The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 34 (2023)

Copyright © 2023 The Japanese Association for American Studies. All rights reserved.

The Role of Congress in the Current Polarized Age:Uniﬁed Decision-Maker or Partisan Arena?
Shunta MATSUMOTO*The U.S. Congress occupies a central place in American representative
democracy. Recently, however, the public has perceived Congress toplay a lesser role than it does in reality partly because Congress’ own
rules and internal organizations make it hard for the public to understandhow Congress works. Given this situation, this paper oﬀers some basic
information about Congress, especially regarding the interaction between
institutional development and polarization, for non-specialists of scholarly
political science. This paper emphasizes three points. First, institutions andparty organizations in Congress have been creations of politics since theﬁrst Congress. The so-called “Textbook Congress,” characterized by weakparties and strong committees, has given way in recent decades to a morepartisan and polarized Congress since the 1970–80s. Second, polarizationand partisanship has been changing an overall function of Congress. Froma comparative framework that classiﬁes legislatures as “transformative
legislatures” and “arenas,” the main function of Congress is graduallyshifting from a uniﬁed decision-maker to a partisan arena. And third,
today’s polarization and partisanship are also altering the discipline ofCongressional studies. Economics-oriented studies dominated in 1980–90s.
However, those studies were designed to explain the Textbook Congress.
With the waning of the Textbook Congress, multiple new theories andmethods began emerging in the 2000s. In particular, a combination ofscientiﬁc and historical studies is promising because the shift from the
Textbook Congress to today’s Congress has been occurring slowly andsteadily over time.

* Professor, Faculty of Law, Meijo University

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INTRODUCTION
Article I, Section 1 of the United States Constitution vests all legislative
power of the U.S. federal government in Congress. The framers of theConstitution underscored the importance of Congress by making it, notthe presidency, the subject of the first article of the Constitution. The
Constitution bestows sweeping powers on Congress, among them to enact
federal laws and the federal budget. Congress occupies a central place inAmerican representative democracy because citizens in Congressional
districts directly elect their members of Congress (hereinafter “members”).
Recently, however, the public has perceived Congress to play a lesserrole than it does in reality. One reason for this is the growth and increasing
power of the executive branch throughout the 20th century, rendering thepresident the primary figure in American politics in the eyes of many.
Further, the very authority and autonomy with which the Constitution
imbues Congress to create its own rules, procedures, precedents, and norms
obfuscates the ability of the public to understand how Congress works.
Over its 234 year history, Congress has evolved and developed
institutionally as it has pursued its original functions of making national
policy and of representing the voters. The history of Congress can besummarized as the ongoing process of the institution maintaining a balance
between making policy that requires compromise among members andrepresenting voters who often do not prefer such compromises.
Political parties (hereinafter “parties”), more specifically, party
organizations within Congress, have played a central role in this process.
Beginning in the 1960–70s and continuing to the present day, the politicaltrend in Congress has been one of intra-party similarity and inter-party
difference in members’ ideology. This phenomenon is usually referred to as“party polarization,” “ideological polarization,” or, simply, “polarization.”
Polarization has created strong party organizations within Congress,
thereby in turn inducing further polarization. Many researchers andcommentators argue that this polarization has led to partisan conflicts thathave undermined the Congress’s performance in making national policy,
and significantly diminished voters’ confidence in the institution.
However, some of these arguments are merely impressionistic and lackany theoretical basis and/or empirical evidence to support them. Indeed,polarization does not lead to poor performance in all aspects of Congress’
functions. There is necessarily a trade-off between the competing functionsof being a forum for intense debate which is usually partisan, and of

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collective decision-making, which is usually more bipartisan and requires
inter-branch engagement. Given this conflict, what is the primary role ofCongress today?
This paper will describe and analyze the relationship between
polarization and development of institutions and party organizations inCongress, and the resulting impact on the overall function of Congress.
My intended audience are scholars in the broad field of American Studies,
who are not familiar with intricacies of American political institutions andscholarly political science.1 This paper makes three main arguments in three
separate sections.
First, Congress today is very much a creation of history and politics.
The institutions and party organizations in Congress have developed
gradually since the framers of the Constitution created the body and set
forth its authority and parameters 234 years ago. In Section I, I will offer
basic information about the history of Congress, especially its internal
institutions and the operation of parties within Congress. I will demonstrate
how Congress in the modern era, the so-called “Textbook Congress,”characterized by weak parties and strong committees during the years afterWorld War II, has given way to the currently more partisan Congress as
parties have become more ideologically polarized and party organizations
have become stronger since the 1970–80s.
Second, polarization and partisanship of recent decades has been
gradually changing the overall function of Congress from one I describe asa “unified decision-maker” to that of a “partisan arena.” In Section II, I will
examine changes in Congress from a comparative framework that classifies
legislatures as so-called “transformative legislatures” and “arenas.” Acomparative perspective between the American presidential system with its
separation of powers between the legislature and the executive, and classic
parliament systems like that of the United Kingdom in this context is vitalto understanding fully Congress’ current evolution from a unified decisionmaker into a partisan arena. This paper goes beyond a simple dichotomy
between the presidential and the parliamentary systems and considers
ways that Congress resembles a parliament. As part of my analysis, I will
devote particular attention to the strength of parties in Congress and theirrelationships with their members, the other party, voters, and the presidency.
Third, I will discuss how polarization and partisanship in Congress today
is altering the very discipline of Congressional studies itself within the fieldof political science. In Section III, I will offer a brief review of politicalscience literature. Economics-oriented studies dominated in 1980–90s.

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However, these studies were basically designed to explain the Textbook
Congress. As the era of the Textbook Congress has been ending, multiple
theories and research methods have emerged since the 2000s based on
behavioral science, data science, and historical studies. In particular, studies
based on so-called American Political Development (APD) seems very
useful for the very reason that the current Congress is a creation of history.
I conclude the paper by offering some reflections and suggestions for future
research.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS AND PARTIES IN CONGRESSThe function of Congress today is primarily the product of historicaldevelopments within the parameters set forth at ratification of theConstitution, not specific dictates set forth in the document itself. I will
begin with a summary of the history of institutions and parties in Congress.2
Multiple and varied interests have driven most institutional changes.3
In this paper, however, I focus the relative strength parties in Congress(e.g., party leaders and organizations) have had over their members overtime, because the balance of power between party leaders and individual
members has always mattered throughout history.
In the prototypical parliamentary system, the majority of members areunder the control of the parliamentary executive, who is selected from theruling party or coalition to head the government, and the members of theminority party or parties oppose the majority. The main function of such
legislatures is what this paper refers to as a “partisan arena,” in whichruling and opposition party members engage in partisan battles in order tobe responsive to partisan voters and to attract voters more generally for the
next election.
However, members of the U.S. Congress essentially act independently.
Members write bills, speak both inside and outside the Capitol, and are free
to vote as they see fit. At the same time, Congress functions to help resolve
members’ regional, societal, and partisan conflicts, and then finally reaches
a single decision with a form of enacting laws and other policies. Thisfunction is what this paper calls a “unified decision-maker.”
Members form party organizations within Congress as long as they have
incentives to do so. Members of each party elect their leaders and delegate
some of their individual authority to the party to pursue their collective
goals such as making law and policy and furthering their own reelections.4
Currently, party “leadership” or “leaders” consist narrowly of theTHE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE CURRENT POLARIZED AGE

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Speaker of the House from the majority party, Leaders or Floor Leaders,and Whips from both parties in both the House and Senate.5 Each partyin each house of Congress has the highest decision-making body, known
as a “party caucus” or “party conference” (hereinafter “caucus”). They
are: the House Democratic Caucus, House Republican Conference, Senate
Democratic Caucus, and Senate Republican Conference.6 These caucuses
elect Leaders, Whips, and candidates for the House Speaker.7 The formalrole of the Speaker of the House is presiding over the House, especially thefloor (i.e., plenary sessions). However, the Speaker usually acts politicallyakin to the Prime Minister in a parliamentary system, using his/herauthority to set the legislative calendar and rules for the floor, and control
other important matters so as to enhance the interests of the majority party.
Leaders represent their party organizations and engage in coordination andnegotiation with the other chamber of Congress, the other party, and theexecutive branch. Whips are ranked second to Leaders. The Whip’s main
responsibility is mobilizing members of their party to vote in favor of theparty’s position in floor votes.
Importantly, history has shown us that the role of these party leaders
has changed over time. The U.S. Constitution neither defines the internal
structure of Congress nor anticipated the emergence of parties. Indeed,in the very early years of Congress, there were almost no rules ororganizations in Congress with which we are currently familiar today.
Almost all characteristics of Congress today are the creation of politics
since the first Congress in 1789. Rules and organizations take various
forms: public laws, internal rules in each chamber, internal rules of party
caucuses, precedents, and unwritten customs.8 The historical developmentof these rules and organizations can be divided into three periods: 1) the
infancy of parties in Congress 2) the “Textbook Congress,” and 3) today’spolarized and partisan Congress. The transition from period 2 to 3 is themain topic of this paper.
Period 1: The Infancy of Parties in Congress
The first period of the institutional development of Congress was marked
by the strengthening of the power of the majority party, especially the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. In initial decades, party leadershipwas generally weak, and the role of the Speaker was not very political.
However, after the Civil War (1861–1865), the Congressional workloadincreased significantly, and greater partisanship emerged. These two factors

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provided members of the majority party an incentive to delegate powers to
the Speaker.9
The watershed was the 1890 adoption of the so-called “Reed’s Rules,”named after Speaker Thomas Reed (R-ME).10 One of the most important
rules pertained to the minority party’s then-existing dilatory tactic ofabusing the quorum call by having its members disappear at the time ofa vote. Just after Reed gained the Speaker’s position, he and Republicans
adopted a new rule that enabled the Speaker to end this practice. Other new
measures that further strengthened the Speaker’s power included granting
the Speaker the prerogative to decide members’ committee assignments
and the authority to control the agenda on the floor through the Rules
Committee.11
In the 1890s and the 1900s, Speakers were often called “Czars.” Duringthat time period, both parties also formally created the positions of Leadersand Whips who carried out duties and wielded power that had belonged
informally to committee Chairs since the mid-19th century.12
But the period of the “Czar” Speakership ended suddenly. In March
1910, when a coalition of progressive majority Republicans from theMidwest and the West and minority Democrats revolted against Speaker
Joseph Cannon (R-IL) and moved to diminish the power of the Speaker’s
office.13 Over Cannon’s opposition, the coalition passed a resolution toremove the Speaker from the Rules Committee and to deprive the Speakerof the authority to make committee assignments. The new rules became
fixed when Republicans subsequently lost their majority in the 1910
election and Cannon lost the leadership of his party.
Period 2: The “Textbook Congress”
The term “Textbook Congress” appeared in an article by politicalscientist Kenneth A. Shepsle in 1989.14 The phrase “textbook” refers to abroad description of Congress in a typical political science textbook. The
most important characteristic of the so-called Textbook Congress is that
Congressional committees led by an independent Chair dominated thelegislative process and pursued particularistic interests shared by bipartisancommittee members.15 The era of Textbook Congress commenced after
the end of the strong Speakership, but defining its duration precisely issomewhat difficult because it both began and ended slowly. The broadest
view is that it began with the revolt against Speaker Cannon and ended
in the 1980s or the mid-1990s. There is a consensus that the peak of theTHE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE CURRENT POLARIZED AGE

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Textbook Congress was in the 1950s and 60s.
Three primary factors led to the emergence of the Textbook Congress.
The first was the aftermath of the revolt against Speaker Cannon.16
After the revolt, the power of committee assignment moved from the
Speaker to each party’s caucus. To avoid intra-party conflicts, the parties
developed a “seniority system,” an informal rule wherein members chose
their committee assignments based on their seniority, with the longestconsecutive serving members choosing their committee assignments first.
Seniority also determined the members’ ranking on the committee, resulting
in the most senior majority committee member automatically occupying
the Chair. The seniority system also enabled members who belonged
to the same committee for a long time to develop a degree of policy
specialization, which enhanced the capacity and power of each committee.
Second, the strength of the executive branch increased significantly
during the New Deal and World War II, and Congress in response
undertook measures to increase its own policymaking capacity. The
Legislative Reorganization Act (LRA) of 1946, which created thecommittee system in effect today, was the main countermeasure Congressenacted. The act strengthened the power of Congressional committees by
consolidating standing committees, streamlining their jurisdictions, creating
subcommittees whose Chairs were generally appointed by committee
Chairs, and allowing committees to hire permanent staff.
Third, Democrats held large and stable majorities in both the House and
Senate beginning with the New Deal. The phrase “New Deal coalition”
refers to an informal coalition of groups who supported the New Deal and
Democratic Party beginning in 1932 and is closely associated with the
Democratic dominance of Congress during this time. However, there wasan internal divide among Democrats, and Southern Democrats often formed
coalitions with Republicans on many important issues.
The combination of the seniority system, strong committees, and apermanent Democratic majority gave members substantial independence
from party leaders. This was especially the case for Southern Democrats.
They were elected with virtually no competition from Republicans because
the South was solidly Democratic at the time. These Southern Democrats
tended to have seniority that enabled them to occupy committee Chairs.
Party leaders still had some institutional authority even after the 1910
Revolt, but its use was circumscribed because the party was internallydivided.17 The main task of leaders at that time was to settle disputes
among ideological and/or regional factions. Party leaders were left to rely

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instead on development of their personal networks, their ability to engage
in informal persuasion, and other political skills. House Speaker Sam
Rayburn (D-TX) and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D-TX) wereparticularly renowned for their mastery of such skills and their politicalacumen.
Period 3: Today’s Polarized and Partisan Congress
The “new institutionalism” in political science, which I will discuss indetail in Section III, posits generally that institutions shape the behaviorof actors who operate within them. However, the new institutionalism
does not claim that institutions automatically determine actors’ behavior
and its outcomes. Indeed, institutions may have little or no influence on
outcomes if there is a time lag between creation of the institution (or asignificant change in its nature) and actors’ making use of the institution.
And sometimes institutional changes even cause unintended consequences.
Both of these are the case in the current partisan era of Congress, whereparty leaders today are pursuing their partisan goals through the use of
institutional authority that was established for other, nonpartisan purposes
during the Textbook Congress or before. Polarization, usually defined
as inter-party heterogeneity and intra-party homogeneity of members’
ideology, has also been a driving force of institutional changes in Congressover the last 50 years.18 Polarized members have been delegating increasing
authority to party leaders. Leaders entrusted with this greater power havemade use of existing institutions or created new rules to further strengthen
party organizations. A cycle of polarization and increasingly stronger parties
has emerged. Its mechanism differs between the House19 and Senate.20
The House
The historical developments that created today’s polarized and partisan
Congress began in the House with two waves of institutional changes.
The first wave began in the early 1970s.21 At the beginning of the decade,Congress passed the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, which sought
to modernize the way Congress operated. Some of the act’s provisions
attempted to weaken the power of committee Chairs through measures suchas new rules in committees and giving some rights to minority committee
members.
Soon thereafter, insurgent young and liberal Democratic members
instigated further reforms within the House Democratic Caucus in orderTHE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE CURRENT POLARIZED AGE

119

to increase the power of individual members and weaken the powerof conservative Southern Democrat committee Chairs, who used theirpositions to block important legislation such as that related to racial
issues. The Democratic Caucus adopted important rules that ended the eraof strong committees and the seniority system. Under the new rules, thecaucus would elect committee chairs, subcommittees were strengthened,
and the Speaker gained the authority to select members of the Rules
Committee from the majority party. After the 1974 Congressional elections,the Democratic Caucus actually voted to oust three sitting committee
Chairs. However, the insurgent Democrats’ actions to elevate the role ofindividual members had the unintended effect of contributing to today’s
Congress characterized by strong parties.
House Republicans led by Newt Gingrich (R–GA) initiated thesecond wave of institutional changes within the House in the 1980s.22
Gingrich formed an informal group named the Conservative Opportunity
Society (hereinafter “COS”) in 1983. Gingrich and COS began pursuingconservative policies and waging partisan battles against Democrats.
Gingrich and his conservative colleagues gradually gained prominenceamong House Republicans by using broadcasted floor speeches. Their
successes including engineering the ouster of Democratic Speaker Jim
Wright (D-TX) and attacking Republican president George H. W. Bush andmainstream Republicans over Bush’s deficit reduction plan.
Then as part of their campaign strategy in the 1994 midterm elections,Gingrich, who had risen to the position of Minority Whip, and a numberof his fellow House Republicans issued a set of policy proposals they titled
Contract with America23 (hereinafter “Contract”). Almost all Republican
candidates signed the Contract, and Republicans won the majority and took
control of the House for the first time since 1954. Gingrich became the first
Republican Speaker of the House in decades.
Congressional reforms were part of the Contract. For example, theRepublicans changed House rules to set limits on the number of terms
an individual could serve as the Chair of a particular committee orsubcommittee. Members could occupy that role for only three Congresses(i.e., six years), weakening their individual power.
The Senate
In contrast to the House, where the partisanship of the majority party
and its leaders is most evident, partisan use of minority rights, led byminority party leaders, has played a critical role in shaping the character

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of today’s Senate. Central to the party leaders’ ability to exercise politicalpower is the filibuster rule and some other countermeasures. The term
filibuster is popularly understood to refer to a Senator’s ability to makean extraordinarily long speech at the floor. Such a filibuster by a fictional
senator in the 1939 film Mr. Smith Goes to Washington cemented thepractice in the collective American imagination. In reality, however,filibuster is a very general term that refers to any type of dilatory tactic
employed by minority senators.24 It is additionally worth noting that theword “minority” here does not necessarily mean members of the minority
party. Even a single Senator is able to obstruct legislation that all other
Senators supported.
As historical background, the Senate in the 19th century was generally
a majoritarian institution.25 However, unlike the House, the Senate did
not create a rule at that time that restricted a minority member’s ability toobstruct the actions of the majority. Lack of such a rule was institutional
inertia that might have unintentionally created a normative perception, or
perhaps more a myth, that the Senate was the chamber of individualism anddeliberation.26 The filibuster developed in this context.
The origin of today’s filibuster rules goes back over 100 years. In 1917,
the Senate adopted Article 22 of the Standing Rules of the United States
Senate which allows the floor to end a filibuster if a two-thirds majority of
Senators vote for a so-called “cloture” motion.
Cloture was rarely invoked until the 1970s when the Senate undertook
rule changes. Such new rules included allowing the floor to proceed withother legislation during a filibuster in 1972 and lowering the thresholdto three-fifths in 1975. These rule changes rather made filibuster lesspotentially costly, which actually led to its more frequent use.27 In the
1970s, battles over filibuster and cloture were mainly over special interestsof individual Senators. In some ways, it was merely an extension of thenegotiation process from that of the subcommittee and committee stages.
Over the 1980–90s, however, the filibuster transformed from anindividual members’ right into a powerful partisan weapon. Polarization
was the driving force that fundamentally changed the characteristics offilibuster. With assertive partisan use of the filibuster, a unified minority
party in the Senate with 41 or more seats could effectively block the
majority party’s legislation. The so-called “60-vote Senate” emerged.28 The
heroic filibuster of Mr. Smith Goes to Washington became an anachronism.
Majority parties developed measures to counteract minority parties’ useof the filibuster. One such measure was the use of what is known as theTHE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE CURRENT POLARIZED AGE

121“budget reconciliation” process.29 Under this process, which was createdas part of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to speed up the budgetaryprocess, legislation requires only a simple majority for passage if it issufficiently related to the budget and meets several other conditions. As
polarization proceeded and securing 60 votes became more difficult, themajority party began using this procedure for important legislation, mostprominently the Affordable Care Act of 2010, tax cut laws in 2001, 2003,
and 2017, and economic recovery laws in 2021 and 2022.
Another measure to attack the filibuster is much more straightforward:
simply lowering the threshold of the passage of cloture from 60 to thesimple majority. In the early 2000s, majority leaders began referring to thispossibility with the sensational phrase, the “nuclear option.” Faced with
Republicans led by Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R–KY) blocking
numerous nominees, Democrats led by Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV)
in 2013 evoked the nuclear option for confirming all nominations except
Supreme Court justices.
In response, Republicans in control of the Senate with McConnell
as Majority Leader in 2017 reduced the number of Senators required toconfirm a Supreme Court Justice to a simple majority. All new justices
since 2017 (indeed four of the nine justices currently on the Supreme Court)
have been confirmed with only simple majorities. They are Justices Neil
Gorsuch (2017), Brett Kavanaugh (2018), Amy Coney Barrett (2020),
appointed by President Trump, and Ketanji Brown Jackson (2022),
appointed by President Biden. The nuclear option has indeed proved true
to its name, as the opposition party has used the same weapon when it has
become the majority party. As such, preemptive attack and retaliation havedestroyed the tradition of individualism and deliberation in the Senate.
II. THE CHANGING ROLE OF CONGRESS
The interaction between polarization and institutional development inside
Congress has an impact on Congress as a whole.30 The main function ofCongress has been shifting gradually from “unified decision-maker” to thatof a “partisan arena.”“Arenas” versus “Transformative Legislatures”
The typology of legislative bodies in political science literature wasarticulated by Nelson Polsby in 1975 to posit two extreme types of122

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legislatures on opposite sides of a continuum from “transformative
legislatures” to “arenas.”31 Polsby described the so-called “transformative
legislature” as one that:possesses the independent capacity, frequently exercised, to moldand transform proposals from whatever source into laws. The act oftransformation is crucial because it postulates a significance to theinternal structure of legislatures, to the internal division of labor, and to
the policy preferences of various legislators. Accounting for legislative
outputs means having to know not merely who proposed what to thelegislature and how imperatively but also who processed what within
the legislature, how enthusiastically—and how completely.32
By contrast, Polsby described “arenas” that:serve as formalized setting for the interplay of significant politicalforces in the life of a political system; the more open the regime, themore varied and the more representative and accountable the forcesthat find a welcome in the arena.33
Polsby’s typology was based on contemporaneous observations of the
U.S. Textbook Congress and the U.K. Parliament and lacked a theoreticalbasis. The intention of the typology was to go beyond the simple dichotomy
between the parliamentary and presidential systems. Polsby tried to place
any legislative body in a democratic (“specialized” and “open” as heterms it) political system somewhere on the continuum of transformative
legislatures to arenas. Variables that determine where a legislature is locatedon the continuum are: 1) how broad a coalition majority party leaders arewilling to work with; 2) the degree of centrality of party organization;and 3) how fixed and assured the composition of legislative majorities areon successive specific issues.34 A legislature is more transformative if its
majority allows larger coalitions, parties are decentralized, and successive
majorities on policy issues are less fixed.
This typology is very dated and has a number of shortcomings. Most
importantly, it fails to account for the possibility that legislatures canundergo significant changes over time. The U.S. Congress today operates
very differently from what Polsby observed in the 1970s. And since the endof the 20th century, the British Parliament has deviated from the “adversary
politics” of half a century ago.35

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123However, many studies still refer to this typology likely because it
successfully extracts something essential to understanding legislatures.
I would claim it is most useful to consider Polsby’s descriptions oftransformative legislatures and arenas as Weberian “ideal types” and thento apply the typology to observations of the actual U.S. Congress. Indeed,
Polsby himself wrote, “I find it useful to contemplate these two classic
cases as tending toward the ends of a continuum rather than as halves of adichotomy, as is often proposed.”36
Applying the Typology to the Current Congress
The U.S. Congress will never become fully like the U.K. Parliament
because the U.S. presidential system and British parliamentary systemfundamentally differ. However, the Constitution only sets forth Congress’
basic structure, and prescribes nearly nothing about how Congress must
actually function. Accordingly, members and parties for more than two
centuries have been able to undertake highly flexible rulemaking andoperate very differently at different times. Indeed, Congress has graduallyshifted its main function from a unified decision-maker to a partisan arena,
without altering the basic structure of the government. The driving force
for this metamorphosis is changes in the way parties in Congress operate.
Applying Polsby’s three independent variables to evaluate whether alegislative body more resembles a transformative legislature or an arena, wefind that in the Congress of today: 1) majority party leaders are less tolerantof the minority party; 2) party leaders have more centralized authority;and 3) parties are ideologically polarized.
These changes affect the way parties in Congress related to four sets ofactors: 1) their members, 2) the other party, 3) voters, and 4) the president.
All of these changes indicate that the role of Congress is shifting fromthat of a unified decision-maker, the main characteristics of Polsby’s“transformative legislature,” to a partisan arena. In other words, changes
with respect to parties in Congress explain the shift from the “Textbook
Congress” toward the current Congress by a gradual transition from one
ideal type to another.
First, party leaders as opposed to rank-and-file members, have become
influential in shaping and enacting legislation in recent decades. A standard
lawmaking process, the so-called “regular order,” had been establishedduring the Textbook era.37 Under the regular order, independent members
would negotiate with each other and make compromises that resulted in

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successful legislation.
The regular order allowed each member (especially committee Chairs)
not only to write a bill, but also to block unfavorable bills in committee,
on the floor through amendments, and at conference committee meetings
in which they represented their chamber. But members had no incentive to
obstruct the interests of other legislators as long as their own interests weresecured. The seniority system and strong committee system guaranteedthat such interests were met. This manner of functioning guaranteed that
the Textbook Congress operated as a unified decision-maker, which served
multifarious interests.
Although the regular order still operates today to some degree, it is
becoming a thing of the past, especially when it comes to importantlegislation. Barbara Sinclair calls the new processes “unorthodox
lawmaking.”38 Under the unorthodox lawmaking process, the regular order
is not always followed. For example: bipartisan members may form a groupcalled a “gang” to draft a bill outside of committees; party leaders and theRules Committee allow fewer floor amendments to the bill than would havebeen allowed under the regular order; partisan battles over a filibuster andcloture dominate the Senate floor; the majority party avoids conference
committees as a measure to resolve differences on bills passed by the Houseand Senate;39 and leaders of both parties and both chambers, occasionallywith members of the executive branch, hold an informal meeting called a“summit.” In short, party leaders have replaced committee Chairs as thelegislators who control the legislative process. Currently, party leaders evencontrol the flow of information in order not to let their own members know
details of the bills.40 Even in cases in which the ongoing legislative processattracts public attention, both majority and minority leaders control theirown members’ behavior by offering incentives and rewards.41
Second, partisan battles unrelated to ideology and policy debates haveincreased in their number and intensity. When raw partisanship pervades,
it is important not to mistake partisanship for ideological polarizationand thus overestimate ideological polarization.42 Many researchers havedemonstrated the rise of various partisan activities. Although records of rollcall votes on the floor are often used as evidence of ideological polarization,
many of these votes in fact are merely procedural.43 Ideologically extreme
members, who come from safe electoral districts, are more likely than othermembers to hold press conferences where they deliver extreme messages,
thereby furthering public perception of substantial ideological divides
between the parties.44 The voting behavior of one party’s members also

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becomes more partisan as a reaction to the other party’s partisan voting.45
The majority party often promotes bills as a way of appealing to their own
voters, even if they are unlikely to pass.46
One reason for increasing partisanship is the narrow gap between theparties in terms of seats held, giving both parties a meaningful chance to
win a majority in any given election.47 A party’s prospect of winning the
majority in Congress also has additional political implications, further
raising the stakes at each election. For example, a party that is expected
to be in the minority after a given election faces difficulty in fundraising,preventing incumbents from retiring, and recruiting new candidates.48
Third, campaign organizations in Congress now have relationships notjust with their members in Congress, but directly with voters.49 Each partyin each chamber of Congress has its own collective campaign organization,
known as a “hill committee.”50 Although incumbent members and other
Congressional candidates still communicate independently with theirconstituents, these hill committees have become involved in partisan
campaign strategies in each district. Hill committees raise huge amounts ofmoney to spend on campaigns and decide how and to which candidates toallocate the money.51
Furthermore, party leaders sometimes craft substantive policy proposals
representing their views and positions as a Congressional party. These setsof policy proposals resemble manifestos in European legislative elections.
Newt Gingrich’s Republican Contract with America campaign strategy in1994 and Nancy Pelosi’s (D-CA) Democratic party campaign in 2006 areexamples of successful policy-based campaigns.
Fourth, parties’ relationships with the president have become increasingly
partisan. One of the purposes of institutional reform in Congress during
the Textbook era was to increase Congress’ power vis a vis the executive
branch. However, as partisanship and polarization has grown, it has become
extremely difficult for the two parties in Congress to reach compromiseson legislation. Instead, the president’s party when it is in the majority inCongress tends to pursue enacting the president’s campaign pledges intolaw. When the opposing party controls Congress, it generally acts as a foil
to the president and prevents his agenda from being enacted. As a result,bills on which the president expresses his position are likely to be morepartisan than those without presidential intervention.52
Since the presidency of Bill Clinton, a typical pattern of unified followedby divided government has emerged. Typically, a new presidency begins
with a unified government. The president and his party succeed in enacting

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significant legislation without the support of the minority party. Thislegislative success in the first two years of the presidency mirrors that of theruling parties in parliamentary democracies. However, the president’s party
generally loses one or both houses of the Congress in the midterm election,
creating divided government.53 Thereafter, the president and Congresspass virtually no important legislation throughout the remainder of thepresident’s administration.54
III.

EXPLAINING TODAY’S CONGRESS FROM A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Finally, I will offer a literature review on political science theories
explaining how the Congress works. The word theory here refers to ascientific framework to explain a general pattern of events and theircauses.55 Today’s polarization and partisanship in Congress are forcing
political scientists to reshape theories and methods they use to conduct
Congressional studies.
Rational Choice Institutionalism and the Textbook Congress
Studies of Congress have been the forerunner in the field of politicalscience since the early to mid-20th century. Initial studies were so-called“behavioral science” studies. These studies described what was taking
place in and around Congress through a loosely applied sociological andpsychological framework with primitive data analyses and/or case studiesof members’ behavior and legislative processes.
In the 1970–80s, drastic changes took place in political science when an
economics-oriented framework called “rational choice theory” emerged. At
nearly the same time, various social sciences, including political science,experienced the emergence of “new institutionalism,” which argued that
institutions shape and explain actors’ behavior and its consequences.
There are two main lines of new institutionalism. One is “historicalinstitutionalism” that stresses the role history and norms play in creating
institutions. The other is “rational choice institutionalism” (hereinafter“RCI”), a combination of rational choice theory and new institutionalism.
Under RCI, institutions shape rational actors’ behavior. This framework
became highly influential across the broad discipline of political science.
Studies of Congress are at the center of this trend.
The basic logic underlying RCI in studies of Congress is as follows.
First, a researcher makes a set of assumptions about members’ goals.

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The most commonly employed assumption is that the member’s goal isreelection, which was initially suggested by David Mayhew in 1974.56 Allother objectives the member may have, such as policy priorities, pursuit ofideology, and advancement of one’s personal career are subsumed by thegoal of reelection.
Second, the researcher posits that members act based on their rational
calculations of the consequences of their actions, thereby enabling
researchers to deductively predict members’ behavior, their interaction withother members (often called “equilibrium,” a term used in economics), andthe consequences of members’ actions. In this process, researchers often
construct mathematical models, based on those developed in economics.
Models based on spatial theory and/or game theory are most frequently
used.
Third, the institutional structures are treated as the “rule of the game”
that shape rational members’ behavior and determine the consequences of
their actions. These institutions are the committee system, seniority system,
floor rules, bicameralism, and the presidential veto. And fourth, researchers
test theories empirically using quantitative data analyses. Frequently
used data include measures of members’ ideology, their social attributes,
Congressional profiles (e.g., seniority, committee assignments, and roll callvotes), characteristics of Congressional districts, and policy outputs.
The seminal application of mathematical models to Congress was madeby Shepsle in 1979.57 Shepsle demonstrated that the committee system
during that Textbook era offered an “equilibrium” of members’ interactions
that enabled Congress to induce stable legislative outputs. However,
Shepsle concluded ten years later that polarization had destroyed theequilibrium that the committee system offered.58 A new theory was needed
to explain a new equilibrium with stronger parties.
A second generation of RCI developed that relied on the “principalagent” framework between members and their party. This version of RCI
posits that members delegate some portion of the power to party leaders toachieve members’ political goals. In this way, members collectively act as“principals” who have control over their party leaders as their “agents.”
Several types of these second generation RCI theories emerged. One
was “Conditional Party Government Theory,” which argued that party
leaders become stronger as members became more polarized and have an
incentive to delegate more.59 Another framework, “Majority Cartel Theory,”emphasized the power of majority party leaders to control legislative
agendas. This was especially the case for the House,60 but leaders in the

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Senate also had the same advantage to some extent.61
These “party theories” became standard in the 1990s. The description ofhistorical events in Section I is also based on these party theories. Severe
partisanship enabled House Speakers in the 1890s to institutionalize theirpower bases. Joseph Cannon lost because his party was internally divided.
The Textbook Congress emerged and survived because it was advantageous
to Southern Democrats. In more recent years, parties and their leaders
became stronger again because parties began to become ideologicallypolarized.
Still the Century of Rational Choice Institutionalism?
Studies based on these party theories attempted to explain the significant
role of parties in Congress while maintaining the foundational assumptionthat individual members’ actions are based on their desire to be reelected.
Under party theories, the power of parties in Congress is constrained by
the authority to which members delegates to them. However, the enormous
strength of parties in Congress today casts serious doubts on the viabilityof party theories and more fundamentally RCI itself for explaining today’s
Congress.
New research trends began in the 2000–2010s. One still follows
the basics of RCI, but casts doubt on its ability to provide deductive
explanations based on the goals of individual members. The advantage
of rational choice theories is their ability to explain various events byemploying simple assumptions. However, if current parties are in factstronger than party theory assumed they were, maintaining the assumptionof members’ reelection seems complicated. Instead, beginning with theassumption that a party has collective goals such as maximizing seats,winning the majority status, and enhancing a party’s reputation appears
more straightforward and realistic.62 These new studies are better able toexplain recent phenomena such as “unorthodox lawmaking” and partisan
battles irrelevant to ideology, described in Section II above. They may alsosuggest that previous party theories have serious weaknesses if members nolonger act as principals who are able to effectively control party leaders as
their agents.
More radically, it may be time to depart from RCI itself for two
reasons. First, RCI is an import from economics. But economics itself isloosening the assumption of rationality, with the advent and developmentof “behavioral economics,” that applies the discipline of psychology

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to economics. Second, the age of “data science” is coming. The rapid
development of information and communications technology increasingly
enables researchers to conduct data-driven studies. The evolution of
behavioral economics and data science has had a considerable impact on
Congressional studies since the 2000–2010s. There are at least three newresearch trends.
First, studies based on behavioral science, which had long fallen out
of favor except for several studies such as that of Frank Baumgartner andBrian Jones and their successors, have reemerged.63 The rise of partisanshipas well as ideological polarization has renewed the relevance andimportance of long-forgotten behavioral science concepts such as power,society, norm, and personality to Congressional research.
Second, research using data science in Congressional studies isincreasing. New data and analytical techniques, such as computational
text analyses and network analyses are now available.64 Third, and mostimportantly for this paper, studies based on what is known as APD(American Political Development) are finally taking place. APD is asubfield of political science that focuses on the historical development ofAmerican politics, political institutions, society, and public policy with thegoal of applying scientific analysis to events.65
Although historical development of institutions is one of the mainconcerns of APD and the discipline largely overlaps with historicalinstitutionalism, review articles on this topic explain how political sciencescholars had considered APD to be incompatible with studies of theinstitution of Congress.66 Early works of APD ignored the importance ofCongress because the main concerns of those studies were state-building
and policy development led by the broader society. At the same time,
RCI-based studies dominated research on Congress and explained the
Textbook Congress without reference to historical contexts. However,APD-based studies of Congress are and should be taking place asevidenced by a seminal work by Eric Schickler in 2001 and other works
that followed. Indeed, as long as the slow and steady movement awayfrom the Textbook Congress and to a partisan and polarized Congresscontinues to occur, both theoretical and historical approaches are extremely
valuable to understanding today’s Congress. Studying institutions and party
organizations in Congress lies at the intersection of APD and Congressional
studies.

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CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have attempted to demonstrate the importance ofunderstanding Congress both theoretically and historically. I have reviewed
changes over time in institutions and party organizations in the U.S.
Congress, with particular attention to the transition from the Textbook
Congress to the current partisan Congress and its impact on the overall
function of Congress in American democracy. I have also summarized
political science literature on the topic. My main argument is that Congress
is currently moving closer to functioning as a partisan arena rather thana unified decision-maker, even as the core institutional structure of theAmerican presidential system, as opposed to a parliamentary system,
remains. I will conclude the paper with three brief reflections pertaining tofuture research.
First, as is typical of much of political science literature, I have notaddressed normative arguments in this paper. It is very easy for an observer
to criticize something about politics from a freely selected normative
standpoint. Today, many people complain about heated partisanship in
Congress. However, if we remember 70 years ago when mainstream
political scientists criticized Congress for failing to make responsible
decisions and advocated a “responsible party government” led by strong
parties,67 we can also easily find something good in today’s partisan
Congress. The transition of Congress’ function from one of a unified
decision-maker to more of a partisan arena might create a normative
conflict between a type of parliamentarism operating in Congress today anda Madisonian balance of power set forth in the U.S. Constitution. I leave it
to researchers of normative political theory and/or the U.S. Constitution toreconcile this conflict.
Second, as this paper has reviewed the function of Congress boththeoretically and historically over time, I believe researchers should takecare at least for now not to overestimate the importance of former President
Trump’s relationship to Congress. Through the lens offered in this paper,
Trump’s relationship with Congress for the four years of his administration
resembled that of an executive operating in a parliamentary system.
Trump attempted to fulfill his campaign promises to voters, not by seeking
bipartisan compromise, but by relying solely on the slim Republican
majority in both houses of Congress only in his first two years in office.
Trump engaged in coercive political tactics such as privately punishing
Republican members on Twitter, endorsing primary election challengers

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131

to members whom he disliked, and otherwise forcing Republican
Congressional leaders to follow him. We do not yet know whether Trump’s
political tactics will become a new norm for the Republicans with his
successors or whether Trump more represents an exception to existingnorms that will again prevail after he has gone.
Third, from a pedagogical standpoint, it is time to consider whether
political science textbooks need to be revised to reflect the new historicaland theoretical understandings of Congress. The thirty to fifty years since
the height of the Textbook Congress is enough time to warrant revisions.
However, even as the transformation of Congress from a unified decisionmaker to a partisan arena has been taking place, many of the essentialsof the Textbook Congress still remain. “Layering,” a key concept in APD
literature and a book by Schickler, seems to describe the transition from
Textbook Congress to the current Congress most precisely.68 Accordingly,
explanations of Congress in today’s texts appear not to need wholesale
replacement.
Throughout American history, Congress has been in an ongoing processof reforming and transforming itself. Understanding history and theory,and the integration of the two can reveal to us what is exceptional and what
is systematic in Congress. I hope this paper provokes some new ideas,
perspectives, and ways of thinking for researchers who are interested in
American government but not intimately familiar with the complexities ofCongress and the intricacies of the legislative process.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This paper was supported by JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientiﬁc Research (C) (KAKENHI)(22K01346).

NOTES
1There is a huge political science literature on parties in Congress. However, because
this paper aims to oﬀer a general overview to non-specialists, I have limited the number ofreferences in the paper to a minimum.
2
The historical facts described in this section can be found in detail in Eric Schickler
and Ruth Bloch Rubin, “Congress and American Political Development,” in The Oxford
Handbook of American Political Development, eds. Richard Valley, Suzanne Mettler, andRobert Lieberman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 259–285.
3
Eric Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of
the U. S. Congress (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Schickler summarizes
these multiple interests into ﬁve categories: individual members’ electoral security, the132

SHUNTA MATSUMOTO

capacity of Congress as a whole, institutional power bases, partisan interests, and policy
goals.
4
See e.g., David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991); John H. Aldrich, Why Parties?: A Second Look
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
5
Congressional party organizations have developed various other positions that rank
below these speciﬁc leadership positions. The actual roles of these positions have alsochanged over time, some of which are mentioned in this paper.
6
Note that there are also informal groups of members that are also called “caucuses,”such as the Blue Dog Coalition and House Freedom Caucus. These types of caucuses are
distinct from party caucuses. The purpose of these types of caucuses is to pursue common
policy or ideological goals.
7
The House Speaker is formally elected on the ﬂoor. However, the majority party caucus
virtually has the authority to select the Speaker because majority members are normallysupposed to vote on the ﬂoor according to the decision at the caucus.
8
The rules of the House of Representatives are adopted at the beginning of each
Congress. This means that the basic procedures of the House may change every two years,
reﬂecting the intention of the majority party. In contrast, the Standing Rules of the Senatechange whenever the ﬂoor adopts a resolution.
9
Schickler and Bloch Rubin, “Congress and American Political Development,” 264.
Historically, the period of years around the end of the 19th century recorded the highest
level of partisanship. Polarization today equals that of the earlier period. The often-cited
DW-NOMINATE score, a summary of members’ ﬂoor roll call votes, provides excellent
documentation of the ebb and ﬂow of partisanship in Congress. See the oﬃcial website for
NOMINATE data (https://voteview.com/parties/all).
10
Schickler and Bloch Rubin, “Congress and American Political Development,” 265.
11
Ibid.
12
Creation of these leadership positions proceeded slightly slower in the Senate than in theHouse, with several of these positions being created in the Senate in the 1910s. For details,
see Congressional Research Service, “Party Leaders in the United States Congress, 1789–
2019,” CRS Report, September 4, 2019, RL30567 (https://crsreports.congress.gov /product/
pdf/RL/RL30567/29).
13
Schickler and Bloch Rubin, “Congress and American Political Development,” 265.
14
Kenneth A. Shepsle, “The Changing Textbook Congress,” in Can the Government
Govern?, eds. John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson (Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1989), 238–267.
15
Schickler and Bloch Rubin, “Congress and American Political Development,” 262.
16
Ibid, 266.
17
Ibid.
18
There are many diﬀerent sources of today’s polarization. They include: the movement
for civil rights, the subsequent dominance of the Republican party in the South, theincreased inﬂuence of advocacy groups, and the proliferation of mass media. Even thoughmany of the origins of current polarization are societal, institutional changes in Congress
are also an important factor as this paper seeks to demonstrate. Indeed, I argue that there
is an interactive relationship between polarization in actors’ ideology and partisanship in
Congress.
19
Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House.
20
Nathan W. Monroe, Jason M. Roberts, and David W. Rohde, eds., Why Not Parties:
Party Eﬀects in the United States Senate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).
21
See e.g., Schickler and Bloch Rubin, “Congress and American Political Development,”

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133

267–268; Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House.
22
For detail about reforms by Gingrich and Republicans, see Schickler, Disjointed
Pluralism, 242–246, 272–276.
23
Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas, eds., Contract with America: The Bold Plan by Rep.
Newt Ginrich, Rep. Dick Armey and the House Republicans to Change the Nation (NewYork: Times Books, 1994).
24
The most comprehensive studies of the ﬁlibuster are Gregory J. Wawro and Eric
Schickler, Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2006), Gregory Koger, Filibustering: A Political History of Obstructionin the House and Senate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), and Congressional
Research Service, “Filibusters and Cloture in the Senate,” CRS Report: April 7, 2017,
RL30360 (https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30360).
25
Wawro and Schickler, “Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking.”
26
Schickler and Bloch Rubin, “Congress and American Political Development,” 269.
27
Koger, Filibustering.
28
Barbara Sinclair, “The “60-Vote Senate”: Strategies, Process, and Outcomes,” in
U.S. Senate Exceptionalism, ed. Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 2002), 241–261.
29
The author published another article (written in Japanese) that analyzes the use ﬁlibuster
and budget reconciliation process. See Shunta Matsumoto, “A Use of Budget Reconciliation
to an Important Legislation: Comparative Case Studies of George W. Bush, Obama, andTrump Administration,” Meijo Law Review 72-3 (2023): 29–54 (Part 1 of 2) and 72-4
(2023): 131–157 (Part 2 of 2).
30
This paper conﬁnes itself to the eﬀect of polarization on the function of Congress in
the American democratic system. The impact of polarization on substantive policy is avery important research subject. For instance, Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard
Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (Cambridge:
The MIT Press, 2006) claim that polarization increases inequality. Space limitations prevent
exploration of this critical topic because it would be impossible to present all the necessary
research from disciplines such as economics, sociology, and policy science here.
31
Nelson W. Polsby, “Legislatures,” in Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 5, eds. Fred I.
Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Boston: Addison Wesley, 1975), 257–319.
32
Idid, 277.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid, 292, 296. The precise terms Polsby used are “parliamentary organizing majorities,”“parliamentary party management,” and “successive policy majorities.”
35
For adversary politics, see e.g., S.E. Finer ed., Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform(London: Anthony Wigram, 1975).
36
Polsby, “Legislatures,” 280–281.
37
See Walter J. Oleszek, “The ’Regular Order’: A Perspective,” CRS Report: November 6,
2020, R46597 (https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R46597.pdf).
38
Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S.
Congress, 5th ed. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2017).
39
See also Hong Min Park, Steven S. Smith, and Ryan J. Vander Wielen, Politics over
Process: Partisan Conﬂict and Post-Passage Processes in the U.S. Congress (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2017).
40
James M Curry, Legislating in the Dark: Information and Power in the House ofRepresentatives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
41
Major studies that discuss this point are: Steven S. Smith, Party Inﬂuence in Congress.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Kathryn Pearson, Party Discipline in

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the U.S. House of Representatives (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015), andGregory Koger and Matthew J. Lebo, Strategic Party Government: Why Winning Trumps
Ideology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017).
42
Sean. M. Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008).
43
Ibid.
44
Justin Grimmer, Representation Style in Congress: What Legislators Say and Why It
Matters. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
45
Koger and Lebo, Strategic Party Government, chapters 6–7.
46
Jeremy Gelman, Losing to Win: Why Congressional Majorities Play Politics Instead ofMake Laws (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2020).
47
Frances E. Lee, Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2016).
48
Jacob F. H. Smith, Minority Party Misery: Political Powerlessness and Electoral
Disengagement (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2021).
49
Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson, Congressional Parties, Institutional Ambition,and the Financing of Majority Control (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012).
50
They are: the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), National
Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee (DSCC), and National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC).
51
Heberlig and Larson, Congressional Parties.
52
Frances E. Lee, Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles and Partisanship in the U.S.
Senate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
53
Congress during the administrations of George W. Bush was an exception to thispattern. Instead of losing one or both of the houses of Congress in the ﬁrst midterm election,
the Republican Party maintained uniﬁed government for six years until the 2006 midterm
elections (with the exception of their losing control of the Senate between June 2001 andNovember 2002).
54
The Clinton presidency was a partial exception to this dominant pattern. Clinton failed
in getting his top legislative priority, health care reform, passed by Congress both during
the ﬁrst two years of his administration when government was uniﬁed. However, some
important legislation was enacted with bipartisan support during the six years of divided
government (e.g., NAFTA and welfare reform).
55
Part of this section is an extension of the theoretical portion of an article I previously
published in Japanese. See Shunta Matsumoto, “Are Party Leaders Still an Agent of Its
Members?: The Evolution of Party Leadership and Polarization in the U.S. Congress,” Meijo
Law Review 69-3 (2020): 79–104 (Part 1 of 2) and 69-4 (2020): 55–90 (Part 2 of 2). The
present paper adds an argument about relationships between RCI-based (i.e., economicsoriented) studies and other studies such as behavioral science, data science, and APD.
56
David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1974).
57
Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional
Voting Models,” American Journal of Political Science 23-1 (1979): 27–59.
58
Shepsle, “The Changing Textbook Congress.”
59
Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House and Aldrich, Why Parties?.
60
Gary W. Cox and Mattew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in
the House, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).
61
Chris Den Hartog and Nathan W. Monroe, Agenda Setting in the U.S. Senate:
Costly Consideration and Majority Party Advantage (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2011).

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62
Lee, Insecure Majorities, and Koger and Lebo, Strategic Party Government. This pointis also a criticism of Majority Cartel Theory that addresses the power of party leadershiponly in terms of the majority party.
63Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
64
See e.g., Grimmer, Representation Style (computational text analyses) and James H.
Fowler, “Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks,” Political Analysis
14-4 (2006): 456–487 (network analyses).
65
E.g., Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek. 2004. The Search for American Political
Development (New York: Cambridge University Press).
66
Ira Katznelson and John S. Lapinski, “At the Crossroads: Congress and American
Political Development,” Perspectives on Politics 4-2 (2006): 243–260; Schickler andBloch Rubin “Congress and American Political Development”; see also Jenkins, Jeﬀery A,“Studying Congress Historically,” in New Directions in Congressional Politics, ed. Jamie L.
Carson (New York: Routledge, 2012), 11–24.
67
American Political Science Association, “Toward a More Responsible Two Party
System: A Report,” American Political Science Review 44-3 (1950), Supplement.
68
Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism.