Opening Plenary, World Conference against A and H Bombs – Nagasaki
August 7, 2023
Statement by Ambassador Alexander KmenF
Federal Ministry for European and InternaKonal Aﬀairs of Austria

I would like to thank the organisers of the World Conference against A and H bombs verymuch for the honor of invi<ng me again to speak to you on this very important occasion ofcommemora<ng the atomic bomb explosion in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. in August 1945.
I send my gree<ngs to all the ac<vists - young or old - who have gathered at thisconference. Your work and your voices are crucially imporant. We will only achieve
posi<ve change on the existen<al issue of nuclear weapons if more people care about thisthat way you do.
I would like to send, in par<cular, my gree<ngs and respect to the Hibakusha for their<reless eﬀorts and commiIment to warning humanity of the devasta<ng impact ofnuclear weapons through thier own daun<ng experiences. These warning, regreIably, arebecoming ever more important and urgent.
Nuclear risks were on the rise long before the Russian invasion in Ukraine and thesubsequent implicit and unmistakable nuclear threats issued by President Pu<n and otherRussian oﬃcials.
These nuclear risks are fueld by heightened geopoli<cal compe<<on, arms race dynamics,
the decline of arms control and the nuclear disarmament and non-prolifera<on regime.
Nuclear risks are increasing, including through new technologies and corresponding
vulnerabili<es. There are several tense and conﬂictual contexts in Europe, Asia and theMiddle East that have the poten<al for dangerous escala<on to the use of nuclear weapons.
In Japan, the disconcer<ng developments in North Korea will be of great concern as well as
the rising geopoli<cal compe<<on and tensions with China.
This already disconcer<ng state of aﬀairs is drama<cally compounded by Russia'sirresponsible nuclear rhetoric and the poten<al for nuclear escala<on of the war in Ukraine.
We also hear talk about the use of tac<cal nuclear weapons, as if this would somehow be"not so bad". The use of nuclear weapons risks being "normalized" and the taboo against1

the use of nuclear weapons looks increasingly fragile.
FiYngly, the famous Doomsday Clock has now been set to an unprecedented 90 seconds
before midnight, the closest to midnight since 1947, when the Doomsday Clock started tomeasure the risk of nuclear war.
This is indeed a very dangerous situa<on.
The majority of states that does not consider nuclear weapons to be legi<mate watches indisbelief how geopoli<cs slides the world back into a perilous phase of high risk of nuclear
conﬂict.
We are now at a fork in the road on the nuclear weapons issue. Either the conclusion thatstates will draw from this crisis is an even stronger emphasis on nuclear weapons anddeterrence. This would likely take us down the path of more compe<<on and tensions, newnuclear arms races, more prolifera<on pressure and further increasing global nuclear risks.
However, this moment of heightened nuclear dangers could also lead to an alterna<veconclusion. Namely, that this crisis and the current high risks of nuclear weapons use havebrought into sharp focus the fragility of nuclear deterrence. That nuclear arms races much
be avoided. That the situa<on in Ukraine is so much more dangerous because of nuclear
weapons; that this increases concerns about the sustainability of the nuclear status quo andthat that a paradigm shi_ on nuclear weapons is needed.
A cri<cal re-assessment of the veracity of the arguments that underpin nuclear deterrenceis necessary together with a weighing of these arguments against the empirical evidence on
the humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear deterrence is seen as the ul<mate security guarantee. This belief is very deeplyentrenched.
The problem in this is that in reality we lack the empirical evidence. Nuclear deterrence is atheory. It assumes and projects ac<ons, inten<ons, consequences and expected outcomes.
We can’t prove that nuclear deterrence has worked in the past or will work in the future,
just as much as it cannot be proven that it has not worked in the past or will not do so in
the future. Like any human belief system" nuclear deterrence depends on assump<ons andcarries within it the risk of overconﬁdence and a poten<al conﬁrma<on bias.
The eﬀec<veness of nuclear deterrence is uncertain but we know for sure that nuclear
2deterrence can fail - and if it fails, we have the evidence that it likely fails catastrophicallyand with global impact.
The whole world carries the risks of nuclear deterrence failing.
It brings high risks for the security of all other countries, whose popula<ons could end up
as collateral damage in much more severe ways than previously understood.
This raises profound legal, ethical, legi<macy and interna<onal and intergenera<onal jus<ceques<ons.
It is certainly understandable that states feel insecure in the face of such irresponsible andaggressive behaviour as we see from Russia and the DPRK. But responding to such
behavior with reliance on nuclear deterrence also compounds and perpetuates nuclear risks
and, thus, also contributes to the con<nua<on of an unacceptable high-risk status quo.
The belief in nuclear deterrence relies on the credible threat of the actual use of nuclear
weapons. As long as states rely on nuclear deterrence, there cannot be a real or credible
taboo against the use of nuclear weapons. Because nuclear deterrence is logically based on
concrete plans and the inten<on of using these weapons of mass destruc<on and inﬂic<ngunthinkable suﬀering with poten<ally catastrophic global consequences. This very prac<cethus carries existen<al risks to all humanity; risks that the majority of States are no longer
willing to accept. The fact that the reliance on nuclear deterrence may be based on theassump<on that nuclear weapons will in the end not be used does not change this.
Are any nuclear threats responsible in light of what we know today about the humanitarianconsequences and risks of these weapons? What in terms of humanitarian consequences
can be considered as acceptable and, especially, for whom and based on what legi<ma<on?
And, what kind of security and security for whom are we talking about in such a context.
An approach based on my nuclear threat is responsible while yours is irresponsible is notconvincing from this perspec<ve.
The States par<es to the TPNW, for their part, have done their share to re-enforce thenuclear taboo and to express their clear and unequivocal condemna<on about any use orthreat of use. In their joint declara<on at the 1st MSP in Vienna in June 2022, they stated:"We are alarmed and dismayed by threats to use nuclear weapons and increasingly strident
3nuclear rhetoric. We stress that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a viola:on ofinterna:onal law, including the Charter of the United Na:ons. We condemn unequivocallyany and all nuclear threats, whether they be explicit or implicit and irrespec:ve of thecircumstances."
This is the clearest and most unequivocal interna<onally agreed statement on this issue todate to solidify the nuclear taboo. It should be the reference point on the nuclear weaponsissue for the interna<onal community in light of the precarious situa<on in which we ﬁnd
ourselves.
Let me close by asking the ques<on how long can we con<nue to assume that nuclear
deterrence will hold and nuclear weapons will not be used? We see Russian rouleIe being
played at the moment. How can we be conﬁdent of this in the future, in tensions with China,
with DPRK or between India and Pakistan or in a poten<al Middle East prolifera<on context?
Can it be considered as a realist approach to con<nue to bet on deterrence stability or is it
in reality wishful thinking based on many assump<ons and uncertain<es and the risk of
conﬁrma<on bias?
Trying to ﬁnd a norma<ve and poli<cal way out of the nuclear deterrence paradigm strikes
me as a realist and prudent response to the empirical evidence on the consequences should
the high-risk nuclear deterrence bet fail.
The TPNW codiﬁes the delegi<misa<on of nuclear weapons because of their unacceptable
humanitarian impact and risks. This is based on serious evidence and is a way to help theinterna<onal community to conceptualise a change in perspec<ve on these weapons.
Ul<mately, no responsible state should ever ﬁnd the use of this most indiscriminate anddestruc<ve weapon acceptable. The same must go for the threat of use.
The TPNW is not a silver bullet answer for future security challenges, but nuclear deterrence
most deﬁnitely is no silver bullet either and certainly not a sustainable one. In these
extremely dangerous <mes we need leadership and we need coopera<on. The TPNW is aconstruc<ve and serious investment into interna<onal law and the common security of all.
Irrespec<ve of diﬀerent legal views regarding nuclear weapons, all responsible statesshould engage construc<vely on the profound arguments and legi<mate and global security
concerns now expressed in the TPNW.

4

When most nuclear developments point in the opposite direc<on of nuclear disarmament
and the leadership of nuclear-armed countries on this issue has all but disappeared, theTPNW is an indispensable and poten<ally consequen<al ray of hope against an otherwise
very bleak backdrop of currently failing leadership on nuclear disarmament.
It is more important than ever that the voices and warnings of the hibakusha that haveplayed such a crucial role in making the TPNW a reality are heard. They must inspire thenext genera<on to push for the change in thinking that is necessary to move away from theill-fated belief in nuclear weapons. I thank you for your support for the TPNW and ope thatyou will con<nue to promote this important new treaty to achieve a world without nuclear
weapons.
Thank you5