Isabelle VERRET ROUSSEL
Research Fellow

COLLECTIVE EMPLOYEEREPRESENTATION SYSTEMSIN JAPAN AND FRANCE

August 9th 2006

1

First Part: The characteristics of employee representation systems in Japan andFrance .............................................................................................................................. 7
I. The traditional form of employee representation systems: labor unions........................ 7
A. The organizations of labor unions ...................................................................................................7
B. The features and functions of labor unions.................................................................................... 11
C. The structure of labor unions.........................................................................................................18
Conclusions on the characteristics of labor unions in each country:..................................................21

II. The evolution of employee representation systems........................................................ 22
A. The development of non-union representation systems in Japan ..................................................22
B. The recognition of new actors for negotiations in France .............................................................25

III. The role of the government in the relations between labor and management
representatives ....................................................................................................................... 27
A. The indirect and guiding intervention of the Japanese government ..............................................27
B. The direct and significant involvement of the French government ...............................................31

Second Part: The role of employee representatives in the regulation of the work place........................................................................................................................................ 35
I. Unilateral regulations and joint regulations.................................................................... 36
A. Work rules as an important means of regulating the workplace in Japan......................................36
B. Collective bargaining as the main means of regulating the workplace in France..........................40

II. Collective bargaining and consultation .......................................................................... 43
A. The distinction between collective bargaining and consultation ...................................................43
B. A common trend of decentralization of collective bargaining .......................................................48

IV. The nature of the relations between labor and management: industrial conflicts .... 52
A. Collaborative relations between labor and management in Japan.................................................54
B. Confrontational relations between labor and management in France............................................56
Discussions on the contribution of a comparative approach ..............................................................61

ANNEX 1: Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 63
ANNEX 2: Interviews ........................................................................................................... 67

2

Collective employee representation systems in France and Japan1
Introduction:
Industrial societies necessary create industrial relations defined as the complex
interrelations between labor, management and the government. These actors“interact with each other, negotiate, and use economic and political power or
influence in the process of determining the rules of the work places that constitutethe output of the industrial relations system » (DUNLOP, 1958, p. 13).
In both countries, federated employer’s associations were formed at national level
after the war. In Japan, Keidanren (the Japan Federation of Economic
Organizations) was created in 1946 and Nikkeiren (the Japan Federation of
Employers’ associations) in 1948. These organizations merged in May 2002 andbecame Nippon Keidanren. The main role of Nippon Keidanren consists in guiding
enterprise members in their decisions on the policies concerning industrial relations.
In France, the employers founded a National Council of French Employers (Conseil

National du Patronat Français or CNPF) in 1946. In 1998, the CNPF wastransformed into the French Business Confederation (Mouvement des Entreprises

de France or MEDEF). The small and middle size companies founded their own
organization in 1944: the General Confederation of Small and Middle Sized
Companies (Confédération Générale des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises or

CGPME). Two other employers’ organizations at national level represent employersof particular sectors: agriculture (FNSEA) and artisans (UPA).
This report will focus on the actors representing labor and will study the collective
employeerepresentation

systemsof

eachcountry.

Collective

employeerepresentation systems may refer to all types of informal or formal organizations
that allow employees to express their opinions and defend their interests throughrepresentatives. This definition does not include direct and individual ways of
expressions of workers. These collective employee representation systems may takewide forms. The most common ones are labor unions, joint consultation committees
or elected representatives like the works councils. They may vary considerably interms or organizations, level of operations, composition and powers.

The author would like to thank JILPT for the kind acceptance as an invited guest
researcher at the Institute and for its substantial support for this report, as well as all
the persons interviewed that helped her draw up this report.
1

3

In Japan, as well as France, labor unions became the privileged way of expressing
the opinions of employees in face of employers or public authorities. In France, theright to organize was recognized in 1884 by the “Waldeck Rousseau” Law. In Japan,
the development and expansion of labor union movement occurred after the WorldWar II. The new constitution of November 1996 guaranteed the right of workers toorganize, to bargain and to act collectively, under article 28. The Labor Relations
Adjustment Law of 1947 reinforced this constitutional right by establishing rules
for adjusting labor disputes. The Trade Union Law of 1949 also immunized union
members from civil and criminal liabilities. These changes enabled the spread of thelabor union movement in Japan and France.
However, since the 1970’s, this type of employee representation system is facing thesame challenge: a continuous decline of the union density as shown by the chart. In
Japan, the trade unionization rate declined from 46.2% in 1950 to 35.4% in 1970.
Since then, it has been progressively decreasing and it dropped by 18.7% in 20052.
In France, a study of the Ministry of Labor shows the decline of trade unionization
rate. In 1950, 26.9% persons were union members and this rate diminished to 16.6%
in 1960. Between 1970 and 1975, the unionization rate increased slightly to 18.6 %.
After the oil crisis in 1973 followed by an economic recession in 1975, union density
has continuously declined to reach 8.2% in 2003.

2 Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, “Basic survey on Labor unions” in 2005.

4

JapanFranceUnionization rate from 1950 to 2005

50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Year

Sources: Japanese Ministry of Labor, Health and Welfare and French Ministry of Labor.

External as well as internal factors caused the decline of union density in bothcountries. The industrial societies underwent long-term structural changes with theshift from secondary to tertiary industry. The employment structure was also
considerably transformed with the development of other types of work likepart-time or temporary work and the expansion of female employees. Labor unions
have been encountering problems in organizing workers of the tertiary sector andnew types of workers. Moreover, the ideological divisions of labor unions led tomany conflicts and schisms which fostered the decline of trade unionization rate.
Scholars in Japan and France also showed that labor unions have made weakattempts to unionize in companies. National characteristics can also give additional
explanations to the decline of labor union movement. As in both countries the
traditional employee representation systems of labor unions are facing the samechallenge with the decline of trade unionization rate, it is interesting to study theway each industrial relations systems tried to solve this issue.
The report starts with explaining the main features of employee representation
systems. We shall analyze the way the different systems of employees’
representation evolved due to the decline of unionization rate in both countries. The
report will also study the role of the State in labor-management relations (Part I).
In the second part, the report deals with interactions between employee
representatives and management and government agencies in the regulation of thework place. We shall precise the role employee representatives play in the setting5

up of the rules for the work place. The report will also focus on the nature of
relations between labor and management through consultation and collective
bargaining, as well as industrial disputes. (Part II).

6

First Part: The characteristics of employee representation systems inJapan and France

I. The traditional form of employee representation systems: labor unions
In both countries, the traditional way to express the workers’ opinions is labor
unions. As Professors ARAKI and OUICHI pointed out 3 , in countries wherecollective bargaining is mainly decentralized, like Japan, the main channel torepresent the voices of workers is labor unions (A). By contrast, in countries where
the predominant levels of collective bargaining are the industry or regional levels,
there is a double form of collective employee representation systems, like in France.
Indeed, elected representatives and labor unions coexist. However, the supremacy oflabor unions is recognized (B).

A. The organizations of labor unions
One main feature of Japanese labor union movement is that labor unions developed
predominantly in enterprises and this is called enterprise unionism. Contrary toJapan, labor unions in France were originally craft unions consisting of blue-collar
workers of the same profession. However, progressively the main form of labor
unions became industry unions consisting of workers of the same sector in a certain
geographical area (LANDIER, LABBÉ, 2004, p.71).

A.1. The predominance of enterprise-unions in Japan
In Japan, in 2005, the number of union members is around 10 millions (10.138
millions) and the trade unionization rate accounts for 18.7% in 2005. Most unions
are organized not by occupation or industry but by enterprise or establishment. In
2004, around 86.2% of labor unions are organized in enterprises.

What can explain this characteristic? Authors have presented various explanations,
3 OUCHI Shinya and ARAKI Takashi, “Introduction”, in Decentralizing Industrial Relations and the role of Labor Unions andEmployee Representatives, JILPT REPORT, n.3, 2006, p.33

7

but they all more or less agree on the opinion that the Japanese enterprise unions
developed from the seniority base system. This system refers to the practice of longterm employment until the mandatory retirement age (so-called lifetime
employment system), in-house training for workers and reward systems based onseniority concerning wages, promotions and other benefits such as retirement pay
systems and welfare facilities (SHIRAI, 2000, p.31). There are other historical andcultural reasons. There was no craft union tradition, no custom of regulating
working practices beyond the framework of a single company, contrary to France. In
addition, in the post-war years, the state had abolished unions so after the war noorganizations could serve as “nuclei” around which workers could huddle up. Even if
National Centers and industrial unions were formed, they were only loose
federations, which were unable to exercise effective leadership for their members
unions. Furthermore, after the war managers did not want to negotiate with anyone

from outside the company and sought by several means to ensure the unions wererestricted to individual companies (NIMURA, 1994).
However, enterprise unions join in industrial federations affiliated to National Centers.
After the enactment of the Trade Union Law in 1949, enterprise unions coordinatedtheir activities at national level. Due to ideological discords, the labor movement split
up and created three National Centers: Sodemei (the Japanese Federation of Trade
Unions) in 1951, Shin-Sanbetsu (the National Federation of Industrial Organization) in
1952 and Churistsu Roren (the Federation of Independent Unions of Japan) in 1956.
This situation prevailed until the late 1980’s. After the first oil shock in 1974-1975, theJapanese economy fell into a deep recession and the union participation rate started to
decline. Consequently, some enterprise-union leaders took the situation very seriously
and launched the union identity movement (FUJIMURA, 1998).

In 1987, the four National Centers of the private sector merged and founded Rengo(the Japan Trade Union Confederation). Unions of the public sector and government
employees also joined Rengo in 1989. However, certain groups of unions refused tobe affiliated to Rengo due to different ideological positions. The unions in favor ofcommunist ideas established Zenroren (the National Confederation of Trade unions).
In addition, a left wing faction close to socialism founded Zenrokyo (the National
Union Trade Council). Although, there are three National Centers, it can be deemed
there was a unification of the labor union movement, as Rengo became the major
National Center numerically. Indeed, in 2005, 65.8% of the organized workers are8union members of Rengo, whereas 9.4% are members of Zenroren and 1.6% ofZenrokyo.

% of N um ber of uni ons m em bers per N a ti ona l Centres

i n J a pa n

23%
2%
Rengo 6.67 M
Zenroren 0.95 M
Zenrokyo 0.16 M
Others 2.3 M
9%66%

Source: Japanese Ministry of Labor, Health and Welfare

A.2. The predominance of industry unions in France
The origins of labor unions can be traced back to the guilds or crafts unions in the
Middle Age during the 12th century. The “Le Chapelier” Act, passed in 1791 banned
all associations. However, following the industrial revolution of the 19th century,
which generated an increased number of blue-collar workers, craft unions
progressively developed to defend the interests of these workers. In 1864, Napoleon
the Third abolished criminal sanctions linked with strikes. As a result, the labor
union movement expanded rapidly. Finally, the so-called “Waldeck Rousseau” Act,
enacted on March the 21st 1884 granted individuals the right to organize. This law
considered labor unions as associations protecting common interests of aprofessional group, such as farmers, small businesses, artisans, or professional
self-employed. At the end of the 19th century, craft unions evolved to industry unions
consisting of workers of the same sector in a certain geographical area in order toadapt to the changes of the industrial structure.
In parallel, labor unions organized at national level. In 1895, the first National
Center of labor unions, named the General Confederation of Labor (Confédération

Générale du Travail : CGT) was created. The internal divisions of the CGT
inevitably led to schisms after the war, like in Japan. The anarchists and socialists
defending the social revolution withdrew from the organization and founded the9National Confederation of Labor in 1946, linked with the communist party. The
reformists,

formedtheGeneralConfederationofLabor-Workers’

Power(Confédération Générale du Travail-Force Ouvrière or CGT-FO) in 1947, notaffiliated to a political party. In parallel, labor unions opposed to the idea of classstruggle and linked to Christianity created another National Center in 1919: theFrench Confederation for Christian Workers (Confédération Française desTravailleurs Chrétiens or CFTC). The CFTC also underwent a schism in 1964 andchanged its name to The French Democratic Confederation of Labor (Confederation

Française Démocratique du travail or CFDT) in order to show its independence with
the Christianity. The minority members who refused this change kept the initialname of CFTC. In addition to ideological divisions, professional divisions havecharacterized the French labor union movement, unlike Japan, but these divisions
tend to tone down. In October the 15th 1944, engineers and executives founded theFrench Confederation for Executives (Confédération Générale des Cadres: CGC). In
1981 the CGC became the French Confederation of Managerial Staff and Executives(Confédération Française de l’Encadrement-Confédération Générale des Cadres) towiden its membership coverage to technicians and upper ranking blue-collar
workers.
There was no movement of unification at national level in the 1980’s, like in Japan.
On the contrary, the existing divisions of labor unions increased. Another National
Center called the National Federation of Autonomous Unions (UNSA) was createdin February 1993. Furthermore, within the GCT and the CFDT, some federations oflabor unions influenced by anarchist’s ideas broke up their affiliation with the
National Centers and created new organizations called SUD federations (meaning
Solidarity, Unity and Democracy). These organizations federated at national level in
1998. Thus, one of the main features of the French labor unions is the pluralism of
National Centers of labor unions due to ideological as well as professional divisions(VERDIER, 1987, p.56).

10

Cu rre n t u n io n me mbe rs ( x 1 0 0 0 )o f N atio n al Ce n tre s
360

60
700

140

132
300
810

CGT
CFDT
FO
CFTC
CFE-CGC
UNSA
Sud

Source: websites of each National Center.

The fragmentation of labor unions is also linked with one of the French systempeculiarities, namely “presumed representativeness” (representativité presumée) oflabor unions. Public authorities granted an automatic right to represent workers atnational level to five labor unions National Centers: CGT, CGT-FO, CFTC,
CFE-CGC and CFDT through the enactment of an administrative rule in 1966. Any
union (whether industry or cross-industry local unions) affiliated to one of the five
National Center does not have to prove its quality to represent all the workers. The
labor unions not belonging to one of the five National Centers have to prove they
comply with different legal and judicial requirements to be able to represent
workers.

B. The features and functions of labor unions
We will analyze the following issues: Where are labor unions located? What are thecharacteristics of enterprise-based unions? Who are the union members? In
addition, what roles play labor unions?

B.1. The features and functions of enterprise-unions in Japan
In Japan, workplaces are bipolarized between large unionized companies and small
and medium sized non-unionized companies. Indeed, in 2005 the unionization rate
amounts to 15% in establishments from 100 up to 999 workers and to 1.2% for thosewith less than 99 workers. By contrast, 47.7% of the workers are unionized incompanies with more than 1000 workers. In addition, trade union members areconcentrated in big enterprises with more than 1000 workers as shown by the table.

11% o f Un io n me mbe r s pe r size o f e stablish me n t 2 0 0 5 in JAP AN
1%
3%

14%

57%

9%
> 1000999> >300
299> >100
Between 30 and 99
Less than 30 workers
Others16%

Source: Ministry of Labor, Heath and Welfare (LHW)

Unions also cover more densely manufacturing industry and the public sector
Indeed, a survey of the Ministry of LHW reveals that in 2005 more than 50% of theworkers in the public sector are union members and 25.7% in the manufacturing.
The lowest trade unionization rates occur in the tertiary sector like retail with 10%,services with 6% and real estate or restaurants with less than 4%. Indeed, tertiary
sector is characterized by small and medium-sized enterprises, except in certain
sectorslikethetransport

sector

(29.4%),

telecommunication(22.3%),

electricity-gas-water and heating supply (58.6%), finance and insurance (48.6%).
Consequently the union density is higher in these sectors.
Secondly, the union shop system, whereby all the workers have to belong to a labor
union in the company or establishment is predominant. In 2003, 63.4% of labor
unions surveyed answered there are a union shop agreement in their company4.
This does not mean that there is always a unique labor union in the company.
Multiple unions may exist in a single company, each with the right to bargain andact collectively. Generally, workers opposed to the strategy of the major labor unions
will form another union, but this is not frequent. Indeed, the same study reveals
that 89.2% of the labor unions surveyed answered there are only one labor union in
their company.
Thirdly, due to the existence of enterprise-unions, the workers acquire membershipof a union by working in a certain enterprise or establishment. Therefore, a worker
will lose the eligibility when he/she leaves the enterprise or establishment due toretirement, transfer to another company or dismissal. Furthermore, labor unions
4 Study of the Ministry of LHW

12

are representing the workers of a single company regardless of their occupational
status up to lower-management level. The presence of white-collar andlower-ranking managers contributes to the cooperative stance adopted by Japaneseenterprise unions towards management. Then, although there are no legal obstacles
to prevent enterprise unions from organizing part time or temporary workers,
enterprise unions have confined the eligibility for union membership to regular
workers employed for an unlimited term. The latter have common interests to theimprovement of the company’s productivity in order to improve their working
conditions. The interests of regular workers can enter into conflict with the ones of
non-regular workers. Although recently unions have organized more non-regular
workers than previously, the estimated unionization rate of part time workers isstill low and amounts to 3.9 % in 20055. As a result, union officials are electedamong the regular workers of the enterprise. They temporarily leave their ordinarytasks, but keep their status as employees during their tenure. The full-time officials
are paid out of unions dues.
Finally, the role of enterprise unions is to defend the interests of union members
through collective bargaining and the conclusion of collective agreements that only
cover their members. Unions are also very much concerned about thecompetitiveness of their firm. Thus, they actively cooperated with managers in therationalization of the shop-floor production (SUZUKI Akira, 2004) through jointlabor-management consultation systems (see p.42). The goal of these councils is toimprove the workers’ productivity to strengthen the company’s competitiveness. The
specificity of Japanese labor union, mainly developed at enterprise-level explainsdifficulty of enterprise unions to join within industrial federations. Indeed,
enterprises are in competition with each other within the same sector and haveconflicting interests. Ideological divisions within the industrial federations and the
National Centers, also contributed to the weak development of high-level labor
unions organizations.
B.2. The main features and functions of labor unions in France

The main features of labor unions
We shall analyze the localization of labor unions. In 2003, 8.2% of the workers areunionized.

The

unionizationrateincreases

with

the

headcountoftheestablishments, as shown by the graphic.
5 A study of the Ministry of LHW.

13

10

Un io n izatio n r at e in 2 0 0 3
pe r size o f e stablish me n ts in t h e pr ivate se c to r

8

> 500
100-499
50-99
<50

%

6
4
2
0
> 500

100-499

50-99

<50

Source: the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies

Like in Japan, workers are more unionized in the public sector and in the
manufacturing industry than in the tertiary industry. In 2003 around 15% of
employees in the public sector joined a labor union. In the private sector, theunionization rate is the highest in manufacturing industry with 7.5% of union
members out of the total of employees, whereas it falls to 2.5% in commerce andconstruction6. Moreover, non-regular workers are less organized than the otherworkers. Only 2.5% of workers under a limited contract or in interim are unionizedand 6% of part time workers are union members in 2003. However, unlike Japan,
unionized companies usually have plural unions. Indeed. In 19987, 37% of unionizedcompanies have plural union delegates affiliated to different National Centers.
As for the union members, as labor unions were created outside enterprises and took
mainly the form of industry unions, the eligibility to a labor union is not linked with theenterprise. It depends on the sector the worker is working for and his/ her location in ageographical area. Consequently, unemployed persons and retired persons can joinlabor unions (article L.411-7 of the Labor Code). Then, unlike Japan, the law forbids

union shop agreements or closed shop agreements, whereby employers, have to hire
only workers members of a labor union (article L.412-2). Consequently, the numberof union members in enterprises has never been very high. Union members areusually militant unions, only consisting of active members.

6 - French Ministry of Labor, DARES, Premières Informations et Premières Synthèses, “Mythes et réalités de la syndicalisation en
France “ (Myths and reality of unionization in France), Octobre 2004.
7 Survey of the French Ministry of Labor.

14

The functions of labor unions
The main role of labor unions is to defend the interests not only of the union
members, but also of all the workers through the conclusion of collective agreements
at different levels. At national level, the five “presumed representative” (see p.10)
labor unions National Centers can negotiate and conclude collective agreementswith the National Centers of employers’ associations. In 2005, they signed 44
cross-sector national collective agreements or amendments of agreements. These
collective agreements covered various and major themes like outplacement for
dismissed employees (April 2005), teleworking (July 2005), unemployment
insurance (December 2005), and employment of elder workers (March 2006) for
instance8. At industry level, any industrial federation affiliated to the five National
Centers is entitled to represent automatically workers and to sign sector-widecollective agreements. In 2005, 1144 collective agreements were signed at industry
level9. Many agreements are also signed at enterprise-level (see p.40).
Secondly, labor unions are in charge of administrative functions. Indeed, the five
National Centers, together with employer’s organizations are in charge of runningjointly Welfare institutions, named joint-administration (paritarisme). It consists ingiving equal seats to representatives of workers and employers. This system was
first introduced in 1946 and in 1967 for the Social Security System. Thus,
employees’ and employers’ representatives have responsibilities close to the ones of“civilservants”

insocialmatters(ROSANVALLON

1988).

Furthermore,

representatives of labor and management play a role in the adjustment of industrial
disputes between labor and management. They are members of the 27110 Industrial
Tribunals (Conseil des Prud’hommes) elected every five years by the workers andemployers of the private sector. These elections are very important for the National
Centers to show their influence.

8 Ministry of Labor, “the Annual reports on collective bargaining in 2005”, released in June 2006
9 Idem.
10 Ministry of Justice.

15

E x pres s ed v otes a t the el ecti ons i n 2002 f or the m embersof Indus tri a l Tri buna l s i n F R A N CE
CF E -CGC
7%
CF TC
10%

U N SA
5%

Sud
2%

FO
19%

CGT
32%

CF D T
25%

Source: Ministry of Labor

Finally, the government consults labor unions representatives through many
committees and councils (See p.30).

The privileged role of labor unions at enterprise level
Labor unions were not originally set up as an employee representation system
within enterprises. The government created another channel of employee
representation system with elected workers’ representatives.
First, the law of April 1946 provided the elections of staff representatives incompany or plant with more than 10 workers, every two years (articles L.421-1 toL.424-5 of the Labor Code). The idea of workshop representatives emerged as a way
to solve disputes between workers and employers11. Their number varies from one
company to another, depending on the workforce employed. In spite of this legal
duty, in 199912 only 27.9% of enterprises or establishments between 11 and 49
workers elected staff representatives. However, their presence increases with thesize of enterprises. In 1999, 79.8% of companies or plants with more than 50
workers established staff representatives. The role of these staff representatives is
to express complaints related to the non-compliance of law in the work place to theemployer. They are also entitled to communicate workers’ request and demands on
any subject to the employer (see p.44).
11 To put an end to an everlasting strike in the mining sector, Minister of labor Waldeck Rousseau imposed the elections of staff
delegates by workers within the companies in 1899 (ROSANVALLON, 1988, p.223).
12 French Ministry of Labor, DARES, Premières Informations et Premières Synthèses,-“Les institutions représentatives dupersonnel” (Collective worker representative bodies), n.48.1, Novembre 2001.

16

Secondly, the lawmaker devised works councils as a tool allowing mutual
understanding and cooperation between labor and management representatives. An
ordinance of February 1945 imposed the settlement of works councils in companies
and establishments with more than 49 workers. Unlike in Germany, the Works
Council is not a co-management institution (PÉLISSIER alii, 2004, p. 837). Indeed
any employer must inform and consult the works council but has no obligation tofollow its decisions. According to a study of the Ministry of Labor in 1999, 88.1% of
establishments with more than 49 workers established works councils (see p.45).
Then, in 1945, the lawmaker also devised the Health, Safety and Working
Conditions Council. It must be set in all companies or plants with more than 49
workers (articles L.236-1 to L.236-10 of the Labor Code). It consists of arepresentative of the management, usually the head of the enterprise or theestablishment, and a delegation of workers representatives (elected by a college ofworks council members and staff representatives) appoint the members of thiscouncil for a two-year term of office. Their number depends on the workforce
employed in the company or the plant (article R.236-1). In 199913, 81.1% of company
or establishment with 50 workers and more established this council. The role of thiscouncil is to protect health and safety of employees by controlling assessing thepotential risks for the health and safety of employees and by improving working
conditions.
After the aftermaths of demonstrations and riots in 1968, the Law of December the
27th 1968 guaranteed the right of workers to organize within companies.
In any company or establishment, workers unions can create a union branch(section syndicale, article L.412-4). Unlike Japan, a union branch is not anenterprise union. It consists of union members working in the same company or
establishment, affiliated to an industry union. Then, the industry unions canappoint a union delegate (délégué syndical) in companies with 50 workers and more(articles L.412-11 and L.412-16 of the Labor Code). Union delegates represent theindustry-union. They are also entitled with the power to represent workers in thenegotiations with the employer of the company or establishment and to conclude
agreements. In 2002, 55.2% of wage earners answered there is at least one labor
union in their company or administration14. Even if there is no legal requirement toinstitute union delegates in companies with less than 50 workers, 19% of wage
13 See note 11.
14 Enquiries of the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Survey,.

17

earners asserted there is a trade union in these companies15.
As a result, the feature of French employee representation in enterprises is amulti-layered system. However, labor unions were given a privileged role. Indeed,
they have a monopoly to propose candidates in the first round of elections for
employee representatives and they can become employee representatives (see p.45).

C. The structure of labor unions
Since

the

organizational

structureofJapaneselaborunions

is

based

on

enterprise-unions, the structure of labor unions is highly decentralized. On the contrary
in France, as the labor unions mainly organized above the enterprise level, thestructure is centralized.

C.1. The decentralized structure of labor unions in JapanEnterprise unions affiliated to higher organizations are not subject to control. They
enjoy full decision-making authority on issues such as their constitution, theappointment and dismissal of their members and unions officials. Enterprise unions
also exert autonomy on the amount and method of collecting dues, as well as on theuse of their fund. The National Centers of labor unions do not define the percentage
each enterprise union has to perceive per union member. Most companies with labor
unions accepted the check-off system, whereby an arrangement between an
employer and a union allow the employer to deduct union dues from wages and totransfer them automatically to the union. In 2001, such system exists in about 94%
of the surveyed companies16. Company-based unions affiliated to federations at
industry-level, fix the amount of union dues transferred to the industrial
federations within the federations. Therefore, this amount varies according toindustry-level federations. Then each industrial federation affiliated to National
Center gives a part of its budget to the central national organization. This part is
fixed within the National Center and depends on the industrial federations(Interviews with Rengo and Zenroren in May 2006).
Furthermore, collective bargaining predominantly takes the form of internal
negotiations between an enterprise-based union and the manager representativesof this enterprise union. However, enterprise-unions coordinated their actions at
industry-level through their federations on wage demands.
15 Idem.
16 A study of the Ministry of Labor

18

In 1955, certain industry-level federations called for inter-industry union
coordination on wage bargaining through a joint struggle, known as the “Shunto”

system” or “the spring wage offensive”. Each spring, National Centers andindustrial federations set the goal for wages increases and coordinate the timeschedule of enterprise-level negotiations and possible strikes for each industry. By
the mid-1960’s, “Shunto” became an annual custom and an institutionalized featureof industrial relations. Until the early 1970’s, unions achieved significant wage
increases (TAKANASHI, 1996). The oil crisis in the mid 1970 has marked a turning
point announcing a very significant decline in the annual wage increase. At the endof the 1970’s, the subjects of negotiations were extended to employment andworking conditions issues. Through the ““Shunto” system”, industrial federations
played an increasing role in directing and regulating wage negotiations. They
directed their enterprise union’s members and coordinated their wage raise target
through scheduling dispute actions and fixing guidelines for figures of agreements(SHIRAI, 2000, p.87). They also came to play a greater role in regulating activitiesof their members, through financial backing for unified struggles, information andassistance services.
Moreover, inter-unions coordination also developed at national level, in close

relations to the wage restraint policy exercised in 1975. In the bargaining process of
this year on wages, union leaders of certain moderate unions engaged informal
consultations with management and government. This consultation paved the way
for the formalization of tripartite dialogue on a more regular basis (SUZUKI Akira
2004). The Round Table Discussion Meeting of Industrial Labor Problem“Sanrokon” was created in 1970 as a tripartite forum enabling representatives oflabor, management and government to exchange information and opinions on laborand industrial issues. This council played an important role in wage restraint.
Other types of advisory tripartite councils were also founded (see p.27).
However, even if there were industry wide offensives and sometimes unified orgroup bargaining, there has never been joint bargaining at industry level, contrary
to France. Then, enterprise unions have no obligation to follow the guidelines set upby their federations or National Centers. They enjoy complete autonomy todetermine wages increases within their company. Furthermore, although labor
representatives are consulted at national level, there has never been practice ofcollective bargaining at national level.

19C.2. The centralized structure of labor unions in France
As labor unions were created outside enterprises, the structure of labor unions ishighly centralized, comparing to Japan. Thus, the autonomy of labor union formedin enterprises is under the authority of upper-level unions: federations and/or
regional unions, which are also under the control of National Centers.
First, enterprise or establishment unions can exert their autonomy under theauthority of the unions of which they belong. Industry unions have the authority to
fix the amount of dues paid by each union member in companies or establishments.
However, the industry unions affiliated to a National Center must respect theguidelines concerning union dues. For instance, union dues perceived must
represent 1% of the annual net salary of any worker, as for the CGT, and 0.75% of
the annual net salary, as for the CFDT. For the CFE-CGC, the industrial
federations fixed the union dues perceived by industry unions17. Union delegates atenterprise or establishment levels are in charge of collecting union’s dues for theirunions. Concerning the CFDT union dues are transferred to the National Center,
which then distribute funds to industrial federations, industry unions and company
level unions. Unlike Japan, the French law forbids the check-off system (article L.
412-2). Consequently, assessing exactly the amount of salary paid by each union
member is difficult.
Then, enterprise or establishment unions can exert their power to bargain and toconclude collective agreements within the framework determined by upper-levelbargaining.
Until the Law of May the 4th 2004 relations between the different levels of collective
agreements were based on the “favorability principle”. According to this principle,
enterprise or establishment-based unions could conclude agreements containing
more advantageous provisions than the ones of an upper level: industry-level orcross-industry agreements. For example, industry bargaining systems set minimum
wages rates per work category. The unions at enterprise or establishment levels canadapt the agreement to the conditions of the firms by fixing their minimum ages
taking into account the ones of the industry agreements as a basis. Hence, thissystem can provide flexibility at the enterprise level (MARSDEN, OECD Report,
1995).

17 The other National Centers don't give any information on their financial system on Internet.

20

Conclusions on the characteristics of labor unions in each country:
In both countries the traditional and main way to express the voices of workers arelabor unions. However, it is difficult to compare the two types of labor unions due totheir sharp differences.
Summary of the differences of Japanese and French labor unions
JAPAN
Characteristics
of labor unions

FRANCEEnterprise unionism: creation ofIndustry unionism: creation oflabor unions mainly insidelabor unions outside enterprises.

enterprises.
Decentralized structure

Centralized structure- Complete autonomy of- Framed autonomy of unions at

Structure ofenterprise-level unions.

enterprise-level.

labor unions- Inter-unions coordination at- Joint negotiations at industry

industry level on wages: theand national levels.

“Shunto”.
-Eligibility linked with company-

Lost of eligibility of a worker leaving

industry or the location.

a company.

- Eligibility of unemployed andUnionsmembers

Eligibility

linkedwiththeretired persons.
- Mainly regular workers- Militant workers- Appointment of union delegates-Election of union officials amongby the industry or local union.

regular employees of the company.
Type of- Mainly union shop agreements.

enterprise
unionism

Function oflabor unions- Ban of union shop or closed shop
agreements.

- Mostly one labor union- Plural labor unions- Represent and defend the interests

Represent and defend all theof their members throughworkers not only their members

consultation and negotiations

throughmainly at enterprise level.

- Negotiations at different levels- Defend the competitiveness of their- Administration of welfare

company for the interests of their

institutions.

members.

21

As the main feature of Japanese labor union is enterprise unions, it is interesting tocompare Japanese enterprise unionism with the French employee representation
system at enterprise level especially works council. We shall study the following
point in the second part.

II. The evolution of employee representation systems
Historically, labor unions played a privileged role to defend workers’ interests andrights. Due to the continuous decline of trade unionization rate since the 1970’s (seep.4), the lawmaker in each country tried to compensate the lack of trade unions.
However, Japan and France chose different ways due to their historical andideological backgrounds and traditions.

A. The development of non-union representation systems in JapanThe Labor Standard Law enacted in 1947 originally provided the system of amajority representative, whereby an employee chosen to represent the workers’
majority can replace a majority union organizing the majority of workers. The
lawmaker expanded gradually this system in 1985 with the Law related to
Dispatched Workers and then in successive reforms of the Labor Standard Law in1987, 1993, 1998, and 2003. Recently, other laws also introduced the majority
representative system like the Child and Family Care Law in 2001 and the Law
concerning stabilization of older people employment in 2004. In addition, in 1998
another type of system was instituted: Labor-Management Committees. Hence,
non-union employee representation systems have been developing since the mid
1980’s.
A.1. A majority representative
The Labor Standard Law (LSL) defined minima standards concerning working
conditions. As a result, working conditions set forth by collective agreements, work
rules or employment contracts that contradict these rules are void andautomatically replaced by the norms of the LSL. In addition, they are enforced by
the Labor Standards Inspection Office, as well as by criminal penalties. However,
the employer can be exempted to comply with certain mandatory standards,
especially on wages and working time matters, through the conclusion of alabor-management agreement with a majority representative.

22

For years, the LSL contained no provisions related to the qualifications of theperson chosen to represent the majority of the workers. Critics pointed out these
persons were in practice appointed by the management and were simply
rubber-stamped. Therefore, the Ministry of Labor issued an administrative
guidance concerning the appropriate selection process of these persons in 1988. Ten
years later, the Enforcement Order in the 1998 revision of the LSL incorporated thisguidance. First, it prohibits any person in a supervisory or management position to
be entitled as a majority representative to preserve their independence from theemployer. Then, it specifies the selection process requiring a vote by the raise ofhands or other procedures. Finally, it provides that an employer shall not accord
disadvantageous treatment to a majority representative on the grounds of his or her
qualifications. As a result, the lawmaker strengthened the legitimacy of a majority
representative.
A.2. The labor-management committee
The 1998 revision of the Labor Standard Law, put into effect on April 2000
introduced another type of non-union employee representation system: thelabor-management committee. This committee is made of equal number of laborand management representatives. A majority union or the employee representing
the majority of the workers must appoint the labor representatives.
The labor-management committee was created at the workplace to allow more
flexibility on working time. In principle, the Labor Standard Law enacted in 1947
set maximum working hours standards. Thus, if the hours worked exceed the limits
the employer is required to pay increased wages for the overtime work. The
discretionary-work schemes introduced exceptions to this principle for workers who
do not receive specific instructions from their employer due to the nature of their job(NAKAKUBO, 2004). The first type of this scheme was adopted in 1987 forprofessional jobs (article 38-3). In the late 1990’s, business circles strongly defended
the extension of the discretionary work scheme to most white-collar employees. By
contrast, the labor unions fiercely criticized the expansion of the scheme that could
deprive employees of their rights to paid overtime (ARAKI, 1996). A compromise
wasfinallyreached.

Labor

unionsagreedtheintroduction

of

a

new

discretionary-work scheme, but in counterpart managers had to accept theestablishment of a labor-management “committee,” instead of the workplacelabor-management “agreement.” The second type of discretionary work scheme, was23

introduced by the 1998 revision of the Labor Standard Law. It covers white-collar
workers who are engaged in duties such as planning, surveys and analysis
concerning management (article 38-4). In counterpart, the law required thesettlement of a permanent labor management committee rather than an
appropriate written agreement.
Contrary to the majority representative, the labor management committee is
expected to play a more general role. This committee is entitled to investigate anddeliberate on matters related to working conditions such as wages, working hours
and to offer its opinions on such matters to the employer (article 38-4, Par1). The
decision of the committee adopted by at least four-fifths of the members18 canreplace a workplace labor-management agreement as to working hours or annual
paid-leaves. Nevertheless, as well as a workplace labor-management agreement,
the decision of a labor-management committee does not have a normative effect on
individual labor contracts like collective agreements. It only works to immunize theemployer against criminal liability (MORITO, 2006).
Recently, on September 2005, the Study Group on the future labor contract law
under the authority of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare published a report
proposing to promote the replacement of workplace labor-management agreementwith a standing labor-management committee. They suggested attributing thecommittee the power to take part in the drawing up or the changes of working
conditions in order to allow the employees to convey their opinions in face ofmanagement. The report triggered criticisms from Rengo (Rengo Updates of
September 200519) fearing that the council would impede on labor unions functions.
The employers welcomed this council because they want to avoid collective
bargaining. In June of this year, the government released a bill on the labor contractdevising a new type of employee representation system to compensate the absenceof a majority union. This draft of law allows employers to set majority
representatives or labor management committees in the lack for a majority union.
This bill is strongly questioned by Rengo and Nippon Keidanren.

18 Since the revision of the Law of 2003 that came into effect in January 2004 the decision must be taken by four fifths of the votes.
Before this law the unanimity was required.
19 www.jtuc-rengo.org

24

B. The recognition of new actors for negotiations in France
As stated before, the main role of union delegates is to negotiate (article L.132-20).
In principle, staff delegates or members of the Works Councils cannot conclude
collective agreements. This privileged power attributed to union delegates tonegotiate collective agreements raised serious problems given the weak presence oflabor unions at company level, especially in small and medium size companies (Seep.13).
B.1. Before 2004: a restricted power to negotiate
To solve the problem caused by the absence of union delegates at the workplace, theNational Centers of employers’ associations and labor unions concluded across-sector national agreement on October 1995. This agreement proposed to allow
elected representatives negotiate collective agreements to compensate the lack ofunion delegates. The law of November the 12th 1996 embodied these proposals. Thislaw authorized elected representatives to sign collective agreements on certain
matters in the absence of union delegates. However, there is no legal obligation toelect workers’ representatives in companies employing less than 11 workers. In
addition in companies where there is a legal obligation to elect staff delegates andmembers of works council, there are not always such bodies in the absence ofcandidates (see p.15-16). Therefore, the lawmaker devised a new type of actor. In
the absence of elected representatives, an employee mandated by a labor union is
entrusted with the role to sign collective agreements at enterprise or
establishments levels. At the same time, the Constitutional Council (Conseil

Constitutionnel) rendered a decision on November the 6th 1996 asserting that theright to organize guaranteed by the Constitution could not be interpreted as given amonopoly on collective bargaining to labor unions. The working time acts of June
1998 and January 2000 also enabled elected representatives or an employee
mandated by a representative labor union to sign a collective agreement in order toreduce working hours.

B.2. After 2004: a general power to negotiate
The Act of May the 4th 2004 on social dialog marked a turning point because it
extended the possibility for elected employees’ representatives or for a worker
mandated by representative labor unions to negotiate and sign collective
agreements on any maters with the employer.

25

The lawmaker allowed elected representatives (staff delegates or members of thework council) to negotiate at company or plant levels in the absence of uniondelegates. In the lack for elected representatives, an employee mandated by arepresentative labor union can be entrusted with the power to negotiate on specificsubjects. However, the lawmaker set requirements to enable this change. First, inany case, an industry-level agreement must authorize the transfer of thenegotiation power of union delegates to non-union representatives and define theitems of the negotiations. Then, on the one hand if elected representatives sign anagreement an industry-level joint Commission (consisting of an equal number oflabor or management representatives) must ratify it. On the other hand, if a worker
mandated by a labor union signed an agreement, the employer must send it to thelabor administration. Since the enforcement of the law, industrial labor unions andemployers’ organizations signed seven sector-wide agreements in trade, retail andfood industries allowing negotiations by elected representatives on unlimited
items20. These agreements were signed in very low unionized sectors.
Conclusion:
In both countries, the development of non-union employee representation systems
occurred. Did these systems enable to compensate the decline of labor unions?
In Japan, a worker chosen to represent the workers’ majority is not a permanent
employee representation system, unlike labor unions. Furthermore, the latter is not
entrusted with similar functions to labor unions. Then, although labor-management
committees are permanently set up, their resolutions, like the labor-managementagreements concluded by an employee majority representative, don't’ replacecollective agreements. Hence, the non-union representation systems did notcompensate the lack for labor union. Although, a recent bill of the government
proposes such change, it is doubtful that it will be adopted due to the fierce
criticisms of Rengo and Nippon Keidanren.
The French lawmaker transferred the negotiation power of union delegates toelected representatives or employees mandated by representative labor unions in
the absence of union delegates. The latter are permanent institutions. Thus, thelawmaker established an alternative system of employee representation to labor
unions.

20 French Ministry of Labor, “La négociation collective en 2005”, Bilans et rapports, Juin 2006.

26

Summary of the effects of non-union representation systems development
JAPAN

FRANCE

No compensation of the absence of labor

Compensation of the absence of labor

unionsunions

1. An employee majority representative

1. Elected representatives andis not a permanent employee

employees mandated by the labor

representation system.

unions are permanent institutions.

2. Labor-management agreements or

2. Transfer of labor unions’ functions tolabor-management committees’

bargain and to conclude agreements todecisions don’t replace collective

these employee representatives.

bargaining.

III. The role of the government in the relations between labor andmanagement representatives
In each country, the role of the State differs from a neo liberalism approach in which
the State refrains from infringing into the regulation of the labor market. Due to theinternal and external changes in the labor market, the government legislative
activities are currently important in the arena of the individual employment
relations law as well as in collective relations. The Japanese and Frenchgovernments established various councils and committees at national-level topromote dialogue and consultation on issues related to labor policies. In addition,
the government of Japan and France play a role in adjusting collective disputes
between labor and management. However, the way state is involved in collective
bargaining between labor and management representatives in each country is quite
different.

A. The indirect and guiding intervention of the Japanese government
In Japan, as seen before, enterprise-unionism is the main feature of industrial
democracy. Therefore, in most cases collective agreements are the result of collective
bargaining at company level. There is no system or table of negotiations at nationalor regional level to determine jointly the rules for the work community (ASAO,
2001). As a consequent, the limitation and inefficiency inherent to enterprise27

unionism only regulating micro level requires the intervention of the State toregulate the macro level (ARAKI, 2002, p.225). The government requests theopinions of labor and management through their high-level organizations, which
are mainly Rengo and Nippon Keidanren. Both organizations select and send
representatives to the various government commissions and councils.
A. 1. The participation of labor representatives in national policies
Rengo and its affiliated members send representatives in many advisory types ofcouncils at national level. The oldest consultation committee between labor,
management and the government is the Industry-Labor Consultation body, named“Sanrokon” created in January 1970. It consists of 25 members representing thegovernment, Rengo, Nippon Keidanren and academics. It allows exchange of views,
cooperation and mutual understanding on industrial labor policies such as wages,
inflation, working conditions. Union leaders originally regarded “Sanrokon” as animportant institution where they could present their requests and proposals on
policies to the government. However, its role has been decreasing in the mid-1990’s(OH, 2004).
In the 1990’s in a context of economic recession, the government established otherconsultative councils. At the request of both Rengo and Nippon Keidanren, thegovernment founded a new tripartite council on Employment Policy in 1998. The
council was very active until November 1999. The government suspended thiscouncil for one year, in reaction to Rengo’s strong opposition against the pension
reform. It was reinstituted in June 2001, but the Council mainly serves as forum forexchanges of opinions, rather than a decision-making committee, like Sanrokon.
Moreover, the government enables Rengo, as well as Nippon Keidanren andrepresentatives of the public interest to convey their opinions and proposals before
the drawing up or the revision of a new law on labor policies. Rengo pays particularattention to the participation of union representatives in labor policies.
There were ten advisory committees subordinated to the Ministry of Labor andmost of them involved three parties with representatives of labor, management andpublic interests. Until the middle of the 1990’s, these committees adopted decisions
with a consensus-oriented approach. However, in 1995, the government establisheda council attached to the Prime minister’s office to promote administrative reforms
and market deregulation. As a result, it became difficult for the advisorycommittees to maintain a consensual approach due to the oppositions of Rengo. For

28

instance, in spite of Rengo fierce criticisms towards the government’s proposals on
the revision of the Labor Standard Law in 1998, the Worker Dispatching Law or thePension Reform in 2000, the government carried out these reforms. Therefore, theinfluence of Rengo in these advisory committees decreased.
In January 2001, in line with the merger of the Ministries of Heath, Labor andWelfare the ten advisory committees were reorganized. This led to the creation of
the Labor Policy Council composed of 30 members equally representing labor,(named by Rengo), management (chosen by Nippon Keidanren) and scholars orexperts (appointed by the Ministry).
Representatives of Rengo can also convey their opinions on wage matters throughthe Minimum Wage Council. Since 1978, its role is to establish criteria for minimum
wages district by district, at the request of the Ministry of Labor and to submit
them to the District Minimum Wage Councils settled in the 47 Prefectures.
According to an announcement of the Ministry on September 2001, about 75% of
these District Councils determined their minimum wages at the same level as theamount set by the Minimum Wage Council. Thus, representatives of Rengo canexert an influence in the determination of minimum wages through this Council.
The advisory committees at national level enables labor unions to exert an influencein the decision making process on labor policies due to the consensus-oriented
approach. However, since the mid 1990’s Rengo’s influence has been decreasing due
to the deregulation policy of the government.
The different channels of social dialogue between labor, management and thegovernment have contributed significantly to mutual understanding between Rengo
and Nippon Keidanren which help shape collaborative relations (OH 2004). The
government has also been encouraging the stabilization of relations between
representatives of labor and management through the support of Labor Relations
Commissions in charge of adjusting collective disputes.
A.2. The encouragement of stable relations between labor and management
representatives
One of the aims of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare21is to guarantee theworkers’ rights to organize, to bargain and to act collectively, under article 28 of the
21 Until the end of 2000, the Ministry of Labor was in charge of the administration of labor Laws and labor policy. It was mergedwith the Ministry of Health and Welfare in January 2001.

29

Constitution. Therefore, the Ministry is responsible for creating procedures toadjust collective disputes.
For the resolution of collective disputes, the Trade Union Law of 1949 established
Labor Relations Commissions. They are quasi-judicial institutions that havejurisdiction over these matters.
The national government supports the Central Labor Relations Commission at
national level and the Prefecture governors are in charge of Labor Relations
Commissions set up in the 47 Prefectures. Labor administration representatives are
not members of these commissions, but they play a role in the selection procedure ofits members. These Labor Relations Commissions are made of an equal number ofcommissioners

representing

employersandworkers,appointed

by

labor

administration among a list presented by the National Centers unions (Rengo,
Zenroren and Zenrokyo) or by Nippon Keidanren for the employers.

Members

representing the public interests, which are usually lawyers or law Professors, also
take part in these commissions.
The Labor Relations Commissions have two main functions. On the one hand, theyexamine claims for unfair labor practices that can lead to the issuance of remedial
orders to protect workers in case the employer committed an unfair labor practice.
On the other hand, the Labor Relations Adjustment Law of 1946 provides the Labor
Relations Commissions for the adjustment of collective labor disputes throughconciliation, mediation and arbitration procedures. Since 1975, the number ofcollective disputes has continuously decreased. In 2004, there were only 311 “unfair
labor practices cases” filed before Prefecture (Local) Labor Relations Commissions,which is about a third of the 929 cases filed in 197522. Moreover, the number of cases
related to adjustment of collective disputes such as conciliation, mediation andarbitration have diminished for all the Labor Commissions (Central and local). In
1974, it amounts to 2,249, whereas in 2004, there were 531 cases23.
The Japanese government did not interfere in relations between labor andmanagement, but strived to facilitate the development of stable and fruitfulrelations. This enables the adaptation and the flexibility of companies.

22 Annual reports of the Central Labor Relations Commissions
23 Idem30

B. The direct and significant involvement of the French government
The French government also developed many advisory committees with labor andmanagement representatives, but there has never been a consensus-oriented
approach in the decision-making process, like in Japan. The government has always
been playing the main role in the rule-making on labor-related issues (GOETSCHY
and ROZENBLATT, 1992). In addition, unlike Japan, the government has been
directly committed into the collective bargaining process between labor andmanagement representatives at different levels.
B.1. The consultation of labor representatives on national policies
The government hears the opinions of workers and employers through various
commissions, committees and councils. The five National Centers: CFDT, CGT, CGT-FO,
CFE-CGC and CFTC are representing workers in these institutions and can express

the workers’ opinions on various issues, especially on labor policies.
The Minister of Labor holds permanent and regular discussions and consultations
with the five National Confederations of labor unions and the employers’organizations on labor policies. Within this Ministry, the Labor Relations Direction(Direction des relations du travail) in charge of protecting the rights of workers
holds regular meetings with labor and management representatives throughvarious committees. For instance, the High Council on Industrial Tribunals discusson the organization and the working of these tribunals and the High Council on
Prevention of Risks at Work is consulted on drafts of laws related to health, safety
and work environment. One of the most important council is the National Council
on Collective bargaining (Commission Nationale de la Négociation Collective)
created on November 1982 (articles L. 136-1 to L.136-4) aiming at developing
collective bargaining. It consists of representatives of the government and an equal
number of members from labor and management sides.
The General Direction of Employment and Vocational Training (Direction Générale

de l’Emploi et de la Formation Professionnelle) of the Ministry of Labor also
consults labor and management representatives on specific issues related to
employment and training. The most important council is the High Employment
Committee where representatives of labor, management and government debate on
the bills and proposals related to unemployment issues. In addition, labor unions
and employers’ associations are regularly consulted on European and International
matters related to labor policies within the European and International Social
Dialog Committee (Comité du Dialogue Social International et Européen), under31

the authority of the Ministry of Labor, created in November 1998.
Furthermore, employees’ and employers’ representatives, as well as representativesof the public interests can convey their opinions on national policies through the
Economic and Social Council. The Constitution of 1958 founded the current
Economic and Social Committee. This national assembly became a fully-fledged
institution working in close collaboration with the French government and has
gained widespread recognition over the years. It is made up of 231 Council memberswith representatives of trade unions, employers’ organizations and public interests
like associations or specialists appointed by the government. The roles of the
Economic and Social Committee are to issue recommendations to the Frenchauthorities on national policies, to provide information for political assemblies, andto take part in the legislative process on bills submitted for approval in the
Parliament. Thus, it allows a fruitful dialogue between the various socioeconomic
groups and public authorities. Labor unions as well as management and public
interests representatives are also consulted at regional or local level through thesame kinds of Councils. At regional level, the regional administration consults themtrough Regional Economic and Social Committees, set up in the 22 French regions
and consultative bodies called the Regional Committee on Employment andTraining. At local level, the Departmental Committees on Employment andTraining play the same role.

B.2. The commitment of the government in collective bargaining
To some extent, the government influences the issues, the jurisdiction, the level andcoverage of collective bargaining.
First, the government can encourage the conclusions of collective agreements
between labor and management. Indeed, at national level, the government will
support the negotiations between CFDT, CGT, CGT-FO, CFE-CGC and CFTC andthe MEDEF, UEAPME and UPA by giving information on the subjects of collective
bargaining and asking experts to write reports and recommendations. At
industry-level, the Minister of Labor or its representative can act as a go-between to
facilitate negotiations between labor and government. Indeed, when negotiations
are blocked, the Minister of Labor can at its own initiative or at the request of twolabor unions or management, organizations carry up a Joint Peer Commission(Commission mixte paritaire). A representative of the Ministry of Labor chairs this32

Commission. In 200524, 88 Joint Peer Commissions were set up. At the initiative of
the Minister, negotiations were re-opened on minimum wages in nine sectors. At
company or establishment levels, the Ministry of Labor also contributes to stable
relations between labor and management through the informal intervention ofLabor inspectorates. At the labor unions and/or management request, labor
Inspectorate can listen to the opinions of each party and try to help them find a
trade-off. In 200525, Labor Inspectorates handled 93% of the conflicts requiring
third-party arbitration.
Then the government can incite labor unions and management to conclude
collective agreements at different levels. First, the government is entitled to
implement and precise the content of laws through administrative rules, underarticle 21 of the Constitution. However, the government can delegate this power to
National Centers of labor unions and management organizations that will precise
the content of the laws through collective agreements. Secondly, the government
can decide to transform cross-sector collective agreements concluded at national
level into laws. In this way, social partners played a crucial role in the drafting of alaw, especially in the area of vocational training in 1971, 1991 and 2003. Thirdly, atindustry-level, the Ministry of Labor can expand the scope of collective agreements
through the extension and enlargement procedures (see p.41).
Finally, at enterprise or establishments levels, the government can also boost theconclusions of collective agreements in order to achieve its political goals. To reduce
unemployment though the creation of jobs, several laws encouraged the conclusionsof collective agreements to reduce working time. The first incentive law of this kind
was enacted in December 1993. It rewarded employers through payroll taxes cuts incounterpart for working time reduction. Other laws were devised in the same line,
both under right wing government with the so-called “De Robien” Law of June 1996
and under a left wing government, with the so-called “Aubry” laws of the 13th June
1998 and 19th January 2000. However, the “Aubry” laws, rather than incite tonegotiate, imposed collective agreements and the signature of collective agreementson the reduction of working time to 35 hours in all companies by the end of a limited
period of time (AUVERGNON 2000).

24 French Ministry of Labor, “La négociation collective en 2005”, Bilans et rapports, Juin 2006.
25 Idem.

33

Conclusion:
The French government has always been highly committed into relations between
employee and managers representatives, while in Japan this involvement was
indirect.
The similarities and differences in the roles of the government
in the relations between labor and management representatives
JAPAN
In the mutual
understanding

FRANCE- Various advisory committees atnational-level with a consensus
oriented approach.

- Various advisory committees but
no consensus oriented approach
the government decides.
- Administrative and financial
support of Industrial tribunals

In adjusting

Administrative

andfinancialcollective

support of the Labor Relations

disputesCommissions- Intervention to adjust conflicts innegotiations:
At industry-level: Joint
Commissions
At enterprise or establishments
levels: the Labor Inspectors.
-Direct commitment of thegovernment into collective

In collective
bargaining- No involvement in collective

bargaining:bargaining at enterprise level- At industry-level: extension andenlargement procedures.

- Autonomy of labor unions and- At enterprise-level: laws inciting

managers

negotiations.
Restricted autonomy of labor andmanagers.

34

Second Part: The role of employee representatives in the regulation of thework place
The actors of industrial relations system prescribe the rules of the work place. The
rules of each system may take a variety of forms like consultation, collective
bargaining, law, and customs for instance. They may be written or oral tradition as
well as customary practices. There are two main types of regulations in the work
place: unilateral regulations whereby the employer determines on its own the terms
and conditions of employment, through work rules, and joint regulations between
employers and workers representatives. Joint regulations can take different forms
such as consultation or collective bargaining. The latter refers to a process ofdecision-making between parties representing the employer and employee interests
with a view to regulate the terms and conditions of employment or their relations bymeans of collective agreements. This report shall examine the relations between
employees’, managers’ representatives and the government by tackling thefollowing issues: Which actor plays the main role in the regulations at the work
place? What are the main types of relations between labor and management:
consultation or collective bargaining? What is the nature of the relations between
labor and management: confrontational or collaborative relations?
As seen in the first part, the main feature of Japanese employee representation
system is enterprise unions. Thus, the right of workers to express their views, tobargain and to collective actions appears mainly at company or establishment levels
through labor unions. The main function of labor unions is to conduct collective
bargaining on employment and working conditions to defend the interests of theunion members. By contrast, as stated before, in France relations between labor
unions and employers’ organizations developed outside enterprise or establishment.
Thus, industry-level collective bargaining plays an essential role in regulating theworkplace. Relations between employee and managers’ representatives incompanies

takemainlytwoforms:

joint

consultations

betweenelectedrepresentatives (staff delegates or the work councils) and collective bargaining with
union delegates.

35

I. Unilateral regulations and joint regulations
We will analyze the role of employee representatives in the regulations of the work
place. In that purpose, we will examine the scope and content of the works rules, set
by the employers and of collective bargaining between employers and labor unions.
Legally, work rules play a less important function than collective agreements inJapan, as well as in France. In Japan, work rules cannot contradict laws andcollective agreements (article 92 of the LSL). In France, the same rule is provided by
the law (L.122-35). What about in practice? We will also analyze the proportion of
employees covered by collective agreements.

A. Work rules as an important means of regulating the workplace in Japan
Any employer in a company with 10 ten or more workers must draw up work rules,
which are a set of uniform rules and conditions of employment at a workplace,(article 89 of the LSL). As most of the workplaces are not unionized, these work
rules drawn up by the employer play a crucial role in ruling the workplace. However,in unionized companies, how is the unilateral power of the employer to set work
rules balanced with the right of employees to bargain and to conclude collective
agreements? Under the Trade Union Law of 1949, any employer has a duty tobargain with each union that meets statutory requirements. The infringement of
this right is prosecuted as an unfair labor practice. Any employer must search forthe possibility of achieving agreement even if he has no obligation to accept union’s
demands and contentions (SUGENO, 2002, p.566).
A.1. Unilateral power of the employer to establish and change work rules
The Japanese Trade Union Law of 1949 specifies the subjects of the work rules. The
scope of the jurisdiction of work rules defined by the law is very broad. It covers
many matters such as 1) working time matters: time of beginning and end of work,
rest periods, rest days and leaves - 2) wages matters - 3) retirement and dismissals 4) Safety and health – Accident compensation - 5) Discipline and sanctions - 6)
vocational training and 7) other items enforceable for all workers at the workplace.
On the contrary, the items of collective bargaining are not clearly defined by the law.
Collective bargaining is dealing with the working conditions of union members(article 2 of the TUL of 1949) and relations between unions and employers.

36

Employers sometimes assert that matters affecting the management and operationof the company are not subject to collective bargaining. Nevertheless, these matters
can also be related to working conditions. As a result, collective bargaining andwork rules domains are hard to tell apart and may overlap. In practice, what kind ofissues do collective agreements as a result of collective bargaining and work rules
tackle?
Themes of collective agreements and work rules in 2001
ThemesCollective agreements

Work rules

Wage amount

54.8%

56.7%

Overtime

56.3%

69.6%

Dismissals

46.6%

82.7%

Supplementary work

46.7%

56.4%

accident insurance
Source: Ministry of Labor, Health and Welfare
The companies surveyed could give several answers.

This study shows that 54.8% of companies surveyed answered collective bargaining
dealt with wage amount and 56.7% answered that works rules dealt with the same
theme. Therefore, collective agreements and work rules are dealing with the same
subjects. Although any employer has a duty to bargain in good faith with a union(article 7 TUL), he/she is not compelled to make concessions or to reach an
agreement. Thus, when the employer and the union cannot conclude a collective
agreement, the employer can regulate or change working conditions through themodification of the work rules.
In addition, the requirements any employer has to comply with in the drawing up orchange of the work rule are not very stringent, comparing to French law. The
employer has a duty to communicate work rules to the Labor Standards Inspection
Office and to display it to the workers. These duties are enforced by criminal
sanctions. The employer is also required to consult a majority representative.
However, even if the latter questions the content of the work rules, the employer
may still submit them to the Labor Standards Inspection Office, which will accept it.
In this sense, the employer can unilaterally establish and modify work rules
unilaterally (ARAKI, 2002, p.52).
Thus, the distinction between the work rules and collective bargaining depends onthe dynamics of the relations between labor unions and the employer at theworkplace. Collective bargaining can lead to the conclusion of collective agreements
setting some rules for the workers in the company. What place do collective

37

agreements play in relations between labor and management representatives?
A.2. A limited use and scope of collective agreementsCollective agreements are signed “between a trade union and an employer or an

employers’ organization concerning conditions of work and other matters which is
put in writing and is either signed by or with names affixed with seals by both of theparties concerned” (article 14 TUL). Collective bargaining means an endeavour ofworkers to substitute a collective process to their previous individual deal with theiremployers with regard to the working conditions (SUGENO 2002, p. 548). Hence,collective agreements have a legal effect called the “normative effect”, which affects
the content of individual employment contracts (article 16 TUL). This means thatcollective agreements can supersede the portion of an individual contract that does
not comply with the standards set forth in it, even if the latter are less favorable
than the provisions of the contract. Work rules also have an imperative and direct
effect on individual employment contracts, even for the disadvantageousmodifications if there are “reasonable modifications”, according to the Supreme
Court26.
In practice, how labor unions and managers’ representatives reach an agreement
regulating the working conditions and binding individual contracts? A 2004 study27
on the relations between labor unions and managers reveals that only 16.1% ofcompanies surveyed answered an agreement is reached after collective bargaining.
Then, 10% of the companies answered an agreement is reached in joint consultation
systems without collective bargaining, 26.8% responded that there is only an oral
agreement. Moreover, 54.6% of the companies responded the agreement between
labor and management representatives is embodied in works rules. Consequently,
collective agreements as a result of collective bargaining do not play an importantrole in regulating the work places.
In addition, the works rules apply to all workers in a workplace or an establishment,
while collective agreements only apply to union members of the union that signed acollective agreement. Due to the long-term decline of the unionization rate, anincreasing share of workers is not covered by formal collective agreements(NAKATA, 1999).
26 The Shuhoku Bus Case, Supreme Court Dec 25 1968.
27 Study of the Japan Institute of Labor, Policy and Training.

38

The percentage of workers covered by collective agreements
Year% of unionized% of unions who% of workers covered byworkers in all

have collective

collective agreements

industries

agreements

1986

28.2

91.7

25.9

1991

24.5

93.3

22.4

1996

23.2

89.2

20.7

2001

20.7

91.5

18.7

Source: Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Labor, Health and Welfare
Indeed, from 1986 to 2001 the share of employees covered by collective agreements
diminished by 7.2 points. In 2001, less than one fifth of Japanese workers arecovered by a collective agreement.
However, the Trade Union Law provides two extensions procedures. Did the use of
these procedures help increase the share of workers covered by a collective
agreement? First, a collective agreement concluded at plant level can apply to all
workers if it comes to cover three-quarters or more of the employees regularly
employed in a workplace (article 17 of the TUL). This requirement is difficult tofulfill. Moreover, the TUL provides a possibility for a regional extension of acollective agreement (article 18 TUL). However during the last fifty years, there has
only been one case of regional extension (MORITO, 2006). Therefore, these
extension procedures of collective agreements did not compensate for the low shareof workers covered by collective agreements.
Due to the rare use of formal collective agreements and the limitation of the scope ofcollective agreements to union members, work rules are a very important set ofrules for regulating the work place, for all the workers, even in unionizedcompanies.

39

B. Collective bargaining as the main means of regulating the workplace inFranceThe French constitution of October 1946 guaranteed the right of workers to express
their opinions. At the workplace, any employer has a management power declined
in a regulation power, which enables him/her to create rules for the work place anda disciplinary role whereby he/she can sanction a worker (PELISSIER, SUPIOT,JEAMMAUD 2004, p.982). Under the law, work rules cannot contradict the laws orcollective agreements (L.122-35). How is the unilateral power of the employer
balanced with the right to bargain and to conclude collective agreements ofworkers?

B.1. A framed power of the employer to establish and change work rules
Any employer must set up work rules in companies with more than 20 employees(L.122-33 of Labor Code). Until the Law of August the 4th 1982, any employer could
include the rules he/she considered as useful for regulating the workplace. However,since this law, the scope of work rules is very limited. It encompasses two main
subjects: heath and safety as well as discipline and sanctions.
In addition, this regulation power is also limited because employers must consult
collective worker representation institutions, such as works council or elected
delegate and the Council for Health-Safety-Working conditions, (article L. 122-35).
If the employer does not abide by the law, these employee representatives cancontest his decision before a criminal Tribunal and forces him/her to pay a fineor/and refer to the Labor Inspectorate. Any employer also has the duty tocommunicate the text to the Labor Inspectorate (representing the Ministry ofLabor), whose main role is to ensure the enforcement of laws (articles L.611-1 andL.611-10). The Labor Inspectorate operates both a procedural check but also a
substantial one the content of work rules.
Thus, unlike Japan, works rules have a limited content and are submitted to astricter control.
B.2. The importance of collective bargaining
Several laws gave impetus to collective bargaining at enterprise level. In 1982, theso-called “Auroux” law, created an annual obligation for the employer to negotiate
on wages and working time (article L.132-27). The lawmaker expanded the scope of
this obligation to equality between men and women in May 2001 and the hiring of40

disabled persons in February 2005. The law of January 2005 provides an obligation
to negotiate every three years on the staff management related to the developmentof workers’ employability. The employer has no obligation to conclude an agreement
but when the parties cannot reach an agreement, they must write in a document
their proposals. Moreover, if the parties conclude an agreement, any employer has
to respect the content of collective agreements or he/she can be prosecuted tocriminal sanctions (article L.135-3 of the labor Code).
In addition, to this annual obligation imposed on any employer for collective
bargaining, many laws encouraged collective bargaining on specific themes. For
instance, in 1998 and 2000, the working time acts, named “Aubry” laws also
encouraged the conclusion of collective agreements by imposing companies tonegotiate on the reduction of working time to 35 hours within a limited period.
Therefore, the number of collective agreements signed at company level grewsignificantly in the 1990’s. From 1990 to 1998 labor unions and managers signed anaverage of 9000 agreements per year at enterprise or establishment levels28. Then,due to the enactment of the Aubry Laws, from 1999 to 2002 the number of collective
agreements signed at enterprise level rose to an average of 35 000 agreements per
year. Since 2002 this number decreased to 19 000 agreements per year. In 2005, 19
310 collective agreement were signed at company level. The main themes ofcollective bargaining are wages and working time. In 2005, 35% of the collective
agreements signed dealt with wages and 27.8% with working time.
Furthermore, contrary to Japan, collective agreements are treated as regulations
when they are applied (PÉLISSIER and alii, 2002, p.863). As a result, any collective
agreement signed between labor union(s) and employers at enterprise or
establishment levels covers all the workers irrespective of their membership to thelabor union. Hence, collective agreements play a very important role in regulating
the workplace for all the workers in unionized companies. Nevertheless, what typeof rules regulates the workplace within non- unionized companies?
In principle, an industry-level collective agreement only covers the workers of thecompanies whose employers are affiliated to the employers’ organizations thatsigned it. Since the Law of June 1936, the Minister of Labor can extend thisindustry-level agreement to companies of the same industry even if their employers
are not members of the employers’ organizations that signed the agreement,
28 Annual reports of the Ministry of Labor on collective bargaining.

41

through an extension procedure. This procedure enables the Minister of Labor toextend the implementation of collective agreements to all companies belonging to
the same sector, at his or her own initiative or at the request of one organization
representing the employers or the workers. The Minister of Labor has to consult the
National Commission on Collective Bargaining, composed by an equal number ofrepresentatives of the employers’ associations and of the labor unions National
Centers (Article L.133-1). The number of requests for extending collective
agreements has steadily increased from 1998 to 200529. In addition, the Minister ofLabor, through the same procedure, can expand the scope of a collective agreement
to another sector or geographical area by using an enlargement procedure. Bothextension and enlargement procedures brought the rate of employees covered bycollective agreements to 93.4% in 1997, whereas it amounts to 86.4% in 198530.
Conclusion:
In Japan, the employer unilaterally set the works rules and the scope of theircontent is very wide. In addition, there is a blurred frontier between the subjects ofcollective bargaining and work rules. Then, the share of workers covered bycollective agreements is very low. Thus, in Japan work rules set by the employers
play a major rule in the definition of the terms and conditions of work, compared tocollective agreements. Employers have huge autonomy to manage on their own theworkplace, even in unionized companies.
In France, the content of the works rules is restricted and the employers are under
the control of employee representatives and labor inspectorates when they draw up
and change the work rules. Furthermore, the themes of collective bargaining listedby the law are wide. Then, the decline of unionization rate was not followed by adecrease of the share of workers covered by a collective agreement at the workplace,due to the commitment of the government. Therefore, collective agreements play a
predominant role in the regulation of the work place, even in non-unionizedcompanies. Thus, employers have less autonomy for regulating the workplace thanin Japan.

29 French Ministry of Labor,“La négociation collective en 2005”, Bilans et rapports, Juin 2006.
30 French Ministry of Labor DARES “La couverture conventionnelle a la fin 1997”, (Collective bargaining coverage at the end of1997) n.29.2 Juillet 1999.

42

II. Collective bargaining and consultation
In

many

countries,

joint

consultation

systems

developed

enabling

therepresentatives of employers and workers to exchange information and views on
various issues such as management, production, welfare, as well as employment
and working conditions. Indeed, these systems allow a form of workers participationin the management process.
In

Japan,

although

there

is

no

legal

requirementtoestablish

joint

labor-management consultation systems, this type of system developed significantlyin the 1960’s. As the dominant form of collective bargaining is enterprise-based, it isimportant to consider the relations between collective bargaining and thelabor-management consultation systems. As labor unions play both a role injoint-consultation institutions and collective bargaining, the frontier between the
two types of relations between labor and management is not clear-cut.
By contrast, in France, the functions of collective bargaining and consultations areclearly shared between labor unions and elected representatives by the law. The
former have the power to negotiate. The latter, via works councils or elected staff
representatives are responsible for conveying the opinions of employees to theemployer.

A. The distinction between collective bargaining and consultation
A.1. A blurred distinction between collective bargaining and consultation in Japan
In Japan, joint labor-management consultation systems as a channel ofcommunication and sharing-information became a central feature of Japaneseindustrial relations.
Their origin is not well known, but the Japan Productivity Center (JPC) created in
1955 encouraged the development of joint consultation systems between labor andmanagement as a means to improve productivity. The surveys of this center in 1960
and 1969 revealed that during this period most large companies adopted voluntary
joint consultations institutions (SUZUKI and OGURA, 1995). In 200431, 37.3% ofcompanies employing more 30 workers have such consultation systems. The survey
31 Ministry of Labor, Labor Management communication Survey 2004.

43

reveals that joint consultations are more likely instituted in unionized companies.
In 2004, up to 80.5% of unionized establishments had such bodies; whereas only
17.1% of companies without enterprise-based unions did. Joint consultation
machineries in unionized companies are often quite formalized and frequently set
up by collective agreements. In 200432, 60.4% of these councils were established bycollective agreements. Generally, union delegates and officials are representing
workers whereas representatives of human resources department and top
management represent employers. They hold regular meetings through Joint
Labor-Management Committees; seven times or more a year on average33.
What are the reasons explaining the development of these systems in unionizedcompanies? First, it is a voluntary and informal procedure, which is not adversarial
unlike collective bargaining. Then, another difference with collective bargaining isthat the themes of communication between labor and management representatives
are voluntary decided. Thus, the items discussed are very broad comparing tocollective bargaining. In most cases, there are kinds of standing committee dealing
with many different issues, ranging from the strategy of the company like plans of
production or sales, organizational changes or rationalizations operations, toworking conditions. About 80% of major management issues are referred tolabor-management consultation as tends to show a 2004 survey34. If specific topics
are discussed, special commissions like committees on health and security,
manufacturing, or staff management, for instance, may be created. These
committees will have to report to the joint consultations central body (SUZUKI and
OGURA, 1995).
However, the borderline between joint consultation and collective bargaining is notclear-cut. First, joint consultations and collective bargaining take place at the sameplace: enterprise or plant levels. Secondly, the parties involved are usually the same.
Finally, the subjects discussed through joint consultation systems and collective
bargaining are not clearly told apart and can overlap. Indeed, according to a 2002
study35, from 1999 to 2001, 56.8% of companies surveyed answered that wages’
matters were treated by collective bargaining and 50% answered that this subject
was also treated by joint consultation systems. As for working time matters,
32 Japanese Ministry of LHW, survey , 2004.
33 RENGO RIALS, survey published in May 2001.
34 Japanese Ministry of LHW, survey, 2004.
35 Japanese Ministry of LHW, survey, 2002.

44

joint-consultation systems dealt with this subject for 55.9% of companies surveyed
and collective bargaining for 35.1% of companies surveyed. Joint consultation
systems handle more items related to staff management, child or family care leaves
or management policy than collective bargaining. In many cases, joint consultations
are the first stage of negotiations and then the subjects are debated in collective
bargaining or conversely when collective bargaining led to an agreement, theagreement is discussed in joint consultation systems. A 2004 study36shows that only
33.4% of companies answered the subjects treated by collective bargaining and joint
consultations bodies are separate. On the contrary, 38.1% answered there are no
precise delimitation between the two.
Thus, the distinction between joint consultation bodies and collective bargaining
systems is vague. In other terms in unionized companies, labor unions have bothcommunication and advisory functions through joint consultation machineries anda collective bargaining power.

A.2. A clear distinction between collective bargaining and consultation in France
Traditionally, there is a functional distinction between collective bargaining
conducted by labor unions and consultations between employer and elected
representatives at the workplace. Unlike Japan, the law provides for joint labor
management consultation systems with elected staff representatives or works
councils.
The aim of elected representatives is to enable workers to convey their opinions on
various issues. Elected staff representatives set up in companies with 11 workers ormore are in charge of communicating workers’ request and demands on any subject
to the employer. To that extent, any employer must meet those staff representatives
once a month. In addition to these regular and mandatory meetings, the staff
representatives can ask for a meeting with the employer when needed and theemployer has to accept it (article L. 424-4 of Labor Code). Works councils have asimilar communication and sharing-information role as staff representatives incompanies with 50 workers or more, but with wider jurisdiction. The manager andthe members of the work council must hold a meeting at least once a month todiscuss on important managerial decisions. The members of the Works Councilmust express their opinions on any decision regarding organizational changes,
36 Study of the Japan Institute for Labor Policy and Training.

45

whether internal (introduction of new technologies) or external (merger or transfer)ones, of the company or the establishment. The Works Council must also convey its
views on the management and general operations of the company and on any
measures affecting the employees like working time, working conditions, vocational
training among other subjects (article L.431-7 of Labor Code). In addition, WorkCouncils also run enterprise benefits scheme for workers and their family. By
contrast, the functions of union delegates are to negotiate at least once per yearwith the employer of the company or establishment on specific issues (article
L.132-6). Therefore, elected representatives and unions delegates have distinctivefunctions.
Furthermore, the actors of elected representatives and labor unions are also
different. Works councils are joint consultative bodies representing labor andmanagement, contrary to German “Betriebsrat”. Indeed, the manager of thecompany participates at the meetings and can be assisted by a maximum of twocolleagues, since the law of May the 4th 2004. Employees are represented by elected
representatives whose number varies with the size of the company from 3 members
in companies with 50 to 74 workers, up to 15 in companies with more than 10 000
employees. In addition, union delegates are also members of the Works Council, butthey do not have the right to vote. By contrast, union delegates are not elected by
the workers of the companies, but they are appointed by an industry or local union.
Therefore, elected representatives and labor unions can be clearly distinguishedbecause they are different actors and are endowed with different functions.
However, the distinction between labor unions and elected representatives is notclear-cut.
Indeed, union delegates can hold the functions of elected representatives. First, an

industry union or local union can appoint a union delegate, in companies with morethan 10 and less than 50 workers, as a staff delegate (L.412-11 §3). Then, incompanies, where a works council is set up, with less than 300 workers, uniondelegates are automatically members of this council (article L. 412-17). In
companies with more than 300 workers, any industry union or local union can
appoint one representative in the works council, apart from union delegate in thecompany (MOURET, 2006). In addition, union delegates can also be member of the
Health, Safety and Working Conditions Council. Indeed, a college of works council
members and staff representatives elects the members of this council.
As a result, a union delegate can hold currently several functions as union delegate,46

staff representative, member of the works council and member of the Health, Safety
and Working Conditions Council. A 1999 study37 reveals that there is a linked withthe presence of union delegates and elected representatives. Furthermore, Works
Councils or staff representatives are entrusted with the power to negotiate in
non-unionized companies, since the Law of May the 4th 2004 (see p.24). Therefore,
the precise functional difference between labor unions and elected representatives
tend to tone down.
Besides, labor unions also play a crucial role in the elections for elected delegates orworks council. They are entitled to negotiate and sign a pre-electoral agreementthat governs the elections of employee representatives. They also have a monopolyon the presentation of candidates in the first round of elections for either elected
institutions (articles L.423-3 and L.423-18). According to a survey, in 200438, tradeunions list won 77.4% of employee’s votes. The majority of the members of theWorks Council are union members elected by employees. In addition, a recent law inJanuary the 18th 2005 allowed companies to sign agreements with union delegateson the working of the works council in case of economic dismissals. Since theenactment of the law, 154 collective agreements have been signed.
Hence, actually, the distinction between elected representatives and labor unions isblurred.
Conclusion:
In Japan, in unionized companies, enterprise unions mainly have communication
and advisory functions through joint consultation systems. Indeed, this type of
relations between labor and management representatives have been privileged overcollective bargaining. Therefore, Japanese enterprise unions are acting in a similar
way to the French Works Councils.
The main difference lies in the formality of the communication between labor andmanagement

representatives.

In

Japan,

labor-management

consultation

institutions are voluntary set up, while works councils in France are mandatory,
according to the law.

37 French Ministry of Labor, study, in 1999.
38 French Ministry of Labor, survey, 2004.

47

Parallel between Japanese “Joint consultation systems”
And French “Works Councils”
Japan
PurposeFranceCommunicate and express the opinions of the workers on many issues.
Joint councils with

Composition

Joint councils with representatives ofrepresentatives of labor andlabor (generally union delegates ormanagement.

officials) and management.

Representatives of labor are
mainly union delegates.

Meetings

More than once every two months

Once per monthFrequency
Functions
Themes of
information

Information and consultation on the management policy andemployee-related issues- Organizational changes: internal and external- Management and general operation: economic strategy, staff management- Vocational training

andconsultation- Welfare- Cultural or leisure activities

B. A common trend of decentralization of collective bargaining
As stated before, the level of collective bargaining corresponds to the structure of
the bargaining actors that is to say of labor unions (SUWA, 2004). In Japan, as thecharacteristics of labor unions is enterprise unions, collective bargaining mainly
takes place at enterprise-level. On the contrary, in France due to the predominanceof industry unions, the essential level of collective bargaining is industry level.
Nevertheless, in many countries, there were pressures for decentralization in the
1990’s due to the necessity to give companies more leeway to adapt to increasingly
volatile international markets and faster moving competition. In both countries, we
can observe a trend towards the decentralization of the bargaining process. The
term “Decentralization” is used in the sense of a shift from higher to lower levels inthe decision process over certain issues, as defined by an OECD report39.
39 OECD report in 1994 on “Collective bargaining levels”

48This report made a useful distinction between disorganized and organized forms ofdecentralization. It defined the former as a breakdown or a dismantling of
higher-level arrangements, whereas organized forms of decentralization refers to
the delegation from higher-level parties to a lower level over certain issues incollective bargaining. Japan and France offer interesting examples of the two typesof decentralization.
B.1. Disorganized form of decentralization in Japan
It has been said that the spring wage offensive, the “Shunto” system created in themid 1950’ compensates the defects of Japan’s decentralized industrial relations suchas the weak bargaining power of industry federations or National Centers and theirlack of influence on national labor policies (ARAKI, 2002, p.166).
As seen before, this system intends to spread a level of wage increases from leading
companies in key industries to other companies and industries by synchronizing
enterprise-level collective negotiations. The outcomes of the "Shunto” affect wage
levels in the public sector, because the National Personnel Agency refers to it inrecommending standard wage increases for public service employees. It also
indirectly has an impact on wages of employees in non-organized companies
because regional minimum wages, revised every fall, are set with reference to the“Shunto” increases. In this manner, until recently, the “Shunto” system madeJapanese decentralized collective labor relations work as if they were centralized.
However, since the mid 1990’s, the effectiveness of the “Shunto” has beenquestioned. After the collapse of the bubble economy in 1990, the Japanese economy
went into severe recession. In parallel, the labor market underwent importantchanges with the significant augmentation of “non regular workers, such as
part-time workers and dispatched workers. Between 1995 and 2001, the number ofthis type of workers increased by 36 percent, according to surveys of the Ministry ofLabor. Consequently the raise of wages declined continuously from 2.8 percent in1995 to 1.7 percent in 2002, as shown by the studies of the Ministry of Labor.
Therefore, management and unions began to plead for a reform of the “Shunto”
system”. The National Center representing employers, named Nikkeiren started
criticizing the “Shunto” system”, because of the high-costs of this system for theJapanese economy. Nikkeiren defended the opinion that wage hikes should be basedon the productivity growth and the capacity of each company. Until now, the49

Japanese Business Federation has taken the same position. The Position Paper of
Nippon Keidanren of 2006 “Employers, be righteous and strong” asserts that“across-the-board base wage increase that raise wage levels even for companies thathave not improved productivity belong to the past (…) Wage at each company
should be determined by management and labor un accordance with that company’s
circumstances”. On the side of labor unions, industrial federations within Rengo
also began to debate on the reform of “Shunto” in the mid-1990’s due to the difficulty
to achieve across-the board-wage increases and the administrative cost of thesystem. The declining importance of inter-union coordination became apparent in2002. Indeed Rengo National Center decided no to stand for a unified request on
basic wage increase during the 2002 “Shunto” and in 2003, it let each industry-level
federation set an industry specific wage increase objective. Besides, some authors
deemed that due to the increase practice of wages’ individualization, the future of“Shunto” system is all the more uncertain. Indeed, it will be more and more difficult
not only to set standard on wage hike during the “Shunto” period, but also to havethe guidelines on wages affect individual employees’ wages, (ARAKI 2002, p.471).
The inter-unions coordination through the “Shunto” system has been considerably
weakening since the mid 1990’s.
Hence, this movement can be analyzed as a dismantling of coordinated bargaining
at level above the enterprise level and as a disorganized decentralization.

B.2. Organized form of decentralization in France
After the two oil crisis in 1973 and 1979, the economy went into recession, the inflation
was around 12% between 1974 and 1982, the number of unemployed persons rose byaround 8% and the growth rate decreased from 5.7% in the 1960’s to 2.5% after the oilchocks. Thus, employers’ organizations began to severely criticize the “favorability

principle”, whereby the most favorable provisions of a norm always prevail, because ithinders the flexibility of companies. Consequently, the lawmaker authorized theconclusion of “dispensatory collective agreements” (accords dérogatoires) at enterpriseor establishment levels that could contain less favorable provisions than the ones of an
upper-level rules. The shift towards the decentralization was very progressive and was
only embedded recently with the Law of May the 4th 2004.

Before the Law of May 2004, flexibility of collective bargaining at company or plantlevels was encouraged, but it was restricted to certain matters. The Law of50

November the 13th 1982 allowed collective agreements at enterprise or
establishment levels to set different provisions, and even less favorable ones, thanthe law, named “dispensatory collective agreements”. These adjustments werelimited to wages increases (article L.132-24) and working time (article L.212-10).
The law of June 1987 extended this possibility (PÉLISSIER and alii, 2004, p.956).
These reforms appear to have given considerable boost to bargaining activity at theenterprise level. In the late 1970’s, industry level agreements outnumberedenterprise agreements by a factor of about two to one. However, by 1986 the numberof enterprise agreements had more than tripled to about 6000, outnumbering
industry agreements by six to one (EYRAUD and alii 1991).
The Act of May the 4th 2004 on social dialogue marked a turning point. This law
broadened the authorization for company or plant levels collective agreements toinclude less favorable provisions than the industry-level collective agreements on
all matters. The lawmaker set very restricted limits to this possibility offered tocollective bargaining at company or plant levels. Under the new article L.132-23 ofLabor Code, the latter agreements cannot contradict industry-level agreements onfour subjects: minimum wages, job classifications, mutual benefits insurance
systems on vocational training and welfare.
However, in spite of this move toward decentralization, collective bargaining at
industry-level has actually continued to play an essential role (JOBERT and
SAGLIO, 2005). Indeed, industry-level unions and employers’ federations can forbid
lower-levels collective bargaining to contain less favorable provisions thanindustry-level collective agreements. Thus, industry federations play a major role in
the promotion of decentralization. Since the enactment of the Law of May 2004, themajority of industry-level agreements prohibited lower-levels collective bargaining
to provide less disadvantageous provisions for employees40. In addition, even thoughlabor and management were allowed to include less favorable clauses in enterpriseor establishment levels collective agreements, they actually rarely used thispossibility. Currently, it is difficult to draw conclusions on the impact of the law, but
for the moment, a limitation of the decentralization movement towards collective
bargaining at company or plant levels can be observed.

40 French Ministry of Labor,“La négociation collective en 2005”, Bilans et rapports, Juin 2006

51

Conclusion on the decentralization of collective bargaining:
In Japan, the inter-unions coordination of National Centers and industrial
federations took place in a decentralized context. There have never been joint
negotiations, like in France, due to the weakness of high-level organizations. For
this reason this coordination movement was not followed by a strengthening in theauthority of National Center and industrial federations. As a result, the trend to
decentralization in Japan can be interpreted as a “re-decentralization” movement(SUZUKI Akira, 2004).
On the contrary, in France, industrial federations have always played a crucial role
in regulating working conditions through industry-level collective agreements.
Therefore, currently even if the lawmaker tries to encourage a shift to enterpriselevel, the movement of decentralization is limited in practice, because theindustry-level collective bargaining has continuously been playing an essential role.

IV. The nature of the relations between labor and management: industrial
conflicts
In relations between labor and management, disagreements will from time to timeoccur if they have different perceptions of what is loyal and fair and when aresolution by discussions or negotiations become impossible. A failure of discussions
and/or collective bargaining may lead to industrial conflicts. Therefore, it is difficult
to establish clear distinctions between collective bargaining and strikes or otherdispute acts. Industrial conflicts may be defined, in a restricted sense, as group orcollective conflicts, which arise when there is a clash of interests between labor andmanagement. This definition does not include disputes involving an individual
worker, called individual disputes. Usually two types of collective industrial
disputes; disputes of rights and disputes of interest are distinguished. Disputes ofrights are about the implementation or interpretation of existing rights andresponsibilities as set forth in laws, collective agreements and work rules or linked
to customs. Disputes of interests can appear concerning the determination of newrights and responsibilities in the collective bargaining process.
However, in Japan the difference between disputes on rights and disputes ofinterests is blurred, because collective agreements, in most of the cases do notcontain normative provisions that spell out specific working conditions in fulldetails (SHIRAI, 2002, p.107-108). In France, the two types of collective industrial52

disputes told apart as they usually occur between different actors (see p.44).
Conflicts on rights will usually oppose elected representatives and management.
Clashes of interests will generally arise between union delegates and management.
Both countries have a legal framework protecting the right for dispute of workers.
In Japanese, article 28 of the Constitution guarantees the right to act collectively,
which as been interpreted as guaranteeing the right for dispute. Article 6 of theLabor Relations Adjustment Laws of September 1946 defines labor disputes as “adisagreement over claims regarding labor relations arising between the parties
concerned with labor relations resulting in either the occurrence of acts of dispute or
the danger of such occurrence”. Then, article 7 specifies the meaning of an act ofdispute: “a strike, a slow down, a lock out or other act or counteract hampering thenormal course of work”. Consequently, any employer is not allowed to restrict theright to dispute without proper reason, and any act doing so will be deemed as
unconstitutional. Then, workers involved in proper disputes acts are exempted fromcivil or criminal liability, in the exception of acts of violence (article 1 paragraph 2
TUL). In the public sector, severe restrictions exist concerning the right for disputeof civil servants, employees of a public corporation and of national enterprise under
the Public Service Law and the Public Corporation and National Enterprise Labor
Relations Law.
In France, the preamble of the constitution of October 27th 1946 guarantees theright to strike. Judges defined the strike as a collective movement of contests,
leading to a total interruption of work in order to obtain professional claims on
working conditions, wages, and security at work for instance. Employees involved instrikes are exempted from civil and criminal liability and cannot be dismissed bytheir employer. It is considered as a suspension of the labor contract, and thus theemployee does not receive wages during the strike’s period, but not as a break of thecontract (article L.521-1 of Labor Code). In the public sector, certain professions
don't have the right to go on strike for security reasons, like police officers,
fire-fighters, soldiers or magistrates. Civil servants enjoy the right to dispute, butthey have to respect a five-day notice period before going on strikes (article L.521-3).
The industrial conflicts of Japan and France take on national characteristics
connected to their own history and culture.

53

A. Collaborative relations between labor and management in Japan
After World War II, labor-management relations were characterized by harsh
confrontations due to the post-war situation. However, there was a shift towards
more collaborative relations in the mid 1970’s. Since 1975, the number of conflicts
has steadily decreased from 7,574 conflicts to 4,230 in 1985. Then it continued to
decline in the 1990’s from 685 in 1995 to 173 in 2004. The number of man-days lost
also felt from more than 8 millions in 1975 by 264 000 in 1985. In 2004, it
represents less than 10 000 days (see above tables). In parallel, since 1975, thenumber of cases related to collective disputes filed before Labor Relations
Commissions has continuously decreased (see p.29).

A.1. Current distinctive features of collective disputes
There is a correlation between the presence of labor unions in companies and thenumber of collective disputes. Indeed, conflicts with acts of dispute are increasing
with the size of the company. As seen above, larger companies are more unionizedthan small and medium-sized companies are. In 2004, the number of workers
involved in industrial actions amounts to 11,472 in companies with 300 up to 999
workers. It decreased to 5,191 in companies with 100 up to 299 workers and to 2,654
in companies with less than 99 workers. Then, there are more industrial disputes inthe secondary sector especially the manufacturing industry and in the public sector
where the labor unions are more strongly implanted traditionally, than in tertiary
sector like bank and insurance and services. The main reasons of conflicts are
wages and staff management. In 2004, labor unions surveyed 41 answered that
49.5% of collective disputes are linked with wages, 33.5% with staff management.
As collective agreements are also dealing with relations between labor unions andmanagement, the number of collective disputes due to the security of these
agreements represents 24.4% of the sources of conflicts.
The characteristic of collective disputes in Japan, comparing to France, is the very
low number of man-days lost (see p.59). In 2004, it amounts to less than 10 000 days.
A low participation of workers and a diminution of the length of conflicts can
explain this fact.

41 The labor unions surveyed could give two answers, because a conflict has always many reasons.

54Short-time span strikes lasting less than half a day are more numerous than strikes
lasting more than half day.
Strikes span in 2004
Strikes more than half day

Strikes less than half day

Number of

Number of workers Number of

Number of workers

companies affected

involved

companies affected

involved

105

6,998

476

30,942

Source: Japanese Ministry of LHW.

A.2. The reasons for the existence of collaborative relations
Historical as well as cultural reasons can explain the existence of collaborative
relations between labor and management.
After the war, the labor movement grew steadily and committed into aggressive
actions. From the mid 1950’s until the mid-1960’s the number of labor disputeincreased significantly.
The direct intervention of the Allied power and the government had an impact on
the relations between labor and management (ARAKI, 2002, p.208). In 1947, anorder of General Mac Arthur and the Allied Powers cancelled a general strike
planned by labor unions, where more than 90% of all organized workers were
expected to participate. Then on July 1948, General Mac Arthur requested thedeprivation of public sector workers’ right to bargain and go on strikes to put an end
to very aggressive public sector union’s movements. The Public Corporation Law
enacted in December 1948 comply with this order. In 1950, the occupational forces
also ordered the expulsion of communists, which caused a change of union leadersfrom communists to moderates ones.
In parallel, the American government and the Japanese Ministry of Trade andIndustry promoted cooperative relations between labor and management throughthe creation of the Japan Productivity Center in 1955. It aimed at promoting
productivity through employment security, the distribution of the productivity
benefits among workers and customers and labor- management consultation
systems. This center created the basis for the development of collaborative
relationship between labor and management.
The specificity of Japanese labor unions with enterprise-unions also helps build
fruitful relations between labor and management. It creates a great solidarity

55

among union workers of the same company, against the other competitors. Workers
have a feeling of identity with their company and interests in its prosperity. Thus,
they don't see the benefits of strikes, but only the drawbacks: a bad reputation of
their company, a loss of benefits and consequently difficulties to improve working
conditions and employment opportunities. Enterprise unions think the same way.
Indeed, according to a survey of the Ministry of LHW, in 2002, 0.4% of the surveyed
unions think strikes are a way to solve problems between employers and employees.
This triggered criticisms and has been refer to as “enterprise egotism”.
In addition, high-level labor organizations do not have the financial power forbacking up strikes.
The society’s disapproval towards strikes can also explain the reluctance of unions
to engage strikes.
Finally, the people ignorance of their rights may cause for the low number of strikes.
According to a survey of NHK in 2003, only 20% of the workers surveyed know theirconstitutional rights and thus the right to organize and to act collectively.

B. Confrontational relations between labor and management in France
Comparing to Japan, relations between labor and management are very
confrontational as statistics on the number of strikes show (see p.59). Although thisnumber has decreased since 1975, it is still very high. Since 1975, the number ofstrikes in the private sector which amounts to around 5 millions in 1975 dropped byaround 1 million in 1985 and leveled of until 1998 where it was approximately 310
000 strikes. However, from 1999 to 2001, the number of strikes increased to 490 000
per year. Then, it continued declining until today. In 2004, 193 000 strikes werelisted in the private sector. The public sector also follows the same trend. However,French characteristics of strikes are that they occur mostly in the public sector andthe transport sector as shown by the table.

56

Thousands

Number of man-days lost due to strikes
2500

2000
1500

1000
500

0
1996

1997

1998

1999

Private sector

2000

2001

Public sector

2002

2003

2004

Transport

Source: French Ministry of Labor, DARESIn 2003, the number of man-days lost in the public sector reached a peak with more than3, 6 millions days lost.

B.1. The current features of strikes in France
Like in Japan, strikes are linked with the presence of labor unions in companies.
Indeed, the number of strike grows with the presence of labor unions in companies,
as reveals by the table.
The number of strikes and the unionization rate by size of establishments
2003, in the private sector
Size of establishments

Unionization rate

Number of strikes
per 1000 workers

More than 500 workers

8.7%

45

From 100 to 499 workers

8.3%

28

From 50 to 99 workers

5.4%

15

Less than 50 workers

3.5%

2

Source: Ministry of Labor.
Then, the most unionized sectors are the ones where strikes are more numerous.
Indeed, the public industry sector with a trade unionization rate of 15% and the
manufacturing industry where 7.5% are unionized are mostly affected strikes. By

57

contrast, in the tertiary sectors where the unionization rate is weak, like services,
retail or building, the rate of acts of disputes is low.
The number of strikes by industry per 1000 workers in 2004 in the private sector
Industry

2004

Manufacturing industry

33

Services (without transport)

8

Retail4

Building

3

Source: Ministry of Labor.

The number of man-days lost is very high, comparing to Japan. Indeed, in theprivate sector, the number of workers committed into strikes is quite important.
From 1996 to 2004, it was around 33% on average. Moreover, strike-span is very
long, even if it has decreased from 4 days in 2001 to around 3 days in 2004.
Concerning the themes of collective disputes, wages and staff management are themain reasons of conflicts, like in Japan. In 2004, among all the listed claims ofcollective disputes, 39% dealt with wage-related matters, and 25% with
employment questions. Working conditions are the third main reasons for conflicts.

B.2. The reasons for the persistent confrontations between labor, management andthe State
Historically, there has always been a habit of revolutions or demonstrations totopple over the government or to impose changes. The most important conflicts arestill caused by the State’s reforms. Indeed, the number of strikes reached a peak in
1995 with 5 millions man-days lost, due to oppositions against the government’s
proposal to reform welfare insurance. In 2003, more than 3.6 millions days lost of
strikes were counted, because of the reform of the retirement pension system by
Minister of Labor, Mr. Fillon. Recently, the proposal of Prime Minister De Villepin in
January 2006 to create a new contract for promoting employment of young people
under the age of 26 year-old, namely “First Hiring Contract”, triggered many strikes.
Students, at the beginning of February 2006, first launched demonstrations. The
climax was reached in March 28th where 1 055 000 persons went on strike. At
company or plant levels, in the private sector, the number of conflicts increased58

after the enactment of the “Aubry” laws of 1998 and 2000 on the reduction ofworking time imposing collective bargaining at enterprise or plant levels. In 2000,
the second theme of collective disputes was working time after wages. It represents
29% of the reasons for conflicts, the highest rate never reached before42. Then, thespecificity of French labor unions, formed outside companies, entailed greatsolidarity between workers of different companies. The centralized structure oflabor unions also enables labor unions National Centers to organize important
strikes. Finally, contrary to Japan, the attitude of society at large towards strikes isvery favorable.

Conclusion on industrial disputes:
In both countries, collective disputes are linked with the presence of labor unions.
However, the characteristics of Japanese and French labor unions shaped relations
between labor and management representatives. In Japan, the structure of labor
unions concentrated at enterprise level, as well as the development of jointlabor-management consultation systems helped build fruitful and cooperative
relations between labor unions and employers. In France, as labor unions wereformed outside enterprises and have always been committed into aggressive
movements aiming at obtaining changes from the government, their attitude is very
confrontational towards employers and the government. As a result, the number ofstrikes as well as the man-days lost is very low in Japan comparing to France.

42

French Ministry of Labor, “Les conflits collectifs en 2002-2003” (Labor disputes in 2002

and 2003) n.18-4, Mai 2005

59

Number of acts of disputes in the private sector
1600

Number of disputes

1400
1200
1000
Japan
France

800
600
400
200
0
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Year

Man-days lost due to acts of disputes
in the private sector

Japan
France700000

Number of days

60000050000040000030000020000010000001996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year

Sources:- The Japanese Ministry of Labor, Health and Welfare.
- The French Ministry of Labor.

60

Discussions on the contribution of a comparative approach
In both countries, labor unions are the traditional and main way to express anddefend workers’ opinions. However, the falling union density, the enlarging share ofatypical workers and of skilled workers, as well as the evolution towards tertiaryindustry and the globalization are challenging this type of employee representation
system. Therefore, it is necessary either to enable labor unions to adapt to thesechanges or to devise new types of communication channels between employees andemployers through non-union employee representation systems.
In Japan, in light of the growing number of individual disputes, the major issue is toconceive a new type of collective employee representation system enabling
communication between employees and managers to prevent conflicts. As stated
before, in France, the lawmaker achieved creating an alternative employee
representative system to labor unions. Indeed, the lawmaker embodied the
proposals of labor unions and employers’ organizations in the cross-sector national
collective agreement of October 1995. Furthermore, the law avoided to create
conflictsofjurisdictions

betweenlabor

unionsandnon-union

employeerepresentation systems as the latter only act in the absence of labor unions.
Therefore, labor unions and employers’ organizations accepted the law of May the
4th 2004 more easily. In Japan, until recently there have never been jurisdictional
conflicts between non-union representation systems and enterprise-unions as they
are playing different roles. Nevertheless, the recent governmental proposal,
released in June of this year on the labor contract, may entail conflicts ofjurisdictions. Indeed, the new devised employee representation system will not be
set up to compensate the lack of labor unions. The way French lawmaker tackled
this issue may be an interesting contribution. First, a new type of collective
employee system should be invented in the absence of labor unions to avoid
jurisdictional

conflicts.

Second,laborrepresentatives

andmanager’s

representatives could strive to propose their own solution.
In France, the main challenge is to create industrial peace. Contrary to Japan, labor
unions have always been involved in harsh confrontations with the managers’
representatives and the government. This can explain, among other reasons,France’s problems to commit into major reforms to face the issues of aging

61

population and unemployment. The report pointed out that the borderline between
labor unions, endowed with negotiation function, and elected representatives
playing a communication role is fading. In other terms, the differences between two
channels of employee representation systems at enterprise-level are less clear than
before.

This study has highlighted that in Japan, enterprise-unions are acting likethe works councils, through labor-management joint consultation mechanisms.
These systems enabled to create fruitful and cooperative relations between labor
unions and employers. Hence, we can wonder if in France this connection between
labor unions and elected representatives will lead to less adversarial relations
between labor unions employers in companies, as it was the case in Japan.
Finally, it is interesting to point the effects of the state intervention in industrial
relations. The French government has always been actively involved to compensate
the structural deficiencies of industrial relations. Labor unions have relied on thestate to initiate the development of collective bargaining. Therefore, labor unions
have not been very much concerned by the divisions of labor union movement anddid not make great efforts to organize new workers to limit the decrease ofunionization rate, comparing to Japan. By contrast, due to the indirect commitmentof the Japanese state into relations between labor and management representatives,
labor unions did not count on the government to compensate the decline of the tradeunionization rate. This can explain the efforts made by labor union movement tounify in the 1980’s and they constant efforts to organize new workers.
In both countries, the most crucial issue is to find a good balance between therespect of the autonomy of labor and management representatives and theintervention of the State to compensate the defects of such autonomy.

62

ANNEX 1: Bibliography
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63

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III. Statistics and reports
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July 1994.

66

ANNEX 2: Interviews- THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF LABOR, HEALTH AND WELFARE.
- NIPPON KEIDANREN, the Japan Business Federation.
- RENGO, the Japan Trade Union Confederation.
- ZENROREN, the National Confederation of Trade Unions.
- UI ZENSEI, the Japanese Federation of Textile, Chemical, Food, Commercial,
Service and General Workers’ Unions (affiliated to RENGO).
- JAM, the Japanese Association of Metal, Machinery and Manufacturing Workers’
Union (affiliated to RENGO).
The author also conducted interviews with enterprise-based unions in one large
company and two small and medium-sized companies.
- Yuichiro MIZUMACHI, Associate Professor of Labor Law at the University ofTokyo.
- Yoichi SHIMADA, Associate Dean and Professor of Law at Waseda University.
- Hiromasa SUZUKI, Professor of Labor Economics at Waseda University.
- Kaoko OKUDA, Professor of Labor Law at the University of Kyoto.

67