Contested Space in the Russian Far East:
Land and Migration along the Russo-Chinese Borderlands
Norio Horie
The Chinese and Russians have shared borders for hundreds of years. Important trade andother peaceful contacts have alternated with bloody, but local, conflicts. Sometimes, these frictions
have generated xenophobic cross-border feelings. Neither side has been immune. In this article, I detaila case where a trade opportunity, economically profitable for both sides, has generated strong negative,
nationalistic sentiment, somewhat like the “yellow peril” thinking more than a century ago. Nowadays,
while the Russian Far East expects cooperation with its “strategic partner” China, such expectations
cause some hesitation in accepting investment and labor supply from China. Local political elites claimthat international cooperation in the borderlands between Russia and China should be developed further.
Therefore, Chinese investment and technological support for the regional development of agriculture
are welcomed. However, the sector-specific characteristics of agriculture always raise the followingdilemma. First, Chinese investment in agriculture often turns to a discussion of “land grabbing” (thesovereignty or integrity of the territory). Second, Chinese investment in land leads to a discussion ofmigration issues. This paper analyses how Russia’s local elites politicize Chinese agribusiness in theborderlands in the Russian Far East by spreading the fear of Chinese land grabbing and of mass inflowsof Chinese workers.
Foreign Investment in Farmland in Russia
When foreign investors engage in crop and soybean production, they must procure the arable
land or existing agricultural lands. The acquisition of land by foreign capital is a sensitive issue for thecountry or region to rent. Therefore, it is a difficult situation to study empirically due to the lack oftransparency of their transactions. 1 China and Korea are the top two countries acquiring farmland
abroad. They have approached developing countries in Africa and Asia; however, this sensitivity often
makes it problematic to rent farmlands there. New Chinese investment in Mozambique failed due tothe locals’ resistance to the settlement of Chinese workers. Investment of Korea’s Daewoo Logistics
Corporation in 1.3 million hectares in Madagascar for maize and oil palm production sparked politicalconflicts, resulting in the overthrow of the government in 2009.2
Russia has vast available arable land and, therefore, can attract foreign investors to accumulate
arable land for agricultural production. Millions of hectares are said to be lying fallow in Russia. If
 Norio Horie is Professor at Center for Far Eastern Studies, University of Toyama.
1 Oane Visser and Max Spoor, “Land Grabbing in Post-Soviet Eurasia: The World’s Largest Agricultural Land

Reserves at Stake,” Journal of Peasant Studies 38: 2 (2011): 309.
2 Joachim von Braun, and Ruth Meinzen-Dick, “Land Grabbing” by Foreign Investors in Developing Countries:
Risks and Opportunities,” IFPRI Policy Brief 13 (2009).
DOI: 10.14943/ebr.10.1.85

85

Eurasia Border Review < Special Section >these were put to use, Russia has the potential to feed an additional 450 million people. 3 The
geographical division between the European part of Russia and Siberia (including the Russian Far East)reasonably divides the directions of their dependence on investors according to their country of origin.
European investors tend to invest in “Black Earth” in the European part of Russia, while China andKorea tend to be active in “Siberia and the Russian Far East.” As a manifestation of the Russian
government’s goal to develop their grain production (especially wheat and maize) as a strategic export
commodity, Russia exported wheat to more than 90 countries, the largest of which are Egypt and Turkey.
The Azov port, facing the Azov Sea, is well equipped and a key port for exporting Russian wheat. On
the other hand, the main product of Siberia and the Russian Far East is not wheat, but soybeans. Morethan 90% of cropped areas are occupied by soybeans in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, and the Amur
Oblast was the top producer of soybeans in Russia in 2015.4
Politicizing Chinese Agribusiness
Chinese agribusiness holds 380,000 ha of agricultural land in Russia, most of which(approximately 80% of the total) is operated by companies in Heilongjiang.5 In the Jewish AutonomousOblast, 27,000 ha (23% of total sown land in the oblast) is occupied by organizations with foreign
capital, almost all of whose capital is estimated to rely on the Chinese.6 There are some reasons fornortheast Chinese actors to expand their land grabbing in Siberia and the Russian Far East. It has also
been said that the northeast Chinese region shares some common features with agricultural land in theRussian Far East. As the Chinese northeast accounts for more than 41% of China’s soybeans, croppatterns are similar between northeast China and the Russian Far East. Northeast China and Russian
Far East depend on mechanized large-scale farming for crop production.7 Based on these commonfeatures, northeast Chinese agribusiness is highly motivated to engage in agriculture in the Russian FarEast. The Russian government has kept its preference for large-scale farming since the collapse of theUSSR. In the Russian Far East, vast arable land is not under the control of private ownership, but under
the control of large-scale state enterprises or local administrations. It is easier for investors to participate
in agriculture in the Russian Far East without collecting small acres of land from numerous owners thatwould have been necessary had the land been redistributed to peasants after the collapse of the USSR.
Furthermore, rent for arable land is significantly cheaper than in China, which stimulated a “Farm Rush”
by Chinese to the Russian Far East.8
Large-scale investment in agriculture often provokes negative reactions in the Russian
3 Visser and Spoor, “Land Grabbing in Post-Soviet Eurasia: The World’s Largest Agricultural Land Reserves atStake,” 307–308.
4 Izumi Sakaguchi, “Russian Agricultural Sector Accelerating Import Substitution [Yunyu-daitai ga Kasoku suru

Roshia no Nougyou Bunya],” Russia & NIS Bisiness Monthly 61:8 (2016): 1–24.
5 Jiayi Zhou, “Chinese Agrarian Capitalism in the Russian Far East,” BICAS Working Paper 13 (2015): 14.
6 Svetlana Mishchuk, “Russian–Chinese Agricultural Cooperation in the Russian Far East,” Regional Research ofRussia 6: 1 (2016): 64.
7 Zhou, “Chinese Agrarian Capitalism in the Russian Far East.”
8 Ibid, 13.

86

Norio Horie

periphery. China and Korea are said to have a strategy of “land grabbing” in African countries and in
Russian Siberia and the Far East. The practical and pragmatic concern in introducing foreign
investment in agriculture is to utilize arable land for agriculture; however, the real concern often turns
to the fact that foreign investment in farmland gives the land to Chinese investors.
The government of Zabaykalsky Krai signed an agreement with a private Chinese company
to lease more than a thousand square kilometers of farmland for a term of 49 years; however, thisagreement has been criticized by political elites. Igor Lebedev (deputy director of the State Duma anda member of the LDPR political party) mentioned that the LDPR group in the State Duma estimatedthis issue to be an important geopolitical problem and warned that tewnty years later, the governor ofZabaykalsky Krai would be Chinese and its territory would become part of China.9 The new governorof the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Alexander Levintal, also shared this concern over the Chinese threat.
He warned that 80% of the farmland in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast is controlled by Chinese
investors, legally or illegally.10 Contrasting sharply with Levintal’s attitude toward Chinese investment
was that of former governor Alexander Vinnikov, who emphasized the importance of attracting andenjoying the benefits of Chinese investment in agriculture.11 A change in governors of the borderlands
can impact local positionality.
The Chinese reaction did not go straight to the problem of land grabbing. The Chinesecompany (Hua’e Xingbang) soon announced that 75% of all farm jobs would be reserved for locals.12
Land grabbing by Chinese investors often reminds Russian locals of the inflow of Chinese workers. In
this sense, land grabbing and the migration threat are parallel in their discussions. Regional and local
authorities often use these threats to pursue their interests in the regions.
Richard Weitz suggested tensions in the borderlands between Russian and China could
increase when poorly managed development, combined with pollution, land seizures, and climate, drive
poor Chinese peasants into Russia.13 This stereotyped image in the borderlands of the Russian Far East
should be questioned in the following two senses. First, does Chinese large-scale investment (or landgrabbing) in farmlands really provoke an inflow of Chinese workers in the Russian Far East? Second,
does it really introduce “poor Chinese peasants”?
Chinese Migration Does Not Matter
The difficulty in the Russian Far East comes from the fact that agriculture and land grabbing
are always accompanied by the introduction of the investor’s ethnic workforce. According to a report

9 Accessed July 21, 2016: http://gazetarb.ru/news/section-society/detail-412242/
10 Accessed

July 16, 2015: http://www.zrpress.ru/business/dalnij-vostok_15.07.2015_73322_80-zemelnykhresursov-v-evrejskoj-avtonomnoj-oblasti-kontroliruetsja-kitajtsami.html
11 See the interview with Aleksandr Vinnikov. Accessed July 21, 2016: http://ruchina.org/china-russia-article/china/35.html
12 Accessed July 21, 2016: http://www.ewinextgen.com/eurasia/2015/8/13/russias-far-east-lease-with-china-anew-problem
13 Richard Weitz, “Superpower Symbiosis: The Russia-China Axis,” World Affairs 175: 4 (2012): 71–78.

87

Eurasia Border Review < Special Section >by Promar Consulting,14 nine Korean enterprises have already accumulated land on a large scale inPrimorsky Krai, with a land acquisition of 168,000 ha. The Korean government placed a high priority
on employing ethnic Koreans in the Russian Far East. Korean investment in agriculture in the Russian
Far East is said to promote assistance to ethnic Koreans in the Russian Far East. North Korea has aims
to promote their labor export and secure a stable food supply. Both countries have more interest inagriculture in the Russian Far East politically than economically.
Japanese investment in agriculture in the Amur Oblast is exceptional among Northeast Asiancountries. A Russia-Japanese joint stock venture was established by the Hokkaido-Russia Agribusiness
Complex in 2013 that cultivates 35,000 ha in the Romnensky District. The director of this jointcompany is Russian, and all fourteen farm workers are local.
Chinese and Korean investments in farming in the Russian Far East are often made by theinitiatives of state or provincial authorities. Additionally, Chinese and Korean investors tend to bringin their own workforce, including their ethnic minorities in the Russian Far East. The motivation to use
their own ethnic workers is not peculiar to Chinese investors in the Russian Far East. Contrary to thesetendencies, Western investors tend to transfer their technologies and managers to the host countries15
and do not raise migration problems in the European part of Russia where they invest. Therefore, large
investments in farmland do not necessarily cause a large inflow of foreign workers.
Chinese local government in Heilongjiang Province is motivated to ease their local labor
surplus with agricultural farms due to the recent mechanization of agriculture. However, soybean
production does not require a large number of workers. Therefore, Chinese investment in soybean
production does not in principle cause a large inflow of Chinese workers to the Russian Far East. Onecase study showed that a local Department of Agricultural Development Planning in Heilongjiang
Province under the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture organized four farms for soybean production andassigned approximately 200 workers to the Russian Far East.16 Takaya suggested that these farms did
not ease the surplus of labor, and their business motivation did not lie in easing it but in acquiring land
resources to increase their sales in Russia. Vegetable production, a rather labor-intensive sector, is often
organized by private Chinese farms in the Russian Far East. It has been said that two-thirds ofvegetables and foodstuffs in the Russian Far East are imported from China or harvested in the Russian
Far East by Chinese enterprises or private farms.17 Vegetable production does not require large-scaleland accumulation. Therefore, Chinese land grabbing for soybean production is not directly
accompanied by a large inflow of Chinese workers.

14 Promar Consulting, Research and Analysis of Russian Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Policy, and of Free-

Trade Agreement: Final Report [Roshia ni okeru Nougyou Suisan Seisaku, Jiyu Boeki Kyoutei nado no Chousa,
Bunseki] (2013). Accessed August 20, 2016: http://www.maff.go.jp/j/budget/yosan_kansi/sikkou/tokutei_keihi/
seika_h24/kokusai_ippan/pdf/60100513_15.pdf
15 Visser and Spoor, “Land Grabbing in Post-Soviet Eurasia: The World’s Largest Agricultural Land Reserves atStake,” 315.
16 Kazuko Takaya, “China’s Grain Policy and Agricultural Investment in Russia [Chuugoku no Shokuryou Seisaku
to Tai Roshia Nougyou Toushi],” Ritsumeikan Economic Review 63: 3–4 (2014): 17–38.
17 Ibid.

88Norio Horie

Land for agriculture, called selo in Russian, used to be located in the suburbs or remote areas
away from the city. Such areas do not have sufficiently dense populations. For example, the Leninsky
District (Raion) in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast has 24 local settlements populated by only 19,496
locals for 6,000 km2. This district has a low population density, three residents per square kilometer.
Their land, 132 km away from Birobidzhan by highway and facing the Chinese border, is mainly usedfor agriculture. The Okytyabrsky District shares the same geographic conditions. The Okytyabrsky
District has 15 local settlements populated by only 10,178 locals for 9.4 thousand km2, and its
population density is 1.59 residents per square kilometer. They face China at the Amurzet checkpoint.
The Leninsky and Okytyabrsky Districts mainly keep their leading position of soybean production.
They are mono-production districts; more than 92% of their agricultural land is used in the productionof soybeans. Maintaining this soybean production demands agriculture workers; however, their low
population densities and relatively low wages do not attract local workers in these districts and cities
in the oblasts. The Jewish Autonomous Oblast demonstrates “a catastrophic lack of labor resources,”and “the use of Chinese migrant workers has been considered one of the main ways to retain agriculturein the oblast.”18 The local space for agriculture in the borderlands requires Chinese workers due to theserious shortage of local workers.
The Amur Oblast took a bold step when it imposed a zero quota for work permits for Chinese
farmworkers in 2013. Even in 2011, before the zero quota policy against Chinese agricultural migrantworkers, the Amur Oblast did not issue many work permits for agricultural workers. The use of work
permits is an official instrument for showing the demand for foreign workers by local economic actors
and an instrument for regulating the flow of foreign workers. Therefore, it shows the economic needsof local economic actors and the attitude of authorities in the region.
In 2011, 139 organizations officially introduced foreign workers. The total number of work
permits issued for these organizations was 6,107. Among these farms/enterprises, we identified 26organizations as Chinese or partly Chinese investments.19 These farms/enterprises introduced 1,481
foreign workers. Domestic organizations introduced 40.9 foreign workers per organization. Foreignorganizations introduced 57.0 foreign workers per organization. From these facts, it is not completely
fair to claim that Chinese investment in agriculture causes the introduction of more Chinese workers
than that caused by Russian organizations. Whether they are Chinese or not, producers demand Chineseworkers, especially skilled workers. We must carefully reconsider the stereotyped image that Chinese
large-scale investment in farmlands provokes the inflow of poor Chinese peasants.
Concluding Remarks
Land acquisition and employment of ethnic workers close to the investor’s country of origin
are very sensitive issues in the Russian Far East. Foreign investors should keep in mind that18 Mishchuk, “Russian–Chinese Agricultural Cooperation in the Russian Far East.”
19 Dr. Svetlana Mishchuk (Institute for Complex Analysis of Regional Problems, Far Eastern Branch) helped meto identify them.

89Eurasia Border Review < Special Section >ethnocentric human resource management can cause anti-foreigner sentiment in the Russian Far East.
International investment in farming is becoming more important in Russia because Russia still reserves
vast amounts of land and has much potential for making agriculture a more strategic economic sector
for exporting products to their neighbors. It is not against the Russian government’s interest to stimulate
large-scale investments with the aim of using food exports as a political tool in cultivating international
relations.20 In this sense, in the long term, local elites in the Russian Far East are required to keep inmind that it makes no sense to exaggerate anti-foreigner sentiment related to land grabbing, and they
are also required to make efforts to reserve local skilled workers for accepting foreign investment.inagriculture. It will contribute to food security and economic integration in Northeast Asia.

20 Oane Visser, Natalia Mamonova and Max Spoor, “Oligarchs, Megafarms and Land Reserves: Understanding

Land Grabbing in Russia,” Journal of Peasant Studies 39: 3–4 (2012): 925.

90