Report on the Rwanda Mission
August 30, 2014
GRIPS Development ForumA GRIPS Development Forum (GDF) team consisting of Kenichi Ohno, Izumi Ohno, andAkemi Nagashima visited Kigali during August 5-8, 2014 to study the features of Rwanda’s
remarkable growth in recent years from the perspective of international comparison of policy
methods, and draw lessons for other developing countries including Ethiopia1. The GDF
team conducted many meetings jointly with JICA’s parallel mission consisting of Ms. Miho
Oikawa, Mr. Masaaki Hamada (JICA Industrial Development and Public Policy Department),and Ms. Yuko Ikeda (JICA Ethiopia Office).
We visited government ministries and agencies, a private sector organization, a policy thinktank, an industrial estate, and donors with industrial support programs including Japan,
Germany, the African Development Bank and the World Bank. Mission schedule,organizations visited and information collected are shown in attachments 1-3. We would liketo express our deep appreciation to all people who kindly received us and shared valuable
information with us. Our special thanks go to the JICA staff at the Africa Department and the
Rwanda Office in particular, who assisted us greatly in executing this mission. We also thankRwandan Ambassador to Japan Dr. Charles Murigande, as well as Japanese Ambassador
to Rwanda Mr. Kazuya Ogawa and his embassy staff.
1. Overview
Rwanda has a unique and remarkable history of economic development. After the tragic
genocide in 1994, the Rwandan economy remained weak with per capita GDP hovering in
the range of $200 to $300 during the period from 1998 to 2002. Subsequently, with theinitiation of proactive development policy in the early 2000s, the economy began to reboundstrongly and sustained high growth with per capita GDP rising at an average rate of 10.7%
between 2002 and 2013 (World Bank data). In 2013 per capita GDP stood at $620, about
twice the level prior to the genocide. President Paul Kagame, who assumed office in 2000,
has transformed Rwanda into a developmental state and guided the nation toward
economic growth. The country aims to attain middle income status by 2020 (“Vision 2020”).
During this recent ascent achievements were made in both policy method and economic
performance with the result that certain aspects of the Rwandan economy already resemble
1

The purpose of our JICA-commissioned missions, including this one, is to collect information on industrial
policy formulation in selected countries for the policy learning of other developing countries. During Phase I
of Japan-Ethiopia industrial policy dialogue 2009-2011, the GDF team visited Singapore (AugustSeptember 2010), Korea (November 2010) and Taiwan (February 2011). During Phase II, India (September2012), Mauritius (October 2012), Malaysia (June 2013), and Indonesia (June 2014) were visited in addition
to Rwanda. Separately, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Thailand, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana and Uganda
were also visited on other budgets.

1

those of advanced economies while other aspects still retain weaknesses expected of atypical latecomer country. This unevenness is one the most striking features of the Rwandan
economy today.
Rwanda’s advanced aspects, which are rarely seen in other countries at similar income
levels, include the following: President Paul Kagame is seriously and strongly committed to development and gives
clear policy directions, to which the country responds.
 High-ranking technocrats are competent and have excellent presentation skills.
 Policy is made through systematic stakeholder consultation, the government has strong
policy ownership, and policy documents are well-written. National Dialogue is annually
held with the participation of the President, and public private dialogue is also active.
 There is little corruption, citizens enjoy personal security, and streets are clean.
 Performance contracts, based on the tradition of Imihigo, are pervasive. Promised
policies are monitored and assessed at every level of government.
 Significant poverty reduction has been achieved with population below poverty line
falling from 77% in 1995 to 45% in 2011.
 In the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business survey in 2014, Rwanda ranks No.2 in
Africa after Mauritius, or No.32 globally.
 High value services such as ICT, telecom and finance are emerging, with services
occupying 45% of GDP in 2013.
 Overall national self-sufficiency in agro products has been attained overcoming theheavy food aid dependency of the past.
 National branding effort has created the image of a rising nation replacing the dark
image of the past.
These features collectively make Rwanda an African Miracle in the eyes of global analysts
and investors. A large number of returning Diaspora—the patriotic Rwandans equipped with
global knowledge and professionalism coming home from America, Europe and neighboring
African countries—provide the human capital necessary for high-value industries andsupporting policies. On the other hand, three deficiencies of Rwanda identified by thismission, which are also commonly seen in many other low-income countries, are (i) a weak
(Rwandans prefer to say “young”) private sector in sharp contrast to the advanced public
sector; (ii) high aid dependency in the absence of competitive foreign exchange-earningindustries2; and (iii) inadequate execution of policies despite their elaborate formulation,
which reduces impact.
2. Causes of high growth
In the opinion of the GDF mission, which was echoed by some development partners of
Rwanda, recent high growth can be explained mainly by three factors.
2

The Rwandan economy is relatively closed with the export volume equivalent to 15% of GDP. Coffee, tea
and minerals accounted for 59% of total export in 2013 (World Bank data).

2

First, fast growth is not uncommon in economies that start from a very low level. Because
the Rwandan economy was devastated after the 1994 tragedy, it had much room to reboundwhen political stability and policy confidence were restored. Post-crisis recovery is a natural
phenomenon and can continue for 10-15 years or more as witnessed in post-WW2 Japan,
China and Vietnam in the 1990s, or Myanmar and Ethiopia today.
Second, continuous injection of purchasing power into the national economy through publicmoney and ODA has sustained growth. Government spending is about 20% of GDP withforeign aid supporting 40% of fiscal revenue. This is demand-driven growth rather than
productivity-driven one backed by strongly emerging industries and structural diversificationand transformation. True, agriculture and services are doing reasonably well, but theirdynamism alone cannot explain the 8% growth recorded in the recent few years. The
government is clearly aware of this situation and determined to transform the current
consumption boom into a “private sector-driven” (supply-driven) growth.
Third, policy improvements and initial economic achievements mentioned above havegenerated business confidence and good reputation which sustained high international
attention and robust inflows of foreign aid and investment. The government should be
credited for the successful national branding and image re-creation.
From the perspective of East Asian experience, however, demand-driven booms andprojection of a good image are not sufficient to produce and sustain high-quality growth. For
this purpose, private sector dynamism, supported by appropriate policy actions, must be
ignited. The Rwandan government values logical consistency, well-defined participatory
frameworks and the pursuit of global best practices. However, it seems relatively weak in
gemba-based pragmatism and unbroken attention to down-to-earth details which are thehallmark of East Asian development including Japanese3. To achieve high and sustained
growth to middle income and beyond, procedural correctness must be supplemented by
gemba pragmatism (see sections 8 and 9).
While strong policy ownership and national pride mark the development processes of both
Rwanda and Ethiopia, the two countries are quite different in their policy approaches.
Rwandans often commission top-class international advisors and consultants to produce
well-structured global standard documents and mechanisms but they are relatively weak inhelping small farmers and producers on the ground. Ethiopians, on the other hand, often
struggle to draft relatively clumsy policy documents by themselves but have established
implementing agencies such as textile, leather and kaizen institutes for boosting priority
sectors, agricultural and health extension services and a farmer training center in every
3

Gemba is a Japanese term signifying a physical location where production actually takes place such as afactory floor or a farm. Improvement of gemba through relentless attention to details is the heart of kaizen(Japanese-style continuous, bottom-up and low-cost productivity improvement) spearheaded by Toyota andpracticed by virtually all competitive manufacturers in Japan. Gemba-orientation is also visible in otherhigh-performing Asian economies.

3

village, a national network of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) andengineering universities, state-run and World Bank-assisted industrial zones, and so on,
through trial-and-error and with national budget (topped up by aid). Ethiopia can learn
national marketing and branding from Rwanda, while Rwanda can learn gemba-oriented
hands-on policy making from Ethiopia4.
3. EDPRS2 and key policy components
Rwanda has so far drafted three five-year plans toward Vision 2020, which is an overarchingnational aspiration to catapult the country into middle income. They are the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP: 2002-2006), the First Economic Development andPoverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS: 2007-2012), and the Second Economic Development
and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS2: 2013-2018). PRSP aimed to move the country
from dependency on humanitarian aid to economic recovery, while EDPRS turned economic
recovery into sustained growth. The main objective of current EDPRS2 is to accelerate
progress toward middle income status and better quality of life.
Based on the greater-than-expected achievements of the recent past, Vision 2020 itself wasrevised in 2012. The original vision created in 2000 targeted a per capita income of $900 by
2020 but it was moved upward to $1,240 by 2020. The required annual growth was set at an
ambitious 11.5%. EDPRS2 has the following thematic areas, targets and priorities.
Thematic area

TargetPriorities

Economic

Average GDP

Domestic & international connectivity, export, investment intransformation

growth of 11.5%

priority sectors, urbanization, green economy

RuralLess than 30%

Land use & human settlements, agricultural productivity,

development

poverty

graduation from extreme poverty, rural economic opportunity

Productivity &200,000 off-farm

Skills & attitudes, technology & innovation, entrepreneurship,youth

jobs p.a.; increased

financial access, business development, labor market

employment

output per worker

interventions

Accountable

More than 80%

Citizen participation, demand for accountability, improved

governanceservice delivery;

service delivery (macroeconomic stability, demographic

increased citizen

issues, food security & malnutrition, etc.)

participation
Cross-cutting

Capacity building, environment & climate change, gender & family, regional

issuesintegration, HIV/AIDS & non-communicable diseases, disaster management,
disability & social inclusion

Source: Economic Development & Poverty Reduction Strategy II (2013-2018), abridged version, May 2013.

4

Kaizen was adopted in Ethiopia as a nationwide productivity movement with Japanese assistance in 2009.
The second phase of JICA cooperation ends in November 2014 with the third phase expected to follow.
Rwanda, which lacks such basic gemba-oriented activities, is a prime candidate for kaizen especially inlight of the fact that the Rwandans are highly disciplined and responsive to national calls for excellence.

4

Drafting of EDPRS2 took one year, starting a year before the end of EDPRS. It began withthe self-assessment of performance in the past five years by sectors and districts5 which
was supplemented by the Household Living Standard Survey 2010/11 and the Demographic
Survey 2010. Five principles of innovation, emerging priorities, inclusiveness andengagement, district-led development, and sustainability were set. In industry, priority
sectors were categorized into three groups: existing, emerging and future6. Comprehensive
hearings of stakeholders were organized through the EDPRS2 website (where over 10,000
SMS opinions were received), road shows with artists and celebrities, and community-based
work days. Also, strategic retreats with development partners were organized twice. After
that, the document was finalized by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning within a
few months. The drafting team at the Ministry consisted of approximately 25 Ministry officials
and a few external consultants and technicians. Within the team, a focal person was
assigned for each thematic area such as economic transformation, rural development, etc.
who actively interacted and coordinated with relevant ministries and agencies.
The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning explained the formulation of growth
numbers of EDPRS2 to the mission as follows. Given Vision 2020, the World Bank’s lower
middle income threshold in 2020 was forecasted at $1,240 per capita, from which thenecessary annual growth of 11.5% was derived. Inter-sectoral consistency was checked by
the IMF-type Excel-based “Financial Programming” without sophisticated econometricmodeling.
Recent growth was analyzed as follows. The vibrant service sector led the growth. Service
growth was broad-based and included telecom (thanks to liberalization), financial services,micro-finance, tourism, trade, transport, real estate and construction. Food production islarge but declining due to falling import of inputs and loss of competitiveness. The Rwandan
franc is strong and regional integration is progressing within the East African Community,
which means Rwandan crops are not competitive against imports. Land consolidation andvillage crop specialization for scale merit are to counter this problem. Rwanda has anationally integrated market thanks to the construction of feeder roads funded by donors.
The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning does not have productivity data of
Rwandan industries.
The main challenge of EDPRS2 is how to generate the required growth of 11.5%. The
government-driven economy must be transformed into a private sector-driven one.
Industries need strengthening, skills must be upgraded, and funds must be mobilized byincreasing export receipt and domestic revenue. This concern is widely and acutely sharedby all quarters of the Rwandan government. As mentioned above, outstanding growth since5

Rwanda is composed of five provinces which are subdivided into a total of 30 districts. Below districts aresectors, then cells and villages as the lowest administrative level.
6
Existing sectors are tea, coffee, mining, horticulture, construction materials, tourism, and food processing
and beverages. Emerging sectors are logistics, ICT-related services, private equity funds, remote
back-office operations (for finance), and electronics assembly. Future sectors include green economy andnew green investments.

5

1994 was driven mainly by aggressive spending for recovery and development throughpublic investment and international aid. Meanwhile, the share of private investment
remained small7. Growth fell significantly to 4.6 % in 2013 due to the partial suspension ofdonors’ aid for general budget support which was triggered by a certain suspicion against
the Rwandan government. This incident clearly showed the quantitative impact of ODA in
the current growth mechanism. In our interviews, the Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning, the World Bank and the African Development Bank all agreed that private sector
dynamism was key if Rwanda was to sustain high growth and reduce aid dependency. Witha relatively high population growth rate and urbanization, it is estimated that 200,000 new
off-farm jobs need to be created every year.
During the years of the First EDPRS, Rwanda established new institutions and strengthened
old ones for the purpose of accelerating economic development. Most importantly, in
September 2008, the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) was created as a principal agency
for implementing private sector development by merging existing organizations (see next
section).8 It has a broad mandate including cross-cutting functions such as investment,
export, human capital, institutional capacity and privatization, as well as specific sectors
such as ICT, trade and manufacturing, services, agriculture, and tourism and conservation.
RDB is directly under the President and its CEO is a member of the cabinet meeting. Thesefeatures were copied from Singapore’s Economic Development Board.
Other industrial policy initiatives which were recently introduced include the following.
 TVET policy was formulated and the Workforce Development Authority (WDA) wasestablished under the Ministry of Education (2009). A State Minister of Education in
charge of TVET was appointed (2013).
 Special Economic Zone Policy (Government, May 2010) defined land allocation,
incentives, infrastructure development, regulatory framework, and RDB was made thesupervising authority.
 Small and Medium Enterprise Development Policy (Ministry of Trade and Industry, June2010) proposed support for entrepreneurship, Business Development Services,
regulatory framework, and policy institution (Ministry of Trade and Industry designs
policy, RDB implements and coordinates).
 Industrial Policy (Ministry of Trade and Industry, April 2011) specified short-, mediumand long-term policy directions for existing and new industries, giving concrete contents
to the preceding Rwanda Industrial Master Plan 2009-2020 of December 2009.
7

Rwanda’s public investment accounted for 16.2% of GDP while private investment amounted only to
8.2% of GDP in 2013. The corresponding numbers in neighboring countries are as follows: Kenya (5.3% vs.
14.3%, in 2009), Uganda (5.9% vs. 18.5%, in 2013), Ethiopia (14.3% vs. 18.7%, in 2012), and Tanzania(8.0% vs. 29.5%, in 2013). Rwanda’s investment is highly skewed toward public investment by the standardof East Africa (data provided by the World Bank Rwanda Office).
8
RDB was created by merging eight government agencies: the Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion
Agency (RIEPA); the Rwanda Office of Tourism and National Parks (ORTPN); the Privatization Secretariat;
the Rwanda Commercial Registration Services Agency; the Rwanda Information and Technology Authority(RITA); the Center for Support to Small and Medium Enterprises (CAPMER); the Human Resource andInstitutional Capacity Development Agency (HIDA); and the Rwanda Environmental Management Authority(REMA).

6 National Export Strategy (Ministry of Trade and Industry, April 2011) classified sectors
into traditional (tourism, coffee, tea, minerals), non-traditional (BPO, floriculture,horticulture) and potential (interior design, fashion, biotechnology, etc.) and proposed
promotion plans.
 Private Sector Development Strategy 2013-2018 (Government, January 2013) showed
integrated policy direction for the Ministry of Trade and Industry, RDB, WDA, the Private
Sector Federation (PSF)9 and other related public and private organizations to follow.
 ICT development has been guided by a series of policy documents (Government). The
First National Information Communication Infrastructure (NICI1) 2005-2010 created alegal framework, NICI2 2005-2010 laid ICT infrastructure, and NICI3 2010-2015 aims at
an expanded use of ICT. SMART Rwanda 2015-2020, the next policy under preparation,
will propose realization of a knowledge-based economy with an extensive use of ICT.
 The National Employment Program (Government, January 2014) is a five-year action
plan in line with EDPRS2 to produce 200,000 off-farm jobs annually. Featuring skills
development, private sector development, and strengthening of labor market functions,
it presents measures to be undertaken jointly by the Ministry of Education, WDA, theMinistry of Trade and Industry, RDB, the Ministry of Public Service and Labor, PSF, andlocal organizations.
Overall, these policies are mutually consistent and collectively share the direction for
national economic development. The basic idea behind these policies is overcoming theconstraints of a landlocked country as well as earning/saving foreign exchange by (i)promotion of light-weight and high-value sectors such as ICT, tourism and financial services
through active FDI attraction; (ii) production and export of high-value agro products; and (iii)
supporting import-substituting manufacturing of household goods and construction materials.
In sum, it can be said that agricultural productivity and value-creation must go hand-in-handwith stable and gainful job creation by the development of manufacturing and services.
Regional integration is an important component of this policy direction. Rwanda is a strong
promoter of the East African Community together with Kenya and Uganda. An oil pipeline to
Kenya, electricity import from Ethiopia, and a railroad link to Uganda are planned to reducehigh energy and transport costs. Rwanda hopes to become an air link hub for Africa with an
expansion of RwandAir and planned construction of a new airport. Many government
officials talk about turning land-locked disadvantage into land-linked advantage and Rwanda
becoming a regional, African and even global hub. While the feasibility of this grand plan
must be examined, it is evident that Rwanda has a strategic and ambitious plan foreconomic development.

9

PSF is a professional organization that promotes and represents the Rwandan business community. It
has eight sectoral chambers such as ICT, tourism, industry, etc. and two cross-cutting chambers for womenand young entrepreneurs. Each chamber has sector-specific associations under which individualcompanies belong. Registered members as of August 2014 counted about 80,000. PSF’s main mandate isadvocacy with additional activities in capacity building, finance, marketing, B-to-B meetings, information,and tours.

7Some of the policy measures and institutions which play crucial roles in Rwanda’s economic
development are discussed more fully in the following sections.
4. Rwanda Development Board
The Singapore model was benchmarked to create the Rwanda Development Board (RDB).
After the genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (ruling party) dispatched many missions to
Singapore to study various aspects of its development policies including investor support.
RDB was conceived as a modified version of Singapore’s Economic Development Board
offering one-stop service, investment incentives, and logistic, trade and other support bybusiness-minded authorities. Dr. Rama Sithanen, Former Vice-Prime Minister and Ministerof Finance and Economic Development of Mauritius, was invited to assume the Chairman ofRDB.
RDB was officially established in 2008 and started operation in 2009. It is an implementation
agency with an objective of empowering the private sector. Its key goals are promotion of
local and foreign investment, export, and job creation. To carry out this task, it has three
departments in charge of (i) investment promotion and implementation with five priority
sectors (tourism & conservation, ICT, trade & manufacturing, services, and agriculture); (ii)human capital and institutional development which provides an enabling environment for
private sector development; and (iii) assets and business management. In Rwanda,
strategic projects which are not taken up immediately by private investors are operated asstate-owned businesses which are later privatized. For example, previously state-run tea
factories are now all in private hands, and fiber optics laid by the government are operated
by the private sector. Apart from these departments, the Strategic Investment Unit under the
CEO Office of RDB has the power to negotiate special incentive deals with preferredinvestors. RDB’s one-stop shop for investors provides smooth investment registration which
contributes to Rwanda’s increasingly higher marks in the World Bank’s Doing Businessranking.
RDB’s functions and organizations continue to evolve10. In October 2013, the CEO of RDB
was elevated to be a cabinet member to facilitate inter-ministerial and agency coordinationon the matters related to private sector development. Recently, with the cabinet reshuffle ofJuly 2014, Mr. Francis Gatare replaced Ms. Valentine Rugwabiza as the CEO of RDB. Also,
new structure was imposed where a few divisions moved out of RDB. Part of human capitalbuilding went to the Ministry of Public Service and Labor as well as the National Capacity
Building Secretariat, the ICT Department now focuses on FDI and export while other ICT
functions left, and tourism functions were enhanced (with convention services likely to moveout). These changes did not affect RDB’s core mandate. As of August 2014, RDB staff
10

The JICA’s internal study on RDB dated in February 2012 gave a mixed assessment of the agency. Itsestablishment backed by strong political will, projection of a positive image of Rwanda, and efficient
one-stop service were highly evaluated while overlapping division of labor with existing ministries andagencies and weak investment follow-up were cited as negative factors. Some of these problems havealready been fixed as explained in the current report.

8

numbered 293 who were housed in the RDB Headquarters and Telecom House (ICT
Department only) in Kigali. RDB also employs about 300 national park staff who will
however be privatized in the future. Although RDB does not have its own overseas offices,
RDB staff are dispatched as commercial attaches in the embassies of Canada (Montreal),
China (Shenzhen), and India (Mumbai)
For monitoring investment projects, one key account manager is assigned to each FDI
project who follows up and trouble-shoots until the project is properly in operation. This
“implementation” team consists of about 30 RDB staff. Another “after-care” team of about 10
staff continues to monitor all projects in operation with less frequency. There are no micro or
small investors to follow up because Rwanda sets a minimum size of investment forregistration11.
RDB feels that the private sector of Rwanda is not as vibrant as hoped for but there aresigns of new growth in telecom, water, services, etc. Rwanda’s export is dominated by a few
crops which should be replaced by more valued and processed exports. To strengthen theprivate sector RDB engages in various measures and services.
For enterprise support, the Trade and Manufacturing Department of RDB conducts the
Manufacturing Growth Program which was started in 2013. RDB hires consultants(Rwandans and Kenyans from Ernst & Young) for diagnostics and formulation of growthaction plans of individual companies suffering from low operation. RDB pays up to certain
hours of their consultancy services beyond which each company must pay for additional
service. If the problem is caused by external factors beyond the power of company
management, RDB takes the issue to the policy level for solution. In the first year of thisprogram (2013), 20 companies were coached in this way. Separately, there is a plan todevelop local experts (Small Business Development Advisors) in 2014 with 10-day training(by hiring local consultants) after which a certificate is issued. Existing “Proximity Business
Advisors” are primary candidates for this program. 800 such local experts are targeted in2014, who will be dispatched to all districts when the training is completed12.
For export promotion, the Export Development Program was initiated also in 2013. Trade
Links, an Irish firm, teaches on standards, packaging, contracts, and export plans with thefunding of Trademark East Africa, an international NGO for facilitating trade and regional
integration in East Africa funded by Western donors. 15 companies were selected for thisprogram among the 40 firms that previously tried to export through trade fairs. Services are
rendered free of charge to the companies except expenses for reaching out to regional
11

Investment certificates are issued to projects of at least $100,000 for local investment and at least$250,000 for FDI only. In 2013 total registered investment (local and FDI) amounted to 262 in number and$1.4 billion in capital, or worth 19% of GDP.
12
The mission expressed amazement at the proposed speed of this expert training plan. In Ethiopia, about
400 local kaizen experts were produced after two phases of JICA’s cooperation spanning five years, whoseskills must be further strengthened in the third phase. In Singapore, during the 1980s JICA’s productivity
development project spent eight years coaching local enterprises and experts before the country was readyto teach others.

9buyers and distributors. Through this program there are already some export contracts
signed mainly for agro products such as cassava and maize milling, baby food, construction
materials (granite), and Inyange (mineral water). RDB is also training local advisors forexport development which includes four government officials and 14 private experts.
Other support programs by RDB include TVET-industry linkage (with WDA under the
Ministry of Education, see below), Sector Skill Councils (see below), and the proposed
Supplier Development Program that will link FDI firms with local suppliers. In preparation forthis program, a survey is being conducted on the current input procurement of large firms toidentify items that may be produced and procured locally.
5. Industrial human resource
For value creation, industrialization and economic diversification, human capital is crucial.
Rwanda also needs industrial skills to remain competitive in the East African Community(EAC), reverse the trade imbalance, and increase employment. Since all cannot be realized
at once, creation of import substitution industries and value-added exports must be
strategized. This means that industrial human resource development must be selective andclosely linked to future labor demand as well as the direction of national industrialization
drive.
The Ministry of Education recognizes that skills at all levels and in all sectors are seriously
lacking. To remedy this problem, access to primary and secondary education must becomplemented by strong higher-level education. Moreover, to produce demand-driven
education, TVET by both public and private hands is highlighted. The government plans toincrease the number of TVET institutions and their enrollment by three to four times within
the next three to four years. Within five years the Ministry of Education wants to see more
TVET students than normal- track students. In this connection, JICA supports Tumba
College of Technology including its linkage with industry. Vulnerable and handicappedpeople will also be supported more strongly in the future.
Sector Skills Councils were recently launched as the principal mechanism for strengthening
the TVET-industry linkage based on public-private engagement. The objectives include
provision of infrastructure for skills formation, training of trainers, and transformation of
curriculums from knowledge cramming to competency creation. Councils are in the initialformation stage and their concrete modalities will be decided in the near future. The Ministry
admitted that Rwanda’s private sector was still “young” and it was difficult to expect all
sectors to embrace this approach immediately and grow at the same pace. For this reason,
this policy must be applied selectively to most prospective sectors. Councils have alreadybeen set up for several priority sectors13 with RDB acting as a collective chair with active
13

As of August 2014, Sector Skills Councils already existed for mining, construction, agriculture, energy,
manufacturing, financial service, ICT and hospitality. However, not all were operational and the frequency of
meetings remained up to each Council. These sectors largely overlap with the sectors prioritized by RDB.

10

PSF participation. The Ministry hopes that the hospitality and construction sectors will
spearhead this approach.
This policy is expected to produce better curriculums and teaching materials that respond tochanging industrial needs. It will also promote pre-graduation “industrial attachment” andpost-graduation “internship” of students (this terminology comes from Singapore). It is
critical that these measures will lead to actual employment in targeted sectors. While skills
development is the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, other ministries will cooperate
to increase absorption of TVET graduates in industries. The Ministry of Trade and Industry
will help startup companies with business development and entrepreneurship support. The
Ministry of Public Service and Labor will provide regular labor demand forecasts including
labor demand from FDI and public works in the pipeline. Government projects such as road
construction, power transmission and others will also be used for job creation and skills
development and matching14.
Sector Skills Councils are an ambitious undertaking. This mechanism is apparently imported
from Singapore’s Council for Professional and Technical Education, which implements a
detailed matching between TVET curriculums, courses and budgets and the number ofstudents in each field on the one hand, and forecasted industrial skill needs and national
industrial plans four to five years ahead on the other. Singapore can engage in such anelaborate labor matching because of its very high policy capability, long experience andcompact size. A strong private sector, tripartite coalition among government, management
and labor, highly advanced TVET programs, active participation of enterprises in managing
TVET and revising curriculums, and skills training centers located inside industrial estates
are already in place, which collectively form a solid basis for effective implementation ofsuch matching. But most other countries, including Japan, find it impossible to imitate thisfeat. For a latecomer country with a weak private sector and without necessary policy tools
in place, a sectoral skills matching mechanism is a great challenge.
6. ICT
Rwanda prioritizes ICT. Given the country’s geography where bulky products are difficult toexport or import, the focus on ICT was a natural one although somewhat surprising for a
low-income country recovering from war and genocide. In the last one-and-half decades,
Rwanda has built ICT infrastructure; connected all districts with central government;
promoted ICT use in government, education, industry and services; introduced the One
Laptop per Child Program; operated four ICT buses for rural communities; adopted 4G
technology through Korea Telecom; invited Carnegie Mellon University to offer masterprograms in ICT and computer engineering, etc. So far the results are highly visible andnational commitment to ICT development is evident.

14

According to the State Minister of Education in charge of TVET, this approach was copied from Ethiopia’s
low-cost housing project which facilitated skills development for youths and provision of contracts to SMEs.

11

Telecom House in central Kigali serves as the Home of ICT in Rwanda where many ideas
and companies emanate. A JICA expert is assisting the formulation and implementation of
the national ICT strategy along with the establishment of k-Lab, which is an incubation
center for ICT entrepreneurs. The mission was greatly impressed with the dynamism of
young leaders we met from the Ministry of Youth and ICT, the ICT Department of RDB, theICT Chamber of PSF, and k-Lab.
The history of ICT promotion policy dates back to 1998 when President Kagame proclaimed
the vision that ICT should be the catalyst for Rwandan development. The First National ICT
Strategy and Plan 2000-2005 (a.k.a. National Information Communication Infrastructure
Phase I or NICI1) provided regulatory and enabling environment for ICT development andliberalized the telecom sector. Subsequently, NICI2 2005-2010 laid out national backbone
infrastructure including the internet center and e-Government, while NICI3 2010-2015 is
promoting development of ICT services. SMART Rwanda 2015-2020, the next ICT masterplan under preparation, will aim at the creation of a knowledge-based economy by
expanding ICT use to produce more and better services in both public and private sector.
As of 2013, ICT sector profile includes mobile subscribers reaching 65% and internet
subscribers of 20% (both numbers are expected to jump significantly with the scheduled
launch of 4G in September 2014). The One Laptop per Child Program had reached 203,000
kids and 95.3% of hospitals were connected electronically. SMART Rwanda intends toaccelerate the use of ICT even more by overcoming the existing challenges in ICT literacy,
content, and internet penetration.
Despite these achievements, the long-term vision of ICT as a future industry of Rwanda
remains unclear. SMART Rwanda proposes broad and active use of ICT in e-Government,
agriculture, education, healthcare, environment, infrastructure, urban development, job
creation, etc. but it seems rather terse in charting a development strategy of the ICT industry
itself especially regarding the level and scope of technology and human resource to betargeted and support measures and marketing strategies required for this purpose.
Production of ICT services is a different matter from its use, just as making a car requires
different skills from driving one. If Rwanda wants to be an excellent user of ICT infrastructure
to catalyze and strengthen its domestic industries and services (indirect creation ofcompetitiveness), that is one good option. Another option is to export ICT services, expertise,engineers and even systems to earn foreign exchange (direct creation of competitiveness).
ICT as a competitive industry needs a proper goal, supporting measures, and a phased
strategy on how much should be relied on incoming FDI and how much to be done by
Rwandans. To us it seems more natural to pursue both paths—use and export ICT—and themaster plan should accordingly spell out the long- and medium-term strategies for each indetail. But we were not convinced that this was the way Rwanda was heading and we arestill unsure even after the mission.
7. Special Economic Zones
12

The feasibility of industrial estates with superior procedural and infrastructure services wasstudied in 2006 to overcome Rwanda’s geographic disadvantage. The initial idea was Free
Trade Zones exempted from tax and tariff obligations provided that tenant companies
exported 80% or more of their products. Exports to neighboring countries were targeted.
However, Rwanda’s accession to the EAC in 2007 meant that it had to conform to therequirements of the EAC Customs Union, which invalidated the strategy of exporting to EAC
neighbors with special conditions. Thus, the idea of Free Trade Zones was replaced bySpecial Economic Zones (SEZs) which combined the functions of free port, export
processing zone, bonded warehouses, and investor services.
At present the first SEZ is being constructed, policy and legal frameworks are prepared, andthe SEZ authority has been established under RDB. In the future, Rwanda plans to develop
more SEZs in other sectors including business process outsourcing, tourism and financial
services, and the SEZ authority will be upgraded as an independent agency.
Kigali SEZ, the first SEZ in Rwanda, is situated on a hilltop near the airport in the Easternpart of Kigali. It takes about 20 minutes by car from the city center. Phase 1 consists of 100
ha of land divided into 85 plots, which are already sold out. Infrastructure has been
completed except the delayed selection of a private internet provider. Tenant companies canbe in any sector, even users of dye and paint, as long as they pass environment impact
assessment (“Everything but Guns”). Centralized waste water treatment is installed and acarrier of solid waste to the dumping area has been designated. The funding is provided bypublic private partnership which includes the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning(30%), state-run corporations, and private firms and banks. The SEZ is managed by aspecial purpose vehicle, which means a private company assigned for the task. Plots are
sold to companies and the proceeds will used to develop more SEZs.
Sectoral composition of Phase 1 companies includes construction materials, agro
processing, motorcycle assembly, mattresses, bio-degradable plastic, and traders anddistributors. In terms of nationality, two Chinese factories are already operational and others
are from Denmark, Lebanon, India, Tanzania, Uganda, etc. Among the 100 ha of Phase 1
development, 16 ha (8 ha x 2 locations) is reserved for the relocation of 14 existing factories
from the city center. Standardized sheds are already completed for relocation15.
Phase 2 of Kigali SEZ will have 175 ha of land divided into over 100 plots. It is underconstruction with 70-80% of infrastructure completed and 60% of the plots already “booked”
15

Relocating companies are selected from good performers and receive official support for relocation.
Their sectors include coffee, steel, tobacco, paint, biscuits, and plastic water tanks. Some relocators2
2
decided not to come because prepared sheds were too small for their operation (600m , 1,200m and2
2,400m ). Two such unoccupied sheds were sold to new investors (Chinese textile and Danish packaging).
In the first phase of relocation, sheds were built by a Chinese contractor supervised by a Kenyan company.
In the second phase of relocation (which is still in Phase 1 of Kigali SEZ), sheds will accommodate size andstyle requirements of companies and will be built jointly by local and Chinese contractors.

13

(a deposit of $10,000 has been made).
There is a wave of Chinese producers relocating to Africa and some of them target Rwanda.
Ms. Helen Hai, a Chinese FDI promoter who managed Huajian Shoe Factory in Ethiopia, ishelping to establish a baby clothes factory here for Walmart purchase through AGOA.
Chinese investors seem to be in a hurry. Eight more industrial estates are planned and“plug-and-play” factories (ready-made sheds) are mulled mainly to accommodate Chinese
investors who are eager to come in.
There is no minimum wage regulation in Rwanda. The Ministry of Trade and Industry feelsthat Rwandan wage is competitive enough to attract factories relocating from Asia16. Wageadvantage is particularly secure if SEZs and factories are located in rural areas. The Ministry
is even considering to lower the wage by offering food, accommodation and social security
to workers
At present 90% of cargo is transported by land through the North (through Uganda and
Kenya) and Central (through Tanzania) corridors, especially the former. Future railway
connection to Uganda (and Kenya) should further assist industrial shipment.
8. General issues in policy making
Three cross-cutting issues concerning industrial policy formulation and execution wereidentified by the mission.
First, current achievements should be combined with gemba-based pragmatism. Rwanda’s
economic growth, as well as public and private efforts behind it, during the last two decades
were truly remarkable. Nevertheless, the current growth mechanism may not be sufficient toproduce private sector-led development or graduation from aid dependency. There is noneed to abandon the existing policy contents, frameworks and institutions, but they should
be enhanced by the adoption of gemba-orientation so that policy can respond more
effectively to varied needs of individual entrepreneurs and deliver necessary supporting
measures on the ground. Transparent and systematic procedures and frameworks, on theupper level of policy making, are important elements imported mainly from the West. They
can produce great results if national leaders and policy makers are also equipped with theground-level knowledge of what works and what does not in the context of specific factories,
farms and schools. Such knowledge, which turns theories and plans into real actions thatwork, can be acquired only through continuous interest, experience and interaction with alarge number of private actors who produce, trade, invest, compete, and innovate.
Development officials in East Asian governments are usually very comfortable with daily
16

An industrial official in charge did not know the average wage of factory workers in Kigali, but he cited thewage of RWF4,000 per day for a professional mason and RWF2,000 per day for a support worker, whichroughly translates to $150 and $75 per month respectively. The standard wage for factory workers may bedifficult to obtain in Rwanda because such workers are just emerging.

14

interactions of this kind. While Rwandan officials interviewed by the mission were highly
competent and strongly committed to national development, additional lessons could belearned from the mindset, attitude and methods of development officials and experts in East
Asia including Japan.
Second, there is an issue of proper balance between internalizing and outsourcing policy
works. The Private Sector Development Strategy of the Ministry of Trade and Industry wascommissioned to Deloitte consultants. RDB has handholding programs for diagnosing andadvising potential enterprises. For Exporters Development Program, an Irish consulting firm
is dispatched to RDB Headquarters by TradeMarks East Africa. For Manufacturing Growth
Program, a mixed team of Kenyans and Rwandans from Ernst & Young is providing
diagnostic and advisory services using standard management and marketing menus. In
principle, we have no grudge against mobilizing external teams for policy purposes at theoutset. However, it is also imperative to “import substitute” industrial expertise so thatdomestic officials (at first) and domestic private service providers (ultimately) can provide
such services in sufficient quality and quantity without depending on aid, NGOs or foreign
consultants in the medium to long run. This was the overarching objective of Japan’s
industrialization strategy in the mid 19th century. More recently, JICA’s industrial projects
usually have such an “internalizing” component from the beginning, with the understandingthat domestic experts will take over the works initiated by Japanese experts17. Without such
substitution, a project is deemed a failure. Our mission did not have enough time todetermine whether the use of outsourced experts in Rwanda was for coaching companies
only or for multiplying Rwandan experts who could replace foreigners.
Third, there is a question of stability versus flexibility in policy frameworks. Rwanda’s SME
policy is changing rapidly, introducing new mechanisms before previous ones take root.
Moreover, it is not entirely clear how responsibilities for SME development are divided
among the Ministry of Trade and Industry, RDB, and PSF. The state-run, free-of-charge
Business Development Service (BDS) established in 2006 was replaced by fee-based BDS
Centers in 30 districts through PSF-RDB collaboration in 2010. In 2011, BDS Centers wereplaced directly under RDB which commissioned service provision to private consultants.
More recently, RDB created the Business Development Fund (BDF)18, a new mechanism toassist SMEs into which existing services will be merged. There must be good reasons
behind these adjustments. It is not unusual to revise institutions in any country and that may
even be necessary when situations change or if the country is in an early stage ofdevelopment. But speed of institutional change in Rwanda is extraordinary. All developing
countries tend to say they are in a hurry, but even in that case, it is highly desirable and17

For example, the main purpose of JICA’s cooperation with Singapore’s productivity development in
1983-90 was training domestic officials and private experts rather than just counting the number ofcompanies advised, and similarly for Phase 2 of JICA’s kaizen project in Ethiopia in 2011-14. In Thailand,
from 1999 to 2004, JICA trained 450 Thai experts for shindan (public purpose SME consultancy) after which
Thai NPOs and universities took over to continue the shindan teaching.
18 BDF is an affiliate of the Development Bank of Rwanda set up with government support in 2012 tofacilitate SMEs’ access to finance.

15

rewarding to spend a few solid years in properly designing policy targets, actions, scheduleand institutional frameworks most suitable for the local context, with all foreseeable
possibilities discussed, rather than jumping onto policy and trying to amend it as (obvious)
problems arise. East Asian economies such as Singapore, Taiwan and Malaysia normallytake about three years to formulate a new policy and about one year to revise an existingone. Due consideration of all views and contingencies takes that much time. Rwanda may
wish to lean more toward policy stability and predictability. Officials should spend more timeand energy on ensuring the effectiveness of training and support on the ground even with
less-than-perfect institutions than revising policies frequently.
9. How Japan can contribute
There appears to be much room for Japanese contribution in introducing gemba-based
pragmatism to Rwanda’s policy making (the first item in the previous section). Japan is goodat filling the gap between policy formulation in the high level and its implementation atfactories, shops, schools, hospitals, and crop fields. Ambitious policy targets and reasonable
policy frameworks are already in place in Rwanda. But details must be filled in. The
perspective of Japanese experts who stay at gemba, work closely with engineers, operators,
workers, farmers, etc., and propose and improvise measures to overcome the problems at
hand can complement the existing policy mechanism. This perspective should provide a
feedback between gemba and policy making, regularly inform implementation issues topolicy authorities, adjust policy to gemba reality, and reduce the probability of excellent
plans and strategies remaining only on paper or being implemented with little impact.
Even with a limited policy area and on a small scale initially, Japanese experts should
consciously offer such policy information and services in their assigned fields, andsimultaneously teach national officials and experts how to do the same. The Japanese
government (including JICA) should monitor the progress of Japanese experts, regularly
discuss strategies with them, and create a communication channel with relevant
government leaders and officials when necessary. Quality, not quantity, should be the goalof Japanese industrial cooperation in Rwanda in particular and in Africa in general.
Japan’s current Country Assistance Strategy for Rwanda (approved in April 2012) supports
sustainable growth with four pillars: economic infrastructure, agricultural development (value
addition and commercialization), social services (safe water supply), and growth-supporting
human resource development (science and technology TVET). Within this framework, JICA
is implementing or has implemented projects in One-Stop Border Post, One Village One
Product, ICT strategy formulation and implementation, and TVET and TVET-industry linkage,
among others. Given the emphasis on private sector development, off-farm job creation andurbanization in EDPRS2, new industrial cooperation may be initiated by Japan. Ideally, thenew project should be designed in such a way that it has close interaction with JICA’sexisting ICT and TVET cooperation.

16

The first possible step may be a review of Rwanda’s SME policy in the past and at present
and exploration of its future directions. Since JICA is considering the dispatch of an SME
expert, the TOR can include this review work as its main component. As discussed above,
SME policy in Rwanda is in a formation stage with frequent trial-and-error, and lacks many
components normally seen in other countries. The Deloitte-drafted Private Sector
Development Strategy is strong on creation of enabling environment and public private
dialogue forums but concrete action plans for skills and enterprise capacity building may bewanting. Institutions change fast and mandate is not allocated clearly or predictably among
ministries, agencies and the private sector. Under such institutional fluidity, the Japaneseexpert should advise on the long-term and overall picture of SME policy from the East Asian
perspective rather than being assigned to work on a narrow sub-issue.
Impact of past and current SME policies should be reviewed, which includes the current
Private Sector Development Strategy, RDB’s Exporters Development Program andManufacturing Growth Program assisted by outsourced experts. The detailed curriculums
and content of existing business coaching programs should be evaluated againstinternational standards as well as Rwanda’s specific industrial needs. SMEs and businessorganizations in different sectors and districts should be interviewed for their awareness andassessment of each policy component. Policies desired by the private sector and proposedand executed by government should be listed and compared. The quality and number ofbusiness consultants in government, districts and the private sector should be surveyed andthe possibility of “import substitution” of experts should be explored. In conducting this basic
policy research, the perspective of international comparison is extremely valuable. Concrete
cases of policy successes and failures from various countries should be cited for reviewing
and designing Rwanda’s SME policy measures19.
Based on such research, past achievements and remaining issues should be identified, andalternative future directions should be proposed with concrete timetables and numbers. Thisshould be a joint interactive process between the Rwandan authorities and Japanese
officials and experts, not a commissioned report drafted by a foreign expert and commented
on later by the government. Such an interactive project should provide a small but good startfor strengthening Rwanda’s SME policy as well as conveying Japanese mindset and methodof industrial policy making to the relevant Rwandan policy makers.
Attachments:
1. Mission schedule (for GRIPS team)
2. Organizations/persons visited
3. List of information collected
19

While Japan and Taiwan have highly advanced SME policies, they are hard to replicate in mostdeveloping countries. Singapore also has well-developed SME assistance which is unique and different
from the East Asian norm. Southeast Asian developing countries, especially Malaysia, may offer a morefeasible model of SME development to latecomer countries. Nevertheless, one model is usually insufficientto guide SME policy of any country. Various policy components should be gathered from different countries,
with proper combination and necessary adjustment, to form a policy package most suitable for Rwanda.

17

Attachment 1

Mission Schedule (for GRIPS team)
Mission Members
Kenichi Ohno

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Izumi Ohno

Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Akemi Nagashima

Research Associate, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan

Miho Oikawa

Special Advisor, PSD Group, Industrial Development and Public Policy Dept., JICA

Yuko Ikeda

Project Formulation Advisor, JICA Ethiopia Office

Masaaki Hamada

JICA Consultant

Mission Schedule
Date
Time

1

5

2

6

4

5

7

8

9

AM

ArrivalPM

JICA Rwanda OfficePM

Embassy of Japan in Rwanda

PM

Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM)AM

African Development Bank (AfDB), Rwanda OfficeAM

Industry Development Unit, Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM)PM

Institute of Policy Analysis and Research Rwanda (IPAR)

PM

Directorate of Policy Evaluation, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN)AM

Department of Trade and Manufacturing, Rwanda Development Board (RDB)

AM

GIZ, Rwanda OfficePM

Private Sector Federation (PSF)

PM

State Minister in charge of TVET, Workforce Development Authority (WDA)

PM

World Bank, Rwanda officePM

Official dinner reception at Japanese Ambassador Residence (GRIPS team)AM

Directorate of Macroeconomics, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN)PM

Joint Meeting with Ministry of Youth & ICT (MYICT), RDB/ICT, PSF/ICT Chamber, and kLabPM

Departure to Addis abada, Ethiopia

Sun

Mon

Aug

3

Activity

Tue

Wed

Thu

18

Attachment 2

Organizations/Persons Visited
The Government / Governmental Organization of Rwanda
Organization

Name

Position

Richard Mushabe

Acting Director of Policy Evaluation and ResearchAlexis Ruzibukira

Director of General Industry and SMEs

Amina Rwakunda Umulisa

Director of Macroeconomics

Obald Hakizimana

Senior Economist

Charles Kalinda

Public Investment Specialist

Thomas Mazuru Semahoro

Policy Analysis and Research Expert

Emmanuel Hategeka

Permanent Secretary

Jean Pierre Dukuzimana

Professional in charge of manufacturing development, Industry
Development Unit

Eusebe Muhikira

Head of Trade and Manufacturing

Muhizi Rugamba

Division Manager of Strategy CompetitivenessMartin Carlos Mwizerwa

Division Manager of National ICT Planning & Coordination

Ministry of Education, Workforce Development Authority(WDA)

Albert Nsengiyumva

Minister of State in Charge of Technical and Vocational
Education and Training

Ministry of Youth & ICT, together with Private Sector
Federation ICT Chamber (MYICT)

Lambert Ntagwabira

Senior Technologist, ICT Skills Development

Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN)

The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM)

Rwanda Development Board (RDB)

Private Organization
Organization

Name

Position

Private Sector Federation (PSF)

Donatien Mungwarareba

Director of Member Service, Capacity Building and
Entrepreneurship Promotion

The Institute of Policy Analysis and Research(IPAR‐Rwanda)

Malunda Dickson

Senior Researcher

kLab

Jovani Ntabgoba

General Director

Patrick Kabagema

President

Alex Ntale

Director

ICT Chamber, PSF

International Organizations
Organization

Name

Position

World Bank, Rwanda Office

Yoichiro Ishihara

Senior Economist

Deutsche Gesellschaft für International Zusammenarbei(GIZ), Rwanda Office

Ulrike Maenner

Country Director

Africa Development Bank (AfDB), Rwanda Office

Edward B. Sennoga

Country Economist

Governmental Organization of Japan
Organization
Embassy of Japan in Rwanda

JICA Rwanda Office

Name

PositionKazuya Ogawa

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Tatsuya Oniki

Coordinator of Economic Cooperation

Mayumi Fujita

Researcher

Takahiro Moriya

Chief Representative

Ryutaro Murotani

Acting Senior Representative

Satomi Kamei

Program Advisor (Education and Vocational Training)

Fumiaki Ishizuka

Program Manager (Water and Sanitation)

19

Attachment 3

List of Information Collected
SourceTitle

Authors/Publisher

Power Point Document: Republic of Rwanda, A Model of Reform-Driven, Market-Based, Sustainable
Development

Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning (MINECOFIN)

Brochure: Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy II 2013-2018(EDPRS2 -Sharpe our development) (May, 2013)
MINECOFIN
Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2013-2018 (EDPR2)
Rwanda VISION 2020 (July, 2000)
Rwanda VISION 2020 (Revised 2012)
Brochure: BDF -Your Business Development Partner-

The Ministry of Trade and Industry(MINICOM)

Business Development
Fund (BDF)

Rwanda Industrial Master Plan 2009-2020 (December 2009)
MINICOM
National Industrial Policy (April, 2011)

Rwanda Development Board(RDB)

Brochure: Rwanda Special Economic Zones

RDB

Ministry of Youth & ICT(MYICT)

National ICT Strategy and Plan NICI-2015

Ministry of Youth & ICT(MYICT)

kLab

kLab Guide kit -Rwanda's 1st Techpreneur Innovation Open Space

MYICT, PSF, Rwanda ICT
Chamber, RDB and JICA

Private Sector Federation(PSF)

Brochure: enterprise -Private Sector Federation Magazine- (July, 2014)

PSF

Rwanda Case Study on Economic Transformation -Report for the African Centre for Economic
Transformation (ACET)- (2012)

IRAR (Dickson Malunda
and Serge Musana)

Against The Odds: Achieving MDGs in Rwanda

IPAR

The Institute of Policy Analysis
and Research (IPAR-Rwanda)

Rwanda Economic Update; Seizing Opportunities for Growth ~with a Special Focus on Harnessing the
Demographic Dividend~(December, 2013)
World Bank

JICA

International Development Association International Finance Corporation Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency, Country Partnership Strategy for Republic of Rwanda for the Period FY2014-2018(May 1, 2014)

World Bank

Quantitative Analysis of Crisis: Crisis Identification and Causality

Yoichiro Ishihara

Institutional Framework and Implementation Flow of SME Support in Rwanda

JICA

20