Proceedings of the International Symposium on Engineering Lessons Learned fromthe 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, March 1-4, 2012, Tokyo, Japan

Fire Following Earthquake– Analysis and Mitigation in North America
Charles Scawthorn1
1

Visiting Professor, Waseda University, Tokyo
Visiting Scholar Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center, University of California at Berkeley
cscawthorn@berkeley.edu
ABSTRACT: Fire following earthquake has the potential for catastrophic loss in Japanand western North America (WNA). In WNA, analysis of the problem over the last
several decades has led to a number of measures to reduce this risk. This paper firstreviews the development and current status of fire following earthquake analysis in theUS, including the current methods employed in HAZUS and by the insurance industry. A
number of mitigation measures have been employed or are under development in WNA
and include: High pressure auxiliary water supply systems in San Francisco and Vancouver, B.C.
 Cisterns
 Portable Water Supply Systems, in San Francisco, Oakland, Berkeley and Vallejo
 Mandated gas shut-off valves, in Los Angeles
However, these measures are in some cases still inadequate, so that the paper concludes with
mitigation measures that are currently under development.
Key Words: fire following earthquake, seismic, ignitions, emergency response,
suppression, fire spread, conflagration, loss estimation, risk

INTRODUCTION
Fire following earthquake (FFE) is a significant problem in countries with large wood building
inventories and high seismicity, such as the US, Canada, New Zealand and Japan. In 2011 both New
Zealand and Japan suffered devastating earthquakes, the latter event also being accompanied byseveral hundred fires. This paper focuses on the problem, and more specifically efforts to mitigate
this problem, in North America particularly the US and California.
Historically, every significant earthquake in California has resulted in multiple simultaneous fires
that have strained, and at least in 1906 overwhelmed, the fire service. In both the 1971 San Fernando
and the 1994 Northridge earthquake, there were over 100 ignitions. Other disasters clearly
demonstrate that massive fires are a problem in California under even non-earthquake ignitions, when913

only one or a few ignitions are involved – the numerous wildland urban interface fires that occur in
California almost every year are only the most telling example of this, particularly the 1991 East Bay
Hills fire, in which over 3,500 houses were destroyed in several hours, in the cities of Oakland andBerkeley, California. Another example is the 1988 First Interstate Bank Fire, which totally destroyed 4
floors of the state’s tallest building (at that time) and severely damaged the rest of the building throughwater and smoke damage.
MODELING“What gets measured, gets managed” is a well-known adage that applies to the problem of fire
following earthquake – in order to manage this problem, we must be able to assess the current risk it
poses, and the beneficial impacts of various mitigation alternatives. This section discusses modelingof fire following earthquake, as practiced in North America, including recent improvements inestimation of ignitions, and several studies for major urban areas.
Overview of Modeling in North America
The basic methodology employed to model fire following
earthquake in North America was developed in the late 1970s(Scawthorn et al., 1981), and can be seen in Figure 1, the Fire
Following Earthquake process, which depicts the main aspects ofthe fire following earthquake problem.
Fire following
earthquake is a process, which begins with the occurrence of theearthquake. In summary, the steps in the process are: ■Occurrence of the earthquake – this will presumably cause
damage to buildings and contents, even if the damage is as simple
as knockings things (such as candles or lamps) over. ■ Ignition– whether a structure has been damaged or not, ignitions will
occur due to earthquakes.
The sources of ignitions are
numerous, ranging from overturned heat sources, to abraded andshorted electrical wiring, to spilled chemicals having exothermic
reactions, to friction of things rubbing together. ■ Discovery – atsome point, the fire resulting from the ignition will be discovered,if it has not self-extinguished (this aspect is discussed further,
below). In the confusion following an earthquake, the discovery
may take longer than it might otherwise. ■ Report – if it is notpossible for the person or persons discovering the fire theimmediately extinguish it, fire department response will be
required. For the fire department to respond, a Report to the fire
Figure 1 - Fire Following
department has to be made. ■ Response – the fire department
Earthquake Process
then has to respond. ■ Suppression – the fire department thenhas to suppress the fire. If the fire department is successful,they move on to the next incident. If the fire department is not successful, they continue to attempt tocontrol the fire, but it spreads, and becomes a conflagration. The process ends when the fuel isexhausted – that is, when the fire comes to a firebreak.

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Figure 2 - Fire Department Operations Timeline
This process is also shown in Figure 2, which is a Fire Department Operations Time Line (TCLEE,
2005). Time is of the essence for the fire following earthquake problem. In this figure, the horizontal
axis is Time, beginning at the time of the earthquake, while the vertical axis presents a series ofhorizontal bars of varying width. Each of these bars depicts the development of one fire, from ignition
through growth or increasing size (size is indicated by the width or number of bars).
Beginning at the left of Figure 2 (that is, at the time of the earthquake), is the occurrence ofvarious fires or ignitions (denoted by the number of the fire in a square box, see the legend at thebottom of the figure). Some of these fires occur very soon after the earthquake, while others occur
sometime later (due for example to restoration of utilities). The mechanism of these ignitions is nodifferent following an earthquake than at other times, although the earthquake can create unusual
circumstances for ignition to take place. The primary difference due to the earthquake is the large
number of simultaneous ignitions.
Following this ignition, or Fire Initiation, phase there is a period during which the fire isundiscovered but grows. A typical rule of thumb in the fire service is that the rate of growth of an
uncombated fire in this phase will double each seven seconds. In Figure 2, the size of the fire isdenoted by its number of bars. That is, each bar for a particular fire represents one engine required forcontrol and/or suppression. Thus if, with time, a fire in Figure 2, proceeds from one bar to two andthen three, this denotes that the fire is growing and now requires three Class A fire engines to control
the fire (Class A fire engines have approximately 1200 gpm of pumping capacity).
The letter “D” denotes discovery of the fire. Discovery under the post-earthquake environment isoften no different than at other times, although discovery may be impeded due to damaged detectors,
or distracted observers. Upon discovery, citizens may themselves attempt to combat the fire, and will
sometimes be successful. We are concerned herein only with ignitions that citizens cannot/do not
successfully combat, and which require fire department response. The letter “R” denotes receipt of theFire Report by the fire department. Under normal circumstances, fires are reported to the fire
department by one of four methods: Telephone, Fire department street boxes (voice or telegraph),
Direct travel to a fire station by a citizen (so-called “citizen alarms”), or Automatic detection andreporting equipment, usually maintained by private companies.
Under normal circumstances, with the exception of citizen alarms, these methods all communicate

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the occurrence of a fire within seconds, which is critical in the timely response and suppression of
structural fires, and in the size and ‘design’ of modern fire departments. In the critical minutes
following an earthquake, review of earthquake experience has indicated that at present citizen alarms
are likely to be the only feasible method for reporting fires, in areas of strong ground shaking. The
telephone system may or may not sustain damage, but almost definitely will be incapacitated due tooverload. Fire department street boxes are generally no longer in use (in California, only San
Francisco maintains street boxes). Automatic detection and reporting equipment account for only afraction of commercial property. Such equipment may be damaged in an earthquake, and will likely
produce many false alarms, leading to lack of response to real fires, due to the inability to discriminate
the real from the false alarms. Several other, unconventional, reporting methods may be employed.
These include: Amateur short-wave radio operators; Helicopter observation and Groundreconnaissance by police or fire personnel
With regard to the last of these other methods, present post-earthquake damage reconnaissanceplanning on the part of several larger California fire departments has been reviewed and, in general,found to be unrealistic and inadequate for identifying fires at a sufficiently early stage to prevent
conflagration. A fundamental flaw in most of these plans is the performance of the post-earthquake
damage reconnaissance by the fire personnel themselves, employing fire apparatus (i.e., engines
and trucks).The flaw lies in the fact that following an earthquake, these personnel and apparatus willalmost immediately be redirected from the reconnaissance to actual fire or other emergency response.
Helicopter observation and amateur radio operators similarly will typically only be able to identify
and report fires after they have reached greater alarm status (that is, when it is too late). Further, mostfire officers have no special training in aerial observation or command.
Following receipt of the Fire Report by the fire department, apparatus will respond, if available (inFigure 2, arrival of apparatus at the fireground is denoted by the engine number within a circle-notethat herein we only track fire engines, since only engines can suppress serious fires). Response may be
impeded by blocked streets due to collapsed structures, or by traffic jams. Upon arrival, the fire may
be combated per normal procedures or, if the general situation is sufficiently serious, minimal tactics
may be all that is possible.
Water supply is a critical element, and earthquake damage to the water system may reduce supply,
thus altering tactics. Due to the interconnectedness of a water supply system, earthquake damage atsome distance from a fireground may still result in reduced supply.
In Figure 2 we denote increasing control of a fire by the reduction in the number of bars (i.e.,engines required for control). As suppression progresses and control of the fire becomes near total,engines will be released by the incident commander for more pressing emergencies elsewhere.
Movement of these released apparatus is denoted by a diagonal arrow showing travel of an engine
from one fire to another. As fires are controlled, engines eventually converge on one or several large
fires, or conflagrations. Growth and spread of conflagrations is a function of building materials,
density, street width, wind, water supply and firefighting tactics.
In this methodology, the process depicted in Figure 2 can be coded in a computer program. An
algorithm determines ignitions, assigns a number to each fire, and tracks fire growth. Algorithms also
determine fire reporting time and fire engine arrival. Each fire engine is tracked from location tolocation. Damage and hydraulic performance to the water supply can be determined using detailed loss
models of the water system such that the availability of fire flows at any fire location and any timeafter the earthquake can be tracked; the effectiveness of fire department apparatus to control a fire at agiven location can then be estimated based on the size of the fire, the quantity of fire department
apparatus at the fire, and the quantity of water available for fighting the fire. Final burnt area for eachignition is thus calculated as a function of fire growth and applied fire suppression capacity. Each
aspect of the problem is next discussed in more detail.

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HAZUS
The above method, termed a simulation model, is followed for each fire. Fires need to be tracked andmerged where they meet (i.e., areas should not be “burnt twice”). Final burnt areas are summed, toarrive at total final burnt area. The implementation of this simulation model for a large urban area isclearly a data- and computationally intensive matter, so that fires following earthquakes are usuallyestimated using computer programs, termed a simulation code. Several such codes exist including
EQEFIRESC, HAZUSSC, URAMPSC, SERA and RiskLink, which are discussed in some detail in(TCLEE, 2005).
HAZUS is the US national program for estimation of earthquake losses, including fire following
earthquake losses, and was developed by the National Institute for Building Sciences, for the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (HAZUS, 1999). As noted in the HAZUS Technical Manual(HAZUS, 1999): HAZUS is designed to produce loss estimates for use by federal, state, regional andlocal governments in planning for earthquake risk mitigation, emergency preparedness, response andrecovery. The methodology deals with nearly all aspects of the built environment, and a wide range ofdifferent types of losses. Extensive national databases are embedded within HAZUS, containing
information such as demographic aspects of the population in a study region, square footage fordifferent occupancies of buildings, and numbers and locations of bridges. Embedded parameters havebeen included as needed. Using this information, users can carry out general loss estimates for aregion. The HAZUS methodology and software are flexible enough so that locally developed
inventories and other data that more accurately reflect the local environment can be substituted,
resulting in increased accuracy. HAZUS is available free of charge – see (Scawthorn et al., 2006) for
more details.
Ignition Modeling
While the HAZUS methodology
was developed over a decade ago,
the ignition module was updated
more recently (SPA Risk, 2009).
Ignitions "refers to each individual
fire that starts (ignites) after anearthquake that ultimately requires
fire
department
responsetosuppress”. The HAZUS equation
prior to the revision discussed here,
was based on 30 data points derived
from U.S. earthquakes from 1906 to
Figure 3 Example Ignition data – 1994 Northridge earthquake
1989.
Based on a review of
relevant earthquakes and available
data, seven U.S. events from 1971 to 1994 were selected and the data on ignitions occurring in those
events was collected on a consistent basis. The resulting data set is the most extensive of its kind, with
238 data points. Measures of seismic shaking, such as MMI and PGA, were assigned for each data
point. Ignition data was normalized by building total floor area to determine ignition rate and avariety of covariate data were regressed against to develop alternative regressions, the most useful ofwhich is a second order polynomial of ignition rate (i.e., mean number of ignitions per million square
feet of total building area) as a function of peak ground acceleration:
Ign./TFA = 0.581895 (PGA)2 - 0.029444 (PGA).

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(1)

Ignition Temporal Distribution
1.00

Fraction of Ignitions Occurring

This equation is the same format
as currently used in HAZUS, so that
re-codingeffortwasminimal.
Comparable equations are provided interms of MMI. The new equations
indicated a somewhat lower ignition
rate at lower intensities, and a rapidly
increasing ignition rate at higher
intensities. As an example of thenumber of ignitions that might beestimated using equation (1), about ahundred ignitions would be estimatedfor a city of 2 million population
shaken to MMI VIII, and over 400
ignitions if shaken to MMI IX. The

0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

Time after earthquake (minutes)

Figure 4 Temporal Distribution of Ignition Report Times,
temporal distribution of ignitions waswith fitted curve
analyzed and distribution is provided,
which indicates that about 20% of
ignitions typically occur within the first hour, and 50% within about 6 hours after the earthquake,
Figure 4. . Guidance on how to implement these equations in HAZUS was provided, andrecommendations for further enhancing the ignition algorithm by inclusion of analytical methods also
provided.
ShakeOut / Southern California
The 2008 ShakeOut and associated Golden Guardian Exercise examined potential impacts
assuming a Mw 7.8 southern San Andreas event affecting Southern California occurring at 10am on 13
November 2008, with breezy, low humidity conditions (Jones et al., 2008). (Scawthorn, 2011b)
examined the potential losses arising from fire following earthquake for this event, resulting in MMI
VI-VIII in the Los Angeles basin, and found that approximately 1,600 ignitions will occur requiring
the response of a fire engine. In about 1,200 of these fires the first responding engine will not be able
to adequately contain the fire, such that one or several conflagrations destroying several city blocks
will occur in Riverside and San Bernardino counties. Of more concern however, are portions ofOrange County and especially thecentral Los Angeles basin, where
the dozens to hundreds of large
fires are likely to merge into
dozensofconflagrations
destroying tens of city blocks,
and several of these merge intooneorseveralsuper
conflagrations
destroying
hundreds of city blocks. Under
the assumed scenario conditions,a preliminary estimate is that theapproximately 1,200 large fires
will result in an ultimate burnt
area of approximately 200
million sq. ft. of residential andcommercial building floor area,
Figure 5 Ignitions (one trial) overlaid on MMI for M7.8 ShakeOut
equivalent to 133,000 single
Scenario and Population Density by zip code, Central LA Basin918

family dwellings. Directly attributable to these fires following the earthquake will be the loss ofhundreds to perhaps a thousand lives, and an economic loss of forty to perhaps as much as one
hundred billion dollars, This loss is virtually fully insured and could result in distortions in the US andglobal insurance industry. Other economic impacts included the loss of perhaps a billion dollars inlocal tax revenues. A number of opportunities were identified for mitigating this problem, including
construction of a seismically reliable basin-wide saltwater pumping system, and the mandatory use of
automated gas shut-off valves, or seismic shut-off meters, in densely built areas.
CAPSS / San Francisco
CAPSS (Community Action Plan for Seismic Safety) is a major study undertaken by the San
Francisco Department of Building Inspection to understand earthquake risk in San Francisco anddevelop appropriate mitigation projects (see www.sfcapss.org).
(Scawthorn, 2010) analysed fire
following earthquake as part of the CAPSS project, with the support and assistance of the San
Francisco Fire Department (SFFD). A stochastic model for analyzing fire following earthquake for
San Francisco was developed, utilizing data received from CAPSS, SFFD and others, to assess fire
following earthquake impacts due to four earthquake scenarios: magnitude 7.9, 7.2 and 6.5 events on
the San Andreas fault near San Francisco, and a magnitude 6.9 event on the Hayward fault. These
events cause high ground motions in San Francisco that result in ground failure in many parts of theCity – ground motions are particularly high in the western part of San Francisco, which was not yet
built up in 1906 and therefore is not protected by the special high pressure SFFD Auxiliary Water
Supply System (AWSS, discussed further below).
Depending on the specific earthquake scenario, these ground motions and ground failures are
estimated to cause over 1,000 breaks in the potable water system, so that SFFD’s AWSS and cisterns
will be the only source of firefighting water in many parts of the City. The AWSS itself will sustainsome damage, forcing SFFD to fall back to cisterns only in some places. At the same time, SFFD’s
42 fire engines will almost certainly not be able to respond to all the post-earthquake fires, which are
estimated to be about 100 on average (with a 10% chance of as many as 140) for the magnitude 7.9
San Andreas event. As a result, the methodology employed here estimated ignitions, building burnt
areas and dollar losses for the four scenario events. These results are presented in Table 1 as ranges
within which losses will fall half (i.e., 50%) of the time (correspondingly, half the time the losses will
be outside – that is, either more or less) than the indicated ranges:
Table 1 Bounds for Losses to Buildings due to Fire Following Earthquake

San Andreas Mw 7.9
San Andreas Mw 7.2
San Andreas Mw 6.5
Hayward Mw 6.9

25% ~ 75% Confidence Range
Total Burnt Building
Loss
Ignitions
Floor Area
$ billions
mill. Sq. ft.
68 ~ 120 $ 4.1 ~ $ 10.3
11.2 ~ 28.2
52 ~ 89$ 2.8 ~ $ 6.8
7.7 ~ 18.6
48 ~ 70$ 1.7 ~ $ 5.1
4.7 ~ 14.0
27 ~ 46$ 1.3 ~ $ 4.0
3.6 ~ 11.0

For example, for the Mw 7.9 event, essentially a repeat of the 1906 earthquake, losses will on
average be about $7.6 billion, and half the time will be more than $4.1 billion and less than $10.3
billion. More detailed results are presented in the report, but the significance of these results is not intheir precision, but rather in their overall magnitude.
The model producing these results wasvalidated by application to the 1989 Loma Prieta event, and examined for methodological andparametric sensitivity, with satisfactory results.

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Figure 6 (left) San Francisco proxy Municipal Water Supply System (i.e., potable water system) withestimated pipe sections with breaks shown in red, for San Andreas Mw 7.8 scenario. Note that theestimation of the pipe breaks is a random process, so that only the general distribution, and not specificlocations, of breaks are meaningful. (right) Distribution of Burn Density per block (millions $) for San
Andreas Mw 7.8 Scenario.
WATER SUPPLY
While the fire service in California since 1906 has professionalized and advanced technologicallyto the point of being perhaps the best in the world, it has not been tested by a major earthquake since1906. Water systems in California have failed in virtually all urban earthquakes in California – as aresult, water departments have engaged in major reviews of their system’s seismic vulnerability, andspent hundreds of millions of dollars seismically upgrading their systems. Exemplary programs
include LADWP and MWD in Southern California, and EMBUD and San Francisco’s Hetch HetchysysteminNorthern
California, to name a few ofthe larger programs.
Nevertheless,theAchilles Heel of thesesystems, and the entire fire
following
earthquake
problem,remains
thedistribution
system–despite massive seismic
retrofit programs, it has notbeen possible to replace allof the distribution systems,
and it is quite possible thatnumerous
distribution
breaks will occur in thehigh intensity areas of amajor earthquake, which
are also the areas most
likely to have fires.
Figure7 San Francisco
AWSSloss of water in theDistribution breaks will not cause system-wide lossof water,but will cause
neighborhood of the fire – for the firefighter, effectively the same thing. Knowing this, fire
departments have identified and developed plans to access alternative water sources – in most cities920

for example, these include swimming pools, tanks, creeks, ponds and storm water drains. San
Francisco, due to its experience in 1906, has gone far beyond this, to develop and maintain the highpressure seawater-supplied Auxiliary Water Supply System (AWSS) and 172 cisterns (undergroundwater tanks spread throughout the city). In fact, San Francisco in June 2010 approved $104.2 million
to enhance this system as part of a $412.3 million bond, which also included a new police/fire
headquarters and rehabilitation of existing fire stations.. However, most other cities, particularly Los
Angeles, San Jose and San Diego, lack such systems and, quite worryingly, the capacity of their watersupplies (normal, and alternative) have been little examined vis-à-vis the demands that multiple
simultaneous post-earthquake fires will place on those supplies.
To further examine this issue, (Scawthorn, 2011a) surveyed fire and water agencies – responses
were received from agencies representing about one third of urban California, and key findings
included: Most larger urban fire and water agencies are ill informed as to the specifics of theirearthquake risk
 Earthquake is recognized as a key issue by fire and water agencies, although many water
agencies see provision of potable water as a higher priority in some cases than firefighting.
 Water agency system vulnerabilities are not well understood by fire agencies, although waterand fire agencies both generally believe most municipal water supply systems are unreliable ina major earthquake.
 Some fire agencies have vigorously addressed this issue, developing innovative high pressure
and/or portable water supply systems. Many have not.
 Some water agencies have alternatives given loss of normal water supply, but many are notwell enough equipped to actually move water a significant distance.
 Fire and water agency liaison is not very good, and is often somewhat indirect solely throughlarger enterprise-wide coordination meetings. Emergency firefighting water supply is not a
focus.
In summary, the survey found that the risk of post-earthquake conflagration in urban California isvery significant, and that the crucial need for post-earthquake firefighting water supply is fallingthrough a gap. Reasons why this is happening are briefly explained, but the key issue is how tocorrect the situation. To do so, the following general recommendations were provided:
1. Highlight the problem to the California Fire Service, for example by a meeting of the Metro
Fire Chiefs, perhaps in conjunction with the Seismic Safety Commission and CalEMA.
2. Enlist the Water Community via a joint meeting of key senior fire chiefs and water department
managers, perhaps held under the auspices of the Seismic Safety Commission and CalEMA.
3. Develop
state-wide
requirementsforearthquake
firefighting
water reliability target, andthat water and fireagencies should develop
and submit plans formeasures intended toachieve these goals by agiven date.
Additionally, three specificmeasures are suggested for further
study:
 Developmentofastandardized
California
Figure 8 San Francisco, Oakland and Vallejo FD PWSS units
portable water supply

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



system (PWSS) that would be
deployed in major urban areas.
This PWSS system would sufficefor the San Francisco Bay Area.
Development of a saltwater highpressure system for the Los
Angeles Metropolitan Area (LosAngeles and Orange counties), to
be used in conjunction with the
PWSS. The LAM area saltwater
system is quite feasible, if existinglarger storm drain channels can beused for pipeline rights-of-way.
Development and deployment ofneighborhood equipment container Figure 9 Berkeley FD 12” (30 cm) Aboveground Water
caches, for use by NERT, CERT
Supply System (BAWSS)
and other volunteers, to enhancetheir currently very limited post-disaster firefighting capability.

Figure 10 (left) Los Angeles county storm drain channel network (right) selected existing larger Los
Angeles and Orange county storm drain channels (blue lines) with connectors to be built (black lines)
overlaid on ShakeOut scenario ignitions. Blue buffer zones around lines would be areas reachable by a
PWSS.

Figure 11 San Francisco NERT equipment container cache922Regarding insurance, the industry has played a key role in U.S. fire protection for over 100 years,
and continues to do so today. This is due in part to the enormous exposure of the industry - about 9.5
million residential and 1 million commercial property insurance policies were in force in California in
2009, with a total value of $ 4.7 trillion, almost all of it exposed to fire following earthquake. The
insurance industry through its periodic review of fire departments and their water supplies seeks toassure that fire departments remain well trained and equipped, and adequately supplied with water, fornormal firefighting conditions. However, guidance provided by the insurance industry for adequacyof public water supplies does not mention or consider earthquake. The study examined a more densely
built-up neighborhood in San Francisco, where it was shown that the water required forpost-earthquake conflagration is far in excess of that required by current insurance standards.
PUBLIC AWARENESS
In order to increase public awareness of this issue, a four page brochure has been prepared, thatgraphically illustratates the risk of fire following earthquake, and offers recommendations for reducing
this risk. The brochure will be a key tool in a major effort by the California Seismic Safety
Commission to garner support for reducing this risk.
The brochure is available at
http://www.seismic.ca.gov/pub/CSSC_2011_4_PAGER_Water_Supply_PEER_Report.pdf .

Figure 12 Brochure re fire following earthquake

CONCLUDING REMARKS
Fire following earthquake is a significant problem in seismic portions of North America. The
problem is being attacked on a broad front, not all aspects of which could be discussed due to space
limitations. (Davidson and Lee, 2006, Lee, 2009, Lee et al., 2008, Lee and Davidson, 2006, Lee andDavidson, 2010a, Lee and Davidson, 2010b, Robertson and Mehaffey, 2000, Mickelson and Moore,
1995) are other workers in this field. The California Seismic Safety Commission is currently
encouraging major urban fire and water agencies to work together to develop and implement
post-earthquake water supply reliability goals for fighting fires.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Support by the California Seismic Safety Commission, the National Institute of Building Sciences,
numerous fire agencies and the Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center of the University ofCalifornia at Berkeley, is gratefully acknowledged.
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