COVER STORY • The Future of Space as Global Commons • 4

Making Space Safe Again:
National Security Space
Policy in the Trump Era
Author Robert Shields

By Robert Shields
The space age was born out of war. On Sept. 8, 1944, Nazi Germany
launched the world’s first ballistic missile, the V-2 rocket, from The
Netherlands, striking London. Thereafter, Germany launchedthousands more V-2s against England until surrendering to Allied
forces in May 1945. Recognizing the vast potential of thistechnological marvel, the United States and Soviet Union raced todevelop their own ballistic missile programs in the years following
World War II. After failed attempts to launch and reenter anintercontinental ballistic missile, yet determined to demonstratetechnological superiority over the US, the USSR launched the world’s
first man-made satellite, Sputnik, on Oct. 4, 1957. Soon after, on Jan.
31, 1958, the US military responded with the successful launch of
Explorer. The space age had begun.
Despite the military roots of the space age, the US enjoyed peaceand freedom of action in space in the decades following 1958. The US
and a limited number of other nations operated satellites for civil
applications (communications, weather tracking) and to enhance
military operations on the ground (intelligence collection, missile
warning, and positioning, navigation and timing (PNT)). Overall, thespace domain itself remained a benign and uncontested environment.
Over the past several years, however, China and Russia have begun
developing weapons systems that can strike US space assets. Antisatellite weapons (ASATs), directed-energy weapons, and even cyberweapons now threaten US satellites. A 2007 Chinese ASAT
demonstration against one of its own weather satellites served as a“wake up call” to the US and its allies that the threat of conflict inspace was real and growing. Space policy experts and military
Photo: The White House

strategists now agree that space will be a contested environment in
future wars.
The administration of President Donald Trump has built upon theefforts of the previous administration of President Barack Obama to
defend the US against emerging threats to its space enterprise. Overthe past year and a half, the Trump administration has framed its space
strategy around recognition that space is now a warfighting domain,
has increased the national security space budget, and has championed
efforts to collaborate with industry and allies to promote more resilientand defendable space architectures. Above all, key leaders within the
Department of Defense (DOD) and the Trump White House haveprioritized national security space efforts, in recognition that the spacedomain is now an integrated component of modern warfare.

A Warfighting Domain
Seventy-three years after the first V-2 was launched in Europe, the
DOD under the Trump administration declared that space had becomea warfighting domain. In their joint written testimony for a May 17,2017 Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
hearing on military space policy, Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson,
Air Force Secretary David Goldfein, Air Force Space Commander(AFSPC) John Raymond, and Space and Missile Systems Center(SMC) Commander Gen. Samuel Greaves stated unequivocally thatspace is now a warfighting domain, similar to the more familiar air,land, and maritime domains. The “benign” space environment, inwhich the US had previously enjoyed virtually “unimpeded freedom ofaction”, no longer exists. Space will be contested in any future conflictand potential adversaries will seek to exploit US vulnerabilities inspace.
Space, however, is not an isolated warfighting domain. It is also
becoming an integrated component of the multi-domain warfare
environment. The recognition of this new-age interconnected, multidomain battlefield in which space has become a vital aspect has
guided national security space strategy during the first year and a halfof the Trump administration.

Revival of the National Space Council

President Donald Trump signs executive order reestablishing the National Space Council on
June 30, 2017.

16 Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 2018

On June 30, 2017, Trump signed Executive Order 13803
reestablishing the long-dormant National Space Council. The revived
Council is chaired by Vice President Mike Pence and represented byseveral Cabinet-level officials. It has held two public meetings (inOctober 2017 and February 2018) where it explored space policy
issues ranging from the regulatory environment to exploration efforts
https://www.jef.or.jp/journal/

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to national security challenges.
During its first public meeting in October 2017, the Council
discussed challenges confronting the US with respect to the protectionof its space assets. The former NASA administrator under President
George W. Bush and current undersecretary of defense for researchand engineering, Michael Griffin, stressed to the Council that space ispart of US critical infrastructure, requiring resiliency and enhanced
cybersecurity. He also highlighted the importance of US allies tonational security space, as they provide added flexibility to the US
space defense strategy. Fellow witnesses retired US Navy Adm. James
Ellis and former Space Shuttle Commander Pamela Melroy echoed
Griffin’s call for closer alliances in the space domain.
Despite some discussions on space defense, most of the Council’s
actions so far have been directed toward civil regulatory reform andspace traffic management (STM). On Feb. 28, 2018, the Council sent
Trump a set of recommendations to streamline and improve civil space
regulations within the Department of Transportation and Department ofCommerce. Later, on April 19, 2018, Pence announced that the Council
would soon send Trump another set of recommendations proposing
the Department of Commerce’s Office Space Commerce lead the US
government effort in STM.
Although the reinstated Council has not yet made recommendations
specific to national security space policy, this issue will likely receive amore prominent focus in its future deliberations.

Space in National Security Strategy& National Defense Strategy
Every US presidential administration has the opportunity to shape
US national security space policy, usually through two key documents:
National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS).
The Trump administration published its NSS and NDS in December
2017 and January 2018, respectively, providing important insights into
how the space domain fits into the Trump administration’s broader
national security and defense priorities.
The NSS outlines a space deterrence strategy for the new era of acontested and increasingly militarized space domain. It acknowledges
that the US is increasingly dependent on space for vital functions suchas communications, finance, military, weather monitoring, andnavigation. At the same time, it notes that other countries aredeveloping ASAT capabilities to threaten US space assets. In response
to US dependence on — and growing vulnerability in — space, it
declares: “Any harmful interference with or an attack upon criticalcomponents of our space architecture that directly affects this vital US
interest will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner,and domain of our choosing.” This deterrent statement provides
significant ambiguity. For example, what space assets are critical to the
US? Will the US military respond to attacks on commercial entities?
Will the response be proportional? This vagueness is designed toconceal US response plans and thus deny an enemy the ability tomake a well-informed risk assessment when planning an attack.
Furthermore, the NSS promotes expanded partnerships with thecommercial sector to improve resilience of the US space architecture.
The US will also “consider” extending national security protections to
private sector partners. Once again, this statement is meant to obscure
US response plans to a space attack and, in turn, increase enemy

uncertainty when considering an attack.
Similarly, the NDS makes a short — but telling — statement on
space defense: “Space...as warfighting domain[:] The Department willprioritize investments in resilience, reconstitution, and operations toassure our space capabilities.” Once again, the DOD unequivocallydeclares that space is a warfighting domain, and that investments
should prioritize capabilities to ensure US space warfighting
superiority. In many ways, the NDS’s focus on resilience andreconstitution is an extension of Obama-era space defense policy,
which promoted similar concepts such as space domain mission
assurance.

“America First” National Space Strategy
On March 23, 2018, the White House unveiled its “America First”
National Space Strategy outlining four “essential” pillars for US space
strategy. Two of these pillars relate directly to national security:transform to more resilient space architectures; and strengthen
deterrence and warfighting options.
These two pillars offer a roadmap to warfighting supremacy inspace. First (and again much like the Obama-era space defense
policy), resilient space architectures improve overall mission
assurance for vital space operations such as PNT andcommunications. Second, a strengthened deterrence posture andconflict readiness demonstrates US willingness to fight in space —only if provoked.
The National Space Strategy also highlights the Trumpadministration’s support for NASA’s upcoming human exploration
missions to the Moon and Mars. While exploration is typically viewed
as a scientific activity, these missions also have strategic value. In
particular, the US can establish international norms and rules in outerspace if it is the first to return to the Moon and then to reach Mars.
Simply put, the US will “make the rules” in outer space if it arrives
first. This may include updating the 1967 Outer Space Treaty or
creating new treaties or norms that would protect US military andstrategic interests.

Growing Budget for Military SpaceTranslating these policies into practice, the Trump administration
has worked with the US Congress to increase national security spacefunding. While a significant portion of the US military space budget isclassified (and thus unavailable for public review), the budget
documents for FY 2018 and FY 2019 offer insights into theadministration’s unclassified space funding priorities.
The DOD’s FY 2019 Budget Request introduced a new accounting
figure called the Major Force Program (MFP)-12, which calculates thetotal obligation authority (TOA) — the total budget authority for a
program that is appropriated by Congress, transferred from anotherprogram, and left over from the previous year — for all unclassified
national security space programs. The MFP-12 funding is projected toincrease from $11.87 billion in FY 2018 to $12.73 billion in FY 2019.
Over the next four fiscal years, DOD projects MFP-12 funding levels tofluctuate, but remain above $12 billion.
Moreover, space programs within the US Air Force — which
comprises approximately 90% of the DOD’s overall space budget —Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 201817

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security space is a budgetary priority for the Trump administration.
Moving forward, the Air Force and related defense offices will continue
to prioritize national security space funding.

TABLE

MFP-12: Unclassified national
security space TOA ($ billions)Fiscal Year

MFP-12 Funding

2018

11.8742019

12.7292020

13.0712021

12.2212022

13.0882023

12.478Source: National Defense Budget Estimate for FY 2019, Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller), April 2018

are expected to receive steady funding increases in the coming years.
In her March 20, 2018 testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, Wilson stated that national security space is one of the top
budgetary priorities for the Air Force. Notably, the FY 2019 defense
budget calls for an 18% increase in Air Force national security spacefunding over the next five years.
However, budget requests are just that — requests. Every year,
Congress reviews the budget requests and then passes appropriations
bills to fund national security space programs. Congressional
appropriations usually differ from the funding levels requested by the
DOD. Indeed, recently, Congress has opted to appropriate more
funding to national security space programs than requested. For
example, Congress’s FY 2018 “Omnibus Bill”, passed in March 2018,
appropriated $600 million in unrequested funding to procure two
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) satellites to bolster the US military’s
satellite communications capabilities.
In terms of FY 2019 funding, the specifics of the budget request areunder debate in Congress, which is required to pass a budget by Sept.
30, 2018 — the end of the US government’s fiscal year. If history is
any guide, however, Congress will likely not pass a new budget before
the end of its fiscal year (the US Congress has not passed a budget ontime in decades) and will therefore rely on Continuing Resolutions tokeep DOD funding at existing levels until at least after the US midterm
elections in November 2018, when there will likely be greater political
will to pass a budget.
Regardless, recent funding increases demonstrate that national
Photo: US Air Force

Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein
testify before the Senate Appropriations Committee for Defense on June 21, 2017.

18 Japan SPOTLIGHT • July / August 2018

Resilient & Defendable US Space Architecture
For years, US leaders have sought to create a more “resilient” spacearchitecture. High-level policy documents and statements have called
for a shift from large, aggregated, and expensive satellites to more
distributed constellations of less expensive satellites that can more
quickly and effectively “bounce back” from an attack.
The Trump administration’s FY 2019 budget request introduced arelatively new concept for its space enterprise in addition to resiliency:“defendable”. This term implies that the US Air Force is more willing to
use military force to defend its space assets. In other words, while US
policy under the Obama administration focused on the passive conceptof resiliency, the Trump administration is emphasizing a moreaggressive space posture that deters, recovers, and defends against
space attacks. However, specific programs to better defend spaceassets are likely to be classified and thus unavailable to the public.
A deeper look into Air Force funding priorities for the FY 2019budget request reveals that the Air Force is beginning to prioritize amore resilient space architecture. One key example is the space-based
early-warning system for US missile defense called the Space-BasedInfrared System (SBIRS). The Air Force had originally planned to
procure eight large, aggregated SBIRS satellites. However, the FY 2019budget request proposes that the Air Force discontinue procurementof the last two satellites and instead shift funding to development of amore resilient and survivable program called the “Next Generation
Overhead Persistent Infrared” (or Next-Gen OPIR). While theparameters of the new system won’t be finalized for several years, theconstellation will one day offer persistent missile warning capabilities
for ground forces with enhanced mission assurance. Additionally, theAir Force is improving its anti-jam capabilities for the Global Position
System (GPS) and communications satellites to provide assured
access in contested environments.

Space Defense Partnerships Improve Resiliency
The DOD is soliciting industry support in developing a more resilient
space enterprise. In particular, the DOD research-wing, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DAPRA), is working withindustry to develop two key space capabilities: rapid launchcapabilities and a distributed low-earth orbit (LEO) constellation.
In February 2018, DARPA announced that it is holding an industry
launch competition that will award companies for successful
demonstrations of short-notice launch capabilities. DARPA’s vision isto help build a space launch industry that can conduct frequent
launches from multiple locations. Ultimately, such on-demand launchservices would help the US military more quickly replace satellites
damaged or destroyed by enemy attacks. DARPA will hold thecompetition in late 2019 and award competitors up to $10 million for
demonstrating rapid launch capabilities.
In April 2018, DARPA released a solicitation for innovative proposals
for low-cost space payloads and/or commoditized satellite buses thatprovide military utility from a distributed LEO constellation. This

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project seeks to enable “highly networked, resilient, and persistent”
DOD payloads in LEO. Ultimately, this program is intended to help the
DOD shift from large, aggregated satellites that are “high-value”
targets for enemies to constellations of smaller, cheaper satellites thatcan be quickly replaced if attacked.
The DOD has also expanded partnerships within the US government
interagency. For example, the Air Force and the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) have partnered to develop the National
Space Defense Center (NSDC), a highly classified operations center
located at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado that serves as the US’s
space threat detection and warning center. The NSDC transitioned to a
24/7 operations center in January 2018.
Additionally, the US military is increasing space collaboration withinternational allies. During an April 17, 2018 speech, Air Force SpaceCommand Commander Gen. John Raymond said that the US military’s
Joint Space Operations Center (JSCPOC), which is responsible for the
DOD’s space situational awareness, is improving operations andcoordination with ally partners. The JSCPOC will soon transition into
the Combined Space Operations Center, which is meant to better
integrate space operations with US allies. In addition, US space forces
are collaborating with allies via joint exercises, such as the annual
Schriever Wargames.

Reorganizing Space Forces & Reforming Space
Acquisitions
Despite increased funding and prioritization of national security
space in the Trump era, key challenges continue to plague national
security space leadership. At the top of the list are a slow and inflexible
acquisition process, a lack of unified leadership, and insufficienttraining and development opportunities for US space personnel. The
acquisitions process remains the top concern among DOD spaceleaders, as space system procurements typically experience severe
delays and dramatic cost overruns. This system is untenable in an ageof rapid technological development and could leave US space forces
woefully unprepared to face the latest threats. Moreover, national
security space leadership is fragmented across the Air Force, US
Strategic Command, and smaller space organizations in the US Armyand Navy — lacking a unified leadership hierarchy.
Recently, a few initiatives have given the DOD the opportunity toenact substantive organizational reforms. For example, the FY 2018
National Defense Authorization Act, signed into law by Trump on Dec.
12, 2017, requires that the deputy secretary of defense provide
recommendations to reorganize the national security spacecomponents of the DOD by Dec. 31, 2018. As such, the office of
Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan is conducting a study
dedicated to delivering recommendations to address these pressing
issues. An interim report sent to Congress on March 1, 2018 statedthat the DOD is looking to reform the two largest space acquisitions
offices — the SMC and the Rapid Capabilities Office — and add moreagility and innovation to the procurement programs. These reforms,
however, will not take place until after the final report is sent toCongress in December and after Congress authorizes the DOD’s
proposed changes.
Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, Trump has inserted himself into
the space reorganization debate, as he has on two occasions called for

Photo: Twitter (@VP)

Vice President Mike Pence issues a command to a GPS satellite at the National Space Defense
Center on June 23, 2017.

a US “Space Force”, described as something akin to another branch of
the US military. While Trump’s “off-the-cuff” remarks are not formal
policy proposals, his comments may add pressure on the DOD
leadership to pursue organizational reforms, as this issue has now
reached the “ears” of the top echelons of government. In other words,
the president’s personal interest in space reorganization efforts may be
the “spark” needed to enact real organizational change that can createa unified leadership hierarchy, better streamline acquisitions, andimprove training and leadership opportunities.

Toward a Defendable Space Enterprise
The first space launch technology was originally created for 20th
century warfare. Today space has become a domain for 21st century
warfighting. Military space commands are now critical components ofjoint military operations for the US and a growing number of allies andcompetitors. Future great power wars will be fought not only on land,
air, sea, but also increasingly in space and its “sister” domain,
cyberspace.
The Trump administration has continued Obama-era efforts to readythe US military for future space conflicts. It has also released highlevel policy documents outlining national security space strategy,
increased funding for space forces, and engaged in discussions on
reorganizing space forces and reforming space acquisitions. Overall,the US national security space enterprise is transitioning fromdefensive, resilient architectures to a more defendable enterprise —where the US is willing to fight in space to defend its assets.
Championing industry technologies and forging closer ties with allies,
the US military will continue to build a defendable architecture toprepare for emerging threats in the 21st century.

Robert Shields is an analyst at International Technology and Trade
Associates, Inc. (ITTA), supporting clients on a wide range of issues involving
US trade and investment policy as well as US science and technology policy.

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