Recommendations by Study Group on the Great East Japan Earthquake & International Humanitarian AssistanceJAPANESE RED CROSS INSTITUTE FOR HUMANITARIAN STUDIESJAPANESE RED CROSS ACADEMYJAPANESE RED CROSS INSTITUTE FOR HUMANITARIAN STUDIES

Recommendations
to prepare for future mega-disasters in Japan

Study Group on the Great East Japan
Earthquake & International Humanitarian AssistanceFebruary 2015

Executive Summary
The following eight recommendations are presented, specifically with regard to the system forreceiving international assistance, which is now common practice when a large scale disasteroccurs.
Part I: System for Receiving International Assistance
1-1. A clear basic policy on receiving international assistance during disasters
As it is expected that international community will offer assistance when a large scale
natural disaster hits Japan, the Government of Japan should pre‐establish its basic policy
clarifying the criteria and procedures for receiving ‐ or declining ‐ offers of international
assistance. Putting in place such a policy will help not only promote diplomatic relations
but also compliment domestic response efforts. The basic policy and overall procedures
for accepting international assistance should be translated into foreign languages andshared with the international community during the pre‐disaster phase1-2. Enhancing the role of the Government for acceptance of international assistance
A comprehensive disaster management body within the (central) Government of Japan
should make centralised and proactive decisions on the acceptance of incominginternational assistance. This body will need to be strengthened in a way that can bear full
responsibility in terms of quick and smooth acceptance of assistance, including transportof relief goods and personnel to disaster affected areas, temporary storage of relief items.
1-3. Development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for accepting international
assistanceIn order to support quick and smooth acceptance of international assistance withcentralised and proactive decisions by the comprehensive disaster management body in
the Government, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) needs to be developed for theofficials of the respective Ministries. Joint exercises testing such SOPs with the
involvement of multiple stakeholders need to be conducted once a year. The SOPs need to
be developed by taking into consideration existing international guidelines.
1-4. Legal arrangements and administrative orders
Legal arrangements and administrative orders on liability for damages and indemnificationneed to be put in place for handling any damages caused by international responders aswell as any accidents or incidents that may occur to international responders. Based on thelessons learned of receiving international assistance in the past and in light of the existing
international guidelines such as the International Disaster Relief Laws (IDRL), exceptional
legal measures and administrative orders need to be put in place before a disaster strikes.
1-5. Concluding partnership agreements
Legal frameworks with foreign countries, from where the likelihood of receiving
international assistance is high, should be established in advance, so that legal problems
related to accidents/damages associated with relief operations can be avoided.
1-6. Securing and developing human resources
A system needs to be developed that allow pre‐registration and deployment of humaniresources those who have experiences related to international disaster relief from outside
the Government structures. The (central) Government of Japan should nurture ‘disaster
response professionals’ who have sufficient knowledge and experience to lead effective
coordination in the acceptance of domestic and international assistance.
1-7. Ensuring accountability
The (central) Government of Japan should bear full responsibility to monitor the utilizationof international assistance and to explain the results and impacts of such assistance to theinternational community with the use of standard reporting formats.
1-8. Timely dissemination of accurate information to the international community
The Government of Japan should develop a system by which it can communicate well with
the international community from the on‐set of large scale disasters. The messaging
should include damages caused, response activities and specific needs for international
assistance, and the Government’s communications efforts need to be more proactive,
timely as well as be conducted in English.
Part II: Application of the existing international norms and standards
In the response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, existing international standards such as‘Human Rights Based Approach’ and The Sphere Project – the Humanitarian Charter and the
Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response’, as well as specialized knowledge and capacityof private companies, NGO/NPOs and individual volunteers were not fully utilised. It istherefore recommended that based on the existing international standards, minimum
standards applicable to disaster response are established and applied in Japan. In view ofcurrent international practices, closer involvement of actors other than the Government anddesignated public institutions is also recommended.
2-1. Establishment and application of national minimum standards for future disaster
response in Japan
With a view to improve Japan’s disaster management system, and to ensure fully
responding to future large scale natural disasters in Japan, it is recommended that anexpert group, which is tasked to review the existing Japanese disaster management systemfrom an international and institutional point of view, is established. More specifically, suchan expert group should discuss and implement action items indicated below.
 Develop national minimum standards that are based on the existing international norms
and standards as well as examples from overseas, and that do not contradict with Japan’s
local characteristics and socio‐cultural background. Such minimum standards should
include methodologies of needs assessments as well as types and qualities of assistance tobe provided;
 Ensure that institutional aid providers fully recognize their obligations to abide byhumanitarian principles including humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational
independence and etc.;
 By fully recognizing that assistance needs during disasters differ depending on variables of
the affected populations, such as gender, age, disability, nationality, mother tongues,ii

family composition and livelihoods, and reflect such variations when developing thenational minimum standards appropriately; Put in place administrative measures that ensure full participation of the affected
populations in consultations where they can demand the assistance they need, andthereby transform the current disaster relief system into the one which is more closelyaligned with the human rights based approaches; Explore concrete measures to realize the principles outlined in the ‘Guidelines for disasterplanning, response and reconstruction from a gender‐equal perspective’ issued by theGovernment of Japan in May 2013; and Promote awareness‐raising among the disaster response actors in Japan on the recent
developments and debates on the international standards in disaster relief.
2-2 .Role of NGOs/NPOs, the civil society and actors other than designated public institutions
 Recognizing the role of NGOs/NPOs and the civil society more institutionally, guidelines for
local authorities should be developed, by which these diverse actors can promote thenational minimum standards, and help integrate them into local disaster management
plans.
 NGOs/NPOs and the civil society should recognize their leading roles in promoting
responses to meet the diverse needs of the affected populations and in enhancing humanrights based approaches. NGOs and the civil society should also strengthen their
engagement in the policy processes in this particular domain.
 Coordination mechanisms need to be built in the pre‐disaster phase, so that NGOs andNPOs can implement their assistance programmes in a coordinated and collaborative
manner. For this purpose, frameworks of coordination need to be designed; a secretariat
facilitating the coordination work needs to be supported; human resources of those whoare involved in the coordination work needs to be developed, and roles of NGOs/NPOs
need to be articulated in local disaster management plans.
 NGO/NPO staff should participate in the relevant meetings and trainings as well as build
relationships with other actors during the pre‐disaster phase, so that smooth and effective
deployment of assistance can be ensured. In addition, common codes of conduct should
be developed for NGOs/NPOs involved in assistance activities.

Part III: Human Resource Development
Providing support for human resource development of practitioners, who are familiar withdisaster response and assistance for affected populations, is critical in realising rapid response;
ensuring the quality of assistance; as well as making sure that response activities are
systematic and well coordinated ‐ including appropriate acceptance of international assistance‐ in future large scale disasters in Japan. With the aim of human resource development of
those who are equipped with necessary knowledge and skills for disaster response and who
can fully demonstrate required competencies in the midst crises – both in Japan and overseasiii

– the following seven recommendations are made.
3-1.Identification of priority areas where human resource development is particularly needed.
This will include: information collection, needs assessment, coordination and collaboration
with various actors, logistics, providing assistance based on norms and standards,
acceptance of international assistance, and communications with the international
community.
3-2.Identification of professional duties to be targeted for human resource development
Human resource development programmes need to be implemented for bothprofessionals who will be responsible for overall management required for disaster
response and for specialists focusing on particular functions.
3-3.Implementation system of the human resource development programmes
Leadership for human resource development of disaster response professionals should becentralised and located inside the (central) Government, such as in the Cabinet Office.
Human resource development should be promoted and maintained in close cooperation
with the Japanese Ministry of Defense/Self‐Defense Forces, academic institutions, local
authorities, NGOs/NPOs and the Japanese Red Cross Society. Methodologies of disaster
response training should be standardized, and the progress should be measured following
a common national curriculum.
3-4.Basic curriculum and methodologies of trainings
As the overall framework of the professional education, the following three categories
should be introduced: (a) knowledge education (lectures), (b) skills education(lectures/exercises) and (c) competency education (lectures/training).
3-5.Functions required for human resource development
In order to implement the human resource development programme in the medium andlonger term, a capacity is needed to develop and manage associated budgets, facilities andteaching materials as well as to conduct researches and evaluations.
3-6.Registration and mobilization of the pools of trained professionals
A centralised system needs to be developed at the national level to register the disaster
response professionals and to facilitate their human resource development. The registeredprofessionals can be divided into three categories including: (a) immediately deployable
capacity; (b) deployable reserve forces; and (c) identified talents to be trained further. The
Government of Japan and local authorities should provide specialist career paths, andmake efforts for placing the trained professionals in appropriate and strategic positions,taking into consideration their possible deployments once a disaster occur.
3-7.Promotion of international cooperation building on domestic disaster response experiences
A system needs to be developed that disaster management professionals working
domestically and internationally are encouraged to exchange their knowledge andexperiences between them. Contribution to as well as learning from the international
community need to be considered, including deployment of human resources, who wereinvolved in domestic disaster response, to international disaster relief operations.

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Part IV: Discussions on the topics of background of the above recommendations
Discussions on the following topics of background of the above recommendations
4-1.IDRL (International Disaster Response Laws)
4-2.Human Rights Based Approach
4-3.Gender
4-4.Children
4-5.Vulnerable groups including elderly and handicapped people
4-6.Role of NGO/NPO during domestic disasterv

Abbreviations

GEJE

Great East Japan Earthquake

GOJ

Government of Japan

CSO

Civil Society Organisation

HAP

Humanitarian Accountability Partnership

HRBA

Human Rights Based Approaches

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

IASC

Inter-Agency Standing Committee

IDRL

International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles

IFRC

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

INSARAGInternational Search and Rescue Advisory Group

JANIC

Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation

JDR

Japan Disaster Relief Team

JICA

Japan International Cooperation Agency

JOCVJapan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers

JRCS

Japanese Red Cross Society

MAFF

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan

MHLW

Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan

MoFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of JapanNGO

Non-Governmental OrganisationNPO

Non-Profit Organisation

OCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

RDC

Reception and Departure Centre

SOP

Standard Operating Procedure

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

UNISDR

United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

UNDAC

United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination

Virtual OSOCC

Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre

WFP

World Food Programme

WHO

World Health Organizationvi

Study on the Great East Japan Earthquake and International Humanitarian Assistance
Recommendations
Table of contents
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ iAbbreviations ................................................................................................................................vi
Preface........................................................................................................................................... 1
Recommendations ........................................................................................................................ 5
Part I: System for Receiving International Assistance................................................................ 5
1. Background to the recommendations ...................................................................................5(1) Objectives and reasons for the recommendations ..............................................................5(2) Issues emerged during the response to assistance after the Great East Japan
Earthquake ..............................................................................................................................6(3) In-depth analysis of the causes of the issues identified above .........................................10
2. Recommended actions..........................................................................................................12(1) Recommended actions ........................................................................................................12(2) Concrete outcomes and situations to be realised by implementing the recommended
actions ...................................................................................................................................20
Part II: Application of the existing nternational norms and standards.................................... 21
2-1. Establishment and application of national minimum standards for future disaster
response in Japan, building on exiting international norms and standards ....................21
1. Background to the recommendations .................................................................................21(1) Objectives and reasons for the recommendations ............................................................21(2) Issues emerged during the response phase of the GEJE ...................................................22(3) In-depth analysis of the causes of the above issues ..........................................................23
2. Recommended actions..........................................................................................................24(1) Recommended actions ........................................................................................................24(2) Concrete outcomes or situations to be realised by implementing the recommended
actions ...................................................................................................................................26
2-2. Role of NGOs/NPOs, civil society and actors other than designated public institution
1. Background to the recommendations ................................................................................. 27(1) Objectives and reasons for the recommendations ............................................................ 27(2) Issues emerged during the response to the GEJE ..............................................................28(3) In-depth analysis of the causes of the problems identified above ...................................30
2. Recommended actions..........................................................................................................30(1) Recommended actions ........................................................................................................30(2) Concrete outcomes and situations to be realised by implementing therecommendations ................................................................................................................31
Part III: Human Resource Development .................................................................................. 32
1. Background of the recommendations .................................................................................32(1) Objectives and reasons for the recommendations............................................................32(2) Issues emerged in the response to the Great East Japan Earthquake ..............................32(3) In-depth analysis of the causes of the issues identified above .........................................34
2. Recommended actions..........................................................................................................34(1) Recommended actions ........................................................................................................35
Part IV: Discussions on the topics of background of the above recommendations ................ 42
References ............................................................................................................................... 54
Appendix.................................................................................................................................. 56

Preface
Given its geographic, topographic, meteorological and various other conditions, Japan is acountry prone to natural disasters, such as earthquakes, volcanic explosions, typhoons,
torrential rain and heavy snow. Up to the 1950s, large-scale earthquakes and typhoons had
frequently caused thousands of casualties. In recent years, the Government of Japan has
striven to develop and strengthen its disaster-management system, promote national landconservation, improve the accuracy of its meteorological forecasting, and upgrade emergency
communications. Accordingly, Japan has successfully alleviated its vulnerability to natural
disasters, enhanced its disaster-response capacity, and achieved a reduction in the loss anddamage caused by natural disasters. This could be attributable to a decentralized
disaster-response system, in which local authorities have been carefully committed to
improving preparedness at each stage of the disaster-management cycle.
Nevertheless, the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011 featured a combination of anearthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power-plant accidents, constituting a large-scale complex
disaster on an unprecedented scale for Japan. Some local authorities in the disaster-affectedareas were temporarily unable to function and the disaster caused widespread damage, whichhindered efforts to immediately determine the overview of needs for assistance and smoothly
utilize domestic and incoming international assistance.
Reviewing the experience, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Japanese Red
Cross Society (JRCS) jointly organised a Public Seminar on International Humanitarian
Assistance on July 5, 2012 at the Hiroo Campus of the Japanese Red Cross College of Nursing inTokyo. The seminar began with a keynote speech made by the head of the OCHA New York
Headquarters concerning issues in international humanitarian assistance, which was followedby lectures by officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) and JICA on Japan’s
initiatives for international emergency relief and humanitarian assistance. The following panel
discussion was held by representatives of the Cabinet Office, JRCS, the Japan Business
Federation (Keidanren), Japan Platform (JPF) and the OCHA Kobe Office. The facilitator wasserved by the Director General of the Secretariat of Japan Disaster Relief Team (JDR) of JICA at
the time of the GEJE. At the seminar, practitioners exchanged frank views and opinions
concerning (1) issues arising and lessons learnt from coordination among the related parties in
how to accept incoming international assistance and assistance for populations affected by the
GEJE; and (2) how to utilise the experience of the earthquake for future international
humanitarian assistance. In particular, the participants recognised quite a few underlying
issues common to international humanitarian assistance and the domestic responses to the
GEJE; and the importance of parties engaging in disaster response and humanitarian assistance,
both domestically and overseas, sharing their experiences and strengths and taking theinitiative to engage in specific actions to improve the domestic and international disaster
response. Asked to deliver closing remarks, I proposed that we should not leave the seminar asa one-off event but establish a study group to continue and deepen these discussions based on
the achievements of the seminar1. Following my proposal, a study group of the Great East
Japan Earthquake and International Humanitarian Relief was established hosted by theJapanese Red Cross Institute for Humanitarian Studies and voluntarily joined by various
1

For the reports delivered in the seminar, visit the website:
http://www.jica.go.jp/topics/news/2012/20120720_01.html (in Japanese.)1

organisations engaging in international humanitarian assistance.
The study group, mainly comprising the presenters of the aforementioned seminar and thosein agreement with the purposes of the group and contributing to dialogue, established its
Secretariat in the Japanese Red Cross Institute for Humanitarian Studies on the premises of theJapanese Red Cross College of Nursing. The co-organisers and some seminar presenters alsojoined the Secretariat for liaison and other supportive work. I would like to note that members
from various backgrounds collaborated beyond organisational boundaries, sincerely engaged
in dialogue from professional perspectives, and committed to giving up their own time incontributing to produce these recommendations. The members of the Study Group and theSecretariat were mentioned in the Appendix lists.
The objective of the study group was to examine lessons learned of the emergency responseto the GEJE in light of international standards and practices by exchanging sincere opinions
among the diverse stakeholders involved in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
domestically and overseas. Doing so would enhance readiness for future large-scale natural
disasters in Japan as well as promoting international cooperation based on such experienceand lessons learnt.
More specifically, the study group aimed to summarise issues emerged during the emergency
response to the GEJE mainly from the following two perspectives, and present forward looking
recommendations with a view to promote relevant institutional reforms, mutual
understanding among domestic disaster-relief organisations, enhancement of a coordination
mechanism, and human-resource development, including capacity development of experts
involved in coordination.
(1) Acceptance of incoming international assistance, and development of coordination
frameworks, administrative orders and legal arrangements in Japan
Following the GEJE, numerous organisations offered various forms of assistance, including
financial resources, rescue teams, medical teams, and armed forces. The assistance included
intergovernmental cooperation, assistance from international organisations, assistance fromthe Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, cooperation by private companies, and by NGOs andcivil society. However, many issues arose in the course of reception, coordination andprovision of assistance, particularly a mismatch between the needs of disaster-affected
communities and the assistance provided. Assuming that similar international assistancewould certainly be offered if another large-scale disaster were to hit Japan, the Government ofJapan must clarify issues revealed in the GEJE and take remedial measures to enhance
preparedness. Although the international assistance is meant to complement its domestic
disaster response, such remedial measures must also be taken into account when reviewing
Japan’s overall policy on accepting incoming international assistance. Moreover, Japan’s policyon accepting incoming international assistance must be re-established beyond the existingboundaries of individual sectors or organisations, considering its consistency with existing
international humanitarian-assistance systems as well as related assistance tools andcoordination mechanisms. In addition, issues around domestic laws and regulations in
accepting incoming international assistance at the time of disaster have been noted as areason why assistance was deployed on an ad-hoc or personal basis and this must also be
considered.

2(2) Application of existing international norms and standards to Japan, and relevant issues
from a perspective of international humanitarian assistance
One of the lessons learnt from the GEJE is that various assistance methods and coordination
mechanisms established as international standards were not necessarily utilised, or that Japan
had no grounding in practicing such standards. From this perspective, the study groupmembers acknowledged the need for further study on the following issues:
・Types of assistance to help alleviate suffering of the affected populations
・Applying norms and standards of humanitarian assistance such as the Sphere standards
and consideration of gender aspects
・Methods to assist affected populations, particularly management of emergency-evacuation
Centres
・Constraints caused by applying legal and institutional framework assuming peacetime toemergency situations, and the need of more flexibility in applying administrative rules
during emergency relief and early recovery phases
・Coordination mechanisms among aid providers
・Strengthening coordination mechanisms like the cluster system, and promoting
collaboration among responders by overcoming their organisational barriers
・Needs assessment, communication with affected populations and information
management tools
・Civil-Military coordination for humanitarian assistance・Leveraging expertise of NGOs for disaster response in Japan; particularly staff of thoseorganisations experienced with emergency relief and humanitarian assistance overseas,
while noting that the present Disaster Management Basic Act has limitations in the sensethat defines that local authorities are the primary responder.
・Substantive contributions made by private companies in assisting the affected
populations and potential for effective partnerships with them・Using charity funds and cash donations more effectively
・Differences in financial assistance among the recipients of charity-funds (i.e. the amounts
granted vary depending on the total amount of funds collected) and differences by typesof disasters (e.g. floods and other low profile disasters as opposed to earthquakes)
・Assistance to the affected populations via cash transfers including through charity funds
and donations
・Disparities in terms of mobilisation and usage of humanitarian finance across different
phases of a disaster, especially, emergency relief v.s. early recovery.
The study group met more than ten times before compiling this report with recommendations.
However, although time constraints prevented the group from discussing all the issues initiallysuggested for consideration. The present report and the recommendations reflect personalviews of the members of the study group and should not be attributed to any of theorganisations to which they belong.
The recommendations reflect the study group’s account of the GEJE from an international
perspective, and the present report consists of the following four parts:
Part I:How Japan should receive international assistance when a large scale
natural disaster strikes, such as earthquakes predicted along the Nankai
Trough or directly beneath the Tokyo Metropolitan Area
Part II:
How Japan should apply internationally gained wisdom and good practices
related to humanitarian assistance to its domestic disaster response3Part III:Part IV:

How Japan should develop human resources to better respond to disasters
in Japan and overseas
Background Discussions by the Study GroupThe Study Group discussed how Japan’s future system for receiving international assistanceshould look like based on the experience of the GEJE. The Study Group prioritised to discussmatters that would contribute to populations and communities affected by a disaster, and it
tried to avoid an assumption that Japan ought to receive international assistance always. The
members of the Study Group kept in mind that the recommendations should not be taken as
imposition of international norms and standards. Japan is prone to earthquakes, with apossibility of another large earthquakes such as the GEJE, thus the Study Group believes thatfacilitation of incoming international assistance will always be an important issue that thecountry must consider. Moving toward establishing a better system for receiving international
assistance is particularly important for Japan, but it will also have significant implications toother developed countries. From this perspective, the Study Group intended to offer rather
practical and detailed recommendations.
We hope that these recommendations will be taken into consideration for reviewing measuresagainst large scale disasters in future, including revision of domestic legal arrangements,
relevant institutional reforms, development of practical manuals. We also hope that therecommendations will be utilised to promote advocacy and awareness raising among various
actors involved in disaster preparedness. Furthermore, we hope that the recommendations
will eventually be shared with the international community, including high and middle income
countries, and to be used as a reference for responding to and preparing for large scale natural
disasters.
Finally, we hope that these recommendations will help protect people’s lives, health anddignity- where-ever they are.
March, 2014
Hiroshi Higashiura
On behalf of the Study Group on the Great East Japan
Earthquake and International Humanitarian AssistanceTranslated into English and printed in February, 2015.

4

Recommendations

Part I: System for Receiving International Assistance
1. Background to the recommendations(1) Objectives and reasons for the recommendations
 The global media reported on the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) immediately, andmany organisations and people across the world started to offer personnel, material andfinancial assistance to Japan. The Government and relevant organisations in Japan
strove to accept as many of these offers as possible. The Government’s Emergency
Disaster Response Headquarters established a team to handle incoming international
assistance, which also coordinated with affected local authorities at prefecture andmunicipality levels. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) decided to accept a
specialised team of the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDACteam)2 for the first time as a developed country. The MOFA deployed liaison officers,
who together with Japan’s rescue teams, supported on-site coordination with the rescue
teams arriving from various countries. As for material assistance, the Government ofJapan prioritised those corresponding to the needs of disaster-affected communities
and liaised and coordinated closely with the municipalities concerned. The Japanese
Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Self-Defense Forces (SDF) cooperated with the U.S. andAustralian armed forces for the first time in its domestic disaster-relief operations.
 The efforts of such responders should be highly valued, but efficiency in terms ofreceiving international assistance should also be assessed as an important element thatcomplements self-help and mutual assistance by the disaster-affected communities.
International assistance should be considered a part of “external help” among the three
types of disaster-response activities, namely self-help, mutual support and assistancefrom outside. In this context, the Government of a disaster-affected country must
accurately grasp people’s needs so as to ensure that necessary assistance are provided
for right locations, proactively disseminate information to the international community,and coordinate with countries and organisations that are willing to offer assistance. As
assistance rash to the affected areas, the Government must also coordinate incominginternational assistance on-site, in order to avoid confusion and unnecessary burden on
the disaster-affected communities. Moreover, the Government is accountable for
ensuring appropriate use of the assistance received and responsible for reporting theresults of such assistance back to the international community.
 The international humanitarian community has established and utilised mechanisms toshare information and coordinate assistance between disaster-affected countries andinternational aid providers. Besides, the Government of Japan and NGOs participate insuch mechanisms when they implement overseas disaster-relief operations. However, inthe case of the GEJE, such system was not fully made aware of among the actors
involved. Thus, the country received offers of assistance from overseas rather passively,
2 An UNDAC team is deployed at the request of governments of or UN offices in disaster-affected countries. Its
core tasks involve assessing the humanitarian situation of disaster-affected areas, reporting it to the international
community and coordinating incoming international assistance. It is staffed by UN officers and experts registered by
the governments.
5

making arrangements for accepting the international assistance on an ad-hoc basis on
many occasions.
 International assistance during natural disasters undeniably has diplomatic implications.
However, to avoid wasting good intentions of those offering assistance and to maximize
its benefit for affected populations, the Government of Japan should work further toimprove and innovate its way to receive and manage international assistance on various
fronts.
(2) Issues emerged during the response to assistance after the Great East Japan Earthquake
The GEJE caused damages in wide areas, severely affecting the capacity of local authorities.
Thus, in the initial phase, the Government of Japan was unable to grasp the overall
humanitarian needs and determine which assistance was needed in which disaster-affectedareas. Moreover, it took time to coordinate between the central government and affected
local authorities, in terms of matching the international assistance offered and beneficiaries. In
addition, both sides lacked knowledge and sensitisation about receiving international aid,
including how to receive incoming rescue teams and awareness about possible risks ofproperty damages and accidents that could occur during the relief operations. Since Japan
experienced the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake, both the central government and local
authorities had assumed that they would receive international assistance. However, how they
managed receiving international assistance during the GEJE was rather passive and ad-hoc.

a. Issues in terms of efficient acceptance of assistance by reflecting the needs ofdisaster-affected communities At the initial phase, it was difficult to consolidate all the necessary information becauseof massive and wide spread damages that were coupled with severe destruction of key
infrastructures. The central government was unable to determine assistance needs,
because the affected local authorities, that would normally be responsible for gathering
information about the damages and assessing the overall needs on the ground, were
often unable to do so. Moreover, there was confusion about what kind of offers shouldbe accepted in the absence of a clear set of standards or criteria.
 Partly due to diplomatic considerations, many rescue teams at various levels ofcompetencies showed up in the affected areas, including those that would had beendisqualified for international deployment in accordance with the INSARAG3 standards,
and those that were poorly equipped and short of running their operations
self-sufficiently. Some teams dispatched in the initial phase were small-sized, thus
unable to fully demonstrate their teams’ capability.
 As for the material assistance, the Government tried its best to prioritise accepting theitems that matched with the needs most. However, it was unable to gain a
3 The International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG), established in 1991, is a voluntary network ofcountries, including Japan, that are dedicated to international search and rescue operations during disasters andrelated operational coordination. Its objectives include standardising the capacity of search and rescue teams
dispatched to disaster affected countries, as well as strengthening their coordination capacity. The Field
Coordination Support Section, located within the OCHA Headquarters in Geneva’s Emergency Services Branch,functions as the INSARAG Secretariat.
6

comprehensive picture of what was most urgently needed and where they were needed.
Therefore, the Government response ended up being nothing more than passive,
without issuing a consolidated appeal for international assistance. Based on the offers ofinternational assistance it received, the central Government contacted the affected local
authorities directly and individually, and asked what they needed and would accept
from the list of offered items. In the absence of a clear messaging from the Japanese,
foreign governments and international organisations suggested a wide range of relief
items. It is clear that this complicated the situation with significantly added timerequired for matching between the specific items offered and local authorities’ needs. In
fact, all the accepted items were not necessary essential for the affected populations’survival. It also took significant time for some countries to ship materials after
expressing their support (up to 3 to 4 months). Nevertheless, once the willingness andreadiness to accept international assistance was confirmed with the local authorities,
the delivery process that followed was basically smooth.
 The Government of Japan had no common standards for receiving assistance by foreign
armed forces for disaster response. However, the U.S. forces played a crucial role inlogistics and to rehabilitate infrastructures, while the Australians also contributed to the
air transport. On the other hand, it is unclear whether or not the Government of Japanwas fully made aware of the fact that the Israel medical team was part of its nationalarmed forces, and considered its legal status and implications of receiving such a team.
 It took several days for the Government of Japan to decide on setting up a framework
for accepting and using cash donations from foreign governments and citizens4. In otherwords, it took considerable time before the Government of Japan had decided that theGovernment established a body that accepted such donations in itself. On note here isthat while the Government expressed its intention to accept all kinds of assistanceincluding personnel, material and financial assistance, the JRCS decided only to accept
financial support. In this regard, it is unclear whether the Government of Japan was able
to give persuasive explanations to the international humanitarian community about thedifferent stance it took from that of JRCS.
b. Issues in terms of domestic coordination when accepting international assistance In several cases, acceptance of rescue teams required extra time so as to ensure
appropriate coordination at each stage. This included coordination at the level ofcontact points accepting offers (i.e. MOFA and embassies/diplomatic missions);
coordination between affected municipalities and relevant ministries of the central
Government (with the involvement of the Emergency Disaster Response Headquarters
supported by a coordination team tasked specifically on the acceptance of international
assistance); and coordination for practical preparation for receiving teams on-site
involving the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, National Policy Agency and theaffected prefectures and municipalities.
 The Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) issued a notice
immediately after the disaster struck and indicated that minimum medical services
provided in the disaster affected areas by those with foreign license of medical
4 After consultations between MOFA and JRCS, the Government of Japan decided that since March 14 2011, it
accepted cash donations from foreign governments and citizens through JRCS.
7

practitioners would not be deemed violation of the Medical Practitioners’ Act in Japan.
However, the MHLW did not clearly define the scope of medical services that foreign
medical practitioners were allowed to offer. Moreover, MHLW avoided making adecision on receiving international medical teams proactively, stating that it respected
the affected local authorities’ opinions.
 Likewise the rescue teams, complicated coordination processes at various stages wererequired for accepting material assistance, causing long time before confirming the local
authorities’ willingness to accept them. This included contact points accepting offersfrom overseas (i.e. MOFA and embassies/diplomatic missions), coordination withmunicipal governments by the Emergency Disaster Response Headquarters and its
coordination team, and coordination between prefectural governments and local
authorities. Moreover, the assistance needs had often changed by the time when relief
items actually arrived on site, whereas there were always time lags for international
shipping.
c. Issues in terms of facilitating acceptance of international assistance operationally The Government of Japan did not establish a single focal point for accepting rescue
teams, but made arrangements with countries that offered assistance on a bilateralbasis. Therefore, the teams’ travel from airports to the operation sites of the disaster
affected areas was not managed systematically5. Operational on-site coordination often
relied on the knowledge and capacity of the hosting local authorities and the supporting
teams from Japan. MOFA dispatched liaison officers and they coordinated effectively
with the affected local authorities. However, they were not necessarily well familiar withinternational relief operations. Therefore, there is room for improvement in terms ofallocating personnel who are familiar with relevant international guidelines under suchcircumstances. Moreover, foreign rescue teams completed their mission essentially attheir own discretion, because the Government of Japan did not declare termination of
the search and rescue phase officially6.
 The Government of Japan did not provide centrally controlled means of transporting
materials from airports to disaster areas, such as vehicles, and it did not make budgetaryarrangements to the necessary cost for it, either.7 As a result, the assisting countries
5 Relevant UN guidelines stipulate that a disaster-hit country should establish a Reception and Departure Centre(RDC) located at the arrival point of international relief teams. According to the guidelines, the RDC’s primary
responsibility is to register teams and provide them with situational updates, and other operational information
including domestic transport.
6 International rescue teams normally end their operations and return home after the hosting government
declares the “termination of the rescue phase.”
7 Japan’s Disaster Relief Act stipulates that disaster response expenses can be financed from the national treasury.
The share of prefectural contributions becomes lower for larger natural disasters. This provision could be applied tothe domestic transport of foreign aid, but this was not the case during the GEJE. This was mainly due to thefollowing reasons: The Disaster Relief Act respects the principle of decentralisation, thus expects prefectures to stepin when the capacity of the municipal governments is overwhelmed, and in which case the central government can
provide financial support. However, the acceptance of international assistance was negotiated directly between thecentral government and municipalities – without the involvement of prefectural governments. In addition, theapplication of the Disaster Relief Act requires prefectures to follow certain administrative procedures with, though
limited, some cost implications. Thus, it was difficult for the municipalities to request the cost-sharing byprefectures as they were not directly involved in the decision to accept international assistance.
Immediately after the GEJE stuck, the central government allocated 30.2 billion Yen from its reserve fund for
FY2010 to procure and transport aid materials, and this was a governmental initiative beyond the traditional
8needed to make arrangement for transporting relief items themselves. Moreover,because means of transport were limited, certain materials needed to be stored at
Narita or other airports temporarily. In such cases, it was not entirely clear whether theGovernment of Japan or assisting countries were responsible for securing such
temporary storage facilities.
 Collaboration between the SDF and the U.S. and Australian armed forces produced
positive results. However, the forces were not well informed of their mutual disaster
response capabilities and their understanding on relevant procedures for mutual
coordination were not sufficient.
d. Issues in terms of recognising risks associated with accepting international assistance Fortunately, there was no major accident involving international rescue teams. However,
it is not clear whether the Japanese domestic actors were fully aware of responsibilities
related to (and their need to potentially responding to) possible damages to private
properties and human beings. The latter included medical malpractice and treatment
not conforming to Japanese standards, and injury or death of rescue team membersthat could happen during the relief operations, as well as in response to any of theseincidents.
 It is uncertain whether the Government of Japan had adequately discussed in peacetime
the extent to which public health standards for food and medicine should be complied in
the time of emergencies8.
e. Issues in terms of actively disseminating information to the international community by theGovernment of Japan The UNDAC team deployed to Japan issued situation reports in English and almost on
the daily basis. WHO, IAEA and other organisations also released reports on the GEJE
occasionally. However, there was a serious lack of information shared by theGovernment of Japan with the world in foreign languages – despite the certain level ofefforts made by the office of the Chief Cabinet Secretary. Japanese citizens and foreigncountries needed different types of information, but the Government was unable toprovide accurate information that was meant to meet the expectation of theinternational community swiftly.

framework of the Disaster Relief Act. However, this funding was used for only a small portion of domestic transportof relief items provided internationally. This was because the allocated reserve fund was intended for aid materials
in general and not particularly designed for handling items arriving from abroad. To secure this funding, the central
government had to match donor countries with recipient municipalities, and fix the departure points (e.g. airports
where materials arrived from abroad) and final destinations (i.e. municipalities receiving materials) in Japan by theend of March 2011. This execution deadline was extremely tight. In addition, the reserve fund was only applicableto procurement and transport of materials for the three most seriously affected prefectures, namely Iwate, Miyagi
and Fukushima. Other affected prefectures were requested to comply with the normal provisions of the Disaster
Relief Act.
8 International disaster-response laws, rules and principles (IDRL), which the International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and other international organizations encourage countries around the world to
adopt, also require the protection of public health and environmental benefits in disaster-hit countries. The IDRL
also stipulate that medicines provided to disaster-hit countries must be those permitted in both the providing andreceiving countries.
9 There are tools for information sharing, such as Virtual OSOCC9, that are used as an
informal network among international disaster responders. However, the Government
was not proactive in leveraging these tools, with a view to communicate with foreign aid
community about the unfolding situation and the Government’s position.
Note: It is assumed that media reports grew, the shortage of accurate informationand lack of swift messaging by the Government of Japan led to exacerbate aid
providing countries’ concerns about the disaster-affected communities and how theGovernment of Japan was handling the situation.
f. Issues in terms of accountability on assistance received from the international community The types and amount of assistance received were widely publicised, and theGovernment of Japan expressed its gratitude to them at various levels. However, it
would be difficult for the Government of Japan to deny potential criticism against itself
entirely, as it has not fully demonstrated its accountability as a recipient of international
aid. This is because the Government has not conducted objective monitoring of theusages of the assistance received as well as an comprehensive evaluation of theiroutcomes.
(3) In-depth analysis of the causes of the issues identified above
As part of the Government of Japan’s response to the GEJE, it received international
assistance. However, the Government had not put in place specific standards and concrete
frameworks for this purpose adequately before the disaster struck. Those responsible fordomestic disaster response lacked understanding of the frameworks and guidelines related tointernational humanitarian assistance, and tailored training and qualified personnel for
accepting incoming international assistance were missing as an institutional gap.
a. Lack of knowledge and cooperation among Japanese disaster response actors about
international humanitarian assistance In Japan, organisations and experts responding to domestic disasters differ from those
responding to disasters occurred in foreign countries. Accordingly, very few officials of
the central government and local authorities have sufficient understanding offrameworks related to international humanitarian assistance such as UNDAC, INSARAG,
OSOCC10, and Reception and Departure Centre (RDC) as well as guidelines including theOslo Guidelines 11 and IDRL 12 . They lack knowledge of qualifications, capability andequipment of international relief actors including rescue teams, medical teams, andforeign armed forces, as well as experience in collaborating with them. This seems tohave made them difficult to make appropriate judgement about which typesof
international assistance could be utilized most effectively to meet what part of the
9 The Virtual On-Site Operations and Coordination Centre (Virtual OSOCC) is a website managed by OCHA thatenables national disaster responders to exchange opinions globally.
10 On-Site Operations and Coordination Centre (OSOCC) is established by an UNDAC team in a disaster-affectedarea to facilitate coordination among international disaster response teams in consultation with thedisaster-response headquarters of the affected country.
11 The Oslo Guidelines govern the use of foreign military and civil defense assets in disaster relief, stipulating basic
policies on accepting foreign armed forces in response to natural disasters. They are not legally binding but are
widely accepted by international humanitarian organisations, NGOs and others. The Government of Japan also
participated in their drafting. The Guidelines define the acceptance of foreign armed forces as a “last resort.”
12 International Disaster Response Laws (IDRL.) For more details, see References.
10

overall needs of disaster affected communities.
 The Government of Japan prioritized accepting “good intentions” of foreign countries asmuch as possible over considering more proactive utilisation of international assistancein a way that supplements the domestic response efforts. As a result, an approach, thatallowed the country to accept international assistance in an effective and efficient while
also taking into account associated risks, cost incurred and the time lag, way was
missing.
 As an international practice, an aid recipient country is expected to comprehensively
grasp, evaluate and communicate the impact of assistance it received. However, theGovernment of Japan had no institutional set-up or framework to meet such an
expectation, and it could not become a model to other countries in terms of fulfillingsuch accountability.
b. Plans were short of necessary details ensuring their effective implementation
 Acceptance of international assistance is mentioned in Japan’s Basic Disaster
Management Plan. Japan also had plans outlining the roles and responsibilities of
relevant Ministries as well as general steps to be followed by them. However, they did
not include detailed procedures, such as mechanisms for decision-making andinter-Ministerial consultations.
 There was no SOPs13 , detailing the operational requirements for accepting personnel
from their arrivals at airports until their return to home countries, or for accepting
relief items including temporary storages, means of transport means, and cost-sharing.
There was also no plan detailing who coordinates the international assistance once they
arrive on site and how to do it.
c. The present institutional set-ups are not necessarily conducive for accepting international
assistance efficiently When international assistance is offered in the forms of either rescue or medical teams,
it makes sense that the Government notifies its acceptance to the assisting countries
after confirming the intention of local authorities with the verification of the assistanceneeds on the ground. However, when local authorities themselves were severely
affected - as was seen in the GEJE - it took long time before such a decision was made as
sufficient information was not available. Moreover, it is difficult to determine withwhom the responsibility associated with the acceptance of international assistance lies,
especially when an unfortunate incident such as discussed above happens.
d. Lack of simulation exercises assuming the acceptance of international assistance Although relevant Ministries had an inter-Ministerial agreement for acceptinginternational assistance, they never had simulation exercises with the participation of all
the relevant actors. Consequently, inexperienced staff had to respond to the GEJE.
 The SDF had conducted joint military exercises with the U.S. forces for many years, butthey had not been designed for disaster response. As a result, the SDF and the U.S.
forces had to cooperate without knowing capabilities of each other and clarifying
protocols for operational coordination.
13

Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
11

2. Recommended actions(1) Recommended actions
At present, disaster relief from overseas is recognised in the Japanese Basic Disaster
Management Plan only as voluntary offers of assistance based on other countries’ goodwill.
What is behind this is the principle that municipalities bear the primary responsibility in termsof disaster relief and rescue efforts for the affected populations, and that prefectural andnational government are expected to supplement the capacity of the municipal authorities byusing financial, material and human resources that are mobilised and made available
domestically. In fact, there is an argument that it would be too risky for local authorities totake into consideration the incoming international assistance as an essential component of
their disaster response plans, as local authorities would not be able have full control over theassistance provided. However, considering the fact that Japan received numerous offers ofinternational assistance during the GEJE, it is rather realistic to assume that Japan would face asimilar situation when a large scale disaster happens again in future – and such a trend could
be further reinforced. Moreover, a great majority of the Japanese public supports acceptinginternational assistance during disaster.
Therefore, the Government of Japan should prepare for receiving internationally assistance“better” by assuming that many countries will again immediately offer various forms ofassistance when a large scale natural disaster strikes Japan. Such preparedness measures
should include developing a clear set of criteria for receiving the assistance; reviewing theroles and responsibilities between the central government and local authorities; drawing up
detailed operational plans; improving legal and institutional arrangements; as well as
strengthening communications capacity.
a. Clarification and dissemination of a ‘basic policy’ on receiving international assistance during
disasters The Government of Japan should establish its ‘basic policy’ by clarifying its own criteria
and procedures for receiving – or declining – offers of international assistance. The
purpose of developing such a policy is to use international assistance for disaster relief
as effectively and efficiently as possible. To this effect, advantages, risks and time lags
for transporting relief items should be taken into account.
 When a large scale disaster occurs, the Government of Japan should trigger the ‘basic
policy’ so as to accept international assistance as effectively and efficiently as possible.
The Government of Japan should also request that foreign countries decide on theiroffers of assistance by referring to the ‘basic policy.’ The ‘basic policy’ should be translated into English and other major foreign languages.
The ‘basic policy’ should also be posted on the website of the comprehensive
disaster-management body, so that the international aid community can access it. The
Government of Japan should further announce the establishment of the ‘basic policy’ atinternational conferences, and make efforts to ensure that it is known by theinternational community.

12

Proposed Outline of the ‘Basic Policy’(General Statement)
・ The Government of Japan will establish a mechanism with a view to promote
diplomatic relations and to supplement domestic response efforts, thereby ensuringthat international assistance is utilised as effectively as possible.
・ A comprehensive disaster management body of the central government - such as theEmergency Disaster Response Headquarters - will make centralised decisions onwhether or not it receives offers of international assistance. Following instructions
from the comprehensive disaster management body, the Cabinet Office will
coordinate with disaster-affected communities.
(Particular Statement)
・ If a disaster overwhelms Japan’s own response capacity, the Government of Japan
will request international assistance as needed. Even if international assistance is notnecessarily required and the Government will not make an explicit request as such,
the Government of Japan will still welcome offers of international assistance without
declining the offers entirely. The Government of Japan will also communicate its
stance clearly that financial assistance is always appreciated and immediately
announce its organisational arrangement for receiving financial assistance funds aswell as their usage (e.g. cash transfers to the populations and municipalities affectedby the disaster).
・ The Government of Japan will accept international search and rescue teams if asignificant number of buildings and urban infrastructures are collapsed, with theprecondition that the Government of Japan will take full responsibilities so as to
avoid burdens on affected local authorities. However, the issue of potential liability
for compensations associated with the acceptance of international search and rescue
teams must be clarified (See below). In other circumstances such as tsunamis, theGovernment of Japan will inform the international search and rescue teams, inadvance, of the possibility that they will be mainly tasked to search victims’ remains.
The Government of Japan will examine the capacity of the search and rescue teams
by using the UN standard system for their capacity assessment as much as possible,
and request that the teams should be essentially limited to those classified as ‘heavy
teams’ by INSARAG 14 - i.e. the teams from the U.S., U.K., Germany, France,
Switzerland, China, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Australia, and etc. The Governmentof Japan will further request that the teams, which are not qualified as the heavyclass yet particularly willing to deploy, should operate under the supervision of aheavy team. Furthermore, the Government of Japan will make appropriate decisions,bearing in mind that confirming the detailed needs on the ground might lead tomissing the appropriate timing for saving lives, but also that unprepared acceptanceof the international teams could cause significant burden on the affected local
authorities.
・ The Government of Japan will consider the possibility to receive foreign armed forces
as the last resort if its civilian capacity alone will not be able meet the needs. In thiscase, the Government of Japan will take into account its diplomatic relations andcomply with the Oslo Guidelines and other internationally established rules and
14

The INSARAG heavy teams are the urban search and rescue (USAR) teams recognised by the UN that they has
have the capacity and equipment qualified for international deployment. More than 40 teams from around theworld have been classified as ‘heavy teams.’
13

・

・

・

・

・

・

standards. The Government will, however, limit the acceptance of foreign armed
forces to those that have past experiences of joint exercises with the SDF; havedemonstrated relatively high inter-operability; and have a legal foundation tooperate in Japan. Following this criteria, the U.S. and Australian forces are
considered to be qualified at the moment. Nevertheless, this provision should not
apply to the use of military aircraft for transporting relief items and aid personnel toJapan.
There are no international common standards for the deployment of medical teams,
as they operate in different forms ranging from the government-led deployment to
the involvement of specialised NGOs. The types and quality of medical services
provided vary depending on the nature of teams, and it is difficult to assess theircapacities across the board. Therefore, the Government of Japan will only consider
the possibility to receive foreign medical teams, only if a shortage of domestic
medical resources is evident and the Government has prior information about thecapacity of specific medical teams. Moreover, the Government of Japan will requestthat as a precondition for their acceptance, such medical teams should work under
the supervision of a Japanese host medical institution or medical team. However, if
any foreign country wishes to send their medical teams to Japan to protect their own
citizens, the Government will facilitate the entry of such teams and support theiroperations as much as possible.
As for other types of experts from overseas, the Government of Japan will receive
them only if they can demonstrate special abilities that are in shortage in Japan.
However, even in this case, the experts are conditioned to always collaborate with
relevant Japanese organisations.
The Government of Japan will not be in a position to make decisions on whether or
not to accept foreign NGOs. However, the Government of Japan will officially entrust
the Japan Platform (JPF) to facilitate their coordination and particularly encouragethem to work in partnership with Japanese NGOs.
With regards to the relief items, the Government of Japan will indicate to foreign
governments a set of concrete examples that can improve affected people’s life inevacuation centers, yet are not fully procured in Japan or delivered at a required
scale or speed. For instance, such items would include, materials to secure evacuee’s
privacy, lighting equipments, temporary toilets, and tents for storage and for relief
workers. Relief goods that can be accepted immediately after a disaster strikes arelimited to those urgently needed. However, in principle, food, water, and medicine
will not be accepted, considering the time required for their quality checks 15 .
Furthermore, the Government of Japan will explain to the international aid providers
that a surplus of the materials delivered may be stored in Japan and used for otherdisasters or emergencies in future.
The Government of Japan will not immediately decline offers of relief items fromforeign governments, even if such items are not urgently needed. However, theGovernment will consider and communicate an appropriate timing when it will beready for receiving them.
The Japan Red Cross Society (JRCS) will decide on whether or not to accept assistancefrom other Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in consultation with thecomprehensive disaster management body of the Government of Japan.

15

In case of a severe shortage of food and medicine, it will still be more efficient to request specialised internationalorganisations such as WFP and WHO to procure and deliver them.
14

b. Enhancing the role of the central government for better accepting international assistance A comprehensive disaster response body of the central government, or the Emergency
Disaster Response Headquarters,16 should make centralized decisions on accepting theinternational assistance. This body should be strengthened enough to fulfill theGovernment’s responsibility for facilitating smooth and swift acceptance of incominginternational assistance. More specifically, the Government of Japan should make it
clear that the central government - i.e. the aforementioned comprehensive disaster
response body rather than the affected local authorities - takes ultimate
responsibilities17 on the entire process of accepting international assistance throughgovernment channels. 18 Such a process includes the identification of needs;
coordination with the countries offering assistance; facilitating the entry and transportof personnel and relief materials to the affected areas; monitoring the assistanceprovided and relief items distributed on site; and reporting the results back to the donor
countries.
 As for the relief items, the Government of Japan should first obtain comprehensive
information about the humanitarian situation and the needs of the affected
communities, and negotiate with the countries willing to provide assistance on specificitems required. This proactive approach is different from the conventional passive
approach where the central government starts to confirm local authorities’ willingness
to accept foreign aid by contacting them individually, only after it received specific offersof assistance from various countries. The Government of Japan should also establish asystem, through which it can collectively manage the relief items received; store them atrelaying points at the prefecture’s level; and distribute them for the affected
communities together with the relief items mobilised domestically.
 As the central government manages the incoming international assistance, theGovernment of Japan should consider amending its Disaster Relief Act in such a way thatthe central government will be able to bear the necessary costs, including fortransporting the foreign relief items from main airports to relaying points, and for theirtemporary storages. This is because the present legal framework is built on the principleof decentralization, hence not suitable for directly applying it to accepting internationalaid (which is essentially what the central government should be responsible for).
 Even before amending the Disaster Relief Act, the Government of Japan can and should
establish a mechanism of reserved funds for disaster relief efforts led by the central
government - as it decided to do during the GEJE. In this context, it is necessary toensure that the reserved funds are made available to finance the transportation costs ofrelief items received from overseas. Furthermore, the Government should guaranteethat the funds can be accessed across successive fiscal years, allowing theimplementation period of at least two to three months building on the GEJE experience.
16

At present, the Emergency Disaster Response Headquarters can be considered equivalent to the country’s
comprehensive disaster management body. However, the Study Group discussed the need of a strengthened
government entity that is more specialised in disaster response supported by added expertise.
17
This recommendation will not apply to the acceptance of international assistance based on ‘twin-city’ typerelationships and partnerships between the private-sectors.
18
The term “ultimate responsibility” does not mean that the Government of Japan will always be directly engaged
in all the practical aspects of accepting assistance.
15

Also the funds should not restrict geographic areas that are applicable for financial
support19.
 A comprehensive disaster response body, or the Emergency Disaster Response
Headquarters, will make a centralised decision on whether or not to accept foreign
armed forces. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) and SDF will control the operations offoreign armed forces once the Government accept them. The MOD and SDF will further
coordinate with relevant ministries, local authorities and other organisations as
required.
c. Development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for accepting international assistance In order to receive the international assistance swiftly and in a centralised manner, theGovernment of Japan should develop a common Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)
for its working level officials of all the relevant ministries, who assist the work of thecomprehensive disaster response body. The relevant actors should also conduct joint
exercises once a year. Such an SOP should build on existing international guidelines on
disaster relief; clarify and integrate roles and responsibilities of the line ministries
involved, and elaborate on a series of steps to be taken from making decisions onwhether or not to accept international assistance to supporting the international teams’
withdrawals – including temporary measures that will allow flexible application of
relevant legal and administrative requirements.
 To accept international rescue, medical and other specialised teams, a comprehensive
disaster response body should establish a centralised decision making procedure. Such a
procedure should include confirming their arrival dates on the Virtual OSOCC and othertools; establishment of one or more Reception and Departure Centres (RDCs) at main
airports; assisting their movements to the disaster affected areas; securing their on-siteaccommodations; clarifying methods to coordinate with local rescue entities on-site;and supporting the teams’ withdrawals. In the procedure, responsible ministries should
be indicated per each step. In particular, the procedure related to the search and rescue
teams must be developed in compliance with the INSARAG guidelines.
 With regard to the acceptance of the relief items, the SOP should cover the issues oftransport inside Japan, storage and distribution, in line with the system proposed in the
Item b discussed above. In conjunction with the SOP, common formats for swift datacollection and assessing needs per evacuation centres or geographic units 20should be
developed. This is in line with the idea of setting common national minimum standards
which will be discussed in detail in Part II.
d. Legal preparedness for receiving international assistance(i) Legal arrangement and clarification for possible accidents associated with relief operations
involving international aid workers
19

The reserved funds should be made more user friendly, covering the costs for temporary storage and organisingof relief items at the arriving airports as well as shipment of multiple consignments to the same destinations in one
lot. A written manual summarising these conditions should be prepared in advance.
20
UN humanitarian organisations have standard formats for calculating the required amount of water, food, tents
and other relief items in accordance with the number of disaster-affected populations, and disaggregated by gender,
age and other attributes.
16 Relevant laws and regulations should be reviewed and, as required, developed oramended, so that consequential damages caused by the international relief operations
and possible accidents involving the international aid workers can be handledappropriately. The law should govern liabilities for damages associated with acceptinginternational assistance including injuries, deaths and property damages caused by theinternational relief personnel; health related and environmental problems caused by therelief items; and compensation for such injuries, deaths and other damages resulting
from rescue and relief operations conducted by the international teams. In principle, theinternational teams should be treated in the same manner as the Japanese disaster
response actors, who will be essentially exempted from legal liabilities for damages
caused by their relief operations except for those caused by gross negligence. Regulatingthese through concluding either bilateral or international agreements are possible
alternatives. However, at present, no standardised rule has been established even
within the INSARAG framework regulating the deployment of international search andrescue teams.21 Therefore, the Government of Japan should actively contribute to therule-making discussion at the international level in this regard.
(ii) Promotion of legal preparedness supported by developing exceptional provisions andadministrative manuals
 Developing exceptional provisions in existing laws, regulations and ministerial
ordinances, that are applicable to the disaster response and emergency phase, iseffective. This approach is in line with the International Disaster Response Laws (IDRL)
concept advocated by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red CrescentSocieties (IFRC). In addition, legal preparedness of a wider definition should bepromoted, such as developing administrative manuals and operationalguidelines/standards, which, even if not legally binding, the relevant Ministries shouldstill follow on their areas of expertise in response to a disaster.
 Receiving rescue dogs from overseas is a good example where legal preparedness
worked effectively during the GEJE. At the time of the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquakethat preceded the GEJE, the Government of Japan was unable to accept international
teams coming with rescue dogs immediately. Having leant the lesson, the Ministry ofAgriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) revised its ordinance related to quarantining
exported and imported dogs, by adding a specific provision that allows the dogs being
quarantined can be be released temporarily if they are needed for disaster relief(Paragraph 5, Article 4 of the ordinance). The ordinance also stipulated thepreconditions to accept the rescue dogs, including their vaccinations against
hydrophobia. Thanks to these preparedness measures, the MAFF was able to issue a
notice on March 11, 2011 - the very first day of the GEJE - promptly reminding andputting into effect the flexible application of the quarantine rules and informing thecountries offering the rescue dogs of the specific conditions for their acceptance. This
minimized confusion and allowed two teams accompanying rescue dogs (Singapore and
21

The Government of Japan should also take into account various approaches taken by other developed countries
in terms of receiving international rescue and medical teams. In particular, a report titled ‘International Assistance
System’ published by the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Department of State andthe U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 2010 is noteworthy. Based on lessons learnt fromaccepting international assistance during the Hurricane Katrina crisis, the report argues that foreign relief personnel
should be requested only as a last resort because of potential concerns including compensation andindemnification.
17

the Republic of Korea) to start operating in Japan from the next the day.
 There would also be a situation where foreign medical practitioners without a Japaneselicense should be exceptionally allowed to provide medical services in emergencies. In
such circumstances, however, it might be difficult to predetermine the exact scope towhich the exceptional legal provision should be applied. Therefore, it is important topre-establish agreements among the relevant Ministries on specific procedures toinform the response actors of the kinds of decisions to be made during the emergencies.
22
The key is not solely relying on measures that are narrowly defined as ‘legal
preparedness’.
 Developing administrative manuals that contain relevant guidelines and operational
standards is considered effective. This will include non-legal and temporary measures
such as the budgetary allocation of reserved funds discussed above and redeploymentof government officials to the disaster response headquarters. During the GEJE, a large
number of government officials were asked to work at the Government’s Emergency
Disaster Response Headquarters for an extended period of time. Thus, the relevant
ministries were required to apply a flexible system in the selection of their staff and toclarify their rotation policies. In addition, MOFA’s decision to deploy its liaison officers
accompanying the international rescue teams helped facilitate their smooth on-sitecoordination significantly. However, the MOFA officers deployed were not fully familiar
with the missions of the rescue teams and their equipment, thus a manual for the laison
officers needs to be developed for their future deployment.
(iii) Use of the international guidelines: IDRLThe Government of Japan should clarify its core responsibilities as the disaster affected
country as well as those born by other countries providing international assistance. The
Government should articulate a set of guiding principles defining its institutionalframework for disaster relief, and strengthen its domestic laws and regulations, policies
and procedures for accepting incoming international assistance. Furthermore, theGovernment should ensure minimum legal convenience extended to the assisting
countries and organisations in a comprehensive manner. To this effect, the Government
should utilise the IDRL guidelines and prepare to communicate on the acceptance ofinternational assistance to the countries and organisations offering assistance without
delay. It is important to note, however, that the IDRL Guidelines have been mainly
designed for assisting developing countries to promote their legal preparedness, thus
they may contain provisions that are not necessarily suitable for a developed country. In
this regard, the guidelines could be further developed and refined building on Japan’s
experience.
e. Concluding partnership agreements
 In order to avoid legal problems such as those caused by the accidents and damages
resulting from relief operations, the Government of Japan should put in place legal
arrangements with countries that are likely to offer assistance.
22

With regard to the provision of medical services by foreign doctors, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
issued an official notice on March 14, 2011, as an opinion of the Ministry’s division responsible for this matter.
According to the notice, non-compliance with the law for providing a minimum and necessary medical service forthe disaster affected populations can be justified on the grounds of the Article 35 of the Japanese Criminal Law.
18

 With regard to the acceptance of foreign armed forces, the Government of Japan should
strengthen its partnerships by developing status-of-forces agreements on the operationof foreign armed forces and cooperative agreements with the neighbouring countries aswell as conducting joint exercises. An option could be to conclude such an agreementwith Australia. In terms of the armed forces of other neighbouring countries, theGovernment of Japan should confirm their disaster response capabilities, and aim toconclude Memorandum of Understandings, if appropriate. As for the assistance of the
U.S. and Australian forces - which Japan is likely to receive - the Government of Japan
should confirm their disaster response capacities including equipment, technologies,
and levels of expertise and develop a coordination mechanism for the military to
military cooperation.
 In order to facilitate more general cooperation for disaster management, theGovernment of Japan should aim to conclude agreements of mutual cooperation
through its existing frameworks with EU, ASEAN, the U.S., and Australia well as thetrilateral cooperation among Japan, China and the Republic of Korea23.
f. Securing and developing human resources A system to pool qualified talents outside the Government structure should be
developed in order to deploy qualified personnel who could support the acceptance ofinternational assistance during the disaster. The potential candidates would include
members of the Japan Disaster Relief team (JDR), JICA staff, current and former Japan
Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCVs), former staff members of internationalorganisations, and former staff members of international NGOs. The registeredmembers will be dispatched to the affected areas or mobilised to support thecomprehensive disaster management body, the Japan Platform or other disaster
response organisations and assist the acceptance of international assistance in the eventof a large-scale disaster.
 The disaster response headquarters of the central, prefectural and municipal
governments should establish coordination and information-sharing mechanisms where
various actors meet. Such actors include Japanese civilian agencies (i.e. governmentalorganisations, medical teams, private companies, NGOs, and etc.), international civilian
organisations, the SDF, and foreign armed forces – all sharing a common operational
environment in the disaster affected areas. This could be a Japanese version of thecluster system, potentially involving civilian-military coordination centres. 24
 The Government of Japan should develop human resources who are capable of taking
initiatives and ensure effective coordination - such as officials of the municipal
governments and other support staff on surge. The Government should also develop
related manuals that the appropriate staff can use, and swiftly dispatch them to thedisaster affected communities.
23

These memoranda should aim to prioritise assistance from the countries concerned and do not intend to exclude
assistance from other countries.
24
In the cluster system, one organisation is normally designated as the lead agency on each specific sector such as
food, water and sanitation, shelter and non-food items. This way, effective coordination among the UN humanitarianagencies and international NGOs is ensured by determining sharing a common situational awareness andinformation on the priority needs per clusters.
19

g. Fulfilling accountability
 The Government of Japan, or its comprehensive disaster management body, should befully responsible for monitoring the utilisation of the international assistance received interms of human, material and financial contributions. To ensure accountability, theGovernment of Japan should also report the results back to the international community
by using standard reporting formats, including on the matching with needs, efficiency,
and feedback from the beneficiaries.
 For this purpose, the Government should also establish a system staffed by those tasked
with the monitoring, and develop standard formats for reporting and evaluation.
h. Timely dissemination and clear communication of the relevant information From the onsetof a disaster, the Government of Japan should disseminate information concerning
damages, domestic response efforts, and specific needs for international assistance inEnglish and in a timely manner - at least daily in the initial phase. Accordingly, theGovernment should establish an emergency communications system before a disasterstrikes.
 The Government should also strive to make full use of communication tools forhumanitarian assistance such as Virtual OSOCC, and exchange information with thehumanitarian community through informal channels as well.
(2) Concrete outcomes and situations to be realised by implementing the recommended
actions By clarifying its basic policy for accepting international assistance and effectively
communicating with the international community based on it, the Government of Japan
will be able to create an environment where foreign countries will be able to make swift
decisions on their assistance. This will help facilitate the incoming international
assistance better targeted to meet the needs of the affected communities to a certain
degree.
 Strengthening the role of the central Government in accepting international assistancewill lead to a more coherent system, in which those who makes the decision to accept
international assistance will also accept full responsibility for the results. Moreover,promoting legal preparedness will help the relevant actors handle risks associated withaccepting the international assistance and thereby facilitate the related process moresmoothly.
 Development of SOPs and manuals will help organise training more easily. It will alsoenable disaster responders to share their knowledge and experience and help theirsuccession planning despite staff turnovers. All of these will contribute to effective
response.
 Establishing cooperation agreements with countries, that are likely to offer (and forJapan to receive) assistance, will help gather experience of joint exercises during thepeace-time. Such agreements will also help avoid potential legal problems and make theswift and efficient acceptance of international assistance possible.

20

Part II: Application of the existing international norms and standards
2-1. Establishment and application of national minimum standards for future disaster response
in Japan, building on exiting international norms and standards
1. Background to the recommendations(1) Objectives and reasons for the recommendations
 The GEJE was an unprecedented large-scale disaster that caused serious and wide
spread damages beyond various assumptions, including numerous casualties anddisplacement for a prolonged period. During the period from the immediate evacuation
phase till rehabilitation starts with the construction of temporary houses, lives of manyof survivors were threatened and their human dignity were denied (or at the risk ofbeing denied) due to severe physical conditions and psychological difficulties they had toendure in the evacuation centres.
 During such period, a number of problems were identified concerning, for examples,
types of food aid and the system of food distributions; lack of privacy and security
concerns in the evacuation centres; conditions and quality of water supply andtemporary toilets; and health and medical services for the evacuees, including those
suffering from chronic diseases. The assistance provided did not sufficiently meet thediverse and different needs reflecting factors such as gender, sexual orientation, age,disability, nationality, mother tongues, family composition and employment status.
 Most of these problems could have been prevented, if pre-determined national
minimum standards were in place and preparedness measures were taken by theinstitutional aid providers, ensuring a systematic response following such standards. On
the contrary, aid providers had to react to the evolving situation in an ad-hoc manner,by predominantly focusing on distributing available resources at a point in time - as fairand equal as possible. This is essentially a different approach from securing a minimum
set of relief items and basic services delivered for everyone in need and consistently.
Moreover, disaster-responderss could ensure more comprehensive, systematic, andevidence based assistance, with clear grounds for aid prioritisation, if they utilised astandard format for needs assessments and common methods for their comparison andcompilation - again in light of the national minimum standards.
 In fact, so-called international minimum standards had already been established andapplied by those involved in disaster relief operations overseas. A background to this isthat these international standards had been developed to ensure that emergency relief
and humanitarian assistance, mainly for developing countries, are provided effectively
and efficiently, and in accordance with international norms related to humanitarianprinciples. Meanwhile, Japan as an international-assistance donor, has been in a position
to request the UN, NGOs and other disaster responders to comply with the international
minimum standards when they provide emergency relief and humanitarian assistanceoutside Japan.

 On the other hand, Japanese Government’s present disaster-management systems andinstitutional measures, including the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, do not21

necessarily reflect the idea to guarantee minimum standards in terms of assistance forthose in need, nor do they articulate the Government’s accountability in meeting suchstandards. While municipalities normally play central roles in disaster response, the first
responders at the local level are not familiar with the international minimum standards.
It is probably too much to expect from the local aid providers to adopt the international
minimum standards to their work rather directly.
 Under such circumstances, Japanese humanitarian practitioners, who should have been
fully familiarised with the international norms and standards, appear to have made little
attempt to apply them to their aid operations and to adjust them to the contexts of local
areas affected by the GEJE. Therefore, bearing in mind the future risk of large scaledisasters, disaster management practitioners and institutional aid providers need todebate what should be the minimum standards to be set and applied for Japan in thelight of existing international standards. This is essential for ensuring appropriate
assistance that takes into account various protection risks and assistance needs of
populations affected by a disaster, and for protecting lives and dignity of the mostvulnerable populations. Such a comprehensive discussion should take place between
those involved in international aid and domestic disaster response.
(2) Issues emerged during the response phase of the GEJE Various approaches that are now considered international practices were not adopted.
Such approaches include human rights-based approach, gender mainstreaming, theSphere standards, and tested needs assessment methodologies. Many problems could
have been avoided if these had been applied on the ground. In reality, however, neither
institutional aid providers nor affected populations had the mindset to take advantageof these standards and tools to the response to the GEJE, in which context socio-culturalelements were also considered to have come into play. However, when the affected
populations and local aid providers were explained about these norms and standards
after the response operations were over, they were apparently receptive and foundthem useful.
 No integrated information management system was developed at the pre-disaster
phase, which could help capture various needs of the affected populations
comprehensively and collect, analyse and disseminate the relevant data systematically.
Such a system should include use of standardised formats for needs assessments anddeployment of trained personnel who can engage with the affected populations and areequipped with appropriate interview techniques. As a result, this hindered aid
prioritisation based on clear evidences at each phase of the disaster cycle; developmentof assistance plans geared towards achieving common minimum standards ofassistance; and swift and flexible response to diverse and ever-changing needs by
allocating available resources most efficiently .
 NGOs could not accomplish their roles in terms of protecting the vulnerable populations.
The NGOs could potentially contribute to ensure that international minimum standards
were met, by complementing local authorities’ efforts to assist those who were hard to
be reached. However, NGOs’ role has not been well recognised or defined in Japan.
Given the Japanese Government’s solid institutional capacity, it was difficult for the civilsociety organisations to provide humanitarian assistance together with local authorities22

– although such a situation is mostly unlikely in many of the developing countries. The
NGO staff had to spend considerable time for explaining their organizational mandates
and characters to local authorities and affected communities, as well as for going
through administrative procedures, including obtaining permits from both prefecturaland municipal authorities. Unlike individual volunteers25, the role of NGOs and NPOs are
not clearly defined in the Japanese legal framework related to disaster management.
Nevertheless, the services that NGOs actually provided, such as providing ‘child-friendly
spaces’ were relatively well received in the end.
 In addition to the protection aspect, the close involvement of affected populations withdiverse background in the decision making was not generally achieved. Although thedisaster management plans emphasize the vulnerability aspect of children and women,
their ‘mainstreaming’- meaning listening to their opinions and reflecting them in thedecision making processes - has not been realised.
(3) In-depth analysis of the causes of the above issues
 Then, why were these international standards not applied? First of all, such standards
were simply not known to many mainly because most of them were not available inJapanese. Although staff members of international NGOs knew them, they did not either
promote them or call for compliance to them. Even a question was raised about theirlevel of awareness about such standards. For example, some Japanese aid workers
involved in overseas operations did not hesitate when applying double standards ongender issues, saying that the situation in Japan was exceptional. Considering today’s
circumstances around Japanese women and, in particular, the challenges they face inachieving gender equality, the problem seems to be rather deep-rooted. It is also
impossible for the whole society to provide sufficient care for handicapped people
during emergencies, unless it is prepared to do so in the pre-disaster phase.
 The relationship between domestic disaster management experts and international aid
providers is disconnected; hence, they have little chance for mutual learning or
personnel exchanges. Accordingly, no process exists that allows application of theinternational humanitarian standards to domestic response or feeding the domestic
experiences into the development of such international standards. In this regard,
coordination between MOFA, which should be aware of relevant international standards,
and the Cabinet Office (disaster management) during the peace-time was consideredinsufficient. In addition, useful know-how that the staff members of JICA had acquired
through their overseas operations could not be sufficiently utilised, as well. Even within
the JRCS, staff members involved in domestic operations would be hesitant or feel
uneasy about directly applying the international standards to a developed country like
Japan, even though its staffers responsible for international operations wouldemphasise their importance. This could be due to their perception that such standards
have been practically developed for disaster relief operations in developing countries.
 Although the focus should be placed on children and women, there are children ofvarious age groups, and pregnant and lactating mothers, elderly persons, people withdisabilities, foreigners and more, each of whom has unique and different needs. Respect
25

The basic disaster prevention plan also includes provisions for volunteering persons as “people who voluntarily
offer assistance with good intention” but makes no reference to NGOs/NPOs organised by people with specialised
abilities.
23

for diversity should, therefore, be mainstreamed in the Japanese disaster relief. At theinternational level, more discussion is needed regarding assistance for and protection of
the elderly and people with disabilities. Given that even the Sphere Standards require
further discussion on this particular aspect, there is a significant room for Japan to makecontributions to further development of the international standards in this domain,
based on its experience during the GEJE.
2. Recommended actions(1) Recommended actions
 A special review committee (hereinafter called the ‘Committee’) should be established,with a mandate to review the Government’s present disaster-response systems from aninternational perspective. The Committee should thereby design a renewed
emergency-response mechanism with a view to ensure sufficient preparedness
measures in response to possible large-scale disasters, including the Nankai Troughscenario. The Committee should be composed not only of Government practitioners but
also of various experts with knowledge of international standards and working
experience in international disaster relief operations. The process and results of their
discussion should be made public. The Committee should be an integral part of thedisaster-management system coordinated by the Cabinet Office, and recognised as an
official body of the Government of Japan. The Committee should also be mandated toserve as a consultative body that facilitates and monitors the implementation of a rangeof improvement measures listed below.
 The Committee should fully take into account internationally established norms andstandards as well as good practices from overseas, and formulate Japan’s common
minimum standards for disaster response that are compatible with its local
characteristics and socio-cultural backgrounds. In this process, the Committee should
respect two basic principles in the Sphere Standards: namely that those affected bydisaster or conflict have the right to live with dignity and hence to receive assistance;
and that all possible measures should be taken to alleviate human suffering fromdisaster or conflict. Moreover, the minimum standards should include: (i) common
methods for needs assessment; and (ii) the types of and methods to provide assistance.
 During the emergency relief and early recovery phases, all institutional aid providers
must fully recognize their obligations to abide by the humanitarian principles
established as international minimum standards, including humanity, neutrality,
impartiality, and operational independence. The minimum standards should also include
the ‘Do No Harm’ principle – i.e. humanitarian organisations should never bring any
harm to the disaster-affected populations.
 The Committee should fully understand that people’s needs for assistance differ
depending on their social and physical, such as gender, age, disability, nationality,
mother tongue, family composition and employment situation, and take into accountsuch variables in the common national minimum standards for disaster response.

 The Committee should advise the Government of Japan to take necessary legal andadministrative measures to shift from its Government centred assistance for the24vulnerable populations, which tends to be a top-down and ‘one size fits all’ approach, toa more human rights-based approach that allows the affected populations to participate
in the planning and to request necessary assistance by themselves. Accordingly, theCommittee should acknowledge that the Government alone can only cover a limited
scope of diverse needs, and that mutual relationships for cooperation and associatedresponsibilities between the Government, NGOs and the local Councils of Social Welfare
should be clearly defined. Moreover, the Committee should advise the Government toclearly institutionalise the rights of various disaster-affected persons to participate in thedecision-making process and to guarantee their ‘rights to be heard.’ In May 2013, the Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office published ‘Guidelines forgender considerations in disaster response,’ a part of which includes those in line with
the Sphere Standards. However, the Guidelines made no direct reference to theestablished international norms and standards. In order to fully realise the principles
already stated in the Guideline and to incorporate more specific improvement measures- such as methodologies of needs assessments –further discussions on this particular
aspect need to be facilitated by the Committee. The debate should not only approach
the gender issue from a protection angle, but also address the issue of gender imbalanceamong the aid providers and policy-makers including civil servants of local municipalities
and the staff of the Cabinet Office working on disaster management issues. Meanwhile,
disaster- management plans of the Government and municipalities should clearly statethat a gender balance is considered at all levels, such as appointing individual males andfemales as representatives at each evacuation centres.
 Separate guidelines should be developed for local authorities recognising the role ofNGOs, civil society as well as community based organisations more institutionally, sothat these organisations can help promote application of the national minimum
standards, particularly in the local disaster management planning. Furthermore,
municipal authorities should be requested to institutionalise means to effectively
address cross-cutting issues, including respecting the rights of children and the elderly,
promoting gender sensitive approaches, and ensuring protection of and assistance forthe people with disabilities. In this regard, the local authorities should be requested toestablish focal points on the cross cutting issues at each relevant departments anddivisions and to consider staff exchange, especially between the divisions responsible fordisaster management and gender equality.
 On the other hand, NGOs and civil society organisations should bear in mind a leadingrole that they are expected to play in ensuring appropriate response to the diverse
needs of the affected populations and the promotion of human rights-based approaches.
To this effect, NGOs should step up their engagement in the relevant policy
development processes. In particular, the civil society should monitor policy measurestaken by the Government and local authorities, and form organisations to support
implementation of such measures in concrete terms. Furthermore, NGOs and civilsociety organisations should enhance their accountability to the affected populations as
aid providers by putting in place effective communication mechanisms with the affected
communities, including needs assessments, monitoring, evaluation, and feedback
processes. Moreover, they should redouble efforts for promoting the code of conducts
based on humanitarian principles, and regulate their activities around a sound peer

25review system, in which if necessary, the organisations’ commitment to comply with thecode of conducts is required as a precondition for participating in the coordinatedresponse.
 The Committee should promote domestic disaster-response actors’ understanding of
the latest discussions on the international standards for disaster response. As
recommended in the Part III discussing human resource development, existing
international standards and tools should be taken into consideration when developing
and implementing specialised training programme, so that domestic disastermanagement experts can understand and apply them in the Japanese context.
(2) Concrete outcomes or situations to be realised by implementing the recommended
actions If the recommended actions are implemented and national minimum standards fordisaster response building on existing international standards are established andapplied in future large scale natural disasters, effectiveness, efficiency, swiftness andmobility of emergency relief to the affected populations are likely to increase
considerably. This will lead to save many more lives, and the dignity of the mostvulnerable will be better maintained.
 For this to happen, not only the Government but also NGOs and other related parties
should commit themselves to make efforts for close and mutual coordination.
Establishing national minimum standards is likely to create some binding force in thisdirection and help reinforce their mutual accountability.
 In reality, however, there will be an inevitable time-lag before the minimum standards
are fully met after the on-set of a disaster. As was seen in the GEJE, if the administrative
functions of municipalities are considerably affected by a disaster, affectedmunicipalities may have to rely on assistance by aid providers arriving from outside of
the affected areas. The following figure intends to provide conceptual illustration of thisconstraint.

26

Degrees thatinternational standards
are metApplication of International Standards in a Large Scale Natural Disaster

Desirable level

Assistance from outside actors
Response by local actors

Response by local actors
Minimum
Requirement

Rescue phase

Emergency and earlyrecovery phase

Reconstruction phase

Timeline

Disasterstrikes

Rehabilitation
phase

Legitimately, the same time-lag can be observed in an international humanitarian setting
as well. Therefore, the existing international standards should not be taken as an absolute
threshold, but they should rather be considered a set of minimum targets that all of theaid providers should make every effort to achieve as quickly as possible, and that disastermanagement experts should use as a basis for developing assistance plans. What is
important here is to establish a shared understanding that relevant parties will ultimately
have to face the consequence of such efforts and should be asked to fulfil their own
accountability to that extent. This point should be fully taken into consideration whendeveloping and applying common national minimum standards in future.

2-2. Role of NGOs/NPOs, civil society and actors other than designated public institutions
1. Background to the recommendations(1) Objectives and reasons for the recommendations
 During the GEJE, not only governmental and public institutions but also NGOs/NPOs,
private companies, and individual volunteers played major roles in providing emergency
assistance for the affected populations and supporting the disaster-affected
communities’ recovery. The basic disaster-management plan of the Government
distinguishes these actors from the governmental organisations and designated public
institutions. They are indeed categorised as “those who offer voluntary assistance out ofgood intentions.” However, lessons learnt from the GEJE show that creating an enabling
environment for these actors to fully demonstrate their strengths and expertise isconsidered to impact on the speed and quality of emergency assistance and recovery
support for the affected populations in future disasters significantly.
27

Among such actors other than the governmental and public institutions, this section will
particularly focus on NGOs and NPOs.


As for the role of the private companies, the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren)
provides detailed insights and recommendations in a report titled “Toward a More
Resilient Society – Further Actions of the Business Sector and Government.” on the role
they played during the GEJE.

(2) Issues emerged during the response to the GEJE In the initial first month, NGOs and NPOs were perceived as akin to individual volunteers.
The organisations, that actually entered the disaster affected areas, were required tocoordinate with the Volunteer Coordination Office of the Cabinet Office or local
disaster-volunteer centres that were tasked to coordinate the individual volunteers.
 Many Japanese NGOs experienced with emergency relief operations overseas ran
activities in the areas affected by the GEJE. However, quite a few of such NGO staff
found it more difficult to perform their functions inside Japan rather than outside. Oneof the biggest reasons was the absence of a mechanism for coordination andinformation sharing, through which an overview of a variety of assistance provided byboth public and private actors should have been established. As a result, NGOs andNPOs were not included in the planning and coordination processes among the disaster
responders for assisting the affected populations, which were led by local authorities. In
some areas and after a while, public and private actors began to come together, andsome NPOs started to apparently play a complementary role in support of local
authorities. For example, NPOs distributed heating equipments for the evacuees in
temporary shelters, and such an arrangement was made to meet the urgent needs thatwent beyond what the local authorities were required to cover under the Disaster Relief
Act. Such NGO/NPO operations were made possible thanks to the efforts of thededicated staff members on the ground, especially by building relationships withinstitutional aid providers on a personal basis. Nevertheless, such coordination efforts
did not happen everywhere in the affected communities and did not always yieldpositive results in terms of responding to the needs of the people in need of assistance.
Based on pre-agreements with local councils of social welfare, volunteer centres were
established at the level of disaster-affected municipalities. However, as their scope ofwork varied by localities, the councils were unable to provide overall coordination
functions covering all the assistance coming into the communities.
 Many aid workers pointed out the absence of humanitarian coordinators who werecharged with the overall coordination of assistance efforts during the disaster – unlike as
often seen in international humanitarian aid operations. As a result, aid workers felt thatthey could not work together and closely coordinate their activities at the central,
prefectural and municipal levels. In other words, they were unable to grasp “3Ws” –namely, a comprehensive picture of who provided, what kinds of assistance and where.
There were attempts to consolidate information related to assistance, develop matrixes
per disaster affected areas, and share them among the aid providers concerned.
However, a limited number of partners supported these initiatives, thus the amount of
information collected was relatively small. While the humanitarian situation on the
ground evolved rapidly, the relevant data could not be collected or updated in a timely

28manner. Consequently, those compiled the information admitted that the extent thatthe information was shared and utilised for a coordination purpose was rather limited.
 Furthermore, there was no overall coordination system that allowed NGOs and NPOs tocooperate with each other and coordinate their activities on a significant scale. During
the initial emergency phase, they found it particularly difficult to coordinate or share
information on their activities with a view to avoid overlapped assistance as thesituation on the ground unfolded. While many NGOs with experience in international
humanitarian operations participated in the response to the GEJE, they had notestablished relationships with NPOs focusing on disaster relief at the domestic level.
Reportedly, there were some cases where the absence of effective partnerships,
combined with difficulties in terms of coordination, even caused frictions among NGOs
and NPOs. A small number of donors, NGOs, NPOs and other aid providers attempted
to hold inter-agency meetings, but the extent of information sharing at the level ofTokyo was rather limited, thus did not result in effective on-site operational
coordination or development of common strategies. In some prefectures andmunicipalities, a limited number of groups coordinated their activities within specificsectors such as education and temporary housing, but even this form of coordination
was limited to a few sectors and in certain affected areas.
 The JPF and the Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) worked toserve as contact points to coordinate the acceptance of incoming assistance byinternational NGOs. However, the information channels of the supply side multipliedand drawing a comprehensive picture of the assistance needs on the ground wasdifficult. Thus, they found it difficult to match the offers of assistance with the needs ofthe disaster-affected communities smoothly. If these intermediary organisations are toaccept and manage offers of assistance to be made by international NGOs, theypresently face many challenges in terms of available human resources, their know-how
as well as systematic coordination with other organisations.
 Many private companies assisted the populations affected by the GEJE, involving aid
workers and relief items from overseas. The size and impact of the assistance provided
by the private sector were particularly notable, playing a crucial role in distributing foodand other relief items immediately since the on-set of the disaster. The companies
dispatched their employees on a voluntary basis to the disaster affected areas, andprovided assistance building on their own core businesses. However, their CSR activities
were often not embedded in any of the coordination systems that had been worked out
at the level of disaster-affected communities, and this was a challenge in terms ofdelivering effective assistance. Therefore, , and ways should be explored to leverage
their contributions more effectively, given the concerns of the considerable overlap ofassistance and wasting of resources during the GEJE, in the absence of a coordination
mechanism to capture the overall situation of disaster relief, including with the
involvement of these private actors.
 As described in the previous section (Part II, 2-1), NGOs are normally required to comply
with international standards that are applied to humanitarian assistance, such as theSphere standards, Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), and the Code of
Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in

29

Disaster Relief. However, some argue that during the GEJE, knowledge of these norms
and standards were not utilised. For example, at the on-set of the disaster, it was only
male staff, who were distributing relief items in many of the evacuation centres. This
made some disaster-affected women feel uncomfortable when receiving relief items
necessary for meeting the specific needs of women. As responders paid little attention
to the gender aspects, women’s needs were not properly reflected on the relief items
provided, and women experienced difficult situations without being able to accessing
the necessary assistance at the evacuation centres. NPOs, that are mostly active inside
Japan , were not well informed of international standards. On the other hand, many of
those involved in international assistance were aware of the standards, but they did notparticularly share the sense of responsibility that they should comply with theinternational standards when operating in Japan as well.
(3) In-depth analysis of the causes of the problems identified above
 There was no coordination and information sharing mechanism that would help grasp acomprehensive picture of assistance provided by both public and private actors.
Moreover, NGOs and NPOs were not part of the discussions or coordinated planning
processes led by the local authorities.
2. Recommended actions(1) Recommended actions
a. Establishment of a coordination body for NGO and NPOs involved in disaster response.
 A mechanism to coordinate NGOs and NPOs (hereinafter called an ‘NGO/NPO
coordination body’) should be established during the pre-disaster phase, so that theirassistance can be deployed more effectively when a disaster strikes. To this effect, aframework to coordinate with actors other than NGOs/NPOs should be designed; its
Secretariat functions need to be supported; and human resources involved in thecoordination work needs to be developed.
b. Improved awareness by the Government, local authorities and designated public institutions
about the NGO/NPO coordination body The above mechanism should be made known to the Government, local authorities anddesignated public institutions in peacetime. The NGO/NPO coordination body should
engage closely with such administrative bodies, including personnel exchange, so that
their understanding as the counterpart to the NGO/NPO sector and recognition about
the coordination body will be promoted.
c. Incorporation of NGO/NPO operations in local disaster-management plans Disaster management plans formulated by prefectures and municipalities should take
into consideration the role of the NGO/NPO coordination body, and incorporate its
coordinating function in terms of their relationship to the community based
coordination activities and participation in coordination meetings. NGOs and NPOs
should be encouraged to actively participate in emergency drills based on local disastermanagement plans. In order to facilitate smooth and efficient humanitarian assistanceduring disasters, NGOs and NPOs should establish partnerships with local authorities inpeacetime.

30

d. Development of codes of conduct for NGOs/NPOs operations
 Development of a common code of conduct, that are applicable to domestic disaster
response operations by NGOs and NPOs and built on international humanitarian
standards, should be considered. If necessary, a separate set of common standards, that
may go beyond the scope of the existing international standards, should also be
considered.
(2) Concrete outcomes and situations to be realized by implementing the recommendations
 If a large scale and wide spread disaster affecting significantly amount of population
occurs in Japan, it will be difficult for the Government, local authorities and designatedpublic institutions alone to provide sufficient and granular emergency relief responding to
the constantly changing needs of the affected populations. Establishing the status ofprivate and civil society actors complementing the Government response, and recognising
their roles as part of coordinated first responders will lead to effective assistancemaximising the NGO/NPOs’ resources and strengths such as follows: Swift access to disaster affected communities,
 Agility and flexible use of financial and material resources, information and humanresources, and Targeted assistance in terms of types and beneficiaries, that cannot be covered by
the public sector due to its existing legal, regulatory and other institutional
constraints.
 Nevertheless, the resources of NGOs and NPOs are limited. Through effective
coordination, the division of labour between these organisations and the governmental
and designated public institutions should be made clear. This will allow efficient
response to the humanitarian needs that cannot be met by the assistance provided by
the public sector.

31

Part III: Human Resource Development
1. Background of the recommendations(1) Objectives and reasons for the recommendations
 Based on the issues emerged during the GEJE response and possible improvements
identified for future disasters, key recommendations related to the acceptance ofinternational assistance were presented in Part I. In addition, establishing andoperationalising a set of national minimum standards and the role of NGOs and NPOs
were discussed in Part II. These recommendations entail improvement of institutional
and legal frameworks, development of organisational arrangements, development ofdetailed plans, dissemination of knowledge and expertise, as well as implementation ofdisaster response exercises.
 Many of the problems faced during the response to the GEJE resulted from a shortage of
qualified human resources capacitated to cope with the disaster situation. Therefore,
securing and nurturing disaster response experts is essential for resolving the problems.
(2) Issues emerged in the response to the Great East Japan Earthquake
a. Absence of a centralised system to capture the qualified and deployable disaster response
experts and aid providers and to manage the pool of such human resources Municipal authorities have their own staff involved in disaster management, but there isno organisation that can centrally control and manage them.
 The total numbers and specialised areas of disaster response experts that the Municipal
authorities can mobilise are not known.
b. Expert knowledge and experience vary among the disaster response experts and aid
providers (i.e. lack of common standards)
 Even if there are staff members with experience in disaster response, their knowledge
and expertise are diverse, and developed on an individual basis.
 In the absence of a national common position and minimum standards on what thedisaster managers and response actors need to learn, strengths and weaknesses ofindividual staff vary significantly.
 Neither a specialist accreditation system nor common standards for capacity assessment
exist at a national level.
 Domestic response actors and aid providers are relatively familiar with the disaster
response methodologies in Japan. However, their understanding of international
coordination systems and standards tend to be limited. They are also expected to be
more familiarised with the procedures and other aspects related to the acceptance ofinternational assistance in view of large scale disasters in Japan.
c. The Government’s human resource management systems are not conducive for encouraging
and supporting the development of specialists in disaster response and relief operations
 Officials of the central, prefectural and municipal governments - including those involved
in disaster management - normally rotate every two to three years. This makes it
extremely difficult for any officers to accumulate their knowledge and experience even on
an individual basis. Moreover, once moved to another position with different
responsibilities, the officials are not able to utilise or transfer their accumulated
32

knowledge experience, as they have to focus on new responsibilities.
 There is no clear and established career path available for officers who are opted forbecoming disaster management specialists. Moreover, there are limited opportunities todevelop their competencies that are most relevant to disaster response andmanagement.
d. There is a divide between the domestic disaster response experts and the Japaneseinternational responders, and there is no interaction between the two.
 The exposure of those experienced in the domestic response – either as part of the local
authorities or as NGO/NPO staff members – tends to be limited to small and medium sized
disasters inside Japan. On the other hand, those involved in international disaster relief
operations are experienced with larger scale disasters, yet they do not necessarily
understand the unique aspects of disaster response in Japan. Bearing in mind the need for
managing the incoming international assistance, disaster managers and practitioners inJapan should be familiarised with the rules and characteristics of both domestic andinternational disaster relief.
 Compared to other disaster-prone countries, Japan’s response capacity is high, and it canmanage most of the disasters with its domestic resources. As a result, Japanese people are
not entirely accustomed to receiving international assistance, and nurturing expertise of
those, who can operate effectively under such circumstances, has not been contemplated.
However, there is an urgent need to develop a group of disaster management professionals,
especially in view of future large-scale disasters such as the Nankai Trough scenario, which
would involve receiving international assistance.
e. A lack of common understanding of the necessary capacity and competencies to be learned
by the disaster responders
 A comprehensive scope of disaster response capacity as well as required skills andexpertise that need to be learned to support the response capacity are unclear. As aresult, levels of expertise shared among the disaster response practitioners depend on
their personal and individual knowledge and experiences.
 Specific types of knowledge and experience required for the disaster relief practitioners
and managers at the decision making level are neither fully identified nor systematicallyorganised.
 There is no means to assess professional capacity of disaster response practioners
individually and objectively in the absence of a specialist accreditation system.
f. Lack of a strategy to share and communicate Japan’s disaster response experience with theinternational community Being a disaster prone yet well prepared and developed country, Japan is uniquely
positioned. However, Japanese disaster management actors are not as proactive as theyshould be in terms of sharing and communicating their experience with the rest of theworld. This is considered to be related to the divide between the domestic andinternational actors discussed above as well as language barriers.

33 As part of Japan’s contribution to the international disaster relief operations, there is no
strategy that supports deployment of domestic experts with rich disaster response
experience to overseas systematically. This prevents Japan from leveraging one of its
major strengths in its contribution to the international efforts. At the same time, very
few attempts have been made in terms of learning and applying the methodologies usedby the international community to the domestic response.
(3) In-depth analysis of the causes of the issues identified above
 Engagement by the central Government of Japan in the human resource development ofdisaster-management professionals is weak.
 This is linked to the provision of the Disaster Management Basic Act that defines local
authorities as the primary responders. Although it makes reference to the deploymentof the government staff from the Prefectural level during disasters, the law does not
articulate the engagement of the central Government in terms of human resource
development. Despite the fact that this is a key cross cutting issue, the law does notprovide details, except for a general clause stating that the central government shouldmake efforts with regards to the development and utilisation of human resources.
 The Government’s Central Disaster Management Council established a committee ofexperts that looked at the human resource development issues and its report was
published. The report has a value in the sense that it helped clarify Government’s basic
stance on this matter and suggested a training programme. However, its actual
implementation is still largely left with the local authorities, and engagement by thecentral Government in this domain is still unclear.
 Similarly, the central Government’s engagement in the utilisation of trained and qualified
human resources is considered insufficient. Being a disaster prone country itself, Japan
can and should share considerable amount of information with the international
community, including its experience during the GEJE. Thus, Japan’s human resource
development strategy should build on this perspective. Noting that international
relations are managed more directly at the national level than by the local authorities,
the central Government’s engagement becomes critical, in order to ensure that theuseful information and experience are communicated most effectively.
 The limited engagement of the central Government does not only hinder efforts fordeveloping the specialised expertise per se, but it also means lost opportunities forleveraging the Japanese human resource to make meaningful contributions to theinternational efforts.
2. Recommended actions
Bearing future large-scale natural disasters in mind, nurturing Japanese practitioners who are
well-versed in disaster relief is essential for guaranteeing rapid, coordinated and systematic
response, including appropriate management of incoming international assistance, andensuring quality assistance for the affected populations. The Study Group therefore makes thefollowing recommendations related to promoting the development of human resources, whoare equipped with necessary knowledge and skills for disaster response in Japan and capable34

of demonstrating their competencies amid natural disasters. The term ‘disaster response’ inthis context refers to a range of activities from the immediate rescue and relief phase tolife-saving support and early recovery phase.

(1) Recommended actions
a. Identification of priority areas where human resource development are most needed The areas of expertise necessary for facilitating disaster response and relief efforts
effectively and smoothly should be identified. Prioritisation of such specialised should be
guided by the practical experiences of the GEJE and other disasters – both in Japan andoverseas. Accordingly, the Study Group recommends that the following should beprioritised:(i) Data collection and needs assessment/analysis,(ii) Coordination and cooperation with various actors offering assistance on a
voluntary basis,(iii) Ensuring smooth flowing of human resource support and relief items (i.e.
logistics),(iv) Relief and assistance for disaster affected populations including management ofevacuation centres in accordance with norms, standards and other key
considerations,(v) Acceptance of international assistance,(vi) Disseminating information to the international community, and(vii) Command, control, and communications across multiple organisations.
 Priority areas for human resource development should be selected in consultation withnational and international disaster responders and relief organisations. The Cabinet
Office should lead in selection those consulted and ensure that opinions of government
officials, especially at the Prefectural and Municipal levels, are duly reflected.
 The special review committee developing the common national minimum standards
proposed in Part II should be involved in the selection process as well.
 In addition to looking at some of the basic items that are required for responding to themost common types of disasters, the human resource development programmes should
cover a wide range of issues corresponding to various types of damages caused bydifferent kinds of disasters and include specific measures against particular categories ofdisaster risks.
b. Identified professional categories subject to the human resource development programme Two categories of human resources should be developed in the areas
identified/prioritised above; i.e. the managers who lead and oversee respective functions
necessary for disaster response and the specialists well versed in particular technical fields.
In addition and as required, decision-makers such as the heads of local authorities
should be included so as to deepen their understanding of disaster management.


The Cabinet Office and the Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Institution should
offer comprehensive and nationwide training programmes for the officials of local
authorities involved in disaster management and corresponding to their professional
categories. In addition, tailored and specialist programmes should be offered for relevant
35

Ministries, as well as Prefectural and Municipal governments
 Professional categories targeted for the human resource development programme areas follows:(i) Overall disaster management at the strategic level
Central government:
Prime Minister’s Office and Line Ministries (leadership and working levels),
Local authorities:
Head and their deputies, directors of disaster management
Designated public institutions, SDF, National Police Agency, the Coast Guard:
Key officials
NGOs, private companies, international and foreign organisations:Staff members wishing to receive training(ii) Experts in specialized areas
Officials of the central, prefectural and municipal governments, and staff
members of designated public institutions, NGOs, private companies, andinternational and foreign organisations working in the following areas:
Information management, communications, search and rescue, health care andnursing, operation of evacuation centres, logistics, education, security, public
information, CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks) and otherrelevant areas.
c. Implementation mechanism of the human resource development programmes Leadership for human resource development of disaster response should be centralised
and located at the national level, such as at the Cabinet Office of the central
Government. For this purpose, the National Human Resource Mobilisation Centre forDisaster Response should be established. The Centre should develop, maintain andmanage the human resources in collaboration with MOD/ SDF, academic institutions,
local authorities, aid organisations, and JRCS.
 A national curriculum should be developed so as to ensure standardized quality control
and to apply common methodologies of disaster response and assistance for thedisaster-affected populations. Such a training programme will, in principle, allow
coordinated response by the staff members of various disaster responders and relief
organisations based on their common understanding of relief operations.
 Training programmes should be conducted for the three types of targeted professional
categories indicated above in Section b., following realistic timeframes. For example,
five days could be allocated for the specialists; three days for the general disastermanagers; and one day for the heads of local authorities.
 Quality control and standardization of the training curriculums should be put in place byreviewing existing relevant training programmes. In order to standardize the training
programme, maintain its quality, and to secure the trainees in a sustainable manner,
selection methods of the training providers need to be reconsidered.
 The curriculum should be reviewed periodically. Taking into account the existing training
for disaster management specialists offered by the Cabinet Office as an example36

(http://www.kisc.meiji.ac.jp/~crisishp/ja/pdf/2013/naikakuhu/pamphlet4.pdf),
otherlectures deemed essential - such as those help understand the acceptance ofinternational assistance - should be added.
d. Basic structure of the curriculum and training methodologies
 The curriculum should be framed around the following three categories:(i) Knowledge enhancement (lectures)
Acquiring basic knowledge about disaster response(ii) Skills training (lectures and exercises)
Performing practical exercises in a standardized environment, aiming to acquirebasic skills related to information gathering/management and multi-actor
coordination(iii) Competency development (lectures and exercises) Nurturing flexibility, judgment, coordination skills, decision making and its execution,
leadership and other forms of competencies required to apply when operating understressful environment The training should cover the basics and practical skills in asystematic manner including : characteristics of natural disasters; domestic disaster
preparedness and response mechanisms; relevant key actors; assessments; logistics;
information management (i.e. collection, aggregation, analysis and dissemination);
coordination; international standards norms, and other key considerations; partnerships
with NGOs and NPOs, private sectors and other actors; differences between domestic
and international response; and case studies.
 The curriculum should be designed in such a way that allows the trainees to maximise
their understanding of relevant knowledge and skills. Theoretical aspects can be taught
in a lecture format, whereas technical skills should be trained by using other mostappropriate methods, such as role-playing, skill practices, as well as modelled anddesk-top simulation exercises.
 The training programmes should be categorised into basic and advanced courses so thatthe trainees’ understanding can be developed systematically. Arrangements necessary
for regular follow-up should be integrated into the training programmes aimed atmaintaining the trainees’ knowledge and experience.
 Training materials and exercise package should be developed by the Cabinet Office andits contracted entities. Development of internet based training tools and materials
should also be considered.
 The programme should provide an environment that allows the trainees’ self-learningand upgrading their knowledge and experience, such as through on-line tools.
 In addition to the Japanese trainers, external lecturers, who are active in theinternational arena, should be invited, in order to learn the latest developments at the
global level and to incorporate the disaster response experiences in other countries into
the training programme. In addition, possibilities of joint exercises and personnel
exchanges should be explored.
 The training materials should be developed based on the existing international37

standards, yet edited for the use of Japanese professionals. It is important to ensure thetrainees’ understanding that the key components of training have been promoted andutilised internationally, and that the specific elements of Japanese disaster response
mechanism are also taken into consideration.
 Practical exercises should stress the training of trainers (ToTs) based in Japan, so thatthe quality of training can be maintained, and that the related experiences can beaccumulated continuously and systematically.
e. Three types of trainers:(i) Full-time lecturers
Act as core trainers facilitating knowledge enhancement- and skills training as wellas competency development by using standard disaster-response manuals,.
(ii) External lecturers
Supplement the work of the full-time lecturers by providing competency related
training based on practical experiences(iii) Researchers
Develop disaster response training manuals based on relevant researches andlessons learned
f. Functions required to support the human resource development programmes
 In addition to the development and implementation of the training programmes, thefollowing functions need to be established to support the human resource development
of disaster responders in the medium and long term:(i) Research・ Conduct researches on the knowledge, skills and competencies necessary for those
involved in disaster response and relief operations. The training organisation shouldinteract with the relevant Ministries, local authorities, designated public institutions,and various foreign and international organisations (including foreign think-tanks),
Japanese and international NGOs, private companies, universities, research institutes
and etc.
・ Collect and analyse lessons learnt from previous disaster responses in Japan andoverseas.
・ Develop national and standardised disaster response manuals, building on the
research outcomes and lessons learnt, as well as in light of the existing legal andinstitutional frameworks. In doing so, coordinate with the national, prefectural andmunicipal governments and other relevant organisations such as NGOs and the private
sector.
(ii) Education
・ Knowledge based education following the disaster response manuals
・ Knowledge based education on relevant competencies(iii) Skills training
・ Skills training based on the disaster-response manuals.
・ Skills training on relevant competencies.
(iv) Exercises
Integrate knowledge, skills and competencies by using simulation exercises assuming
various scenarios and operational environments.
(v) Evaluation
38

Evaluate and analyse the training package to improve quality of lectures, skill practices andsimulation exercises(vi) Support services
General administration, accounting, management and maintenance of learning materials andfacilities
g. Registration and mobilization of pools of trained professionals
 Establish a ‘National Human Resource Mobilisation Centre for Disaster Response’ at thelevel of the central Government as a centralised mechanism to register and train
disaster response professionals. Practitioners who would be ready to support receiving
and managing incoming international assistance as discussed in Part I should also be
secured and registered by this centre.
 Individual professionals, who have completed the training programmes discussed above
Section d, should also be registered by the centre and recognised as human resources
available at the national level.
 The trainees be classified into the following three categories, and will be allocated andmobilised strategically :(i) Active (appointed and registered compulsory)
Persons currently assigned with tasks related to disaster response(ii) Active back-up (appointed but registered voluntarily)
Persons not currently assigned with any tasks related to disaster response but
intending and able to perform such tasks if required, also with the prior consent
of the organisations to which they belong(iii) Contingency back-up (designated and registered voluntarily)
Persons who have reached the mandatory retirement age but with considerable
knowledge and experience, and intending and able to perform tasks related todisaster response if required.
 The central Government and local authorities should make arrangements to ensure
appropriate posting of the trained officials and others with equivalent skills andexperiences. The organisations should develop concrete ‘career ladders’ for the trainedand qualified professionals, by clarifying relevant functions to be demonstrated by theexperts.
 Certificates should be issued for those who completed the training programmes,
together with a ‘license document’ indicating specialised areas or professional
categories. These documents will be used as a basis for proving their acquired skills andcompetencies. In addition, the registered professionals are required to attend refresher
courses on a regular basis to maintain and update their knowledge and skills.
 By assessing damages caused by a disaster, the heads of Prefectural and Municipal
governments and their disaster response teams will identify specific areas of expertise
where support is required, and take actions to request the central Government to
deploy the registered professionals.

39 The affected local authorities will respond to the situation in collaboration with the
deployed professionals. In order to facilitate smooth integration of the deployedprofessionals into the existing response mechanisms without delay, the host prefecturaland municipal Governments should include and articulate relevant arrangements intheir disaster response manuals or SOPs. In this regard, a standard SOP template should
be developed by the central Government, with a view to help the local authorities tofollow the necessary procedures.
 It is assumed that many of the trained and registered professionals are posted in therelevant parts of the Prefectural and Municipal authorities addressing disastermanagement issues. Tripartite agreements should be concluded in advance between
the Centre, the registered experts and the organisations to which they belong, so thatnecessary actions are taken to allow temporary deployment of the professionals during
an emergency.
 The local authorities should include arrangements for receiving the professionals
deployed from the national level in their own disaster management plans and clarify
concrete steps to be followed to make this happen in advance. In addition, the local
authorities should sensitise their staff about the possibility that support experts would
be deployed from other local authorities as well as JRCS and NGOs and ensure that theywould be received appropriately and without delay.
 Even if the registered professionals are transferred to other positions not directly
related to disaster response, the local authorities should continue to register them as
active back-up resources. As part of their human resource management policies, dueconsideration should be made not to create any gaps in the expertise, especially when
the trained officials had to move on and while successors are being trained to back-up.
 The central Government and the local authorities should actively support the careerdevelopment of the registered professionals, particularly by creating an environment
where they can strengthen their expertise and accumulate experiences. An accreditation
system should also be put in place.
h. Promoting international cooperation building on the domestic experience in disaster
response More interactions between those involved in the domestic disaster response and thoseworking for international disaster relief operations should be encouraged, such as
through personnel exchanges and organising joint seminars. This will help mutual
learning about the different operational environments and maximising their strengths
from both sides.
 Arrangements should be made to ensure that professionals experienced with disaster
response in Japan are prioritised to attend and speak at international conferences on
disaster management and be advised to share their experiences and views with theinternational community.

 Proffesionals experienced with domestic disaster response should be deployed to40

foreign countries affected by large scale natural disasters and engage in response
coordination around UNDAC and etc. Such a deployment in itself will contribute to theinternational efforts, but also create opportunities for leaning about international
disaster response systems.
 Working with Japan based organisations promoting international cooperation,
opportunities should be explored to utilise the experiences of domestic responders to
support disaster management in other countries.
 To support the career development of qualified professionals at the central Government
and local authorities, opportunities should be created to help them share experiences
and learn at the international level, including staff exchange programmes with disastermanagement agencies such as OCHA and UNISDR.

41

Part IV: Discussions on the topics of background of the above recommendations
The Study Group held many sessions to study topics related to the recommendations made to date.
Part IV outlines our discussions as background references, which, we hope, will deepen theunderstanding of the recommendations.

1. International Disaster Response Laws (IDRL)
Since 2001, the IFRC has worked to contribute to domestic legal preparedness by providing
guidelines for improving domestic legal, institutional and organisational frameworks on international
disaster relief and initial recovery assistance. In 2007, the IFRC and the state parties to the Geneva
Convention adopted the “Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of international
disaster relief and initial recovery assistance” was adapted by the 30th International Conference of
the Red Cross and Red Crescent.
The guidelines are meant to assist, if not legally bind, governments to strengthen their domestic laws,
policies and/or procedures for international disaster response, while stating that they will have no
direct impact on existing responsibilities and rlights under domestic laws. The guidelines reconfirm
the primary roles of authorities and relevant organisations, and recommend that they should giveminimum legal facilities to foreign governments and humanitarian assistance organisations that
intend and are able to satisfy the minimum standards for coordination, quality and accountability.
The guidelines also expect governments to improve the quality and efficiency of international
disaster relief and initial recovery assistance for better assistance to disaster-affected regions.
The guidelines mainly cover the following topics26:
Core responsibilities (responsibilities of affected states, assisting states and humanitarianorganisations)・ The authorities and responsibilities of affected states with primary responsibility for relief andrecovery assistance; compliance of disaster-affected states with national and international laws,
responsibility for international standards for the quality of assistance, earyl warning andpreparedness for assisting states and humanitarian organisations
Early warning and preparedness
・ Development of procedures to facilitate swift sharing of information about disasters amongassisting states and humanitarian organisations (including the United Nations’ Emergency
Relief Coordinator) to maximise the effect of international assistance・ Coordinators as contact persons for effective international assistance
26The Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery

Assistance, the Journal of Humanitarian Studies Vol. 1, 2012, pp. 181-196
42

・ Clear designation of domestic governmental entities with responsibility and authority in relatedareas.
Initiation and termination of international disaster relief and initial recovery assistance・ The affected state should decide whether or not to request disaster relief and notify promptly.
・ The affected state should undertake joint needs assessments with the United Nations and otherassisting humanitarian organisations.
・ The affected state should provide assisting states and humanitarian organisations with adequate
information on domestic laws and regulations of particular relevance to the entry and operationof disaster-relief or initial recovery assistance.
・ Prior to deploying military assets, terms and conditions including issues such as the duration of
deployment, whether they must be armed or unarmed, the use of their national uniforms, andmechanisms for cooperation with civilian actors are to be agreed by the assisting states
involved.
・ When an assisting actor wishes to terminate disaster-relief or initial recovery assistance, it
should provide appropriate notification.
・ The affected state and assisting actor should consult, bearing in mind the impact of suchtermination on disaster-affected communities.
Eligibility for legal facilities (facilities to assist states)
・ It is recommended that states establish criteria for assisting humanitarian organisations seeking
eligibility for legal facilities, and make quick decisions and notifications to such organisations.
Legal facilities for entry and operations
・ It is recommended that the affected states provide the legal facilities listed below to assistingstates and eligible assisting humanitarian organisations:- Visas and any necessary work permits renewable within the territory for the period
necessary to implement disaster-relief or initial recovery activities- Temporary approval of licenses and certifications issued by foreign governments for
medical care, engineering, driving and other specialties- Exemption from all customs duties, taxes, tariffs or governmental fees
- Exemption from all exports, transit and import restrictions, and simplification orminimization of documentation requirements (for vehicles, ITC equipment, special
instruments, etc.)- Registration of vehicles for disaster-relief or initial recovery activities, and temporary
approval of number plates- Priority access to bandwidth, frequencies and satellite use for telecommunications and datatransfer- Setting of requirements for imports of medical goods and equipment, and alleviation of43

legal and administrative barriers in relation to imports and exports- Various rights (opening bank accounts, concluding leases, rental agreements and othercontracts, acquiring and disposing of property)- Securing of legal employment contracts and contract terminations of domestic workers- Legal responsibility for accidents and damage

2. Rights Based Approach
The Rights Based Aapproach (RBA) is defined as a framework for problem-solving, in which
problems faced by a person are understood as situations where the person’s rights are not respected
or fulfilled. To resolve the problems, this approach aims to clarify who needs to play a role, andwhat kinds of roles need to be played. To overcome discriminations and to promote realisation ofuniversal rights, the RBA supports empowerment of the right holders as well as capacity building of
the duty bears to fulfil their accountability. According to this approach, the aid providers andexternal factors involved in emergency relief need to provide direct and temporary assistance toaddress issues that require urgent interventions.
‘Protection’ is an internationally established approach built on RBA that is applied to humanitarianassistance and disaster relief during emergencies. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)
defines protection as activities to fully respect all persons’ rights in compliance with international
humanitarian, human rights, refugee laws, and regardless of age, gender, social, ethnic, nationality,
religion and any other backgrounds of the persons concerned. According to the IASC definition,
protection not only involves ensuring physical security but also respecting and fulfilling various
rights including right to live, freedom from torture and gender-based violence, freedom of movement,right to access humanitarian assistance including food, water, healthcare and education, and property
right and right of residence. Accordingly, a wide range of activities implemented by international
humanitarian organisations to realize protection constitute the core of international humanitarian
action.
A number of protection mandated agencies including UN humanitarian organisations, theInternational Red Cross Movemnet and others implement protection activities as part of their own
programmes in their specialised areas. Such activities include, for example, registration of refugees
and internally displaced persons (IDPs), countermeasures against human trafficking, support for
tracing and reunifying separated family members, follow-up support for the victims of sexual
violence and abuse, training for those managing the IDP camps and the military, and protesting
against serious violation of the law and human rights. Protection is also a common issue
cross-cutting various support sectors. For instance, making right decisions on the locations of water
points and the methods of food distribution is essential for ensuring protection, as women could be

44subject to intimidation or violence in these contexts. In addition, every effort needs to be made topromote durable solutions for the affected populations beyond securing their protection on atemporary basis. In order to reduce people’s protection risks, efforts also need to be made to preventand stop human rights violations. If violations have already occurred, interventions are required interms of responsive actions to mitigate the immediate impacts; remedial actions to restore dignity ofthe victims; and to support environment-building by improving social, cultural, institutional andlegal conditions so that people’s rights are more respected.
The roles played by external actors in the RBA can be categorised as follows:(i)strengthen the capacity of the local community to respect human rights, and support the rightholders claiming their rights;(ii) Strengthen mechanisms to protect human rights, and support the duty bearers in their efforts tofulfil their obligations;(iii) Provide direct and temporary assistance, depending on the circumstances, and(iv) Make efforts to eliminate discriminations and to promote everyone’s rights.

In the Istanbul CSO Development Effectiveness Principles, RBA is highlighted as the first and mostimportant principle to be followed by the civil society organisations (CSOs). JANIC has published aguidebook elaborating the Istanbul Principles, and it promotes the dissemination of the principles
among Japanese NGOs. The promotion of RBA as well as ensuring appropriate leaning
opportunities related to it are being discussed at various forums between MOFA and NGOs as well
as between JICA and NGOs.

3. Gender
Women’s empowerment must constitute a key component when promoting disaster preparedness inthe peacetime. However, such an idea shares only a small part of the general policy discourse inJapan. People started to draw sufficient attention to the relationship between disaster management
and gender started only after the GEJE. Nevertheless, the discussions geared towards revising local
disaster management plans still tend to be centred around how to pay attention to women’s needs
while they stay in evacuation centres.
The Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office admitted that from a gender perspective, various
problems emerged during the GEJE. The Government noted that women’s perspectives were often
neglected in the disaster response and preparedness; little consideration was made on the needs ofwomen; and women’s involvement in the decision-making process was rather limited. In thefollow-up to these lessons learned, the Bureau developed and announced ‘Guidelines for Disaster
Management and Recovery from a Gender Equality Perspective’ on May 31, 2013.
The Sphere Project provides a set of minimum standards which need to be met in emergency relief

45operations during natural disasters and conflicts, and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement and NGOs are committed to comply with them. As cross-cutting issues, the Sphere refers
to children, gender, HIV/AIDS, the elderly, disability, psychosocial support, disaster risk reduction
and the climate change. Of particular note here is that understanding and applying some of theSphere Standards may provide possible solutions to the gender related problems identified during the
GEJE. For example:
 The Humanitarian Charter stipulates the protection principles.
 The core standards of the Sphere underscores the need to collect and report gender and age
disaggregated data; ensuring the right gender balance in the team composition when
conducting interviews; gender sensitive interview methods; as well as ensuring reflecting theappropriate gender balance when the affected populations express their views.
 The Sphere Project gives more detailed sector specific standards as well:
Water , Sanitation and

Making sure that necessary items are available/accessible; giving due

Hygieneconsiderations not to put excessive burden on women; locations ofbathing facilities and toilets; securing appropriate washing and drying
spaces; addressing safety/security concerns by installing lighting
facilities; and ensuring an appropriate ratio of the toilets between men andwomen (1:3)

Food Security andSecuring women’s access/participation; addressing the needs of pregnant

Nutrition

women and lactating mothers; participation in designing kitchen facilities;
equal access to livelihood and employment opportunities; and not
imposing household responsibilities on women exclusively

Shelter and Non-FoodDiverse views are represented in deciding the use of available spaces;

Items

securing privacy; distributing extra clothes and sanitary items for thosewith chronic diseases and disabilities, pregnant women, infants, and theelderly; and addressing specific needs in terms of cooking items, plates
and other non-food items

HealthSecuring female medical staff; addressing reproductive health needs

Protection

Protection from gender-based violence; response and legal measures; andreferring the victims to support/care facilities

Similar points are also raised in the IASC Guidelines on the Protection of the People Affected by
Natural Disasters, which the UN humanitarian agencies and other NGO members of IASC haveagreed to. The IASC Guidelines articulate the importance of both protecting vulnerable women andwomen’s participation in decision making.
The Women’s Network for the East Japan Disaster compiled good practices on gender and diversity
46

issues in light of the international standards discussed above. In the process of compilation, thegroup identified the following problems:
 SOS signals were not simply picked up, and the needs were neither communicated nor
understood.
 Gender disaggregated data were not available.
 Lack of understanding of or indifference to gender equality.
 The responders did not understand the meaning of minimum standards. Given that Japan is a
developed country, it was difficult to for them to realise the level of response that address theissue of people’s dignity sufficiently.
 Misunderstanding or bias by the external actors/aid providers on women’s burden or
responsibilities in the area of unpaid household work such as cooking.
 The rights of women as aid beneficiaries are not understood. People receiving humanitarianassistance should be aware of the international norms and standards.

Levels of awareness “In a disaster situation, it does not matter if you are a man or woman.”among the aid

 “Children are treated equally, regardless of whether they are boys or
girls.”

providers, including
those with international

 “Unlike Afghanistan or any other developing countries, Japan is aexperiencedeveloped country with no gender based discrimination. So, there isno need to pay attention to gender issues in Japan.” “The Shere Standards are needed in developing countries, but they are
not applicable to Japan, where the people’s living standard is veryhigh.”
 “The Japanese culture is great, because even in evacuation centres,
people clearly distinguish the division of labour between men andwomen, and they all behave in an orderly manner.” The bias and assumption that only women’s groups or groups for thehandicapped people can do the necessary job for them. At the on-setof an emergency, it is the local community that responds first, andspecialised groups could be approached for assistance afterwards.

Level of awarenessamong the beneficiaries
of disaster relief“I thought I must not ask too much or something too selfish, because
people are helping us.” “I thought that those in charge made the best possible decisions.
Under such circumstances, I found it difficult to request more.”47

4. Children(1) Little or no access to disaster information by children themselvesChildren are often recognised as those who are protected by adults, and information related todisasters are monopolised by adults. As a result, children cannot understand what ishappening and why certain actions need to be taken. This makes children feel uneasy andpowerless. Moreover, adults are often not ready to listen to children’s opinions, even ifchildren might know more than adults (e.g. the shortest and safest evacuation routes). A
situation like this could lead to increased disaster risks.

(2) Lack of understanding about child specific needs
The fact that children have their own needs during disasters, which are different from those of
adults, is not well understood. For example, children need safe and secure spaces to learn andplay, even when they are in evacuation centres. Another child specific priority is not todiscontinue education. However, education is not included even in the Sphere standards.

5. Vulnerable groups, including the elderly and handicapped
The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) reports that according to a study
on the GEJE conducted by the Japan Disability Form (JDF), the mortality rate of the persons withdisabilities was more or less twice as high as that of those without disabilities. NHK’s ‘welfare
network’ team also conducted a survey on the mortality rates in the 27 disaster-affected
Municipalities of the three Prefectures in Tohoku, and its result supports the same trend. The
mortality rate among the total affected population was 1.03%, whereas that of the persons withdisabilities was 2.06%. Main lessons learned around assisting the persons with disabilities wererelated to some of the physical difficulties faced during evacuation as well as limited access to vital
information due their visual and hearing disabilities. In addition, a significant number of those withdisabilities chose or were forced to stay at home rather than in evacuation centres where people andassistance were concentrated. Moreover, those who did not belong to specific support groups before
the disaster were particularly vulnerable, yet the need to protect their personal information and otherprivacy issues led to restrict the responders’ outreach efforts. Furthermore, according to theGovernment’s White Paper on Disaster Management in 2011, 65 % of the total deaths involved theaffected populations who were more than 60 years old, whereas the proportion of the same agegroup in the three disasters affected Prefectures was approximately 31%. These data show theextreme vulnerability of the people with disabilities and the elderly during disasters, thus swift andappropriate response to meet their diverse needs is crucial.
In August 2013, the Cabinet Office (Disaster Management) issued a set of guidelines to support theevacuation of the population who need special care and assistance at the time of a disaster. These48

guidelines recommend that an overall approach to the people requiring special care and assistanceduring their evacuation needs to be clarified; key action items related to this objective are agreed aspart of the local disaster management plans; and that further details are fleshed out in the sub-plans
supporting the overall planning. The guidelines also prioritize identifying those in need of special
care and assistance, creating their name lists, sharing information about them and using suchinformation when they are assisted with evacuation - e.g. transport arrangements and verifying theirsurvival and safety. However, the guidelines do not provide concrete guidance on individual
planning, while tasking the municipal governments and social welfare coordinators at thecommunity level to come up with a plan and to conduct training and evacuation drills in partnershipwith relevant factors such as healthcare and welfare institutions, the private sector and voluntarygroups. Furthermore, the guidelines do not recommend a specific set of standards or methodologies
in terms of facilitating their evacuation as well as on the kinds of assistance to be provided to meettheir needs after they are moved to the evacuation centres.

6. Role of NGOs/NPOs in the domestic disaster response(1) Strengths of NGOs/NPOs in the domestic disaster response
NGOs and NPOs’ actual experience and accomplishments in assisting the affected
populations during the GEJE demonstrated their strengths and unique roles that are different
from Government entities or designated public institutions. With their strong knowledge andexperience, NGOs and NPOs can provide considerable support capacities that complement
the efforts of other public aid providers in the following areas: Assistance in receiving and managing individual volunteers: As was the case in the GEJE, it
is often the local Councils of Social Welfare and their support staff that are tasked to operate
the volunteer centres to receive and coordinate non-professional volunteers who show up in
the affected areas offering help individually. However, depending on the disaster’s types andscales, the local Council’s level of preparedness, as well as the number of incoming
volunteers, there are situations where the local Councils find it difficult to fully cope by themalone. Under such circumstances, resources of NGOs and NPOs can be utilised to supplement
the work of the local Councils with greater capability and flexibility. Additional support by
NGOs/NPOs would help address a wide range of practical concerns including registration of
the volunteers, planning of their allocations and deployment, matching between assistanceneeds and available resources as well as managing volunteers’ safety and security. The
activities can be implemented through collaborations between the Council’s support staff and
NGO/NPO staff members experienced in the coordination of emergency relief andhumanitarian aid.

49

 Targeted assistance for the affected populations who cannot be reached rapidly or withspecific critical needs: Local authorities are allowed to interpret the existing legal provisions
related to disaster response when setting their boundaries of beneficiaries and types ofassistance. However, until the central Government communicates how the law should beapplied more concretely, the local authorities would not be able to trigger certain types ofassistance. Moreover, there is always communication time-lag until the decision iscommunicated down to the ground level and shared among the staff, particularly when they
are busy responding to the local emergencies with their extremely stretched capacity.
Particularly at the onset of the disasters, there are many critical occasions where NGOs andNPOs can offer help and make time sensitive interventions without waiting for initiatives tobe taken by the public institutions.

(2) Role of NGOs/NPOs in disaster response
Before the GEJE, the existence of NGOs/NPOs and the unique role that they could play inassisting the affected populations were not fully recognised by the public institutions especially by the local authorities. In the Disaster Management Basic Act, references are
made to ‘other relevant parties’ or neighbourhood and solidarity based voluntaryorganisations. Although it is assumed that NGOs and NPOs are included in these categories,
the specific areas and degree of contribution that NGOs/NPOs can make are largely different
from what individual volunteers can offer. In the current set-up, therefore, potential capabilityof the NGOs and NPOs are not fully explored, and the impact of their contributions in the
response could be well underestimated.
Individual volunteers showing up in the affected areas tend to operate in an ad hoc manner.
Therefore, their general tasks matched with the needs - such as moving relief items or clearing
mud and cleaning at the household level - usually do not require much of the specialist skills.
On the other hand, NGOs and NPOs are groups of trained staff who accumulated experienceand can demonstrate their expertise. Therefore, NGOs/NPOs can commit themselves toimplement their designed activities with necessary inputs and in coordination with otherorganisations. The NPOs/NGOs can be considered supportive resources as they aim to secure
qualified staff and conduct training to ensure quality of their programmes at a certain level.
Therefore, the central, prefectural and municipal governments should value the competencies
that NGOs/NPOs have; clearly recognise and articulate the role of NGOs/NPOs in theirdisaster management plans; and utilise their capacity in the actual disaster response.
In response to the GEJE, NGOs distributed NFI kits for temporary houses such as bedding
and cooking items, or provided some cash support to cover these needs. However, some argue
that the public institutions could have better covered the needs by interpreting the Disaster50

Management Basic Act differently, and that NGOs/NPOs should have focused on other typesof assistance requiring different expertise and response to more diverse and critical needs ofthe affected populations that they are better at addressing. In order to ensure rapid response
and efficient assistance based on a clear division of labour, NGOs and NPOs should learn
more about the Disaster Management Basic Act. At the same time, the public institutions
should consider apply disaster response related laws to NGO/NPO activities before a disasterstrikes. Furthermore, media should be advised to make a clear distinction between theindividual volunteers and those working with NPOs/NGOs; reflect on their roles and evaluate
the impact of their programmes; and address questions related to the accountability ofNGOs/NPOs.

(3) Coordination among NGOs/NPOs
A coordination system - that does not solely rely on informal and ad-hoc personal
relationships - is needed, in order for NGOs and NPOs to maximise their capabilities to
respond to a large scale disaster with sufficiently wide geographic coverage. Given that theoperational environment of humanitarian assistance in Japan differs significantly from that ofother countries, it is questionable if transplanting the coordination mechanisms and resources
used in the international context directly to Japan would work effectively. In other words, aunique Japanese system needs to be developed by well taking into consideration the Japanesedisaster response system and the wide range of organisations involved in it. Lessons learned
by JPF, JANIC and other intermediary organizations created during the GEJE shows thatNGOs and NPOs need to agree on a system to collectively respond to and communicate on an
emergency situation; establish a coordination body equipped with necessary resources; andsensitise about these among the NGOs and NPOs during the peacetime.
To strengthen their coordination capacities, NGOs and NPOs should secure human resources
with relevant knowhow and experience. In particular, systematic and continued collection of
information around 3Ws (Who, does what and where) is essential for creating an enabling
environment for coordination. Thus, the coordination body needs to examine the mostefficient information management methods and prioritise to develop a system that allows realtime data collection, monitoring and analysis on needs and response.
During the GEJE, intermediary organisations were expected to play a significant role in termsof responding to the offers of international assistance and handling the foreign aid
organisations. However, such coordination required the intermediary organizations to
pre-establish networks not only with the domestic responders but also with different parts of
the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UN and other international organisations, foreign
donors and international NGOs, and to put in place a mechanism to ensure swift and smooth51

communications with them in advance. To fully respond to a disaster as intermediaryorganisations, they need to incorporate these responsibilities in their work planning; develop
response capacity including human resources; and improve their management systems.
In addition, it is important to secure dedicated staff that can focus on coordination work,
because requesting NGO and NPO programme staff to participate in coordination meetings
would mean considerable burdens for them on the ground. It is therefore necessary for theseorganisations to recognise that coordination is an essential element of relief activities, and toinvest in securing and developing staff with coordination related knowledge and skills during
the peacetime. If securing such coordination staff is financially difficult, an option could be toregister and retain the trained and qualified staff and mobilise them when faced withemergencies. In other words, NGOs and NPOs should consider the necessity and means toretain human resources before a disaster strikes. In this context, former JOCVs could be auseful pool of talents as well.

(4) Broader coordination mechanisms involving diverse actors including NGOs/NPOs
In order to respond to a large scale disaster in Japan effectively, the central, prefectural andmunicipal governments, designated public institutions, and other actors should understand therole of NGOs and NPOs and the need to cooperate closely with them. It is also important topre-establish a mechanism with the involvement of all the relevant actors. To this effect, thecoordination body for NGOs/NPOs discussed above should take part in the framework ofbroader coordination and represent the views of NGOs and NPOs.
Firstly, the role of NGO/NPO coordination body should be clearly defined in the Disaster
Management Basic Act and relevant disaster management basic plans. This will enable the
NGO/NPO coordination body to engage with the government and other public institutions intheir official capacity. Furthermore, NGO and NPO members should participate ingovernment led meetings for disaster preparedness at the central, prefectural and municipal
levels. Such pre-engagement will ensure that NGOs and NPOs can discuss coordinatedresponse with the disaster response headquarters at central, prefectural and municipal levels inconcrete terms, followed by pre-disaster exercises to test the necessary coordination
arrangements.
In the response to the GEJE, NGOs and NPOs were requested to coordinate among
themselves with the disaster volunteer centers at the prefectural and municipal levels, andwith the volunteer coordination office of the Cabinet Office at the national level. However,coordination of NGOs and NPOs with considerable amount of resources and operational
capacities require a significantly higher level of capacity than what is required for handlingindividual volunteers. It would be practically impossible for a staff at a volunteer center to52

coordinate both the NGOs/NPOs and the individuals in parallel. Thus, it would be morereasonable to establish a body that can coordinate among NGOs and NPOs, separately fromthe volunteer centres. Alternatively, a mechanism needs to be developed to inject necessary
human resources that support the community based relief activities and work in close
partnership with the NGO/NPO coordination body as needed.
For example, in Ishinomaki, a clear division of labour was agreed between the local Councilof Social Welfare and the Ishinomaki Disaster Recovery Assistance Council in a relatively
early phase of the disaster response. Whereas the former focused on the management of
individual volunteers, the latter worked on the coordination and information management ofprogrammes run by NGOs/NPOs. The experience in Ishinomaki, which resulted in an
effective assistance and recovery efforts joined by both the NGO/NPO community and thegovernment authorities, is a good practice that should be considered when designing a future
model of coordination.

(5) Code of conduct for the assistance programmes implemented by NGOs/NPOs
To date, whether the international standards such as the Sphere standards, that have been
primarily developed to support humanitarian assistance in the developing countries, can bedirectly applied to the disaster response in Japan has not been thoroughly examined. However,as discussed in the Section 1 of Part I (Establishment and application of national minimum
standards for future disaster response in Japan, building on exiting international norms andstandards), the NGO/NPO coordination body should promote that NGOs and NPOs should
comply with these normative standards when they are involved in relief operations.
Nevertheless, faced with many emergency situations both in and outside Japan, NGOs andNPOs may have to recruit a significant number of new staff and dispatch them quickly, often
before being able to fully sensitise them with the norms and standards. Few Japanese NGOs
and NPOs have established solid financial bases, and most of them struggle with retaining
staff members as part of their preparedness for future disaster response. In other words, manyof them usually operate with a minimum number of staff, while there is not much room left
for supporting the staff themselves to accumulate knowledge on the international standards,
including training. Therefore, ensuring compliance with the norms and standards cannot beleft with the NGOs and NPOs alone; they require additional support in terms of developing
guidance materials, providing training, and establishing a monitoring mechanism andaccountability framework.

53References• Children’s Charter for Disaster Risk Reduction (by UNICEF, PLAN, Save the Children, World
Vision)http://www.childreninachangingclimate.org/database/CCC/Publications/children_charter.pdf• Ensuring inclusion of Older People in Initial Emergency Needs Assessments (HelpAge)
http://www.helpage.org/what-we-do/emergencies/ensuring-inclusion-of-older-people-in-initial-e
mergency-needs-assessments/• Guidelines for Gender Based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Settings (IASC, 2005)
https://sites.google.com/site/iascguidanceforum/gender/guidelines-for-gender-basedviolence-interventions-in-humanitarian-settings-2005• Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (OCHA, 1998, 2nd Edition 2004)
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/GuidingPrinciplesDispl.pdf• Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (Global Protection Cluster Working
Group, 2010)https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/IDP%20Handbook_FINAL%20All%20document_
NEW.pdf• Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) http://www.hapinternational.org/• Humanitarian Action and Old Persons: An Essential Brief for Humanitarian Actors (IASC, 2008)https://sites.google.com/site/iascguidanceforum/age/humanitarian-action-and-olderpersons-an-ess
ential-brief-for-humanitarian-actors-2008• IASC Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters (TheBrookings Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2011)https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Operational%20Guidelines.pdf• IASC Policy Statement: Gender Equality in Humanitarian Action (IASC, 2008)https://sites.google.com/site/iascguidanceforum/gender/iasc-policy-statement-gender-equality-inhumanitarian-action-2008• Mainstreaming Disability into Disaster Risk Reduction: A Training Manual (Handicap
International, 2009)http://www.handicap-international.org.uk/Resources/Handicap%20International/PDF%20Documents/HI%20Associations/MainstreamingDisDisasterRiskRedu_2009.pdf• Multi-Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) Framework (IASC, 2012)https://sites.google.com/site/iascguidanceforum/needs-assessment/multi-cluster-initial-rapid-asse
ssment-framework-2012

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• Model Act for the Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial
Recovery Assistance, the Journal of Humanitarian Studies Vol. 3, 2014
• Online Course: Different Needs, Equal Opportunities: Increasing Effectiveness of Humanitarian
Action for Women, Girls, Boys and Men
http://www.iasc-elearning.org/• Operational Guidance for Coordinated Assessments in Humanitarian Crises (IASC, 2012)https://sites.google.com/site/iascguidanceforum/needs-assessment/operational-guidance-for-coor
dinated-assessments-in-humanitarian-crises-2012• The Operational Framework: IASC Taskforce on Accountability to Affected Populations
http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-subsidi-common-default&s
b=89• The Sphere Project – Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response
http://www.sphereproject.org/• Women, Girls, Boys and Men: Different Needs, Equal Opportunities Gender Handbook for
Humanitarian Action (IASC, 2006)
https://sites.google.com/site/iascguidanceforum/gender/gender-handbook-in-humanitarian-action-2006• Istanbul Principles (a Japanese translation)
http://www.janic.org/mt/img/activity/Istanbulprinciples.pdf• Solidarity and sympathy across the border (Japan Platform, 2012)
http://tohoku.japanplatform.org/report/overseas.html (in Japanese)• Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief andInitial Recovery Assistance, the Journal of Humanitarian Studies Vol. 1, 2012, pp. 181-196
http://www.sure.co.jp/JRCS/ihs/journal_01/index.html• Toward a More Resilient Society – Further Actions of the Business Sector and Government (theJapan Business Federation (Keidanren) 2012) https://www.keidanren.or.jp/policy/2012/013.html• Guidelines for Efforts on Disaster Preparedness and Reconstruction from the Gender Equality
Perspective (the Cabinet Office, May 2013)
http://www.gender.go.jp/policy/saigai/shishin/pdf/shishin.pdf• Policies for Providing Disaster Support to Persons Requiring Assistance During a Disaster,Cabinet Office (Disaster Management), August 2013
http://www.bousai.go.jp/taisaku/hisaisyagyousei/youengosya/index.html

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Appendix
List of participants of the Great East Japan Earthquake and International Humanitarian Relief Study(in alphabetical order)
Name

Affiliation (as of March 1, 2014)

Higashiura Hiroshi

Japanese Red Cross College of Nursing
Japanese Red Cross Institute for Humanitarian Studies

Kawahara Setsuko

Hitotsubashi University

Kokawa Naoki

Japanese Red Cross Society

Murakami Takeo

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism

Murata MasahikoDisaster Reduction and Human Renovation Institution

Ohashi Makiko

Japan Platform

Sadamatsu Eiichi

Save the Children Japan

Saito Yukiya

Japanese Red Cross Society

Shiina Noriyuki

Japan Platform

Yanagisawa Kae

Japan International Cooperation Agency

Yoshitomi Nozomu

Japan Ground Research & Development Command

Watabe Masaki

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs* As described in the Preface, the Great East Japan Earthquake and International Humanitarian
Assistance Study was conducted by participants’ voluntary efforts. The recommendations werecompiled by their individual opinions and do not represent the views of their organisations.
* Besides the above participants, officers from the Cabinet Office of the Government of Japan and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs participated as observers.

List of members of the Secretariat for the Great East Japan Earthquake
and International Humanitarian Assistance Study(in alphabetical order)
Name
Katsube Tsukasa

Affiliation (as of March 1, 2014)
Japan International Cooperation Agency
Japanese Red Cross College of Nursing

Kawate Hanayo

Japanese Red Cross Institute for Humanitarian Studies

Nakagawa KaoriJapanese Red Cross Society

Shinozaki Toshiharu

Japanese Red Cross Society
Japanese Red Cross College of Nursing

Tsukada Yoshiko

Japanese Red Cross Institute for Humanitarian Studies

56

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Recommendations by Study Group on the Great East Japan Earthquake & International Humanitarian AssistanceJAPANESE RED CROSS INSTITUTE FOR HUMANITARIAN STUDIESJAPANESE RED CROSS ACADEMYJAPANESE RED CROSS INSTITUTE FOR HUMANITARIAN STUDIES

Recommendations
to prepare for future mega-disasters in Japan

Study Group on the Great East Japan
Earthquake & International Humanitarian AssistanceFebruary 2015