues. For short-term strategies, we must findways to solve problems related to the low birthrate and an aging society. Also, economic
growth for producing means to combat future unknown risks such as a pandemic isneeded. These tasks mentioned above can be a common agenda for the region. In a world
where economic growth is only possible through healthy cooperation, the dynamic East
Asian region leads to better globalism. I hope that we can learn from each other’s
successes and failures on various agendas. Through this dialogue, let us create a basis forour mutual goal of stabilizing the region. I hope that today’s event with various experts
may produce fruitful results for the region. Thank you.
MICHIGAMI Hisashi
Greetings everyone, I am Secretary-General of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat,
Hisashi Michigami. I would like to express my gratitude to Sunghwan Kim, Chi Fulin,
and Kazumasa Kusaka, who have made this event possible. I would also like to thankformer Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ro-Myung Gong. I am honored to have been allowed
to provide the opening remarks for this event in front of various experts from the three
countries. I am especially thankful that we can invite such esteemed guests to this event.
The COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc upon the world. Although China, Japan,
and Korea have been successful in suppressing the pandemic, it could not be completely
safe from the economic and societal impacts that COVID-19 caused. Constriction of theworld's economy and poverty is expected to persist. The World Bank has projected thatpeople living under the absolute poverty line will increase. It is time that we seek out
ways for effective COVID-19 response, the continued growth of the economy, andestablish human-centered economic plans for the poor.

37

Over six months, the three countries have persisted in ministerial meetings in response to
COVID-19 in the field of health, commerce, finance, transports, and economy. Also, we
have successfully hosted an ASEAN+3 meeting as well. The Trilateral Secretariat also
hosted several online seminars in response to COVID-19, watched by thousands ofviewers from over 70 countries. Even webinars on subjects such as smart cities invited
many experts from across the region. We have hosted a session in the Jeju Forum as well.
In China, Korea, and Japan, there are 21 ministerial conferences. Our Trilateral Secretariat
provides practical support for these conferences. Moreover, we also put great emphasis
upon interactions in the private sector. Fields of interaction include businesses, youth,
culture, and media. Even among the uncertainties brought about by the pandemic, we arestill focusing on issues such as the recovery of the economy, environment, and humansecurity issues. The Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat was established in 2011 and will
be at its tenth anniversary next year. Admittedly, the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat is
not very well known, and this is a task we must address. This is why we need teachingsand guidance from esteemed guests that we have invited here today. I want to express myrespect to all those who have participated in today’s event for discussions. We at the
Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat are also aware of the collective problems we face in theregion. That is why we would like to learn from the experts today. I would like to thankthe event hosts and wish that today’s event will be successful. Thank You.
GONG Ro-Myung
Hello everyone, I would like to express my greetings and respect to everyone participating
in today’s event. Despite the hardships we face due to the COVID-19 crisis, I am glad togather here today via online to discuss pressing matters in the region.
From the very onset of this dialogue, I have had the honor of participating in seven CJKCooperation Dialogues. Throughout this period, I have time and time again perceived that
East Asia’s future lies in continued discussion and cooperation between the three
countries. Due to the pandemic, unilateralism and protectionism are prioritized, whereas
dialogue and collaboration are increasingly becoming sidelined in the international
community.
Today’s crisis will subside shortly. Essentially we need to make sure the previous sevenyears of effort through dialogues will continue to build strong ties in the private sector
among the three countries and contribute to the region’s co-prosperity.

38

Although conflict and disagreement are unavoidable on the international stage, we havefound ways to overcome our differences and move toward the peace, co-existence andmutual prosperity through the spirit of dialogue, compromise and cooperation. I want to
end my remarks by wishing that the CJK Cooperation Dialogue continues with such spirit
and contributes to overcoming whatever hurdles the region might face. Thank you.

39

Session 1
Pandemic Spread, Outlook, and Trilateral Cooperation
November 25th, 2020 11:00-12:00

Moderator: HE Dongni (Vice president, China Institute for Reform andDevelopment)
Speakers:
ZHANG Yunling(Academician and Director-General, Department of International
Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
KOBAYASHI Keiichiro (Research Director, The Tokyo Foundation for Policy
Research)
KWON Soonman (Professor and Former Dean of the School of Public Health, Seoul
National University)
SEONG Baik Lin (Professor, Yonsei University Medical School / Director, Vaccine
Innovative Technology Alliance (VITAL)-Korea)
JIANG Ruiping (Former Vice President, China Foreign Affairs University)

ZHANG Yunling
CJK cooperation has been experiencing triple challenges as follows. The first challenge
we face today concerns the disinfection of COVID-19 as it is still unclear when the
pandemic will end. With rapid research and development for vaccines, we can expect a
positive outcome of disinfection efforts in Northeast Asia. Therefore, I would like topropose establishing a CJK vaccine supply cooperation center, which will enable thecountries to communicate on vaccine distribution under the form of cooperation.

40

The negative influence of COVID-19 has deferred worldwide economic recovery. As
traditional industry supply chains have been cut off due to the pandemic, CJK should
continue to stay open and build a mutual communication channel for businesses byintroducing a QR-based health certificate system. In China, individuals can easily track
travel and health history with a simple barcode. This system will allow international traveland business during the coronavirus pandemic because a focal point in the economic
recovery is in intimate connection. It is required for China, Japan, and Korea to rush theoperation of RCEP and realize the FTA negotiations. When the negotiations are completed,
we will aim for agreements that will perform functional cooperation.
The last challenge we face is rapprochement with China. The hostile relations between
China and the US are even negatively affecting the CJK relations. As the US presidential
election ended, I think it is time to push for the restoration of China-US relations. The
Trump administration's legacy, blockade of technologies, and cut off of traditional
industry supply chains, is very illogical and irrational. Therefore, with the new US
administration, CJK should build new standardized industry chains for technology fields
that are both stable and credible. Such blockades cannot positively influence either RCEP
or Northeast Asia in inducing the US government and strengthening our voice.
Furthermore, CJK's cooperation plan should be made professionally to secure the supply
chain and value chain of products and technologies. The current US trade policy is very
burdensome to Northeast Asia and affects the region; thus, we should expand domestic
demand and increase China’s innovation capabilities to achieve a dual circulation
economy. Through this series of efforts, CJK will meet new cooperation opportunities. I
hope to talk in more detail shortly about how China can integrate domestic demand andinnovation and build a new supply chain for CJK through a dual circulation economy.
KOBAYASHI Keiichiro
I will be presenting on Japan's COVID-19 response. From April to May, Japan declaredan economic shutdown. This was a policy measure to buy time against the explosion of
infection cases. As a result, Japan's economy suffered a huge blow that amounts to 10%
of its GDP. Within this background, we strived to increase the number of PCR testing kits
and make them available for more people in order to decrease infections and revitalize
the economy. However, this was not followed through.

41

The availability of PCR testing increased very gradually (or slowly). At the present
moment, a surmountable number of people have been tested cumulatively. Currently,
Japan has a PCR testing capacity of 70,000 cases per day.
At the end of August, the Japanese government announced its target of enforcing 200,000
antigen tests (not PCR tests) per day. On November 12th, at this present moment, theJapanese government set a new target of achieving 540,000 PCR and antigen test capacity
per day. There has been definite progress.
However, I would like to point out there is a considerable gap in the understanding of an
infection test between economists and public healthcare workers. Epidemiologists andpublic healthcare experts have asserted the value of an infectious disease test like the PCRlies in diagnosing patients. It is essential to find infected patients efficiently, and this is
the primary motive. There is no value in proving someone is uninfected. Moreover, theyalso state medical personnel coordinating tests and quarantine in public healthcare centers
are being overworked.
On the other hand, economists argue there is value in test information discerning theinfected and the uninfected itself. For the economy and the society to function properly,
it is valuable to get data on uninfected (PCR negative) cases. Therefore, economists
believe more citizens must get tested.
Due to these deep-rooted differences in perspective, the Japanese government hasannounced its aims to achieve 540,000 test capacity per day but not provide these tests
for free.
At the present moment, Japan has three categories for dividing testing. The first category
consists of people who have symptoms. Second category A consists of people with nosymptoms but are at high risk. The government funds these tests. People who are notcategorized in these categories, second category B, have no symptoms and are at low risk.
Therefore, they are not funded by the government. They can choose to get tested at theirown expense.
This, compared with other countries, suggests the PCR test system in Japan is notorganized enough to guarantee safe economic activities.
In observing recent developments, Japan suffered a second wave of COVID-19 in thesummer of 2020. The number of infections has fallen a little over September and October,showing a relatively stable situation. However, entering November 2020-at presentJapan experienced a rapid escalation in infections over the last three weeks. We believe42the third wave size will be 4 to 5 times that of the summer second wave. In case thisprediction is confirmed, Japan is discussing response measures in economic activity andcitizen's lockdown degree. Also, it is predicted hospital capacity will reach its limit. These
are some of Japan's most urgent issues.
Whether Japan will overcome the third COVID-19 wave and return to a safer situation
will be decided over the next three or four weeks' doings.
In conclusion, considering the overall East Asian situation, I believe the coronavirus will
be with us for the next one or two, three years. Therefore, businesses will have to adopt
new models to adapt to the New Normal coexisting era with COVID-19. Finally, I would
like to conclude by encouraging Japan, China, Korea (three countries), and other nations
to resolve the problem of government debt developed over the pandemic period. This
global, transnational problem necessitates a global resolution. We need international
coordination of fiscal policy and tax systems, such as adopting a common tax. The
application of a common tax will discourage and prevent investment from fleeing.
Imposing a worldwide or even an East Asian common tax will allow countries to yieldtax revenue. This form of international fiscal policy cooperation will solve thegovernment debt exacerbated during the coronavirus era. East Asia can take the initiativeand set an example.
KWON Soonman
Today, I will be presenting on Korea's COVID-19 experience and the role of testing. As
the previous speaker mentions a third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in Japan, Korea
is currently on the road to its third wave, with the number of daily confirmed cases
increasing to 350-400 people. However, the extent of the pandemic has been smaller inthe country compared to Japan and China.
I believe that preparedness and flexibility have been the cornerstones of Korea's unique
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Having experienced the Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome (MERS) outbreak in 2015, the nation learned that infectious diseases are notconfined to third-world countries. In the process, the government took reformative
measures, strengthening the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA),
increasing the coordination between central and local governments, and providing a legal
basis for the controversial patient contact tracing. We also realized the importance ofquick and practical testing to reduce patient numbers and the consequent damages tosociety.
43

With this background, the Korean government responded quickly to the initial COVID19 outbreak, flattening the epidemiological curve in a short amount of time. With swift
approval for mass-scale testing and adopting drive-through methods, it detected
epidemiological patients and prevented further infection. Additionally, the government
used various digital data such as credit card information and mobile phone tracking toisolate and trace patients. As a result, Korea has not imposed a significant lockdown like
China and Japan.
The COVID-19 is a new pandemic, and there was an initial lack of scientific data for aproper response. But through flexibility in policies and learning from newly emerging
evidence, the government gradually revised its response to the pandemic, changing thecriterion on the discharge of patients from hospitals and prioritizing cases based on
severity. This fluid response ensured that the medical system was not overwhelmed withpatients and could focus on critical patients.
Additionally, universal health coverage through the National Health Insurance (NHI)
scheme decreased the barrier to access for all patient tests and treatment. With theoutbreak, the NHI expanded coverage for medicines and services for COVID-19 patientsand increased advance payment to hospitals through a pay first, review later policy. The
NHI also provided critical data infrastructure by mobilizing all public and private
healthcare providers under one program. While data on health care is divided into districtsin Japan and China, the NHI spooled information on the entire population to create oneof the most extensive data sets on the COVID-19 pandemic. This has helped doctors gain
knowledge on the pandemic and prepare appropriately.
However, there are still challenges ahead. Parts of the population remain vulnerable,
especially daily workers and staff working in hospitals. They cannot work from home or
conduct work online, which has led to job loss and economic hardships. Also, people
without access to the internet have had difficulties accessing information, going to school,and getting jobs. A solution might be a change in how we look at testing, increasing the
speed of results through rapid testing, and decreasing the risk of offline work and travel.
Korea's exit strategy to the COVID-19 pandemic is not the complete eradication of thedisease. Instead, it is the efficient response and minimization of risks to levels when theeconomy and society can function properly. Just as the government has shown flexibility
in measures based on changing risk assessments, future policies on the COVID-19
pandemic should be a work in progress.
44

SEONG Baik Lin
Today, I will be discussing Korea's status on developing a vaccine and possibilities fortrilateral cooperation on this front. The disease that has global impact, COVID-19, now
has infected over 55 million today and claimed 1.4 million lives worldwide. The vaccine
is typically administered to a healthy individual, which means that its safety is equallyimportant as its effectiveness. Thus, a meticulous testing process must be conducted toensure both of these aspects, and it typically requires ten to fifteen years to ultimately
certify a particular vaccine. However, today's medical field is under tremendous pressure
to develop a vaccine rapidly to prevent this unprecedented virus’s further spread.
Although rapid development is imperative, the world is still in competition over aplatform that has not yet been commercialized. For example, mRNA vaccines havereached Phase 3 clinical tests—the vector vaccines have not been commercialized yet.
However, because these vaccines can be rapidly produced, they have been placed at theforefront of our battle against COVID-19. In the case of the mRNA vaccine, it has beendeveloped by companies in the United States and Europe, such as Moderna and Pfizer.
For the Vector vaccine, American and European companies such as AstraZeneca andJohnson & Johnson compete with Russian vaccines produced by Gamaleya Institute andChina's CanSino. Also, China is leading the world in inactivated vaccines throughcompanies such as Sinopharm and Sinovac.
I would also like to introduce vaccine development situations in Korea. Firstly, the Korean
government prioritizes vaccine procurement to vaccinate more than 60% of the
population. Korea is adopting a two-track strategy, which consists of developing adomestically produced vaccine and at the same time purchasing vaccines from overseas
companies. For domestically developed vaccines, a venture company named Genexine
was authorized for Phase 1 clinical test in June for a DNA based vaccine. Also, SK
BioScience sent in a request for authorization of clinical trials on its recombinant antigen
vaccine, which was recently permitted. SK Bionics agreed on a contract manufacturing
deal with AstraZeneca for the delegated production of adenovector vaccines. Not only
this, the company recently signed a CDMO deal with America's Novavex for its insect
cell platform vaccines. Through such corporate cooperation, Korea moves from mere
consignment production to active importation of vaccine production capabilities fromabroad. Secondly, for the procurement of vaccines from foreign countries, the platforms
considered are vector vaccines, which are in the last stages of clinical trials, and mRNA45

vaccines will be given priority for purchase. Since recombinant antigen vaccines are notyet fit for clinical trials, these will take time to be imported.
Choosing what sort of vaccines from which companies is a very complicated process forthe government. First and foremost, the effectiveness and safety of the product must be
verified. Also, factors such as price, timing of supply, storage, and distribution must all
be considered. Vaccinations will begin by administering vaccines that were purchasedfrom overseas. If domestically developed vaccines can be completed in time, we expect
to boost the vaccination level. However, since there is no clinical test that verifies safety
for children under the age of 18, the vaccination will only cover 70% of the population
who are adults. Now, Influenza and the COVID-19 virus can become a pathogen thathumans must coexist with. To prepare for this, we must prepare for 'twindemic,' a situation
where Influenza and COVID-19 spread concurrently. For this, Korea must begin
cooperation with eminent scientists and medical experts from Japan and China to develop
a vaccine to prepare for a further disastrous pandemic that is probable to occur in the
future.
JIANG Ruiping
When considering the overall situations in East Asia, I believe three circumstances canbe witnessed.
Firstly, compared to other parts of the world, I believe East Asia was most effective inpreventing the spread of COVID-19. This is not to show off, but statistics tell us that thethree countries were very successful in preventing the spread. The proportion of those
infected out of 10+3 countries accounts for less than a tenth of the world, according to
my calculation. Secondly, the degree of the economic downturn was less pronounced thanin other countries, and recovery was swift. According to the IMF, the economic downturn
speed of 10+3 countries was 1.27 times slower than that of the world, and the recovery
rate was 2.8% higher than other parts of the world. Thirdly, regional cooperation became
stalled after the pandemic for different parts of the world, but this was not our region'scase. From February, ASEAN countries and China engaged in a Foreign Ministers’
conference, a special trilateral meeting was held between China, Japan, and Korea, and
the ASEAN+3 conference was also held.
Most importantly, RCEP was finally signed on November 15th of 2020. The signing
paved the way for renewed opportunities to promote regional trade. Taking these three46

situations together, I believe that new opportunities are presenting themselves for East
Asian countries.
Previously, the World Bank published a report saying that miraculous economic growthis occurring in East Asia. After the publication of this report, however, many scholars
from the United States and Europe disagreed. Significantly, the renowned American
economist Krugman was among those that denied this report. On July 2nd of 1997, Asia's
Financial crisis began in Thailand, which depressed the region's economy. It was asituation that seemed to suggest that although rapid economic growth can be achieved,
there is no way to avoid a financial crisis. After this crisis, however, East Asia once again
displayed a strong trend towards economic growth. Also, East Asia's economy
significantly contributed to economic growth worldwide.
While there is a clear sign of the East Asian economy's strength, I also believe that thereservations held by previously mentioned scholars on Asia's economy were an argument
based on analytical data. Before 1997, two factors severely weakened Asia's economy.
First of all, during this period, mainland China's active participation in the regional
economy was absent. When the World Bank discussed Asia, it was usually referring toJapan and 'Four Tigers of Asia.' When the Asian Financial Crisis occurred in 1997, there
was very little systemic cooperation within the region. ASEAN countries focused on the
security aspects of collaboration. On the other hand, Japan emphasized the 'goose
formation' model of collaboration and focused on the Asia-Pacific cooperation, which did
not produce practical results. After 1997, we witnessed two critical changes occurring in
the region. Firstly, the Chinese economy achieved rapid economic growth thanks to its
opening-up policy. Secondly, from November 1997, Asian countries began economic
cooperation, which consisted of ASEAN and East Asia. As of today, the Chinese economy,
according to the IMF, will achieve a 1.7 increase in GDP, which is expected to rise to 8
percent next year. Also, with the start of the 10+3 mechanism, we have achieved
significant growth. This is growing to 10+8, which would include New Zealand andAustralia and keep adding regional interested parties. Even with the COVID-19 crisis,
East Asia must struggle to prevent the spread and restart the economy.
In the era of Post-COVID-19, the focus is whether or not we can continue to cooperate.
Continued cooperation will be made possible by two factors: first is restarting the
economy. Not long ago in China, the 19th CPC Central Committee held its 5th plenary
session in Beijing, and it was announced that by 2035, we would achieve dual circulation
domestically and overseas. To facilitate the circulation within the domestic market, the47party decided to strengthen the supply chain within the domestic market. In this way, theChinese market can have sustained growth. Under this situation, the East Asian economy
will benefit through China's growth. The 15 economies involved in RCEP make up 30%of the global economy. This means that the Chinese economic growth will help create anenvironment where all members can deal with emergencies like we saw in 2019. Secondly,
I believe that more comprehensive cooperation within the region is possible through close
coordination with partners. Thirdly, disease control and opening up the economy wereprimarily due to East Asia's cultural and social institutions. We must emphasize thischaracter that has made us so successful, and by this means, I think the region cancontinue the East Asian miracle. I will talk about ways this can be achieved specifically.
Firstly, RCEP has been signed, but effectuation might need time. Each member must
effectuate it domestically. Effectuation should entail close coordination even after the
COVID-19 crisis is over. Thirdly, going beyond RCEP, we must continue to strengthen
regional ties. Fourthly, establishing a stable supply chain in the region between China,
Japan and Korea are vital.

[Q&A and Discussion]<Question 1> Prof. Zhang shared his insights about China's dual circulation economy
and emerging opportunities for CJK. Is there a new cooperation model or a breakthroughthat China, Japan, and Korea should pursue?
ZHANG Yunling: First of all, a dual circulation economy is based on the premise that
China's economy will continue to grow, which will ultimately affect the economy ofsurrounding regions and the global economy. China will achieve what Japan has
accomplished in the past years as it is estimated to become the most significant economic
entity in three to five years. Some people say that China's dual circulation economy is aself-relied and closed framework. It is a fair and open framework that integrates domestic
and foreign affairs. I believe that we can make a transition to the economy and cooperate
under this framework. Then, what should we do? We need digitalization and networkbuilding using high technology such as RCEP, which focuses on the connected networkand the three countries' digital economic network. As I mentioned earlier, we shouldemphasize the rules of economic development, not political ideologies. This is a matterto be discussed in a high-level meeting between the Ministry of Commerce and theMinistry of Science and Technology about how China will set standards for technologies,48

industries, and supply chains ahead of time in the flow of dual circulation economy. As
for the rules, the US’s participation is welcome; however, I think CJK's new form should
be made with practical goals.
CHI Fulin: Adding to that, when China's 14th Five-Year plan ends in 2025, China willenter a society centered on service consumption. More and more demands for the service
industry and service trade will be generated in the community. The proportion of service
trade in China's total trade is estimated to be larger than the previous year's 46.3%. In thisnew setting, China will provide a broader market for consumers in China, Japan, andKorea.
<Question 2> Can RCEP serve as a model for global trade standards and establish trade
regulations on digital products?
JIANG Ruiping: Compared with CPTPP, RCEP has a clear distinction when looked at
as a whole. The most critical factor in establishing global trade and investment regulations
is the overall needs of participants. Of course, there are some difficulties that RCEP faces.
One of them is that among 15 participants, some are developed countries like Japan, South
Korea, and Singapore, where per capita income is high; however, there are also lessdeveloped countries like Laos and Myanmar. The gap among the participants in theeconomic system makes it harder to sustain a relatively big framework. When setting a
global model, it is more important to reflect the participants' objective state and demands
to meet all needs. I think that a higher level of cooperation will become available throughthis effort, and also, RCEP can have a positive influence globally.
<Question 3> How will CJK’s industrial cooperation be in the New Normal?
KOBAYASHI Keiichiro: As a macroeconomist myself, what I mentioned earlier was
about financial difficulty. Due to the pandemic crisis, many countries, including China,
Japan, and South Korea, experienced a massive increase in financial expenditure andgovernment debt. Considering that it is a common problem we face to figure out how toredeem increased government debt, building a joint framework for a fiscal policy can be
helpful. In this manner, we could establish a standard taxation system for the region thendistribute profits to each country to pay for debt caused by COVID-19. Maybe this formof cooperation can be a foundation for a new world order since there hasn't been any
significant effort in worldwide collaboration in fiscal policy, unlike monetary policy.
Until now, it was complicated to establish a common fiscal policy due to various issues,
such as tax haven and tax imposition on global digital platform businesses like Amazon
49

and Google. Therefore, I would like to suggest that CJK lead the establishment of acommon fiscal policy to recover the global economy accelerated by the COVID-19
situation.
<Question 4> The COVID-19 situation in the U.S. is dire at the moment. Then how
should we cooperate with the US to fight the virus? What kind of influence will there be
on TPP?
SEONG Baik Lin: As the question is a little bit away from my expertise, I would liketo answer how to establish a CJK joint fund on infectious disease. There is no national
border for the transmission of the virus; therefore, we could say that Korea, China, andJapan share a common destiny. The past decade's history shows that the highly pathogenic
avian influenza virus, which has infected humans from animals, is spreading to a fatal
infection that kills one in two. Also, Foot and Mouth Disease Virus has become one of
the most critical issues in agriculture. There is an excellent opportunity for us three
countries to cooperate in a war against viruses like these. Japan is an essential science
powerhouse that produced many Nobel prize winners leading immunology andvaccinology. Also, China was the first country to develop vaccines by the historical record
even though many people generally think of Edward Jenner of the UK and Louis Pasteurof France to be the first ones. Regarding infectious diseases, Korea has the UN-affiliatedInternational Vaccine Institute. As Prof. Zhang suggested earlier, CJK will need further
cooperation to deal with the coronavirus and the post-corona era. In this respect, I would
like to offer the CJK the establishment of a joint fund and further discussions in foreign
ministers' meetings.
KWON Soonman: Although the COVID-19 situation in the U.S. was mentioned, it is
not a matter of the U.S. alone. Unless the COVID-19 subsides in South America and other
Asian countries, we cannot say that the situation is under control. We can't fight the virus
with the cooperation of the three countries only in this open economy. In that sense, I
think the three countries will coordinate with each other in the ODA field with various
cooperation forms, such as ASEAN Plus Three.
JIANG Ruiping: After the Obama administration suggested TPP, the newly elected US
President Donald Trump withdrew the US signature from TPP. However, it seems very
likely that the U.S. will return to TPP once Biden takes over the presidency. If I tell you
about China's position, President Xi Jinping clearly announced that China is willing tojoin CPTPP. Suppose China and the U.S. get to be in this together. In that case, it is50

expected that Asia will greet a new phase of regional cooperation, which will enable us
to work together in this pandemic and even the post-corona era. I think there is a lot to do
for public health as well in the post-corona age.
ZHANG Yunling: Biden announced earlier that the U.S. would return to the WHO after
his inauguration. In this manner, CJK will be able to cooperate more through the WHO.
As COVID-19 is a regional problem and a global crisis, we can lead and play an essential
part in the WHO. China's position is also for the WHO.
KOBAYASHI Keiichiro: I agree that the pandemic is a global crisis. Firstly, I think thatthe three countries should control infection through RCEP or such organizations.
Secondly, the infection will spread again in East Asia unless the pandemic calms down indeveloping countries in Africa, South America, and South Asia. Thus, it is necessary,
especially for China, Japan, and South Korea, to lead arrangements to support developing
countries.
<Question 5> According to the media, China had many confirmed cases initially but
managed the situation well with successful countermeasures, allowing the daily
confirmed case to reach nearly zero. However, it is reported recently that China started tohave an increase in confirmed cases again. Tell us the scale of the spread and whether
Chinese pharmaceutical companies have executed joint development for vaccines with
global pharmaceutical companies.
TIAN Xueyuan: On the vaccine development, President Xi Jinping has announced veryclearly that China will do its best on the vaccine development. There is some good news
as well. If you look at the current situation, the U.S. and other countries are very
aggressive on vaccine development. I am sure China, Japan, and Korea can cooperate on
this matter. As for the spread of the COVID-19 in China, many experts, including Prof.
Zhong Nanshan, estimated that the rebound would happen to a specific scale, but it will
not be massive. I also agree with this opinion.

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Session 2
Climate Change, Green Energy, Environmental Industries, andTrilateral Cooperation Post-COVID-19
November 25th, 2020 13:00-14:00

Moderator: AHN Choong Yong (Distinguished Professor, Chung-Ang University)
Speakers:
QI Ye (Dean, Institute for Public Policy, the Hong Kong University of Science andTechnology)
KANG MoonJeong (Head of Institute for Hydrogen Industry(IHI), Hyundai Motor
Group)
MATSUSHITA Kazuo (Professor Emeritus, Kyoto University/Senior Fellow,
Institute for Global Environmental Strategies(IGES))KIM Sang-hyup (President, Jeju Research Institute)
CHANG Xiuze (Professor, Academy of Macroeconomic Research of NDRC)AHN Choong Yong: The second session will be on the environment, and this topic has
been central to this dialogue since the very beginning. We have, time and time again,
agreed that China, Japan, and Korea are a single community when it comes toenvironmental issues. From many different environment experts, we are getting bleak
prospects of the end of the world if climate change and the melting of polar ice caps were
to continue. Ironically, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we could see clear skies andenjoy clean air for consecutive days here in Seoul. What this ironic situation tells us isthat we need a coordinated response to COVID-19 and climate change. Encouraging news
is that the United States will return to the Paris Agreement once Biden starts his term in
January of 2021. According to yesterday’s news, John Kerry, a renowned diplomatic52

figure, will be serving as the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate for President-electBiden. I believe this is excellent news for East Asia and global communities that areconcerned with climate change. China, Japan, and Korea must establish a long-term
strategy for low carbon usage by 2050, and I believe a written report is due by the end of
this year to the United Nations. Also, I know that many countries are readjusting theirenvironmental and economic policies to achieve this goal. In the post COVID-19 era, I
believe that reducing carbon emission would also be an excellent way to facilitate
expedient economic recovery after the pandemic. For this session, many experts fromthree countries are due to present in today’s session.
QI Ye
I will be speaking on the topic of opportunities and challenges in the new era of climate
action. I want to talk about this in four aspects. Firstly, I will discuss why we have reached
a new age and then discuss the latest consensus in this era. Then I will discuss theopportunities and challenges that we face in this new era.
On September 22nd of this year, during the 75th General Session of the United Nations,
President Xi announced that China would reach its peak of carbon usage by 2030 andobtain carbon neutrality by 2060. His announcement had a strong reaction from the global
audience. After this, in a series of international seminars, which included the UN Summit
on Biodiversity on September 30th, the 3rd Paris Peace Forum on November 12th, the12th BRICS Summit on November 17th, and the G20 Summit on November 22nd,
President Xi repeatedly emphasized China’s commitment to carbon reduction.
Looking at other countries, on October 26th of this year, Prime Minister Suga gave an
inauguration speech to the Diet and professed that Japan would reach zero carbon
emission by 2050, which is ten years ahead of China. In looking at the statement madeby Suga, he noted that the transformation of our energy structure is an opportunity, not aburden. He also added that climate change prevention does not necessarily mean
constriction of the economy, calling for a change in people’s conception and a bold action
against climate change.
On October 28th of this year, President Moon Jae-in also announced that Korea would go
hand-in-hand with the international society in responding to climate change. He also
pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Also, he stated that although Korea’s
reliance on carbon energy is high, there will be an increased investment into the renewable53

energy sector and electric vehicle industries. European Union’s New Deal and GreatBritain’s pledge are similar to those we have seen above.
Currently, approximately 20 countries have announced their target emission andestimated time of completion. The Biden administration is about to start, and one of thefirst things that are being discussed is their emission targets and deadline years. We cannow extrapolate that a new age of carbon neutrality and climate change prevention has
begun.
Now looking at some of the commonalities of this new age, there has been series ofclimate agreements from 1992 to 2020, which have all emphasized everyday
responsibilities. We can say that we view climate change as not just a responsibility but
an opportunity. In regards to the new climate change, we have reached a new consensus.
The perception of climate change has undergone several phases, and understanding thiswould contribute to the future consensus-building measures. Previous approach of theBush administration’s in 2001 was a fundamental contradiction between climate actionand economic growth. Then, around 2007, new perceptions grew. The new paradigm wasthat although climate action can be costly, there will be a more significant burden forhumanity in the future if no action is taken now. In 2014, under the slogan of better growthand better climate, there arose an agreement that can be achieved simultaneously. From
2020, we have a new paradigm that views climate action as a vital force needed for the
speedy recovery of the green economy.
Of course, we will face many challenges to achieve this. First is the fact that it takes time
to reach the point of carbon neutrality. The European Union reached its peak in the 1990s
and expected to reach neutrality within 60 years. The US reached its peak in 2005 andneeds 45 years. For China, it wants to spend only 30 years, which itself comes as achallenge. To reach these goals, we need a quick transformation of energy structures. For
this, we need technological innovations. In past years, China has speedily achieved suchinnovations. However, when it comes to essential technologies, domestic development isdifficult, which needs to be addressed.
Another issue is the problem of cost. In our prospect, in order to achieve carbon neutrality,
China needs to invest 2% of its GDP every year. There will be successes and failures forthis. Looking at investments, much of it is directed towards overcoming COVID-19. If
we can direct some of that fund towards energy structure transformation, it would greatly
benefit us. Also, I would like to emphasize that the three East Asian countries can come54

up with a platform for carbon reduction through this opportunity. Japan has been at theforefront of reduction research for a long time, and China’s hydrogen vehicles haverecently expanded. If three countries cooperate, we can achieve more. Lastly, China has
been contributing to the Green investment commerce. In light of this, I propose that Korea
and Japan participate in our endeavors.
KANG MoonJeongFirstly, I will present Hyundai Motor’s efforts to realize hydrogen cars. HMG has a visionof pioneering the future mobility industry based on FCEVs. HMG plans to utilize its
hydrogen fuel technology in hydrogen-electric vehicles and railways, vessels, aviation
mobility, UAM (Urban Air Mobility), and many other fields. HMG is actively leading thefuture of mobility realization by securing various domestic and foreign partnerships.
HMG’s aims in future mobility and hydrogen-electric cars are as follows. We seek clean,autonomous, and connected mobility for our future. FCEVs purify the air while operating.
Thus it is a cleaner form of mobility. An FCEV’s driving range is superior to an electriccar, making it the most appropriate form for an autonomous vehicle with various ICT
functions that consume a lot of power. Hyundai Motor’s FCEV, NEXO, has alreadysuccessfully run 200km in level 4 automatic driving during the 2018 Pyeongchang WinterOlympics. Now it is undergoing automated driving tests in Seoul Gangnam province.
XCIENT, the world’s first hydrogen-electric truck to be exported to Switzerland, has
successfully passed the platooning test.
Regarding the HMG’s vision for hydrogen fuel, at the end of 2018, HMG announced theFuel Cell Electric Vehicle Vision 2030. HMG will invest KRW7.6 trillion won by 2030
under the FCEV Vision 2030. We aim to produce 700,000 fuel-cell systems annually by2030. Five hundred thousand units will be used for building FCEVS. Two hundred
thousand units will be supplied to other transportation manufacturers of automobiles,
vessels, and forklifts and sectors beyond transportation, such as power generation andstorage systems.
With regards to HMG’s recent hydrogen fuel cell trends, In July, HMG started exporting
the world’s first fuel cell heavy-duty truck, the Hyundai XCIENT, to Switzerland. A totalof 50 units have been shipped this year. By 2025, HMG aims to send a total of 1600 units.
This September, we began shipping hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles and buses to Saudi
Arabia. Also, we have started exporting our hydrogen fuel cell systems to Europe for nonautomobile industries. The companies importing the hydrogen fuel cell system, including55

a Swiss hydrogen solution firm and many energy solution startups, plan to build
emergency power supply systems and eco-friendly mobile generators. HMG’s nextgeneration fuel cell vehicle, NEXO, reached 10,000 cumulative sales in a single country
for a single car model. Two days ago, the global British chemical company INEOS and
HMG came together to accelerate the realization of a global hydrogen economy. We aim
to actively develop a hydrogen value chain encompassing hydrogen production, storage,
and transportation in Europe and expand the global hydrogen ecosystem.
Secondly, due to the difficulty of decarbonizing the mobility and industry sectors evenwith the expansion and development of renewable energy, these sectors are becoming the
focus of significant nations’ hydrogen industry strategy. Korea, China, and Japan are
mainly focused on using hydrogen fuel in the mobility sector. In January last year, theKorean government announced its Hydrogen Economy Roadmap. January this year, theNational Assembly passed the first Hydrogen Law, designated a special institution forhydrogen development, and launched the Hydrogen Economy Committee to lay a basis
for the hydrogen economy.
Major European countries have consecutively announced their national hydrogen policies
and strategies. In April, May, and June, Belgium, Portugal, and Germany announced theirhydrogen strategy. In close pursuit, the European Union, France, and Spain madehydrogen strategy announcements in September and October. Russia followed suit byannouncing its national hydrogen roadmap in October as well. Europe aims to dominate
the hydrogen production sector technology early on, establish a secure, global hydrogen
supply chain system to South and East Europe, and Africa, and achieve carbon neutrality.
Europe is building a hydrogen engine network that will reach 6,800km in 2030 and a totalof 24,000km in 2040. Nine European nations are participating in constructing a transEuropean solar and wind-powered hydrogen production and transportation system thatruns along the Danube River (Europe’s second-longest river), passing through Germany,
Austria, Italy to Romania.
The predicted market size of the 2050 global hydrogen industry is at the least US 1 trillion
dollars, at the most US 11 trillion dollars. Different institutions have announced otherfigures, but the hydrogen industry is undoubtedly a growing, future industry. Goldman
Sachs’ prediction for the hydrogen industry in 2050, US 11 trillion dollars, amounts to
87% of China’s 2018 GDP. This is triple the market size of the present global oil and gas
market. Bloomberg has defined the recent phenomena of major countries competitively
providing subsidiaries to preoccupy the hydrogen economy as a ‘hydrogen war.’ Goldman
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Sachs, which estimated the 2050 hydrogen market to be US 11 trillion dollars, asserts thisis a once in a generation opportunity.
In September, France called upon a trans-European cooperation to get ahead of Asia andthe US in its national hydrogen strategy, announcing it will strengthen ties with Germany.
In October, a bilateral summit meeting between the two countries was attended by theEuropean Commission President. During the summit, the two countries discussed thespecificities of cooperative measures concerning hydrogen production, infrastructure, andmobility.
I would like to end this presentation by thanking the East Asia Foundation for hosting
this event at this crucial time when Korea, China, and Japan should also seek cooperation
for mutual benefits in the hydrogen war.
MATSUSHITA Kazuo
I will share my screen to facilitate the understanding of the audience. My theme for today
is ‘From Green Recovery to Net-Zero Society under COVID-19.’ Looking at both
COVID-19 and climate change, they are both a pressing challenge for the global
community that must be solved to ensure humanity’s survival. Both issues are related to
globalization. Also, some are pointing out that the pandemic is exacerbating due to thedeterioration of environmental conditions. Commonalities exist regarding climate change
and COVID-19. Firstly, solid and scientific understandings of both issues are critical.
Secondly, the solution for both requires significant changes to society and the economy.
Thirdly, the international society must cooperate to bring about changes. Fourthly, weneed substantial financial commitment to reach an effective solution. The following
picture (Picture 1) is an example that shows improvement in air pollution in China.

57

(Picture 1)

After the outbreak of COVID-19 around the Chinese city of Wuhan, there was a massive
reduction of NO2, CO2, and other harmful pollutants in China. However, these
improvements were found to be transitory changes. Picture 2 is another example from
China.
(Picture 2)

During the lockdowns, we saw a drastic reduction in carbon emissions in China. However,with economic recovery in May, the emission levels increased 5% compared to the year
before. Many are saying, especially the Secretary-General of the UN, that economic
recovery in the post-COVID-19 world should be based on Green Recovery”, also known
as Build Back Better”.
58The recovery that is being argued here is predicated upon actions, including the transition
to a decarbonized society and the realization of SDGs. At the vanguard of such thoughtis the European Union. Last December, the EU adopted the European Green Deal. In Julythis year, the EU created a next-generation EU fund that amounts to €1.8 trillion. Out of
this amount, it is said that 30% of it will be dedicated to stopping climate change. As said
before, the newly elected US President Biden has pledged to return to the Paris Agreement
on climate change and expressed his will to have the US reach a net-zero emission of
GHGs by 2050. Biden stated that the new administration would spend US$ 2 trillion on
establishing green infrastructure. As noted before in the introduction, President Xi
declared that China would obtain carbon neutrality status by 2060. In Korea, just before
its general election in April, the governing party put forth Korea’s Green New Deal thatessentially led to their victory. On October 28th, President Moon stated in his National
Assembly speech that Korea will reach carbon neutrality by 2050. For the Korean New
Deal, 94.6 billion US$ will be invested in total. Lastly, Japan’s Prime Minister Suga
declared that by 2050, Japan would reach zero carbon emission.
In reality, this is a very ambitious goal and needs several processes to be realized. Firstly,
we must strengthen the current reduction plans for 2030 by aiming to emit 45% of thelevel compared to 1990. Also, the Global Warming Prevention Plan and Basic Energy
Plan are currently being reviewed. We must increase the proportion of renewable energy
and decrease the portion of carbon emission from fossil fuels. Moreover, we must
gradually reduce reliance on coal as our primary source of energy. Initiating tax on carbon
emission could also significantly help to establish the concept of carbon pricing. Lastly,
to have the green recovery lead to a carbon zero society, there are several challenges.
The first challenge is what sort of decarbonized society we are trying to achieve. One canbe Japan’s version of green recovery. We must share in the sense of crisis in the society
and make it the government's official stance to head to a decarbonized society. With thisin mind, areas such as the social system and lifestyle should shift towards renewableenergy, efficient use of energy, and IOT/AI/ICT use. Moreover, energy conversion to
renewables must be made on the axis of economic recovery. Finally, we must come up
with contingency plans for those industries that will be negatively impacted because of
the transition to decarbonized society. Thank you everyone, for listening.
KIM Sang-hyup

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There was an informal climate talk. From the United States, John Kerry, recently chosen
as presidential envoy for climate for the Biden administration, participated. For China,
Xie Zhenhua, an expert who has paid close attention to climate change in China,
participated in the informal talks. Lastly, Ban Ki-moon, current Chair of the National
Council on Climate and Environment, participated. There was a high-level talk on
November 11th of this year on climate change by these figures.
Biden has pointed out that the most significant difference between him and the Trumpadministration will be the climate. According to the New York Times, one of the decisive
agendas in this year’s election was climate change. What is most significant is that climate
is no longer an auxiliary issue but rather a core issue that is fundamental in a presidential
election.
Thus, the United States will return to the Paris Agreement immediately and engage in alarge-scale Green New Deal for net-zero goals. The new administration highlighted that
economic recovery would go hand-in-hand with efforts to thwart global climate change.
During the meeting, John Kerry’s strong commitment to climate change prevention could
be seen. He stated that climate and energy policies would move beyond the limited realmof environmental protection and be considered an integral problem of national security,
economy, and industry. It was not announced at the time but, time and time again, Kerry
expressed confidence that everything will change with him as the special envoy. Also, I
met Kerry before during the signing of the Paris Agreement and what he was pushing forat the time was Mission Innovation. It consisted of Clean Energy and Technology, but hepledged that it would be a multi-trillion-dollar project. What was emphasized was that it
is not our capabilities that were restricting the United States but our will. Also, he stressedthat the US would return to multilateralism. In particular, he stated that the US-China
cooperation is vital above all else. He believed that trans-pacific collaboration on climatechange is essential, and he hoped that Korea and Japan would participate. The Biden
administration will hold climate conferences with major countries within 100 days of
inauguration.
Xie Zhenhua noted that China would reach its emission peak by 2030 and reach net zeroin 2060, and a significant amount of monetary support is being directed towards this. He
also expressed how much the world waited for the return of the US leadership. Xie also
made a unique suggestion of creating a carbon market. As previously mentioned in our
talk by Professor Qi, this is an initiative of green finance. Korea initially adopted a carbon
60

trading scheme, which was followed by China. Japan is doing it partially, and the US’s
envoy Kerry proposed a bill of that nature, which was not passed, but California iscurrently implementing it. Thus, as Xie suggested, emission trading schemes could boost
the level of cooperation in the region.
Ban Ki-moon was representing not only Korea but the UN's perspective. As we have seen,
Korea pledged carbon neutrality and a multi-billion investment for the Green New Deal.
Also, next year, Korea is expected to hold a Green Growth and Global Goals summit. Banemphasized the need to create a Quadrilateral Cooperation Group, including the UnitedStates, Korea, Japan, and China. Cooperation among countries ranked in first, second,
fifth, and seventh in terms of emissions would bring unprecedented changes. The Green
Climate Fund that Korea is hosting was expected to gather 10 billion dollars, but theUnited States’ rejection made it impossible. Ban emphasized the need for the US
participation.
There can be many ways for cooperation, and a global agreement such as the Paris
Agreement is not enough. Special Envoy Kerry stated that to promote changes, likeminded countries must cooperate as well. Professor David Victor and I, who also
participated in this conference, argued for a Quadrilateral Green Club to solve thisproblem.
Hydrogen is becoming a favorite in supplementing carbon as it has a significant amountof energy density. Also, Kerry emphasized the need for the future development of nuclear
power. China, Korea, and Japan all have essential infrastructure and technology in regards
to nuclear power. Also, electric cars, autonomous driving, digital electricity grid, andcarbon trading are fields that the three countries are leading. Moreover, the three countries
are leading some critical organizations. Japan is leading ADB, China is leading AIIB, andKorea is leading GCF, so multilateral cooperation is also possible in this area. If the four
countries cooperate, the Paris Agreement can be significantly improved. Also, as
Professor Matsushita stated, green recovery should coincide with economic recovery.
Whether Climate Detente is possible between the US, China, and Northeast Asia, theanswer is not clear. When I was in the Jeju Forum, I had the honor of speaking with
Thomas Friedman, Sunghwan Kim, and Hee-ryong Won on this issue. During the forum,
it was made clear that on the high tech & security front, confrontation will continue. On
the other hand, in the field of pandemic and climate change, they will cooperate. However,61

climate change is a field that needs at least trillions of dollars as an investment. Also, asJohn Kerry noted, it's a security issue.
CHANG Xiuze
Time and again, experts have discussed three main ways to increase cooperation between
Korea, Japan, and China. The first is technological cooperation. The second is economic
cooperation about demand and supply, means of production, and investment. The third isinformation cooperation and the standardization of laws and regulations overseeing thesector. My contribution to today’s dialogue will explain the collaboration between our
nations in establishing environmental property rights.
For over 2,000 years, Chinese philosophers have promulgated the idea of “Tian Di Ren”the three elements of heaven, earth, and people. Subsequently, I introduced the conceptof a “Tian Di Ren” for property rights ten years ago and even wrote a book about it. In
my book, I proposed a broader meaning of property rights, including environmental
property rights.
For a long time, environmental property rights did not exist. However, with the signingof the Tokyo Protocol in 1997, the international control and regulation on CO2 emissions
came into effect. With it began the discussion surrounding the property rights of CO2.
While CO2 is not a property, its conversion into an economic resource converts it into a
property. This view, in effect, brought environmental property rights into existence.
Similarly, in our roadmap to a green revolution, there is a need to create property rights
for other elements found in nature. Such rights should not be occupied by one nation but
shared commonly between our civilization so that our governments can cooperate further.
Also, we must establish a relationship between the contributors and detractors ofenvironmental property rights. There must be clear guidelines outlining those who havecontributed most to the environment’s damage and hold them responsible. As Director
Kim of the Jeju Research Institute stated before me, environmental rights must be about
responsibility.
In China, we have begun to develop parts of environmental property rights. The China
Hubei Emissions Exchange opened in 2019 and has seen a market capitalization of￥340,000,000. Many experts in South Korea and Japan are surprised at the high amountof trade within the exchange. I can say that China has successfully established CO2

62

property rights in the region. Two days ago, the Exchange recorded 1,317 tonnes of trade
worth ￥367,000,000.
I believe that there is much that our three nations can cooperate on the issue ofenvironmental property rights. I also request everyone to please come to Hubei andwitness the world’s largest environmental property exchange.

[Q&A and Discussion]<Question 1> Please explain China’s roadmap to obtain carbon neutrality by 2060.
QI Ye: The government has planned the road map under the 14th Five Year Plans and the15th Five Year Plans, from 2021 to 2025 and from 2016 to 2030. According to research
conducted by the Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development at Tsinghua
University, which I am also a part of, the amount of carbon emission is expected to peakin 2030, and carbon neutrality will be obtained in the year 2060. Results also show that
we could move up the date and achieve carbon neutrality by 2025. There have beendifferent opinions that suggest getting carbon neutrality before carbon emission reaches
the peak. However, this plan can face a cost problem. It is more effective to reach thepeak then obtain carbon neutrality, as the cost of non-fossil fuels, such as solar energy,
wind energy, and hydrogen energy, is decreasing at a fast pace, which is also reflected in
the government’s plan. Perhaps a clear vision for government plans will come out before
the two sessions are held in March next year.
<Question 2> What is Japan’s stance on the quadrilateral meetings and do you have any
recommendation for figures who may participate in the meetings?
MATSUSHITA Kazuo: Japan stands positive on having high-level quadrilateralmeetings. In Japan, Shinjiro Koizumi, the Minister of Environment, took the initiative in
September this year and established the online platform for green recovery to overcome
the COVID-19, climate change, and the implementation of the Paris Agreement where
Ministers of Environment and significant figures from many countries participated,
including Secretary-General Ban. In that, I think it is meaningful to have quadrilateralmeetings aligning with the initiative. We will take a review for qualifying personnel thengive you recommendations.

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AHN Choong Yong: Amid the US-China trade war and the Cold War, we shared good
opinions that we can overcome this challenge with Climate Detente. The discussion could
be further extended from the environmental issues even to trade points once the three
countries create mutual trust. China, Japan, and Korea are the world’s leading
manufacturing production bases that rank the highest in carbon emissions. Since we are
geographically close to each other, I hope that the three countries continue to solve the
COVID-19 and climate problem with a firm conviction. Having quadrilateral meetings
with the U.S. joining us, which President Kim suggested, can be a key to deal with the
COVID-19 issues, economic cooperation, and acts against climate change. A Japanese
author’s book is crossing my head that says nature also has property rights, just likehumans have human rights. I wish that the environmental issues rise to the attention as
China, Japan, and Korea continue to work together.

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Session 3
Economic Impacts of COVID-19, Recovery Strategies, and SocialEconomic Policies for the Aged
November 25th, 2020 14:30-15:30

Moderator: KIM Sang-hyup (President, Jeju Research Institute)
Speakers:
QIU Guohong (Former Ambassador of the P.R.C to the R.O.K)
INAMURA Takuma (Director of the Healthcare Industries Division at Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI))KIM Jung-Sik (Professor Emeritus, School of Economics, Yonsei University)
OGURO Kazumasa (Professor, Faculty of Economics, Hosei University)
TIAN Xueyuan (Academician, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
YI Insill (Professor, Graduate School of International Economics, Sogang
University)
YOSHINO Naoyuki (Professor Emiratis, Faculty of Economics, Keio University,
Visiting Professor of GRIPS)QIU Guohong
I would like to thank the East Asia Foundation for inviting me to today’s dialogue
discussing the future trilateral relations between Korea, China, and Japan. In a postpandemic world, economic cooperation and close coordination in response to COVID-19
will deepen ties between the three nations.
These partnerships have already born fruit to tangible results. Several bilateral andmultilateral cabinets approved the meetings discussing the response to the COVID-19
pandemic, which have created a positive political atmosphere between the three nations.
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They have engaged in high-level talks regarding quarantine and restriction measures,
creating a flow of dialogue. This has bolstered bilateral relations and created a positive
political atmosphere. While conflict and confrontation were shared between the threenations before the pandemic, the COVID-19 pandemic has mitigated many such issues
and has provided an essential change in the overall political mood.
Also, the three nations have increased economic cooperation by establishing the fast track
movement of business personnel. Regular operation of value chains, supply chains, andlogistic chains continued as a result, and many companies were able to return to work andproduction quickly. This has created a solid foundation for the region’s economic
recovery and future trilateral cooperation.
Finally, through excellent responses to the pandemic, the three nations have left valuable
examples for the rest of the world to follow. This has increased the region’s influencearound the world and has created a common, united identity.
In the future, this collaboration will continue to deepen and internalize the region’s
trilateral cooperation. China has seen the fastest economic recovery in terms of grossdomestic product(GDP), showing a 3.2% gain in this year’s third and fourth quartercompared to the first quarter’s -6.8% growth rate. This was partly due to the rise in the
total value of trade between Korea and Japan, which increased by 1.1% and 1.4%
respectively for the third quarter.
How can Korea, China, and Japan further pave this path of cooperation?
A summit meeting will play a key role in bolstering relations between the three nations.
It is to my knowledge that Korea is the host of this year’s trilateral summit and is in theprocess of fine-tuning the details. I hope the finalization of the summit’s plans is expedited
for a summit shortly.
With the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership(RCEP), the legal
basis of a trilateral free trade agreement(FTA) has come into place. This agreement will
support a trilateral dialogue in a post-pandemic age. Korea, China, and Japan havediscussed an FTA for over three years and have achieved a consensus on critical issues. I
hope that the three nations make the necessary concessions to bring closer the date of theagreement’s formal signing.

66

Cooperation in elderly welfare, artificial intelligence(AI), high-speed networks, andenvironmental protection will also bolster industrial cooperation chains and achieve
economic growth for all three nations. Such industries require large investments, highskilled labor, and long value chains. Hence, the three countries can converge industrial
structures and put high commercial complementarity to share funds, skills, and talent.
There is much potential for future growth together.
Finally, companies in the region must increase cooperation outside markets, such as in
the fields of high-speed networks and rail. In the past, they competed with each other andcreated a comparative loss for each other. Hence, such companies must increase bilateralor even trilateral cooperation for a win-win situation in foreign markets. They must also
actively utilize the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)+3 system to further
integrate their businesses.
Shifting international situations must also result in a shift in policies. De-globalization
and uncertain United States-China relations have significantly impacted the global
economy, security, and politics. The United States views China as a competitor and has
engaged in pressure tactics. Amid this chaos, Korea and Japan have leveraged theirtraditional alliance with the United States to check cooperation between the United States
and China in the high-tech sector. A complex power tug is expected in the foreseeable
future. While paradoxical, the three nations must overcome these obstacles and increasecooperation. I believe that mutual economic growth will benefit all parties involved andeven branch out to multilateral trading systems and partnership in fighting climate change.
The future is bright for the Korea-China-Japan relations. Thank you.

67

INAMURA Takuma
Today, I would like to discuss new healthcare tasks for the government in the age of the
COVID-19 pandemic.

In the graph, the red line represents Japan’s population aging rate, which has quickly
increased in recent times. Compared to the European and American countries on the right,
we can observe that our rate of population aging is comparatively high. The nation’s shareof the population aged 65 and above is 28%, and I expect this to rise to near 40% by the
middle of this century. This phenomenon is also occurring in other Asian countries like
China, which is experiencing an aging population. Hence, it is the government’s job todevelop its existing healthcare systems and healthcare industries to increase healthy life
expectancy in the long run.

68

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a decrease in physical activity.
This graph shows the average amount of activity by people in each country. Thanks todeveloped public transportation network in Japan, we can see that Japanese citizens took
an average of 7,000 steps a day. However, after March, the daily number of steps quickly
decreased. Measures like work at home increased the time people stayed inside andreduced the total amount of movement. There was an even higher rate of decrease forcitizens in European and American countries. On the other hand, Korea was quick torecover from the pandemic, and we can see that its step count soon returned to normal.
While all countries experienced the pandemic differently, the overall amount of activity
and movement decreased.
80% of elderly Japanese citizens replied that their frequency of going out decreased with
the COVID-19 pandemic. Subsequently, the amount of stress from not being able to meetfriends and pursue hobbies increased. This was a similar case for working people in Japan,
who suffered from “stiff shoulders” and deteriorating mental health due to a lack ofcommunication from working at home.
Such health problems related to COVID-19 affect the elderly significantly. Isolation fromsocial activity lowers them into a spiral of lack of exercise and causes cognitive decline.
While such issues have been pointed out before, the COVID-19 pandemic has brought
the problem to the spotlight. There is a need for the active use of digital technology tosolve this problem. Currently, in Japan, many PCR examination forms are written by handand submitted via fax. Many have pointed out the low use of information technology
during the pandemic, which was keenly felt.
To this end, the Japanese government is pursuing a proper utilization of digital technology
for health management. Building up and maintaining an information base is a vital policy
task. For most Japanese citizens, there are annual health checkups at schools and work.
However, the information is stored in separate databases. We plan to combine the database
under one umbrella that can be individually accessed through applications using the
National ID number system. Next year, health checkup data will be available throughsuch applications and daily activity by each user will be stored. This will help people tomaintain their health properly. Also, people will be able to share their medical information
with doctors for effective treatments. With the proper use of data, the prevention of healthrisks will become possible. I believe that it is the role of the government to address theseissues gradually and respond accordingly.

69

KIM Jung-Sik
I will approach the effects of COVID-19 from a macroeconomic point of view, highlightthe problems it has created for the elderly, and suggest solutions.
The unique characteristic of the COVID-19 pandemic has been the increase of contactless
spending, as traditional methods have a high risk of spreading the virus. This has reduced
domestic consumption and demand, and the economies of countries with high domestic
demands have been the worst hit during the pandemic.
The following table shows the trade dependency ratio of each country.

As you can see, Korea has high exports and trade while the U.S. and Japan have inverse
economic structures, with low amounts of trade. China previously had a high tradedependency ratio but is decreasing the amount of trade. Countries with a high tradedependency ratio and low domestic demand have been the least affected by the COVID19 pandemic, as seen in Korea, which is relatively well off than other developed nations.
This trend can also be seen in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook. China quickly
overcame the COVID-19 pandemic to show a 1.9 point growth in 2020. On the other
hand, Japan and the USA reported a large deficit in economic growth rate. With a modest
deficit of 1.9 points, Korea experienced a comparatively shorter recession than thesecountries.
The second characteristic of the COVID-19 pandemic is its unique effects on the elderly.
It has expanded economic inequality. The pandemic-called recession has led to high70unemployment, a decrease in the number of jobs, and an increase in income inequality.
Also, low-interest rates and the subsequent growth in money circulation have led to a risein property and stock value, further increasing wealth inequality.
The third characteristic is digitalization. The rise of contactless trade has quickly
increased the process of digitization. On the one hand, digitalization decreases the numberof jobs and increases the number of people working from home, but on the other brings
innovation and investment to the economy. Digitalization has a significant impact on thewelfare of the elderly, which I will speak about in-depth later.
To address these three characteristics, China, Japan, and Korea are using similar methods.
They have implemented expansionary fiscal policies, eased monetary policies, removed
government regulations to stimulate investment, depreciated their currencies to increase
exports, and propped up protectionism for their domestic economies. This has increased
the Base Money Supply, lowered interest rates, and increased exchange rates against the
dollar.
So, what are the COVID-19 pandemic’s critical, adverse economic effects for the elderly?
And what policies can the government implement to combat these issues? First, due toeconomic recession and a decrease in income, there is a high possibility that the elderly
will face a reduction in income. For this problem, the government should increase state
welfare for the elderly and help provide jobs.
The elderly also have weaker immune systems and have a comparatively higher mortality
rate to the COVID-19 virus. The government must prioritize the elderly for vaccinations.
Digitalization also plays a crucial problem for the elderly in times of the COVID-19
pandemic. The elderly usually cannot use the internet and have less knowledge of online
financial transactions. The government must work towards providing solutions to thisissue.
Finally, inequality also has the most significant effects on the elderly.
So how can China, Japan, and Korea respond to this issue? From a macroeconomic
perspective, the three nations should increase cooperation in trade and decrease
protectionist policies. Also, they must cooperate to prevent an exchange rate war.
Moreover, all three countries should implement economic stimulus policies to increasejobs for the elderly and promote corporate mutual investment in the process.
71OGURO Kazumasa
I would like to share the current status of the economic and Public financial situation
regarding the aging population.
As many reported in previous sessions, the aging population is adversely affecting many
countries’ macro-economy and even registering negative growth, especially in face-toface service industries. In contrast with the Lehman Brothers crisis, damage to financial
institutions was less, and the economic recovery was pretty fast due to a massive publicfinancial policy scale. Looking at the impacts on households in Japan, we can see a
distinctive characteristic that has a limited effect on the aged, whereas massive
implications on the young. An annual government budget of approximately ¥140 trillion
to finance the pandemic measures later expanded to ¥160 trillion as the first and second
supplementary budget was approved by the cabinet. The government debt is expected toincrease further once the cabinet approves the third supplementary budget, which iscurrently being discussed. We must also consider the reimbursement of government bondsthat are being issued. Similar difficulties apply to China and Korea as well, and thisnecessitates joint efforts.
Secondly, the movement for a digital government has been activated in Japan. The newadministration is establishing an office of digitalization as an exclusive policy. Korea
successfully constructed an advanced digital government. This matter elevated concerns
in Japan when the government failed to provide the cash transfer of ¥100,000 per citizen
as the COVID-19 infections escalated. The United States, Australia, and Korea were able
to distribute funds instantly, but Japan was unsuccessful. This provoked a strong
movement for establishing a digital government, and the current administration is
operating to implement a specialized office. Amidst such circumstances, within the themeof an aging population, essential financial functions include resource distribution,
redistribution, and economic stability. A ‘push’-form administration is crucial. We must
perceive the former ambiguity of the administration and redistribute accordingly.
Efficient redistribution requires indexing bank account numbers when distributing cash
benefits. Japan is presently in need of such policies.
Thirdly, the COVID-19 crisis can also be recognized as an issue between generations.
Although accurate data remains inadequate, key factors include the current generationand future population growth regarding an aging population. Social isolation due to
COVID-19 could influence the birth rate. Suppressed personal encounters may reduce the72birth rate among the younger generation. Additionally, as mentioned in previous sessions,
COVID-19 has drastic effects on the younger generation and human resources
employment. Digital management devices such as ZOOM conferences may substitutepractical work to some extent, which altered employment in Japan. The government ispreparing various countermeasures, but research demonstrates that productivity in theworkplace plunges 70%. Even with additional devices, we must strive to continue raisingproductivity.
Furthermore, the problem of inequality persists. Seniors receive stable income throughpublic pensions, whereas temporary workers of the younger generation are severely
impacted. We must take precautions against economic polarization in the future.
Lastly, despite such difficult times, crises provide opportunities for reformation. In Japan,
online diagnosis and treatment, online education, the digital office, cashless payments,
FinTech, and digital Yen rose as discussion points. Alongside this session’s theme, tomaintain political and economic stability in the East Asian region, CJK must propose
resolutions for such agendas.
I would like to share one final slide on how Japan could resolve this situation. As adeveloped country with a declining population, new policies regarding the low birth rate
and means of
be considered.
theme of an
population, theeffortsofpension,andsocialmust be shared
implemented
countries. To this, the current slide shows a senior-friendly, workable city.

work must
Under theaging
reformpublichealthcare,security
andamong

As COVID-19 infections also impact long-term care, we must collaborate to build cities
that can stand against infectious diseases. I look forward to further cooperation among
CJK for overcoming the issue of the aging population.
TIAN Xueyuan
My presentation’s main subject is ‘Effective Countermeasures for the Aging Population73

in the Post-COVID Era,’ and ‘CJK Join Hands for Coexistence and Co-prosperity.’
Professionals have already proposed profound ideas, and I would like to add to thediscussion by briefly introducing my research. As everybody understands, the 20th century
was marked by a boom in population, while an aging population distinguishes the 21st
century. According to UN estimates, the population of 65 years or older in the year 2000
was 6.8%. The UN predicts that this number will rise to 10.4% by 2025 and 16.2% by
2050. A large gap exists between developed and developing countries. However, the aging
population will continue in the latter part of the 21st century at a relatively slower pace.
Under the circumstances of a rapidly aging population, elderly in poverty has become auniversal social phenomenon. The UN observed the year 1999 as the Year of Elders
Worldwide, along the theme of ‘A society that everyone enjoys regardless of age.’Entering the 21st century, the coronavirus attacked humanity in three waves: SARS,MERS of 2012, and the recent COVID-19. Now, we will soon encounter the post-COVID
era. We cannot disregard the grave impacts of COVID-19 on the economy, population,science and technology, and society. The elderly, one of the weakest groups in society,suffer most from the virus and its aftereffects. This sufficiently proves the vulnerabilityof elders. Such problems severely burden the recovery from COVID-19, and makes
accelerating social and economic development in the post-COVID period andimplementing the UN’s goals difficult. Thus, confronting the matter of aging populationmust be seriously reassessed.
The East Asian region centered around CJK experiences the aging population’s severity
while simultaneously implementing the most effective preventive measures against the
pandemic. Therefore, the three nations must move forward to cooperate on this issue. As
you may already know, Japan records the most severe case of an aging population, andChina and South Korea are catching up quickly. The three countries have reached acritical state, and CJK all hold theoretical experience responding to the aging population’s
issue. Therefore, the three countries can learn from and provide models for each other.
Today, I would like to introduce three ways this can be done. Firstly, we must increase
academic exchange and share theoretical thinking strategies in dealing with the aging
population. Recently, books on the aging population from Japan and South Korea arebeing translated into Chinese for the Chinese market. A book that I personally wrote waspublished in Japan around ten years ago. ‘Aging Population and the Middle Income Trap,’a book that I also wrote, is soon to be translated and published in Korea. The three nations,similar in culture and social problems, including an aging population, must prompt
academic exchange. Secondly, we must reconsider the level of seniority guarantee and74

ability to prevent infectious disease through the reformation of seniority guarantee
policies. Lastly, we must actively seek solutions for an aging population’s issues andprotect the commonly shared traditional culture of respecting and supporting elders,ultimately constructing a society of co-prosperity. We must move past simple manuals
and take immediate action. Such procedures should not be exempt but fully incorporated
in the post-COVID era.
YI Insill
The population is an issue that affects all facets of our lives, including my expertise, theeconomy. Today, I will briefly discuss the aging problem in Korea and discuss some ofthe possible solutions.
Although the current aging level is lower than in Japan, Korea is an unprecedented casein the progression rate into an aging society. Previously someone has pointed out that thebirth rate might decrease due to the COVID-19 crisis. Actually, in Korea, the total birthrate in Korea in 2018 was 0.98, and this year, we have seen a steady decrease due to thepandemic as it was 0.9 in the first quarter, 0.84 during the second quarter, finally reaching
0.82 in the third quarter.
Also, we see a rapid increase in expected life expectancy, which exacerbates the rate ofaging in Korean society. Due to rapid aging, by 2050, the proportion of the elderly (ages
65 and above) will be around 40%. Also, by the same year, it is expected that Korea willbe the country with the most elderly population in the OECD and the second-most in the
population of ages 80 and above. By 2065, Korea’s portion of the elderly is expected toreach 42%, which will be 3.8% higher than Japan.
Thus, it is expected to create various problems such as insufficient labor population,
decreased quality of labor, increased medical fees, and higher social costs for taking careof the elderly. The fact that all these problems will have a detrimental effect on economic
growth is a well-known fact. This issue is particularly difficult for Korea because theprogression is so rapid that measures to counter such problems cannot be developed intime, and Korea does not have an example to learn from when it comes to these issues.
We have devoted a tremendous amount of funds to alleviate this issue, but the reality isthat the birth rate is decreasing. Looking at 2018, individual’s spending on medical fees
were lower than that of OECD’s average. On the other hand, the rate of expenditure on
medical fees was the fastest among OECD nations. In the last five years, from 2013 to75

2018, the increase was 7.3%, which was the fastest among the OECD nations. However,caretaking personnel per 100 people for the elderly was around 3.5, much lower than theOECD average. At this rate, from 2010 to 2060, the Korean government’s spending
increase on elderly and medical fees will be the highest among OECD countries.
Depending on what sort of policy-decision the Korean government makes, the rise ingovernment spending on elderly care can range from 4.9% to 9.4% of Korea’s GDP.
Thus, it cannot be overemphasized that an appropriate course of action must be taken toincrease the healthy life expectancy of the Korean people. In the age of the pandemic,
active financial measures such as quantitative easing released a large amount of cash in
our society. Due to social distancing measures, they have led to the expansion ofcontactless businesses. However, the aged population was not able to catch up to suchrapid changes. According to last October’s statistics, the number of infected was around
25,000 in Korea, and the proportion of 60 years or older was about 27%. Among thedeceased, 93% were 60 years and above. Over half of the dead were found to be 80 years
and older. This statistic shows that COVID-19 is much more lethal to the elderly
population.
Also, limited social contact was available for the younger population by commuting towork and social networking services. For the elderly, on the other hand, many community
facilities were closed, making religious or social activities difficult for them, which led totheir isolation. Closing off from the community has been shown to exacerbate depression
and dementia among the elderly population. Specifically, in Korea, elderly households
account for 21.8%, and those who live alone account for 34.2%. For the last ten years,
the portion of elderly living alone increased 50%. When taking a look at this, COVID19’s detrimental effect is particularly devastating towards the elderly.
In Korea, most of the efforts and resources are currently focused on preventing andtracking the disease. However, less attention is being paid to the elderly, whose healthexpectancy and the pandemic severely impacts the quality of life. What we see in the
media is censures against caring home for the elderly for spreading the disease. Thus, weneed a different approach for the elderly population. Specifically, for the elderly,
psychological problems such as depression and memory loss are severe issues. More thanemotional symptoms, we see more physical and psychological symptoms among theelderly. Thus, we need to develop ways to mitigate the negative impacts brought on to theelderly by the social distancing measures. Also, we hear a lot about vaccines and remedies

76for COVID-19. I think we need a specific approach for the elderly population on thesematters as well.
There is something particularly characteristic to Korea’s aging society. Unlike othercountries such as Japan, Europe, China, or the United States, the baby boomer period
started 7 to 8 years later than other countries due to the Korean War. Recently the baby
boomer generation has now become the elderly. This generation led Korea’s
industrialization, and their purchasing power is different from previous baby boomer
generations. Also, this generation is the one that will lead the elderly population in Korea.
They have a tendency towards individualism, which leads them to dedicate a moresignificant portion of their capital for themselves. Also, they are very adept at utilizing IT
services and have a great demand for this. Besides, they have a great interest in healthservices. For example, according to Auction’s (Korea’s online shopping venue) statisticfrom 2014 to 2018, Korea’s baby boomer generation’s consumption was 1.3 to 1.7 times
higher than other generations.
Lastly, according to professionals in the medical field, around 500,000 to 800,000 strandsof the unknown virus still exists. Even if COVID-19 is eradicated, we have no idea whena new disease will arise. Medical management services around the world are focused ontreatment, facilities, and hospitals. However, I do not believe it is adequately dealing withchanging nature of diseases and demands for health services. Around 50% of the elderly
population in the OECD countries have at least one chronic condition. Those who are 75
years and older have at least three or more. Thus, we must develop a medical management
system that can effectively combat the disease’s changing nature and its variety.
Especially, digitalization through using big data can be a useful measure. If the three
countries can closely coordinate, I think It would be beneficial for all.
YOSHINO Naoyuki
I will be addressing two points today. The first is the declined effectiveness of monetaryand fiscal policies in the face of an aging population, and the second is re-thinking theDomar Rule. In response to COVID-19, government spending and budget deficit rocketedin numerous countries. The Domar Rule, which compares interest rates and economic
growth rate, can measure economic stability. The Domar Rule only applies to the UnitedStates, so the supply and demand of government bonds must be considered to measurefiscal stability for other countries.
Regarding the aging population, I propose the DSGE model that incorporates household
77and business sectors, financial institutions, and government structures. I will also explain
the change in the effects of monetary and fiscal policies as the number of seniors andretired increases. Firstly, the rate of consumption will plunge. As retired seniors become
dependent on pension and housing aid without individual income, results verify thatspending will significantly decrease. Secondly, as the population ages, the budget deficit
will increase taxation, raising the tax burden on the younger generation, resulting in adecrease in disposable income. This will further discourage consumption and investment
because less consumption of goods diminishes investment in businesses. Such are theeffects of an aging population.
Under such circumstances, what monetary policy should be enforced? Monetary policy
focuses on decreasing interest rates and promoting business investments. The effects are
significant for a working population. As businesses produce more profit, wages will rise,and subsequently, consumption will also expand. This cumulative effect is the key tomonetary policy for economic recovery. However, if the senior population grows, since
they do not work, individual company performance will not improve even if the monetary
policy lowers interest rates. Seniors in the East Asian region possess financial assets indeposit savings, but as interest rates decline, interest payments will also be reduced. This
negatively impacts seniors as they do not benefit from bonus incomes or interest payments.
Hence, as the population ages, the effects of expansionary monetary policy become
invalid. This is one reason that Japan’s monetary policy failed to show effective results.
Secondly, let us examine the effects of fiscal policy. A fundamental principle ofmacroeconomics is incorporating fiscal policy when monetary policy proves ineffective.
However, macroeconomics underlines the assumption of a working population. As thenumber of retired surge, fiscal policies used to create new jobs will not be applicable.
Contrary to this, those searching for new job positions may find long-term work inaccordance with the effects of fiscal and reflation policy. As such, fiscal policies are
efficient for a working population, but unproductive for a retired population. This graphdisplays the impact of fiscal policy declines for the aging and non-aging economies ofOECD countries.

78

For the aging economies, the financial increase is only 0.6, in contrast to the 1.5 increase
for non-aging economies. In aging economies, the financial increase is less than one,which implies fiscal policy’s ineffectiveness. Although Japan is providing for income
security in response to COVID-19, this only means government spending, not economic
recovery on a macro level. Governments must strive to extend healthy life and transform
income to be suitable for productivity to be employed for as long as possible to manage
such issues. This also suggests the friendly use of robots and digitalization.
Next, regarding fiscal stability, this graph demonstrates distinctions between Greece, acountry that experienced government bankruptcy, and Japan, a country that did not. Japan
had domestic investors for government bonds, while two-thirds of Greece’s government
bonds were held by overseas investors, in which negative impacts ultimately led togovernment bankruptcy. In this figure, the blue line indicates interest rates. For Greece,
interest rates soared, and interest payments also expanded. The black line signifies Japan,
and because holders of government bonds were domestic investors, interest rates declined
and exhibited utterly different results. Therefore, domestic holders of government bonds
drastically influence fiscal stability.

79Lastly, Asian countries are suffering from a budget deficit. While the debate of how thebudget deficit will lead to bankruptcy is an ongoing matter, a key factor is the Domar
Condition, which compares interest rates and economic growth rates. As presented in thebottom part of this picture, when interest rates are higher than the economic growth rate,
the economy is unstable. In contrast, if interest rates are lower than the economic growthrate, the economy is stable. The recent Nobel Prize winners Paul Krugman and Tirore
applied the Domar Condition to Japan and claimed that Japan is relatively secure sinceinterest rates remain lower than the economic growth rate. However, such assumptions
only presume the supply of government bonds. The revised Domar Condition highlights
a balance between supply and demand, government bonds’ elasticity, and the balanceissued. The large B and small B on the bottom is the essential condition for stability.
Comparing the elasticity of demand for government bonds and the balance of government
bonds is a necessary procedure. In the case of Greece and Japan’s public debt stability
condition, I propose that a country will suffer from bankruptcy if the blue line rises above
the red line and appreciate stability if the blue line resides below the red line. As illustrated
in the picture, Japan maintains stability. According to my formula, the reason for Greece’sbankruptcy is the decrease in demand.
The Domar Condition alone is insufficient for post-COVID fiscal stability in Asian
countries. For the United States, demand from foreign investors increases, especiallyduring crises. Hence, the United States is not concerned about demand but only interested
in supplying government bonds. However, other nations must consider both demand andsupply for fiscal stability. I will continuously emphasize this point to other countries.
KIM Sang-hyup
As the retired population multiplies, monetary and fiscal policies become ineffective.
Furthermore, the balance of supply and demand of government bonds is crucial. If we
had the time, we could have addressed fundamental income theories, emergency relief
grants, and governmental response to COVID-19. Further debate on subjects involving
the increase in female workers’ productivity as they work from home may be continued
in later sessions. I have participated in the CJK dialogue for seven consecutive years, andas each year passes, I recognize the escalating value of CJK cooperative conversations.
Each nation’s historical, territorial, and security agenda may vary, but concentrating oncommonalities such as COVID-19 and population change will allow for a moreconstructive CJK dialogue.
80Session 4
Trade, Tourism, FDI, Regional FTAs, Tourism post-COVID-19
Recovery
November 25th, 2020 15:30-16:30
Moderator: HARAOKA Naoyuki (Executive Managing Director of JEF)
Speakers
AHN Choong Yong (Distinguished Professor, Chung-Ang University)
FUKAGAWA Yukiko (Vice Dean, School of Political Science and Economics,
Waseda University)
WU Shicun (President, National Institute for South China Sea Studies)
HIRAI Akira (Managing Director, Chief Secretary, Kyushu Economic Federation)
KIM Do Hoon (Professor, Sogang University / former President, Korea Institute for
Economics and Technology)
URATA Shujiro (Professor Emeritus, Waseda University)
GUO Yanjun (Director, Institute of Asian Studies, China Foreign Affairs University)

HARAOKA Naoyuki
The topic of Session 4 includes trade, tourism, and regional FTA. We will discuss theprospect of change in such areas in the post-COVID-19 era. As Chairman Kusaka
mentioned this morning, beta globalization is essential. Exhibited even through the recent
U.S. elections, although Biden won, many citizens advocate Trump’s America First policy.
Also, as was the main subject of Session 3, income inequality is escalating due to thepandemic, which leads to intense movements of domestic populism, nationalism, andanti-globalization. Amidst such circumstances, maximizing the merits of globalizationand shaping necessary rules is substantial. Another critical subject will be the global
contribution to this region through the RCEP, CPTPP, and CJK FTA, which we discussed
this morning.
81

AHN Choong Yong
Starting from the first opening statement, many seem to welcome the conclusion of RCEP.
About today’s topic, I will propose the ultimate amalgamation of the RCEP and TPP for
the successful economic integration of East Asia, aligning the challenges andopportunities that confront us.
As most have mentioned before, Henry Kissinger claimed that COVID-19 is likely toalter the world order forever. As the pandemic progressed, we experienced the inversely
related tradeoff between stringent lockdowns and economic recovery. Thus, althoughnumerous countries had adopted outward-oriented strategies, because of COVID-19,
most veered to take inward-looking, self-reliant, and even anti-globalization modes.
In such circumstances, South Korea-China-Japan, the CJK has performed better incontrolling the pandemic than major western countries. CJK cooperation will provide asilver lining for the recovery of regional and global economies. Above all, the threenations will contribute profoundly to the return to multilateralism.
However, because we still face a high risk from excessive trade dependence on aparticular country, after the COVID-19, management systems that diversify trade partners
and inventory accumulation will prevail.
All the while, as some have stated this morning, the adoption of RCEP is encouraging
news. Compared to the CPTPP, the RCEP’s spectrum of liberalization and tariff reduction
rate is of lower quality. However, the conclusion of RCEP signifies to reverse inwardlooking strategies and invoke multilateralism and liberal order, as the RCEP contains
twenty or so provisions related to such issues. RCEP can be a substantial contribution to
East Asia’s integration. The 28 rounds of negotiations have provided valuable lessons forvarious signatory countries to open domestic markets. Another significant aspect of RCEP
is that it has resolved the commotion arising from differences in origin regulations ofvarious bilateral FTAs by establishing unified rules of origin, or common rules. RCEP is
the first official and multilateral framework in which the three countries, South Korea,
China, and Japan, have become connected. This creates new momentum for an
accelerated CJK FTA negotiation.
Even before the RCEP, the regional value chain, or the global value chain formed throughthe market, accounted for 50% of total trade worldwide. RCEP will reinforce the alreadydeveloped regional or international value chain, and CJK must join efforts to avoid
artificial damage to the natural supply chain.
82

This graph shows RCEP, CPTPP, and NAFTA, newly named by the Trump
Administration as the USMCA.
The dark blue represents RCEP, and we can see that the number of people, combined GDP,and combined trade value is overwhelmingly higher. Although the spectrum of openness
and tariff reduction rates of RCEP remains relatively low, such a comparison of statistics
confirms the historical meaning of the RCEP.

The TPP, in which the U.S. was once a member, included the most comprehensive andliberalized provisions, especially the ISD and extended intellectual property rights. Suchclauses were omitted during the transition to CPTPP. Efforts to revive the advanced
provisions of the TPP is crucial. Despite the reduction to CPTPP, the Biden
Administration is likely to return to the TPP, and the critical point is that when the U.S.
joins again, we must not halt at twelve countries but expand the TPP. As mentioned in the
opening remarks this morning, President Xi of China at the APEC summit has expressedinterest in joining the TPP. South Korea, the UK, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines,
Colombia, Taiwan, and China have stated hopes to become members. Although the U.S.,
Australia, and Japan’s stance on China’s entrance are uncertain, embracing all thesecountries will take a long time, especially for the U.S. to rejoin the ISD, and the IPR
extension clause must be incorporated. Although the process will be prolonged, I would
like to emphasize the amalgamation of the expanded TPP and RCEP.
The convergence of these two massive free trade blocs, as I stated in my thesis from 2018,
can be interpreted into three scenarios. The first is the convergence of the two gigantic
blocs. The second is that, as observed through the Korea-US-China commerce policy, the83

U.S.-China conflict will continue, diminishing any possibility of convergence instead ofbringing forth a two-way race. The third is muddling through the status quo. I, of course,
claim that efforts towards convergence are essential. Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee
Hsien Loong asserted in the Foreign Affairs Journal that East Asian countries aside from
China must avoid situations that compel them to line up behind either the U.S. or China,
for this will result in the division and downfall of East Asia. This raises the significanceof the U.S. and China to work as partners in the Asia-Pacific region.
Therefore, within East Asia, as I have used the term “Constructive Powers” here, anassociation of nations consisting of middle powers excluding the U.S. and China is
necessary to propose constructive alternatives. This is not a matter of whether countries
such as Japan or Australia side with the U.S. or China, but rather a matter of binding the
U.S. and China within a common fence through maintaining an open and transparent tradeorder.
As you can see, the seven countries in the middle are members of both the China-led
RCEP and U.S.-anchored TPP. If countries such as Korea, UK, and Indonesia join, theinfluence of constructive powers will increase, and such enhanced power can be utilized
to converge the two gigantic blocs. A necessary condition for eventual amalgamation is
the upgrade of the quality of RCEP to match the TPP, including the level of liberalization,
tariff cuts, and the abolition of various regulations related to non-tariff barriers, allworking towards establishing a level playing field.
CJK can play a significant role in this process. CJK FTA negotiations started in 2002 andhave gone through 18 rounds but have failed to show any progress. The conclusion of
RCEP creates momentum for the CJK to collaborate. If the three countries effectuate theCJK FTA, this can function as a linchpin to trigger East Asia’s eventual amalgamation.
The fact that China, Korea, and Japan share a common framework through the RCEP isof great importance. This will also provide means to develop further the Korea-China
FTA that remains at a superficial level.
Because this process requires a lengthy period, the CJK needs a combination of top-down
and bottom-up approach. The top-down approach is for the institutional framework, suchas the RCEP. The bottom-up approach incorporates local to local cooperation, including
tourist and student exchange, between Fukuoka-Busan and Incheon-Qingdao. We must
diligently cooperate in this area.
In conclusion, the middle powers, or constructive powers, must prevent the U.S. andChina competition from turning into a trade war while boosting the quality of RCEP to84match the TPP. Regarding North Korea’s issue, if East Asia integrates under a free tradesystem with common norms and enjoys common prosperity, North Korea will not be able
to stand on its own. Therefore, we can work together to bring North Korea into “CVID”
denuclearization while constructing an external framework that North Korea cannot help
but join. Korea, China, and Japan, must continue multilateral negotiations on a levelplaying field, accumulating mutual trust through non-aggressive relations on equal terms.
FUKAGAWA Yukiko
The information that I will share today is perhaps similar to the opinions of various
international trade experts. The conclusion of RCEP and the impact of COVID-19 is
notably significant. Japan is already a member of both the TPP and RCEP, so the single
remaining extensive economic negotiation framework is the CJK network. I would liketo discuss how the CJK economic network should be designed with professionals from
China and Korea.
As many have already mentioned, RCEP has yet to reach a high level. Nevertheless,because it covers a broad spectrum and involves young countries of great potential, theevolution of RCEP may resolve various matters. Amidst depressive times, the conclusionof RCEP is encouraging news. Its practical aspects are less emphasized, but RCEP
impacts not only bilateral FTA but also the TPP. Members share an accumulation of a ruleof origin that applies to this vast region. Common tariffs may not have been achieved, but
the adoption of a common rule is noteworthy. For Japan, tariff lines between China andKorea have been liberalized. Zero-tariff items between China and Japan have increased
from 8% to 86%, and the rate between Korea and Japan has increased up to 92%.
Unfortunately, India was not able to participate.
Despite successful outcomes, the impacts of COVID-19 generate changes in the trade
framework. Firstly, trade in services was more severely impacted than the hardware trade.
To break this down, traditional services, including travel, transportation, construction, andentertainment, were negatively impacted. Digital services, finance, and R&D experienced
less damage. In terms of hardware trade, the calculations show interesting results.
Actually it was more the supply chain disruption, rather than demand and supply
themselves, that depressed trade. The first is ‘sustainability.’ Regarding the global value
chain, efficiency and lowering costs were prioritized. However, the value of stability andsustainability will escalate, and consequently production base will diversify despite
higher costs. Portions of FDI will be supplied by home countries, especially in theperspective of innovative enterprise with a large domestic market. Alongside, as digital85

transformation advances, manufacturing will not require physical labor, and thus, thevalue of data will exceed labor costs. Lastly, data related rules must be established.
Currently, hardware trade is regulated by WTO guidelines, but data related rules remain
insufficient. Ultimately, the deepening of the Security-Trade nexus and connection willemphasize institutional tools regarding data sharing. Similar countries that share data will
intricately connect each other.
Under such circumstances, the agenda for CJK FTA is as the following. Firstly, the TPP
in effect applies common tariffs through its emphasis on zero-tariff policy, utterly
different from bilateral FTA. RCEP must decide whether to use common tariffs or halt at
incrementally lowering tariffs. Through RCEP, service, and investments progressed tosome extent. Because CJK has already established a global supply chain through FDI, thethree countries will have to increase service and investment liberalization levels. The
collapse of the supply chain has become an obstacle for trade.
Moreover, because CJK maintains dense relations, tariffs will be inadequate in settlingareas such as SPS, Standard, IPR, and Competition. Unfortunately, Japan failed to resolve
agricultural protectionism through RCEP. China and Korea are also relatively deficient inagriculture. We must alter our conceptions to incorporate food and energy security as acollective agenda for CJK cooperation. Aging society and the environment are topics that
others have previously discussed, but I would specifically like to emphasize the issue ofdata.
As I have already stated, institutions affect economic ties very deeply these days. In allhonesty, CJK relations are not at best terms, and the three countries encounter numerous
conflicts. This all the more signifies the necessity to build trust. The business sector,
including tourism, entertainment, and education, builds upon mutual trust to promote
understanding as well. The Japan-Korea semiconductor supply chain undergoes friction,
but Korean entertainment is widely consumed in Japanese homes, even more so during a
lockdown. This is the essence of consumer-based service.
Furthermore, in the academic sector, basic research for public goods must be conducted
together, as European countries do, to vaunt any particular country’s superiority andcooperate towards providing public goods. If the three countries do not cooperate in thisarea, it would be difficult to expect any other countries to take action in Asia. Establishingmultiple interfaces for trust-building channels is vital as well. Gaps between generations
exist within each country. The young generation is borderless through social media and,hence, conforms to similar ideas, even more so than with the older generation. The
86

channels must not be simplified and limited to governments but expanded to generation,
gender, and local exchange.
Data is unquestionably a new agenda. Because various sectors utilize AI and data,
common data-related rules are crucial for FDI and service sectors, especially since B to
B, B to C, and C to C models are dissimilar. Concerns related to an aging society and theenvironment continuously are challenging and inefficient to resolve without involvingsocial business. Cooperation for data pool/archives and evidence-based policies isessential. Because data qualitatively differs from goods, data flow would be unlike free
trade of goods. Consumer protection, Cybersecurity, and privacy protection issues exist.
We must construct appropriate regulations and guidelines.
This animation is currently prevalent in Japan, and I have heard that it has also appealed
to the audience in China and Korea. The world of the new generation will transformthrough such media.
WU Shicun
The main topic of my presentation is the reinforcement of East Asian cooperation
centered around RCEP and CPTPP. RCEP has already been signed, and China has
expressed intentions to join the CPTPP. We hope that Japan will provide practicalassistance through the necessary procedures. President Xi has announced that China isconsidering entering the CPTPP, of which Japan has voiced its warm welcome. As experts
have clarified, the regulations of CPTPP are stricter than those of RCEP. Therefore,joining the CPTPP will not be simple for China. The U.S. initially prompted the TPP torival China, and whether the members of CPTPP will embrace China is uncertain.
However, we request that Japan fully support China in the CPTPP.
The newly concluded RCEP will take time to fully come into effect, as ASEAN nations
and the other three nations must complete the signing. After the conclusion of RCEP, thethree CJK countries proceeded with further cooperation, including the China-Japanbilateral tariff negotiations and China-Korea FTA. Such circumstances provide an
opportunity for the CJK FTA. The CJK FTA held 16 rounds of talks from 2012. The
accumulation of trust and constructive experience among the three nations within the
RCEP framework will allow for a more mature multilateral cooperative system.
Secondly, the three countries, Korea, China, and Japan, must notice post-COVID-19
economic recovery and stability of the supply chain or value chain. CJK successfully
collaborated in preventive measures, and the situations in Japan and Korea are87incrementally improving. The members of RCEP and the WHO will jointly confront
vaccines’ distribution, thereby forming a cooperative system against the pandemic.
Currently, China is in the process of developing and testing vaccines. Korea, China, andJapan must take the lead in distributing vaccines through a collaborative mechanism. We
must also gradually open doors for travel and tourism. CJK has established the first track
for human interchange during the COVID-19 period through macro-level compromise.
Wang Yi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Japan and agreed upon implementing
the first track for such human interaction within this month. A green path for humaninteraction and distribution logistics may be established. Political interference of the
supply chain must be prevented for stability and economic recovery.
Thirdly, I propose utilizing the competitive advantage of free port districts such as
Okinawa, Jeju Island, and Hainan to form integrated tourist zones. CJK is vital to inboundtourism markets for each other. The number of visitors among CJK in 2019 exceeded 30
million, as there were more than 10 million visitors between China-Japan and ChinaKorea, and over 9 million between Korea-Japan. Recently, China is seeking to promote
the tourism industry in Hainan. Okinawa, Jeju Island, and Hainan can partner throughmechanisms such as a Minister of Tourism Summit, Hainan International Golf Alliance,and MOU between travel agencies to form joint travel agencies or set off additional tourist
routes. Essentially, a CJK tourism brand could be designed through the advancement of
cruise travel, golf tourism, and more. We propose creating a free traveling region basedon Hainan, Okinawa, and Jeju Island.
We have launched tourist routes from Boao to Seoul and Haikou to Osaka. With suchfoundations, we can initiate round-trip routes from Haikou, located in the northern regionof Hainan, and Sanya, a famous tourist attraction in the southern part of Hainan, to Jeju
and Yokohama. Centering around Sanya’s international cruise home port, cruise tourist
routes that cross Sanya, Jeju, and Okinawa may also be launched. Indeed, the validity andeconomic efficiency of such roads must be thoroughly examined. Golf leisure tourism
can likewise be vitalized starting from Jeju Island and Osaka. More Korean and Japanese
tourists will visit Hainan and enjoy outstanding golf tourism at a relatively low price.
Lastly, practical affairs of marine environment protection and environmental governancerequire extended cooperation. The CJK are close neighbors sharing a common sea. Indeed,
the three CJK nations have maritime boundary disputes; China and Japan also haveterritorial disputes. However, collaboration for marine science research and development
is a pressing matter. Partnership in the rational use of marine resources, marine
environment protection, and maritime crisis management must be reinforced.
88Furthermore, an exchange mechanism for such cooperation must be employed. The
National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Sichuan Marine Policy Institute, andteams from Korea are progressing in think tank exchange. Sharing marine policy
experiences will initiate CJK cooperation for marine resources.

HIRAI Akira
I am Hirai Akira from Kyushu Economic Federation. Kyushu Economic Federation is an
economic organization from Kyushu, the nearest region in Japan to South Korea andChina, full of active interaction with the neighboring nations. Mainly, Kyushu has hosted
the annual Yellow Sea Economic and Technical Exchange Meeting with China and South
Korea since 2001. This year marks the meeting’s 19th anniversary; however, this year’s
conference has been postponed to next year due to COVID-19. With the slogan ‘Move
JAPAN forword from Kyushu,’ Kyushu Economic Federation strives to makeachievements in various sectors, including symbolic efforts such as the export of Kyushu
agro-fishery and livestock products and inbound tourism promotion.
Despite the COVID-19 crisis, we utilize this time to prepare for immediate action whenstability is restored. We are striving for complete and thorough preparation. Firstly, I will
discuss the status of agro-fishery and livestock products with some visual representation.
As Professor Fukagawa has mentioned previously, in terms of the reality of Japan’s
agriculture, food security and energy security are serious challenges. Recent statistics
state that farmers’ average age is 66.8 years old, evidently affected by aging society waves.
The food self-sufficiency rate is 38%, which marks the lowest among developed countries.
Kyushu, stated to be 10% of Japan’s economy, provides 20% of the Agriculture, Forestry,
and Fisheries and especially 40% of the nationwide share in the aquaculture industry. As
Kyushu Economic Federation’s initiatives indicate, companies that entered theagricultural field increased by six times from 2009 to 2016, with a total number of 277
cases. We have successfully transformed the negative impression on agriculture, namely
the 3Ds(Dirty, Dangerous, Difficult), by employing IT such as spraying agriculturalchemicals with drones. Such attempts have drawn back to Kyushu, the young people who
had moved to Tokyo and Osaka areas. Income has also increased, and such changes help
foster ‘happy agriculture.’ As a symbolic endeavor, we have specifically set theagriculture, forestry, and fisheries exports from Kyushu to 120 billion yen. However, thiswas unachieved because of COVID-19.
Consequently, we are going through a preparation phase. As I have asserted earlier,89

Kyushu’s direct exports to mainland China and South Korea hold symbolic meaning.
Exports are shipped from the Hakata Port in Fukuoka to Busan, South Korea. The
products are then transported to Gunsan, South Korea, through the highway from Bussan,and shipped to Shidao Port in Shandong Province. This way, the export procedure iscompleted quickly, and the products are maintained freshly refrigerated. Such routes areunder construction.
Kyushu Economic Federation strives to achieve five tasks. Firstly, exporting agricultural
products Kyushu has an advantage in, such as strawberries and sweet potatoes. Secondly,
exporting beef, pork, chicken, and processed foods. Third, adding designated rice mills
to Kyushu, which I am diligently pursuing by communicating with various related
institutions, including Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, theChinese Embassy, and the Chinese consulate in Fukuoka. Fourth, abolishing or
significantly relaxing radioactivity regulation to Kyushu in advance. Lastly, reducing
risks of delay of quarantine or customs clearance.
Next, I would like to assess the tourism sector. The graph illustrates the number of
inbound tourists to Kyushu in 2019 by nation or region.
Visitors from mainland China and South Korea account for 70%. The previous year, we
had numerous visitors from Europe, United States, and Oceania because the World Cup
Rugby was hosted in Japan. We are working to attract additional visitors from suchregions to Kyushu. The following graph depicts the number of inbound tourists to Kyushu
from January to August of this year, organized into national and regional categories.

90

After April, the numbers plunged due to COVID-19. As Japan is gradually accepting
tourists from China and South Korea, Kyushu is preparing to act as soon as such measures
are implemented. Therefore, our next action is first to encourage outbound tourism. We
will welcome visitors to Kyushu and concentrate on inbound customers and face outward
so that outbound, inbound two-way tourism may be propelled. Countless tourist routes
have been blocked; thus, intriguing tourist routes must be developed. Secondly, we seek
to promote adventure tourism. Much like the “Tour de France” cycling race that is famousin not only in France but Italy and Spain, we are preparing the “Tour de Kyushu,
Yamaguchi” in 2023 to increasingly attract foreign tourists. Lastly, developing humanresources for tourism industries is essential, primarily through the coordination of tourism
curriculum for universities and colleges.

As we take such symbolic measures, Kyushu Economic Federation is entirely preparedto take action as soon as the COVID-19 situation stabilizes.
KIM Do-Hoon
I will mainly present on how to secure the global supply chain in East Asia. At GSIS ofSogang University, I lecture on the industrial ecosystem in East Asia. The efficient
operation of the global value chain in this region surges the industrial competitiveness ofeach nation. Although CJK appears to compete against each other in the automobile andcommunication device industry, the three countries internally cooperate for intermediary
goods such as components and materials. Professor Ahn previously mentioned the term91

“constructive powers.” I believe the “constructive powers” are comprised of industrial
figures. East Asia cannot accommodate each other politically or culturally, butconstructive power for international cooperation is active in the industrial world.
The industrial world recently experienced quite a shock because of COVID-19, as Wuhan
went into lockdown. Wuhan has historically functioned as the center of the Chinese
industry, manufacturing numerous components and materials. Alternatively, China’s
sharp ascent in industry alarmed Korea and Japan, which fronted suspicions that China
controls rare-earth elements for weapons. The COVID-19 outbreak that began in China
generated a bad memory for the Korean automobile industry as the industry experienced
the most significant shock and was completely halted. This was because the wire harness,a less substantial piece, could not be imported.
COVID-19 also negatively impacted world trade. On the graph to the left, the COVID19 mark indicates the expected decline in trade of 2020. Alongside the decrease in global
trade, China and Korea have also been negatively affected by imports and exports.

As Professor Fukagawa stated in her presentation, firms and industries’ strategies shiftedfrom efficiency to resilience and safety. I have already highlighted the productivity of theEast Asian industrial ecosystem, which focuses on cutting costs. Several methods haveemerged as a means to attain security and resilience. The first is reshoring or returning to
one’s own country, which seems to overcome the global supply chain crisis. Examples of
reshoring include Apple initially attempting to establish India’s production units through92

Foxconn and TSMC, the largest semiconductor provider, building factories in the UnitedStates. Secondly, neighboring nations tend to cooperate, such as in Europe and nations inthe southern hemisphere like Australia and New Zealand.
Internationally, separate safety networks for security exist (although this may be mitigatedby Biden, the recent U.S. presidential candidate). The following countries supported the
U.S. Global Prosperity Network (GPN) initiative (Japan, India, Australia, New Zealand,
Vietnam, and [Taiwan]). Korea was also heavily encouraged to join. In contrast, nations
relatively less amiable with the U.S., such as Russia, China, and Brazil, came together.
The effectiveness of such methods as solutions is unclear.
Korea found itself in a dilemma. It is reliant on the U.S. for diplomatic matters andconcurrently associated with China economically, with 30% of exports depending on
China and Hong Kong.
Hence, CJK must pursue the global supply chain in the following three ways. While
cooperation is desirable in various aspects, CJK has attained a highly efficient industrial
ecosystem and global supply chain through specialization, or “putting all eggs in one
basket.” However, each country must establish an independent minimum portfolio.
Secondly, a framework that will assure the constructive powers of the industrial worldmust be instituted. The continuous attempts to initiate CMIM (Chiang Mai Initiative
Multilateralization) as a security initiative against Asia’s financial crisis have beenmoderately successful. CJK must begin forming a security initiative against the supply
chain crisis in East Asia in favorable industries. If the political and institutional sectors
concede, the industrial sector will undertake the operation immediately. Thirdly, as
everyone has underlined, the CJK FTA must be accelerated, especially for the efficient
operation of this region’s industrial ecosystem and global supply chain. Additionally,businessmen’s free movement must be guaranteed, as they are the constructive powersthat can be responsible for the worldwide supply chain under a COVID-19 security
network.
URATA Shujiro
Because of the lack of time, I will shortly address points that have not been mentioned.
Firstly, in line with Professor Kim’s presentation, I would like to expound on responses
by Japanese companies to the COVID-19 crisis. Similar to in case of Korea, Japan’s
automobile industry was severely damaged. Businesses and industries each responded
differently, in ways such as diversifying the supply chain, suppressing production,
managing inventory, and more. However, companies that seek more effective solutions
93

propose simplifying and rationalizing the extensive and complex supply chain. Thisimplies the strategies such as the enhancement of regional production in a place ofconsumption and ‘reshoring,’ the process of bringing production bases back to acompany’s original country. As Professor Fukagawa has specified, COVID-19 devastatedthe labor market, as businesses began employing robots instead of human labor. In termsof trade in parts and components, products that were physically transported across borders
are now exchanged through data sharing and 3D printing. In the future, infectious diseases
and natural disasters, and protectionist policies will escalate uncertainty in theinternational trade system.
Thus, businesses and governments must formulate appropriate strategies. Governments
must provide a free and open environment for trade and investment. Yet, in reality, somegovernments adopted protectionist policies in response to COVID-19, intervening withthe market by regulating exports. Businesses expect a market of free decision making,and RCEP is a notable application of this. The advancement of RCEP remains a crucial
agenda for governments. When the APEC summit of 2010 was held in Japan, allparticipants agreed upon setting Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) as the ultimate
goal, which can be approached through the TPP, and RCEP. RCEP marked a historicaccomplishment, but we must move forward to expand RCEP and TPP and reform theworld trade system.
GUO Yanjun
Because time is limited, I will briefly discuss my opinions regarding cooperation in East
Asia. Numerous experts have claimed throughout today’s morning and afternoon sessions
that the world is experiencing massive change. The U.S.-China competition and COVID19 have notably altered the world order. Fortunately, East Asian countries, particularly
CJK, look to strengthen economic partnership regardless of such complications. The
cooperation of CJK will likewise benefit other nations within the East Asian region.
COVID-19 provides new opportunities for regional association, especially multilateraland bilateral relations. Governments can overcome ideologies and collaborate on publichealth.
As levels of uncertainty and risk escalate, working together on preventive measures is the
only way to surmount COVID-19. China seeks to reinforce close relations with Korea,
Japan, and other East Asian nations. A new era of cooperation in East Asia has begun.
East Asia engaged in an open, cooperative structure, stressing the process rather than the
results. However, structural problems surfaced as some nations prioritized relative gains,94which emphasized a result-centered collaboration model. Now, the process andbeneficiary results must both be taken into consideration. We have conceded on attainingbalance and mutual prosperity to distribute the benefits of cooperation equally.
This region must recognize the significance of the global supply chain, and China, Japan,
and Korea must consider the importance of the value chain. Essentially, Europe andAmerica are the destinations for final products since CJK primarily produce intermediate
goods. Issues within the European and American markets create difficulties for East Asia
as well. Therefore, the construction of a regional value chain will expand the potential of
our markets. I believe that CJK is capable of joining efforts for such causes.
Regional cooperation must be enhanced separately from the U.S.-China framework. East
Asia has been under the U.S. influence and swayed by U.S. interests. Henceforth, wemust break away from such pressure and put forth regional interests. To escape the U.S.China structural contradiction, there needs to be a reinforcement of valid regional
exchange and cooperation centered around regional crisis management. Such movements
may be executed through ASEAN+ and CJK structures, as important figures in East Asia
must lead.
Cooperation in East Asia should be accelerated to a higher level. The U.S.-China trade
war has significantly impacted China. I have observed that cities in China are increasingly
eager to partake in East Asian collaboration. As indicated by Director Wu Shicun’s
proposal about Hainan, cities in the coastal and inland regions of China hope that local
governments of East Asia will partner together. Significant developments are in prospect,
especially for trade in services such as tourism. Lately, the tourism industry has beenmaturing more rapidly than the GDP, and trade in services is significantly contributing to
the rise of GDP. As China will resume its open-door policy, the three CJK nations caninvigorate the tourism market to overcome the COVID-19 crisis. President Xi has
proposed the innovative idea of “Health Cards,” which may also trigger travel amongst
East Asian countries. Travel and tourism will prompt economic recovery, allowing us toformulate the ideal model for trade in services. Lastly, China’s market capacity and South
Korea and Japan’s sophisticated skills for the silver industry allow for great possibilities
in this sector. Thank you.

95Special Closing Remarks
November 25th, 2020 16:30-16:35

WU, Hailong (President, China Public Diplomacy Association)
Thank you. Many experts have offered profound insights and opinions today. Asneighboring nations, China, Japan, and South Korea have maintained close relationships
throughout history. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the three countries have cooperated
in taking preventive measures against the epidemic. As the saying goes, “We are all on
the same boat,” we have continued to extend a helping hand to each other. The citizens ofChina commend such exceptional examples of collaborative practices and traditions. We
are experiencing an economic recession, and according to statistics, the amount of trade
amongst the three countries is at 260 billion dollars by this year October, which is a 0.4%
decrease compared to the same period in the previous year. However, despite the effects
of COVID-19, trade among the three nations remains relatively stable, as the amount oftrade between South Korea and China have reached 320 billion dollars. This proves that
the South Korea-China-Japan economic trade is indeed compelling.
The RCEP has successfully been signed. This is positive news for all three nations, as we
can collaborate within a single framework. Furthermore, China-Japan and Japan-South
Korea tariff agreements have been signed for the first time. This sets appropriate measures
for a trilateral FTA. Trade relations are advancing, and trade integration is accelerating.
At the APEC summit, President Xi has defined China’s intentions to join the CPTPP,
verifying that China advocates multilateralism and free trade. China joining the CPTPP
will provide another framework to fortify cooperation among South Korea, Japan, andChina. This will hasten the economic integration of East Asia. We must seize the current
historic opportunity. However, we must simultaneously acknowledge the difficulties thatexist for the three nations. We must resolve the following issues throughout thecooperation process.
Firstly, we must reinforce mutual trust. Political mutual trust is the basis of our trilateralrelations. The three nations’ differing political systems will not hinder the enhancementof mutual trust. Recently, international affairs are rapidly shifting intricately, and mutual
trust is being seriously challenged. Favorable attitudes toward other nations are declining.
96

We must reinforce confidence through heightened collaboration and exchange. The
deepened trust will lead to a brighter future. Indeed, everyone concurs that the South
Korea-China-Japan cooperation will substantialize and actualize.
Secondly, from a strategic stance, we must overcome the interference of a third-party.
Thirdly, we must enhance cooperation. Economic collaboration must be the primarydriving force for the three nations, as mutually beneficial and complementary relations
remain solid. South Korea and Japan obtain advanced technology, while China offers avast market, which allows an excellent potential for trilateral economic cooperation.
Through the domestic and international dual circulation economic strategy, China islooking to extend its open-door policy. This will provide a significant opportunity forSouth Korea and Japan. This will also provide space for South Korea-China-Japan+
cooperation and further enhance collaborative efforts within a third market. A partnershipis viable for energy, tourism, manufacturing, and infrastructure business sectors. As afellow expert from China has previously mentioned, cooperation for maritime governanceis promising. South Korea has also suggested this afternoon to reinforce mutual assistancefor the silver industry. The trilateral cooperative community will be beneficial for all. For
effective implementation, we must provide an environment for a closer “people-to-peoplebond” through extensive humanities exchange projects, in which South Korea and China
have a competitive advantage. A vital aspect of humanities exchange is the interaction
among international youth. The new generation, namely Generation Z, is the future of ournations. They will be the core force of the development of South Korea, China, and Japan.
Looking onward, we must boost interaction among international youth throughhumanities exchange programs to raise amicable relations, ultimately connecting citizens’
hearts and minds. The South Korea-China-Japan trilateral network is essential not only
for government partnerships but also for regional and global stability and peace. We
expect the South Korea-China-Japan trilateral cooperative relations to vitalize during the
COVID-19 crisis successfully. Thank you.

97

７．発表資料
セッション１：Pandemic Spread, Outlook, and Trilateral Cooperation① 小林 慶一郎氏 東京財団政策研究所 研究主幹／慶應義塾大学経済学部教授
セ ッ シ ョ ン ２ ： Climate Change, Green Energy, Environmental Industries, and Trilateral
Cooperation Post-COVID-19② 松下 和夫氏

京都大学名誉教授／地球環境戦略研究機関 ｼﾆｱﾌｪﾛｰ

セッション３：Economic Impacts of COVID-19, Recovery Strategies, and Social-Economic
Policies for the Aged③ 稲邑 拓馬氏

経済産業省

商務・サービスグループ ヘルスケア産業課長④ 小黒 一正氏

法政大学経済学部教授⑤ 吉野 直行氏

慶應義塾大学名誉教授／政策研究大学院大学客員教授

セッション４：Trade, Tourism, FDI, Regional FTAs, Toursim post Covid-19 Recovery⑥ 深川 由起子氏 早稲田大学政治経済学術院 副学術院長・教授⑦ 平井 彰氏

一般社団法人 九州経済連合会 常務理事事務局長⑧ 浦田 秀次郎氏 早稲田大学名誉教授

98セッション１ ： 小林 慶一郎氏

COVID-19 Policy in Japan
Keiichiro Kobayashi
Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research
Keio University
1. Economic Shutdown in April-May* Buying time against explosion of infections* Enormous damage on the economy (10% of GDP)

2. PCR testing* Number of testing capacity (PCR test, antigen test): 70,000 cases per day=> Target as of August 28:

200,000 cases per day (antigen test)=> Target as of November 12

540,000 cases per day (PCR, antigen)* Serious disagreement between public health experts and economists* Public health: Value of test is at diagnosis for patients# Testing is for diagnosis and for cure of patients# Efficiency in finding infected people# Overwork in public health center coordinating testing and quarantine* Economists: Value of test is at information for citizens# Testing is for a decrease in the infection probability in economic activities# A change in the probability has a positive economic value, even if test negative.
(Example)
Gain from transaction 100
Loss from infection 10000
Probability that the counterparty is infected = 0.01 (without test)
Probability that the counterparty is infected = 0.003 (with test negative)
The expected value of transaction is 0 without testing,while it is 70 with test negative99

# Avoiding economic shutdown
Cost of economic shutdown is an order of magnitude larger than cost of testing* Prioritize the testing targets# Category 1: symptomatic and contacted# Category 2a: asymptomatic and with a high risk
# Category 2b: asymptomatic and with a low risk
Category 2b is tested with her own expense
Some policy intervention is allowed

3. Recent development* The second wave: 2020 Summer# Originated from entertainment districts in Tokyo# Large number of infections/ Small number of death and serious cases# Correlation with crowd becomes weaker or nearly zero* Lower risk of economic shutdown in October# Expectation prevailed that the level of infection may be stabilized* The third wave: 2020 November# The size may be 4 or 5 times larger than the second wave
# Restrictions on regional economic activities may be introduced to some extent# Increasing the capacity of hospitals is the most urgent need today.

4. Conclusion* The crisis of COVID-19 may continue for a few more years (or for years)* The businesses should adopt their business models to the New Normal with COVID-19.
* Need the international coordination of tax and fiscal policies to redeem the sovereign bondsthat are issued to finance COVID-19 policies.
100セッション２：松下 和夫氏

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セッション 3：稲邑 拓馬氏

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セッション 3：小黒 一正氏

中韓協力ダイアログ
高齢化
法政大学教授小黒一正
１． マクロ経済・財政への影響
・今回のコロナ危機は、中国・韓国・日本を含む各国のマクロ経済に大きな影響を及ぼした。特に、負の影響が大きいのがサービス産業であり、リーマンショックの時と異なり、金融機関や製造業への影響が少ない。このため、大規模な金融緩和の影響もあるが、日本を含む各国の株価も回復が早かった。
・また、日本では、コロナ対策の結果、2020 年度における国の当初予算（一般会計）は、
第 1 次補正予算・第 2 次補正予算で、約 100 兆円から約 160 兆円に拡大し、財政赤字が大幅に増大している。
・いま第 3 次補正予算の編成が進んでいるが、コロナ危機が収束した段階で、いずれ、この債務を返済する議論を始めなければならない。その時に問題になるのは、抜本的な税制改革だと考える。
２．デジタル政府の重要性とデジタル庁の創設
・いま菅義偉・新政権が掲げる最重要政策は「デジタル庁」創設となっている。
・この重要性が誰の目にも明らかな姿で露呈したのが、新型コロナウイルスの感染拡大に伴う緊急経済対策で、国民一人当たり 10 万円の現金給付を行おうとしたとき。
・残念ながら、アメリカやオーストラリア・韓国などの国々と異なり、日本は迅速かつ的
確に現金給付を行うことができなかった。その理由は、デジタル政府の核心（コア）は「プッシュ型・行政サービス」であるにもかかわらず、それに政治が本気で取り組んでこなかったから（だが、今回の政権は違うかもしれない）。
・従来型の行政は「プル型」で、国民が行政側に相談や申請をしてはじめて、行政手続き等がスタートする仕組みであり、行政手続き等のアプローチの起点が国民側にあるが、「プッシュ型」は「プル型」の逆の仕組みでアプローチの起点が行政側にある。
・現状では、制度改正したために受けられる給付や減税を気づかずにいるケースも多いが、利用者の年収や年齢、家族構成や配偶者の年収、振込み先の銀行口座などを事前に登録しておけば、年収や年齢を条件とする手当が制度改正で新設された場合、給付額の通知
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や銀行口座への振込みなどをスムーズに行うことができ、社会保障関係の給付や税制上の還付を含め、申請漏れで本来は受給可能な手当を受給し損ねる事態も回避できる。
３．コロナ危機と世代間問題
・現時点では正確なデータが存在しないが、私が気になっているのは以下の問題である。
１） 社会的距離（Social distance）が引き起こす出生率への影響→人々の出会いの抑制が、人口減少を加速しないか
２）若い世代の雇用や人的資本に及ぼす影響→コロナ対策は重要だが、この問題が長引くと、失業率が徐々に上昇する可能性も新入社員に対する職場教育が十分にできず、職場の生産性が 7 割程度まで低下しているという調査も
３）経済的格差の拡大→年金を主な収入源とする高齢者などはコロナ危機のなかでも収入が安定しているが、元々、雇用が不安定であった非正規労働者が収入面で大きなダメージ→経済や雇用の二極化は、政治にも影響を及ぼす可能性
４．危機が切り開く「改革の窓」
・いま日本では以下の改革が加速
１）オンライン診療・オンライン教育
２）デジタル庁
３）キャッシュレス決済やフィンテックの拡大（→デジタル円）・東アジア地域の政治経済的な安定性を高めるため、中国・韓国・日本が上記３の問題に対する解決策を示す必要
・なお、コロナ危機が収束しても、中国・韓国・日本をはじめ、様々な国が高齢化の問題に直面することは変わらない。高齢化先進国のトップランナーである日本の経験の伝
達はいうまでもないが、リアルとデジタルの融合といった新たなテクノロジーの活用を含め、引き続き、以下の先進的事例に関する知識共有が重要ではないか。
１） 少子化対策
２） 働き方改革
３） 年金・医療・介護などの社会保障改革
例：2004 年の年金改革、新しい公共（社会的処方）
高齢者に優しいまちづくり（ウオーカブルなまちづくり）、
ケア・コンパクトシティ

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セッション 4 ：吉野 直行氏

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セッション 4 ： 深川 由起子氏

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감사합니다

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セッション 4 ：平井 彰氏
農林水産物の輸出と観光振興～九州経済連合会の取り組み～2020 日中韓協力ダイアログ
九州経済連合会
１．九州経済連合会（九経連）は九州の経済団体。日本の中でも韓国や中国に最も近い地域。
古くから CJK 間交流が盛ん、2001 年からは毎年、環黄海経済・技術交流会議(“Yellow
Sea Rim Economic and Technology Exchange Conference”)を開催。
２．九経連の取り組みは多岐に亘るが、九州から日本を動かす象徴的な取り組みとして、
農水畜産物の輸出と観光振興を図っている。コロナ禍ではあるが、一定の収束が見えた段階で直ちに動けるよう、その準備期間として、遺漏ないように努めているところ。
３．農水畜産物の輸出（１） 食料安全保障が最大の課題に～日本の農業の実情
・農業従事者の平均年齢は 66.8 歳と高齢化。食料自給率 38％は先進国中最低。
（２） 九州農業の特徴
・1 割経済といわれる九州にあって、農林水産業シェアは 2 割。
（３） 九州経済連合会の数値目標
・企業の農業参入、2016 年までの 7 年間で 6 倍、277 件に。2020 年の輸出を 1,200
億円に（～コロナ禍により未達）。
（４） 九州と韓国・中国との新たな輸送ルート例と当面の課題
・博多⇔釜山（海上）、釜山⇔群山（高速道路）、群山⇔石島（海路）の可能性
・苺やさつま芋など九州の特産物の輸出
・牛肉、豚肉、鶏肉や加工品の輸出
・輸出のための精米工場の九州指定追加
・放射能規制の撤廃または大幅緩和（九州先行実施）
・検疫・通関遅延リスク削減
４．観光面の課題（１）2019 年のインバウンド客の国・地域別構成比
・70%が中国、韓国から→広く欧米豪からも（２）2020 年のインバウンド客の国・地域別構成比・4 月以降、コロナ禍で激減（３）「アフターコロナ」に向けた九経連のアクション・アウトバウンド、インバウンド双方向の観光推進～新たな航空路整備と PR 団の派遣
・アドベンチャーツーリズムの推進～「2023 ツールド九州・山口」
・観光人材の育成～大学や専門学校等でのカリキュラム整備
（以上）
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セッション 4 ：浦田 秀次郎氏
Talking Points
浦田秀次郎
１）新型コロナ禍の企業活動への影響（サプライチェーンへの影響を中心として）
企業の対応
生産抑制
在庫の積み上げ（just-in-time システムから just-in-case システムへの転換）
サプライチェーンの多元化、短縮化
消費地生産・地産地消
特注部品から汎用部品への転換
モノの取引からデータの取引への転換
労働節約型技術の導入（例、ロボットの導入）
政府の対応
輸入への依存度の低下：国内生産の推進
望ましい政府の対応
サプライチェーン多元化・多様化への支援（情報提供など）円滑な経済活動の支援
ルールに基づく自由で開かれた貿易・投資・デジタル環境の整備
RCEP、TPP11、日 EU・EPA、WTO 改革の推進
IT 技術の効率的活用を可能にする技術支援
２）RCEP の成果と課題
成果
貿易自由化（特に累積原産地ルールの導入）
投資：技術移転要求の禁止など
知的財産：悪意の商標出願の拒絶・取り消し権限など
政府調達：手続きの透明性の確保など

課題
より高度な自由化の実現（財、サービス、投資、データなど）
加盟メンバーの拡大
途上メンバーに対する経済協力の実施
環境分野の対応
補助金への対応136

８．活動と成果
1．活動
日中韓のダイアログは、この三ヵ国がひざを突き合わせて東アジアと激動する世界情勢について如何に協力し、不確実性の高い社会を乗り越えていくことができるのかを探る格好の機会と位置付けられる。
財団では米国、欧州、ASEAN＋６と、それぞれの産官学で政策対話を行うフォーラムを開催して来たが、そうした中で韓国や中国の参加者との議論を積み重ねた結果、互いの抱える共通課題をもっと幅広く、専門家や異世代を入れて議論する必要性が認識された。その実現から今回の開催で 7 回目を迎える。昨年度の東京開催に続き、２０２０年度も実地開催を検討したが、コロナウイルスの感染状況拡大によりオンライン開催となった。
各国が抱える国内の課題が、近隣国との関係にも及ぶ近年の北東アジア関係は、関連する
世界全体の社会経済情勢とも絡んで更に複雑化している。こうした時代には自国中心的にならず、知識と専門性を持ち世代を超しての議論の場が不可欠である。
日中韓三ヵ国は、歴史的にも多面的にも繋がりが深いが、時に政治・経済的に難しい状況にもなることから、常時対話ができる関係を続けることが重要だと確認された。我々は、これまで以上に自由貿易の維持と拡大を進める努力をし、コロナとの共生を強いられる今後も、技術革新を加速すると同時に取り残される人々、環境問題と経済発展の矛盾、先進国と開発途上国との間に生じる差など、加速する変化に迅速に適応するための対応策を立てていかなくてはならない。少子高齢化の進行など、長期的な戦略が必要となる共通課題にも対処が必要である。
自国の成長を高めるには、国内の生活、社会、産業に与える負の影響に対する政策を立て、構造改革を進めて、国内格差を是正した包括的な成長の探求が求められるが、このダイアロ
グでは、それぞれの共通課題への取り組みを進めると同時に、三ヵ国の究極の目的として同地域の安定と発展に貢献することを確かめた。
本ダイアログは、１１月２５日(水)１０:３０～１６:３０で行われ、冒頭の各国機関代表の開会挨拶に続き、日韓の特別挨拶を行った。その後、三か国のスピーカーによる以下 4 つのセッションを実施した。以下は参加パネリストたちの発言要旨。
（１）セッション１：パンデミックの見通しと三国間協力（キーワード）コロナウィルスの現状、見通し、治療方法、予防、ワクチン開発、研究開発、公的及び私的協力について〇日中韓でコロナ・ワクチン供給センターを作ることを提案する。これにより、三か国は協力関係の下でのワクチン配布の対話をすることが可能になる。また、QR コードによる健康証明ができればビジネス・チャンネルを開き続けることもできる。
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〇我々は RCEP の活用を加速させ、日中韓 FTA 交渉の実現をすべき。
〇日中韓協力計画は、サプライチェーンと製品や技術のバリューチェーンを安全に確保するため、高い専門性を持って立てられなくてはならない。
〇医療現場は治療の要否のため、感染テストの必要性を訴えるが、経済学者は感染の有無を識別したその情報に価値を見出している。
〇東アジア情勢を見ると、今後数年はコロナが居続けると考えた方がいい。ビジネスはそれに合わせた新しいビジネスモデルに順応していかねばならず、そのためには国際共通税導入などの国際的な協調が必要。
（２）セッション２：コロナ収束後の気候変動、グリーンエネルギー、環境産業
における三国間協力について（キーワード）気候変動とパンデミック、エネルギーポートフォリオ、グリーン産業の統合、水素燃料電池、コロナ禍の三国間協力パワーグリットシステム〇日中韓は環境問題においては一つの共同体。コロナの状況下で澄んだ大気が戻って来た
皮肉な状況の維持については今後も三者の共同歩調が必要。
〇再生可能エネルギー開発が進む中にあっても、非炭素化が難しい運輸業界は、国家の水素産業戦略の焦点になっている。２０５０年の世界水素市場は２０１８年の中国 GDP の
８７%になるという試算もあり、これは現在の世界石油・天然ガス市場の 3 倍に当たる。
〇気象変動とコロナウイルスの間には類似性がある。客観的分析の必要性、社会及び経済に顕著な変化を及ぼす解決策とそのための国際社会の協力、そしてしっかりとした財政負担が必要という点である。
（３）セッション３：コロナの経済的インパクト、回復戦略と高齢化に対する社会経済政策（キーワード）経済成長、雇用問題、財政金融政策、社会保障、高齢化に対する社会経済政
策、三国間シルバー経済協力〇日中韓の高齢者福祉、AI、高速通信網、環境保護分野における協力は産業協力チェーンを更に増強し、経済成長を達成させる。これらには多額の投資、熟練工と長いバリューチェー
ンが必要となることから、三ヵ国が協力し、産業構造を集中させて財源、技術、人材をシェアし、高い通商上の相互補完関係を築けば共に将来成長できる可能性が開かれる。地域外の市場でも協力関係を強くすべきであり、過去に高速通信網や高速鉄道で地域内企業が競争した結果、出た損失は相当なものだった。
〇高齢者のコロナによる社会活動からの隔離は、運動不足と認知能力低下につながっており、その解決にデジタル技術の積極的活用が必要になっている。一方、高齢者は健康管理に役立つデジタルデバイスが使いこなせず、管理機関に格納された情報は分散しており、総合
的に健康状態を見ることができない。情報をまとめるのは政府の仕事であり、正しいデータによって初めて健康管理ができる。
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〇高齢者は景気低迷による収入減に直面する可能性が高いため、三カ国の政府は経済刺激策を策定し、国家福祉を高めて就業の機会を提供すべき。企業間の投資を促進させる必要がある。
（４）セッション４：観光、FDI, FTA の地域性、コロナ収束後の観光（キーワード）地域サプライチェーン、在庫管理、デジタル貿易、ＦＤＩの三国間協力、障害、RCEP、CCPTT、三国間自由貿易、デジタル経済〇コロナ禍は世界の秩序を永遠に変えてしまうだろうと言われる。数多の諸国が外向きの戦略を立てた一方で、内向きに独立したり、反グローバリゼーション・モードになったが、日中韓協力は地域経済及びグローバル経済に一筋の光を当てることになるだろう。三カ国
は多国間主義への回帰に大きく貢献することができる。RCEP 締結は内見的戦略の逆をいくものであり、先進的 TPP 復活への努力も極めて重要。
〇バイデン政権下で米国の TPP 復活が想定される。参加国はこの１２カ国に限定せず、対象国を拡大すべき。時間はかかるだろうが、拡大 TPP と RCEP の融合について強調したい。但し、融合には自由化の度合い、関税引き下げ、非関税障壁を生む諸規制廃止を含めた
RCEP の質を TPP に合わせる必要がある。日中韓はここでも大きな役割を果たすことができる。三カ国が RCEP の枠組みを共有することは重要であり、２０１２年から続く三カ国の FTA への道が展開していくための手段にもなるだろう。
〇東アジア諸国は、同地域の分断と没落を生むことになるため、米中どちらの国にもついてはならない。これこそが、米中がアジア太平洋のパートナーとなることの明らかな重要性を高めている。
〇日本としては TPP と RCEP は締結済みなので、残る地域間の経済交渉は日中韓でのネットワークとなる。日中韓では FDI により既にグローバル・サプライチェーンを構築済みのため、サービスと投資レベルを増やしていく必要がある。食品及びエネルギー保障を組み入れ、三カ国間協力の共通アジェンダにすべく、考え方を変えていく必要がある。特に AI や
データは強調したい。データ関連ルールは FDI やサービス分野に不可欠であり、高齢化や環境問題解決のためには情報集積とそれに基づいた政策形成が肝要。消費者保護、サイバー
セキュリティ、プライバシー保護について適切な規制とガイドラインを策定しなくてはならない。
〇三カ国の関係は正直なところ、必ずしも良好ではなく数々の衝突が起きている。重要なことは相互の信頼を構築することである。
〇学会では公共財の基礎研究を一緒に行うべき。この分野で協力できなければ、どの国も行動を起こすことはできない。信頼構築には様々な異なる接点が必要であり、チャンネルは簡素化して政府間に限定するのではなく、世代・性別・地域を拡大して交流を行うべきである。
〇RCEP においても CPTTP でも、日本が中国の参加をサポートし、実務的な支援を行うことを期待する。
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〇日中韓は同じ海を共有しており、境界、領有権問題があることも確かだが、海洋科学研究と発展は喫緊の課題。資源の合理的な利用、環境保全、危機管理におけるパートナーシップが強化されなければならない。
〇コロナウイルスの蔓延で、企業は拡大・複雑化したサプライチェーンの簡素化をより効果的に行おうとしており、これは地域内生産と消費というリショアリングを暗示していることになる。また、人の往来や人を介する作業を最小限にすべく、ロボット化やデータによる貿易が行われるようになり、労働市場を混乱に陥らせている。将来的には感染病や自然災害、保護主義などが広がり、国際貿易システムにおいても不確実性が高まると予想される。ビジネス、政府においても適切な戦略を立てていく必要がある。RCEP は歴史的な締結を行ったが、我々は更に前進し、FTA を締結して世界の貿易システムを刷新していく必要がある。
〇コロナの状況は地域連合、特に多国間や二国間関係を構築する新しい機会をもたらした。
中国は日韓及び他の東アジア諸国との緊密な関係を強化すべく模索している。東アジアは米国の関心事に左右されて来たが、その圧力から解放され、地域の事項に注力すべき。東ア
ジア諸国間の協力はもっと高いレベルに引き上げられないとならない。
２．成果
これまでの実地開催と異なり、オンライン参加の聴衆からフィードバックを得ることは困難を極めた。来年度以降の改善策につなげたい。スピーカーからの意見は以下のとおり。
（１） 総合評価
・多くの有益な情報および意見を聞くことができた。
・中国や韓国のコロナ対策の現状や課題に関し生の声が聞け、意見交換することができた。
・タイムリーなテーマであり、発表者・発表内容とも充実していた。時間やオンラインの制
約もあり議論を十分深めることができなかった面がある。
・少し人数が多すぎ、論点が拡散気味となった。学会的内容と政策的議論が混じり、専門外の聴衆には理解しにくい発表もあった。
・時間が短い場合は資料の枚数を 1-2 枚に制限するなど、工夫も必要。
（２） 議論内容
・当該分野の専門家から話が聞けたが、発表者数が多く、議論の時間が十分なかったため、その多くが決められた時間を超過していた。
・各々がプロの研究者であり、短い時間でも発言内容が本質をついていた。
・コロナ禍、米国大統領選挙、日本の新政権発足など国際状況の変化の中で、タイムリーなテーマが取り上げられ、多角的な議論が展開された。
・それなりに中国の本音を垣間見ることができ、韓国の参加者の発表も政争と距離を置いていてよかった。
・リモートの利点は多々あるが、今回のダイアログは大半が一方的なスピーチとヒアリングとなり、リアルに意見交換できることの良さを改めて感じた。また、このダイアログの場が140

一時的、一方的な発表だけの場になってはいけない。この日を出発点として、その場で出された問題提起なり意見を取りまとめ、いかに 3 カ国三者で実現に近づけていくかがダイアログの役割ではないかと感じる。
（３） その他
・発表資料を入手したい。
・オンライン会議運営は技術的な面も含め改善が必要。
・公私ともに IT 化対応の遅れが露呈していた。日本は、本気で IT 化対応を図らねばならないと痛感。IT 先進国・韓国が幹事だったが、突発的なテクニカル・トラブルは残念だった。
これらのコメントを踏まえ、来年度以降はウェブ上でのアンケート実施など、回収率を上げる工夫とより良いシステムの構築に努めたい。

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９．CJK 共催団体紹介＜日本＞

一般財団法人国際経済交流財団／Japan Economic Foundation

The Japan Economic Foundation (JEF) was established in July 1981 to deepen
understanding between Japan and other countries through activities aimed at promoting
economic and technological exchange.
With this goal in mind, JEF engages in a broad range of activities such as providing
information about Japan and arranging venues for the exchange of ideas among opinion
leaders from many countries in such fields as industry, government, academia and politics
in order to build bridges for international communication and to break down the barriers
that make mutual understanding difficult.
URL: www.jef.or.jp＜中国＞

中国改革発展研究院／China Institute for Reform and Development

China Institute for Reform and Development (CIRD)，established on 1 November 1991,
is a public and non-profit research institution mainly specializing in reform anddevelopment policy research.
CIRD, with the mission of facilitating China’s economic reform and development policy
decision- making, follows the guideline of “basing its research activities in Hainan, facing
the whole country and marching towards the other parts of the world”.
CIRD practices a system of vesting the full responsibility with the president under theleadership of the board of directors and adheres to the operating mechanism
characterized with small organization with a large network. Its organizational features ofbeing network-based, international operations and independent research have attracted
wide attention.
URL: http://www.cird.org.cn/＜中国＞

中国公共外交協会／China Public Diplomacy Association

China Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA), established in March 2013 as a juridical
association with 64 founding members, is a nationwide non-profit organization
comprising experts and scholars, celebrities, and relevant institutions and enterprises in
the field of public diplomacy.

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Dedicated to providing professional consultation and coordination services, mobilizing
and coordinating social resources and making the best of people-to-people channels ininternational exchanges, CPDA strives to advance the development of China’s public
diplomacy, enhance mutual understanding and friendship between China and the rest of
the world, project to the world a positive image of China that is civilized, democratic,
open, and progressive, and create an international environment conducive to China’s
peaceful development.
URL: http://www.chinapda.org.cn/eng/＜韓国＞

東アジア財団／East Asia Foundation

The East Asia Foundation was established as an independent, non-profit organization topromote peace and prosperity in East Asia through human and knowledge networks.
East Asia has been facing new challenges and tasks under the rapidly-changing
environment of the 21st century international orders where conflicts and cooperationintertwine such as the continuing Cold-War structure of security orders and deepening
economic interdependence, and the establishment of nation-states and increasing global
exchanges and cooperation. The most important tasks to successfully manage conflicts
and promote regional prosperity in the region are to boost mutual understanding
between countries and establishing appropriate policies for joint control and settlementof conflicts.
Accordingly, the East Asia Foundation strives to realize these needs by providing an open
forum for knowledge-sharing and hopes to aid the formation of a co-operative regional
identity by supporting the exchange of ideas and policy know-how through humaninteraction.
URL：http://www.keaf.org/

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１0．事務局（日本側）
一般財団法人国際経済交流財団／Japan Economic Foundation （JEF）
住所：〒104-0061 東京都中央区銀座 3-7-3 銀座オーミビル５階
TEL： 03-6263-1517
FAX： 03-6263-2513
Email：gyoumu@jef.or.jp
担当： 業務部長
業務部

石井 淳子
永川 美佳
木村 晶子

（中国側）
中国改革発展研究院／China Institute for Reform and Development(CIRD)
住所： 1 East 4th Changbin Street, Xiuying District, Haikou 570311,Hainan, China
TEL： +86-898-61180000
FAX： +86-898-66258777
Email: cie@cird.org.cn
担当： He Dongni, Vice President and Associate Research Fellow
Zhong Yinman（韓国側）
東アジア財団／East Asia Foundation
住所： 4th FL, 116 Pirundae-ro, Jongno-ku, Seoul, Korea 03035
TEL： +82-2-325-2604~6
FAX： +82-2-325-2898
Email: mail@keaf.org
担当： KANG Chan-koo, Senior Program Officer

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