Committee on Payment andSettlement Systems
Board of the International
Organization of Securities
Commissions

Principles for financial market infrastructures:

Disclosure framework
andAssessment methodology
December 2012

This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org) and the IOSCO website(www.iosco.org).

© Bank for International Settlements and International Organization of Securities Commissions
2012. All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced or translated provided the source isstated.

ISBN 92-9131-899-X (print)
ISBN 92-9197-899-X (online)Preface
In April 2012, the CPSS and IOSCO published the report Principles for financial market
infrastructures (PFMI), which establishes new international standards for payment systems
that are systemically important, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems,
central counterparties and trade repositories.
The present report contains the CPSS-IOSCO Disclosure framework for financial market
infrastructures (“disclosure framework”) and the CPSS-IOSCO Assessment methodology forthe principles for FMIs and the responsibilities of authorities (“assessment methodology”)
referenced in the PFMI.
The disclosure framework prescribes the form and content of the disclosures expected of
FMIs. The assessment methodology provides guidance to assessors for evaluating
observance of the 24 principles and five responsibilities set forth in the PFMI.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012iii

Contents
Preface .................................................................................................................................... iii
Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................... vii
1.0. Introduction ......................................................................................................................1
Purpose of the disclosure framework and assessment methodology .............................1
Use of the disclosure framework .....................................................................................2
Use of the assessment methodology ..............................................................................2
General considerations for conducting assessments ......................................................3
Organisation of the report ................................................................................................4
2.0. Disclosure framework for FMIs ........................................................................................5
Objective of the disclosure framework ............................................................................5
General instructions for completing the disclosure template ...........................................5
3.0. Assessment methodology for the principles for FMIs ......................................................7
General considerations ...................................................................................................7
General instructions for completing an assessment of the principles..............................7
Step 1: Determine the appropriate scope of the assessment ................................7
Step 2: Gather facts on each applicable key consideration ...................................9
Step 3: Develop key conclusions for each principle .............................................10
Step 4: Assign a rating for each principle .............................................................10
Step 5: Indicate the appropriate time frame for addressing each issueof concern ...................................................................................................12
Step 6: Prepare an assessment report ................................................................12
4.0. Assessment methodology for the responsibilities of authorities ....................................13
General instructions for completing an assessment of the responsibilities ...................13
Step 1: Determine the appropriate scope of the assessment ..............................13
Step 2: Gather facts on each key consideration ..................................................13
Step 3: Develop key conclusions for each responsibility .....................................14
Step 4: Assign a rating for each responsibility .....................................................14
Step 5: Indicate the appropriate time frame for addressing each issueof concern ...................................................................................................16
Step 6: Prepare an assessment report ................................................................16
5.0. Questions by key consideration for the principles for FMIs ...........................................17
6.0. Questions by key consideration for the responsibilities of authorities for FMIs .............75

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012v

Annex A: FMI disclosure template ......................................................................................... 82
Annex B: Assessment report template on the observance of the principles for FMIs ............ 84
Annex C: Assessment report template on the observance of the responsibilities ofauthorities for FMIs ....................................................................................................... 88
Annex D: Country assessment report template on observance of the principles
for FMIs and responsibilities of authorities ................................................................... 91
Annex E: Members of the CPSS-IOSCO review of standards ............................................... 99vi

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Abbreviations
CCP

central counterparty

CPSS

Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems

CSD

central securities depository

DNS

deferred net settlement

DvD

delivery versus delivery

DvP

delivery versus payment

FMI

financial market infrastructure

FSAP

Financial Sector Assessment Program

IFI

international financial institution

IMF

International Monetary Fund

IOSCO

International Organization of Securities Commissions

IT

information technology

LVPS

large-value payment system

PFMI

Principles for financial market infrastructuresPS

payment system

PvP

payment versus payment

repo

repurchase agreement

RTGS

real-time gross settlement

SSS

securities settlement systemTR

trade repository

WB

World Bank

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012vii

1.0.

Introduction

1.1.
The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) have developed this supplemental reporton the Principles for financial market infrastructures. The present report contains theDisclosure framework for financial market infrastructures (“disclosure framework”) and theAssessment methodology for the principles for FMIs and the responsibilities of authorities(“assessment methodology”), which aim to promote the observance of the principles andresponsibilities set forth in the CPSS-IOSCO report Principles for financial market
infrastructures (PFMI), published in April 2012. The PFMI provided new international
standards for financial market infrastructures (FMIs), including payment systems (PSs) thatare systemically important, central securities depositories (CSDs), securities settlement
systems (SSSs), central counterparties (CCPs) and trade repositories (TRs). The PFMI also
set forth five responsibilities of central banks, market regulators and other relevant authorities
for FMIs as they relate to the regulation, supervision and oversight of FMIs.
1.2.
The disclosure framework and assessment methodology in the present report weredeveloped in parallel with and as adjuncts to the PFMI. 1 The two reports were published forcomment in April 2012. In response to comments, the two documents have been
consolidated into a single, final report. Accordingly, the disclosure framework andassessment methodology in this report and the PFMI report should be taken together as
closely related and supporting documents. Together, they serve to support consistent
implementation and application of the PFMI. The disclosure framework is an importantcomponent of the set of disclosures which, together with key quantitative information, is
expected of FMIs. The disclosure framework also serves as a key input to the assessment
methodology. The assessment methodology provides guidance to assessors for evaluating
observance of the 24 principles and five responsibilities set forth in the PFMI. The disclosure
framework and assessment methodology are designed to promote greater transparency,
objectivity and comparability of assessments of observance of the PFMI.
Purpose of the disclosure framework and assessment methodology
1.3.
The PFMI requires that an FMI provide relevant information to participants, relevant
authorities and the broader public. In particular, Principle 23 on the disclosure of rules, key
procedures and market data states that an FMI should provide sufficient information to
enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks and costs they incur byparticipating in the FMI. The disclosure framework prescribes the form and content of the
public disclosures expected of FMIs under key consideration 5 of Principle 23. Standardised
FMI disclosure practices will allow for more-robust comparisons of FMIs by participants,
authorities and the broader public. In addition, the CPSS and IOSCO are developing aseparate set of key quantitative information disclosures that particular types of FMIs would
be expected to update more frequently than the disclosure framework.
1.4.
Also, the PFMI states that all FMIs should observe the principles and that all relevant
authorities should observe the responsibilities to the fullest extent allowed by the legal
framework in their jurisdiction. In order to promote and monitor observance of the principles
and responsibilities, the assessment methodology provides guidance to assessors on how to
conduct assessments of observance against the PFMI. For the principles, the goal of the1

The World Bank and International Monetary Fund co-chaired the working group that developed theassessment methodology. Working group members were experienced experts who collectively have
performed numerous assessments through the Financial Sector Assessment Program and other diagnostics
of payment systems, CSDs, SSSs and CCPs as external assessors and as overseers of national andinternational systems.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 20121

assessment methodology is to determine whether and how well an FMI observes theprinciples and to help identify potential opportunities for improvement. For the
responsibilities, the goal of the assessment methodology is to determine whether and how
well authorities fulfil their regulatory, supervisory and oversight responsibilities for FMIs andto help identify potential opportunities for improvement.
1.5.
The disclosure framework and the assessment methodology are distinct sections in
the report serving two different purposes and audiences. The sections, however, are closelyinterrelated. The disclosure framework uses the questions that have been developed for theassessment methodology to provide guidance for a comprehensive disclosure of the FMI’s
risks and risk management and other practices. In addition, the assessment methodology
uses the disclosure framework as one of the sources of information for assessments of FMIs.
Use of the disclosure framework
1.6.
Through the publication of the disclosure framework, the CPSS and IOSCO intend topromote the disclosure of information by all FMIs to facilitate implementation and ongoingobservance of the PFMI. Further, the disclosure framework is intended to promote a baselevel of transparency for information about FMIs. This transparency is intended to assist
participants, authorities and the broader public in better understanding the activities of an
FMI, its risk profile and its risk management practices and will thus support sound decisionmaking by FMIs and their stakeholders. In this way, the disclosure framework will achieve thegreater public policy goal of strengthening financial stability.
Use of the assessment methodology
1.7.
Through the publication of the assessment methodology, the CPSS and IOSCO
intend to promote consistent implementation and ongoing observance of the principles for
FMIs and responsibilities of authorities. Although specific objectives may differ byassessment, a common goal among all assessors is to determine whether and how well an
FMI observes the principles or an authority fulfils the responsibilities. In addition, theassessment methodology serves to promote full observance of the principles and fulfilmentof the responsibilities by allowing assessors to identify issues of concern that should be
addressed.
Use by FMIs
1.8.
The assessment methodology may serve as a useful tool for an FMI in its decisionmaking process. For example, when considering the introduction of new products or services
or major changes to its policies, rules or procedures, an FMI may refer to the assessment
methodology to ensure that the proposed changes will not hamper its effectiveness inobserving the PFMI. Additionally, where consistent with national practice, an FMI may use
the assessment methodology to conduct formal periodic full or partial self-assessments ofobservance of the principles. Such assessments may serve to identify matters that require
structural improvement and to prioritise resources to address identified areas of
improvement. Where consistent with national practice, an FMI conducting a self-assessment
should use the assessment methodology rating framework.
Use by authorities
1.9.
Authorities are expected to regularly assess observance of the principles by FMIs in
their respective jurisdictions in connection with their regulatory, supervisory and oversight
responsibilities to ensure consistent implementation and application of the PFMI.
Assessments of an FMI’s observance of the principles may be particularly important for
authorities involved in cooperative arrangements with authorities in other jurisdictions

2

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

regarding multicurrency or cross-border FMIs. In any FMI assessment, an objective forauthorities should be to identify possible risks and recommend actions to mitigate such risks.
1.10. To record the results of assessments of FMIs, an authority may use the assessment
methodology rating framework or another rating framework, in particular when it is legallybound to use a different assessment methodology. If an authority uses a different rating
framework, that framework should be as effective as the assessment methodology rating
framework for assessing FMIs and must enable the authority to form a judgment regarding
the level of observance of the principles. The assessment methodology rating framework is
expected to be used in the context of cross-border cooperative oversight arrangements
unless agreed otherwise by the authorities that participate in such arrangements.
1.11. In addition, authorities may choose to self-assess how effectively they fulfil their
responsibilities as regulators, supervisors and overseers. Authorities are encouraged to
conduct periodic self-assessments of their observance of the responsibilities.
Use by external assessors
1.12. External assessors, including the international financial institutions (IFIs), will use theassessment methodology to determine observance of the principles and responsibilities by
FMIs and authorities. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, inparticular, will use the assessment methodology as part of their Financial Sector Assessment
Program (FSAP) and their technical assistance programmes. In conducting theirassessments, external assessors may have as an objective the identification of risks toglobal financial stability and potential areas for improvement. They may also draw
comparisons at the international level to identify best practices. In addition, they may use theassessment methodology as a tool in the context of technical assistance to identify
development needs and build assessment capacity.
1.13. For FSAPs, the IMF and the World Bank are expected to use the rating frameworkpresented in the assessment methodology. Technical assistance assessors are notnecessarily expected to use a rating framework. They are likely to achieve their goals best bycommunicating outcomes through dialogue with local FMI management and authorities
rather than through formal ratings.
General considerations for conducting assessments
1.14. In assessing observance of the principles and responsibilities, assessors should take
into account a number of general considerations that are critical to an effective and efficient
assessment.
Access to information
1.15. Assessors should have access to relevant information and stakeholders when
conducting an assessment. Relevant information may include public information (such as
relevant laws, regulations and policies) and non-public information (such as internal selfassessments, policies, procedures, data, metrics and supervisory reports). Relevant
stakeholders may include individuals (such as management and auditors), organisations(such as market participants and industry associations) and authorities.
Assessment of the FMI’s actual practices
1.16. Assessors should place a strong emphasis on the FMI’s actual practices to ensure its
safety and soundness. Assessors should evaluate not only the legal and regulatory
framework and the rules of the FMI, but also the ways such legislation and rules are appliedand achieved in practice within the jurisdiction.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 20123

Assessment of market-wide recommendations
1.17. As indicated in Annex C of the PFMI, market-wide recommendations on tradeconfirmation, settlement cycles, CCPs and securities lending from the CPSS-IOSCO
Recommendations for securities settlement systems were not included in the review ofstandards for FMIs. These recommendations and the related assessment methodology
remain in effect.
Assessors’ background, experience and training
1.18. Assessors should have sufficient background, experience and training to carry out anassessment. Qualified individuals should possess practical market and technical experienceand have sufficient knowledge of the FMI or authority being assessed.
Organisation of the report
1.19. This report has six sections. Following this introduction (Section 1) is the disclosure
framework for FMIs (Section 2). Sections 3 and 4 contain the assessment methodology
framework: Section 3 outlines the assessment methodology for assessing an FMI against the
principles, and Section 4 outlines the assessment methodology for assessing authorities
against the responsibilities. Section 5 contains questions organised by key consideration foreach of the principles. These questions serve both as guiding questions for the disclosure
framework and as key inputs for the assessment methodology. Section 6 contains questionsorganised by key consideration for each of the responsibilities of authorities. Annex A
contains a template for an FMI’s disclosure. Annex B contains a template for an assessment
report on the observance of the principles by an FMI. Annex C contains a template for anassessment report on the observance of the responsibilities by authorities. Finally, Annex D
contains a template for a country assessment report on the observance of the principles by
FMIs and on the observance of the responsibilities by authorities for a particular jurisdiction.

4

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

2.0.

Disclosure framework for FMIs

2.1.
This section describes the disclosure framework that FMIs should complete in orderto observe key consideration 5 of Principle 23 on the disclosure of rules, key procedures andmarket data. The disclosure framework also supports the assessment methodology byproviding assessors with a basic set of facts from which to begin their assessments of FMIs.
Objective of the disclosure framework
2.2.
The objective of the disclosure framework is to improve the overall transparency of
the FMI and its governance, operations and risk management framework for a broad
audience that includes current and prospective participants in the FMI, other market
participants, authorities and the general public. Greater market transparency supports themain public policy objectives of the CPSS and IOSCO to enhance the safety and efficiency inpayment, clearing, settlement and recording arrangements, and, more broadly, to foster
financial stability.
General instructions for completing the disclosure template
2.3.
An FMI should complete the disclosure template outlined in Annex A of this report.
The template requires an FMI to provide:•

an executive summary of the key points from the disclosure;•a summary of the major changes since the last update of the disclosure;•a description of the FMI’s function and the markets it serves; basic data andperformance statistics on its services and operations; and a description of the FMI’s
general organisation, legal and regulatory framework, and system design andoperations;•a comprehensive narrative disclosure for each applicable principle with sufficientdetail and context to enable a reader to understand the FMI’s approach to observing
the principle; and•a list of publicly available resources, including those referenced in the disclosure,that may help a reader understand the FMI and its approach to observing eachapplicable principle.

Charts and diagrams should be included wherever they would be helpful and should beaccompanied by a description that enables them to be easily understood. Whenever thedisclosure references or quotes rules or regulations, it should indicate where the primarysources of those rules or regulations can be found. To determine which principles areapplicable to an FMI for the purposes of the disclosure framework, an FMI should refer toAnnex E of the PFMI. Section 5 of the present report repeats the relevant information foreach principle and, where relevant, each key consideration.
2.4.
The summary narrative disclosure for each principle should provide sufficient detailand context to enable a variety of readers with different backgrounds to understand the FMI’s
approach to observing that principle. The questions in Section 5 are guiding questions for the
key issues that an FMI is expected to address in its summary narrative responses. Although
the questions should guide the summary narrative, an FMI is not necessarily expected toaddress each question individually or to structure its disclosure in a question-and-answer
format. An FMI may also choose to supplement the summary narrative with answers toindividual questions.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

5

2.5.
In addition to this disclosure framework, an FMI should publish a separate set of key
quantitative information to enable stakeholders, including the general public, to evaluate
FMIs and to make cross-comparisons. The CPSS and IOSCO are in the process ofdeveloping the criteria for this disclosure. An FMI is expected to update its quantitative
disclosure more frequently than the summary narrative disclosure component of thedisclosure framework.
2.6.
In order for the disclosures to correctly reflect the FMI’s current rules, procedures andoperations, the FMI should update its responses following material changes to the system or
its environment. At a minimum, an FMI should review its responses every two years toensure continued accuracy and usefulness. An FMI should make its responses to thedisclosure framework readily available through generally accessible media, such as theinternet.

6

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

3.0.

Assessment methodology for the principles for FMIs

3.1.
This section describes the assessment methodology for the principles for FMIs, which
was prepared to assist FMIs, authorities and IFIs in assessing an FMI’s observance of the
PFMI. This assessment methodology is designed to cover all the types of FMIs to which theprinciples apply – that is, systemically important payment systems, CSDs, SSSs, CCPs andTRs.
General considerations
3.2.
In conducting an assessment of an FMI’s observance of the principles, assessors
should take into account a number of considerations, including but not limited to:
Customisation of the assessment for each FMI
3.3.
Assessments will differ by FMI. Assessors may have to exercise some judgment indetermining which activities or functions of an FMI are to be assessed, especially wheremultiple FMIs belong to the same legal entity, where individual FMIs perform multiple
functions, or where the clearing and settlement processes are independent of one another.
Further, as specified in Table 1 and Annex E of the PFMI, certain principles and key
considerations are applicable only to specific types of FMIs. For example, the PFMI reflects
the fact that TRs do not face credit or liquidity risks, and therefore the principles and key
considerations pertaining to these risks do not apply to TRs. Likewise, the assessment
methodology specifies, in a manner consistent with the PFMI, the types of FMIs to which theassessment questions apply.
Applicability of the assessment methodology to public sector-owned FMIs
3.4.
The assessment methodology is intended to assist assessors in correctly applying theprinciples to both private and public sector FMIs, taking into account differences in ownership
structures and organisational forms. The principles are applicable to FMIs owned or operated
by the public sector, in particular central banks. In general, central banks and other public
sector entities should apply the same standards to FMIs that they own or operate as thosethat are applied to similar private sector FMIs. However, because of the circumstances of
their ownership, public sector FMIs are outside the scope of some assessment questions
and require specific guidance under a few principles. Appropriate questions have beenformulated to help assess observance by public sector-owned FMIs.
General instructions for completing an assessment of the principles
3.5.
There are the six steps involved in an assessment of the principles: (1) determine theappropriate scope of an assessment; (2) gather facts on each applicable key consideration;(3) develop key conclusions for each principle; (4) assign a rating for each principle;(5) indicate an appropriate time frame for addressing each identified issue of concern, if any,
including a discussion of priorities; and (6) prepare an assessment report.
Step 1: Determine the appropriate scope of the assessment
3.6.
Assessors should give careful consideration to the scope of the assessment. The
scope of the assessment should include determining which FMIs to assess, which FMI
operations and services to assess, and which principles to assess. This scope should beclearly communicated to the assessed FMIs in advance of the assessment being
undertaken.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 20127

Determining which FMIs to assess
3.7.
According to the PFMI, authorities for FMIs are expected to regularly assess FMIs
that are deemed systemically important. As noted in the PFMI, statutory definitions ofsystemic importance may vary somewhat across jurisdictions, but in general a payment
system is systemically important if it has the potential to trigger or transmit systemic
disruptions. The presumption is that all CSDs, SSSs, CCPs and TRs are systemicallyimportant, at least in the jurisdiction where they are located.
3.8.
External assessors will typically rely on the domestic authorities’ designation of FMIs
as systemically important but may define certain FMIs as being outside the scope of theassessment (for example, national FMIs processing small-value transactions that pose little
contagion risk outside the domestic jurisdiction). Further, external assessors may choose tofocus on the FMIs that are the most relevant to global financial stability.
Determining which FMI operations and services to assess
3.9.
Each FMI should be assessed separately. According to the PFMI, an FMI is defined
as a multilateral system among participating financial institutions, including the operator of
the system, used for the purposes of recording, clearing or settling payments, securities,
derivatives or other financial transactions. 2 FMIs can differ significantly in organisation,function and design. FMIs can be legally organised in a variety of forms, including
associations of financial institutions, non-bank clearing corporations and specialised banking
organisations. They can be defined as separate legal entities or parts of another legal entity.
3.10. Assessors must determine which of the FMI’s operations and services are within
scope and identify the entity to be assessed for each assessment (such as a legal entity, partof a legal entity or several legal entities). If the FMI subject to the assessment hasestablished links to settle cross-border trades, assessors may need to consider how best tocoordinate with the authorities in those relevant jurisdictions if such coordination is essential
for completing the assessment.
3.11. The following examples illustrate how the complexity of FMIs’ arrangements could be
addressed to clearly define an assessment scope that is consistent with the application of thefunctional definition of an FMI.
•

Two or more FMIs operate under one entity. A single operator might operate two
FMIs that fulfil clearly distinct roles and only share some arrangements, such as asingle operator that operates both a CSD and an RTGS system. If the CSD and
RTGS system share the same legal and governance arrangements but use different
operational and risk management arrangements, the two key functions could beassessed separately.

•

Two or more FMIs are integrated into one entity. A single operator might operate
two FMIs whose key functions are highly interrelated and complementary, such as a
CSD that operates an SSS. If the CSD and SSS share the same legal andgovernance arrangements and use highly integrated operational and risk
management arrangements, then the two key functions could be assessed as if they
were one FMI.

2

The general analytical approach of the PFMI and the assessment methodology is to consider FMIs as
multilateral systems, inclusive of their participants, as stated in the definition of FMI. In market parlance,
however, the term FMI may be used to refer only to a legal or functional entity that is set up to carry out
centralised, multilateral payment, clearing, settlement or recording activities and, in some contexts, may
exclude the participants that use the system. This difference in terminology or usage may introduce ambiguity
at certain points in the PFMI. To address this issue, the PFMI and this assessment methodology may refer toan FMI and its participants, or to an FMI including its participants, to emphasise the coverage of a principle orother text where this is not clear from the context. The definition of FMIs excludes bilateral relationships
between financial institutions and their customers, such as traditional correspondent banking.

8

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012•One FMI serves different markets with different arrangements. The assessment of
the FMI can be split into separate assessments if the FMI has developed clearly
distinct arrangements for the different markets it serves.

In each of these cases, assessors should identify and address, as appropriate, anyinterdependencies.
Determining which principles to assess
3.12. An assessment might be conducted (a) against all relevant principles as part of aperiodic comprehensive review of an FMI’s safety and efficiency, (b) against one or moreindividual principles that relate to a proposed new service offering or a proposed materialchange to an FMI’s risk management framework, (c) against one or more individual
principles that may be targeted for a thematic (or “horizontal”) review across one or more
FMIs, or (d) against one or more individual principles that are relevant to certain problems
identified before the assessment and may be targeted at one or more FMIs.
Step 2: Gather facts on each applicable key consideration
3.13. Assessors should gather sufficient facts to be able to develop key conclusions foreach principle. Section 5 of this report contains questions organised by key consideration foreach of the 24 principles. These questions are tools to help assessors gather facts todetermine whether an FMI is observing the principles. Additionally, the information collection
process may serve as an early indicator of the extent to which the FMI being assessed ismeeting expectations for providing access to information.
3.14. The questions outlined in Section 5 are intended to inform and guide the judgment ofassessors, not to replace it. 3 Assessors’ questions and efforts should focus on the issues
where risk is greatest, and risk assessment is most valuable when it is forward-looking andbased on sound judgment. The questions are not intended to serve purely as a checklist.
Moreover, the questions are not intended to be exhaustive, and assessors could, at theirdiscretion, pose additional or different questions as needed, in particular to address thedifferent levels of complexity of the FMI. In some instances, assessors may want to modify
specific questions to reflect particular risk factors or circumstances specific to theassessment. The list of questions used by assessors should provide at least a level of
information equivalent to that included in the assessment methodology.
3.15. In order to build a contextual base for developing key conclusions and assigning
ratings, assessors should develop a general understanding of an FMI’s basic businessactivities, operations and services, processes, rules and procedures. Therefore, assessors
should keep in mind the following overarching questions for each principle during theassessment:
1.

What is the FMI’s approach or method for observing the principle?

2.

What analyses, processes and rationale does the FMI use to ensure theeffectiveness of its approach or method for observing the principle?

3.

How does the FMI measure and monitor its ongoing performance in observing theprinciple?

4.

What other evidence is available to help monitor the FMI’s ongoing performance inobserving the principle?

3

The questions included in the assessment methodology may be revised in the future to ensure that they stay
up to date.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 20129

Step 3: Develop key conclusions for each principle
3.16. Key conclusions are an assessor’s overall determination of the extent to which aprinciple is observed by the FMI being assessed. Key conclusions should be drawn for eachapplicable principle and should be provided in the form of a narrative summary based on thefacts gathered by assessors. When drawing a key conclusion, assessors should:
1.

Summarise the FMI’s practices and achievements, as warranted.

2.

Identify any gaps or shortcomings as they emerge from the facts gathered byassessors.

3.

For each gap or shortcoming, describe any associated risks or other issues and theimplications for observing the principle.

4.

For each gap or shortcoming, determine if it is an issue of concern based on theassociated risks and issues. An issue of concern is a risk management flaw, adeficiency, or a lack of transparency or effectiveness that needs to be addressed.
Assessors should distinguish between the three categories of issues of concern: (a)issues of concern that are serious and warrant immediate attention; (b) issues ofconcern that could become serious if not addressed promptly; and (c) issues ofconcern that should be addressed in a defined timeline.

Key conclusions will serve as building blocks for assigning a rating as described in step 4.
Step 4: Assign a rating for each principle
3.17. This assessment methodology rating framework provides guidance for assigning a
rating to each principle. The IFIs will use this rating framework, particularly in the FSAP
context. National authorities may also use this rating framework for their own assessments,
as appropriate (see paragraph 1.10). Ratings are assigned at the level of each principle.
Rating framework for assessments of principles
3.18. The rating framework is built on the gravity and urgency of the need to remedy
identified issues of concern.
Observed

The FMI observes the principle. Any identified gaps and shortcomings
are not issues of concern and are minor, manageable and of a naturethat the FMI could consider taking them up in the normal course of its
business.

Broadlyobserved

The FMI broadly observes the principle. The assessment has identified
one or more issues of concern that the FMI should address and follow
up on in a defined timeline.

Partly observed

The FMI partly observes the principle. The assessment has identified
one or more issues of concern that could become serious if notaddressed promptly. The FMI should accord a high priority toaddressing these issues.

Not observed

The FMI does not observe the principle. The assessment has identified
one or more serious issues of concern that warrant immediate action.
Therefore, the FMI should accord the highest priority to addressingthese issues.

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CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Not applicable

The principle does not apply to the type of FMI being assessed becauseof the particular legal, institutional, structural or other characteristics ofthe FMI. 4

Guidance on the assignment of ratings
3.19. Assessors should assign ratings to reflect conditions at the time of the assessment.
The rating is built on the key conclusions and reflects the assessors’ judgment regarding thetype or impact of the risks and other issues associated with each identified gap or
shortcoming. Plans for improvements should be noted in the assessment report, whereappropriate, but should not influence judgments about observance of the principles.
3.20. The assessment should note instances where observance of a particular principle
could not be adequately assessed and explain why. For example, certain information may
not have been provided, or key individuals or institutions may have been unavailable todiscuss important issues. Unsatisfied requests for information or meetings should be
documented in writing. In such cases, the assessors may treat such information gaps as
evidence of a concern.
3.21. In determining a rating for a principle, assessors should first identify whether the
principle is not applicable. This is the case when a principle does not apply to the type of FMI
being assessed (for example, Principle 4 on credit risk for a TR and Principle 6 on margin fora payment system). This can also be the case when the principle applies to the type of FMI
being assessed but the specific, legal, institutional, structural or other characteristics of the
FMI’s jurisdiction or design make the principle irrelevant (for example, Principle 4 on credit
risk for an RTGS system with no (intraday) credit provided to participants).
3.22. When rating observance of an applicable principle, assessors should determine
whether it is observed. For a principle to be observed, any identified gaps or shortcomings
should not be issues of concern and should be minor, manageable and of a nature that the
FMI could consider taking them up in the normal course of business. When a principle is not
fully observed, assessors must decide on the degree of observance. Ratings should take into
account not only the number of issues identified but also the level of concern they present. It
is important to note that there may be multiple issues with differing degrees of concern. In
such cases, the assessor typically should assign the principle a rating that reflects theassessor’s judgment of the severity of the most serious concerns identified:•

If the assessment has identified one or more serious issues of concern that warrant
immediate action and therefore should be addressed with the highest priority, theprinciple should be rated as “not observed”.

•

If the above condition does not apply and the assessment has identified one or moreissues of concern that could become serious if not addressed promptly and thatshould be addressed with a high priority, the principle should be rated as “partly
observed”.

•

If the above conditions do not apply and the assessment has identified one or moreissues of concern that the FMI should address and follow up on in a defined
timeline, the principle should be rated as “broadly observed”.

Assessors, however, should ensure that the rating appropriately reflects the circumstances.
For example, in some cases, the combination of a number of smaller gaps or shortcomings
may form an issue of concern.

4

The case of a principle not being assessed does not fall within this category. A list of principles not covered in
the assessment, and an accompanying explanation of the reasons for the exclusion, are part of theintroduction to the assessment (see, for example, the introduction to Annex B).

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201211

Step 5: Indicate the appropriate time frame for addressing each issue of concern
3.23. An assessment report should conclude with (a) a clear identification of the issues ofconcern that need to be addressed, if any, and (b) an indication of an appropriate time frame
for addressing each identified issue of concern. In preparing recommendations for a principlethat is not rated as “observed”, assessors should provide recommendations that address any
identified issues of concern and serve to improve the FMI’s level of observance of theprinciple.
3.24. There is no simple process for defining an appropriate time frame, but some basic
steps may be useful to consider. Assessors should identify the areas in which less than fullobservance of principles may lead to serious concerns. The CPSS and IOSCO have notassigned degrees of importance to the individual principles because the principles as a groupcontribute to the safety and efficiency of the FMI. Assessors will have to come to anunderstanding of priorities based upon their judgment as to the deficiencies that pose thegreatest risks or greatest lack of transparency or effectiveness to the FMI.
3.25. Having identified priority areas, assessors should then determine the actions neededin each area. In the case of assessments completed by domestic authorities, the FMI itself isoften expected to prepare an action plan for review by the authorities. In the case of
assessments completed by external assessors, the assessors often prepare
recommendations and discuss them with the relevant authorities. A reasonable time frame inwhich an issue of concern should be addressed should also be specified.
3.26. Where appropriate, assessors should also provide recommendations that serve torectify any gaps or shortcomings that are not issues of concern. There is no requirement or
specified timeline for implementing these recommendations, and the FMI could consider
taking them up in the normal course of its business.
Step 6: Prepare an assessment report
3.27. An assessment report template for assessing an FMI against the principles isprovided in Annex B. An assessment report template for assessing a country’s FMIs andauthorities against the principles and responsibilities is provided in Annex D.

12CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

4.0.

Assessment methodology for the responsibilities of authorities

4.1.
This section describes the assessment methodology for the responsibilities ofauthorities for FMIs and for assisting authorities and IFIs in assessing a jurisdiction’sobservance of the PFMI. This assessment methodology may be used to assess authorities
individually and collectively. The IFIs, in the context of an FSAP, will assess authorities at thejurisdictional level.
General instructions for completing an assessment of the responsibilities
4.2.
There are six steps involved in an assessment of the responsibilities: (1) determine
the appropriate scope of an assessment; (2) gather facts on each key consideration;(3) develop key conclusions for each responsibility; (4) assign a rating for each responsibility;(5) indicate an appropriate time frame for addressing each issue of concern, if any, including
a discussion of priorities; and (6) prepare an assessment report.
Step 1: Determine the appropriate scope of the assessment
4.3.
Assessors should give careful consideration to the scope of the assessment. The
scope should be clearly communicated to the assessed authorities in advance of theassessment being undertaken.
Determining which authorities to assess
4.4.
In general, authorities should be assessed at a jurisdictional level and not at the levelof the individual regulatory, supervisory or oversight authority. This allows assessors to
perform a comprehensive assessment of the authorities’ observance of the responsibilities
and to identify potential regulatory gaps or overlaps in the jurisdiction. This approach isconsistent with Responsibility E, which deals with, among other things, cooperation between
domestic authorities. Also, this approach does not preclude that some actions be addressed
to a specific authority within the country’s oversight framework or to a particular type of FMI.
In addition, authorities may wish to assess, jointly or individually, the jurisdiction’s own
observance of the responsibilities.
4.5.
There may, however, be situations where assessing the regulatory, supervisory andoversight framework that applies to a specific FMI is appropriate, such as in cases of FMIs
with cross-border activity. Foreign authorities, for example, may be interested not only in thegeneral adherence of the domestic authorities to the responsibilities but also in a more
specific assessment of the way the responsibilities are applied with respect to a particular
FMI. It may also be appropriate to assess the responsibilities in conjunction with a categoryof FMIs (for example, to understand how national authorities fulfil their responsibilities
towards CCPs).
Step 2: Gather facts on each key consideration
4.6.
Assessors should gather sufficient facts in order to develop key conclusions for each
responsibility. Section 6 of this report contains questions organised by the key considerationfor each of the five responsibilities. These questions are tools to help assessors gather facts
to determine whether authorities are fulfilling the responsibilities. Additionally, the informationcollection process may serve as an early indicator of the extent to which the authorities being
assessed are meeting expectations for providing access to information.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

13

4.7.
The questions outlined in Section 6 are intended to inform and guide the judgment ofassessors, not to replace it. 5 The questions are not intended to serve purely as a checklist.
Moreover, the questions are not intended to be exhaustive, and assessors could, at theirdiscretion, pose additional or different questions as needed. In some instances, assessors
may want to modify specific questions to reflect circumstances specific to the assessment.
The list of questions used by assessors should provide at least a level of informationequivalent to that included in the assessment methodology.
4.8.
In order to build a contextual base for developing key conclusions and assigning
ratings, assessors should develop a general understanding of the authorities’ jurisdiction,
rules and processes. Therefore, assessors should keep in mind the following overarchingquestions for each responsibility during the assessment:
1.

What is the authorities’ approach or method for observing the responsibility?

2.

What analyses, processes and rationale do the authorities use to ensure theeffectiveness of their approach or method for observing the responsibility?

3.

How do the authorities measure and monitor their ongoing performance in observing
the responsibility?

4.

What other evidence is available to help monitor the authorities’ ongoing
performance in observing the responsibility?

Step 3: Develop key conclusions for each responsibility
4.9.
Key conclusions are an assessor’s overall determination of the extent to which theintent of a responsibility is observed by the authorities being assessed. Key conclusions
should be drawn for each responsibility and should be provided in the form of a narrative
summary based on the facts gathered by assessors. When drawing a key conclusion,assessors should:
1.

Summarise the authorities’ practices and achievements, as warranted.

2.

Identify any gaps or shortcomings as they emerge from the facts gathered byassessors.

3.

For each gap or shortcoming, describe any associated risks or other issues and theimplications for observing the responsibility.

4.

For each gap or shortcoming, determine if it is an issue of concern based on theassociated risks and issues. An issue of concern is an oversight or supervisory flaw,
a deficiency, or a lack of transparency or effectiveness that needs to be addressed.
Assessors should distinguish between the three categories of issues of concern: (a)issues of concern that are serious and warrant immediate attention; (b) issues ofconcern that could become serious if not addressed promptly; and (c) issues ofconcern that should be addressed in a defined timeline.

Key conclusions will serve as building blocks for assigning a rating as described in step 4.
Step 4: Assign a rating for each responsibility
4.10. This assessment methodology rating framework provides guidance for assigning a
rating to each responsibility. The IFIs will use this rating framework, particularly in the FSAP
context. National authorities may also use this rating framework for their own selfassessments. Ratings are assigned at the level of each responsibility.

5

The questions included in the assessment methodology may be revised in the future to ensure that they stay
up to date.

14

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Rating framework for assessments of responsibilities
4.11. The rating framework is built on the gravity and urgency of the need to remedy
identified issues of concern.
Observed

The authorities fulfil the responsibility. Any identified gaps andshortcomings are not issues of concern and are minor, manageable
and of a nature that the authorities could consider taking them up in thenormal conduct of their activities.

Broadly observed

The authorities broadly fulfil the responsibility. The assessment has
identified one or more issues of concern that the authorities should
address and follow up on in a defined timeline.

Partly observed

The authorities partly fulfil the responsibility. The assessment has
identified one or more issues of concern that could become serious if
not addressed promptly. The authorities to which these concerns apply
should accord a high priority to addressing these issues.

Not observed

The authorities do not fulfil the responsibility. The assessment has
identified one or more serious issues of concern that warrant immediate
action. Therefore, the authorities to which these concerns apply should
accord the highest priority to addressing these issues.

Not applicable

The responsibility does not apply to the authorities because of theparticular institutional framework or other conditions faced by theauthorities with respect to this responsibility. 6

Guidance on the assignment of ratings
4.12. Assessors should assign ratings to reflect conditions at the time of the assessment.
The rating is built on the key conclusions and reflects assessors’ judgment regarding the typeor impact of the risks and other issues associated with each identified gap or shortcoming.
Plans for improvements should be noted in the assessment report, where appropriate, butshould not influence judgments about observance of the responsibilities.
4.13. The assessment should note instances where observance of a particularresponsibility could not be adequately assessed and explain why. For example, certain
information may not have been provided or key individuals or institutions may have been
unavailable to discuss important issues. Unsatisfied requests for information or meetings
should be documented in writing. In such cases, the assessors may treat such information
gaps as evidence of a concern.
4.14. When rating observance of a responsibility, assessors should first determine whether
it is observed. For a responsibility to be observed, any identified gaps or shortcomings
should not be issues of concern and should be minor, manageable and of a nature that theauthorities can consider taking them up in the normal conduct of their activities. When the
responsibility is not fully observed, assessors must decide on the degree of observance.
Ratings should take into account not only the number of issues identified but also the level ofconcern they present. It is important to note that there may be multiple issues with differing
degrees of concern. In such cases, the assessor typically should assign the responsibility arating that reflects the assessor’s judgment of the severity of the most serious concerns
identified:

6

The case of a responsibility not being assessed does not fall within this category. A list of responsibilities notcovered in the assessment, and an accompanying explanation of the reasons for the exclusion, are part ofthe introduction to the assessment (see, for example, the introduction to Annex C).

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201215

•If the assessment has identified one or more serious issues of concern that warrant
immediate action and therefore should be addressed with the highest priority, theresponsibility should be rated as “not observed”.

•

If the above condition does not apply and the assessment has identified one or moreissues of concern that could become serious if not addressed promptly and thatshould be addressed with a high priority, the responsibility should be rated as “partly
observed”.

•

If the above conditions do not apply and the assessment has identified one or moreissues of concern that authorities should address and follow up on in a defined
timeline, the responsibility should be rated as “broadly observed”.

Assessors, however, should ensure that the rating appropriately reflects the circumstances.
For example, in some cases, the combination of a number of smaller gaps or shortcomings
may form an issue of concern.
Step 5: Indicate the appropriate time frame for addressing each issue of concern
4.15. An assessment report should conclude with (a) a clear identification of the issues ofconcern that need to be addressed, if any, (b) an indication of an appropriate time frame foraddressing each identified issue of concern, and (c) an identification of the parties that are
best positioned to address each identified issue of concern. In preparing recommendations
for a responsibility that is not rated as “observed”, assessors should provide
recommendations that address any identified issues of concern and serve to improve theauthorities’ level of observance of the responsibility. Assessors should also indicate to whomthese recommendations are addressed.
4.16. There is no simple process for defining an appropriate time frame, but some basic
steps may be useful to consider. Assessors should identify the areas in which less than fullobservance of the responsibilities leads to serious concerns. The CPSS and IOSCO havenot assigned degrees of importance to the individual responsibilities because theresponsibilities as a group contribute to the safety and efficiency of FMIs. Assessors will
have to come to an understanding of priorities based upon their judgment as to thedeficiencies that pose the greatest risks or greatest lack of transparency or effectiveness of
the authorities.
4.17. Having identified priority areas, assessors should then determine the actions neededin each area. Where domestic authorities conduct self-assessments, they should prepare theaction plan themselves. In the case of assessments completed by external assessors, theassessors often prepare recommendations and discuss them with the authorities. In eachcase, the party best positioned to initiate each action or recommendation should be
identified. A reasonable time frame in which an issue of concern should be addressed should
also be specified.
4.18. Where appropriate, assessors should also provide recommendations that serve torectify any gaps or shortcomings that are not issues of concern. There is no requirement or
specified timeline for implementing these recommendations, and the authorities could
consider taking them up in the normal course of their activities.
Step 6: Prepare an assessment report
4.19. An assessment report template for assessing authorities against the responsibilities isprovided in Annex C. An assessment report template for assessing a country’s FMIs andauthorities against the principles and responsibilities is provided in Annex D.

16

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

5.0.

Questions by key consideration for the principles for FMIs

PS
●

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR
●

Principle 1: Legal basis
An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis foreach material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.
As a robust legal basis for an FMI’s activities in all relevant jurisdictions is critical to an FMI’s
overall soundness, this principle should be reviewed holistically with the other principles.
Key consideration 1: The legal basis should provide a high degree of certainty foreach material aspect of an FMI’s activities in all relevant jurisdictions.
Material aspects and relevant jurisdictions
Q.1.1.1:

What are the material aspects of the FMI’s activities that require a high degreeof legal certainty (for example, rights and interests in financial instruments;
settlement finality; netting; interoperability; immobilisation and dematerialisationof securities; arrangements for DvP, PvP or DvD; collateral arrangements(including margin arrangements); and default procedures)?

Q.1.1.2:

What are the relevant jurisdictions for each material aspect of the FMI’s
activities?

Legal basis for each material aspect
Q.1.1.3:

How does the FMI ensure that its legal basis (that is, the legal framework andthe FMI’s rules, procedures and contracts) provides a high degree of legal
certainty for each material aspect of the FMI’s activities in all relevant
jurisdictions?
a)

For an FMI that is a CSD, how does the CSD ensure that its legal basis
supports the immobilisation or dematerialisation of securities and thetransfer of securities by book entry?

b)

For an FMI that is a CCP, how does the CCP ensure that its legal basis
enables it to act as a CCP, including the legal basis for novation, open
offer or other similar legal device? Does the CCP state whether novation,
open offer or other similar legal device can be revoked or modified? If yes,in which circumstances?

c)

For an FMI that is a TR, how does the TR ensure that its legal basis
protects the records it maintains? How does the legal basis define therights of relevant stakeholders with respect to access, confidentiality anddisclosure of data?

d)

For an FMI that has a netting arrangement, how does the FMI ensure thatits legal basis supports the enforceability of that arrangement?

e)Where settlement finality occurs in an FMI, how does the FMI ensure thatits legal basis supports the finality of transactions, including those of an
insolvent participant? Does the legal basis for the external settlement
mechanisms the FMI uses, such as funds transfer or securities transfer
systems, also support this finality?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201217

Key consideration 2: An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that areclear, understandable, and consistent with relevant laws and regulations.
Q.1.2.1:

How has the FMI demonstrated that its rules, procedures and contracts areclear and understandable?

Q.1.2.2:

How does the FMI ensure that its rules, procedures and contracts are consistent
with relevant laws and regulations (for example, through legal opinions or
analyses)? Have any inconsistencies been identified and remedied? Are the
FMI’s rules, procedures and contracts reviewed or assessed by external
authorities or entities?

Q.1.2.3:

Do the FMI’s rules, procedures and contracts have to be approved before
coming into effect? If so, by whom and how?

Key consideration 3: An FMI should be able to articulate the legal basis for its
activities to relevant authorities, participants, and, where relevant, participants’customers, in a clear and understandable way.
Q.1.3.1:

How does the FMI articulate the legal basis for its activities to relevant
authorities, participants and, where relevant, participants’ customers?

Key consideration 4: An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are
enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions. There should be a high degree of certainty
that actions taken by the FMI under such rules and procedures will not be voided,
reversed, or subject to stays.
Enforceability of rules, procedures and contracts
Q.1.4.1:

How does the FMI achieve a high level of confidence that the rules, procedures
and contracts related to its operations are enforceable in all relevant
jurisdictions identified in key consideration 1 (for example, through legal
opinions and analyses)?

Degree of certainty for rules and procedures
Q.1.4.2:

How does the FMI achieve a high degree of certainty that its rules, procedures
and contracts will not be voided, reversed or subject to stays? Are there any
circumstances in which an FMI’s actions under its rules, procedures or contracts
could be voided, reversed or subject to stays? If so, what are thosecircumstances?

Q.1.4.3:

Has a court in any relevant jurisdiction ever held any of the FMI’s relevant
activities or arrangements under its rules and procedures to be unenforceable?

Key consideration 5: An FMI conducting business in multiple jurisdictions should
identify and mitigate the risks arising from any potential conflict of laws acrossjurisdictions.
Q.1.5.1:

18

If the FMI is conducting business in multiple jurisdictions, how does the FMI
identify and analyse any potential conflict-of-laws issues? When uncertainty
exists regarding the enforceability of an FMI’s choice of law in relevant
jurisdictions, has the FMI obtained an independent legal analysis of potential
conflict-of-laws issues? What potential conflict-of-laws issues has the FMI
identified and analysed? How has the FMI addressed any potential conflict-oflaws issues?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

PS
●

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR
●

Principle 2: Governance
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote
the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial
system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant
stakeholders.
In reviewing this principle, it should be noted that if an FMI is wholly owned or controlled byanother entity, the governance arrangements of that entity should also be reviewed to ensurethat they do not have adverse effects on the FMI’s observance of this principle. As
governance provides the processes through which an organisation sets its objectives,
determines the means for achieving those objectives and monitors performance against
those objectives, this principle should reviewed holistically with the other principles.
Key consideration 1: An FMI should have objectives that place a high priority on thesafety and efficiency of the FMI and explicitly support financial stability and otherrelevant public interest considerations.
Q.2.1.1:

What are the FMI’s objectives, and are they clearly identified? How does the
FMI assess its performance in meeting its objectives?

Q.2.1.2:

How do the FMI’s objectives place a high priority on safety and efficiency? How
do the FMI’s objectives explicitly support financial stability and other relevantpublic interest considerations?

Key consideration 2: An FMI should have documented governance arrangements thatprovide clear and direct lines of responsibility and accountability. These arrangements
should be disclosed to owners, relevant authorities, participants, and, at a moregeneral level, the public.
Governance arrangements
Q.2.2.1:

What are the governance arrangements under which the FMI’s board of
directors (or equivalent) and management operate? What are the lines of
responsibility and accountability within the FMI? How and where are thesearrangements documented?

Q.2.2.2:

For central bank-operated systems, how do governance arrangements address
any possible or perceived conflicts of interest? To what extent do governancearrangements allow for a separation of the operator and oversight functions?

Q.2.2.3:

How does the FMI provide accountability to owners, participants and otherrelevant stakeholders?

Disclosure of governance arrangements
Q.2.2.4:

How are the governance arrangements disclosed to owners, relevant
authorities, participants and, at a more general level, the public?

Key consideration 3: The roles and responsibilities of an FMI’s board of directors (orequivalent) should be clearly specified, and there should be documented proceduresfor its functioning, including procedures to identify, address, and manage member

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201219

conflicts of interest. The board should review both its overall performance and theperformance of its individual board members regularly.
Roles and responsibilities of the board
Q.2.3.1:

What are the roles and responsibilities of the FMI’s board of directors (orequivalent), and are they clearly specified?

Q.2.3.2:

What are the board’s procedures for its functioning, including procedures to
identify, address and manage member conflicts of interest? How are theseprocedures documented, and to whom are they disclosed? How frequently are
they reviewed?

Q.2.3.3:

Describe the board committees that have been established to facilitate thefunctioning of the board. What are the roles, responsibilities and composition ofsuch committees?

Review of performance
Q.2.3.4:

What are the procedures established to review the performance of the board asa whole and the performance of the individual board members?

Key consideration 4: The board should contain suitable members with the appropriate
skills and incentives to fulfil its multiple roles. This typically requires the inclusion of
non-executive board member(s).
Q.2.4.1:

To what extent does the FMI’s board have the appropriate skills and incentives
to fulfil its multiple roles? How does the FMI ensure that this is the case?

Q.2.4.2:

What incentives does the FMI provide to board members so that it can attract
and retain members of the board with appropriate skills? How do theseincentives reflect the long-term achievement of the FMI’s objectives?

Q.2.4.3:

Does the board include non-executive or independent board members? If so,
how many?

Q.2.4.4:

If the board includes independent board members, how does the FMI define anindependent board member? Does the FMI disclose which board member(s) it
regards as independent?

Key consideration 5: The roles and responsibilities of management should be clearlyspecified. An FMI’s management should have the appropriate experience, a mix ofskills, and the integrity necessary to discharge their responsibilities for the operation
and risk management of the FMI.
Roles and responsibilities of management
Q.2.5.1:

What are the roles and responsibilities of management, and are they clearlyspecified?

Q.2.5.2:

How are the roles and objectives of management set and evaluated?

Experience, skills and integrity
Q.2.5.3:

To what extent does the FMI’s management have the appropriate experience,mix of skills and the integrity necessary for the operation and risk managementof the FMI? How does the FMI ensure that this is the case?

Q.2.5.4:

What is the process to remove management if necessary?

20

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Key consideration 6: The board should establish a clear, documented riskmanagement framework that includes the FMI’s risk-tolerance policy, assigns
responsibilities and accountability for risk decisions, and addresses decision making
in crises and emergencies. Governance arrangements should ensure that the riskmanagement and internal control functions have sufficient authority, independence,resources, and access to the board.
Risk management framework
Q.2.6.1:

What is the risk management framework that has been established by theboard? How is it documented?

Q.2.6.2:

How does this framework address the FMI’s risk tolerance policy, assign
responsibilities and accountability for risk decisions (such as limits on risk
exposures), and address decision-making in crises and emergencies?

Q.2.6.3:

What is the process for determining, endorsing and reviewing the risk
management framework?

Authority and independence of risk management and audit functions
Q.2.6.4:

What are the roles, responsibilities, authority, reporting lines and resources of
the risk management and audit functions?

Q.2.6.5:

How does the board ensure that there is adequate governance surrounding the
adoption and use of risk management models? How are these models and therelated methodologies validated?

Key consideration 7: The board should ensure that the FMI’s design, rules, overall
strategy, and major decisions reflect appropriately the legitimate interests of its direct
and indirect participants and other relevant stakeholders. Major decisions should beclearly disclosed to relevant stakeholders and, where there is a broad market impact,
the public.
Identification and consideration of stakeholder interests
Q.2.7.1:

How does the FMI identify and take account of the interests of the FMI’s
participants and other relevant stakeholders in its decision-making in relation toits design, rules, overall strategy and major decisions?

Q.2.7.2:

How does the board consider the views of direct and indirect participants andother relevant stakeholders on these decisions; for example, are participants
included on the risk management committee, on user committees such as adefault management group or through a public consultation? How are conflictsof interest between stakeholders and the FMI identified, and how are they
addressed?

Disclosure
Q.2.7.3:

To what extent does the FMI disclose major decisions made by the board to
relevant stakeholders and, where appropriate, the public?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

21

PS
●

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR
●

Principle 3: Framework for the comprehensive management of risks
An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively
managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.
In reviewing this principle, an assessor should consider how the various risks, both borne by
and posed by the FMI, relate to and interact with each other. As such, this principle should
be reviewed holistically with the other principles.
Key consideration 1: An FMI should have risk-management policies, procedures, andsystems that enable it to identify, measure, monitor, and manage the range of risks
that arise in or are borne by the FMI. Risk-management frameworks should be subject
to periodic review.
Risks that arise in or are borne by the FMI
Q.3.1.1:

What types of risk arise in or are borne by the FMI?

Risk management policies, procedures and systems
Q.3.1.2:

What are the FMI’s policies, procedures and controls to help identify, measure,monitor and manage the risks that arise in or are borne by the FMI?

Q.3.1.3:

What risk management systems are used by the FMI to help identify, measure,monitor and manage its range of risks?

Q.3.1.4:

How do these systems provide the capacity to aggregate exposures across the
FMI and, where appropriate, other relevant parties, such as the FMI’s
participants and their customers?

Review of risk management policies, procedures and systems
Q.3.1.5:

What is the process for developing, approving and maintaining risk
management policies, procedures and systems?

Q.3.1.6:

How does the FMI assess the effectiveness of risk management policies,
procedures and systems?

Q.3.1.7:

How frequently are the risk management policies, procedures and systems
reviewed and updated by the FMI? How do these reviews take into accountfluctuation in risk intensity, changing environments and market practices?

Key consideration 2: An FMI should provide incentives to participants and, where
relevant, their customers to manage and contain the risks they pose to the FMI.
Q.3.2.1:

What information does the FMI provide to its participants and, where relevant,their customers to enable them to manage and contain the risks they pose to
the FMI?

Q.3.2.2:

What incentives does the FMI provide for participants and, where relevant, theircustomers to monitor and manage the risks they pose to the FMI?

Q.3.2.3:

How does the FMI design its policies and systems so that they are effective inallowing their participants and, where relevant, their customers to manage andcontain their risks?

22

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Key consideration 3: An FMI should regularly review the material risks it bears fromand poses to other entities (such as other FMIs, settlement banks, liquidity providers,and service providers) as a result of interdependencies and develop appropriate riskmanagement tools to address these risks.
Material risks
Q.3.3.1:

How does the FMI identify the material risks that it bears from and poses toother entities as a result of interdependencies? What material risks has the FMI
identified?

Q.3.3.2:

How are these risks measured and monitored? How frequently does the FMI
review these risks?

Risk management tools
Q.3.3.3:

What risk management tools are used by the FMI to address the risks arisingfrom interdependencies with other entities?

Q.3.3.4:

How does the FMI assess the effectiveness of these risk management tools?
How does the FMI review the risk management tools it uses to address theserisks? How frequently is this review conducted?

Key consideration 4: An FMI should identify scenarios that may potentially prevent itfrom being able to provide its critical operations and services as a going concern andassess the effectiveness of a full range of options for recovery or orderly wind-down.
An FMI should prepare appropriate plans for its recovery or orderly wind-down basedon the results of that assessment. Where applicable, an FMI should also provide
relevant authorities with the information needed for purposes of resolution planning.
Scenarios that may prevent an FMI from providing critical operations and services
Q.3.4.1:

How does the FMI identify scenarios that may potentially prevent the FMI fromproviding its critical operations and services? What scenarios have been
identified as a result of these processes?

Q.3.4.2:

How do these scenarios take into account both independent and related risks towhich the FMI is exposed?

Recovery or orderly wind-down plans
Q.3.4.3:

What plans does the FMI have for its recovery or orderly wind-down?

Q.3.4.4:

How do the FMI’s key recovery or orderly wind-down strategies enable the FMI
to continue to provide critical operations and services?

Q.3.4.5:

How are the plans for the FMI’s recovery and orderly wind-down reviewed andupdated? How frequently are the plans reviewed and updated?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

23

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Principle 4: Credit risk
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposure toparticipants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An
FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to eachparticipant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in
activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple
jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide
range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the defaultof the two largest participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest
aggregate credit exposures to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. Allother CCPs should maintain, at a minimum, total financial resources sufficient to cover
the default of the one participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest
aggregate credit exposures to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Because of the extensive interactions between the financial risk management and financial
resources principles, this principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 5 oncollateral, Principle 6 on margin and Principle 7 on liquidity risk, as appropriate. This principle
should also be reviewed in the context of Principle 13 on participant default rules andprocedures, Principle 23 on disclosure of rules, key procedures and market data, and otherprinciples, as appropriate.

The following key consideration applies to

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 1: An FMI should establish a robust framework to manage its credit
exposures to its participants and the credit risks arising from its payment, clearing,and settlement processes. Credit exposure may arise from current exposures,
potential future exposures, or both.
Q.4.1.1:

What is the FMI’s framework for managing credit exposures, including current
and potential future exposures, to its participants and arising from its payment,
clearing and settlement processes?

Q.4.1.2:

How frequently is the framework reviewed to reflect the changing environment,
market practices and new products?

The following key consideration applies to

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 2: An FMI should identify sources of credit risk, routinely measureand monitor credit exposures, and use appropriate risk-management tools to control
these risks.
Q.4.2.1:

How does the FMI identify sources of credit risk? What are the sources of credit
risk that the FMI has identified?

Q.4.2.2:

How does the FMI measure and monitor credit exposures? How frequently does
and how frequently can the FMI recalculate these exposures? How timely is theinformation?

24

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Q.4.2.3:

What tools does the FMI use to control identified sources of credit risk (forexample, offering an RTGS or DvP settlement mechanism, limiting net debits or
intraday credit, establishing concentration limits, or marking positions to market
on a daily or intraday basis)? How does the FMI measure the effectiveness ofthese tools?

The following key consideration applies to

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP

TR

Key consideration 3: A payment system or SSS should cover its current and, where
they exist, potential future exposures to each participant fully with a high degree ofconfidence using collateral and other equivalent financial resources (see Principle 5
on collateral). In the case of a DNS payment system or DNS SSS in which there is nosettlement guarantee but where its participants face credit exposures arising from its
payment, clearing, and settlement processes, such an FMI should maintain, at aminimum, sufficient resources to cover the exposures of the two participants and theiraffiliates that would create the largest aggregate credit exposure in the system.
Coverage of exposures to each participant
Q.4.3.1:

How does the payment system or SSS cover its current and, where they exist,
potential future exposures to each participant? What is the composition of the
FMI’s financial resources used to cover these exposures? How accessible arethese financial resources?

Q.4.3.2:

To what extent do these financial resources cover the payment system’s or
SSS’s current and potential future exposures fully with a high degree ofconfidence? How frequently does the payment system or SSS evaluate thesufficiency of these financial resources?

For DNS payment systems and DNS SSSs in which there is no settlement guarantee
Q.4.3.3:

If the payment system or SSS is a DNS system in which there is no settlement
guarantee, do its participants face credit exposures arising from the payment,
clearing and settlement processes? If there are credit exposures in the system,
how does the system monitor and measure these exposures?

Q.4.3.4:

If the payment system or SSS is a DNS system in which there is no settlement
guarantee and has credit exposures among its participants, to what extent does
the payment system’s or SSS’s financial resources cover, at a minimum, thedefault of the two participants and their affiliates that would create the largest
aggregate credit exposure in the system?

The following key consideration applies to

PS

CSD

SSS

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 4: A CCP should cover its current and potential future exposures toeach participant fully with a high degree of confidence using margin and otherprefunded financial resources (see Principle 5 on collateral and Principle 6 on margin).
In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or thatis systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial
resources to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but
not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would
potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure for the CCP in extreme but
plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial
resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should
include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201225

potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure for the CCP in extreme but
plausible market conditions. In all cases, a CCP should document its supporting
rationale for, and should have appropriate governance arrangements relating to, theamount of total financial resources it maintains.
Coverage of current and potential future exposures to each participant
Q.4.4.1:

How does the CCP cover its current and potential future exposures to eachparticipant fully with a high degree of confidence? What is the composition of
the CCP’s financial resources used to cover its current and potential future
exposures? How accessible are these financial resources?

Q.4.4.2:

To what extent do these financial resources cover the CCP’s current andpotential future exposures fully with a high degree of confidence? How
frequently does the CCP evaluate the sufficiency of these financial resources?

Risk profile and systemic importance in multiple jurisdictions
Q.4.4.3:

Do any of the CCP’s activities have a more-complex risk profile (such as
clearing financial instruments that are characterised by discrete jump-to-default
price changes or that are highly correlated with potential participant defaults)? Is
the CCP systemically important in multiple jurisdictions?

Additional financial resources
Q.4.4.4:

What additional financial resources does the CCP maintain to cover a wide
range of potential stress scenarios that include, but are not limited to, the defaultof the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest
aggregate credit exposure in extreme but plausible market conditions?

Q.4.4.5:

If the CCP is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or issystemically important in multiple jurisdictions, to what extent do the additional
financial resources cover, at a minimum, the default of the two participants andtheir affiliates that would create the largest credit exposure in the CCP in
extreme but plausible market conditions?

Q.4.4.6:

How frequently does the CCP evaluate the sufficiency of its additional
resources?

Supporting rationale and governance arrangements
Q.4.4.7:

How does the CCP document the supporting rationale regarding its holdings of
total financial resources?

Q.4.4.8:

What governance arrangements are in place relating to the amount of total
financial resources at the CCP?

The following key consideration applies to

PS

CSD

SSS

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 5: A CCP should determine the amount and regularly test thesufficiency of its total financial resources available in the event of a default or multiple
defaults in extreme but plausible market conditions through rigorous stress testing. A
CCP should have clear procedures to report the results of its stress tests toappropriate decision makers at the CCP and to use these results to evaluate theadequacy of and adjust its total financial resources. Stress tests should be performed
daily using standard and predetermined parameters and assumptions. On at least amonthly basis, a CCP should perform a comprehensive and thorough analysis ofstress testing scenarios, models, and underlying parameters and assumptions used toensure they are appropriate for determining the CCP’s required level of default
protection in light of current and evolving market conditions. A CCP should perform
26

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

this analysis of stress testing more frequently when the products cleared or markets
served display high volatility, become less liquid, or when the size or concentration of
positions held by a CCP’s participants increases significantly. A full validation of a
CCP’s risk-management model should be performed at least annually.
Stress testing
Q.4.5.1:

How does the CCP determine and stress-test the sufficiency of its total financial
resources available in the event of a default or multiple defaults in extreme but
plausible market conditions? How frequently does the CCP stress-test its
financial resources?

Q.4.5.2:

How are stress test results communicated to appropriate decision-makers at the
CCP? How are these results used to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust the
CCP’s total financial resources?

Review and validation
Q.4.5.3:

How frequently does the CCP assess the effectiveness and appropriateness ofstress test assumptions and parameters? How does the CCP’s stress test
programme take into account various conditions, such as a sudden andsignificant increase in position and price volatility, position concentration,change in market liquidity, and model risk including shift of parameters?

Q.4.5.4:

How does the CCP validate its risk management model? How frequently does it
perform this validation? Who carries this out?

The following key consideration applies to

PS

CSD

SSS

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 6: In conducting stress testing, a CCP should consider the effect ofa wide range of relevant stress scenarios in terms of both defaulters’ positions andpossible price changes in liquidation periods. Scenarios should include relevant peakhistoric price volatilities, shifts in other market factors such as price determinants andyield curves, multiple defaults over various time horizons, simultaneous pressures infunding and asset markets, and a spectrum of forward-looking stress scenarios in avariety of extreme but plausible market conditions.
Q.4.6.1:

In conducting stress testing, what scenarios does the CCP consider? What
analysis supports the use of these particular scenarios? Do the scenarios
include relevant peak historic price volatilities, shifts in other market factors suchas price determinants and yield curves, multiple defaults over various time
horizons, simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets, and a spectrumof forward-looking stress scenarios in a variety of extreme but plausible market
conditions?

The following key consideration applies to

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 7: An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that
address fully any credit losses it may face as a result of any individual or combined
default among its participants with respect to any of their obligations to the FMI.
These rules and procedures should address how potentially uncovered credit losses
would be allocated, including the repayment of any funds an FMI may borrow fromliquidity providers. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI’s process
to replenish any financial resources that the FMI may employ during a stress event, sothat the FMI can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201227

Allocation of credit losses
Q.4.7.1:

How do the FMI’s rules and procedures explicitly address any credit losses it
may face as a result of any individual or combined default among its participants
with respect to any of their obligations to the FMI? How do the FMI’s rules andprocedures address the allocation of uncovered credit losses and in what order,
including the repayment of any funds an FMI may borrow from liquidity
providers?

Replenishment of financial resources
Q.4.7.2:

28

What are the FMI’s rules and procedures on the replenishment of the financial
resources that are exhausted during a stress event?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Principle 5: Collateral
An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants’ credit exposure should
accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set andenforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.
Because of the extensive interactions between the financial risk management and financial
resources principles, this principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 4 on credit
risk, Principle 6 on margin and Principle 7 on liquidity risk, as appropriate. This principle
should also be reviewed in the context of Principle 14 on segregation and portability,
Principle 16 on custody and investment risk, and other principles, as appropriate.
Key consideration 1: An FMI should generally limit the assets it (routinely) accepts as
collateral to those with low credit, liquidity, and market risks.
Q.5.1.1:

How does the FMI determine whether a specific asset can be accepted ascollateral, including collateral that will be accepted on an exceptional basis?
How does the FMI determine what qualifies as an exceptional basis? How
frequently does the FMI adjust these determinations? How frequently does the
FMI accept collateral on an exceptional basis, and does it place limits on its
acceptance of such collateral?

Q.5.1.2:

How does the FMI monitor the collateral that is posted so that the collateralmeets the applicable acceptance criteria?

Q.5.1.3:

How does the FMI identify and mitigate possible specific wrong-way risk – forexample, by limiting the collateral it accepts (including collateral concentration
limits)?

Key consideration 2: An FMI should establish prudent valuation practices and develop
haircuts that are regularly tested and take into account stressed market conditions.
Valuation practices
Q.5.2.1:

How frequently does the FMI mark its collateral to market, and does it do so atleast daily?

Q.5.2.2:

To what extent is the FMI authorised to exercise discretion in valuing assets
when market prices do not represent their true value?

Haircutting practices
Q.5.2.3:

How does the FMI determine haircuts?

Q.5.2.4:

How does the FMI test the sufficiency of haircuts and validate its haircut
procedures, including with respect to the potential decline in the assets’ value instressed market conditions involving the liquidation of collateral? How frequently
does the FMI complete this test?

Key consideration 3: In order to reduce the need for procyclical adjustments, an FMI
should establish stable and conservative haircuts that are calibrated to include
periods of stressed market conditions, to the extent practicable and prudent.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201229

Q.5.3.1:

How does the FMI identify and evaluate the potential procyclicality of its haircut
calibrations? How does the FMI consider reducing the need for procyclicaladjustments – for example, by incorporating periods of stressed market
conditions during the calibration of haircuts?

Key consideration 4: An FMI should avoid concentrated holdings of certain assets
where this would significantly impair the ability to liquidate such assets quickly
without significant adverse price effects.
Q.5.4.1:

What are the FMI’s policies for identifying and avoiding concentrated holdings ofcertain assets in order to limit potential adverse price effects at liquidation?
What factors (for example, adverse price effects or market conditions) areconsidered when determining these policies?

Q.5.4.2:

How does the FMI review and evaluate concentration policies and practices todetermine their adequacy? How frequently does the FMI review and evaluate
these policies and practices?

Key consideration 5: An FMI that accepts cross-border collateral should mitigate therisks associated with its use and ensure that the collateral can be used in a timely
manner.
Q.5.5.1:

What are the legal, operational, market and other risks that the FMI faces by
accepting cross-border collateral? How does the FMI mitigate these risks?

Q.5.5.2:

How does the FMI ensure that cross-border collateral can be used in a timely
manner?

Key consideration 6: An FMI should use a collateral management system that is welldesigned and operationally flexible.
Collateral management system design
Q.5.6.1:

What are the primary features of the FMI’s collateral management system?

Q.5.6.2:

How and to what extent does the FMI track the reuse of collateral and its rights
to the collateral provided?

Operational flexibility
Q.5.6.3:

How and to what extent does the FMI’s collateral management system
accommodate changes in the ongoing monitoring and management ofcollateral?

Q.5.6.4:

To what extent is the collateral management system staffed to ensure smooth
operations even during times of market stress?

30

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

PS

CSD

SSS

CCP
●

TR

Principle 6: Margin
A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through aneffective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.
Because of the extensive interactions between the financial risk management and financial
resources principles, this principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 4 on credit
risk, Principle 5 on collateral and Principle 7 on liquidity risk, as appropriate. This principle
should also be reviewed in the context of Principle 8 on settlement finality, Principle 17 on
operational risk, and other principles, as appropriate.
Key consideration 1: A CCP should have a margin system that establishes marginlevels commensurate with the risks and particular attributes of each product, portfolio,
and market it serves.
Description of margin methodology
Q.6.1.1:

What is the general framework of the CCP’s margin system, particularly withrespect to current and potential future exposures? If the CCP does not use amargining system, what risk management measures does it take to mitigate its
risks? To what extent do these measures deliver equivalent outcomes?

Q.6.1.2:

Is the margin methodology documented?

Q.6.1.3:

To what extent is the detail of the CCP’s margin methodology made available toparticipants for use in their individual risk management efforts?

Credit exposures
Q.6.1.4:

What are the determinants of the credit exposures of the CCP, with respect tothe attributes of each product, portfolio and market it serves?

Q.6.1.5:

To what extent are the CCP’s margin requirements commensurate with the risks
and particular attributes of each product, portfolio and market it serves?

Operational components
Q.6.1.6:

How does the CCP address the risk of a participant payment failure that would
cause a shortage of required margin to the participant’s position?

Q.6.1.7:

How does the CCP enforce timelines for margin collections and payments? If
the CCP has participants from different time zones, how does the CCP address
issues posed by differences in local funding markets and operating hours of
relevant payment and settlement systems?

Key consideration 2: A CCP should have a reliable source of timely price data for its
margin system. A CCP should also have procedures and sound valuation models foraddressing circumstances in which pricing data are not readily available or reliable.
Sources of price data
Q.6.2.1:

What are the sources of price data for the CCP’s margin model? What data
does the CCP use to determine initial margin?

Q.6.2.2:

How does the CCP determine that the price data it uses for its margin system istimely and reliable, including prices provided by a third party where relevant?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201231

Estimation of prices
Q.6.2.3:

When prices are not readily available or reliable, how does the CCP estimate
prices to calculate margin requirements?

Q.6.2.4:

How does the CCP validate models used to estimate prices or margin
requirements when price data are not readily available or reliable? How does
the FMI ensure the independence of the validation process?

Key consideration 3: A CCP should adopt initial margin models and parameters thatare risk-based and generate margin requirements sufficient to cover its potential
future exposure to participants in the interval between the last margin collection andthe close out of positions following a participant default. Initial margin should meet an
established single-tailed confidence level of at least 99 percent with respect to theestimated distribution of future exposure. For a CCP that calculates margin at theportfolio level, this requirement applies to each portfolio’s distribution of future
exposure. For a CCP that calculates margin at more-granular levels, such as at the
subportfolio level or by product, the requirement must be met for the corresponding
distributions of future exposure. The model should (a) use a conservative estimate of
the time horizons for the effective hedging or close out of the particular types of
products cleared by the CCP (including in stressed market conditions), (b) have anappropriate method for measuring credit exposure that accounts for relevant productrisk factors and portfolio effects across products, and (c) to the extent practicable andprudent, limit the need for destabilising, procyclical changes.
Initial margin model
Q.6.3.1:

What is the design of the CCP’s initial margin model? Describe the model indetail, including the method used to determine potential future exposure. Whatis the level of coverage of the initial margin model?

Q.6.3.2:

What are the assumptions of the margin model?

Q.6.3.3:

How does the CCP estimate the key parameters and inputs of the margin model(such as the liquidation horizon and confidence interval)?

Closeout and sample periods
Q.6.3.4:

How does the CCP determine an appropriate closeout period for each product?
In particular, how does the CCP account for potentially increased liquidation
times during stressed market conditions? What factors are considered in thisanalysis (for example, market liquidity, impact of a participant’s default on
prevailing market conditions, adverse effects of position concentration, and the
CCP’s hedging capability)?

Q.6.3.5:

How does the CCP determine an appropriate sample period for historical data
used in the margin model? What factors are considered (for example, reflectionof new, current or past volatilities, or use of simulated data for new products
without much history)?

Q.6.3.6:

How does the CCP consider the trade-off between prompt liquidation andadverse price effects?

Procyclicality and specific wrong-way risk
Q.6.3.7:

How does the CCP address procyclicality in the margin methodology? In
particular, does the CCP adopt margin requirements that, to the extent practicaland prudent, limit the need for destabilising procyclical changes?

Q.6.3.8:

How does the CCP identify and mitigate specific wrong-way risk?

32

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Key consideration 4: A CCP should mark participant positions to market and collectvariation margin at least daily to limit the build-up of current exposures. A CCP shouldhave the authority and operational capacity to make intraday margin calls andpayments, both scheduled and unscheduled, to participants.
Q.6.4.1:

What is the design of the CCP’s variation margin model? Describe the model indetail, including the method used to measure current exposure, frequency ofmark-to-market and schedule of margin collection, and intraday margin callcapabilities.

Q.6.4.2:

Does the CCP have the authority and operational capacity to make andcomplete intraday margin calls for initial and variation margin?

Key consideration 5: In calculating margin requirements, a CCP may allow offsets or
reductions in required margin across products that it clears or between products thatit and another CCP clear, if the risk of one product is significantly and reliably
correlated with the risk of the other product. Where two or more CCPs are authorised
to offer cross-margining, they must have appropriate safeguards and harmonised
overall risk-management systems.
Portfolio margining
Q.6.5.1:

Does the CCP allow offsets or reductions in required margin across productsthat it clears or between products that it or another CCP clear? If so, is the riskof one product significantly and reliably correlated with the risk of the otherproduct? How does the CCP offset or reduce required margin?

Q.6.5.2:

How does the CCP identify and measure its potential future exposure at the
product and portfolio level? How does the CCP’s portfolio margining
methodology account for offsets or reductions in required margin acrossproducts that it clears?

Cross-margining
Q.6.5.3:

In the case of cross-margining between two or more CCPs, how have the CCPs
harmonised their approaches to risk management? What legal and operationalarrangements govern the cross-margining arrangements?

Robustness of methodologies
Q.6.5.4:

How does the CCP confirm the robustness of its portfolio and cross-margining
methodologies? How does the CCP’s methodology account for the degree of
price dependency, and its stability in stressed market conditions?

Key consideration 6: A CCP should analyse and monitor its model performance andoverall margin coverage by conducting rigorous daily backtesting – and at least
monthly, and more-frequent where appropriate, sensitivity analysis. A CCP should
regularly conduct an assessment of the theoretical and empirical properties of its
margin model for all products it clears. In conducting sensitivity analysis of themodel’s coverage, a CCP should take into account a wide range of parameters andassumptions that reflect possible market conditions, including the most-volatile
periods that have been experienced by the markets it serves and extreme changes in
the correlations between prices.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201233

Backtesting and sensitivity analysis
Q.6.6.1:

Describe in detail the backtesting methodologies and model performance,
including both target confidence level and the result of overall margin coverage.
How does such testing address portfolio effects within and across asset classes
within the CCP and cross-margining programmes with other CCPs? How
frequently is the backtesting conducted?

Q.6.6.2:

Describe in detail the sensitivity analysis of model performance and overall
coverage of the CCP’s initial margin methodology. Does the analysis cover awide range of parameters, assumptions, historical and hypothetical market
conditions, and participant positions, including stressed conditions? How
frequently is the analysis conducted?

Margin model performance
Q.6.6.3:

What are the identified potential shortcomings of the margin model based on
backtesting and sensitivity analysis?

Q.6.6.4:

What actions would the CCP take if the model did not perform as expected?

Q.6.6.5:

How does the CCP disclose the results of its backtesting and sensitivity
analysis?

Key consideration 7: A CCP should regularly review and validate its margin system.
Q.6.7.1:

How does the CCP regularly review and validate its margin system including its
theoretical and empirical properties? How frequently is this done?

Q.6.7.2:

How does the CCP incorporate material revisions and adjustments of themargin methodology, including parameters, into its governance arrangements?

Q.6.7.3:

How and to whom does the CCP disclose both the method and the results ofthis review and validation?

34

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Principle 7: Liquidity risk
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should
maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and,
where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a highdegree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should
include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would
generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible
market conditions.
Because of the extensive interactions between the financial risk management and financial
resources principles, this principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 4 on credit
risk, Principle 5 on collateral and Principle 6 on margin, as appropriate. This principle should
also be reviewed in the context of Principle 8 on settlement finality, Principle 13 onparticipant default rules and procedures, Principle 23 on disclosure of rules, key procedures
and market data, and other principles, as appropriate.

The following key consideration applies to

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 1: An FMI should have a robust framework to manage its liquidity
risks from its participants, settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity
providers, and other entities.
Q.7.1.1:

What is the FMI’s framework for managing its liquidity risks, in all relevant
currencies, from its participants, settlement banks, nostro agents, custodianbanks, liquidity providers and other entities?

Q.7.1.2:

What are the nature and size of the FMI’s liquidity needs, and the associatedsources of liquidity risks, that arise in the FMI in all relevant currencies?

Q.7.1.3:

How does the FMI take into account the potential aggregate liquidity riskpresented by an individual entity and its affiliates that may play multiples roles
with respect to the FMI?

The following key consideration applies to

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 2: An FMI should have effective operational and analytical tools to
identify, measure, and monitor its settlement and funding flows on an ongoing andtimely basis, including its use of intraday liquidity.
Q.7.2.1:

What operational and analytical tools does the FMI have to identify, measureand monitor settlement and funding flows?

Q.7.2.2:

How does the FMI use those tools to identify, measure and monitor its
settlement and funding flows on an ongoing and timely basis, including its useof intraday liquidity?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201235

The following key consideration applies to

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP

TR

Key consideration 3: A payment system or SSS, including one employing a DNS
mechanism, should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies toeffect same-day settlement, and where appropriate intraday or multiday settlement, of
payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential
stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of theparticipant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment
obligation in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Q.7.3.1:

How does the payment system or SSS determine the amount of liquid
resources in all relevant currencies to effect same day settlement and, whereappropriate, intraday or multiday settlement of payment obligations? Whatpotential stress scenarios (including, but not limited to, the default of theparticipant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment
obligation in extreme but plausible market conditions) does the payment system
or SSS use to make this determination?

Q.7.3.2:

What is the estimated size of the liquidity shortfall in each currency that thepayment system or SSS would need to cover?

The following key consideration applies to

PS

CSD

SSS

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 4: A CCP should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant
currencies to settle securities-related payments, make required variation margin
payments, and meet other payment obligations on time with a high degree ofconfidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but
not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate thelargest aggregate payment obligation to the CCP in extreme but plausible market
conditions. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk
profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should consider
maintaining additional liquidity resources sufficient to cover a wider range of potential
stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the twoparticipants and their affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment
obligation to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Sufficient liquid resources
Q.7.4.1:

How does the CCP determine the amount of liquid resources in all relevant
currencies to settle securities-related payments, make required variation margin
payments and meet other payment obligations on time? What potential stressscenarios (including, but not limited to, the default of the participant and its
affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation in
extreme but plausible market conditions) does the CCP use to make thisdetermination?

Q.7.4.2:

What is the estimated size of the liquidity shortfall in each currency that would
need to be covered, following the default of the participant and its affiliates thatwould generate the largest aggregate payment obligation to the CCP in extreme
but plausible market conditions? How frequently does the CCP estimate this?

36

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Risk profile and systemic importance in multiple jurisdictions
Q.7.4.3:

Do any of the CCP’s activities have a more complex risk profile (such as
clearing financial instruments that are characterised by discrete jump-to-default
price changes or that are highly correlated with potential participant defaults)? Is
the CCP systemically important in multiple jurisdictions?

Q.7.4.4:

If the CCP is involved in activities with a more complex risk profile or issystemically important in multiple jurisdictions, has the CCP considered
maintaining additional resources sufficient to cover a wider range of stressscenarios that would include the default of the two participants and theiraffiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation to the
CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions?

The following key consideration applies to

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 5: For the purpose of meeting its minimum liquid resource
requirement, an FMI’s qualifying liquid resources in each currency include cash at thecentral bank of issue and at creditworthy commercial banks, committed lines of credit,
committed foreign exchange swaps, and committed repos, as well as highlymarketable collateral held in custody and investments that are readily available andconvertible into cash with prearranged and highly reliable funding arrangements, evenin extreme but plausible market conditions. If an FMI has access to routine credit at
the central bank of issue, the FMI may count such access as part of the minimum
requirement to the extent it has collateral that is eligible for pledging to (or for
conducting other appropriate forms of transactions with) the relevant central bank. Allsuch resources should be available when needed.
Size and composition of qualifying liquid resources
Q.7.5.1:

What is the size and composition of the FMI’s qualifying liquid resources in eachcurrency that is held by the FMI? In what manner and within what time frame
can these liquid resources be made available to the FMI?

Availability and coverage of qualifying liquid resources
Q.7.5.2:

What prearranged funding arrangements has the FMI established to convert its
readily available collateral and investments into cash? How has the FMI
established that these arrangements would be highly reliable in extreme but
plausible market conditions? Has the FMI identified any potential barriers toaccessing its liquid resources?

Q.7.5.3:

If the FMI has access to routine credit at the central bank of issue, what is the
FMI’s relevant borrowing capacity for meeting its minimum liquid resource
requirement in that currency?

Q.7.5.4:

To what extent does the size and the availability of the FMI’s qualifying liquid
resources cover its identified minimum liquidity resource requirement in eachcurrency to effect settlement of payment obligations on time?

The following key consideration applies to

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 6: An FMI may supplement its qualifying liquid resources with otherforms of liquid resources. If the FMI does so, then these liquid resources should be in
the form of assets that are likely to be saleable or acceptable as collateral for lines ofcredit, swaps, or repos on an ad hoc basis following a default, even if this cannot be

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201237

reliably prearranged or guaranteed in extreme market conditions. Even if an FMI does
not have access to routine central bank credit, it should still take account of what
collateral is typically accepted by the relevant central bank, as such assets may be
more likely to be liquid in stressed circumstances. An FMI should not assume theavailability of emergency central bank credit as a part of its liquidity plan.
Size and composition of supplemental liquid resources
Q.7.6.1:

What is the size and composition of any supplemental liquid resources available
to the FMI?

Availability of supplemental liquid resources
Q.7.6.2:

How and on what basis has the FMI determined that these assets are likely to
be saleable or acceptable as collateral to obtain the relevant currency, even if
this cannot be reliably prearranged or guaranteed in extreme market
conditions?

Q.7.6.3:

What proportion of these supplemental assets qualifies as potential collateral at
the relevant central bank?

Q.7.6.4:

In what circumstances would the FMI use its supplemental liquid resources inadvance of, or in addition to, using its qualifying liquid resources?

Q.7.6.5:

To what extent does the size and availability of the FMI’s supplemental liquid
resources, in conjunction with its qualifying liquid resources, cover the relevant
liquidity needs identified through the FMI’s stress test programme fordetermining the adequacy of its liquidity resources (see key consideration 9)?

The following key consideration applies to

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 7: An FMI should obtain a high degree of confidence, throughrigorous due diligence, that each provider of its minimum required qualifying liquid
resources, whether a participant of the FMI or an external party, has sufficient
information to understand and to manage its associated liquidity risks, and that it has
the capacity to perform as required under its commitment. Where relevant toassessing a liquidity provider’s performance reliability with respect to a particularcurrency, a liquidity provider’s potential access to credit from the central bank ofissue may be taken into account. An FMI should regularly test its procedures foraccessing its liquid resources at a liquidity provider.
Use of liquidity providers
Q.7.7.1:

Does the FMI use a liquidity provider to meet its minimum required qualifying
liquidity resources? Who are the FMI’s liquidity providers? How and on what
basis has the FMI determined that each of these liquidity providers has
sufficient information to understand and to manage their associated liquidity risk
in each relevant currency on an ongoing basis, including in stressed conditions?

Reliability of liquidity providers
Q.7.7.2:

How has the FMI determined that each of its liquidity providers has the capacity
to perform on its commitment in each relevant currency on an ongoing basis?

Q.7.7.3:

How does the FMI take into account a liquidity provider’s potential access tocredit at the central bank of issue?

Q.7.7.4:

How does the FMI regularly test the timeliness and reliability of its procedures
for accessing its liquid resources at a liquidity provider?

38

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

The following key consideration applies to

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 8: An FMI with access to central bank accounts, payment services,or securities services should use these services, where practical, to enhance its
management of liquidity risk.
Q.7.8.1:

To what extent does the FMI currently have, or is the FMI eligible to obtain,
access to accounts, payment services and securities services at each relevant
central bank that could be used to conduct its payments and settlements and to
manage liquidity risks in each relevant currency?

Q.7.8.2:

To what extent does the FMI use each of these services at each relevant central
bank to conduct its payments and settlements and to manage liquidity risks ineach relevant currency?

Q.7.8.3:

If the FMI employs services other than those provided by the relevant central
banks, to what extent has the FMI analysed the potential to enhance themanagement of liquidity risk by expanding its use of central bank services?

Q.7.8.4:

What, if any, practical or other considerations to expanding its use of relevant
central bank services have been identified by the FMI?

The following key consideration applies to

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 9: An FMI should determine the amount and regularly test thesufficiency of its liquid resources through rigorous stress testing. An FMI should haveclear procedures to report the results of its stress tests to appropriate decision
makers at the FMI and to use these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its
liquidity risk-management framework. In conducting stress testing, an FMI should
consider a wide range of relevant scenarios. Scenarios should include relevant peakhistoric price volatilities, shifts in other market factors such as price determinants andyield curves, multiple defaults over various time horizons, simultaneous pressures infunding and asset markets, and a spectrum of forward-looking stress scenarios in avariety of extreme but plausible market conditions. Scenarios should also take into
account the design and operation of the FMI, include all entities that might posematerial liquidity risks to the FMI (such as settlement banks, nostro agents, custodianbanks, liquidity providers, and linked FMIs), and where appropriate, cover a multiday
period. In all cases, an FMI should document its supporting rationale for, and shouldhave appropriate governance arrangements relating to, the amount and form of totalliquid resources it maintains.
Stress test programme
Q.7.9.1:

How does the FMI use stress testing to determine the amount and test thesufficiency of its liquid resources in each currency? How frequently does the
FMI stress-test its liquid resources?

Q.7.9.2:

What is the process for reporting on an ongoing basis the results of the FMI’s
liquidity stress tests to appropriate decision-makers at the FMI, for the purposeof supporting their timely evaluation and adjustment of the size and compositionof the FMI’s liquidity resources and liquidity risk management framework?

Stress test scenarios
Q.7.9.3:

What scenarios are used in the stress tests, and to what extent do they take into
account a combination of peak historic price volatilities, shifts in other market
factors such as price determinants and yield curves, multiple defaults over

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201239

various time horizons, simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets,and a spectrum of forward-looking stress scenarios in a variety of extreme but
plausible market conditions?
Q.7.9.4:

To what extent do the scenarios and stress tests take into account the FMI’s
particular payment and settlement structure (for example, real-time gross ordeferred net; with or without a settlement guarantee; DVP model 1, 2 or 3 for
SSSs), and the liquidity risk that is borne directly by the FMI, by its participants,
or both?

Q.7.9.5:

To what extent do the scenarios and stress tests take into account the natureand size of the liquidity needs, and the associated sources of liquidity risks, thatarise in the FMI to settle its payment obligations on time, including the potentialthat individual entities and their affiliates may play multiples roles with respect to
the FMI?

Review and validation
Q.7.9.6:

How frequently does the FMI assess the effectiveness and appropriateness ofstress test assumptions and parameters? How does the FMI’s stress test
programme take into account various conditions, such as a sudden andsignificant increase in position and price volatility, position concentration,change in market liquidity, and model risk including shift of parameters?

Q.7.9.7:

How does the FMI validate its risk management model? How frequently does it
perform this validation?

Q.7.9.8:

Where and to what extent does the FMI document its supporting rationale for,and its governance arrangements relating to, the amount and form of its totalliquid resources?

The following key consideration applies to

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 10: An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures thatenable the FMI to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday
settlement of payment obligations on time following any individual or combined
default among its participants. These rules and procedures should address
unforeseen and potentially uncovered liquidity shortfalls and should aim to avoid
unwinding, revoking, or delaying the same-day settlement of payment obligations.
These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI’s process to replenish any
liquidity resources it may employ during a stress event, so that it can continue tooperate in a safe and sound manner.
Same day settlement
Q.7.10.1:

How do the FMI’s rules and procedures enable it to settle payment obligations
on time following any individual or combined default among its participants?

Q.7.10.2:

How do the FMI’s rules and procedures address unforeseen and potentially
uncovered liquidity shortfalls and avoid unwinding, revoking or delaying thesame day settlement of payment obligations?

Replenishment of liquidity resources
Q.7.10.3:40

How do the FMI’s rules and procedures allow for the replenishment of any
liquidity resources employed during a stress event?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Principle 8: Settlement finality
An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of thevalue date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement
intraday or in real time.
In reviewing this principle, it should be noted that this principle is not intended to eliminate
failures to deliver in securities trades. The occurrence of non-systemic amounts of such
failures, although potentially undesirable, should not by itself be interpreted as a failure tosatisfy this principle. This principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 9 on money
settlements, Principle 20 on FMI links, and other principles, as appropriate.
Key consideration 1: An FMI’s rules and procedures should clearly define the point at
which settlement is final.
Point of settlement finality
Q.8.1.1:

At what point is the settlement of a payment, transfer instruction or otherobligation final, meaning irrevocable and unconditional? Is the point ofsettlement finality defined and documented? How and to whom is thisinformation disclosed?

Q.8.1.2:

How does the FMI’s legal framework and rules, including the applicable
insolvency law(s), acknowledge the discharge of a payment, transfer instruction
or other obligation between the FMI and its participants, or between
participants?

Q.8.1.3:

How does the FMI demonstrate that there is a high degree of legal certainty that
finality will be achieved in all relevant jurisdictions (for example, by obtaining awell reasoned legal opinion)?

Finality in the case of links
Q.8.1.4:

How does the FMI ensure settlement finality in the case of linkages with other
FMIs?
a)

For an SSS, how is consistency of finality achieved between the SSS and,if relevant, the LVPS where the cash leg is settled?

b)

For a CCP for cash products, what is the relation between the finality ofobligations in the CCP and the finality of the settlement of the CCP claims
and obligations in other systems, depending on the rules of the relevant
CSD/SSS and payment system?

Key consideration 2: An FMI should complete final settlement no later than the end of
the value date, and preferably intraday or in real time, to reduce settlement risk. An
LVPS or SSS should consider adopting RTGS or multiple-batch processing during thesettlement day.
Final settlement on the value date
Q.8.2.1:

Is the FMI designed to complete final settlement on the value date (or same day
settlement)? How does the FMI ensure that final settlement occurs no later thanthe end of the intended value date?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201241

Q.8.2.2:

Has the FMI ever experienced deferral of final settlement to the next business
day that was not contemplated by its rules, procedures or contracts? If so,
under what circumstances? If deferral was a result of the FMI’s actions, whatsteps have been taken to prevent a similar situation in the future?

Intraday or real-time final settlement
Q.8.2.3:

Does the FMI provide intraday or real-time final settlement? If so, how? How areparticipants informed of the final settlement?

Q.8.2.4:

If settlement occurs through multiple-batch processing, what is the frequency ofthe batches and within what time frame do they operate? What happens if aparticipant does not have enough funds or securities at the settlement time? Are
transactions entered in the next batch? If so, what is the status of thosetransactions and when would they become final?

Q.8.2.5:

If settlement does not occur intraday or in real time, how has the LVPS or SSS
considered the introduction of either of these modalities?

Key consideration 3: An FMI should clearly define the point after which unsettled
payments, transfer instructions, or other obligations may not be revoked by aparticipant.
Q.8.3.1:

How does the FMI define the point at which unsettled payments, transfer
instructions or other obligations may not be revoked by a participant? How does
the FMI prohibit the unilateral revocation of accepted and unsettled payments,
transfer instructions or obligations after this time?

Q.8.3.2:

Under what circumstances can an instruction or obligation accepted by thesystem for settlement still be revoked (for example, queued obligations)? How
can an unsettled payment or transfer instruction be revoked? Who can revoke
unsettled payment or transfer instructions?

Q.8.3.3:

Under what conditions does the FMI allow exceptions and extensions to therevocation deadline?

Q.8.3.4:

Where does the FMI define this information? How and to whom is thisinformation disclosed?

42

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Principle 9: Money settlements
An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical andavailable. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control
the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.
This principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 8 on settlement finality,
Principle 16 on custody and investment risks, and other principles, as appropriate.
Key consideration 1: An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bankmoney, where practical and available, to avoid credit and liquidity risks.
Q.9.1.1:

How does the FMI conduct money settlements? If the FMI conducts settlementin multiple currencies, how does the FMI conduct money settlement in eachcurrency?

Q.9.1.2:

If the FMI does not settle in central bank money, why is it not used?

Key consideration 2: If central bank money is not used, an FMI should conduct its
money settlements using a settlement asset with little or no credit or liquidity risk.
Q.9.2.1:

If central bank money is not used, how does the FMI assess the credit andliquidity risks of the settlement asset used for money settlement?

Q.9.2.2:

If the FMI settles in commercial bank money, how does the FMI select its
settlement banks? What are the specific selection criteria the FMI uses?

Key consideration 3: If an FMI settles in commercial bank money, it should monitor,
manage, and limit its credit and liquidity risks arising from the commercial settlementbanks. In particular, an FMI should establish and monitor adherence to strict criteria
for its settlement banks that take account of, among other things, their regulation andsupervision, creditworthiness, capitalisation, access to liquidity, and operationalreliability. An FMI should also monitor and manage the concentration of credit andliquidity exposures to its commercial settlement banks.
Q.9.3.1:

How does the FMI monitor the settlement banks’ adherence to criteria it uses forselection? For example, how does the FMI evaluate the banks’ regulation,
supervision, creditworthiness, capitalisation, access to liquidity and operationalreliability?

Q.9.3.2:

How does the FMI monitor, manage and limit its credit and liquidity risks arisingfrom the commercial settlement banks? How does the FMI monitor and manage
the concentration of credit and liquidity exposures to these banks?

Q.9.3.3:

How does the FMI assess its potential losses and liquidity pressures as well as
those of its participants if there is a failure of its largest settlement bank?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201243

Key consideration 4: If an FMI conducts money settlements on its own books, it
should minimise and strictly control its credit and liquidity risks.
Q.9.4.1:

If an FMI conducts money settlements on its own books, how does it minimiseand strictly control its credit and liquidity risks?

Key consideration 5: An FMI’s legal agreements with any settlement banks should
state clearly when transfers on the books of individual settlement banks are expected
to occur, that transfers are to be final when effected, and that funds received shouldbe transferable as soon as possible, at a minimum by the end of the day and ideallyintraday, in order to enable the FMI and its participants to manage credit and liquidity
risks.
Q.9.5.1:

Do the FMI’s legal agreements with its settlement banks state when transfers
occur, that transfers are final when effected, and that funds received aretransferable?

Q.9.5.2:

Are funds received transferable by the end of the day at the latest? If not, why?
Are they transferable intraday? If not, why?

44

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

PS

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Principle 10: Physical deliveries
An FMI should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physicalinstruments or commodities and should identify, monitor, and manage the risks
associated with such physical deliveries.
This principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 15 on general business risk,
Principle 23 on disclosure of rules, key procedures and market data, and other principles, as
appropriate.
Key consideration 1: An FMI’s rules should clearly state its obligations with respect tothe delivery of physical instruments or commodities.
Q.10.1.1:

Which asset classes does the FMI accept for physical delivery?

Q.10.1.2:

How does the FMI define its obligations and responsibilities with respect to thedelivery of physical instruments or commodities? How are these responsibilities
defined and documented? To whom are these documents disclosed?

Q.10.1.3:

How does the FMI engage with its participants to ensure they have an
understanding of their obligations and the procedures for effecting physicaldelivery?

Key consideration 2: An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks and costs
associated with the storage and delivery of physical instruments or commodities.
Q.10.2.1:

How does the FMI identify the risks and costs associated with storage anddelivery of physical instruments or commodities? What risks and costs has the
FMI identified?

Q.10.2.2:

What processes, procedures and controls does the FMI have to monitor andmanage any identified risks and costs associated with storage and delivery ofphysical instruments or commodities?

Q.10.2.3:

If an FMI can match participants for delivery and receipt, under whatcircumstances can it do so, and what are the associated rules and procedures?
Are the legal obligations for delivery clearly expressed in the rules andassociated agreements?

Q.10.2.4:

How does the FMI monitor its participants’ delivery preferences and, to theextent practicable, ensure that its participants have the necessary systems andresources to be able to fulfil their physical delivery obligations?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

45

PS

CSD
●

SSS

CCP

TR

Principle 11: Central securities depositories
A CSD should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integrity of
securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping
and transfer of securities. A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or
dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry.
In reviewing this principle, where an entity legally defined as a CSD or an SSS does not holdor facilitate the holding of assets or collateral owned by its participants, the CSD or SSS ingeneral would not be required to have arrangements to manage the safekeeping of such
assets or collateral. This principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 17 on
operational risk, Principle 20 on FMI links, and other principles, as appropriate.
Key consideration 1: A CSD should have appropriate rules, procedures, and controls,
including robust accounting practices, to safeguard the rights of securities issuersand holders, prevent the unauthorised creation or deletion of securities, and conductperiodic and at least daily reconciliation of securities issues it maintains.
Safeguarding the rights of securities issuers and holders
Q.11.1.1:

How are the rights of securities issuers and holders safeguarded by the rules,
procedures and controls of the CSD?

Q.11.1.2:

How do the CSD’s rules, procedures and controls ensure that the securities it
holds on behalf of participants are appropriately accounted for on its books andprotected from risks associated with the other services the CSD may provide?

Q.11.1.3:

How does the CSD ensure that it has robust accounting practices? Do audits
review whether there are sufficient securities to satisfy customer rights? How
frequently are end-to-end audits conducted to examine the procedures andinternal controls used in the safekeeping of securities?

Prevention of the unauthorised creation or deletion of securities
Q.11.1.4:

What are the CSD’s internal procedures to authorise the creation and deletionof securities? What are the CSD’s internal controls to prevent the unauthorised
creation and deletion of securities?

Periodic reconciliation of securities issues
Q.11.1.5:

Does the CSD conduct periodic and at least daily reconciliation of the totals of
securities issues in the CSD for each issuer (or its issuing agent)? How does
the CSD ensure that the total number of securities recorded in the CSD for aparticular issue is equal to the amount of securities of that issue held on the
CSD’s books?

Q.11.1.6:

If the CSD is not the official registrar of the issues held on its books, how does
the CSD reconcile its records with official registrar?

Key consideration 2: A CSD should prohibit overdrafts and debit balances insecurities accounts.
Q.11.2.1:

46

How does the CSD prevent overdrafts and debit balances in securities
accounts?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Key consideration 3: A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or
dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry. Where appropriate, a CSD should
provide incentives to immobilise or dematerialise securities.
Q.11.3.1:

Are securities issued or maintained in a dematerialised form? What percentage
of securities is dematerialised, and what percentage of the total volume oftransactions applies to these securities?

Q.11.3.2:

If securities are issued as a physical certificate, is it possible to immobilise themand allow their holding and transfer in a book-entry system? What percentage of
securities is immobilised, and what percentage of the total volume oftransactions applies to immobilised securities?

Q11.3.3:

What incentives, if any, does the CSD provide to immobilise or dematerialise
securities?

Key consideration 4: A CSD should protect assets against custody risk throughappropriate rules and procedures consistent with its legal framework.
Q.11.4.1:

How do the CSD’s rules and procedures protect assets against custody risk,
including the risk of loss because of the CSD’s negligence, misuse of assets,
fraud, poor administration, inadequate recordkeeping or failure to protect
participants’ interests in their securities?

Q.11.4.2:

How has the CSD determined that those rules and procedures are consistent
with the legal framework?

Q.11.4.3:

What other methods, if any, does the CSD employ to protect its participants
against misappropriation, destruction and theft of securities (for example,
insurance or other compensation schemes)?

Key consideration 5: A CSD should employ a robust system that ensures segregation
between the CSD’s own assets and the securities of its participants and segregation
among the securities of participants. Where supported by the legal framework, theCSD should also support operationally the segregation of securities belonging to aparticipant’s customers on the participant’s books and facilitate the transfer ofcustomer holdings.
Q.11.5.1:

What segregation arrangements are in place at the CSD? How does the CSD
ensure segregation between its own assets and the securities of its
participants? How does the CSD ensure segregation among the securities ofparticipants?

Q.11.5.2:

Where supported by the legal framework, how does the CSD support theoperational segregation of securities belonging to participants’ customers fromthe participants’ book? How does the CSD facilitate the transfer from thesecustomers’ accounts to another participant?

Key consideration 6: A CSD should identify, measure, monitor, and manage its risks
from other activities that it may perform; additional tools may be necessary in order toaddress these risks.
Q.11.6.1:

Does the CSD provide services other than central safekeeping andadministration of securities and settlement? If so, what services?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201247

Q.11.6.2:

48

If the CSD provides services other than central safekeeping and administrationof securities and settlement, how does it identify the risks associated with those
activities, including potential credit and liquidity risks? How does it measure,monitor and manage these risks, including legally separating services otherthan safekeeping and administration of securities where necessary?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

PS
●

CSD

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Principle 12: Exchange-of-value settlement systems
If an FMI settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations (forexample, securities or foreign exchange transactions), it should eliminate principal risk
by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of theother.
This principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 4 on credit risk, Principle 7 on
liquidity risk, Principle 8 on settlement finality, and other principles, as appropriate.
Key consideration 1: An FMI that is an exchange-of-value settlement system should
eliminate principal risk by ensuring that the final settlement of one obligation occurs if
and only if the final settlement of the linked obligation also occurs, regardless ofwhether the FMI settles on a gross or net basis and when finality occurs.
Q.12.1.1:

How do the FMI’s legal, contractual, technical and risk management frameworks
ensure that the final settlement of relevant financial instruments eliminates
principal risk? What procedures ensure that the final settlement of one
obligation occurs if and only if the final settlement of a linked obligation also
occurs?

Q.12.1.2:

How are the linked obligations settled – on a gross basis (trade by trade) or on a
net basis?

Q.12.1.3:

Is the finality of settlement of linked obligations simultaneous? If not, what is thetiming of finality for both obligations? Is the length of time between the blocking
and final settlement of both obligations minimised? Are blocked assets
protected from a claim by a third party?

Q.12.1.4:

In the case of a CCP, does the CCP rely on the DvP or PvP services provided
by another FMI, such as an SSS or payment system? If so, how would the CCP
characterise the level of its reliance on such services? What contractual
relationship does the CCP have with the SSS or payment system to ensure that
final settlement of one obligation occurs only when the final settlement of any
linked obligations occurs?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

49

PS
●

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Principle 13: Participant-default rules and procedures
An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage aparticipant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the
FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meetits obligations.
Because of the extensive interactions between the default management principles as they
apply to CCPs, this principle needs to be reviewed in the context of Principle 14 on
segregation and portability. This principle should also be reviewed in the context ofPrinciple 4 on credit risk, Principle 7 on liquidity risk, Principle 23 on disclosure of rules, key
procedures and market data, and other principles, as appropriate.
Key consideration 1: An FMI should have default rules and procedures that enable the
FMI to continue to meet its obligations in the event of a participant default and that
address the replenishment of resources following a default.
Participant default rules and procedures
Q.13.1.1:

Do the FMI’s rules and procedures clearly define an event of default (both afinancial and an operational default of a participant) and the method for
identifying a default? How are these events defined?

Q.13.1.2:

How do the FMI’s rules and procedures address the following key aspects of aparticipant default:a)the actions that the FMI can take when a default is declared;b)

the extent to which the actions are automatic or discretionary;c)changes to normal settlement practices;d)the management of transactions at different stages of processing;e)

the expected treatment of proprietary and customer transactions andaccounts;f)the probable sequencing of actions;g)the roles, obligations and responsibilities of the various parties, including
non-defaulting participants; andh)the existence of other mechanisms that may be activated to contain theimpact of a default?

Use of financial resources
Q.13.1.3:

How do the FMI’s rules and procedures allow the FMI to promptly use any
financial resources that it maintains for covering losses and containing liquidity
pressures arising from default, including liquidity facilities?

Q.13.1.4:

How do the FMI’s rules and procedures address the order in which the financial
resources can be used?

Q.13.1.5:

How do the FMI’s rules and procedures address the replenishment of resources
following a default?

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CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Key consideration 2: An FMI should be well prepared to implement its default rules
and procedures, including any appropriate discretionary procedures provided for in
its rules.
Q.13.2.1:

Does the FMI’s management have internal plans that clearly delineate the roles
and responsibilities for addressing a default? What are these plans?

Q.13.2.2:

What type of communication procedures does the FMI have in order to reach ina timely manner all relevant stakeholders, including regulators, supervisors andoverseers?

Q.13.2.3:

How frequently are the internal plans to address a default reviewed? What is thegovernance arrangement around these plans?

Key consideration 3: An FMI should publicly disclose key aspects of its default rules
and procedures.
Q.13.3.1:

How are the key aspects of the FMI’s participant default rules and procedures
made publicly available? How do they address:a)the circumstances in which action may be taken;b)

who may take those actions;c)the scope of the actions which may be taken, including the treatment ofboth proprietary and customer positions, funds and assets;d)the mechanisms to address an FMI’s obligations to non-defaulting
participants; ande)where direct relationships exist with participants’ customers, themechanisms to help address the defaulting participant’s obligations to its
customers?

Key consideration 4: An FMI should involve its participants and other stakeholders in
the testing and review of the FMI’s default procedures, including any close-out
procedures. Such testing and review should be conducted at least annually or
following material changes to the rules and procedures to ensure that they arepractical and effective.
Q.13.4.1:

How does the FMI engage with its participants and other relevant stakeholders
in the testing and review of its participant default procedures? How frequently
does it conduct such tests and reviews? How are these tests results used? To
what extent are the results shared with the board, risk committee and relevant
authorities?

Q.13.4.2:

What range of potential participant default scenarios and procedures do thesetests cover? To what extent does the FMI test the implementation of theresolution regime for its participants?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

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CSD

SSS

CCP
●

TR

Principle 14: Segregation and portability
A CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability ofpositions of a participant’s customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect
to those positions.
Because of the extensive interactions between the default management principles as they
apply to CCPs, this principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 13 on participant
default rules. This principle should also be reviewed in the context of Principle 19 on tiered
participation arrangements, Principle 23 on disclosure of rules, key procedures and market
data, and other principles, as appropriate.
Key consideration 1: A CCP should, at a minimum, have segregation and portability
arrangements that effectively protect a participant’s customers’ positions and related
collateral from the default or insolvency of that participant. If the CCP additionallyoffers protection of such customer positions and collateral against the concurrent
default of the participant and a fellow customer, the CCP should take steps to ensurethat such protection is effective.
Customer protection from participant default
Q.14.1.1:

What segregation arrangements does the CCP have in place to effectively
protect a participant’s customers’ positions and related collateral from thedefault or insolvency of that participant?

Q.14.1.2:

What are the CCP’s portability arrangements?

Q.14.1.3:

If the CCP serves a cash market and does not provide segregation
arrangements, how does the CCP achieve protection of customers’ assets? Has
the CCP evaluated whether the applicable legal or regulatory framework
achieves the same degree of protection and efficiency for customers that would
otherwise be achieved by segregation and portability arrangements?

Customer protection from participant and fellow customer default
Q.14.1.4:

If the CCP offers additional protection to customers to protect their positions andcollateral against the concurrent default of the participant and a fellow customer,
how does the CCP ensure that such protection is effective?

Legal basis
Q.14.1.5:

What evidence is there that the legal basis provides a high degree of assurance
that it will support the CCP’s arrangements to protect and transfer the positions
and collateral of a participant’s customers?

Q.14.1.6:

What analysis has the CCP conducted regarding the enforceability of its
customer segregation and portability arrangements, including with respect toany foreign or remote participants? In particular, which foreign laws has the
CCP determined to be relevant to its ability to segregate or transfer customer
positions and collateral? How have any identified issues been addressed?

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CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Key consideration 2: A CCP should employ an account structure that enables it readily
to identify positions of a participant’s customers and to segregate related collateral. A
CCP should maintain customer positions and collateral in individual customer
accounts or in omnibus customer accounts.
Q.14.2.1:

How does the CCP segregate a participant’s customers’ positions and related
collateral from the participant’s positions and collateral? What type of accountstructure (individual or omnibus) does the CCP use for the positions and related
collateral of participants’ customers? What is the rationale for this choice?

Q.14.2.2:

If the CCP (or its custodians) holds collateral supporting customers’ positions,what does this collateral cover (for example, initial margin or variation margin
requirements)?

Q.14.2.3:

Does the CCP rely on the participant’s records containing the sub-accounting
for individual customers to ascertain each customer’s interest? If so, how does
the CCP ensure that it has access to this information? Is customer marginobtained by the CCP from its participants collected on a gross or net basis? To
what extent is a customer’s collateral exposed to “fellow customer risk”?

Key consideration 3: A CCP should structure its portability arrangements in a way thatmakes it highly likely that the positions and collateral of a defaulting participant’s
customers will be transferred to one or more other participants.
Q.14.3.1:

How do the CCP’s portability arrangements make it highly likely that thepositions and collateral of a defaulting participant’s customers will be transferred
to one or more other participants?

Q.14.3.2:

How does the CCP obtain the consent of the participant(s) to which positions
and collateral are to be ported? Are the consent procedures set out in the
CCP’s rules, policies or procedures? If so, please describe them. If there areany exceptions, how are they disclosed?

Key consideration 4: A CCP should disclose its rules, policies, and procedures
relating to the segregation and portability of a participant’s customers’ positions andrelated collateral. In particular, the CCP should disclose whether customer collateral isprotected on an individual or omnibus basis. In addition, a CCP should disclose any
constraints, such as legal or operational constraints, that may impair its ability tosegregate or port a participant’s customers’ positions and related collateral.
Q.14.4.1:

How does the CCP disclose its segregation and portability arrangements? Does
the disclosure include whether a participant’s customers’ collateral is protected
on an individual or omnibus basis?

Q.14.4.2:

Where and how are the risks, costs and uncertainties associated with the CCP’ssegregation and portability arrangements identified and disclosed? How does
the CCP disclose any constraints (such as legal or operational) that may impair
the CCP’s ability to fully segregate or port a participant’s customers’ positions
and collateral?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

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CCP
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TR
●

Principle 15: General business risk
An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficientliquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it
can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise.
Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly
wind-down of critical operations and services.
This principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 3 on the framework for thecomprehensive management of risks, Principle 21 on efficiency and effectiveness, and otherprinciples, as appropriate.
Key consideration 1: An FMI should have robust management and control systems toidentify, monitor, and manage general business risks, including losses from poor
execution of business strategy, negative cash flows, or unexpected and excessively
large operating expenses.
Q.15.1.1:

How does the FMI identify its general business risks? What general businessrisks has the FMI identified?

Q.15.1.2:

How does the FMI monitor and manage its general business risks on an
ongoing basis? Does the FMI’s business risk assessment consider the potential
effects on its cash flow and (in the case of a privately operated FMI) capital?

Key consideration 2: An FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity (such ascommon stock, disclosed reserves, or other retained earnings) so that it can continue
operations and services as a going concern if it incurs general business losses. The
amount of liquid net assets funded by equity an FMI should hold should bedetermined by its general business risk profile and the length of time required toachieve a recovery or orderly wind-down, as appropriate, of its critical operations andservices if such action is taken.
Q.15.2.1:

Does the FMI hold liquid net assets funded by equity so that it can continue
operations and services as a going concern if it incurs general business losses?

Q.15.2.2:

How does the FMI calculate the amount of liquid net assets funded by equity tocover its general business risks? How does the FMI determine the length oftime and associated operating costs of achieving a recovery or orderly winddown of critical operations and services?

Key consideration 3: An FMI should maintain a viable recovery or orderly wind-downplan and should hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to implement thisplan. At a minimum, an FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity equal to atleast six months of current operating expenses. These assets are in addition toresources held to cover participant defaults or other risks covered under the financial
resources principles. However, equity held under international risk-based capital
standards can be included where relevant and appropriate to avoid duplicate capitalrequirements.

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CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Recovery or orderly wind-down plan
Q.15.3.1:

Has the FMI developed a plan to achieve a recovery or orderly wind-down, as
appropriate? If so, what does this plan take into consideration (for example, theoperational, technological and legal requirements for participants to establish
and move to an alternative arrangement)?

Resources
Q.15.3.2:

What amount of liquid net assets funded by equity is the FMI holding for
purposes of implementing this plan? How does the FMI determine whether thisamount is sufficient for such implementation? Is this amount at a minimum
equal to six months of the FMI’s current operating expenses?

Q.15.3.3:

How are the resources designated to cover business risks and losses separated
from resources designated to cover participant defaults or other risks covered
under the financial resources principles?

Q.15.3.4:

Does the FMI include equity held under international risk-based capital
standards to cover general business risks?

Key consideration 4: Assets held to cover general business risk should be of highquality and sufficiently liquid in order to allow the FMI to meet its current andprojected operating expenses under a range of scenarios, including in adverse market
conditions.
Q.15.4.1:

What is the composition of the FMI’s liquid net assets funded by equity? How
will the FMI convert these assets as needed into cash at little or no loss of value
in adverse market conditions?

Q.15.4.2:

How does the FMI regularly assess the quality and liquidity of its liquid net
assets funded by equity to meet its current and projected operating expenses
under a range of scenarios, including in adverse market conditions?

Key consideration 5: An FMI should maintain a viable plan for raising additional equity
should its equity fall close to or below the amount needed. This plan should beapproved by the board of directors and updated regularly.
Q.15.5.1:

Has the FMI developed a plan to raise additional equity? What are the mainfeatures of the FMI’s plan to raise additional equity should its equity fall close toor fall below the amount needed?

Q.15.5.2:

How frequently is the plan to raise additional equity reviewed and updated?

Q.15.5.3:

What is the role of the FMI’s board (or equivalent) in reviewing and approving
the FMI’s plan to raise additional equity if needed?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

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●

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR

Principle 16: Custody and investment risks
An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants’ assets and minimise the risk ofloss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI’s investments should be in
instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.
This principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 4 on credit risk, Principle 5 oncollateral, Principle 7 on liquidity risk, and other principles, as appropriate.
Key consideration 1: An FMI should hold its own and its participants’ assets at
supervised and regulated entities that have robust accounting practices, safekeeping
procedures, and internal controls that fully protect these assets.
Q.16.1.1:

If the FMI uses custodians, how does the FMI select its custodians? What are
the specific selection criteria the FMI uses, including supervision and regulationof these entities? How does the FMI monitor the custodians’ adherence to thesecriteria?

Q.16.1.2:

How does the FMI verify that these entities have robust accounting practices,safekeeping procedures, and internal controls that fully protect its and its
participants’ assets?

Key consideration 2: An FMI should have prompt access to its assets and the assets
provided by participants, when required.
Q.16.2.1:

How has the FMI established that it has a sound legal basis to support
enforcement of its interest or ownership rights in assets held in custody?

Q.16.2.2:

How does the FMI ensure that it has prompt access to its assets, including
securities that are held with a custodian in another time zone or legal
jurisdiction, in the event of participant default?

Key consideration 3: An FMI should evaluate and understand its exposures to its
custodian banks, taking into account the full scope of its relationships with each.
Q.16.3.1:

How does the FMI evaluate and understand its exposures to its custodianbanks? In managing those exposures, how does it take into account the fullscope of its relationship with each custodian bank? For instance, does the FMI
use multiple custodians for the safekeeping of its assets to diversify exposure to
any single custodian? How does the FMI monitor concentration of risk
exposures to its custodian banks?

Key consideration 4: An FMI’s investment strategy should be consistent with its
overall risk-management strategy and fully disclosed to its participants, andinvestments should be secured by, or be claims on, high-quality obligors. These
investments should allow for quick liquidation with little, if any, adverse price effect.

56

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012Investment strategy
Q.16.4.1:

How does the FMI ensure that its investment strategy is consistent with its
overall risk management strategy? How and to whom does the FMI disclose its
investment strategy?

Q.16.4.2:

How does the FMI ensure on an ongoing basis that its investments are securedby, or are claims on, high-quality obligors?

Risk characteristics of investments
Q.16.4.3:

How does the FMI consider its overall exposure to an obligor in choosing
investments? What investments are subject to limits to avoid concentration of
credit risk exposures?

Q.16.4.4:

Does the FMI invest participant assets in the participants’ own securities or
those of its affiliates?

Q.16.4.5:

How does the FMI ensure that its investments allow for quick liquidation withlittle, if any, adverse price effect?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

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●

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR
●

Principle 17: Operational risk
An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal andexternal, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies,
procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of
security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity.
Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations andfulfilment of the FMI’s obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major
disruption.
This principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 20 on FMI links, Principle 21 on
efficiency and effectiveness, Principle 22 on communication standards and procedures, andother principles, as appropriate.
Key consideration 1: An FMI should establish a robust operational risk-management
framework with appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls to identify,
monitor, and manage operational risks.
Identification of operational risk
Q.17.1.1:

What are the FMI’s policies and processes for identifying the plausible sourcesof operational risks? How do the FMI’s processes identify plausible sources ofoperational risks, whether these risks arise from internal sources (for example,
the arrangements of the system itself, including human resources), from the
FMI’s participants or from external sources?

Q.17.1.2:

What sources of operational risks has the FMI identified? What single points offailure in its operations has the FMI identified?

Management of operational risk
Q.17.1.3:

How does the FMI monitor and manage the identified operational risks? Where
are these systems, policies, procedures and controls documented?

Policies, processes and controls
Q.17.1.4:

What policies, processes and controls does the FMI employ that are designed
to ensure that operational procedures are implemented appropriately? To what
extent do the FMI’s systems, policies, processes and controls take into
consideration relevant international, national and industry-level operational risk
management standards?

Q.17.1.5:

What are the FMI’s human resources policies to hire, train and retain qualified
personnel, and how do such policies mitigate the effects of high rates of
personnel turnover or key-person risk? How do the FMI’s human resources andrisk management policies address fraud prevention?

Q.17.1.6:

How do the FMI’s change management and project management policies andprocesses mitigate the risks that changes and major projects inadvertently
affect the smooth functioning of the system?

Key consideration 2: An FMI’s board of directors should clearly define the roles andresponsibilities for addressing operational risk and should endorse the FMI’s
operational risk-management framework. Systems, operational policies, procedures,

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CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

and controls should be reviewed, audited, and tested periodically and after significant
changes.
Roles, responsibilities and framework
Q.17.2.1:

How has the board of directors defined the key roles and responsibilities for
operational risk management?

Q.17.2.2:

Does the FMI’s board explicitly review and endorse the FMI’s operational risk
management framework? How frequently does the board review and endorse
the FMI’s operational risk management framework?

Review, audit and testing
Q.17.2.3:

How does the FMI review, audit and test its systems, policies, procedures andcontrols, including its operational risk management arrangements withparticipants? How frequently does the FMI conduct these reviews, audits andtests with participants?

Q.17.2.4:

To what extent, where relevant, is the FMI’s operational risk management
framework subject to external audit?

Key consideration 3: An FMI should have clearly defined operational reliability
objectives and should have policies in place that are designed to achieve thoseobjectives.
Q.17.3.1:

What are the FMI’s operational reliability objectives, both qualitative andquantitative? Where and how are they documented?

Q.17.3.2:

How do these objectives ensure a high degree of operational reliability?

Q.17.3.3:

What are the policies in place that are designed to achieve the FMI’s
operational reliability objectives to ensure that the FMI takes appropriate action
as needed?

Key consideration 4: An FMI should ensure that it has scalable capacity adequate tohandle increasing stress volumes and to achieve its service-level objectives.
Q.17.4.1:

How does the FMI review, audit and test the scalability and adequacy of its
capacity to handle, at a minimum, projected stress volumes? How frequently
does the FMI conduct these reviews, audits and tests?

Q.17.4.2:

How are situations where operational capacity is neared or exceeded
addressed?

Key consideration 5: An FMI should have comprehensive physical and information
security policies that address all potential vulnerabilities and threats.
Physical security
Q.17.5.1:

What are the FMI’s policies and processes, including change management andproject management policies and processes, for addressing the plausible
sources of physical vulnerabilities and threats on an ongoing basis?

Q.17.5.2:

Do the FMI’s policies, processes, controls and testing appropriately take into
consideration relevant international, national and industry-level standards forphysical security?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201259

Information security
Q.17.5.3:

What are the FMI’s policies and processes, including change management andproject management policies and processes, for addressing the plausible
sources of information security vulnerabilities and threats on an ongoing basis?

Q.17.5.4:

Do the FMI’s policies, processes, controls and testing appropriately take into
consideration relevant international, national and industry-level standards for
information security?

Key consideration 6: An FMI should have a business continuity plan that addresses
events posing a significant risk of disrupting operations, including events that could
cause a wide-scale or major disruption. The plan should incorporate the use of asecondary site and should be designed to ensure that critical information technology(IT) systems can resume operations within two hours following disruptive events. The
plan should be designed to enable the FMI to complete settlement by the end of the
day of the disruption, even in case of extreme circumstances. The FMI should
regularly test these arrangements.
Objectives of business continuity plan
Q.17.6.1:

How and to what extent does the FMI’s business continuity plan reflect
objectives, policies and procedures that allow for the rapid recovery and timely
resumption of critical operations following a wide-scale or major disruption?

Design of business continuity plan
Q.17.6.2:

How and to what extent is the FMI’s business continuity plan designed to enable
critical IT systems to resume operations within two hours following disruptive
events, and to enable the FMI to facilitate or complete settlement by the end of
the day even in extreme circumstances?

Q.17.6.3:

How is the contingency plan designed to ensure that the status of alltransactions can be identified in a timely manner, at the time of the disruption;and if there is a possibility of data loss, what are the procedures to deal withsuch loss (for example, reconciliation with participants or third parties)?

Q.17.6.4:

How do the FMI’s crisis management procedures address the need for effective
communications internally and with key external stakeholders and authorities?

Secondary site
Q.17.6.5:

How does the FMI’s business continuity plan incorporate the use of a secondarysite (including ensuring that the secondary site has sufficient resources,
capabilities, functionalities and appropriate staffing arrangements)? To what
extent is the secondary site located a sufficient geographic distance from theprimary site such that it has a distinct risk profile?

Q.17.6.6:

Has the FMI considered alternative arrangements (such as manual, paperbased procedures or other alternatives) to allow the processing of time-criticaltransactions in extreme circumstances?

Review and testing
Q.17.6.7:

60

How are the FMI’s business continuity and contingency arrangements reviewed
and tested, including with respect to scenarios related to wide-scale and major
disruptions? How frequently are these arrangements reviewed and tested?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Q.17.6.8:

How does the review and testing of the FMI’s business continuity andcontingency arrangements involve the FMI’s participants, critical service
providers and linked FMIs as relevant? How frequently are the FMI’s
participants, critical service providers and linked FMIs involved in the review andtesting?

Key consideration 7: An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks that key
participants, other FMIs, and service and utility providers might pose to its operations.
In addition, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks its operations mightpose to other FMIs.
Risks to the FMI’s own operations
Q.17.7.1:

What risks has the FMI identified to its operations arising from its key
participants, other FMIs, and service and utility providers? How and to what
extent does the FMI monitor and manage these risks?

Q.17.7.2:

If the FMI has outsourced services critical to its operations, how and to what
extent does the FMI ensure that the operations of a critical service provider
meet the same reliability and contingency requirements they would need tomeet if they were provided internally?

Risks posed to other FMIs
Q.17.7.3:

How and to what extent does the FMI identify, monitor and mitigate the risks it
may pose to another FMI?

Q.17.7.4:

To what extent does the FMI coordinate its business continuity arrangementswith those of other interdependent FMIs?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

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TR
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Principle 18: Access and participation requirements
An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria forparticipation, which permit fair and open access.
In reviewing this principle, it should be noted that FMIs are subject to the constraints of local
laws and policies of the jurisdiction in which the FMI operates, and those laws may prohibit or
require the inclusion of certain categories of financial institutions. This principle should be
reviewed in the context of Principle 19 on tiered participation arrangements, Principle 21 on
efficiency and effectiveness, and other principles, as appropriate.
Key consideration 1: An FMI should allow for fair and open access to its services,
including by direct and, where relevant, indirect participants and other FMIs, based onreasonable risk-related participation requirements.
Participation criteria and requirements
Q.18.1.1:

What are the FMI’s criteria and requirements for participation (such as
operational, financial and legal requirements)?

Q.18.1.2:

How do these criteria and requirements allow for fair and open access to the
FMI’s services, including by direct and, where relevant, indirect participants andother FMIs, based on reasonable risk-related participation requirements?

Access to trade repositories
Q.18.1.3:

For a TR, how do the terms of access for use of its services help ensure thatcompetition and innovation in post-trade processing are not impaired? How arethese terms designed to support interconnectivity with other FMIs and service
providers, where requested?

Key consideration 2: An FMI’s participation requirements should be justified in termsof the safety and efficiency of the FMI and the markets it serves, be tailored to andcommensurate with the FMI’s specific risks, and be publicly disclosed. Subject tomaintaining acceptable risk control standards, an FMI should endeavour to set
requirements that have the least-restrictive impact on access that circumstances
permit.
Justification and rationale of participation criteria
Q.18.2.1:

How are the participation requirements for the FMI justified in terms of thesafety and efficiency of the FMI and its role in the markets it serves, and tailored
to and commensurate with the FMI’s specific risks?

Q.18.2.2:

Are there participation requirements that are not risk-based but required by law
or regulation? If so, what are these requirements?

Q.18.2.3:

Are all classes of participants subject to the same access criteria? If not, what is
the rationale for the different criteria (for example, size or type of activity,
additional requirements for participants that act on behalf of third parties, andadditional requirements for participants that are non-regulated entities)?

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CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Least restrictive accessQ.18.2.4:

How are the access restrictions and requirements reviewed to ensure that they
have the least restrictive access that circumstances permit, consistent withmaintaining acceptable risk controls? How frequently is this review conducted?

Disclosure of criteria
Q.18.2.5:

How are participation criteria, including restrictions in participation, publicly
disclosed?

Key consideration 3: An FMI should monitor compliance with its participation
requirements on an ongoing basis and have clearly defined and publicly disclosed
procedures for facilitating the suspension and orderly exit of a participant thatbreaches, or no longer meets, the participation requirements.
Monitoring complianceQ.18.3.1:

How does the FMI monitor its participants’ ongoing compliance with the accesscriteria? How are the FMI’s policies designed to ensure that the information it
uses to monitor compliance with participation criteria is timely and accurate?

Q.18.3.2:

What are the FMI’s policies for conducting enhanced surveillance of, or
imposing additional controls on, a participant whose risk profile deteriorates?

Suspension and orderly exit
Q.18.3.3:

What are the FMI’s procedures for managing the suspension and orderly exit ofa participant that breaches, or no longer meets, the participation requirements?

Q.18.3.4:

How are the FMI’s procedures for managing the suspension and orderly exit ofa participant disclosed to the public?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

63

PS
●

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR
●

Principle 19: Tiered participation arrangements
An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising fromtiered participation arrangements.
This principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 14 on segregation andportability, Principle 18 on access and participation requirements, and other principles, as
appropriate.
Key consideration 1: An FMI should ensure that its rules, procedures, and agreementsallow it to gather basic information about indirect participation in order to identify,
monitor, and manage any material risks to the FMI arising from such tiered
participation arrangements.
Tiered participation arrangements
Q.19.1.1:

Does the FMI have any tiered participation arrangements? If so, describe thesearrangements.

Q.19.1.2:

How does the FMI gather basic information about indirect participation? Whichinformation is collected and how frequently is it updated?

Risks to the FMI
Q.19.1.3:

How does the FMI evaluate its risks arising from these arrangements?

Q.19.1.4:

What material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements
has the FMI identified? How has it mitigated these risks?

Key consideration 2: An FMI should identify material dependencies between direct andindirect participants that might affect the FMI.
Q.19.2.1:

How does the FMI identify material dependencies between direct and indirect
participants that might affect the FMI?

Key consideration 3: An FMI should identify indirect participants responsible for asignificant proportion of transactions processed by the FMI and indirect participants
whose transaction volumes or values are large relative to the capacity of the direct
participants through which they access the FMI in order to manage the risks arisingfrom these transactions.
Q.19.3.1:

Has the FMI identified (a) the proportion of activity that each direct participant
conducts on behalf of indirect participants in relation to the direct participants’capacity, (b) direct participants that act on behalf of a material number ofindirect participants, (c) indirect participants responsible for a significant
proportion of turnover in the system, and (d) indirect participants whosetransaction volumes or values are large relative to the capacity of the direct
participant through which they access the FMI to manage risks arising fromthese transactions?

Q.19.3.2:

What risks to the FMI arise, and how does the FMI manage these risks arisingfrom key indirect participants?

64

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Key consideration 4: An FMI should regularly review risks arising from tiered
participation arrangements and should take mitigating action when appropriate.
Q.19.4.1:

What are the FMI’s policies for reviewing its rules and procedures in order tomitigate risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation? How frequently is thisreview conducted?

Q.19.4.2:

What criteria does the FMI use to determine when mitigating actions are
required? How does the FMI monitor and mitigate its risks?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

65

PS

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR
●

Principle 20: FMI links
An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, andmanage link-related risks.
In reviewing this principle, it should be noted that the questions apply only to FMIs that haveestablished links with one or more other FMIs. Additionally, the term CSD generally refers to
a CSD that also operates an SSS. The use of this broader definition for CSD in this principle
mirrors market convention in the discussion of FMI links. This principle should be reviewed in
the context of Principle 8 on settlement finality, Principle 11 on CSDs, Principle 17 on
operational risk, and other principles, as appropriate.

The following key consideration applies to

PS

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR
●

Key consideration 1: Before entering into a link arrangement and on an ongoing basis
once the link is established, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage all potential
sources of risk arising from the link arrangement. Link arrangements should bedesigned such that each FMI is able to observe the other principles in this report.
Q.20.1.1:

What process is used to identify potential sources of risk (such as, legal, credit,
liquidity, custody and operational risks) arising from prospective links? How
does this affect the FMI’s decision whether to establish the link?

Q.20.1.2:

What links have been established with other FMIs? How does the FMI identify,
monitor and manage the risks arising from an established link on an ongoingbasis?

Q.20.1.3:

How does the FMI ensure that link arrangements are designed so that it is able
to remain observant of the other principles? How frequently is this analysis
conducted?

The following key consideration applies to

PS

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR
●

Key consideration 2: A link should have a well-founded legal basis, in all relevant
jurisdictions, that supports its design and provides adequate protection to the FMIs
involved in the link.
Q.20.2.1:

In which jurisdictions has the FMI established links? What are the relevant legal
frameworks supporting the established links?

Q.20.2.2:

How does the FMI ensure that its links have a well founded legal basis that
support its design and provide it with adequate protection in all relevant
jurisdictions? How does the FMI ensure that such protections are maintained
over time?

The following key consideration applies to

PS

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP

TR

Key consideration 3: Linked CSDs should measure, monitor, and manage the credit
and liquidity risks arising from each other. Any credit extensions between CSDs
should be covered fully with high-quality collateral and be subject to limits.

66

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Q.20.3.1:

What processes are in place to measure, monitor and manage credit andliquidity risks arising from any established links?

Q.20.3.2:

If a CSD extends credit to a linked CSD, what processes exist to ensure thatcredit extensions to the linked CSD are fully covered by high-quality collateraland that credit limits are appropriate?

The following key consideration applies to

PS

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP

TR

Key consideration 4: Provisional transfers of securities between linked CSDs should
be prohibited or, at a minimum, the retransfer of provisionally transferred securities
should be prohibited prior to the transfer becoming final.
Q.20.4.1:

Are provisional transfers of securities allowed across the link? If so, whatarrangements make provisional transfers necessary, and is the retransfer ofthese securities prohibited until the first transfer is final?

The following key consideration applies to

PS

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP

TR

Key consideration 5: An investor CSD should only establish a link with an issuer CSD
if the arrangement provides a high level of protection for the rights of the investor
CSD’s participants.
Q.20.5.1:

For any established link, how has the investor CSD determined that the rights of
its participants have a high level of protection?

Q.20.5.2:

How frequently is reconciliation of holdings conducted by the entities holding thesecurities in custody?

Q.20.5.3:

How does the investor CSD provide a high-level of protection for the rights of its
participants (including segregation and portability arrangements and asset
protection provisions for omnibus accounts)?

The following key consideration applies to

PS

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP

TR

Key consideration 6: An investor CSD that uses an intermediary to operate a link with
an issuer CSD should measure, monitor, and manage the additional risks (including
custody, credit, legal, and operational risks) arising from the use of the intermediary.
Q.20.6.1:

If the CSD uses an intermediary to operate a link, what are the criteria used by
the CSD to select the intermediary or intermediaries? Are these criteria riskbased?

Q.20.6.2:

What are the respective liabilities of the two linked CSDs and theintermediaries?

Q.20.6.3:

What processes exist to measure, monitor and manage the risks arising fromuse of the intermediary?

The following key consideration applies to

PS

CSD

SSS

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 7: Before entering into a link with another CCP, a CCP should
identify and manage the potential spill-over effects from the default of the linked CCP.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201267

If a link has three or more CCPs, each CCP should identify, assess, and manage therisks of the collective link arrangement.
Linked CCP default
Q.20.7.1:

Prior to establishing any links, what analysis was undertaken by the CCP to
identify and assess the spillover effects of a linked CCP’s default?

Q.20.7.2:

How does the CCP manage any identified spillover effects of a linked CCP’s
default?

Collective link arrangements (three or more CCPs)
Q.20.7.3:

Prior to establishing any links, what analysis was conducted by the CCP to
identify and assess the potential spillover effects of a link arrangement involving
three or more CCPs?

Q.20.7.4:

In the case of collective link arrangements, what processes are in place for the
CCP to identify, assess and manage risks arising from the collective linkarrangement? In the case of links between CCPs, is there a clear definition of
the respective rights and obligations of the different CCPs?

The following key consideration applies to

PS

CSD

SSS

CCP
●

TR

Key consideration 8: Each CCP in a CCP link arrangement should be able to cover, atleast on a daily basis, its current and potential future exposures to the linked CCP and
its participants, if any, fully with a high degree of confidence without reducing the
CCP’s ability to fulfil its obligations to its own participants at any time.
Exposures and coverage of exposures
Q.20.8.1:

What processes are in place to measure, monitor and manage inter-CCP
exposures?

Q.20.8.2:

How does the CCP ensure, on an ongoing basis, that it can cover its current
exposure fully?

Q.20.8.3:

How does the CCP ensure that it covers its potential future exposure with a highdegree of confidence, without reducing its ability to fulfil its own obligations?

Management of risks
Q.20.8.4:

What arrangements do the linked CCPs have in place to manage the risks
arising from the link (such as a separate default fund, increased margin
requirements or contributions to each other’s default funds)?

Q.20.8.5:

If the CCPs contribute to each other’s default funds, how is it ensured that thecontribution to another CCP’s default fund does not affect the ability of the CCP
to fulfil its obligations to its own participants at any time?

Information provided to participants
Q.20.8.6:

68

How do the linked CCPs ensure that participants are informed about their
exposures to the potential sharing of uncovered losses and uncovered liquidity
shortfalls from the link arrangement?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

The following key consideration applies to

PS

CSD

SSS

CCP

TR
●

Key consideration 9: A TR should carefully assess the additional operational risks
related to its links to ensure the scalability and reliability of IT and related resources.
Q.20.9.1:

How does the TR ensure the scalability and reliability of its IT and relatedresources to take into account the additional operational risks associated with alink to another FMI? How frequently does the TR validate the adequacy of its
scalability and reliability?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

69

PS
●

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR
●

Principle 21: Efficiency and effectiveness
An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants
and the markets it serves.
This principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 17 on operational risk,
Principle 18 on access and participation requirements, Principle 22 on communication
procedures and standards, and other principles, as appropriate.
Key consideration 1: An FMI should be designed to meet the needs of its participants
and the markets it serves, in particular, with regard to choice of a clearing andsettlement arrangement; operating structure; scope of products cleared, settled, or
recorded; and use of technology and procedures.
Q.21.1.1:

How does the FMI determine whether its design (including its clearing andsettlement arrangement, its operating structure, its delivery systems andtechnologies, and its individual services and products) is taking into account theneeds of its participants and the markets it serves?

Q.21.1.2:

How does the FMI determine whether it is meeting the requirements and needsof its participants and other users and continues to meet those requirements asthey change (for example, through the use of feedback mechanisms)?

Key consideration 2: An FMI should have clearly defined goals and objectives that aremeasurable and achievable, such as in the areas of minimum service levels, riskmanagement expectations, and business priorities.
Q.21.2.1:

What are the FMI’s goals and objectives as far as the effectiveness of its
operations is concerned?

Q.21.2.2:

How does the FMI ensure that it has clearly defined goals and objectives thatare measurable and achievable?

Q.21.2.3:

To what extent have the goals and objectives been achieved? Whatmechanisms does the FMI have to measure and assess this?

Key consideration 3: An FMI should have established mechanisms for the regularreview of its efficiency and effectiveness.
Q.21.3.1:

What processes and metrics does the FMI use to evaluate its efficiency andeffectiveness?

Q.21.3.2:

How frequently does the FMI evaluate its efficiency and effectiveness?

70

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

PS
●

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR
●

Principle 22: Communication procedures and standards
An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted
communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment,
clearing, settlement, and recording.
This principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 17 on operational risk,
Principle 21 on efficiency and effectiveness, and other principles, as appropriate.
Key consideration 1: An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate,internationally accepted communication procedures and standards.
Communication procedures
Q.22.1.1:

Does the FMI use an internationally accepted communications procedure and, if
so, which one(s)? If not, how does the FMI accommodate internationallyaccepted communication procedures?

Q.22.1.2:

If the FMI engages in cross-border operations, how do the FMI’s operational
procedures, processes and systems use or otherwise accommodate
internationally accepted communication procedures for cross-border
operations?

Communication standards
Q.22.1.3:

Does the FMI use an internationally accepted communications standard and, if
so, which one(s)? If not, how does the FMI accommodate internationallyaccepted communication standards?

Q.22.1.4:

If the FMI engages in cross-border operations, how do the FMI’s operational
procedures, processes and systems use or otherwise accommodate
internationally accepted communication standards for cross-border operations?

Q.22.1.5:

If no international standard is used, how does the FMI accommodate systems
that translate or convert message format and data from international standards
into the domestic equivalent and vice versa?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

71

PS
●

CSD
●

SSS
●

CCP
●

TR
●

Principle 23: Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data
An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide
sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of therisks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant
rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.
In reviewing this principle, information should be disclosed to the extent that it would not risk
prejudicing the security and integrity of the FMI or divulging commercially sensitive
information. This principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 8 on settlement
finality, Principle 13 on participant default rules and procedures, Principle 24 on thedisclosure of market data by trade repositories, and other principles, as appropriate.
Key consideration 1: An FMI should adopt clear and comprehensive rules andprocedures that are fully disclosed to participants. Relevant rules and key proceduresshould also be publicly disclosed.
Rules and procedures
Q.23.1.1:

What documents comprise the FMI’s rules and procedures? How are these
documents disclosed to participants?

Q.23.1.2:

How does the FMI determine that its rules and procedures are clear andcomprehensive?

Disclosure
Q.23.1.3:

What information do the FMI’s rules and procedures contain on the procedures
it will follow in non-routine, though foreseeable, events?

Q.23.1.4:

How and to whom does the FMI disclose the processes it follows for changing
its rules and procedures?

Q.23.1.5:

How does the FMI disclose relevant rules and key procedures to the public?

Key consideration 2: An FMI should disclose clear descriptions of the system’s designand operations, as well as the FMI’s and participants’ rights and obligations, so thatparticipants can assess the risks they would incur by participating in the FMI.
Q.23.2.1:

What documents comprise information about the system’s design andoperations? How and to whom does the FMI disclose the system’s design andoperations?

Q.23.2.2:

How and to whom does the FMI disclose the degree of discretion it can exercise
over key decisions that directly affect the operation of the system?

Q.23.2.3:

What information does the FMI provide to its participants about their rights,
obligations and risks incurred through participation in the FMI?

Key consideration 3: An FMI should provide all necessary and appropriate
documentation and training to facilitate participants’ understanding of the FMI’s rules
and procedures and the risks they face from participating in the FMI.

72

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Q.23.3.1:

How does the FMI facilitate its participants’ understanding of the FMI’s rules,
procedures and the risks associated with participating?

Q.23.3.2:

Is there evidence that the means described above enable participants’
understanding of the FMI’s rules, procedures and the risks they face fromparticipating in the FMI?

Q.23.3.3:

In the event that the FMI identifies a participant whose behaviour demonstrates
a lack of understanding of the FMI’s rules, procedures and the risks ofparticipation, what remedial actions are taken by the FMI?

Key consideration 4: An FMI should publicly disclose its fees at the level of individual
services it offers as well as its policies on any available discounts. The FMI should
provide clear descriptions of priced services for comparability purposes.
Q.23.4.1:

Does the FMI publicly disclose its fees at the level of its individual services andpolicies on any available discounts? How is this information disclosed?

Q.23.4.2:

How does the FMI notify participants and the public, on a timely basis, ofchanges to services and fees?

Q.23.4.3:

Does the FMI provide a description of its priced services? Do these descriptions
allow for comparison across similar FMIs?

Q.23.4.4:

Does the FMI disclose information on its technology and communication
procedures, or any other factors that affect the costs of operating the FMI?

Key consideration 5: An FMI should complete regularly and disclose publicly
responses to the CPSS-IOSCO disclosure framework for financial market
infrastructures. An FMI also should, at a minimum, disclose basic data on transaction
volumes and values.
Q.23.5.1:

When did the FMI last complete the CPSS-IOSCO Disclosure framework forfinancial market infrastructures? How frequently is it updated? Is it updated
following material changes to the FMI and its environment and, at a minimum,
every two years?

Q.23.5.2:

What quantitative information does the FMI disclose to the public? How often is
this information updated?

Q.23.5.3:

What other information does the FMI disclose to the public?

Q.23.5.4:

How does the FMI disclose this information to the public? In which language(s)are the disclosures provided?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

73

PS

CSD

SSS

CCP

TR
●

Principle 24: Disclosure of market data by trade repositories
A TR should provide timely and accurate data to relevant authorities and the public inline with their respective needs.
This principle should be reviewed in the context of Principle 17 on operational risk and otherprinciples, as appropriate.
Key consideration 1: A TR should provide data in line with regulatory and industry
expectations to relevant authorities and the public, respectively, that iscomprehensive and at a level of detail sufficient to enhance market transparency andsupport other public policy objectives.
Q.24.1.1:

What data are made available by the TR to the relevant authorities and to the
public?

Q.24.1.2:

How does the TR ensure that its disclosures of data effectively meet the needsof the relevant authorities and the public?

Key consideration 2: A TR should have effective processes and procedures to provide
data to relevant authorities in a timely and appropriate manner to enable them to meettheir respective regulatory mandates and legal responsibilities.
Q.24.2.1:

What processes and procedures does the TR use to provide data to relevant
authorities in a timely and appropriate manner to enable them to meet theirrespective regulatory mandates and legal responsibilities?

Q.24.2.2:

How does the TR ensure that this provision of data to relevant authorities is
supported from a legal, procedural, operational and technological perspective?

Key consideration 3: A TR should have robust information systems that provide
accurate current and historical data. Data should be provided in a timely manner andin a format that permits it to be easily analysed.
Q.24.3.1:

How does the TR ensure that data remain accurate?

Q.24.3.2:

How does the TR ensure that data and other relevant information are provided
in a format that is generally accessible, comparable and easily analysed?

74

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

6.0.

Questions by key consideration for the responsibilities ofauthorities for FMIs

Responsibility A: Regulation, supervision, and oversight of FMIs
FMIs should be subject to appropriate and effective regulation, supervision, andoversight by a central bank, market regulator, or other relevant authority.

Key consideration 1: Authorities should clearly define and publicly disclose thecriteria used to identify FMIs that should be subject to regulation, supervision, andoversight.
Q.A.1.1:

What criteria do authorities use to identify FMIs that should be regulated,supervised and overseen?

Q.A.1.2:

How are the criteria publicly disclosed?

Key consideration 2: FMIs that have been identified using these criteria should be
regulated, supervised, and overseen by a central bank, market regulator, or otherrelevant authority.
Q.A.2.1:

Which FMIs have been identified for regulation, supervision and oversight? Did
the authorities use the criteria set forth in key consideration 1?

Q.A.2.2:

Which authority or authorities regulate, supervise or oversee the identified
FMIs? What is the scope of the responsibilities for each authority?

Q.A.2.3:

How have relevant authorities avoided (or addressed) any gaps in regulation,
supervision or oversight of FMIs?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201275

Responsibility B: Regulatory, supervisory, and oversight powers and resources
Central banks, market regulators, and other relevant authorities should have the powers
and resources to carry out effectively their responsibilities in regulating, supervising, andoverseeing FMIs.

Key consideration 1: Authorities should have powers or other authority consistent
with their relevant responsibilities, including the ability to obtain timely informationand to induce change or enforce corrective action.
Powers or other authority consistent with relevant responsibilities
Q.B.1.1:

What are the authorities’ powers or other authority and how are these consistent
with the relevant responsibilities (as identified in Q.A.2.2)?

Powers to obtain timely information
Q.B.1.2:

How do the authorities’ powers or other authority enable them to obtain timely
information from the FMIs, including confidential and non-public information, inorder to carry out their responsibilities? What are the relevant constraints, if
any?

Q.B.1.3:

What information are FMIs required to provide? How frequently does the FMI
provide this information?

Q.B.1.4:

To what extent do authorities have the ability to obtain information tounderstand and assess: (a) an FMI’s various functions, activities and overall
financial condition; (b) the risks borne or created by an FMI and, whereappropriate, the participants; (c) an FMI’s impact on its participants and thebroader economy; and (d) an FMI’s adherence to relevant regulations andpolicies?

Powers to induce change or enforce corrective action
Q.B.1.5:

What powers, authority or other mechanisms enable authorities to inducechange or enforce corrective action in an FMI that is not observing relevant
principles or that is not complying with relevant regulations or policies? What
are the relevant constraints, if any?

Key consideration 2: Authorities should have sufficient resources to fulfil theirregulatory, supervisory, and oversight responsibilities.
Resources
Q.B.2.1:

What resources (including adequate funding, qualified and experienced
personnel, and appropriate ongoing training) are available to authorities toenable them to fulfil their responsibilities?

Q.B.2.2:

To what extent does the level of available resources constrain the ability of theauthorities to carry out their responsibilities?

Q.B.2.3:

What is each authority’s process for assessing the resources it needs to fulfil its
regulatory, supervisory or oversight responsibilities?

Legal protections
Q.B.2.4:

76

Where relevant, what legal protections apply to the staff that carries out
responsibilities for regulation, supervision and oversight?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Responsibility C: Disclosure of policies with respect to FMIs
Central banks, market regulators, and other relevant authorities should clearly define
and disclose their regulatory, supervisory, and oversight policies with respect to FMIs.

Key consideration 1: Authorities should clearly define their policies with respect to
FMIs, which include the authorities’ objectives, roles, and regulations.
Q.C.1.1:

What are each authority’s policies with respect to FMIs, including its objectives,
roles and regulations? Are they clearly defined?

Key consideration 2: Authorities should publicly disclose their relevant policies withrespect to the regulation, supervision, and oversight of FMIs.
Q.C.2.1:

How are the relevant policies disclosed?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201277

Responsibility D: Application of the principles for FMIs
Central banks, market regulators, and other relevant authorities should adopt the CPSSIOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures and apply them consistently.

Key consideration 1: Authorities should adopt the CPSS-IOSCO Principles forfinancial market infrastructures.
Q.D.1.1:

How and to what extent have the relevant authorities adopted the principles?

Key consideration 2: Authorities should ensure that these principles are, at aminimum, applied to all systemically important payment systems, CSDs, SSSs, CCPs,
and TRs.
Q.D.2.1:

To which systemically important payment systems, CSDs, SSSs, CCPs andTRs do authorities apply the principles? Are there systemically important FMIs
to which the relevant authorities do not apply the principles?

Q.D.2.2:

How do the authorities disclose to which FMIs they apply or do not apply theprinciples? How does each relevant authority justify its decision to apply or not
to apply the principles to specific FMIs?

Key consideration 3: Authorities should apply these principles consistently within andacross jurisdictions, including across borders, and to each type of FMI covered by theprinciples.
Q.D.3.1:

How do authorities apply these principles consistently within the relevant
jurisdictions, including to public sector-owned or -operated FMIs, and acrossjurisdictions, including across borders?

Q.D.3.2:

If an authority is an owner and operator of FMIs as well as the overseer ofprivate sector FMIs, how does it consider and address possible conflicts ofinterest?

Q.D.3.3:

If an FMI does not observe all applicable principles, how do authorities ensurethat the FMI takes appropriate and timely action to remedy its deficiencies?

78

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Responsibility E: Cooperation with other authorities
Central banks, market regulators, and other relevant authorities should cooperate witheach other, both domestically and internationally, as appropriate, in promoting the safety
and efficiency of FMIs.

Key consideration 1: Relevant authorities should cooperate with each other, both
domestically and internationally, to foster efficient and effective communication andconsultation in order to support each other in fulfilling their respective mandates withrespect to FMIs. Such cooperation needs to be effective in normal circumstances andshould be adequately flexible to facilitate effective communication, consultation, or
coordination, as appropriate, during periods of market stress, crisis situations, andthe potential recovery, wind-down, or resolution of an FMI.
Q.E.1.1:

For which FMIs is there cooperation among authorities and what authorities are
involved?

Q.E.1.2:

How does the cooperation among authorities, both domestically andinternationally, foster efficient and effective communication and consultation inorder to support each other in fulfilling their respective mandates with respect to
FMIs in normal circumstances?

Q.E.1.3:

How does the cooperation among authorities facilitate the effective
communication, consultation or coordination, as appropriate, during periods ofmarket stress, crisis situations and the potential recovery, wind-down orresolution of an FMI?

Key consideration 2: If an authority has identified an actual or proposed operation of across-border or multicurrency FMI in its jurisdiction, the authority should, as soon as
it is practicable, inform other relevant authorities that may have an interest in the
FMI’s observance of the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures.
Q.E.2.1:

Which FMIs in the authorities’ jurisdiction provide cross-border or multicurrency
services? How do authorities identify an actual or proposed operation of across-border or multicurrency FMI in their jurisdiction?

Q.E.2.2:

What criteria do authorities use to determine whether other relevant authorities
should be notified?

Q.E.2.3:

How and when are notifications provided to other relevant authorities?

Key consideration 3: Cooperation may take a variety of forms. The form, degree offormalisation and intensity of cooperation should promote the efficiency andeffectiveness of the cooperation, and should be appropriate to the nature and scope ofeach authority’s responsibility for the supervision or oversight of the FMI andcommensurate with the FMI’s systemic importance in the cooperating authorities’
various jurisdictions. Cooperative arrangements should be managed to ensure theefficiency and effectiveness of the cooperation with respect to the number ofauthorities participating in such arrangements.
Forms of cooperation
Q.E.3.1:

What are the forms of cooperation for each FMI identified under key
consideration 1?

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201279

Q.E.3.2:

How are the forms of cooperation appropriate to the nature and scope of eachauthority’s responsibility for the supervision or oversight of the FMI?

Efficiency and effectiveness of cooperation
Q.E.3.3:

How does the management of cooperative arrangements promote the efficiency
and effectiveness of the cooperation, including with respect to the number ofauthorities participating in such arrangements?

Key consideration 4: For an FMI where cooperative arrangements are appropriate, atleast one authority should accept responsibility for establishing efficient and effective
cooperation among all relevant authorities. In international cooperative arrangements
where no other authority accepts this responsibility, the presumption is the authority
or authorities with primary responsibility in the FMI’s home jurisdiction should accept
this responsibility.
Q.E.4.1:

For each FMI identified under key consideration 1 where cooperative
arrangements are appropriate, which authority or authorities have accepted
responsibility for establishing efficient and effective cooperation among all
relevant authorities?

Q.E.4.2:

What are the duties of this authority or these authorities with respect to thecooperation?

Key consideration 5: At least one authority should ensure that the FMI is periodicallyassessed against the principles and should, in developing these assessments, consult
with other authorities that conduct the supervision or oversight of the FMI and forwhich the FMI is systemically important.
Q.E.5.1:

Which relevant authority ensures that the FMI is periodically assessed against
the principles?

Q.E.5.2:

How does this authority consult on and share assessments with other relevant
authorities that conduct the supervision or oversight of the FMI and for which
the FMI is systemically important?

Key consideration 6: When assessing an FMI’s payment and settlement arrangements
and its related liquidity risk-management procedures in any currency for which the
FMI’s settlements are systemically important against the principles, the authority or
authorities with primary responsibility with respect to the FMI should consider theviews of the central banks of issue. If a central bank of issue is required under its
responsibilities to conduct its own assessment of these arrangements andprocedures, the central bank should consider the views of the authority or authorities
with primary responsibility with respect to the FMI.
Q.E.6.1:

For which currency (or currencies) do the authority or authorities with primary
regulation, supervision or oversight responsibility assess the FMI’s payment andsettlement arrangements and its related liquidity risk management procedures?

Q.E.6.2:

When assessing an FMI’s payment and settlement systems and its related
liquidity risk management procedures in any currency for which the FMI’s
settlements are systemically important, how do the authority or authorities withprimary regulation, supervision or oversight responsibility with respect to the
FMI consider the views of the central bank(s) of issue?

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Q.E.6.3:

When conducting its own assessment of the payment and settlement
arrangements and liquidity risk management procedures of an FMI, how does
the central bank of issue consider the views of the authority or authorities withprimary responsibility with respect to the FMI?

Key consideration 7: Relevant authorities should provide advance notification, wherepracticable and otherwise as soon as possible thereafter, regarding pending material
regulatory changes and adverse events with respect to the FMI that may significantly
affect another authority’s regulatory, supervisory, or oversight interests.
Q.E.7.1:

How do relevant authorities provide advance notification, where practicable andotherwise as soon as possible thereafter, regarding pending material regulatorychanges and adverse events with respect to an FMI that may significantly affectthe respective regulatory, supervisory or oversight interests of another domestic
or foreign authority?

Q.E.7.2:

Where appropriate, how does the authority consider the views of such
authorities in connection with such regulatory actions taken with respect to the
FMI?

Key consideration 8: Relevant authorities should coordinate to ensure timely accessto trade data recorded in a TR.
Q.E.8.1:

If the authority regulates, supervises or oversees a TR that maintains data
pertaining to other jurisdictions, how does such an authority coordinate withother authorities who have a material interest in the trade data consistent with
their responsibilities, to ensure that they have timely and appropriate access totrade data in the TR?

Key consideration 9: Each authority maintains its discretion to discourage the use of
an FMI or the provision of services to such an FMI if, in the authority’s judgment, the
FMI is not prudently designed or managed or the principles are not adequately
observed. An authority exercising such discretion should provide a clear rationale forthe action taken both to the FMI and to the authority or authorities with primary
responsibility for the supervision or oversight of the FMI.
Q.E.9.1:

Has the authority exercised discretion to discourage the use of an FMI, or theprovision of services to an FMI, on the grounds that it is not prudently designed
or managed, or the principles are not adequately observed?

Q.E.9.2:

If so, did the authority provide a clear rationale to the FMI and to the authority or
authorities with primary responsibility for the supervision or oversight of the
FMI?

Key consideration 10: Cooperative arrangements between authorities in no way
prejudice the statutory or legal or other powers of each participating authority, nor dothese arrangements constrain in any way an authority’s powers to fulfil its statutory or
legislative mandate or its discretion to act in accordance with those powers.
There are no questions with respect to this key consideration.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201281

Annex A:
FMI disclosure template
Responding institution: [FMI name]
Jurisdiction(s) in which the FMI operates: [list jurisdictions]
Authority(ies) regulating, supervising or overseeing the FMI: [list authorities]
The date of this disclosure is [date].
This disclosure can also be found at [website address].
For further information, please contact [contact details].

I.

Executive summary

This section should summarise the key points from the disclosure framework, including abrief overview of the FMI, its participants, its legal and regulatory framework, its primary risks,
and its key risk management and other relevant practices.

II.

Summary of major changes since the last update of the disclosureThis section should summarise the major changes to the FMI’s organisation, services,
design, rules, markets served and regulatory environment since its last disclosure. The FMI
should note the sections in its disclosure where such changes are reflected.

III.

General background on the FMI

General description of the FMI and the markets it serves
This section should provide basic, concise descriptions of the services offered and functions
performed by the FMI. It should also provide an overview of the markets the FMI serves andthe role it fulfils within those markets. Further, the section should include basic data andperformance statistics on its services and operations. An FMI should provide, for example,
basic volume and value statistics by product type, average aggregate intraday exposures of
the FMI to its participants, and statistics on the FMI’s operational reliability.
General organisation of the FMIThis section should provide an overview of the organisational and governance structure of
the FMI, including a description of the FMI’s governance policies, governance structure andmanagement structure.
Legal and regulatory framework
This section should provide an overview of the FMI’s legal and regulatory framework,
including the legal and ownership structure of the FMI, the legal basis for each material
aspect of the FMI’s activities, and the regulatory, supervisory and oversight framework for the
FMI.

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System design and operations
This section should explain the FMI’s design and operations. It should include a clear
description of the typical lifecycle of the transaction process. The information should highlight
how the FMI processes a transaction, including the timeline of events, the validation andchecks to which a transaction is subjected, and the responsibilities of the parties involved.

IV.

Principle-by-principle summary narrative disclosureThis section should provide a summary narrative disclosure for each applicable principle with
sufficient detail and context to enable a reader to understand the FMI’s approach toobserving the principle.

Principle-by-principle summary narrative disclosure
Principle X
Text of the principle
Summary narrative

This section should provide a summary narrative disclosure with
sufficient detail and context, as well as any other appropriate
supplementary information, to enable readers to understand the
FMI’s approach to or method for observing the principle.
In preparing its summary narrative disclosure for the principle, an
FMI should refer to Section 5 of this report as guidance for the
points of focus and level of detail it is expected to convey in its
disclosure.
Cross references to publicly available documents should be
included, where relevant, to supplement the discussion.

Answers to individualquestions (optional)

V.

This section, which is optional, should provide answers to theindividual questions outlined in Section 5 of this report. Answers to
the questions should be organised by key considerations.

List of publicly available resources

This section should list publicly available resources, including those referenced in thedisclosure, that may help a reader understand the FMI and its approach to observing eachapplicable principle.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201283

Annex B:
Assessment report template on theobservance of the principles for FMIs

I.

Executive summary

This section should highlight the key findings of the assessment.

II.

Introduction

This section should introduce the report and include the following key information regarding
the assessment:•

Assessor: Identify the entity and assessors conducting the assessment.

•

Objective of the assessment: Identify the objective and context of the assessment.

•

Scope of the assessment: Identify the FMI, the set of the FMI’s operations andservices, and the set of principles assessed.

•

Methodology of the assessment: Identify the process followed in conducting theassessment. If not all principles were assessed, an explanation should be providedof why certain principles were not assessed.

•

Sources of information in the assessment: Identify the main sources of information,
including public and non-public sources, used in conducting the assessment. Thesesources may include written documentation (such as other assessments, surveys,
questionnaires, reports, studies, relevant laws and regulations, and regulatory andindustry guidance) and conversations with the FMI itself, authorities and relevant
industry stakeholders (such as participants, other FMIs, stock exchanges,
custodians, securities brokers and end user associations).

In addition, this section should mention any difficulties in conducting the assessment, suchas lack of information or cooperation and any factors limiting the assessment process or its
scope. Further, an account of any information requested but not obtained should be given.

III.

Overview of the payment, clearing and settlement landscapeThis section should provide a general description of the role of the FMI in the overall
payment, clearing and settlement landscape; a general description of the FMI’s operations
and services; and summary statistics to help understand the scope of the FMI’s activities.
The general description and summary statistics should help to facilitate comparisons withother FMIs, as appropriate.
This section should also provide a general description of the regulatory, supervisory oroversight framework relating to the FMI; a brief description of the relevant authorities; and asummary of the major changes and reforms implemented in the recent past or scheduled forthe near future.

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IV.

Summary assessment

Summary assessment of observance of the principles
This section should summarise the key findings of the detailed assessment of the principles.
For each principle, the assessment should:•

highlight the FMI’s key practices and achievements;•

list identified issues of concern; and•comment on each principle that is not fully observed and provide the main reasonsfor assigning a rating of “broadly observed”, “partly observed” or “not observed”;
indicate the risk factors that might influence the degree of non-observance; andindicate whether the issues of concern are being addressed, as well as the degreeof observance that will be achieved if current efforts proceed as envisaged.

This section should conclude with a summary of the results of the principle-by-principle
assessment of observance (see Table 1).
Table 1Ratings summary
Assessment category

Principle

Observedeg Principles 1, 3, 6 and 8

Broadly observed
Partly observed
Not observed
Not applicable

Recommendations for the FMIThis section should list the suggested steps to improve the FMI’s observance of theprinciples. In Table 2, assessors should list issues of concern and other gaps or
shortcomings in the FMI’s observance of the principles along with any recommendations toaddress them and the time frame within which the FMI should take action.
Assessors should list recommendations in order of priority, from the most urgent to be
implemented or addressed to the least urgent. Assessors also should explain the manner inwhich the recommended action would lead to an improvement in the level of observance ofthe principle. If an FMI has plans for improvements under way, this should be noted in thecomments section. Any specific obstacles to observance should also be noted.
Some principles may be listed multiple times in Table 2 when multiple issues of concern orother gaps or shortcomings have been identified.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201285

Table 2
Prioritised list of recommendations
Principle

V.

Issue of concern orother gap or
shortcoming

Recommended action
and comments

Time frame foraddressing
recommended action

Detailed assessment report

The detailed assessment table should provide a description of the FMI with regard to
applicable key considerations, key conclusions and the assessment rating for eachapplicable principle (see Table 3).

Table 3
Detailed assessment of observance of the principles
For each applicable principle
Principle X
Text of the principle
Key consideration 1
Text of key consideration⋮
Key consideration N
Text of key consideration

86

This section should provide information on the practices of the FMI as
they relate to the key consideration. Assessors should be guided by thequestions for each applicable key consideration and, where applicable,
should organise information according to the subject headers provided
in the question set in Section 5. Only the key considerations applying to
the category of FMI being assessed should be selected.
Responses should reflect the actual practices followed by FMI
operators and participants. The list of questions in Section 5 is a tool tohelp assessors gather facts and is not intended to be a checklist. The
specific answers to each of these questions should not necessarily bepart of the assessment report.

⋮
Supporting facts…

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Table 3 (cont)
Detailed assessment of observance of the principles
Key conclusions forprinciple

This section should provide a narrative summary of key informationcollected by the assessors for each principle based on the supporting
facts collected for each applicable key consideration. The narrative
summary should summarise the FMI’s practices and achievements,
describe the seriousness of any issues of concern, and identify anyother gaps or shortcomings.

Assessment of principle

This section should state whether the principle is “observed”, “broadly
observed”, “partly observed”, “not observed” or “not applicable”. Thissection should also give the rationale for the assigned rating.

Recommendations andcomments

This section should provide recommended actions and other comments
for each identified issue of concern and any other gaps or
shortcomings.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201287

Annex C:
Assessment report template on theobservance of the responsibilities of authorities for FMIs

I.

Executive summary

This section should highlight the key findings of the assessment.

II.

Introduction

This section should introduce the report and include the following key information regarding
the assessment:•

Assessor: Identify the entity and assessors conducting the assessment.

•

Objective of the assessment: Identify the objective and context of the assessment.

•

Scope of the assessment: Identify the set of authorities; authorities’ responsibilities
over regulation, supervision and oversight of FMIs; and responsibilities assessed.

•

Methodology of the assessment: Identify the process followed in conducting theassessment. If not all responsibilities were assessed, an explanation should be
provided of why certain responsibilities were not assessed.

•

Sources of information in the assessment: Identify the main sources of information,
including public and non-public sources, used in conducting the assessment. Thesesources may include written documentation (such as other assessments, surveys,
questionnaires, reports, studies, relevant laws and regulations, and regulatory andindustry guidance) and conversations with authorities and relevant industry
stakeholders.

In addition, this section should mention any difficulties in conducting the assessment, suchas lack of information or cooperation and any factors limiting the assessment process or its
scope. Further, an account of any information requested but not obtained should be given.

III.

Overview of the payment, clearing and settlement landscapeThis section should provide a general description of the overall payment, clearing andsettlement landscape; a general description of the regulatory, supervisory and oversightframework relating to the FMIs in the jurisdiction; a brief description of the relevant
authorities; and a summary of the major changes and reforms implemented in the recent
past or scheduled for the near future.

IV.

Summary assessment

Summary assessment of observance of the responsibilities
This section should summarise the key findings of the detailed assessment of the
responsibilities. For each responsibility, the assessment should:•

highlight the authorities’ key practices and achievements;•

list identified issues of concern; and88

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

•comment on each responsibility that is not fully observed and provide the main reasonsfor assigning a rating of “broadly observed”, “partly observed” or “not observed”;
indicate the risk factors that might influence the degree of non-observance; andindicate whether the issues of concern are being addressed, as well as the degree ofobservance that will be achieved if current efforts proceed as envisaged.

This section should conclude with a summary of the responsibility-by-responsibility
assessment of observance (see Table 1).
Table 1Ratings summary
Assessment category

Responsibility

Observedeg Responsibilities A and C

Broadly observed

eg Responsibilities B, D and E

Partly observed
Not observed
Not applicable

Recommendations for authorities
This section should list the suggested steps to improve authorities’ observance of the
responsibilities. In Table 2, assessors should list issues of concern and other gaps or
shortcomings in the authorities’ observance of the responsibilities, along with any
recommendations to address them, the relevant authority to address the recommendation,and the time frame within which the relevant authority should take action.
Assessors should list recommendations in order of priority, from the most urgent to be
implemented or addressed to the least urgent. Assessors should also explain the manner inwhich the recommended action would lead to an improvement in the level of observance ofthe responsibilities. Any specific obstacles to observance should also be noted. If authorities
have plans for improvements under way, this should be noted in the comments section.
Some responsibilities may be listed multiple times in Table 2 when multiple issues of concern
or other gaps or shortcomings have been identified.
Table 2
Prioritised list of recommendations

Responsibility

Issue of concern
or other gap or
shortcoming

Recommended
action andcomments

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Relevant parties

Time frame foraddressing
recommended
action89

V.

Detailed assessment report

The detailed assessment table should provide a description with regard to the key
considerations, key conclusions and the assessment rating for each responsibility (seeTable 3).

Table 3
Detailed assessment of observance of the responsibilities
For each responsibility
Responsibility X
Text of the responsibility
Key consideration 1
Text of key consideration⋮

This section should provide information on the practices of theauthorities as they relate to the key consideration. Assessors should
be guided by the questions for each key consideration and, whereapplicable, should organise information according to the subject
headers provided in the question set in Section 6.
Responses should reflect the actual practices followed byauthorities. The list of questions in Section 6 is a tool to help
assessors gather facts and is not intended to be a checklist. The
specific answers to each of these questions should not necessarily
be part of the assessment report.

⋮

Key consideration N
Text of key consideration

Supporting facts…

Key conclusions forresponsibility

This section should provide a narrative summary of key informationcollected by the assessors for each responsibility based on the
supporting facts collected for each key consideration. The narrative
summary should summarise the authorities’ practices andachievements, describe the seriousness of any issues of concern,and identify any other gaps or shortcomings.

Assessment ofresponsibility

This section should state whether the responsibility is “observed”,“broadly observed”, “partly observed”, “not observed” or “notapplicable”. This section should also give the rationale for theassigned rating.

Recommendations andcomments

This section should provide recommended actions and othercomments for each identified issue of concern and any other gaps or
shortcomings.

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Annex D:
Country assessment report templateon observance of the principles for FMIs
and responsibilities of authorities

I.

Executive summary

This section should highlight the key relevant findings of the assessment.

II.

Introduction

This section should introduce the report and include the following key information regarding
the assessment.
•

Assessor: Identify the entity and assessors conducting the assessment.

•

Objective of the assessment: Identify the objective and context of the assessment.

•

Scope of the assessment: Identify the FMIs, the set of FMIs’ operations andservices (including instruments and markets served) and the set of principles
assessed. Identify the set of authorities; authorities’ responsibilities over regulation,
supervision and oversight of FMIs; and responsibilities assessed.

•

Methodology of the assessment: Identify the process followed in conducting theassessment. If not all principles or responsibilities were assessed, an explanation
should be provided on why certain principles or responsibilities were not assessed.

•

Sources of information in the assessment: Identify the main sources of information,
including public and non-public sources, used in conducting the assessment. Thesesources may include written documentation (such as other assessments, surveys,
questionnaires, reports, studies, relevant laws and regulations, and regulatory andindustry guidance) and conversations with the FMIs themselves, authorities andrelevant industry stakeholders (such as participants, stock exchanges, custodians,
securities brokers or end user associations).

In addition, this section should mention any difficulties in conducting the assessment, suchas lack of information or cooperation and any factors limiting the assessment process or its
scope. Further, an account of any information requested but not obtained should be given.

III.

Overview of the payment, clearing and settlement landscapeThis section should provide a general description of the overall payment, securities orderivatives clearing and settlement architecture.
The section should also provide a general description of the FMIs’ operations and services;and summary statistics to help understand the scope of the FMIs’ activities, including bycomparison with other FMIs of the same type, either from the same country or from otherrelevant countries.
The section should also provide a general description of the regulatory, supervisory oroversight framework relating to the FMIs; a brief description of the relevant authorities; and asummary of the major changes and reforms implemented in the recent past or scheduled forthe near future.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

91

IV.

Summary assessment

IV.1

Summary assessment of observance of the principles

This section should summarise the key findings of the detailed assessment of principles.
Assessors should state the main findings of the detailed assessment of observance of theprinciples under the following main categories: (a) general organisation (Principles 1 to 3);(b) credit and liquidity risk management (Principles 4 to 7); (c) settlement (Principles 8 to 10);(d) central securities depositories and exchange-of-value settlement systems (Principles 11
and 12); (e) default management (Principles 13 and 14); (f) general business and operationalrisk management (Principles 15 to 17); (g) access (Principles 18 to 20); (h) efficiency(Principles 21 and 22); and (i) transparency (Principles 23 and 24).
Under each category, assessors should, for each FMI:•

highlight the FMI’s key practices and achievements;•

list identified issues of concern; and•comment on each principle that is not fully observed and provide the main reasonsfor assigning a rating of “broadly observed”, “partly observed” or “not observed”;
indicate the risk factors that might influence the degree of non-observance; andindicate whether the issues of concern are being addressed, as well as the degreeof observance that will be achieved if current efforts proceed as envisaged.

This section should conclude with a summary of the results of the principle-by-principle
assessment of observance (see Table 1).
Table 1Ratings summary for principles: [name of FMI]
Assessment category

Principle

Observedeg Principles 1, 3, 6 and 8

Broadly observed
Partly observed
Not observed
Not applicable

IV.2

Summary assessment of observance of the responsibilities

This section should summarise the key findings of the detailed assessment ofresponsibilities. For each responsibility, the assessment should:•

highlight the authorities’ key practices and achievements;•

list identified issues of concern; and•comment on each responsibility that is not observed and provide the main reasonsfor assigning a rating of “broadly observed”, “partly observed” or “not observed”;
indicate the risk factors that might influence the degree of non-observance; andindicate whether the issues of concern are being addressed, as well as the degreeof observance that will be achieved if current efforts proceed as envisaged.

This section should conclude with a summary of the results of the responsibility-byresponsibility assessment of observance (see Table 2).

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Table 2
Ratings summary for responsibilities
Assessment category

Responsibility

Observedeg Responsibilities A and C

Broadly observed

eg Responsibilities B, D and E

Partly observed
Not observed
Not applicable

IV.3

Summary assessment of market-wide recommendations

This section should present any findings with regard to the assessment of market-wide
recommendations, where applicable (such as FSAPs and technical assistance). 7
IV.4

Recommendations for FMIs

This section should list the suggested steps to improve the FMIs’ observance of theprinciples. In Table 3, assessors should list their recommendations to address each identified
issue of concern and other gaps or shortcomings in the FMIs’ observance of the principles
and the time frame within which the FMIs should take action.
Assessors should list recommendations by FMI and in order of priority, from the most urgent
to be implemented or addressed to the least urgent. Assessors should explain the manner inwhich the recommended action would lead to an improvement in the level of observance ofthe principle. If FMIs have plans for improvements under way, this should be noted in thecomments section (although the future impact of those plans will not be reflected in thecurrent assignment of an assessment category). Any specific obstacles to observanceshould be noted.
Some principles may be listed multiple times in the table when multiple issues of concern orother gaps or shortcomings have been identified.
Table 3
Prioritised list of recommendations for [name of FMI]
Principle

7

Issue of concern orother gap or
shortcoming

Recommended action
and comments

Time frame foraddressing
recommended action

For external assessments which cover the overall national payment system in the country, this section could
be used to include comments on any relevant matter identified as an improvement opportunity for the broad
payment, clearing and settlement environment.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

93

IV.5

Recommendations for authorities

This section should list the suggested steps to improve authorities’ observance of the
responsibilities. In Table 4, assessors should list their recommendations to address eachidentified issue of concern and other gaps or shortcomings in the authorities’ observance ofthe responsibilities and the time frame within which the relevant authority should take action.
Assessors should list recommendations in order of priority, from the most urgent to be
implemented or addressed to the least urgent. Assessors should explain the manner in which
the recommended action would lead to an improvement in the level of observance of the
responsibilities. If authorities have plans for improvements under way, this should be noted(although the future impact of those plans will not be reflected in the current assignment ofan assessment category). Any specific obstacles to observance should be noted. The parties
that are best positioned to address each identified issue of concern should be indicated.
Some responsibilities may be listed multiple times in the table when multiple issues ofconcern or other gaps or shortcomings have been identified.
Table 4
Prioritised list of recommendations for authorities

Responsibility

IV.6

Issue of concern
or other gap or
shortcoming

Recommended
action andcomments

Relevant parties

Time frame foraddressing
recommended
actionOther recommendations on market-wide issues

This section should present any recommendations stemming from the assessment ofmarket-wide recommendations, where applicable (such as FSAPs and technicalassistance). 8V.

Detailed assessment reports

Detailed assessment table of observance of the principles
The detailed assessment table should provide a description of the FMI(s) with regard to
applicable key considerations, key conclusions and an assessment rating for each byprinciple (see Table 5). An example of this template as applied to Principle 1 on legal basis isalso provided (see Table 5 – example).

8

94

For external assessments which cover the overall national payment system in the country, this section could
be used to include comments on any relevant matter identified as an improvement opportunity for the broad
payment, clearing and settlement environment.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Table 5
Detailed assessment of observance of the principles
For each applicable principle
Principle X
Text of the principle
Key consideration 1
Text of key consideration⋮

This section should provide information on the practices of the FMI as
they relate to the key consideration. Assessors should be guided by thequestions for each applicable key consideration and, where applicable,
should organise information according to the subject headers provided
in the question set in Section 5. Only the key considerations applying to
the category of FMI being assessed should be selected.
Responses should reflect the actual practices followed by FMI
operators and participants. The list of questions in Section 5 is a tool tohelp assessors gather facts and is not intended to be a checklist. The
specific answers to each of these questions should not necessarily bepart of the assessment report.
⋮

Key consideration 1
Text of key consideration

Supporting facts…

Key conclusions forprinciple

This section should provide a narrative summary of key informationcollected by the assessors for each principle based on the supporting
facts collected for each applicable key consideration. The narrative
summary should summarise the FMI’s practices and achievements,
describe the seriousness of any issues of concern, and identify anyother gaps or shortcomings.

Assessment of principle

This section should state whether the principle is “observed”, “broadly
observed”, “partly observed”, “not observed” or “not applicable”. Thissection should also give the rationale for the assigned rating.

Recommendations andcomments

This section should provide recommended actions and other comments
for each identified issue of concern and any other gaps or
shortcomings.

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Table 5 – example
Example table for detailed assessment of observance of principles
Principle 1: Legal basis
An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material
aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.
Key consideration 1
The legal basis should provide ahigh degree of certainty for eachmaterial aspect of an FMI’s
activities in all relevant
jurisdictions.

Material aspects and relevant jurisdictions
Insert supporting facts

Legal basis for each material aspect
Insert supporting facts

Key consideration 2
An FMI should have rules,
procedures, and contracts thatare clear, understandable, andconsistent with relevant laws andregulations.
Key consideration 3
An FMI should be able toarticulate the legal basis for its
activities to relevant authorities,
participants, and, where relevant,participants’ customers, in a clear
and understandable way.
Key consideration 4
An FMI should have rules,
procedures, and contracts thatare enforceable in all relevant
jurisdictions. There should be ahigh degree of certainty that
actions taken by the FMI undersuch rules and procedures will not
be voided, reversed, or subject tostays.
Key consideration 5
An FMI conducting business in
multiple jurisdictions should
identify and mitigate the risks
arising from any potential conflictof laws across jurisdictions.

Insert supporting facts

Insert supporting facts

Enforceability of the rules, procedures and contracts
Insert supporting facts

Degree of certainty for rules and procedures
Insert supporting facts

Insert supporting facts

Key conclusions for
Principle 1

Insert narrative

Assessment of Principle 1

Insert assessment

Recommendations and comments

Insert recommendations and comments

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CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Detailed assessment of observance of the responsibilities
The detailed assessment table should provide a description with regard to the key
considerations, key conclusions and the assessment rating for each responsibility (seeTable 6). An example of this template as applied to Responsibility B is also provided (seeTable 6 – example).

Table 6
Detailed assessment of observance of the responsibilities
For each responsibility
Responsibility X
Text of the responsibility
Key consideration 1
Text of key consideration

This section should provide information on the practices of theauthorities as they relate to the key consideration. Assessors should
be guided by the questions for each key consideration and, whereapplicable, should organise information according to the subject
headers provided in the question set in Section 6.
Responses should reflect the actual practices followed byauthorities. The list of questions in Section 6 is a tool to help
assessors gather facts and is not intended to be a checklist. The
specific answers to each of these questions should not necessarily
be part of the assessment report.

⋮⋮

Key consideration N
Text of key consideration

Supporting facts…

Key conclusions forresponsibility

This section should provide a narrative summary of key informationcollected by the assessors for each responsibility based on the
supporting facts collected for each key consideration. The narrative
summary should summarise the authorities’ practices andachievements, describe the seriousness of any issues of concern,and identify any other gaps or shortcomings.

Assessment ofresponsibility

This section should state whether the responsibility is “observed”,“broadly observed”, “partly observed”, “not observed” or “notapplicable”. This section should also give the rationale for theassigned rating.

Recommendations andcomments

This section should provide recommended actions and othercomments for each identified issue of concern and any other gaps or
shortcomings.

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201297

Table 6 – example
Example table for detailed assessment of observance of responsibilities
Responsibility B: Regulatory, supervisory, and oversight powers and resources
Central banks, market regulators, and other relevant authorities should have the powers andresources to carry out effectively their responsibilities in regulating, supervising, and overseeing
FMIs.
Key consideration 1
Authorities should have powers orother authority consistent with
their relevant responsibilities,
including the ability to obtaintimely information and to inducechange or enforce corrective
action.

Powers or other authority consistent with relevant
responsibilities
Insert supporting facts
Power to obtain timely information
Insert supporting facts
Powers to induce change or enforce corrective action
Insert supporting facts

Key consideration 2
Authorities should have sufficient
resources to fulfil their regulatory,
supervisory, and oversight
responsibilities.

Resources
Insert supporting facts
Legal protections
Insert supporting facts

Key conclusions for
Responsibility B

Insert narrative

Assessment of Responsibility B

Insert assessment

Recommendations and comments

Insert recommendations and comments

98

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012

Annex E:
Members of the CPSS-IOSCO review of standards
This list shows the members of the Steering Group and Editorial Team that coordinated andimplemented the review of standards, including the production of the disclosure framework
and assessment methodology.
Steering Group co-chairs
Bank of EnglandFederal Reserve Bank of New YorkFinancial Services Agency, Japan
Securities and Exchange Commission, US

Paul Tucker (since April 2012)
William C Dudley (until April 2012)
Masamichi Kono (since August 2011)
Kathleen Casey (until July 2011)

Editorial Team co-chairs
European Central Bank
Securities and Exchange Commission, US

Daniela Russo
Jeffrey MooneyMembers
Reserve Bank of Australia

Tony Richards (since March 2012)
Christopher Kent (from September 2010
until March 2012)
Michele Bullock (until August 2010)

National Bank of Belgium

Johan Pissens

Central Bank of Brazil

Daso Maranhão Coimbra (since October2010)
Radjalma Costa (until October 2010)

Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil

Marcelo Queiroga Reis

Bank of Canada

Paul Chilcott (since November 2010)
Carol Ann Northcott (until November
2010)

Autorité des marchés financiers, Québec

Claude Gatien

Ontario Securities Commission

Maxime ParéSuperintendencia de Valores y Seguros, Chile

Vicente Lazen

People's Bank of China

Pan Song

China Securities Regulatory Commission

Fan YuShen Bing

European Central Bank

Andreas Schönenberger
Karine Themejian

Bank of France

Frédéric Hervo

Autorité des marchés financiers, France

Sonia Cattarinussi (since November
2011)
Bénédicte Doumayrou (until October
2011)

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 201299

Deutsche Bundesbank

Jochen Metzger
Roland Neuschwander

Bafin (German Financial Supervisory Authority)

Thomas Eufinger
Jan Budaeus

Hong Kong Monetary Authority

Esmond K Y Lee

Securities and Futures Commission, Hong Kong

Rico Leung

Reserve Bank of India

G PadmanabhanBank of Italy

Paolo Marullo Reedtz

Bank of Japan

Takeshi Shirakami (since July 2012)
Yutaka Soejima (from June 2011 until
July 2012)
Masayuki Mizuno (until June 2011)

Financial Services Agency, Japan

Jun Mizuguchi
Jutaro Kaneko
Kazunari Mochizuki (until July 2012)

Bank of Korea

Jeon Beopyong

Bank of Mexico

Ricardo Medina Alvarez
David Margolín Schabes (until October
2012)

Netherlands Bank

Ron Berndsen

Central Bank of the Russian Federation

Nikolay Geronin

Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency

Ali Al Homidan

Monetary Authority of Singapore

Terry Goh (since March 2012)
Andrew Khoo (until March 2012)

Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores,
Spain

Iñigo de la Lastra

Sveriges Riksbank

Malin Alpen

Swiss National Bank

Philipp Haene

Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority

Andreas Bail (since January 2012)
Michael Zumbach (from July to
December 2011)
Tina Müller (until June 2011)

Bank of England

Edwin Schooling Latter (since March
2011)
Julian Oliver (from November 2010 until
February 2011)
Paul Chilcott (until October 2010)

Financial Services Authority, UK

Barry King

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
SystemJeffrey Marquardt
Jennifer Lucier
Paul Wong

Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Lawrence Sweet

100

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012Commodity Futures Trading Commission, US

Ananda Radhakrishnan
Robert Wasserman (since March 2011)
Sarah Josephson (until March 2011)

Securities and Exchange Commission, US

Katherine Martin (since August 2012)
Alison Duncan (since October 2010)David Michehl (until August 2010)

International Monetary Fund

Froukelien Wendt (since March 2012)
Christine Sampic (until March 2012)

World Bank

Massimo Cirasino

Observers
European Commission

Patrick Pearson

European Securities and Markets Authority

Fabrizio Planta

Secretariat
Bank for International Settlements

Klaus Löber (since September 2012)
Daniel Heller (until February 2012)
Robert LindleyInternational Organization of Securities
Commissions

Yukako Fujioka

The review of standards also benefited from contributions by Greg Chugg, Louise Carter,
Darren Massey (Reserve Bank of Australia), Rogerio Antonio Lucca (Central Bank of Brazil),
Suzanne Mercure, Élaine Lanouette (Autorité des marchés financiers, Québec), Joaquín
Bernal (Bank of the Republic, Colombia), Sylvia Tyroler (Deutsche Bundesbank), Ryan Ko(Securities and Futures Commission, Hong Kong), Takeshi Mori (Bank of Japan), Lau Tze
Hon, Loh Pui Hoon, Ken Nagatsuka, Janice Chua (Monetary Authority of Singapore), Mike
Stocks (South African Reserve Bank), Sergio Gorjon (Bank of Spain), Miguel Ángel Herrero
Alvite (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores, Spain), Simon Turek, Ben Mitchell,
Richard Spooner, Benjamin Cohn-Urbach (Financial Services Authority, UK), Travis Nesmith,Mark Magro, Emily Caron, Namirembe Mukasa, Michael Koslow, Jeremy Ward, Kristopher
Natoli, Sarah Wright, Scott Abrahams, Dibora Amanuel (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System), Marsha Takagi, Brian Begalle, Shari Bower, Kirsten Harlow (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York), Marta Chaffee, Joseph Kamnik, Matthew Landon, Catherine
Moore, Stephanie Park, Ester Saverson (US Securities and Exchange Commission), Maria
Teresa Chimienti, Mario Guadamillas and Bruce Summers (World Bank).

CPSS-IOSCO – Disclosure framework and assessment methodology – December 2012101