Introduction to EBR Special Section on
Russo-Chinese Relations and Northeast Asia
David Wolff On December 2, 2019, Russia and China had a public video summit to celebrate the putting
into service of Gazprom’s new pipeline “The Power of Siberia,” funneling gas from deep in Siberia to
China’s energy-hungry economy and consumers. Since gas is perfect for heating, a big beneficiary willbe the Chinese Northeast where winter 2019–2020 is just setting in. The operation of this 3,000kilometer line for the next decades is at the core of the deal made in Shanghai in 2014 between
Presidents Xi and Putin, and is the largest business deal of all time valued at roughly $400 billion. It isalso the backbone of strategic cooperation, long-term policy thinking to keep Russia and China friends
for decades to come.
Across 5,000 kilometers of Eurasia, 3,000 of which now had a new metallic thread connecting
Russia and China, Xi waved playfully to Putin. Putin quickly stood up, buttoned his jacket for thecameras and waved back. The image of their friendly, wordless exchange flashed across the globe,
causing concerns among pundits and policymakers in Washington, but quite different and various
feelings among fellow-members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICs, AsianInfrastructure Investment Bank, G20 or One Belt, One Road. For some of these important internationalorganizations, Sino-Russian friendship is a lynchpin.
And relations have certainly improved during the five years that the authors published below
have been studying Russo-Chinese ties. Putin and Xi seem to be meeting quarterly to hold wide-ranging
conversations. In these highly centralized top-down governments, all the main indicators would havebeen decided at the highest level. These include: coordinated moves at the UN regarding Syria andUkraine; new party to party ties between the CCP and United Russia; new sales of advanced Russian
weapons systems and components; large Chinese investment in the Yamal LNG plant, Russia’s premierindustrial enterprise on the Northeast Sea Route (where China also hopes to become a player); and thesteady realization of the “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline, estimated to have cost over $50 billion toconstruct.
These wide-ranging large-scale measures of rapprochement in several fields of politics andeconomics have been steadily accumulating, but do not add up to an alliance. In a tight chronologicalanalysis, Tokyo University Professor Emeritus Akira Ishii clarifies the steps from “partnership” to“strategic partnership” to the present “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination.” Although
exactly how each level of closer partnership differs is unclear, both sides have been at pains to statethat this is not an alliance and there is no “target” of deepening Russo-Chinese consultation andcooperation in diplomatic, political, economic, financial, military and technological matters.
David Wolff is a professor at the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, Hokkaido University. He thanks theSchlaikjer-Mclntyre Foundation for their support.

DOI: 10.14943/ebr.10.1.71

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Eurasia Border Review < Special Section >The Regional Dimension: Past and Present
But surprisingly, almost shockingly, this massive expansion in relations has not had much
impact in the Russian Far East or its neighbor, the Chinese Northeast. Why have cross-border ties notbenefitted from the overall warming in the Sino-Russian relationship? Here, insights from Toyama
University Professor Norio Horie’s paper can help us. Even though application of Chinese capital andlabor could make many of the Russian Far East’s empty acres bloom, there is resistance not only to thevisible presence of Chinese workers, but also to the invisible purchase of Russian lands. This tension
between economic calls for additional Chinese investments and “yellow peril” fears of Chinesepresence have kept things at a standstill in the border regions. The knowledge that Chinese investors
would be planting soybeans, never a traditional harvest crop for Russian peasants, also makes Russianarable land somehow less Russian. Various bridges across the Amur, both rail and road, have taken
decades to complete despite the fact that China has built more bridges in recent decades than any othercountry in the world. The Russians agreed to build only a tenth of the bridge from Heilongjiang
province into the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, but that tenth was the last completed.1
An analysis by Ivan Zuenko, from the Russian Far East, labeled the 2009–2018 Regional
Cooperation Program a failure, but pointed out that in 2018 at the Eastern Economic Forum a newagreement had been signed at the ministerial level where more practical results can be expected, startingwith the soon-to-be-inaugurated bridges.2 But why have the top leaders stepped away from crossborder agreement, allowing relatively low-ranking ministers to sign and take responsibility?
History reveals the answer to this conundrum. Although contact between Russians andChinese did drive the early stages of development in this area, many tensions also resulted. In order toavoid further conflicts of this nature, the Russians and Chinese are reducing contact and limitinginvestment, while touting the Great Friendship. In Russia, self-restraint in cross-border activity
produces complaints both about the limits of Chinese investment in the Russian Far East and about theRussian government’s failure to fully fund its own regional initiatives. The other side of the border, theChinese Northeast, is less vocal about being left to stagnate, but the rust is palpable. Chinese enterprises
and capital are not allowed to undertake any large-scale cross-border ventures without approval fromthe Center and this is not forthcoming.
What is most interesting about the sensitivities of the Russo-Chinese case is that both sides
have suffered from post-colonialism. Chinese remember the depredations of the Tsarist regime, even if
they are not allowed to talk about it. (The term waiman (Outer Manchuria), i.e., the Russian Primor’eand Priamur, is carefully scrubbed from the internet.) Almost no one remembers that Mao Zedong once
opined that the Russians had taken too much land and that the Chinese had not yet presented the bill
1 “Nizhneleninskoye -Tongjiang Rail Bridge” on CSIS website. Consulted on December 10, 2019. Here the bridge

is described as “completed.” Accessed December 20, 2019: https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/database/projects/
nizhneleninskoye-tongjiang-rail-bridge-construction/30914463-4a42-416b-82ac- 5283c46e2e12/
2 Ivan Zuenko, “A Milestone, Not a Turning Point: How China Will Develop the Russian Far East” Carnegie
Moscow Website. Accessed November 8, 2018: https://carnegie.ru/commentary/77671

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David Wolff

for this. Likewise, very few Russians remember that the Chinese forced out long-time Harbiners in the1950s, once Stalin was dead, discontinuing their pensions. Chinese labor reminds Russians of being
exploiters, but the sale of timber, oil and gas to China makes the Russians feel that they are also being
exploited for their natural resources. These feelings may seem contradictory, but historical insecurities,
virulent nationalisms, and boisterous opportunisms follow no rationale but their own.
Blagoveshchensk State Pedagogical Institute Professor Olga Zalesskaia’s historical study ofthe years 1917–1922 makes clear exactly how chaotic relations between the Chinese Northeast and theRussian Far East can be during a period of power vacuum. Multiple cabinets, governments and militaryleaders presented themselves as candidates for power in Russia, who needed breathing space in China
while they mobilized. China, itself far from unitary, seduced by the Bolsheviks early offer of theChinese Eastern Railway, the infamous and soon-withdrawn “Karakhan Declaration,” played thecurrents artfully until White Power faded away. But China’s help in establishing the Bolshevik regime
would only be repaid with another difficult decade of Soviet claims on the Chinese Northeast, theChinese Eastern Railway, in particular.
Now both the Russian and Chinese leaders appear to have read these lessons of history
correctly and reached agreement on containing these borderland risks, even if that means curtailingborderland opportunities. Xi Jinping’s first official foreign trip as President of China was to Moscow
where he gave a speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, where many future
diplomats are trained. In this March 2013 speech, he insightfully addressed the mentalities issue, callingon the young generation to overcome the past:To keep up with the times, we cannot have ourselves physically living in the twenty-firstcentury, but with a mindset belonging to the past, stalled in the old days of colonialism, andconstrained by zero-sum Cold War mentality.
Since Russo-Chinese colonialism happened mostly in Manchuria and the worst moments ofSino-Soviet friction also took place in the Far East, on the border with Manchuria, Xi’s dictum consigns
the Russo-Chinese borderland to benign neglect. Heilongjiang province’s economy, for example, has
fallen behind as other provinces advance. In 2000, it was the tenth province ranked by GDP per capita,dropping to sixteenth in 2010 and twenty-seventh in 2018 out of a total of 31 provinces and Special
Administrative Regions.3 Although everyone is supposed to stay cheerful in the interest of bilateralrelations, both sides of the Sino-Russian border are far from satisfied with their lack of progress. If theborderland is being ignored, capital politics is certainly drawing more attention.

3 These rankings come from National Bureau of Statistics of China data tabulated on the following website.

Accessed December 20, 2019: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Chinese_administrative_divisions_by_GDP_per_capita

73Eurasia Border Review < Special Section >Parallel Tracks: Territory, Nationalism, Leading Cadres
At every Belt and Road summit in Beijing, Putin is always at Xi Jinping’s right hand at centerstage. The Chinese press emphasizes Putin’s hidden charms, illustrating his fine qualities as a humanbeing, the very emblem of his nation. China Daily celebrated Putin’s 67th birthday with an image ofPutin looking thoughtfully at a Siberian mushroom he had just picked under the title “Putin swaps desk
for wilderness pursuits.”4 On May 14, 2017, while “waiting” at the Belt and Road summit, Putin“wandered” into a room at the Xi Jinping residence, where he found a baby grand piano, that
unfortunately nobody nearby knew how to tune. He promptly sat down and knocked off two wellknown Soviet-era tunes. A Russian camera man conveniently filmed Putin’s performance and it aired
all over Russia and China and the worldwide web.5
With a whole new scale of strategic contact taking place by orders of the Centers in both
Moscow and Beijing, together with talk of a Xi-Putin “bromance,” there is some grounds to bring up
the issue of cross-learning. Approaching twenty years in the saddle, Putin looks more and more like
President for Life. It is just not safe to step down. His end of year 2019 press conference hinted broadly
at constitutional reforms to come, as well as aid to China to develop a ballistic missile early warning
system.6 Xi, coming to power a decade later, has already removed his own term limits. Both Presidents
made use of anti-corruption campaigns to eliminate any possible resistance or alternative leadership.
Other parallels are more tenuous, logical enough, but without any solid evidence of cooperation. For
example, both Russia and China have powerful cyber-security capabilities, but have employed themdifferently. China became known for technology theft from international company websites anddatabases, as well as pioneering big-data AI applications to increase surveillance and control of thepopulation, particularly in restive areas, such as Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Russia, on the other hand,according to a finding of the U.S. intelligence community, attempted to influence the U.S. elections byhacking and distributing stolen emails, as well as by manipulating social media. But all of these are
cutting-edge operations, employing cutting-edge hacking technology driven by sophisticatedunderstandings of foreign societies. It is possible that these technologies and techniques have simplyevolved in parallel, but also very possible that technology and know-how have been exchanged.
Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Institute has noted in Foreign Affairs that China and Russia
regularly support each other in international meetings where “norms in cyberspace and control over theInternet” are under discussion. Regular mutual support in international regulatory bodies could well betaken as proof that some degree of intergovernmental expert coordination on cyberspace issues is takingplace. Gabuev adds that:

4 Ren Qi “Putin swaps desk for wilderness pursuits: Russians treated to images of leader on 67th birthday enjoying

the outdoors,” China Daily Global Weekly, October 18–24, 2019, 10.
5 Putin piano playing on many websites including the following. Accessed December 20, 2019: https://www.

youtube.com/watch?v=I5Af_Ka0auw
6 Cited from the website. Accessed December 20, 2019: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/12/ 19/putins-

end-of-year-press-conference-in-quotes-a68686

74David Wolff

Enhanced trust between Russian and Chinese militaries may lead to growing cooperation andcoordination in cyberspace, particularly when it comes to probing vulnerabilities in U.S.
military and civilian communication systems. 7
This is stated clearly in the future tense, but just as clearly calibrated to invoke U.S. security
analysts’ darkest present concerns. The implication is clear: there is still room to develop the partnershipthat became first “strategic,” then “mature” and now “coordinated.” But, of course, having a common
enemy would make this more like an alliance, in the way that Japan was the object of the Sino-Soviet
alliances of 1945 and 1950.
The final article in this section connects our focus on Russo-Chinese relations to the larger
regional setting, where our Sino-Russian research team worked in parallel with the Japanese National
Institute for the Humanities’ Northeast Asia project. 8 In a masterly exposition, Professor Akihiro
Iwashita of Hokkaido University takes us behind the scenes of failed border negotiations between
Russia and Japan, the so-called Northern Territories issue. Territorial/border controversies havebedeviled Abe’s relations with Korea and China as well. Abe’s willingness to compromise with Russia
and full embrace of Putin have made him less convincing as a “hardliner” towards Korean and Chinese
territorial demands. These issues are potent triggers for nationalist, xenophobic and even violent
behaviors with strong public resonance in Korea and China, where war memories are fading but stillinfluential. The last eyewitness will soon die, but those who have heard about Japanese cruelty during
World War II from their parents and grandparents will still be with us for decades to come.
Beyond the flashpoints of territory and history, Iwashita makes clear that Japanese attempts tomake Russia worried about the “Chinese threat” are unlikely to bear fruit. The Russians already know
all too well what it is like to have an assertive Chinese neighbor and prefer cooperation, especiallywhen it includes nearly $100 billion a year in profitable trade. Japan is simply not in a position tocounterbalance either the economic or political clout of a resurgent China. Of course, Japan’s attempt
to play the nationalist card by speaking of a “Chinese threat” is not without local appeal, as Professor
Horie’s study of regional-level reactions to Chinese “land grabbing” has shown. But it is unlikely toconvince Moscow, where cooler heads prevail.
At least for now, Russia is more likely to make common cause with the Chinese and Koreansto make parallel territorial claims on Japan and to denounce Japanese historical insensitivities andinaccuracies. Furthermore, at least since 2014, all oil and gas construction in Eastern Siberia has been
made with only one customer in mind. The “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline ends at the Chinese border,
thousands of kilometers from any alternative customers. In this sense, the “Power of Siberia” is just as
clearly a demonstration of the power of China.
If the results of our research suggest a certain Japanese impotence in the face of the present
Sino-Russian alignment, it is important to put this into historical perspective. Japan was explicitly
7 Alexander Gabuev, “Why Russia and China are Strengthening Security Ties: Is the U.S. Driving Them Closer

Together?” Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2018.
8 Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Scientific Research Fund 15H03319 “Sino-Russian Relations:

From Rapprochement to Alliance?” (Principal Investigator: David Wolff)

75Eurasia Border Review < Special Section >targeted in the alliances of 1945 and 1950. The fact that Japan is not the main focus of the strategic
partnership could be seen as some kind of improvement in the chances for ongoing peace in the region.
Professor Ishii finishes his article with a 2014 quote from an eminent Chinese scholar concerned about
the unintended consequences of alliance systems in setting off the first and second world wars. These
historical memories of alliance “entrapment” make the Chinese especially wary. Alternative scenarios
offer potentially better outcomes. When Putin, Xi and Abe all stood on the stage together at the Eastern
Economic Forum in Vladivostok in October 2018, that too was an image from a more conciliatory
Northeast Asian future that remains to be made.

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