Chapter 3

Japan’s Security
and the Russian Far East
Nakano Junzo

Introduction
In the mid-nineteenth century, as a result of its military defeat at thehands of the British and French coalition during the Crimean War,
Imperial Russia became clearly aware of its own decline. With theonset of reforms directed towards capitalism, the vector of Imperial
Russia’s aspirations shifted to the Far East. Around the same time,
Japan was being forcibly opened to the outside world by US gunboat
diplomacy. This resulted in Japan being set on the road tomodernization under the auspices of the Meiji Restoration. It was acoincidence that both Japan and Russia began to modernize around thesame time as a result of strong pressure from the Western Great Powers.
For a weak but independent Japan, Russian expansion in the Far East
was felt to represent a profound threat. Actions like Russia’s
development of its Far East infrastructure, the laying of theTrans-Siberian Railway and building of port facilities at Vladivostok
were all seen by Japan as tangible expressions of this threat.
In the period following the Russo-Japanese War, both countries
signed a series of four Russo-Japanese Treaties with the common aimof blocking American influence in Manchuria. In less than 10 years,
however, the cooperative relationship between the two countries was
terminated by the collapse of Imperial Russia. Considering this, if theshort period covered by the treaties is ignored, it could be argued thatfor approximately 100 years through to the end of the twentieth century,
Japan viewed Russia as a threat. Moreover, there was an ongoing
consciousness that the source of this threat lay in the Russian Far East.
From the Russian point-of-view, events such as Japanese imperial- 39 -

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expansion on the Korean Peninsula, the annexation of Manchuria,
Japanese intervention in Siberia and the post-WWII US-Japan allianceall created an atmosphere of threat towards Russian Far East territories.
These feelings of mutual distrust and hostility between Japan andRussia have undergone a thaw with the demise of the cold war as
Japanese attitudes towards the Russian Far East have changed. Due tothe transformation of Russia that has occurred as a result of the Soviet
Union’s collapse, and changes in the posture adopted by Russian Far
East military forces, awareness of the Russian Far East threat to Japan
has been downgraded on both an official government and general
population attitude level. At a minimum, it is very unlikely in theforeseeable future that Japan will be re-confronted with a threat
originating from Russian Far East military forces.
In the post cold war environment, one immediate issue facing
Japan’s security is the development of nuclear weapons by the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). Medium-term
issues that could make or break Japan’s security are the anxiety
associated with peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula andpeaceful evolution of Chinese-Taiwanese relations. Furthermore, therising power of China is one area of long-term concern for Japan. No
longer does Japan consider the Russian Far East as a source of threat,
however, for Japan’s security, as a region the Russian Far East is
closely related to areas in which Japan has a security interest.
Below follows a discussion of three topics: Japanese perception of
the Russian Far East, Sino-Russian Relations in the Russian Far Eastand Japan, and Russian Policy towards the Korean Peninsula andJapan.

Japanese Perception of the Russian Far East
As is widely known, at a summit meeting in December 1989, President
George H.W. Bush of the United States and President Mikhail
Gorbachev of the USSR officially announced the end of the cold war.
Three months before this historic announcement, the Japan Defense
Agency’s Defense White Paper (entitled “Defense of Japan”) showed
the following understanding of cold war relations: “The East-West
relations, the reality, in which military confrontations exist, has not yet- 40 -

Japan’s Security and the Russian Far Eastbasically changed.” Continuing on to comment on militarydevelopments in the region surrounding Japan, the White Paper cited
both the ongoing strengthening of Soviet military power in the Far Eastand its increased operational activity. It also stated that Soviet Far East
military forces continued to represent a “potential threat” to Japan, andconsidered these forces to be a “source of the increased militarytensions” in the Far East.1
In September 1989 (the same year in which the Defense White
Paper was published), after a meeting between Japanese and Soviet
Foreign Ministers, a plan was announced regarding a state visit toJapan by President Gorbachev sometime during 1991. In line with this,with the aim of creating an environment in which the Northern
Territories dispute could be successfully resolved, Japanese foreign
policy became more active. In July 1990 at the G7 Houston Summit,
Japan was successful in having references to “The importance of theresolution of the Northern Territories dispute” included as a condition
written into announcements made about economic support provisions
to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union displayed their displeasure withJapan, because Japan persisted with a doctrine that stated “economics
and politics cannot be separated” in order to develop Japan-Soviet
relations. At the same time, however, Kaifu Toshiki, Japan’s Prime
Minister, instructed the Japan Defense Agency to remove all references
to a “potential Soviet threat in the Far East” from the 1990 edition of
the Defense White Paper. In issuing such orders, Kaifu was not merely
showing consideration of Gorbachev’s visit to Japan in 1991; rather it
was more that Japan was attempting to catch up with the other G7
members in terms of evaluating changes in the Soviet Union.2 Fromthen on, the references to a “potential Soviet threat in the Far East” that
had appeared in the annual Defense White Paper since 1980
disappeared.3
1
2
3

Boeicho [Japan Defense Agency], Nihon no boei [Defense of Japan], 1989, pp.
46-47.
Hasegawa Tsuyoshi, Hoppo ryodo mondai to nichiro kankei [The Northern
Territories Dispute and Japan-Russia Relations] (Chikuma Shobo, 2000), pp.
183-184, 190.
Impacted by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and a hardening of US policy
toward the Soviet Union, during an address to the Diet in January 1980 Prime- 41 -

Nakano Junzo

However, within the 1990 White Paper, the references to Soviet
Far East military forces being a “source of the increased militarytensions” remained. Furthermore, in the 1991 edition, a similarreference was made.4 With regard to Soviet Far East military forces
immediately prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan’s defense
establishment continued to view them harshly. However, with changes
in the strategic environment in Northeast Asia as a result of the end of
the cold war, Japan’s threat perception began to change. In the
post-Soviet collapse White Papers issued by the Japan Defense Agency
during 1992-1995, while analysis pointed to a tendency of quantitative
reduction in force numbers, it was noted that Russian Far East Forces
retained a massive war-fighting ability. Furthermore, due to theConventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), it was assessed that
Russian Far East forces were modernizing as Russia shifted more of its
modern weapons systems from the European Theater to the Russian
Far East. Within the White Papers published in these years, Russian
Far East military forces were described as a “cause of instability”
within the region. Compared to the earlier “contributing to militarytensions within the region,” “cause of instability” represented a subtle
change in assessment.
For the Defense White Papers published in the early 1990s, one
area of interest was the analysis sections written regarding the militarysituation around Japan. The first section of analysis had been “ThePosture of Soviet (Russian) Far East Military Forces” until 1993 when
it was replaced by an analysis entitled “Military Developments on the4

Minister Ohira Masayoshi became the first postwar Japanese leader to publicly
state “The Soviet Union represents a threat to the safety of our country.” Refer toKimura Hiroshi, Toi ringoku: Roshia to Nihon [The Distant Neighbors: Russia
and Japan] (Sekai Shisosha, 2002), pp. 314-320. Incidentally, the Defense White
Paper 1978 described the contemporary international military situation in thefollowing terms: “The international situation has transformed greatly from that of
the mid-1950s Cold War era. A sense of coexistence between the US-Soviet
Union has become firmly entrenched as one of the basic principles that govern
US-Soviet relations.” (Boeicho, Nihon no boei, 1978, p. 3) To wit, it could be said
that changes in Japanese government attitudes towards the Soviet Union, both inrecognizing the Soviet “threat” and reappraisal as a non-threat, reflect changes in
US policy towards the Soviet Union.
Boeicho, Nihon no boei, 1990, pp. 5, 46; 1991, pp. 43, 45-46.

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Japan’s Security and the Russian Far East

Korean Peninsula.” Since the 1994 Defense White Paper, this analysis
has been the first section on which most focus has been placed.
Reasons for the change include the following. On one hand, the Tokyo
Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations (October 1993) resulted in
improved Japan-Russia relations. Both sides promoted discussions on
security and military exchanges while hopefully working towards aformal peace treaty. On the other hand, North Korea’s declaration ofwithdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (March 1993)
heightened military tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
In the latter half of the 1990s, Japan’s Defense White Papers
described future tendencies among Russian Far East Military Forces as“non-transparent,” in part due to the uncertainties that Russia faced
domestically. In the Defense White Paper 2001, reference was made tochanges in posture of both the entire Russian military and its Far East
components in the following terms: “Within the foreseeable future,
there is little possibility that the Russian military will revert to a cold
war Soviet-type force in terms of size or posture.”5 With regard to thebackground of changes in the Russian military, the White Paper
referred to Russia’s financial situation and the easing of tensions in the
Russian-Sino and Russian-US relationships. It could also be said thatthrough Japan-Russia security dialogues, the Japanese defense
establishment obtained a deeper understanding of tendencies forchange within the Russian military.
With the birth of the Russian Federation, Japan-Russia security
dialogues and military exchanges continued to develop. As mentioned
above, Japan’s harsh attitude towards Russian Far East military power
also began to ease. The Japanese security establishment reached anunderstanding that “in the foreseeable future, Russian Far East militaryforces will not pose a threat.” Against this backcloth, general relations
between the new Russia and Japan have alternated between increasingcloseness and stagnation. One issue that has contributed to these shifts
5

Defense White Papers for the years 1992-1995 can be found at the Japan Defense
Agency homepage:
http://jda-clearing.jda.go.jp/hakusho_data/1992/w1992_01.html
http://jda-clearing.jda.go.jp/hakusho_data/1993/w1993_01.html
http://jda-clearing.jda.go.jp/hakusho_data/1994/w1994_01.html
http://jda-clearing.jda.go.jp/hakusho_data/1995/ara12.htm- 43 -

Nakano Junzo

has been the ongoing differences of opinion regarding the Northern
Territories (the issue of the possession of four islands off the northcoast of Hokkaido: Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai). When
this issue is raised, Russia tends to emphasize the strategic importanceof the Sea of Okhotsk and the Southern Kuriles island chain (theNorthern Territories).
In September 1992, the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, wasplaced under severe pressure by domestic conservative political forces
who became alarmed that he might reach some sort of comprise withJapan regarding the Northern Territories. In the same month, a mere
four days before he was scheduled to visit Japan, he took the very
unusual diplomatic step of canceling his State Visit. Two months
before the cancellation, in July the Russian Supreme Council held open
hearings on “Russia-Japan Relations and Territorial Integrity.” Military
participants at these hearings offered comments against the “handing
over of the Southern Kuriles” because of its impact on the survivabilityof Russian Strategic Ballistic Nuclear Submarines (SSBN) operating in
the Sea of Okhotsk.6 After rumors in March 2002 that the Russian
government and Japan had reached agreement over the “handing overof the Southern Kuriles,” the Lower House of the Russian Parliament(Duma) opened public hearings on the “Southern Kurile Problem.”
Then in April 2002, General Kvashnin, Chief of the Russian General
Staff carried out an inspection tour of Sakhalin and Etorofu islands.7
Simultaneously, a thesis written by a military retiree stressing thestrategic importance of the Southern Kuriles appeared in “MilitaryThought,” a military theory publication put out by the Russian
Ministry of Defense.8
As operational waters for SSBN, during the cold war, Soviet
strategy imagined the Sea of Okhotsk to be a bastion into which
American anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces would not be allowed
6
7
8

Nezavisimaia Gazeta, July 30, 1992, pp. 1-2; Rossiiskaia Gazeta, August 14,
1992, p. 4. With regard to opposition to Yeltsin’s Japan visit within the Russian
military, refer to Kimura, Toi ringoku, pp. 607-612.
Asahi Shimbun, March 19, 2002 (morning edition) p. 2; April 20, 2002 (morning
edition) p. 5.
A.F. Klimenko, “O roli Kuril v obespechenii bezopasnosti Rosii,” Voennaia mysl,
No. 4, 2002, pp. 69-71.

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Japan’s Security and the Russian Far East

to enter or operate. In post cold war Russia, the general view was that
this state of affairs would continue. However, due to continued nuclear
force reductions and financial considerations (the huge amounts ofmoney required to build SSBNs and units to defend them), there weresome military analysts within Russia who commented that it would be
more rational to limit SSBN operations to one area only – namely the
Artic Sea.9 Furthermore, in an environment that has seen planning forthe next generation of Russian SSBNs greatly delayed and an overalltendency towards reduction of Russian naval power, one subject ofinterest is whether Russia could maintain its persistence regarding
operating SSBN in the Sea of Okhotsk.10
During the cold war, Russian military forces stationed in the
Northern Territories had been increased from the late-1970s into the
1980s. These forces represented an issue of great concern to Japanese
security. Currently, however, as part of the Japanese interest in
negotiating the Northern Territories return, one issue is whether or not
the withdrawal of Russian forces commenced in the 1990s will actually
be total. As mentioned previously, during public hearings held by the
Russian Parliament in July 1992, the Russian military stressed the“strategic importance of the Southern Kuriles.” In contrast, as a resultof advances in Japan-Russia relations due to President Yeltsin’s state
visit to Japan at the start of 1994, some attention was gained by anarticle that appeared in “Military Thought” that stated the following:“A military strategy stressing total defense in protecting the Sea of
Okhotsk and surrounding coastal regions from American attack isanachronistic, and it is a fallacy to consider the border disputes withJapan against such a backcloth.”11
With regard to the strategic importance of the Northern Territories,
among Russian military experts, there are two schools of thought. One
supports the cold war argument that adheres to the idea of the Sea of
9

Aleksei Arbatov and Boris Makeev, “The Kurile Barrier,” New Times, No. 43,
1992, pp. 24-25; Boris Makeev, “Kuril’skaia problema: voennyi aspekt,”
Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 1, 1993, p. 58.
10 Boeicho, Nihon no boei, 2003, pp. 28, 69.
11 A.V. Boliatko, “Voenno-politicheskaia situatsiia i problemy formirovaniia novoi
struktury bezopasnosti v Severo-Vostochnoi Azii” Voennaia mysl, No. 2, 1994, pp.
5-6.

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Nakano Junzo

Okhotsk being a military bastion for Russian naval forces. Adherents
oppose any “handing over of the Southern Kuriles.” On the other hand,
there are those who believe that, from an arms control perspective,
Russia would be better served by escaping from its cold war strategy
and seeking to resolve the Northern Territories dispute.12 For Russia, acountry that has given up on its policy of strategic nuclear parity with
the United States, cold war military strategy should not act as a barrier
to successful resolution of the Northern Territories dispute.

Sino-Russian Relations in the Russian Far East and Japan
After the inauguration of the Gorbachev administration, China andRussia successfully negotiated demarcation of the border and military
reductions along their eastern border prior to the birth of the RussianFederation. These actions calmed border tensions that had previously
escalated to clashes between Chinese and Soviet forces. In April 1997,
Russia and China signed the agreement on mutual reduction of armed
forces in the border areas. This was followed in November 1997 by theannouncement of demarcation of the eastern border between the twocountries. This solidified the foundation of the “strategic partnership”
announced by Russia and China in April of the previous year. 13
12 Aleksei Arbatov and A.V. Boliatko believe in the latter.
13 Although both Russia and China have worked towards demarcation of the Easternborder in accordance with the agreement on the eastern section of the border
between China and the former Soviet Union, signed in May 1991, discussions
regarding the return of two islands in the Amur River and one island in the Argun
River lapsed. As such, all three remain under Russian control (Problemy Dal’nego
Vostoka, No. 6, 1997, pp. 20-21; Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, No. 11-12, pp. 4-5).
Negotiations on the mutual reduction of military forces in the border areas havebeen difficult. Because of this, the agreement regarding confidence building in the
military field in the border areas was separated from the agreement on mutual
reduction of armed forces in the border areas and signed in April 1996. The
following five countries are parties to the agreement: the Russian Federation, theRepublic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and thePeople’s Republic of China. The same five countries are signatories to “theagreement on mutual reduction of armed forces in the border areas.” Under theterms of this agreement, the four Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) andChina agree to limit ground forces, front-line air forces and air defense forces
stationed within 100 kilometers of the border. Manpower numbers are limited to a

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Japan’s Security and the Russian Far East

Furthermore, in a bid to both counter the unilateralism of US power
and to stand firm against independence and secessionist factions withineach country, both countries signed the Sino-Russian treaty of
Good-neighbourliness, Friendship, and Cooperation of July 2001. The
partnership between both countries seemed solid, coupled withexpanded economic relations. However, as had been pointed out earlier,there was a subtle divergence between the interests of both countries,
as Russia came to realize the potential non-military threat presented by
China.
In May 1996 (the month following the announcement of the“strategic partnership”), the publicly-released “Russian Federation
Security Draft Policy (1996-2000)” highlighted the following issues:
the significant population drains from both the Russian Far East andEastern Siberia and the tendency of these regions towards separationfrom European Russia in favor of closer economic ties with immediateneighboring countries. The document also included the following
quote: “The largest potential threat lies in China, which is beginning toexert both economic and population influence in the Far East. We
cannot help being anxious about the stalling of political discussions
with Japan and the lack of progress in the normalization of
Russia-Japan relations.”14
maximum of 134,000 personnel for each side. While strategic forces such as
strategic rocket forces, naval units, long-range air forces, air defense force’s
missile units and border guards are excluded from these manpower caps, there areupper limits on the number of border guard personnel and the types of weaponsand equipment they can deploy (Nezavisimaia gazeta, April 25, 1997, p. 1;
Rossiiskaia gazeta, April 25, 1997, p. 3; Krasnaia zvezda, April 25, 1997, p. 1).
According to Izvestiia, within the area specified by the agreement, Russia will not
cut its stationed forces because they already fall below the upper manpower limits
stipulated. It also reported that China continues to only deploy border protection
units within the 100 km radius (Izvestiia, April 15, 1997, p. 3).
14 Iurii M. Baturin, the presidential advisor on national security at the time, played a
key role in the development of the draft. Among its analysis of military andpolitical situations, the draft commented on the impact of the following threeissues: 1) The impact of the West and neighboring Muslim countries on theCentral Asia and Caucasus regions; 2) The eastern expansion of NATO; 3) The
potential threat presented by China (Nezavisimaia gazeta stsenarii, May 23, 1996,
p. 2). The draft analysis of the eastern expansion of NATO was used in thepresidential address with some small corrections in the terminology. However, the- 47 -

Nakano Junzo

In the presidential address on national security (1996-2000) given
in June 1996 by President Yeltsin, however, no similar references were
made.15 If the evolution of Russian foreign policy towards Asia at thetime is considered, it was very much skewed towards China. However,as the draft clearly shows, even at that time within Russian policy
circles there was an awareness of the distortion in diplomatic policy
towards Asia caused by the focus on China, as well as policy debatesthat stressed the importance of improving and strengthening
Russia-Japan relations.
The Russia-China Joint Declaration in April 1996 announced a“strategic partnership.” In order to heighten the economic relations
between Russia and China that started simply with direct cross-border
trade and barter, it advocated promotion of large-scale projects such asenergy, machinery manufacture, aerospace and transportation. 16
Among these, cooperation in the energy sector that sought to realize
linkage of China’s robust energy demand with Siberia’s vast oil andnatural gas reserves seemed most promising. During the state visit of
Jiang Zemin to Russia to sign the Sino-Russian treaty in July 2001, anagreement between the countries was signed regarding the plan to lay
down an oil pipeline, and the research of related technical andeconomic issues. The agreement was signed in order to deliver 20
million tonnes of oil to China annually from 2005, and to increase thisto 30 million tonnes from 2010.17 Considering that this agreement wasother two issues were not referred to in the presidential address (Nezavisimaia
gazeta, June 14, 1996).
15 As an issue of diplomacy, reference was made to increasing relationships withcountries in the Asia-Pacific region. Specific reference was made to China andJapan. With regard to relations with China, the address included the sentence“Developing a dynamic strategic partnership as we move towards the 21stCentury.” With regard to relations between Russia and Japan, the address included
the expression “Coordinating a cooperative relationship that works towards thesigning of a peace treaty.” The difference between these two expressions showed
the difference in warmth between the two relationships. Relations with China
were expressed in terms of continuation, while those with Japan were expressedin terms of improvement. It might be said that such wording towards Japan
expressed the importance placed on the Japan relationship at that time
(Nezavisimaia gazeta, June 14, 1996, p. 8).
16 Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, No. 5, 1996, p. 18.
17 Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, No. 8, 2001, p. 30.

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Japan’s Security and the Russian Far Eastsigned by the leader of China who executed a basic treaty with Russia,
there could be little doubt that this project would be realized.
However, in April 2002, an article written by a Russian oil
specialist outlining the problems associated with laying a pipeline from
Eastern Siberia (Angarsk) to China (Daqing) appeared in a Russian
newspaper. The article pointed out that laying a single pipeline
between Angarsk and Daqing would effectively make China the single
purchaser of Russian oil. As the single purchaser, the article argued
that China could effectively control the Russian oil production industry
by controlling the setting of prices. Considering this, the article
suggested that in the interest of increasing the number of sales
channels (potential buyers), the pipeline should be extended to
Nakhodka on the Russian Pacific coast. 18 Since the article waspublished, debate within the Russian press has been rather vigorous
regarding whether the proposed pipeline route should end at Daqing or
continue on to the Russian Pacific coast.
For the Russian government, energy policy represents an integral
part of the national development strategy. It is not merely seen as
another means by which to build foreign currency reserves. Throughrealization of the project, Vladimir Putin sees the East Siberia pipeline
as an opportunity to genuinely develop the Siberia and Russian Far
East regions. At a National Security Council meeting held to consider
Russian Far East problems in November 2002, he clearly stated thatthe decision on the Eastern Siberia pipeline route must be made basedon the interest of benefiting the Russian Far East. 19 Furthermore,during Koizumi’s visit to Russia in January 2003, the “Japan-Russia
Action Plan” that was released stated the following: “In order to realizea project in the Russian Far East and the Siberian region to develop
energy resources and construct a pipeline for transportation of such
resources, both sides will promote specific cooperation.”20 Behind thisstatement lay the Japanese desire to diversify its sources of oil for
18 Nezavisimaia gazeta, April 2, 2002, p. 5.
19 Svetlana Babaeva, Oleg Zhunusov, and Mariia Ignatova, “Neft poidet drugim
putem,” Izvestiia, December 9, 2002, http://www.izvestia.ru/economic/article275
60.
20 http:www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/russia/kodo_0301.html.

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security reasons. This desire matched the Russian national
development strategy of diversifying its oil pipeline.
In his annual state of the nation address in May 2004, Putin
remarked that “Poor rail networks, oil pipelines, gas transportation
systems and energy industry infrastructure represent serious
impediments to economic development.” He also confirmed that
including determining pipeline routes from oilfields in Eastern Siberia,
it was important for Russia to diversify delivery of Russian oil.
Decisions should be the realization of national tasks, and not theinterests of individual companies.21
Realizing energy projects in Siberia and the Russian Far East canalso benefit Japan as long as they are economically viable because they
improve Japanese energy security. At the current time, construction of
the Nakhodka route that supports building infrastructure in Siberia andthe Russian Far East seems preferable. However, including the pipeline
route issue, it is neither desirable for Russia or Japan that Japan and
China get into a zero sum game regarding the overall development ofSiberia and the Russian Far East. For various development projects,
multinational cooperation including China, South Korea and theUnited States is desirable. Such cooperation does not just reduce theeconomic cost burden of such projects but also prevents the
manifestation of distrustful feelings among Japan, China and Russia.

Russian Policy Towards the Korean Peninsula and Japan
From a security perspective, Japan and Russia share common concerns
regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Within theJapan-Russia Action Plan, as part of the “promotion of activities anddiscussions within the strategic partnership,” it was announced thatboth countries would aim to form a framework that allowed for
multilateral dialogues on Northeast Asian security. Both countries also
agreed to increase high level dialogues regarding the Korean Peninsula
due to their awareness that the non-nuclear status of the Peninsula wasvital for retaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia.22
21 Rosiiskaia gazeta, May 27, 2004, p. 4.
22 http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/russia/kodo_0301.html.

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Japan’s Security and the Russian Far East

The problem of North Korean nuclear weapons development
represents a direct and serious security threat to Japan. Meanwhile,
because North Korean nuclear missiles are not aimed directly at Russia,
it might be possible to say that North Korea’s nuclear program does not
represent a direct threat to Russia. However, in the summer of 2003,
Russia convened a Civil Defense meeting to discuss the impact ofradioactive fallout on the Russian Far East as a result of nuclear
weapons usage on the Korean Peninsula. Military exercises were also
held that simulated a large-scale exodus of North Korean refugees into
Russia. Considering Russian territorial security, these actions indicatedthat Russia is not taking the threat posed by North Korean nuclear
weapons development lightly.23
More than anything else, for Japan a successful resolution of theNorth Korean nuclear weapons problem means the removal of aserious threat. For Russia, resolution offers an environment in which it
could benefit from being able to participate in plans to reconstruct theNorth Korean economy. Within North Korea there is an infrastructurebase built largely on economic support provided by the former Soviet
Union. Russia would like to reconstruct this base using a combinationof Japanese and South Korean funds and Russian technological support.
Also, through multilateral cooperation, Russia would like to see a rail
network that runs through the Korean Peninsula linked to theTrans-Siberian Railroad. It would also like a gas pipeline from Eastern
Siberia laid into the Korean Peninsula. Such projects could result ingenuine development of the Siberia and Russian Far East regions. In
2000, through direct discussions between the leaders of South andNorth Korea, and through negotiations held between the United States
23

If it is considered that the timing of the civil defense meeting and the military
exercises was immediately prior the first round of discussions between North
Korea and other members of the six Nation Group regarding North Korea’s
nuclear program (end of August of the same year), it is possible that Russia
leveraged these activities to apply pressure to North Korea to ensure its
cooperation in discussions. On the same day that North Korea signaled it would
participate in the 6-way meetings (July 31, 2003), Izvestiia reported that, in orderto prevent nuclear weapon usage by Pyongyang, there were discussions heldamong officers of the Russian Pacific Fleet regarding deployment of naval units
for a preventative strike against North Korean nuclear facilities (Izvestiia, July 31,
2003, pp. 1-2).

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and North Korea, there was some progress in reducing tensions. It wasthought that these actions would lead to the promise of multinational
economic cooperation on the Korean Peninsula. As everybody knows,
however, revision of US policy towards North Korea by the Bush
Administration combined with the subsequent North Korean backlash
and its tendency towards diplomatic brinkmanship meant that tensions
again increased and any hope of multinational economic cooperation
was lost. For Russia, who is playing a role in diplomatic negotiations
to remove the nuclear threat from the Korean Peninsula, there is somehope regarding the commencement of economic cooperative projects
on the Korean Peninsula once stability is achieved.
In moving towards a reduction of tensions on the Korean
Peninsula, the Presidents of Russia and South Korea held a meeting in
New York in September of 2000. At this meeting, a basic agreement
was obtained on the construction of a railway that would connect
South Korea and Russia via the Trans-Siberian Railroad, thedevelopment of the Siberian Irkutsk gas fields and the building ofindustrial parks within the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone. The
meeting also agreed to consider North Korean and Japaneseparticipation in these projects.24 Russia showed some opposition to theidea of having a Korean Peninsula railway join the Trans-Siberian
Railway via China. Instead, it proposed realization of a project thatjoined the Korean Peninsula railway with Khasan in the Russian Far
East. Based on its evaluation of North Korea’s domestic railway
network, Russian experts felt that such a plan would need some $2.5
billion in funding.25
For both Russia and South Korea, there is some expectation thatafter any normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea,
Japan will offer massive amounts of economic aid to North Korea.
From the perspective of Japan’s security, in order to bring stability to
the Korean Peninsula after removing the nuclear threat, reconstructionof North Korea’s economy is necessary to drag North Korea into aframework of multinational cooperation. Due to North Korea’s
economic size and its close physical location vis-à-vis the Russian Far
24 http://japan.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2000//09/09/20000909000002.html.
25 http://vn.vladnews.ru/Arch/2004/ISS403/News/upd19_2.HTM- 52 -

Japan’s Security and the Russian Far East

East, most of its business and economic relations are tied to theRussian Far East. Because of this, the region of the Russian Far East
represents the key for Japan in its attempts to participate inmultinational cooperation with its interest in stabilizing the Korean
Peninsula.

Conclusion
As mentioned earlier, in discussing the military situation around Japan,
since 1994 the three major areas of focus of the Defense White Paper
have been (in order) the Korean Peninsula, the Russian Far East andChina. In the 2003 White Paper, the order of the Russian Far East andChina reversed. As such, the Korean Peninsula was No. 1, China was
No. 2 and the Russian Far East was No. 3. Furthermore, in terms ofanalysis report volume, reporting on the Russian Far East wasapproximately one-third of that posted on both the Korean Peninsula
and China. Such White Paper analyses clearly show where Japan’s
military security interest lies. When discussing the objectives behind
China’s modernization of its armed forces, the 2003 White Paper statedthat it was “important to keep an eye on China whether its militarystrength exceeds the level necessary for self-defense.” On the other
hand, it judged that there was “little possibility in the foreseeable
future that the Russian military would return to the size or structure it
had enjoyed during the cold war period.”26
However, as mentioned previously, it should be said that whilefrom a security perspective Japan’s level of interest in the Russian Far
East continues to decline in comparative terms, its importance forexternal strategy continues to increase. During the cold war period,
Japan saw the Soviet Far East as a “source of threat” and worked with
the US simply to contain it militarily. On the contrary, the current
approach to the Russian Far East is more complex for Japan. This isbecause the Russian Far East is related to Japan’s external strategies
such as the stability of the Korean Peninsula, constructive partnershipwith China, and energy security.

26

Boeicho, Nihon no boei, 2003, pp. 29, 64, 68.

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Nakano Junzo

Postscript
In June 2004, Vladimir Putin inspected a Russian naval base on the Kamchatka
Peninsula. While there he declared that Russian Far East naval forces, including
strategic nuclear maritime forces, should remain deployed in the region. However,considering the slow pace of Russia’s naval construction and the increasing number ofdecommissioned units, it remains unclear as to whether Russia can carry on with its
deployments of SSBN units in the Sea of Okhotsk (see Krasnaia Zvezda, June 25,
2004, p. 1; October 19, 2004, p. 3).
In October 2004 during a state visit to China by Putin, a border agreement was signed
between the two countries. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov,
Russia agreed to cede control of one complete island and part of another island to
China. While the Bol’shoi Island in the Argun River remains under Russian control,
the Tarabarov Island and the western half of Bol’shoi Ussuriiskii Island in the Amur
River were handed over to China (see http://www.interfax.ru/r/B/0/2.html?menu=1&id_issue=10720392).
Prior to this visit to China, Putin told Chinese media representatives that any decisionon the route of the Eastern Siberia-Asia Oil Pipeline must take into consideration
Russia’s own interest in developing the Russian Far East (see http://www.strana.ru/print/229530.html).
The 2004 edition of Japan’s Defense White Paper echoes the 2003 edition in its
analysis of Chinese and Russian military forces (see Boeicho, Nihon no boei, 2004, pp.
58, 62).
On 31 December 2004 the Russian media reported that Russian Prime Minister
Mikhail Fradkov had signed a directive on the construction of the Taishet-Nakhodka
oil pipeline route (see http://www.strana.ru/print/237179.html).

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