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Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear DoctrineHome › Public Diplomacy › E-Books › In Focus Article

Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian NuclearDoctrine
August 17, 1999
Opening Remarks by National Security Adviser Mr. Brajesh Mishra at the Release of the Draft Report
1.Preamble

2.Objectives

3.Nuclear Forces

4.Credibility and Survivability

5.Command and Control

6. Security and Safety

7. Research and Development

8.Disarmament and Arms Control

1. Preamble
1. The use of nuclear weapons in particular as well as other weapons of mass destruction
constitutes the gravest threat to humanity and to peace and stability in the international system.
Unlike the other two categories of weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical
weapons which have been outlawed by international treaties, nuclear weapons remain
instruments for national and collective security, the possession of which on a selective basis has
been sought to be legitimised through permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty (NPT) in May 1995. Nuclear weapon states have asserted that they will continue to rely on
nuclear weapons with some of them adopting policies to use them even in a non-nuclear context.
These developments amount to virtual abandonment of nuclear disarmament. This is a serious
setback to the struggle of the international community to abolish weapons of mass destruction.
2. India's primary objective is to achieve economic, political, social, scientiﬁc and technologicaldevelopment within a peaceful and democratic framework. This requires an environment ofdurable peace and insurance against potential risks to peace and stability. It will be India'sendeavour to proceed towards this overall objective in cooperation with the global democratic
trends and to play a constructive role in advancing the international system toward a just,peaceful and equitable order.
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3. Autonomy of decision making in the developmental process and in strategic matters is aninalienable democratic right of the Indian people. India will strenuously guard this right in a world
where nuclear weapons for a select few are sought to be legitimised for an indeﬁnite future, andwhere there is growing complexity and frequency in the use of force for political purposes.
4. India's security is an integral component of its development process. India continuously aims at
promoting an ever-expanding area of peace and stability around it so that developmental
priorities can be pursued without disruption.
5. However, the very existence of oﬀensive doctrine pertaining to the ﬁrst use of nuclear weapons
and the insistence of some nuclear weapons states on the legitimacy of their use even against
non-nuclear weapon countries constitute a threat to peace, stability and sovereignty of states.
6. This document outlines the broad principles for the development, deployment and employment
of India's nuclear forces. Details of policy and strategy concerning force structures, deployment
and employment of nuclear forces will ﬂow from this framework and will be laid down separately
and kept under constant review.
^top
2. Objectives
1. In the absence of global nuclear disarmament India's strategic interests require eﬀective, credible
nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail. This is consistent
with the UN Charter, which sanctions the right of self-defence.
2. The requirements of deterrence should be carefully weighed in the design of Indian nuclear
forces and in the strategy to provide for a level of capability consistent with maximum credibility,survivability, eﬀectiveness, safety and security.
3. India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of "retaliation
only", the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic
environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size
components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of thesefactors. India's peacetime posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that :(a) any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter thethreat: and (b) any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with
nuclear weapons to inﬂict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.
4. The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use ofnuclear weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the ﬁrst toinitiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.
5. India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do notpossess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.
6. Deterrence requires that India maintain:(a) Suﬃcient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces,(b) a robust command and control system,(c) eﬀective intelligence and early warning capabilities, andhttp://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18916/

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Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine(d) comprehensive planning and training for operations in line with the strategy, and(e) the will to employ nuclear forces and weapons
7. Highly eﬀective conventional military capabilities shall be maintained to raise the threshold ofoutbreak both of conventional military conﬂict as well as that of threat or use of nuclearweapons.
^top
3. Nuclear Forces
1. India's nuclear forces will be eﬀective, enduring, diverse, ﬂexible, and responsive to therequirements in accordance with the concept of credible minimum deterrence. These forces will
be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets in keeping withthe objectives outlined above. Survivability of the forces will be enhanced by a combination ofmultiple redundant systems, mobility, dispersion and deception.
2. The doctrine envisages assured capability to shift from peacetime deployment to fully
employable forces in the shortest possible time, and the ability to retaliate eﬀectively even in acase of signiﬁcant degradation by hostile strikes.
^top
4. Credibility and Survivability
The following principles are central to India's nuclear deterrent:
1. Credibility: Any adversary must know that India can and will retaliate with suﬃcient nuclear
weapons to inﬂict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will ﬁnd unacceptable if
nuclear weapons are used against India and its forces.
2. Eﬀectiveness: The eﬃcacy of India's nuclear deterrent be maximised through synergy among all
elements involving reliability, timeliness, accuracy and weight of the attack.
3. Survivability:
I. India's nuclear forces and their command and control shall be organised for very highsurvivability against surprise attacks and for rapid punitive response. They shall be designedand deployed to ensure survival against a ﬁrst strike and to endure repetitive attrition
attempts with adequate retaliatory capabilities for a punishing strike which would be
unacceptable to the aggressor.
II. Procedures for the continuity of nuclear command and control shall ensure a continuingcapability to eﬀectively employ nuclear weapons.

^top
5. Command and Control
1. Nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for use at the highest political level. The
authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India,
or the designated successor(s).
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2. An eﬀective and survivable command and control system with requisite ﬂexibility andresponsiveness shall be in place. An integrated operational plan, or a series of sequential plans,predicated on strategic objectives and a targetting policy shall form part of the system.
3. For eﬀective employment the unity of command and control of nuclear forces including dual
capable delivery systems shall be ensured.
4. The survivability of the nuclear arsenal and eﬀective command, control, communications,computing, intelligence and information (C412) systems shall be assured.
5. The Indian defence forces shall be in a position to, execute operations in an NBC environment
with minimal degradation.
6. Space based and other assets shall be created to provide early warning, communications,
damage/detonation assessment.
^top
6. Security and Safety
1. Security: Extraordinary precautions shall be taken to ensure that nuclear weapons, theirmanufacture, transportation and storage are fully guarded against possible theft, loss, sabotage,
damage or unauthorised access or use.
2. Safety is an absolute requirement and tamper proof procedures and systems shall be instituted
to ensure that unauthorised or inadvertent activation/use of nuclear weapons does not takeplace and risks of accident are avoided.
3. Disaster control: India shall develop an appropriate disaster control system capable of handlingthe unique requirements of potential incidents involving nuclear weapons and materials.
^top
7. Research and Development
1. India should step up eﬀorts in research and development to keep up with technological advancesin this ﬁeld.
2. While India is committed to maintain the deployment of a deterrent which is both minimum andcredible, it will not accept any restraints on building its R&D capability.
^top
8. Disarmament and Arms Control
1. Global, veriﬁable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament is a national security objective.
India shall continue its eﬀorts to achieve the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world at an earlydate.
2. Since no-ﬁrst use of nuclear weapons is India's basic commitment, every eﬀort shall be made topersuade other States possessing nuclear weapons to join an international treaty banning ﬁrst
use.

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3. Having provided unqualiﬁed negative security assurances, India shall work for internationallybinding unconditional negative security assurances by nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear
weapon states.
4. Nuclear arms control measures shall be sought as part of national security policy to reduce
potential threats and to protect our own capability and its eﬀectiveness.
5. In view of the very high destructive potential of nuclear weapons, appropriate nuclear risk
reduction and conﬁdence building measures shall be sought, negotiated and instituted.

^topOpening Remarks by National Security Adviser Mr. Brajesh Mishra at the Release of Draft Indian
Nuclear Doctrine
August 1 7,1999
Ladies & Gentlemen,
I am happy to present to you the draft of the Nuclear Doctrine prepared by the National Security Board. A
copy has been placed in each of the seats in the hall. We have decided to make this document public in
keeping with our position in favour of greater transparency in decision-making. Please note that this is adraft proposed by the NSAB and has not yet been approved by the Government. That will have to wait
until after the general elections.
As our thinking on the nuclear tests has been fairly well publicised, I do not intend to go over the groundagain. Suﬃce it to say that this was a step necessitated by the security environment and our need toensure for ourselves the element of strategic autonomy in decision making which we will need in the
coming years. Our position has all along been that global security would be enhanced by the universal
elimination of all nuclear weapons, and this remains our conviction today. Unfortunately, the indeﬁnite
extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 was in the reverse direction.
Our nuclear weapons are not country-speciﬁc but, as I mentioned earlier, are aimed at providing us theautonomy of exercising strategic choices in the best interest of our country, without fear or coercion in a
nuclearised environment. That being so, we have adopted a policy of minimum deterrence as the basic
building block of our nuclear thinking. Minimum but credible deterrence is the watchword of our nuclear
doctrine. From this, ﬂows the decision to adopt a no-ﬁrst-use posture. We have therefore given
unconditional guarantees to States that do not have nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear
weapon powers.
A cardinal principle regarding the use of nuclear weapons is that of civilian control. Only the electedcivilian leader of the country is empowered to authorise the use of nuclear weapons. As the recent
operations in Kargil have demonstrated, our system and the political leadership, believe with great
responsibility and restraint, as you would expect from the largest democracy in the world. This sense ofresponsibility will also guide our actions with regard to nuclear weapons.
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With these words, I have great pleasure in releasing the document for public discussion and debate.

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