The Impact of Intergroup Contact and Intergroup Conflict on
Japanese Immigration Attitudes
Hope Dewell Gentry and Regina Branton
Abstract
Due to its aging population, Japan has been experiencing the negative effects of a shrinking
workforce. Relaxing immigration policies and increasing the number of foreign workers has beensuggested to help alleviate the workforce problem. This paper explores the circumstances under which
the Japanese public is likely to hold favorable attitudes toward open immigration. Using intergroupcontact and group threat theories, we determine that there is a conditional relationship between thefrequency of contact with foreigners and the number of foreigners in a region on attitudes toward
immigration. As the size of the foreign population increases, frequency of contact with foreign workers
no longer has a mediating effect on immigration attitudes, and support for more open immigration
policies decreases.
Introduction
Facing an aging population, relaxing immigration policies could be the solution Japan needs
to solve their workforce problem. Due to having an older population, there are more people not working
than those in the workforce. As a result, fewer people are available to pay taxes and contribute to thewelfare system, as well as make contributions to the economy as a whole. Further, because there are
more jobs available than there are people to work them, fewer Japanese citizens are willing to takeunskilled, labor intensive jobs. 1 However, despite the fact that more open economic immigration
policies could help alleviate these problems, Japanese public opinion polls consistently reveal theJapanese general population has an overall negative perception of immigration.2
In order to determine what affects attitudes toward immigration, a common approach in theliterature is to apply the theories of intergroup contact and intergroup threat. While previous research
on Japanese immigration attitudes has utilized these strategies individually, we argue that theinteraction between intergroup threat and contact theories better reveals the factors that explain
individual perceptions toward foreign workers.
* Hope Dewell Gentry is a doctoral student in Political Science at the University of North Texas and can becontacted at: hopedewellgentry@my.unt.edu Regina Branton is Professor of Political Science at the University ofNorth Texas and can be contacted at: branton@unt.edu
1 Emiko Jozuka and Junko Ogura, “Can Japan Survive Without Immigrants?” CNN, August 1, 2017. Accessed
March 16, 2018: https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/01/asia/japan-migrants-immigration/index.html
2 David Green and Yoshihiko Kadoya. “Contact and Threat: Factors Affecting Views on Increasing Immigrationin Japan,” Politics and Policy 43:1 (2015): 59–93.
DOI: 10.14943/ebr.10.1.43

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Eurasia Border Review < Research Note >In order to test these theoretical approaches, we use the 2006 Japanese General Social Survey(henceforth the JGSS), which allows for analysis at the prefectural-level.3 We find that the interaction
between intergroup contact (number of interactions) and group threat (size of foreign population) better
addresses attitudes toward immigration than either theory on their own, as support for increased
immigration is conditional on the size of the foreign population. When the size of the foreign-born
population is low, having increased contact with foreigners positively affects attitudes toward
immigration. However, as the foreign population increases, the impact of contact on positive attitudes
diminishes until it eventually becomes insignificant, indicating that the intergroup contact theory only
applies so long as the size of the foreign population does not exceed its mean value, thus creating aperception of threat.
Intergroup Contact vs. Group Threat Literature
In the context of the United States, diversity and socioeconomic status have been demonstrated
to impact immigration attitudes. Originally applied to relations between white and black Americans,the intergroup contact literature is now often used to show how increased contact with a variety of typesof groups, aside from race and ethnicity, can produce a reduction in prejudice, particularly when boththe in-group and out-group are of equal status and the contact is voluntary.4 From there, the role thatdiversity and socioeconomic status play in contributing to anti-immigration attitudes has also been
explored.5 According to the contact literature, the more often individuals interact and form meaningful
relationships with members of another race/ethnicity, the more likely the individual is to have positive
racial attitudes and reduced prejudices.6 Support for intergroup contact theory is also found outside of
the United States, with much literature exploring anti-immigration and anti-Muslim attitudes in Europe
often finding that contact with the out-group often helps reduce negative attitudes.7
3 Our choice to utilize the 2006 JGSS is based on a lack of access to key information in more recent JGSS data,

which we address in the data section.
4 Thomas F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp, “A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory,” Personality
and Social Psychology 90:5 (2006): 751–783.
5 Regina Branton and Bradford Jones, “Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship Between
Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment,” Midwest Political Science Association 49:2 (2005): 359–372.
6 Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1954); Mary Jackman andMary Crane, “‘Some of my best friends are black...’: Interracial Friendship and Whites’ Racial Attitudes,” Public
Opinion Quarterly 50 (1986): 459–486; Lee Sigelman, Timothy Bledsoe, Susan Welch and Michael Combs,“Making Contact? Black-White Social Interaction in an Urban Setting,” American Journal of Sociology 101:5(1996): 1306–1332.
7 Rico Neumann and Patricia Moy, “You’re (Not) Welcome: The Impact of Symbolic Boundaries, Intergroup
Contact, and Experiences with Discrimination on Immigration Attitudes,” American Behavioral Scientist 62:4
(2008): 458–477; Michael Savelkoul, Peer Scheepers, Jochem Tolsma, and Louk Hagendoorn, “Anti-Muslim
Attitudes in The Netherlands: Tests of Contradictory Hypotheses Derived from Ethnic Competition Theory andIntergroup Contact Theory,” European Sociological Review 27:6 (2011): 741–758; Ann E. Wilson-Daily, Markus
Kemmelmeier and Joaquin Prats, “Intergroup Contact versus Conflict in Catalan High Schools: A Multilevel
Analysis of Adolescent Attitudes toward Immigration and Diversity,” International Journal of Intercultural
Relations 64 (2018): 12–28; Oriane Sarrasin, Eva G. T. Green, Nicole Fasel, Oliver Christ, Christian Staerkle and44

Hope Dewell Gentry and Regina BrantonGroup threat literature, on the other hand, argues that the interests between groups areincompatible. This is due to the in-group’s perception that any attempted resource gains by the outgroup creates a competition for resources, thus making the out-group a threat. 8 As a result, theseconflicting interests create negative racial attitudes. 9 The discussion of socioeconomic status was
naturally applied to group threat theory, contending that threat to social or economic opportunities canlead to negative racial attitudes.10 Also related to group threat is the idea that the size of the minority
group matters, as an increase in the minority group’s population can also lead to group threat, thusincreasing prejudicial attitudes.11
Some studies, however, reflect that it is important to consider certain contextual situations
regarding the effects of intergroup contact or group threat. For instance, Della Posta12 finds that at thecity level, citizens are less likely to support the French Front National party (FRN) when the immigrant
population is large, yet large immigrant populations at the state level are associated with higher supportof the FRN. The context surrounding a country’s historical and cultural background may also impact
attitudes toward immigrants. For instance, Garcia-Faroldi argues that the size of the foreign populationis less relevant than the immigrant group’s similarity to the country’s majority group or whether thecountry has recently experienced an economic crisis.13 Thus, various studies find the effects of groupthreat and intergroup contact are not constant.
Immigration in Japan
While the Japanese government has taken a hard line against more open immigration policies,
the government has taken advantage of existing loopholes in order to allow more foreign workers inJapan. In fact, the foreign workforce has grown by 40% since 2003.14 Skilled workers have been offeredan accelerated path of immigration using a point-based system. Yet, skilled workers do not seeminterested in staying in Japan. Indeed, Japan is the lowest ranking Asian country in appeal for skilled

Alain Clemence, “Opposition to Antiracism Laws Across Swiss Municipalities: A Multilevel Analysis,” Political
Psychology 33:5 (2012): 659–681; Seth K. Jolly and Gerald M. DiGiusto, “Xenophobia and Immigrant Contact:
French Public Attitudes toward Immigration,” The Social Science Journal 51 (2014): 464–473.
8 Herbert Blumer, “Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position,” Pacific Sociological Review 1:1 (1958): 3–7.
9 Lawrence Bobo, “Group Conflict, Prejudice, and the Paradox of Contemporary Racial Attitudes,” in Eliminating
Racism: Profiles in Controversy, eds. Phyllis Katz and Dalmas Taylor (New York: Plenum, 1988), 85–114.
10 Robert Huckfeldt and Carol Weitzel Kohfeld, Race and the Decline of Class in American Politics (Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1989); J. Eric Oliver and Tali Mendelberg, “Reconsidering the Environmental
Determinants of White Racial Attitudes,” Midwest Political Science Association 44:3 (2000): 574–589.
11 James Glaser, “Back to the Black Belt: Racial Environment and White Racial Attitudes,” Journal of Politics
56:1 (1994): 21–41.
12 Daniel J. Della Posta, “Competitive Threat, Intergroup Contact, or Both? Immigration and the Dynamics ofFront National Voting in France,” Social Forces 92 :1 (2013): 249–273.
13 Livia Garcia-Faroldi, “Determinants of Attitudes towards Immigration: Testing the Influence of Interculturalism,
Group Threat Theory and National Contexts in Times of Crisis,” International Migration 55:2 (2017): 10–22.
14 David Green, “Immigration Perception in Japan: A Multilevel Analysis of Public Opinion,” Asian Survey 57:2
(2017): 368–394.

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Eurasia Border Review < Research Note >foreign workers,15 which is likely due to the language barrier or taxation norms.16 For unskilled workers,a work training program is utilized to allow foreign workers into the country legally; however, they are
only allowed to stay temporarily.17
While there are avenues the Japanese government can utilize in order to help ease the burden
created by Japan’s aging population, the issue of immigration remains complicated. Skilled workers
are not interested in moving to Japan, and unskilled workers are not easily allowed to stay. In addition,
the Japanese government may be in need of more foreign workers, but they have been reluctant to makeofficial policy changes that will allow for easier immigration due to wanting to keep a certain image of
who is allowed to live and work in Japan.18 While the foreign population has been steadily growing,
they still only comprise less than two percent of the total population.
Japanese Attitudes toward Immigration
Following the example of intergroup contact research conducted in the United States andWestern Europe, similar approaches has been utilized to explain what impacts Japanese public opinion
toward foreigners. The literature on Japanese attitudes toward immigration points to the idea that
contact with foreign populations matters. According to the Nagayoshi’s paper,19 it is not the size of theforeign population alone that matters, but the type of foreign worker is important, as well as the speed
at which the type of foreign worker population is growing. Manual laborers are more likely to beperceived negatively. Further, the country of origin of the worker also has an effect, as Latin American
and Chinese immigrants are more likely to experience anti-immigration attitudes. As Nagayoshi20 andGreen21 find, the rate of foreign population growth influences immigration attitudes, where the fasterthe population grows, the stronger the person’s opinion on immigration becomes.
Intergroup contact theory traditionally considers increasing the opportunity to build
interpersonal relationships with members of an out-group as a method to reduce prejudice.22 However,
15 “IMD World Talent Ranking,” IMD World Competitiveness Center (IMD World Talent Ranking 2017): 1–107.
16

Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan Pays Foreign Workers to Go Home,” New York Times, April 22, 2009. Accessed March
16, 2018: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/business/global/23immigrant.html
17 Noah Smith, “Japan Wants Immigrants. The Feeling Isn’t Mutual,” Bloomberg, November 29, 2017. Accessed
March 16, 2018: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-11-30/japan-wants-immigrants-the-feelingisn-t-mutual
18 Tom Batchelor, “Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Refuses to Relax Immigration Rules Despite Shrinking
Population.” Independent, November 20, 2017. Accessed March 16, 2018: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/asia/japan-immigration-shinzo-abe-refuse-relax-rules-prime-minister-policy-shrinking-population-foreigna8065281.html
19 Kuniko Nagayoshi, “Whose Size Counts? Multilevel Analysis of Japanese Anti-Immigrant Attitudes Based on
JGSS-2006,” JGSS Research Series 6 (2009): 157–174.
20 Ibid.
21 David Green, “As Its Population Ages, Japan Quietly Turns to Immigration,” Migration Policy Institute, March
28, 2017. Accessed March 16, 2018: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/its-population-ages-japan-quietlyturns-immigration
22 Allport, The Nature of Prejudice.

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Hope Dewell Gentry and Regina Branton

the more conventional way of conceptualizing intergroup contact theory is limiting in the case ofJapan.23 Since the foreign-born population in Japan is so small, the possibility of forming meaningful
relationships between in-groups and out-groups is low. As a result, scholars interested in contact theory
in Japan tend to use more superficial contact, such as sharing a brief greeting with a foreign neighbor.24
While superficial contact has been found to have similar effects as deeper contact, Green and Kadoya
argue another way to conceptualize contact is through proficiency in speaking English.25 They argue
because the chance of forming a relationship with someone foreign-born is so low that a Japanesecitizen who has taken the time to experience and identify with another culture through learning alanguage is more likely to be tolerant toward immigrants than someone not proficient in speaking
English.
While intergroup contact theory has proven useful for explaining Japanese attitudes toward
immigration, whether measured by deep, superficial, or linguistic contact, the notion of group threat
has not been as consistently supported in the context of Japan, at least in the sense of economic threat.
For instance, Nukaga tests both contact and economic conflict theories by examining the effects ofeducation on attitudes toward foreign born populations. 26 While economic conflict would be a logicalexplanation for how education impacts attitudes toward immigrants due to the idea that education istied to competition in the labor market, Nukaga finds that education’s effects on attitudes act throughcontact with foreigners.27 Further, Green and Kadoya argue that intergroup contact and group threat
theories are not necessarily opposed, as they can work together, explaining that conflict creates
prejudice while contact facilitates the alleviation of prejudice.28 However, Green does not find that
economic conflict influences prejudicial attitudes, but instead argues that cultural identity threat is what
contributes to negative attitudes toward immigrants. 29
Fear of Small Numbers
As with the literature that examines immigration attitudes in the United States,30 the research
on Japanese attitudes toward foreign workers could also benefit from considering the interaction
between intergroup contact and threat theories. As Green and Kadoya point out, the intergroup contact
and group threat theories can be complementary. 31 The issue of population size is especially
23 Green and Kadoya, Contact and Threat.
24 Kuniko

Nagayoshi, “Whose Size Counts?” JGSS Research Series:6 (2009): 157–174; Misako Nukaga,“Xenophobia and the Effects of Education: Determinants of Japanese Attitudes toward Acceptance of Foreigners,”
JGSS Research Series 2 (2006): 191–202.
25 Green and Kadoya, Contact and Threat.
26 Nukaga, “Xenophobia and the Effects of Education.”
27 Ibid.
28 Green and Kadoya, Contact and Threat.
29 Green, “As Its Population Ages, Japan Quietly Turns to Immigration.”
30 Robert Stein, Stephanie Post, and Allison Rinden, “Reconciling Context and Contact Effects on Racial Attitudes,”Political Research Quarterly 53 (2000): 285–303.
31 Green and Kadoya, Contact and Threat.

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Eurasia Border Review < Research Note >straightforward when considering how the in-group might form their attitudes based on the number ofopportunities the in-group has to meet and form relationships with members of the out-groups. Further,
the amount of resources the groups are in competition over may influence attitudes regarding
immigrants. As the scholars noted above have argued, in the case of Japan, where the foreign population
is so low, the impact of population size contributing to a sense of positive or negative attitudes is not
sufficient on its own. Instead, we argue that there is a conditional relationship between the size of theforeign population and the amount of interactions between Japanese citizens and foreign workers.
In their research on the attitudes of whites toward Hispanics in Texas, Stein and co-authors
argue that the common conclusions within the literature — increased contact with members of theoutgroup contributes to positive attitudes toward the outgroup, while increased size of the outgroupleads to negative attitudes toward the outgroup — is too simplistic32. They assert the extant literaturedoes not outline what to expect when intergroup contact and group threat are considered concurrently.
Further, they contend it is logical to assume that both aspects of the theories need to be considered
together.
They also argue that increased contact with the outgroup mediates the relationship between
outgroup threat and attitudes toward the outgroup. Specifically, they propose that frequent contact withthe outgroup—i.e., Hispanics—mediates the negative influences of perceptions of conflict created bya larger Hispanic population. The results of their study partially confirm their expectations. Contact
significantly mediates the relationship between the size of the Hispanic population and attitudes toward
Hispanics, but they find the relationship is curvilinear. As the size of the Hispanic population increases
from a small to moderate size, they find contact has a negative impact on white attitudes toward
Hispanics. Yet, as the size of the Hispanic population increases from moderate to large, they find contact
has a positive impact on white attitudes toward Hispanics.
Similarly, Charitopoulou and Garcia-Manglano test the joint effect of intergroup contact andgroup threat on support for Switzerland’s populist radical right. 33 As with Stein’s analysis, 34
Charitopoulou and Garcia-Manglano find that Swiss voters are more likely to experience a “fear ofsmall numbers” due to group threat when there is a noticeable, but still fairly small, increase in theimmigrant population. 35 In this way, it is the Swiss municipalities with a moderate number of
immigrants that are more likely to vote for the populist radical right, while the municipalities witheither a small or a large proportion of immigrants tend to not support the populist radical right.
In the context of Japan, we expect that the interaction between the elements of intergroupcontact and group threat theory will be important in better understanding Japanese attitudes towardforeigners in Japan. As with Stein’s analysis36, we anticipate there is a mediating relationship between
32 Stein, Post, and Rinden, “Reconciling Context and Contact Effects on Racial Attitudes.”33 Effrosyni Charitopoulou and Javier Garcia-Manglano, “Fear of Small Numbers? Immigrant Population Size andElectoral Support for the Populist Radical Right in Switzerland,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44:5
(2017): 1–21.
34 Stein, Post, and Rinden, “Reconciling Context and Contact Effects on Racial Attitudes.”35 Charitopoulou and Garcia-Manglano, “Fear of Small Numbers?”
36 Stein, Post, and Rinden, “Reconciling Context and Contact Effects on Racial Attitudes.”48

Hope Dewell Gentry and Regina Brantonintergroup contact and group threat. However, we expect the size of the foreign-born population
mediates the effect of contact on attitudes toward immigration. To illustrate the distribution of theforeign-born population across prefectures in Japan, consider Figure 1. This choropleth map depicts
the prefecture-level percentage of the foreign-born population. The graduated color scheme uses darker
colors to reflect a higher percentage of foreign born and lighter colors to reflect a lower percentage of
foreign born. Substantively, this figure highlights the variability in JGSS respondents’ spatial exposure
to prefecture-level foreign born populations. Given that the foreign population accounts for less than
two percent of the overall population in Japan, it is possible that there are not enough foreigners inJapan to allow for increased opportunities for frequent contact. As such, we offer the following
hypothesis: H1: The negative effect of group threat—the size of the foreign population—mediates the
positive effect of intergroup contact on Japanese attitudes toward increased immigration.

Figure 1: Prefecture-Level Percent Foreign Born
Data and Methods
To evaluate Japanese attitudes toward immigrants, we utilize the 2006 JGSS. 37 38 As stated inFootnote 3, we use the 2006 JGSS due to a lack of access to key information in more recent JGSS data.

37 As noted, we used the 2006 JGSS due to a lack of access to key information in more recent JGSS data.

Unfortunately, all the JGSS data sets after 2006 omit the respondents’ prefecture. We contacted the Director of the
JGSS requesting access to more recent JGSS data. We were informed due to changes in the Resident Registry
System Act in 2015 that JGSS no longer provides access to the respondents’ prefecture location due to privacy
issues.
38 Ichiro Tanioka, Noriko Iwai, Michio Nitta and Tokio Yasuda, Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS) (AnnArbor: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2006) Accessed March 16, 2018: https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR25181.v1

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Eurasia Border Review < Research Note >Unfortunately, all the JGSS data sets after 2006 omit the respondents’ prefecture. Due to changes in the
Resident Registry System Act in 2015, the JGSS no longer provides access to the respondents’prefecture location to protect the privacy of the participants. The 2006 JGSS includes 4,254 interviews
completed between October 3, 2006, and November 3, 2006. We merged the JGSS data with theprefecture-level Japan Census demographic data from 2005. Together, these data allow us to identify
both individual-level factors and aggregate-level contextual factors that influence Japanese attitudes
regarding increased immigration.
The dependent variable measures respondent attitudes regarding an increase in the number of
immigrants in their community.39 The respondents were asked: “Are you for or against an increase in
the number of foreigners in your community?” The response options are coded “0” for “Against” and“1” for “For.”40 Forty-one percent of the respondents indicated they supported increased numbers of
foreigners, 52% indicated they were against increased numbers of foreigners, and 7% offered no
response.
The primary individual-level characteristic of interest is contact with foreign born persons. To
account for the impact of contact with foreigners, we use the response to the following survey item:“Do you often see foreigners in the area where you live?” The item, “Contact,” is scored 1 for “Not atall”, 2 for “Rarely,” 3 for “Sometimes,” and 4 for “Frequently.”41 The key aggregate-level variable
represents the percent of the foreign-born population at the prefecture level. Japan is partitioned into
47 prefectures, which are administrative jurisdictions. We culled the data from the Japanese Statistics
Bureau, which is housed within the Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications(Population of Japan). We use the prefecture as the geographic unit of interest as this is the lowest level
geographic indicator included in the JGSS. The prefecture-level percent foreign born ranges from .27
to 2.07, with a mean value of 1.20. To account for the proposed conditioning relationship between theprefecture-level percent foreign born and the individual-level contact with foreign-born persons, themodels include an interaction term—(%) Foreign Born x Contact.
The models also include five individual-level control variables: gender, age, partisan
affiliation, ideology, social class, education, marital status, English-language proficiency, satisfaction
with area, and view of other countries. These control variables are included in the models to accountfor potential difference across respondents as a function of demographic differences. To account for the
respondent’s gender, the model includes a variable, Female, which is coded 1. The age of the respondent
ranges from 20 to 89 with a mean of 52.6. Partisan affiliation is measured by five binary variables: No
Party ID, Democratic Party of Japan, New Komeito Party, Japanese Communist Party and Social
39 Summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables are presented in the Appendix.
40 This question was asked to 2,124 respondents as part of a split sample design.
41 It is worth mentioning, however, that our measure of intergroup contact is superficial. Allport’s theory argued

for the formation of meaningful relationships in order to combat prejudice, not mere contact with members of theout-group (See, Allport, The Nature of Prejudice). However, as the literature indicates, because Japan’s foreign
population is so small, the likelihood of a Japanese citizen being able to form a meaningful relationship with theirforeign neighbors is low. Thus, there is a possibility a study that could consider the depth of the relationship, rather
than simple interactions, would have different results.

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Hope Dewell Gentry and Regina Branton

Democratic Party (coded 1 in each case). Liberal Democratic Party serves as the baseline category.
Ideology is also measured by 5 category ordinal variable ranging from 1 (conservative) to 5
(progressive).
We incorporate a 5-category variable measuring a respondent’s perceived Social Class, whichranges from 1 (Lower) to 5 (Upper). Finally, education is measured using a dichotomous variable, HighSchool Degree, coded 1 if the respondent holds a high school degree or 0 if otherwise. A respondent’s
marital status is measured using a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the respondent is married or 0 if
otherwise. English language proficiency is based on a response to the question: “How well can you
speak English?” The variable, Speak English, is a 5-category variable ranging from 1 (I can hardly
speak English) to 5 (I can speak sufficiently for daily life or business).
To account for the respondent’s satisfaction with the area in which they live, we use a 5category variable ranging from 1 (Dissatisfied) to 5 (Satisfied). To account for a respondent’s view ofother countries we created an additive index based on evaluations of Korea, North Korea, China,
Mongolia, Taiwan, Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Russia and the United States. Respondents
were asked: “How do you feel about the following countries and regions?” The response options ranged
from 1 (no evaluation) to 7 (most favorable). The additive index itself ranges from 0 to 77 with a meanof 43.7; higher values reflect a greater affinity toward other countries.
The model also includes three aggregate-level control variables: population density, age, andpublic assistance. These aggregate-level control variables are included to account for population
demographic difference across Japan’s prefectures. All three prefecture-level variables were culledfrom Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Statistics Bureau (Population of Japan).
Population density measures the number of people per square kilometer and ranges from 1.8 to 123.3,
with a mean of 38.2. Age is measured by the average of the prefecture population and ranges from 39.1
to 47.1 with a mean of 43.4. Finally, to account for the socio-economic status of an area, we include ameasure of the percent of the prefecture population that is on public assistance. This measure ranges
from .58 to 4.1 with a mean of 2.
Results
Given that our dependent variable is a binary, we use logistic regression to estimate twomodels. The first model (Main) omits the interaction between (%) Foreign Born and Contact, while
the second model (Interactive) includes in the interaction between (%) Foreign Born and Contact. We
estimated both the main and interactive models to illustrate the importance of accounting for theconditioning relationship between contact and foreign-born threat. The results for both models arepresented in Table 1.
42

42 There are multiple approaches available to deal with clustered data (such as those used here). As Steenbergen

and Jones note, there are a variety of ways to deal with clustered data. Further, they note that Huber-White
Sandwich estimated standard errors is an appropriate option. See, Marco R. Steenbergen and Bradford S. Jones,“Modeling Multilevel Data Structures,” American Journal of Political Science 46:1 (2002): 218–237.

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Eurasia Border Review < Research Note >We begin by discussing the “Main” effect model. Both variables of primary interest—Contact
and (%) Foreign Born—are significant. Contact with individuals that are foreign born is positively
associated with support for immigration, while as the foreign-born population increases, support forincreased immigration decreases.
Table 1: Japanese Attitudes Regarding Increased Immigration

Standard errors in parentheses *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. These data are taken from the 2006 Japanese General Social
Survey. The wording of the dependent variable is: “Are you for or against an increase in the number of foreigners in yourcommunity?” The response options are coded “0” for “Against” and “1” for “For”.

To help highlight the impact of contact with foreign born individuals and prefecture-level
foreign born population, the predicted probabilities are presented in Figure 2.43 The left panel presents
the probability of supporting immigration as a function of contact and the right panel presents theprobability as a function of prefecture-level (%) foreign-born population. The left panel demonstrates
that increased interaction with foreign born individuals leads to greater support for increased
immigration. The probability of support of increased immigration is .40 for an individual that has rare
43 All predicted probabilities are based on holding all other independent variables at their mean value.

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Hope Dewell Gentry and Regina Branton

contact, while the probability for an individual with frequent contact is .50 (∆ Prob=.10). This suggeststhat greater contact leads to increased support for increasing immigration levels, which reflects thecontact hypothesis. The right panel reveals that increases in the prefecture-level foreign born population
leads to less support for increased immigration. For instance, the probability of support for increased
immigration is .55 among those living in prefectures with minimal percentages of foreigners, while theprobability for those living in prefectures with maximal percentages of foreigners is .36 (∆ Prob=-.19).
This finding suggests that as the prefecture-level foreign born population increases support for
immigration decreases, which reflects the group threat hypothesis. Together, the main effect model
suggests that the effect of contact and (%) foreign born threat work in opposite directions—intergroupcontact has a positive effect and group threat, indicated by the size of the foreign born population, hasa negative effect on support for increased immigration.

Figure 2: Probability of Support for Increased Immigration (Main Model)
Next, we consider the conditional relationship between intergroup contact and group threatand support for increased immigration. To help facilitate interpretation of the impact contact withforeigners has on support for increased immigration, which is conditioned on percent of the foreignborn population at the prefecture-level, we present the relationship graphically in Figure 3. The left
panel presents the difference in predicted probability, indicating if one supports increased immigrationin their community as the prefecture-level foreign born population increases from the minimum tomaximum across the range contact with foreigners. The right panel presents the difference in predictedprobability of indicating one supports increased immigration in their community as one’s contact withforeigners increases from the minimum to maximum across the range of the percent foreign born
measure.

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Eurasia Border Review < Research Note >Figure 3: Conditional Support for Increased Immigration (Interactive Model)
The left panel of Figure 3 demonstrating a heightened presence of foreign-born individuals is
associated with less support for increased immigration among individuals that rarely come into contact
with foreign-born individuals. Further, the level of support for increased immigration further declines
as contact with foreign-born individuals increases. For example, when contact with foreigners is rare,
the probability of a respondent residing in a prefecture with a minimum foreign born population
supporting increases in immigration is .46, while the probability for someone supporting increased
immigration residing in a prefecture with a maximum foreign born population is .33 (∆ =-.13). Further,when contact with foreigners is frequent, the probability of a respondent residing in a prefecture witha minimum foreign born population supporting increases immigration is .63, while the probability forsomeone supporting increased immigration residing in a prefecture with a maximum foreign born
population is .35 (∆ =-.28). Taken together, this suggests that foreign born threat has a negative
conditioning effect on the relationship between contact and support for increased immigration, meaningthat prefectures with higher foreign-born populations are less likely to support increased immigration,even when contact with foreigners is higher.
The right panel of Figure 3 demonstrates that contact with immigrants is associated withgreater support for increased immigration in the absence of a sizeable foreign-born population, but this
support diminishes as exposure to a growing foreign-born population increases. For example, when
the percentage foreign born population is at is minimum value, the probability of a respondent withminimal contact with foreigners supporting increases immigration is .46, while the probability forsomeone supporting increased immigration with maximal contact with foreigners is .64 (∆ =.18). Yet,as the percentage foreign born approaches its mean value, the probability of a respondent with minimal
contact with foreigners supporting increases in immigration is .39, while the probability for one with54

Hope Dewell Gentry and Regina Branton

maximal contact with foreigners is .49 (∆ =.10). Further, as the percentage foreign population exceeds
the mean value of foreign-born population, the difference in predicted probability between those withminimal and maximal contact with foreigners is no longer statistically significant. This suggests that
prefecture-level foreign born population has a negative conditioning effect on the relationship between
foreign born contact and support for increased immigration.
Taken together, the main and interactive models offer a consistent view of the impact of groupthreat and opposing views on the impact of intergroup contact. Both models indicate an increasing
foreign born population serves to diminish support for increased immigration. Yet, the findings of themain and interactive model diverge on the impact of contact. The main model finds increased contact
leads to more support for increased immigration, while the interactive model finds after accounting forthe conditioning effect of foreign born threat, increased contact leads to less support for increased
immigration.
In addition to the findings of primary interests, the results provide several interesting findings
among the control variables.44 First, the results indicate that one’s view of other countries significantly
impacts one’s support for immigration. As one’s view increases from minimum to maximum value theprobability of supporting increased immigration grows from .04 to .89 (∆ = .85). Substantively, thissuggests that respondents with a positive evaluation of multiple of countries are more accepting of theidea of greater immigration to Japan.
Second, the results reveal some interesting partisan differences with regard to support forincreased immigration. To help illustrate the differences, we plot the predicted probability of support
for increased immigration across parties in Figure 4. This figure demonstrates that respondents with nopartisan affiliation, supporters of the Liberal Democratic Party, supporters of the Japanese Community

Figure 4: Partisan Differences in Support for Increased Immigration
44 The results for the control variables are consistent across the main and interactive models; thus, we focus on thefindings of the interactive model.

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Eurasia Border Review < Research Note >Party, and supporters of the Democratic Party of Japan are significantly less supportive of increased
immigration than compared to supporters of the New Komeito Party. These differences possibly reflect
the New Komeito Party’s platform emphasizes shaping Japan into a nation of global citizens, rather
than focusing on national interests, while parties like the Liberal Democratic Party have taken a hardstance against more open immigration policies.
Finally, consistent with Green and Kadoya (2015) 45 , our findings indicate even after
controlling for intergroup contact and group threat, English language proficiency is associated withsupporting for increased immigration. The probability of a Japanese with limited English language
proficiency support for increased immigration is .40, while the probability for a Japanese with sufficient
English language proficiency is .57 (∆ = .17). This suggests English language acquisition leads to morepositive perception of the foreign population.
Conclusion
Consistent with the American Politics literature regarding immigration attitudes, intergroupcontact and group threat theories have important implications for how we understand attitudes towardforeigners in Japan. It is not that factors associated with group threat theory are not as relevant in Japan,
as previous research would suggest, but the relationship between group threat and immigration attitudes
is a conditional one. When we see how elements of group threat and intergroup contact theory interact,
we better understand what motivates anti-immigrant perceptions in Japanese citizens. When the size ofthe foreign population increases, the impact of increased contact creating more positive views towardforeign workers diminishes. As the perceived threat of immigrants becomes more viable, contact withimmigrants no longer fosters positive attitudes, thus decreasing support for more open immigration
policies.
To illustrate this importance of accounting for how group threat and intergroup contact interact,consider the conclusions generated by the main and interactive models. Both models suggest groupthreat, reflected by size of the foreign-born population, leads to less support for increased immigration.
Individuals residing in prefectures with a heightened foreign-born population are on average lesssupportive of increased immigration than compared to individuals residing in prefectures with a smaller
foreign born population even when controlling for the conditioning effect of contact (interactive model).
However, the main and interactive models result in opposing conclusions with regard to the impact ofcontact. The main effect model finds that increased contact with foreign-born individuals leads togreater support for increased immigration. While the interactive model finds the impact of intergroupcontact is contingent on foreign born group threat. When the conditioning effect of the foreign-born
threat is taken into account increased contact leads to less support for increased immigration. As theforeign population increases, those with frequent contact are less supportive of increased immigrationcompared to those with rare contact.

45 Green and Kadoya, Contact and Threat.

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Hope Dewell Gentry and Regina Branton

The conditioning effect of intergroup contact on attitudes toward outgroups leads to morenegative evaluations at lower values of foreign born population size, due to perceived threat.46 However,as the size of the outgroup becomes moderate to large, the impact of contact serves to improve
evaluations of the outgroup. If this pattern takes root in Japan, the benefits of intergroup contact may
translate to more positive attitudes regarding increased immigration. As the immigrant population in
Japan continues to increase, it seems plausible to expect for more frequent contact to result in morepositive attitudes toward more open immigration policies. Since the size of the foreign population in
Japan is so small, the likelihood of Japanese citizens having regular and frequent contact withforeigners is low. Thus, if the size of the foreign population continues to grow, there is hope thatJapanese citizens will be more willing to accept more open immigration policies.47 Indeed, this would
serve to help alleviate the economic problems created by Japan’s aging population.
Relatedly, it is important to acknowledge the immigration landscape has changed since 2006—
the year observed in this study. There has been a rapid increase in the number of foreign born residents
the in past decade. Indeed, as of 2018 there were approximately 2.5 million foreign residents in Japanand they comprise just over 2% of the country’s total population. The trend is likely to continue as aresult of changes in Japan’s immigration policy passed in 2018,48 which seeks to attract a larger numberof foreign residents to address labor shortages. Given this continued growth of the foreign populationin Japan, it is possible that the foreign-born population will grow to a level that would allow for morepositive attitudes toward open immigration policies as suggested by Stein et al. In essence, the frequentcontact and integration into the Japanese community may help foster positive interactions between
Japanese citizens and those who are foreign born.49

46 Stein, Post, and Rinden, “Reconciling Context and Contact Effects on Racial Attitudes.”47 Ibid.
48 Simon Denyer and Akiko Kashiwagi, “Japan Passes Controversial New Immigration Bill to Attract Foreign

Workers,” Washington Post, December 7, 2018. Accessed November 21, 2019: https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/japan-passes-controversial-new-immigration-bill-to-attract-foreign-workers/2018/12/07/a76d8420-f9f311e8-863a-8972120646e0_story.htmll
49 Rene Rocha and Rodolfo Espino, “Racial Threat, Residential Segregation, and the Policy Attitudes of Anglos,”Political Research Quarterly 62:2 (2009): 415–426.

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