Global Leadership Training Programme in Africa 20162014
Activity Report of Field Research

Industrial Conciliation between Multi-Racial Trade Union and the Apartheid Government:
A study of the Food and Canning Workers Union in 1950s Western Cape

Atsuko Munemura
Affiliation in Japan: Ph.d Student, School of Economics, Kansai University
Host University: the University of Cape Town, South Africa
Research Period:<A Note of Caution >The objective of this report is NOT to publish as “a research paper” but as “an activity report” to show and sharewhat you experienced and learnt from field research activities through the GLTP. The report consists of three mainparts as below;
I. Summary
II. Research Activity
III. Reflection to GLTP

＜Outline＞
Ⅰ Summary
Ⅱ Research Activity
1. Introduction
2. Study Area
3. Research Method/ Main Materials
4. Research Findings
5. Discussion
6. Conclusion
Ⅲ Reflection to GLTP
Ⅳ Acknowledgement

1

Ⅰ. Summary
English Abstract
In South African Labour History, the industrial conciliation has been carefully examined on how non European(i.e. African, Coloured, and Indian under the legal classification in the period 1948-1994) workers could
proceed their industrial citizenship.1 From the 1930s to 1940s, non- European workers tried to get involved in
trade and industrial union dominated by white skilled workers. They were expected to set up raciallysegregated unions in order not to threat the white dominance in trade unions. The 1950s is generally seen as adecade of mass movements as well as the decline of labour campaign after the 1946 suppression. However, thefact that some of them succeeded in becoming eligible for industrial conciliation is rarely highlighted.
This study explores these exceptional cases, focusing in particular on a series of industrial conciliations of
the Food and Canning Workers Union (FCWU) in the 1950s. My field work was designed to illustrate achanging relationship between the Department of Labour (DL), the police service, employers, the trade unionand ordinary workers and examine how it resulted in a number of cases of labour negotiations. Since the 1956
amendment of the Industrial Conciliation Act prohibited all gatherings of multi-racial trade unions, labour
negotiations of multi-racial trade unions were threatened by the segregation policy of Apartheid government.
Nevertheless FCWU exceptionally reached 28 industrial conciliations during the 1950s. DL mostly accepted
settlements of industrial conciliations between FCWU and employers some of which were not necessarily
positive to agree with. This led me to examine why the DL played a key role in facilitating these conciliations
through compulsory arbitrations to persuade employers.
The previous studies on industrial conciliation of non-European workers have analyzed how it washampered due to interconnection among trade unions and labour structures in factories. They focus less on the
dynamic relationships between unorganized workers and trade unions, mutual influence between mass andlabour movement.2 The promotion of industrial conciliations was likely to be the way that FCWU, employing
about 9000 workers, increased the number of unorganized employees of food preserving factories through thepromotion of industrial conciliations in the1950s. My fieldwork involved case studies on the transition of
employer-employee relationship revolving around FCWU, with a particular interest in interrelations between
unorganized workers’ strikes and labour management negotiations during this period.

日本語要旨
産業調停制度は南アフリカでは現在まで、産業市民権がこれまで認められなかった非白人労働者（1948 年以降の区分では、アフリカ人、カラード、アジア人にあたる）にどの程度開かれたかを測る制度として、労働史家たちに注視されてきた。1930〜40 年代には非白人労働者が製造業部門に進出し、白人熟練職人によって占められていた労働組合に加わろうとした。その試みは第二次世
界大戦の終了後「白人の労働組合を脅かさない」よう組合を分離するという条件つきでで認められた。そうした背景から 1950 年代のアパルトヘイト抵抗史では大衆運動の興隆と対照的に労働運動
1

N. Nattrass and J. Seekings, “Citizenship and Welfare in South Africa: Deracialisation and Inequality in a Labour
Surplus Economy”, Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2013, p. 453.
2
J. Lewis, Industrialization and Trade Union Organization in South Africa 1924-55: The Rise and Fall of South
African Trade and Labour Council, Cambridge, 1984: E. Webster, Cast in Racial Mould: Labour Process andTrade Unionism in the Foundries, Johannesburg, 1985.

2

が沈滞していったことが強調されているが、産業調停制度が非白人労働者にも利用できた例は見過ごされてきた。本研究では、労働運動と大衆（本研究では unorganized worker とする）の接点で産業調停が利用されてきた例外として、1950 年代の「食品缶詰労働組合（Food and Canning Workers
Union, 本稿では FCWU）」を取り上げたい。具体的には政府、それも労働省と警察、雇用主と労働組合、そして大衆の関係が産業調停を通じていかに変化し、労使交渉制度を形成していったのかを明らかにする。
1956 年の産業調停法の改定まで、非白人労働者たちの労働組合（場合によっては白人労働者も含む多人種で構成された労働組合、本稿では multi-racial trade union とする）は労働省による恣意的な分離政策によって労使交渉を脅かされていた。ところがそのような状況下でも産業調停の実績は皆無ではなく、FCWU には 28 件もの産業調停の記録が残っている。驚くべきことに労働省はそれらの産業調停の申請をほとんど受理しており、時には強制的な介入手段を用いて産業調停に消極的な雇用主を労使交渉の場に促していた。
この調査では、そのような産業調停が成立する条件を考察するために、労働組合と組織化されていない労働者との関係、つまり大衆と労働運動の関係を横断的に捉えようとした。これまでは非白人労働者の産業調停は労働組合間の関係や労働力構成による影響からどのように制限されてきたかに焦点が当てられてきたのに対し、本研究では逆にどのような労労関係、ないしは労使関係の中で産業調停が成立していたのかを考察対象とする。
FCWU に関して言えば、この組合に多い時では 9000 人もの労働者が登録されていたものの、工場職員の全てが組織化されることは一度もなかった。このような悩みを抱えていた FCWU では
1950

年代を通じて、産業調停を広めることが労働組合の組織率をあげる実直な手段になっていた。

本研究では FCWU の産業調停のケーススタディをあげることで、具体的には労使交渉とストライキとの相互関係から労使関係がどのような変節を遂げたのかを詳細にしようとした。

Ⅱ. Research Activity

1. Introduction
The system of industrial conciliation in pre-1994 South Africa is usually analyzed in line with its raciallydiscriminatory character and recognized as a means of enabling European minorities to dominate trade unions.
According to R. Davies, its racial colour bar was the way to divide radical trade unionism since the First World
War, making the right of collective bargaining an exclusive right for European organized workers.3 In the
1920s, when the police saw frequent strikes of White workers who were called on to by European activist andtrade unionism, the government introduced some types of collective bargaining machineries, in order to calm
down their armed protest.4 Davies argued that their privileged right of industrial conciliation divided growing
labout movement to make white-dominated trade and industrial unions as a counter for other industrial unionsin 1930s. In contrast to this view, non-European workers were actually allowed to participate in multi-racial
3

R.H. Davies, Capital, State, and White Labour in South Africa, 1900-1960: A History of Materialist Analysis ofClass Formation and Class Relations, London: Birhgton, 1979.
4
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, and Wage Act of 1926.

3

unions called as “Mixed Unions,” and given the right of industrial conciliation as well if they segregatedAfrican workers from their organization in 1946.
How did these mixed unions practice this right? During the Second World War, the Food and Canning
Workers Union, or FCWU, called workers for effort to product combat ratio, and became eager for wage
negotiation before its registration of 1946. In Davies’s view, its segregation and attitude were manifestation of“cooperatism.” His Weberian interpretation of the role of government under capitalism regards a legally
protected right of protest and collective bargaining as a unilateral controlling power given by the government.
However, the recent studies on the political process theory have begun to deny this power distribution
approach, arguing that open political systems are generally more tolerant to protests5. Of them, Duncun
reconsiders the role of activists as an agency of a “structure” in which the government, the police, andprotesters restrain and affect each other. One of three powers, protest itself facilitates the whole activities ofmass objection, so that it can maintain the criticism toward decision makers, which consequently minimize thecost of governance for the police and government. Meanwhile, protesters could put pressure on decision
makers, so that a more tolerant approach is adopted. It is assumed that a fear of losing political power makes
decision makers attempt to respond appropriately. Duncan sums up the legal right of protest and protest,
arguing that “structures are dynamic and can change interaction with activist agency.” 6
Although the political situation between the 1950s and post-1994 South Africa is quite different, theDuncun’s view on protests sheds light on interaction between the Department of Labour (DL) and FCWU andmore local organizations of protest. Revisiting the rich documents regarding a series of events from aperspective of an agency between protests and the government, this research explores the ways that thepolitical spaces of collective bargaining for mixed unions were set up and narrowed in this decade. I focus onfour facts: admission of right of negotiation allowed DL to deal with the oppression of protests; employers had
to follow DL’s instruction as a consequence of Industrial Conciliation (IC) Boards; the negotiation did not only
strengthen the protest of unorganized workers, but also control a hostile way of appeal including vandalism;
DL struggled to scale down such power of collective bargaining with denying FCWU as a represent of workers.
This study demonstrates how repeating IC Boards of FCWU affected the relationship between the DL,
employers and employees through the 1950s.

2. Study Area
In South Western Cape, on which my fieldwork focused, a variety of fruits, including peaches, pears, apricots,
can be harvested. Hence, the fruit and vegetable canning industries have developed since the 1930s. By the
1950s, more than 30 canning and dried fruit companies set up their factories in this area as shown in Figure 1,
and temporary workers, called seasonal workers, have been employed for fruit farming in every shortharvesting season of May.
I visited the National Archives of Repository of Cape Town, National Library of South Africa in CapeTown, and National Archive of Pretoria, Pretoria and examined various documents of FCWU, DL and police
services. In terms of document of FCWU’s archives, I made use of special collections compiled by the
University of Cape Town where I worked through the fieldwork.
5
6

For example, D. Della Porta, “The Policing of Protest”, African Studies, No. 56, Vol. 1, 1997, pp. 97-127.
J. Duncan, Protest Nation: The Right of Protest in South Africa, Pietermaritzburg: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal
Press, 2016, pp. 24- 35.

4

Figure1 Fruits and Vegetable Canning Factories in South Western Cape

Picture1 A Landscape of Elgin where Fruits Packing Factory is located

3. Research Method/ Main Materials
How did Mixed Unions promote the use of an IC Board as a practical way of collective bargaining? In the caseof FCWU, the most participants lived in rural areas where each canning factory was dispersed, and someregularly came from farms to factories to work. As FCWU’s for education of them, most workers did not knowwhat an IC Board meant and how they could use it. The consideration of FCWU’s role as an agency is needed
to make clear on how the union kept in touch with these unorganized workers and led them to sit down at thelegal bargaining tables.

5

My fieldwork was designed to answer the three questions. What situation did enable FCWU to use frequentindustrial conciliations? When did they happen? How did FCWU respond to such a situation by making use ofand sometimes repressing strikes? I gathered a number of documents regarding strikes as well as records ofindustrial conciliations. The collected archives were explored to clarify a number of strikes and industrial
conciliations chronologically, and to discuss links between these events and social circumstances. The dynamic
relationship of various actors revolving around strikes and industrial conciliations were taken into account.
The documents I gathered are of FCWU, DL and police services, allowing me to illustrate complex,
delicate process of negotiation for industrial conciliations. One of them was FCWU’s publication, Simons’Collection, which is part of the special collections of the University of of Cape Town, where I worked closelywith my local supervisor. It includes the records of FCWU’s Central Executive Committee temporarily held atCape Town, describing that its participants from local branches reported their achievements, problems andsequences of strikes. The exploration of their voices enabled me to elucidate how strikes happened andexpanded to rural areas.
A set of police records regarding the 1954 strike were collected at the National Archive of Pretoria therelevant articles of Simon’s Collection, which mirrored FCWU’s point of view. I examined the relationships
between DL, the police and FCWU. The other strikes were revealed through the exploration of Simons’Collection and DL’s file on IC Boards available at Pretoria. The files mainly include recorded conversations ofdelegates from employers and FCWU, and the reports of IC Board are usually settled in Capet Town andPretoria. A DL inspector, who was initially settled for every Magistrate District, played a role as a mediator of
every IC Board reporting the result of its dispute to his boss, the Secretary for Labour in Pretoria. Therefore,
these reports allowed me to examine for what IC Boards were settled, who participated in their negotiations
from employers and FCWU, and how DL dealt with claims of both when strikes happened. As well as lettersfrom employers and FCWU, the above DL documents indicate what complaints still remained after the wage
determinations of IC Boards.

4. Research Findings
4-1. IC Board system and the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act
While the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act allowed DL-registered trade unions to negotiate with theiremployers, it had prevented Coloured, African workers from participating in trade and industrial unions
acknowledged by DL. After the Second World War, DL admitted the registration of multi-racial trade unions
consisted of Colourd and African workers, enabling them to get involved in the management of these unions.
FCWU was one of its examples, registered in 1946. In accordance with DL’s instruction, African Food andCanning Workers Union was originally separated from the main organization of FCWU. The change of DL
policy made this union become the pioneer in using new systems for labour negotiations.
Before the IC Boards system was established the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act provided a wage board
for unorganized workers and unregistered union instead of IC Board. Throughout the 1940s, FCWU’s
negotiations relied upon the wage board system to appeal for a pay rise as well as the need to improvement ofworking conditions. Under this system, DL was allowed to conduct factory inspection and make a coercive
wage determination. Meanwhile, workers’ objection against DL’s determination was not accepted, and theirapplications were often refused due to its discretion. Since 1946, FCWU tried to make use of the IC Board

6

system, continuously taking advantage of the wage board. If its IC board application was declined, it focusedon wage issue and appeal to the wage board system.
When FCWU used the IC Board system for the first time in 1946, it combined this application with strike.
In this case, FCWU initially applied the wage board for claiming reconsideration of its determinations madeduring the Second World War. Since its claim was refused, FCWU stepped into a strike action at 6 factories of
5 companies. Although the protest was immediately suppressed, FCWU made tactical use of this confusionand succeeded in encouraging their employers to make concession on their wage without DL mediation in 5days. The strike involved as many as 800 workers, including ones mobilized from other factories as well as
scabs. The Cape Province Federation of Labour Union (CPLFU), a DL-registered alliance of industrial union
cooperating with FCWU, had a close association with the ex-minister of Labour, telling him that “wagedetermination in the fruit processing industry will be in the hands of workers’ representative for anotherseveral weeks.” Immediately FCWU signed the gentleman’s agreement with employers, the Secretary forLabour, directed the police to call its wage inspector prior to suppressing the strikes.

4-2. IC Boards Applications and Strikes, 1946-1958
Table1 Number of IC Boards and Strikes
The Number of IC BoardYear

Vs Single
CompanyVs Multiple
Companies

IC Board
Failured

Agreement Failured

Strike

1945
1947

1
2

0
0

1
2

0
0

1

1

1

1

1948
1949

0
0

0
0

0
0

3

0

0

1

0

1

1950

2

1

1

2

0

1951
1952

4
0

3
0

1
0

1
1
0

0
0

0
1

1953

2

1

1

1

0

5

1954

4

3

1

1

2

1955

1

1

0

0
3

0

1

1956
1958

1
1

0
0

1
1

0
0

1

0

1

0

Sum

18

9

9

10

7

12

Table 1 shows the numbers of strike, IC Boards and cases dismissed between 1946 and 1958.7 18 out of 28
applications were succeeded to reaching IC Boards during this period were held 18 times from 1946-1958. The
case of “Vs. Multiple Companies” included both negotiations with particular several companies and entire
food preserving industry. “IC Boards Failure” means the cases where employers’ refusal of participation in
negotiations led to DL’s arbitration in absence of delegates of employers. The IC Boards often saw the end ofnegotiation before reaching agreement. In these cases, FCWU lately attempted to appeal to a wage board or reapply for another IC Board.

7

Created by the author based on Department of Labour, ARB 1395/1052/439, 1421/1052/596, 1421/1052/597,
1428/1052/629, 1438/1052/675, 1438/1052/679,1439/1052/679,1440/1052/696, 1462/1052/8138, 1465/1052/839,
1465/1052/839, 1467/1052/868, 1469/1052/878, 1476/1052/916, 1476/1052/918, 1478/1052/939, 1486/1052/1001,
1493/1052/1049, 1493/1052/1051, 1493/1052/1050, 1500/1052/1103, 1506/1052/1126, 1506/1052/1131,
1508/1052/1145, 1512/1052/1163, 1491/1052/1033, 1512/1052/1163/2, National Archives of Pretoria.

7The IC Board application in this period can be classified into 3 based on the different terms andcharacteristics as follows.

(a) 1946-1951
This term saw FCWU’s attempts to annually apply for IC Boards after the 1946 Great Strike. A series of theapplications involved 2 small strikes.

(b) 1952-1954
FCWU’s founder and general secretary Ray Alexander was banned from her involvement in any of its
activities and finally expelled from South Africa under the Communist Suppressions Act of 1953. Despite this,FCWU continued to take advantage of the right to IC Board application. The peak of the applications in
number was seen in 1954. During the two years from 1952, FCWU got actively involved in strikes.

(c) 1954-1958
In this period, FCWU seems to have found it difficult to appeal to IC Boards, because it was unlikely to berecognized as the representative of factory workers. In fact, the percentage of unionized labours was at most 87
percent on average, and it dropped below 50 percent in large factories. This began to make DL decline
applications for IC Boards.

4-3. Strikes
While FCWU obtained the right to apply for an IC Boards, a strike continued to be a popular means of claim
after 1946. This field trip to South Africa allowed me to classify the post-1946 protests into 3 types according
to their causes and how FCWU was involved in.

(a) Tactical Strike (1946)
The 1946 Strike was the only tactical action to which FCWU had led ever. FCWU launched the large-scaled
strike in 3 days after the wage board was failed. DL, which did not expect such a response, urged the police to
avoid taking the same approach to suppression.
Meanwhile, FCWU involved scabs in different factories, to worsen the shortage of labours during thebusiest season. This intended to encourage their employers to accept the gentlemen’ agreement on wage
determination. In 1943, FCWU once achieved an agreement with some of employers, but the wage
determination toward the whole canning industry was neglected. Then, DL immediately was forced to re-open
the bargaining table between FCWU and employees.

(b) Impulsive Strike (1947, 1949, 1952, 1953, 1954)
There were impulsive strikes by both organized and unorganized workers, including various actions involving
walk-out, singing and vandalism. These types of protest were initially led by a few workers with complaints
about wage and unfair dismissal, and raised through FCWU’s involvement. When a protest started, FCWU
members of local branch collected information from factory workers and then informed its other local branches.
At the same time FCWU worked for DL and employers as a mediator with these workers. Having a survey for8their claims, FCWU negotiated with employers to restore the workers who were dismissed because of theirrefusal at a work place.
When its negotiation came to a standstill, FCWU was actively involved in a walk-out action. For example,
in the Wolseley strike originally held by 9 workers in 1954, FCWU gathered more participants walking aroundthe town.8 It coped with the employers interruption involving the use of scabs by unionizing them immediately.
Indeed this type of strike enabled FCWU to increase the number of unionized workers.
The 1953 strike at Worcester was exceptional. Immediately the settlement of it was likely to be promotedby the IC Board, FCWU suppressed vandalism caused by small group of Nyasaland workers. In fact, FCWU’sleader visited the site and called the police up to settle down amid the negotiation between them and employers.
It cooperated with the police to disperse these violent demonstrators and search their houses for arms including
explosives. This incident manifested FCWU’s flexible attitude. While it often took advantage of strike actions,cooperation with the police to oppress the mayhem was also a means to achieve its purpose.9(c) Political Strike (1953)
Since the Communist Suppressions Act of 1953 was enforced, political leaders of the African National
Congress (ANC), South African Indian Congress and African People’s Organization were banned to havedirect contact with trade unions. Some members of FCWU were also arrested and its founder Ray Alexander
was expelled from South Africa. This resulted in a nationwide general strike led by the Peoples’ Charter
Conference, in association with ANC and South African Communist Party. FCWU mobilized protesters via theSouth African Communist Party to have a strike in several canning factories in Mossel Bay.
In 1953, 4 out of 5 strikes were concerned to this general strike. The core issue of these strikes was on theamendment of criminal law (Swartz Bill) aiming at reviving a whipping punishment. The proposers, ANC andSouth African Indian Congressl and African People’s Organization promoted the general strikes, including
May Day. The involvement of FCWU led to an antipathy of the main stream of Labour Movement, Trade
Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) until 1956, when FCWU got independent from TUCSA due to theconfrontation on the amendment of the Industrial Conciliations Act. “Political Strike” literally implies defiant
actions towards a series of arrests, and labour movements began to refrain from oppositions towards DL.

8

R. Goode, “Wolseley’s Great Strike”, in W.G. James and M. Simons, Class, Caste and Colour: A Social andEconomic History of South African Western Cape, Cape Town: Transaction Publications, 1994, pp. 111-127.
9
Police Record SAP/519

9

4-4. Relation between Negotiations and Strikes

Figure2 Types of Protest and Their Relations with FCWU in the 1950s
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the types of strikes, labour negotiations and IC Boards. The
horizontal axis shows the level of FCWU’s intervention, indicating how it was intentionally involved inworkers’ actions. The vertical one represents the scale of them.
It is considered that factory committees played a key role in bringing cases of IC Boards. They were groups
of workers who often refused to go back to their works after their lunch, and sang a song involving complaints
about wage. These gathering were called factory committees or strike committees, and the workers involved inthis type of independent action were strategically controlled by local branches of FCWU. It attempted tounionize them for appeal to an IC Board, urging them to claim for dismissals as well as poor ill treatments attheir work places. These activities were reported to the annual meeting of the FCWU’s central committee as
achievements of its local branches.
Strikes led to industrial conciliations, and vice versa. Except the tactical strike of 1946 previously
explained, FCWU launched strikes to protest against employers refusing negotiation. One of the examples was
the 1954 Wolsely strike, which stemmed from a walk out led by a few workers. A planned IC Board
negotiation with their employer was suspended, because he suspected FCWU was suspected of fueling the
walk- out. In order to object to employers’ refusal of IC Board, FCWU decided to cooperate with the walk-out.
As its participant, seasonal workers initially came from farms, the protest expanded not only to other factory
but also to farms. At that time, the employer attempted to bring the picked fruits to other factories in order tocarry on producing cans to meet the quota in a short harvest season, but Wolseley seasonal workers informed
other factory workers “not to touch the fruit from Wolseley” one after another. Consequently, the employer
was forced to response to FCWU requirement to reopen the IC Board, and during the negotiation the factory
manager was forced to resign in response a determination of the employers’ association, Deciduous Fruit
Board.

10

5. Discussion
5-1. Control of Impulsive Strikes
Did the IC Board system have an effect of controlling strikes by unorganized workers?
Since the 1954 strike at Worcester involving vandalism, FCWU attempted to control protest activities byorganizing and unionizing workers. For example, weekly mobile study classes were arranged in order toeducate unorganized workers. The class travelled among the local branches, and its participants were gatheredat bus stops, civic halls and gyms of junior high schools. The members of FCWU’s central committee as wellas guest speakers from other trade unions were invited to speak about the effectiveness of the IC Board system
and instructed how to read pay slips, calculate wages, and so on.
The attendances of this instruction were expected to become the next generation of union leaders. Such a
FCWU’s intention reflected on the contents of the mobile classes, ranging from primary education to how tomanage its local branch. The number of workers participating in this class reached to 400 at most. In FCWU’sview, the IC Board system replaced an impulsive strike and was the alternative and civilized way of appeal.
It can be thought that FCWU’s effort to control impulsive strikes was attributed to difficulties that it
experienced in claiming dismissals to employers and DL in IC Boards. Most seasonal workers, who lived in
temporary accommodations and shacks in farms, had a verbal contract for work at the same factory in every 2
weeks of every harvest season. This enabled employers to discharge them easily if they led to strike actions.
DL declined claims for unfair dismissal, arguing that seasonal workers would be hired by same factory in next
harvest season even if once disposed. FCWU struggled to deal with dismissed seasonal workers, andsometimes had to seek jobs for them.

5-2. Wage Negotiation Outcome
Did FCWU succeed in appeal at IC Boards? Criteria of success is not necessarily clear, still its negotiations
could be examined in terms of how it contributed to unorganized workers.
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, there were 4 case (in 1941, 1951, 1954, 1956) which were the outcomesof the FCWU’s negotiations at wage boards and IC Boards. When it achieved the first wage determination in
1941, factory workers were assessed and roughly categorized into 4 grades based on their skills as well as
experience. Seasonal workers were completely excluded from this assessment system. Since FCWU succeededin making DL modify the grading scale of factory workers in 1951, seasonal workers were gradually
recognized and assessed according to how many times they were engaged in factory jobs. This skill assessment
had much to do with their wages. The more they had experienced of working at the same factories, the higher
their rate of pay were.
However, the result of FCWU’s wage negotiation in1956 was even worse than the case of 1941, 1951, and1954, creating a wage gap due to the introduction of assessment of distance from Capet Town. In 1951, DL’s
grading system made a difference between the Magistrate Districts of Cape and that of Montague. After the IC
Board of 1954 was closed, the criteria for assessment become more diverse in Montague Magistrate District,varying according to its areas (see Figure 1): Wellington, Paarl, Worcester, Stellenbosch, Groot Drankenstein,
Robertson, Montagu, Grabouw and so on. The rates of pay in these areas were entirely lowered than the11standard wages in Cape Town. As their gender, ages, skills and locations of factories become parts of thecriteria for grading, FCWU began to experience complexity in wage negotiations for seasonal workers. In
1956, DL finally defined a certain level of seasonal works uniformly as “Grade5” deleting a category of theothers from its grading system.

5-3 Segregation of Multi-racial Trade Union since 1956
Since the Group Areas Act of 1952 was enforced, the rural municipalities of Worcester and Wellington applied
its racial-segregation policy to control of factories as well as residents, including canning workers. At several
factories, the practice of employing seasonal workers in units of families was broken up, and some veteranmembers of FCWU were expelled from factories. This caused a constant shortage of labour who could takepart in gathering of its factory committee.
Furthermore, the amendment of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 had a huge impact on the
management of FCWU’s Central Executive Committee and local branches. This new act prohibited all tradeand industrial unions to get together with other race members, including the White. Their organizations wereforced to separate into differential racial branches. Its local meetings were interrupted by this racial segregation
policy because its cooperation with African Food and canning Workers Union was against to the law.
While FCWU was opposed to the amendment of the 1956 act in labour movement, it became isolated fromother giant white unions of racially white workers, which were threatened by semi-skilled cheap labourers
dominated with Non-European workers10. In 1956, the Trade Union Council of South Africa, the biggest
alliance of trade and industrial unions decided to expel all African union members. In response to this, FCWU
declared independence with other 11 African Unions and launched a new labour movement, South Africa
Trade Union Council11. As core members of FCWU were arrested under the 1953 Communist Suppressions
Act and the Native Labour (Disputes) Act, its Central Executive Committee decreased in number and becameless active. The number of IC Boards applications also declined in 1954 onward, because, as previously
mentioned, DL began to deny FCWU’s legitimacy as the “representative of factory workers.”
Therefore, FCWU’s negotiation was forced to proceed under the unfavourable law on industrial
conciliation. Meanwhile the number of its local branches, including Natal, Pretoria, and Johannesburg
branches, grew from 14 to 22 by 1956, and they were recognized as the national unions for the first time. This
led implicitly to a fundamental contradiction in ideology, and was in contrast to a segregation policy
underlying the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act.

10This nuance was response to the second amendment of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1953, which abolishedthe registration of African trade and industrial unions which participated in multi-racial trade and industrial unions
and diluted them into government manufactured Workers Committees. N. Nattrass and J. Seekings, “Citizenshipand Welfare in South Africa”, pp. 461-462.
11
R. Lamberts, “SACTU and the Industrial Conciliation Act”, South African Labour Bulletin, vol. 8, no. 6, 1983, p.
28.

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5-4 Recession to Gentleman’s Agreement
The last IC Board was held in 1958, including negotiation with 11 employers of 26 factories. While somemembers of FCWU’s Central Executive Committee and their proxies were repeatedly arrested and discharged、
several local branches supplemented the management of its central organization. It was involved the IC Board
application for a year, but ended up with failure because of its lack of “representatives”. There was no
likelihood of legal negotiation amid political circumstances where DL finally arrested the delegate to theplaned IC Board from FCWU.
In response to advice from ANC, FCWU initially tried to achieve the wage increase of labour recognized as
low-skilled and the solution of overtime work issues by proposing a gentleman’s agreement. The employers
accepted part of its claims, particularly in terms of the grade of seasonal workers in Port Elizabeth, offering theexceptional wage-determination case promoted by DL to raise their status. However, as the IC Board started,
they imposed an additional condition that lowered minimum wage except for Port Elizabeth as its bargaining
point. In fact, FCWU was forced to take part in such unfavourable negotiations for the first time. Finally nowage determination was made by DL, and its hope of achieving the highest wages for seasonal workers in the
post-war period was extinct.

6. Conclusion
In the 1950s, FCWU made full use of the IC Board system, for unionizing unorganized factory workers andmanipulating voluntary gatherings, called “factory committees,” via its local branches. That was because it
constantly needed to be recognized from DL as the delegate of seasonal workers for applying IC Board
application. These committees which temporarily caused impulsive strikes, raising FCWU complaints tonegotiate with employers. It played a role as a mediator between these unorganized workers and employers inbringing its negotiation into IC Boards. When employers hampered settlement of IC Boards, it cooperated with
impulsive strikes, recruiting scabs and unorganized seasonal workers in farms and factories. At the same time,
it worked together with the police to calm down impulsive strikes which could lead to a further mayhem. Oncea vandalism was caused by unknown workers rather than protesters, FCWU had to seek jobs for these workers
who were involved and dismissed by it. Therefore FCWU preferred negotiation at an IC Board to control
impulsive strikes.
Since 1953, FCWU actively educated workers in response to the enforcement of the Communist
Suppressions Act, and Native Labour (Dispute) Act, which prohibited leading members from access to its
activities. Its mobile study classes, involving participants from other unions were aimed at not only training its
existing members to become the future union leaders, but also promoting the effects of IC Boards among
unorganized workers. This was activity held at public spaces outside factories, and lectured them how to read
wage slips and calculate their salaries in order to attract them to legal negotiations.
The outcome off an industrial negotiation between FCWU and employers always depended on how FCWU
was linked with DL. In 1947, DL avoided to suppression of a strike which resulted in a gentleman’s agreement
without its mediation. In response to instructions by DL, employers were forced to take part in IC Boards. Ifthey refused, DL issued compulsory arbitration on wage determination. However, as a series of arrests of
FCWU’s core members hampered its management from1956 onward. DL began to deny the legitimacy of
FCWU as the representative of seasonal workers. At first, employers took a negative view of using the IC
Board system, but changed their attitude. Rather they began to offer an IC Boards to FCWU. The gentleman’s

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agreement, which had been initially FCWU’s means to make employers come to the bargaining table in 1947,
finally became beneficial for employers to enforce an undesirable premise to FCWU in 1958.
In 1956, DL amended the Industrial Conciliation Act, which enforced a vivid segregation policy on the
management of trade and industrial unions. Despite its objection to this amendment, FCWU opened new
branches in Johannesburg and Pretoria, and hoped to be designated as the national union. In short FCWU wasforced to accept this nightmarish registration of the Act, which was a danger to its legitimacy in politicalcircumstances where its leading members and co-operators were arrested and expelled.

Ⅲ.

Reflection on the Global Leadership Training Programme

I’ve visited University of Cape Town since 5 years ago for research about Food and Canning Workers Union,
and thanks to GLTP, I could proceed further research with multi-archival search and interviews for potential
study after my Ph. D thesis.
In University of Cape Town, I could read a rare collection compiled by the Leslie Library, thanks to Dr.
Divine Fuh. Also, I had a meeting with Dr. Lauren Palmer and Dr. Asanda Benya in the UCT. Especially Dr.
Palmer conducted me an interview with Professor Mary Simons, daughter of the founder of FCWU, Ray
Alexander Simons. Unfortunately I couldn’t see her because of our schedule, but I’m going to keep in touchwith her the next time. (Thanks to GLTP, I could get supervise from Dr. Fuh continuously for another
scholarship, Matsushita Konosuke Foundation for 11 months, since September 2016 to August 2017.)
During my stay for this 9 weeks, I could touched a lot of my friends, and one of them, Ms. Haji Kadhija
kindly answered my inquiry for interview about Apartheid period. She taught me about compulsory divorce on
her family same to experiences of Coloured canning workers in South Western Cape. After my Ph..d Thesis,
I’m going to visit ex-FCWU members Ms. Kadhija introduced me.

Ⅳ.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank United Nations University for giving innumerable supports for this long stay in South
Africa. Especially, Dr. Natsuko Imai and Dr. Miyamoto gave me kind instructions for writing research planand this report. Also, I would like to thank my Supervisor, Dr. Divine Fuh giving suggestive ideas forproceeding my research, as well as Dr. Lauren Palmer and Dr. Asanda Benya in University of Cape Town forkind advise. In addition, I sincerely appreciate to Ms. Haji Kadhija, telling her Apartheid experience in her
childhood seeing the documents I collected, and Mr. Butch Binnermann for helping translation of Afrikaans
documents. Without their help, I couldn’t approach rich police information about strikes.

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Picture2 Supper with My Housemates

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