冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )Report 5
Lee Woo-yeon (Naksungdae Institute of Economic Research Committee member)

The Migration, Mobilization, Working Environment, and Daily Lives of Korean Laborers at the
Sado Mines, 1940-1945: A Critique of the “Forced Mobilization” and “Forced Labor”
Arguments

1. How was the Korean Wartime Mobilization Carried Out?
South Korean and Japanese media reports and previous studies on Korean migration andmobilization to the Sado mines during the war have all been mere recapitulations of thesentiments expressed in Record of the Forced Mobilization of Koreans, published in 1965 by anon-professional, self-proclaimed “expert” researcher. The author was a teacher at the
Chongryon’s Korea University who made no attempt to hide the fact that his purpose inpublishing it was to prevent the restoration of diplomatic relations between South Korea andJapan. He argued that the process by which Koreans were brought to Japan was “slavery”－that
is, “forced mobilization”－and that in Japan, they were used in “slave labor”, or “forced labor”.
Koreans were mobilized across three stages: “recruitment”, “official mediation”, and“conscription”. Recruitment was precisely that; company representatives traveled to Korea,
where it was public knowledge among farmers that they had come to hire employees. “Official
mediation” differed from recruitment only in that the local police voluntarily provided
administrative support to recruiters dispatched from Japan, while “conscription” was legally
enforced (those who did not comply faced up to one year in prison and a fine of up to \1,000
JPY. To put this into perspective, the wholesale price of rice in Seoul between 1939-45 was\38-47 JPY per 1.8kg, according to the Historical Statistics of Korea Vol.2, p.822, 2018, editedby Kim Nak-nyeon, Park Ki-joo, Park Lee-taek, and Cha Myung-su). However, conscription
also entailed a lengthy series of legal procedures that took approximately an entire month; first,
a summons was issued to conscripts. Once they received this, they were then obliged to take a
medical examination, after which－if they were deemed medically fit－they finally reported for
duty at the designated place and time. Accounts from those who claim to have been whisked
away “while sleeping at home”, “while working in the fields”, or “forcibly mobilized” do notcomport with the facts. This misconception is believed to stem from the conflation of the “street
recruitment” that took place during the Korean War (coercive enlistment in front of schools, inhomes, and on the streets without an official summons) with the wartime mobilization undercolonial occupation.
Unlike the “recruitment” that took place from September 1939, the mobilization of Koreans54

冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )under “official mediation” from February 1942 was based on a 1940 “Labor Resources Survey”
by the Government-General of Korea. How the Korean authorities dealt with the mobilization
during this phase varied significantly, which manifested in an equally varied degree of“coercion”. The reason for this is that there was no law stipulating the methods by which
Koreans were to be mobilized or any punishment for those who failed to comply; labor divisionpersonnel from Japanese companies, the Government-general of Korea, and the local police
simply disseminated public information administratively to young Korean men and solicited or
coaxed them into applying.

2. A Case Study of Sado: Concerning wages
Even before the initiation of the Japanese government’s wartime labor mobilization in
September 1939 and the Sado mines’ subsequent recruitment of Koreans in line with this policy
in February 1940, migrant Korean workers who had come to Japan to earn money were already
employed at the mines. These more experienced workers would have served in the capacity ofmentors and directors for the wartime laborers. In a broad sense, from the perspective of thecorporate sector, mobilization was a means of addressing labor shortages (although the Japanese
government’s perspective may differ), while for Koreans, it was characterized by the movementof labor outside the Korean Peninsula or emigration. Considered in this light, the nature of thewartime migration of Koreans to Japan is contiguous with that of post-liberation migration.
As with other establishments, Korean workers at the Sado mines, including those recruitedunder conscription from September 1944, were paid wages on a regular basis. For both Koreans
and Japanese, compulsory savings, labor income tax, health insurance premiums, and pension
insurance were deducted from their salaries. With the exception of savings, these deductions
were not so large, and Koreans were free to decide whether to send the money to their families
in Korea or spend it locally. The most notable discrepancy between the Japanese and Koreans interms of deductions was the compulsory savings, but this was because, unlike Japanese workers,
many Koreans were single workers with no families, and they had a much greater capacity tosave than Japanese with families to support.
A comparison of the amount of money that the Sado mines did not－or could not－pay Koreans
which was deposited with the Legal Affairs Bureau (an average of \203 JPY per person, in thecase of the Sado mines) and the amount deposited by other Mitsubishi and Mitsui (anotherlarge conglomerate) affiliates with the monthly wages they paid around 1945 (an average ofover \100 JPY at the Sado mines) shows that the total amount was equivalent to one or twomonths' wages－a decidedly small sum. Firstly, for fugitives and those who returned to the55冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )peninsula immediately following the end of the war, the reimbursement of such an insignificant
amount of money was evidently not worth waiting for. Secondly, compared to the wages they
had received up to that point, the money deducted was a relatively small amount for theindividuals who decided not to pursue payment. Therefore, this deposited money cannot be
used as the basis for forced labor without compensation or for systematic and large-scale
exploitation.

3. The Case of Sado: Daily Life and Treatment
Koreans who came to Japan during the war, including those at the Sado mines, were better off
than the peasants who remained in Korea in terms of housing (the rent for both dormitories andhousing and use of communal facilities such as bathhouses were either free of charge or far
below market price), staple foods (including rice, wheat, and beans), and calorie intake. Just
before the end of the war, the menu and amount of food provided were the same for both
Korean and Japanese laborers. However, this resulted in a relative shortage of food since
Koreans were more voracious eaters than the Japanese. This shortage, in conjunction with thefact that condiments (pepper and garlic) were not provided, caused dissatisfaction among the
Koreans. When the distribution system was impacted by a poor harvest and the U.S. bombing
campaign in the final days of the war, Koreans faced the same hardships as the Japanese
wrought by food shortages. Henceforth, research systematically comparing the living standardsof Koreans who came to Japan with those of the farmers who remained in Korea will be
required.
More Koreans lived with their families at the Sado mines than in other mines that employedmobilized Koreans. It is speculated that the reason for this was that many Koreans came to
Japan as migrant workers and secured employment even before the labor mobilizationcommenced in 1939.
The higher number of casualties and severe injuries among Koreans compared to Japanese at
the Sado mines and other wartime worksites were not due to any particular racial discrimination
but merely a result of the coalescence of labor supply and demand at the workplaces. In otherwords, healthy, young and middle-aged Japanese men were drafted into the army (Japanese
troops overseas numbered 950,000 in 1937, 3.58 million in 1943, 5.4 million in 1944, and 7.34
million in 1945. By the end of the war, 60.9% of men aged 20-40 were enlisted in the military,and 2 million had died), the result of which was that young, healthy Koreans worked in the pits
in their stead.
In the case of the Sado mines, there were far fewer disputes than at other work sites; since the56冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )mobilization began in 1940, there were a total of three cases of group demonstrations by
Koreans. These incidents were due to insufficient provisions of food in the dormitories, therental cost of work equipment, and a “rescue” attempt of colleagues who were reported to thepolice for gambling.

4. Runaways are Not Evidence of Forced Labor
The percentage of Korean fugitives at the Sado mines was infinitely lower than at other sites.
This is believed to be because of the excellent treatment Koreans were afforded, the low risk ofaccidents compared to coal mines and the fact that many Koreans lived with their families.
Although many wartime mobilized workers fled, this was also the case even before the war. The
same was true on the Korean peninsula, and although the scale was much smaller than that of
Koreans, a significant number of Japanese laborers also abandoned their jobs.
These instances of desertion differ considerably from the allegations of the “forced labor theory”
and cannot be deemed “Korean dissent.”
Runaways simply sought to avoid working underground in coal and other mines, such as the
Sado mines, where approximately 60% of the Koreans were mobilized. Not only those who fled
during their time at the mines but all those who used labor mobilization as a safe means oftraveling to Japan without incurring travel expenses (fleeing upon arrival in Japan in areas suchas Fukuoka or with the help of Korean brokers they had contacted beforehand in major cities
such as Osaka, Kyoto, and Tokyo), those who fled after the expiration of their contracts using
the money they received from the company for their return ticket, or fled while their family
members were repatriated to Korea all remained in Japan to seek employment at companies
offering better pay and working conditions.
No special policies or measures were adopted by the Japanese government to find these fugitives,and even if they were caught, they were simply fined the equivalent of 20-40% of their monthly
wages, with deportation to Korea reserved as the most severe punishment. Fugitives were also
welcomed with high wages at munitions factories and other sites where military installations
were being constructed, due in part to the vast capital these establishments possessed but also
because labor was in extremely short supply.
To claim that these fugitives constituted a form of “resistance," or even a facet of some kind of“anti-imperialist” or “anti-war” struggle while ignoring such circumstances is an ideologicaldistortion of history.
As was the case at other mines, at the Sado mines, too, many of those Koreans who had fled towork elsewhere returned following the end of the war on August 15, 1945, where they received
57

冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )the money for their return to Korea in accordance with the policy of the Japanese government.

5. The Need to Bring the Historical Facts to Light
Was the mobilization of Koreans really “forced mobilization”? Although recruitment andofficial

mediation

were

at

times

supportedonanadministrative

level

by

the

Government-General or local police, the relationship between Koreans and Japanese companies
was fundamentally contractual. Contracts were concluded in Korea or upon arrival at thecompanies in Japan. The reason for this was that, although in the case of official mediation,
there were cases where the Governor-General’s Office employed coercive measures inconvincing them to go to Japan, if Koreans point-blank refused to go or fled to another part of
Korea, there were no legal means by which Japanese companies or the Government-General
could force them to assent. In contrast, conscription involves legal sanctions, and the concept
itself is literally that of forced mobilization. In other words, it is clear that “forced mobilization”
is a tautology in the case of conscription, but coercion in the case of recruitment and official
mediation cannot be defined as “forced mobilization”.
So, can the mobilization of Koreans be considered “forced labor”? Relying on the Forced Labor
Convention promulgated by the ILO in 1932 and ratified by Japan in the same year, leftist
forces in Korea and Japan argue that Korean wartime mobilization was forced labor and thatJapan violated this Convention. However, not only is the interpretation that wartime labor does
not correspond to forced mobilization but is a matter of the survival of the community and thenation gaining significant credence, but South Korea ratified the Convention in February 2021,
perfectly illustrating the reality that the interpretation and application of the Convention vary
according to the circumstances of each country.
The more important issue regarding the “Forced Labor Convention” is the relationshipbetween the concepts stipulated in the laws and the Convention and the historical facts.
Whatever these concepts may be, they cannot alter the objective reality of history. Nevertheless,leftist forces are obsessed with the concept of “forced labor” in the above-mentioned
Convention and try to bind the Korean and Japanese people to it in order to force upon freecitizens a subjective, collective, and ideological “image” of history already formed by the concept
of “forced labor” rather than objective historical facts, i.e., a dominating cultivated view ofhistory. This is not an objective historical fact but a subjective, collective, and ideological“image” of history already formed by the concept of “forced labor,” i.e., a dominating cultivatedview of history that is being forced upon free citizens.
Therefore, the most fundamental task is still that of clarifying the historical facts on the issue of58

冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )whether wartime labor mobilization does or does not constitute “forced labor” and to fightagainst the existing distorted fictions.
The work Korean wartime laborers engaged in cannot be considered “forced labor”. First,
recruitment and official mediation were contractual in nature, and thus the duration of thecontract was clearly specified. When the Sado mines recruited Koreans in 1940, the contract
period was three years, whereas most other workplaces had two-year contracts.
As a result of labor shortages, Japanese companies offered various incentives to Koreans whose
contracts had expired, such as visits home, financial incentives, wage increases, and encouraged
them to invite their families so that they might renew and extend their contracts. Although someclaim that companies coerced the Koreans into extending their contracts, this was not legally
enforceable, and it was, in fact, Korean laborers who frequently reneged on their periods ofcontract. As many as 40% of workers abandoned their workplaces at their discretion.
Companies were, of course, never compensated for this. Koreans had the authority and freedom
to decide whether to return to Korea or renew their contracts once the initial contract period
concluded, as well as more bargaining power.
The fact that Japanese companies deported Koreans who were negligent of their duties as wellas ringleaders in group demonstrations as “delinquents”, and granted workers with personalreasons or extended contracts “temporary leave” － many of whom did not return － also
contradicts the claim of “forced labor”. At the time, Koreans (including those at the Sado mines)
were paid higher wages than factory hands and clerical workers, were guaranteed the right to beabsent from work in the case of illness and other extenuating circumstances, and enjoyed such
freedom in their daily lives that alcohol and other sundry activities became an issue. Because theJapanese government and companies gave top priority to the labor productivity of Koreans,
there was no mandated or systemic discrimination between Japanese and Koreans in terms oflabor, working environment, food, clothing, or housing.
After working hours and on the three to four days off they received each month, they were free
to go out. There were no “barbed-wire fences”, “watchtowers”, or “military police with guns"
surveilling Koreans as they worked to prevent their escape. The Korean “forced labor” depicted
in movies such as Battleship Island is pure fiction.

6. Koreans who came to Japan of Their Own Volition
Approximately 2.4 million Koreans traveled to Japan during the period of wartime labormobilization (1939-45). However, only about 720,000 came to Japan under the wartime
mobilization of Japanese companies and the Tokyo government. As the gates to Japan were59

冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )thrown wide open with the commencement of wartime mobilization, about 1.68 million people
emigrated to the home islands, the majority of whom were itinerant workers who had come tostay for several years and earn money. Due to the marked weakening of restrictions on travel toJapan and the extreme shortage of labor, there were also many stowaways that were notreflected in the statistics, and their number is consequently unknown. At the time, thesemigrant workers who came to Japan to earn money irrespective of the wartime mobilization
were known in Japan as “general laborers” or “non-mass migrant workers.”
During the same period, about 25% of the 720,000 people who came to Japan under wartime
mobilization were recruited, 40% were hired through official mediation, and 35% wereconscripted. Since recruitment was fundamentally voluntary, and about 40% of those recruited
through official mediation and conscription deserted and became free laborers, 55%(25%+75%*0.6) of the wartime laborers were free. There were undoubtedly many workers
among those who came to Japan through official mediation or conscription who willingly
accepted their placement at sites offering high incomes (for example, those who extended theircontracts or found employment at other workplaces after the expiration of their contracts), but
precisely how many is still unknown. Ultimately, even by conservative estimates, 45% of thewartime workforce, or about 320,000 people, moved to Japan regardless of whether they wanted
to or not.
Because 320,000 out of 2.4 million cannot be used to define the nature of Korean emigration to
Japan between 1939 and 1945, precedence must be given to the 2.08 million. Moreover, as seenin the case of the Sado mines, there were already Korean workers who had emigrated to Japan
before September 1939. As the example of the Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine shows, they
played an essential role in directing and managing the wartime laborers, and this would havebeen the case at other sites, including the Sado mines. These more than 2.08 million freelaborers and 320,000 wartime workers were not mutually exclusive; they coexisted in theJapanese labor market, sometimes working in the same factories or mines. Escape was a routefor wartime workers to become free laborers, and sites that employed wartime workers had to beaware of the existence of free laborers in more favorable conditions, such as surface workers andrelatively high wages.
Overall, this period was the first time in its history that Korea saw a veritable explosion in freemigrant work in such a short period of time, which can be largely attributed to the free
expatriates who pioneered an expanded sphere of economic activity. It was during this periodthat the international migration that unfolded during the so-called “first wave of globalization”
from the 1870s to World War I and the Korean international migration that developed in the60

冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )wake of liberation began. Even though this migration was colonial in form and took place during
the war, the fundamental nature of it was that of overseas migration. The term “colonial” refers
to the fact that this migration took place under the rule of the Japanese colonizers and that
migrants were treated as “second-class citizens” in accordance with the rapidly changing
policies on Koreans traveling to Japan from 1937 onward. While “second-class citizen” may
allude to the possibility of racial discrimination against Koreans due to their “second-class”
status, it also implies that Koreans were foreigners and prisoners of war who had rights andobligations as Japanese “nationals”. This is suitably expressed in the fact that Koreans were
subject to “conscription” and could choose to “run away”, if they so wished.
The “wartime” nature of Korean wartime immigration refers to the fact that labor immigration
took place under the exceptional circumstances of war when freedom of employment was
restricted; that is, Koreans were obliged to work in occupations they shunned in coal mines andother mines, where they received preferential treatment. At the same time, the war resulted in
the rapid and large-scale expansion of possibilities for immigrants in a very short period of time.
The labor shortage brought about by the massive conscription of Japanese men dictated that thetreatment of Koreans be determined not by market equilibrium but by the extra-economic
policies of the Japanese government and corporations, paradoxically resulting in a situation inwhich the wages and benefits the colonized people were afforded exceeded their human capital.
Wartime migration thus developed in seemingly contradictory and complex ways.
I propose that the movement of Koreans to Japan during 1939-45 be understood as a form of“colonial and wartime overseas migration”, and that the wartime labor mobilization be seen as afacet of it. Koreans and Japanese alike must identify with this perspective in accepting theregistration of the Sado mines as a World Heritage site.

7. Official Mediation“Official mediation” was an administrative measure without any legal regulation whereby
government authorities (county office officials and local police) assisted employees dispatched
by Japanese companies in carrying out mobilization, the success of which varied depending on
their commitment.
Essentially, 1) it could not be decisively enforced because there was no legal basis that stipulated
the procedures for mobilization or punishment in the case of non-compliance. 2) The
mobilization process varied depending on a combination of the efforts of the Japanese company
labor department staff charged with recruiting and leading the mobilization, the county labor
officials and clerks, police stations and sub-stations, the cooperation and willingness of61

冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )landowners and wardens, the cooperation of rural Koreans, and the evasion and resistance of the
Korean people. How the Korean authorities dealt with the mobilization during this phase varied
significantly, which manifested in an equally varied degree of “coercion”. Consequently, theresults of the mobilization also varied according to the county.
As an indicator of the level of success achieved by wartime mobilization, the frequency ofescapes can be considered along with the number of mobilized personnel. However, desertion in
and of itself cannot be interpreted as Korean aversion to going to Japan. They shunned jobs atmines, where they would be compelled to work underground digging for coal and gold,
evidenced by the fact that they did not return to their hometowns in Korea after fleeing theirworksites but worked at other business entities in Japan, such as construction sites and factories.
In this respect, the flight of Koreans is much like the recent phenomenon of Southeast Asian
workers fleeing their workplaces in South Korea.
On March 12, 1940, letters were sent from the Director-General of the Bureau of Internal
Affairs to the governors of each province, instructing them to “set the ideal area of arable landinconsideration of the local conditions (as of the end of March 1939), prepare a “Labor
Resource Survey Report”, and submit it to the Korean Governor-General by the end of April”.
(Noh Yong-jeong (2016), p. 196) Five surveyors were assigned to each township, with a total of
11,355 people mobilized across 2,271 townships nationwide. (Noh Yong-jeong (2016), p. 198)
For example, South Chungcheong Province surveyed labor resources in 167 areas under its
jurisdiction and reported to the Bureau of Internal Affairs on May 17, 1940. This was a survey of
16,700 houses (equivalent to 7.8% of a total of 223,372 houses) carried out by 835 surveyors(Noh Yong-jeong (2016), p294).
It has been confirmed that the Governor-General of Korea surveyed and reviewed labor
resources throughout Korea in July 1939. Following this, on March 12, 1940, it issued its report“Concerning the Matter of the Investigation of Labor Resources” to the governors of eachprovince through the Director General of the Bureau of Internal Affairs. The Governor-General
instructed each county and township through the provincial governments to “set the ideal areaof arable land in consideration of the local conditions (as of the end of March 1939), prepare a“Labor Resource Survey Report,” and submit it to the Korean Governor-General by the end of
April.” Towns and other administrative units were excluded from this survey, which covered
only townships, the number ofthose who were able to work as migrant laborers or change
occupations, as well as the number of those who wished to do so (Noh Yong-jeong (2016), p.
196).
With budgetary support from the Office of the Governor-General of Korea, each province
62冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )appointed a “person familiar with the circumstances in each province” as a surveyor toinvestigate the labor resources in each province. Five surveyors were assigned to each township,with a total of 11,355 people across 2,271 townships nationwide. (Noh Yong-jeong (2016), p.
198). For example, South Chungcheong Province spent approximately one month surveying thelabor resources of 167 townships under its jurisdiction before reporting the results to the
Bureau of Internal Affairs of the Office of the Korean Governor-General on May 17, 1940. This
was a survey of 16,700 houses (equivalent to 7.8% of a total of 223,372 houses) carried out by
835 surveyors, with each surveyor in these five-man groups responsible for surveying 200
households for a total of 1,000 households per township. The number of those who were able towork as migrant laborers or change occupations, as well as the number of those who wished to
do so, were also investigated (Noh Yong-jeong (2016), p. 196).
The household survey report included 12 categories: the head of household's permanent
residence, address, occupation, the name and age of each family member, their relationship withthe head ofhousehold, their name, age, state of health, whether or not they were migrant
workers or wished to change jobs, the area of cultivated land, and living conditions (annual
income and annual expenses). Occupations were divided into “landed farmer,” “landed tenant
farmer,” “tenant farmer,” and “agricultural laborer,” while physical health was classified aseither strong, average, or weak. Migrants and job-seekers were surveyed among men aged 20-44
and women aged 12-19 who were of average or better health (Noh Yong-jeong (2016), p. 196).
When each county reported the results to the provincial governor, each province added up theresults and reported them to the Governor-General's Office, which then added them all up andcompiled the “Labor Resource Survey Report.”
The results of the surveys recorded in this report indicated that the ideal area of land for eachhousehold or house was 16-35 “banbo” (one banbo = 1/10 hectare); the ideal number ofhouseholds nationwide was 2,035,264; the surplus number of houses was 1,023,491; the numberof possible transferees among males aged 20-30, 31-40, and 41-45 (and females aged 12-19)
was calculated to be 232,641, 534,068, 274,887, 118,581, and 927,536, respectively, while thecorresponding numbers of those who expressed an interest in doing so were 20,767, 158,919,
61,502, and 21,893 for a total of 242,316. As of the end of 1936, the total area of cultivated land
was 4,941,584 hectares, and the total number of farminghouseholds was estimated to be
3,058,755 (Ho Su-yeol (1985) 308-10).
The provinces with the largest number of excess households was South Jeolla with 161,722
households (accounting for 15.8% of all farmers in the province), followed by Gangwon with
142,296 households (13.9%), Gyeongbuk with 132,525 households (12.9%), South Gyeongsang
63冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )with 124,228 (12.1%) and North Jeolla with 85,418 (8.3%). As can be seen, the majority of the
respondents (75.1%) were concentrated in Jeolla, Gangwon, and Gyeongsang Provinces. It isparticularly interesting to note that the majority of potential and interested applicants wereconcentrated in the southern region (Gyeongsang, Jeolla, and Chungcheong) (Noh Yong-jeong(16), p. 201-202). The fact that workers mobilized to Japan also came primarily from this region
proves that the official mediation was based on the “Labor Resource Survey Report.”
The Governor-General's Office, which conducted the survey from the end of March 1940,
establishedandpromulgatedthe“LaborMediation

Guidelines

of

the

KoreanGovernor-General's Office” and its corresponding by-laws at the end of 1940. First, employers
who wished to avail of worker placement services were to submit a plan for using workers to theprovincial governor-general in charge of the area where the business was located. In accordancewith this plan, the province would prepare a “Projected Manpower Requirements Protocol.”Based on the results of the “Labor Resource Survey,” the province established a “Provincial
Labor

Adjustment Plan”

andreporteditto the Governor-General's Office.

The

Governor-General's Office combined these “Provincial Labor Adjustment Plans” to formulate a“Headquarters Labor Adjustment Plan,” which was then dispatched to each province. Based on
this, each province would then formulate a “Provincial Internal and External Mediation
Implementation Plan” and issue it to each county while also informing business owners of its
contents.
Once the Governor-General assigned and dispatched mediation personnel to each province, theprovinces would then assign them to the counties and islands of the provinces, where they werein turn assigned to towns and townships. The towns and townships then set about compiling alist of “those who wish to work or change occupations” and “those who can work or change
occupations,” and mobilizing laborers with the cooperation of the “National Federation ofTowns and Townships” and the “League of Communities” within the same federation. At thistime, towns and townships maintained close contact with the police and government officials.
Meanwhile, the Governor-General of Korea enacted and promulgated the “Outline of theMediated Migration of Koreans to the Home Islands” and its by-laws and began the “publicdispatch of laborers recruited through official mediation” to Japan and other regions. (Hsu
Hye-ryeol (1985), p. 306-328). However, no “list of applicants and potential applicants” hasbeen found among these documents, and it may be assumed that no such physical list was
actually created. This is because there is no trace of the extensive research personnel, time, andmoney that would have been spent on the field surveys.

64

冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )８. Wage

Table: Wage Expenditures
Units: JPY/%.
Deductions

FiscalYear
1940

Meal Expenses

15.24
21.2

13.37
18.6

11.78
16.4

SubtotalRemmitances

Balance

24.84

6.72

40.39
56.1

34.5

12

0

0

45.00

25.00

88.00

30

16.7

58.7

67.16

26.7

67.16

53.8

53.8

36.88
29.6

100.0

79.99

30.2
40.00

71.95

100

24.07

29.6

Total

52.96

40.6

23.62
18.00

9.3

21.52

21.7

1943

1945

Other

11.5

1941

1944

Savings

100.0
22.00

150.00

14.7

100.0

20.75
16.6

124.79100.0

Sources: 1940: Japan Mining Association (1940), “Report on Korean Laborers,” edited by Park
Kyung-woo (1981) vol.2, p.1-300. 1941: Institute for Research on Labor Affairs (1942), “In
Conversation with Korean Laborers Based at the Hitachi Mines, edited by Kyung-woo Park
(1981), vol.1, p.90. 1943: Sumitomo Konomai Mining Co., statistics for January-March fromthe “1943 Report Concerning Koreans”, edited by Yoshihiko Moriya (1991), Historical

Documents on the Wartime Forced Mobilization of Foreigners, part 3, section 2. The numbers
as of the end of March were the average for January to March. 1944: Kyushu Regional Coal
Control Association, (1945), “Korean Personnel Management in Coal Mines,” edited by Park
Kyung-woo (1991) vol.2, p.209. 1945: Yoshihiko Moriya (1996: 128).

65

冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )Table: Comparison with Other Occupational Wages
FiscalOccupations forMonthlyYear

Comparison

IncomePercentage

Spinning and Weaving
1940(Cotton Processing)

14.00

5.2

in Seoul; Male workers
1940

Male Teachers in Seoul

15.96

4.6

1940

Male Company Employees in Seoul

21.00

3.5

1940

Male Bank Employees in Seoul

30.80

2.4

55.00

1.5

1943

Public Elementary School Teachersin Tokyo (initial wages)

1944

Police Officers in Japan (initial wages)

45.00

3.7

1944

Clerical Work in Japan (starting salary)

75.00

2.2

Sources: Lee Woo-yeon (2019), “The Fiction of Korean Wage Discrimination”, edited by Lee
Yong-Hoon, Anti-Japanese Tribalism, Bungeishunju. The wages of the workers in 1943 werereported by Tsutomu Nishioka (2022), “Ignorance of Primary Sources Among Proponents of
the Forced Labor Theory,” Seiron, April 2022 issue. Miners' wages for the same year are fromthe Sado mining operations’ 1943 report Concerning Korean Personnel Management.

9. Industrial Accidents, Direct Laborers, and Pit Workers
66% percent of Koreans worked in the mines, where approximately 90% were pit workers.
These unskilled and inexperienced Korean laborers were responsible for the most important anddangerous work in the mines, which led to an increase in industrial accidents, a decline inproduction efficiency, and an increase in the consumption of materials.
According to documents from the Labor Department of the Coal Mutual Aid Association,
among pit workers, direct laborers included coal miners, bracers, and diggers, while indirect
laborers included repairmen, haulers, pit operators, shop hands, miscellaneous workers, andassistants. Positions on the surface included assistants, coal dressers, haulers (surface),
operators (surface), craftsmen, electricians, and miscellaneous laborers (assistants, haulers,
operators, craftsmen, and miscellaneous workers worked both on the surface and in the pits).
Excluding both Japanese and Korean short-term laborers (Labor Service Corps, Volunteer
Corps), 59,874 of the 212,604 general Japanese workers and 56,949 of the 83,299 mobilized
Korean workers were engaged in direct labor (equivalent to 95.1% of the Japanese workers),
66

冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )while 127,153 Japanese and 56,949 Koreans worked inside the mines (60.5% of the Japanese
workers). (Shigeru Nagasawa (1987), p.157-159)
Organization and Mortality Rates of Korean and Japanese Direct Laborers, Pit Miners, and Surface Workers
by Occupation in 179 Major Coal Mines in Japan
Number of Workers
Koreans Japanese

Total

Percentage of Pit Miners（％）

KoreanJapanese

Pit Workers

Pit Workers

Koreans Japanese

Percentage of
Pit Workers

A

1,036

5,648

6,684

B

947

5,427

6,374 ー

ー

ー

ー

ー

C

2,527

6,648

9,220 ー

ー

ー

ー

ー

D

365

933

1,298 ー

ー

ー

ー

ー

E

314

1,036

1,350 ー

ー

ー

ー

ー

F

506

1,413

1,990

Total

5,740

21,10526,196 ー

984

3,890

494

95

933

97.6

ー

ー

Korean
Dead

68.9

1.38

66
ー

1.48
ー

Japanese

Severe injury

Total

Dead

Severe injury

Total

A

9

1

10

33

5

38

B

39

170

209

94

512

606

C

13

4

17

28

11

39

D

7

0

7

7

2

9

E

4

11

15

6

16

22

F

2

49

51

4

99

103

Total

74

235

309

172

645

817

Koreans
Mortality

SevereRate

injuryJapanese
Total

Mortality

SevereRate

injuryKorean／Japanese Ratio
Total

Mortality

SevereRate

injury

Total

A

9

1

10

5.5

0.8

6.3

1.64

1.2

1.58

B

36.9

161

197.9

19.2

104.4

123.6

1.93

1.54

1.6

C

5.5

1.7

7.2

4.4

1.7

6.1

1.24

0.97

1.17

D

21.6

0

21.6

7.6

2.2

9.8

2.84

0

2.21

E

11.8

32.6

44.4

5.5

14.7

20.2

2.15

2.21

2.19

F

4.4

108.1

112.5

3

74.5

77.5

1.47

1.45

1.45

Total

13.3

42.4

55.7

8.3

31.3

39.6

1.6

1.36

1.41

67

冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )The reason why Koreans met with so many accidents as described above is that most of themwere underground laborers －engaged primarily in direct labor －and thus working underconditions where they were more prone to accidents; furthermore, the fact that they had beenwith the company for a much shorter period of time than their Japanese colleagues in
conjunction with their relatively low proficiency meant that they were infinitely more vulnerable
to accidents in the mines than the Japanese.
For example, according to the “Record of Disasters” in which accidents at the Joban Coal Field(which belonged to the Eastern Branch of the Coal Control Association) were recorded, thedeath rate of Koreans was 4.3 times higher than that of Japanese, and the casualty rate was 1.7
times higher (Yamada, et al. (2005), p.186). When discussing the high mortality and injury
rates ascompared to the Japanese, it is necessary to examine the ratio of direct laborers andunderground laborers and their length of service, but there are very few data for this purpose,and few studies have been written from such a perspective.
In a 2019 research report authored by Chung Hye-kyung for the Foundation for Victims ofForced Mobilization by Imperial Japan, it was alleged that the death rate of Korean laborers
across all regions of Japan was 0.9% (October 1939-October 1942), 0.6% in Fukuoka
Prefecture, and 1.7% in the Konomai mines in January 1944, while the Inquiry Commission on
Forced Mobilization related that “9 deaths account for 6% of the 148 deaths...This is remarkably
high as compared to the contemporary mortality rates of coal mines and miners in Japan,” basedon reports it had received concerning these “victims.”
However, these are highly exaggerated and fictional figures. As the 1943 data from the Sado
mines shows, 1,005 Koreans were mobilized from February 1940 to May 1943, during which
period only 10, or 0.1%, died.
Although it is, of course, possible that some of these workers may have died between May 1943
and August 15, 1945, most of the others－excluding fugitives－returned home once theircontracts had expired, and since they only worked at the Sado mines after May 1942 for a very
brief period, the number of additional deaths would subsequently have to have been quite low. If
there were any credibility to Chung Hye-kyung’s assertion of a 6% mortality rate, there would
have had to have been an additional 59 deaths, which is highly unrealistic.
On the contrary, the mortality rate at the Sado mines must be considered very low incomparison to other mines; unlike coal mines where over 40% of Koreans worked, gold mines
had solid bedrock, far less risk of cave-ins, very little coal dust, and few gas explosions or fires.
This is an example of how even the slightest misunderstanding or misinterpretation of statistics
can lead to completely conflicting conclusions about objective historical facts and distort ourview of history.
68冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )10. Silicosis
According to a book written by Teizo Hirose (Hirose (2000), p.13) and physician Ken Saito’s
1944 report on silicosis at the Sado mines titled “Investigative Study and Addendum on
Silicosis”, the respective amounts of dust inhaled by workers were 810 ㏄ for drillers, 360 for
haulers, 350 ㏄ for bracers, and 240 ㏄ for miners. As noted earlier, at the time, these jobs were
mostly occupied by Koreans.
As of the end of May 1943, there were 294 Koreans engaged in hauling, 123 in drilling, 56 inbracing, and 49 in outside transport. There were no Koreans in the occupations at the Sado
mines classified as “miscellaneous.” In contrast, the number of Japanese in miscellaneous jobs
was 321, 85 worked in ore milling, 80 in hauling, 52 in general labor, 46 in leveling, and 39 inbracing (522 in total). It was also pointed out in A Comprehensive History of Sado Aikawa(1995) that Koreans were primarily pit workers engaged in hauling, drilling, and bracing (p.
681).
When dust mixed with silicic acid accumulates in the lungs, the mechanical and chemical effectsof silicic acid cause inflammation of the lungs. This inflammation eventually leads to scarring of
the lungs, which over time eventually causes problems with the lungs' ability to supply oxygen to
the rest of the body. This chronic disease is called silicosis. (Doosan Encyclopedia)
Silicosis refers to chronic pulmonary mycosis. It also occurs in coal mines, and it was not limited
to the Sado mines. Although the rate of onset varies depending on the concentration of silicic
acid, it usually takes 15 to 20 years for silicosis to develop. The longest period of service formobilized Korean workers was six years, typically two to three years, and just a few months forfugitives. The claims by Hirose (2000), the Foundation (2019), Chung Hye-kyung, and Lee
Sang-yi (2021; 2022) that pulmonary mycosis occurred extensively among mobilized Korean
laborers are most likely an exaggeration.

11. Disputes
In Teizo Hirose's book on group demonstrations and disputes (Hirose (2000), p. 13-14), two
incidents of “conflict” by Koreans are noted. The first, on February 17, 1940, was “Due to thelack of facilities at the camp to accommodate all the (Koreans: the author),” requiring “about 40(workers) to temporarily use the new dormitory run by employees of the mines. On February 17,
the 40 lodgers, led by Choi Jae-man, demanded measures to address this. The mine accepted
their request, and the situation was resolved on that day”.
In the second incident, on April 11, 1940, 97 Korean workers in Kirinai Town in Sado County“went on strike demanding higher wages, complaining that after they had been paid their March69

冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )wages, the conditions were different from those they had received upon recruitment. The strikewas “settled” on April 13 through the Aikawa Police Station, and the company “was to improve
workers’ conditions.” However, the three ringleaders were deported to Korea. He also recounted
that the reason for the dispute was the fact that the workers had to pay for their own food (\0.5
JPY a day at the time), bedding (\0.5 JPY per set), and all other necessities for work, such as
jika-tabi (traditional Japanese footwear with a divided toe), which they assumed would be
provided free of charge, as well as the extremely discriminatory attitude of several labor section
employees.
Korean scholars of forced mobilization and forced labor argue that these demonstrations
constituted a form of resistance against oppression and exploitation. Chung Hye-Kyung (2022)
describes the disputes at the Sado mines as follows.
“Koreans mobilized under Japan's national mobilization system resisted in various
ways...(Introducing two cases of demonstrations over the issue of treatment: Lee Woo-yeon).
Documents show that on April 29, 1942, when three Korean laborers from the Mitsubishi Sado
mines were taken away by the police, 160 of their comrades stormed into the office to protest,
leading to eight further arrests. In two of the three cases, the police intervened.”
Chung failed to elaborate on the substance of this apparent Korean “labor dispute” at the Sado
mines. Describing this as “large-scale Korean resistance” is highly misleading. The reality,
however, is that it may more accurately be regarded as a rather weak demonstration. Based on
the Special Higher Police Monthly Report, Hirose (2000) posited that the incident was
triggered by gambling, but it is unclear why it developed into a large-scale demonstration.
“In general, gambling was widely practiced in the “rooms” and dormitories of the mines.
Koreans gradually began to adapt to this custom, gambling by candlelight late at night insecluded thickets or the crematorium. In April 1942, while three Koreans －including Yi
Han-bong－were gambling with hanafuda (traditional Japanese playing cards) at the Soai
dormitory, a Japanese labor section officer discovered them and attempted to take them to the
local police station. In an attempt to recover the betting money, more than 160 fellow Koreans
stormed the dormitory office, injuring a labor section employee and breaking 36 windows in theoffice. As a result, Aikawa police officers rushed to the scene, rounded up eight of theringleaders, and defused the situation.” (Teizo Hirose (2000), p.16).
Let us consider the Japanese police's response to these Korean demonstrations. According to
Nagatani’s (2021) analysis of the Special Higher Police Monthly Report, the measures taken
against Korean workers engaging in demonstrations were “strict warnings,” “strict
admonitions,” “strong criticism,” “accommodation,” “persuasion,” and “pacification” with70

冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )almost no use of violence to suppress them. In other words, there were no cases, including
labor-management disputes, where the police forcefully suppressed or dispersed a group of
Koreans to protect the flow of operations. Even if the police were dispatched, they would only
issue

“strict

warnings”,“strictadmonitions,”“strong

criticism,”“accommodation,”“persuasion,” and “pacification,” to borrow the expressions from the Special Higher Police

Monthly Report. At the Sado mines, too, the police never used force to disperse or subdue the
Koreans.
Unlike other mines, there were few disputes involving Koreans at the Sado mines. Even after the
war ended, Koreans did not cause any disturbances. Pyeong Jung, who was at the Sado mines
when the war ended, wrote, “Overall, as can be seen in the good results obtained throughtraining and guidance, Korean laborers could be repatriated without the riots seen in otherregions at the end of the war.” (p. 486).

2. Nutritional Supply
Let us consider the nutritional intake of South Korean and Japanese wartime laborers.

Table: Nutrient Absorption of South Korean Koreans and Japanese Wartime Workers
Southern Korea（Rationing of Staple Foods）

Korean Workers at Mitsui Yamano

Masaru Tonomura

Coal Mine, Japan（2012),

Coal Miners Surface Workers

Mine Workers

Korean Laborers

Calories

ProteinCalories

Calories

Calories

Calories（kcal）（g）（kcal）（kcal）（kcal）（kcal）

1937

1,937

70.4

1938

1,860

66.9

1939

1,621

58.7

3,675

1940

1,762

59.7

3,675

1941

1,799

58.2

1942

1,410

47.6

1943

1,264

1944
1945

3,224

2,161

1,343

39.6

2,646

2,161

1,343

1,394

40.9

2,989

2,161

1,372

2,401

1,377

37.9

2,573

1,971

1,212

1,372

Source: Yook So-young (2017), “A Study on Changes in Living Standards in Korea in the 20th
Century Through the Analysis of Food Supply Lists”, Doctoral dissertation, Department of
Economics, Graduate School of Economics, Chungnam University; Tonomura (2012), p. 186
Note: 1 cup = 140 g (490 kcal); 100 g was 350 kcal.

71

冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )The volume of rations in southern Korea and Japan were converted to calories using Yook
So-young's 2017 doctoral dissertation and the results of the United States Strategic Bombing
Survey, respectively.
With the exception of surface workers under the age of 21－who received the least rations of all
Koreans mobilized to Japan－their calorie intake was far higher than that of Korean workers
who remained on the peninsula. Because rationing was primarily regulated by the Japanese
government and corporate bodies such as the Coal Control Association, there was no particularvariance between companies. 1937-40 was 1.4 to 1.5 times the amount of stock rations in 1941,
so the nutritional supply was far better than that of Koreans who remained in Korea during thisperiod as well. In the case of protein, the minimum daily requirement per person in Japan at thetime was estimated at 76g, but according to Cohen (1949), citing data from the U.S. Strategic
Bombing Survey (USSBS), the situation was at its worst in August 1945, when the dailyrequirement dropped to 37.9g.
A comparison must be made between the standard of living of the young men who remained in
Korea and that of the Korean wartime workers mobilized to Japan and the free migrant workers－the number of which was three times that of the wartime workers employed in coal mining
and other mines. It is now evident that the nutritional intake of Koreans who chose to go to
Japan far exceeded that of those who remained in southern Korea.

72

冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )Bibliography

Sources:・Kyushu Regional Coal Control Association (1945), “Korean Personnel

Management in

Coal Mines,” Park Kyung-woo (ed.) (1991) Vol.II, Korean Research: A Source Book, Vol.II,
p.1-245
・Sado mining operations (1943), Concerning Korean Personnel Management

・ Niigata Shimbun
・Institute for Research on Labor Affairs (1942), “In Conversation with Korean Laborers Basedat the Hitachi Mines,” Kyung-wooPark (ed.) (1981), Vol. 1, Korean Research: A Source Book,
Vol.1, p.56-96
・Sumitomo Konomai Mining Co., “1943 Report Concerning Koreans,” Yoshihiko Moriya (ed.)(1991); Historical Documents on the Wartime Forced Mobilization of Foreigners, part 3,
section 2.
・Japan Mining Association (1940), “Report on Korean Laborers,” Kyung-woo Park (ed.) (1981)
Vol.II, p.1-300.
・ Institute for Research on Labor Affairs (May 1943), “In Conversation with Korean Laborers
Based at the Hitachi Mines,” Kyung-woo Park (ed.) (1981), Korean Research: A Source Book,
Vol.1, p.339-521

Papers and Publications

・Historical Statistics of Korea Vol.1 &II (2018), Kim Nak-nyeon, Park Ki-joo, Park Lee-taek,
and Cha Myung-su (ed.), Haenam Publishing
・ Yook So-young (2017), “A Study on Changes in Living Standards in Korea in the 20th
Century Through the Analysis of Food Supply Lists,” Doctoral dissertation, Department of
Economics, Graduate School of Economics, Chungnam University
・Foundation for Victims of Forced Mobilization (2019), academic research report.
・Chung Hye-kyung, “The Actual Circumstances of the Forced Mobilization of Koreans inJapan's Regional Mines and Coal Mines, Focusing on Mitsubishi’s Sado Mining Operations,”
Foundation for Victims of Forced Mobilization 2022 academic seminar “How Japan’s World
Heritage Registration Distorts the History of Forced Labor at the Sado Mines”
・Chung Hye-kyung and Ho Kwang-mu (text and photographs) (2021), Land of Greed: The

Mitsubishi Sado Mines and The Forced Mobilization of Koreans, Seonin Publishing73

冊子テンプレート
A4 1P（210mm × 297mm )・Ryosuke Nagatani (2021), “The Actual Conditions of Korean Laborers at Work Sites,”
Tsutomu Nishioka (ed.) (2021), The Realities of Korean Wartime Labor, National Council for
Industrial Heritage
・Park Kyong-sik (1965), Record of the Forced Mobilization of Koreans, translated by Park
Kyong-Ok (2008), Gojeuwin Publishing・ The Ohara Institute for Social Research, Hosei University (1964), Workers’ Conditions

During the Asia-Pacific War, Toyo Keizai Inc.
・Yutaka Nishinarita (1997), The “World” of Japanese Koreans and the “Imperial” State,
University of Tokyo Press
・ Yoshihiko Moriya (1988), “Labor Recruitment in Newly Developed Mines under State
Control: The Konomai Gold Mines,” Dohto University Bulletin, Issue 7, p.11-43
・ Yoshihiko Moriya (1996), “The Forced Mobilization and Bereaved Family Relief of Koreans
During the Asia-Pacific War,” Dohto University Bulletin, Issue 15, p.81-138
・Kanji Katsuoka (2019), “On the Truth of Korean Workers (So-called “Conscripts”): Focusing
on the Plaintiffs in the Korean Supreme Court Decision”, Journal of Historical AwarenessResearch, Issue 4, p.19~44
・ Masayuki Satani, supervised by Junsuke Fukamachi (2005), The Truth and Glory of the Coal

Mines: The Fiction of Korean Forced Mobilization, Fukuoka Chikuho Branch of the Japan
Conference・Shigeru Nagasawa (1987), “The Wartime Labor and Struggles of Korean Miners in Joban Coal
Field,” Shien: The Journal of Historical Studies, Rikkyo University, Vol. 47 Issue 1,
・Yang Te-ho (ed.) (1993), “The Forced Mobilization of Koreans Corpus,” Akashi Shoten,
pp.146-204.
・ Korean Forced Mobilization Inquiry Commission (1974), Record of Korean Forced

Mobilization and Labor, Gendai Publishing. p.147-148.
・Yasuto Takeuchi (2013), Investigation of the Forced Labor of Koreans 1: Coal Mines,
Shakaihyoronsha
・Masaru Tonomura (2012), Korean Forced Labor, Iwanami Shinsho.
・ Cohen, Jerome Bernard 1949. Japanese Economic History 1930-1960, Vol. II, London and
New York, Routledge.

74