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ࠦࠬࡕࠬ࿖㓙⾨ฃ⾨⸥ᔨ⻠Ṷળ
2014 INTERNATIONAL COSMOS PRIZE The Commemorative Lecture









ਥ௅㧦౏⋉⽷࿅ᴺੱ࿖㓙⧎ߣ✛ߩඳⷩળ⸥ᔨදળ

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CONTENTSࡊࡠࠣ࡜ࡓ
 ᐕࠦࠬࡕࠬ࿖㓙⾨ฃ⾨⠪ࡊࡠࡈࠖ࡯࡞
⻠Ṷળ⊓ს⠪⇛ᱧ⻠Ṷⷐᣦ‫ޟ‬਎⇇ߩౣ᭴ᚑߦ߻ߌߡ‫ ޠ‬ᣣᧄ⺆ The art of composing worlds Englishࡊࡠࠣ࡜ࡓ
Ԙ᧲੩ળ႐
ᣣᤨ㧦ᐔᚑ  ᐕ  ᦬  ᣣ㧔᦬㧕 㨪㧔 ᤨ㑆㧕႐ᚲ㧦᧲੩ᄢቇ દ⮮࿖㓙ቇⴚ⎇ⓥ࠮ࡦ࠲࡯ દ⮮⻢ᕲࡎ࡯࡞
ᰴ╙㧦㨪 ࡊ࡟࠯ࡦ࠹࡯࡚ࠪࡦ  ᱞౝ๺ᒾ 㧔ࠦࠬࡕࠬ࿖㓙⾨ㆬ⠨ኾ㐷ᆔຬ㐳‫᧲ޔ‬੩ᄢቇᄢቇ㒮ᢎ᝼㧕   㨪 ⻠Ṷ            ࡈࠖ࡝࠶ࡊ࡮࠺ࠬࠦ࡜ඳ჻㧔 ᐕࠦࠬࡕࠬ࿖㓙⾨ฃ⾨⠪㧕   㨪 ኻ⺣            ࡈࠖ࡝࠶ࡊ࡮࠺ࠬࠦ࡜ඳ჻
 ⑺㆏ ᥓᒫ㧔ࠦࠬࡕࠬ࿖㓙⾨ㆬ⠨ኾ㐷ᆔຬ‫ޔ‬✚ว࿾⃿ⅣႺቇ⎇ⓥᚲฬ⹷ᢎ᝼㧕   㨪 ⾰⇼ᔕ╵   㐽ળԙᄢ㒋ળ႐
ᣣᤨ㧦ᐔᚑ  ᐕ  ᦬  ᣣ㧔᳓㧕 㨪㧔 ᤨ㑆㧕႐ᚲ㧦ᄢਣᔃᢪᯅ഍႐
ᰴ╙㧦㨪 ࡊ࡟࠯ࡦ࠹࡯࡚ࠪࡦ 
 ⑺㆏ ᥓᒫ㧔ࠦࠬࡕࠬ࿖㓙⾨ㆬ⠨ኾ㐷ᆔຬ‫ޔ‬✚ว࿾⃿ⅣႺቇ⎇ⓥᚲฬ⹷ᢎ᝼㧕   㨪 ⻠Ṷ  ࡈࠖ࡝࠶ࡊ࡮࠺ࠬࠦ࡜ඳ჻㧔 ᐕࠦࠬࡕࠬ࿖㓙⾨ฃ⾨⠪㧕   㨪 ኻ⺣  ࡈࠖ࡝࠶ࡊ࡮࠺ࠬࠦ࡜ඳ჻ ᳰ⼱ ๺ା㧔࿖┙᳃ᣖቇඳ‛㙚ᢎ᝼㧕   㨪 ⾰⇼ᔕ╵   㐽ળ―1― ᐕࠦࠬࡕࠬ࿖㓙⾨ฃ⾨⠪ࡊࡠࡈࠖ࡯࡞
ࡈࠖ࡝࠶ࡊ࡮࠺ࠬࠦ࡜ඳ჻
Dr. Philippe Descolaࠦ࡟࡯ࠫࡘ࡮࠼࡮ࡈ࡜ࡦࠬᢎ᝼
Professor, the college de France ࠺ࠬࠦ࡜ඳ჻ߪ‫ੱޔ‬㘃ቇ⠪ߣߒߡ‫ޔ‬ධ☨ࠕࡑ࠱ࡦߦ૑߻వ૑᳃ࠕࠪࡘࠕ࡯࡞ߩੱ‫ޘ‬ߩ⥄ὼⷰߣߘߎߩ⥄ὼߣ㑐ࠊࠆ⻉ᵴേߦὶὐࠍᒰߡ‫✎ߩࠄࠇߎޔ‬ኒߥ⺞ᩏ߆ࠄືቇ⊛ߥᕁᗐ߳ߣ⺰ࠍㅴ߼‫⥄ޔ‬ὼߣᢥൻࠍ⛔ว⊛ߦᝒ߃ࠆ‫⥄ޟ‬ὼߩੱ㘃ቇ‫ࠍޠ‬ឭ໒ߒߚ‫ߎޕ‬ࠇߪ‫⥄ߩߢ߹ࠇߎޔ‬ὼߣᢥൻࠍੑర⺰⊛ߦ⷗ࠆࠃ߁ߥ᰷☨ߩੱ㑆ਛᔃਥ⟵ߩᕁᗐߦ෻
㚛ߒߚ߽ߩߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬࿾⃿਄ߩⅣႺ໧㗴ࠍᛴ߃ࠆฦ࿾߳ߩ᥉ㆉᕈࠍᜬߟ߽ߩߣ⹏ଔߒߚ‫ޕ‬
1972ࡄ࡝⷏࠽ࡦ࠹࡯࡞࡮࡜࡮࠺ࡈࠔࡦࠬᄢቇ㧔ࡄ࡝╙ 10㧕ߦߡືቇୃ჻ภ෸߮᳃ᣖቇ
ቇ჻ภขᓧ

1980 - 1983

␠ળ⑼ቇ㜞╬⎇ⓥ㒮㧔EHESS㧕ߦߡ⻠ᐳਥછ

1983

␠ળ⑼ቇ㜞╬⎇ⓥ㒮㧔EHESS㧕ߦߡ␠ળੱ㘃ቇ╙ਃ⺖⒟ඳ჻ภขᓧ

1983

ੱ㑆⑼ቇ࠮ࡦ࠲࡯ߦߡ࡝ࠨ࡯࠴࡮ࡈࠚࡠ࡯

1984

␠ળ⑼ቇ㜞╬⎇ⓥ㒮㧔EHESS㧕⻠ᐳਥછഥᚻ

1987 - 1989

␠ળ⑼ቇ㜞╬⎇ⓥ㒮㧔EHESS㧕⻠ᐳਥછ

1989 - 2000

␠ળ⑼ቇ㜞╬⎇ⓥ㒮㧔EHESS㧕ኾછ⎇ⓥਥછ

2000 -

ࠦ࡟࡯ࠫࡘ࡮࠼࡮ࡈ࡜ࡦࠬ‫⥄ޟ‬ὼߩੱ㘃ቇ‫⻠ޠ‬ᐳᢎ᝼

2001 -

␠ળੱ㘃ቇ⎇ⓥቶቶ㐳㧔ࠦ࡟࡯ࠫࡘ࡮࠼࡮ࡈ࡜ࡦࠬ㧛ࡈ࡜ࡦࠬ࿖┙⑼ቇ⎇ⓥ࠮ࡦ
࠲࡯㧔CNRS 㧛␠ળ⑼ቇ㜞╬⎇ⓥ㒮㧔EHESS㧕౒หㆇ༡㧕

2001 -

␠ળ⑼ቇ㜞╬⎇ⓥ㒮㧔EHESS㧕ߦߡ⎇ⓥਥછࠍ౗છ

―2―⻠Ṷળ⊓ს⠪⇛ᱧ‫᧲ޣ‬੩ળ႐ ࡊ࡟࠯ࡦ࠲࡯‫ޤ‬ᱞౝ ๺ᒾ㧔ߚߌ߁ߜ ߆ߕ߭ߎ㧕᧲੩ᄢቇࠨࠬ࠹ࠗ࠽ࡆ࡝࠹ࠖቇㅪ៤⎇ⓥᯏ᭴㧔㪠㪩㪊㪪㧕ᯏ᭴㐳࡮ᢎ᝼࿖㓙ㅪวᄢቇ਄⚖೽ቇ㐳ࠦࠬࡕࠬ࿖㓙⾨ㆬ⠨ኾ㐷ᆔຬળᆔຬ㐳
ኾ᡹ಽ㊁‫✛ޟ‬࿾ⅣႺቇ‫ޔ‬࿾ၞ↢ᘒቇ‫ࠖ࠹࡝ࡆ࠽ࠗ࠹ࠬࠨޔ‬ቇ‫ޠ‬᧲੩ㇺ┙ᄢቇℂቇㇱഥᚻ‫᧲ޔ‬੩ᄢቇㄘቇㇱഥᢎ᝼‫ޔ‬หࠕࠫࠕ↢‛⾗ḮⅣႺ
⎇ⓥ࠮ࡦ࠲࡯ᢎ᝼‫ޔ‬หᄢቇ㒮ㄘቇ↢๮⑼ቇ⎇ⓥ⑼ᢎ᝼ࠍ⚻ߡ‫ޔ‬ᐔᚑ  ᐕࠃࠅ⃻⡯‫ޕ‬ᐔᚑ ᐕ࿖ㅪᄢቇ೽ቇ㐳‫ ޔ‬ᐕࠃࠅ਄⚖೽ቇ㐳‫ޕ‬ਥߥ⪺ᦠߦ‫ޢ࡯ࠫࡠࠦࠛࡊ࡯ࠤࠬ࠼ࡦ࡜ޡ‬‫ޡ‬࿾⃿ᜬ⛯ቇߩߔߔ߼‫ޢ‬‫ޡ‬਎⇇ㄘᬺㆮ↥‫ ޢ‬એ਄න⪺ ‫ޔ‬‫ޡ‬㉿ጊߩⅣႺቇ‫ޢ‬‫ࠖ࠹࡝ࡆ࠽ࠗ࠹ࠬࠨޡ‬ቇ‫ޢ‬‫ޡ‬㉿ጊ࡮㉿ᶏ‫ޡޢ‬ᣣᧄߩ⥄ὼⅣႺ᡽╷‫ ޢ‬એ਄౒✬⪺ ߥߤ‫ޕ‬‫᧲ޣ‬੩ળ႐ኻ⺣⠪࡮ᄢ㒋ળ႐ࡊ࡟࠯ࡦ࠲࡯‫ޤ‬⑺㆏ ᥓᒫ㧔޽߈ߺߜ ߣ߽߿㧕                       ✚ว࿾⃿ⅣႺቇ⎇ⓥᚲฬ⹷ᢎ᝼
ࠦࠬࡕࠬ࿖㓙⾨ㆬ⠨ኾ㐷ᆔຬળᆔຬ

ኾ᡹ಽ㊁‫↢ޟ‬ᘒੱ㘃ቇ‫ޔ‬ᶏᵗ᳃ᣖቇ‫ޔ‬᳃ᣖ↢‛ቇ‫ޠ‬࿖┙᳃ᣖቇඳ‛㙚ഥᚻ‫ޔ‬ഥᢎ᝼‫ޔ‬ᢎ᝼‫⎇ޔ‬ⓥㇱ㐳ࠍ⚻ߡ‫ޔ‬ᐔᚑ  ᐕࠃࠅ✚ว࿾⃿ⅣႺቇ⎇ⓥᚲᢎ᝼‫ޔ‬೽ᚲ㐳‫ޕ‬ᐔᚑ  ᐕห⎇ⓥᚲฬ⹷ᢎ᝼‫ޕ‬ਥߥ⪺ᦠߦ‫ޡ‬ᶏߦ↢߈ࠆ̆ᶏੱߩ᳃ᣖቇ‫ޡޢ‬Ṫ᠇ߩ᳃ᣖ⹹̆᧲ධࠕࠫࠕ߆ࠄࠝ࠮ࠕ࠾ࠕ߳‫↢ޡޢ‬ᘒผ߆ࠄ⺒ߺ⸃ߊⅣ࡮Ⴚ࡮ቇ̆ߥࠊ߫ࠅߣߟߥ߇ࠅߩ⍮‫ߩ࠭ࡦࡕࠦޡޢ‬࿾⃿ผ̆ࠣࡠ࡯ࡃ࡞
ൻᤨઍߩ౒᦭⺰ߦะߌߡ‫ੱߩ࠭ࡦࡕࠦޡޢ߆ߩ߽ߩ⺕ߪ࡜ࠫࠢޡޢ‬㘃ቇ̆ᢥൻ࡮ᱧผ࡮↢ᘒ‫ޢ‬ߥߤ‫ޕ‬
‫ޣ‬ᄢ㒋ળ႐ ኻ⺣⠪‫ޤ‬ᳰ⼱ ๺ା㧔޿ߌ߿ ߆ߕߩ߱㧕࿖┙᳃ᣖቇඳ‛㙚᳃ᣖᢥൻ⎇ⓥㇱㇱ㐳࡮ᢎ᝼✚ว⎇ⓥᄢቇ㒮ᄢቇᢥൻ⑼ቇ⎇ⓥ⑼ᢎ᝼

ኾ᡹ಽ㊁‫ޟ‬ⅣႺੱ㘃ቇ‫ੱޔ‬ᢥ࿾ℂቇ‫ޔ‬࿾⃿ቇ‫ޠ‬ർᶏ㆏ᄢቇഥᚻߥߤࠍ⚻ߡ‫ޔ‬࿖┙᳃ᣖቇඳ‛㙚╙৻⎇ⓥㇱഥᚻ‫ޔ‬ห᳃ᣖ␠ળ⎇ⓥㇱੱ㘃ⅣႺㇱ㐷ഥᢎ᝼‫ޔ‬ᢎ᝼ࠍᱧછ‫ޕ‬ᐔᚑ  ᐕࠃࠅห᳃ᣖᢥൻ⎇ⓥㇱㇱ㐳‫ޕ‬ਥߥ⪺ᦠߪ‫ੱޡ‬㑆ߦߣߞߡࠬࠗࠞߣߪ૗߆̆ࠞ࡜ࡂ࡝⁚⁸᳃ߣ⠨߃ࠆ‫ޡޢ‬ጊ⩿ណࠅߩ␠ળ⹹̆⾗Ḯ೑↪ߣ࠹࡝࠻࡝࡯‫ޡޢ‬࿾⃿ⅣႺผ߆ࠄߩ໧޿̆ࡅ࠻ߣ⥄ὼߩ౒↢ߣߪ૗߆‫ߣ࠻ࡅޡޢ‬േ‛ߩ㑐ଥቇ╙  Ꮞ㊁↢ߣⅣႺ‫ޕߤߥޢ‬―3―⻠Ṷⷐᣦ
‫ޟ‬਎⇇ߩౣ᭴ᚑߦ߻ߌߡ‫ޠ‬ࡈࠖ࡝࠶ࡊ࡮࠺ࠬࠦ࡜
ੱ㘃ቇߪ㐳ࠄߊ⥄ὼߣᢥൻߩ㑐ࠊࠅࠍតࠆ⑼ቇߢ޽ࠆߣߐࠇߡ߈߹ߒߚ‫ߤ߶ࠆߥޕ‬ᱧผ⊛ߦ
ߺߡ߽ 19 ਎♿ߩ⷏᰷೉ᒝߦࠃࠆᬀ᳃࿾᜛ᄢߩߥ߆ߢ‫⷏ޔ‬᰷␠ળ߆ࠄ߶ߤ㆙޿࿾ၞߦ૑߻ੱ߮
ߣߣ‫ޔ‬๟࿐ߩേᬀ‛ߣߩ㑐ࠊࠅᣇߦߟ޿ߡߩ⼾߆ߢ⹦⚦ߥᖱႎ߇ߤࠎߤࠎ㓸߼ࠄࠇࠆࠃ߁ߦߥ
ࠅ߹ߒߚ‫⥄ޔߢ߆ߥߩߘޕ‬ಽߚߜߩ␲వߪ․ቯߩേᬀ‛⒳ߦ߶߆ߥࠄߥ޿ߣ߆‫ࠆ޽ޔ‬േ‛ࠍ⥄ಽߚߜߩㄭⷫ⠪߽ߒߊߪಽりߣߺߥߔ⠨߃߇⷗಴ߐࠇ߹ߒߚ‫⃟ߚߒ߁ߎޕ‬ᄸߣᕁࠊࠇࠆ⠨߃߇⷏᰷ߣ࿾ℂ⊛ߦ㔌ࠇߚ࿾ၞߦ૑߻หᤨઍੱߦࠃߞߡၷᜬߐࠇߡ޿ࠆߎߣߦኻߒߡ‫ޔ‬ቬᢎผ߿᳃
ଶቇߩ⎇ⓥ⠪ࠄߪ‫ੱ޿ߚߞ޿ޔ‬㘃ߩ⢻ജߦᏅ߇޽ࠆߩ߆‫ੱޔ‬㘃ߩ⊒ዷߦߎࠇ߶ߤ㆑޿߇↢ߓߚߩߪ޿ߞߚ޿ߥߗߥߩ߆ߦߟ޿ߡ‫⇼ޔ‬໧ࠍᛴ߆ߑࠆࠍᓧ߹ߖࠎߢߒߚ‫ޕ‬ੱ㘃ቇߪߎߩᄢ໧㗴ߩ⻘ࠍ⸃ߊ⑼ቇߣߒߡ↢߹ࠇ߹ߒߚ‫␠ߚߒ߁ߎޔߡߒߘޕ‬ળߦߺࠄࠇࠆ‫ޔ‬⥄ὼߣᢥൻߣߪፋ೎ߢ߈ߥ޿ߣߔࠆ㘃߹ࠇߥᕁ⠨᭽ᑼߦࡔࠬࠍ౉ࠇߡ⺑ᓧജߩ޽ࠆ⺑᣿ࠍߒࠃ߁ߣߒߚߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬᛬ߒ߽‫⷏ޔ‬᰷ߩᄢቇߢߪ⥄ὼ⑼ቇߣੱᢥ␠ળ⑼ቇ߇ߚ߽ߣࠍಽ߆ߟߎߣߦ
ߥࠆᤨઍߢ߽޽ࠅ߹ߒߚ‫ߩߎޕ‬ὐߢ޿߃߫‫ੱޔ‬㘃ቇߩಽ㊁ߪੱ㘃ߩ↢‛ቇ⊛ߥߒ߫ࠅ߿೙⚂ߦߟ޿ߡߩ໧㗴ߣ‫ੱޔ‬㑆␠ળߩ৻⷗ࡃ࡜ࡃ࡜ߥⷙೣ߿ଔ୯ⷰߦߟ޿ߡߩ໧㗴ߣߦੑᭂൻߒߚ⎇ⓥ
ߩᢿ⛘ࠍၒ߼ࠆ߽ߩߣߒߡ⊓႐ߒߚߩߢߔ‫ੱޕ‬㘃ቇߩౕ૕⊛ߥኻ⽎ߪ‫ޔ‬㓸࿅ߩ߽ߟ⻉೙ᐲߣ‫ޔ‬ߘࠇࠄࠍᒻᑼ⊛ߢߪߥߊታ⾰⊛ߦᡰ߃ࠆ↢‛ቇ⊛࡮ᔃℂቇ⊛ߥၮ⋚ߣࠍߟߥߋಽ㊁ߢ޽ࠆߣ޿
߃߹ߔ‫ੱޔࠅ߹ߟޕ‬㘃ቇ߇ኻ⽎ߣߔࠆߩߪ‫ⷫޔ‬ᣖߣᇕᆪߦ㑐ߔࠆ⻉ⷙೣ‫ޔ‬ⅣႺߩ⹺⍮࡮೑↪࡮ᄌኈߦߟ޿ߡߩᣇᴺ‫ޔ‬ᛛⴚߩ૕♽‫ޔ‬੤឵ߩ᭽ᑼ‫ੱޔ‬㑆࡮り૕࡮㘩‛߳ߩⷰᔨ‫↢ޔ‬ᘒቇ⊛ߥ⍮⼂ߣ᳃ᣖಽ㘃ߥߤߩᄙ᭽ߥ␠ળᘠⴕ߿ᛛⴚ㧔ࡁ࠙࡮ࡂ࠙㧕ߢ޽ࠅ‫ੱޔ‬㑆ߩ↢ℂቇ⊛ߥᯏ⢻‫ޔ‬り૕⊛ߥ․ᓽ‫ޔ‬ㆇേᯏ⢻‫⹺ޔ‬⍮⢻ജߥߤߦၮ␆ࠍ߅ߊ߽ߩߢ޽ࠆߣߣ߽ߦ‫ߩߡߒߣ⽎⴫ߩߘޔ‬ᢥൻߩ᭽ᑼߣ߽ᷓߊߟߥ߇ߞߡ޿ࠆߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬40 ᐕ೨‫⥄ߪ⑳ޔ‬ὼߣᢥൻߩធὐߣߥࠆಽ
㊁ߦߟ޿ߡߩੱ㘃ቇ⊛⎇ⓥߦ⌕ᚻߒ߹ߒߚ‫ޔ߼ߚߩߘޕ‬ධ☨ࠛࠢࠕ࠼࡞᧲ㇱߩࠕࡑ࠱ࡦᅏߦ޽ࠆኒᨋࠍᦨㆡߩ⺞ᩏ࿾ߣߒ߹
ߒߚ‫ߢߎߘޕ‬ᢙᐕ㑆‫ޔ‬ᆄߢ޽ࠅੱ㘃ቇߩห௥ߢ߽޽ࠆࠕࡦ࡮ࠢ࡝ࠬ࠹ࠖ࡯࠿࡮࠹ࠗ࡜
࡯ߣㆊߏߒ‫⁚ޔ‬⁸ߣ὾⇌ㄘ⠹ࠍ߅ߎߥ߁ࡅ
ࡃࡠࠕ⺆ᣖߩ৻㓸࿅ߢ޽ࠆࠕࠪࡘࠕ࡯࡞
ߩੱ߮ߣߦߟ޿ߡ⎇ⓥߒ߹ߒߚ‫߇ߣ߮ੱޕ‬ᄖ⇇ߣᐔ๺⊛ߦࠦࡦ࠲ࠢ࠻ߒߚߩߪ⑳߇⺞ᩏߦ౉ߞߚ⋥೨ߩߎߣߢߔ‫ޕ‬⑳ߪࠕࡑ࠱ࡦߩ␠ળߣⅣႺߦ߅ߌࠆ‛⾰㕙ߣⷰᔨ㕙ߦߟ޿ߡ‫ޔ‬ቯ㊂࡮ቯᕈಽᨆࠍㅢߓߡ߈߼
⚦߆ߊ⸥ㅀ࡮ಽᨆߔࠆ⎇ⓥࠍታᣉߒ߹ߒߚ‫⺞ޕ‬ᩏᒰᤨ‫ޔ‬ⅣႺੱ㘃ቇߩಽ㊁ߢߪ‛⾰ᢥൻ⺰ߦ߽―4―ߣߠߊන⚐ߥ᳿ቯ⺰߇ఝ൓ߢ޽ࠅ‫⽎ޔ‬ᓽ⊛ߥታ〣ⴕὑߪ↢ᘒ♽߳ߩㆡᔕߦ߶߆ߥࠄߥ޿ߣ⺑᣿ߐࠇߡ޿߹ߒߚ‫ߚߞߥ⇣ߪߣࠇߘߪ⑳ޕ‬᭎ᔨ⊛ߥᨒ⚵ߺ߆ࠄ೎ߩ⸃㉼ࠍឭ␜ߒߚ޿ߣ⠨߃߹ߒߚ‫ޔߦߊߣޕ‬ᴡ⇎ၞߣਐ㒺࿾ߣ޿߁ੑߟߩኻᾖ⊛ߥ↢ᘒ♽ߦ㐳ࠄߊዬ૑ߒߡ߈ߚࠕࠪࡘࠕ࡯࡞
ߩੱ߮ߣߦߣࠅੑߟߩ↢ᘒ♽ߢ೑↪น⢻ߥ⾗Ḯߪ⇣ߥߞߡ޿߹ߔ߇‫␠ߪߣ߮ੱޔ‬ળ᭴ㅧ߿ᢥൻ
⊛ߒ߈ߚࠅࠍή᧦ઙߢ↢ᘒ♽ߦㆡวߐߖߡߪ޿ߥ޿ߎߣࠍ␜ߒ߹ߒߚ‫ޕ‬ࠕࠪࡘࠕ࡯࡞ߩᢥൻ߇ⅣႺߩᓇ㗀ࠍ߽ࠈߦฃߌ
ߥ޿቟ቯᕈࠍ߽ߞߡ޿ࠆℂ↱ߩ৻ߟߦ‫ޔ‬ᴡ⇎ၞߣਐ㒺࿾Ꮺߦ߅ߌࠆ㘩ᢱ↢↥ߪᔅⷐಽࠍᄢ߈ߊ⿥߃ߡ
߅ࠅ‫߽߆ߒޔ‬ᛩਅߐࠇࠆഭ௛߽߈ࠊ߼ߡૐ޿ὐࠍ᜼
ߍࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈߹ߔ‫ߚ߹ߪ⑳ޕ‬὾⇌ߣ᫪ᨋߦ߅ߌࠆ
ᬀ‛೑↪ߦߪ౒ㅢὐ߇޽ࠆߎߣߦᵈ⋡ߒ߹ߒߚ‫ࠕޕ‬ࠪࡘࠕ࡯࡞ߩੱ߮ߣߪᩱၭ૞‛ࠍ೑↪ߔࠆߣߣ߽
ߦ‫ߥ↪᦭ޔ‬㊁↢⒳ߩᬀ߃߆߃߿⒳ሶߩ଻ሽࠍߖߞߖ
ߣ߅ߎߥߞߡ߈߹ߒߚ‫ߚߒ߁ߎޕ‬༡ߺ߇਎ઍࠍ⿥߃ߡታ〣ߐࠇࠆߎߣߢᾲᏪ㔎ᨋߩᬀ↢߽ᄢ߈ߊᡷᄌߐࠇߡ߈ߚߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬ᾲᏪ㔎ᨋߪ⷏᰷ੱߩ⋡ߦߪ㊁↢ߘߩ߽ߩߩේ⥄ὼߣᤋࠆߢߒࠂ߁߇‫ޔ‬ߓߞߐ޿ߪᢙජᐕߦ߅ࠃ߱ੱὑ⊛ߥᡷᄌ߇⍮ࠄߕ⍮ࠄߕߩ㑆ߦ߅ߎߥࠊࠇߡ߈ߚߩߢߔ‫ࠪࠕޕ‬ࡘࠕ࡯࡞ߩੱ߮ߣߪ᫪ᨋࠍ⥄ಽߚߜ߇ㆡᔕߔߴ߈⥄ὼߩ৻ㇱߣߪߺߥߒߡ޿߹ߖࠎ‫ޕ‬᫪ᨋߪᣣ‫ߩޘ‬ᵴേߩ႐ߢ޽ࠅ‫ੱޔ‬ᩰࠍ߽ߟሽ࿷߿േᬀ‛ߩ㓸ว૕߆ࠄߥࠆߣ⠨߃ߡ޿߹ߔ‫ࠕߦࠄߐޕ‬ࠪࡘࠕ࡯࡞ߩੱ߮ߣߪ㊁↢േ‛ࠍ㘺⢒ߒߡሶࠍჇ߿ߔⴕὑߦᚻࠍ⾉ߔߎߣߪߥ޿ߦߒࠈ‫ޔ‬ᄙߊߩູ੃㘃ࠍዬ૑࿾ߢࡍ࠶࠻ߣߒߡ㘺ߞߡ޿߹ߔ‫ߩࠅ⁚ߪ࠻࠶ࡍޕ‬㓙ߦᓧࠄࠇࠆࠊߌߢߔ߇‫ߘޔ‬
߁ߒߚ㊁↢േ‛ߪ㊁↢₞ࠍᡰ㈩ߔࠆᒝᄢߥ♖㔤ߩട⼔ߦ޽ࠆቅఽ⊛ߥሽ࿷ߣߒߡ৻⋡߅߆ࠇߡ޿߹ߔ‫ੱޕ‬㑆߇ࡍ࠶࠻ߣߥࠆേ‛ࠍᗧߩ߹߹ߦߔࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ߥ޿ߩߪߎ߁ߒߚℂ↱߆ࠄߥߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬ᄙߊߩ᳃ᣖ⹹ࠍ౉ᔨߦᬌ⸛ߒߚ⚿ᨐ‫ޔ‬㊁↢േ‛ࠍ㘺޿ᘠࠄߒߡኅ⇓ൻߔࠆ⊒ᗐ߇ධ☨ૐ࿾߿਎⇇ߩઁ࿾ၞߩ⁚⁸᳃␠ળߢᰳ⪭ߒߡ޿ࠆ੐ታߩ޽ࠆߎߣ߇ࠊ߆ࠅ߹ߒߚ‫ޕ‬㊁↢േ‛ࠍࡍ࠶࠻ߣߒߡ㘺⢒ߔࠆߎߣ߇ኅ⇓ൻߩ⿠Ḯߢ޽ࠅ‫ߜߩߩߘޔ‬ኅ⇓ൻ߇㆐ᚑߐࠇߚߣߔࠆ઒⺑ߦߪߟߥ߇ࠄߥ޿ߣ޿߃ࠆߢߒࠂ߁‫ޕ‬⑳߇߅ߎߥߞߚ㊁ᄖ⺞ᩏߩ߽ߞߣ߽㊀ⷐߥᗧ⟵ߪ‫ੱޔ‬㘃ቇߦ߅ߌࠆ⥄ὼߣᢥൻߩੑర⺰ࠍౣ⠨ߔࠆߎߣߢ޽ࠈ߁߆ߣ߅߽޿߹ߔ‫߁ߘߦ⑳ࠄ⥄߇ߣ߮ੱߩ࡞࡯ࠕࡘࠪࠕޕ‬⠨߃ࠆᯏળࠍ޽ߚ
߃ߡߊࠇ߹ߒߚ‫ޕ‬ᓐࠄߩᣣᏱ⊛ߥኻੱ㑐ଥ߿ੱ㑆એᄖߩሽ࿷ߣߩ㑐ଥߪ‫ޔ‬᝝㘩㧔predation㧕ߣ‫ޟ‬ᩱၭൻ‫( ޠ‬domestication)ߣ޿߁ੑߟߩ༡ߺߦࠃߞߡ᭴ᚑߐࠇߡ߅ࠅ‫ࡦ࠱ࡑࠕޔ‬ᴡᵹၞߦ౒ㅢ
ߔࠆ࠼࡜ࡧࠖ࠳ဳߩⷫᣖฬ⒓㧔⸼㧦෺஥੤෷ࠗ࠻ࠦᇕ㧔ῳᣇ‫ޔ‬Უᣇਔᣇߩ੤෷ࠗ࠻ࠦᇕ‫ࠆ޽ޔ‬޿ߪᆌᆂࠍ੤឵ߔࠆᆌᆂ੤឵ᇕ㧕ࠍ⴫ࠊߔಽ㘃૕♽㧕ࠍ߽ߟ⚵❱ߦ․ᓽ⊛ߥⷫᣖߣᆪᣖߩኻ┙᭴ㅧߣߒߡౕ⃻ൻߐࠇߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬᝝㘩㑐ଥߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫⁚ޔ‬⁸ߦ߅ߌࠆ₞߿ᚢ㑵ߦ߅ߌࠆẜ࿷⊛ߥᢜߣߥࠆㄭ㓞㓸࿅ߪ↵ᕈߦߣߞߡߩᆪᣖߣߺߥߐࠇ߹ߔ‫৻ޕ‬ᣇ‫ޔ‬὾⇌࿾ߦ߅ߌࠆᩱၭ૞‛ߪᅚᕈߦߣߞߡ㙃⢒ߔߴ߈ሶߤ߽ߣห᭽ߦⷫᣖ㑐ଥߦ޽ࠆ߽ߩߣߺߥߐࠇ߹ߔ‫ࡘࠪࠕޔࠅ߹ߟޕ‬ࠕ࡯࡞ߦߣߞߡ‫ੱޔ‬㑆એᄖߩሽ࿷ߣߩ㑐ଥߪੱ㑆㑐ଥߣታ㓙⊛‫ޔ‬᭎ᔨ⊛ߦ߽߅ߥߓ✢਄ߢ⠨߃ࠆߎߣߩߢ߈ࠆ߽ߩߣߐࠇߡ޿ࠆߩߢߔ‫ߩߎޕ‬᳃ᣖ⹹⊛ߥ⊒⷗ߪ‫⥄ޔ‬ὼⷰߩ޽ࠅᣇߣߒߡ⷏᰷

―5―ߦ߅ߌࠆᒻ⠰਄ቇߣ⹺⼂⺰ߦౣ⠨ࠍㄼࠆ߽ߩߣߥࠅ߹ߒߚ‫⷏ޔ߇ߚߒߢߣߎߩߜߩߋߔޕ‬᰷ߩ⥄ὼⷰߪࠕࠪࡘࠕ࡯࡞એᄖߩࠕࡑ࠱ࡦవ૑᳃ߛߌߢߥߊ਎⇇ਛߩᄙߊߩੱ߮ߣߦ߽ᒰߡߪ߹
ࠄߥ޿ߎߣߦ᳇ߠ߈߹ߒߚ‫⷏ޔߪ⑳ߡߒ߁ߎޕ‬᰷ਛᔃਥ⟵⊛ߥ⥄ὼߣᢥൻߩੑర⺰⊛ߥᕁ⠨ࠍ᫈ළߒ‫✢ߩߘޔ‬਄ߢੱ㘃ቇߩ⋡ᮡࠍ߽߁৻ᐲ⚵ߺ┙ߡߥ߅ߔ઀੐ߦ⌕ᚻߒߚߩߢߔ‫ޔߡߒߘޕ‬⑳ߪ਎⇇ߩੱ߮ߣ߇਎⇇ࠍߤߩࠃ߁ߦ᭴▽ߒߡ޿ࠆߩ߆ߦߟ޿ߡᲧセ⎇ⓥߔࠆߎߣࠍ⋡ᮡߣߒߡ⸳ቯߔࠆߎߣߣߒߚߩߢߔ‫⻠ߩߎޕ‬Ṷߢߪ‫ޔ‬ᣂߒ޿⎇ⓥߩ⸳ቯߦߟ޿ߡ޿ߊߟ߆ߩ੐଀ࠍ
⚫੺ߒߚ޿ߣ⠨߃ߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ᚻᆎ߼ߦ⏕⹺ߒߡ߅߈ߚ޿ߩߪ‫ੱޔ‬㘃ߪၮᧄ⊛ߦ߅ߥߓ⹺⼂࡮ᗵⷡㆇേེቭࠍ߽ߞߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬᥉ㅢ⸒ࠊࠇࠆ‫ޟ‬ᢥൻߩߜ߇޿‫ੱߪޠ‬㘃ߩ⢻ജᏅߦࠃࠆߩߢߪߥߊ‫ޔ‬਎⇇ࠍ᭴ᚑߔࠆ⻉․ᓽࠍ޿
߆ߦ⃻ታߩ߽ߩߣߔࠆ߆ߩ㆑޿ߦࠃࠆߣ޿߁ὐߢߔ‫ޕ߆߁ࠂߒߢߩࠆߥߦߣߎߥ߁ࠃߩߘߗߥޕ‬㘩‛ߪ㘩ߴࠆߚ߼ߢߥߊ‫ޔ‬⠨߃ࠆߚ߼߿ⴕേߩᜰ㊎ߣߔࠆߚ߼ߩ߽ߩߢ޽ࠆߣߔࠆ⠨߃ߦ޽ࠆࠃ߁ߦ‫․ޔ‬ቯߩ੐⽎߿㑐ଥᕈࠍㆬᛯߒ‫ࠍߩ߽ߩ߆߶ߩߘޔ‬᫈ළߔࠆᕭᗧ⊛ߥࡊࡠ࠮ࠬߪ૗ߦ↱᧪ߔࠆߩߢߒࠂ߁߆‫߽ߣߞ߽ޕ‬㒸⣣ߥߎߚ߃ߪ‫ߪ⽎⃻ࠆࠁࠄ޽ޔ‬ᄙᰴరߦࠊߚߞߡ޿ࠆ߆ࠄߣ
޿߁߽ߩߢߔ‫ߩߎޕ‬ὐߪືቇ⠪ߩࡏࠗ࡞߿ࡠ࠶ࠢ߇৻⟵⊛ᕈ⾰ߣੑ⟵⊛ᕈ⾰ߩߜ߇޿ߣߒߡ৻
⥸ൻߒߡએ᧪ߩቯ⺑ߣߥߞߡ޿߹ߔ‫⊛⟵৻ޕ‬ᕈ⾰ߩ੐⽎ߣߪ⺕ߦߢ߽ℂ⸃ߢ߈ߡ㆑޿ߩࠊ߆ࠆ
߽ߩߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬ᄢዪ⊛ߦߪ⸘㊂ൻ߽ߢ߈ࠆ߽ߩߢߔ‫৻ޕ‬ᣇ‫ޔ‬ੑ⟵⊛ߥᕈ⾰ࠍ߽ߟ੐⽎ߣߪ‫ߩ⑳ޔ‬Ꮷߢ޽ࠆࠢࡠ࡯࠼࡮࡟ࡧࠖ㧩ࠬ࠻ࡠ࡯ࠬ߇‫ౕޟ‬૕ߩ⺰‫ߡߒߣޠ‬ឭ໒ߒߚ߽ߩߦ߶߆ߥࠄߕ‫ࠊޔ‬ࠇࠊࠇ߇⹺⍮ߔࠆⅣႺ਎⇇ߩߥ߆߆ࠄ㘃ૃ㑐ଥߦ޽ࠆ߽ߩߣኻ┙㑐ଥߦ޽ࠆ߽ߩࠍขᝥㆬᛯ
ߔࠆ⍮⊛⢻ജࠍᜰߒߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬޽ࠄࠁࠆ⃻⽎ߩߥ߆ߢ৻⟵⊛ᕈ⾰ࠍ߽ߟ੐⽎ࠍᛒ߁႐ว‫⹥ߦࠇߘޔ‬ᒰߔࠆߩߪߚ޿ߡ޿᥉ㆉ
ਥ⟵⠪ߦߣߞߡᚻߩౝߦ޽ࠆ߽ߩߥߩߢߔ߇‫ޔ‬ᗵⷡ⊛ߥශ⽎ߦᒁ߈ઃߌࠇ߫‫ޔ‬୘ੱ߿ᱧผߩ⁁ᴫߣ㑐ࠊࠆߐ߹ߑ߹ߥផ⺰߿㑐ଥᕈ߇น⢻ᕈߣߒߡᶋ߆߮਄߇ࠅ߹ߔ‫ߩࠬ࠺ࡔࠠ࡞ࠕޕ‬ේℂߪ᳓ߦ౉ࠇߚ‛⾰ߩᕈ⾰ߦࠃࠄߕ࿾⃿਄ߤߎߢ߽หߓࠃ߁ߦㆡ↪ߐࠇ߹ߔ߇‫ޔ‬᳓ߦᴉ߼ࠄࠇࠆߩ
߇ੱ㑆ߩ႐ว‫ߩੱߩߘޔ‬ਥⷰ⊛ߥ૕㛎ߪੱ㑆ߩ⢻ജ߿⁁ᴫᰴ╙ߢ߆ߥࠅᄢ߈ߊᄌࠊࠆߢߒࠂ߁‫ޕ‬ߟ߹ࠅ‫ߩࠬ࠺ࡔࠠ࡞ࠕߓߥ߅ޔ‬ේℂߦ㑐ߔࠆ⃻⽎ߢ޽ߞߡ߽‫ੱߣ⾰‛ޔ‬㑆ߣ޿߁ሽ࿷᭽ᘒߩߜ
߇޿ߦࠃߞߡືቇ⊛ߦߪᏅ⇣߇↢ߓࠆߎߣߦߥࠅ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ᄙ᭽ߥࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴ߩߜ߇޿ߦࠃߞߡ⃻ታൻߩߐࠇ߆ߚ߽⇣ߥࠅ߹ߔߩߢ‫⥄ޔ‬ὼ⑼ቇߣੱᢥ␠ળ⑼ቇߩ㗔ၞߣߢߪ⹺⼂⺰⊛ߦᄢ߈ߥᢿ
⛘߇߁߹ࠇࠆߎߣߦߥࠆߩߢߔ‫ޔ߃߁ߩߘޕ‬㧔৻⥸ൻ‫ޔ‬ᢙ㊂ൻ‫ޔ‬෻ᓳᕈ‫੍ޔ‬᷹ߥߤߩᣇᴺߣ੍
᷹ࠍၮ⋚ߣߔࠆ㧕⥄ὼ⑼ቇಽ㊁ߣ‫ޔ‬㧔୘೎ൻ‫ޔ㉼⸃ޔ‬ଔ୯ߩಽ᦭‫ޔ‬ᗧ๧⺰⊛ߥ৻⽾ᕈߥߤߩᣇ
ᴺߣ੍᷹ࠍၮ⋚ߣߔࠆ㧕ੱᢥ␠ળ⑼ቇಽ㊁ߣߩ޽޿ߛߢ‫ߦ޿߇ߚޔ‬ᣇᴺ߿੍᷹ࠍャ಴౉ߔࠆߎ
ߣ߇⑌ߓࠄࠇࠆࠃ߁ߦߥߞߚߩߢߔ‫ߡߒ߁ߎޕ‬ੑߟߩ⑼ቇߪߚ߇޿ߦ⥄ಽߩ㗔ၞࠍขᝥㆬᛯߒ
޽޿‫☴⚐ࠍࠄ⥄ޔ‬ൻߒ‫⋧ޔ‬ᚻߣߩႺ⇇㗔ၞࠍ߆߉߹ࠊࠆߎߣߦߥߞߚ⚿ᨐ‫⥄ޔ‬ὼߣᢥൻߩᄙᰴ
రߦࠊߚࠆ੐⽎ࠍ޽ߟ߆߁ߎߣ߇ታ㓙਄ߣߡߟ߽ߥߊ࿎㔍ߥߎߣߣߥߞߚߩߢߔ‫ޔ߽ߩ߁޿ߣޕ‬ᄙᰴర⊛ߥ੐⽎ߣ޿߁ߩߪ⴫⃻ᒻᘒ߇ᄙ᭽ߢ޽ࠅ‫ߩߘޔ‬ᩮ᜚ߣߥࠆ⠨߃߽ߐ߹ߑ߹ߢ޽ࠆߩߢ
ᔅὼ⊛ߦᷙੂࠍ᜗ߊߎߣߣߥߞߚߩߢߔ‫ࡦ࠱ࡑࠕ߇⑳ޕ‬਄ᵹၞߩࠕࠪࡘࠕ࡯࡞ߩੱ߮ߣߣ᥵ࠄ
ߔߥ߆ߢ಴ળ޿‫⎇ޔ‬ⓥߒߚ࿯ფߦߟ޿ߡ޿߃߫‫ޔ‬࿾ቇ߿ൻቇߥߤߩ⥄ὼ⑼ቇߪߘߩ৻㕙ࠍ᣿ࠄ߆ߦߒߡߊࠇ߹ߔ߇‫ੱ߁߇ߜߊߚߞ߹ߪߣࠇߘޔ‬㘃ቇߩ⎇ⓥߢߪ‫ޔ‬࿯ფߩ೑↪ᣇᴺ߿⒳㘃೎ߩ―6―࿯ფߩ᳃ଶฬ‫ߪߦࠄߐޔ‬࿯ფߦ߆߆ࠊࠆ␹⹤ߦߟ޿ߡߩ⺑᣿ࠍ⹜ߺࠆߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬⑳߇㗡ߦឬ޿ߡ߈ߚߩߪ‫⥄ޔ‬ὼ⇇ߩ⻉⃻⽎ࠍዊಽߌߦߒߡ⎇ⓥߔࠆ߿ࠅᣇࠍㆱߌߡ‫ੱޔ‬㘃ߩᄙ᭽ߥⅣႺ⹺⍮ߩ޽ࠅᣇߦࡔࠬࠍ޿ࠇࠃ߁ߣߔࠆ߽ߩߢߒߚ‫ੱޔߪߟ৻߁߽ޕ‬㘃߇↢‛ቇ⊛ߦ౒ㅢߩ૕ゎࠍ߽ߜߥ߇ࠄ‫ߗߥޔ‬਎⇇ߦߪߚ޿߳ࠎ⇣ߥߞߚવ⛔ᢥൻ߇ሽ࿷ߔࠆߩ߆‫ߩߘޔ‬ᗧ๧ࠍ⺑᣿ߔࠆߎߣߦ޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ⅣႺߩߥ߆ߢ⹺⼂ߐࠇߚߎߣ߇ࠄࠍ㓸Ⓧߒ‫ޔ‬਎⇇ߩਛߢ૏⟎ߠߌࠆߎߣࠍ‫ޟ‬਎⇇ൻ‫ޠ‬㧔worlding㧕ߣ๭ࠎߢߺ߹ߒࠂ߁‫࡮࠻ࠬࡐ߿ࡦ࠳ࡕ࡮࠻ࠬࡐޔߪ⑳ߢߎߎޕ‬ࠦࡠ࠾ࠕ࡞ߩੱ㘃ቇ⠪ߚߜ߇਎⇇ൻࠍ‫ⷓޟ‬ᮭਥ⟵⊛ߥ⷏᰷ੱߦࠃࠆ⃻ታ਎⇇ߩ␠ળ⊛᭴▽‫ߣޠ‬૏⟎ߠߌࠆߩߣߪߜ߇ߞߚⷰὐ߆ࠄ⠨߃ߡߺߚ޿ߣ߅߽޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬೨ㅀߩ⎇ⓥ⠪ߚߜߪ‫ޟޔ‬਎⇇ൻ‫ߪߦޠ‬ㆊ෰ߦ⿠ߎߞߚߎߣߣ‫ߩߘޔ‬੐ታߦߚ޿ߒߡ޽ߚ߃ࠄࠇࠆ⒳‫ߩޘ‬ᢥൻ⊛ߥ⺑᣿ߣࠍፋ೎ߔࠆߎߣࠍᥧ㤩ߩੌ⸃੐㗄ߣߒߡ޿߹ߔ߇‫ޟߪ⑳ޔ‬਎⇇ൻ‫ߩ⋡ޔߪ⺆↪߁޿ߣޠ‬೨ߢ⿠ߎߞ
ߡ޿ࠆ⻉⃻⽎ߩߥ߆ߢ޿ߊߟ߆ߩ․ᓽ⊛ߥ੐ᨩ߇቟ቯൻߔࠆࡊࡠ࠮ࠬࠍᜰߔ߽ߩߣ⠨߃ߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬㧔⸼㧦ߟ߹ࠅ‫ޔ‬ታ㓙ߦ⿠ߎߞߚߎߣࠍߔߴߡ⸃㉼ߔࠆߩߢߪߥߊ‫ޔ‬਎⇇ߢ߰ߟ߁ߦ޽ࠆ
߽ߩߣ⷗ߥߐࠇࠆࠃ߁ߦᄌൻߔࠆㆊ⒟ࠍᗧ๧ߔࠆ‫ޕ‬㧕ߐߡ‫ޟޔ‬਎⇇ൻ‫ޔߪ⑳ޕࠎߖ߹ࠅ޽ߪߢߩࠆࠇߐߥߦ࡜ࡃ࡜ࡃߪޠ‬ⅣႺߦ޽ࠆ੐‛߿ߘߩ․ᓽߩ߁ߜ‫ߣࠇߎߦ⊛ⷰ⋥ޔ‬ᵈ⋡ߒߚ߽ߩ߇ㆬ߫ࠇࠆߩߛߣ⠨߃ߡ޿߹ߔ‫ߩ࡞࡯ࠕࡘࠪࠕߗߥޕ‬⁚⁸⠪ߪ᫪ࠍᱠߊߐ޿ߦ♖㔤ࠍ⷗ߟߌߛߔߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆߩߢߒࠂ߁߆‫ޕ‬ᩭ⑼ቇ⠪ߦߪߘ߁ߒߚ
ߎߣ߇ߣߡ߽ߢ߈ߥ޿ߩߢߔ‫⇼ߩߎޕ‬໧ߪ‫ޔ‬਎⇇ࠍ޽ࠄࠁࠆ੐‛߇㓸ᄢᚑߐࠇߚ߽ߩߣߺߥߔ
⠨߃ߣ‫ઁޔ‬ᣇߢ⚻㛎ߦࠃࠅ⹺⍮ߐࠇߚ⃻ታ਎⇇ߩᄙర⊛ߥ㓸วߣߺߥߔ⠨߃ߣࠍኻᲧߔࠆߛߌ
ߢߪ⸃ߊߎߣߦߥࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫ޔ߽ߣߞ߽ޕ‬਎⇇ࠍ޽ࠅߩ߹߹ߩ߽ߩߣߒߡᝒ߃ࠆ⷗ᣇߣ‫ޔ‬ਥⷰ⊛ߦᛠីߐࠇߚ߽ߩߛߣߔࠆ⷗ᣇߣࠍኻᲧߒߡ⠨߃ࠆߩߪ⃻ઍߩ⹺⼂⺰ߢߪᏱᅃߣߐࠇߡ޿߹
ߔ‫ޕ‬ઃ⸒ߔࠇ߫‫ޔ‬ᗵᕈࠍ߽ߟࠊࠇࠊࠇੱ㑆ߦߣߞߡߪ‫ޔ‬਎⇇ߣߪ㧔୘ੱߩ㧕ⷞὐߦ߅߁ߓߡ
⴫಴ߐࠇࠆ⥄Ꮖቢ⚿⊛ߥ߽ߩߢߪߥ޿ߛࠈ߁ߣ߅߽޿߹ߔ‫ߚߞߥ⇣ߪߊࠄߘ߅ޕ‬ᕈ⾰߿㑐ଥᕈ߆ࠄߥࠆ෕ᄢߥ㊂ߩ੐⽎ߩߥ߆߆ࠄ‫ߪࠇࠊࠇࠊޔ‬ሽ࿷⺰⊛ߥⷰὐ߆ࠄⅣႺ᧦ઙߦᔕߓߡ઀
ಽߐࠇ⃻ታൻߐࠇࠆ‫⃻ߪߊߒ߽ޔ‬ታൻߐࠇߥ޿ߎߣ߇ࠄࠍㆬ೎ߒߡ޿ࠆߣ߅߽޿߹ߔ‫ߚ⑳ޕ‬ߜࠍขࠅᏎߊⅣႺߦ޽ࠆ‛⾰࡮㕖‛⾰⊛ሽ࿷ߪ‫ߩࠇࠊࠇࠊޔ‬⢻ജߢᧂ᧪᳗ധߣ߽ߦℂ⸃น⢻ߥ਎⇇ߢ߽‫⥄ޔ‬ὼ⇇ߩሽ࿷ߦ␠ળ⊛ߥᒻߣᗧ๧ࠍઃਈߒߚߛߌߩ߽ߩߢ߽޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫ߞ޿ޕ‬ߡߺࠇ߫‫߇ࠇࠊࠇࠊޔ‬ᗵ⍮ߔࠆ߽ߩ‫ޔ‬ήⷞߔࠆ߽ߩࠍ߰ߊ߼ߡߐ߹ߑ߹ߥᕈ⾰ࠍ߽ߟ੐⽎ߩ㓸ว૕ߦㆊ߉ߥ޿ߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬‫ޟ‬਎⇇ൻ‫߇ޠ‬ᄙ᭽ߥ᭽ᑼࠍߣ߽ߥߞߡ޿ࠆ⸶ߪ‫ޔ‬਎⇇ߩ޽ࠄࠁࠆ੐⽎߇ήㅧ૞ߦታ૕ൻߐࠇ
ߡ޿ࠆ߆ࠄߢߪ޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫߇ࠇࠊࠇࠊޕ‬ᵈ⋡ߔࠆ੐‛ߩᕈ⾰ߣߘߩ㑐ଥᕈߦߟ޿ߡផ᷹ߔࠆᕁ
⠨߇ၮᧄߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆߩߢߔ‫߇⑳ޕ‬ᒝ⺞ߒߚ޿ߩߪ‫ੱޔ‬㘃ቇߩ⎇ⓥ߇ᚻᆎ߼ߦขࠅ⚵߻ߴ߈ߪሽ࿷⺰⊛ߥ᭎ᔨߦ㑐ߔࠆಽᨆߩᨒ⚵ߺߦߟ޿ߡߢߔ‫ޕ‬ಽᨆߩᨒ⚵ߺߥߤߪ⎇ⓥߢߪᒰߚࠅ೨ߩ
ߎߣߣߐࠇߡ޿ࠆߩߢߔ߇‫⎇ߪ⑳ޔ‬ⓥ਄ߩ㊀ⷐߥၮ⋚ߦߥࠆ߽ߩߣ⠨߃ߡ޿߹ߔ‫⏕߇⑳ޕ‬ାࠍ߽ߞߡ⸒޿ߚ޿ߩߪ‫ੱޔ‬㘃߇᭴▽ߔࠆ਎⇇߇ᄙ᭽ߢ޽ࠆߩߪߘࠇߙࠇߩ␠ળߩ೙ᐲ‫⚻ޔ‬ᷣࠪࠬ࠹ࡓ‫ޔ‬ଔ୯ⷰ‫ޔ‬ᢥൻߩ㘃ဳ‫ޔ‬਎⇇ⷰߥߤߩߜ߇޿ߦࠃࠆߩߢߪߥ޿ߣ޿߁ὐߢߔ‫⻉ޔࠅ߹ߟޕ‬␠ળߦ߅ߌࠆᢥൻⷐ⚛⟲ߪ਎⇇߇૗ߦࠃߞߡ᭴ᚑߐࠇߡ޿ࠆߩ߆‫⚛ⷐ⻉ߦࠄߐޔ‬㑆ߩ㑐ଥߪߤ߁ߥߞߡ޿ࠆߩ߆ߣ޿߁ၮᧄ⊛ߥ઒⺑ߦ↱᧪ߔࠆ߽ߩߥߩߢߔ‫ࠅ߹ߟޔ࡯ࠫࡠ࠻ࡦࠝޕ‬ሽ࿷⺰

―7―ߣ޿߁↪⺆ߪ⹺⼂⺰ߩ਎⇇ߢߪ‫ޟ‬೨คㅀ⊛‫ੱޔߢߩ߽ࠆࠇߐߣޠ‬㘃ቇߦ߅޿ߡ߽ಽᨆߩᨒ⚵ߺߢណ↪ߢ߈ࠆㆡಾߥ↪⺆ߢ޽ࠆߣ߅߽޿߹ߔ‫ ߩߎޕ‬20 ᐕ㑆‫ߦߕࠊ૶ࠅ߹޽ࠍ⺆↪ߩߎߪ⑳ޔ‬޿߹ߒߚ‫ߪ⸶ߩߘޕ‬᭎ᔨߣߒߡᷙੂߔࠆߩߢ޽߹ࠅࠃߊߥ޿ߣ⠨߃ߡ޿ߚ߆ࠄߢߔ‫޿ߒ߆ߒޕ‬߹߿‫߁޿ߣ࡯ࠫࡠ࠻ࡦࠝޔ‬᭎ᔨ߆ࠄ‫ੱߪࠇࠊࠇࠊޔ‬㘃ߩᄙ᭽ᕈߩᷓᷗߦㄼࠅ‫ߩߎޔ‬਎⇇ࠍ᭴ᚑߔࠆ޽ࠄࠁࠆሽ࿷ߣߘߩ⋧੕㑐ଥᕈߦߟ޿ߡߩၮᧄ⊛ߥផ⺰ࠍ߅ߎߥ߁ߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆߣ⠨߃ࠆߦ⥋ࠅ߹ߒߚ‫ޕ‬ߐߡߎߎߢ‫ޟޔ‬਎⇇ൻ‫ࠍޠ‬ᄙ᭽ߥᒻᘒߢታ૕ൻߔࠆߎߣߪሽ࿷⺰ߩᄙ᭽ߥ૕♽ߦ⿠࿃ߔࠆߣ
޿߁⑳ߩ⠨߃ߦߟ޿ߡ߰ࠇߡ߅߈߹ߒࠂ߁‫ੱޔߕ߹ޕ‬㘃ቇߣߪ૗ߦ㑐ߔࠆ⎇ⓥߢ޽ࠆߩ߆ߦߟ
޿ߡᦨೋߦㅀߴߡ߅߈߹ߔ‫ߩ⑳ޕ‬⠨߃ߢߪ‫ੱޔ‬㘃ቇߩ߅߽ߥ઀੐ߪ․⇣ߥ೙ᐲ‫ޔ‬ᢥൻ⊛ᘠⴕ‫ޔ‬␠ળ⊛ታ〣ߥߤߦߟ޿ߡ⹦⚦ߦ⸥ㅀߔࠆߎߣߢߪ޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫ߪࠇߎޕ‬᳃ᣖ⹹㧔ࠛࠬࡁࠣ࡜ࡈࠖ
࡯㧦ethnography㧕ߩ઀੐ߢ޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ੱޕ‬㘃ቇߪ᳃ᣖቇ⠪ߦࠃߞߡ߽ታ〣ߐࠇࠆ߽ߩߢ޽ࠆߒ‫ޔ‬᳃ᣖቇߪੱ㘃ቇߦࠃߞߡ߽ߥߒ߁ࠆ߽ߩߢ޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫⥄⑳ޕ‬りߪߘߩਔᣇࠍᚻដߌߡ߈ߚࠊߌߢ
ߔ߇‫ޔ‬หᤨㅴⴕߢ߿ߞߡ߈ߚߩߢߪ޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫ޕ‬᳃ᣖቇߣੱ㘃ቇߩ⋡ᜰߔ⋡ᮡߣᣇᴺ⺰ࠍࠊࠇࠊࠇߪᷙหߒߡߪߥࠄߥ޿ߣ⠨߃ߡ޿߹ߔ‫ੱޕ‬㘃ቇߩਥⷐߥ⋡ᮡߪ‫ੱޔ‬㑆߇๟࿐ߩⅣႺߣ޿߆ߦ㑐ࠊࠅ‫ߩ߆ߥߩߘޔ‬੐‛ࠍ޿߆ߦ૶޿‫ޔ‬㗼⪺ߢߪ޽ࠆߌࠇߤߌߞߒߡ᳗⛯⊛ߣߪ޿߃ߥ޿Ⅳ
Ⴚߩᄙ᭽ᕈߣߩ޽޿ߛߦ᳗⛯⊛ߥ޿ߒ৻ᤨ⊛ߥ㑐ࠊࠅࠍߟ߻ߋߎߣߦࠃࠅ‫ߩߘߦ߆޿ޔ‬ⅣႺࠍ
ᄌኈߐߖߡ߈ߚ߆ߦߟ޿ߡశࠍ޽ߡࠆߎߣߢ޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ߩߎޕ‬૞ᬺࠍታ〣ߔࠆߚ߼‫ߩࠄࠇߎޔ‬㑐ଥᕈߦߟ޿ߡߩ⷗ขࠅ࿑ࠍߟߊࠅ‫ޔ‬ᕈᩰઃߌߣㆡว࡮ਇㆡวᕈࠍ⏕ቯߒ‫ⴕࠆ߆ࠊߋߔߡ⷗ޔ‬േߣᕁ⠨ߩ᭽ᑼߣߒߡ޿߆ߦታ૕ൻߐࠇࠆ߆ࠍᬌ⸛ߔࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ੱޔࠅ߹ߟޕ‬㘃ቇߩ઀੐ߪ޿߆ߦ਎⇇߇᭴▽ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ߆ࠍ⺑᣿ߔࠆߎߣߦ޽ࠆߣ޿߃ࠆߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬ੱ㘃ቇ߇శࠍ޽ߡࠆ‫ޔ‬਎⇇ࠍ᭴ᚑߔࠆ㓙┙ߞߚ᭽ᑼߣߪ޿ߞߚ޿ߤࠎߥ߽ߩߥߩߢߒࠂ߁߆‫ޕ‬ߘߩਛりߪ⹺⍮♽ߣᗵⷡ࡮ㆇേ♽ߦၮ␆ࠍ߅ߊ߽ߩߢ޽ࠅ‫৻ޔ‬ㇱߪ↢߹ࠇߟ߈ߩ߽ߩߢ޽ࠅ߹
ߔ߇‫ޔ‬ᚲਈߩⅣႺߩߥ߆ߢੱ㑆ߣੱ㑆એᄖߩሽ࿷ߣߩ⋧੕૞↪ࠍㅢߓߡ᣿ࠄ߆ߦߥࠆ߽ߩࠍ฽
ࠎߢ޿߹ߔ‫ߩߘޔߡߞ߇ߚߒޕ‬᭽ᑼߪ⎇ⓥ⠪ߦࠃࠆ⁁ᴫ⺑᣿ߩߚ߼ߩᨒ⚵ߺߠߊࠅߥߤߣߪߜ
߇ߞߡ‫⁁ޔ‬ᴫࠍ๟⍮ߒߡ♖ᐲߩ㜞޿ᨒ⚵ߺࠍ᭴▽ߒߚ↥‛ߣߥࠆߴ߈߽ߩߥߩߢߔ‫ߩߘޕ‬ᨒ⚵ߺ⥄૕ߪᣣᏱ⊛ߥ༡ߺߩ╭ᦠ߈ㅢࠅߩ੍ቯߩࠃ߁ߥ᛽⽎⊛ߥ߽ߩߢ‫⏕ޔ‬࿕ߚࠆ⍮⼂ࠍᜬߜ಴ߔ
ߎߣ߇ߥߊߡ߽ᛛ㊂‫⹺ޔ‬⍮‫ⴕޔ‬ὑࠍ⚵ߺวࠊߖߡታ⃻ߢ߈ࠆᕈᩰߩ߽ߩߢ޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫࡮ࠬ࡝࡯ࡕޕ‬ࡉࡠ࠶ࠢߩ⸒ࠍ୫ࠅࠇ߫‫ޔ‬‫ߩߥ߇߽ߕࠊ⸒ޟ‬੐ᨩ‫ޠ‬
㧔1992㧕ߢ޽ࠅ‫ࠬ࠘࠻ࡆࡂޔ‬㧔⸼㧦ᘠᕈ⊛ߥ⍮ⷡ࡮⊒ᗐ࡮ⴕὑࠍⷙቯߔࠆ᭴ㅧ㧕ࠍᓞߒ‫ޔ‬ផ⺰ࠍଦߒ‫⹺ޔ‬⍮⢻ജࠍ߰ࠆ޿ߦ߆ߌࠆ⹺⼂૞↪
ߢ޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ߪࠇߘޕ‬਎⇇߇ߣߊߦੱ㑆ߩᕈะߦ⾮ਈߐࠇߚࠕࡈࠜ࡯࠳ࡦࠬ㧔ⴕὑน⢻ᕈ㧕ߩ↥‛ߥߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬ߎࠇࠄߩᨒ⚵ߺߩᩮᐙߣߥࠆߩߪ‫ޔ‬㘃ૃߩ޽ࠆ޿ߪ⇣ߥߞߚᕈ⾰ߩ߽ߩ߆ࠄߥࠆ⃻ታ਎⇇ߩ⻉ⷐ⚛ࠍ߹ߣ߼਄ߍߚࠅ‫ޔ‬ಽ㔌ߔࠆߎߣߢห৻ᕈߩ޽ࠆ੐ᨩߦᢛℂߔࠆߎߣߥߩߢߔ‫߇⑳ޕ‬ਥᒛߒߚ޿ߩߪ‫ߚߒ߁ߘޔ‬ᕈะߩၮ⋚ߣߥࠆ⹺⼂ㆊ⒟߇᥉ㆉ⊛ߥ․ᓽߣߒߡ‫ޔ‬り૕ᕈ㧔physicality㧕‫ޔ‬ߟ߹ࠅ‛⾰⊛ߥㆊ⒟ߣ‫ޔ‬ౝ㕙ᕈ㧔interiority㧕‫ࠅ߹ߟޔ‬ᔃߩ⁁ᘒߣߦੑᭂൻߐࠇߡ޿ࠆߣ޿߁⢛᥊ߢߔ‫ޕ‬
ߎߩ઒⺑ߪືቇ‫ޔ‬ᔃℂቇ‫ޔ‬᳃ᣖቇߥߤߦࠃࠆᢙᄙߊߩᢥ₂ߦଐ᜚ߒߚ߽ߩߢߔ߇‫ߪߢߎߎޔ‬―8―ߘߩ⹦⚦ߦߪ߰ࠇ߹ߖࠎ‫ߛߚޕ‬ᜰ៰ߒߡ߅߈ߚ޿ߩߪ‫ޔ‬20 ਎♿ᓟඨߦ߅ߌࠆ⷏᰷ߩ‛ℂቇ⠪ߩ⺑ߦࠃࠆ߹ߢߪ‫ޔ‬ᗧ⼂ߣ޿߁߽ߩߪ↢‛ቇ⊛ߥᯏ⢻ߣߒߡ⺑᣿ߐࠇߡ޿߹ߒߚ߇↢߈ߡ޿ࠆ߰
ߟ߁ߩੱ㑆߇ౝ㕙ᕈࠍ߽ߚߥ޿り૕ߛߌߩሽ࿷ߢ޽ࠆߣ߆‫᦭ޔ‬ᒻߩ૕ゎࠍ߽ߚߥ޿ౝ㕙ᕈߛߌߩሽ࿷ߢ޽ࠆߥߤߣ⸒᣿ߒߚ੐ታߪߤߎߦ߽޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫ޔߦ߁ࠃߩߎޕ‬り૕ᕈߣౝ㕙ᕈߣߩᏅ⇣ߪ‫⷏ޔ‬᰷ߦ․⇣ߥ‫ޔ‬り૕ߣ♖␹ߣߩኻ┙ࠍනߦ᳃ᣖਛᔃ⊛ߥ߽ߩߣߒߡᛩᓇߒߚ߽ߩߢߪ޽
ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫ߩߎޔࠈߒ߻ޕ‬ኻ┙᭽ᑼߪ⷏᰷ߢ⿠ߎࠅ‫ࠍࠇߘߦࠄߐޔ‬ᵞ✵ߒߚືቇ⊛࡮⺰ℂቇ⊛ߥ⺑ࠍヘ಴ߒ߹ߒߚ߇‫ߥ⊛⥸৻ࠅࠃߡߣࠇߘޔ‬ၮᧄ⊛ኻ┙♽ߩ࿾ၞߦߔ߉ߥ޿ߎߣ߇Ყセ⎇ⓥࠍㅢߓߡ޽߈ࠄ߆ߦߥߞߡ޿߹ߔ‫ߩߎޕ‬᥉ㆉ⊛ߥᲧセߩゲߦߒߚ߇߃߫‫ੱޔ‬㑆ሽ࿷ߪ㕖ੱ㑆⊛ߥሽ࿷ߩ޽޿ߛߢㅪ⛯ᕈߣᢿ⛘ࠍᒝ⺞ߔࠆ߆ᦨዊൻߔࠆ߆ߩ޽޿ߛߦ૏⟎ߠߌࠄࠇࠆߎߣߦ
ߥࠅ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ߎߎߢታ଀ࠍ␜ߔߎߣ߇ਇนᰳߣߥࠅ߹ߔߩߢ‫ੱޔ‬㑆ߣ㠽㘃ߩ㑐ଥߦ㑐ߔࠆ⼾߆ߥ଀ࠍᒁ↪
ߒ߹ߒࠂ߁‫ࠕ࡝࡜࠻ࠬ࡯ࠝޕ‬ධ⷏ㇱߦ૑߻࠿ࡦࠟ࡯ᣖ㧔Nungar㧕ߩ␠ળߪᄖᇕ೙ߩඨᣖ߆ࠄߥ
ࠅ‫ߩߘޔ‬ฬ೨ߪ⊕⦡ߩࠝ࠙ࡓ㧔Cacatua tenuirostris)ߣࠞ࡜ࠬ㧔Corvus coronoides㧕ߣ޿߁ੑ⒳㘃
ߩ㠽ߦߜߥࠎߢ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬೨⠪ߪ⃻࿾⺆ߢࡑࠕ࡞ࡀ࠹ࠖ㧔maarnetj㧕ߟ߹ࠅ‫ޟ‬᝝ᝒ⠪‫ߩޠ‬ᗧ๧ߢ‫ޔ‬ᓟ⠪ߪࡢࠕ࡞࠳࡯࡞㧔waardar㧕ߟ߹ࠅ‫ⷞ⋙ޟ‬⠪‫ߩޠ‬ᗧ๧ߢߔ‫ࠆࠁࠄ޽ ޕ‬േ‛⒳ߦߚ޿ߒߡߪ‫ޔ‬
ߘߩ⒳ߩߺߦ㒢ቯߐࠇߚኾ㐷⊛ߥ↪⺆ߢߪߥߊ‫ⴕޔ‬േ਄ߩ৻⥸⊛ߥ․ᓽߦߜߥࠎߛ↪⺆߇↪޿ࠄࠇ߹ߔ߇‫ࠕ࡝࡜࠻ࠬ࡯ࠝߪࠇߎޔ‬వ૑᳃ߩ⻉⸒⺆ߦ౒ㅢߔࠆ․ᓽߢߔ‫ߩߎޕ‬ὐߪㇱಽ⊛ߦߒ
ࠈ 2 ⒳㘃ߩ㠽߇࠻࡯࠹ࡓߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆߎߣࠍ⺑᣿ߔࠆ߽ߩߢߔ‫ߩࠄࠇߎޕ‬㠽ߪ‛⾰ߣ㔤⊛ߥሽ࿷ߣ޿߁ 2 ߟߩ㗼⪺ߦ⇣ߥࠆዻᕈ‫ߜࠊߥߔޔ‬ᕈᩰ⊛․ᓽ‫ޔ‬り૕⊛ߥ᭴ㅧ߿⢻ജ‫ޔ‬ᔃℂቇ⊛ߥ௑ะߥߤࠍ޽ࠊߖ߽ߟߣߣ߽ߦ‫⿠ߩߘޔ‬Ḯߣߣ߽ߦታ⾰਄ߩᮭൻߣ߽ߥߞߡ޿߹ߔ‫ߎޔ߽߆ߒޕ‬ࠇࠄߩ․ᓽߪ 2 ߟߩඨᣖࠍ᭴ᚑߔࠆᚑຬߣߣ߽ߦ㕖ੱ㑆⊛ߥሽ࿷ߢ޽ࠆ㠽߽߇౒᦭ߒߡ޿ࠆߩߢߔ‫ ߪࡦ࡟ࠡ࡮ࠢࡦ࡜ࡈߣ࡯ࠨࡦࡍࠬ࡮ࡓࠕ࡝ࠗ࠙ޕ‬1 ਎♿એ਄߽೨ߦ‫ޔ‬ਛᄩࠝ࡯ࠬ࠻࡜࡝ࠕ
ߦ߅ߌࠆ㔀ᄙߥ㓸࿅߆ࠄߥࠆ౒ห૕ౝߦ߅ߌࠆੱ߮ߣߩᕈ⾰߿᳇⾰ߦߟ޿ߡߟ߉ߩࠃ߁ߦ⸥
ㅀߒߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬̌ੱ㑆ߛࠇ߽߇߽ߟ࠻࡯࠹ࡓߪ‫ޔ‬ᓐ⥄りߣ߅ߥߓ߽ߩߣ⷗ߥߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ̍‫ޕ‬
ߎߩ⒳ߩห৻ൻߩኻ⽎ߪ‫ޔ‬ⅣႺߩߥ߆ߢⷰኤߢ߈ࠆࠞ࡜ࠬ߿ࠝ࠙ࡓߢߪ޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫߁޿ߣޕ‬ࠃࠅ߽‫ߩࠄࠇߎޔ‬⒳ߪߎߩ਎⇇ߦ߅ߌࠆੱ㑆ߣ㠽ߣߩ޽޿ߛߦ޽ࠆり૕⊛࡮㆏ᓼ⊛ߥห৻ൻ㧔identification㧕ߦ㑐ࠊࠆ㑐ଥᕈࠍታ૕ൻߒߚ߽ߩߢ޽ࠆߣ޿߃߫ࠃ޿ߢߒࠂ߁‫ޔߜࠊߥߔޕ‬ᄖ⷗ߩᒻᘒቇ⊛‫ޔ‬ᯏ⢻⊛ߥᏅ⇣ࠍ⿥߃ߡ‫ޔ‬ሽ࿷⺰⊛ߥ㘃ૃᕈࠍ౒ㅢߒߡ߽ߞߡ޿ࠆߣ޿߃߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ࠝ࡯ࠬ࠻࡜࡝ࠕ߆ࠄ߶ߤ㆙޿ࡔࠠࠪࠦਛㇱ㜞ේߦዬ૑ߔࠆࠝ࠻ࡒ࡮ࠗࡦ࠺ࠖࠕࡦ߽߹ߚ㠽㘃ߩࠢࡠࠦࡦ࠼࡞ߣ⥄ಽߚߜߣࠍห৻ⷞߔࠆ㑐ଥࠍ᦭ߒߡ޿߹ߔ‫ߟ߽߰ߣߞ߽ߪ࡞࠼ࡦࠦࡠࠢޕ‬߁ߦߺࠄࠇࠆ⣣㘩⠪ߢ޽ࠅ‫ੱࠆࠁࠄ޽ޔ‬㑆ߣ߅ߥߓࠃ߁ߥ↢ᵴผࠍ߽ߟേ‛‫࠽࠻ߜࠊߥߔޔ‬㧔tona㧕ߩಽりߣߐࠇߡ޿߹ߔ‫ߩߎޔ߽ߩ߁޿ߣޕ‬㠽ߪੱ㑆ߩ↢ᱫߣหߓᤨᦼߦ↢ᱫࠍߣ߽ߦ
ߒ‫৻߆ࠄߜߤޔ‬ᣇߩஜోߥ⁁ᘒ߇៊ߥࠊࠇࠆߣ‫ޔ‬หᤨߦઁᣇߦ߽ᓇ㗀߇෸߱ߣߐࠇߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ߎࠇߪ࠽ࠣࠕ࡝࠭ࡓ㧔nagualism㧕ߣ޿߁↪⺆ߢ⍮ࠄࠇࠆାઔߢ޽ࠅ‫ੱޔ‬㘃ቇ⠪߇⸽⸒ߒߡ޿ࠆ
ㅢࠅਛᄩࠕࡔ࡝ࠞ৻Ꮺߦߺࠄࠇࠆߩߢߔ‫ߣ଀ߩࡓ࠹࡯࠻ࠆߌ߅ߦࠕ࡝࡜࠻ࠬ࡯ࠝޕ‬ห᭽ߦ‫ޔ‬ਛᄩࠕࡔ࡝ࠞߦ૑߻వ૑᳃ߦߣߞߡߪ‫ੱޔ‬㑆ߣേ‛ߣ߇ፋ೎ߐࠇߡ޿ߥ޿ߣ޿߁੐ታ߇޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬―9―ߒ߆ߒ‫ޔ‬ਛ☨ࠕࡔ࡝ࠞߢᵹᏓߔࠆ‫ੱޔ‬㑆ߣേ‛ߩಽり߇ㆇ๮ࠍߣ߽ߦߔࠆ⸶ߪ‫࡝࡜࠻ࠬ࡯ࠝޔ‬ࠕߩ࠿ࡦࠟ࡯ᣖ߇ඨᣖߩᚑຬߣᓐࠄߩ࠻㧙࠹ࡓߢ޽ࠆ㠽ߣߩ㑆ߦ߅޿ߡ⸳ቯߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ‛⾰ߣ㝬ߣߩㅪ⛯ᕈߦ㑐ߔࠆ੐଀ߣߪߚ޿߳ࠎ⇣ߥߞߡ޿߹ߔ‫ߪࠇߘޕ‬એਅߦㅀߴࠆ 2 ߟߩℂ↱ߦࠃߞߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬╙৻ߦ‫ੱߪߡ޿߅ߦࠦࠪࠠࡔޔ‬㑆ߩಽりߢ޽ࠆ㠽㘃ߪ৻⠀ߩ୘૕ߢ޽ࠅ‫ࠆ޽ޔ‬ᣣߦ↢߹ࠇ‫ޔ‬ߐ߹ߑ߹ߥᵴേࠍᣣ‫ੱߦ߁ࠃࠆߌ߅ߦࠕ࡝࡜࠻ࠬ࡯ࠝޔߡߞ޽ߢߩ߁ߥߎ߅ޘ‬㑆ߩ․ቯ㓸࿅ߣ᛽⽎⊛ߥ․ᓽࠍ౒᦭ߔࠆේဳߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆߩߢߪ޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫╙ޕ‬ੑߦ‫ޔ‬ਛᄩࠕࡔ࡝ࠞߢߪੱ㑆ߪಽりߣߐࠇࠆേ‛ߣ․ቯߩᕈᩰࠍ߽ߜ޽ࠊߖߡ޿߹ߖࠎ‫ੱޕ‬㑆ߪߘߩᕈ⾰ࠍ๟⍮ߒߡ޿ࠆࠊ
ߌߢ߽޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫߇ࠈߎߣޕ‬ㅒߦ‫ੱޔ‬㑆ߣߘߩಽりߢ޽ࠆേ‛ߣߩ㑆ߦ޽ࠆ㘃ផ⊛ߥኻᔕ㑐ଥߪฬታߣ߽ߦ඙೎‫⹺ޔ‬⍮ߐࠇߡ߅ࠅ‫৻ޔ߽߆ߒޔ‬ᣇߦߥࠎࠄ߆ߩ੐᡿߇⿠ߎࠆߣ‫ߦࠇߘޔ‬෻㗀ߔࠆࠃ߁ߦઁᣇߦ߽ᓇ㗀߇෸߱ߣߐࠇߡ޿ࠆߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬ࡔ࠰ࠕࡔ࡝ࠞߩߐࠄߦධߦ޽ࠆࠕࡑ࠱ࡦߢ⑳߇㊁ᄖ⺞ᩏࠍ߅ߎߥߞߚࠕࠪࡘࠕ࡯࡞ߩੱ߮
ߣ߽‫ࠪࡂࠝࠝޔ‬㧔toucan㧕ߣ޿߁㠽ߦ․೎ߩଔ୯ࠍ޽ߚ߃ߡ޿߹ߔ‫ߩߎޔߕ߹ޔ‬㠽ߪ⡺߇࿕ߊߡ㘩ㅢะ߈ߣߪ޿߃߹ߖࠎ߇‫⁚ޔ‬⁸ኻ⽎ߣߒߡߪߏߊ߰ߟ߁ߩ㠽ߢߔ‫ߩ߆߶ޕ‬㠽߿ᄙߊߩູ੃
㘃ߣห᭽‫ੱߪࠪࡂࠝࠝޔ‬㑆ߣૃߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬㔤ࠍኋߒߡ޿ࠆߣߐࠇߡ޿߹ߔ‫․ߩߎޕ‬ᓽߦ޽ࠆࠃ߁
ߦ‫ߪࠪࡢࠝࠝޔ‬ਥⷰߣ૞ὑᕈߦḩߜߚੱ㑆ߣ߅ߥߓ࿾૏ࠍ޽ߚ߃ࠄࠇߡ߅ࠅ‫ߩߎޔ‬⢻ജߩ߅߆ߍߢ߅ߥߓࠃ߁ߥ․ᮭ⊛ߥ⢻ജࠍ߽ߟߔߴߡߩ↢߈‛‫ߩߤࠎߣ߶ࠅ߹ߟޔ‬ᬀ‛߿േ‛ߣኻ⹤߇ߢ߈ࠆߣߐࠇߡ޿߹ߔ‫␠ߩߣ߮ੱߩ࡞࡯ࠕࡘࠪࠕߪࠪࡂࠝࠝޔߚ߹ޕ‬ળ↢ᵴࠍᓞߔࠆⷙೣ߿ଔ
୯ⷰߦߘߞߚ⢻ജࠍ߽ߟߣߐࠇߡ޿߹ߔ‫ੱߪࠪࡂࠝࠝޕ‬㑆એᄖߩሽ࿷ߩߥ߆ߢ߽ߣߊߦ‫⟵ޟ‬ఱᒉ‫ߩޠ‬ᆫ࡮ᒻࠍౕ⃻ߔࠆ߽ߩߣߐࠇ‫⟵ޟޔ‬ఱᒉ‫ߪ⺆↪߁޿ߣޠ‬ᢥ⣂ߦᔕߓߡߎߩ㠽ࠍᜰߔߎߣ
߇޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ੱߪࠪࡂࠝࠝޕ‬㑆߇⁚⁸₞ߣߩ޽޿ߛߦ߽ߟᆪᣖ㑐ଥߩ⋧ᚻߣߒߡౖဳ⊛ߥሽ࿷ߣߐࠇߡ޿ࠆߩߢߔ‫ੱࠆߔ᦭౒߇ࠪࡂࠝࠝߣߣ߮ੱߩ࡞࡯ࠕࡘࠪࠕޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬㑆⊛ߥᕈ⾰ߣߪ‫ޔ‬り૕⊛ߢߪߥߊ㆏ᓼ⊛ߥᕈᩰߩ߽ߩߢߔ‫ޔࠅ߹ߟޕ‬ਔ⠪ߩり૕ߟ߈ߪ⷗ߡ޽߈ࠄ߆ߦ㆑߁ߌࠇ
ߤ߽‫ߩߘޔ‬ౝㇱߦ౒ㅢߩౝ࿷⊛ᕈ⾰ࠍኋߒߡ޿ࠆߩߢߔ‫ੱޕ‬㑆ߣࠝࠝࡂࠪߪ‫ޔ‬ᄖㇱߣߩႺ⇇ࠍ߈ߜࠎߣ߈߼ߚ␠ળන૏ࠍ౒ㅢߩ߽ߩߣߒߡߘࠇߙࠇߩ↢ࠍ༡ࠎߢ߈ߚߩߢߔ‫         ޕ‬ࠝ࠻ࡒᣖߦߣߞߡ‫․ߪ࡞࠼ࡦࠦࡠࠢޔ‬ᓽߩߥ޿න⁛↢ᵴ⠪ߢ޽ࠅ‫ߊߚߞ߹ޔ‬หߓㆇ๮ࠍߚߤ
ࠆߎߣߦߥࠆੱ‛ߦߣࠅή✼ߢታ૕ਇ᣿ߩሽ࿷ߢ޽ࠆࠊߌߢߔ‫࡯ࠕࡘࠪࠕޔߡߒ޿ߚߦࠇߎޕ‬࡞ߩࠝࠝࡂࠪߪੱ㑆ߣ߅ߥߓᕈ⾰ࠍ߽ߟ౒ห૕ߩᚑຬߢ޽ࠅ‫ੱߥࠎߤޔ‬㑆߿ੱ㑆એᄖߩሽ࿷ߢ
޽ߞߡ߽‫␠ޔ‬ળ㑐ଥߩߥ߆ߢߪẜ࿷⊛ߦਥੱ౏ߣߥࠅ߹ߔ‫ࠟࡦ࠿ߩࠕ࡝࡜࠻ࠬ࡯ࠝޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬࡯ᣖ␠ળߢ࠻࡯࠹ࡓߣߐࠇࠆ㠽ߩ႐วߣ⇣ߥࠅ‫ੱߣࠪࡂࠝࠝޔ‬㑆ߣߩ޽޿ߛߦ‛⾰⊛ߥㅪ⛯ᕈߪ޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫ߩߎޔߦࠄߐޕ‬㠽ߩⴕേ߿ᘠ⠌ߩၮ⋚ߪੱ㑆ࠍࡕ࠺࡞ߣߔࠆ߽ߩߢ‫ࠝߡߒߞߌޔ‬ࠝࡂࠪߦࠃࠆࡕ࠺࡞ߦଐ᜚ߒߚ߽ߩߢߪ޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫ޕ‬ߎߎߢ⷏᰷ߦ⋡ࠍ߁ߟߒ‫⷏ޔ‬᰷ੱ߇ࠝ࠙ࡓ㧔parrot㧕ߩߤߩࠃ߁ߥ․ᓽߦ⋡ࠍߟߌߡ޿ߚ߆
ߦߟ޿ߡ⠨߃ߡߺ߹ߒࠂ߁‫⷏ߪࡓ࠙ࠝޕ‬᰷ߦߣࠅ⇣࿖ߩ㠽ߢ޽ࠆߎߣߪ⇼߁ߴߊ߽޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ
߇‫ੱޔ‬㑆ߩ߽ߩ߹ߨࠍߔࠆߎߣߢᢙ਎♿એ਄ߦࠊߚࠅᇅᭉߩ⊛ߣߥࠅ‫ືޔ‬ቇ⺰ᢥߦ߆ߎߟߌߚ
⼏⺰ߩ⒳ߣߐࠇߡ߈߹ߒߚ‫ߩߎޔ߃޿ߪߣޕ‬ᄸᅱ߈ࠊ߹ࠅߥ޿⢻ജ߇޽ࠆ߆ࠄߣ޿ߞߡࠝ࠙ࡓ
߇ੱ㑆ߦㄭ޿ሽ࿷ߣߐࠇߚߩߢߪ޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫ߤߥ࠷࠶࠾ࡊࠗ࡜ޔࠢ࠶ࡠޔ࠻࡞ࠞ࠺ߌࠊࠅߣޕ‬―10―ߩஉᄢߥືቇ⠪ࠄߪࠝ࠙ࡓߩ⊒ߔࠆ⺆ฏ߇ੱ㑆ᕈࠍ␜ߔళ୥ߢߪߥ޿ߣਥᒛߒߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ታ㓙‫ޔ‬ࠝ࠙ࡓߪᄖ⇇ߩ੐‛߆ࠄฃߌߚශ⽎ࠍ‫ޔ‬ᮨ୮ߦࠃߞߡࠨࠗࡦ㧔ାภ‫ޔ‬ჿ㧕ߣߒߡౣ⃻ߔࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈߹ߖࠎ‫ੱߪࡓ࠙ࠝޔࠅ߹ߟޕ‬㑆ߣߪ⇣ߥߞߡᣂߒ޿⸒⺆ࠍ૞ࠅ಴ߔߎߣ߇ߢ߈ߥ޿ߎߣ
ߦߥࠅ߹ߔ‫࠻࡞ࠞ࠺ޕ‬ᵹߩሽ࿷⺰ࠍᕁ޿಴ߖ߫‫ޔ‬േ‛ߪ⚐☴ߦ‛⾰⊛ߥሽ࿷ߢ޽ߞߡ‫ޔ‬ᐢ߇ࠅࠍ߽ߚߥ޿㝬ߣ޿߁ታ૕ࠍࠕࡊ࡝ࠝ࡝㧔వ㛎⊛㧕ߦ౒᦭ߢ߈ߥ޿ߩߢߔ‫ߩ࠻࡞ࠞ࠺ߢ߹ࠇߎޕ‬ⷰὐ߳ߩᛕ್ߪ⛘߃ࠆߎߣߪ޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎߢߒߚߒ‫ޔ‬ᄙߊߩᣣᧄߩߺߥߐ߹ߦߣߞߡ߽ᄸᅱߣᤋ
ࠆߣᕁ߁ߩߢߔ߇‫⷏ޔ‬᰷ੱߪ࠺ࠞ࡞࠻ߩ⠨߃ࠍᅢࠎߢᡰᜬߒ⛯ߌߡ޿߹ߔ‫⷏ޔࠅ߹ߟޕ‬᰷ੱߪ㆏⟵⊛‫ޔ‬ਥⷰ⊛‫ޔ‬ᗧᕁ⴫␜ߩജ‫⸥ޔ‬ภߩᛒ޿‫ߩߤߥ↪૶⺆⸒ޔ‬㕙ߢ⥄ಽߩ⢻ജࠍ⹶␜ߒ‫ੱޔ‬㑆ߣੱ㑆એᄖߩሽ࿷ߪߜ߇߁ߩߛߣ޿߁ߎߣߦߎߛࠊࠅ⛯ߌߡ߈ߚߩߢߔ‫⷏ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬᰷ੱߪੱ㑆߇ߥߗఝ૏ߥߩ߆‫ߩߘޔ‬೨ឭߣߥࠆᥧ㤩ߩੌ⸃੐㗄߇૗ߢ޽ࠆߩ߆ߦߟ޿ߡ⇼໧ࠍ߽ߟߎߣ
ߪ޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎߢߒߚ‫ޕ‬ㅒߦੱ㑆ߪੱᎿ⊛ߥ⸥ภࠍ૞ࠅ಴ߔ⢻ജߦࠃߞߡ‫ޔ‬஧ὼߦߒߡ߽ߺߕ߆
ࠄ߽ߟᘠ⠌ࠍᏅ⇣ൻߒ‫ޔ‬㧔ᢥൻ⊛ߦ㧕⋧ኻൻߔࠆߎߣߦߥߞߚߩߢߔ‫ߩߎޕ‬㓸ว⊛ߥ․⾰ߪ‫ޔ‬߆ߟߡ࠼ࠗ࠷⺆ߢࡈࠜ࡞ࠢࠬࠟࠗࠬ࠻㧔Volksgeist㧦᳃ᣖ♖␹㧕‫࡮࡯࠾ࠚࠫ࡮࡞ߢ⺆ࠬࡦ࡜ࡈޔ‬࠳ࡦ࡮ࡊ࡯ࡊ࡞㧔le génie d’un peuple㧦᳃ᣖᕈ㧕ߣࠃ߫ࠇߚ߽ߩߢ‫ߪߢ߹޿ޔ‬ᢥൻ㧔culture)ߣߐ
ࠇࠆ߽ߩߥߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬㧔⸼㧦ᢥൻߦࠃࠆᏅ⇣ൻߦࠃࠅ‫ੱޔ‬㑆એᄖߩሽ࿷ߣߩߜ߇޿߇ਇ᣿⍎ߣߥߞߚ‫ޕ‬㧕
ᦨᓟߦ‫ߣ࠻࡞ࠞ࠺ޔ‬ห᭽ߦ࠳࡯࠙ࠖ࠾࠭ࡓߩ߽ߚࠄߒߚวℂ⊛ߢᱜᒰߥ㧔⸼㧦ㅴൻ⺰㧕ਥᒛߦࠃࠅ‫⷏ޔ‬᰷ੱߪࠊࠇࠊࠇੱ㑆ߩり૕⊛ⷐ⚛ߪ‛⾰਎⇇ߩㅪ⛯ᕈߩߥ߆ߦ޽ߞߡ‫ੱޔ‬㑆એᄖߩሽ࿷ࠃࠅ߽ᩰᲑߦ․⇣ߢ޽ࠆߣߪ⷗ߥߐߥߊߥߞߡ޿ࠆߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬వߦ߰ࠇߚㄭઍߩሽ࿷⺰ߩᨒ⚵ߺ߆ࠄ‫ࠆࠁࠄ޽ޔ‬੐‛ߦ⷗಴ߒ߁ࠆዻᕈߣಽ㘃ߩᣇᴺࠍតࠆ
㓙‫⛘ޔ‬ኻ⊛ߥၮḰߦࠃࠆߩߢߥߊᢥൻ⊛ߥᏅ⇣ߦ⌕⋡ߔࠆߣ‫ࠍ⟲ޔ‬ᛮ޿ߡ᣿⏕ߥሽ࿷⺰⊛ߥ․ᓽߩ޽ࠆߎߣ߇᣿ࠄ߆ߦߥࠅ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬㠽ߩ໧㗴ߦ߭߈ߟߌߡ⠨߃ࠆߣ‫ޔ‬એਅߦ␜ߔࠃ߁ߥ 4 ߟߩน⢻ᕈ߇ᶋ߆߮਄߇ࠅ߹ߔ‫ޔߕ߹ޕ‬㧔1㧕⑳⥄りߣ߅ߥߓౝ㕙ᕈߣり૕ᕈࠍ߽ߞߡ޿ࠆ߇‫ోޔ‬૕ߣߒߡߺࠇ߫⑳ߩᆄ߿⟵ఱᒉߦߣߞߡߩ㠽ߣߪ⇣⾰ߥ႐วߢ‫࡯ࠟࡦ࠿ߪߦࠇߎޔ‬ᣖߩ଀߇޽
ߡߪ߹ࠅ߹ߔ‫ࡓ࠭ࡒ࠹࡯࠻ࠍࠇߎߪ⑳ޕ‬㧔totemism㧕ߣ๭߱ߎߣߦߒ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬㧔2㧕⑳ߦߣߞߡ‫ޔ‬޽ࠆ㠽߇ౝ㕙ᕈߢ߽り૕ᕈߦ߅޿ߡ߽⇣ߥߞߡ޿ࠆ႐ว‫ࡒ࠻ࠝޔ‬ᣖߩ଀ߦ޽ߞߚࠃ߁ߦ‫ߕࠊޔ‬߆ߥߜ߇޿ߢߒ߆㘃ૃߒߡ޿ࠆߣߒ߆⸒߃ߥ޿ࠃ߁ߥ႐ว‫ࠍࠇߎޔ‬㘃Ყਥ⟵㧔analogism㧕ߣ๭߱ߎߣߦߒ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬㧔3㧕ߐࠄߦ‫ޔߦ߁ࠃࠆ޽ߦ଀ߩ࡞࡯ࠕࡘࠪࠕޔ‬㠽ߣ⑳߇ౝ㕙⊛ߦߪ߅ߥߓ
ߢ޽ࠆߌࠇߤ‫ޔ‬り૕ᕈߢߪ⇣ߥߞߡ޿ࠆ႐ว‫ࡓ࠭ࡒ࠾ࠕࠍࠇߎߪ⑳ޔ‬㧔animism㧕ߣ๭߱ߎߣ
ߦߒ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬㧔4㧕ᦨᓟߪࠊࠇࠊࠇߩ߽ߞߡ޿ࠆౝ㕙ᕈ߽り૕ᕈ߽߶߆㧔ߩ㠽㧕ߣ౒ㅢὐࠍ߽ߚ
ߥ޿Ყ㘃ߥ߈߽ߩߢ  ౝ㕙ᕈߩ㘃ૃ‫ޔ‬ౝ㕙ᕈߩ㘃ૃ‫ޔ‬ࠕ࠾ࡒ࠭ࡓ ࠻࡯࠹ࡒ࠭ࡓ
り૕ᕈߩᏅ⇣り૕ᕈߩ㘃ૃ
਎♿ߦ⷏᰷ੱߩખ㑆޽ࠆߣߔࠆ⠨߃ߢ‫ޔ‬17ౝߢᵹᏓߔࠆࠃ߁ߦߥ ߞ ߚ ⥄ ὼ ਥ ⟵ౝ㕙ᕈߩᏅ⇣‫ޔ‬㧔naturalism㧕ࠍ᜼ߍり૕ᕈߩ㘃ૃ ⥄ὼਥ⟵ࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈߹ߔ‫ޕ‬

―11―

 
㘃ផਥ⟵

ౝ㕙ᕈߩᏅ⇣‫ޔ‬り૕ᕈߩᏅ⇣

એ਄ߩ 4 㘃ဳࠍ৻⷗ߔࠇ߫‫ੱޔ‬㑆ߣⅣႺߦ߅ߌࠆ੐‛ߣߩ㑆ߩㅪ⛯ᕈߣ㕖ㅪ⛯ᕈߦߟ޿ߡߩ
ࠃࠅ൮᜝⊛ߥ⷗ขࠅ࿑߇ᶋ߆߮਄߇ࠅ߹ߔ‫ߩߎޕ‬႐ว‫ޔ‬਎⇇ߣߩ㑐ࠊࠅ߆ࠄዉ߈಴ߐࠇࠆᒻ
ᑼ࡮ታ૕࡮ⴕേ㕙ߥߤߦ߅ߌࠆ㘃ૃᕈߣᏅ⇣ᕈ߇ߤߩࠃ߁ߦ㈩⟎ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ߆߇ࡐࠗࡦ࠻ߦߥ
ࠅ߹ߔ‫ ߦࠄߐޕ‬4 ߟߩห৻ൻ᭽ᑼߪ਎⇇ⷰߩ┵⊛ߥ⴫ࠊࠇߢ޽ࠅ‫␠ޔ‬ળ⊛ߥ⚿ว߿ઁ⠪ࠍ޿߆ߦ⹺⼂ߔࠆ߆ߦߟ޿ߡߩជࠅਅߍߚઁ⠪ⷰߦ㑐ߔࠆℂ⺰ߣ߽ߥࠆ߽ߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬ߒ߆ߒߥ߇ࠄ‫ޔ‬એ਄ㅀߴߚ 4 ߟߩ㘃ဳߪ‫ߩࠇࠊࠇࠊޔ‬๟࿐ߦ޽ࠆ੐‛ߩߥ߆߆ࠄ㊀ⷐߣ߅߽ࠊࠇࠆⷐ⚛ࠍ᛽಴ߒ‫ޔ‬਎⇇ⷰߣߒߡߘࠇߙࠇߦ᭴ᚑߐࠇߚ߽ߩߢߪ޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫ޕ‬ታ㓙‫ޔ‬᳃ᣖ⹹
߿ᱧผᢥ₂ࠍᷤ⁸ߒ߹ߔߣ‫ޔ‬4 ߟߩ㘃ဳߪ޿ࠈ޿ࠈߥ␠ળߦሽ࿷ߔࠆߎߣ߇ࠊ߆ࠅ߹ߔ‫ߣߚޕ‬߃߫‫ߪࡓ࠭ࡒ࠾ࠕޔ‬਄⸥ߦㅀߴߚࠃ߁ߦ‫ޔ‬㔤㝬ߩㅪ⛯ᕈߣ⡺૕ߣߩਇㅪ⛯ᕈߣߒߡ޽ࠆ߽ߩߢ
ߔ߇‫࡞࡯ࠕࡘࠪࠕޔ‬ᣖ߿ࠕࡑ࠱ࡦߩవ૑᳃ߦᐢߊߺࠄࠇࠆߛߌߩ߽ߩߢߪ޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫ޕ‬ർ☨߿ࠪࡌ࡝ࠕ‫᧲ޔ‬ධࠕࠫࠕߩ৻ㇱ‫⥄ߪߣ߮ੱޔߢߩ߽ࠆࠇࠄߺ߽ߦࠕࠪࡀ࡜ࡔޔ‬ὼ⇇ߩᬀ‛࡮േ‛ߘߩઁߩ੐⽎ߦߪਥⷰᕈ߇޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬ታ૕ߣߒߡ߽෹ੱ㑐ଥ‫ޔ‬੤឵‫ޔ‬㝯ᖺ‫ޔ‬ᢜኻᔃߥߤ޽ࠄࠁࠆ୘
ੱ⊛ߥ㑐ଥࠍౕ⃻ߔࠆߣߐࠇߡ޿ࠆߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬ห᭽ߦ‫ޔ‬㘃ផਥ⟵ߪࠝ࠻ࡒ࡮ࠗࡦ࠺ࠖࠕࡦ߿ਛධ
☨ߩవ૑᳃␠ળߦߛߌߺࠄࠇࠆ․ᓽߢߪ޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫ޕ‬਎⇇ߩ޽ࠄࠁࠆሽ࿷ߪ‫ޔ⾰ᧄޔ‬ᒻᑼ‫ޔ‬ታ૕ߦ߅޿ߡࠊߕ߆ߕߟ⇣ߥߞߚ㑆㓒ࠍ଻ߜ‫ޔ‬ᄙర⊛ߥⷐ⚛ߣߒߡࡃ࡜ࡃ࡜ߢߪ޽ࠅ߹ߔߤ‫ޔ‬㘃ផ૞↪ࠍㅢߓߡߚ߇޿ߦኒߥ㑐ଥߢߟߥ߇ߞߡ޿ࠆߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬㘃ផਥ⟵ߪ⷏᰷␠ળ߿ฎઍ߆ࠄ࡞
ࡀ࠶ࠨࡦࠬᤨઍߩⅣ࿾ਛᶏᢥ᣿ߢߪ߰ߟ߁ߦߺࠄࠇߚ⠨߃ߢߒߚ‫࡮ࠕࠫࠕ߿ࠬ࠺ࡦࠕߡߒߘޕ‬ࠕࡈ࡝ࠞߩవ૑᳃␠ળߢ޿߹ߥ߅ᵹᏓߒߡ޿ࠆߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬ߣߪ޿߃‫ޔ‬એ਄ㅀߴߚ 4 ߟߩሽ࿷⺰ߪᢥൻߘߩ߽ߩ߿਎⇇ⷰࠍߚߛߜߦᜰߔ߽ߩߣߔࠆߎߣ
ߪߢ߈߹ߖࠎ‫ޔࠈߒ߻ޕ‬਎⇇ߦ߅ߌࠆ⻉ሽ࿷ࠍߤߩࠃ߁ߦᝒ߃ࠆ߆ߦߟ޿ߡ‫ޔ‬4 ߟߩ⇣ߥࠆ⋥ⷰ⊛ߥᕁ⠨᭽ᑼ߇޽ߞߡ‫⊒ߡ⚻ࠍࡓ࠭࠾ࠞࡔߥ⊛⺰⽎⃻ޔ‬㆐ߒߡ߈ߚ߽ߩߢ޽ࠆߣ⠨߃ߡ޿߹ߔ‫ੱޕ‬㑆ߪ⁁ᴫߦᔕߓߡ‫ޔ‬4 ߟߩ㘃ဳߩ޿ߕࠇߣ߽߆߆ࠊࠆផ⺰ࠍឭ␜ߢ߈ࠆߣ޿߃߹ߔ߇‫ޔ‬ሽ࿷⺰⊛ߥᨒ⚵ߺ߆ࠄߔࠆߣ‫ߦߟߣ߭߆ࠇߤޔ‬᳿߼ࠆߩ߇߰ߟ߁ߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬୘ੱ߇ዻߔࠆ␠ળ㓸࿅ߪߘߩߤࠇ߆৻ߟߩ⠨߃ࠍ೙ᐲൻߔࠆࠊߌߢߔ‫ޕ‬ታ㓙ߩ႐㕙ߢߪ‫ߡߒߣ࡞࠺ࡕ߇⑳ޔ‬᜼ߍߚ
4 ߟߩ႐วߣ߈ࠊ߼ߡㄭૃߔࠆ଀߇޽ࠅ‫߿ࡦ࠱ࡑࠕޔ‬੝ኙᏪߦ߅ߌࠆࠕ࠾ࡒ࠭ࡓ‫࡜࠻ࠬ࡯ࠝޔ‬࡝ࠕߦ߅ߌࠆ࠻࡯࠹ࡒ࠭ࡓ‫ޔ‬ฎઍਛ࿖ߥ޿ߒࡔࠠࠪࠦߦ߅ߌࠆ㘃ផਥ⟵‫ޔ‬ㄭઍ⷏᰷ߦ߅ߌࠆ⹺
⼂⺰߿ືቇ㗔ၞߦ߅ߌࠆ⥄ὼਥ⟵ߥߤ‫ߩࠄࠇߎޔߒ߆ߒޕߔߢࠅ߅ߣߚ߈ߡ⷗ߢ߹ࠇߎޔ‬㧠㘃ဳߪ߹ߓࠅ޽ߞߚ⁁ᴫ߇޽ߞߡ‫ޔ‬ห৻ൻߩ᭽ᑼߣ޿ߞߡ߽ⶄ㔀ߥ᭴ᚑⷐ⚛ߩ޽ࠆߥ߆ߢߪ৻ᣇ
߇߆ࠈ߁ߓߡઁᣇߦఝవߔࠆߩ߇߰ߟ߁ߥߩߢߔ‫ޔࠄ߆ߔߢޕ‬਄ߦ᜼ߍߚ 4 㘃ဳߪ␠ળࠍ㘃ဳ
ൻߔࠆᣇᴺߣ޿߁ࠃࠅ߽‫␠ޔ‬ળࠍ✚ว⊛ߦᝒ߃ࠆᚻᴺߣ⷗ߥߔߴ߈ߢߒࠂ߁‫ࠇߎޔ߃޿ߪߣޕ‬ࠄߪ᦭↪ߥᚻᴺߢ޽ࠆߎߣߪ㑆㆑޿ߥߊ‫ޔ‬㧔1㧕⃻⽎⺰⊛ߥ਎⇇ߦ߅ߌࠆ᭴ㅧ਄ߩⷙೣᕈࠍតࠅ‫ޔ‬㧔2㧕ߘ߁ߒߚⷙೣᕈߩ޽޿ߛߦ޽ࠆᢛว࡮ਇᢛวᕈ߇ߥߗሽ࿷ߔࠆߩ߆ߦߟ޿ߡశࠍ޽ߡࠆ
ߎߣߦߥࠆ߆ࠄߢߔ‫ࠄࠇߎޕ‬㧞ߟߩ઀੐ߪੱ㘃ቇߩಽ㊁ߢ޽߹ࠅߦ߽ᣧߊήⷞߐࠇߡߒ߹޿‫ޔ‬ߘߩ⚿ᨐ޽ࠅߩ߹߹ߩ⥄ὼࠍᝒ߃ࠆࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴ߪଐὼߣߒߡ↢߈ߡ޿ࠆߣ޿߃ࠆߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬ߐߡ‫ᦨߢߎߎޔ‬ೋߦ᜼ߍߚ໧㗴ߦ┙ߜ߽ߤࠅ‫߇ࠇࠊࠇࠊޔ‬਎⇇ࠍ᭴▽ߔࠆㆊ⒟ࠍ޿߆ߦᝒ߃
ࠆ߆ߦߟ޿ߡᬌ⸛ߒ߹ߒࠂ߁‫߅߽ࠎߐ⊝ޕ‬᳇ߠ߈ߩࠃ߁ߦ‫ߪ⑳ޔ‬਎⇇߇ᄙర⊛ߢ޽ࠅ‫ߦࠇߘޔ‬ᔕߓߡ਎⇇߽ⷰⶄᢙሽ࿷ߔࠆߣ޿߁઒⺑ࠍᡰᜬߒ߹ߖࠎ‫ޕ‬ᄙర⊛ߥ਎⇇ߥߤሽ࿷ߒߥ޿⸶ߪ‫ޔ‬―12―ੱ㑆ߩߐ߹ߑ߹ߥ⚻㛎ࠍ․⇣ᕈߣ‛ℂᴺೣࠍ߰߹߃ߡߒߞ߆ࠅߣ⹣߼ㄟࠎߛ౉ࠇ‛ߣߒߡߩ਎⇇ߥߤߥ޿߆ࠄߢߔ‫ੱޔࠄߥߗߥޕ‬㑆ߩ⹺⍮ߣⴕേߦਈ߃ࠄࠇࠆߐ߹ߑ߹ߥ⾗⾰߿㑐ଥᕈߪ㧔ᢥൻߩᏅ⇣ࠍ⿥߃ߡ㧕ဋ৻ߦߺࠄࠇࠆ߽ߩߢ޽ࠆߎߣߪ߈ࠊ߼ߡ⬄ὼᕈߩ㜞޿ߎߣ߇ࠄߢ޽
ࠅ߹ߔ‫ޟޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬਎⇇ൻ‫߇ޠ‬㆐ᚑߐࠇࠆㆊ⒟ߢ‫ߟ߽ࠍ⾰⾗ߩ߆ߟߊ޿ޔ‬੐‛ߣߘࠇࠄ⋧੕ߩ㑐ଥᕈ߇૕♽ൻߐࠇߡ߽‫⚿ߩߘޔ‬ᨐߪߚߛߜߦ਎⇇ⷰߦᏫ⌕ߔࠆߩߢߪ޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫ޔࠅ߹ߟޕ‬ᓧࠄࠇࠆ⚿ᨐߪ৻ߟߩ਎⇇ߦߪߜ߇޿޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ߇‫ޔ‬ታ૕ൻߐࠇࠆ․ᕈ⟲ߪቢోߥ߽ߩߢߪߥ
ߊ‫ޔ‬ᄙߊߩᗧ๧߿૞↪࿃ߦḩߜ޽߰ࠇߚ߽ߩߣߥߞߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޔ߽߆ߒޕ‬೎ߩੱ߮ߣߦࠃࠅߜ߇
ߞߚ߿ࠅᣇߢታ૕ൻߐࠇߚ਎⇇ߣㇱಽ⊛ߦ㊀ߥߞߡ޿ࠆ㕙߇޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ߩࠄࠇߎޕ‬ᢿ⊛ߥታ૕ൻߪ‫ޔ‬உᄢߥ⧓ⴚኅ߿ᔃℂቇ⠪ߥߤߦࠃߞߡߥߐࠇߡ߈ߚ߈ࠊ߼ߡ୘ੱ⊛ߥ߽ߩࠍ߰ߊ߼ߡ‫ޔ‬ߐ߹ߑ߹ߥน⢻ᕈࠍᄌဳߥ޿ߒㇱಽ⊛ߥ੐଀ൻߒߚߦㆊ߉߹ߖࠎ‫ߩߎޕ‬ὐߢ‫ޔ‬໑৻ήੑߩ਎⇇ࠍ᭴▽ߢ߈ࠆน⢻ᕈߪߎࠇ߹ߢߦߥߊ‫੹ޔ‬ᓟߣ߽ߦߥ޿ߢߒࠂ߁‫ޕ‬ቢోήᲧߩ਎⇇ࠍ㆐ᚑߔࠆ
ߩ߇ᄞߢ޽ࠆߣߒߡ‫ޔ‬⢷ࠍᒛߞߡ⸒߃ࠆታ࿷⺰㧔reality㧕ߥߤߪᚻߩዯ߆ߥ޿߽ߩߦᕁ߃߹ߔ‫ޕ‬߽ߞߣ߽৻ᣇߢ‫⋧ޔ‬ኻਥ⟵ߩ┙႐߆ࠄ਎⇇ࠍ᭴▽ߔࠆߎߣߪߚ߿ߔ޿ߎߣ߇ࠄߢ޽ࠅ߹ߔ߇‫ޔ‬ߤߩ⺑᣿߽߇ㇱಽ⊛ߥ߽ߩߢ޽ࠆߎߣ߇޽߹ߨߊ೨ឭߣߐࠇߡ޿ࠆએ਄‫⥄߹߹ߩߘޔ‬Ṍߔࠆߎߣߦߥࠅ߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ߎߩ਎⇇߇ㇱಽ⊛ߦ޿ߊߟ߽㊀ߥߞߚ਎⇇߆ࠄ᭴ᚑߐࠇߡ޿ࠆߣ޿߁⷗ᣇߦߚ޿ߒߡ‫ޔ‬㧔਎⇇ߪ߭ߣߟߣߔࠆ㧕᥉ㆉਥ⟵ߩ┙႐ߪࠊࠇࠊࠇࠍ቟ᔃߐߖߡߊࠇࠆ߽ߩߢ޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬ߘߩ቟႑ᗵ߇ߥߊߥࠆߣ‫ޔ‬᡽ᴦߦ⛘ᦸߔࠆߩߣ߅ߥߓࠃ߁ߦ‫⥄ޔ‬ಽߛߌࠍାߓࠆ໑ᚒ⺰ߦ↢߈ࠆߒ߆ߥ޿ߣㆇ๮ߠߌࠆߎߣߦߥࠆߣᕁ߃߹ߔ‫⁁ߥ߁ࠃߚૃޔ߽ߩ߁޿ߣޕ‬ᴫਅߢ޽ࠇ߫‫ੱޔ‬㑆ߪߔߴߡหߓࠃ߁ߥ໧޿ࠍᛩߍ߆ߌࠆࠊߌߢߪ޽ࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫⸃ߪߡߞࠃߦੱޕ‬᣿ߔߴ߈໧޿߇
૗ߢ޽ࠆ߆ࠍߪߞ߈ࠅߣℂ⸃ߢ߈ߥ޿႐ว߇޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬ዋߥߊߣ߽໧޿ߩ⊒ߒᣇߪߓߟߦߐ߹ߑ߹
ߣ޿߃ࠆߩߢߔ‫ߚߒࠢࡖࠪࠢࠡࠎ߳޿ߚࠆߓ↢ࠄ߆ߣߎߩߎޕ‬㑐ଥߪ⃻ઍߩ↪⺆ߢߪ‫ޟ‬ᢥൻ⊛ߥ⺋↪‫ߣޠ‬๭߫ࠇߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ߐߡ‫ޔ‬਄⸥ߦ᜼ߍߚ⒳‫⇼ߩޘ‬໧ߪሽ࿷⺰⊛ߥ⣂⛊߆ࠄ޿߃߫⇣ߥߞߚ໧㗴⟲ߣߒߡ⴫ࠊߔߎ
ߣ߇ߢ߈߹ߔ‫ޔ߽ߒ߽ޕ‬ሽ࿷ߔࠆ੐‛ߩ⾗⾰߇ߎࠇ߹ߢ߰ࠇߚ 4 ߟߩห৻ൻߩ᭽ᑼߦࠃࠅਛり߇⇣ߥࠆߣߔࠇ߫‫⹺ޔ‬⍮㗔ၞߣߘߩၮ⋚ߣߥࠆ⹺⼂⺰⊛ߥ┙႐‫⚿ߩߘޔ‬ᨐߣߒߡߩ໧㗴߳ߩߔߴߡߩขࠅ⚵ߺߪ޽ࠆ⒟ᐲᄌࠊߞߡߊࠆߎߣࠍ⹺߼ߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠅ߹ߖࠎ‫⚿ߩߘޕ‬ᨐ‫ޔ‬᥉ㆉਥ⟵ߣ⋧ኻਥ⟵ߩኻ┙᭽ᑼ߆ࠄᦼᓙߐࠇࠆࠃࠅ߽‫ࠬࠪࠢ࡜ࡊޔ‬㧔praxis㧕ߟ߹ࠅታ〣ⴕേߩ㗔ၞ߇ߪࠆ߆ߦⶄ㔀ߥ߽ߩߣߥࠆߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬ห᭽ߦ‫ޔ‬4 ߟ޽ࠆห৻ൻߩ᭽ᑼߢߪ‫౒ࠇߙࠇߘޔ‬ㅢߩㆇ๮ࠍ߽ߟ㓸ว૕ߣߒߡߩᄙ⒳㘃ߩሽ࿷‛߇޽ࠄ߆ߓ߼␜ߐࠇߡ޿߹ߔ‫߇ߣ߮ੱޕ‬೙ᐲ⸳⸘ߔࠆߐ޿ߩᄙ᭽ߥ⠨߃ᣇߦᵈ⋡ߔࠇ߫‫ޔ‬ੱ߮ߣ߇␠ળߩ㗔ၞߛߌࠍ㓒㔌ߒߡ⁛┙ߒߚ૕೙ߩ߽ߩߣߔࠆࠃ߁ߥߎߣߪ߹ߕߥ޿ߎߣߦ
᳇ઃߊߪߕߢߔ‫ޕ‬ታ㓙‫⥄ޔ‬ὼਥ⟵߇ᚑᾫߔࠆ߹ߢߩᤨઍ‫ޔ‬ኾ㐷ቇ໧㗔ၞߩ⎇ⓥ⠪ߪ␠ળࠍ⎇ⓥ
ኻ⽎ߣߒߡ߈߹ߒߚ‫⚿ߩߘޕ‬ᨐ‫ޔ‬࿾ၞ࿕᦭ߩ᭎ᔨߦߪ߶ߣࠎߤ⋡߽ߊࠇߕ‫ޔ‬਎⇇ਛߩࡈࠖ࡯࡞
࠼ࠍ⎇ⓥኻ⽎ߣߒߡ߈߹ߒߚ‫ߚߒ߁ߎޕ‬ขࠅ⚵ߺߢߪ‫⷏ޔ‬᰷ੱߪ޽ࠄ߆ߓ߼ขࠅ᳿߼ߚ߿ࠅᣇ
ߦᓥ޿‫ޔ‬਎⇇ਛ޿ߚࠆ႐ᚲߦ߅޿ߡ⥄ಽߚߜߩ߅߽޿౉ࠇߢᧂ㐿ᜏ㗔ၞߣౝኈߦߟ޿ߡ⎇ⓥߒ
ߚߩߢߔ‫␠ޕ‬ળᕈ㧔sociality㧕ߣߪ਎⇇ࠍ᭴▽ߔࠆሽ࿷⺰⊛ߥ૞ᬺ߆ࠄᏫ⚿ߔࠆ߽ߩߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬―13―޽ࠄࠁࠆห৻ൻߩ᭽ᑼߦㅢߓࠆ߽ߩߢ޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫ࠆߔ᧪↱ߩߩ߽ࠆࠁࠄ޽ޔߪࠇߘޕ‬ၮ⋚ࠍ೨ឭߣߔࠆ┙႐ߣߪ߶ߤ㆙޿߽ߩߥߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬ߒߚ߇ߞߡ‫␠ޔ‬ળᕈߪ৻ߟߩ⺑᣿ߢߪߥߊ‫⺑ࠈߒ߻ޔ‬᣿ࠍⷐߔࠆߎߣ߇ࠄߥߩߢߔ‫ᦨߊߏޕ‬ㄭ߹ߢ‫ੱޔ‬㘃ߪ⥄ὼߣ␠ળߣߩߜ߇޿ࠍ߈ߜࠎߣ૏⟎ઃߌߕߦ‫ੱޔ‬㑆ߣ㕖ੱ㑆⊛ߥሽ࿷ࠍ೎‛ߣߒߡᛒ߁ߎߣࠍᗐቯߒߡߎߥ߆ߞߚࠊߌߢߔ‫␠߁ߟ߰߇ࠇࠊࠇࠊޔ߫ࠇߔߣޕ‬ળߣ߆਎⇇ⷰߣ๭ࠎߢ޿ࠆ߽ߩߪ‫ޔ‬૗ߣ⺕ߣ߇ߚ߇޿ߦ㑐ଥߔࠆߩ߆‫ߦ߁ࠃߩߤߡߒߘޔ‬㑐ଥߒ‫ޔ‬૗ߩߚ߼ߩ㑐ଥ߆‫߁޿ߣޔ‬໧޿ࠍ߽ߣߦߔࠆ⹜ߺߢ޽ࠅ‫ࠆࠁࠄ޽ߪߦ߼ߚߩߘޔ‬ሽ࿷‛ࠍߎࠇ߹ߢߣߪ
⇣ߥߞߚ㓸ว૕ߣߒߡᝒ߃ߥ߅ߔᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆߢߒࠂ߁‫ޕ‬ߎ߁ߒߚ⇼໧ߦ╵߃ࠃ߁ߣߔࠆߐ޿‫⷏ޔ‬᰷ߩ␠ળ⑼ቇ߇ 17㨪18 ਎♿ߩ᡽ᴦືቇ߆ࠄ⛮ᛚߒߡ߈ߚᘠ⠌⊛ߥᚻᲑߪਛᔃ⊛߆ߟᓇ㗀ജ߇޽ࠆࠁ߃ߦ⎕᫈ߔߴ߈߽ߩߢ޽ࠆߣ޿ߞߡࠃ޿ߢ
ߒࠂ߁‫ߩࠄࠇߎޔߪߩ߁޿ߣޕ‬ᚻᲑߪ߈ࠊ߼ߡ․ᱶߥ᡽ᴦ⁁ᴫਅߦ߅޿ߡ⠨߃ࠄࠇߚ߈ࠊ߼ߡ
․ᱶߥ⸃㉼߆ࠄ⋥ߦዉ߈಴ߐࠇߚ߽ߩߥߩߢߔ‫ߩߎޕ‬⠨߃ߪੱ߮ߣ߇↢߈ߡ޿ߚᤨઍߦ߅ߌࠆ
౒ห૕ߩ․ᱶᕈࠍᛠីߒ‫⁁ߩߘޔ‬ᴫࠍ߽ߣߦ૞ࠅ਄ߍࠄࠇߚ↥‛ߢߔ‫⷏ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬᰷ߦ߅޿ߡ
߽᣿⊕ߣߥߞߚࠃ߁ߦ‫⺑ߩߎޔ‬᣿ߪࠊࠇࠊࠇߩ↢߈ࠆ⃻ઍߩᄙర⊛ߥ਎⇇ൻ⁁ᘒ߿Ꮕߒㄼߞߚ
ⅣႺ໧㗴ߦኻಣߔࠆߚ߼ߦߪ߽ߪ߿ߘߋࠊߥ޿߽ߩߣߥߞߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬ߎߎߢ‫߇ߜߚ⑳ޔ‬໧㗴ߣߒߚ޿ߩߪ౒ห૕ߩ␠ળ⊛࡮᡽ᴦ⊛⚵❱ߦ㑐ߔࠆ൮᜝⊛ߥ᭎ᔨᨒ⚵ߺߢ޽ࠅ߹ߔ‫౒ߚ߃⿥ࠍᤨޔࠅ߹ߟޕ‬ㅢߩ⷗ㅢߒࠍ޽߈ࠄ߆ߦߔࠆߚ߼‫ޔ‬೎ߩᣂߚߥᣇᴺߣߣ
߽ߦ‫ߪߣઁޔ‬㗼⪺ߦ⇣ߥࠆሽ࿷ߢ޽ࠆੱ㑆߇ߘߩ․⾰⊛ߥᕁ⠨ࠍ⵬ᒝߔࠆ߽ߩߣߒߡขࠅㄟࠎ
ߛ⥄ὼ‫ޔ‬ᢥൻ‫␠ޔ‬ળ‫ޔ‬ਥᮭ‫ޔ‬࿖ኅ‫ޔ↥↢ޔ‬ᱧผ‫⻉ߩߤߥⴚ⧓ޔ‬᭎ᔨࠍ߼ߋߞߡ‫⺖ߦࠇࠊࠇࠊޔ‬ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆߩߪᱧผߦ߅ߌࠆᢇ਎ਥ⊛ߥ૕೙ࠍ᭴▽ߔࠆߎߣߥߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬ߎߩ⻠Ṷߢ߰ࠇߡ߈ߚᕁᗐߪᤨ㑆ࠍ߆ߌߡᩮ᳇ࠃߊ✬ߺ਄ߍࠄࠇߡ߈ߚ߽ߩߢ޽ࠅ‫ੱޔ‬㘃ቇ
ߩ․ቯಽ㊁ߣߒߡઁಽ㊁ߣߣ߽ߦ㊀ⷐߥᗧ๧ࠍ߽ߟ߽ߩߢߔ‫ุ߇ߡߴߔߩߘޔࠄ߆ߛޕ‬ቯߐࠇߥ޿߹ߢ߽‫⛘ߩߘޔ‬ኻ⊛ߥ࿾૏߆ࠄߩ㒠ᩰߪ߿߻ࠍ߃ߥ޿ߢߒࠂ߁‫ޕ‬޿߹ߎߘੱᢥ␠ળ⑼ቇߪ⻉਎⇇߇޿߆ߦᄙ᭽ߥ᭴ᚑߩߐࠇᣇࠍߐࠇߡ޿߆ࠍี๧ߔࠆߴ߈ᤨ
ߢ޽ࠅ‫⷏ޔ‬᰷⊛ߥ⠨߃ߦㅊᓥߔࠆߎߣߥߊ޿߆ߦ਎⇇߇᭴ᚑߐࠇࠆ߆ߦߟ޿ߡߩℂ⸃ࠍㅴ߼‫ޔ‬ߐࠄߦᐢߊߪࠊࠇࠊࠇ࿾⃿Ꮢ᳃߇਎⇇ࠍౣ᭴ᚑߒ‫ੱޔ‬㑆ߣੱ㑆એᄖߩሽ࿷ࠍ߰ߊ߻࿾⃿ߩ૑ੱߦߣࠅᔟߊฃߌ౉ࠇࠄࠇࠆ႐ߣߥࠆࠃ߁ߥ઀੐ߦ⌕ᚻߔߴ߈ᤨߥߩߢߔ‫ޕ‬―14―

Draft of the lecture
The art of composing worlds
Philippe Descola
It has long been said that anthropology is the science which studies the interface between
nature and culture. And there is an element of truth in that. Historically to begin with. In
the wake of the colonial expansion of the European powers in the 19th century, increasingly
rich and detailed information was being collected in faraway places on the ways in which
non modern peoples perceived plants and animals. Some were said to grant the status ofancestors to particular species, while others treated animals as close relatives or as doubles.
Although historians of religion and folklorists had already been studying such strange
attitudes, their steadfastness among geographically distant contemporaries inevitably raisedquestions as to the unity of humans’ faculties and their seemingly unequal pace ofdevelopment. Anthropology as a specialized science spawned from a need to solve thislogical scandal, by explaining and justifying exotic forms of thinking that seemed to makeno clear distinctions between nature and culture; and this was happening precisely at thetime when the separation between the natural sciences and the sciences of culture wasbeing definitively consolidated in European universities. It resulted from these initialconditions that the domain of anthropology came to span the great divide between, on the
one hand, the biological constraints of human and non-human organisms and, on the other
hand, the contingent rules and values of human societies. All the concrete objects studied
by anthropology are located in this interface between collective institutions and thebiological and psychological dimensions which give to social facts their substance, but nottheir forms. The rules of kinship and marriage, the ways environments are perceived, used
and transformed, technical systems, forms of exchange, ideas about the person, the bodyand its ailments, ecological knowledge and modes of classifying organisms, all these social
practices and know-how that anthropologist study take their sources in a wide variety ofhuman physiological functions, anatomical peculiarities, motor schemas, and cognitive
abilities, which cannot be dissociated from the cultural forms by the means of which they
are expressed.
I started my career as an anthropologist 40 years ago by studying precisely this kindof interface between nature and culture. And in a most appropriate setting for such an―16―endeavour, deep in the Amazonian jungle of Eastern Ecuador. There, together with mywife and fellow anthropologist Anne Christine Taylor, I spent several years studying the
Jivaroan-speaking Achuar – a small tribe ofhunters and swidden horticulturists who had
recently engaged in peaceful contacts withoutsiders.

Using

both

quantitative

andqualitative methods, I undertook to present athorough description and analysis of thematerial and ideal relations between thisAmazonian society and its environment. By contrast with the simplistic determinism ofcultural materialism, which was predominant at the time in the field of environmental
anthropology and which purported to explain symbolic practices by their sole adaptive role
to an ecosystem, I attempted to offer alternative explanations in an alternative conceptual
framework. In particular, I showed that, although the Achuar had long settled in twocontrasted types of habitat (riverine and interfluvial), they did not adjust automaticallytheir social structure and cultural institutions
to adapt differentially to the resources
potentially available in the two ecosystems.
One of the reasons for this homeostasis wasthat, in both habitats, the food production of
the Achuar widely exceeded their needs
while requiring very little labor. I also
highlighted the continuum between thegardens and the forest in terms of plant manipulation. By constantly transplanting andsparing useful wild plants in their gardens alongside cultivated ones, the Achuar,
generation after generation, had deeply modified the floristic composition of the rainforest.
The result was that the forest, which appeared as wild and spontaneous to Western eyes,
was in fact the non-intentional result of millennia of human action. This in part explained
why the Achuar did not conceive of the forest as a raw piece of nature to which they had to
adapt, but as a collection of personified entities, plants and animals, with whom they
engaged in daily interactions. I also accounted for the fact that the Achuar had refrained
from domesticating wild animals (i.e. having them produce offspring in domestic settings)
while normally keeping in their homes a great variety of pets, notably a whole array of―17―

mammals known to be able to breed in captivity. Pets are the byproducts of hunting andthey were treated with respect as orphans still under the protection of the powerful spirits
ruling the game animals. This precluded their being owned and controlled by humans. On
the basis of a careful revision of the ethnography, I showed subsequently that thismotivation for the non-domestication of wild animals was equally valid for the rest of thelowlands of South America as well as for some native hunters elsewhere. Thus, petkeeping was in no way a form of proto-domestication, and it did not lead automatically todomestication as some authors had surmised.
But the most important result of this initial fieldwork was probably to make mereconsider the relevance of the great divide between nature and culture as an analytical tool
for anthropology. The Achuar Indians themselves led me to this. For their day to day
relations both to humans and to non-humans were structured by the same two schemes ofpractice – predation and domesticity – embodied in the opposition between consanguinity
and affinity, typical of the Dravidian kinship systems common in Amazonia. Predation
rules both hunting and warfare in such a way that game animals are treated by men as
affines, as are neighboring human groups who are potential enemies; while domesticity
reigns in the gardens where cultivated plants are treated by women as consanguines, that is,
as children who need to be nurtured. Thus, it was obvious that, for the Achuar there was apractical and conceptual continuity between the relations with non-humans and therelations with humans. This ethnographic reappraisal challenged the philosophical notionof nature, so important in Western metaphysics and epistemology. For I soon becameaware that such a notion was not only equally irrelevant for other Amazonian native
populations, but also for most other peoples the world over. It thus led me to discard asEurocentric the opposition between nature and culture and, as a consequence, to embark on
the task of reconceptualizing the object of anthropology. I have come now to define thisobject as the comparative study of how peoples go about composing their worlds. And I
would like to devote this lecture to giving some substance to this definition.
I think we can safely take for granted as a starting point the assumption that humans
share the same basic set of cognitive and sensory-motor dispositions, and that what areusually called ‘cultural variations’ are due, not to differences in capacities but todifferences in how salient features of the world are actualized by these capacities. But whyis that so? Where does the filtering process come from, that selects certain qualities ofobjects and relations, and neglects others, as food for thought and vector of action? The―18―

most common answer is that phenomena are multidimensional. This property is a wellestablished theme in philosophy ever since Boyle and Locke popularized it as a distinction
between primary and secondary qualities: the former are said to be intelligible, separable
and, in a large measure, calculable; while the latter are the subject matter of what mymaster Claude Lévi-Strauss called ‘la logique du concret’, the ability of the mind toestablish relations of correspondence and opposition between salient features of ourperceived environment. Dealing with those dimensions of a phenomenon where its socalled primary qualities are deemed relevant will most likely result in propositions that fallunder a universalist regime; while dealing with the impressions it leaves on our senses will
open up many possibilities for inferences and connections that are relative to personal andhistorical circumstances. Archimedes’ principle applies everywhere on earth, whatever thenature of the body that is plunged into water, while the subjective experience of a humanplunged into water may vary considerably according to his or her abilities and to thecontext. This philosophical distinction between the modes of being of a same phenomenon
as they are differentially actualized by various approaches generated the great
epistemological divide between the domain of the sciences of nature and that of thesciences of culture, and the ensuing anathema against exporting the method andexpectations of the former (generalization, measuring, replicability, prediction, etc.) into
the methods and expectations of the latter (individualization, interpretation, value sharing,
semantic coherence, etc.) and vice versa. The resulting processes of sorting out,
purification and border policing has made it extremely difficult to deal in practice with themultidimensionality of phenomena as these are necessarily dislocated between various
forms of expression and various regimes of veridiction. Geology and chemistry willaccount for one aspect of the soils I encountered and studied among the Achuar of theUpper Amazon, while anthropology will account for the use they make of it, the names
they give to the different types and the myths they narrate about it.
The direction I have been exploring tries to avoid this parceling out of phenomena
as a way of explaining the diversity of human perceptions of their environment. For there
is another reason which explains the very different ways, traditionally labeled ‘cultural’, ofgiving accounts of the world in spite of a common biological equipment. Let us call‘worlding’ this process of piecing together what is perceived in our environment. Here, I
take worlding in a different sense from the one given to that word by postmodern andpostcolonial authors, that is, as a social construction of reality by hegemonic Westerners.

―19―

By contrast with this meaning which implies a distinction between a pre-existingtranscendental reality and the various cultural versions that can be given of it, I see
worlding rather as the process of stabilization of certain features of what happens to us.
Now, I surmise that this worlding process is not done at random, but is mainly based uponbasic intuitions as to the existence and properties of certain beings in our environment.
Why do Achuar hunters detect spirits when they walk in the forest, while nuclear scientists
do not do so? Questions like this cannot be resolved by opposing, on the one hand, theworld as the totality of things and, on the other hand, the multiple worlds of experienced
reality, although such an opposition between the world as it is and the world as it issubjectively apprehended has become a basic tenet of modernist epistemology. What is
potentially available to us as sentient beings is not a complete and self-contained world
waiting to be represented according to different viewpoints, but, most probably, a vast
amount of qualities and relations that can be actualized or not by humans according to how
ontological filters discriminate between environmental affordances. The material andimmaterial objects of our environment do not stand in the heavens of eternal ideas ready to
be captured by our faculties, nor are they mere social constructs giving shape and meaning
to a raw material; they are just clusters of qualities some of which we detect, some ofwhich we ignore.
The variety in the forms of worlding comes from the fact that this differential
actualization of qualities is not done at random; it follows the line of basic inferences as tohow qualities come to be attached to the objects we apprehend and as to how thesequalities are related. Speaking of ‘ontological filters’ is a way for me to emphasize the factthat the analytical level at which I suggest that the anthropological endeavor should start ismore elementary than what is usually taken for granted. My conviction is that systems ofdifferences in the ways humans compose their worlds are not to be understood as byproducts of institutions, economic systems, sets of values, cultural patterns, worldviews or
the like; on the contrary, the latter are the outcome of more basic assumptions as to what
the world contains and as to how the elements of this furniture are connected. The word
‘ontology’ seems appropriate to qualify this analytical level which could be called
antepredicative in the language of phenomenology. And my parsimonious use of thisnotion over the past two decades stands for a claim of conceptual hygiene: ‘ontology’
simply means we should look for the roots of human diversity at a deeper level, where―20―basic inferences are made about the kinds of beings the world is made of and how they
relate to each other.
Let me now clarify my proposition that the variety in the forms of worlding resultsfrom the variety of ontological regimes under which this process is realized. Perhaps it
would help if I began by stating what I think anthropology is about. Its main task, as I see
it, is not to provide thorough descriptions of specific institutions, cultural habits or social
practices – this is the job of ethnography. Anthropology can be practiced by ethnographersand ethnography can be done by anthropologists; I have done both things myself, but not at
the same time, for the aims and methods of ethnography and of anthropology should not be
confused. The main task of anthropology is to bring to light how beings of a certain kind –humans – operate in their environment, how they detect in it such or such property thatthey make use of, and how they manage to transform this environment by weaving with it
and between themselves permanent or occasional relations of a remarkable, but not infinite,
diversity. To carry through this task, we need to map these relations, to better understandtheir nature, to establish their modes of compatibility and incompatibility and to examine
how they become actualized in styles of action and thought that appear immediately
distinctive. In short, the task of anthropology is to account for how worlds are composed.
What are these distinctive styles of composing worlds that anthropology should
bring to light? They should be understood as cognitive and sensory-motor patterns ofpractice, in part innate, in part resulting from the actual process of interactions between
organisms, that is, from the practical manners of coordinating human and non-humanagencies in a given environment. Such patterns are thus more than framing devices used by
the analyst to describe a situation; they are framing devices used by the actants to makesense of a situation and manage the fine-tuning of what could be called interagency. Theseframing devices can be seen as abstract structures, such as the artificial perspective or theroutine scenarios of daily interactions, which organize skills, perceptions and action
without mobilizing a declarative knowledge. They are, to borrow Maurice Bloch’s words,“things that go without saying” (1992), that is, cognitive schemata that regulate habitus,
guide inferences, filter perceptions and are largely the products of the affordances which
the world offers to the specifically human dispositions.
A fundamental function of these framing devices is to ascribe identities by lumping
together, or dissociating, elements of the lived world that appear to have similar or
dissimilar qualities. My argument is that one of the universal features of the cognitive―21―

process into which such dispositions are rooted is the awareness of a duality of planes
between material processes (which I call ‘physicality’) and mental states (which I call‘interiority’). This assumption is founded on a variety of sources derived from philosophy,
psychology and ethnology upon which I will not dwell here. Let me just point out theestablished fact that, until the Western physicalist theories of the late 20th century
explained consciousness as an emerging property of biological functions, there was noevidence anywhere of a conception that would describe the normal living human person asa pure physical body without any form of interiority, or as a pure interiority without any
form of embodiment. Thus, the distinction between a plane of interiority and a plane ofphysicality is not the simple ethnocentric projection of an opposition between body andmind that would be specific to the West; one should rather apprehend this opposition as it
emerged in Europe, and the philosophical and theological theories which were elaborated
upon it, as local variants of a more general system of elementary contrasts that can bestudied comparatively. By using this universal grid, humans are in a position to emphasize
or minimize continuity and difference between humans and non-humans.
An illustration is indispensable here, which I will borrow from the rich palette ofrelations between people and birds. The Nungar tribes in south-western Australia wereorganized in exogamous moieties named after two birds: the white cockatoo, Cacatua
tenuirostris, whose indigenous name maarnetj can be translated as “the catcher”, and thecrow, Corvus coronoides, called waardar, a term meaning “the watcher”. The fact that an
animal species is named after a general characteristic of its behaviour rather than by a term
exclusively associated with it, a feature common in Australian languages, is partiallyexplained by the status conferred on these two totemic birds. They are the origin andsubstantial incarnation of two contrasting sets of material and spiritual properties –character traits, physical dispositions and capacities, psychological tendencies and the like– that are reputedly peculiar to all human members of each of the moieties, andsimultaneously to all non-humans respectively affiliated to them. William Spencer andFranck Gillen noted this community of dispositions and temperaments within hybrid
communities more than a century ago, when they wrote that, in central Australia, “thetotem of any man is regarded … as the same thing as himself”. It is not that the object of
this kind of identification is a crow or cockatoo observable in the environment, but rather
that these species constitute the hypostases of a relationship of physical and moral identity
between certain entities of the world – a relationship that transcends apparent―22―

morphological and functional differences, better to emphasize a common base of
ontological similitude.
Far from there, on the plateau of central Mexico, the Otomi Indians also maintain arelationship of identification with birds and primarily with the black vulture. This
scavenger is the most common avatar of the tona, an animal double whose life cycle isparallel to that of every human being, since it is born and dies at the same time as he or she
does, and anything that harms the integrity of the one simultaneously affects the other.
Labelled with the term “nagualism”, this belief, found throughout Mesoamerica, wasconsidered by anthropologists as a testimony to the fact that some peoples did not makeclear distinctions between a human being and an animal, exactly as was the case with
totems in Australia. Yet, there are at least two reasons why the commonality of fate
between the human and his or her animal double that is surmised in Mesoamerica is very
different from the material and spiritual continuity postulated by the Nungar between
members of the moieties and their totemic birds. First, in Mexico, the animal double is anindividual, born on a certain day and engaged daily in a variety of activities, not a
prototypical species as in Australia, which shares abstract properties with some humans.
Second, in Mesoamerica, a human being does not have the idiosyncratic features of theanimal double with which he or she is matched, and whose nature is often unbeknown tohim or her. It is necessary, on the contrary, for the human being and his or her animal alterego to be distinguished in essence and substance for a relationship of analogicalcorrespondence to exist between them, and for accidents that happen first to the one to beable to affect the correlate, as if by reverberation.
Further south, in upper Amazonia, the same Achuar with whom I did fieldwork
grant a place of choice to another bird, the toucan. First, it is the most common type ofgame, even if its meat is too tough to be recommended to gourmets. Like other birds andmost mammals, the toucan is said to have a soul similar to that of humans. This feature
locates the toucan among people endowed with subjectivity and intentionality, which it canuse to communicate with all the entities endowed with the same privilege, that is, mostplants and animals. It is also owing to this aptitude that the toucan is said to conform to therules and values governing social life of the Achuar. The toucan is in particular the
exemplary embodiment among non-humans of the figure of the brother-in-law, a term used
to denote it in certain contexts. This makes the toucan the emblematic partner of therelationship of affinity that humans maintain with game. Yet the humanity shared between―23―

the Achuar and the toucans is of a moral and not physical nature: their identical interiority
underpinning their similarities is lodged within bodies with clearly different properties
which define and make manifest the boundaries of separate but isomorphic social units inwhich their respective lives develop. By contrast with the vulture of the Otomi, which is ananonymous singularity, entirely foreign and unknown to the person to which it is coupledby the same destiny, the toucan of the Achuar is a member of a community of the same
nature as that of humans and, as such, the potential subject of a social relationship with any
entity, human or non-human, placed in the same situation. But the toucan also differs fromthe totemic birds of the Nungar of Australia insofar as there is no material continuity
between the toucan and humans, and furthermore as it is believed that it bases its behaviour
and institutions on the model provided by humans, and not the reverse.
Let us now turn to the West and consider the properties that Europeans have
granted to the parrot. It is no doubt an exotic bird, but also one whose disturbing ability toimitate the human voice has for several centuries been a source of entertainment and apretext for philosophical disquisitions. Yet, this uncanny ability did not grant to the parrot
the status of a quasi-human. For a score of great philosophers, among them Descartes,
Locke and Leibniz, have argued that the phrases uttered by parrots are in no way a sign of
their humanity since this bird cannot adapt the impressions it receives from outside objects
to the signs that it reproduces by imitation; which is why, by contrast with humans, itwould be incapable of inventing new languages. Let us recall that, in the Cartesian
ontology, animals are purely material beings because they cannot participate a priori in theunextended substance that is the soul. And even though this point of view has been
criticized countless times and would appear bizarre, I should think, to many Japanesepeople, Europeans carry on spontaneously adhering to it when they surmise that humans
are distinguished from nonhumans by a reflexive conscience, subjectivity, the power tosignify, the manipulation of symbols, and the use of language through which thesefaculties are expressed. Westerners furthermore fail to question the consequences implicitin this postulate: that the contingency inherent in the ability to produce arbitrary signs
causes humans to differentiate between themselves by way of the form they give theirconventions, and this by virtue of a collective disposition that was formerly called
Volksgeist in German, or le génie d’un peuple in French, and that we now prefer to callculture. Finally, like Descartes, but with the sounder justifications provided by Darwinism,
Westerners are ready to grant that the physical components of our humanity situates them―24―

in a material continuum within which they do not appear to be a far more significant
singularity than any other organized being.
If we consider the modern ontology that I have just described as a way, among
several others, of identifying and classifying beings according to the properties that we
detect in them, and not as an absolute standard in relation to which cultural variations must
be measured, then the contrasting features that it presents in relation to other ontologicalformulaebecomefar more manifest.
Faced with a birdof some kind, since
it is with birds that
we started off, I

Resemblance ofinteriorities
difference ofphysicalities
Difference ofinteriorities
resemblance ofphysicalities

Animism

Totemism

Naturalism

Analogism

Resemblance ofinteriorities
resemblance ofphysicalities
Difference ofinteriorities
difference ofphysicalities

can assume either: that it has elements of physicality and interiority identical to my own,
but which all together differ from those that my spouse or my brother-in-law share withanother bird – which is what the Nungar do – and I have called that ‘totemism’; or that theinteriority of this bird and its physicality are distinct from my own, even though they
display small enough differences to allow for relations of analogy – which is the case of
the Otomi – and I have called that ‘analogism’; or else that the bird and I have similarinteriorities and heterogeneous physicalities – as the Achuar posit – and I have called that‘animism’; or finally that our interiorities are incommensurable and our physicalities
likewise – the view that began to prevail in certain circles in the West during the 17th – andI have called that ‘naturalism’. Over and above the relationship to these particular objects
that I have taken as examples, each of these combinations affords a glimpse of a moregeneral principle governing the distribution of the continuities and discontinuities between
any human subject and the objects of its environment, on the basis of the resemblances andcontrasts of form, substance and behaviour that his or her engagement in the world leads
him or her to infer. Each of these modes of identification serves moreover as a touchstone
for singular configurations of cosmological systems, of conceptions of the social link andtheories of otherness that are as many instituted expressions of more entrenchedmechanisms of recognition of the other.
However, these manners of detecting and emphasizing folds in our surroundings
should not be taken as a typology of tightly isolated ‘worldviews’. True, I have isolated
them after a careful consideration of the ethnographical and historical literature. For―25―

example, animism, as I have just defined it – that is, as a continuity of souls and a
discontinuity of bodies – is not only typical of the Achuar, or of Amazonian Indians ingeneral; it is most common also in northern North America, in Siberia and in some parts ofSouth-East Asia and Melanesia where people endow plants, animals and other elements of
their physical environment with subjectivity and establish with these entities all sorts ofpersonal relations, of friendship, exchange, seduction, or hostility. Likewise, ‘Analogism’
is not only a feature of the Otomi Indians or of Mesoamerican native societies. The notionthat all beings in the world are fragmented into a multiplicity of essences, forms andsubstances separated by minute intervals, but can nevertheless be coordinated by a dense
network of correspondences based on analogical reasoning, this notion was common in
Europe and the circummediterranean civilizations from Antiquity to the Renaissance, andit still prevails in native communities of the Andes and in large parts of Asia and Africa.
Nevertheless, these ontologies cannot be directly equated with cultures or worldviews.
Rather, they are the development of the phenomenological consequences of four different
kinds of intuitions about the identities of beings in the world. According to circumstances,each human is capable of making an inference in any of the four modes, but will most
likely pass a judgment of identity according to the ontological context – that is, thesystematization for a group of humans of one of the inferences only – where he or she wassocialized. Actual ontologies can be very close to the model (animism in Amazonia and theSubarctic, totemism in Australia, analogism in ancient China or Mexico, naturalism in the
epistemological and philosophical literature of European modernity); but perhaps the mostcommon situation is one of hybridity, where a mode of identification will slightly dominate
over another one, resulting in a variety of complex combinations. This fourfold typology
should thus be taken as a heuristic device rather than as a method for classifying societies,
a useful device, however, as it brings to light the reasons for some of the structural
regularities observable in the ways the phenomenological world is instituted and for thecompatibilities and incompatibilities between such regularities, two basic anthropologicaltasks that have been too quickly discarded and thus left open to crude naturalistic
approaches.
I will now return to my initial concern: how should we conceive the process ofcomposing worlds? It should be obvious that my position excludes both the hypothesis ofmultiple worlds and that of multiple worldviews. There can be no multiple worlds, in thesense of tightly sealed containers of human experience with their own specific properties―26―

and physical laws, because it is highly probable that the potential qualities and relations
afforded to human cognition and enactment are uniformly distributed. But once theworlding process has been achieved, once some of these qualities and relations have been
detected and systematized, the result is not a worldview, that is, one version among othersof the same transcendental reality; the result is a world in its own right, a system ofincompletely actualized properties, saturated with meaning and replete with agency, butpartially overlapping with other similar configurations that have been differently actualized
and instituted by different actants. All these fragmentary actualizations, including thehighly personal ones of great artists or psychopaths, are variants, or partial instantiations,of potentialities that have never been, and will probably never be, fully integrated in asingle unified world. As a dream of perfect totalization, full-fledged realism seems out ofreach; relativism, on the other hand, is easily attainable but self-defeating since it
presupposes the universal background of which each version is a partial rendering.
At first glance, these partly overlapping worlds appear to condemn us to live insolipsism, perhaps even in political despair, once we forfeit the reassuring consolation ofuniversalism. For faced with similar situations, not every fragment of humanity will ask
the same questions; or they at least will formulate them in such different ways that otherfragments may have difficulty in recognizing in them the very questions that they
themselves have set out to elucidate. This induces massive mismatches, usually called‘cultural misunderstandings’ in the language of the Moderns. Now, most of those questions
may be grouped as problems whose expression will take different forms depending on the
ontological contexts in which they arise. If one accepts that the distribution of the qualities
of existents varies according to the modes of identification that I have sketched, one mustalso accept that the cognitive regimes, the epistemological positions that make thoseregimes possible and the resulting manners of tackling a problem will all vary to the same
degree. It thus renders our sphere of praxis far more complicated than what the usual
opposition between universalism and relativism had led us to expect.
Likewise, each of these modes of identification prefigures the kind of collectivethat is suited to assembling within a common destiny the various types of beings that it
distinguishes. If we pay attention to the diverse ideas that peoples have forged concerning
their institutions, we are bound to notice that they seldom result in isolating the social
domain as a separate regime of existence, with precepts that govern solely the sphere ofhuman activities. In fact, not until naturalism reached maturity did a body of specialized―27―

disciplines take as their object the social domain and consequently undertake to detect andobjectivize that field of practice in every part of the world and with scant regard for local
concepts, just as if its frontiers and content were everywhere identical to those that
Westerners had fixed for it. Far from being the presupposed basis from which everythingelse stems, sociality on the contrary results from the ontological work of composing worlds
to which every mode of identification leads. So sociality is not an explanation but, rather,what needs to be explained. If, up until recently, humankind did not operate hard and fastdistinctions between the natural and the social and did not think that the treatment of
humans and that of non-humans were divorced, then we should regard what we usually callsocieties and cosmologies as a matter of distributing existents into different collectives:
what or who associates with what or who, and in what way, and for what purpose?
Asking this kind of questions, and trying to answer them, implies that theconventional tools which the social sciences have inherited from the European politicalphilosophy of the 17th and 18th centuries have to be divested of their centrality andparadigmatic clout, for these tools are the direct outcome of a highly unusual reflexive
account of highly unusual historical circumstances. At the time it was produced, thisaccount both captured and fashioned the peculiarity of the kind of collective within which
the Moderns felt they were bound to live; but it has become obvious, even in the West, thatthe account is no longer apposite to the multiple worlding states we live in and to theurgency of the impending ecological doom. What is at stake here is the whole conceptual
framework through which we deal with the ‘social and political organization’ of collectives,
the messianic regime of historicity that we have imposed upon other, very different, ways
to deal with the unfolding through time of a common prospect, and the basic notions by themeans of which we buttress our thinking about why humans are distinctive and how they
implement differentially this distinctiveness, notions such as: nature, culture, society,sovereignty, the state, production, history, art, and so forth. All of this patiently constructedgrid will have to be, if not wholly discarded – for it expresses a specific anthropology
which deserves to be taken into account alongside others –, at least demoted from its
imperial position. It is time, then, that the social sciences take stock of the fact that worlds
are differently composed; it is time that they endeavour to understand how they arecomposed without automatic recourse to the Western mode of composition; it is time, moregenerally, that we, citizen of the earth, set out to recompose theses worlds so as to makethem more amenable to a wider variety of inhabitants, human and non-human.

―28―























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䎨䎻䎳䎲䙹䎜䎓䎃 䎩䏒䏘䏑䏇䏄䏗䏌䏒䏑䎃䎕䎐䎔䎖䎙䎃 䎵䏜䏒䏎䏘䏆䏋䏌䏎䏒䏈䏑䎏䎃䎷䏖䏘䏕䏘䏐䏌䎐䏎䏘䎏䎃䎲䏖䏄䏎䏄䎏䎃䎘䎖䎛䎐䎓䎓䎖䎙䎃䎭䏄䏓䏄䏑䎃䎷䎨䎯䰆䎛䎔䎐䎙䎐䎙䎜䎔䎘䎐䎗䎘䎔䎖䎃 䎩䎤䎻䰆䎛䎔䎐䎙䎐䎙䎜䎔䎘䎐䎗䎘䎕䎗౒௅䎃᧲੩ㇺᢎ⢒ᆔຬળ䎃 䯴᧲੩ળ႐䬽䭎䯵䎃䎦䏒䏖䏓䏒䏑䏖䏒䏕䎃䎷䏒䏎䏜䏒䎃䎰䏈䏗䏕䏒䏓䏒䏏䏌䏗䏄䏑䎃䎥䏒䏄䏕䏇䎃䏒䏉䎃䎨䏇䏘䏆䏄䏗䏌䏒䏑䯴䎲䏑䏏䏜䎃䏗䏋䏈䎃䏏䏈䏆䏗䏘䏕䏈䎃䏋䏈䏏䏇䎃䏌䏑䎃䎷䏒䏎䏜䏒䯵䎃䎃䎃ᓟេ䎃ㄘᨋ᳓↥⋭䫺࿖࿯੤ㅢ⋭䫺ᢥㇱ⑼ቇ⋭䫺ⅣႺ⋭䫺䎃ᄢ㒋ᐭ䯴ᄢ㒋ળ႐䬽䭎䯵䫺ᄢ㒋Ꮢ䯴ᄢ㒋ળ႐䬽䭎䯵䫺䮜䮰䮺䮀ᄢ૶㙚䎃䎶䏘䏓䏓䏒䏕䏗䏈䏕䏖䎃䎰䏌䏑䏌䏖䏗䏕䏜䎃䏒䏉䎃䎤䏊䏕䏌䏆䏘䏏䏗䏘䏕䏈䎏䎃䎩䏒䏕䏈䏖䏗䏕䏜䎃䏄䏑䏇䎃䎩䏌䏖䏋䏈䏕䏌䏈䏖䎃 䯂䎃 䎰䏌䏑䏌䏖䏗䏕䏜䎃䏒䏉䎃䎯䏄䏑䏇䎏䎃䎬䏑䏉䏕䏄䏖䏗䏕䏘䏆䏗䏘䏕䏈䎏䎃䎷䏕䏄䏑䏖䏓䏒䏕䏗䎃䏄䏑䏇䎃䎷䏒䏘䏕䏌䏖䏐䎃䎰䏌䏑䏌䏖䏗䏕䏜䎃䏒䏉䎃䎨䏇䏘䏆䏄䏗䏌䏒䏑䎏䎃䎦䏘䏏䏗䏘䏕䏈䎏䎃䎶䏓䏒䏕䏗䏖䎏䎃䎶䏆䏌䏈䏑䏆䏈䎃䏄䏑䏇䎃䎷䏈䏆䏋䏑䏒䏏䏒䏊䏜䎃 䯂䎃 䎰䏌䏑䏌䏖䏗䏕䏜䎃䏒䏉䎃䏗䏋䏈䎃䎨䏑䏙䏌䏕䏒䏑䏐䏈䏑䏗䎃䎲䏖䏄䏎䏄䎃䎳䏕䏈䏉䏈䏆䏗䏘䏕䏄䏏䎃䎪䏒䏙䏈䏕䏑䏐䏈䏑䏗䯴䎲䏑䏏䏜䎃䏗䏋䏈䎃䏏䏈䏆䏗䏘䏕䏈䎃䏋䏈䏏䏇䎃䏌䏑䎃䎲䏖䏄䏎䏄䯵䎏䎃䎦䏌䏗䏜䎃䏒䏉䎃䎲䏖䏄䏎䏄䯴䎲䏑䏏䏜䎃䏗䏋䏈䎃䏏䏈䏆䏗䏘䏕䏈䎃䏋䏈䏏䏇䎃䏌䏑䎃䎲䏖䏄䏎䏄䯵䎏䎃䎨䏐䏅䏄䏖䏖䏜䎃䏒䏉䎃䏗䏋䏈䎃䎩䏕䏈䏑䏆䏋䎃䎵䏈䏓䏘䏅䏏䏌䏆䎃䏌䏑䎃䎭䏄䏓䏄䏑䎃