Fifth US‐Japan Roundtable, “American Viewpoints on Japan’s Zero Nuclear Option” hosted jointly by The Howard Baker
Forum and The Heritage Foundation on December 5, 2012, at the Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C. USA.

Closing Remarks
Shunsuke KONDO
ChairmanJapan Atomic Energy Commission
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The Philosophy of the Howard Baker Forum• In governance, wrote James Madison in Federalist
No.14, the government should never disregard as
touchstones of sound policy "the suggestions of theirown good sense, the knowledge of their own situation,and the lessons of their own experience."• Sorting out these "suggestions" in today's modern
world of advocacy and spin is a daunting challenge.
• The Howard Baker Forum serves as a neutral groundfor examining the issues and finding creative solutions
to pressing national problems.
2Aftermath of 2011 Great East Japan
Earthquake and Tsunami
 Causalities– 18, 131 deaths, 6194 injured and 2829 missing– 1618 deaths related with the disaster: 764 in Fukushima; 636 in Miyagi
and 179 in Iwate

 Damages– 129,391 house were completely destroyed and 265,096 houses werehalf destroyed.

 Evacuees– 326,873 people in total; 41,969 of Iwate, 114,787 of Miyagi and 99,229of Fukushima Causes– The magnitude of this natural event was that of once in 1,000 years.
– Only 40% of the coastline was lined with anti‐tsunami seawall.
– Most of them were washed over their top by the tsunami as the return
period of their design base tsunami was less than 1,000 years.
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Accident Sequences
Earthquake

M 9.0 at 170 km
off the coast

Automatic
reactor shutdown

Loss of both core cooling and UHS
due to damages of EDGs, seawaterpumps and power distribution panels

T and P increase in RPV dueto depletion of coolingcapability

Loss of off-site
power supply

Unexpectedly
high (~15 m)
tsunamiCore melt occurred as
SAM operations were notdone timely.

Emergency
power supply
by EDG
Cooling of reactor
and spent fuel pool
SAMG:
CV venting
Relief-valve opening
Water injection by firepump• Hydrogen explosion in reactor building (RB)caused by the leakage of H2 generated by water-Zr
reaction in the core to PCV and then to RB• Large releases of radioactive materials (RM) toenvironment from PCV owing to degradation ofleak-tightness due to its excessive temperature rise4

AEC’s Request for Governance* Plans• On‐site cleanup• Off‐site remediation• Nuclear power recovery• Coping with the policy of no new NPP＊Here governance means a democratic engagement of public decision‐making
body through the institutional arrangements where various stakeholders including
citizens and government officials give input into the process to reach an effective
and legitimate action plan.
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Major Onsite Works Promoted at Present• Assurance of the reliable operation of circulating‐waterinjection cooling• Treatment of accumulated water and control of groundwater inflow to reactor buildings• Reduction of environmental radiation• Improvement of work environment in controlled areas• Long‐term health management of workers experienced
high‐level exposures• Removal of spent fuel from spent fuel pool
• Preparations for fuel debris removal• Management of radioactive wastes
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Land contamination extends over area
within about 260km‐radius from
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.

8Legend
Area1 : Areas to which evacuation orders are readyliftedArea2: Areas in which the residents are notpermitted to live in two years
Area3: Areas where the residents have difficulties
in returning for a long time
Restricted Area, where habitability after decontaminationis under discussion.

9Naraha‐City is Divided into Habitable Area and Inhabitable Area (atleast for five years) in Two Years.

High Dose Area

The first stage decontamination will be done, aiming at reducing
the additional annual dose below 20mSv before end of 2013.
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Offsite Recovery
The challenges government are tackling at present are to• Promote public communication for securing sites for interim storage
facility for radioactive waste from decontamination works;• Seek for more efficient and effective decontamination technology
and approach and those for forests which cover more than 70 % of
their area, in particular;• Monitor health condition and promote health management basedon the common concept of early diagnosis and treatment for any
diseases identified for a two million population during almost wholelifespan due to uncertainty in the effect of low‐dose radiation
exposure;• Promote risk communication about the low‐dose exposure;
The life of sufferers, the proceeding of these works and inevitableoccurrences of friction in the proceeding are on the news almost day
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after day and will be so year after year.

Recovery of Nuclear Power Generation• Should cover governance in three dimensions
TechnologicalInstitutional
Public trust

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Recognition of Global Nuclear Community• Though the accident was triggered by a massive forceof nature, it was existing weaknesses regarding
defense against natural hazards, regulatory oversight,
accident management and emergency response thatallowed it to unfold as it did, and apparently they canbe fixed.
• Nuclear energy offers and will offer many benefits,
helping to improve energy security, reduce the impact
of volatile fossil fuel prices, mitigate the effects ofclimate change and make economies morecompetitive.

Root Causes of the Accident
 Nuclear regulator and operators were shy with probabilistic approachand failed to let the experts in tsunami know the necessity of having
information about a tsunami event of which frequency of exceedance
was less than 1 in 10,000 years.
 They also failed to satisfy the need for defense‐in‐depth features thatshould prevent a disproportionate increase in radiologicalconsequences from an appropriate range of events more severe thanthe design basis event (cliff‐edge).
 Utilities and vendors made a decision to deviate from the accident
management strategies developed by the global nuclear community,
claiming that AC Power supply in Japan is highly reliable based on thedata obtained in 10 years or so: measures introduced were based on
the assumption that a loss of all AC power would not last for more than
30 minutes.
 Emergency trainings were superficial such that they could not build up
the preparedness for venting PCV in diverse situations.

Measures Directed by the NISA
 Ensure that design base external events (seismic, seismic‐tsunami andother events, their combined effects) are properly evaluated.
 Ensure extended losses of power and ultimate heat sink are covered
under severe accident conditions and protection is provided by adiverse and flexible capability to provide power and cooling: Ensure that severe accident management procedures, including
reliable hardened vent for specific reactor containments, that take into
consideration the fact that external events might affect the entire site,
and that training thereof are in place: Ensure emergency preparedness capabilities are in place and available
even under combined effects of natural events.

Recommendations of the Governmental
Accident Investigation Committee
 A strong safety culture should be established in every nuclear
enterprise.
 There should be strong leadership in all the institutions involved innuclear power that ensures attention to safety, as well as continuing
efforts to understand the technology and to improve it.
 Every operator should recognize its fundamental responsibility forsafety, continuously driving himself for safety excellence and making
regular investments to address insights arising from operating
experience and evolving knowledge of external events.
 The regulator must be competent, independent, and dedicated to thetask of ensuring that safety obligations are fulfilled.

Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)The Commission

CommissionerCommissioner
Nakamura
Shimazaki
Reactor Safety
Examination
Committee

ChairmanTanakaNuclear Fuel Safety
Examination
CommitteeCommissione Commissioner
r Fuketa
OshimaRadiation Council

Committee for Evaluationof Independent
Administrative Agency

Secretariat of NRA (S/NRA)
Secretary-General
Deputy Secretary-General
Director-General for
Emergency Response
GeneralAffairs
Division

PolicyEvaluation
and Public
Relations
Division

Director-General for
Nuclear Regulation Policy
InternationalAffairs
Division

Nuclear Regulatory Local Office(22 sites)

Regulatory
Rl tStandardandResearch
Division

Director-General for
Regional Safety
Management
Nuclear
Emergency
Preparedness
Division

Director for
Nuclear
Regulation(5 members)

Liaison to the local administration(5 members)Recent Actions Taken by the NRA
 Started reviewing the characteristics of active‐faults in andaround several NPP sites that had been open to dispute.
 Recommended the municipalities within 30km from NPPs
to establish an emergency plan (about 10 km in the past).
 Started the deliberation of a new safety requirement thatshould request the implementation of countermeasuresagainst severe accident.
 The latest technical requirement (seismic resistance, regulations
on severe accident, etc.) shall be applied to the existing plants
retrospectively.
 NPPs must not be operated beyond 40 years, in principle, though
one‐time‐only extension up to 20 years will be allowed on a case‐by‐case basis.

The Governance of Public Trust• In the public trust dimension local governments andcitizens are essential participants in addition to central
government and operators of NPPs.
• As the NRA asked municipalities within 30km from NPPs toestablish an emergency plan, the number of participating
municipalities rose significantly.
• Government should establish an innovative institutionalarrangement within which problems are identified andsolutions are enacted through interaction amongparticipants in restarting the idling plants.
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How to Cope With No NewConstruction Policy• The plan should cover;– Human resources– Competitiveness of nuclear industries– Nuclear fuel cycle activity– Relation with local governments– International relations

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Recent Activities in the Area of theNuclear Fuel Cycle• Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL)– Started the operation of new centrifuge cascade for uranium enrichmentof the updated section of Uranium Enrichment Plant.
– Resumed the construction of a MOX Fuel Fabrication Plant.
– Started the final test of Melter B of Reprocessing Plant. The test of Melter
A will followed and the active test will be completed in the fall of 2013.

• Government is to• Start the R&Ds for used nuclear fuel direct disposal and for advanced
burner reactors that can reduce the amount of radioactive wastes,
compiling the outcome of 30 years or so of fast‐breeder reactor R&D
activity including the operation of Monju.

• Intensify the activity to determine the site for a high level
radioactive waste repository.
21How to Cope WithNo New Construction Policy At present, priority should be given to recovery of public trust: Improve the safety of their plant so that they can resume theoperation of idling plant, satisfying the requirement of the NRAand obtaining the consent of the local government； Resume their efforts to obtain the consent of the local
government to use MOX fuel in their plants.

 The plan should have a mid and long term perspective:
 Complexity – need for comprehensive approach Industry already has prepared themselves for low domestic order.

 Short term actions necessary
 Assurance of human resources Pursuance of a joint action for making best use of industrial
capability in terms that are going to make sense to the people 22We should fix nuclear energy,
not extirpate it.
David Lilienthal, the first Chairman of the US AEC,
shortly after the TMI Accident in 1979.

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