DP2022-35

Revisiting the Effects of Group
Identity and Information
Diversity in a Leader-member
Public Goods Experiment
Yuning TANG
Qinxin GUO
Junyi SHEN

September 22, 2022

Revisiting the effects of group identity and information diversity in aleader-member public goods experiment
Yuning Tanga, Qinxin Guob,*, Junyi Shenc

a Graduate School of Economics, Kobe Universityb School of International Economics and Trade, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and

Finance, China.
c Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University.

*Corresponding author: School of International Economics and Trade, Shanghai Lixin
University of Accounting and Finance, China. E-mail: qinxinguo@lixin.edu.cn

Abstract
We investigate the willingness to cooperate between leaders and members in a
repeated public goods experiment, when there is group identity and information diversity
between them. The participants who play the role of leader, first decide their contributions
to the team project. Subsequently, members also decide their contributions. The results
indicate that having the same group identity as the leader has a positive effect on members'
intention to fully cooperate with the leader Additionally, in the case of being in the samegroup, disclosing information only to members may increase cooperation. Finally,
cooperative behavior between members is closely related to the identity of the leader andinformation diversity.
Keywords: Leadership; Beliefs; Group Identity; Information Diversity; Public Goods
Experiment
JEL classification: C72, C91, D63

1

1. Introduction
People believe that, in a group, the behavior of one member is influenced by theleader and other members. People's own behavior largely depends on their beliefs about
the way others behave. For example, if leaders and other team members are selfish andwilling to accept bribes, the rest will also take it for granted and be more likely to behave
in a similar manner. Over time, acceptance of such practices may become part of one’s
own belief, which will makes the whole team enter a vicious cycle. However, if leadersand other members are selfless and fair, a virtuous cycle can be created. Gächter andRenner (2018) and Fisman and Golden (2017) found that the more people believe that
others are corrupt, the more widespread the corruption becomes. Cialdini et al. (1990)
conducted an experiment in a parking lot. The experiment demonstrated that people weremore likely to throw away flyers (posted by the experimenter on their car) in the parking
lot itself, if it looked messy, as compared to if the parking lot looked clean.
Kelley and Stahelski (1970) found that people's cooperative behavior is somehow
related to others. In fact, it can even be argued that it depends on that of others, i.e., many
people are "conditional-cooperators". They cooperate if others cooperate positively.
Keser and Van Winden (2000) found that conditional cooperation is a common
phenomenon in a public goods game, and that most people choose to cooperateconditionally. Fischbacher et al. (2001) further studied conditional cooperation in public
goods games and found that 1/3rd of the subjects could be classified as free-riders, while
50% were conditional-cooperators. The behavioral relevance of conditional cooperation
has also been demonstrated in field experiments. For example, Croson and Shang (2008)
found that by updating social information (i.e., other donors’ donations that were higher
or lower than the previous years’), they would change their donations along with thesocial information. When other donors’ donations were higher than their previous ones,
people increased their own donations, and vice versa. Jack and Recalde (2015) found thatvoluntary donations increase when local authorities lead by example.
With globalization and diversity, the workforce has become more diverse. Most
teams are composed of people of different ages, groups, religious beliefs, and evennationalities. Therefore, it is important to learn how to manage diversity in order tofacilitate coordination and cooperation. While diversity in group membership has beenfound to induce positive outcomes, such as greater caution in decision-making (Nemeth,2

1986), expanded access to social networks and resources (Tushman, 1977), andpromotion of innovation (Van Der Zee and Paulus, 2008), it can also lead to intergroupbias and conflict among the members (Pelled et al., 1999; Hargreaves Heap et al., 2009).
The above-mentioned studies show that while diversity within a group can induce positive
outcomes, it might lead to bias. This triggers a thought that if there is an identity
difference between the leader and members within a team, will it bring about morepositive or negative cooperation behaviors? Will they trust each other more because of
their contrasting experiences, or will they distrust each other because of a lack ofunderstanding? In teamwork, leader-member type teams are the most common, so it isnecessary to study the willingness to cooperate between leaders and members, when there
is identity diversity between them.
To conduct this study, we first create an artificial identity. The use of artificial
identity groups to study issues related to discrimination is common in identity economics
literature (Eckel and Grossman 2005; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Chen andChen, 2011). In real life, a shared identity is often used to enhance a sense of belonging
to a team and encourage team members to work towards a common goal. For example,
Nike's founder Phil Knight and many of his employees had the Nike "swoosh" logo
tattooed on their left calf as a symbol of group membership (Camerer and Malmendier,2007). To create a common identity, organizations have experimented with various teambuilding exercises, such as simulated space missions, where crews work together toovercome malfunctions as they navigate through space (Ball, 1999). Although thestandard economic theory does not explain this phenomenon, research on social identity
reveals the impact of shared identity on organizational outcomes.
Social psychological research on intergroup relations has found that highlighting andstrengthening shared ingroup identities can reduce bias (Dovidio et al., 2009), andenhance cooperation (Dovidio and Gaertner, 2000). For example, students from the same
university with different nationalities showed a decrease in their willingness to cooperate,
if information about their nationality was emphasized in the experiment; however, there
was no significant changes noticed in their willingness to cooperate, if information about
their university was emphasized (Chen et al., 2014). Another study emphasized thatshared group identity increases satisfaction within colleagues in ethnically diverse workgroups (Cunningham, 2005).
3

Our study adds to previous research on the effects of leaders' beliefs and identities
on behavior in public goods games, by addressing the issue of information diversity.
Information diversity can change people’s behavior during games. Participants who were
informed, had a common group identity that increased their cooperation in public goods(Eckel and Grossman, 2005) and prisoner’s dilemma games (Goette et al., 2006). We
examine how the cooperative behavior of leaders and members with different identities
differ in the public goods game. Our sample consisted of student participants from apublic university in China who were given group identities at the time of recruitment, andthen leaders were randomly selected from among them. We reinforced group identity as
the highlighted identity in the experiment, and by controlling variables if-know-id,
designed seven experimental sessions. We chose a leader-follower public goods game as
our analytical framework, which we have described in detail in the next section.
In this study, we found that group identity has an impact on members' cooperative
behavior, and it varies under different session treatments. In addition, we found that
preferences for risk, knowledge of economics, and experimental experience also matter.
This study contributes to the literature on social identity in three ways: First, we
introduce identity information into a leader-member public goods game and explore theeffects of different identities in a led model. Second, we take the approach of inducing
group identity in the laboratory rather than studying naturally occurring social identities(e.g., race, religion, gender, etc.), which makes our results purer and does not include
other identity elements (religion, gender, age, etc.). For example, some participants may
pay more attention to religion than others, while others may not care about gender. Thiscan easily be applied to real-life work settings. We use identity induction techniques fromsocial psychology to manipulate the salience of respective identities, to examine theextent to which evoking different dimensions of these identities affects individuals'
choices of coordination and cooperation. Finally, we analyze individual behaviors at a
micro level and provide a quantitative categorical classification of each participant's
behavior, providing further empirical evidence for the refinement of behavior types inpublic goods games.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes theexperimental design of this study. Section 3 presents our analysis and results. Section 4
discusses the results, and concludes the study.
4

2. Experimental design
Our basic design involves a leader-member public goods game. In the experiment,
all participants were divided into two roles: role A called “leader” makes an investment
decision first in the experiment and role B called “member” makes decision after role A.
Each team has one leader and three members. Both the leader and members were endowedwith 30 RMB each. The leader was first asked to decide how much money to contributeto the team project, ranging from 0 to 30. Then, after knowing the amount their leader
contributed, the members needed to decide how much money to contribute to the teamproject, which could also range from 0 to 30. The total contribution of the team project isthe sum of all contributions from the leader and three members. The payoff for eachsubject is given by

4𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 30 − 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 0.5 � 𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗=1

where subject i ∈ {1, . . .,4} is endowed with 30 RMB and decides how much money tocontribute to the public good (i.e., 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 ) and how much money to keep for themselves(i.e., 30 − 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 ). Each piece of money allocated to the team project yields a marginal per

capita return of 0.5. 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 is the project’s payoff and ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 is the total investment of the teamproject.

In the pursuit of profit, both the leader and the member will expect to pay less, andothers to pay more. If the leader does not invest any money, the member will not invest
any money either. That is, for a rational leader and/or member seeking to maximize theirown profit, the choice of the game is clear: the leader chooses to invest 0, and the member
also chooses to invest 0. In our game setting, if both the leader and members choose toinvest less money, their payoff will converge infinitely to the initial endowment (i.e., 30
RMB). However, with the full cooperation that everyone invests the entire amount (i.e.,
30 RMB), everyone earns as much money as his/her initial endowment (i.e., 60 RMB).
Therefore, bounded-rational participants in the actual game experiment, will choose toinvest a certain amount of money and actively cooperate with the leader or other members
to obtain more profits. This is also demonstrated in the actual game experiment, in which
both leaders and members choose to pay more than 0. In addition, there is a significant
positive correlation between the number of leader investments and member investments.
This is significantly different from the theoretical prediction and is due to the existence5

of the team project rule, where all participants are likely to be better off if the leader
invests more (if he or she trusts the members), and the member also invests more (if heor she trusts the leader). Thus, the amount of the leader and member’s contribution,
respectively, or the ratio of the member’s contribution to the leader’s contribution canalso be considered as a measure of the leader and member’s trust in each other.
When designing the experiment, we wanted to ensure that identity was salient
enough to matter. Many experimental studies have addressed the salience of group
identity in experimental designs, relying on induced identities such as the color of thegroup (e.g., Cochard et al., 2019; Currarini and Mengel, 2016). Additionally, Chen andChen (2011) found that implementing social interactions can increase identity salience.
Therefore, at the beginning of the experiment, we introduced a word-chain game tostrengthen the sense of identity among the participants.
We conducted the experiment at the Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and
Finance on December 11–12, 2021. A total of 168 students (82 males and 86 females;mean age:20.22 years, standard deviation:1.02 years). Each subject was randomly
assigned to WeChat group A (72 students), WeChat group B (72 students), or WeChat
group C (24 students), at the time of recruitment. After recruiting participants, we held aword-chain activity in WeChat groups A and B, and participants of the group wererewarded with a certain number of red packets for working together to complete theactivity. To avoid the formation of negative social links, word-chains are rather easy, and
we allow subjects to discuss or help each other. Every correct word chain is rewarded
with a certain payoff to each member of the group. In WeChat group C, the word-chain
game was not conducted.
There were seven sessions, each with 24 participants. In the baseline session (sessiona), all subjects were from WeChat group C. In the six treatment sessions (i.e., sessions b,
c, d, e, f, and g), subjects were from either WeChat group A or B. In sessions b and e, thesubjects’ identities of the WeChat group were common knowledge within each fourplayer team. In sessions c and f, only the leader was informed of the other participants’
identities in each team, while the members were not, and they knew this difference. In
sessions d and g, only the members were informed of the other participants’ identities in6each team, while the leader was not, and they knew this difference. 1 The seven sessions
are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1．Summary of the seven sessions
LeaderBaseline

No identity(Session a)
ID-Both informed(Session b)

Member

No group identity.

No group identity.

Knows the group of the members andKnows the group of the leader

that the members know theirand that the leader knows theirgroup.

group.

Same

ID-Member

Knows the group of the members andDoes not know the group of the

Identity

uninformedthat the members do not know

leader but is aware that the(ID)(Session c)their group.

leader knows their group.

ID-Leader uninformed(Session d)

ID-Both informed(Session e)

Does not know the group of themembers but is aware that themembers know their group.

Knows the group of the leader
and that the leader does notknow their group.

Knows the group of the members andKnows the group of the leader

that the members know theirand that the leader knows theirgroup.

group.

Different

ID-Member

Knows the group of the members andDoes not know the group of the

Identity

uninformedthat the members do not know

leader but is aware that the(ID)(Session f)their group.

leader knows their group.

Does not know the group of theKnows the group of the leader

members but is aware that theand that the leader does notmembers know their group.

know his/her group.

ID-Leader uninformed(Session g)

Notes: Same ID, The leader and members in each four-player team are from the same WeChat group.
Different ID: The leader’s WeChat group is different from the members’ in each four-player team.

Our four-player teams included one leader and three members. The three members are always from thesame WeChat-group (i.e., either from WeChat-group-A or B), and the leader may be from the same
WeChat-group or a different one.
1

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We randomly selected 18, 18, and 6 leaders from WeChat group A, B, and C,
respectively (20 males and 22 females; mean age:19.92 years, standard deviation:0.98
years) 2. The remaining 126 participants in the WeChat-groups became members during
the experiment (62 males and 64 females; mean age:20.30 years, standard deviation:1.01
years). In addition, to maintain anonymity between the leaders and members, they weresegregated in different classrooms when they arrived and remained there during theexperiment. In each classroom, the subjects received written instructions 3, a recording
sheet, and an investment amount recording sheet. In each classroom, one of the native
Chinese experimenters read the instructions to ensure that they understood them.
In each session, when the subjects arrived, they were informed that they would
participate in an experiment consisting of ten rounds. In each round, a public good game
experiment was conducted. Eighteen members were randomly paired with six leaders.
Each leader and member was endowed with 30 RMB (about 4.5 USD, where 1
RMB=0.15 USD). The detailed procedure of the experiment is as follows:
Step 1. The leaders in one classroom were asked to decide on the amount to contribute to
the team project, predict the average of the team members’ contributions, and write
them on their recording and investment amount recording sheets, respectively.
Step 2. The experimenters collected the leaders’ transfer amount recording sheets, went
to the members’ classroom, and wrote the amount of each leader’s investment on
the recording sheets of the corresponding members.
Step 3. After learning about the leader’s investment amount, the members decided how
much to contribute to the team project, predicted the average of other teammembers’ contributions, and wrote them on their recording and investmentamount recording sheets, respectively.

We numbered the participants according to the order in which each of them joined the WeChat-group,and then decided who became leaders by randomly selecting the numbers. The participants who wereselected as leaders were informed individually, and the others did not know which of them were selected
as leaders.
3
The experimental instructions for leaders and members of the six treatment sessions are almost the sameas those in the baseline session, except for the additional information presented in Table 1 being provided
in corresponding sessions. The experimental instruction for leaders and members of the baseline session
are provided in Appendices A and B, respectively.
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Step 4. The experimenters collected the members’ investment-amount recording sheetsand recorded the total investment amount for the team project on the recording
sheets of the leader and each member, respectively.
Step 5. After all the subjects calculated their payoffs and filled in their recording sheets,the first-round experiment was completed.
The procedure of the remained nine-round experiment was the same as that of thefirst-round. After ten rounds, all subjects were asked to answer a post-experimental
questionnaire, which included questions related to basic individual information (e.g.,gender, age, major, hometown, monthly living expenses, and frequency of studying
economics), the question evaluating subjects’ risk preferences was borrowed from Hseeand Weber (1997), and the widely used General Social Survey (GSS) was utilized toformulate questions about trust, helpfulness, and fairness. 4
Communication was prohibited during the experiment, with the subjects
understanding that the experiment would be terminated immediately if they
communicated with one another. There were no show-up fees for our experiments. The
total reward for each subject was the sum of the payoffs based on the decisions in two
randomly selected rounds. Each session lasted for approximately one hour, and on anaverage, a leader earned 90.96 RMB (about 13.64 USD, where 1 RMB= 0.15 USD), anda member 86.02 RMB (about 12.90 USD, where 1 RMB= 0.15 USD).
3. Results
3.1 Descriptive evidence
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the participants’ experimental performanceand basic individual information. There was a good male-to-female ratio, among theparticipants. Approximately, the ratio of the participants’ answering GSS questions
regarding trust, helpfulness, and fairness positively, as compared to those answering
negatively was about 50%, which suggests that, in general, the participants were relatively
neutral in their social preferences. 5 Risk_appetite represents participants’ risk
The post-experimental questionnaire is provided in Appendix C. It is identical in content for bothleaders and members.
5
GSS_trust is defined as 1, if “most people can be trusted” was chosen as the answer to the survey question“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful indealing with people?” and 0 otherwise. GSS_fairness is defined as 1 if “most people would try to be fair”
was chosen as the answer to the survey question “Do you think most people would try to take advantage ofyou if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?” and 0 otherwise. GSS, Helfulpness is defined as 1 if
4

9

preferences, which is the number of participants choosing option B in Q11 of the postexperimental questionnaire, provided in Appendix C. The more the participant choose
option B, the more is their preference for risk-seeking activities. A 5-point Likert scale
was used to measure Economics_knowledge which is the frequency of studying
economics, where 1 stood for NEVER and 5 meant ALWAYS. Experiment_experiencemeasured whether the participants had participated in any economics experiments before.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variable

Investment_Leader

Investment _Member

Payoff_Leader

Payoff_Member

Male

Age

Living_expense

Economics_knowledge

GSS_Trust

GSS_Fairness

No ID

Same ID

Different ID

SessionSessionSessionSessionSessionSessionSession

a

b

c

d

e

f

g

19.60

16.60

14.10

12.60

14.90

14.50

14.70

(9.32)(7.67)(10.02)(9.85)(9.38)(9.22)(6.64)

14.20

10.80

9.29

9.51

11.40

10.90

9.96

(11.06)(8.08)(9.39)(9.22)(9.28)(7.82)(8.64)

47.92

43.36

40.37

43.08

44.25

43.30

41.33

(13.17)(8.44)(15.44)(14.80)(11.49)(11.15)(22.66)

47.02

43.68

41.64

40.90

43.14

42.29

42.25

(10.28)(8.52)(9.80)(9.85)(9.30)(8.53)(9.74)

0.56

0.72

0.28

0.44

0.44

0.61

0.61

(0.50)(0.50)(0.48)(0.44)(0.49)(0.50)(0.50)

20.11

20.28

20.33

19.94

20.44

20.00

20.00

(0.92)(1.11)(0.89)(1.35)(0.83)(0.86)(1.20)

4.64

4.58

4.67

4.54

4.42

4.54

4.33

(1.08)(1.28)(1.32)(1.20)(0.73)(0.96)(1.18)

2.57

2.49

2.48

1.69

1.79

2.00

2.41

(0.75)(1.05)(0.91)(0.68)(0.99)(0.77)(1.15)

2.11

2.61

2.71

2.00

2.67

1.72

1.83

(1.45)(1.74)(1.26)(1.49)(0.88)(1.41)(1.26)

0.70

0.43

0.63

0.75

0.70

0.43

0.58

(0.45)(0.50)(0.50)(0.47)(0.50)(0.50)(0.58)“most of the time people try to be helpful” was chosen as the answer to the survey question “Would you
say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or are they mostly just looking out for themselves?” and0 otherwise.
10

GSS_Helpfulness

Risk_appetite

Experiment_experience

0.35

0.34

0.58

0.34

0.38

0.49

0.60

(0.48)(0.46)(0.46)(0.40)(0.47)(0.50)(0.50)

2.21

2.54

2.29

2.30

2.79

2.08

2.19

(0.47)(0.50)(0.48)(0.50)(0.49)(0.50)(0.48)

0.95

0.86

0.88

0.95

0.91

0.92

0.94

(0.43)(0.24)(0.28)(0.40)(0.35)(0.34)(0.20)

Notes: Figures with and without parentheses are the standard deviations and mean values, respectively.

The mean investment and payoff for both, leaders and members in the baseline
session (session a) were higher than those in the other 6 sessions. In addition to the effectof group identity, this may also be related to the fact that their knowledge of economics
and experimental experience is more. Moreover, the participants in session a, had a higher
cost of living and a higher number of participants who believed that giving was rewarded(GSS_Fairness:0.70) among all participants.
3.2 Regression analysis of members’ investment behavior
Table 3 lists the regression results of the random-effects Tobit model for members’
investment decisions 6 . The dependent variable in this model is the investment of themembers. The session dummies SameGroup_Bothknow, SameGroup_Leaderknow,
SameGroup_Memberknow, DifferentGroup_Bothknow, DifferentGroup_Leaderknow,
and DifferentGroup_Memberknow are included as the independent variables, with thebaseline session (session a) being used as the reference. In addition, the independent
variable Investment_Leader is the investment of the paired leader, decided prior tomembers making decisions, and L.Investment _Member is the average investment of theother two paired members in the previous round. L.Investment _Average is the average
investment of one paired leader and two paired members.
As shown in the table, none of the variables related to the treatment session weresignificant. Chi-squared tests were conducted to investigate whether the coefficients ofthese treatment sessions were equal. The results are also not significant, which indicatesthat group identity and information diversity do not seem to affect members’ investment
Our main purpose in the current paper is to investigate the investment behavior of members in a leadermember public goods game. Therefore, we present the regression results for the leader’s investment
decision in Appendix D.

6

11

decisions. However, Transfer_leader and L.Transfer_Member are estimated to besignificantly positive, implying that members’ investment is somewhat conditional onothers’ past behavior. We further analyze members’ investment behaviors individually inthe next subsection.
With respect to the effects of other independent variables, Age, Male, GSS_Fairness,
GSS_Helpfulness, Living_expense, and Experiemnt_experience were not statisticallysignificant. Risk_appetite and GSS_Trust were found to affect investment significantly
and positively, while Economics_knowledge had the opposite effect. The coefficient ofRound is significantly negative, which is consistent with the findings of previous
literature on public goods experiments.
Table 3. Tobit regressions of the members’ investment
VARIABLES

Member
1.182

SameGroup_Bothknow (Session b)(1.494)-1.266SameGroup_Leaderknow (Session c)(1.530)-1.000SameGroup_Memberknow (Session d)(1.527)0.032

DifferentGroup_Bothknow (Session e)(1.486)0.634

DifferentGroup_Leaderknow (Session f)(1.509)1.048

DifferentGroup_Memberknow (Session g)(1.465)-0.903***Round(0.105)0.469***

Investment_Leader(0.036)0.235***

L.Investment_Member（0.044）0.160***

L.Return_Average（0.044）0.486**

Risk_appetite(0.293)12

0.965Male(0.848)1.540*

GSS_Trust(0.878)0.276

GSS_Fairness(0.906)
0.102

GSS_Helpfulness(0.845)-1.115**

Economics_knowledge(0.482)
0.029

Living_expense(0.348)1.490

Experiment_experience(1.159)0.287

Age(0.389)-3.063

Constant(7.893)
Notes: Standard errors clustered by subject are in parentheses. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels of confidence, respectively.

3.3 Categorizing members by their investment behavior
Since the Tobit regression results indicate that the investment amounts of both theleader and the other two members in the team, affect the corresponding member’sinvestment decisions, we use two ratios to categorize the members. One is the ratio of themember’s investment to the leaders’, in the same round (hereinafter, by leader), and theother is the ratio of the member’s investment to the average of the other two members’ inthe previous round (hereinafter, by member). As a result, 126 members were categorized
into the four types listed below:
 Full-Cooperator: We categorized members with the above-mentioned ratio above
1.0, in at least 60% of the rounds, into this type. As a result, 35 (i.e.,28%) and 22
subjects (i.e.,17%) fell into this category by leaders and members, respectively.
These are those subjects, who are more willing to cooperate. They invest more thanthe leader or other members in more than 60% of the rounds. They are more resolute13

in their beliefs about cooperation and are typically altruistic.
 Conditional-Cooperator: We categorized members with the above-mentioned ratio
between 0.6 and 1.0 in at least 60% of the rounds into this type. As a result, 62(i.e.,49%) and 57 subjects (i.e.,45%) fell into this category by leaders and members,
respectively. These subjects always want to be fully aligned with the contributionsof others. They also revise their own investments with reference to others. Their
cooperation is conditional and not entirely selfless. Therefore, this behavior cansimply be described as "conditional cooperation with self-serving bias".
 Free-Rider: We categorized members with the above-mentioned ratio being lower
than 0.6 in at least 60% of the rounds, into this type. As a result, 23 (i.e.,18%) and 40
subjects (i.e.,32%) fell into this category by leader and member, respectively. These
subjects always want to get something for nothing and are not willing to co-operate.
Therefore, they seem purely selfish or lack altruistic motives.
 Others: We categorized members with the above-mentioned ratio being irregular
into this type. In other words, their ratio can neither be categorized as “FullCooperator,” nor “Conditional -Cooperator” nor “Free-rider.” As a result, 6 (i.e.,5%)
and 7 subjects (i.e.,6%) fell into this category by leader and by member, respectively.
These subjects always behave randomly.
The above- mentioned information can be seen in Figures 1 and 2. From the figures,
we can see that by both leader and member, nearly 50% of the subjects are conditional
co-operators, which is consistent with the findings of Fischbacher et al. (2001). The
second most frequent type, by leader was full-cooperator (28%), and by member was freerider (32%).
Figures 3 and 4 show the ratio of the treatment sessions to the baseline session(session a). To see the results more visually, we divided the number of subjects of eachtype in the treatment sessions by those of the corresponding type in the control session(Session a) and presented the ratios in Figures 3 and 4. 7 As shown in the figures, thecomposition of the co-operator types in each session differed from that in the control
session. For example, compared to the baseline session, the number of full-cooperators
7
For example, as we can see in Figure 1, the number of full-cooperator in the baseline session (session a)is 3 and that in session f is 4, so the ratio of the number of full-cooperator in session f to session a is 1.33
(in Figure 3).

14

(categorized by leader) is much higher in the same ID sessions (i.e., sessions b, c, and d).
However, the number of free-riders (categorized by members) is higher in all treatment
sessions than in the baseline session. To investigate how group identity and information
diversity affect member types, we conducted a multinomial logit regression. The results
are presented in the following sub-section.
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Session a

Session b

Full-Cooperator

Session c

Session d

Session e

Conditional-Cooperator

Session f

Free rider

Session g

OthersFigure 1. Types of members in each session (by leader)
10
8
6
4
2
0

Session a

Session b

Full-Cooperator

Session c

Session d

Session e

Conditional-Cooperator

Session f

Free rider

Session g

OthersFigure 2. Types of members in each session (by member)

15

4
3
2
1
0

Session b

Session c

Full-Cooperator

Session d

Session e

Conditional-Cooperator

Session f

Session g

Free rider

OthersFigure 3. The ratio of the numbers of subjects of each type in treatment sessions comparedto those in the baseline session (by leader).
2

1

0

Session b

Session c

Full-Cooperator

Session d

Session e

Conditional-Cooperator

Session f

Session g

Free rider

OthersFigure 4. The ratio of the numbers of subjects of each type in treatment sessions comparedto those in the baseline session (by member).

3.4 Regression analysis of members’ types
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the multinomial logit regression on member
types, categorized by leader and member, respectively. First, we examine the results inTable 4. When both leader and members know they belong to the same WeChat group(i.e., Session b), the probability of being a ‘conditional co-operator’ decreases
16significantly (-0.411), while the probabilities of being a ‘full-cooperator’ (+0.123), ‘freerider’ (+0.181) and ‘others’ (+0.102) are all estimated to be significantly positive. In otherwords, under the condition that every role knows that they belong to the same group,
members are significantly less influenced by the leaders' behavior (conditional cooperator decreases significantly) and tend to act more according to their own
characteristics (the other 3 types increase). In the condition that only the leader knowsthat the members and they belong to the same WeChatgroup, (i.e., Session c), theprobability of being a ‘conditional co-operator’ decreases (-0.167), and the probabilities
of being a ‘free-rider’ (+0.104) and ‘others’ (+0.094) increase significantly. When only
members know that the leader and they come from the same WeChat group (i.e., Sessiond), the probabilities of being a ‘full-cooperator’ (+0.322) and ‘others’ (+0.137) increasesignificantly, while the probabilities of being a 'conditional-cooperator’ (-0.312) and‘free-rider’ (-0.145) decrease significantly. In the conditions when the leader andmembers come from different WeChat groups (i.e., Sessions e, f, and g), the probabilityof being 'others' increase significantly, but the probability of being a free-rider in Sessione (-0.045) and Session f (-0.066) decreases, and the other types are not significant. For
other independent variables, people with a high-risk appetite have a higher probability of
being full-cooperators, and those with positive attitudes towards trust and fairness have alower probability of being free-riders. Interestingly, members with more economic
knowledge are less likely to be full-cooperators.
Table 4. Multinomial Logit regressions on the cooperative type of members (byleader)
VARIABLES
SameGroup_Bothknow(Session b)
SameGroup_Leaderknow(Session c)
SameGroup_Memberknow(Session d)
DifferentGroup_Bothknow(Session e)

Full-Conditional-

Cooperator

Cooperator

0.128***

Free-Rider

Others-0.411***0.181***

0.102***-0.031-0.167***0.104**

0.094***

0.322***-0.312***-0.145***0.137***-0.0580.054-0.045*0.049**

17

DifferentGroup_Leaderknow

0.013

-0.07

-0.066**0.123***-0.038-0.045-0.0450.128***

Economics_Knowlegde-0.039**0.049-0.035**-0.045Experiment_Knowlegde

0.059

0.071**-0.049-0.085***

Male

0.016

-0.003-0.021-0.002Age-0.001

0.038

0.158

-0.053***

Living_expense

0.001-0.042***-0.0010.034***

GSS_Trust

0.003-0.032-0.084***0.122***

GSS_Fairness-0.0210.077-0.083**0.112***

GSS_Helpfulness-0.017*0.024-0.0740.067**

Risk_appetite

0.033**-0.006-0.003-0.024**(Session f)
DifferentGroup_Memberknow(Session g)

Notes: The figures represent marginal effects. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levelsof confidence, respectively.

With respect to the results in Table 5, overall, compared to the baseline session, in
all the treatment sessions the probability of being a ‘full-cooperator’ decreases
significantly, and that of being ‘others’ increase significantly. However, the decrease in
the probability of being a full-cooperator differs in the degree among sessions. In cases
where the leader and members come from the same WeChat groups (i.e., Sessions b, c,and d), the probability of being a 'full-cooperator' decreases more when the members
know this information (i.e., Sessions b and d) than when they do not know (i.e., Sessionc). In contrast, in cases where the leader and members come from different WeChat
groups (i.e., Sessions e, f, and g), the probability of being a 'full-cooperator' declines lesswhen members know this information (i.e., Sessions e and g) than when they do not know
(i.e., Session f).
For other independent variables, men are more inclined to be full-cooperators. People
with a high-risk appetite and those who have participated in similar experiments are also
be more inclined to be full-cooperators. In addition, members with more economic
knowledge are more likely to be a ‘free rider’, while those with positive attitudes towards
trust, fairness, and helpfulness have a lower probability.

18

Table 5. Multinomial Logit regressions on the cooperative type of members (bymember)
VARIABLES

Full-

Conditional-

Cooperator

Cooperator-0.240***Free-Rider

Others-0.0220.129**

0.109**-0.204***0.001

0.080*

0.123***-0.275***

0.027

0.070

0.179***-0.132***

0.027

0.039

0.066

-0.215***0.045-0.046

0.216***-0.136***

0.097**

0.041

0.081*

Economics_Knowlegde

0.025-0.0150.043***-0.053***

Experiment_Knowlegde

0.018

0.052

-0.038-0.032

Male

0.005

-0.082***0.041

0.036*

Age

0.016

0.017

0.011

-0.044***

Living_expense-0.010-0.05-0.0110.026***

GSS_Trust

0.003-0.051*-0.108***0.156***

GSS_Fairness

0.028

0.001

-0.056*

0.028

GSS_Helpfulness-0.0350.028-0.0370.043**

Risk_appetite

0.049***-0.0040.010-0.035***SameGroup_Bothknow(Session b)
SameGroup_Leaderknow(Session c)
SameGroup_Memberknow(Session d)
DifferentGroup_Bothknow(Session e)
DifferentGroup_Leaderknow(Session f)
DifferentGroup_Memberknow(Session g)

Notes: The figures represent marginal effects. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levelsof confidence, respectively.

4. Discussion and conclusion
This study examined the effects of group identity and information diversity on typesof people who co-operate, in a leader-member public goods game experiment. Three main
results were highlighted. First, with respect to members’ investment, based on the leader’s,
as shown in Table 4, we found that when members know that they have the same group
identity as the leader, they are more likely to be “full-cooperators” than when they knowthat the leader’s group identity is different from theirs (0.128 versus -0.058 in sessions b
and e; 0.322 versus - 0.038 in sessions d and g). This suggests that if the team leader has
19the same identity as majority of the team (e.g., nationality and faith), most members will
prefer to behave cooperatively, and the overall benefits of teamwork are likely to be
maximized. Moreover, to have a better collaborative effect, the leader should be a rolemodel upholding high moral standards.
Second, we found that when only members know they have the same identity as theirleader (categorized by leader), members were 2.5 times (0.322 versus 0.128) more likely
to be “full-cooperators” than “free-riders” as compared to when both are aware of theiridentity (see Table 4). In other words, if every role knows that they belong to the samegroup, members are significantly less influenced by the leaders' behavior and tend tobehave according to their own characteristics. However, there were no significant
differences in the case of different identities. This indicates that disclosing information
about being in the same group as the leader only to members, may promote morecooperation.
Third, regarding members’ investment in response to other members’, as shown in
Table 5, we found that when members know they have the same identity as their leader,the probability of being a "full-cooperator" decreases more, while members know they
have the different identity as their leader, the probability of being a "full-cooperator"
decreases less (-0.240 versus -0.132 in sessions b and e; -0.275 versus -0.136 in sessions
d and g). This implies that cooperative behavior between members is closely related to
the group identity of the leader and information diversity.
There are also issues that require further investigation. First, although creating an
artificial identity (id) group setting by the WeChat group makes id-diversity purer andexcludes the influence of other potential identities (e.g., age, gender), the word-chain
game aimed at strengthening the sense of identity among the participants may not besalient enough to matter. Instead, more difficult but high-reward mini-games can be
conducted to strengthen the sense of group identity. Second, providing excessive
information (e.g., the role of leader and member, whether the leader and members belong
to the same group, and their group identities are known to others or not) to the participants
may burden their comprehension; therefore, the information diversity that we tried toinvestigate could be manipulated more purely in future studies.
Acknowledgement
20

Financial support from the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Scienceand Technology through Grants-in-aid for Scientific Research (A) 18H03641 and Grantsin-aid for Scientific Research (C) 19K01541 and 19K01558 are gratefully acknowledged.
All the views expressed in this paper and any errors are the sole responsibility of theauthors.
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AppendicesA. Experimental instruction for leaders in the baseline session (originally written in
Chinese)Start
Welcome to the current experiment. It will be divided into ten rounds. The rewardthat you receive in the experiment is determined by the sum of those you obtain over theten rounds, and we will randomly select two decisions to determine your reward. Finally,
a post-experimental questionnaire will be distributed to you for completion and will becollected individually. Payment will be made individually upon the completion of thequestionnaire. Your experimental ID number, in this experiment, is the one you were
provided by the experimenter when you signed in, and it should match the number on
your seat. Please place your cell phone in your bag before the experiment begins andrefrain from using it until the end. Use of cell phones is prohibited during the experiment.
The experiment
The procedure of the experiment is described below:
In the experiment, you make decisions about the money you have. You will receive
30 RMB.
There will be two roles (leader or member) in this round, and your role is of theleader during the ten rounds. You will be randomly paired with three member participantsin another classroom, playing role B. There will be only 1 leader(you), i.e., after pairing,
you and the other 3 experiment participants will form a 4-person team consisting of 1
leader and 3 members. The roles (leader or member) and composition of the team will23

not change during the 10 rounds of the experiment. The pairing of leaders and members
will be randomized by the experiment implementer.
Let us now consider the specific experimental procedure.
The person in the role of the leader will first invest an arbitrary integer amount (which
can also be zero) from their 30 RMB to the team project. After knowing the amountinvested by the leader, the other 3 participants in the member role of the team will
simultaneously decide to invest an arbitrary integer amount (which can also be zero) fromtheir 30 RMB to the team project.
Your payoff (as leader) = 30 RMB - the amount you invest in the team project+ 0.5 ×
team project (invested by all 4 people).
〈Example〉 Suppose you decide to invest 10 RMB to the team project, and the 3 people
in the role of members decided to invest 10RMB, 10RMB, and 20RMB, respectively (i.e.,
the total amount invested by all 4 people is 50 yuan). After the investment, you will have
45RMB (= 30-10 + 0.5 × 50), so the payoff for you for that round of the experiment willbe 45 RMB.
In this round, you will use two types of sheets: one is the "Investment Recording
Sheet,” and the other is the " Sheet for the leader."Before using both sheets, please fill in your experimental ID number in the blanks
where "Your experimental ID number" is listed in both sheets.
First, please look at the "Investment Recording Sheet." It will be used to record yourinvestment, and at each round, the experimenter will take away the "Investment
Recording Sheet" after you fill it in and inform the three members of your investment.
Next, please look at the " Sheet for the leader. " It is used to record the amount ofinvestment. For each round of the experiment, the experimenter will retrieve the"Investment Recording Sheet" and calculate the total amount invested by all 4 people ofyour team and publish it to your team.
In each round of the experiment, when you decide on your investment amount, please
fill in this amount in the "Your Investment Amount A" column in the "Leader Recording
Sheet" and " Sheet for leader." The experimenter will collect the "Investment Recording
Sheet". Then, you will be asked to predict the most likely average investment of the otherthree members of your team (excluding you) and fill in the column "Your predictedinvestment amount (average) of the other members X" in the " Sheet for leader." Finally,24

after the experimenter enters the total amount invested by your team in the "Total amountinvested by all team members (including you and the leader) B" column of the " Sheet forleader,” please calculate the final amount of money and fill it in the "Final amount ofmoney you have" column of the " Sheet for leader. " The " Sheet for leader " will becollected by the experiment conductor at the end of Round 10.
If you have any questions about the above experimental instructions, you can raise
your hand now and the experimenter will answer your questions.
The experiment will begin with the confirmation that all participants have understoodthe experimental description.
Please remember that you cannot speak to other participants during the experiment.
If communication such as talking occurs, the experiment will be aborted at that point. If
you have any questions, please raise your hand.
B. Experimental instruction for members in the baseline session (originally written
in Chinese)
Start
Welcome to the current experiment. It will be divided into ten rounds. The rewardthat you will receive in the experiment is determined by the sum of those you obtain over
the ten rounds, and we will randomly select two decisions to determine your reward.
Finally, a post-experimental questionnaire will be distributed to you for completion andwill be collected individually. Payment will be made individually upon the completion of
the questionnaire. Your experimental ID number in this experiment is the one you were
provided by the experimenter when you signed in, and it should match the number on
your seat. Please place your cell phone in your bag before the experiment begins andrefrain from using it until the end. Use of cell phones is prohibited during the experiment.
The experiment
The procedure of the experiment is described below:
In the experiment, you make decisions about the money you have. You will receive
30 RMB.
There will be two roles (leader or member) in this round, and your role is of a member
during the ten rounds. You will be randomly paired with one leader (in another classroom)and two members. There will be only 1 leader, i.e., after pairing you, and the other 3
25

experimental participants will form a 4-person team consisting of 1 leader and 3 members.
The roles (leader or member) and composition of the team will not change during the 10
rounds of the experiment. The pairing of leaders and members will be randomized by theexperiment implementer.
Let us now consider the specific experimental procedure.
The person in the role of the leader will first invest an arbitrary integer amount (which
can also be zero) from their 30 RMB, to the team project. After knowing the amountinvested by the leader, the other 3 people in the role of team members will simultaneously
decide to invest an arbitrary integer amount (which can also be zero) from their 30 RMB
to the team project.
Your payoff (as a member) = 30 RMB - the amount you invested in the team project+ 0.5
× team project (invested by all 4 people).
〈Example〉 Suppose the person in the role of leader decides to invest 10 RMB to theteam project, you(member) decided to invest 10RMB, other 2 members decided to invest
10RMB and 20RMB, respectively (i.e., the total amount invested by all 4 people is 50
yuan), After the investment, you will have 45RMB (= 30-10 + 0.5 × 50), so the payoff
for you for that round of the experiment will be 45 RMB.
In this round, you will use two types of sheets: one is the "Investment Recording
Sheet,” and the other is the " Sheet for member."
Before using both the sheets, please fill in your experimental ID number in the blanks
where "Your experimental ID number" is listed within both sheets.
First, please look at the " Investment Recording Sheet." It is for recording the amountof your investment. For each round of the experiment, the experimenter will retrieve the"Investment Recording Sheet" and calculate the total amount invested by all 4 participantsof your team and publish it to your team.
In each round of the experiment, the experimenter will fill in the "Leader'sInvestment Amount Y" column of the " Sheet for member " with the investment amountof the leader of their team before the members decide how much to invest, and then you
make your decision. When you have decided, please fill in this amount in the "YourInvestment Amount A" column of the ‘Sheet for member’ and the "Investment Recording
Sheet." The experimenter will collect the "Investment Recording Sheet." Then, you will
be asked to predict the most likely average investment of the other two members of your26

team (excluding you and the leader) and fill in the column "Your predicted investment
amount (average) of the other members X" in the " Sheet for member." Finally, after theexperimenter enters the total amount invested by your team in the "Total amount invested
by all team members (including you and the leader) B" column of the " Sheet for member,”please calculate your final amount of money and fill it in the "Final amount of money you
have" column of the " Sheet for member." The " Sheet for member " will be collected by
the experiment conductor at the end of Round 10.
If you have any questions about the above experimental instructions, you can raise
your hand now and the experimenter will answer your questions.
The experiment will begin with the confirmation that all participants have understoodthe experimental description.
Please remember that you cannot speak to other participants during the experiment.
If communication such as talking occurs, the experiment will be aborted at that point. If
you have any questions, please raise your hand.
C. Post-experimental questionnaire (originally written in Chinese)
Q1. Your year of birth. Please fill in a specific year in the parentheses.
() YearQ2. Your gender. Please check the appropriate answer.
1. Male2. FemaleQ3. What is your major? Please fill in the specific major in the parentheses.
()

Q4. Where is your hometown? Please fill in a specific province in the parentheses.
()

Q5. Where was high school attended? Please fill in a specific province in the parentheses.
(

)

27

Q6. Your monthly living expenses. Please check the corresponding answer.
1. Less than 500 RMB per month
2. Between 500 RMB and 999 RMB per month
3. Between 1000 RMB and 1499 RMB per month
4. Between 1500 RMB and 1999 RMB per month
5. Between 2000 RMB and 2499 RMB per month
6. Between 2500 RMB and 2999 RMB per month
7. More than 3000 RMB per monthQ7. Frequency of studying economics and/or reading books on economics. Please referto the corresponding answers.
1. Never2. Rarely
3. Occasionally
4. Often
5. Always
Q8. Generally speaking, do you think most people can be trusted or that you need to bevery careful in dealing with people? Please check the appropriate answer.
1. Most people can be trusted
2. You need be very careful in dealing with people
Q9. Generally speaking, do you think most people would try to take advantage of you ifthey got a chance or would they try to be fair? Please check the appropriate answer.
1. Most people would try to be fair
2. Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance
Q10. Generally speaking, do you think people try to be helpful most of the time or are
they mostly just looking out for themselves? Please check the appropriate answer.
1. Most of the time people try to be helpful
2. People are mostly just looking out for themselves

28

Q11. Have you ever participated in any economic experiment before?
1. Yes2. No
Q12. Suppose you bought a lottery ticket a week ago, and now you are told that you have
won and have two options to receive the prize: Option A is to receive the lottery prize
amount directly, and Option B is to flip a coin and receive 10000 RMB if the coin is heads
or 0 RMB if it is tails. What option will you choose based on your lottery prize amountlisted below.
A. Lottery Prize

B. Coin Flip

Your Choice of A or B

Amount2000 RMB

10000 RMB or 0

3000 RMB

10000 RMB or 0

4000 RMB

10000 RMB or 0

5000 RMS

10000 RMB or 0

6000 RMB

10000 RMB or 0

7000 RMB

10000 RMB or 0

8000 RMB

10000 RMB or 0

D. Tobit regressions for the leader’s investment
VARIABLES

LeaderSameGroup_Bothknow (Session b)-2.244(2.666)-3.862SameGroup_Leaderknow (Session c)(2.895)-4.837*SameGroup_Memberknow (Session d)(2.591)-1.720DifferentGroup_Bothknow (Session e)(2.423)-5.392**DifferentGroup_Leaderknow (Session f)(2.509)-1.809DifferentGroup_Memberknow (Session g)(2.777)29

-0.0224

Round(0.187)0.0594

L.Investment_Leader(0.0859)
0.537***

L.Investment_Member(0.108)-1.008**

Risk_appetite(0.606)-0.984*Male(2.050)-0.301

GSS_Trust(1.457)-0.813

GSS_Fairness(1.511)-0.134

GSS_Helpfulness(1.952)-0.439Economic_knowledge(0.840)1.290

Living_expense(0.769)10.53*

Experiment_knowledge(5.647)0.760

Age(1.072)-14.33

Constant(22.91)
Notes: Standard errors clustered by subject are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels of confidence, respectively. The independent variables L.Transfer_Leader and L.Transfer_Member
are the investment of the paired leader and the average investment of the other two paired members in the previous
round, respectively.

30