Why do Diasporas Re-Emigrate to their Historical “Homelands”? A Case Study of Koryo Saram’s “Return” from Post-Soviet Uzbekistan to South Korea (LEE)

Why do Diasporas Re-Emigrate to their Historical “Homelands”?
A Case Study of Koryo Saram’s “Return” from Post-Soviet
Uzbekistan to South Korea
Jinhye LEE*

Abstract:
The name Koryo Saram describes the Korean diaspora who are living in the former Soviet
Union, and it is their self-identification. The Koryo Saram have been segregated into various
subgroups, based on the policies and cultures of their countries of origin and residence fromthe Soviet era to the modern era. Simultaneously, the community has been forming
transboundary networks expanding beyond their countries of origin and residence. This
study focuses on the unprecedented increase in the number of Uzbekistani immigrants since2007, when the Koryo Saram began returning to South Korea as compatriots. Exploring thiscase will make it possible to closely examine the dynamics of the minority communities inCentral Asia. Moreover, by examining the factors accounting for diasporic return migration,
empirical evidence concerning the globalized modern diaspora may be revealed. Therefore,
this study investigates the return migration of diaspora minorities to their historicalhomeland focused on a case study of Koryo Saram migration from Uzbekistan to South
Korea and identifies the steps necessary for their integration into the host society andfulfilling a multicultural coexistence. Furthermore, it presents novel findings of diaspora
research and captures the social dynamism of the minority communities in Central Asia.
Keywords: Koryo Saram, diaspora, return migration, Uzbekistan, overseas Korean

1. Introduction
Today’s international migration is globalized and diversified by the development of informationand communication technologies, as well as the expansion of cross-border networks. Therefore,“diaspora,” which cannot be grasped purely by the existing framework of “nation,” is defined as agroup of migrants with a strong identity from both the country of origin and the host society. They
often have a cross-border network and have close interactions between countries. Understanding thenotion of diaspora has great significance in grasping the gap between ethnic groups, ethnicities, and*Assistant Professor, Kinugasa Research Organization, Ritsumeikan University.
Email: jlr22051@fc.ritsumei.ac.jp
Received on 2023/1/27, accepted after peer reviews on 2023/6/20.

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51

Journal of the Asia-Japan Research Institute of Ritsumeikan University Volume 5 • October 2023

the identity of the state and individuals. However, in comparison to its importance, we still identify
limitations in terms of modern nationalism across related studies (Hayao, 2020: 11-20). In otherwords, modern concepts characterized by migration from the motherland and discrimination in thehost society have limitations in the interpretation of contemporary, voluntary, and multidimensional
diasporic situations (Yang and Li, 2009). In addition, diaspora groups are not integrated into the frameof nation in the host society, but rather they have a strong tendency to create their own ethnic identity(Laguerre, 1998; Guin, 2012; Nititham, 2020). Considering the contemporary era in which ethnic
groups and ethnicities are becoming increasingly complex due to globalization or the increase inmigration and refugee flows under various circumstances and conditions, the analysis of the group
deemed as diaspora by migration is very important for understanding the diversity of the international
community.
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to re-examine “diaspora,” with respect to a recent
phenomenon which is concerned with integration into a contemporary nation-state in a contemporary
context that is diversified and complicated by its transnational movement. It seeks to answer theacademic question: Why do diasporas re-emigrate to their historical “homelands”?
In particular, diaspora communities are accelerating in growth as they provide future generations
with the information and basic economic tools necessary for international migration (Colier, 2013:9-26). Among those communities, we would like to focus on the migration of later generations whochose to return to their historical homeland “voluntarily,” in particular, those who originated from thefirst diaspora generation and have experienced non-voluntary migration. Diasporic returning is one of
the trends of contemporary diasporic migration, and economic motivation has been pointed out as apivotal factor of migration (Markowitz and Stefansson, 2004; Tsuda, 2003; 2009; Tsuda and Song,2019). It is acknowledged that economic motivation plays a prevalent role in their migration.
However, the return or form of migration of various diaspora groups varies depending on the political,
economic, social, and cultural factors in the country of residence, as well as the return policy andsystem of the historical homeland. In other words, in order to consider the tasks of their multicultural
coexistence, a close review and comprehensive analysis of migration factors from both the country ofresidence and the host society are essential.
Meanwhile, as the subject of this study, the Koryo Saram refers to the Korean diaspora living in
the former Soviet Union. This group includes individuals who moved from the Joseon Peninsula to theRussian Far East from 1863 and were subsequently forcibly settled in Central Asia by Stalin in 1937.
They are an ethnic minority who have citizenship of the former Soviet Union (total 500,000,
approximately 170,000 in Russia, 177,000 in Uzbekistan, and 110,000 in Kazakhstan) (Lee, 2021b:
48). After the Soviet Union collapsed and the former Soviet Union states gained independence,
members of the Koryo Saram were forced to adapt and assimilate into the new political and social
systems as a minority in a multiethnic society.
The Koryo Saram are forming networks around the world through international migration in the
21st century, despite having experienced this so-called “minoritization” from the Soviet Union twice— once before the fall of the Soviet Union, and once after. From the Soviet era to the modern era, theKoryo Saram diaspora has been divided and transformed into various subgroups according to thepolicies and cultures of their respective countries of origin and residence. Their networks also crossboundaries beyond their countries of origin and residence.
The reason why the global migration of the Koryo Saram began in earnest is the socialtransformation that arose from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independence of the former
52

Why do Diasporas Re-Emigrate to their Historical “Homelands”? A Case Study of Koryo Saram’s “Return” from Post-Soviet Uzbekistan to South Korea (LEE)

Soviet countries. Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, members of the Koryo Saram
had to choose if they wanted to remain where they had lived during the Soviet era, return to their
historical homeland, or move to another post-Soviet state where political and economic conditions
were better (Lee, 2021a; 2021b; 2022). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, members of the Koryo
Saram became minority citizens of the newly independent states. As a consequence, the choice of
whether they would stay or move depended on factors such as the national integration policy of theircountry of residence and the return policy of their historical homeland.
Each country’s national integration policy centered on the titular ethnic group for that region.
This created a new challenge for each country’s non-titular ethnic groups or minorities, which directly
impacted their survival. In particular, the implementation of the titular ethnic-centered language policy
has been regarded as the most urgent issue for ethnic minorities and the Koryo Saram, who had alreadybeen Russianized in the Soviet era (Yoo, 2009: 108-112). For example, the social transformation of theKoryo Saram in Kazakhstan, who adopted both Kazakh and Russian as their official languages, isdifferent from those in Uzbekistan, who adopted only the Uzbek language as their official language.
The South Korean government’s policies regarding the return of ethnic Koreans, including themembers of Koryo Saram, were primarily the Revised Overseas Korean Act of 2004 and the Visiting
Employment System of 2007. These acts allowed the Koryo Saram to immigrate to South Korea for
the first time as compatriots (Kim, K. 2015; 2018; Sun, 2017). As mentioned above, the academic
focus of this study is the process by which the Koryo Saram chose to move from Uzbekistan to South
Korea. This paper is a case study of the Koryo Saram diaspora who returned to their homeland. This
topic is of increasing importance, considering the fact that discussions on diaspora studies are reachingan all-time high as people become more focused on diasporic integration and multicultural coexistencein the host society.
By focusing on the process of the diasporic integration into their country of residence and returnto their historical homeland, as well as tangential topics, we would like to break away from theconventional perspective of diaspora research, which focuses on the historical trauma or historicalsense of return. Furthermore, this study can contribute to multicultural symbiosis research and present
one empirical example to understand the dynamics of ethnic minorities living in Central Asian statesfrom a more diverse perspective.

2. Analysis of Previous Works and Significance of this Paper
According to Uzbekistan’s official statistics as of July 1, 2022, the country’s total population is35,603,4431. The ethnicities in Uzbekistan are Uzbeks 83.8%, Tajiks 4.8%, Kazakhs 2.5%, Russians
2.3%, Karakalpaks 2.2%, Tatars 1.5%, and others 2.9%, with the population of Koryo Saram included
in “others”2. The number of Koryo Saram living in Uzbekistan decreased from 220,000 in 1995 to
180,000 in 2014. Although a large proportion of Uzbekistan’s Koryo Saram population has already
moved to Korea, the number only keeps increasing (Lee, 2015).
In the 1990s, the independent state of Uzbekistan was formed by the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. This has resulted in various areas such as politics, economics, and education in the country
being reorganized under policies centered around the Uzbek people, who are the titular ethnic group1
2

https://www.stat.uz/ (2017 est. accessed on November 19, 2022.)
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/uzbekistan/ (2017 est. accessed on November 19, 2022.)53

Journal of the Asia-Japan Research Institute of Ritsumeikan University Volume 5 • October 2023

(Critchlow, 1991; Khalid, 2015; Obiya, 2022). In order to adapt to the new social order, a survival
strategy was necessary for the Koryo Saram, especially the younger generation. After the
independence of Uzbekistan, the Koryo Saram initially migrated to Russia and Kazakhstan. However,in the 2000s, there has been a surge in migration to South Korea. This has been a survival strategy formany who have experienced violent social changes such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, thebirth of an independent Uzbekistan, and Uzbekistan’s national integration (Kim, 2015). This can beseen as a different strategy from the Koryo Saram in Kazakhstan who chose to stay there, with the
majority choosing to live under some of the options that were given to them immediately after the
independence of the former Soviet Union States.
According to the previous studies, the two central factors leading to the increase in Uzbekistani
Koryo Saram migration to Korea are the push factors from Uzbekistan, and the pull factors into Korea.
First of all, the political, economic, and cultural factors of newly independent countries have been
pointed out as the push factors from Uzbekistan. The Uzbekistan government implemented
nationalistic policies that constrained minority groups. After realizing the limitations faced by them asa minority, the Koryo Saram established their own survival strategies to resist various political,
economic, and cultural constraints (Park and Lee, 2021; Yoon and Kim, 2016). After the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the independence of the Central Asian states, the status of the Koryo Saramchanged rapidly. The independent states have since implemented policies centering around the titularethnic group, aiming to de-Sovietize and de-Russianize their states. Uzbekistan, in particular, has had astronger nationalistic tendency compared to the other Central Asian countries. After Uzbekistan’s
independence, the country began to reorganize its administrative, political, and economic policies tocenter around the Uzbek people. Educational policies focused on the nationalization of the Uzbek
language as a means of excluding ethnic minorities, which include Russian-speaking groups (Khalid,
2021; Jones Luong, 2002; 2004; Roy, 2000). As a result, the Koryo Saram, who had already been
Russianized during the Soviet era, were marginalized and shunned by the government. They wererestricted from access to high-ranking and professional positions, thereby making them feel theirsurvival was threatened. Furthermore, not only did Uzbekistan force them to change their language,
but it also required them to socially and culturally integrate to their Uzbek norms which acted as astrong push factor from the country (Yoo, 2009).
Moreover, the Koryo Saram had a strong economic incentive to move to Korea (Lee, 2015).
Uzbekistan’s GDP is less than half of Kazakhstan’s which stands at $466.86 billion (Uzbekistan:$222.63 billion, Kazakhstan: $466.86 billion3. Due to its poor economic environment and rigid
political system, more than 2.5 million Uzbekistan citizens themselves have moved abroad in search of
employment.
The majority of the migrants have moved to either Russia, Kazakhstan, Europe, or South Korea,
with 85% choosing Russia. As of 2015, about 2.2 million Uzbekistan citizens are staying in Russia.
The aforementioned economic factors, such as fair wages and opportunities for growth in professionalroles, are the main motivators for the large outward migration from Uzbekistan. The main motivation
for the migration is economic-related factors such as the absence of jobs with appropriate wages andthe lack of more professional jobs and career opportunities in Uzbekistan (Kim, 2015).
In the preceding studies mentioned above, the resistance to the nationalistic policies that solely
support the titular ethnic group in Uzbekistan has been the strongest push factor inside the country.
3

https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook (2018 est. accessed on November 19, 2022.)54

Why do Diasporas Re-Emigrate to their Historical “Homelands”? A Case Study of Koryo Saram’s “Return” from Post-Soviet Uzbekistan to South Korea (LEE)This is an irrefutable fact. However, it is also true that there is a lack of analysis on the specific content
as to how these policies have been implemented and changed since Uzbekistan’s independence. In thecase of Kazakhstan in the Central Asian region, it has already been mentioned that the majority of
Kazakhstani Koryo Saram have chosen to stay under the options mentioned above. This is because
while Kazakhstan has also adopted nationalism centered around its titular ethnic group, the Kazakh
people, the characteristics and direction of its policies are different from Uzbekistan, especially interms of its implementation. Periodic ethnocentrism, which differs from country to country, has also
been a factor that differentiates the survival strategies of the Koryo Saram in each country. Therefore,
more detailed information should be provided regarding the process and characteristics of
Uzbekistan’s ethnocentrism in order to completely understand the push factors.
Next, as for the pull factors in Korea, previous studies mainly focus on the revision of theOverseas Koreans Act in 2004 and the implementation of the Visiting Employment System in 2007. Inother words, the presence of the Korean government’s acceptance policy in Korean migration has beena strong attraction to the country. It has also been influenced by changes in Korea’s overseas Korean
policy and foreign manpower policy.
The Korean government enacted the Foreign Technical Intern Training System (FTITS) in 1993
and the Foreign Employment Permit System (FEPS) in 2004 to resolve its manpower shortages in the
manufacturing sector. Since the implementation of the FTITS in 1993, Koryo Saram, like other foreign
workers have begun to flow into Korea as foreigners (Shin, 2013). At that time, there was no specificpolicy to accept Koryo Saram into the country as compatriots. The Overseas Koreans Act, enacted in
1999, excluded compatriots who moved abroad before the establishment of the Korean government,i.e., Koreans in China and Koreans in the former Soviet Union, on the grounds that they had neverheld Korean citizenship (Kim, Y. 2018). However, the Sakhalin Koreans, a sub-group of Russianspeaking Korean diaspora, were considered for permanent residency in Korea due to the Sakhalin
Permanent Residence Project started in the 1990s. Thus, Sakhalin’s Koreans were able to legally
migrate to the country. With the exception of the Sakhalin Koreans, most Koryo Saram experiencedsocial turmoil after the dissolution of the Soviet Union as the option to migrate to Korea was not yet inexistence.
In 2007 however, the Visiting Employment System was added to the Overseas Koreans Act which
had previously excluded ethnic Koreans in China and Koryo Saram who had moved abroad before
1945. Social resistance due to the unfair nature of this policy led to this addition to the Overseas
Korean Act. In addition, with the implementation of the overseas Korean visa system in 2008, Koryo
Saram were able to freely enter Korea and find employment in the manual labor sector. Due to this,those who had moved away from Korea before 1945 were now recognized as compatriots, leading toan increase in their migration into the country. As such, the expansion of overseas Korean visas (F-4)
affected the fully-fledged increase in the number of Koryo Saram living in Korea. Comparing thenumber of Koryo Saram F-4 visa holders from 2010 to 2013, the percentage increased substantiallyfrom 6 percent to 26 percent, respectively. Those who obtained F-4 are also eligible to invite theirchildren from their country of origin to Korea. As a result, the population of Koryo Saram has
increased (Kim, 2015: 45-46). Consequently, they are now able to obtain permanent resident status,
and are granted hopes of qualifying as, or have already become permanent residents (Park and Lee,2021).
As mentioned above, it seems that the Korea’s acceptance policy for Koryo Saram has changed inline with its foreign manpower policy and the Overseas Koreans Act. Koryo Saram’s status as55

Journal of the Asia-Japan Research Institute of Ritsumeikan University Volume 5 • October 2023

compatriots has long been an issue and since the enactment of the Overseas Koreans Act, therestrictions that had previously existed are no longer seen as a barrier to their migration to Korea.
Thus, it is becoming an increasingly stronger pull factor. Previous studies have pointed out this fact,
but there is a lack of explanation for the reason, process, and background for defining them ascompatriots. For a comprehensive understanding of the pull factors of their migration to Korea, it isnecessary to analyze the timing and overall background of the expansion and change of Korea’s
acceptance policy that has led to them being seen as compatriots.
Thus, this study aims to explain the factors surrounding the increase in migration of Koryo Saramfrom Uzbekistan. Currently, the number of Koryo Saram moving to Korea is increasing rapidly with amajority migrating to certain specific locations. Analyzing the expansion and change of overseas
Koreans, the push factors from their country of origin and pull factors in their host countries have allprovided an important clue in helping clarify the various factors for their diasporic return. In addition,
this study will provide clues as to how the host society embraces diversity due to changes in theinternational climate and how it has solved the challenges of integration into multicultural coexistence
due to the return and settlement of diaspora as well as the acceptance of refugees and migrants fromvarious other movements.

3. Theory, Methodology and Sources
As mentioned above, this paper aims to clarify the factors that have led to the increased migrationof Uzbekistan’s Koryo Saram to Korea. It also focuses on investigating the following researchquestion. How might we explain the recent increase in migration of Uzbekistan’s Koryo Saram to
Korea? In order to answer this research question, we would like to clarify the following two factors:
What is pushing the movement out of Uzbekistan? And what is pulling the movement towards South
Korea?
Firstly, the paper aims to understand the push factors leading to movement out of Uzbekistan. We
establish a research hypothesis that the migration of the Koryo Saram out of Uzbekistan is in response
to nationalistic policies that focus solely on supporting the country’s own titular ethnic group. In
particular, the push factors are clarified by closely examining the process of adopting the Uzbek
language as the official state language, which lacks consideration for the Russian-speaking ethnic
minority groups across the country. Using statistical data from both countries, we intend to analyze therelationship between the research hypothesis and the actual migration increase phenomenon byhighlighting the policy changes as the reasoning for the increase in population outflow.
Secondly, this paper uncovers the pull factors encouraging an inward migration to South Korea,
by examining Korea’s recognition of the Koryo Saram as compatriots. As mentioned above, the fullfledged migration of Koryo Saram to Korea began with the implementation of changes to the Overseas
Korean Act in 2007. Many analyses on the implementation and performance of this policy have been
done. Although it is important to understand the Korean government’s position and change in thetarget area due to changes in the international situation in the study of diasporic return migration, there
have been only a few studies on the process and detailed background to the recognition of certain of
the Koryo Saram as compatriots. Therefore, this paper seeks to examine the process of the Koryo
Saram’s recognition as compatriots by the Korean government. We will mainly consider related
literature and statistical data to analyze the timing and overall background of the expansion and changeof Korea’s acceptance policy. This work will provide a foundation for a comprehensive understanding56

Why do Diasporas Re-Emigrate to their Historical “Homelands”? A Case Study of Koryo Saram’s “Return” from Post-Soviet Uzbekistan to South Korea (LEE)of the full extent of the factors for Koryo Saram’s migration to Korea.

4. Discussion
1) Uzbekistan’s Language Reform and Koryo Saram’s Migration
In the republics of Central Asia, we have been seeing a rapid movement towards de-Russification,
pursued mainly for political and sociological reasons. The states have been set up to oversee language
reform, dealing with two main missions, “de-Russification” and “nationalization.” The question of
language is particularly sensitive because it distinguishes participating citizens from passive citizens.
All the republics had already installed their titular language as the national language before they
declared independence (Roy, 2000: 168-170).
In other words, each republic already had its own national language during the Soviet period, butmany of the constituent peoples were Russianized. Since gaining independence after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, the de-Russification and nationalization of each newly independent country has been
carried out based on this environmental context. Among them, the overall rationale for national
integration in each country in Central Asia is to integrate non-titular ethnic groups around the titularethnic group. This is no different from the so-called self-ethnic nationalistic policy centered on thepeople, language, history, and culture of the titular ethnic group. However, the national integration ofeach country differs in its implementation depending on its characteristics, such as the population of
the titular ethnic group, ethnic composition, language condition, and economic structure (Lee, 2021a:
262-263).
At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russians were 50.78%, Ukrainians 15.45%,
Uzbeks 5.84%, Belarusians 3.51%, Kazakhs 2.85%, Azeris 2.38%, Armenians 1.62%, Tajiks 1.48%,
Georgians 1.39%, Moldovans 1.17%, Lithuanians 1.07%, Turkmens 0.95%, Kyrgyzs 0.39%, Latvians
0.51%, Estonians 0.36%, and others 0.75%4. Table 1 shows the ethnic composition of Uzbekistan, oneof the independent Central Asian countries based on this ethnic composition.5
Table 1. Changes in ethnic composition in Uzbekistan (unit %)5
1994

1996

2017

Uzbek

71.4

80

83.8

Russian

8.3

5.5

2.3

Tajik

4.7

5

4.8

Kazakh

4.1

3

2.5

Karakalpak

2.4

2.5

2.2

Tatar

2.1

1.5

1.5

Others

7

2.5

2.9

Source: The CIA World Factbook 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2007, 2010, 2011,2014, 2017.

This country gained independence based on the Uzbeks, who were the majority of its people. As
can be seen from the changes in ethnic composition since independence, the number of Uzbeks
4
5

The 1991 CIA World Factbook.
According to this data, ethnic composition statistics from 1996 to 2016 are not updated.

57

Journal of the Asia-Japan Research Institute of Ritsumeikan University Volume 5 • October 2023

increased, and the number of non-Uzbeks such as Russians, Kazakhs, and Tatars decreased. In
particular, it is characterized by having the largest decrease in Russians as well as a decrease inminority groups corresponding to “others.”
In this section, we would like to review the language policies among Uzbek-centered national
integration strategies based on the factors of the decrease in the number of non-Uzbek people in the
country so as to resolve the previous hypothesis that their outflow from the country is due to thesepolicies.
Uzbekistan has registered Uzbek as its official language and has implemented public education in
Uzbek in its rapid nation-building process. There have been two major revisions to the language law.
The first, which designated the state language, was implemented in October 1989, and the second wasa modification in December 1995. When Russian was replaced with Uzbek, an important question
arose as to what status should be assigned to the Russian language. This was important in terms ofrestructuring the relationship between Uzbeks and non-Uzbeks, including Russians, that is,reorganizing the nationalist framework of the country. In the first revision, the Uzbek language wasdefined as the only official national language, and Russian was given the status of an official language
between ethnic groups (Collins, 2006: 146-150). Regardless of the ethnic distinction, it was a realistic
acknowledgment that groups of Russian-speaking people in the Soviet era were superior. In the second
revision, however, Russian was downgraded to a status equal to that of the non-Uzbek languages. In
other words, the status and scope of the use of Uzbek have been expanded. However, this did not justchange the scope of use of Uzbek in everyday life. The most significant change was that public
education began to be conducted in Uzbek and this has been expanding (Critchlow, 1991: 99-110),contributing to the outflow of non-Uzbeks from Uzbekistan for economic reasons.
Based on this strong and rapid language reform, the biggest driving force for national integration
centered on key ethnic groups is the size of the key ethnic group in the country. In this regard,
Uzbekistan is also the region with the highest key ethnic population among Central Asian countries.
Meanwhile, in the case of Kazakhstan, it is the country with the smallest ethnic population inCentral Asia, and from independence until 1999, Kazakhs, were in the minority. Before securing
majority status, Russians were the largest majority, and Russian-speaking groups were far superior in
numbers to Kazakh language speakers (Lee, 2022: 49). After independence, there were two revisions
to the language law until the status of Kazakh and Russian under the current language law of thecountry was confirmed. In the revision of the language law of the country, the Kazakh language has
not been changed as the national language, but the question of what status should be given to Russian
has been the main problem. In 1993, the first revision declared Kazakh as Kazakhstan’s only national
language with the aim of establishing a nation-state in which Kazakhs were the main subjects.
However, the law was revised in 1995 to recognize Russian as a language that was officially usedequally with Kazakh due to massive opposition from Russian-speaking groups and criticism for notconsidering the ethnic composition and language situation of the country (Fireman, 1998:176-177;
Dave, 2004: 128-132). Currently, Kazakhstan is a so-called legally bilingual country. In other words,
Uzbekistan only designates Uzbek as its official language, but Kazakhstan designates Kazakh andRussian as its official languages.
As such, the population of the titular ethnic group becomes an important condition in theimplementation of national integration centered on titular ethnicity. Uzbekistan, like other Central
Asian countries, has been expanding the use of Uzbek in real life as well as policies and public
education, driven by the much higher proportion of its Uzbek population. As a result, the migration of58

Why do Diasporas Re-Emigrate to their Historical “Homelands”? A Case Study of Koryo Saram’s “Return” from Post-Soviet Uzbekistan to South Korea (LEE)

Russian-speaking groups has occurred (Collins, 2006: 146-150; Critchlow, 1991: 99-110).
On the other hand, the Koryo Saram, one of the Russian-speaking groups in the former Soviet
Union is the largest in Uzbekistan among Central Asian countries. As such, they account for 0.6% of
the total population of Uzbekistan, as one of the ethnic groups in the country.
Table 2. Koryo Saram population in the Post-Soviet Union
1989

1999

2009

2011

2013

Post-Soviet Union

439,000

466,000

476,000

476,542479,310

Uzbekistan

183,140

198,000

175,939

173,600

171,300

Kazakhstan

103,315

105,000

103,952

107,130

107,613

Kyrgyzstan

18,35519,00018,81018,23017,228Turkmenistan

2,848

3,000

483

884

1,329

Tajikistan

13,431

6,000

1,762

1,632

634

Source: Recreated using (Kim, 2013: 432)

According to Table 2, the population of Koryo Saram increased slightly from independence to1999 but has gradually decreased since then. This is believed to be due to the large floating population
moving to other countries within the former Soviet bloc during the transition period from the early
1990s immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The reason for the decrease since 1999 is
the increase in the movement of Koryo Saram to Korea, especially with the introduction of the Visiting
Employment System in 2007 by the Korean government. Currently, it is impossible to determine theexact figure because the census of Koryo Saram living in Korea is not conducted separately. However,with the introduction of the Visiting Employment System in 2007, it is possible to estimate their size
through statistics on overseas Koreans visas (F-4) and visiting employment visas (H-2) issued only tooverseas Koreans among foreigners from the former Soviet Union (Overseas Korean Foundation,
2015:2). The size of the movement of Koryo Saram in major Soviet countries to Korea can be
estimated from the numbers shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Number of Koryo Saram who obtained F-4 and H-2 visas
2007

2009

2011

2013

F-4

H-2

F-4

H-2

F-4

H-2

F-4

H-2

Total

21

1,194

435

6,464

6,652

10,571

14,936

12,093

Russia

16

1,178

293

2,864

4,344

3,501

10,354

1,402

Ukraine

1

0

0

9

12

24

23

173

Uzbekistan

0

634

83

3,009

1,447

6,416

3,019

9,236

Kazakhstan

3

133

52

462

772

491

1,316

765

Kyrgyzstan

1

29

7

101

70

122

217

391

Other

3

0

0

19

7

17

7

45

Source: Recreated using (Overseas Korean Foundation, 2015: 18-19)

Reviewing the Koryo Saram holding F-4 overseas Korean visas by country order, Table 3 shows
Russia has the highest number, then Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, with a lower number from
Kyrgyzstan. Looking at the number of H-2 visiting employment visa holders by country in order,
Uzbekistan has by far the greatest number of citizens, followed by Russia, Kazakhstan, and59

Journal of the Asia-Japan Research Institute of Ritsumeikan University Volume 5 • October 2023

Kyrgyzstan. The number of holders of F-4 and H-2 visas tends to increase as a whole, but there arealso differences from country to country in terms of visa application qualifications. In other words,
H-2 visa holders tend to stay for simple labor employment, and F-4 visas holders have a strong
tendency to stay for purposes other than simple labor employment, including professional jobs.
According to Table 3, the number of people with Uzbekistan nationality who are H-2 visa holders
wanting simple labor employment has increased significantly (Lee, 2022: 189-195).
The reason why there are many Koryo Saram from Uzbekistan with H-2 visas is as follows. With
the revision of the Overseas Koreans Act in 2019, up to four generations of Koryo Saram wererecognized as compatriots and guaranteed minimum eligibility to stay in Korea. However, this is anadditional form of discrimination as it presents strict conditions and procedures depending on the
country of origin. Since 2010, only Russian nationals among Koryo Saram have been issued F-4 visas,and certain requirements, such as college graduation, have been specified as a prerequisite for F-4
visas for Koryo Saram from Central Asian countries. As a result, many Koryo Saram from Central
Asia, who find it relatively difficult to obtain an F-4 visa, received an H-2 short-term visa. In addition,even if they are considered eligible to obtain an F-4 visa, F-4 visa applicants often hold an H-2 visa forthe job they want to do, because working as unskilled labor, which mainly employs those withinsufficient Korean language skills, is not possible. Therefore, under Uzbekistan’s rapidly changing
economic and political situation, their best option for moving to Korea is by obtaining an H-2 visa6.
Although the unstable political and economic situation is not much different anywhere in theformer Soviet Union, Uzbeks have chosen to move abroad as well as Koryo Saram due to their strong
political nationalism and for economic reasons such as unstable employment and low wages. Thisfactor can also be seen in the outflow of non-Uzbek people after independence. The decrease in the
population of Uzbekistan’s Koryo Saram has led to an increase in migration to Korea, and among
Uzbekistan’s strong nationalist policies, public education in Uzbek language and the heightened statusof Russian have served as a strong motivation for the migration of the Koryo Saram. Korea is one of
their major migration destinations, and migration to Korea is on the rise. Koryo Saram’s migration is
expected to increase in the future, focusing on concentrated residences formed in Korea.
2) The Process of Incorporating Koryo Saram into Korea as Compatriots
As designated by the Korean government, overseas Koreans include both individuals who
maintain Korean nationality while being permanent residents in a foreign state, and foreign nationals
with ethnic Korean roots who maintain citizenship elsewhere (Yoon, 2013: 16). The policy of what
constitutes an overseas Korean has been applied by the policies of each regime, and this is shown in
Table 4, which reviews the process in which the Koryo Saram are recognized as compatriots.

6

In addition, in the case of Koryo Saram holding an H-2 visa, they must return to their home country and come to
Korea once every three years for renewal. For this reason, it is difficult to guarantee long-term stay and labor rights
in Korea, such as difficulty in finding a full-time job and health insurance problems. Moreover, they must have atleast one year of work experience in small cities with a population of 20,000 or less. However, it is not easy toobtain a certificate and get a job due to their low Korean language level (http://www.korean.net/homepage/index.
do (Accessed on April 11, 2023.)

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Why do Diasporas Re-Emigrate to their Historical “Homelands”? A Case Study of Koryo Saram’s “Return” from Post-Soviet Uzbekistan to South Korea (LEE)
Table 4. Development of Overseas Korean Policy
RegimeOverview of Contents

Rhee Syng-man(24/ 7/1948~27/4/1960)▪ Enactment of the Overseas Korean Registration Act for Koreans living in Japan
in 1949▪ Support for Mindan7-centered activities (excluding those related to
Chochongryeon8)

Park Chung-hee▪ Support for projects relevant to Koreans living in Japan (in the form of(17/12/1963~26/10/1979)
educational support and visits to South Korea)▪ Additional financial aid for Chochongryeon activities by attaining investment
from overseas Koreans
Chun Doo-hwan(27/8/1980~24/2/1988)▪ This regime did not focus on this policy in an effort to prevent widespread
criticism from abroad due to its military dictatorship

Roh Tae-woo(25/2/1988~24/2/1993)▪ Implementation of the Sakhalin Koreans’ Permanent Return Project in 1989 (peran agreement with the Soviet Union)▪ Implementation of a Special Permanent Resident System for Persons in Japan in
1991▪ Inclusion of Koreans in both China and Soviet Union under the designation ofoverseas Koreans

Kim Young-sam(25/2/1993~24/2/1998)▪ Implementation of the Industrial Trainee System in 1993
▪ Sakhalin Koreans’ Permanent Return Demonstration Project in 1994 (agreementwith Japan)▪ Established Overseas Korean Foundation in 1997

Kim Dae-jung(25/2/1998~24/2/2003)▪ Enactment of the Overseas Koreans Act in 1999
▪ Introduction of limited overseas Korean visa (F-4)▪ Initiation of the Training Employment System in 2000
▪ Launch of the Employment Assistance System in 2000
▪ Introduction of the Employment Management System in Korea▪ The stagnation of the permanent return project of Sakhalin Koreans

Roh Moo-hyun(25/2/2003~24/2/2008)▪ Expansion of the scope of overseas Koreans in 2004
▪ Abolition of the Industrial Trainee System and the Introduction of the
Employment Permit System in 2004
▪ Establishment of Visiting Employment System in 2007
▪ Resumption of Sakhalin Korean Permanent Return Project in 2007

Lee Myung-bak(2008.2.25-2013.2.24)▪ Allowing Dual Nationality in 2009
▪ Introduction of the Overseas National Election System in 2009▪ Amendment of the Nationality Act in 2010
▪ Commencement of Conditional Long Stay and Family Invitation System in 2010

Source: Recreated using (Yoon, 2018: 25-101)

The Koryo Saram began to be regarded as “overseas Koreans” during the Roh Tae-woo regime,
which led to new policies regarding those living in countries such as China, the USSR, and Eastern
Europe due to rapid changes in external relations. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations
between China in 1992 and the Soviet Union in 1990, Koreans in China and the Soviet Union who
have never been to Korea have been considered as overseas Koreans. With their incorporation, thenumber of overseas Koreans increased significantly. As a result, there was a need to make various

7

8

The Korean Residents Union in Japan is one of two organizations in Japan of Korean affiliation, which
contrastingly consists of Zainichi Koreans (ethnic Korean citizens or residents of Japan) who have adopted South
Korean nationality.
The General Association of Korean Residents in Japan is one of two main organizations for Zainichi Koreans andhas close ties to North Korea (DPRK).

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Journal of the Asia-Japan Research Institute of Ritsumeikan University Volume 5 • October 2023

policies regarding them (Yoon and Kim, 2016: 48-50).
In the Kim Young-sam regime, comprehensive and systematic policies began to be preparedstarting with a project to organize terms for overseas Koreans and Korean compatriots. Additionally,
the establishment of the Overseas Koreans Foundation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2007 laid
the foundation for the implementation of overseas Koreans policies. At this time, overseas Koreans
were defined as those who live in a foreign country, regardless of their nationality, as well as those
who have a permanent address in a foreign country or have lived in a foreign country for multiple
years (Kim, Y. 2018: 10-12).
From the time of the Kim Dae-jung administration to now, overseas Koreans policies have been
more thoughtfully developed. In the midst of the IMF financial crisis, the “Overseas Koreans Act” wasenacted and implemented to systematize the regime’s intention to overcome the economic crisis byencouraging overseas Koreans to contribute to their homeland. A representative example is theintroduction of an overseas Korean visa (F-4) that was issued to overseas Koreans who wish to enter
Korea. However, people who migrated before the establishment of the Republic of Korea’s
government in 1948 were excluded, that is to say, a part of Japanese Koreans, Chinese Koreans, andthe Koryo Saram were excluded. This was criticized as socially discriminatory treatment and it wasrevised after receiving a constitutional nonconformity decision because it violated the principle ofequality in the constitutional petition filed by Chinese Koreans (Shin, 2013: 18-22).
The Noh Moo-hyun administration abolished discriminatory policies affecting foreign nationals
and introduced amendments to include overseas Koreans in all policies. As a result, compatriots in
China and the former Soviet Union, who had been excluded, were now included by the Overseas
Koreans Act. In this regime the right to sympathy became active and inclusive (Yoon, 2018: 52-54).
The criterion for the discriminatory application of the Overseas Koreans Act was whether the firstmigration of overseas Koreans was before or after 1948, the year when South Korea established theProvisional Government of the Republic of Korea after being liberated from Japanese rule in 1945.
Depending on whether their migration was before or after that and whether they obtained Koreannationality or had experience of that, the Koryo Saram were subject to exclusion until 2007. This was
because most of the Koryo Saram had migrated before that period, and they had also lived in and had
experience in imperial Russia, then the Soviet Union, then the dissolution of the Soviet Union, andthen the independence of the post-Soviet countries.
In Korea, overseas Korean policies have been used as a tool to redefine the nation and its people
through the Cold War ideology. This development follows the end of Japanese rule, the liberation of
the Korean Peninsula, the Korean War, and the division of the two Koreas. Among them, it is due tonationalism from South Korea to gain leverage in the systemic competition with North Korea. One
may ask: How can we define the Korean pedigree, which includes those who migrated after theestablishment of the Republic of Korea as citizens of the Republic of Korea? Furthermore, how dothey differ from those of North Korean pedigree, who are considered to be of the same descent? This
complex concept of Korean pedigrees is due to Korea’s domestic and international political stancesand changes. Korea’s political position at home and abroad has changed amidst the post-Cold Warinternational situation due to the following phenomena: 1) Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula,2) the remnants of Japan’s colonial rule, 3) the Korean War and its resulting division, 4) the interKorean confrontation, and 5) the reorganization of the international order. In addition, thetransnational movement and globalization have become a factor in the emergence of more complex
and diverse actors.
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Why do Diasporas Re-Emigrate to their Historical “Homelands”? A Case Study of Koryo Saram’s “Return” from Post-Soviet Uzbekistan to South Korea (LEE)

In the midst of this trend, the Koryo Saram, both those who migrated prior to the establishment of
the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, and also those of the same ethnic Korean
descent - regardless of nationality - were recognized as compatriots. Against this background, therelationship between the Korean government and the Korean diaspora has been established andstratified by discrimination and exclusion. In addition, Koryo Saram’s position has shifted due to thenational history of the host society in their respective countries, and the affiliation between theircountry and Korea.

5. Conclusion
We have discussed the return migration of diaspora by examining the case of the recent rapid
increase in migration of Uzbekistan’s Koryo Saram to Korea, in order to present novel findings in
diaspora research. In particular, the factors of the return migration of the Koryo Saram were analyzed,
focusing on the push factors of Uzbekistan and the pull factors of South Korea.
First, Uzbekistan’s push factors were reviewed focusing on language policies among national
integration policies centered on titular ethnic groups during the period that excluded non-titular ethnic
groups. The language reforms before and after Uzbekistan’s independence have undergone an intense
and rapid process of embracing the Uzbek language as the only official language and adopting public
education in the Uzbek language without consideration for the Russian-speaking groups. In theprocess, the outflow of non-Uzbek people abroad increased. The biggest driver of this intense andrapid language reform in the country is the population of the titular ethnic group, the Uzbek people.
This was reviewed through comparison with the case of Kazakhstan, a neighboring country in Central
Asia, which adopted a similar line in language policy but showed differences in its implementation. In
addition, regarding the outflow of non-Uzbek people due to Uzbekistan’s language reforms, it became
evident that the rapidly introduced language policy of Uzbekistan influenced the push factors of Koryo
Saram’s migration. This paper has presented the phenomenon of this migration and demonstrated it byshowing the increase in their migration to South Korea along with the number of cases which weredirectly due to Uzbekistan’s titular ethnic-centered language reform.
Second, the pull factors of Koryo Saram’s return migration were reviewed, focusing on policychanges by the Korean government related to overseas Koreans. In particular, we analyzed the processof recognizing Koryo Saram as compatriots as a policy and the enacting of related laws by thegovernment, revealing not only the factors that led to the rapid increase in Koryo Saram’s migration to
Korea, but also the details of Korea’s policy of accepting Koryo Saram. We also suggested that thehistorical background, the modern transnational movement, the emergence of various actors due toglobalization, and Korea’s domestic and foreign political position had contributed to thediscriminatory way it was applied to compatriots by region in the country’s overseas Korean law.
Therefore, it was identified that the relationship between the Korean government and the Koryo Saram
diaspora has been established and stratified by discrimination and exclusion.
The purpose of this study has been to re-examine “diaspora,” with respect to a recent
phenomenon which is concerned with integration into a contemporary nation-state in a contemporary
context that is diversified and complicated by its transnational movement, and to answer the academic
question: Why do diasporas re-emigrate to their historical “homelands”?
The return of the Koryo Saram diaspora to South Korea presents a critical case for the study of
how to accommodate the increasingly diverse and complex needs of communities, countries, and63

Journal of the Asia-Japan Research Institute of Ritsumeikan University Volume 5 • October 2023

regions considering social integration in the host society and even multi-ethnic coexistence. The
knowledge obtained by analyzing the migration factors of Koryo Saram in this study from theperspective of both their country of origin and their historical homeland is expected to lay thefoundation for studies on the migration of returning diasporas, integration into their host societies, andmulticultural coexistence. From these findings, further investigation is required for a more detailed
analysis of multicultural symbiosis in the host society; the status of the Overseas Koreans Act, such as
restrictions on visa acquisition by country of origin, the working environment of Koryo Saram
returnees, the educational environment of the migrants’ accompanying children, the treatment of
Ukrainian refugees belonging to Koryo Saram, and the current status of the connection between
returnees and the local community, etc. Based on the review of migration factors in this paper, theinvestigation of their environment after return migration is expected to provide more empiricalexamples of diasporic return and multicultural coexistence in the host society.
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