Dutch school and continued his higher education in Holland andVienna.
Kartini's correspondence lays bare an unreserved eagerness formodernity as a narrative of progress. As such, ic assumes the presenceof human design and a notion of freedom, often in its most furious
expression. le also involves a humani se subject, often in an articulationso salient chat ic frees itself from the world in which ic creates things .
'There is a resclessnessin our native civilization , che spirit of progress
is moving among us,' she says in a letter of August 19, 1901. 'le isstrongly combated by the inherent love which the Javanese has for theancient "laws." There will be a hard fight before these hoary ideas andcustom s shall be deeply buried in the ground, never again to rise.'
Bue another hard figh c cook place, in an arena quite different.
Here, che opponent was not chose 'hoary ideas and customs '; it was,instead , the repressive modus operandi of the Dutch colonialadministration , shaped by the very impetus of modernity chatbrought into che world, among ochers, the bureaucratization ofdifferences. Thus, the dream of emancipation as che fruit of 'progress'
brought by the idea of 'Europe ' turned our co be chat of Tantalus.' In
Greek mythology, Tantalus was condemned by the gods co hangforever from a tree in Tartarus, the lowest region of che underworld.
Under che tree was a pool of water, bur when Tantalus scooped codrink , the pool dried. The branche s above him were laden with fruit ,but when he reached up, the wind blew the branches away. In thestory ofKartini , her frustration stemmed from che way che Durchcolonial administration sec down its policy of culcivacing, in Ann
Scoler's words , 'bourgeois bodies and racial selves,' by reducing checolonial society into entities wrapped up and segregated by categories
2

Ann Laura Sto ler, Raceand the

Educationof Desire(DukeU niversity Press, Durh am andLondon: 1995), pp . 95- 136.

decided by the authority . 2
In one of her letters, Kartini described che way the creation of
categories cook place in Java. 'In many subcle ways they make us feel
their dislike,' she wrote about the Durch. 'I am a European , you are aJavanese,' they seem to say, or 'I am the master , you che governed .'For che native, the learned wisdom was chat 'one cannot serve a
Europ ean official better than by creeping in the dust before him, andby never speaking a single word of Durch in his presence.'
In this context, it came as no surprise chat by che end of 1902,
Kartini began co see things differencly. She no longer spoke of Europe
as 'che centre of civilization, and of enlightenment ,' as she did in a

SessionI

26S

letter co a German couple in mid-1901 . She had already cancelled herplan and case off her dream of going co study in Europe. She
conspicuously distanced herself from che 'European world' she
encountered in che colony. 'We do not expect the European world to
make us any happier', she wrote in October 1902. The time has longsince gone by when we seriously believed chat che European is che
only true civilization, supreme and unsurpassed.'[II)
And yet Kartini's pain did not produce an alternative image ofeminence to 'E urope.' To her, 'E urope's ocher' was 'Java.' The word
'Asia' never entered her lexicon. She died before che Russo-Japanese
War of 1905, in which Japanese victory offered Indonesiannationalists a much-needed myth of a non- 'European' awakening. In
1923, Mohammad Hatta (1902-1980), one of the leading figures inche pro-independence movement who in 1945 became Indonesia's
first Vice President, wrote an ebullient piece about it, further
promulgating the myth of Japan as a representative of'Asia' 's newforce. 'The victory of Japan over Russia has stirred che world ,' hewrote, 'Especially in Asia, the heart of humanity has been set into
motion . Russia's defeat generated revolcs (armed uprising) ac ho.me,
and its fire has heated up che political climate in Asia. Since
then ... euphoria has been ferociously on che increase among patriots
in Asia.' 3
Earlier in his essay, addressed co che members of Indonesische
Vereniging,the radical Indonesian student organization based in the
Netherlands, Hatta spoke of the 'dawn of humanity,' followed by 'the3
In Mohammad Hatta, Kumpulan
Karangan (Collected Works), Vol.
I (Penerbit Bulan Bimang, Jakarta:
I 976), p. 29.

rising sun' of which 'che golden splendor shines over a group islands
ruled by a Mikado. ' 4 In his view, Japan was the country in which theinitial desire for freedom was born in che mind of 'Asian peoples' after
so many centuries of'whice men 's' domination.

It is obvious that Hana's 'Asia,' as a concept by which hemeasures the pain inflicted by 'white men 's' colonialism, is builc on
the idea of change. His description of Japan betrays a normative
paradigm defined by modernity.

His 'Asia' is performative; it isjustified not by what it is (or what it expresses), but by what ic
achieves. As such, it tacicly recognizes itself as part of theuniversalizing elan of che Enlightenment. And yet, setting itself

266

SessionI

4
Ibid ., p. 26.

against the 'E uropean,' it is trapped in the logic of identity, its idea ofself marked out by two different, sometimes even contradictory,
features: race and revolt. Hence Hana 's 'Asia': a triumphant Japanagainst an imperial Russia, a restless India during Gandhi 's nonviolent revolution, a proud Turkey after Mustafa Kemal's victory overthe Greeks. Yet, while maintaining that it is to such an anti-European'Asia' Indonesia naturally belongs, he too speaks of ' che dawn ' (fajar)
and 'the seed' (benih) of'humanity ' (kemanusiaan). These metaphorssuggest chat humanity begins with the insistence on particularity
before it ends up in a new form of universality. Correspondingly,'Asia' as defined by race and revolt would ultimately disappear.
There is a large dose of the Marxist view of history to be found in
Hatta' s chinking; at any rate, it fails to resolve the problem arisingfrom his, (to use Gayacri Spivak's words), 'strategic essentialism.' Can
Quoted in D avid Reeve, Golkar of

one really move from 'race,' through 'revolt,' to the end of history? By

Indonesia,an alternative to theparty system (Oxfo rd University
Press, Singapore: 1985), p. 7. For

and large, the bias ofindonesian political chinking, hatched andthis paper, I am indebted tO hisfor 'revolt' rather than 'race.' In any case, not long after Hatta wrote

research on the Asia-based

the essay, another kind of 'Asia' -Indon esian political thinking.

6
See H.A.0 . de Toll enaere, 'The
Theosophical Society and Labourand National Movements inIndon esia, 1913- 1918,' paper for
the first European Soc ial Sciences
Hi story Co nference,
Noo rdwijkerhout, The
Netherlands: 9-11 May 1996. De
T ollenaere exami nes the
Theosophical Society (TS)' s
support in Indon esia in the first
decade of the 20th century:'Among Dutch in the East Indies
colony, the TS had the highest
proportion of members anywherein the world. It also had quite
some support among the Javanesenobi lity (priyayi). Th eosophicalsupporters put the names of theirleaders literally o n the map ofcities in Java: in Batavia Uakarta),
there was Blavatsky Park; in
Bandung, Olcott Park; inSemarang, Annie Besant Square.'
Additionally, five of the thirtynin e memb ers of the Dutchcreated 'parliament' for the colon ywere Th eosophists.

tempered during the struggle against the Dutch colonialist order, is
one more expressive in nature -entered the Indonesian nationalist dream .
In 1927, Rabindranath Tagore, the revered Indian poet, toured
Java and Bali. His idea on education as applied in his Shanti Nikecan
University has been influential among Indonesian nationalises sincethe 1910s. After his visit, Tagore wrote in his magazine chat 'theJavanese' particularly responded to his idea 'about the need of Asia
becoming conscious of her own cultural inheritance.' 5 Around chistime , an idea of'Asia' that gained ground among Indonesia's newpolitical elites was one forged by the Theosophical Society. In India
and Ceylon, the Society was not only involved in Hindu andBuddhist revivals but also in pro-independence politics. In Indonesia,
the picture was quite different. While the Society had a verysignificant presence in Indonesia -its membership was substantial

among the Dutch population in the colony, and it enjoyed staunch
support from both local aristocracy and native public intellectuals 6-

it had a visibly conservative leaning on the issue of Indonesian

independence. Its leader, Van Hinloopen Labberton, believed that'Java and the Netherlands should be one' and that ' ... chat True
Freedom may only manifest itself as the tie of law exists and people
act according to its limits.' He also stressed chat 'for the country, only

SessionI267

Government authority has the right to wield the club ofpunishment.' 7

7

Unsurprisingly, the Society's direct influence began to wane

Ibid.

towards 1930s, following the upsurge of radical politics forIndonesia's independence. However, the Society's concept of a'universal brotherhood of humanity' -one that transcends race,

gender, religion, and caste distinction -remained attractive to many

Indonesians, and understandably so; after all, they desperately wanted
to escape from the colonialist order with its authorized versions ofotherness. Besides, the Society's bias towards 'affirmative
Orientalism,' propagated among others by Anne Besant, the mostprominent figure of 20th century of the Theosophical Society,practically washed off the image of an inferior 'native land' andrestored their greatly damaged self-esteem. This kind of Orientalism
perpetuated the myth of the native as the mirror-opposite of 'Europe'
or 'the West,' but with 'a view that proclaimed the spiritualsuperiority of Indian civilization.' 8 Members of the Society proudly
put the 'D.I' initials behind their names, signifying their commitment
as 'the Servants ofindia.'In the early 20th century, 'India' was, of course, as ambiguous aword as any. Even Kartini used words like 'our Indian life' to describe
her immediate background. It is possible that later-day Indonesiannationalists who stayed on as members of the Society deliberately
maintained this ambiguity; 'India' could be 'Dutch East India,' while
simultaneously intimating the idea of the 'Orient' or 'Asia.'
This idea of'Asia' is, however, different from the one conceived
by political leaders such as Mohammad Hatta. It has a different
normative paradigm. It is not built on the idea of change. One does
not get the impression that it has a temporary role of being aparticular; it is not something that will ultimately dissolve into ahumanity unconfined by either a racial or a geographic perspective ofcivilization. More expressive than performative, it tends to accord
privilege to identity, or 'being,' over 'becoming.' The pain ofcolonialism was such that the imagined community called 'Asia' sometimes hypostasized in the notions of'Japan' or 'India' -hadincreasingly become part of a self-shrouding ideology, an ideologythat refused to admit that it was quintessentially a political agenda,
riddled with incoherence and contradictions. The main thrust of thisagenda was to split the Janus faces of modernity, adopting its

268

Session I

On 'affirmative Oriencalism ' see

Richard G. Fox, Gandhi Utopia:
Experimentswith Culture (Beacon
Press, Boston: 1989) , pp. 111,
113, 118, I 19 and 128.

emancipatory elan and rejecting its drive for conquest. To themainstream of modern Indonesian intellectual discourse, thisappeared co be the best way co respond to the conquering 'West .'The great illusion of the 1940s was the belief that Japan, an'Asian' nation -state equipped with impressive paraphernalia ofmod ernity , would do the job. On January 10, 1942, the Japanesemilitary invaded Indone sia (the archipelago was then known as Dutch
East India). On March 9, the widely-despised Dutch colonialadmini stration surrend ered; many Indonesian s, including leaders of
the nationali st movement , cook no tim e in welcoming the victor.
The y believed that the Japane se were their liberators , whose mission
was to create a greater, more prosp erous, new Asia. The y acquiesced
co calling them their saudara tua ('elder brother s'), or, even, in morelaudatory terms, 'the light of Asia.'[III]'Search for Asia in your heart!' -said Usmar Ismail (1921-

1972), Indonesiar poet and playwright, in one of his poems written
during the Japanese occupation oflndonesia (1942-1945).
Like many other writers, painters, musicians and stage director s,
Usmar Ismail had his works published and recognized under the aegis
of Keimin Bunka Sidosho, an office created by the Jap anese military
government to give 'guidance ' to cultural activities and co 'enlighten '9
Fo r mo re detailed doc um entatio nof chis period, and the role of thethe minds of Indonesian people . 9 The Keimin, generally known as a'cultural center,' was actually part of Sendenbu , an 'information'

Japanese propaganda m ach ine, seeagency founded to propagate Japanese policy in the 'Great East Asian

H .B. Jassin, KesusastraanIndonesia
Dimasa]epang (Indonesian

W ar.' This does not mean, however, that works of that period are

Literature Un der rhe Japanese

Occupatio n), (P.N . Balai Pustaka,
Dj akarta: 1969, 2nd printin g) andMasaom i T anaka, Sikap Barisan

PropagandaMiliterjepang
TerhadapSastradan Budaya
Indonesia/942 -1945 (Th enecessarily the product of false enthusia sm. Most of them are in fact
eulogies co patriotism ; while they are, superficially at least, generally
in line with the Japane se war propaganda, they often betray different
levels of meaning. The 'nation ' (bangsa) and 'homeland ' (tanahair)
they exalt, the 'struggle' or 'battle ' they exhort, are all obviously

position of Japanese Milirary's
Propaganda Team vis-3.-vis

related co the dream oflndonesian independence. As in Usmar

Indo nes ian Lite rary and Artistic

Ismail's poem, 'Asia' is neither a geographical entity nor an amalgam

Expressions, 1942- 1945), a postgradu ate thesis in the hum anit ies,of political power ; it seems more like a mystical Being, a luminou s

the D ept. of Literature of theWhole , an enshrined Promise , to which Indonesia belongs eternally.

Un iversity o f Indo nesia, Jakarta:

2000.

Like 'the East,' 'Asia' is also a signifier of a rediscovered self. In
1943, Sanusi Pane (1905-1968), one of the leading poets of 1930s

Session I

269

and a member of the Theosophical Society known for his repugnanceof che 'nihilism' of the 'West' and his passion for 'India,' applaudedche 'Dai Nippon soldiers' for their success in overthrowing 'che Allied
imperialists .' Following the Japanese victory, he wrote, 'ourIndonesian-ness and our Eascern-ness have co shine again in oursociety and through our artistic expressions .. . Only by doing so can
we cake pare in chis Holy War whose ultimate victory is co overthrow
the Allied imperialism for good.' 10
This mindset , translated into an animated celebration of

10
Quot ed by M asaomi Ta naka,

p. 100.

'Eascern-ness,' was especially evident in articles written by Indonesian
leading intellectuals in Asia Raja (Great Asia), a major Jakarta daily
created by che Sendenbu on April 29, 1942, a date known as tencho
setsu or che birthday of the Emperor. On ics pages, 'Asia' is mostly

represented by things 'Indian ' as well as 'Japanese.' Tagore 's work
appeared in installments . A link between 'India,' 'Japan ' and 'Java'was forged, using essays like che one written by Ki Hadjar Dewantara(1889-1959), the pioneer oflndonesian national education and an
admirer of Tagore, who argued that the Japanese education system
was essentially che same as Indonesian practices since the 'HinduJavanese era.' The main thrust of numerous articles was toimmortalize the dichotomy between che spirirual 'Ease' and the'nihilism ' and 'egoism ' of the West. As a matter of course, Asia Raja
praised Indonesian intellectuals who had stood against the 'Western
way of chinking.' 'The time has come,' the editorial insists, 'co
fertilize our spiritual strength in Indonesia, using Eastern culture as
the basis, while taking what is good from Western science.' 11
Such a consciously selected method of synthesis assumes thepresence of an immutable centre to decide 'what is good' in the
dynamics of social change. Likewise, it scareswith imagining of'nation ,' 'society,' or 'community' as a self-consistent corpus . It was
only natural chat the Japanese military government, in its systematicefforts co uproot cultural traces of the 'West ' while consolidating its
power in Java, found a ready and eager support among people who
opposed the 'Western way of chinking.' Among the members of anadvisory body set up by the Japanese administration to plan the future
structure of government were such figures as Ki Hadjar Dewantara,
Sukarno (1901-1970), who became the first president of the country,
and Supomo (1903-1958) , a nationalist law professor who wasinstrumental in the drafting oflndonesia's long-lasting constitution

270

SessionI11
For further detads see Da vid

Reeve, pp . 59-60.

in 1945. Both Dewantara and Sukarno spoke for the idea of'guided
democracy,' or 'democracy guided with wisdom.' On one occasion
during the first constitutional debates over the issue of the rights ofcitizens, Sukarno vehemently appealed to the meeting not to put
human rights in the constitutional design. In support of Sukarno's
ideas, Supomo, the lawyer, rejected the individualist, liberal view aswell as the dictatorship of the proletariat, and proposed instead 'theidea of totality ,' and the notion of 'an integralistic nation,' meaning 'a
12

Ibid., pp. 63-67.

nation which unites with the entire of its people. ' 12
The notion of'integralistic nation ' was to remain unchallenged
up to the end of the 20th century. It was forcefully upheld by
Suharto's 'New Order' until its demise in 1998 -an end that paved

the way for a number of fundamental changes in the Indonesianconstitution. Suharto (1921-) , however, was by no means a lone voiceon this issue. Like Malaysia's Mahathir (1925-) and Singapore's Lee
Kuan Yew (1923-) , he spoke, albeit more sparingly, for the legitimacy
of 'Asian values.'[IV]

The burning question , is, of course, whose belief? Whose values?
Whose 'Asia'? Needless to say, both 'E urope' in Kartini's imagining
and 'Asia' in the mainstream of Indonesian political discourse arearbitrary modes of representation . One can argue that, in Foucauldian
fashion, they correspond neither to an external object, a reality, asubjectivity, nor an agenda, but rather to the discursive regularity
reproduced in the very representation of 'Asia,' (or 'Europe' for thatmatter), in the above-mentioned texts.
Yet one can always point out that there are real people behind ,inside, and beyond the discourse -people who can speak out but

also whom nobody listens to. It is interesting to note , for example,
that the idea of 'Asia' discussed above has almost no reference toIslam. One can easily discern the absence of powerful intellectual andinstitutional voices representing Islamic voice in the whole debate.
Most of the advocates of the 'Asia' seem to have been speaking of a
specific world-view -a cultural expression shaped by an imagined

continuity with the Indonesian Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms before
the advent oflslam in the 14th century . This world-view , mainly
shared by members of Javanese aristocracy and European-educatedSessionI271

elites marginalized by the colonial society, was manifestly on the
defensive. It had to deal not only with intruding technologies andideas from the 'West,' but also with the aggressive promotion of
Marxism and reformist Islam that spread like fire among the lower
classes since the beginning of the 1920s. 13

In other words, the idea of 'Asia,' as a survival kit, begins and

13
Ibid. , p. 8.

ends by reproducing an exclusionary, if not coercive, subject notunlike that of'European' modernity.
On that very basis, the 'moral double book-keeping' as describedby Geertz in his essays on societies in transition like Indonesia anda general desire to appropriate, in the words of Asia
Rajas editorial writer, 'what is good from Western science,' while

Clifford Geertz , lsktm Observed

flaunting the very symbols modernity comes to invalidate -Chicago: 1968), p.l 17.

Morocco 14 -is not asincongruous as it may seem. In Kalah dan Menang (Victory andDefeat), a novel by S. Takdir Alisjahbana (1905-1994), the foremost
advocate for modernity in the 1930s literary movement, one of theleading characters is a Japanese officer stationed in Java in the 1940s
by the name of Major Katsuhiko Okura. Okura represents themodern man who is simultaneously a master of the technology of war
and repression and an eloquent advocate of the Japanese identity. To
Elizabeth, his Swiss mistress, he insists that 'it is impossible to thinkof mankind as one.' Every nation is unique, he says. To be sure, theJapanese utilize science, technology and economy from the 'West,'
while remaining heedful of ideas like 'individualism, rationalism, andliberalism' that may 'destroy the cohesive nature of their society.'
Bur ultimately, his story is a case of identity steeling itself,
unsuccessfully, against the ecstatic, inexhaustible motions ofdifference. What Okura and others like him fails to foresee is thedefeat of the Japanese forces and the disgrace of the Japanese ideals.
Thereupon, the freewheeling energies of modernity he fears most,often in its ugly and violent expressions, inevitably change hismonolithic, monochromatic world forever. In this sense, Kalah dan
Menang, in all its lumbering narrative, stands as an allegory ofIndonesian intellectual history, in which the emancipatory promise of'Asia' ends up becoming its own nemesis.

271

SessionI

14(University of Chi cago Press,

Discussion

Moderator[T. Mizusawa]: We have now finished the threepresentations which followed Professor Sakai's keynote speech.
In the first presentation, Professor Koziumi spoke about
Okakur a's self-representation and what sort of person he actuallywas. I do not think we have previously looked at Okakura in thisway. Professor Koizumi has spoken in a very interesting way
about how Okakura's philosophy was expressed through his useof fashion . Professor Koizumi, I wonder if you would like ro add
to your presentation , or if you have any questions related to otherpresentations?
S. Koizumi: There is a book called Color-ban Nihon Bijutsushi

Qapanese Art History in Color) published by Bijutsu Shuppansha that costs 1,900 yen -I know the price because I use it astextbook. The preface is written by Tsuji Nobuo, and he begins
his paragraph with a quote from Okakura's Ideals of the East . He
describes Japanese art as "the beach where each successive wave ofEastern thought has left its sand-ripple as it beat against thenational consciousness." I always try to explain to my students
why Okakura made such a statement , and what he was thinking
as he wrote these words. Okakura once drew a diagram , which
obviously made references to European art history. In thisdiagram , he placed China in the middle , India on one side, andJapan on the other.
Professor Sakai mentioned that Asia is not a fixed entity, but
a concept forcibly created by Europe, and therefore, is one of apair of concepts . Okakura also understood that Asia relies onsome sort of "countering " -I would call it a "counter relief" -to define itself. The tide of his last lecture at Tokyo University
was " Taito Kogeishi (The History of Aesthetic Works in the

SessionI

17J

East)," instead of"Japanese Art History." He did not use theword "arr" and focused on the history of aesthetic works andcraftsmanship, that is, skill and technique . The definition of"aesthetic works (kogei)" is nor clear, but he uses this expression
anyway. Okakura dismantled the history of Japanese arr andreassembled its parrs in an Asian context, by positioning Japanese
arr in the discourse of"aesrheric works in the East."
I suspect Okakura had developed a concept of Asia, which isdifferent from our concept of Asia consisting of Japan, Indonesia,
China, and other countries. I have not been able to resolve thisissue yet, bur Okakura 's choice of his lecture ride, "The Historyof Aesthetic Works in the East," instead of"Japanese Art History"
gives us a hint of the kind of idea he had of Asia. I wanted to add
this comment to my presentation.

Moderator[T.Mizusawal:Professor Wang Hui, could I ask you tocomment?
H. Wang:I would like to go back to the question I mentioned at

the beginning of my presentation, and to which I did not give ananswer in my presentation: why China has not had a real
discussion on the topic of Asia. I have tried to think abour thisquestion, even though I could not find a comprehensible answer.
I can follow up on this question by giving several reasons.
First of all, in the first wave between the late 19th century
and the early 20th century, none of the Chinese revolutionaries
and intellectuals talked about Asia. The word "Asia" wastranslated; it was actually translated from Japanese . With the riseof nationalism, the nationalists tried to translate this Japanese idea
into a Chinese idea, and closely align it with the nationalist
movement. However, they acted too late. There was a war between
the Qing dynasty in China and Japan during 1894-1895 . Then,
there was the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, in which the Allied
powers betrayed and sacrificed China in the interest of Japan. The
Japanese invasion into China followed in the early 1930s. By then ,the ground for a narrative on Asian history was based on a narrow
East Asian issue, which was dominated by Japanese Imperialism.

274

SessionIIn chis historical context and process, most Chinese, even che
revolutionaries and nationalises, gave up on chinking about Asia.
So, one of the reasons is chat throughout our historicalexperience, che term "Asia" has made no sense co the Chinese.
Another reason may be rooted in the Chinese intellectuals'
centralism, which some people criticize. I believe the criticism iscorrect. In the early period of the 20th century, when Chinese
intellectuals used che concept of che Ease or Asia, in most cases
they were talking about China. This could be seen in thediscursive dichotomy of Ease/West and China/West. However,the dichotomy itself shows us the illusive nature of Chinesecentrism for the face chat che sense of center was constructedagainst the only reference -the West. Hence, the so-called

Chinese-centrism is another version ofWescern-centrism. In lasetwo decades after the Cultural Revolution, China launched areform, which has also been called "opening." The historicalmeaning of chis "opening" is China opening its doors co theWest, or che advanced capitalise countries, including Japan and,especially, America. Therefore, we did not pursue a concrete
dialogue in the form of China-Japan , China-Indonesia, China-thePhilippines, or China-India relationships.
I mentioned che lase two decades because che discursive
framework has greacly changed from chat of earlier times during
the Chinese revolution which was so closely related co theinternational alliance with Russia and ocher socialise countries or
the third world. After the disagreement between China and the-Soviet Union in the lace 1950s, Mao Zedong created China as acenter of world revolution. Surrounded by the Eastern bloc andthe Western bloc, China re-established its worldview with thefocus on Africa, Asia and Latin America . When I was a child, I
saw many visitors from Vietnam, North Korea, the Philippines,
and African countries and we were familiar with social
movements, wars against American invasions, and even literaturefrom the Third World countries . After the Culcural Revolution,
we gave up chis kind of world view. Then the dichotomy of China
and the West came back again and dominated our imagination
for a long time .

Sessionl

175

Finally, I would like to say, it's time to re-examine ourperspective and re-launch the discussion on Asia.
Moderator [T. Mizusawal: Now Mr. Goenawan Mohamad would
you like to add any comment?
G. Mohamad:Yes. In my paper, I mentioned a novel written by

T akdir Alisjahbana. He was a writer who was the foremost
advocate of modernity in the Indonesian literary movements of
the 1930s. He wrote Kalah dan Menang (Victory and Defeat). It
is about Japanese occupation in Indonesia as seen by several
characters. One of them is a Japanese officer called Major
Katsuhiko Okura. Okura represents the modern man who issimultaneously a master of the technology of war and repression,and an eloquent advocate of Japanese identity. He says to his
Swiss mistress that "it is impossibl e to think of mankind as one."
Every nation is unique, he says. To be sure, the Japanese utilize
science, technology, and economy from the "West," whileremaining wary of ideas like "individualism, rationalism, andliberalism" chat may "destroy the cohesive nature of their society."
This is a typical fascist idea. Bue curiously you can also find thesekinds of ideas in Islamic ideology, for example, the propaganda of
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. I would like co say chat276

SessionImodernity would equal rationalism and, especially, liberalism.
The ocher thing I would like to add to chis is that che Japaneseperson, Major Okura, a fictive character, speaks also of modernity
against modernism. These people believed in modernization,technology, science, and everything. But on the other hand, there
were various free expressions being produced or created bymodern anises like Picasso, Samuel Beckett, and James Joyce.
A similar contradiction can be found, I chink, in the Russian
revolutionaries who wanted to impose socialise realism. There wasa debate berween Gyorgy Lukacs and other socialist thinkers
about expressionism in Europe in the 1930s. And Lukacs, like theStalinist ideologues, of course subscribed to the idea ofmodernization: believing in science, technology, rationality, andall. In exhibitions like "Under Construction," you feel themodernist temper in the air. Precisely because it implies a seanceagainst dark side of modernization -the control and conquest of

space and time, che push of instrumental reason -it inherits chismodernist temper. And as you may recall, modernism is notalways in line with modernity. Modernism in the arcs (Duchamp,
Picasso, Kandinsky, etc.) tends to undo the rationality-driven
performance of modernity.

Moderator(T.Mizusawa]:There is a question from the audience
about Takeuchi Yoshimi. Professor Sakai, you mentioned
Takeuchi in your previous publication. He continued to think
about modernity until his lacer years. Could you pick up on ourprevious discussion and comment on the issue of modernity withreference to Takeuchi?
N. Sakai: Takeuchi Yoshimi is a figure who thought seriously
about the issue of Asia during the decade after Japan's defeat in
the Second World War.
First of all, as suggested by the words of John Lennon, Asia is"a concept by which we measure our pain." We muse understandthat the reason why Asia has to talk about Asia is rooted in theissue of colonialism. It became inevitable for people who were
wounded by colonialism to use the word "Asia." This is one of

SessionI177

the most important points in this discussion.
In chis context, as seen in the case of Okakaura Kakuzo,
discussed in Professor Koziumi's paper, the idea of Asia emerged
from resisting European colonialism, or protesting againstcolonialism.
Bur there is a kind of crick embedded in the apparatus of"Asia." That is, the word Asia is often used in the context of thevictims protesting their pain and experience of humiliation. Yet,it concomitantly becomes an apparatus which enables people toforget that it is multi-faceted and contains perpetrators as well as
victims.
Therefore, the point Professor Wang touched upon is very
interesting. There is a strong proclivity among scholars who
specializes in China, particularly, those who are now in North
America, to construct a discussion that divides the world into
China and the West, or China and North America. This is very
similar to the mentality prevalent between the l 940s and the1970s; the world was divided into Japan and America or Japanand Europe, or Euro-America. Asia was discussed in relative
terms, not taken as a real agenda. The relationship with America,in this context, was extremely comfortab le although Japan was
victimized under the American occupation.
So, when we construct a relationship with Asia, we must
eventually confront the fact that in our multilateral relationship,
it is not always easy to distinguish the victim and the victimizer.
Consequently, chis brings us to the problem ofmodernization and modernity, as pointed out by Mr. Mohamadin his last comment. Although there was modernity in theeconomic modernization of Japan, there was strong resistanceagainst the unpredictability of modernity itself and extremely
alien elements or subversive elements chat would destroy
homogeneity.
This was also true of the Fascist period of the 1930s, but it
seems to me that it was even more so in the forcibly uniform
Japan chat emerged after the loss of the empire. While pursuingeconomic modernization, Japan may have been the nation among
the old empires or colonialist powers chat did not permit

278

SessionIimmigration from its colonies or completely shut chem out. It
carried out its modernization in a thoroughgoing way with nocountering forces. Inevitably, chis is why Japan has not yet beenable to solve the problem of ethnic Koreans in Japan, and ocher
similar problems.
Hence, whenever Japanese claims its membership in the Asia
community, our neighboring countries say, "Hey, wait a minute."
We muse recognize chis hlnd of crick embedded in the concept ofAsia.
Moderator [T. Mizusawa):Thank you. I chink you have spoken

about the issue of modernization and modernity -the spiritualside of modernity and modernization as a consequence ofindustrial society -and how there is a gap between the two. Mr.

Mohamad had pointed to the problems chat emerge from chis gap.
I would suspect chat until very recently in the 20th century,
the Japanese have been living with chis contradiction. However, I
suspect chat the same problem can be found in European
modernity as well, and it extends beyond the problem of Asia towhich we must return.
Lee us keep our focus. How was modernism and modernity
understood by Okakura?
S. Koizumi: Okakura was a very "modern" person, who preferredbeer to Japanese sake. He was one of the first Japanese people toread Sherlock Holmes. He essentially understood chat "us" is an
imaginative projection of"chem," as mentioned in our earlier
discussion .
Mr. Mohamad mentioned chat Asia is placed at one pole andEurope at ocher, and then there is the problem of modernciy. I
chink Okakura had a strategy of creating an Asia chat is distinctly
different from both Europe and modernity.
For example, when he explained the policy ofNihon
Bijucsuin (Japan Art Institute) in English, he described Japanese
art as distinct and different from modern arc and European
realism. Bue he also maintained that he did not believe in reviving
traditional art. He asserted chat Japan is placed in a very

Sessionl279

ambivalent position. I feel that his position is Asian, in a sensethat it does not have a fixed recognizable location.
Okakura gave a lecture at the World Exposition in Sr.Louisin 1904 in which he rook the side of Asia and severely criticized
the uniformity and modernization of Europe, as described by Mr.
Mohamed just now. On the other hand, he tried to rake Asia
inside the West, as demonstrated by his activities in building the
Asian arr collection at the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.
Saro Michinobu suggests that Okakura 's strategy was to rake
advantage of Asia and use it as a tool to infiltrate Europe. There
are others who assert rhar, therefore, Okakura's grand strategy wasto establish nihongaas a new and modern form of Japanese art at
the Nihon Bijutsuin.
Moderator[T. Mizusawa): Our discussion is now becoming

complex. Okakura 's closest apprentice, Hishida Shunso, writes
that the distinction between nihonga Qapanese art) and yoga(Western art) is irrelevant. Yokoyama Taikan, another apprentice,also shared this view but I suspect they did so with fullunderstanding of Okakura's ideas.
S. Koizumi: I think so, too. But nihongahas survived. In China,
this category is called guohua (kokugain Japanese). But I doubt
there is any concept similar to nihongain Indonesia .

Yoga,of course, in another context means American films (yois a generic adjective which means western, and the term yoga isused to describe western-style painting as well as film). But we do
not call Japanese film nihonga.Nihonga is strictly applied toJapanese painting. We call Japanese films houga.
The concept of nihongais as ambivalent as the concept ofAsia. I cannot explain what it is. If Okakura were here today,
things would have been different. The members of the Nihon
Bijursuin are still doing the same thing today . The modernity wehave been discussing was homogenized, found a place for itself.
They seem to be oblivious to what is going on around them .
Moderator[T. Mizusawa): The issue of kokuga has been raised.

I
180 Session

Does anyone have further comments about about modernity, or
the contradictions in modernization?
H. Wang: Yes. In the late 19th century and early 20th century,

there was a whole set of knowledge, which we called "national
knowledge," including art. In Chinese, we have guohua (nationalarts), guoyue (national music), guoxue (national scholarship) andso on so forth, which indicates this new knowledge as national. It
was part of the process of building national knowledge.
Moderator [T. MizusawaJ:Modernism flourished in Shanghai

during the 1920s and 1930s; more than in Tokyo at the time. I
wonder if there was any conflict or contradiction between thefundamental mentality of the Chinese and modernity?
H. Wang: Art, novels, and poetry flourished in the first decade of

20th century. Many overseas Chinese students came back fromJapan, Europe, and America, and produced much of the art andliterature of that period. They called their work "modern art" and"new literature."
In late Qing period, "national scholarship" and other formsof"national knowledge" were produced as part of the movementof Han Chinese nationalism against Manchu rule. The May 4th
movement was an anti-Western movement with the aim ofreviving traditional culture, but a counter-movement arose in thesphere of culture and art. Even within the circle that carried out
the "new culture movement," there was a program to develop"national knowledge" led by Hu Shi and his followers. This wasconsistent with the overall tendency of modernization, which
combined nationalism and cosmopolitanism. You could see thedifference between the two: national versus modern. After 1927,
especially in the 1930s, much Chinese literature, art, and popular
culture of all kinds was influenced by Japanese art and literature,including Neo-Sensual novels, revolutionary art, and so on.
Moderator [T. MizusawaJ:There was a sort of international

network of modernity that transcended nationality. Many new

SessionI181

•developments were modeled on the examples of Tokyo andShanghai. Let us get back to Professor Sakai's reference to Mr.
Mohamad's comment. The word Asia seems to be associatedwith some sort of pain. This pain is closely related to the
problems of modernization. Moreover, the person who suffers
this pain could potentially become a victimizer who impo ses painon others, as demonstrated by the example of Japan, whose
cultural sphere was modernized at a relatively early stage.
N. Sakai: It was very interesting to listen to Mr. Mohamad's
presentation and also to understand that Okakura Kakuzo although he was active before the age of modernism -andcontributors or key persons in the modernist movement were partof a similar network. We can see this from the kind of influencesthat they had on each other.
Becoming aware of this context makes it easier for us tounderstand why Okakura played a certain role in the 1930s
during the modernization ofJapan. Also, as Mr. Mohamad said,in Japanese modernism , and I think this was also true of Europe,
there was a type of modernism that was close to fascism and that
could turn into fascism at any time.
At the same time, Mr. Mohamad described how Japanesemodernism also moved toward cosmopolitism. One reason forthis the West. As long modernism was understood as something
coming from the West, it was comparatively safe, but when, as inEurope, it developed as a movement that criticized modernity
itself, it had the potential to turn into fascism given the rightopportunity. We have examples of Japanese modernist writers
such as Yokomitsu Riichi, who influenced China, who suddenly
changed into fascists.
This means that we shou ld discuss modernism in particular
contexts and not generalize about it any longer. I am interested in
Mr. Mohamad's opinion on this issue.
G. Mohamad:Yes. What I can understand from the discussion
about Okakura and "Asia as one," is that he resists the impulse ofunity rooted in European modernity, on the one hand. On the282

SessionIother hand, he creates a unity in Asian modernity. This goes handin hand with the impulse of control that modernity can be open
to. Bureaucratization and uniformity-

these are all part ofmodernity, and it is vety easy to link them with fascism. When
you try to create a strong unity and, at the same time, put
yourself against another type of unity, you become very repressive
inside. Such circumstances, with the help of technology and otherfactors, are very conducive to fascism.
The best way to look at this is in the context of identity
politics. Identity politics culminated in che 1960s in che United
Scates, when women and blacks stood up to affirm their identity.
Identity politics can be dangerous because it attempts to fix whatshould always be a process. As Julia Kristeva once put ic, thesubject is always "subject-in-process". The idea of identity
assumes chat the border of the self is solid and impermeable. The
best way to deal with the question of"Asian" identity is todeconscrucc European identity. Europe always claims to be very
unified, with its link to Greek and J udeo-Chriscian tradition.
They always claim that the Greek legacy is a natural property ofEurope, bur this is a mistake. During the Dark Age, theEuropeans did not know about Greek antiquity. In face, theylearned about the Greek legacy from the Arabs in the 9th century.
The Greek legacy was assimilated by the Arabs from the 9th
century co the 12th century. For example, in Baghdad in che 9th
century, all books by Aristotle, except for chose on policies, werealready translated. Three hundred years lacer, Averroes, or Ibn
Rushd, wrote a famous commentary on Aristotle's thought which was a major influence on the theological works of Thomas
Aquinas. Therefore, the claim for Europe as one, caking thelegacy from che Greeks, is false. There was a German historian
who said that the idea of Greek as being untainted by the Orient
was a creation of historians in the 19th century, when Jews
became recognized as equal citizens. The Germans were afraid ofthem, so they cried to shield themselves by creating chis image ofthe pure identity of che Greek legacy. This is why I chink weshould deconstrucc che European identity.

SessionI28]

Moderator[T. Mizusawa]: The drive for racial purity as epitomizedby the Nazis is a kind of illusionary identity. Using Mr.
Mohamad's expression, it is a kind of solidified or fixed identity.
Professor Sakai in his keynote speech asserted that Asia should
not bear a fixed identity, because it is in transition. There may be
a linguistic contradiction in phrasing this, but we cannot share an
Asian identity all together. The individual differences that can
only be found be examining particular cases are very important.
The story ofKartini is about an Indonesian woman who
desired Europe, and who failed to construct a strong Javanese
identity although she had the chance to do so. The more you cry
to fix your identity, the more you become aggressive toward theother and in the end destroy yourself. This is a vicious cycle.
Okakura seems to have defined the identity of Asian art
rather loosely. He seems to have formed it in a flexible way
through his interactions with other people.
5. Koizumi: I chink that pain or weakness is actually an important

aspect when speaking of Asia. In addition, I feel that there is avery weak ego on the other side of a mechanical and uniform
modernity.
Okakura wrote a series of love letters to a married Indian
woman just before his death. I am not sure if we could call theseletters literature, but a scholar on modern literarure has written apaper on these documents. 1
According to this paper, there are only two male writers inmodern Japanese literature of the Meiji period whoever knelt

Poetic Imagination ofOkakura

down before a woman. One was Okakura Kakuzo and the other

Tenshin - Poetry of Space),"lzura Romo, no. 3, I996.

was Kitamura Toukoku . Their relationships with women were
central to their identity. They left writings in which they knelt
down to women and asked for forgiveness. Because of this, I
think that Okakura had what would be taken as a weakness in the
fascist context.
Natsume Soseki is another literary figure of the same period
who also expressed his anxiety towards modernity . Some scholars
say that all ofNatsume 's novels express the writer's anxiety aboutmodernity. In the last pages of his novel, The Three-Cornered284

I
Hashiura Hiroshi, "Tmshin no Shi
Seishin - Kukan no Shigaku (Th eSessionI

World, the protagonist snaps out of his dream-like world to reality
when he rakes a soldier, heading to Manchuria to fight in the
Russo-Japanese War, to the train station. The train is the realworld "for there is nothing more typical of twentieth-century."
This idea resonates with Okakura's description of a train as "arimedevouring locomotion" in The Idealsof the East.
But there are some people who cannot get on board ofmodernity. Asia seems to be one of the destinations for suchpeople who missed the train. We may need to touch on the issueof women in tomorrow's discussion .
Moderator [T. MizusawaJ:Thank you. Professor Koizumi's

comment touched on Okakura's creativity. We may be expanding
our discussion too much if we touch on feminism, but Professor
Sakai, do you have any comment?
N. Sakai: I think Professor Koizumi's point is very important. But
I am concerned that the structure in which a man worships awoman is facilitated by an acute distinction between the two sexes-a system that was established during the process ofmodernization.
Moderator [T. MizusawaJ:Thank you. From the start, I had nointention of leading this discussion into any conclusion.
In the final stage of our discussion, I understood that it is arather peculiar way of thinking to see identity as something fixedand established, something chat needs to be sought as the basis of
the self before anything can be accomplished. Identity is always ina flux. When one's identity is too strong, it may result inaggression toward others. That is because identity may arise
through an experience of pain. Asia may be described as a child
who was hurt at birth. This means that there is a possibility of
becoming caught in a chain reaction in which someone who
becomes strong through painful experiences turns around andhurts someone else. But if we rake a flexible approach, we can see
from history that people in different cultural regions are looking
for something, seeking for something. Okakura Kakuzo's idea of

SessionI285

Asia is usually understood as very assertive, but he also seems tohave had a vulnerable side as pointed out in the episodeintroduced by Professor Koizumi.

If all of these facets are considered together in a flexible but
careful examination of what Asian identiry might consist of in
hisrory, we may come up with results that are more definite. Thismight sound a little rhetorical, but I would like ro end here. Thisis the conclusion of Session I. Thank you.

286

Session I

Opening Comment for Session II
Yoshimi Shunya
Professor, Institute ofSocio-lnformacion and Communication Studies,
University of Tokyo

Good morning. Ir is very a fine day. Bur we are going to have avery long day. I chink today's program may be challenging
physically as well as intellectually.
Yesterday, we had four presentations, including rhe keynote
speech by Professor Sakai, on the idea of Asia and modernity. The
discussion was very profound and touched on issues char need ro
be dealt with over the long term. I do nor think I can summarize
yesterday's session well, bur I would like to rake this opportunity
to remind you of what we covered by pointing to three things.
First, there is an issue of desire when speaking of Asia,
identifying with Asia, or representing Asia. This desire isembedded in the structure of modernism.
Mr. Mohamad gave an example in his extremely stimulating
and imaginative presentation regarding this issue of desire. He
introduced us to Kartini, an Indonesian woman, who initially had
a desire ro identify with Europeans, bur eventually reverted backto her native Java, and spoke of Java in this context. He alsopresented a case in which Japan's desire for colonial rule in Asia
fell in rune with the emotions of people who considered Japandesirable as they were oppressed by an imperialistic or European
colonial system. There was also a group of Indonesian nationalists
who similarly desired India.
Also, in a different context, Professor Koizumi rook theexample of Okakura Kakuzo, and described how Asia was
imagined or desired under a modernist conscience . Professor
Koizumi suggested that to Okakura, Asia was a tentative namegiven to an empty space in transition . These various forms ofdesire toward Asia were one of rhe themes in yesterday's
discussion.
Secondly, as pointed our in Professor Wang's presentation,

288

less,on II

YoshimiShunya

there is an issue of Asia chat does not speak about itself-Asiachat is not represented. This leads to the issue of China, assuggested in Professor Wang's presentation. His discussion
reminded me of an article, "Asia's Chinese Name" by Pekka
Korhonen in the recent issue of Inter-Asia Cultural Studies,
Volume 3, Number 2, August 2002. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies isa culcural studies journal in which I participate as a member ofthe editing committee and work with my Asian colleagues. She
writes about how the concept of Asia was constructed by the 17th
century Jesuits, particularly, by Macheo Ricci.
According to her analysis, when "Asia" is written in kanji(Chinese characters), it has a very negative connotation.
Particularly, because the kanji for "A (i!E:) " in "Asia(i!E~i!E:) "means "inferior," and the kanji that describes "si (~ ) " in "Asia"
has a negative overtone because it means small. This is how"Asia" has been represented to begin with. Professor Wang
discussed how an Asia with negative connotation has been
discussed or not discussed, particularly in the Chinese context.
The third point, which is very important, is an issue raised byProfessor Sakai, whether it is possible to represent Asia beyond
the framework of modernism or of colonial discourse. To
rephrase what Professor Sakai said yesterday, we tend to get stuck
in a structure in which we project ourselves as "the other of'ochers'," and look for our origins in functional relation co the"ocher." Is it possible to find a way to represent Asia beyond such
structural restrictions? This problem could be understood as acommon concern in presentations made by Mr. Mohamad,
Professor Koizumi, and Professor Wang. Yesterday's discussion
examined what it means to represent Asia from the long-range
perspective of modernity.
In Sessions II and III, I would like to cake yesterday's
discussion as a starting point bur bring it a little closer to thepresent day, relating it to the subjects of art and exhibitions,which have been discussed in previous symposiums organized by
the Japan Foundation Asia Center, and continue the discussion interms of specific issues.
I hope chat today's discussion will revolve around three main

SessionII289

areas.
First, we talked yesterday about the representation of Asia
during the historical period of modernity, but today we will takeup the issue of what it means co represent Asia in the context ofglobalization.
In light of yesterday's discussion, Asia should not be
understood as something chat already exists and then expands
into the global arena. Asia is a concept chat is constructed, made,and multiplied within the process known as globalization, whichcontains contradiction, division, and repression . The first
concern is how to chink about this issue, the issue of globalization
and representation.
Second, in contrast to yesterday's discussion chat focused on
ideas, today's three panelists will discuss institutions of art, suchas art museums and biennial and triennial exhibitions, the places
and the system in which art is represented.
Professor Tony Bennett, one of today's panelists, writes
about an "exhibicionary complex," a complex sec of places where
exhibitions are carried out. These places may include a biennial
or triennial or an art museum. Today, I hope chat we canconsider the issues related to these places with reference toyesterday's discussion.
Now for the third point. We went to see "Under
Construction" yesterday. It was a very interesting exhibition.
Although I am not an expert on art, I felt that many of theelements in art are now closer to the elements in such disciplines
as sociology, anthropology, and cultural studies, and fusing withchem. In chis symposium , many of the participants have a nonart background, like myself, a sociologist. I would like to see how
people in the arcs and people in ocher disciplines could
communicate . I would like to see what sort of dialogue can becreated between arts professionals and professionals in ocher areas,such as sociology, anthropology, and knowledges related to
cultural studies.
I would like to move into the presentations now. We havemade some changes in the program. We will have Professor Lee
Yong Woo first, then Professor Tacehaca Akira, and finally290

SessionII

Professor Tony Bennett as the third speaker.

SessionJI

291

Session II Presentation I

Globalism and the Vanity of its System
Lee Yong Woo
Executive Director , New York Center for Media Arts[I]
My approach here to the subject of Asia will be through global
cultural events such as the recent proliferation of biennials andtriennials. I have chosen co present chis area because, whether one
looks Ease or looks West, it is rare to find another genre of culturalindustry chat is as popular and as expansive as the biennial ortriennial. Moreover , when it comes co debate on globalism, chebiennial is one of chose rare cases chat in both che Ease and che West
meet with unanimous approval. In general, when it comes co things"global," there are different levels of adhesion and resistance to it,
especially according to one 's implication in the economy and poliry.

An exception co our suspicions about things global is the biennial,
which is acclaimed by the general public for bridging che culcural andhistorical gap between the East and the West and viewed as theultimate alternative global event. The term biennale here will be usedliberally co include biennials, triennials, and ocher international
events.
In Asia, the biennial has become an important event, one inwhich we can read structures of cultural production andconsumption. In the Far Ease alone, comprising Japan, China, Korea
and Taiwan, there are dozens of biennials, some of which, like theGwangju Biennale in Korea and che Yokohama Triennale in Japan,
have at their disposal mammoth budgets of around five million
dollars. The number of biennials and triennials outside of the Far Ease
but in and around Asia is also growing. There is, for instance, theTriennale India, the Asian Arc Biennale Bangladesh, che Biennale of
Sydney, and the Asia-Pacific Triennial of Contemporary Arc, ro namebut a few of the major ones. The Asian arc scene is now definitively
incorporated into the global culcural loop. What drives chis arc systemand the municipalities and cultures behind it is the fear of finding

292

SessionII

LeeYong Woo

itself excluded from this loop. And so together they participate, as
though they were part of a global cultural relay race.
There are two faces to globalism, and they are reflected in thetwo faces of the biennial. The biennial lefr behind it long ago theorigins of its name: an art event that is held every two years. It has
undergone a complete transformation that is now transforming art
and culture. Now its production and consumption of art is big
enough to coexist with the tourism industry. Now it entices us to visit
far away cities to see art that has less to do with the artist's studio thanwith media information. The media is now essentially in control ofthe production and consumption of art. In fact, in the end, it
manipulates art so that it becomes its message. The media is theelement essential to multiplying entropy in the name of the biennial.
The biennial has also brought about an immense transformationin the technology of the exhibition. There is at once vanity andexcitement to creating a spectacle, sometimes across an entire city,using new technology, gigantic exhibition spaces for huge
installations, and striking visual content. By making the artist carrythe economic burden of creating the works for the biennial, theorganizers place the artist in a precarious post-biennial financial
situation. The artist must create work that meets biennial exhibition
spaces whose scale rivals that of the Roman Colosseum -we're backin the days of Roman Empire. By allowing or demanding or most
likely needing to be sponsored by the local and/or the national
government, the biennial becomes part of the local and/or national
industry, one that is directed by the government and that has an
obligation toward it. The days of a gallery discovering and supportinga young, unknown artist, a Paul Cezanne living in cold-water flat, area part of the past.
The biennial is perhaps driving away art to a place that is so far
off that it will never find its way back. Its arrogant strutting is like theglobal companies that dominate then absorb its medium and small
competitors. Biennial art is like an art with motor. It makes new art
every two years, which also means that every two years we have tothrow away the old art. This cycle is no different than the life cycle ofother consumer products such as computers, mobile phones, and cars.
Biennial art has fallen prey to capitalism's genius for speedily planned
obsolescence. This culture of speed has given birth to alienation inart. Past discourses stating that art and technology were sensitive to

SessionII29]

speed and fashion and the eternity of the aesthetic of art are now outof place. A Marxist would be completely befuddled in from of abiennial. The biennial is a media circus whose rallying cty is global
repentance.
Thanks to the speed of the biennial cycle, artists have lose theirposition at the center of the art scene and now are mere attendants
called upon then dismissed from the cultural industry. In chis role,
perhaps it's better chat they don't dream of controlling chis speed.
Marshall McLuhan wrote chat the artist is an antenna; Andre Malraux
said chat artist is a beacon and a cacalyzer chat clarifies and predicts
social changes. They were both wrong. At least now, artists are notalone in being wrong. Curators who sign their biennial contracts areconcerned only with what's written in it. They are all used to chisroutine. As soon as their contract is fulfilled, they don't worry about
the possible problems that happen in the biennial afterward.
The biennial has for a long time been at the source of a newcommon language with a new system of grammar that differs fromand replaces regional language. It erases memories of the original
language of each region and offers a linguistic foundation for a new
language. In this way, the biennial presumes to present something likea new standard time that rectifies regional inaccuracies. This standard
gives rise to a new standard and this new rectified time rectifies
another rectified time. The biennial caravan goes, for instance, toVietnam and Cambodia, raises the Asian banner, and then tries topractice the ways of Venice and Kassel. With the zeal of the newly
proselytized, it cries to spread to the poor souls in the outback what it
just learned. Regionalism sometimes resists it, but chis effort leaves
but trace of documentation in a faint history of the region.
Every two years, the world of art gets dizzy again as if it wascatching a wave on a surfboard, riding it in to shore, then slowly
paddling back out to sea to repeat this cycle of excitement followed byletdown. And, from its tidal source in Venice, Kassel, SaoPaolo, andLyon, it now rides a tsunami chat is crashing down upon Asia Pacificshores. All you can do is surfing, then wait for the next big wave. The
only thing that counts in chis game is that wave. The rest is just a seaof oil.
The biennial is under the charm of a promotional campaign chat,in the name of art and culcure, welcomes the isolated region as well as
the global community and, in the process, explodes its budget. This

294

Session IIdilapidation means that the next historic creation will lack funds. The
biennial is like the fun of surfing: once the thrill is over, fatigue andanxiety set in, for the investment and the expenses have been too
great. In this sport there is a minority of winners and a majority oflosers: the indifferent, the cynical, or rhe disgusted . Apart from rheeuphoric period of surfing rhe waves, the rest is depression, or aperiod of incubation and dissimulation, whose truth is difficult toreveal, for it remains an enigma. Daily life and struggle become
distorted or disappear from our view. Felix Guattari warns us chat"when fascism enters into our veins, it chemically changes our desire."
The biennial is a new institution char has immediately become adominant power, pushing aside other arr institutions such as rhe
museum, the gallery, arr market and arr criticism.
Lee's rake a look now at a completely different biennial, one
whose face differs from the somber look of the biennial justmentioned . The biennial contributes to the deconstruction of theconcept of the refined object as an archaeological document in thework of arr. Ir is a system chat has liberated the artwork by placing it
in front of the public, in the town square, and in a new aesthetic
discourse chat changes continuously through its separation from theoppressive and categorical walls of the museum. The biennial createsan open-air environment by bringing arr whose character is public or
urban to alternative places such as the subway or abandonedbuildings. Ir is the place where a hierarchy of arr is established, where
spectators from all walks oflife come together, where pluralism is theoverriding theme, and where a uniquely democratic aesthetic rakes
over.
The biennial, then, is like a contemporary bazaar. Ir is aninternational scene where information is readily available, and whererace, culture, tradition, language, religion, and even arr express
themselves in total freedom . Juse as one of the foundations of today's
marker economy is bazaar, the biennial is the cornerstone in thefoundation of rhe avant-garde in artistic philosophy and aesthetic
discourse. This is true, however, only if the biennial refuses to imitate
the organized power of institutional systems, if it avoids the pitfalls of
power-mongering chat typifies it now, and if, instead, it uses its power
to confront rhe power of the system.
Perhaps the biennial's most invaluable contribution is to rhecreation of a place for the popular education of arr. It has also

SessionII295

inspired at once the creation of other art genres and a unified view ofart. The growing number of biennials encourages artists to create
work that bypasses the more conservative cultural politics of thepowerful museums in the world. The biennial not only encourages
the visual arts bur the mutual relationships among each arr, making
possible innovative collaborations among artists.
Because of the promptness of its return -every two years -thebiennial is for the moment where the most active exchanges of
information occur on the international art scene. Ir is the place where
people in the art world meet to brainstorm and trade information. As
a result of this, since around 1990 the major art institutions museums, galleries, and journals -have grown to accept in theirown ways the aesthetic tendencies, curators, and young artists formedin the biennial system. Ir is especially this transfusion of young blood
into the institutional system that is invigorating.
The biennial has not yet reached the popular acclaim of theGrand Tour of the 18th century, but it now plays a role in the global
economy through its connections to the tourist industry. According
to the ciry of Venice's estimates, every two years the opening of the
Venice Biennale increases city revenues by 2.5 percent compared to a
non-biennial year. The last Kassel Documenta calculated that amongits 650,000 visitors, 200,000 were foreigners, whose expenditures on,
for instance, restaurant meals and hotel stays played an important rolein the economy of the city. The First Gwangju Biennale welcomed
1.6 million visitors who brought almost 100 million dollar to the city.
The biennial cultivates an aesthetic of populism, an image of acultural event that represents the interests of the people , one that adds
speed to an avant-garde visual art often accused of being boring. It
succeeds in promoting this image because, with its relatively short life
span, it meets with fewer restrictions and regulations on its
exhibitions than permanent art institutions. This is nor to say, ofcourse, that the biennial is more entertaining or higher artistic quality
than the museum or the gallery. Although I'm part of the biennial
system, I have never heard someone around me say that the biennial
is actually fun.

(II]
This phenomenon -2%

Sess,onll

the biennial as a global and popular artistic

event -is only about a decade old. Although the first Tokyo

Biennale was held in 1952, it was organized on ly sporadically. The
Triennale India endured because of its small scale, which today seems
to be the antithesis of what it means to be global. There is of course

the Biennale of Sydney and the Istanbul Biennale, yet, geographically,
these are on the edges of Asia. It is only since the 1990s that thebiennial has become a fundamental global festival of culture, andsince 1995 chat, in this context, the Gwangju Biennale in particular
has become a pivotal showcase. Since then, the Taipei Biennial andthe Shanghai Biennale have followed in its path, and last year the
Yokohama T riennale became the first global art festival of the 21st
century.
The Gwangju Biennale's breath of fresh cultural air was merely
the frontal system of the cultural whirlwinds that have blown acrossKorea and touched nearly a dozen ocher cities and venues, including
the Busan International Film Festival, the Busan Biennale, the Jeonju
Film Festival, the Seoul Media Art Biennale (media_ciry seoul), theJeonju International Craft Biennale, the Euiwang International
Theater Biennale, and the Buchun International Experimental Music
Festival. For all of these events to survive and thrive, they will eachhave to create and build on a unique identiry. This will cake muchtime. Today there are over one hundred and twenry biennials
throughout the world, a scary number when it comes to theprofessional curator's job of considering each one's potential motherlode of fresh, new, and vital art -unless this is an impossible task. In

Korea, the fact chat there are so many events of the biennial rype isbeginning to seem abnormal.
Although all of the aforementioned biennials are situated in Asia,
they are global events. This is, on the one hand, their qualiry, yet, on
the ocher hand, their problem. They are geographically in Asia, yetthey seek to transcend Asia. Ir is difficult to see chem as culturally
different and independently Asian, as events chat only Asia couldorganize. In fact, in their determination to compete on the global
cultural scene, they present a facade of Asianness, while hiding theirtrue ideological agendas of un-Asianness and global
homogeneousness. They are packaged in a superficial culturaldifference and Asian character chat hides deeper contradictions.
Like all biennials around the world, although the Asian biennials
have large budgets and attract large publics, it would be difficult to

SessionII297

say chat they succeed in presenting arc chat is remarkable for its
quality and unique identity. And in chis, and according co each case,they more or less succeed in being but second best in comparison coWestern biennials, in being but tepid, self-congraculacory festivals chatdecorate the framework of globalization. I don't chink chat chose whoorganize the Asian biennials sin from a lack of experience or an
absence of ideology, buc, more correccly from an absence of self
resulting from confused ideology and goals. Mose of chem
demonstrate chis by following faithfully the contradictions andexperimentations of Western biennials.
I like co think that I've been invited co speak to you today
because I created the Gwangju Biennale, which, historically, is thefirst true biennial in Asia. I also like co think chat I'm here because ofwhat you have perhaps heard through che biennial grapevine, which isthat, yes, the Gwangju Biennale bases its organization on a politicaland social bedrock of citizens who participate conscientiously, and onche social ramifications of che biennial after it closes. And finally, I
like co chink chat if we now define che biennial system as Western, I
deserve perhaps co be seen as a globalist who accepted and put co use
che most actively chis Western system in Asia. This, I like to chink, isantinomic to the superficial global political attitude chat the Asianbiennial commonly perpetuates.
I established my reputation on the rumor that the Gwangju
Biennale tried co overthrow symbolically che global and perennial
hegemony of the Western arc system. That is, supposedly I upset thepioneers of globalism by inaugurating a global festival. It's amusing
for me co hear this kind of rumor that is more appropriate in boldtype on the cover of certain provocative magazines, but I have toadmit chat che truth is quite different.
One thing is certain, that my biennial methods were like guerrilla
tactics: co covertly attack the political center and loud global themes
and ideologies with, as an arm, a new Gwangju Biennale that was
seemingly far from the center of the art world stage. Power andinflated ideology in che midst of this hegemonic system is usuallysafely ensconced in a position of undisguised vanity. Ir's safe to say
chat, historically, this vanity is always protected by che kitsch ofimperialism, and chat it is attacked from che outside. The Gwangju
Biennale was chis outsider.
I chink the first reason for che Gwangju Biennale's success was

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SessionII