MULTINATIONAL DESIGN EVALUATION PROGRAMMEANNUAL REPORTMARCH 2012 – MARCH 2013
April 2013

N U C L E A R

E N E R G Y

A G E N C YTABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword ........................................................................................................................................................ 5
Executive summary ....................................................................................................................................... 6
1.

Introduction.......................................................................................................................................... 82.

Programme goals and outcomes....................................................................................................... 8

3.

Self assessment .................................................................................................................................. 94.

Programme implementation ............................................................................................................... 9
4.1 Membership ..................................................................................................................................... 9
4.2 Organisational structure ................................................................................................................ 10
4.3 MDEP Library ................................................................................................................................ 11
4.4 Common positions ......................................................................................................................... 115.

Interactions with other organisations ............................................................................................. 12

6.

Current activities ............................................................................................................................... 13
6.1 EPR Working Group (EPRWG) ................................................................................................... 14
6.2 AP1000 Working Group (AP1000WG) ........................................................................................ 18
6.3 APR-1400 Working Group (APR1400WG) .................................................................................. 21
6.4 Vendor Inspection Co-operation Working Group (VICWG) ......................................................... 22
6.5 Codes and Standards Working Group (CSWG) .......................................................................... 25
6.6 Digital Instrumentation & Controls Working Group (DICWG) ...................................................... 27

7.

Interim results .................................................................................................................................... 30

8.

Next steps – Future of the programme ........................................................................................... 30

Appendices
Appendix A – Table of acronyms ............................................................................................................... 333

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORTFOREWORD FROM THE POLICYGROUP CHAIRMAN

lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi
accident, which has direct impact on both
operating and new reactor programmes. We will
participate in additional witnessed and joint
vendor inspections, further broadening ourunderstanding of issues of mutual interest andenhancing our ability to address concerns that
may arise. We will further our work in the area of
evaluating, and where appropriate, harmonisingcodes and standards. In addition, we willcontinue our discussions regarding potential cooperation in the areas of construction inspection
and commissioning activities. These activities will
enable a growing MDEP membership to further
advance the programme’s main mission ofleveraging resources and expertise for common
benefit.

Washington D.C., 26 April 2013
In January 2013, I was honoured to assume
the Chairmanship of the MDEP Policy Group,and grateful for my warm welcome into the
MDEP community. It is always a pleasure to join
an organisation that is doing good work. The
contents of this report demonstrate anothersuccessful year for MDEP, in which theprogramme continues its collaborative work on
both design-specific and generally-applicableissues.
There are a number of important initiatives
underway that are providing direct benefit to all
countries involved, and the information produced
during the course of this work has even broader
benefit. In the past year, member countries
gained insight from the Atomic Energy
Regulatory Board of India, which participated in
its first MDEP meetings. We have also welcomed
into our membership the Federal Authority for
Nuclear Regulation (FANR) of the United ArabEmirates. FANR’s participation, and in particular,
the creation of a new design-specific working
group to address issues specific to the
APR-1400 reactor design, demonstrates a strong
interest in MDEP on the part of countries withemerging nuclear power programmes.

In reflecting on MDEP’s accomplishments in thepast year and the important and interesting workthat lies ahead, I would be remiss not torecognise the tireless efforts of the outgoing
Policy Group Chairman, Mr André-Claude
Lacoste. MDEP’s accomplishments to date, andspecifically those detailed in this annual report,
are due in large measure to his vision andleadership.
Not surprisingly, MDEP functions best when all of
its members participate fully in the programme.
Based on what I have seen thus far, I believe weare on track for another successful year.
Dr Allison Mcfarlane
MDEP Policy Group Chairman

In the coming year, we expect this good work
to continue. We will continue our co-operation on

MDEP Policy Group Meeting - 15 March 20135

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORTEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

improvements were identified in terms ofprogramme implementation to increase outreach,identify completion strategies and increase
membership.

The
Multinational
DesignEvaluation
Programme (MDEP) is a multinational initiative toleverage the resources and knowledge ofnational regulatory authorities who are, or will
soon, undertake the review of new reactor power
plant designs. MDEP member countries are:Canada, China, Finland, France, India, Japan,
Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, theUnited Kingdom (UK) and the United States(US). In addition to these members, the national
regulator for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has
been accepted as an Associate Member. The
IAEA also takes part in the work of MDEP and
the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
performs the technical secretariat support
function for MDEP.

Three design-specific working groups
facilitate MDEP’s programme goal of enhanced
co-operation. The EPR working group comprises
the regulatory authorities of France, Finland, theUS, the UK, China, and India. The AP1000
working group comprises the regulatory
authorities of Canada, China, the UK, and the
US. The APR-1400 working group includes theregulatory authorities of Korea, the US, Finland,
and the UAE. The design-specific working
groups have been successful in sharing
information and experience on the safety design
reviews in order to enhance the safety of thedesigns, enable regulators to make timely
licensing decisions, and promote the safety andstandardisation of designs through MDEP cooperation.

MDEP incorporates a broad range ofactivities including enhancing multilateral cooperation within existing regulatory frameworks,
and increasing multinational convergence ofcodes, standards, guides, and safety goals. A
key concept throughout the work of MDEP is thatnational regulators retain sovereign authority for
all licensing and regulatory decisions.

The Vendor Inspection Co-operation Working
Group (VICWG) has achieved its short-termgoals and continues to focus on maximisinginformation sharing, conducting joint inspections(multiple regulators inspecting to the regulatory
requirements of one member country) andwitnessing of other regulators’ inspections. A
total of seven witnessed and joint inspections
were conducted through MDEP in 2012. The
VICWG also works with Standards Development
Organisations (SDOs) to encourage and explore
harmonisation of quality standards. The working
group continues to make progress towards
achieving its long-term goal of harmonising asignificant portion of the quality assurance
inspection procedures.

The programme of work consists of shortterm activities/goals that result in significant
benefits with a minimum use of resources.
Working groups implement the activities
according to the programme plans, which are
tailored to their specific activities and goals. They
have also established the necessary interfaces
both within and beyond MDEP membership. This
report provides information regarding the current
status of the programme after its fifth year of
implementation.

The Digital Instrumentation and Controls
Working Group (DICWG) has identified 12 topics
to pursue/explore in order to foster thedevelopment of common positions based on theexisting standards, national regulatory guidance,
best practices, and group inputs using an agreed
upon process and framework. To date, theworking group has published five common
positions on Software Tools, Communication
Independence, Simplicity in Design, Verification
and Validation, and Impact of Cyber Security
Features on DI&C Safety Systems. Those
common positions have been made publicly
available on the MDEP website. The DICWG isenhancing its co-operation with the SDOs, theInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers(IEEE) and the International ElectrotechnicalCommission (IEC). In addition, the DICWG

Significant progress is being made on
MDEP’s overall goals of increased co-operationand enhanced convergence of requirements andpractices. In addition, the lessons learned fromthe 11 March 2011 events at the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant are being
appropriately incorporated into MDEP activities.
1

A self-assessment of the programme wasconducted in 2012 to evaluate whether MDEP is
meeting its goals and to identify areas for
improvement. The results indicated that MDEP is
meeting its stated objectives. Based on the
results of the assessment it was decided that thecurrent programme of work continue. Some
1

Available at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/mdep/workinggroups/stc.html

6

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT
members jointly review and comment on
proposed IEC, IEEE, and IAEA standards thatare relevant to the regulatory review of DI&C
systems.

harmonisation of pressure-boundary codesand standards;
 finalising common positions on DI&C for
new reactors in the areas of: Software
Tools for the Development of Software for
Safety Systems, Principles of Data
Communication
Independence,andPrinciples on Simplicity in Design;

The Codes and Standards Working Group(CSWG) has completed an evaluation of thecode comparison performed by the SDOs, which,with the encouragement and support of theworking group, compared the Class 1 pressure
vessel codes and developed a database that
identified the similarities and differences between
the Korean, Japanese, Russian, Canadian, andFrench codes with the ASME code. The CSWG
is working closely with SDOs and the World
Nuclear Association’s Working Group on Cooperation in Reactor Design Evaluation andLicensing (WNA/CORDEL) to converge code
requirements and reconcile code differences. In
addition, the CSWG has drafted a technicalreport and three common positions.

 establishing the APR-1400 design-specificworking group and prioritisation of four
topics for future discussion; bringing the new members, India and theUAE, to pace and started to incorporate
their views into the MDEP products thathave already been issued;
 holding several seminars to discuss areasthat the Canadian regulator designated as
focus areas for their review of the AP1000
design;

MDEP’smembership,
structureandprocesses provide an effective method foraccomplishingincreased
co-operationinregulatory design reviews. The interim results for2012 attest to MDEP’s relevance and efficiency;
they include: finalisingaTechnical
Reporton“Regulatory Frameworks for the Use of
Nuclear Pressure Boundary Codes andStandards in MDEP Countries”, and a
Common Position on “Lessons Learned on
Achieving Harmonisation of Codes andStandards
for
Pressure
Boundary
Components in Nuclear Power Plants”.

 the preparation of a comparison report on
the differences in probabilistic safetyassessment modelling and results for the
EPR; the preparation of technical reports on the
differences among the designs in eachcountry about the arrangement andconfiguration of the severe accident heatremoval system injection lines into thecore catcher, and the pH control for the incontainment refuelling water storage tankfor the EPR;
 the development of a common position
addressing Fukushima-related issues for
the EPR; co-operation on six witnessed vendor
inspections and one joint inspection;
 interaction with SDOs to complete andissue comparison tables of the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code with
French, Japanese, Korean, Canadian andRussian codes for Class 1 pressure
vessels, piping, pumps, and valves.
Evaluation of the report and conclusions
drawn regarding the code-comparison and7

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT
among regulators will improve the effectivenessand efficiency of the regulatory design reviews,
which are part of each country’s licensing
process. The goal of MDEP is not to develop
new regulatory standards independently, but tobuild upon the existing similarities andharmonised practices drawn-up by the IAEA andother safety standards. In addition, the common
positions developed in MDEP are shared with
IAEA for consideration in the its standards
development programme.

MULTINATIONAL DESIGN EVALUATIONPROGRAMME
1.

INTRODUCTION

The
Multinational
DesignEvaluation
Programme (MDEP) is a multinational initiativethat develops innovative approaches to leverage
the resources and knowledge of national
regulatory authorities who are, or will shortly be,
undertaking the review of new reactor power
plant designs. MDEP has evolved from a design
evaluation programme to a multinational cooperation programme that includes inspection
activities and generic issues.

MDEP is meeting its goal of enabling
increased co-operation through the activities of
the working groups. MDEP has been very
successful in providing a forum for regulatory
bodies to co-operate on design evaluations andinspections. In addition to organising working
groups, MDEP has provided each regulator withpeer contacts who share information, discuss
issues informally, and disseminate information
rapidly. For example, the design-specific working
group members have benefitted significantly fromthe sharing of questions among the regulators,
resulting in more informed, and harmonised,
regulatory decisions. MDEP members have also
been highly successful in co-ordinating vendor
inspections in which the regulators shareobservations and insights. MDEP has madeimprovements in communicating information
regarding the members’ regulatory practices
through development of an MDEP Library which
serves as a central repository for all documents
associated with the programme.

A key concept throughout MDEP is that eachregulatory authority retain sovereign authority
over licensing and regulatory decisions and thatthe programme help regulatory authorities makeinformed decisions through multinational cooperation.
The programme of work consists of activities
chosen because they could be accomplished in
the near term and would result in significant
benefits while requiring minimum resources.
Working groups implement the activities in2
accordance with the programme plans ; they all
have specific activities and goals and haveestablished the necessary interfaces both within
and outside MDEP members. Significant
progress has been made over the past year on
the overall MDEP goals of increased cooperation and enhanced convergence of
requirements and practices. Accomplishments todateprovideconfidence
that
MDEP’smembership, structure and processes provide aneffective method of accomplishing increased cooperation in regulatory design reviews. The
progress that has already been achieved
demonstrates that a broader level of co-operationand convergence is both possible and desirable.

MDEP is meeting its goal of convergence ofregulatory practices by establishing common
positions in both the issue-specific and designspecific working groups. The working groups aremaking comparisons of the regulatory practices
in the member countries, identifying differences,and developing common positions. The working
groups are also working with codes andstandards organisations to identify differences
and propose areas of convergence.

This report provides a status update of the
programme after its fifth year of implementation.

2.

MDEP has been successful in meeting the
expected outcomes as defined in the MDEP
Terms of Reference by: increasing knowledgetransfer, identifying similarities and differences in
the regulatory practices; and enhancing theability of regulatory bodies to co-operate inreactor design evaluations, vendor inspections,and construction oversight, leading to more
efficient and more safety-focused regulatory
decisions.

PROGRAMME GOALS AND OUTCOMES

The main objectives of MDEP are to enable
increased co-operation and establish mutuallyagreed upon practices to enhance the safety of
new reactor designs. The enhanced co-operation
2

Available at www.oecd-nea.org/mdep

8

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT Open at least a part of the MDEP Library

The events of 11 March 2011, at the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant further
highlight the need to continue this effort, and thelessons learned from Fukushima are being
appropriately incorporated into MDEP activities.

to non-MDEP representatives and invite
non-MDEP organisations to attend issuespecific working group meetings asappropriate; Enhanceinteractions
with
IAEA
counterparts to identify areas in which
MDEP can provide useful input to IAEA
safety standards under development;

3. SELF ASSESSMENT
In order to assess the progress that MDEP
has made towards achieving its goals ofenhancing the safety of new reactor design
reviews and promoting the harmonisation ofregulatory requirements, a self-assessment was
initiated in September 2011. The goal of the selfassessment was to evaluate whether MDEP
activities meet the needs of both members andother relevant stakeholders such as industry,
standards organisations, and non-member
regulators, and to identify improvements andadjustments to current and future MDEP
activities. Input was solicited from both MDEP
members and external groups to getcomprehensive and diverse input. The survey
responses indicated that MDEP members view
the programme as a unique and useful forum toconnect with experts from other regulators.
MDEP members strongly agree that MDEP is
meeting the goals and outcomes stated in theTerms of Reference, and both internal andexternal stakeholders believe that the mosteffective aspect of MDEP is the co-operation andexchange of information it facilitates for design
reviews.

 Identify completion strategies (including
final products, recommendations to SDOs
or other organisations for follow-up activity)in the issue-specific working group
Programme Plans; Continue the activities of the designspecific working groups at least throughthe construction oversight phase; Act quickly to implement new designspecific working groups (consistent withthe existing Rule of Three for forming
design-specific working groups);

 Support increasing MDEP membershipconsistent with the existing guidance, andencourage participation in MDEP by any
national regulators who are considering
designs under MDEP review.
4.

4.1 Membership

The results of the self-assessment indicatedthat no significant changes were warranted to
MDEP and that the current programme of work
should continue. However, the members agreed
that some actions should be taken to improve
communications, and make MDEP activities
more effective. The survey results identified thefollowing actions, which have now been
completed:

MDEP’s membership is intended for mature,experienced national regulatory authorities ofinterested countries that have already committed
to new build or have firm plans to commit tobuilding new reactor designs in the near future.
MDEP’s founding members are: Canada, China,
Finland, France, Japan, Korea, the RussianFederation, South Africa, the United Kingdom
and the United States. The IAEA also takes partin MDEP’s work. MDEP’s Policy Group (PG) has
discussed potential expansion of MDEP
membership and several national regulatory
authorities have expressed interest in joining
MDEP. In 2012, the PG approved the Indian
nuclear regulator, the Atomic Energy Regulatory
Board (AERB), to join MDEP as a full member.

 Develop an agreed upon definition of
convergence to be used for MDEP
activities, in the form of a revision to theTerms of Reference; Modify the MDEP Terms of Reference tobetter reflect MDEP expected interactions
with the public;

 Develop

PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATIONIn January 2011, the PG approved additional
levels of MDEP membership. An MDEP
associate member will be a national regulatory
authority without previous licensing experiencethat has been invited by the PG to participate inacommunication plan that
identifies stakeholders and specificcommunication products;

9

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT
selected MDEP design-specific activities basedon evidence that the organisation is actively
involved in new reactor design review activities
relevant to MDEP. Such a regulatory authority
would be from a country that has made a firm
commitment in the near term to proceed withsafety design review activities, has proprietary
agreements with the vendor, and is willing andready to contribute to specific MDEP activities. It
is expected that the associate member would bein a position to exchange information with MDEP
members to enhance information sharing andexperience in relevant design safety reviews.

4.2 Organisational structure

In August 2012, the PG invited the United
Arab Emirates’ Federal Authority for Nuclear
Regulation (FANR) to join MDEP as an associate
member. As an associate member, FANR
participates in the APR-1400 Working Group,and observes meetings of MDEPS’s Steering
Technical Committee (STC) and MDEP’s issuespecific working groups.

-

The PG also recognises that there are othernational regulatory authorities that may also
benefit from close interaction with MDEP. For
example there are several countries that have anexperienced nuclear regulatory organisation, arealready regulating nuclear power plants and also
have mid- to long-term plans to pursue newreactor licensing and construction. Suchregulators could clearly benefit from interactingwith MDEP now and, in the near future, could beclear candidates to become MDEP members or
associate members. It is therefore the intent toinvite some experienced regulators to become
MDEP candidates with the purpose of that
regulators benefit from the issue-specific andgeneric aspects of MDEP.

DESIGN SPECIFIC WORKING GROUPS:
CO-OPERATIONISSUE SPECIFIC WORKING GROUPS:CONVERGENCE

The programme is governed by a PolicyGroup (PG), made up of the heads of theparticipating organisations, and implemented by
a Steering Technical Committee (STC) and its
working groups. The STC consists of senior staff
representatives from each of the participating
national safety authorities, plus a representativefrom the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA).
The PG provides guidance to the STC on theoverall approach; monitors the progress of the
programme; and determines participation in it.
The STC manages and approves thedetailed programme of work including: defining
topics and working methods, establishingtechnical working groups, and nomination ofexperts; approving procedures and technicalpapers developed by the working groups;
establishing interfaces with other international
efforts to benefit from available work and avoid
duplication; developing procedures for thehandling of information to be shared in the
project; reporting to the PG; identifying new
topics for the programme to address; and10

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT
3establishing subcommittees of the STC to study
specific topics.

website. The STC, through the secretariat, willcontinue to add documents and makeenhancements to improve the effectiveness of
the library.

The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
performs the technical secretariat function in
support of MDEP.

In order for MDEP to be successful infulfilling its goal of leveraging the work of peer
regulators in the licensing of new nuclear power
plant designs, a framework was developed tofacilitate the sharing of technical information
among MDEP participants, which at times may
include the sharing of proprietary and other typesof sensitive information. As a general rule, theinformation exchanged as part of the MDEP in
meetings and the MDEP Library is solely forparticipating national regulatory authorities’ use.
The members of the design-specific working
groups also have a communication protocol toshare MDEP positions on topics with othermembers before releasing this information into
the public domain. A large portion of theinformation shared may not be proprietary or
sensitive; however, all participating members
must protect and properly handle the informationthat an originator claims to be proprietary or
sensitive.

Two lines of activities have been establishedto carry out the work.
 Design-specificactivities.
Workinggroups for each new reactor design share
information on a timely basis and cooperate on specific reactor design
evaluations and construction oversight.
Participants in these working groups are
the regulatory authorities that are actively
reviewing, preparing to review, or
constructing the specific reactor design. A
design-specific working group is formed
when three or more MDEP member
countries express interest in working
together. Under the design-specificworking groups, expert subgroups havebeen formed to address specific technicalissues.
 Issue-specific activities. Working groups
are organised for the technical andregulatory process areas within the
programme of work. These currently
include, but are not limited to, vendor
inspections, pressure boundary component
codes and standards, and DI&C standards.
Membership in issue-specific working
groups is open to all MDEP participating
countries and the IAEA representatives.

4.4. Common positions
MDEP has developed a process for
identifying and documenting common positions
on specific issues among the member countries
which may be based on existing standards,
national regulatory guidance, best practices, andgroup member inputs. Design-specific Common
Positions document common conclusions
reached by working group members during
design reviews. Discussions among themembers and sharing of information in theseareas help to strengthen the individual
conclusions reached. Design-specific Common
Positions require only working group members toagree on them because they need to be issued
more quickly and the responsibility for thesedecisions rests with the regulators performing thedesign reviews.

4.3 MDEP Library
MDEP information is communicated among
the members through the MDEP Library which
serves as a central repository for all documents
associated with the programme. The NEA
provides the technical support for thedevelopment and maintenance of the library on a
website. The website provides for 2 levels ofaccess which are password protected: (1) MDEP
member countries, and (2) member countries
participating in design-specific working groups.
Access to the library is based on requests of the
STC member for each participating country andgenerally provided to STC members andmembers of the working groups. Publicly
available documents related to MDEP areavailable on the MDEP page of the the NEA

Generic Common Positions apply genericallyrather than only to one design. Generic Common
Positions document practices and positions thateach of the working group members findacceptable. The common positions are intended
to provide guidance to the regulators in reviewing
new or unique areas, and will be shared with the311www.oecd-nea.org/mdep

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORTIAEA and other standards organisations forconsideration
instandards
development
programmes. After a Generic Common Positionis agreed to by a working group, it is presented to
the STC for endorsement. Upon endorsement by
the STC, the proposed Generic Common
Positions are made publicly available on the NEA
MDEP website for external stakeholder
information and comment. Those Common
Positionswill
becomebest
practices,
recommended by MDEP. There is no obligationon the part of any regulatory body to follow them.
If a regulatory body chooses to adopt a GenericCommon Position, it would be through thatcountry’s normal processes.
5.

specific working groups. In addition, the GenericCommon Positions developed by MDEP will beshared with the IAEA for consideration in the
IAEA standards development programme.
MDEP’s working groups are very interested
in understanding the perspectives of the design
vendors, codes and standards organisations, andcomponent manufacturers in MDEP activities, andthe challenges they face in dealing with numerous
regulators and regulatory systems. MDEP’s
working groups interact with, and invite industry
groups to participate in, selective portions ofmeetings and other activities. For example:
 the Codes and Standards Working Group
interacted with a committee of SDOs
(ASME, JSME, KEPIC, AFCEN, NIKIET
and CSA) in a code comparison project;

INTERACTIONS WITH OTHER
ORGANISATIONS

 the EPR working group meets regularly
with representatives of AREVA, EDF, andother EPR-licensees, applicants, andpotential applicants to discuss similarities
and differences among the EPR designs
being licensed in each country;

MDEP recognises that other organisations
are implementing programmes to facilitate
international co-operation on new reactors.
These means should be available to countries
interested in new build, but do not meet thecriteria for entrance to MDEP. MDEP strives tokeep abreast of, and interact with these othergroups to ensure against duplication and tobenefit from the results of these activities. MDEP
also communicates its activities and results toother organisations. In order to maintain its
specificity, MDEP focuses on short-term activities
related to specific design reviews conducted bymember countries as well efforts to harmonise
specific regulatory practices and standards.

 the Digital Instrumentation and Controls
WorkingGroup(DICWG)
interacts
frequently with applicable standards
organisations, the IEC and IEEE, byinviting representatives of the IEC andIEEE to MDEP meetings, attending theIEC and IEEE meetings, and involving themin the development of common positions.
The working group communicates specificsuggestions to the standards organisations
and the IAEA for consideration ofharmonisation in a timely manner when
they are identified during its activities;

The CNRA Working Group on the Regulationof New Reactors (WGRNR) examines theregulatory issues of siting, licensing andregulatory oversight of Generation III+ andGeneration IV nuclear reactors. The current
focus areas of the WGRNR are construction
experience and siting issues. The WGRNR coordinates its work with the work performed by
MDEP such that it utilises its outputs and does
not duplicate its efforts. It extends the results of
MDEP to other CNRA members. MDEP interacts
with the CNRA WGRNR and Working Group on
Inspection Practices (WGIP) through the NEA
staff who also serve as the technical secretariat
for the CNRA. WGRNR is the focal point ofinteractions between MDEP and the CNRA and
its working groups, and will assist in coordinating
communications
andrequests
between the two activities.

 WNA/CORDEL met with members of the
MDEP Codes and Standards Working
Group (CSWG). Both MDEP and CORDEL
see some benefits in collaborating in the
areas
of
codes
and
standards
harmonisation and safety classification;
 WNA/CORDEL also met with the STC toshare their status of work and their viewson harmonisation, and has opened theway to further interaction with MDEP
working groups.

The IAEA participates in the work of MDEP
through participation in the PG, STC, and issue-

122012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT

6. CURRENT ACTIVITIESThe current activities of MDEP are being
implemented through design-specific and issuespecific working groups. The members of thedesign-specificworkinggroupsshare
information and co-operate on specific reactor
design evaluations and construction oversight.
Issue-specific working groups are organised forthe technical and regulatory process areas
within the programme of work. Each working
group has a lead and co-lead country
designated and has developed a programmeplan that identifies specific activities, schedules
and contacts.

13

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT

Olkiluoto 3 EPR reactor, Finland: 5 March 2013. Copyright TVO.

6.1 EPR Design-specific Working Group

Accidents andTransients
Probabilistic
SafetyAssessment

EPR Working
Group

DigitalInstrumentation andControls

Severe Accidents

United States and referenced by four combined
license applications. In November 2008, China
and the UK were added as members. China(NNSA) issued construction permits for two
EPRs at the Taishan site, and construction isunderway. The UK ONR is nearing completion of
its Generic Design Assessment of the UK- EPR
at the joint request of EDF and Areva. Canada(CNSC)’s review of the EPR design was placedon hold at AREVA’s request.
The working group currently includes four
subgroups that are addressing specific technicalissues: Accidents and Transients, Digital
Instrumentation
andControls(DI&C),
Probabilistic Safety Assessment, and Severe
Accidents. The subgroups meet regularly to
exchange information on relevant aspects of thedesign review status, share relevant evaluations
when they become available, produce technicalreports to identify and document similarities anddifferences among designs, regulatory safety
review approaches and resulting evaluations. In
addition to the expert subgroups, the EPRWG
addressed important ad hoc issues to support
design safety review decision-making, such as
internal hazards, technical specifications and

The EPR Working Group currently consistsof the regulatory authorities of France, Finland,
the US, the UK, India, and China. The regulatory
authority of Canada, previously a member of theworking group, announced in January 2013 its
intention to withdraw from the working group
because it was no longer actively reviewing thisdesign. This working group was established in
January 2006 as a multilateral initiative by
France, Finland and the US. Numerous meetings
and technical exchanges have taken place toexchange information on the reviews being
conducted in each country: Olkiluoto 3, underconstruction in Finland; Flamanville 3 underconstruction in France; and the US version of the
EPR under review for design certification in the14

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT
radiation protection, which included source termissues.

preliminary results of the initiating events
comparisons. A restricted (proprietary) version of
the report will be issued in April 2013, followed
by a public version in October 2013.

Accomplishments

EPRWG Accidents and Transients subgroup

The EPRWG has documented common
MDEP positions on some aspects of the review
to enhance safety and standardisation ofdesigns. It has co-ordinated communication on
MDEP views and common positions to vendors
and operators regarding the basis of safety
evaluations and standardisation. It has drafted
technical reports to identify and document
similarities and differences among designs aswell as approaches to regulatory safety reviews
and the resulting evaluations. The working group
has also documented lessons learned fromdesign reviews and design issues faced during
construction, commissioning and early phases ofoperation.

The Accidents and Transients subgroup is
identifying differences in regulatory criteria andapproaches among the member countries. The
subgroup has developed four products:
1. A survey of the regulatory approaches toanalysis of accidents and transients;
2. An interim position statement on EPR
containment mixing;
3. An interim position statement on mass andenergy release into containment; and4. A report on “Approaches and Criteria usedin the Analysis of Accidents andTransients in MDEP Countries”.

The
EPRWG
met
regularlywithrepresentatives of AREVA, EDF, and other EPRlicensees, applicants, and potential applicants todiscuss similarities and differences among the
EPR designs being licensed in each country. The
WG also met with AREVA to discuss postFukushimasafetyreviews.
AREVA
representatives
discussedtheactions
AREVA/EDF is taking as a result of the
Fukushima accident such as using probabilistic
risk
assessment
toidentify
possible
improvements and to strengthen defence-indepth. It was agreed that the EPRWG and the
EPR family (a forum of organisations involved in
the design and licensing of the EPR in several
countries) via AREVA will continue tocommunicate regarding this issue.

EPRWG Digital Instrumentation and Controls
subgroup
The Digital Instrumentation and Controls(DI&C) subgroup focused on the area ofExtended Loss of Power (ELEP). The results ofthe subgroups’ evaluation will be documented as
Appendix 1 to the EPR Design-specificFukushima Common Position. Progress is being
made by all countries on the EPR Digital I&C
review, and most countries are currently
concentrating on close-out of technical questionsin the DI&C area. The subgroup drafted atechnical report that identifies the differences andsimilarities among the EPR designs and the
major outcomes of EPRWG interactions. This
report is expected to be issued in 2013.

EPRWG Probabilistic Safety
Assessment subgroup
The
Probabilistic
SafetyAssessment
subgroup is identifying the design differences
and modifications affecting risk and the maindifferences in PSAs. The technical expert
subgroup prepared a comparison report of thedifferences in probabilistic safety assessment
modeling and results among the member
countries. The report compares selected internal
initiating events at power including: loss of offsite
power, medium loss of cooling accident, steam
generator tube rupture, and loss of cooling chain.
The subgroup conducted a workshop attended
by the EPRWG members and AREVA/EDF
representatives in October 2012. At thisworkshop, the working group presented

EPRWG Severe Accidents subgroup
The Severe Accident expert subgroup is
focusing on the following topics:
 sacrificial concrete composition in thereactor pit;
 containment heat removal system active
flooding;
 debris ingression into valve compartments
near the core catcher spreading area;15

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT pH control in the in-containment reactor
water storage tank and the drawbacks ofpassive pH control;

member countries to the Fukushima accidents.
The working group also met with AREVA and the
EPR applicants in each country to discuss the
EPR Family common approach to Fukushima
lessons learned. The working group isdeveloping a common position addressing
Fukushima-related issues for the EPR. This
paper identifies common preliminary approaches
to address potential safety improvements for
EPR plants as related to lessons learned fromthe Fukushima Dai-ichi accident or Fukushimarelated issues. After the safety reviews of the
EPR design applications that are currently inreview are completed, the working group plans to
update the common position to reflect their safetyconclusions regarding the EPR design and how
the design could be enhanced to address
Fukushima-issues. The common preliminary
approaches are organised into five sections:external hazards, reliability of safety functions,accidents with core melt, spent fuel pools,
emergency preparedness in design. Based on its
initial conclusions, the EPRWG decided toconsider some areas of the EPR design ingreater depth to gain a better understanding of
possible differences among different EPR
evolutions (i.e. Olkiluoto 3, Flamanville 3,
Taishan 1, UK-EPR and US-EPR) in terms ofdesign and to highlight possible recommended
practices. The following areas were identified forfurther study: dual use of the Primary Depressurisation
System (feed and bleed and severe
accidents);
 containment venting/filtration system.
In addition, the subgroup will address
lessons learned from Fukushima related tosevere accidents. The group prepared technicalreports on the differences among the designs ineach country. The technical reports covered thearrangement and configuration of the severe
accident heat removal system injection lines into
the core catcher, and the pH control for the incontainment refueling water storage tank. The
group began to prepare two technical reports
addressing
post-Fukushima
considerations.
These reports focus on management ofcontainment pressure during severe accidents,
and reliability and qualification of instrumentation
for dealing with severe accidents.
New EPRWG subgroups
In June 2012, a new technical expert
subgroup was formed to address the issue of
ensuring long-term cooling of the spent fuel pool.
The subgroup will address three subtopics: thereliability of the cooling system and make-up
water,
instrumentation,andhydrogenmanagement issues.

 arrangements for extended loss ofelectrical power (supplies and distribution
systems) to ensure long term decay heatremoval;The EPRWG has begun a new effort toconsiderco-operationoncommissioning
activities. As several of the member countries get
closer to the late stages of construction andpreparations for operation, MDEP will consider
how it can co-operate to share experience inlate-stage construction tests (e.g. hot functional
tests) leading to fuel load and operations. An ad
hoc expert subgroup was formed to pursue this.
A workshop is planned for June 2013 to begin
discussing this area.

 reliability and qualification
accident management;ofsevere management of pressure in containment
during severe accidents;
 long-term cooling of spent fuel pool;reliability of cooling and make-up water
systems, instrumentation and hydrogen
management; maintaining long-term inventory and subcriticality in primary circuit.

The EPR working group held several
discussions on the response by each of the16

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT

Flamanville 3 EPR reactor, France: March 2013. Copyright EDF.

Taishan EPR reactors, China.

17

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORTSanmen AP1000 reactor, China: 2013.

completed the current phase of its review andhas issued an interim Generic Design
Assessment (GDA) of the AP1000 design. At therequest of Westinghouse, ONR has suspended
its review of the AP1000 at the end of GDA Step
4. In January 2010, the CNSC completed phase4
1 of its pre-project design review on thepotential choices for new reactor construction,
which includes an assessment of the AP1000.
The purpose of the Phase 1 review was todetermine whether the design intent in the safetyareas is compliant with the CNSC requirements
and expectations for the design of new nuclear
power plants in Canada. The CNSC is currently
performing Phase 2 of its review.

6.2 AP1000 Design-specific working groups

Accomplishments

The AP1000 design-specific working group
was established in November 2008 with initial
participation by China (NNSA), the UK (ONR),
and the US (NRC). Canada (CNSC) was added
as a member in March 2009. A total of 4 AP1000
units are under construction in China at theSanmen and Haiyang sites. The US NRC has
certified the AP1000 design and is reviewing
applications for combined licenses for 8 AP1000
units. Four units are under construction in the US
at the Vogtle and Summer sites. The ONR has

The working group members have shareddesign information, application documents,
preliminary findings, and identified the mostsignificant review issues. In the past year, CNSC
re-established its review of the AP1000, and the
US NRC completed its design review and began
418

Find out more at http://www.nuclearsafety.gc.ca/

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT
oversight of safety-related construction. As theworking group members transitioned to different
stages of their design reviews, the group reevaluated the scope of the working group topics,
and the issues to be addressed. The members
agreed that Fukushima issues should beconsidered in future interactions and cooperation. In addition, the areas of focus for
CNSC’s Phase 2 review of the AP1000 wereconsidered as candidates for co-operation. The
following technical topics will be discussed by theworking group:

These topics incorporate many of the issues
that were addressed by the initial technicalexpert subgroups.
CNSC’s phase 2 design review consists ofdirectassessmentofWestinghouse’s
submissions by technical staff, and technicaldiscussions with the US NRC via videoconference of selected priority focus topics. The
US NRC and CNSC held several seminars to
discuss areas that CNSC has designated as
focus areas for Phase 2 of their review. Seminars
have been held in the focus areas of:containment and civil structures important tosafety, emergency core cooling and emergency
heat removal systems, classification of
structures, systems, and components, beyonddesign-basis
accidents,
severeaccident
prevention and mitigation, and computer codeanalysis. In addition, working group members
from the US observed a quality assurance audit
at Westinghouse headquarters conducted by
CNSC.

 civil engineering (shield building): issues tobe discussed include design of thecomposite
shieldbuilding,
modularfabrication and construction techniques,
and seismic issues;
 passive safety systems: issues to be
discussed include those that could affectthe operation of the emergency corecooling systems such as the design andtesting of the squib valves that initiate thecooling as well as testing and evaluation of
the thermal hydraulic capability of thepassive emergency core cooling system;

As the working group members move into theconstruction phase, they have begun to share
information on construction experience. Some of
the topics that the working group plans toaddress include start-up testing, and construction
lessons learned that feed back into the design.

 DI&C safety systems;
 safety classification.

Haiyang AP1000 reactors, China.

Summer AP1000, unit 2, US: 10 March 2013. Copyright SCE&G.

19

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT

Vogtle AP1000 reactor, US: April 2013.

20

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT

Shin Kori, APR-1400 reactors, units 3 & 4, Korea: 2013.

application for the first 2 units in 2013. Finland(STUK) has completed a preliminary safetyassessment of the APR-1400, which includes
information
regardingdesignfeasibility,
organisational capability and plant site.

6.3 APR-1400 Design-specific Working Group(APR1400WG)
Background

The first meeting of the working group washeld in December 2012 at KINS headquarters in
Daejeon, South Korea. The working groupagreed to prioritise six topics for discussion:
design differences between the countries anddifferences in licensing processes; Fukushima
lessons-learned enhancements; long termcooling; DI&C; construction oversight; andprobabilistic safety assessment and severe
accidents. Additional topics that may be
discussed include: seismic and structural analysis;
fuel design and design basis analysis; aircraft
impact methodology; technical specifications; fire
protection; and vendor inspections.

The APR-1400 design-specific working group
was established in August 2012 with theparticipation of South Korea, Finland, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), and the US. South Korea
made the proposal to form the working group at
the May 2012 Policy Group meeting. The
working group officially came into existence inAugust 2012, with the PG’s approval for the UAE
to join MDEP. The APR-1400WG chair is Korea,
the country of the design originator; and theUAE, as the second country to begin theconstruction of an APR-1400, is the vice-chair.
In Korea, four APR-1400 units are underconstruction and 2 additional units are underpreliminary safety evaluation report review. The
US expects to receive a design certification
application in July 2013 and is planning to start
the review of a number of topical reports in early
2013. Two units are under construction in the
UAE. On 17 July 2012, FANR issued the FANR
Licence for construction and related regulated
activities for Barakah units 1 & 2. FANR expects
the submission of the construction permit
application for the next 2 units, which it presumes
will be similar to the construction permit

21

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT

Novovoronezh VVER reactor, steam generator, Russia: 2013.
Provided by Rostechnadzor

witnessed
inspectionsofsafety-related
mechanical pressure retaining components(Class 1) such as pressure vessels, steam
generators, piping, valves, pumps, etc., andquality assurance inspections. Witnessed
inspections consist of one regulator performing
an inspection to its criteria, observed byrepresentatives of other MDEP countries. The
benefits to the observing countries include
additional information and added confidence in
the inspection results. MDEP regulators areusing the experience gained during the conduct
of VICWG witnessed inspections in theirinspection planning.

6.4 Vendor Inspection Co-operation
Working Group (VICWG)
Background
The VICWG was formed because component
manufacturing is currently subject to multiple
inspections and audits similar in scope and insafety objectives, but conducted by different
regulators against different criteria. The primary
goal of the VICWG is to maximise the use of theresults obtained from other regulators’ efforts in
inspecting vendors.
Long-term goals of the working group include
harmonisation of quality assurance/ management(QA/QM)requirements
andstandards;
harmonisation of vendor inspection practices
among MDEP regulators; and performing
multinational inspections of vendors according to
the common QA/QM requirements. To achievethese goals, the VICWG is working towards thefollowing: identify and document a set ofcommon QA/QM requirements; agree on an
acceptable method to assess the implementationof the requirements; and develop an MDEPQA/QM inspection procedure.
The
workinggroup
enhancestheunderstanding of each regulator’s inspection
procedures and practices by co-ordinating22

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORTVICWG – 2012: Witnessed and joint vendor inspections
VendorLocation(Country)

Inspecting
regulator

Participating
regulator(s)

Scope

MHI

Japan

NRC

JNES
NRA (Japan)

Engineering & Design
Follow-Up to AIT)

Enertech

USA

NRC

NNSA

AP-1000 Check Valve Qualification Testing(QME-1)

Target
Rock

USA

NRC

SPX,
CopesVulcan

USA

NRC

NNSA

Design & Manufacturing of Squib valves

KSB

Germany

KINS

Rostechnadzor

Pumps, QA program implementation

SempellGermany

KINS

Rostechnadzor
STUK

Valves, QA program & PSAR commitment

Kinectrics

CanadaNRC

CNSC

AP-1000 Containment Electrical Penetrations
and Commercial Grade Dedication (CGD) of
Relays & Breakers

KINS

Process(SONGS

Safety Related Valves

Joint inspections consist of one regulator
conducting an inspection according to its own
regulatory framework with the active participationof one or more other regulators. This would allow
the participating members to use the results of
the inspection that are applicable to theirregulations.

joint inspections (multiple nations inspecting theregulatory requirements of one country), andwitnessing other regulators’ inspections. The
VICWG is also working with standards
development organisations to encourage andexplore the harmonisation of QA/QM standards.
A total of seven witnessed and joint
inspections were conducted pursuant to VICWG
activities in 2012. One joint inspection of Target
Rock was held with KINS and the US NRC asparticipating regulators. Overall the joint
inspection was deemed a success at saving
resources and continuing the exchange of
information among VICWG members. The table
above lists the inspections conducted and themembers participating.

A long-term goal of the working group ismultinational inspections: inspections conductedby a team of inspectors from multiple countries
using common inspection criteria and selected
criteria that are unique to their countries.
The working group maintains a list of
inspections from the MDEP VICWG regulatorsfor opportunities to witness inspections, andshares inspection results through a databasemaintained in the MDEP Library. This data baseincludes not only the reports of witnessed andjoint inspections, but all inspections that might beof interest to MDEP members.

Participating members found the witnessed
inspections to be beneficial to the conduct ofvendor inspections in each of their countries.
Russia began witnessing inspections from otherregulators for the first time this year under the
VICWG framework. As a lesson learned, after
witnessing inspections from the US NRC, theKorean regulator decided to make its reports asdetailed as the US NRC’s reports. In addition,
KINS noted that it saved resources by sending
fewer inspectors per inspection. After witnessing
inspections by KINS, the US NRC is working to

Accomplishments
The MDEP VICWG has achieved its shortterm goals and continues to make progress
towards achieving its long-term programme
goals. For the intermediate term, emphasis will
be placed on maximising information sharing,23

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT
focus more on technical requirements to assess
how the work inspectors observe meets thedesign requirements. A more rigorous view of the
QA programme implementation was carried out.

The issue of conducting multinational
inspections (defined as inspectors from multiple
regulators actively undertaking an inspection of avendor against a common set of requirements) is
under discussion by the WG. Conducting joint
inspections and formulating common QA/QM
criteria inform issue of conducting multinational
inspections.

MDEP members who don’t currently perform
direct inspections of vendors have benefitted
from the group’s activities by learning how to
conduct such inspections and receiving
information on vendors that they wouldn’t
otherwise have.
The WG plans to identify common quality
assurance requirements that could be acceptable
to MDEP regulators. The long-term goal of the
WG is to harmonise a significant portion of thequality assurance inspection procedures so thatthe results of an inspection conducted by one
member could be used by the other members,
requiring that other member countries only
inspect that portion of their requirements notcovered by the common inspection procedure.
The working group met with some SDOs thatdeal with QA/QM standards (AFCEN and ISO)and WNA/CORDEL to discuss ideas about thepotential harmonisation of standards. The WG
plans to work with the SDOs to encourage
harmonisation of QA/QM-related standards.
The working group conducted a survey on
quality assurance requirements used in theoversight of vendors to identify those areas
where the various regulators have common
regulatory frameworks. A comparison table wasanalysed, and a QA/QM Criteria Comparison
Report written. Using this comparison, the WG
will identify MDEP Core QA requirements. This
activity supports the identification of common QA
requirements that could be acceptable to VICWG
regulators and that could eventually support
multinational inspections.
Next steps
Participating regulators have gained much
experience in each other’s inspection processes
through the MDEP witnessed inspections
conducted since 2008. Therefore, the working
group will continue to co-ordinate witnessed
inspections and will increase its focus on joint
inspections in 2013. This will continue toenhance the exchange of information between
the regulators and provide better understandingof the inspection scopes and safety findings andhow these findings may be utilised. The working
group’s goal is to hold at least two joint
inspections per year.

242012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT

Preparation for hydraulic test of the reactor vessel for the EPR reactor of Flamanville 3,
France: August 2010. Copyright AREVA, Tracy Faveyrial.

differences. The CSWG was represented on thesteering committee by the representative fromthe US NRC. The SDOs compared requirementsof their pressure-boundary codes and standards
including JSME’s S-NC1 Code (Japan),
AFCEN’s RCC-M Code (France), KEA’s KEPIC
Code (Korea), CSA’s N285.0 standard (Canada)
and NIKIET’s PNAE G-7 Code (Russia) against
the requirements of Section III of the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (US) for Class
1 vessels, piping, pumps and valves. The results
enabled the CSWG to understand from a global
perspective how each country’s pressureboundary code or standard evolved into its
current form and content.

6.5 Codes and Standards Working Group(CSWG)
BackgroundThe goal of the Codes and Standards
Working Group (CSWG) is the harmonisation ofcode requirements for the design andconstruction of pressure-retaining (pressure
boundary) components in order to improve theeffectiveness and efficiency of the regulatory
design reviews, increase the quality of safetyassessments, and strengthen each regulator’sability to make safety decisions.
The CSWG recognised early on that the firststep to achieving harmonisation is to understandthe extent of similarities and differences amongst
the pressure-boundary codes and standards
used in various countries. The CSWG
encouraged SDOs to conduct code comparisons,study the similarities and differences between
codes, and develop a strategy and process forachieving code harmonisation. The SDOs formeda steering committee, composed of therepresentatives of ASME, JSME, KEPIC,
AFCEN, CSA, vendors, and utilities, which
performed a comparison of their pressureboundary codes and standards to identify theextent of similarities and differences in code
requirements and the reasons for their

The CSWG will work closely with SDOs and
WNA/CORDEL to converge code requirements
and reconcile code differences. The CSWG isalso working with the SDOs to develop a strategy
to prevent, minimise, or limit future code
divergences.
The WG also conducted work separate from
SDOs code comparison and SDO/CORDEL code
convergence, which includes exploring ways toevaluate acceptability of components that aredesigned and manufactured using foreign codesand standards, and evaluating the differences incodes applications on the quality and safety of
nuclear power plants.

25

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT
Accomplishments

point forefforts.

exploringpotential

harmonisation

On 27 January 2012, the SDOs from theUnited States, France, Japan, Korea andCanada issued their Code Comparison Report
for Class 1 Nuclear Power Plant Componentsthat was prepared for MDEP.
made publicly available on the ASME website (inthe form of an ASME Standard TechnicalPublication). This report includes a comparisonof JSME’s S-NC1 Code (Japan), AFCEN’s RCCM Code (France), KEA’s KEPIC Code (Korea),
and CSA’s N285.0 standard (Canada) against
the requirements of Section III of the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (United States)
for Class 1 vessels, piping, pumps and valves.
On 31 December 2012, the SDOs publishedrevision 1 of the report that included acomparison with the Russian code.

Common Position 1, “Lessons Learned on
Achieving Harmonisation of Codes andStandards for Pressure Boundary Components inNuclear Power Plants” documents the findings
and overall conclusions of the CSWG pertaining
to (1) the safety of several MDEP-member
country’s
pressure-boundary
codes
and
standards and (2) the potential for harmonisationof those pressure-boundary codes and standards
based on the code-comparison work performedby the SDOs from April 2008 to March 2012. This
report also documents a strategy and process
proposed by the SDOs for achieving code
harmonisation.
The working group has drafted two additionalcommon positions on Fundamental Attributes forthe Design and Construction of Pressure
Boundary
Components,
andEssential
Performance Guidelines for Pressure Boundary
Components. These two documents are currently
under MDEP internal review.

The results provided a significant amount of
information about the comprehensiveness andtechnical adequacy of each country’s pressureboundary codes and standards and produced awealth of useful information about the technicaland programmatic similarities and differencesamong each country’s codes including thereasons for these differences. Consequently, theresults will enable regulators as well as otherusers of the Code-comparison report todetermine the impact of those differences andtheir safety significance as well as provide
insights into the level of effort needed toreconcile those differences. The SDOs’ CodeComparison report does not make any
conclusions about the comparisons. The CSWG
evaluated the report and made conclusions on
the code-comparison and harmonisation ofpressure-boundary codes and standards.

Next steps
The results of the code-comparison project
enabled the CSWG to take the next steps
towards harmonisation of codes and standards.
The CSWG has been interacting with
WNA/CORDEL. As part of its plan to achieveinternational standardisation of reactor designs,
the CORDEL Group identified an urgent need forthe international harmonisation of standards andcodes. CORDEL is supportive of the CSWG’s
long-term goals and the SDOs’ code-comparison
effort and proposed to take harmonisation to thenext level by trying to converge on someselected Code differences. CORDEL has
proposed a pilot project regarding exploration ofpotential harmonisation among the various
codes. Based on the results of the SDOs’ codecomparison, CORDEL and the SDOs areplanning to select a few specific code rules
where differences have the most important
industrial impact and convergence is relatively
easy to achieve. CORDEL plans to choose
independent technical experts to propose a“harmonised” version of the Code differences orto demonstrate the equivalence of thesedifferences. The proposed pilot project will be coordinated and funded by CORDEL, and will be
conducted in co-ordination with the CSWG.
CORDEL will seek the CSWG’s recognition ofpotential code changes proposed in their pilot
project.

The SDOs formed a Code Convergence
Board with the objective to limit divergence andachieve convergence on individual requirements
where realistic and practical. Although not a
voting member of the Board, MDEP has observer
status and a member of the CSWG attends mostmeetings.
The working group finalised two reports in2012.
Technical
Report1,“Regulatory
Frameworks for the Use of Nuclear Pressure
Boundary Codes and Standards in MDEPCountries” was written to consolidate information
shared and accomplishments achieved by themember countries. This report documents howeach MDEP regulatory authority utilises nationalor regional mechanical Codes and Standards in
its safety reviews and licensing of new reactors.
The preparation of this report, together with code
comparison, could be an appropriate starting26

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORTI&C Teleperm X5. Erlangen, Germany: 2009.
Copyright Areva.

and IEEE allowed a number of their standards
relevant to DI&C to be made available in the
MDEP Library for use by the working groupmembers. In addition, the IEC formalised anagreement with the OECD to facilitate cooperation between the two organisations.

6.6 Digital Instrumentation and Control
Working Group (DICWG)
Background:

Accomplishments

The DICWG works to increase collaboration,
co-operation, and knowledge transfer among
members and with other stakeholders to achieve
the following primary goals:

The topics for DICWG generic common
positions were selected based on the safety
implications of the issue, and the need todevelop a common understanding from theperspectives of regulatory authorities. The
original list of topics was developed following an
examination of the regulatory requirements of theparticipating members, and of relevant industry
standards and IAEA documents. DICWG genericcommon positions are not intended to cover all
issues associated with the DI&C technicaldisciplines, but only those of most value to themembers. The DICWG follows a formal process
for the proposal, evaluation, and development of
new generic common positions. Any member canpropose generic common positions and canassume the lead role for the development of thegeneric common positions. The table on the next
page lists both the published (highlighted inbold)5 and planned DICWG generic common
positions to date.

 Facilitate timely and efficient mechanisms
for sharing of knowledge and experienceamong members, thus allowing knowledgetransfer and more effective safety reviews;
 Work jointly to develop common positions
among members for issues of significance,
which may be based on a review of theexisting standards, national regulatory
guidance, best practices, and groupinputs.
All MDEP members participate in the
DICWG. In addition, the IAEA, the Institute ofElectrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) andthe International Electrotechnical Commission(IEC) representatives are invited to participate inworking group meetings and activities. Industry isrepresented via the IEC and IEEE standards
organisations and through specific invitations by
the DICWG to share information and givepresentations on topics of interest. Both the IEC

527

Available on www.oecd-nea.org/mdep

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT
Issue

Issue Leader

1. Treatment of Software Common Cause Failure in USA
Safety Systems
2. Software Tools
UK

Generic common position 2 recommends
that tools be used to support all aspects of the
I&C lifecycle where benefits result through theiruse. However, the benefit and risk of using tools
should be balanced. This common position
asserts that the important principle in choosing
tools is to limit the opportunity for making errors
and introducing faults, but maximise theopportunity for detecting faults. As such, tools
should be verified and assessed in a way that is
consistent with the tool reliability requirements,
the type of tool, and the potential of the tool tointroduce faults.

3. Verification and Validation Throughout the Japan
Life cycle of Safety Systems Using Digitalcomputers
4. Data Communication Independence
Korea
5. Treatment of Hardware Description Language France(HDL) Programmed Devises for Use in Nuclear
Safety Systems
6. Simplicity in DesignUSA
7. Qualification of Industrial Digital Devices ofLimited Functionality for Use in Safety
Applications
8. Impact of Cyber Security Features on Digital
I&C Safety Systems
9. System Architecture Considerations for Systems
Classified at the Highest Safety Level
10. Configuration Management for Software

directly concerned with software development(e.g. word processors).

IAEA

USA
IAEA
Finland

11. Factory Acceptance Test and Site Acceptance Russian
Test
Federation
12. Use of Automatic Tests to Perform Surveillance Korea
for Digital Systems

The DICWG has published five genericcommon positions that describe methods andevidence that all DICWG member states findacceptable to support safety justification for DI&C
systems. The five published common positions
include:SoftwareTools,
Communication
Independence, Simplicity in Design, Verification
and Validation, and Impact of Cyber Security
Features on DI&C Safety Systems. These
common positions have been made publicly
available on the MDEP website. Seven additionalcommon positions are under development. The
key principles of each of these five genericcommon positions are summarised below.
Generic Common Position 2, “Software
Tools for the Development of Software for Safety
Systems,” provides criteria on the selection,
qualification, and use of software tools used forthe development of safety system software in
nuclear power plants. This common position
applies specifically to tools that directly support
the development of safety systems, such as
those that support the capture of requirements
and support the transformation of requirements
into the final system code and data (there may
be many intermediate steps), or those that areused to directly support the performance ofverification, validation and testing. This common
position does not apply to tool support forcomplex programmable logic devices (e.g.
FPGAs), or off-line tools (e.g. tools that calculate
important variables used during the design andanalysis of safety systems), or officeadministration tools used to support tasks not

Generic Common Position 3, “Verification
and Validation Throughout the Life Cycle of
Digital Safety Systems,” provides criteria for
Verification and Validation (V&V) activities for
digital safety systems throughout their life cycles.
To address the differences in terminology among
DICWG members for activities in each phase of
the life cycle, this common position included a
typical representation of DI&C systems’
development
life
cycles.
This
typicalrepresentation is derived from the draft IAEA
safety guide for DI&C. In general, this common
position refers to verification as the confirmationthat the products of each development phasefulfil the requirements or conditions imposed by
the previous phase, and validation confirms thatthe finished product is in compliance with thesystem’s functional performance and interface
requirements. One key point in this common
position is that although the DICWG member
countries may have different regulations
governing third party verification of the system,
the member countries all agree that V&V shouldbe performed by an independent group who has
not been engaged in the design & developmentof the system.
Generic Common Position 4, “Principle ofData Communication Independence,” provides
agreed-upon principles for maintaining data
communications independence among different
safety systems to ensure that errors in one
channel or division or lower class systems will
not cause the failure of another channel ordivisions or higher class systems. This common
position describes the types of communication
protocolsandcommunications
network
topologies that should be used for data
communication
betweendifferent
safetydivisions. For communication between higher
classified safety systems and lower safety classsystems, this common position recommends that28

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORTMDEP, the UAE and India, and incorporated theircomments.

the communications flow should only be unidirectional from higher classified safety systems
to lower safety class systems. In cases where it
can be shown that data flow from lower to higher
classified safety systems is of safety benefit, thenit must be demonstrated that the safety functionsof the higher category cannot be adversely
affected by such a connection.

The working group continues to implement aformal “Quick Inquiry” process to generate andprocess inquiries from member countries topromote an efficient and structured informationexchange and provide for storing this information
in a retrievable database. The DICWG maintains
frequent communication with the design-specificworking groups, particularly with the EPR DI&C
subgroup.

Generic Common Position 6, “Principle on
Simplicity in Design,” provides principles on
ensuring that safety systems are designed to be
as simple as they are practical. Since complexity
can generate additional faults in design, difficulty
in detecting and correcting faults, introduction of
failure modes and effects that are not present in
simpler design, and challenge in demonstrating
conformance to safety system design criteriasuch as independence, testability and reliability,
the design of safety systems should avoid
including unnecessary functions (e.g. those thathave no safety benefit) in safety systems. Any
additional features included in design should not
violate other design principles of safety (e.g.
independence, redundancy, diversity).

The DICWG is working with the IAEA, theIEC, and IEEE to pursue harmonisation of
relevant standards, and to share with theseorganisations relevant regulatory perspectives
and lessons learned. The DICWG has obtained
agreement from the IEC and IEEE to increase
co-operation and consider MDEP common
positions when updating or developing new
standards. The DICWG has reviewed andprovided input to proposals for new standards.
As generic common positions are developed, the
DICWG will make recommendations to theseorganisations on key areas where standards
should be developed or enhanced.

Generic Common Position 8, “Impact ofCyber Security Features on DI&C Safety
Systems,”
providesprinciples
onthe
implementation of cyber security features suchthat these features do not adversely impact
safety functions. Although, it is recognised thatthe implementation of a cyber security
programme may vary based on site specificrequirements and each country’s regulatory
frameworks, the general understanding is that,independent of specific implementation, thecyber security programme shall not adversely
impact the performance and dependability ofsafety functions. One of the key principles in thiscommon position is that implementation of cybersecurity features directly in the safety systemshould be avoided when practical. Adding cybersecurity features to safety I&C system may
increase system complexity and may introduce
potential failure modes to the system that would
challenge its ability to perform its safety function
in a reliable manner. For this reason, inclusion of
cyber security features should be carefully
evaluated and only implemented when it is notpractical or otherwise feasible to accomplish an
equivalent measure of cyber security protection
by other means. In addition, a cyber security
feature, when challenged, should not inhibit ordeactivate safety functions.

The IEC and IEEE have agreed to work
together to develop joint logo standards inspecific areas. The MDEP DICWG fully supports
this initiative as a vehicle to facilitate
harmonisation and provides support to thesetypes of efforts. In addition, the IAEA is
considering MDEP common positions as part oftheir DI&C work and has invited the DICWG toprovide comments to the DI&C safety guide.
Next steps
The working group has prioritised theremaining issues and has identified schedules forthe development, review, and issuance of eachcommon position.
The working group will communicate specificsuggestions to the standards organisations andthe IAEA for consideration of harmonisation in atimely manner when they are identified during its
activities. For example, MDEP may be able tohelp co-ordinate the development of cybersecurity standards by serving as the focal point
for harmonising IAEA, ISO, the IEC, and IEEE
cyber security standards development.
The working group will continue to engage
DI&C vendors and utilities to share experienceand insights toward developing common
positions that are based on a broad spectrum of
inputs.

The working group reviewed the publishedcommon positions with the regulators new to29

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT
7.

 finalisation of a Technical Report on“Regulatory Frameworks for the Use of
Nuclear Pressure Boundary Codes andStandards in MDEP Countries” a Common
Position on “Lessons Learnt on Achieving
Harmonisation of Codes and Standards for
Pressure Boundary Components inNuclear Power Plants”.

INTERIM RESULTS

MDEP is considered a long-term programmewith interim results. Interim results are those
products that document agreement by the MDEP
member countries and are necessary steps inworking towards increased co-operation andconvergence. The interim results for 2012
included:8.

 preparation of a comparison report of thedifferencesinprobabilistic
safetyassessment modelling and results for the
EPR;NEXT STEPS – FUTURE OF THE
PROGRAMMEAt its meeting in May 2012, the MDEP PolicyGroup endorsed the extension of the planningwindow for MDEP activities from March 2013 toMarch 2018. MDEP still remains a mid and longterm programme that focuses on interim results.
The PG members stressed that they will review
this issue in three years to determine if theplanning window is still appropriate.

 preparation of technical reports on the
differences among the designs in eachcountry
inthearrangement
andconfiguration of the severe accident heatremoval system injection lines into thecore catcher, and the pH control for the incontainment refuelling water storage tankfor the EPR;

The results of the MDEP self-assessment
indicated that MDEP should maintain a relatively
small number of topics and keep them closely
connected to topics relevant to new reactor
designs. It was also recognised that the mosteffective aspect of MDEP is the co-operation andexchange of information it facilitates for design
reviews. Therefore, MDEP will act quickly toapprove the formation of new design-specificworking groups (consistent with the existing Ruleof Three for forming design-specific working
groups). At its meeting in May 2012, the PolicyGroup discussed a request by the Russian
regulator to start a VVER design-specific working
group. A decision on this working group is
pending approval by the Policy Group. The
Russian regulator provided information regarding
the design reviews that are being pursued by theregulatory authorities of Russia, India, andTurkey, the members proposed to take part insuch a group, and documentation regarding themain differences between the designs in eachcountry. To form such a group, Turkey would
have to follow the process of becoming amember or an associate member of MDEP.

 development of
a common position
addressing Fukushima-related issues for
the EPR; co-operation on six witnessed vendor
inspections and one joint inspection;
 interacted with the SDOs to complete andissue comparison tables of the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, and thecodes of France, Japan, Korea, Canada
and Russia for Class 1 pressure vessels,
piping, pumps, and valves; evaluation of
the report and drawing conclusions on thecode-comparison and harmonisation ofpressure-boundary codes and standards;
 finalisation of common positions on DI&C
for new reactors in the areas of: Software
Tools for the Development of Software for
Safety Systems, Principles of Data
Communication Independence , andPrinciples on Simplicity in Design; establishment of the APR-1400 design
specific working group and prioritisation offour topics for future discussion;

The self-assessment also addressed theissue of how long the working groups should
continue. Both the internal and external
responders believe that there is a benefit tomaintaining
some
type
of
co-operative
arrangements after one or more WG members
completes its design review. Therefore, thedesign-specific working groups will continue cooperation and exchanging feedback on design
issues at least through the construction phase.

 bringing the new members, India and theUAE, to pace and started to incorporate
their views into the already issued MDEP
products;
 holding several seminars to discuss areasthat Canada has designated as focus
areas for their review of the AP1000;30

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT
After design review activities are completed for amajority of members, the working group format
and goals may change to a type and level ofactivity that would be appropriate to continue toexchange information.

the activity is of generic interest and ofsafety significance to the licensing of newreactors in MDEP member countries;
1. the approach followed by the MDEP
regulators is not completely similar;

It was determined that the current issuespecific working groups should continue until
they complete the goals and activities specified
in their programme plans. However, the work of
the issue-specific working groups should
eventually be transferred to other organisations
such as the CNRA or the IAEA. The working
groups will identify completion strategies(including final products, recommendations to
SDOs or other organisations for follow-up
activity) in the working group programme plans
and will identify end users of MDEP products
early and interface with them throughout
development so that the products will be usefulto stakeholders and can easily be transitioned toanother organisation.

2. successful completion of the activity would
likely result in increased harmonisation/
convergence in regulatory practices orincreased
co-operation
withinareasonable timeframe and resource
expenditures;
3. any new MDEP activity should not
duplicate similar efforts that are alreadyon-going or are planned to be undertaken
by other more appropriate organisations
such as the CNRA/WGRNR (or other NEA
WGs), IAEA, GIF, WENRA, etc. except
where MDEP could contribute to theongoing work of these groups;
4. each new activity should have a leadcountry willing to take an active leadershiprole, and should have a defined product.

No new issue specific working groups were
proposed for MDEP in 2012. The following
criteria are used to evaluate whether a proposed
activity should be undertaken as part of MDEP in
the future:

Novovoronezh VVER AES 2006 Phase 2, Russia: 2013. Provided by Rostechnadzor.

31

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORTAppendix A
Table of Acronyms

33

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORT

Table of Acronyms

AFCEN

French Society for Design and Construction and in-Service Inspection Rules /Association Française pour les règles de Conception, de construction et desurveillance en exploitation des matériels des Chaudières Electro Nucléaires

ASME

American Society of Mechanical Engineers

CNRA

Committee on Nuclear Regulation (NEA)

CNSC

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

CORDEL

Co-operation in Reactor Design Evaluation and Licensing

CSA

Canadian Standards Association

DI&C

Digital Instrumentation and Control

EDF

Electricity of France/Electricité de France

FANR

Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation

GIF

Generation IV international Forum

GSR-3

IAEA Safety Standards/the Management System for Facilities andActivities/Safety Requirements

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

IEC

International Electro-technical CommisstionIEEE

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

INSAG

International Nuclear Safety GroupISOInternational Standards Organisation

JSME

Japan society of Mechanical Engineering

KEA

Korean Electronic Association

KEPIC

Korea Electric Power Industry

MDEP

Multinational Design Evaluation Programme

MHI

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries

NEA

Nuclear Energy Agency

NIKIET

Russian Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering

NNSA

National Nuclear Safety Administration (China)

NPEC

Nulcear Power Engineering Committee

NRC

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (United States)

ONR

Office for Nuclear Regulation (UK)34

2012-2013 MDEP ANNUAL REPORTOECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OL3

Olkiluoto-3

PNAE G-7

Russian Rules for Design and Safety Operation of Equipment and Piping of
Nuclear Installations

PG

Policy Group (MDEP)

PSA

Probabilistic Safety Assessment

QA

Quality Assurance

RCC-M

Design and Construction Rules for Mechanical Components of PWR Nuclear
de Conception et de Construction des Matériels mécaniques des îlots
nucléaires des REP

RHWG

Reactor Harmonisation Working Group

SDO

Standards Development Organisations

STC

Steering Technical Committee (MDEP)

STUK

Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority

TOR

Terms of Reference

WENRA

Western European Nuclear Regulators Association

WNA

World Nuclear Association

WGRNR

Working Group on the Regulation of New Reactors (NEA)

35

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Cover photos: front cover – Sanmen AP1000 NPP, China; Novovoronezh Phase 2 VVER NPP, Russia; VICWG meeting, November 2012, Paris, France.
back cover – MDEP STC meeting, September 2012, China.

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