Positioning Asia and Kyushu
in Shifting Global Politics
A Reflection on East Asian IR Theory Building:
From Here to Where?
Yong-Chool Ha (University of Washington)
Good morning ladies and gentleman. It is my honor to make a keynote speech today.
Before I start my speech, let me begin by expressing my deep gratitude to Professor
Iwashita at the Center for Asia-Pacific Future Studies, Kyushu University for organizing this timely and important conference. Professor Iwashita has been a long-timefriend and colleague of mine who has been tirelessly working for new visions for the
future of East Asia and Eurasia and beyond. He has been a leader, innovator and true
entrepreneur in initiating many projects and ideas to promote a better future for East
Asia and Eurasia. By now we all are familiar with border studies, which is his signature
project. I only wish him further success in whatever he chooses to do in the future.
Today I would like to make a few reflections on the current status of studies in
East Asia with a particular focus on East Asian international relations theories andregional integration. I will raise two broad questions regarding building East AsianIR theories: One concerns how to identify distinctive aspects of East Asia in thinking
about international relations theories. The second is the level of analysis in the current
discussions of building IR theories in East Asia.
For the last two decades, scholars have paid attention to the challenging quest for
IR theories which are germane to East Asia. Most agree that the mainstream international theories are limited in being able to capture international phenomena in the East
Asian region. Theories based on Western, and especially West European experience,are of limited value in making sense of the Asian context. The reason for the limited
value of mainstream international relations theories is that they are based on Western
experiences, which include histories, experiences and traditions of the United Statesand Western Europe.
The initial effort to apply Western frameworks to East Asia turned out to be limited and most scholars agree that further exploration of the distinctive aspects of East1

Asia is necessary to build new international theories for the region. Distinctions include
the hierarchical nature of the regional order, Asian state behaviors that cannot be explained by current IR theories and limited liberal institutionalism due to variations ineconomic and social systems. The admission that Western frameworks are limited iswelcome. However, this list of distinctive features is not exhaustive. A critical questionis whether Asia’s distinctive qualities which are relevant to new international relations
theory can be fully grasped by the current international relations theories, or not. I contend that we should go beyond the IR field in preparing a base for new international relations theories in East Asia. The intellectual history of Western international relations
theories demonstrates that building international theories involves so many areas, suchas history, economy and psychology. The current training background of the IR field isinadequate for new theory building because of the artificial disciplinary boundaries towhich scholars in the IR field cling.
The existing situation in East Asia international theory building is analogous
to long forgotten modernization theory in comparative politics and sociology. Morespecifically, I am referring to the debates on the validity of modernization theory inunderstanding the third world development in the late 1960s and 1970s. Modernization theory assumed unidirectional social and economic change and was based on theassumption of universal change. It projected the future of the non-Western world basedon Western experiences. Ultimately, modernization theory was criticized logically andempirically. The sources of challenge were varied, and included political economy, BA
regime theory and sociology of late development.
The analogy between the contemporary status of IR in East Asia and modernization theory cannot be more vivid in that the initial application of Western frameworks
turned out to be inadequate to explain the non-Western world. If this analogy stands,
reviewing intellectual trends in the aftermath modernization theory to derive any hints
in developing East Asian IR theories would be useful.
The assumption of uni-directionality of modernization theory has been severely
criticized by the counter argument that history goes through multiple paths. The assumption of universality has also been challenged by diversity in the patterns of socialchange in the non-Western world. In short, universal claims by the modernization paradigm shifted to the efforts to contextualize each case of modernization. Contextualization arose in different fields and in different forms: varieties of capitalism in political
economy and democratic transition in political science are good examples. What ismost notable in challenging the modernization paradigm, however, was recognition of
the role of tradition in understanding social change in the non-Western world.
Tradition is assumed to disappear in modernization theory. Contrary to this claim,
however, later findings indicate that the role and impact of tradition varies widely depending on different contexts for change. Sometimes tradition even plays a positiverole in economic development. As the cases of late industrialization illustrate, traditional institutions and values facilitate institutional workings in non-Western industrialization. In fact, the role of tradition in modernization in the non-Western world turned out
to be the most important factor in differentiating non-Western modernization from that2

of Western Europe.
Lessons from the fate of the modernization paradigm for IR in East Asia should
not be limited to abstract thinking that Western IR theories may not work and thus thatthey should be not applied to East Asia. We should think about what is involved in understanding the distinctiveness in East Asian experiences and what the implications arefor IR theory building on East Asia.
Most important is recognition that building theory is not the same as its application. IR theory building is based on the totality of experiences from which IR theories
can be formulated, as the backgrounds of Western IR theories clearly indicate. One
critical variable in Western IR theories is the nation state. As we all are fully aware,
the process for the nation state to emerge was a long and protracted one even after
the Westphalian treaty. There was a constant interplay of dynamics between economy,
ideology, politics and the military. In fact, the different orientations in Western IR tradition stem exactly from how to interpret this long historical process. It is also clearthat Western IR theories are extensions of domestic political order, whether liberalism
or Marxism.
What Western experiences show us is that IR theory building is a complicatedprocess involving the close examination of all the relevant experiences to international
relations. Viewed in this perspective IR theory building on East Asia has barely made afirst step. All the phenomena that are suggested by IR specialists as unique to East Asia
are restricted in scope as they are limited to only those that are different from Western
experiences. One typical example is the so-called ‘Asian paradox’. The Asian paradox
is a paradox largely because it is understood in neo-functional terms. Identifying differences is not the same as grasping the whole of which those differences are only a part.
What is necessary is to scrutinize modernization going on in East Asia. This job clearlygoes beyond the conventional territory of international relations. I question whether thecurrent IR field is adequately equipped in terms of training and the coverage of fields
needed for theory building.
There are many areas that require detailed analysis to flesh out international perspectives that will, in turn, become a foundation for building IR theories on East Asia.
Among them I will point to history, industrialization and international development.
History provides important clues to international experiences of peoples and nations,and as such, it is an essential part of new theory building. One historical questionthat has been mentioned in delineating the distinctiveness of the East Asian regionis humiliation and the sense of inferiority from colonial rule or imperialism. There isno denying that they are important historical legacies. However, one cannot but wonder whether studies on the colonial and imperial legacies remain at a superficial level
without being fully analyzed in conjunction with IR theory building in East Asia. For
example, questions, such as how colonial rule affected the perception of war and peaceand how the concept of enemy evolved in the process and aftermath of colonial ruleneed to be addressed.
Another question for East Asia IR theory building is whether, or not, a past regional order will remerge. This is certainly an interesting intellectual exercise. What is3

at stake in the debate is how to understand the return of tradition. If indeed tradition
comes back, will it be same as in the past or in changed forms? If the latter is the case,what determines the difference from the past?
Discussions on the invention of tradition in comparative politics are quite relevant. Tradition should not be taken as static; it should be distinguished from the traditional. Tradition is constantly redefined and upgraded depending on who takes up thetask. When we discuss the reemergence of the 19th century Chinese world order weneed to be very specific about the contexts in which tradition changed.
One of the most important contexts is industrialization and modernization. One
clearly distinct aspect of East Asian industrialization is lateness, whether in Japan, Korea, China or elsewhere. Late industrialization always brings up the issue of tradition.
Unlike the modernization paradigm claimed, traditional institutions and values are frequently invoked to facilitate late industrialization. This invocation of traditional institutions and values is bound to have a bearing on social and political development. Eachcase of late industrialization has its own unique way of assimilating its own tradition,
causing diversity in patterns of social and political change. This diversity also means
variety in international perspectives. Analyzing the distinct international perspectives
that are developing in different countries is therefore necessary. One example is nationalism. Rather than developing different labels for nationalism, its contents need to beclosely examined in specific contexts.
A related factor that causes divergence is the international environment in whichlate industrialization occurs. For example, Japan’s industrialization unfolded in thecontext of imperialism, for South Korea in the context of the Cold War, and for China
in the context of globalization. In each case, the international environment affected themode of economic development differently and each case picked up distinct international perspectives. For example, Japan was able to justify its international behavior by
way of the international standards of the time, while China is rapidly learning international norms in the context of globalization. Such distinctive international learning and
its impact need to be considered in thinking about IR theories on East Asia. In this regard, the mundane issue of nationalism needs to be examined in the context of different
late industrialization cases. In addition, at a domestic level late industrialization gives
rise to distinct international perspectives separate from the international environment.
As a result, the revival of the 19th century regional order should be approached inconjunction with modernization and industrialization processes going on in East Asia,
especially from the perspective of how tradition is invented.
Another example which deserves attention in thinking about IR on East Asia isinternational development that has been evolving in the region. This goes beyond shifting military power balance. Unlike in Western Europe, East Asia has gone through a
convoluted historical process. For a long time, East Asia has been under the influenceof Western powers, most prominently American power. What is unfolding before oureyes is finally the beginning of what I call the de-Americanization process. The diminishing influence of the United States seems inevitable, and this process is not limited
merely to policy shift; it has serious implications for structural changes in international4relations in East Asia. How to handle the de-Americanization process will have a profound impact on the future of the regional order.
As Western international relations theories are based on domestic, regional andinternational experiences as they pertain to international relations, so too should IR
theories in East Asia. Beyond the stage of identification of differences from the West,IR theory builders should start looking into the totality of East Asian experiences thatare relevant to IR theory building. As most nations in East Asia are late comers to industrialization, so the process and nature of building a regional order in East Asia willcertainly be different. While we should learn from Western experiences, we should notforget that the region will tread a different path. We must remember that the processof preparing new IR theories in East Asia goes way beyond the conventional territoryof the IR field. In this sense, we must change our position from theory application totheory building mode. Most important would be to flesh out the international orientations that may develop from the modernization and industrialization process unfoldingin East Asia. From this perspective, perhaps it may be premature to take the job of IR
theory building in East Asia.
Lastly, I would like to mention methodology in thinking about IR theories in East
Asia. Mostly coming from the Western IR background there seems to exist a rigid conceptual barrier between macro and micro phenomena. This conceptual barrier leads toa tendency in the field that whatever happens at local levels or micro-levels is regarded
as insignificant. The rigid distinction between macro-structural and micro-processes
may be sensible in the already fixed international structure. However, in a region like
East Asia where everything is so fluid, it is strategically important to pay attention to
local and micro dynamics. To understand macro implications of micro phenomena isan essential part of our theoretical imagination. In this regard, I would like to direct
our attention to so many happenings at the local level. For instance, local interactions
among Japanese, Koreans and Chinese in Fukuoka, on Jeju Island, on Tsushima Island,at the Tuman River, and in the Dandong area are good examples where we can observea possible divergence between the formal state level actions and those at the local level.
As far as I can see, people in the region have increasingly experienced human interactions that sometimes overwhelm the central government’s formal policy directions.
During my stay at Kyushu University I heard a moving story where local residents in
Kyushu looked for family members of forced mining workers in Korea during the colonial period for reconciliation.
Most importantly the border study projects that Professor Iwashita launchedhave produced so many stories about border regions. North Korean border stories, theOkinawa situation and Sino-Russian border areas are good cases in point. In one of theconferences that he was involved in, as I distinctly remember, Professor Iwashita remarked that nationalism near the border is quite different from other regions. I propose
here to start a project to collect all the micro cases of regional dynamics. These cases
will provide us with important opportunities not only to understand local dynamics;
they may open up new clues in thinking about macro-structural consequences in the
future. I argue it is high time to loosen the shackles of macro-determinism, especially5when we are dealing with an ever-changing regional order.
Concluding my speech, I would like to make summarizing observations. First,
we should realize that building new international theories requires close examinationof the international implications of political, economic, historical and psychologicalchanges that develop in a region. In this regard, East Asia is not an exception. From
this perspective, in the current field of IR theories, East Asia has just completed thetask of identifying the limited value of Western IR theories in understanding East Asianinternational dynamics. We should go beyond this initial stage to identify and analyze
the totality of East Asian experiences from the perspective of IR theory building. This
would require us to go beyond conventional IR fields. Our hands are full, and as lateindustrializations forge ahead, perhaps we need to hurry in catching up with the history
and reality of East Asia.

Shaping East Asia’s Regional Order
T.J. Pempel (University of California, Berkeley)
I will talk about the changing order in East Asia, and the Asia-Pacific, and specificallyJapan’s role within that changing order. Mine will be a rather macro-level perspective.
But let me start with a very obvious point: the Asia-Pacific is undergoing a change in
its order, reconfiguring both economics and security. This process has been going onwith varying degrees of acceleration and deceleration over time. The result has been
deeper and more encompassing lines of interdependence across the Asia-Pacific region.
Yet within that general outline, the specific details of the emerging order remain murky
and will remain subject to the actions of individuals and different states. The emerging
order is thus very much a work in progress.
To sketch this changing order, I want to draw your attention to three major dimensions along which change is taking place. The first is the change in the nature of security. Changes in security have been going on since the end of bipolarity, which I markfrom the 1972 visit of Richard Nixon to China and the changes in Chinese economic
policy begun under Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. There has been a significant improvement in the positive state-to-state interactions that have taken place, perhaps untilvery recently. In addition, there has been a parallel decline in the military confrontations across the region, along with a diminution in most countries’ reliance on militaryprowess as a tool of foreign policy.
The second big change involves economic shifts that blurred the ideological gapsthat once separated the two sides in the Cold War, and that were erected to stymie
economic interactions between China and America’s Cold War allies. These economic
shifts have since been marked by extensive cross-border investments, interdependence,
foreign direct investment in East Asian finance and investment and trade.
Third, we have seen substantial growth in the number of regional institutions that6

span the arc of security and economics and pull together at the official level a numberof different governments in a variety of different organizations.
I want to go into a little bit more detail on each of these. Let me start with ending
bipolarity. The normalization of relations between China and the United States, Japan,
South Korea, and a number of America’s Cold War allies, began this process, and it was
accelerated with the economic changes introduced in China by President Deng Xiaoping. The end result has been the general diminution of state-to-state conflicts. The Cold
War has hardly vanished in East Asia, but the degree of hard security conflict has been
severely diminished. Despite the tensions that we see in the newspapers on a regularbasis, we have had the benefits of what might be called an East Asia peace in Northeast
Asia, since the end of the Korean conflict in 1953, and across Southeast Asia as wellsince 1979. So, while we do have tensions on the Korean peninsula and between Taiwan and the PRC, as well as over island disputes in the East and South China Seas, weshould remember that, for the most part, these have not been generating state-to-state
conflicts and major warfare.
The second point to stress is the deepening of intra-Asian economic relationships
and financial interdependence. An important starting point is that as economic development across individual countries began to proceed in East Asia, numerous leadersbegan to pivot their domestic legitimacy on the provision of economic benefits to theircitizens. They have moved away from focusing on military prowess and have insteademphasized domestic economic development as the main basis for their legitimacy. In
this context we have seen national development projects within numerous countries becoming increasingly interwoven with one another through the development of regional
production networks and cross-border investments. Consequently, intra-Asian trade isalmost at the same level as intra-European trade levels. We have had a number of these
corporate moves to weave together closer linkages across national borders in East Asia.
Meanwhile, intra-Asian investment has risen, particularly since the 1990s, thecumulative effect of which has been the increase in cross-border production and deepening levels of interdependence within East Asia. A further effect has been the reduced
dependence of individual East Asian countries on the markets within the United States,
even though the US ultimately remains a major market for many of the goods that aresent from the collective Asian development effort.
Finally, the third point is deepening regional institutionalization. Bottom-up corporate development in investment and trade ties has been enhanced by a build-up informal regional institutions that involve a top-down process driven by government interactions. The Cold War has not disappeared. We still have the alliance structuresthat link certain governments, but these have been supplemented by a growing interdependence among states and a growing institutionalization of state participation informal institutions, particularly within the economic area. This has led to an increase ininter-governmental interactions that cut across security tensions as well as the old Cold
War lines that previously divided the region.
This process happened for most of the 1990s and well into the 2000s. It has led toincreased interdependence and the rise in a huge number of regional institutions, many7

of which are familiar to you. We have had Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum(APEC), the ASEAN regional forum (ARF), we have had the Chiang Mai Initiative, wehave had the ASEAN-plus-three, and numerous others. In particular, these have been
forming within Asia in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and 1998.
The crisis led many countries to recognize that they had much more in common with
one another on economic grounds. However, there has yet to be any conviction on thepart of East Asian governments that they have some common enemy that would linkthem together on security. So there has been a much closer inter-connection institutionally in economics and finance, than there has been in security.
How does Japan fit into this emerging order, and what role does it play? One way
to think about this is the tension that Japan faces between security and economics on the
one hand and then bilateralism and regionalism on the other. Everyone recognizes thatthe starting point for Japan is to continue making the United States the major pillar for
its foreign policy. It has maintained robust ties on both economics and security to theUnited States. Nevertheless, once bipolarity began to end in East Asia, Japan opened
itself up to closer ties with China. As we know, economic relations between Japan and
China grew very quickly after the normalization of relations in 1972, and then accelerated during the 1980s. Ministry of Foreign Affairs data suggests that between 1979and early 2016, Japan sent approximately 3.3 trillion yen in loan aid, 157 billion yen in
grant aid, and 181 billion yen in technical aid to China. This aid, however, represents a
dependence that China has not been very vocal in articulating. Japan, on the other hand,
took a great deal of pride for a very long period of time in its role in boosting Chinese
economic development. There was a 30-year period of congeniality between the twocountries that only began to be challenged around 2008.
Despite Japan’s deepening economic ties with China, and despite the rise in thenumber of regional and multilateral bodies that Japan has participated in, Japan’s foreign policy continues to be closely tied to that of the United States. As a consequence,
and as a result of trying to keep the United States deeply engaged in the Asian region,
Japan, along with Australia and other countries, created APEC and the ARF. These
were institutional efforts to weave the United States more deeply into links across the
Asia-Pacific, and to keep the United States closely engaged with Japan and with therest of the region. This relationship came to something of a crisis in the 1997 financial
difficulties when Japan proposed the Asian Monetary Fund as a way to deal with thefinancial turmoil. China, the United States, and the IMF were very upset, and Japan
dropped its proposal. Nevertheless, Japan has been a strong proponent of regional integration through institutions and has played a powerful role in helping to create closer
security relations within Asia, and in keeping the United States engaged in Asian regional institutions.
The United States and Japan deepened their bilateral security ties as part of the
Obama pivot, or the re-positioning. As China’s rise has challenged previous foreign
policy considerations of the United States and Japan, the US and Japan have drawn
ever closer in their security relationships. Japan has taken on a much more active rolein its own hard security and has re-defined what is constitutionally possible in using8

its self-defense forces. However, we are coming to something of a watershed with theelection of Donald Trump as president, and the possibility that many of the long-standing relationships between Japan and the United States will be up-ended as a result of
his priorities. Many of the long-standing expectations about that relationship are being
drawn into question. Trump has started by removing the US from the Trans-PacificPartnership, which for both Obama and Abe was an important part of linking the UnitedStates and Japan economically to the Asian region and to one another.
To conclude let me say that economics and finance continue to show an expanded
integration, and are increasingly organized through multilateral forms and multilateral
institutions. Regional security institutions, on the other hand, have not been equally
forceful in pulling the countries together. I think this is a point — the lack of empathy
among the various states in the region — that the next speaker, Professor Evans, will
be drawing to our attention. Nevertheless, Japan has been an active and enthusiastic
member of multilateral institutions. In the economics and finance areas it has worked
energetically to keep the United States closely engaged with the Asian region. On security Japan has endeavored to forge a close tie with the US.
The great difficulty Japan currently faces and that Asia faces collectively, is thepossibility of a serious withdrawal politically and institutionally from the continent by
the United States. This is something that Donald Trump has emphasized with his promise of “making America great again”, advocating increased protectionism and isolation
for the United States, and a growing reduction of the US role in East Asia. For Japanand for other countries in the region, this is going to create serious problems not only
in security but also in the economic arena. So, it is with that relatively pessimistic notethat I want to bring my comments to a close, and let me thank you very much for yourattention.

Relationship between Asia and Kyushu
Hiroyuki Okamoto (Kyushu Economic Research Center) (Figure 1)
Kyushu is a gateway to Asia. The role of Kyushu is to connect Asia and Japan. Shanghai and Seoul are closer than Tokyo. Fukuoka airport has convenient access to themajor Asian cities. (Figure 2)
Historically, in Kyushu, there were threats from the Asian continent. In the 6th
century, there was Dazaifu. The imperial regional government office, Dazaifu and Mizuki were built as defense facilities against threats from the Asian continent. In the
13th century, Kyushu suffered two attacks by the Mongolian army. As Professor Ha
described in his keynote speech, Kyushu has been experiencing interactions with Asian
countries for a long time ago. Let us look at our history with Asian countries.
This gold seal (Figure 3), which was granted by ancient China, was found in Kyushu. There was Kolkan which was the imperial guest house for envoys from China and9

Korea in the 6th century. In the 11th century, Kyushu had the first Chinatown in Japan.
In the 13th century, green tea, udon noodles and, manju sweet buns were brought from
China into Japan via Kyushu. Today, all of them are common foods.
Kyushu was the first place in Japan where Christianity was introduced by Francisco Xavier. Although Japan had a period of national isolation in the Edo era (c16001868), Dejima in Kyushu was the only open port to foreign nations. In the Meiji
Restoration, a political transformation to build a modern state, Kyushu served as adriving force in the movement, because samurai of Kyushu could get information on
foreign countries. (Figure 4)
Japan’s traditional industry is also affected by Asia. The town of Arita, which is
100 miles from here, was the first place to produce porcelain in Japan. Porcelain produced in Arita is the most refined. Production began in 1600. That was supported by a
Korean potter called Ri Sanpei (year of birth unknown-1655). He was one of the mostrespected Koreans in Japan. People in Arita built a monument to him to express their
gratitude. (Figure 5)
People of Kyushu had supported Sun Yat-Sen who forged a political revolution in
China, called the Xinhai Revolution, in 1911. I think this is the empathy that Professor
Evans described in his speech. People of Kyushu had empathy for Sun Yat-Sen andhelped him.
Kyushu is highly dependent on Asia. Kyushu’s largest trading partner is China,accounting for 20 percent of exports and 60 percent of imports. Figure 6 indicates that
Kyushu’s economy is closely linked to the Asian economy. The degree of Kyushu’s
economic linkage with Asia is higher than the national average, except for the value ofimports. (Figure 7)
In 2015, Kyushu posted a record high number of foreigners entering, due to a
sharp increase in the number of foreign cruise ships calling port at Kyushu. Most tourists who use cruise ships are Chinese. By nationality, Koreans occupy the majority.
(Figure 8)

Kyushu has close relationships among local governments in East Asian countries.
We have had the Japan-Korea Strait Governor meeting since 1992. In this meeting, we
discuss sightseeing, environmental technology, and youth exchange programs. (Figure

9)

Kyushu, China, and Korea face the Yellow Sea. The Pan-Yellow Sea Economic
and Technical Exchange Meeting has been held in this region’s coastal cities since2001. This meeting aims to expand exchange and create investment and technology in
the Yellow Sea region. It consists of ten think-tanks in Kyushu and Korea. We hold ageneral meeting and study meeting annually in Kyushu and Korea. (Figure 10)
Kyushu’s economy is relatively large. Kyushu’s Gross Regional Product (GRP),
which has a similar meaning to Gross Domestic Product, is as large as that of Norway,
which ranks 20th worldwide. It is larger than Thailand and Malaysia. Kyushu is as large
as Spain and larger than Korea and Taiwan. (Figure 11)
Kyushu’s economy is known as the 10 percent economy of Japan. Key indicators10

such as land area, population and GRP are 10 percent of the national figure (Figures
12 & 13). However, there are several industries with a high market share relative to therest of Japan. Kyushu is often called the “silicon island” or the “car island” or the “foodisland” (Figures 14, 15 & 16). Let me briefly explain about the features of Kyushu’s
main industry. In Japan, the semiconductor industry has been forced to reorganized, but
30 percent of integrated circuit production in Japan is still carried out in Kyushu. Kyushu is one of Japan’s largest automotive production bases. There are several assemblyplants for Nissan, Toyota and Daihatsu. Nissan is purchasing components and materials
from China and Korea. The amount of cars produced in Kyushu reached 1.3 million
vehicles. Toyota is producing Lexus brands. About 70 percent of vehicles produced by
Nissan and Toyota are exported to China and the United States. Motor vehicles are a
top item of exported goods in Kyushu. The automotive industry creates 46,000 jobs
in Kyushu. Agricultural products amounted to 1.8 trillion yen. This is 20 percent of
national agricultural output. Now we are trying to export our agricultural products toother Asian countries.
For greater stability in Asia, Kyushu can cooperate with Asian countries on someissues. Firstly, air pollution issues. As cities close to Kyushu have rapidly grown, they
face serious environmental issues such as air and water pollution. It is difficult to respond to these issues without inter-city cooperation and mutual networks. Kyushu has
a history to overcome air pollution. We can help other Asian people and countries. Secondly, water issues. Water is a must for cities to grow. The city of Fukuoka has sufferedfrom a serious shortage of water for years. Today, Fukuoka is a water-efficient city. The
city of Kita-Kyushu has cooperated with China, Cambodia, and Vietnam to solve waterleaks and water quality management. I think inter-city cooperation on environmental
issues will stabilize Asia.
Thirdly, cultural exchange in the arts and animations contribute to peace in Asia.
The Fukuoka Asia Culture Prize started in 1990. It is a means of showing respect tothose who have contributed to the arts and culture in Asia. Animation also contributes
to understanding. For example, 60 million copies of One Piece are printed and sold in
more than 35 countries. Galaxy Express 999 is also a famous animation. The best authors of these animations were born in Kyushu.

11Figure - 1

Figure - 2

12Figure - 3

Figure - 4

13

Figure - 5

Figure - 6

14

Figure - 7

Figure - 815Figure - 9

Figure - 1016

Figure - 11

Figure - 1217

Figure - 13

Figure - 1418

Figure - 15

Figure - 16

19

Building Trust in Northeast Asia under Gloomy
Global Skies: The Role for Academics
Paul Evans (Institute of Asian Research, University of British Colombia)
I am going to begin where Professor Pempel ended, which is with a view of the gloomyskies of 2016. What I would like to do is paint a global picture and then bring it down
to the local situation, about which Professor Ha opened the conversation.
Why do I say, “gloomy global skies?” Historians may well look back on the year
2016 as the moment when the liberal world order that we have lived under and supported for most of the last 70 years reached a tipping point. It is not going to collapse,
but it is going to change. If we look at the output of the world economy, we are getting
growth estimates of 1.2 percent for the past year. More than that, liberal democratic
institutions have not had a good year. Several countries are sliding backwards, Turkey, Thailand and the Philippines among them. Populism, extremism, xenophobia, anddistrust of institutions are eroding support for moderate politics. Simply use the word
“Brexit” to summon to mind the challenge presented by anti-globalization views, extremism, populism, and the fractures within democracies.
Professor Pempel, I apologize in advance (the Canadian way) because I am goingto make some comments about Canada’s nearest neighbor, its President elect, and what
this means for the world democracies.
The unease about Mr. Trump’s victory is palpable in Canada, Japan and the othercountries I have visited in the past month including China, Indonesia, and Singapore.
The anxiety is not just about Mr. Trump as President but the social forces in the United States revealed during the campaign. We all saw new fissures and divisions within
American society, deeper polarization, a dysfunctional Congress. America has a wonderful system but it is not perfect and this may have been one of its most imperfectyears.
Some of the forces at play are not unique to the United States. The backlash
against globalization, anger about the 1 percent and inequality, intertwine with elementsof racism, xenophobia, protectionism, and “us first”-ism. Multiple forces will constrain
the new President from acting on his election promises. But one thing of which we
can be very sure is that the United States will be more unpredictable for friend and foe
alike. There will be major disruption to the patterns of expectations and relationships
about American behavior and the US role in underpinning the liberal world order thatit has anchored since the Second World War.
This world order will not suddenly collapse but it is going to demand leadershipfrom new quarters and in new ways, often without the United States or around theUnited States on matters including climate change, the multilateral trading system,
multilateral institutions, alliances, and peace keeping operations.
Let me give an example at the regional level: the American pivot, or re-balancing
to Asia-Pacific. As I spoke last month with people at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

20and at Japan’s Self Defense Forces, it became very clear that everyone was deeply uncertain and anxious about the alliance system and the US role in the region. The Obamapolicy had been built on three foundations
One of them, the most important — at least the most evident, was a slow but
steady build-up of military capacity across the Pacific. My sense is America is notgoing to back away from that military build-up. There is every indication that, in fact,
we have the kind of leadership group which is about as close to a military-industrial
complex as we have ever seen in an American cabinet, that the idea of more Americanships, more American troops, in this region, are very strong possibilities.
Where we see potential disengagement is in the realms of trade and institution
building. As Professor Pempel indicated, there are clear signs of protectionism and an
America First approach. Mr Trump will likely withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and possibly NAFTA. These will likely be replaced by new sets of bilateralnegotiations.
As Canadians who live next door to the United States, we love our Americanneighbors dearly but do not always trust them and expect them to act largely on their
immediate self-interests. At the same time, we have admired the United States as thecreator of public goods and a country that lives largely by the rule of law and treaties.
The United States is not going to withdraw from its trading arrangements with individual countries or its involvement in multilateral agreements — but it does appear poised
to play a different game in trade matters, more transactional and US-centric. Officials
in Ottawa, Tokyo, Singapore and virtually every other capital will scramble to secure
their bilateral understandings and agreements with the US even as their knees shake
about the future of the multilateral trading system that is so central to their economic
well-being.
The third pillar is support for multilateral diplomatic process like the UN at the
global level and the various ASEAN-centered security and political processes in the region. Professor Pempel provided a wonderful map of these cross-cutting and overlapping institutional footprints. To be sure, there has always been an American preference
for bilateral agreements. But Washington has also supported nascent regional processes
for several decades. Under Obama US diplomats gave a strong boost to regional multilateralism, trying to support rather than dominate or erode them. Mr. Trump’s government will not abandon all of these processes but neither will it make them priorities.
Those who work on regional institutions in Asia know how slowly they are developing, how much patience is necessary to see them get traction on economic or security
issues. So, for all of those reasons, I think that governments, including in Tokyo, arevery concerned about what comes next, recognizing we are simply guessing.
It is in that context that this project is so important. I only know what I haveheard in the two hours, mainly about what is happening at the ground level and in people-to-people contacts in Northeast Asia. What a wonderful project! I have been hoping
this would happen for many years. But these micro-projects are going to be affected bywhat I fear is a coming geo-political tension of the sort we have not seen since the Cold
War and even back to the 1930s when liberal democracies turned in against themselves,21the international institutions of the day collapsed and a naked form self-interest andstrategic competition flourished.
And I am going to make two suggestions on what we do under that gloomy sky.
The first of them is in the paper that I am tabling today but not presenting (See Appendix 2). It is about trust-building and confidence-building, through empathy in Northeast
Asia. I am humbled and just delighted to see what this process is doing. Whatever else,
it is making connections at the intellectual level, at the historical level, at the culturallevel — connections among people that allow them to see the world through the lensesof others in the region. This is a topic we have been exploring with Chinese colleagues
for the past three years and about which we recently published a special volume of themagazine Global Asia. The idea of empathy is a much under-valued concept in international relations and appears to be one of the things you are seeking to generate in thisproject.
But let me suggest a second thing that can be done. And this time I can speak withsome pride, as a Canadian. Canada has a new government. Canada has a liberal government, a liberal internationalist government that defines itself in part by its “sunnyways” optimism. It came with a new approach to governance domestically. It has comein with an agenda that focuses on support for multilateralism and multilateral institutions. Canada is returning to peacekeeping and peace support operations. It is committed to open borders, reception of refugees and immigrants, free-trade arrangements,and fundamentally, a rule-based international order. Some say Canadians are acting like
Canadians again. Canadians may be playing a Middle Power role again but it has 21st
century characteristics and involves a new approach to mainland China.
Prime Minister Trudeau made a trip to China in August and September. And Premier Li Keqiang then visited Canada. We have had a quiet reset of the bilateral relationship, some of it focused on economics, including the first steps toward a free trade
agreement. Some of it was on educational exchanges and other things. But the bigger
picture was that we need to engage China at the global level on global issues, with thepotential for responsible leadership on several key ones including climate change, environment, global health issues, and now, peacekeeping and peace support issues, China
is not on the periphery. China is coming close to the center. And what Robert Zoellick
referred to as China becoming a “responsible stakeholder” almost now seems passé. We
need it as a responsible leader as America steps back from the role it has long played.
Some of the things China is doing are not so nice from that perspective, particularly in its maritime boundary issues. But in general, the argument is that we need tobring China more deeply into key institutions and regimes. What Mr Trudeau’s groupis thinking about is the next level of that process. If any of you followed the G20 meetings in Hangzhou, and saw the dynamics of those meetings, the three countries that had
the most ambitious agenda for institution-building in the G20 were the Germans, theCanadians, and the Chinese. The experience of interactions with China on high financeissues sees them now playing a role in producing public goods as important as anyother major power.
Let me then conclude that we are now in an era that has been variously described22

as multi-polar or multi-centric. We cannot count on the United States as we have in earlier times and will need to look for new types of leadership and coalitions of the willing
and the relevant to address major global and regional issues. China will need to be acentral part of that new order. It is the Canadian bet that with the right mix of firmness
and accommodation China can play a constructive, indeed essential role in shaping it.
Thank you.

Discussants’ Comments
Beom-Shik Shin (Seoul National University)
Professor Pempel explained how security and economics have various dimensions in
the region. In addition, he suggested the kinds of institutional results that exist in theregion. I think his theory has raised important and serious theoretical challenges. Firstof all, the issue of the relation between security and economy, and the theoretical taskof understanding the security-economy nexus in international relations theory. As Professor Ha elaborated in his speech, international relations theory has evolved mainly
from the experiences of the Western European states. As a result, IR theory cannot
sufficiently explain the security-economy nexus in this region. At the risk of over-simplification, the realist perspective tends to understand security as leading the economy. A liberalist perspective, especially the functionalist group, tends to emphasize theeconomy’s leading role over security. Nevertheless, both theories posit that security
and economy move in the same direction. However, we need to consider what kind of
condition underlies this coupling process of economy and security.
The role of the United States is very important. After World War II, until the endof the Cold War, the United States was the leading hegemon. It had responsibility for
maintaining world security and the economic structure. Under these conditions, security and the economy could move in the same direction. However, with the advent of the
post-Cold War era and the rise of China, the United States can no longer dominate theworld economy. Changing international relations have come to challenge the existing
situation. In Northeast Asia, security and the economy cannot go together. Even though
security competition goes higher, economic cooperation goes further. In other words,
hot economy and cold security co-exist. Some call this contradictory phenomenon to
traditional Western IR theory the ‘Asian Paradox’. Professor Pempel has appropriately
pointed out that the combined changes in the external security order plus the increased
significance of the cross-border economy and financial ties pose serious challenges tothe deeply institutionalized combination of security and economy power positions, andthe policies that were previously in play.
Adding to these findings, I will now consider the security-economy nexus and dynamics along with its conditions in the region. This can provide us with a more creative
platform for building a new regional IR theory — a hope that Professor Ha expressed23

in his speech. We need to study the following factors. First, we need to study how transformations in regional states impact on the regional order. If we look only through thegreat power politics framework, we cannot grasp and evaluate appropriately the changes in regional international politics. Of course, since the post-Cold War Era, Northeast
Asia has been changed in a sense, but at the same time, it remains unchanged. The main
rules or the actors may change, but the structure continues. However, regional playertransformations have a strong impact on the regional mode of international interactions. Therefore, the task ahead is to explain the impact of regional states’ transformations, such as democratization, marketization, or industrialization on the regional order.
Second, Professor Pempel’s emphasis on the role of Japan in the region is interesting. Some may say that the rivalry between the United States and China will be thebasic framework of the regional order. However, besides the United States and China,
we need to pay more attention to relations between the so-called middle ground states,
such as Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Russia. If we put aside the extraordinarycase of North Korea, cooperation between the middle-ground states can ultimately be
the foundation of the future regional order. Especially if we accept that neither the United States nor China can prevail in this region for the time being, cooperation among the
middle-ground states may have a decisive role in the process of regional transformation. In this respect, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s efforts to improve relations
with Russia, or the re-consolidation of South Korea and Japan’s relations that havebeen fluctuating in recent years, can have a significant impact on the regional dynamics
in the future. Furthermore, if Japan, South Korea, and Russia cooperate tri-laterally thiswill contribute greatly to stabilizing the regional order. They may take the buffer function between the United States and China. In this respect, we need to pay more attention
to the significance of tri-lateral cooperation and unilateralism in the region. Concerning
this, I would like to ask Professor Pempel two questions: firstly, whether, or not, therole of the United States will diminish in this region? And; secondly, if the Americanrole diminishes, what role or strategy would be appropriate for Japan?
My third point is the importance of leadership and ideas in the formation of regional cooperation and institutions. I want to ask Professor Evans, besides the leadingrole of the United States in the region, who or what can take the capitalist role of cooperation in Northeast Asia?
Finally, I want to point out the under-represented importance of various actors
besides the nation-state in the region. Mr. Okamoto’s presentation showed the position
and the possible role of Kyushu in the region. I fully understand the importance of thecity, and the region, and the locale can be solid grounds for regional cooperation. Somesay that this kind of interaction in low politics may have some meaning, but that it is not
so important, and cannot overcome the lead that comes from high politics. However,many scholars have found various examples of how continuous pressure from below
became a resource for high political change. In addition, many East Asian businesspeople have a tendency to invest despite existing geopolitical competition and instability
in the region. Furthermore, although time does not permit me to explain in detail, we
should consider the importance of the construction of city networks and local networks.

24Such networks are increasing in the region. Therefore, pressure from below will continue to be influential. This would leave security and the economy in such a way that East
Asia is different from other regions. If the coming Trump administration pursues a socalled ‘US-first diplomacy,’ which is an isolationist diplomacy, the significance of pressure from below will need to be discussed more seriously among the regional states.
Sergey Sevastyanov (Far Eastern Federal University)
We have heard from several very famous speakers, and it is a great honor to respond tosome of their ideas. I will elaborate on how Russia can contribute to improving Northeast Asian security. As we know, the main strategy for Russia in the Asia-Pacific andNortheast Asia is to use regional economic integration to boost economic developmentof the vast and under-populated territories of the Russian Far East. In addition, Moscow
is interested in promoting initiatives to shape the new security architecture in Northeast
Asia. Security should be based on a balance of bilateral mechanisms and multilateraldiplomacy that exclude any closed or restricted systems or blocs. This is the peacefulprincipal position for Moscow and Beijing, and it is important for discussions in our
session.
According to Professor Pempel, one important component of the emerging Asianorder is represented by the rapid increase in formalized governmental links that marknew institutional commitments reflecting enhanced regional interdependence. This isabsolutely true. I also agree with him that at the same time, security arrangements suchas the Asian Regional Forum and the Six-Party talks are not working so well. Furthermore, Track II, Track 1.5 and Track 1 diplomacy have become less effective. What we
see is that Cold War views still exist. They demonstrate different visions of the East
Asian security order and shape modern security relations.
As for multilateral economic cooperation projects, those involving Russia, North
Korea, and South Korea, are making little progress. This is a big setback for Northeast
Asia and for Russian plans to realize these projects as an option for economic integration with Northeast Asian countries. On the other hand, a positive development is the
improving relationship between Japan and Russia. There is a good chance for these
economic and political ties to improve. There are some interesting projects under discussion such as the proposal to connect Sakhalin and Hokkaido with a gas pipeline,
electricity grid and rail transportation, and many others. They are to be further discussed during the forthcoming visit by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe to Vladivostok in early September 2017 to participate in the annual Eastern Economic Forum.
Now, about the experience of 1.5 Track diplomacy on security in Northeast Asia.
First of all, the Six-Party talks are now dormant, but we have two other structures.
These are the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) and the Northeast Asia
Peace and Cooperation Forum (NEAPCF). The NEACD is well-known; it is about
traditional security, mostly North Korean security issues. It is attended by active diplomats, most of whom also represented their country at the Six-Party talks. It is an important mechanism to keep alive intellectually the process of discussions on Northeast
Asian security and Korean peninsula security issues at times when Six-Party talks have25not been operational.
I do not think anyone has mentioned the NEAPCF. It was launched three years
ago by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs This is a strong initiative. They discuss
non-traditional security issues with the full support of the Korean Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Again, the leaders of these NEAPCF delegations are the same diplomats who
participate in the NEACD and the Six-Party talks. Lately, however, there have beensome problems due to the difficult geopolitical situation in the region. For example,
three years ago I was asked by the NEACD leaders to arrange a conference in Vladivostok. We started preparations, but because of events in the Ukraine in the spring of2014 the conference was cancelled. More or less the same happened with the NEAPCF. The conference was arranged for October 2016 in Washington DC. However, theRussian and Chinese diplomats did not attend, because they were unhappy with recent
South Korean initiatives to install a new American air defense system. These geopolitical aspects influenced 1.5 Track diplomacy in a negative way.
The prospects for these mechanisms are mixed. The NEACD is not a high priority project for the American State Department, while the Korean initiative is fully
supported by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I think Korea has a good position
and I am sure that the new presidential administration of South Korea will continue todevelop this resource.
My first conclusion is that overall Northeast Asia could not avoid or postpone
finding a solution to the nuclear security threat posed by North Korea. Some people say
if North Korea does not want to cooperate then we should do nothing. I think that is not
the right idea. So far, Beijing has been the most consistent proponent of the idea thatsomething should be done. What may have a positive effect is to arrange multilateral
exercises including not only US military allies in the region, but also China and Russia.
Another effective step is to decrease the level of US-South Korea exercises in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula so as to not to directly provoke North Korea. I agree withProfessor Evans’ point that the missing ingredient in moving from confidence to trust is
empathy. We do not have enough empathy. We are frustrated with North Korea because
Pyongyang as of late, has been lacking empathy, too. Empathy needs cultivation andI think Seoul has no choice but to change this in some positive way. Newly-elected
President Moon Jae-in has already declared such plans.
My second conclusion is that, taking into account the dangerous security situationon the Korean peninsula, in a short term perspective multilateral cooperation projects in
the Russian Far East could become an interim substitute for the idea of Northeast Asian
economic integration. China is already active in this context. Several recent summits
between Putin and Abe brought Japan into this scenario as well, and Korean businessshould engage too. It is an innovative and promising idea for forging trust and cooperation between key actors in Northeast Asia.
Lastly, Russia and Northeast Asian countries have great potential for developing
cooperation in security, science and education. According to Professor Evans, the university is a natural place to cultivate empathy. My view is that the newly formed Far
Eastern Federal University in Vladivostok is particularly relevant to promote dialogue

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with universities and research institutions from Northeast Asia. We are ready and liketo discuss different aspects of soft security, including nuclear safety, energy security,
the environment and climate change to develop empathy that is lacking in the region.
I have one question for our speakers. It could sound a little bit provocative, taking into account that most of our speakers are from North America. Professor Pempel
spoke about the emerging regional order. According to him, it involves the recognition
that any Asia-Pacific security order will depend on two things: a balance of power andan accepted set of norms. This is certainly true. However, he says that such a set of rules
could be agreed upon only in the distant future. I suggest that if President Trump realized only some of his presidential campaign promises, for example, to focus mainly on
domestic politics, and to be less interested in multilateral institutions in East Asia, thenmaybe China, Russia, Korea, and Japan, could play a more important role in Northeast
Asian security. As you know, Russia has a double identity. We are an Asian and European country, but as far as cooperation norms go, Russia is happy to follow the “Asianway”. These countries are able to develop new norms for multilateral security to makeour region safer.

Discussion with the Audience

Marcin Kaczmarski (University of Warsaw & Slavic-Eurasian Research Center)I have a question for Professor Evans. You said that there is a need to reach out to China
to make it a kind of responsible leader, but my question is to what extent China is reallyinterested. Professor Ha warned us about being too Western-centric. Aren’t we projecting our own expectations, Western expectations, when we speak about China having
potential to be a “responsible” leader?
David Wolff (Slavic-Eurasian Research Center)I was very struck by the introduction of how the economic research institute here in
Kyushu comes directly from the research department of the South Manchurian Railroad, and I thought that resonated very nicely with Professor Ha’s point about how
the persistence of tradition has up-ended our predictions about modernity. I wanted toinvite members on the panel to talk about ways in which they can imagine tradition
being guided into useful or not useful channels, if they can see those kinds of visions in
the future. And I was also very struck by Professor Evans’ idea about the middle powerwith 21st century characteristics, and I’m wondering if Canada’s potential effectiveness comes from being a middle power or from being not fully in the region? I wanted
to invite him to elaborate upon that.

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Naomi Chi (Hokkaido University Public Policy School)
The first question is directed to Dr. Evans. I fully support the Trudeau administration on
trying to engage China, but we need to be cautious. Isn’t it dancing with the devil, so
to speak, in trying to engage with China? The second question goes to all the panelists.
We talked about empathy. We talk about this in conferences and people say that it’s
important. But we never really talk about how we do this. Do you have any ideas as to
how we can go about increasing empathy?
Professor Pempel
I am going to make one very broad observation and hope that it picks up some of thethreads in the questions. There is, I think, a central tension that goes on between what
we tend to think of as operating at the macro level and what happens at the micro level.
It is very interesting to me to recognize that, as an American with a particular focus onwhat is going on between the major powers, we hear a great deal about what goes onat the lower level, for example, in the case of Kyushu and relations with the rest of theregion. But the difficulty that I think needs to be confronted is the question of whether
these micro-level interactions are successfully operating below the radar or whether
they are going to be up-ended or interfered with by national-level political considerations. I am very conscious of the fact that a number of efforts were made to improve ties
with Hokkaido and Manchuria, Russia, North Korea, and they tended to be up-ended
by the failures of national politics to go along with the very creative efforts at the local
level. I would love to see a situation in which local-level efforts can go forward andbuild a kind of bottom-up regional cooperation mechanism, but my fear constantly isthat national politics and national finance, will make it difficult if and when those local
initiatives do not parallel or are not compatible with what the national leaders (whomay be driven by xenophobia, by nationalism, by animosity) decide are relations thatthey do not want to see go forward.
Professor Evans
Let me deal with two of the questions to lay a foundation for what comes ahead in thenext day and a half. I think it is an interesting question about empathy-building measures. What do we do? Well, my guess is that the process that you are involved with in
this project is a valuable contribution in its own right. I wonder how far and how often
people speak outside their national positions. One of the things when I go to a meetingthat I find interesting is how many seconds does it take me to tell what country someone
is from. Not necessarily their accent, but how fast do they identify with their national
positions. And I think all of us have been at many meetings where this is pretty quick. I
found it quite interesting that for part of the discussion earlier today I could not recognize where Professor Ha comes from. I mean by that, his position. If I heard Professor
Pempel talk, and I put him in a Korean mask, most of what he said could have beenfrom Korea. Cultivating such cosmopolitanism is something we do with our students,and something universities are good at.

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As for empathy-building I sit on the group called the ASEAN Regional Forum
Experts and Eminent Persons Group. One of the things we have been talking throughis the logic of preventive diplomacy. What are the measures that are appropriate? Moving from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy to conflict resolution. We havebeen talking about what actual empathy-building measures can be created, and it is
nice when people study in other countries and that sometimes works. But we have avery concrete idea we are working on now, it is mainly with militaries, and with map
exercises and simulations, where we do a simulation of a particular kind of crisis, but
we make sure that the players do not play their own national role. So you put a Chinese
as the head secretary-general of the United Nations, dealing with a humanitarian crisis
that demands huge intervention into that outside position. Japanese are not quite asstrong at playing other roles. In any case, those are little kinds of examples, and in thesweep of things, we know they are not determinant, but they can be the kind of things
that open up possibilities.
Now let me get to this middle power-ism with 21st century characteristics. Because the twist — a middle power is not just in the middle. This is middle power-ism
3.0. And its principal feature that distinguishes it from the other is — you are interested
in a rule-based order, but you are willing to have some flexibility on who makes therules. The idea of a principled security order, is a really great idea, if the principles are
made by more countries than the United States. This is the era where that kind of input
is needed, and it takes enormous judgment to dance with the devil. Now, those of you ininternational relations: you tell me who the devil is? I am quite happy to say that mostsuper-powers are devils. And that we like some devils more than we like other ones, but
do not think there are angels out there. And I will conclude with this observation: China
is a devil. It is doing things domestically that are working to make it a more repressive
government, a more authoritarian government. It is doing things internationally thatsometimes make us very nervous. But — and its global role on climate change, already,now on peacekeeping and peace support operations — what it is doing looks very much
like a responsible international actor, not because it is embracing Western norms, but
because it is dealing with practical problems that need creative solutions that just sometimes look like Western norms.

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