Proceedings of the International Symposium on Engineering Lessons Learned fromthe 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, March 1-4, 2012, Tokyo, JapanENGINEERING AGENDA ON
NUCLEAR SAFETY FROM THE
2011 TOHOKU-PACIFIC EARTHQUAKE
Hiroyuki KAMEDA
Professor Emeritus, Kyoto University andTechnical Counselor, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES), Tokyo, Japan
kameda2@minuet.plala.or.jp

ABSTRACT: The paper addresses engineering agenda on earthquake and tsunami safetyof nuclear power plants (NPP) that were raised by the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake(Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster). As an introduction, it is emphasized that a firm
technology governance must be established to implement appropriate technology for
nuclear safety. On this basis, engineering topics for nuclear safety are discussed. Overall
performance of NPPs in the disaster area, characteristics of strong ground motions andtsunamis at the NPP sites are presented. Three critical lessons (risk-based decision,scientific imagination, and speed in action) are proposed. Specific engineering agenda
are addressed in terms of establishment of risk-based decision scheme, development ofintegrated seismic-tsunami PSA, and establishment of tsunami resistant technology.
Key Words: nuclear safety, risk-based decision, "scientific imagination",seismic-tsunami PSA, cliff-edge, smooth fragility, tsunami-resistanttechnology, water proof-structural resistance-dry siting

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview as a basis for engineering discussion
The Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake of March 11, 2011 with M=9.0 (moment magnitude) caused agigantic disaster which was named "Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster (GEJE)". 1 It brought triple
major disasters; i.e., damage by strong motions extending over 500km of the eastern Pacific Japan, an
overwhelming devastation by gigantic tsunami attacks, and huge impacts of the accident at Fukushima
I (Dai-ichi) Nuclear Power Station. The scale of the disaster and its serious societal impacts far exceed
any disasters Japan has experienced since the end of the World War II. Among the effects of the
Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake, this paper will discuss the performance of nuclear power plants (NPP)1"Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake" and "Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster" are both commonly used. The
former represents geographical location of the source area, while the latter emphasizes its diverse
societal impacts. This paper will use the former as source area locations and tsunami source
characteristics were key for the performance of nuclear power plants in the disaster area.

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in the disaster area, on which basis propose earthquake engineering agenda for nuclear safety.
The nuclear safety is being seriously questioned since the Fukushima I accident. The question has
enough reasons to be asked in the presence of the accident that should have never happened. The final
judgment is to be made by the people of Japan.
It is critically important to use appropriate technology in order for Japan to continue the nuclear
power production. But more importantly, appropriate decision mechanism should be established to
implement appropriate technology. Lessons of the Fukushima I accident raised by prominent bodies(IAEA (2011), NERH (2011), etc.) that extend not only to technical issues but to agenda on regulatory
as well as cooperate managements are right judgments. Unless a right decision mechanism beestablished, the Japanese nuclear energy production will fail to recover supports of the people of Japanand also of the international community. It is the issue of technology governance. We do havetechnology to realize nuclear safety under the Japanese seismic environments. But the mechanism of
implementation needs drastic enhancements. A tough process is going on to realize the target that
requires innovation in the Japan's political, bureaucratic, corporate, and academic involvements.
Upon the condition that an appropriate integrated regulatory and operational framework for nuclear
safety be established, the author believes that we should positively discuss the option to rely on
nuclear energy which is free from greenhouse gas emission as a major social and industrial
infrastructure. This includes an urgent issue to devise and implement a proper technical framework toassure safety of existing nuclear power plants. With this recognition, this paper will discuss
engineering frameworks of earthquake and tsunami protection for nuclear power plants.
1.2 Background of this paper
The purpose of this paper is to present earthquake engineering agenda for nuclear safety raised by theexperiences in the Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake. Discussion will be developed primarily from the view
point of earthquake engineering and risk-based decision theory.
On March 30, 2011, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) proposed for NPPs throughout
Japan to implement emergency safety measures as backups in case of nuclear accident emergency(NISA, 2011), which was practiced by all electric utilities. This action is in a right track in order to beprepared for accident management (AM) to stop steps of severe accident sequences in the event ofstation blackout and malfunction of cooling systems.
It should, however, be recognized that the key requirement is to achieve a total system reliability
that will keep the plant from facing such emergency situations under severe earthquake and tsunami
actions, which is the main subject of this paper.
The context of this paper is based on the author's article written half a year ago in the Japanese
language (Kameda, 2011). This paper is its updated version.
This paper has a background of extensive discussion with relevant researchers and engineers on
which basis, four companion papers are presented in an organized session of the Symposium (Ebisawa,
Kameda and Hirano, 2012; Miyano and Nakamura, 2012; Takada, 2012; Takamatsu, Kameda andEbisawa, 2012). The readers are referred to these companion papers.

2. IMPACTS OF THE TOHOKU-PACIFIC EARTHQUAKEON NPPs AND FUKUSHIMA I ACCIDENT
2.1 Overall performance of nuclear power plants in the disaster area
There are four NPP sites in the heavily damaged disaster area; i.e., Onagawa NPS 2 (Tohoku EPCO:
Tohoku Electric Power Company), Fukushima I and Fukushima II NPSs (TEPCO: Tokyo ElectricPower Copany), and Tokai II PS (JAPC: Japan Atomic Power Company). Table 1 shows overall
performances of these plants under the strong ground motions that were followed by tsunami attacks
2

NPS = nuclear power station / PS = power station

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about forty minutes later.
The Fukushima I NPS was subject to a serious nuclear accident. It was triggered by loss of all AC
powers (SBO: station black-out) and functional failure of residual heat removal systems (RHR). Thenfollowed severe accident sequence that led to core melt down. While loss of external power wascaused by strong ground motions, other major functional losses including malfunction of EDG(emergency diesel generator) and RHR were caused by inundation and hydrodynamic effects oftsunami. The other three plants, Onagawa, Fukushima II, and Tokai II were cool shut down despite
partial inundation by tsunami. Not only the failure case, the success cases should be carefully observedin order to draw useful lessons for nuclear safety to the future. For further details of the NPP
performances, see e.g. NERH (2011). What led to stability and accident on the site is a crucial issue.
Regarding this, see Miyano and Nakamura (2012), one of our companion papers for the Symposium.
Table 1 Performance of NPPs in the disaster area of the Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake

The overall performance of the four NPPs may be stated that Fukushima I "failed catastrophically"
but Onagawa, Fukushima II and Tokai II "failed gracefully". We should learn from the facts: both infailure and success stories. We need to learn critical lessons and put them in action to the future.
2.2 Ground motions at NPP sites
The source of Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake was truly a giant event. It was a combined ruptures
involving five distinctly defined inter-plate thrust zone source areas and a rupture in the "tsunami
earthquake" zone along the Japan Trench. The entire rupture zone extends over the length of 500km
north-south and the width of 200km east-west. Fig.1(a) shows a typical source model. Fig.1(b) shows
variation of strong motion records. Observe that strong motion time histories vary depending on
locations of observation sites relative to the asperities. Fig.1(c) shows tsunami height survey results
along the pacific coast. Locations of the four the NPPs in the disaster area are shown in Fig.1(a) and(c). Tsunami survey is missing for a section around Fukushima NPPs because of the nuclear accident.
From Fig.1, we get a general picture of the experienced ground motions and tsunami heights.
Strong motions at NPP sites are shown in Table 2 where PGA values (in cm/s2) at the basemat of reactor buildings (RB) are compared between observed records and response analysis
results from design basis ground motions (DBGM: Ss). Site specific DBGMs had been definedon the basis of the revised Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design of Nuclear Power
Reactor Facilities (NSC, 2006 / hereafter, NSC Seismic Design Guide). The numbers in red indicatethat the observed PGA exceeds the corresponding DBGM-based PGA (in blue).

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Tsunami survey teams
coordinated by JSCE
Coastal Eng. Comm.
red: inundation
blue: run-up(a) source model (JMA) (b) strong motion records (NIED) (c) tsunami height (JSCE)
Fig.1 Source model, and strong motion and tsunami height records of the Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake
Table 2Strong ground motions at NPP sites (source: NERH, 2011)

Observe in Table 2 that the three units at Onagawa and three of the six units at Fukushima
I experienced PGAs exceeding DBGM-based response values by 2% ~ 26%. Nevertheless, we
may say that the observed PGA are generally in the range of DBGM from an engineering
stand point where substantial seismic margin is anticipated at carefully designed plant SSCs.
This observation implies that our general understanding of multiple-shock earthquakes thatstrong ground motions in short period ranges are primarily controlled by the nearest
asperities applies to the gigantic event like Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake.

2.3 Tsunamis at NPP sites
The gigantic source area of the Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake affected more drastically ontsunami generation than on ground motions. It is important to recognize that we experienced
superimposed effects of two distinct types of tsunamis: "large tsunami" and "high tsunami".
The "large tsunami" was generated by the slip of inter-plate thrust zones (see Fig.1(a)). This
component of tsunami had a long wave length and therefore momentum of a huge volume ofseawater that caused inundation as far as 5km from the coast line in the flat plane of Miyagi
Prefecture. This is said to be a recurrence of the type of Jogan tsunami of AD 869 (Satake,Namegaya, and Yamaki, 2008; Namegaya, Satake and Yamaki, 2010). These inter-plate thrust slips
were the sources of major strong ground motions.
The "high tsunami" was generated by the slip at a belt zone adjacent to the axis of Japan Trench (see105Fig.1(a)). The belt zone produces so-called "tsunami earthquake" which is characterized as generating
weak ground motions but very high tsunamis. The major reason for the very high tsunami comes fromextremely large slips occurring there. The largest slips in the zone are estimated to be over 40 m far
exceeding the slips in the inter-plate thrust zones (Fujii, Satake, Sakai, Shinohara and Kanazawa,
2011). This type of earthquake is regarded as recurrence of Meiji Sanriku Tsunami of 1896.

Fig.2 Superposition of "large tsunami" and "high tsunami"in the Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake (PARI)
Fig.2 shows the tsunami record at Kamaishi harbor where we observe distinct components of "large
tsunami" with a long period (large wave length) and "high tsunami" with a short period (small wave
length). Thus, simultaneous occurrence of the two types of tsunamis that made it "large and hightsunami" is found to be specific characteristics of the Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake.
Table 3 Tsunami height at NPPs (red: observed in Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake; green: site
elevation; violet: assessment in construction permit; blue: re-assessments)

Table 3 shows tsunami height at the four NPP sites. The observed tsunami heights(inundation heights: some run-up height) in the Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake are shown in red,site elevations in green, official assessments in construction permit in violet, andre-assessments practiced later based on scientific progress and increase in technicalinformation in blue colors. Observe that Fukushima I NPS was subject to tsunami height
remarkably larger than the site elevation which caused severe inundation and led to severe
accident sequences. Onagawa NPS was also subject to a high tsunami but fortunately slightly
lower than the site elevation. For further details of the NPPs under tsunami action, see thecompanion papers presented in this Symposium (Kameda, Takamatsu and Ebisawa, 2012;106Miyano and Nakamura, 2012).
It is important to note that major tsunami sources that affected the four NPPs are thesegments near the trench axis; i.e., "tsunami earthquake" zone. This aspect is typically seenin the fact that the tsunami height at Onagawa NPS observed in the Tohoku-Pacific
Earthquake is nearly equal to the simulation results from the Meiji Sanriku Tsunami (1896).
Meiji Sanriku is case of typical "high tsunami". It was an isolated tsunami earthquake, notcombined with other inter-plate thrust rupture. This implies that key for the tsunami hazard
assessment for NPPs should be proper incorporation of "tsunami earthquakes". This aspect
has been demonstrated in JNES's detailed tsunami analysis (Sugino, 2011). It was shownthat major contributors to the tsunami heights at the four NPP sites are the sub-zones near
the trench axis that generated "high tsunami".

2.4 A note on the giant event and NPP performance information
There were arguments that such a mega thrust as Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake was beyond
expectation of seismology and beyond the capability of science. However, within the gigantic scale ofthe entire event, individual sub segments are accounted for using the context of existing seismologicaland tsunami science (e.g., Fujii, Satake, Sakai, Shinohara and Kanazawa, 2011). The question was in
the unexpected mega scale combined rupture of multiple source areas. This aspect is also being
discussed with a concept of super-cycle of plate boundary activities. In this way, scientific reasoningof the entire event is progressing.
Engineering hazard assessments should carefully incorporate all these real world information. Yet,
engineering decision is always subject to various sources of uncertainties as decision is to be madeagainst the future events. Risk-based decision is extremely important where physically sound models
and systematic uncertainty models are appropriately integrated.
It should be emphasized that details of structural and functional damage at the NPPs should beclarified and made open. It is particularly important to identify the mode of load effects; i.e., if they
are due to ground motion effects, tsunami effects, or ground motion and tsunami combined effects.
No such survey activities have been performed in a systematic manner. A preliminary table ofcomponent failure have been disclosed (Tohoku EPCO, 2011) which is valuable information, but notenough for engineering discussion. Information that enables to perform final assessment throughstructural and hydraulic analysis should be compiled. It will be a precious real-world input to thecomponent vulnerability evaluation that takes essential roles in risk assessments.

3. CRITICAL LESSONS FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY
The following three lessons are proposed as a basis of discussion on earthquake engineering agenda in
the following part of this paper. They address fundamental issues that must be implemented in practiceabsolutely in order never to have a recurrence of the Fukushima I accident.
(1) Risk-based decision should be the basis of nuclear safety measures.
(2) “Scientific imagination” should be a key for establishing risk models.
(3) Speed in action is critical.
These items point out serious gaps between theory and practice that were direct causes of the nuclear
accident. It is a critical task to close the gaps. These lessons are elaborated below.
3.1 Risk-based decision should be the basis of nuclear safety measures (Critical lesson 1)
Lack of beyond-design tsunami protection was a major cause of the accident at Fukushima-I. In
engineering context, this is an issue of risk-based decision for safety assurance covering
beyond-design hazard levels.
In the Japanese regulatory framework, the NSC Seismic Design Guide revised in 2006 (NSC, 2006)
made explicit statements of the risk concept in terms of "residual risk" which stands for seismic risk of107

the plant in the beyond-design hazard levels. PSA (probabilistic safety assessment) application was
promoted (not enforced) for assessment of residual risk. While its implementation has been in limited
activities, it has important roles for discussion of nuclear safety.
The same context should have been applied to tsunami effects. But despite some importantachievements (Sugino, Iwabuchi, et. al, 2008; JSCE, 2009), the process of implementation was muchslower than PSA application to ground motion effects. Then the 3.11 giant tsunami. The engineeringcommunity should take the situation seriously, and speed up implementation of the risk concept fortsunami protection of NPP.
The risk concept is an indispensable roadway in decisions to avoid NPP plant systems being
unguarded in beyond-design hazard levels. We should establish implementation of risk-based decision
for nuclear safety against mega earthquakes and mega tsunamis that will continue to recur in Japanand other seismic regions of the world.
3.2 “Scientific imagination” should be a key for establishing risk models (Critical lesson 2)
Using historical high record was a major reason for underestimation of the tsunami height at
Fukushima NPS. Tsunami simulation activity was confined to source models identified for the events
within the recent 1.5 century, a time span where geophysical verification is available. But 1.5 century
is only a small time window in the entire process of the nature.

(a) distinction of "tsunami earthquake" (b) past events and sources ofand inter-plate thrust zones
Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake
Fig.3 Seismicity of Tohoku-Pacific Japan(added to Earthquake Research Committee, 2002)
As discussed in 2.3, the most dangerous tsunami sources for NPPs in eastern Pacific Japan is the"tsunami earthquake" zone extending 800km north-south adjacent to the trench axis (see Fig.3(a))
where "high tsunami" is generated. The only scientifically verified "tsunami earthquake" is Meiji
Sanriku Tsunami of 1896 (see Fig.3(b)). But the Earthquake Research Committee, government ofJapan issued a long-term forecast for the eastern Pacific Japan (Earthquake Research Committee,
2002), where it was proposed on the basis of information in the past 400 years that "tsunami
earthquakes" can take place anywhere of the belt zone. It was reported at the expert meeting of theCentral Disaster Management Council (CDMC) but this concept was not adopted for general disastermanagement. Using historical high was the decision. Tsunami hazard assessments for Fukushima NPS
stayed in the same context. The reality of Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake is that "tsunami earthquake"
took place in the south side of the Meiji Sanriku source with the NPPs directly faceing in the front(Fig.3(b)).
Paleo-tsunami studies (e.g.: Abe, Sugano and Chigama, 1990; Imaizumi, et. al, 2008, ) provide

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important information for tsunami hazard assessment for nuclear safety, as they contribute to looking
at the tsunami histories in a timeframe much longer than geophysical observations. On this basis
warning by scientists had been appealed. But it is after Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake that
paleo-tsunami studies have established its firm position.
From these two examples, we should be aware that the judgmental fault was not in the fact that we
could not expect the mega thrusts of Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake but in the fact that we could notincorporate scientific warnings in engineering modeling. There was a general atmosphere immediately
after the Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake that seismologists were shocked, but not very much among
earthquake engineers. Engineers are responsible for building risk models. Engineers should seriously
look at the event.
From these considerations, we should establish a view that extreme events with very long return
periods should be incorporated in risk modeling if no observed data but sound scientific bases. This isa departure from being confined to historical highs. We may call this attitude "scientific imagination".
We need to mobilize "scientific imagination" in the process of decision. In an engineering terminology,
it may be called a "sound logic of extrapolation".
3.3 Speed in action is critical (Critical lesson 3)
Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake has taught us in an extreme manner that "the nature does not wait forus". It was only one year after publication of the paper demonstrating that AD 869 Jogan Tsunami
extended extensively from Miyagi to Fukushima and its inundation heights were quantitatively
estimated through numerical simulation (Namegaya, Satake and Yamaki, 2010). But it was seven years
after long-term forecast of "tsunami earthquakes" (Shimazaki, 2011), enough to get prepared.
There is no excuse "the nature acted before we acted" with nuclear accidents. It is urged to establish
new criteria to put promptly new scientific knowledge into action. Efficiency and transparency of
discussion is important. There should be lively brain storming, integration, and leadership for decision.
As an example, the case of Tokai II PS should be highlighted where construction of new side wallswith increased height (7m) to enclose sea water pump areas, nearly completion at the time of the greattsunami, protected the ultimate heatsink function (NERH, 2011).

4. ENGINEERING AGENDA (1): ESTABLISHMENT OF
RISK-BASED DECISION SCHEME FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY
4.1 Nuclear safety against earthquakes and tsunamis by integration of deterministic benchmark
assurance by design and beyond-design assurance by residual risk
Fig.4 proposes a risk-based decision scheme of nuclear safety against earthquakes and tsunamis. It
has been developed to conform with the NSC Seismic Design Guide (NSC, 2006). It constitutes aframework of safety assurance of the entire plant system by combined effects of deterministic design
and probabilistic assessment in beyond-design hazard levelsbu residual risk. Key safety parameters inthis context are 1) design point to define benchmark assurance, 2) seismic margin of SSC to clarify
their beyond-design capacity, and 3) residual risk to define seismic margin of the entire plant system.
It is emphasized that these parameters are connected consistently through fragility concepts. On thisbasis, we can discuss them on the same arena of physical phenomena.
As explained in the caption for Fig.4, the same framework is applicable to tsunami risk problems.
Major differences between seismic PSA and tsunami PSA come from the nature of load effects; i.e.,
ground motion effects and water inundation-hydrodynamic effects. The difference affects
characterization of fragility and accident scenarios. Despite these differences, basic structure of
risk-based decision is commonly applicable.

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Fig.4 Scheme of seismic safety assurance of NPP that should be realized underthe 2006 NSC Seismic Design Guide(While the figure illustrates the framework of design for strong groundmotions, the same context should be applied to tsunami safety: the terminologies
seismic design, seismic margin, seismic PSA, and DBGM are to be replaced bytsunami design, tsunami margin, tsunami PSA, and DBT (design basis tsunami),
respectively.)
4.2 Significance of implementing PSA in risk assessment
PSA (probabilistic safety assessment) is the only methodology currently available for risk assessmentof complex systems like nuclear power plants. Herein, significance of implementing PSA is discussed.
4.2.1 Framework of PSA procedure
The procedure of seismic PSA consists of the following five steps.
Level 1 PSA
Collection / Analysis of plant information and general analysis of accident scenarios:

Setting of Accident
Scenarios(ASs)Collection / Analysis of plant information

Implement of plant walk-down

List of R/B and Equipment

Comp.A
Comp.BPGA at bedrock
PGA at bedrock

Accident sequence evaluation
Core damage prob. curve
Ha

za
rd

CDF

cu
rv
e

Documentation

Fragility curveCore damage freq.
perGalFragility evaluation

Seismic hazard curve
Failure prob.

Seismic hazard evaluation

Exceedance
freq.(/yr)

Clarification of ASs,
Analysis of Initiating Event

PGA at bedrock

Level 3 PSA (Individual risk)

Level 2 PSA (FP release rate)

Fig.5 Procedure of level 1 seismic PSA (Hirano, Nakamura and Ebisawa, 2008)- Step 1: Collection of information related to earthquake and identification of accident scenario- Step 2: Seismic hazard evaluation110

- Step 3: Fragility evaluation- Step 4: Accident sequence evaluation- Step 5: Documentation
The role of each step is illustrated in Fig.5.
The algorithm of seismic PSA is analogous to constituting a convolution integral of i) hazard(ground motion / tsunami) - occurrence rate for each hazard level, ii) fragility (probability offunctional failure of SSC) - function of hazard level, and iii) accident scenario - event tree and fault
tree with branch probabilities. As discussed in 4.1, the same context is applicable to tsunami PSA.
For further details of the procedure, see the AESJ Standard (AESJ, 2007).
4.2.2 Benefit of using PSA
Major benefits of using PSA for seismic-tsunami safety of NPPs may be addressed as follows:+ Integrated system reliability: We have solid technology to be used in deterministic design. We
can expect that neatly designed and constructed plant components will have substantial level ofseismic margin. But no matter how well we know about high reliability of individual components, thereliability of the entire plant as an integrated system is still in a "black box". We need to integratecomponent reliabilities into the integrated system reliability of the entire plant. This is the only way tomake the plant safety transparent and accountable to the public (see Fig.4). In this way, we can discuss
the plant reliability relative to safety goals and/or performance goals. PSA is the only applicable
methodology developed so far.
+ Identification of critical accident scenarios and critical plant components: By conducting ade-convolution analysis of the integrated results of PSA, we can identify critical accident scenarios
and relevant SSCs. In this manner, PSA results can be used for importance evaluation of individual
plant components. Through this process, we can establish consistent relations between actual
component design or enhancement plans and the reliability of the entire system. The key point isavoiding unrecognized critical missing links. This will help making consistent and appropriate
cost-effective choice of earthquake and tsunami countermeasures.
+ Rigorous application to common-cause failures caused by earthquake and/or tsunami: NPPs
are designed to protect its safety in the event of accidents by defense-in-depth mechanism. The
effectiveness of defense-in-depth has been well established for accidents caused by internal events.
But when the plants are subjected to strong earthquake ground motions and tsunami attacks, we facepossibilities of simultaneous failure of several important safety components. That is, we must deal
with the plant safety with common-cause events. In this case, logics of sequential safety scenario of
defense-in-depth no longer holds. Seismic PSA provides methods for quantitative risk assessment forthese common-cause events with correlated component failures (Ebisawa, Ogura and Hirano, 2010).
+ Synthetic treatment of inherent uncertainties: Throughout this paper, it has been repeatedlyemphasized that we need risk concepts in safety assessment for NPPs. Major reason is that our future
events are subject to uncertainties. Seismic events including ground motions and tsunamis have very
high level of uncertainty. Even in Japan where ample geophysical and seismological observation data
as well as paleo-seismological and paleo-tsunami information are available, we need to treat various
types of uncertainties (aleatory and episteic) to establish engineering models for safety assessment.
PSA incorporates methods of synthetic treatment of uncertainties, which is a key factor to make PSA
useful (AESJ, 2007).
4.3 Implementation of risk concepts in Japan for nuclear safety - a slow process
Development of seismic PSA methodologies for Japanese seismic environments began at Japan
Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) (1985-2001) which was aimed at establishing acomprehensive framework of the theory. A seismic PSA project targeting its implementation was
conducted at Nuclear Power Engineering Corporation (NUPEC) (1994-2003), then succeeded by
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) (2003~).

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The pioneering works on PRA 3 through the SSMRP project by US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (USNRC) was available in 1981 (USNRC, 1981). The developments in the U.S. wereconducted for application in the central and eastern U.S. where seismicity is low or moderate, and notfor high seismicity areas like California. It is the author's understanding that the primary purpose of
SSMRP was to provide quantitative answers to seismic margins of NPPs in the central and eastern U.S.
whose design seismic loads are considerably lower than those in California, but once a severe
earthquake takes place actual ground motion will far exceed design values, yet the plant mustwithstand them so that severe accident like core melt down will not occur.
In the Japanese environment where seismicity is very high and with ample geophysical andseismological data are available, nuclear safety assessment practice has been done under deterministic
frameworks. There was an atmosphere to hesitate discussing "risks" which looks inevitably at
possibilities of earthquake ground motions exceeding design levels. However, particularly after the
1995 Great Hansin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake Disaster and various major earthquakes occurring at
unidentified active faults, treatment of inherent uncertainties in seismic hazard assessment attained
wider recognition. Meanwhile, the NUPEC/JNES PSA project made substantial progress in systematic
treatment of uncertainties under the Japanese high seismicity environments.
With these backgrounds and after heated controversy at the code development committee, the risk
concept was adopted in the Japanese regulatory guide with a terminology "residual risk" in the NSC
Seismic Design Guide (NSC, 2006). This terminology was employed to represent the plant risk in the
beyond-design hazard levels.
Seismic PSA plays a central role in residual risk assessment. Along with revision works for theseismic design guide at NSC, Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) worked on compiling
Implementation Standard for Probabilistic Safety Assessment of of Nuclear Power Plants, and it was
published in September 2007 (AESJ, 2007). It provides technical bases for implementation of seismic
PSA (Hirano, Nakamura and Ebisawa, 2008).
One year after the revision of the NSC Seismic Design Guide, Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake(NCOE) of 16 July 2007 took place and heavily affected TEPCO's Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear
Power Station (K-K NPS). The plant was subjected to very strong ground motions some exceeding
three times the DBGM (under old design guide), but cool shut down was achieved at all of the reactor
units. This experience explicitly demonstrated that assessment of residual risk is a practical demand,
which led to a certain progress in the consensus development on the significance of seismic PSA.
Fundamental principle of implementing risk-based decision is for 1) treatment of external loads inexcess of design values, and 2) quantitative incorporation of inherent uncertainties involved in future
events. The principle is indispensable to achieve high reliability of complex systems. Nuclear safety isa typical case. In this regard, the current NSC Seismic Design Guide needs improvements, as it does
not enforce application of seismic PSA, just stipulating reference to the annual excess probability of
DBGM (NSC, 2006-2). Because of this situation, implementation of seismic PSA in nuclear regulatory
activities was a slow process. As mentioned earlier, implementation of tsunami PSA was even slower.
The reality of nature repeatedly pose questions through NCOE, Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake, etc.
seismic risk management of NPPs based on PSA is an urgent agenda.

5. ENGINEERING AGENDA (2): ESTABLISHMENT OF SEISMIC-TSUNAMI PSA
5.1 Seismic PSA and Tsunami PSA - a usability check
Usability of seismic PSA depends on how realistically the hazard, fragility and scenario models aredefined. This point can never be overly emphasized in each of the aforementioned five Steps of PSA.
Two such examples are shown in Fig.6
Fig.6 (a) shows a comparison between the accident scenario of level 1 seismic PSA based on the
AESJ Standard (AESJ, 2007) and events that actually occurred at K-K NPS in the NCO earthquake of3

PRA: Probabilistic risk assessment. It is a common terminology in the U.S. instead of PSA.

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July 2007. The final draft of the AESJ Standard were completed half a year before the NCOE. Fig.6(a)shows that the AESJ Standard identified well about the events before they actually occurred.
Fig. 6(b) shows accident scenarios identified in the tsunami PSA project that started at JNES in2006 (Sugino, Iwabuchi et. al, 2008). It is shown that functional loss of seawater pumps and diesel
generators would be major causes of scenarios leading to core damage, which is exactly what
happened in the Fukushima I accident as shown in the attached table.
Examples for wide range of Accidental Scenario described in
the Standard for Procedure of Seismic PSA 2007 (AESJ)

A1.Direct Effect
A2.Indirect Effect①SSCs having Safety Function（Damage of As, A Facilities）

A2-1 Other than SSCs having Safety Function （Secondary
effects may affect As, A facilities directly to lead Core Damage）

・Indoor Facilities①Effect on CV and PV by falling and dropping of Overhead
Traveling Crane②Effect on As, A facilities by damaging of B, C facilities③Effect on adjacent Building by Turbine Missile
・Outdoor Facilities④Effect on buildings by falling of Stack⑤Effect on Buildings and Surrounding Facilities by Possible
Collapses of the Surrounding Grounds above the foundation⑥External Power Source Loss by Damages of Power Line Towersof Power Grids⑦Function Loss of Cooling by stopping Industrial Water Supply

A2-2 Effect on Human Error⑧Incorrect operation introduced by highly stressed operators andworkers during and after earthquakes⑨Trouble of backup operation by blackouts for Damage of
Insulator of Transformer⑩Trouble of transportation on site by soil liquefaction and damageof retaining wall
⑪Effect to operators by Damage of Secondary members of Sealing⑫Mistakes on Plans and Designs, Selecting Materials,
Manufacturing and Building to Completion of Facilities

B. Effect on Core Damage by Aftershocks

Damage Status of NPP by NCOE
① NoneA. Effect on Core Damage by Main Shock⑬Evaluate Increase of
CDF by Aftershocks① (Unit 6）Damage of connection part ofwheel axis of Overhead TravelingCenter② （Unit 4）Crack on connection part ofCondenser, Sea water Leakage（Unit 7）Degradation of water-tightnessof watertight door on RCIC and RHR
System（Unit 3）Come off of Blow Out Panel of
R/B③ None④ Incline of Stack, Shift of Duct
⑤ Partial land slide of slope in the eastside of Switchyard⑥ None⑦ None. Floods in the basement of
Building by Breakage of Piping for Fire
Extinction⑧（Unit 7） Iodine detected at main exhaust
tower in periodic measurement⑨（Unit 3） Fire broke out at Auxiliary
Transformer 3B（Unit 3,4,6）Oil leakage of Auxiliary
Transformer 3B⑩ Caving in yard
⑪ Dropping of secondary members of
Sealing⑫ None⑬ None(a) Scenarios by AESJ Standard as compared with reality (b) Accident sequences by run-up
tsunami (Sugino, et.al, 2008)
at K-K NPS in NCOE (Ebisawa et. al, 2012)
Fig.6 Usability of seismic PSA and tsunami PSA in terms of accident scenario identification
So far, seismic PSA and tsunami PSA have been developed independently. Seismic PSA is now
implementable (AESJ, 2007). Tsunami PSA development came later, but catching up. AESJ
implementation standard for tsunami PSA is being compiled by its committee and task force. As
ground motion effects and tsunami effects are inter related, next step should be integration into
"seismic-tsunami PSA".
5.2 Seismic-Tsunami PSA
Most of severe tsunamis we experience in Japan are near-source tsunamis. We meet strong groundmotions first, and tsunami attacks with delays of several minutes~1 hour. The Tohoku-Pacific
Earthquake was a typical case. We need to establish PSA methodology to deal with correlated groundmotion and tsunami effects, i.e., integrated "seismic-tsunami PSA".
A companion paper for the Symposium (Ebisawa, Kameda and Hirano, 2012) discuses challenges
to seismic-tsunami PSA. Herein its basic framework will be presented.
Following lessons must be learned from the Fukushima I accident as engineering agenda understrong ground motion and tsunami combined actions.
① Occurrence of gigantic earthquake and tsunami requiring combined consideration of seismic
hazard and tsunami hazard② Risk evaluation of multi-units③ Combined emergency management of both natural disaster and nuclear accident④ Protection of support systems (seawater supply, power supply and signal systems) whosefunctional failure caused core damage in a short period of time.
⑤ Common cause failure of multi structures and components⑥ Dependency among neighboring units
All of these items require development of an integrated seismic-tsunami PSA, particularly items ①.
③, ④ and⑤ directly involve seismic-tsunami hazard, seismic-tsunami fragility, and seismictsunami accident scenarios.

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Items ② and ⑥, treatment of multi-unit issues, are not necessarily the agenda for seismic-tsunami
combined effects. Multi-unit correlation is a vital issue in seismic PSA as well (Ogura, et. al, 2011).
But modes of correlations are different between ground motion effects and tsunami effects. Highly
correlated tsunami fragilities of electric devices, very vulnerable to water, is a typical tsunami specificexample. They often constitute step-function type fragility; i.e., cliff-edge effects.
Seismic-tsunami PSA will be performed according to the steps:+ Setting accident scenarios+ Seismic-tsunami hazard evaluation+ Seismic-tsunami fragility evaluation+ Seismic-tsunami accident sequence identification in detailFig.7 is a schematic illustration of seismic-tsunami accident scenarios. Of the four cases shownherein, Case 1 is the safe case, while other three are cases with core damage occurrence.

Fig.7 Seismic-tsunami accident scenarios (Ebisawa, Kameda and Hirano, 2012)

While it is clear that the nuclear accident at Fukushima I NPS corresponds to Case 2, generalframework of seismic-tsunami PSA should incorporate all the four cases in Fig.7. We need to establish
site specific seismic-tsunami hazard models with careful scientific surveys, "scientific imagination",and a sound risk concept.

6. ENGINEERING AGENDA (3): FRAGILITY ENHANCEMENT THROUGHESTABLISHMENT OF TSUNAMI RESISTANT TECHNOLOGY
6.1 Motivation
Improving seismic and tsunami resistance of plant SSCs is the most straightforward way ofseismic-tsunami risk reduction of nuclear power plants. In the context of safety assurance in Fig.4, it
corresponds to the enhancement of seismic-tsunami fragility. It will contribute to reduction of residual
risks through seismic-tsunami PSA. It also feeds back to seismic-tsunami margin of SSCs relative todesign point. In this way, fragility enhancement is a key action in the seismic-tsunami risk reduction.
While we already have tremendous information on seismic fragility technology and data, tsunami
fragility assessment needs much more efforts. Tsunami science and tsunami engineering have maderemarkable contributions to tsunami hazard assessment and tsunami simulation. Engineering aspects
including PTHA (probabilistic tsunami hazard assessment) and tsunami forces applied to objects havebeen significantly contributed (JSCE, 2002, 2009; Shuto et. al, 2007). On the other hand, tsunami
vulnerability issues have not drawn adequate attention. In this context, a proposal is addressed hereinfrom a standpoint of structural engineering. The proposal is to establish "tsunami resistanttechnology" like we have earthquake resistant technology. Detailed discussion of this issue ispresented in a companion paper of the Symposium (Takamatsu, Kameda and Ebisawa, 2012).
6.2 Key issue = Elimination of Cliff-edge Effects

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The most overwhelming effects of tsunami in the Fukushima I accident was that the critical safety
support systems including emergency diesel generators and seawater pumps for residual heat removal
systems were inundated and immediately lost their functions. In these cases, their fragility functions
are nearly step functions as shown in Fig.8(a). This situation is called cliff-edge effects. The residual
tsunami risk in the beyond-design hazard levels becomes discontinuously too large.
Cliff edge effects in seismic fragility are observed in brittle failure of piping, etc. In the tsunami
case, most dangerous cliff edge effects are typically found in the vulnerability of electric devices
against water. They include motors for seawater pumps, cables, switch boards, instrumental sensors,data transmission devices, etc.
To eliminate cliff-edge effects, we need to improve the fragility to "smooth fragility" (Fig.8(b)) or"safe relocation" (Fig.8(c)).

Fig.8 Scheme of fragility enhancement for eliminating cliff-edge effects (Kameda, 2011)
6.3 Load effects of tsunami
Tsunami hazard is represented typically by the tsunami heights. We should, however, be aware that
there are various types of load effects of tsunami that should be considered for nuclear safety
depending on how the plant components face tsunami attacks with various conditions of location,
elevation, angles relative to tsunami flow direction, etc. They will affect the feasible technologies to be
implemented for tsunami protection.
6.3.1 Inundation height

Photo 1 Inundation at Fukushima I NPS (by TEPCO)
Photo 1 shows scenes of inundation at Fukushima I NPS. It was the primary cause of triggering thesever accident sequence. These scenes cover the sea front to the turbine buildings in Fig.9(a). Fig.9(b)shows the case of Onagawa NPS. One major difference in inundation states at the two plants is seen in
the layout of sea water pumps for emergency cooling systems that need to be located lower than site
elevations for efficient performance. At Fukushima I, the pumps were installed at 5m elevation andbare to the sea front. At Onagawa, elevation of the pumps was low at 3m, but the entire pump pit was
located behind the front bank facing the sea with the full site elevation of 14.9m (13.9m at the time oftsunami because of co-seismic tectonic subsidence) and was protected from direct inundation(Fig.9(b)). Many lessons should be drawn from the experiences in the great tsunami.

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Reactor building
Turbine building
Cooling sea water
pump motor
Sea water Seawall
intake pit
Sea surface: 0m
Emergency
Diesel Generator
room

Cooling sea waterpump(a) Fukushima I NPS (Unit 1)(b) Onagawa NPS (Unit 2)
Fig.9 Illustration of sea water supply systems (source: NERH, 2011)
6.3.2 Hydrodynamic forces
Hydrodynamic forces should be a key factor for nuclear facilities that directly face tsunami front.
The tsunami forces have different phases such as dynamic pressure (impulsive tsunami front pressure),
followed by sustained pressure (run-up, and backwash) (Shuto et. al, 2007; JSCE, 2007).
Photo 2 shows some examples. Photo 2(a) is deemed as a case of failure due to impulsive tsunami
front pressure, and Photo 2(b) due to sustained run-up pressure.
Photo 3 shows a positive example, tsunami wall across Fudai River (TP+15.5m). The tsunami flew
over the wall, and destroyed the maintenance decks. But the main structure and the foundation wereintact. The tsunami flow was wakened: it did not reach an elementary school 300m upstream.

(a) Destroyed sea wall gate (Miyako)(b) Bent steel pillars (Onagawa)
Photo 2 Structural failure due to hydrodynamic tsunami forces

Photo 3 Tsunami wall across Fudai River(Fudai, Iwate Prefecture)

Photo 4 Seawalls toppled due to scouring(Ryou-ishi, Miyako)

6.3.3 Scouring
Many coastal seawalls along the Pacific coast of Tohoku District were destroyed due to scouring byhuge sustained flows once tsunami overflows them. Photo 4 shows such example.
New sea wall constructions are planned or underway at many Japanese NPP sites. A risk-based
decision in the wall design to incorporate the case of overflow is critically important. They should be
devised with strong wall structures and strong foundations to withstand impulsive and sustained
tsunami pressure and sea bed consolidation to prohibit excessive scouring. The case of Photo 3 isrecognized as a promising example of this premise.
6.3.4 Buoyancy and uplift
In the Tohoku-Pacific Tsunami, everything that can float floated and drifted, cars, trucks, railway
vehicles, storage tanks without tight foundations, ships moving on to the land. Photo 5 shows a fuel116

tank at Onagawa NPS just sitting on the ground that floated and dislocated. In photo 1, we see a surge
tank not dislocated by the tsunami although structurally damaged.
Another mechanism to raise structures is uplift. Bridge decks with T-shaped cross section in
Rikuzen Takada is believed to have been pulled up from the piers due to uplift.

Photo 5 Fuel tank floated and dislocated(by Tohoku EPCO)

Photo 6 Heat exchanger room at Onagawa NPS
RB basement (by Tohoku EPCO)

6.3.5 Seawater intrusion through unanticipated paths
We must be aware that water creeps in anywhere if it has pressure head and find accessible intrusion
paths. While Onagawa NPS was able to avoid direct tsunami inundation, the basement of the RB
accessory structure was partially inundated by seawater that intruded by an inverted siphon effectthrough seawater intake tunnel - tide gage pipe - pump pit - trenches (pipe ducts) (see Fig.9(b)). Photo
6 shows the heat exchanger room that got wet. The water level reached 2.5m above the floor: center ofthe heat exchanger drum.
Sealing of possible water intrusion path is very important. Cases are reported that cable trays
crossing partition walls with urethane resin seals stopped tsunami pressure, but those with plasterboard could not. This arouses us about the importance of sealing materials.
6.3.6 Sea sand immixed in seawater
Tsunami is a mixture of seawater and sea sand that is produced when it reaches shallow sea. Finesands mixed in the seawater can harm active plant devices such as motors, generators, turbines, etc,
particularly their shaft bearings.
6.4 Elements of tsunami-resistant technology: A framework of Water proof (WP), Structuralresistance (SR) and Dry siting (DS)
From the arguments in 6.1~6.3, it is pointed out that tsunami protection of NPPs should be a set ofproper technologies to withstand various forms of tsunami hazard including inundation, hydrodynamic
forces, scouring, etc. This requires establishment of tsunami - resistant technology that will help
tsunami fragility enhancement.
It is believed that ample technological resources are available in the fields of machinery,architectural and civil engineering that can be mobilized effectively for tsunami protection of NPPs.
R&D should be conducted for new developments and verification.
On this basis, a framework of the following three technological elements is proposed; i.e., Water
proof (WP), Structural resistance (SR), and Dry siting (DS).
6.4.1 WaterProof (WP)（防水）: Isolate from direct contact with water
Isolation of electric devices from direct contact with water is critical. Especially safety-related electric
devices are important such as control panels for water injection, switch boards, monitoring systems,
seawater pumps, emergency diesel generators, etc. Technical elements for protection include
waterproof casings, watertight partitions, enforced isolation seals, waterproof cables/connectors,
sealing of seawater intrusion paths.
6.4.2 Structural Resistance (SR)（耐水）: Withstand hydrodynamic tsunami effects
Plant components that directly face approaching tsunamis must withstand their hydrodynamic effects

117such as impulsive and sustained tsunami pressures, scouring, buoyancy, and uplift. Protection ofseawater pumps that are inevitably installed at relatively low elevation is critical. Technical options
would be to make the pumps and motors completely water tight, constructing isolation walls tallenough, or both combined. Tsunami walls to enclose the plant site should have strong structure andfoundation design and sea bed consolidation. Water and fuel tanks important in emergency operation
should be connected to tight foundations.
6.4.3 Dry Siting (DS)（避水）: Locate at high elevation
This is to install plant facilities and equipments at high enough elevations so that none of the future
tsunamis will ever reach. They may include part of emergency diesel generators, storage of equipment
stocks to be used under emergency, control systems critical for safety management, etc. As relocationsites, high elevation point adjacent to the plant will be the first choice. Equipments with light weight
can be relocated to upper floor of the plant buildings.
In case of a new plant construction, decision on site elevation is by itself an important dry siting
judgment.
6.5 Practical perspective
Table 4 shows a listing compiled from practical observations on SSC design and enhancement. Major
SSCs critical for tsunami issues have been identified. They include sea wall, residual heat removal
function following reactor shut down, core cooling system, emergency power supply system, electric
devices, equipments for emergency management, building components, and possible paths of intrusion.
Locations of these SSCs were assumed to be standard cases of existing plants.
Table 4 SSC design and enhancement for tsunami protection of NPP (typical examples)(Takamatsu, Kameda and Ebisawa, 2012)
Structures, Systems, Components (SSC)

Location

Actions (e.g.)*Seawall*outdoor*facing theopen sea*strong walls*strong foundation*sea bed consolidation

WP

SR

DS

○

*Residual heat removal
function following reactor
shut down (scram)*Pumps for the residual heatremoval system , etc.

*buildingbasement*watertight chamber○*Core cooling system*High pressure-low pressure
core pumps, etc.

*bldg. basement*watertight chamber○*Emergency power supply
system*Emergency diesel generator*bldg. basement& vicinity*watertight chamber, or*relocate in high elevation○○○*Fuel oil tanks*outdoor*strong foundation*Emergency component
cooling system*Sea water pumps, etc.

*outdoor &seawater level* Electric devices*power cable & signal cable*monitoring instruments*electrical panels, etc.

*outdoor*indoor*watertight protection for
driving motors, etc.
*water-sealed cable*strong cable supports*watertight chambers*upper floor of bldg

*Equipments for
emergency management*Portable emergency power
supply systems*Portable pumps*(optional)*install at high elevation○*(optional)○*Carry-in entrance to bldg.
*Ventilation louvers, etc.

*Outer wall of
bldg.

*Hatches and openings
within buildings* Openings at intake tunnels* Trenches, etc.

*Inside bldg.

*install at high elevation*watertight & strong
doors to resist tsunami
loads*waterproof hatches &doors* Outdoor &underground* Watertight lids, etc.

*Building components* Possible paths of intrusion(seepage, siphon effects, etc.)

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○
○

Then options of engineering actions for enhancements and their categorization in Water proof (WP),
Structural resistance (SR), and Dry siting (DS) have been identified. This type of clarification will help
consistent implementation of SSC design and enhancement.
6.6 Roles of tsunami-resistant technology

118

Tsunami-resistant technology is expected to enable flexible adoption of tsunami protection alternatives
through WP, SR, and DS. In this way, it will contribute to realizing comprehensive and appropriate
tsunami protection measures depending on site specific conditions as well as to risk reduction by
redundant protection measures. This aspect is particularly important for existing plants where the site
elevations are pre-fixed.
It will also be a basis for tsunami fragility assessment for tsunami PSA and/or seismic-tsunami PSA,
which will help establishing a risk-based safety assurance scheme, discussed in 4.1.

7. CONCLUSIONSThis paper addressed engineering agenda for nuclear safety based on the experiences of the 2011
Tohoku-Pacific Earthquake. Discussion was focused on how technological developments andimplementation should be conducted for the nuclear safety in the future. Major points of discussion inthis paper may be summarized as follows.
1. Based on the performance of nuclear power plants in the disaster area, three critical lessons were
proposed: i) Risk-based decision, ii) "Scientific imagination", and iii) Speed in action.
2. Risk-based decision scheme for nuclear safety was proposed. It constitutes an integrated safetyassurance of the entire plant system by combined effects of deterministic design and risk-based
assessment by residual risk. It urges improvements of Japan's NSC Seismic Design Guide.
3. Significance of implementing PSA methodology was discussed, where benefits of using PSA wereaddressed as i) Integrated system reliability ii) Identification of critical accident scenarios andcritical plant components, iii) Rigorous application to common-cause failures caused by earthquake
and/or tsunami, and iv) Synthetic treatment of inherent uncertainties:
4. Establishment of seismic-tsunami PSA was proposed. Scheme of integrating seismic PSA andtsunami PSA was presented.
5. Establishment of "tsunami-resistant technology" was proposed. For eliminating "cliff-edge effects","smooth fragility" and "safe relocation" were proposed. Based on observation of various types oftsunami load effects, a framework of technical categories i) Water proof (WP), ii) Structuralresistance (SR), and iii) Dry siting (DS) were proposed.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author wishes to express deep appreciation to his colleagues who worked together to contributecompanion papers for the Symposium: Katsumi Ebisawa, Mitsumasa Hirano, Hiroshi Miyano, Takao
Nakamura, Tsuyoshi Takada and Naotaka Takamatsu.

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