Chernobyl Sufferers in Ukraine and Their Social Problems: Short Outline
Volodymyr TYKHYI
Environmental Education and Information Center
POB 136, Kyiv 245070, Ukraine; eeic@gluk.apc.org
Such slogans were patriotic, but politically neutral andthus safer then direct appeals to independence. Major
political forces were using issues like consequences ofChernobyl disaster, secrecy around this problem,
absence of real consultations with sufferers to prove
the necessity of real changes of the state system.
Soviet Union was facing extremely severe
economic problems in 80-s, caused by the lastingAfghanistan war, huge expenses for armament raceand dramatic 1985 drop in world crude oil prices - oneof the main export commodities and the source of hardcurrency income.
Chernobyl disaster, mitigation of impacts of which
required huge material and labour investments played
an important role in developing economic crisis.
Victims of radiation increased the number of suffering
people which needed urgent help - like invalids ofAfghanistan war, like victims of military conflicts in
Azerbaijan, refugees from Georgia, sufferers of Spitak
earthquake in Armenia, population in the area of Aralsea.
In August 1991, after the unsuccessful attempt of acoup-d’etat in Moscow, Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada
(Parliament) proclaimed the Act of Sovereignty of
Ukraine. The communist party lost its role and in lessthan a year the USSR has disintegrated. Ukraine had
become an independent state with full responsibility
for all positive and negative issues, including thelegacy of Chernobyl catastrophe.
First and subsequent governments of independent
Ukraine faced enormous problems with liquidation ofChernobyl consequences. These problems wereexacerbated by enormous inflation during 1992-1995
and general breakdown of national economy due tovarious reasons. Rapidly decreasing quality of life of
all population did not allow for proper measures toprotect those for suffered from Chernobyl. It is hard tojudge whether there existed adequate political will andcapacities to sort out the problems and properly solvethem.

1. INTRODUCTION.
1.1. Change of nationhood and political system in
Ukraine after the accident.
At the moment of the Chernobyl NPP catastrophe
Ukraine was one of 15 republics of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union). Ukraine
was the second biggest republic (population 51
million) after Russia (population 144 million in 1986).
Soviet Union was a strongly centralised state with one
and very powerful ruling Communist Party (CPSU),
which dominated in all structures - governments, local
authorities, army, businesses, culture, society as awhole.
Formally republics were self-governed, but inreality all important decisions were taken in Moscow
by the Central Committee of CPSU and the so called
Union Government. All management system was
known as “command and control”. The backbone ofvertical authority was the Communist Party
committees of all levels - Central, Republic, Oblast,
district. There were also party committees atenterprises, organisations, villages and city quarters,
which controlled implementation of decisions ofhigher levels. All resources, including financial - forindustries, housing, food etc. - were distributed bycentral government in Moscow. Local governments
and industries were lobbying interests of their regions
and enterprises in Moscow.
Actually the only one way of influencing the state(and at that time everything was state!) policy wasraising an issue at the meeting of a low-level party
committee. Of course, only ideas supported by highlevel party authorities had some chances to be
implemented.
In 1985 a new and dynamic leader of CPSU,
Mikhail Gorbachev launched “perestroyka” reconstruction of the whole system. This had lead to a
substantial weakening of the authority of Communist
Party. One important feature of perestroyka was“glasnost” - opportunity to publicly express one’s
opinion, reveal information etc. This opportunity wasused to disclose facts and consequences of Chernobyl
disaster, and eventually to make this problem an issue
of a public policy. Glasnost was used by active
political forces in republics, first of all Baltic
republics, to begin a struggle for independence.
Similar movements began also in Ukraine, Bielarus
and other republics. Very often “green” slogans(protests against nuclear power plants, polluting
industries) were first in programs of these movements.

1.2. Sufferers from Chernobyl catastrophea) liquidation of the consequences of disaster:“liquidators”
The first statement about Chernobyl catastrophefrom the USSR Council of Ministers said “An accident
has taken place at the Chernobyl power station, andone of the reactors was damaged. Measures are being
taken to eliminate the consequences of the accident”.

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Those who “were taking measures” are the first big
category of sufferers - “liquidators”.
The first who immediately was affected by reactor# 4 explosion was personnel of Chernobyl NPP andfire brigades - many of theses people died, andhundreds lost their health. Urgent measures to prevent
further aggravation of disaster involved thousands ofother specialists and workers. For example, to cool andstrengthen the basement of reactor building a tunnel
under the damaged reactor was dug by miners fromDonetsk oblast - hundreds of them are suffering now
from different diseases. To dampen the fire andcontain the radioactivity, 5 thousand tons of lead,boron and sand had been dropped from helicopters in
the heart of the burning reactor this meant irradiation
among pilots and others who participated in thisoperation.
During May-November 1986 a giant constructionof sarcophagus was erected. To build it out of morethan 400,000 cubic meters of concrete, 7,000 tons ofsteel tens of thousands of construction workers,
engineers, drivers were drafted to work just near thedebris of unit 4, where radiation levels were very high.
The deadly decision to start again reactor # 3,
situated on the same basement with # 4 and sharing a
lot of vital communications, had led to over-irradiationof thousands of workers who constructed necessary
walls and rearranged thousands of pipelines andelectric circuits.
Of course, all these men working at the reactor 4
and around needed food, housing, transportation etc.
Army and militia (police) regiments were guarding thefenced out 30-km exclusion zone. Most of them had
only basic understanding of what’s happening andoften their doses were very high.
During the years after the accident buildings, roads,
machines and equipment needed permanentdesactivation - and again this involved hundreds ofdrivers, dosimetrists, washers. In the course of
desactivation houses in tens of villages weredemolished and buried, and all the so called “redforest” (hundreds of hectares) adjacent to the power
plant, was cut and buried in specially dug huge ditches.
People needed food and basic services, so logisticalproblems were solved on the highest level - in
Moscow, with involved tens of thousands people lived
at a time in the city of Chernobyl 30 km from nuclear
power plant. The biggest canteen in Chernobyl,
organised in a huge ward constructed for cars technicalservice could house more than 1000 men at a time.
First years after the accident “command and control
system” was still strong, and the country (USSR)
worked more or less as an army. Workers for the giant
construction were recruited in all 15 republics, manyof them were volunteers (levels of financial
compensation for possible health problems were quitehigh). Those who did not want to come on their own
were recruited to the Soviet Army and in the 30-km

zone they were doing what was needed - but being
dressed in military uniform.
As it is clear from above mentioned, people weredraft from all parts of Soviet empire - and eventuallydispersed on its wide spreads. No one knows exact
figures - how many “liquidators” worked in
Chernobyl. Some estimates give numbers around
600,000. According to the recent data, in Ukraine live
about 180,000 liquidators. And, of course, much less isknown about liquidators’ radiation doses.
b) population
The second huge category of the sufferers is
population - we will speak of Ukraine. First of all,these were people of nearby cities and villages.
Immediate victims became those who had rest or workout of houses. Some of them contracted even acuteradiation diseases, radiation burns - and all received
enormous doses of iodine on thyroid glands. But thiswas only the beginning - they lost their houses,
property, jobs, their native land, after all.
The 50,000 population of the city of Pripyat wasevacuated two days after the accident, and in latermonths and years still more people were forced toleave their homes. People were resettled to newly
constructed villages, many found shelter with theirrelatives and friend all over Ukraine. They lived as
refugees, very often in unfriendly surrounding - someilliterate men looked at evacuated as lepers.
Evacuation from contaminated areas continued formany years. Plan of Ukrainian Council of Ministers for
1990-1991 previewed evacuation of 45,000 people
from contaminated zones. On contaminated territories
of Ukraine in 1990 lived about 1,5 million people. Allof them were suffering from Chernobyl.
People in contaminated areas were not allowed to
eat wild berries and mushrooms (and this is theterritory where traditionally “gifts of woods” are very
important part of diet), they were not allowed to use
milk of their cows and goats, and the traditional
economy of collective-farms producing milk, meat,
potato, linen collapsed.
It is hard to say whether evacuated people were in abetter situation than those living in contaminated areas(except some limited number of NPP personnel andother privileged categories, who received comfortableapartments in Kyiv and other big cities). The quality of
new settlements, built for the evacuated under a bigtime pressure was often very low, and many people
were moving back to their houses in evacuation zone,
including the 30-km zone around Chernobyl NPP.
There were direct and obvious sufferings like lossof houses, forced abortions or diseases caused bythyroid irradiation. But there were also hidden losses,
like stress, change of life style, uncertainty etc. And, ofcourse, families of Chernobyl “liquidators” suffered a
lot.

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Real fight against secrecy and for the benefit ofsufferers of Chernobyl disaster was launched at thefirst Congress of People Deputies of the USSR, which
took place from 25 May till 10 June in Moscow.
People deputies from Ukraine - Volodymyr
Yavorivsky, Yuri Shcherbak, Borys Oliynyk, Alla
Yaroshynska - raised their voice to help victims ofChernobyl. Right before the Congress, on 24 May
1989, the USSR Government took decision to
unclassify information about Chernobyl disaster.
Unfortunately, it was easier to reveal the truth than toreally help victims.
Another information blockade fell in 1989, when
the documentary “Mi-cro-phone!” had been shown in
the West. Later that year Volodymyr Yavorivsky
openly spoke about the consequences of Chernobyl in
the USA, Yuri Shcherbak was invited to the hearing in
the Swiss Parliament (Switzerland was preparing voteon the future of Swiss nuclear industry), Alla
Yaroshynska participated in a big antinuclear
conference in France.
It was now clear that a lot should be done to solve
the problems of Chernobyl. But it was also 100 % clearthat the public purse of the Soviet Union Central
Government is empty, and Ukraine was to elaborate its
own Chernobyl policy. This was the task for the new
Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine, which waselected in 1990.
Hundreds of candidates to Ukrainian Parliament
included Chernobyl problems in their programs. The
issue of Chernobyl sufferers became the question of areal politics. Basic laws on Chernobyl were adopted
and money were needed to implement them.
Scarce budget resources were needed here andthere, economic crisis in Ukraine became graver, but
the decision was taken to impose a sort of a special
Chernobyl tax and to spend it on the needs ofliquidation of the consequences and mitigation
negative impacts. Here we set aside the question of
how effectively were this money spent.

1.3. Role of media and public politics in disclosing
the real situation of people living in contaminatedareas and liquidators
The information approach of the Soviet
Government towards Chernobyl accident wasformulated in a simple order of 27 June 1986: “Toconsider as secrets: data about the accident; data about
results of treatment of sufferers; data on irradiation of
personnel involved in liquidation of the consequencesof disaster”. Numerous cases of diseases amongliquidators and population of contaminated areas werecalled “radiophobia”.
It was perestroyka and glasnost which eventually
led to the disclosure of the truth about the accident. As
was already mentioned, democratic movements
emerged in many republics of the USSR, and many ofthem were coloured in green. In Ukraine, the first
unofficially (not by the order from the party
committee) big rally in Kyiv was organised by
Ukrainian Environmental Association “Green world”
in November, 1988. At this gathering participants
accused official medicine in hiding up the number ofChernobyl victims, the dangers of living incontaminated areas, in lack of care for liquidators andevacuated people.
One of the biggest information successes was
documentary filmed by Georgi Shklyarevsky(“Mi-cro-phone!”), which revealed the truth about
radiation levels in Narodichi district of Zhytomyr
oblast. This documentary was followed by films andarticles of other journalists. Some films had been
shelved by authorities, like “Threshold”.
Very important role in disclosing the truth aboutliquidators’ sufferings played documentaries by
Rollan Sergiyenko (“Threshold”, “Bells of Chernobyl”
and others). In the West, several documentaries about
Chernobyl disaster in general, about ill children,
abandoned villages and people living in “forbidden
30-km zone” had been shot by different companies andTV programs. They had raise awareness of Western
people and initiated the movement to help Chernobyl
victims.
In fall 1988 - winter 1989 an election campaign ofthe first almost free elections of people deputies of the
USSR began (role of People Deputies was to someextent similar to the role of Members of Parliament inWestern democracies). Many candidates included
requests connected with Chernobyl disaster in theirprograms. For example, Alla Yaroshynska from
Zhytomyr oblast wrote in her program: “It is necessary
to publish data on the consequences of radioactive
contamination in Narodichi district, which arethoroughly hidden from the people. There are many
villages with extremely high levels of radiation. On
radioactively contaminated areas new construction has
been organised, and more than 50 million roubles had
been already invested. It is necessary to investigate theusefulness of this construction”.

2. STATE ACTIVITIES TO RESOLVE THE
PROBLEMS OF SUFFERERS OF
CHERNOBYL CATASTROPHEAs it was described in part 1.1, by the “State” wemean the Soviet Union and its part Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic in 1986 -1991, and an independent
state Ukraine after December 1991. We will discuss
efforts and successes of both legislative and executive
branches of power, often calling both “Government”,
although interrelations among them were not clear andobvious.
Of course the state (government) - taxpayers, as wewould say now - carried the main burden of helping
sufferers from Chernobyl. Public activity was essential
to disclose the consequences and to attract attention of
the state to this or that important issues. Public also
played
the
main
role
in
“independent”,

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non-governmental assistance, and this is the topic ofchapter 3 of this report.

houses had been built for people evacuated from rural
areas. People from cities Pripyat (50,000) and
Chernobyl (12,000) received apartments in Kyiv,
Chernigiv and other cities of Ukraine and other Soviet
republics. Many of them moved in October 1988 to thecity of Slavutich, built for the personnel of re-started
Chernobyl NPP.
As always, a lot of abuses were happening with
distribution of apartments, benefits, compensations.
To solve their problems, people wrote letters toprosecutors offices, local and central party
committees, Councils of Ministers. Pushing theseletters through “corridors of power” were people
deputies of all levels, journalists, some publicorganisations.
Evacuated people faced many problems. Often thequality of new-built houses was bad, they were cold
and wet. Nature conditions in areas of resettlement
were different from those of Chernobyl area - steppes
instead of woods. People were complaining, some had
moved back to their abandoned villages. In autumn
1988 more than 1000 people lived in the 30-km zone as a rule, older people, pensioners. Some assistance forthem was provided by the administration of the 30-km
zone and, from time to time, they received shipmentsof humanitarian aid.
Even in the privileged city Slavutich, built by joint
efforts of 8 Soviet republics, people were sufferingfrom lack of medical care, poor food supply,
uncertainty. The council of Slavutich publicorganisation “Pripyat society” which consolidated
more than 2,000 former inhabitants of the city of
Pripyat, had written numerous appeals, asking vitalquestions: “Who will calculate our real doses? Whowill organise medical treatment and rest for ourchildren - many of them are ill? When will we receive
compensations for the damage to our health? The cityof Slavutich is located in radioactively contaminatedarea, will we have respective privileges?”/2, p.105/
Similar issues were raised by the people in manyother areas, like Narodichi, Ovruch, Polisske andothers. They pointed out that levels of contamination
were too high for safe living - why than to invest? “In
our district - 25,000 people. In the district 67 million
rubbles has been spent for new construction. 37
millions planned for this year. Easy calculations showthat these sums would allow construction of 90
five-storey apartment houses, and all rayon would
have homes. Where than this money is invested, when
the decision is to be made on evacuating people fromthis land? Who benefits from this wasted millions?..
Why should someone supply us “clean” food when we
could harvest them ourselves on “clean” lands?” /2,
p.147/
Still there are no answers to these questions.
Polisske, many villages in Narodichi and other
districts are abandoned now, in 1997 - after all
desactivations and construction...

2.1. Soviet “command and control” period.
Immediate measures and attempts to formulate abalanced policy
The state was bad prepared to a disaster of such
scale as Chernobyl and most of necessary decisions
were drafted and taken immediately when they wereneeded. Fortunately in the initial period there werematerial and financial resources available and amechanism of direction was in place - an “undivided
union” of the party, the state, the army. Thismechanism was not perfect, and its quality was quickly
deteriorating, undermined as well by Chernobyl itself.
Obviously Chernobyl disaster was not a case for a
public policy, and it would not be such case in any
other political system, at least during the initial period.
The Soviet people were silent, they did not have vote.
They received such vote only at the First Congress of
the People Deputies of the USSR in 1989.
Executive power of the USSR - Council of
Ministers and numerous ministries - behaved
practically independently from the Supreme Soviet(Parliament) until 1989. First period was marked byattempts to hide and to diminish the consequences, andmany efforts were needed to alter this approach (seepp.1.3 and 3.1 of this paper).
First decisions on compensations for those working
at Chernobyl NPP and around, as well as for thoseevacuated, had been taken by the Central Committeeof the Communist Party and the Council of Ministersof the USSR 7 May 1996. Workers received higher
rates, those relocated from the zone of disaster insurance compensations for their houses and one-time
gratuities up to 4,000 rubbles per person. It should be
noted that insurance premiums were several times
lower than the real cost of abandoned households.
Of course, no compensation was received by
women who underwent abortions during evacuationand first weeks after the accident. We could not findthe number of such women or reliable information onwhether and according to which criteria abortions wererecommended (or not recommended) to pregnant
women. This information is missing, although in thefirst period after the accident 2,000 medical teams
examined 135,000 evacuated from the 30-km zone,“paying special attention to children and pregnant
women” /1, p.540/. Could they turn the time back andannihilate huge doses accumulated by future mothers
and foetus? Could they eliminate, reduce orcompensate future impacts of these doses?
The question of desirability or necessity ofabortions was also widely discussed in all area around
Chernobyl, including Kyiv.
By mid-August 1986 some 90,784 persons were
evacuated from Ukrainian area around Chernobyl.
According to the ordinances of the Council of
Ministers of Ukraine more than 11,000 one-family
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Many people in contaminated areas (especiallythose with children) requested evacuation. Manyothers preferred to live where they lived but insisted on
improving infrastructure (gas and water pipelines,
paved roads, medical services) and financial
compensations. Government was manoeuvring
between these two options - both needed huge money,
and after 2 years of central (USSR) funding the burden
was shifting to Ukrainian budget.
The choice between evacuation and compensations
was extremely controversial. Moreover, scientific andlegal backgrounds for decisions were missing. As it
was put in March, 1989 by TASS news agency: “TheUkraine Health Ministry has recommended theevacuation of five villages in the affected area, eventhough the ministry insisted that there hasn’t been an
increase in radiation-related “congenital anomalies” ortumour or blood diseases”/3/.
By the end of 1989 a low effectiveness ofdesactivation efforts became obvious and the Councilof Ministers of Ukraine issued an ordinance allowing
people with children under 14 to leave contaminatedvillages. Actually this decision was providing for somecompensation for households which was left by people
in contaminated areas. Calculations performed in theend of 80-th had proven that per capita costs ofcompensations and rehabilitation measures for people
who live in contaminated areas are more than 2 times
higher than the costs for evacuation.
In 1990 - 1992 several ordinances were endorsedby the Council of Ministers of Ukraine regarding
obligatory evacuation, voluntary evacuation andcompensations for those who live on contaminatedareas. In 1990-1991 there were 13 658 obligatory
evacuated persons and 58,700 “voluntary” resettles /1,
p.88/.
By 1995 in 57 Ukrainian villages and settlements
around Chernobyl lived less than one half ofpre-disaster population (we do not mean thosesettlements which were evacuated).
Liquidators were also badly suffering from poor
medical treatment, low pensions and low
compensations for their lost health. Many of themwere invalids but could not receive official proof that
their diseases had been caused by irradiation during
their work in the 30-km zone. In specialised wards andclinics for liquidators hunger strikes took place.
In March 1990, the Council of Ministers of the
USSR and the All Union Central Council of Trade
Unions adopted a special provision which defined thestatus of “liquidator”, demanded regular medical
examination of such people and determined someprivileges to liquidators. This provision had been put
into effect from 1 June, 1990 when the first certificatesto liquidators had been issued.
Nevertheless, it was obvious that “soviet justice”
did not work any more and real laws and mechanisms
for their implementation are needed.

During September-October 1989 Councils of
Ministers of Ukrainian SSR, Bielorussian SSR and
Russian Federation developed the complex
perspective plans of liquidation of consequences ofChernobyl disaster, and the Supreme Soviet(Parliament) of the USSR approved respective State
Union-Republican Program. In line with this work, on
the 28 of February 1991 Verkhovna Rada (Parliament)of Ukraine passed a law “On the status and social
protection of citizens who had suffered due toChernobyl catastrophe”. The Parliament also approved
the “Concept of safe living on the territories of
Ukrainian SSR with high levels of radioactive
contamination due to Chernobyl catastrophe”.
In the same time the Parliament adopted decisionon the source of funding for implementation of theselaws. Enterprises were obliged to pay to a special Fundof Liquidation of the consequences of catastrophe
19 % (later 12 %) of sums of their wages-funds.

2.2. The Law of Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic (the law of Ukraine) of 28.02.91 and its
implementation
The Law had been passed by the Parliament of
Ukrainian SSR 28 February 1991. It was drafted undera serious pressure from “Chernobyl” lobby - people
deputies and organisations who represented liquidatorsand those living in contaminated areas. Later the Law
underwent some serious amendments in 1992, 1993
and 1996, mainly because an application of the law
revealed some economic miscounts.
“The Law is directed at protection of citizens who
have suffered in consequence of Chernobyl
catastrophe, and at solving connected with it problemsof medical and social character which have appeared
because of radioactive contamination of the territory.
The state policy in the area of social protection of
sufferers from Chornobyl catastrophe... is based on theprinciples:- priority of life and health of people, who havesuffered from Chornobyl catastrophe, full
responsibility of the state for creating safe andnon-harmful conditions of work;...
- social protection of people, full compensation of
detriment to people who have suffered in theconsequence of Chernobyl catastrophe;- use of economic methods of improving quality oflife by employing policy of preferential taxation of
citizens who have suffered from Chernobyl
catastrophe and their unions...” (Article 1. Here andonwards the law is quoted in unofficial translation of
the author of this paper).
According to the Article 70, added in 1996, citizens
received the right to protect in the court their interests
and rights guaranteed by this Law.
a) The Law explicitly distinguishes two groups those who worked on liquidation (liquidators), and239

citizens (including children) who lived or lives inaffected areas (suffers). Children also constitute a
separate group with a separate system of privileges andcompensations (Chapter V of the Law).
There are four categories of persons who havesuffered from Chernobyl. These categories are definedaccording to the level of damage for their health(manifested and potential) during their work or
because they have lived in contaminated areas.
Liquidators have categories from 1 to 3, sufferers havecategories from 1 to 4. Depending on their category
people receive “general compensations and privileges”(Chapter IV. Social protection of the citizens...
General compensations and privileges).
Disabled (both liquidators and sufferers) who had
lost their health as a result of Chernobyl catastrophe
constitute the category # 1. To receive this category a
person must have a decision (based on medical
examinations, records etc.) of a special certified
medical commission which “ascertains a causal nexusof disease or disability and Chernobyl catastrophe”.
These commissions work in oblast centres.
Whether liquidator (not disabled) receives acategory # 2 or # 3 depends on the period and durationof his/her work on liquidation. The fact of his work has
to be proven by respective records at the enterprise
which issued his/her assignment. For example, toreceive category # 2 one should have worked “anynumber of days in a period from 26 April until 1 July
1996, or more than 5 days in a period from 1 July until
31 December 1996, or more than 14 days in 1997”(Article 14). Another time scale is used for category#3.
Of course, not all records at the enterprises were
kept in proper order, and this had led to a numerous
cases when people could not receive respective
category. Even more frequent were abuses and false
documents. Lyubov Kovalevskaya reported /4, p.307/
that of 14 scrutinised 2-nd category “liquidators” fromhigh-level trade-union office only one half proof theircategory. In 1996 the state launched campaign ofverification of liquidators’ and sufferers’ documents.
b) Definition of categories of “sufferers” is basedon the level of radioactive contamination of soil inaccordance with the Article 2 of the Law: “Categories
of zones of radioactively contaminated territories”.
There are four zones.
The worst zone # 1 is an “alienation zone” territory from which people were evacuated in 1986.
“Zone of unconditional (obligatory) resettlement”(#2), “zone of guaranteed voluntary resettlement” (#3), “zone of intensified radiological control” (# 4) aredefined according to the levels of contamination. For
example, territory is defined as a zone # 4 if it iscontaminated by caesium isotopes with density 1.0 to
5.0 Ci/sq.km, or strontium 0.02 to 0.15 Ci/sq.km or
plutonium 0.005 to 0.01 Ci/sq.km. There are some

additional criteria stipulated by the National
commission of radiation protection.
Actual category assigned to each sufferer depends
on the zone where he/she lived, and the period andduration of living in this zone. e.g., if “a person
permanently lived at the territory of unconditional(obligatory) resettlement on the date of disaster, or by
the 1 January 1993 lived not less than two years in thezone of unconditional (obligatory) resettlement...” thisperson belongs to category # 3.
Actually for categories # 2 , # 3 and # 4 the Law
does not distinguish the harm which has been alreadymanifested (in the form of some diseases, or more
frequent illnesses, or psychic misfunctions) andpotential harm which has not yet developed in some
visible form.
Dynamic of numbers of sufferers is impressing,partly because of changes in legislation directed atbetter social protection of sufferers and partly becauseof natality. During 1886-1995 the number of people
which have the status of sufferer according to
Ukrainian laws increased from 540,000 to 940,000 in1990 and 3,200,000 in 1995 (of them 997,000
children) /1, p.129/.
There are seven grounds why a child can be thesufferer from Chernobyl catastrophe: evacuated fromalienation zone, those who lived certain number ofyears in other contaminated zones, were born fromparents who were sufferers of 1st, 2nd or 3rd category,those who have thyroid cancer or radiation sickness,those with thyroid doses higher than the levelestablished by the Ministry of Health (Article 27).
Medical treatment of children sufferer is defined aspriority for all medical programs and is performed by
the best medical and recreational facilities.
Children sufferers from Chernobyl catastrophe
have privileges and compensations similar to those of
adult sufferers. It is hard to say how efficient are allthese measures, and how effective is government inproviding equal access of all sufferers to the existing
opportunities.
c) There are three other special chapters in the Law.
Chapter VI defines mainly compensations andassistance for evacuated people for lost of theirproperty. It also prescribes regulations on providingthem with new housing.
Chapter VII regulates the work rules andremuneration for those working in contaminated areas.
Chapter VIII is specifically devoted to pensions,pensions due to disability caused by Chernobyl, andcompensations to families that had lost providers.
According to the system of social protection,“general compensations and privileges”
highercategories of sufferers have more privileges. The main
components of this system are: health (medical care);recreation (vacations, sanatorium); material aids likeapartments, houses, reduced rates for water and heatand electricity; social benefits - schools, universities;

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economic - taxes and custom privileges; lower pension
ages and higher pensions; transportation privileges
and others.
These are long and complicated lists: 32 points for
category #1, and somewhat shorter lists for othercategories.
Never the system was accomplishing in full all thathas been prescribed by the law. Always there werepeople waiting apartments or houses, or waiting free
bed in a hospital, or disabled people waiting promisedcars. According to the published data (we do not speakof real situation) allocated state funds allowed forcovering recreation expenses for each second sufferer
in 1991, each third in 1992, each eighth in 1995 /1,
p.128/.
For example, all categories can get medicines freeof charge, but this good provision very often does notwork because pharmacies do not have needed
medicines in stock.
Some privileges were directly leading to abuses,
like tax exempt status for liquidators or permission toimport everything free of charge. There were many
articles in newspapers telling of liquidators or sufferers
who managed to import new cars every second week.
There were also enterprises importing lot of goods
duty free and then selling them. Of course theseenterprises claimed that this money is being used forthe “protection of the sufferers of Chernobyl disaster”,
but it was hard to control their compliance. As a result,taxation and import privileges were soon revoked.
Some privileges were substantial at the time ofendorsement of the law, like compensation forrecreation or additional annual payments or special
payments for “clean” food. Now many of them are
negligible and result mainly in extra paper work foraccountants, like 2.10 hryvna ($1.1) monthly extra
payment for “clean” food in zone # 3.
The Law bears all signs of the so called “socialist
distribution system”. At that time (and sometimes nowtoo) the state was the biggest owner and investor in
housing, communication systems (telephones),
educational and transportation system etc. Easier (inthe first place or jumping the queue) access to these
services and facilities was a benefit in itself, and this isoften mentioned in the law. Indeed this system worked(and was also a huge temptation for abuses).
Liquidators could even buy motor boats and vacuum
cleaners “out of queue”.
Almost at the same time when the Law had been
passed the State Committee on Chernobyl was createdto manage all related problems (later - the Ministry of
Chernobyl). Local authorities with all theirinfrastructure (social care, medical care etc.) were also
extremely tightly involved in these activities. Special“Chernobyl” departments were organised in rayon
state administrations and now they carry main
responsibility for accounting of sufferers, their needsetc.

d) There are two sorts of compensations: for thedamage to health and for lost property. Calculations ofcompensations for health are based on the minimalmonthly salary, which is specified by the Parliament(17 hryvna, or $9.20 in 1997).
For example, one-time compensation for people
who were commissioned as disabled of the 1st group(as a rule, these people cannot work and needassistance in everyday life) is 60 minimal salaries(1,020 hryvna, or $550). There are also compensations
for families, children of disabled parents etc.
Sufferers of all categories have some extra
payments to their pensions and lower pension age. The
pension age for category # 2 is lowered by 8 years, so
men can become pensioners in 52 instead of 60.
Pensioners of this category receive monthly an extra
payment 30 % of minimal pension.
Compensations for lost property are defined in a
special chapter of the law. This was one of the mostcontroversial issue during all period after thecatastrophe, because of extremely diverse conditionsof living before and after the resettlement, and becauseof quickly changing and aggravating economic
situation in Ukraine.
Another serious issue was construction of housing
and respective infrastructure for evacuated people andresettles. With the so high state expenses on thisconstruction (up to 15 % of all state capital
investments) abuses with construction materials andfunds were very frequent. And, of course, programs of
construction were not achieved: in 1992 the programof resettlement was fulfilled on 19 %, and the programof housing construction on 28 % /5, p.668/.
Compensations, privileges and direct expenses on
liquidation of the consequences of the catastrophe (e.g.
maintenance of the infrastructure of the 30-km zone)
have been an incredible burden on Ukrainian
economy. The share of these expenses in the budget of
Ukraine was 15.7 % in 1992, 10.9 % in 1993, 5.4 % in1994 and 3.4 % in 1995 /1, p.79/. The biggest part ofthis money has been spent on compensation. The
structure of Chernobyl budget (estimate) looks like thefollowing: compensations 50 %, resettlement 20 %,health care 9 %, “Shelter (Sarcophagus)” and 30-km
zone 5 %, Agriculture/Forestry 6 %, other 10 %. As it
was mentioned before, these money are collected as
obligatory payments to the special “Chernobyl” fund:enterprises pay 12 % of their wage-fund.
Ukrainian Parliament and Cabinet of Ministers
have been facing intense pressure from all sectors ofsociety which badly needed financial and otherresources: social protection, medical care, education,
local authorities of non-Chernobyl areas and so on. Of
course the relatively high privileges to Chernobyl
sufferers look unfair. Why only those who had
suffered from Chernobyl and radiation are receiving so
much? Why not the other areas of environmental
crisis, like heavily polluted cities of Dniprodzerzhynsk

241

or Mariupol? Why only Chernobyl children and not
those children who are from time to time loosing hairto full boldness in many areas of Ukraine, probably
because of high non-specific chemical contaminationof air, water and food? This acute problem is still far
from solution.
As it was already mentioned, some controversial
provisions of the law, like tax exempt status oforganisations working in contaminated areas, orimport laws for “Chernobyl” organisations have been
already revoked.

organisations, Ukrainian Peace Committee and someothers.
At the same time, specialised “Chernobyl” funds
had been set up in foreign countries. During his visit in
the US in October 1989 Volodymyr Yavorivsky
implored America’s help in forestalling the tragedy ofChernobyl victims. And Americans
shippedhumanitarian load of medicines, vitamins, powderedmilk to Ukraine. All organisation was done by
Chernobyl Fund organised by the family of Ukrainian
Americans Matkivsky and their colleagues. This
shipment was distributed among the people incontaminated areas by Ukrainian movement forindependence and perestroyka - Rukh.
In spring of 1989 liquidators and former workers ofChernobyl NPP founded their own NGO - “Soyuz
Chernobyl” (Chernobyl Union). Later this union
became an international organisation.
Many other international activities were taking
place during 1989-1990. We will briefly describe
some as examples - not because they are better ordifferent from others, but because an author was
somehow involved in them.
a) A very attractive program of support had beensuggested by Prof. Edmund Lengfelder from Munich
University. Numerous German organisations andauthorities (including universities, cities, lands)
supplied dosimetric and diagnostic equipment,
medical instruments etc. to Ukrainian and Bielorussian
hospitals. This action was planned as trilateral
co-operation (Germany, Ukraine, Bielorussia), butlater Germans concentrated their efforts on
Bielorussia. Results of the action were somewhat
disappointing for Germans, as during follow-up visits
they often found expensive diagnostic equipment to be
not in use.
b) French organisation “Medicins du mond“ set up
a diagnostic laboratory in Kyiv to investigate
Chernobyl children. Organisation worked in close
relations with local medical authorities. Unfortunately,organisation provided only limited treatment for ill
children who were investigated, this was considered
unfair (“you use us as guinea pigs”), and after a year
the mission was wrapped up.
c) One of the first international organisations whichcame to Ukraine was Greenpeace. In 1989 Greenpeace
set up Ukrainian office with a clear name “Greenpeace Children of Chernobyl”. The aim of thisoffice was to set up a hospital for Chernobyl children,
equipped by the most sophisticated equipment.
Negotiations with Ukrainian medical and Government
authorities
were very hard, but eventually allnecessary approvals were obtained. Unfortunately,when the design of reconstruction of one of children
hospitals was ready, agreement was cancelled by
Ukrainian side. Greenpeace was forced to end up withequipping of biochemical laboratory in one of Kyiv
children hospitals. Canadian technicians and doctors

3. PUBLIC MOVEMENT IN UKRAINE AND
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES TO HELPPEOPLE AFFECTED BY CHERNOBYLACCIDENT
3.1. International medical and humanitarian aid
In this chapter we will pay special attention to“informal”, non-governmental help from international
community to sufferers of Chernobyl. Few projects ofinternational organisations (IAEA, WHO), very often
quite negatively perceived by Ukrainian people,
require separate analysis. As a rule the goal of theseprojects was to offer research assistance to respective
Ukrainian institutions and thus these projects were tosome extent not directly aimed at sufferers, but at somemedical problems.
When Chornobyl nuclear reactor exploded, theSoviet rulers did not yet comprehend the poverty of thestate. Ukrainian government, headed at that time by
the First Secretary of the Communist Party of
Ukrainian Republic Volodymyr Shcherbytsky,
refused to accept assistance from foreign countries.
Nonetheless, the policy of openness initiated by
Mikhail Gorbachev was gradually dismantling the“iron curtain”. Soviet-American Peace Marches,
ecological conferences touched the problems ofChernobyl victims.
Assistance came first from non-governmentalorganisations and charitable foundations. First it was
dosimetric and medical equipment, then medicines,
vitamins, food. Concentrated efforts were made toprotect children.
The process of development of foreign assistanceto Chernobyl victims went hand in hand with theprocess of democratisation in the USSR. Of course,
foreign donors needed domestic Ukrainianorganisations to advise what is the best way ofassistance and to practically deliver this assistance.
From the very beginning the leading role in thesecontacts belonged to newly emerged NGOs - like“Zeleny svit (Green world)”, “Chernobyl Union”,“Children of Chernobyl”, “Rukh (Movement)”.
Founded in 1989, later Rukh had become a politicalparty. Very often the role of mediators was played bywell established Soviet “quasi-NGOs” liketrade-unions, young communist and pioneer
242

worked more then one year in the lab performing
analyses needed by Ukrainian doctors. Finally the lab
was donated to the city of Kyiv. The University ofAlberta continued the program of training for
Ukrainian doctors using grants from CanadianGovernment.
Later on Greenpeace had set up (jointly with
International Renaissance (Soros) Foundation andUkrainian Environmental Association “Zeleny Svit
(Green World)” an independent environmentallaboratorywhich
investigatedradioactive
contamination of soil, food, water in the area around
Chernobyl.
d) Very attractive was the project developed by Dr
Martin Walter from the Swiss branch of IPPNW(International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear
War) and later implemented by SKH (Swiss
Commission for Help in Catastrophes). Swissorganisations equipped rayon hospital in Polisske,
Kyiv oblast, with modern diagnostic equipment andseveral years Swiss doctors lived and worked in
Polisske side by side with their Ukrainian colleagues.
It is hard to believe that Polisske was evacuated in mid
90th (after construction of natural gas supply network,building new apartment houses, reconstruction ofroads and millions of roubles invested in
desactivation...)Generally speaking, Ukrainian medical authorities
were friendly, but not very constructive. It looked as if
they suspected foreign organisations in attempts oflearning something secret and extremely valuable
about radiation diseases and suffering children. It wasalso very hard to get letters of acknowledgement from
Ukrainian medical organisations and doctors.
Many foreign organisations got involved inassistance to children, including complicated andexpensive medical treatment. “Help Chernobyl
children” projects were taking all possible forms:
organised groups of children, stay in families,
organised vacations in Ukraine etc. Tens of countries
in Western and Eastern Europe, former Soviet Union,
Americas and on other continents - hosted Chernobyl
children from Ukraine (and continue to do this now, in
1997!) All sorts of organisations were counterparts offoreign donors in Ukraine. Some figures related to
Chernobyl Union activities you can find below, butthat is only a small example.
First groups of children often were undergoing
careful and specialised medical examinations, but later
it appeared not necessary. Some projects were quite
controversial, like an annual treatment of Chernobyl
children in Cuba hospitals - many experts said that theclimate was too hot and transportation costs were too
high, but the project goes on.
A lot of humanitarian aid shipments were received
in Ukraine. This was medicines, syringes, vitamins,
powdered milk etc - tens of 20-ton trucks andairshipments a year. As a rule, such goods were

distributed to hospitals and clinics, but also directly to
big families, disabled.
The fact of supplying food needs some explanation.
The region of Ukrainian-Bielorussian Polissie is arural, quite poor area with forests, small villages andvery bad road system. Traditionally people depended
mainly on home supply of food - milk and milk
products, potatoes. Wild berries and mushrooms was
substantial part of a diet. After the accident, when milk
was very radioactive and definitely not recommended
for children and babies, this problem became
extremely acute: supply of safe fresh milk from
elsewhere was practically impossible, and Soviet
industry producing children and baby food wasagonising (as many other industries at that time).
Purchases of imported baby food were limited becauseof lack of hard currency resources. Thus, any
shipment of baby and children food was indeed vital.
Disappointments also happened during thishumanitarian aid activities - both from foreign andUkrainian sides. Foreigners complained for unfair
distribution of donations, Ukrainians accusedforeigners of supply of outdated medicines or broken
equipment. Officials dreamed of co-ordination. An
attempt to set up a Co-ordination Committee was madeat a Congress of World Federation of Ukrainian
Medical Societies in 1991. Fortunately or not, bothco-chairmen of Committee did not start a real work,and the idea died without consequences. It seems,
however, that the need in co-ordination was quite real in 1992 the same appeal was expressed by Volodymyr
Yavorivsky.
Eventually Committee on Humanitarian Aid had
been created at the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. It
was headed by Vice Prime-Minister and was solving
all questions related to receiving and distribution ofhumanitarian help. By 28 December 1992 11,439 tonsof humanitarian shipments were received in Ukraine /1
p.176/. Of course it is impossible to believe that allloads had been registered at this Committee, so actual
number is higher. The biggest donor was Germany(about 50 % of all aid), then Italy, France, USA andother countries. Of received humanitarian aid 67 %was food, 18 % medicines and medical equipment, and
15 % of clothing’s and other goods.
Some less successful fund-raising activities wereorganised by Chernobyl NGOs in the end of 80th beginning of 90th. These were bus tours to European
countries, tele-maraphones, exhibitions. Expenses forsuch events were sometimes comparable to the sums
collected. Some Western Europeans had already sadexperience with individual “Chernobyl fund raisers”,
which collected money or medicines and later werereported to sell these medicines to clinics.
Gradually children summer recreation has become
the main “Chernobyl aid” activity, while medical
problems are being solved mainly under bilateral or
multilateral intergovernmental projects. As an243

example, the Sasakava Fund helped in equipping andfinancing examinations of children in several clinics,
including one in Ovruch (Zhytomyr oblast).
Intergovernmental assistance to sufferers was quite
limited. For example, in September 1991 the special
Conference was held in New York to create a special
Chernobyl Fund for three regions of the former USSR.
Total collected sum amounted to $1,500,000 /1,
p.161/. This poor result was partly a consequence ofthe report prepared and published by the IAEA. This
report was prepared during an international
investigation headed by Itsuzo Shigematsu (by theway, investigation did not include liquidators). At thevery first stages of the investigation “green
movement” strongly protested against biased approachof IAEA. When the report has been published theGovernment of Ukraine also objected against its
conclusions.

the badly needed Chernobyl legislation through theParliament.
Another important project of “Green world” was an
Independent Chernobyl Investigation (1990-1992),
with participation of lawyers, witnesses etc. This was
an attempt to give a legal appraisal of actions ofgovernment officers and all others responsible for
Chernobyl disaster and clean up (liquidation ofconsequences). Ideally that would have allowed thevictims of Chernobyl disaster to sue the state, officers
or managers and to receive through court procedure ajust compensation for loss of health or property.
Unfortunately, very few lawyers agreed to participate
in this project (organisers were thinking of a trial
similar to Nuremberg Tribunal). As a result, collected
evidences and their legal appraisal did not haveconvincing value. What is even more important,government officers who were responsible for
Chernobyl decisions are still active politicians andthey would never allow such process to go too far.
While “Green world” worked primarily with the
population of contaminated areas, similar role forliquidators and evacuated people played another NGO“Chernobyl Union International” (CUI), founded in
Ukraine in 1989 and registered as an internationalorganisation in 1991. The primary aim of CUI was “toaddress and mitigate the consequences of theaccident... by assisting the 1.5 million direct victims of
the Chernobyl catastrophe including children andthose disabled due to the effect of the explosion, todeal with the extraordinary social, economic andmedical needs they are facing” (Statute ofInternational Organization “Chernobyl Union”,
registered in the Ukraine Ministry of Justice 24th
February, 1992).
Funds for its activity CUI received from othercharitable organisations abroad - Bavarian Red Cross,German land and city governments, clinics etc. CUI
has not been the recipient of aid, but has served as thefacilitator and co-ordinator of relief to institutions,
hospitals, clinics etc. The cost of goods and medicines
distributed by CUI in Ukraine amounted to tens of
millions dollars (compare $1,500,000 collected at the
UN Conference in 1991, p.3.1 above).
CUI played an important role in initiating anddrafting laws concerning the status and social needs ofChernobyl victims. At that time the CUI President
Volodymyr Shovkoshytny was a People Deputy of
Ukraine.
Important and still going on program of CUI wasorganisation of children rest abroad: 231 children in
1990, 1520 in 1991, 1800 in 1992 and so on.
There are also several NGOs named “Children of
Chernobyl” in Ukraine and other countries. They
organise treatment of children and their rest abroad
and in Ukraine.
Separate investigation is needed to assess the roleand results of activities of different charitable

3.2.Non-governmental “Chernobyl” organisations
Ukrainian writers were the first who began
campaign to disclose the truth of Chernobyl in
Ukraine. In 1988 the first “green” NGO in Ukraine wascreated - “Zeleny Svit (Green World)”. It was an
association with numerous member organisations inmany oblasts and districts of Ukraine. Of course,
Chernobyl problems were of the highest priority forthe “Green world”. In 1989 another network of small
NGOs appeared as part of “Green world” - Union“Salvation from Chernobyls”. Organisations of thisUnion were founded mainly in contaminated areas.
These NGOs played an important role of pressuregroups. This was “vox populi”, and it was used bypeople deputies and local authorities of contaminatedregions to redistribute resources in favour ofcontaminated areas. Often local politicians were using
support from these groups in their election campaigns
and legislative work.
An important example of such activity was the firstpublic meeting of the State Commission for
Liquidation of the Consequences of Chernobyl
Accident in Narodichi, Zhytomyr oblast in August,1989.
Later that year an antinuclear, anti-Chernobyl
march had been jointly organised by “Green world”
and Ukrainian movement for perestroyka “Rukh”.
March started at Khmelnytska NPP in Western
Ukraine and was to finish in Kyiv. On the route rallies
were taking place in numerous villages and towns:
people protested against the secrecy in Chernobyl
affairs, demanded fair compensation for the victims,
demanded clean food, medicines for sufferers,
evacuation of children. More than 300,000 people
from 5 oblasts signed an appeal to the Supreme Soviet(Parliament) of the USSR. This appeal with signatures
had been taken to Moscow and handed over to
Ukrainian members of the Parliament (Shcherbak,
Yavorivsky and others). They use this appeal to push244

foundations and enterprises, which were organised bypeople who had status of sufferers from Chernobyl
disaster. Such organisations enjoyed substantial tax
privileges and other benefits according to Chernobyl
legislation. It is essential that these privileges were
stipulated not by the law itself, but by decrees andordinances of the Cabinet of Ministers, which were
often applied selectively, according to the statutes oforganisations and some other features.

author has also personal experience with the system ofsocial assistance.
The author is well aware that this short report isonly one drop in the process of disclosing of the role
which public and different social forces played during
after-Chernobyl period. While - at last! - many
documents have been published and analysed /1,5/, areally deep and unbiased analysis of the roles of many
important players like IAEA, UN and its organisations,international “green” and anti-nuclear organisations,internal Soviet nuclear lobby, Soviet “green” andpublic movements is needed. Maybe it is still too early
and in-depth analyses is not possible simply because
the drama is not finished yet and many players are stillon the stage.
Of course it is necessary - as gratuity andacknowledgement - to collect and publish information
about all people of good will from all over the world,
who have helped the sufferers of Chernobyl
catastrophe. This should include both official
structures and purely unofficial and private actions.

CONCLUSION
This report is based both on materials published in
the Soviet Union and Ukraine and on author’s personal
experience. Report does not pretend to be a complete
investigation of social activities in Ukraine related to
Chernobyl disaster.
In 1987-1989 the author worked as physicist in the
30-km zone and in other contaminated areas. This
enabled him to meet many people of different levels(administrators, collective-farmers, “self-settlers”
etc.). In 1988-1991 author was an active Board
member and researcher of Ukrainian Environmental
Association “Zeleny Svit (Green World)” - the biggest
and most influential Ukrainian NGO at that time,headed by People Deputy of the Soviet Union Yuri
Shcherbak.
In 1991-1993 the author worked as a ProjectManager and Director of Greenpeace Ukraine office.
That was the time when Greenpeace ran a medical
assistance project and independent investigation ofradioactive contamination in Zhytomyr oblast. These
activities required frequent contacts with the Ministryof Health Protection and members of Ukrainian
Parliament, with people in contaminated areas.
The author also participated in some humanitarian
projects, mainly with Swiss and German partners.
Being a “participant of the liquidation of theconsequences of Chernobyl catastrophe, category 2A”

References
1. Chornobylska katastrofa (Chernobyl catastrophe). Chief editor V.G.Barjakhtar. Kyiv, “Naukova
dumka”, 1996. 576 pp. (in Ukrainian).
2. Alla Yaroshynskaya. Chernobyl’ s nami (Chernobyl
with us). - Moscow, “Kniga”, 1991. 158 pp. (inRussian).
3. Villages Suffering Chernobyl’s Fallout Face Soviet
Silence. By Peter Gumbel. - “The Wall Street
Journal”, 03/06/89.
4. Lyubov Kovalevskaya. Chernobyl DSP (Chernobyl
classified). - Kyiv, 1995. (in Russian).
5. Chornobylska tragedia. Dokumenty i materialy(Chernobyl. Documents and materials). - Kyiv,
1996. (in Ukrainian).

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