MULTINATIONAL DESIGNEVALUATION PROGRAMME
Annual Report
April 2016-April 2017
August 2017

MDEP 2015-2016 Annual Report

A(M

MULTINATIONAL DESIGNEVALUATION PROGRAMME
Annual Report
April 2016-April 2017
August 2017

Policy Group – Olkiluoto 3 EPR construction site visit, Finland, 24 May 2016.

Steering Technical Committee – 31st meeting, Vienna, Austria, 7-8 June 2017.

Cover page photo credits: Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant, United Arab Emirates, May 2017 (provided by
Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation – ENEC); Three reactors of Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant in Eurajoki,
Finland, May 2016 (provided by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority – STUK).

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Foreword from the Policy Group Chair

It is my renewed pleasure to share my thoughts on the Multinational Design
Evaluation Programme (MDEP) Annual Report for 2016-2017. The Annual Reportprovides an opportunity to reflect on the achievements of collaboration under thisunique programme for regulatory activities related to new reactors. The contentsof this report demonstrate another successful year for MDEP.
MDEP was launched in 2006. In the past ten years, MDEP’s reputation as aneffective organisation for leveraging the resources and experiences of multiple
nations in the regulatory review of new reactors has grown significantly. As aresult, the portfolio of new reactor designs that are being addressed haveincreased from two in 2006 to five in 2017, with a possibility of adding more newreactor designs in the coming years. MDEP’s membership has grown from the original 10 national
regulators to 15.
Over the past year, MDEP design specific working groups have all completed their common positions toaddress the impact of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident on new reactor designs. New
reactor commissioning activities are a major part of all design specific working groups. The EPR and
AP1000 Working Groups are particularly active in this area, as together they are overseeing 12 new reactor
constructions worldwide. The design specific working groups have finalised a common position to provide
high-level guidance to applicants and licensees that wish to take credit for a first plant only test (FPOT).
This common position was first implemented in March 2017 at the Taishan 1 plant in China, where
regulators and licensees from the United Kingdom, France and Finland witnessed reactor pressure vesselinternals vibration tests. The FPOT marked a significant milestone for MDEP since it provided a unique
opportunity for regulators involved to demonstrate the efficiency of using common positions to effectively
collaborate and share information on test results. This model should be followed as much as possible inother MDEP co-operation areas. Another significant step in multinational regulatory co-operation was the
successful completion of the second multinational vendor inspection at the AREVA NP Creusot Forgefacility in December 2016. This multinational inspection constituted an excellent example of regulatory
co-operation using MDEP vendor inspection protocol for an area of high risk that could potentially impact
several nations’ nuclear programmes. In addition, it has proven to be a valuable tool to gain vendor
performance insights with minimal inspection resources from the participating regulators. I am also
content to see the fruitful MDEP collaboration with the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Working Group on
the Regulation of New Reactors (WGRNR) on generic aspects of commissioning activities.
I am pleased to report that, in line with the MDEP Policy Group’s decision to focus on design specificactivities, MDEP and the NEA have taken steps to consider transferring MDEP generic activities to the NEA.
Towards this end, one of three generic issue specific working groups, the Digital Instrumentation andControls working group, will conclude its programme of work under MDEP and start its new mandate
under the NEA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities with the aim of broadening its scope to include
operating reactors, as well as its membership.
Moving forward, we will continue to build on our achievements to further improve the effectiveness of
new reactors regulation and collaboration under MDEP. Overall, MDEP continues to function smoothly, inno small measure as a result of the support of the NEA as the MDEP Secretariat.

Petteri Tiippana,
MDEP Policy Group Chairman

3

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Table of contents
Executive summary .............................................................................................................................. 7
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 9
2. Programme goals and outcomes .................................................................................................... 9
3. Programme implementation ......................................................................................................... 10
3.1 Membership .............................................................................................................................. 10
3.2 Organisational structure ......................................................................................................... 10
3.3 MDEP Library ............................................................................................................................ 11
3.4 Common positions................................................................................................................... 11
4. Interactions with other organisations......................................................................................... 124.1. CNRA WGRNR .......................................................................................................................... 124.2. IAEA........................................................................................................................................... 13
4.3. Advanced Reactor Forums ..................................................................................................... 13
4.4. WENRA ..................................................................................................................................... 13
4.5. Industry .................................................................................................................................... 13
4.6. World Nuclear Association .................................................................................................... 14
5. Current activities ............................................................................................................................. 14
5.1 EPR Working Group (EPRWG) ................................................................................................. 16
5.2 AP1000 Working Group (AP1000WG) ..................................................................................... 20
5.3 APR1400 Working Group (APR1400WG) ................................................................................ 21
5.5 ABWR Working Group (ABWRWG) ........................................................................................ 26
5.6 Vendor Inspection Co-operation Working Group (VICWG) ............................................... 28
5.7 Codes and Standards Working Group (CSWG) .................................................................... 30
5.8 Digital Instrumentation and Controls Working Group (DICWG) ...................................... 32
6. Interim results ................................................................................................................................. 35
7. Next Steps – Future of the Programme ....................................................................................... 36
Appendix 1: List of abbreviations and acronyms ......................................................................... 37
Appendix 2: Revised or new documents and publications ......................................................... 41
Appendix 3: Photographs of reactors considered within MDEP ................................................. 435

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Executive summary
The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme(MDEP) is a multinational initiative to leverage
the resources and knowledge of national
regulatory authorities that are currently, or will
shortly be, undertaking the review of newreactor power plant designs. MDEP members are
the regulatory authorities of Canada (CNSC),
China (NNSA), Finland (STUK), France (ASN),
Hungary (HAEA), India (AERB), Japan (NRA),
Korea(NSSC),
theRussianFederation(Rostechnadzor), South Africa (NNR), Sweden(SSM), Turkey (TAEK), the United Arab Emirates(FANR), the United Kingdom (ONR) and theUnited States (NRC). The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) also takes part in the workof MDEP. The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
performs the Technical Secretariat function in
support of MDEP. MDEP incorporates a broad
range
of
activities
includingenhancing
multilateral
co-operation
withinexisting
regulatory
frameworks
andincreasing
multinational convergence of codes, standards,
guides and safety goals. A key concept
throughout the work of MDEP is that national
regulators retain sovereign authority for all
licensing and regulatory decisions.
Working groups are implementing theactivities in accordance with programme plans
with specific activities and goals, and haveestablished the necessary interfaces both within
and outside of MDEP. This report provides a
status of the programme after its ninth year of
implementation.
Significant progress is being made on theoverall MDEP goals of increased co-operation andenhanced convergence of requirements andpractices. In addition, the lessons learnt from the
11 March 2011 events at the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant (NPP) have appropriately
been incorporated into MDEP activities in the
DesignSpecificWorkingGroup(DSWG)
programme plans.
Five DSWGs are facilitating the MDEP goal ofenhanced co-operation. The EPR Working Group(EPRWG) consists of the regulatory authorities ofChina, Finland, France, India, Sweden, theUnited Kingdom and the United States. The
AP1000 Working Group (AP1000WG) consists of
the regulatory authorities of Canada, China,
India, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The APR1400 Working Group (APR1400WG)
includes the regulatory authorities of Korea, theUnited Arab Emirates and the United States. The
VVER Working Group (VVERWG) includes theregulatory authorities of China, Finland, Hungary,
India, Russia and Turkey. The ABWR Working

Group (ABWRWG) includes the regulatory
authorities of Japan, Sweden, the United
Kingdom and the United States. The DSWGs
have continued to share information andexperience successfully on the safety design
reviews with the purpose of enhancing thesafety of the design and enabling regulators tomake timely licensing decisions. Additionally,
promoting safety and standardisation of designs
is made possible through MDEP co-operation.
The Vendor Inspection Co-operation Working
Group (VICWG) continues to implement its
programme successfully; reaching another key
milestone in December 2016 with the completionof the second multinational inspection. This
accomplishment represents a significant step in
multinational regulatory co­operation and it
clearly demonstrates the benefits of regulatoryco­operationinvendorinspection.
The
inspection team consisted of eleven inspectors
from France, Canada, China, Finland, the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom.
The VICWG continues to focus on maximisinginformation sharing, conducting joint inspections (multiple regulators inspecting to theregulatory requirements of one country) andwitnessing other regulators’ inspections. In 2016,
in addition to the multinational inspection, twowitnessed inspections were completed. The
French and United States regulators also collaborated on inspections results from separately
conducted
vendorinspections.
In
total,
15 opportunities were identified to co­operate on
vendor inspection related information. The
VICWG is also interfacing with standards
development organisations to encourage andexplore harmonisation of quality standards.
The Digital Instrumentation and Controls(I&C) Working Group (DICWG) has issued
13 common positions (CP) based on the existing
standards, national regulatory guidance, bestpractices and working group inputs. These
common positions describe methods andevidence that all DICWG member countries findacceptable to support safety justification for
digital I&C systems. In addition, the DICWG
members jointly research and comment on
proposed
International
ElectrotechnicalCommission (IEC), Institute of Electrical andElectronics Engineers (IEEE) and IAEA standards
that are relevant to the regulatory review ofdigital instrumentation and control systems.
The Codes and Standards Working Group(CSWG) is working closely with standards
development organisations to converge code

7

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Reportrequirements related to pressure boundary
components and to reconcile code differences.
The working group has successfully completed its
goal and mandate to achieve some harmonisationand to identify the challenges in harmonisingcodes and standards. The group works closelywith industry and standard development
organisations (SDOs) to continue to advance its
goals and seek further progress co-operatively.
Accomplishments to date provide confidence
that the MDEP membership, structure andprocesses offer an effective method ofaccomplishingincreased
co-operationinregulatory design reviews. The interim results
and key accomplishments for 2016-2017 include
the publication of the two first generic common
positions from the Steering Technical Committee(STC). The first one provides high-level guidance
to applicants and licensees that wish to takecredit for a first plant only test (FPOT) performed
during the commissioning of the first unit of asimilar type, if accepted by the applicants,
licensees and regulators. This common position isbased on the draft that was developed by the
EPRWG, recognised to be applicable to all designs.
The second generic common position addresses
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant
accident for all MDEP reactor designs, based on
the work of the design specific working groups. At
the level of the working groups, the key
accomplishments for 2016-2017 include:•

All five DSWGs have completed common
positions on post-Fukushima consideration
for their specific design and the Steering
Technical
Committee
hasissuedan
integrated MDEP common position.

•

As the ABWR has multiple vendors withdiffering designs, the ABWRWG drafted acomparison matrix of the key features of each
design. This comparison matrix was sent tomember country vendors to voluntarily
populate in order for the ABWRWG to compile
and review the responses. It is intended thata technical note discussing the outcomes of
the review will be drafted towards the end of
2017.

•

The APR1400WG completed a technical report
on design differences between APR1400
plants,theTechnical
ReportTRAPR1400WG­01: Design Description andComparison of Design Differences between
APR1400 Plants was approved by the STC in
June 2017.

•

The APR1400WG Accident and TransientsTESG finalised the Common Position CPAPR1400-02: Common Position on the
APR1400 Post Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA)
Strainer Performance and Debris In-Vessel

8

Downstream Effects, that was approved by
the STC in June 2017.
•

The FPOT was conducted during the firstsemester 2017 at the Taishan 1 plant in China.
This test provided the opportunity to
implement the MDEP common position on
FPOT. The attendees to the FPOT in March2017 included ONR, ASN, STUK, NEA
representing
the
MDEP
CATESG(Commissioning Activities Technical Expert
Subgroup) and EDF, NNB, and TVO
representing the EPR Owners and Operators
Group (OOG).

•

The AP1000WG continued to exchange
information about important design changes,
construction issues and vendor issues
associated with the AP1000 design, especiallyamong the regulators of China, the United
Kingdom and the United States.

•

The VVERWG continued to interact with theRussian nuclear industry, as well as invite
representatives of Rosatom, Rosenergoatom
and design organisations (Atomenergoproekt,
Atomproekt, Gidropress) to take part in themeetings of the VVERWG and its subgroups toget additional information about safetysignificant design solutions.

•

The VVERWG completed two technicalreports – TR-VVERWG-01 on regulatory
approaches and criteria used in severe
accident analyses and severe accident
management
and
TR-VVERWG-02
onregulatory approaches and oversight practices
related to reactor pressure vessel and primary
components. These technical reports were
presented to the STC in June 2017.

•

The
VICWG
completedthesecondmultinational inspection at AREVA NP,
Creusot Forge facility in December 2016.

•

The DICWG issued the CP-DICWG-13:
Common Position on Spurious Actuations.

•

The CSWG has reviewed three SDOs and
CORDEL code harmonisation reports andprovided comments to the SDOs and CORDEL.
MDEP held a joint workshop with theCommittee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities(CNRA) Working Group on the Regulation of
New Reactors (WGRNR) on commissioning
activities in March 2016. The report on theworkshop results focused on proposedcommendable practices to help nuclear
regulatory organisations (NROs) develop theircommissioning oversight arrangements inaddition to planning and performing theiroversight activities. This report will be
submitted for CNRA approval in December
2017.

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

1. Introduction
The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme(MDEP) is a multinational initiative that develops
innovative approaches to leverage the resources
and knowledge of national regulatory authorities
who are, or will shortly be, undertaking thereview of new reactor power plant designs. MDEP
is primarily focused on design evaluation, butalso includes inspection activities and genericissues. A key concept throughout the programmeis that MDEP will better inform the decisions ofregulatory authorities through multinational cooperation, while each regulator retains thesovereign authority to make licensing andregulatory decisions.
Working groups are implementing the activities in accordance with their programme plans
with specific activities and goals, and the working
groups have established the necessary interfaces
both within and outside MDEP members. Significant progress has been made over the past year
on the overall MDEP goals of increased

co-operation and enhanced convergence of
requirements and practices. Accomplishments todate provide confidence that the MDEP
membership, structure and processes provide aneffective method of accomplishing increased
co-operation in regulatory design reviews for new
reactors.
MDEP was established in 2006 as amultinational initiative for a five-year period. It
was extended for another five-year period in 2012by the Policy Group based on the value gained by
the members. At its meeting in June 2015, the
MDEP Policy Group determined that MDEP should
continue at least for five years following 2017, in
its current form. Since MDEP is a temporaryorganisation, the Policy Group has approved thetransfer of two of the issue specific working
groups to an NEA committee. This report provides
a status of the programme after its ninth year of
implementation.

2. Programme goals and outcomes
The main objectives of the MDEP effort are toenable increased co-operation within existing
regulatory frameworks and establish mutuallyagreed upon practices to enhance the safety of
new reactor designs. The enhanced co­operation
among regulators will improve the effectivenessand efficiency of the regulatory design reviews,
which are part of each country’s licensing process.
The programme focuses on co-operation on
regulatory practices that aim at harmonising
regulatory requirements. The IAEA safety
standards, which provide a general level ofharmonisation, provide input to the work and canbenefit from the final results.
MDEP is meeting its goal of enabling increased
co-operation through the activities of the working
groups. MDEP has been successful in providing aforum for regulatory bodies to co-operate on

design evaluations and inspections. In addition toorganising working groups, MDEP has provided
each regulator with peer contacts who share
information, discuss issues informally anddisseminate information rapidly. For example,
the design specific working group members havebenefitted significantly from the sharing ofquestions among the regulators, resulting in more
informed and harmonised regulatory decisions.
MDEP members have also been highly successful
in co-ordinating vendor inspections in which theregulators share observations and insights. MDEP
has made improvements in communicating
information regarding the members’ regulatory
practices through development of an MDEP
library which serves as a central repository for all
documents associated with the programme.

92016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

3. Programme implementation
3.1 Membership•

Design specific activities. Design specificworking groups share information on a timely
basis and co­operate on the areas of specificreactor design evaluations, construction
oversight and the commissioning and earlyphase operation of new reactor type plant.
Participants in these working groups are theregulatory authorities that are actively
reviewing, preparing to review, or regulating
the construction of the specific new reactor
designs. A design specific working group isformed when three or more MDEP member
countries express interest in working together.
Under the design specific working groups,
expert subgroups have been formed to address
specific technical issues. Non-MDEP regulators
could request MDEP membership in order tojoin a design specific working group.

•

Issue specific activities. Working groups havebeen organised for specific technical andregulatory
processareas
withintheprogramme of work. These include vendor
inspections, codes and standards, and digital
instrumentation and controls. Membership in
issue specific working groups is open to all
MDEP participating countries and the IAEA
representatives. These topics were chosenbecause the activities are of generic interest
and of safety significance to the licensing of
new reactors in MDEP member countries. The
approaches followed by the MDEP regulators
are not completely alike, and successful
completion of the activities related to the issue
specific working groups will likely result inincreased harmonisation and convergence inregulatory practices or increased co-operation.
In June 2015, the MDEP Policy Group
determined that the programme should focus
on design specific activities going forward andthe issue specific working groups should beclosed or transferred to another organisation
over the next few years. The STC is currently
working with the NEA to transfer two of thethree issue specific working groups under
NEA’s CNRA within the next two years. The
DICWG will transition to the CNRA in
December 2017. The CSWG may be transferredin the future, if approved by the CNRA. The
following chart illustrates how the programme
is currently organised.

Participation in the Policy Group and Steering
Technical Committee is intended for nationalsafety authorities of interested countries that
already have commitments for new build or firmplans to have commitments in the near future for
new reactor designs. MDEP members are: Canada,
China, Finland, France, Hungary, India, Japan,
Korea, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, theUnited Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom andthe United States. The IAEA also takes part in thework of MDEP.

3.2 Organisational structure
The programme is governed by a Policy Group(PG), made up of the heads of the participatingorganisations, and implemented by a Steering
Technical Committee (STC) and its working
groups. The Steering Technical Committee consists of senior staff representatives from each of
the participating national safety authorities in
addition to a representative from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The Policy Group provides guidance to theSteering Technical Committee on the overall
focus of MDEP; monitors the progress of the
programme; and determines participation in the
programme.
The Steering Technical Committee manages
and approves the detailed programme of work
including: defining topics and working methods;
establishing technical working groups andnomination of experts; approving procedures andtechnical papers developed by the working groups;
establishing interfaces with other international
efforts to benefit from available work and avoid
duplication; developing procedures for thehandling of information to be shared in the
project; reporting to the Policy Group; identifying
new topics for the programme to address; andestablishing subcommittees of the STC to study
specific topics.
The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
performs the Technical Secretariat function in
support of MDEP.
Two lines of activities have been establishedto carry out the work of MDEP:

10

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

MDEP organisational structure

3.3 MDEP Library
In part, MDEP information is communicated among
the members through the MDEP library which
serves as a central repository for all documents
associated with the programme. The NEA provides
the technical support for development andmaintenance of the MDEP library on a secured
password-protected website. The website provides
two levels of access which are: 1) general access
open to every member, and 2) restricted area accessfor each MDEP working groups’ member regulators
participating in that specific group. Publicly
available documents related to MDEP are available
on the MDEP page of the NEA website (www.oecdnea.org/mdep/). The STC, through the secretariat,
manages the maintenance of the library and makes
enhancements to improve the effectiveness of thelibrary.
In order for MDEP to be successful in fulfilling
its goal of leveraging the work of peer regulatorsin the evaluation of new nuclear power plantdesigns, a framework was developed to facilitate

the sharing of technical information among MDEP
participants which at times may include thesharing of proprietary and other types of sensitive
information. As a general rule, the informationexchanged as part of the MDEP in meetings andthe MDEP library is for the sole use of theparticipating national regulatory authorities. The
members of the working groups also have acommunication
protocol
to
share
new
information related to new reactors with othermembers in advance of its release to the public. A
large portion of the information shared may not
be proprietary or sensitive; however, allparticipating members must protect and properly
handle the information that an originator claims
to be proprietary or sensitive.

3.4 Common positions
MDEP has developed a process for identifying anddocumenting common positions on specificissues among the member regulators based on
existing standards, national regulatory guidance,11

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

best practices and group member inputs. Design
specific common positions document common
conclusions that each of the working groupmembers have reached during design reviews.
Discussions among the members and sharing of
information in these areas help to strengthen theindividual conclusions reached.
Generic common positions apply genericallyrather than only to one specific design. Genericcommon positions document practices andpositions that each of the working groupmembers find acceptable. The common positions
are intended to provide guidance to the regulators
in reviewing new or unique areas, and will beshared with the IAEA, and other standards
organisations, for consideration in standards
development programmes. After a common

position is agreed to by a working group, it ispresented to the STC for endorsement. Upon
endorsement by the STC, the proposed common
positions are made publicly available on the NEA
MDEP website in order to keep external
stakeholders informed of the work completed
within MDEP. Those common positions will
become commendable practices, recommended
by the MDEP. There is no obligation on the part ofany regulatory body to follow them. A key
concept throughout the work of MDEP is thatnational regulators retain sovereign authority for
all licensing and regulatory decisions. If a
regulatory body chooses to formally adopt acommon position, it would be through thatcountry’s normal processes.

4. Interactions with other organisations
MDEP strives to maintain an awareness of, andinteractions with, other organisations that are
implementing
programmestofacilitate
international co-operation on new reactors.
Interactions focused on ensuring that MDEP does
not duplicate efforts, benefits from the outputs ofthese organisations. Continued communication of
MDEP activities and results to other organisations
assists these interactions. In order to ensure thatefforts are not duplicated between the groups,
MDEP’s scope is focused on short-term activities
related to specific design reviews being conductedby the member countries and efforts to harmonise
specific regulatory practices and standards.

4.1. CNRA WGRNRThe CNRA Working Group on the Regulation of
New Reactors (WGRNR) examines the regulatory
issues of siting, licensing, and regulatory
oversight of generation III+ and generation IV
nuclear reactors. The current focus areas of the
WGRNR are construction experience andconstruction inspection issues. The WGRNR coordinates its work with the work performed by
MDEP such that it utilises its outputs, does not
duplicate its efforts, and extends the results of
MDEP to other CNRA members. To avoid overlapof activities between the groups, WGRNR focuseson procedures and guidance, while MDEP focuses
on design specific issues.
MDEP interacts with the CNRA WGRNR and
the Working Group on Inspection Practices (WGIP)
through the NEA who also serves as the Technical
Secretariat for the CNRA. WGRNR is the focal
point of interactions between MDEP and the
CNRA and its working groups, and will assist in

12

co-ordinating communications and requests
between the two activities in order to ensure that
the MDEP's efforts take full advantage of the work
already being done by the CNRA.
In 2014, MDEP and CNRA agreed to a proposed
framework
in
which
MDEP
addresses
commissioning activities (hot functional andstart-up testing) specific to a design and WGRNR
addresses generic commissioning activities.
Lessons learnt from MDEP commissioning
activities will be transferred to WGRNR for it topursue the work on a generic basis withparticipation open to a wider range of regulators.
In March 2016, MDEP and WGRNR held a jointcommissioning workshop in Korea with wellbalanced
WGRNR-MDEP
participation.
The
workshop consisted of three parallel sessions oncommissioning management, commissioning
oversight and cross-cutting issues. The report on
the workshop results will focus on the 11 topics
discussed at the workshop and propose
commendable
practicesto
help
nuclearregulatory organisations (NROs) develop theircommissioning
oversight
arrangements
inaddition to planning and performing theiroversight activities. This report will be submitted
for CNRA approval in December 2017.
In accordance with the Policy Group direction
to transfer the MDEP issue specific working group
activities to another structure, MDEP isinteracting with CNRA leadership to propose atransfer of some the activities to CNRA. Although
the MDEP working groups will have completed
their current programme of work, the benefits ofcontinuing co-ordination among regulators onthese topics have been recognised both within
and outside of the MDEP members. Therefore,2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

MDEP has proposed that the working group
activities, in full or a limited scope, be transferred
as a new task under CNRA, maintaining the same
goals and processes during the initial transfer
period. The first issue specific working group to
be transferred to CNRA in December 2017 is the
DICWG.

them to participate in selective portions ofmeetings and other activities. For example:•

The Codes and Standards Working Group
interacted with a committee of standards
development organisations (SDOs) (ASME,
JSME, KEPIC, AFCEN, NIKIET and CSA) in acode comparison project. After issuing thecode comparison report, the SDOs formed a
Code Convergence Board to limit divergence
and achieve convergence on individual
requirements, where realistic and practical.
Members of the MDEP CSWG participate inmeetings of the Code Convergence Board.

•

The EPR Working Group meets regularly withrepresentatives of AREVA, EDF and other EPRlicensees, applicants and potential applicants
to discuss similarities and differences among
the EPR designs being licensed in each country.

•

The AP1000 Working Group meets with
Westinghouse and the AP1000 applicants andlicensees.

•

The APR1400 Working Group meets with
KHNP and representatives of the licensee for
the Barakah NPP, an APR1400 underconstruction in the United Arab Emirates(UAE).

•The ABWR Working Group interacts with anumber of industry representatives including
GE-Hitachi, Hitachi-GE, Toshiba, Tokyo
Electric Power Company, Horizon Nuclear
Power, Vattenfall AB and Nuclear Innovation
North America.

•

The VVER Working Group continues to interact
with Russian nuclear industry, as well as invited
representatives of Rosatom, Rosenergoatom
and design organisations (Atomenergoproekt,
Atomproekt, and Gidropress) to take part in themeetings of the VVERWG and its subgroups toacquire additional information about safetysignificant design solutions.

•

The Digital Instrumentation and Controls
Working Group (DICWG) interacts frequently
with applicable SDOs, the Institute of Electricaland Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and theInternational Electrotechnical Commission(IEC), by including representatives of IEC andIEEE in MDEP meetings, attending IEC and IEEE
meetings, and involving them in thedevelopment of common positions.

•

The Vendor Inspection Co-operation Working
Group (VICWG) met with SDO and World
Nuclear Association (WNA) representatives todiscuss Quality Assurance and Quality
Management(QA/QM)
standardsformanufacturing nuclear components.

4.2. IAEA
The IAEA takes part in the work of MDEP throughparticipation in the Policy Group meetings, STC
meetings and issue specific working groups. In
addition,thegeneric
commonpositionsdeveloped in MDEP are shared with the IAEA for
consideration in the IAEA standards development
programme.

4.3. Advanced Reactor Forums
Although MDEP is not currently considering thedesigns of advanced reactors, MDEP interacts
with the Generation IV International Forum (GIF)
to stay informed of multinational co­operative
activities in the area of advanced reactors. MDEP
also receives updates, through NEA, of the workof the Joint CNRA/CSNI Ad hoc Group on the
Safety of Advanced Reactors (GSAR), andmaintains an awareness of the efforts of the IAEA
Small Modular Reactor Forum. While thesegroups co-operate on the generic issues related toadvanced and small modular reactors (SMR),
there is an understanding that MDEP may form adesign specific working group if three MDEP
member countries begin to consider a specificadvanced or SMR design.

4.4. WENRAThe MDEP Steering Technical Committee meets
periodically with a representative of the Western
Europe Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA)
to discuss the development of WENRA safety
objectives and reports. The WENRA Reactor
Safety Working Group has welcomed MDEP input
when developing its documents.

4.5. Industry
The MDEP working groups are very interested inunderstanding the perspectives of the design
vendors, codes and standards organisations,component manufacturers and the challenges
they face in dealing with numerous regulatorsand regulatory systems. The MDEP working
groups interact with industry groups, and invite13

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

4.6. World Nuclear Association
The World Nuclear Association CORDEL group
acts as the industry counterpart to MDEP. CORDEL
has initiated task forces to address many issues,
including those currently being worked on by the
MDEP issue specific working groups. Members of
the MDEP STC meet with CORDEL periodically,
and CORDEL has participated in meetings of the
MDEP Codes and Standards and Digital I&C
Working Groups. CORDEL plays an important rolein code harmonisation. They have established a
Codes and Standards Task Force (CSTF) toconverge code requirements and technicalexperts from over ten companies worldwide areworking in the CSTF.
Since both MDEP and CORDEL have expressedinterest in and have established a goal offurthering harmonisation of reactor designs,
regulatory
practices,andindustry
andinternational standards, the MDEP Policy Group
has agreed that co-ordination of efforts with
CORDEL is appropriate in some cases. While coordinating efforts in areas of mutual interest,
MDEP members will always retain their individual
and independent regulatory roles and positions.
While MDEP is a regulatory forum and CORDEL
is an industry organisation, both parties agree
they can benefit from communications andco­operation where the organisations sharecommon goals. Two areas in which CORDEL and
MDEP both have programmes of work to increase
harmonisation are digital instrumentation andcontrols and codes and standards.

Both MDEP and CORDEL maintain strong
interests in the harmonisation of new reactor
designs and design reviews, regulatory safety
standards and practices, and related industry and
IAEA
standards.
MDEP
valuescontinued
interaction to assist in achieving these goals
while each organisation functions in a mannerconsistent with its appropriate roles andresponsibilities.
With effective communications in mind, MDEP
has regular interactions with CORDEL. The mostrecent meeting was held in March 2017, inMaryland, USA. During this meeting, MDEP STC
members and CORDEL discussed current
activities being undertaken at CORDEL and theirrole in MDEP. Collectively, the group discussed
the potential for industry and SDO work on thearea of carbon segregation. The next interaction
with CORDEL will be in September 2017.
To celebrate its 10 year anniversary, MDEP will
host a 2-day conference in September 2017 in
London, United Kingdom. The conference will
include sessions on: codes and standards
harmonisation; digital instrumentation andcontrols: current and emerging technicalchallenges; supply chain regulatory issues andvendor inspection co-operation; influence of
MDEP interaction on reactor designs safety;
commissioning activities; and perspectives for
MDEP. Each session will be led by a Policy Group
member and organised by a working group chair.
CORDELwill
participate
throughout
theconference.

5. Current activities
The current activities of MDEP are being
implemented through design specific and issue
specific working groups. The members of thedesign specific working groups share informationand co-operate on specific reactor design
evaluations and construction oversight. Issue
specific working groups are organised for thetechnical and regulatory process areas within the
programme of work. Each working group has alead and co-lead regulator designated, and has
developed a programme plan which identifies
specific activities, schedules and contacts.

Design specific working groups achieve this goal
through:

The design specific working groups leveragenational regulatory resources by sharing
information and experience on the regulatory
safety design reviews with the purposes ofenhancing the safety of the design and enabling
regulators to make timely licensing decisions.

14•

Exchanging experiences and lessons learnt on
licensing process implementation, design
reviews, and design-related construction andcommissioning activities;•

Working to understand the differences inregulatory safety review approaches in eachcountry to support potential use of otherregulators safety design evaluations, whereappropriate;•

Identifying and understanding key design
differences including those originating from
regulatory
requirements
andthendocumenting the reasons for differences inregulatory requirements;

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report•

Looking for opportunities to provide input toissue specific working groups on potential
topics of significant interest;•

Documenting common MDEP positions on
aspects of a review;•

Documenting the group’s activities intechnical reports to ensure knowledgetransfer;•

Communicating
andco-ordinating
communications on MDEP views andcommon positions to vendors and operators
regarding the basis of safety evaluations andstandardisation.

While the design specific working groups
typically address issues that the members findchallenging, specific to each design, some topics are
addressed by several working groups. Two such
topics are commissioning activities and Fukushima
Daiichi lessons learnt.

Commissioning activities
Members of design specific working groups,
especially EPRWG and AP1000WG, have started
activities and are presently devoting resources for
co-operation on commissioning of first-of-a-kind(FOAK) reactor testing. Lessons learnt by MDEP
will be transferred to WGRNR for it to pursue thework on a generic basis, with participation open
to a wider range of regulators.
Early 2016, the EPRWG issued a draft common
position addressing first plant only tests (FPOT)
on the EPR design. During 2016, the other design
specific working groups recognised the paper tobe applicable to their own design. As aconsequence, the draft EPR common position on
FPOT was published as a generic one at the STC
level in May 2016. The MDEP generic common
position on FPOT provides high-level guidance toapplicants and licensees that wish to take credit
for a FPOT performed during the commissioningof the first unit of a similar type, if accepted by
the applicants, licensees and regulators. An FPOT
allows a test performed on the very first reactor ofa specific design to be credited for the subsequent
units of similar design.
•

As the United States and China progress inconstruction of AP1000s and move into thecommissioning phase, they have begun toshare information on commissioning tests
and activities. The Commissioning Activities
Technical Expert Subgroup (TESG) future
activities include increasing co­operation on
pre-operational and start-up testing as morereactors start going through these phases.

•

The EPR Working Group has created a new
Commissioning Activities TESG in order tobegin co­operating on oversight of plantcommissioning, pre-operational and start-up
testing. As several of the member countries
get closer to the late stages of construction
and preparations for operation, the newsubgroup will enable MDEP members to shareexperience in late-stage construction tests(e.g. hot functional tests) leading to fuel loadand operations. The commissioning activities
focused mainly on preparing for the joint
witnessing of the reactor pressure vesselinternals vibration first plant only test at the
Taishan 1 nuclear power plant conducted in
March 2017.
The 2016 MDEP joint workshop with the CNRAWGRNR on commissioning activities aimed toshare best practices and recent experience frominternational regulatory approaches for thecommissioning of new reactors. Topics discussed
included: regulatory priorities and practices,
oversight and regulation of commissioning tests
and activities, and commissioning issues not tied
to a specific design. The outputs of the workshop
will be recorded in the form of a report proposingcommendable
practicesto
help
nuclearregulatoryorganisations
developtheircommissioning oversight arrangements, and planand perform their commissioning oversightactivities. The final draft report of the joint
WGRNR-MDEP workshop on commissioning is tobe submitted to the STC for approval by October
2017. WGRNR aims to have the report approved at
the CNRA meeting in December 2017.

MDEP co-operation in operational phases
MDEP was established primarily as a forum to cooperate on design reviews. As the designs are
moving into the commissioning and eventually
the operational phases, the Policy Group andSteering Technical Committee have discussed thebenefits and challenges of continuing cooperation after construction is complete and into
the operational stages. MDEP recognises thebenefitsofcontinuingtheco-operative
relationships formed during the design review
stage, as well as the benefit to the members of the
Design Specific Working Groups (DSWG) who arestill in the licensing phase. The Policy Group hasdetermined that the operational stage should not
be included in the scope of MDEP. However, theystated there should be a means to ensure that
operating experience related to design issues isaddressed by DSWGs. With this in mind, MDEP
will
continue
toshare
informationon
construction and commissioning of new reactors,
and incorporate feedback from operating
experience as it pertains to design.

15

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

MDEP
membersagree
that
operatingexperience, when it has an impact on designs,
should be considered. In particular, informationfrom the first year of operation may be directly
related to commissioning. MDEP members areencouraged to stay and participate in a group
after the considered reactor begins to operate intheir country to share operating experience.
This issue was raised once more at the STC
meeting in June 2017. After an extensive
discussion, it was clear that the members value
the forum that MDEP provides. The discussion
revolved mostly around the transition of a DSWG
from MDEP to another area because there is a realvalue in the structured co­operation and dialoguethat MDEP promotes. The STC discussed thischallenge extensively and will be looking for the
PolicyGroup’s
guidance
following
their
September 2017 meeting.

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
Accident Lessons Learnt
Lessons learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant accident are discussed by allof the DSWGs and have been incorporated in theirprogramme plans. MDEP recognises that otherinternational initiatives are ongoing that arefocused on operating plants. Therefore, it isimportant for MDEP to address such issues for
new reactor designs. All of the MDEP design
specific working groups conduct discussions on
Fukushima Daiichi lessons learnt and eachworking group has developed a common position
that identifies common approaches to address
potential safety improvements, as well as
common general expectations for new NPPs. As
directed by the MDEP Policy Group, the STC andworking groups developed an integrated MDEP
common position on the lessons learnt from the
Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. The STC
finalised this document in 2016 and placed it on
the MDEP public webpage.

5.1 EPR Working Group (EPRWG)
The EPR design specific Working Group (EPRWG)
includes the regulatory authorities of China (NNSA),
Finland (STUK), France (ASN), India (AERB), Sweden(SSM), the United Kingdom (ONR) and theUnited States (NRC). Numerous meetings andtechnical exchanges have taken place to share
information on the reviews being conducted ineach country. The following major construction
activities are currently ongoing: Olkiluoto 3, whichis in the final stage of construction in Finland,
Flamanville 3 which is under construction in
France, the twin unit plant at Taishan which is in
the final stage of construction in China, and the16

twin unit plant at Hinkley Point C which is in theearly construction phase in the United Kingdom.
The working group currently includes fivetechnical expert subgroups that are addressing
information on specific technical issues: Accidents
and Transients, Digital Instrumentation andControls, Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Severe
Accidents and Commissioning Activities. The latter
is a new subgroup which was created in early 2016and has actively met during this year. Each ofthese subgroups meet regularly to exchange
information on relevant aspects of the design
review status, share relevant evaluations when
they become available, produce technical reports
to identify and document similarities anddifferences among designs, regulatory safety
review approaches and resulting evaluations.
The
EPRWG
meets
regularlywithrepresentatives of AREVA, EDF and other EPRlicensees, applicants, and potential applicants todiscuss similarities and differences among the EPR
designs being reviewed and licensed in eachcountry. In June 2016, the EPRWG held a meeting inFrance with a visit to the Flamanville 3 plant underconstruction. In November 2016, the EPRWG held ameeting in China which included a visit to the
Taishan plant under construction.

Accomplishments and plan of work
In 2016, the EPR Working Group commenced workon a draft common position stating how the EPR
design addresses the objectives of the Vienna
Declaration, especially with regards to avoiding
large and early releases and long-term
contamination. This common position addresses
design basis, design extension and severe
accidents.
The Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA)TESG is incorporating the EPR Owners andOperators Group (OOG) feedback in a technicalreport identifying the main differences in themodelling of the PSAs used on the modelling ofinternal hazards in the various EPR designs.
Similar studies will now focus on the modelling of
the heating, ventilation and air conditioning(HVAC) systems and the instrumentation andcontrol systems in various EPR designs.
The Accidents and Transients TESG held
discussions on the use of reflective metallic
insulation for the primary circuit, and boron
dilution issues with the aim of trying to reachcommon positions in these areas. In addition, thesubgroup contributed to the EPRWG common
draft position on the Vienna Declaration. The
subgroup plans to work on LOCA status in thesafety assessment report.

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

The EPR I&C TESG continues to focus on theissue of spurious actuations due to software
failures. It is recognised that this concern is not
specific to EPR, and thus it is also being consideredin the DICWG. This year the subgroup has also
focused on the qualification of I&C systems andthe updating of the technical report on the EPR I&C
designs.
The Severe Accidents TESG shared the final
assessment of the severe accident analysis for the
Flammanville 3 plant. The subgroup also provided
input to the EPRWG draft common position on the
Vienna Declaration.
The EPR Commissioning Activities TESG
(CATESG) met four times during 2016. The
discussions included the following topics: phasingof the commissioning proposed by the plantvendor and inspection programmes; first plant
only tests (FPOT); and lessons learnt duringcommissioning
includinganyassociatedregulatory issues.
The CATESG prepared for the joint witnessingof the reactor pressure vessel internals vibration
FPOT by sharing technical documentations andagreeing on the conditions to witness the test.
Preparatory meetings for the FPOT were held inJune, October and December 2016. The FPOT was
conducted during the first semester 2017 at the
Taishan 1 plant in China. This test provided theopportunity to implement for the first time the
MDEP common position on FPOT. The CATESG
organised in March 2017 a common witnessing of
the FPOT, in order to gain confidence in themanner in which the FPOTs are undertaken andobserve the quality assurance and quality control
arrangements. The objective was not to review
the technical adequacy of the tests nor the
resulting data.
In this aim, the Chinese regulatory authority,
NNSA, shared with its counterparts, in a very
open manner, its inspection process and results.
The attendees to the FPOT included ONR, ASN
and STUK, supported by NEA. One of thepreconditions set by MDEP for crediting FPOT is
for regulator and licensee to be provided withpossibility to witness the FPOT. In this aim, theTaishan Nuclear Power Joint Venture Co., Ltd
kindly welcomed EDF (France) and NNB GenCo(UK) to witness the FPOT alongside the regulators.
While planning to also perform the test at
Olkiluoto 3, TVO (Finland) also attended the event.
The general observations of the EPR CATESG
included that there was evidence of adequate
quality control arrangements for preparation andperformance of FPOT; no fundamental reasons
identified for not crediting TSN1 FPOT results;
and that this was a positive example of MDEP
supporting regulators to work together to benefit
the EPR family.

EPR CATESG – Witnessing of the reactor pressure vessel internals vibration FPOT,Taishan 1 EPR construction site, China, March 2017.

17

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

In the coming year, the EPRWG plans to:•••Continue to communicate timelines forsharing regulatory evaluations of the EPR
among all EPRWG member countries.

- follow-on licensees to submit case to

retrospective regulators for crediting TSN1
RPVI FPOT results as appropriate;

Continue to share information among EPRWG
members in the areas in which technicalexperts subgroups (TESGs) have been formed
including
DigitalInstrumentation
andControls – DI&C (Lead: Finland), Probabilistic
Safety Assessment – PSA (Lead: Finland),
Severe Accidents – SA (Lead: France),
Accidents and Transients – A&T (Lead: UK)
and Commissioning Activities – CA (Lead: UK).
These groups plan to perform the following:- sharing

the
first
resultsofthecommissioning tests with a NEA press
release reporting CATESG visit andpresent RPVI FPOT at the fourth MDEP
Conference in September 2017;- preservation

andmaintenanceofequipment during the commissioning
phase to ensure its qualification is notinvalidated;- the technical expert subgroups will

provide a work plan including description
and scope of issues to be addressed to the
EPRWG and report on the status at every
EPRWG meeting;- provide feedback to WGRNR on potential
generic issues for their consideration.

•

Address important ad hoc topic areas tosupport design safety review decision making:- continue to meet regularly and exchange- exchange of information on specific- share relevant evaluations when they

- NPP accident-related issues within theinformation on relevant aspects of thedesign review status;

technical issues (carbon properties ofnuclear pressure equipment);

become available;

EPRWG and with the vendors andlicensees/operators/applicants to ensure
follow up on safety issues.

- produce

technical
expertsubgroup
technical reports on subject that the
subgroup deems important to safety toidentify and document similarities anddifferences among designs, regulatory
safety review approaches and resulting
evaluations;- produce MDEP EPRWG common positions,especially on important safety evaluation
findings, such as how EPR design meetsthe
expectationsoftheViennaDeclaration;- post evaluations, positions, reports, etc. in
the MDEP library.

18

Follow up on EPR specific commissioning
activities regarding:•

When necessary, plan and conduct designrelated inspections to ensure adequate design
configuration control, quality assurance andacceptability of structures, systems, andcomponents of the EPR (with appropriate coordination with VICWG).

•

Provide recommendations, when appropriate,
to the STC for considering possible items as
topics to address generically.

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

EPRWG – Flamanville 3 EPR construction site visit, France, 15 December 2016.

EPRWG – Olkiluoto 3 EPR construction site visit, Finland, 15 June 2017.

19

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

5.2 AP1000 Working Group (AP1000WG)
The AP1000 design specific Working Group(AP1000WG) includes the regulatory authorities ofCanada (CNSC), China (NNSA), the United
Kingdom (ONR), and the United States (NRC). In
2017, India (AERB) joined the AP1000 WG. A totalof four AP1000 units are under construction in
China at the Sanmen and Haiyang sites. As of
30 July 2017, four units were under constructionin the United States at the Vogtle and Summer
sites. On 31 July 2017, South Carolina Electric &Gas (SCE&E) ceased construction on VC Summer
Units 2 and 3. The NRC has issued combined(construction and operating) licenses for fourother AP1000 units, two each at the Levy and Lee
sites. The NRC is also nearing completion of its
review of combined licenses for two other AP1000
units at the Turkey Point site.
In 2016 and 2017, ONR continued its review of
the AP1000 as part of the four step Generic Design
Assessment (GDA) process. In 2011, ONR issued
an interim Design Acceptance Confirmations(iDAC) of the AP1000 design, with 51 outstanding
GDA issues attached. Since restarting the Step 4
review in 2015, ONR has been engaged in detailed
technical discussions with Westinghouse toaddress these issues and to re-establish thegeneric AP1000 design proposed for the United
Kingdom, cognisant of changes to the AP1000
design (and supporting analyses) introduced in
the United States and China since 2011. ONR isalso in engagement with a prospective licensee
who has plans to build three AP1000 units in thenorth west of England. Westinghouse addressed
the 51 issues raised by ONR as part of their GDA
process. In March 2017, a Design Acceptance
Certification was awarded with a number of GDA“assessment findings” attached that will need to beaddressed by future licensees at the site specificdesign stage.
In Canada, since CNSC completed a prelicensing assessment of the AP1000 in June 2013 aspart of its Phase 2 evaluation, there has been no
activity with Westinghouse on further review
efforts. The Phase 2 vendor design review is now
complete.
In April 2017, India joined the AP1000WG. The
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) provided
an overview of their organisational structure, newreactor construction and licensing status in India.
India is planning to build six AP1000 units at
Kovvada site (Andhra Pradesh state).

Accomplishments and plan of work
The working group members have shared design
information, application documents, evaluations
and preliminary findings, and identified the most20

significant design review issues as well as
construction and vendor challenges. As theworking group members transitioned to different
stages of their design reviews, the group
continued to re-evaluate the scope of the working
group topics, and the issues to be addressed.
In 2016, the working group continued discussions
focused on issues identified with the design of theplants under construction in the United States
and China including changes to the containment
condensate return system design, hydrogenventing inside containment, and main control
room dose and heat up. An additional focus ofco-operation was in support of exchanging
information with the United Kingdom on avariety of topics that were the focus of thecontinued GDA review by ONR. The working
group also shared information and experience onvendor issues such as squib valve design andtesting, reactor coolant pump design and testing,and digital instrumentation and controls. The
working group has also exchanged information
on how the AP1000 design addresses the findings
from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant
accident and drafted a common position.
As the AP1000s in China moved closer tocompletion and the first units there started
system hot and cold functional testing, theworking group began to focus its discussion on
the results of these tests through their official
communication channels (e.g. working meetings,
teleconferences, e-mail exchanges). The groupwill also discuss how the initial test programme isimplemented. The AP1000 Working Group meetsregularly with representatives of Westinghouse to
discuss similarities and differences among thedesigns being licensed and constructed in eachcountry and to discuss post-Fukushima safety
reviews. In 2016, the working group toured plants
under construction in China and met with China
and US licensees.
The United States and ONR held several
bi-lateral discussions to support informationexchange associated with closing out issues
identified in the GDA Step 4 for the AP1000. These
discussions focused on the topics of squib valve
design and testing, human factors engineering,
spent fuel pool and Fukushima lessons learnt.
The United States and China exchanged
severalletters
containing
questionsandresponses related to design and construction
issues in each country. The documents wereshared with the other working group members
through the MDEP library. This exchange of
information was the result of engagement ofupper managements of the two regulators. The
two regulators shared information with the otherAP1000WG members on the discussion topics
including condensate return, main control room2016-2017 MDEP Annual Reportdose and habitability, reactor coolant pumps,
squib valves and equipment qualification, as well
as discussions on lessons learnt from the
Fukushima Daiichi accident and the prevention
and mitigation of severe accidents.
As the United States and China progress inconstruction and move into the commissioning
phase, they have begun to share information oncommissioning tests and activities. The US NRC
provided NNSA inspection procedures and has
sent inspectors to AP1000 sites in China toobserve the commissioning activities. In addition,
NNSA has assembled experts in NPP design andcommissioning to plan a strategic approach forthe commissioning inspections. In October 2016,
the working group members from the UnitedStates, the United Kingdom, China and Canada
met in China for the fourth time to discuss
co-operation on pre-operational testing and initialtest programme activities. Following this meeting,
the NRC and NNSA continued discussions andcorrespondence on this issue (including at
AP1000WG meetings). A follow-up meeting on
pre-operational testing issues is planned for
October 2017 in the United States.
The United States and China have a robust
inspector and technical reviewer exchange
programme ongoing with a goal of sharing
information about regulatory activities such ascommissioning, initial test program and otherregulatory responsibilities and roles in eachcountry.

AP1000WG – 12th meeting, Rockville, MD, United States, 22-25 September 2015.

5.3 APR1400 Working Group (APR1400WG)
The APR1400 design specific Working Group(APR1400WG) started in August 2012 with four
countries, but Finland decided to leave the
APR1400WG in 2015 due to the cancellation of the
Olkiluto 4 project. The current participants are
the regulatory authorities of the Republic of Korea,
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the UnitedStates. The Republic of Korea leads this working
group.

Korea issued an operating license for the first
APR1400 at Shin-Kori Unit 3 in 2015, and currently
Shin-Kori Unit 3 is in full power operation. Fiveadditional units, Shin-Kori 4, Shin-Hanul 1&2,
Shin-Kori 5&6, are under construction. Four
APR1400 units are under construction at the
Barakah site in the UAE. The construction
licenses for Barakah Units 1&2 and Barakah Units
3&4 were granted in July 2012 and September
2014, respectively. The operating licensing
application for Barakah NPP Unit 1 was submitted
in March 2015 and new fuel import license, fresh21

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

fuel transportation license and fresh fuel storage
license were granted in 2016. The United States isreviewing an application for design certificationthat was submitted in December 2014 by KHNP
and KEPCO and docketed in March 2015. The
contents of the application include design control
documents, environmental report, technicalreports,
Inspection,
Tests, Analyses, andAcceptance Criteria (ITAAC) and topical reports.
The Phase 1 safety evaluation was completed in
February 2016 and Phase 2 review was completed
in May 2017. Safety evaluation reports with open
items were issued in 2016 and the NRC’s Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards completed its
review in July 2017.

discussed and finalised the in-vessel downstream
effects CP at their fourth meeting. The margin
assessment approach was added to the common
position and finalised. The Common Position CPAPR1400-02: Common Position on the APR1400
Post Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) Strainer
Performance and Debris In-Vessel Downstream
Effects was approved by the STC in June 2017,
noting that if more information becomes
available that the CP should be updated if
necessary.
The APR1400 working group also completed
the following activities in 2016:•

Compilation of a Severe Accident Regulatory
Requirements and Criteria table which documents
theregulatory
requirements
considered relevant to the review of severe
accident considerations in the participating
countries;•

Preparation of a table reflecting differences inprovisions for prevention and mitigation of
Severe Accidents in the APR1400 designs
proposed
and/orimplemented
inparticipating countries;•

Development of a table summarising themethodologies and countermeasures associated with the different severe accident
phenomena considered in the severe accident
assessment provided by the participating
countries.

Accomplishments and plan of work
The APR1400WG had two meetings in 2016. In
addition, in 2016, the Accident and Transienttechnical experts subgroup met twice and the
Severe Accident subgroup met once. In
February 2017, the ninth APR1400WG meeting,the forth Accident & Transient technical experts
subgroup meeting, and the fourth Severe
Accident technical experts subgroup meeting
convened at FANR, UAE.
The participating regulatory agencies from
USA, Korea, and UAE continued to exchange
information related to several significant
regulatory review issues identified during the
March and October meetings in 2016. Theseissues included the testing approach related to
APR1400
strainerdebrisby-pass
fractionmeasurement, boron precipitation evaluation
during long-term cooling of a LOCA, boron
dilution during SBLOCA and Mode 3-5 operationand loop seal reformation. In addition, the TESG
members reviewed the Common Position
CP­APR1400WG-01: Common Position addressing
the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident anddeveloped a revised version to be considered byeach participating organisation. This common
position was approved by the STC in June 2017.
In February 2017, a representative from KINS
observed the NRC’s audit on the APR1400 testing
programme related to the fuel seismic evaluationof APR1400 PLUS-7 fuel design, currently used in
Korea and the UAE.
In February 2017, the member countries
completed their common position on debris
strainer performance and in-vessel downstream
effects and decided to launch the effort ofinitiating a new common position on fuel pellet
thermal conductivity degradation issue. The
Accident and Transients TESG reviewed,

22

Additionally, the safety evaluation report ofShin-Kori Unit 3 operating license from KINS and
the APR1400 design certification from NRC wereshared between members using the MDEP library.
The APR1400WG completed the Technical
Report TR-APR1400WG-01: Design Description
and Comparison of Design Differences between
APR1400 Plants. This report was approved by the
STC in June 2017.
The working group is continuing thedevelopment of a report on the safety review
findings related to the Molten Core ConcreteInteraction (MCCI) phenomena performed to date.
The interim technical report was completed in
April 2017. The severe accident TESG reviewed
and discussed the APR1400 MCCI technical reportat their fourth meeting, and the interim version
was finalised with KINS and FANR’s input. The
technical report was presented at the STG
meeting in June 2017. The approval of the
APR1400 MCCI technical report is expected during
the November 2017 meeting after NRC completes
their review of the document.

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

APR1400WG – 9th meeting, Abu Dhabi, UAE, 28 February-2 March 2017.

5.4 VVER Working Group (VVERWG)

Accomplishments and plan of work

The VVER design specific Working Group(VVERWG) includes the regulatory authorities ofChina, Finland, Hungary, India, Russia andTurkey. The working group members arereviewing plants at various stages of design andconstruction. In Russia, Rostov NPP: Unit 3 is inoperation and Unit 4 is under construction(review for an operating license started);
Leningrad-II NPP: Unit 1 is under construction(review for an operating license ongoing), Unit 2
is under construction, and siting licenses havebeen issued for Units 3 and 4; Novovoronezh-II
NPP: Unit 1 is in operation, and Unit 2 is underconstruction (review for an operating license
ongoing); Kursk-II NPP: Units 1 and 2 are underconstruction (construction licences issued);
Smolensk-II NPP, siting licenses have been
issued for Units 1 and 2. While in Finland, one
unit is under review for a construction license atHanhikivi NPP. India has two units in operationand two units at the early stage of construction
at Kudankulam NPP, and two more units areplanned. In Turkey, four units are being
considered at the Akkyuy site and a Revised Site
Parameter Report was approved by TAEK in
February 2017. In China, two units are in operation and two units are under commissioning andconstruction at Tianwan NPP. Hungary is considering two VVER units at Paks-II NPP, a review
was completed based on generic design information and a site license granted.

The VVERWG continues to discuss a comparison
table of differences in the VVER designs. The
VVERWG currently includes four technical expert
subgroups that are addressing specific technicalissues: Severe Accidents (SA TESG), Fukushima
accident Lessons Learnt (Fuku TESG), Reactor
Pressure Vessel and Primary Circuit Components(RPV&PC TESG). The VVERWG recently added a
new TESG on Accidents and Transients. The
members meet regularly to exchange information and experience in their countries’ regulatory activities, approaches and legal framework
related to new design NPPs.
The sixth VVERWG meeting in April 2016, held
in Novovoronezh, included participation of representatives from Rosenergoatom, Gidropress,
Atomproekt,
NIAEP
and
AtomTechEnergo(Russian utility and design organisations). The
participants shared information on the progressof construction at Leningrad-II NPP and
Novovoronezh-II NPP and discussed safety issues
related to new VVER designs in Russia, India,
China, Turkey, Finland and Hungary. The meeting
included a visit to Novovoronezh-II NPP Unit 1
which was in the final stages of construction.
The seventh VVERWG meeting in November
2016 held in Beijing, China, included participationof representatives from JSC AtomStroyExport andJiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation. The participants shared information on the progress of units
under construction at Tianwan NPP and discussed

23

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

safety issues related to new VVER designs in
Russia, India, China, Turkey, Finland and Hungary.
The meeting concluded with a visit to Tianwan
NPP Unit 1 under operation and Unit 3 undercommissioning; where participants discussed
nuclear safety and commissioning oversightissues with representatives of the operatingorganisation.
The eighth VVERWG meeting was held in May
2017 in Paris. At this meeting, the final version of
the technical report on regulatory approaches
and criteria used in severe accident analyses andsevere accident management was discussed,
agreed upon and submitted to the STC for review.
Also, the Technical Report TR-VVERWG-02:
Regulatory Approaches and Oversight Practices
Related to Reactor Pressure Vessel and PrimaryComponents was discussed, agreed upon andapproved by the STC in June 2017. The reportcovers the following seven topics:•

Regulatory requirements related to applicationof the leak before break concept;•

Requirements and regulatory oversight on
manufacturing of primary components;•

Radiation embrittlement of RPV regarding useof new base materials including influence of Ni
and Mn;•Regulatory requirements related to pre- and inservice inspection of primary components(including hydrostatic pressure test);•

Regulatory requirements related to designbasis of primary components (loadings andtheir combinations);•

Regulatory requirements related to cladding ofprimary circuit;•

Regulatory requirements related to protection
against overpressure of primary circuit.

24

The new TESG on Accidents and Transients
plans to have a kick-off meeting at the end of
September 2017.
In addition, in 2017, the SA TESG, initiatedthe development of a draft common position
addressing ex-vessel corium cooling andcontainment integrity strategy and discussed aquestionnaireonpassive
autocatalytic
recombiners and another one on extended
station blackout.
In 2016 and 2017, the Fuku TESG refined thecommon position addressing Fukushima-related
issues that includes four topics: accounting forexternal events in the design; reliability of safetyfunctions implementation; design solutions tocover specific beyond design basis accidents(station blackout and loss of ultimate heat sink);
and emergency preparedness and response.
Future work of the subgroup includes thedefinition and discussion of new safety issues
related to Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident
lessons learnt or other problems highlighted by
the accident; one of possible paths is to develop
a new common position to address the Vienna
Declaration issues.
During 2016-2017, the RPV&PC TESG focusedon the preparation of the technical reports on
regulatory approaches and criteria used in severe
accident
analyses
andsevereaccident
management and on regulatory approaches andoversight practices related to RPV and PC. The
RPV&PC TESG activities also included exchange
of information on topics related to regulatory
requirements and design basis of primary
components (loadings and their combinations),
cladding of primary circuit and protection
against overpressure of primary circuit. Future
subgroup's activity includes the definition anddiscussion of possible issues for development of
a common position related to RPV and primary
components.

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

VVERWG – Tianwan NPP, China, 25 November 2016.

VVERWG – 7th meeting, Beijing, China, 22-24 November 2016.

25

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

5.5 ABWR Working Group (ABWRWG)
The Advanced Boiling Water Reactor design
specific Working Group (ABWRWG) includes theregulatory authorities of Japan, Sweden, theUnited Kingdom and the United States. The firstmeeting of the working group was held in January
2014 and May 2017 marked the date of theseventh meeting. The eighth meeting isscheduled for October 2017 in the UK.
Several different ABWR designs, offered bydifferent
vendors,arecurrently
underconsideration by the working group members.
These are two US-ABWR designs offered by
GE-Hitachi and Toshiba, UK-ABWR offered by
Hitachi-GE and J-ABWRs offered by Hitachi-GE
and Toshiba.

Accomplishments and plan of work
ABWRWG published its common position
addressing issues related to the Fukushima
Daiichi NPP accident in June 2016. The paper presents the overall position that “the ABWR today
represents an evolution in safety compared withearlier generation BWR designs. Following the
Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, further safetyenhancements are being considered, and/or
designed and implemented, by the ABWR vendors
and licensees to respond to national regulatory
requirements and international expectations”.
These enhancements will be monitored by thegroup as new ABWRs are constructed andcommissioned.
Utilising the efforts of the technical expert
subgroups, the group is considering thedevelopment of additional common positions asannexes to this report, in areas such as hydrogen
management.
The group worked on the development of acomparison matrix identifying variations in key
design features of the reactor. They identified anumber of challenges regarding the details to be
asked of the vendors. Following some extended
discussions throughout 2016, a completed matrix
has now been issued for reactor vendors topopulate. The ABWRWG focused the meeting inMay 2017 on reviewing the responses from thevendors. The responses should assist the group in
developing a sustainable plan for collaborative

26

work. The working group intends to develop atechnical note discussing the outcomes of thereview by the end of 2017.
Two technical expert subgroups continued toco­operate during 2016 on the topics of severe
accident
prevention
andmitigation,andinstrumentation and controls.
The severe accident subgroup worked on
defining a comparison table of key severe accident
design features and established a work plan for2017 and beyond. The next deliverable will be to
document differences in the provision of severe
accident measures in key categories including
reactorbuildinghydrogencontrol
andinstrumentation for use in a severe accident.
The instrumentation and controls subgroupalso worked on defining a similar table. However,no consensus could be drawn from the work foreither a comparison table or a future plan. Thus
the instrumentation and controls subgroup has
been disbanded. The long-term goals of ABWRWG
remain unchanged; however, the intermediate
goals have been modified to address the
disbanding of the I&C TESG. Other achievements
include the completion of the ABWR key featuresdesign comparison table, identification of areas ofsignificant difference, and further sharing of the
UK regulatory observations (ROs) and regulatory
issues (RIs) from the ABWR GDA assessments.
The major activities planned for 2017 and 2018
include:•An MDEP paper on the differences identified
between vendor designs;•

An ABWRWG internal paper on design
comparisons (including strictly confidential
material);•

Confirming and detailing potential activities ofcommon interest that are related to the ABWR
designs (e.g. suppression of pool suction
strainer, diversity of liquid level measurement
within Reactor Pressure Vessel, plus others);•

The SA TESG to deliver a draft technical reporton regulatory differences in Severe Accidents;•

The UK regularly sharing of the ROs and RIs
from the ABWR GDA assessments and how
they are being used.

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

ABWRWG – Fukushima Daiichi NPP site visit, Japan, 18 May 2017.

ABWRWG – Fukushima Daiichi NPP site visit, Japan, 18 May 2017.

27

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

5.6 Vendor Inspection Co-operation
Working Group (VICWG)
The goals of the VICWG are to:•Support MDEP design specific working groups;•

Maximise the use of the results obtained fromother regulator’s efforts in inspecting vendors;•

Understand the similarities and differences
between MDEP national regulators’ Quality
Assurance and Quality Management (QA/QM)
Requirements in order to utilise theinformation to improve regulators own
requirements;•

Facilitate the adoption of good vendor
oversight practices by national regulators;•

Harmonise the vendor inspection practices
among MDEP regulators for inspections under
the MDEP protocol;•

Continue joint and witnessed inspections andperform multinational inspections of vendors
accordingtothecommonQA/QM
requirements;•

Focus vendor attention on areas of emerging
risks;•

Focus licensee and vendor oversight oneffective supply chain performance;•

Focus licensee and vendor attention on
positive nuclear safety culture expected
within the supply chain;•

Continue to engage with CNRA to consider
how to maximise the use of information
gathered through VICWG activities;•

Consider the establishment of an NEA
working group for vendor oversight at theclosure of MDEP activities.

The
workinggroup
enhancestheunderstanding of each regulator’s inspection
procedures and practices by co­ordinating
witnessed, joint and multinational inspections ofquality assurance arrangements and safety
related components.
Witnessed inspections consist of one regulator
performing an inspection to its criteria, observedby representatives of other MDEP countries. The
benefits to the observing countries include
additional information and added confidence in
the inspection results.
Joint inspections consist of one regulator
conducting an inspection according to its own
regulatory
frameworkwiththeactiveparticipation of one or more regulators. This
allows the participating members to use theresults of the inspection that are applicable totheir regulations.

28

Multinational inspections involve two or moreregulators conducting an inspection of a vendor
based on the MDEP common requirements.
Multinational inspections are a tool to gain vendor
performance insights with minimal inspection
resource from the participating regulators.
The working group maintains a list of planned
inspections
providingtheopportunity
toco­operate and fully maximise the results fromvendor inspection activity. The inspection results
can be shared through the MDEP library. This
database includes not only the reports of
witnessed, joint and multinational inspections, but
all inspections that may be of interest to the MDEP
members.

Accomplishments and plan of work
The MDEP VICWG continues to achieve its goals.
The completion of the second multinational
inspection in December 2016 represented asignificant step in multinational regulatoryco­operation and demonstrated the benefit ofregulatory co­operation in vendor inspection. The
inspection incorporated eleven inspectors from
France, Canada, China, Finland, United States andthe United Kingdom.
The multinational inspection conducted at
AREVA’s Creusot Forge facility was led by France’s
ASN and has led to ASN issuing a number of
improvement demands. The inspection represented a good example of regulatory co­operation
identifying areas of risk potentially impacting
several nations’ civil nuclear programmes.
In 2016, in addition to the multinational inspection, two witnessed inspections were completed
involving regulators from the United States, China
and Canada. The French and United States
regulators also collaborated on inspection resultsfrom separately conducted vendor inspections. In
total, 15 opportunities were identified to co­operate
on vendor inspection related information.
The VICWG routinely engages with standard
development organisations (SDOs) to exchange
regulatory
experience,
encourage
forwardco­operation and influence the future activity of
the SDOs. During 2016, the working group met
with representatives from the IAEA and the World
Nuclear Organisation. The VICWG welcomed the
publication of related IAEA guidance on
procurement and supply chain oversight, includingCounterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items (CFSIs)
mitigation, and the World Nuclear Association’s
Supply Chain Report.
The VICWG has enhanced its co­operation on
areas of emerging risk in supply chain management
and vendor activity, specifically CFSIs. The groupeffectively co-operated on an emerging issue during

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report2015 associated with fraudulent material certificates
supplied from a UK valve manufacturer andcontinued this approach into 2016 with the sharingof related experience from French civil nuclear
industry vendors. The ongoing co­operation has
enabled participating regulators to consider theadequacy of their activities aimed at mitigating therisks of CFSIs entering licensee facilities throughvendors. Forward activities will continue to consider
co­operation on areas of emerging risk.

Next steps
The VICWG will continue to examine opportunities
to co­operate on vendor inspection activity
considering the potential for witnessed, joint or
multinational inspections. The team will learn fromthe similarities and differences between MDEP
national regulators’ QA/QM requirements in order toutilise the information to improve individual
regulators’ own arrangements. The VICWG
considers it an appropriate time to review its
Technical Report TR-VICWG-03: Common QA/QM
Criteria for Multinational Vendor Inspection,
following experience gained in the first two
multinational
inspections
andchangesininternational quality standards.
As the VICWG has matured and national vendor
inspection programmes have developed, theopportunities from VICWG participation haveincreased from co­operation on vendor inspection
activities to sharing the outcomes from national
vendor inspection programmes. The ProgrammePlan has been amended to emphasise thisadditional objective of the VICWG.
Following
completionofthesecondmultinational inspection, the VICWG will produce alearning report to influence the organisation of
future multinational inspections and ensure its
programme documents and inspection protocols
are effectively maintained.
The VICWG will continue to co­operate on areasof emerging risk and share inspection programmeoutcomes among regulators and with SDOs toinfluence appropriate mitigating methods including
the development of associated international
standards and guidance.
To ensure continued alignment with MDEP goals,
the VICWG will engage with the Design Specific
Working Groups (DSWG) during 2017 and 2018 toassess if it continues to provide effective support for
DSWG issues and identify any opportunities forenhancement. The VICWG has been supporting the
DICWG in considering how existing vendor
inspection process could be applied to support
Digital I&C Vendor Inspections. Currently, VICWG is
considering a proposal for co­operation with DICWG
to develop a common position on Digital I&C vendor
inspection subject to the STC approval.

VICWG – 19th meeting, Rockville, MD, United States, 4-6 April 2017.

29

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

VICWG – Curtiss-Wright Electro-Mechanical Corporation site visit, USA, 7 April 2017.

5.7 Codes and Standards Working Group(CSWG)The goal of the Codes and Standards issue
specific Working Group (CSWG) is to achieve
harmonisation of code requirements for designand construction of pressure-retaining (pressure
boundary) components in order to improve theeffectiveness and efficiency of the regulatory
design reviews, increase quality of safetyassessments, and to make each regulator stronger
in its ability to make safety decisions.
The CSWG recognised early on that the firststep to achieving harmonisation is to understandthe extent of similarities and differences among
the pressure boundary codes and standards usedin various countries. The CSWG encouraged
standards development organisations (SDOs) tocompare the requirements in JSME’s S-NC1 Code(Japan), AFCEN’s RCC-M Code (France), KEA’s
KEPIC Code (Korea), CSA’s N285.0 standard(Canada) and NIKIET’s PNAE G-7 Code (Russia)
against the requirements of Section III of the
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (UnitedStates) for Class 1 vessels, piping, pumps andvalves. The results identified the extent ofsimilarities and differences among the national
codes, provided insight into background, history,

30

and philosophy of each code, and provided a basis
for developing general approach for code
harmonisation. The report on code comparison
was published in December 2012.
Based on the CSWG findings and the code
comparison results, the CSWG established a
global framework of a hierarchical structure forachieving code harmonisation. At the top of thehierarchy, the Fundamental Attributes provides
overarching requirements for NPP design andconstruction. At the middle level, the Essential
Performance Guidelines recommends basic
design and construction rules to be included incodes, and provides guidance for code
harmonisation. At the bottom level, code
harmonisation is performed which includes
convergenceandreconciliationofcode
differences as well as the minimisation of further
code divergence. The CSWG proposed a stepwise
approach for code convergence and established aregular communication process for informationexchange and discussion.
The CSWG plays an important role as aninterface between the regulators and industry
efforts to harmonise codes and standards. CSWG
interacts with the WNA CORDEL group Codes andStandards Task Force (CSTF), consisting oftechnical experts from over ten companies

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

worldwide (AREVA, Bentley, Rolls-Royce, EDF,
EPRI, Westinghouse, TVO, et al.) working toconverge code requirements. They proposed apilot project plan, which is consistent with CSWG
stepwiseapproach,toharmonisecode
requirements. CORDEL CSTF has achieved
significant accomplishments in the areas of nondestructive
examination(NDE)
personnel
certification and non-linear analysis. They havecompared requirements in the major nuclear
design codes, compared the current international
industrial
certification
practices,andrecommendedaharmonised
international
alternative for the certification of NDE personnel.
They have also thoroughly reviewed the existing
non-linear rules in different codes, and compared
the scope, methods and availability of material
data needed to perform analysis in very technicaldetail; they are developing universal new rules for
non-linear analysis.
After issuing the code comparison report, theSDOs formed a Code Convergence Board to limit
divergence on individual requirements, andachieve convergence on individual requirements
where realistic and practical. SDOs and CORDEL
are working jointly on code convergence of weld
qualification. They extensively review worldwide
practices in performance qualification, procedure
qualification, and quality assurance of welding;and explore strategy to harmonise code
requirements on weld qualification. The SDOs arealso considering including other significant
technical issues with international interest; thatare not currently addressed in the working scope
andjointlydeveloping
universal
code
requirements. These include corrosion fatigue,
RPV indications, flow-induced vibration in steam
generators, small modular reactors, margin underhigh-seismic loadings and the use of high-density
polyethylene piping.

Accomplishments
The CSWG has successfully completed its goal
and mandate to achieve some harmonisation andidentify the challenges in harmonising codes andstandards. The group has established a regularcommunication process for information exchange
and discussion, and has encouraged the industry
and the SDOs to move forward and work cooperatively. Five documents have been formallyissued by the working group. The Fundamental
Attributes document and Essential Performance
Guidelines document provide high-level andmiddle-level guidance for code harmonisation,
respectively. The Regulatory Frameworks for Useof Codes document describes the regulatory
practices in each country in using codes andprovides insight on the flexibility of theregulatory framework of MDEP countries in using

foreign codes. The Lessons Learnt document
provides CSWG’s preliminary findings onachieving code harmonisation and provides
general guidance on using foreign codes. The
common position proposes a hierarchy structure
as a global framework for harmonisation anddocuments the CSWG common positions on code
harmonisation. Despite the challenges of code
convergence, with dedicated work and close cooperation among the CSWG, CORDEL CSTF and
SDOs, code convergence is happening in several
technical areas. For example, one SDO isdeveloping its code based on the SDOs’ CodeComparison Report, and introducing new code
areas. A regulatory authority is using the
CORDEL/SDO Weld Qualification report to draft
proposals for modifying regulatory requirements.
An
SDO
that
requirescompany-based
certification has started to modify its code and toaccept the international alternative proposed in
the NDE personnel certification report.
Withthecontinuation
of
the
close
co-operation from the three parties, moreachievements are expected in the near future,
which will increase the efficiency of design andconstruction of nuclear power plants, and will
enhance the safety of nuclear power plants that
may be licensed in multiple countries.

Next steps
The working group will continue to interact with
the CORDEL CSTF, and SDOs on: 1) preventing
further code divergence; 2) converging code
differences; and 3) reconciling code differences.
The CSWG has reviewed three SDO and
CORDEL code harmonisation reports and provided
comments to the SDOs and CORDEL. The threereports are titled Comparison Report on Welding
Qualification and Welding Quality Assurance, STPNU-078, Non-Linear Analysis Design Rules, Part 1
Code Comparison, and Non-Linear Analysis Design
Rules, Part 3 Benchmark on Nozzles under Pressure,
Thermal and Piping Loads. The CSWG is currently
conducting a survey to identify potential topics
for future code harmonisation.
A code is a living document that is continuously being updated to incorporate emerging
technologies, improved understanding andaccumulated operational experience. Therefore,
the CSWG will continue to encourage SDOs tocommunicate with each other to minimise
divergence of code during code updates. Somecountries are considering developing their own
codes. The CSWG will encourage these countries
to study the existing codes carefully andminimise the potential differences between newcodes and the existing codes.

312016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

The CSWG will continue to encourage CORDEL
and the SDOs to converge code requirements
using two methods: 1) modify existing code
requirements that are identified as urgent andpractical for code convergence; 2) jointly develop
universal new code requirements on significant
technical issues with international interest thatare not currently addressed in codes.

requirements, the work is still very valuable forcode reconciliation. The CSWG will also continue
exploringstrategies
forreconcilingcode
differences. The CSWG is currently working with
NEA to develop a document that highlights theworking groups’ scope of work and the benefit(s)the group can provide to CNRA members in case
the CSWG is transferred under CNRA.

Code convergence is a very challenging work.
Even if the effort does not result in change of code

CSWG – 16th meeting with the SDO Board and CORDEL CSTF, Saint Louis, 8-9 November 2016.

5.8 Digital Instrumentation and Controls
Working Group (DICWG)
The Digital Instrumentation and Controls issue
specific Working Group (DICWG) works toincreasecollaboration,
co-operation,andknowledge transfer among members and withother stakeholders to achieve the following
primary goals: 1) facilitate timely and efficientmechanisms for sharing of knowledge andexperience among members, thus allowing
knowledge transfer and more effective safety
reviews; and 2) work jointly to develop common
positions among members for issues ofsignificance, which may be based on a review ofthe existing standards, national regulatory
guidance, best practices and group inputs.

32

The IAEA, the Institute of Electrical andElectronics Engineers (IEEE) and the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) representatives are invited to participate in working groupmeetings and activities. Industry is represented
via the IEC and IEEE standards organisations andthrough specific invitations by the DICWG toshare information and give presentations on
topics of interest.

Accomplishments
The DICWG identified topics for generic common
positions which were selected based on the safety
implications of the issue, and the need to develop
a common understanding from the perspectivesof regulatory authorities. DICWG generic common
positions are not intended to cover all issues

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Reportassociated with the digital I&C technicaldisciplines, but only those of most value to themembers.
Since its creation, the DICWG has published
13 common positions that describe methods andevidence that the DICWG member states findacceptable to support safety justification for
digital I&C systems. The published common
positions include:•

Generic Common Position 1 – Treatment ofCommon Cause Failures Caused by Software
within Digital Safety Systems•

Generic Common Position 2 – Software Tools•

Generic Common Position 3 – Verification andValidation Throughout the Life Cycle of Digital
Safety Systems•

Generic
CommonPosition
Communications Independence•

Generic Common Position 5 – Treatment ofHardwareDescription
Language(HDL)
Programmed Devices for Use in Nuclear Safety
Systems•

Generic Common Position 6 – Simplicity in
Design•Generic Common Position 7 – Selection and Useof Industrial Digital Devices of Limited
Functionality•

Generic Common Position 8 – Impact of Cyber
Security Features on Digital I&C Safety Systems•

Generic Common Position 9 – Safety Design
Principles and Supporting Information for theOverall I&C Architecture•

Generic Common Position 10 – Hazard
Identification and Control for Digital I&C
Systems

4

–

Data

•

Generic Common Position 11 – Digital I&C
System Pre-Installation and Initial On-Site
Testing•

Generic Common Position 12 – Use ofAutomatic Testing in Digital I&C Systems as
part of Surveillance Testing•

Generic Common
Actuations

Position

13–

Spurious

These common positions have been madepublicly available on the MDEP website.
The STC approved the scope of work of a newcommon position 14, on qualification of I&C
platforms for use in important to safety applications.
The new common position is intended to provide
guidance on the qualification process of the
hardware and software of I&C platforms for systems
important-to-safety at nuclear power plants. Many
I&C platforms and other digital equipment readily
available in the marketplace were not designed

specifically for use in nuclear facilities and have notbeen subject to the quality assurance criteria
established by national regulators. In order for thisequipment to be used in important-to-safety digitalequipment (those whose adverse performance
could challenge the assumptions in safety analyses),
they must undergo qualification in order todemonstrate their suitability for their intended
applications. The DICWG has agreed that a common
position on this topic is warranted given its growing
applications to new and operating reactors, its
safety implications, and the need to develop acommon understanding from the perspectives ofregulatory authorities.
The working group also developed a plan
approved by the STC for updating Common
Position 4, on data communications independence,
which was last revised in December 2012. An
evaluation performed by the working grouprevealed that the issued text in the common
position needs to be revised to address, among
other issues, recent technical developments in thefield of data communications.
The working group continues to implement aformal “Quick Inquiry” process to generate andprocess inquiries from member countries topromote an efficient and structured informationexchange and provides for storing this information
in a retrievable database. The DICWG maintains
frequent communication with the design specificworking groups, particularly with the AP1000 digital
instrumentation and controls technical expert
subgroup, and with the VICWG and the NEA/CNRA
working group on inspection practices in regards tothe topic of vendor inspections of digital I&C
equipment.
The industry counterpart to MDEP DICWG is
CORDEL’s Digital I&C Task Force. CORDEL’s statedobjectives for the task force include 1) managementof design changes for digital I&C, 2) develop acommon understanding of what is expected byindustry and regulators and 3) promote thedevelopment of international standards. In 2016, the
DICWG reviewed and provided comments on the
CORDEL report Safety Classification for I&C Systems in
Nuclear Power Plants – Current Status & Difficulties. The
purpose of the report is to address the current
status in classification of I&C systems and identify
key causes for inconsistencies and difficulties acrossinternational standards as well as potential
solutions for harmonising these standards. As partof their future tasks, CORDEL intends to provide
draft position papers on I&C safety classification:comparison of I&C keywords definition provided by
MDEP member states, and defence in depth &diversity – challenges related to the I&C architecture.
CORDEL plans to continue to engage with the
DICWG for comments on these and related
documents.

33

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Next steps
The DICWG has made significant progress inincreasing harmonisation of digital I&C standards
by developing generic common positions thathave been or are planned for incorporation into
regulations and regulatory guidance of manymember regulators. The DICWG will continue todevelop common position 14 that is in the initialstages. The working group and steeringcommittee have considered the DICWG’s future
including the transition to NEA. The members
desire to continue interaction in some format thatprovides a forum to share information among themember regulators, as well as an interface withstandards organisations (e.g. IAEA, IEC and IEEE)and industry (CORDEL group) to promoteharmonisation.

A draft mandate for the transition of the
DICWG to CNRA has been finalised. The draft
mandate is a joint effort with the NEA and it
addresses some potential challenges that theworking group will face throughout its transition
to CNRA. DICWG’s draft mandate and activities
were presented to CNRA for review during the
May 2017 meeting. The draft mandate was also
discussed at the STC meeting in June 2017. NEA
will provide the final mandate to CNRA prior to
the December 2017 meeting where the committee
will be asked to approve the integrated plan andthe mandate, formalising the transition of DICWG
to CNRA. The STC highlighted the importance ofcontinuing the work of the DICWG with minimal
disruption during the transition period.

DICWG – 24th meeting, Boulogne-Billancourt, France, 22-24 March 2016.

DICWG – Flamanville 3 EPR construction site visit, France, 15 December 2016.

34

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

6. Interim results
MDEP is considered a long-term programme withinterim results. Interim results are those productsthat document agreement by the MDEP members
and are necessary steps in working towards
increased co-operation and convergence. Theinterim results for this reporting period include:•

The VICWG has enhanced its co-operation on
an area of risk in supply chain management
and vendor activity, specifically Counterfeit,
Fraudulent and Suspect Items (CFSIs). The
group effectively co-operated on issues
associated with fraudulent material certificates supplied from a UK valve manufacturer
and continued collaboration in 2016 with thesharing of related experience from French
civil nuclear industry vendors.

•

The ABWRWG drafted a comparison matrix ofthe key design features with input from thevendors.

•

The AP1000WG formed a Commissioning
Activities technical experts subgroup and met
to discuss co­operation on pre­operational
testing and initial test programme activities,
and
the
EPRWG
createdanewCommissioning Activities technical experts
subgroup to begin co­operating on oversightof plant commissioning.

••

The EPRWG started developing a common
position on how the EPR design addresses theobjectives of the Vienna Declaration.
The Commissioning Activities TESG of the
EPRWG witnessed the reactor pressure vesselinternals vibration first plant only test
conducted in Taishan 1, in March 2017. This
test constituted the first implementation of
the MDEP Common Position on FPOT. The
general observations from the groupconcluded that there was evidence ofadequate quality control arrangements for
preparation and performance of FPOT. No
fundamental reasons were identified for notcrediting TSN1 FPOT results.

•

The APR1400WG compiled a severe accident
regulatory requirements and criteria tablethat documents the regulatory requirements
considered relevant to the review of severe
accident considerations in the participating
countries; prepared a table reflecting differences in provisions for prevention and mitigation of severe accidents in the APR1400
designs proposed and/or implemented inparticipating countries; and developed a tablesummarisingthemethodologies
andcountermeasuresassociatedwiththedifferent
severeaccident
phenomenaconsidered in the severe accident assessment
provided by the participating countries.

•

The VVERWG continued to exchange information and experience on regulatory
activities, approaches and legal framework
related to new design NPPs and important-tosafety
designdifferences,
especially
Leningrad-II, Novovoronezh-II, Hanhikivi,
Paks-II and Akkuyu NPPs.

•

The VVERWG, with input from the industry,
continues to develop a comparison table of
VVER designs differences implemented in themember countries.

•

The CSWG has issued several documents
related to code harmonisation and generalguidance on how to use foreign codes.

•

The DICWG issued Generic Common
Position 10 on Hazard Identification andControl for Digital I&C Systems as well as
Common Position 13 on spurious actuation.

•

All five DSWGs have completed theircommon position addressing post-Fukushima
accident consideration for their specificdesign and the Steering Technical Committee
issued an integrated MDEP common positionin September 2016.

35

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

7. Next Steps – Future of the Programme
MDEP was established in 2006 as a multinational
initiative for a five-year period. It was extended
for another five-year period in 2012 by the PolicyGroup based on the value gained by the members.
At its May 2014 meeting, the MDEP Policy Group
requested a data collection to be conductedamong the members to prepare for a discussion
on MDEP’s mid and long-term strategy. The
questions focused on MDEP’s mission and
expected deliverables, the use of MDEP products,
and the future of MDEP. The results of the datacollection indicated that the members continue toreceive significant benefits from participation in
MDEP and it should continue beyond 2017. The
members confirmed that the core activity shouldbe the design specific working groups andidentified some recommended improvements indevelopment of the programmes of work,
defining the products and ensuring knowledgetransfer as reactors begin the operational phase.
These findings were shared with the Policy Group
at its June 2015 meeting. At this meeting, thePolicy Group determined that MDEP should
continue in its current form for at least five years
after 2017; until the end of 2022. The PG stressedthat going forward, MDEP should focus on design
specific activities.
As new cross-cutting issues are identified in
the future, the STC will consider setting up
specific arrangements, such as ad hoc groups,
subcommittees or arrangements with otherworking groups (e.g. the NEA’s WGRNR and WGIP)
to address the issues without duplication rather
than creating new issue specific working groups.
The design specific working groups will continue

36

co-operation and exchanging feedback on design
issues through the construction phase. The PolicyGroup has determined that the operational stage
should not be included in the scope of MDEP.
However, there should be a means to ensure that
operating experience related to design issues isaddressed by DSWGs. With this in mind, MDEP
will
continue
toshare
informationon
construction and commissioning of new reactors,
and incorporate feedback from operating
experience as it pertains to design.
As the current issue specific working groups
are completing the goals and activities specified
in their programme plans, the STC and PolicyGroup have considered transferring the generic
activities to other organisations. In this regard,
the NEA CNRA has initiated the process totransfer the DICWG activities from MDEP to the
CNRA as a new working group. The DICWG has
identified completion strategies that include
products, schedules and recommendations for
ensuring the continuation of the interactions
among the regulators, and between regulatorsand external stakeholders when these activities
are transferred.
MDEP participating countries have also
expressed the need and benefits of continuing theongoing co­operation among members even after
a specific design review has concluded. To that
end, the STC has begun to explore different
options that can be utilised to transition existingco­operation within a design specific working
group outside of the MDEP once the working
group has achieved its mandate under MDEP.

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Appendix 1: List of abbreviations and acronyms
ABWR

Advanced boiling water reactor

ABWRWG

Advanced Boiling Water Reactor Working GroupAERB

Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (India)

AFCEN

Association Française pour les règles de conception, de construction et desurveillance en exploitation des matériels des chaudières électro nucléaires (French
SDO)

ASME

American Society of Mechanical Engineers

ASN

Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (Nuclear Safety Authority of France)

BWR

Boiling water reactor

CATESG

Commissioning Activities Technical Experts Subgroup

CCF

Common cause failure

CNRA

Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (NEA)

CNSC

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

CORDEL

Co-Operation in Reactor Design Evaluation and Licensing

CP

Common position

CSA

Canadian Standards Association

CSTF

Codes and Standards Task Force

CSWG

Codes and Standards Working Group

DICWG

Digital Instrumentation and Controls Working Group

DSWG

Design Specific Working GroupEDF

Electricité de France

ENEC

Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation

EPRWG

EPR Working Group

FANR

Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (United Arab Emirates)

FOAK

First-of-a-kind

FPGA

Field-programmable gate arrays

FPOT

First plant only tests

GDA

Generic design assessment

GIF

Generation IV International Forum

GSAR

Group on the Safety of Advanced Reactors

HVAC

Heating, ventilation and air conditioning37

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

38

HAEA

Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority

HDL

Hardware description language

I&C

Instrumentation and controls

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

IEC

International Electro Technical Commission

IEEE

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

IRWST

In-containment refuelling water storage tank

ISWG

Issue Specific Working Group

ITAAC

Inspection, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

JSC

Joint Stock Company (AtomStroyExport, Russia)

JSME

Japanese Society of Mechanical Engineers

KEPCO

Korea Electric Power Corporation

KEPIC

Korean Electric Power Industry Code

KHNP

Korea Hydro and Nuclear PowerKINS

Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety

LOCA

Loss-of-coolant accident

MCCI

Molten core concrete interaction

MDEP

Multinational Design Evaluation Programme

MHI

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries

NDE

Non-destructive examination

NEA

Nuclear Energy Agency

NIKIET

Scientific Research and Design Institute of Energy Technologies(Russian SDO)NNSA

National Nuclear Safety Administration (China)

NPP

Nuclear power plant

NRA

Nuclear Regulation Authority (Japan)

NRC

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (United States)

NRO

Nuclear regulatory organisation

NSSC

Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (Korea)

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

ONR

Office for Nuclear Regulation (United Kingdom)

OOG

Owners and Operators GroupPC

Primary circuit components

PG

Policy Group

PSA

Probabilistic safety assessment

QA

Quality Assurance

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

QM

Quality Management

RI

Regulatory issue

RO

Regulatory observation

RPV

Reactor pressure vessel

SBLOCA

Small-break loss-of-coolant accident

SDOStandard development organisation

SMR

Small modular reactor

SSMStrålsäkerhetsmyndigheten (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority)

STC

Steering Technical Committee

STUK

Säteilyturvakeskus (Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland)

TAEK

Türkiye Atom Enerjisi Kurumu (Turkish Atomic Energy Authority)

TESG

Technical Experts Subgroup

TR

Technical report

TVO

Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (Finnish Nuclear Power Company)

UAE

United Arab Emirates

VICWG

Vendor Inspection Co-operation Working GroupVVER

Water-water energetic reactor

VVERWG

VVER Working GroupWENRA

Western Europe Nuclear Regulators Association

WGIP

Working Group on Inspection Practices (NEA/CNRA)WGRNRWorking Group on the Regulation of New Reactors (NEA/CNRA)WNAWorld Nuclear Association

39

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Appendix 2: Revised or new documents and publications•

Working group programme plans•

Terms of References (TOR) – Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP)•

Common Position on Spurious Actuation (CP-DICWG-13)•

Common Position addressing First-Plant-Only-Tests (FPOT) (CP-STC-01)•

Common Position addressing Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Accident (CP-STC-02)•

Common Position addressing Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident-related Issues (CP-AP1000WG-02)•

Common Position addressing Fukushima related issues, Version 2 (CP-VVERWG-01)•

Common Position addressing Issues Related to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
Accident (CP-ABWRWG-01)•

Common Position addressing Fukushima-related issues, Revision 1, 2017 (CP-APR1400WG-01)•

Common Position on the APR1400 Post Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) Strainer Performance andDebris In-Vessel Downstream Effects (CP-APR1400WG-02)•

Technical Report: Design Description and Comparison of Design Differences between APR1400
Plants (TR-APR1400WG-01)•

Technical Report: Regulatory Approaches and Oversight Practices Related to Reactor Pressure
Vessel and Primary Components (TR-VVERWG-02)

41

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Appendix 3: Photographs of reactors considered within MDEPTaishan Units 1 and 2 – EPR, China, April 2017 (Provided by NNSA).

Taishan Unit 1 – EPR, China, March 2017
(Provided by NNSA).

Taishan Unit 2 – EPR, China, March 2017
(Provided by NNSA).

43

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Flamanville 3 – Construction site aerial view, EPR, France, 31 May 2017 (© EDF All rights reserved.
Aménagement Flamanville 3, Communication).

Flamanville 3 – EPR, France, Commissioning supervision in
the control room, June 2017 (© EDF All rights reserved.
Aménagement Flamanville 3, Communication).

44

Flamanville 3 – EPR, France, Equipment yard of the vessel headcompleted: CRDM, June 2017 (© EDF All rights reserved.
Aménagement Flamanville 3, Communication).

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Olkiluoto 3 – EPR, Finland, May 2016 (Provided by STUK).

Olkiluoto 3 – EPR, Finland, Turbine island being prepared for hot functional tests May 2017(Provided by STUK).

45

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Hinkley Point C – View from the Batching Plants, showing the Bylor fabrication area, tower cranes,
and Kier BAM JV spray concrete batch plant, EPR, UK. May 2017 (Provided by EDF).

Hinkley Point C – North West Area of Construction Site,
EPR, UK, May 2017( Provided by EDF).

46

Hinkley Point C – A Bylor team member checks thereinforcement ties prior to the start of the first nuclear safety
concrete pour, EPR, UK, March 2017 (Provided by EDF).

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Vogtle Unit 3 and 4 – Aerial view, AP1000, United States, April 2017 (Georgia Power Company, all rights reserved).

Vogtle Unit 3 – AP1000, United States,
December 2016 Middle Ring placed in nuclear
island (Georgia Power Company, all rights
reserved).

Vogtle Unit 4 – AP1000, United States, August 2016 CA20 module
placed (Georgia Power Company, all rights reserved).

47

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

V.C. Summer – Units 2 and 3 AP1000 Construction Site Aerial View – United States, January 2017.
(SCE&G, all rights reserved).

V.C. Summer Unit 2 – Placed final Unit 2 containment vessel
ring, AP1000, United States, 9 June 2017.
(SCE&G, all rights reserved).

48

V.C. Summer Unit 3 – CA01 in Containment, AP1000,
United States, 23 July 2015.
(SCE&G, all rights reserved).

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Sanmen Units 1 and 2 – Construction site, AP1000, China, 2016 (Provided by NNSA).

Sanmen Unit 1 – AP1000 China, April 2016 Installation of HFT.
(Provided by NNSA).

Sanmen Unit 2 – AP1000, China, RCP
installation (Provided by NNSA).

Haiyang Unit 1 – Construction site, AP1000, China, 27 September 2017 (Provided by NNSA).

49

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Haiyang Unit 2 – AP1000, China, September 2017, CVTH Installation (Provided by NNSA).

Shin-Kori Unit 3 – Inside Control Room, APR1400, Korea, 2017 (Provided by KINS).

50

2016-2017 MDEP Annual ReportShin-Kori Units – Overview, APR1400, Korea, 2016 (Provided by KINS).

Shin-Hanul Overview, APR1400, Korea, 2016 (Provided by KINS).

51

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Barakah Units 1,2,3, 4 – Overview, APR1400, United Arab Emirates, February 2017 (Property of ENEC).

Barakah Units 3 and 4 – Overview, APR1400, United Arab Emirates, September 2016 (Property of ENEC).

52

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Leningrad 2 – Overview of the construction site, VVER, Russia, 2016 (Provided by Rostechnadzor).

Leningrad 2 – Application of voltage for in-house needs, VVER, Russia, 2017 (Provided by Rostechnadzor).

53

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Novovoronezh NPP-2 Unit 2 – Overview of construction site, VVER, Russia, 2016 (Provided by Rostechnadzor).

Baltic NPP-2 Unit 1 – Overview of construction site, VVER, Russia, 2016 (Provided by Rostechnadzor).

54

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Novovoronezh NPP-2 Unit 1 – Overview, VVER, Russia, 2016 (Provided by Rostechnadzor).

Novovoronezh NPP-2 Unit 1 – Overview, VVER, Russia, 2016 (Provided by Rostechnadzor).

55

2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

Kudankulam Units 1 and 2 – Overview, VVER, India, 2017 (Provided by AERB).

Tianwan NPP Unit 3 and 4 – Construction Site VVER, China, 2016 (Provided by NNSA).

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