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CONTENTS

How Applied Should Applied Ethics Be? ――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 1
Michael Davis

Forms of Organizing Human Society Inspired by Technological Structures―――10
Alfons Josef Schuster

ii

Editorial Note
The Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy is an interdisciplinary
SHULRGLFDOFRYHULQJGLYHUVHDUHDVRIDSSOLHGHWKLFV,WLVWKHRI¿FLDOMRXUQDORI
the Center for Applied Ethics and Philosophy (CAEP), Hokkaido University.
The aim of the Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy is to contribute toa better understanding of ethical issues by promoting research into various
areas of applied ethics and philosophy, and by providing researchers,
scholars and students with a forum for dialogue and discussion on ethicalissues raised in contemporary society.
The journal welcomes papers from scholars and disciplines traditionallyand newly associated with the study of applied ethics and philosophy, as well
DVSDSHUVIURPWKRVHLQUHODWHGGLVFLSOLQHVRU¿HOGVRILQTXLU\Shunzo Majima
Editor-in-Chief

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Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy Vol. 9

How Applied Should Applied Ethics Be?

1

Michael Davis
Illinois Institute of Technology

Abstract
How applied should applied ethics be? I take up that question not because it belongs to thepast of applied ethics (though it does), but because, given the present, it seems likely to be apart of the future of applied ethics as well. Consider, for example, a recent debate in the journal
Bioethics: One of the four papers was titled, “Why Moral Philosophers Are Not and Should Not
Be Moral Experts”; another, “Moral Philosophers Are Moral Experts!” In that debate, a “moral
expert” was a philosopher who used his knowledge of philosophy to speak with authority onpractical questions. In the course of answering my question, I make a number of distinctions:
between ethics-as-practice and ethics-as-theory; between ethics-as-morality, ethics-as-afield-of-philosophy, and ethics-as-special standards; and so on. Having thereby narrowed
my question to:what can ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy properly contribute to moral
practice?,DQVZHUWKDWHWKLFVDVD‫ۋ‬HOGRISKLORVRSK\FDQFRQWULEXWHPXFKWRPRUDOSUDFWLFH
EXWRQO\E\PDLQWDLQLQJDFHUWDLQGLVWDQFHIURPLW)RUH[DPSOHH[SHUWVLQHWKLFVDVD‫ۋ‬HOGRI
philosophy—or even experts in all of philosophy—should not on that basis alone undertake toadvise on questions of ethics-as-morality or ethics-as-special-standards. Practical experiencehas something to teach that is not philosophy—sensitivity to context, know-how, judgment, or
the like.
Key words: moral experts, biomedical ethics, applied ethics, moral expertise, judgment

The role of the moral philosopher is not the role ofthe preacher, we are told. But why not?
—Peter Singer, “Moral Experts”, Analysis 32(1972): 115-117, p. 115
Long-haired preachers come out every night
Try to tell you what’s wrong and what’s right—Joe Hill, “The Preacher and the Slave”, 1911
How applied should applied ethics be?1 I address this
1 Previous versions of this paper were presented at the
Humanities Colloquium, Illinois Institute of Technology, on
October 7, 2016, and at the10th International Conference
on Applied Ethics, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan,
October 28, 2016. I should like to thank those present, as
well as Geoff Holtzman and one reviewer for this journal,
for their comments.

question not because it belongs to the past of applied
ethics (though that forty-year-old quotation from Peter
Singer shows that it does), but because, given thepresent, it also seems likely to belong to the future ofapplied ethics, a perennial threat to its moral integrity.
Consider, for example, a recent debate in the journal
Bioethics: One of the four contributions was titled,“Why Moral Philosophers Are Not and Should Not Be
Moral Experts”; another, “Moral Philosophers Are Moral
Experts!” All four contributions treated moral expertiseas (in part) authority to tell people what they shoulddo (“what’s wrong and what’s right”). For all four, thecentral question was what moral philosophers should (or,at least, can) do with their expertise in applied ethics.2
2 Bernward Gesang, “Are Moral Philosophers Moral
Experts?” Bioethics 24 (2010): 153–159; David Archard,“Why Moral Philosophers Are Not and Should Not Be

2“Applied ethics” may be used for one of several
entities or activities depending on how “ethics” and“applied” are understood—and philosophers, ethicists,and others who claim to “apply ethics” are far fromagreeing on how those terms should be understood. 3
So, before I address directly the question posed in thispaper’s title, I should say how I understand those terms
and why understanding them as I do is likely to be agood way, though perhaps not the only good way, toapproach that question.

EthicsI usually distinguish three senses of “ethics” before
entering a discussion in which that term has asignificant part: ethics-as-ordinary-morality; ethicsas-special-standards-of-conduct; and ethics-as-a-fieldof-philosophy. I do that to avoid the confusion that
commonly follows when a writer uses one sense while
readers understand another. So, let us consider what
³DSSOLHG´PLJKWPHDQLISUH¿[HGWRHDFKRIWKHVHVHQVHV
If morality consists of universal standards of conduct(rules, principles, ideals, precedents, and the likegoverning all reasonable persons), then applied ethics-asPRUDOLW\ZRXOGEHWKHXVHRIWKRVHVWDQGDUGVLQVSHFL¿F
situations, in order to guide practice, for example: “Since
it is always morally wrong to kill the innocent, andthis person is innocent, killing this person is morally
Moral Experts”, Bioethics 25 (2011): 119–127; Christopher
Crowley, “Expertise, Wisdom and Moral Philosophers: A
Response to Gesang,” Bioethics 26 (2012): 337–342; JohnStewart Gordon, “Moral Philosophers Are Moral Experts! A
Reply to David Archard”, Bioethics 28 (2014): 203–206; andreferences they cite. There is a similar debate about politicalexperts. See, for example, Steven Wall, “Public Reason
and Moral Authoritarianism”, Philosophical Quarterly 63(January 2013): 160-169; or Daniel Viehoff, “Authority
and Expertise”, The Journal of Political Philosophy 24(December 2016): 406-426, and references cited there.
And about experts in general. See, for example, Alvin I.
Goldman, “Which Ones Should You Trust?” Philosophy andPhenomenological Research 63 (July, 2001): 85-110.
3 For some sense of the varied ways in which “applied ethics”
is used, compare: Seumas Miller, “Research in Applied
Ethics: Problems and Perspectives”, Philosophia 37 (2009):
185–201; Fritz Allhoff, “What Are Applied Ethics?” Scienceand Engineering Ethics 17 (2011): 1–19; Torbjörn Tännsjö,“Applied Ethics: A Defence”, Ethical Theory and Moral
Practice 14 (2011): 397–406; Onora O’Neill, “Applied
Ethics: Naturalism, Normativity and Public Policy”,
Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2009): 219-230; andBonnie Steinbock, “How Has Philosophical Applied Ethics
Progressed In the Past Fifty Years?” Metaphilosophy 44(January 2013): 58-62.

How Applied Should Applied Ethics Be? Michael Daviswrong.”4 Here a moral standard (“it is always morally
wrong to kill the innocent”) is “applied”, that is, provides
the major premise, in an argument in which a certain
fact (this person being innocent) is the minor premise.
The conclusion concerns practice (what it would be
morally wrong to do). Though this example of applying
ethics-as-morality is deductive, it need not have been.
An application can rely on a looser relation between
premises and conclusion than deduction, for example,
probability, analogy, or inference to the best explanation.
Using “ethics” as a synonym for “morality” seems
to be a reasonable way to use the “ethics” in “applied
ethics”—even if that use should make us wonder why
WKH¿HOGLVQRWLQVWHDGFDOOHG³DSSOLHGPRUDOLW\´,QIDFW
VRPH¿HOGVRIDSSOLHGHWKLFVVXFKDVELRPHGLFDOHWKLFVor environmental ethics, seem to be predominantly
applied morality in this sense. They typically appeal to
RUGLQDU\PRUDOVWDQGDUGVVXFKDVMXVWLFHRUEHQH¿FHQFH
to resolve (or, at least, help resolve) practical problems.5
The word “ethics” adds little—or nothing.
If, however, we understand morality as the practice inwhich moral standards have a central part, morality itself
would be so applied that the “applied” in “applied ethics”
would be redundant. Morality-as-practice must always beapplied. The implied contrast with “unapplied morality”(however understood) is lost.
Much the same is true of ethics-as-special-standards,
that is, those morally binding standards of conduct that
apply to members of a group (a group not including all
moral agents) simply because they are members of thatgroup: accounting ethics, engineering ethics, research
ethics, and so on. If “ethics” in this sense is understoodas the standards themselves, then applied ethics-asspecial-standards would be the application to particularsituations of those standards (standards contained in,for example, the code of ethics of a profession, researchcommunity, or other group). “Ethics” in this sense adds
information that “morality” does not, the relevance ofspecial standards. If, however, we understand ethics-asspecial-standards as the practices in which such standards
are central (such as the practice of the legal profession),then “ethics-as-special-standards” would—like “ethics4

Of course, if one is a moral relativist, the standards inquestion would be universal only with respect to the society
in question, not with respect to all rational persons. But
there would still remain a distinction between that sort ofstandard and the special standards I shall soon distinguish. It
is also worth pointing out that “morality” here is not merely
what people happen to think is morally right or wrong (anempirical fact) but those standards they would endorse when
they are at their reasonable (an idealized version of thestandards people routinely cite).
5 Compare Tom L. Beauchamp, “History and Theory in‘Applied Ethics’”, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 17(March 2007): 55-64.

3

Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy Vol. 9

as-morality” in the corresponding sense—already be so
DSSOLHGWKDWWKHSUH¿[³DSSOLHG´ZRXOGEHUHGXQGDQWApplied ethics in either of the non-redundant senses
just identified is not without difficult questions. For
example, what are we to do when more than one standard
applies, when a standard applies without giving a clear
resolution, when an applicable standard is disputed, orwhen we lack enough information to know whether or
not a particular standard applies? Such questions may,
however, be dealt with using casuistry, hermeneutics,
reflective equilibrium, or the like interpretive strategy.
Such questions are the friction of ordinary practice. They
need not have much to do with our question: how appliedshould applied ethics be? The third sense of “applied
HWKLFV´²HWKLFVDVD¿HOGRISKLORVRSK\²SODLQO\GRHVEthics-as-a-field-of-philosophy is (more or less) theattempt to understand morality, including ethics-asspecial-standards, as a reasonable practice. Ethics inthis sense, whether understood as an intellectual pursuitor a community of pursuers, is not morality but about
morality, an exercise in theory or (what Kant called)“speculative reason”, not “practical reason”. It is “pure”
rather than “applied”. The philosophy ends when thedesired understanding is achieved. Hence, the very ideaof appliedHWKLFVDVD¿HOGRISKLORVRSK\PXVWVHHP DQGperhaps be) deeply problematic. The problem is bothold and general to philosophy, not limited to ethics-asa-field-of-philosophy. Plato’s Cave remains the classic
statement of that problem: What can we do with theunderstanding achieved in the bright sun of pure reason(theory) when we return to the dim, many-shadowed
cave of ordinary life (practice)?
Of course, Plato’s problem is more philosophical thanpractical. In practice, we teach “theory” (that is, waysof understanding) to future practitioners and, all things
considered, they seem better practitioners as a result.
That improvement in practice is one reason, probably
the chief reason, that most countries spend large sums
WRPDLQWDLQXQLYHUVLWLHVDQG¿OOWKHPZLWKVWXGHQWVZKR
upon graduation, work in accounting, computer science,
medicine, or another useful endeavor, where they seemto translate theory into practice, not only philosophicaltheory but also accounting theory, programming theory,
medical theory, or the like. The interesting philosophicalquestion Plato raised is how that is possible.
Though Plato’s question remains open, it is not ourquestion. Our question might now be restated as thismore modest (and practical) one: what can ethics-asa-field-of-philosophy properly contribute to moral
practice? My answer is that ethics-as-a-field-ofphilosophy can contribute much to moral practice, but
only by maintaining a certain distance from it. For
example, experts in ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy—
or even experts in all of philosophy—should not on thatbasis alone undertake to advise on questions of ethics-

as-morality or ethics-as-special-standards. The Cave
has something to teach that is not philosophy—knowhow, sensitivity to context, judgment, or the like.6 We
must turn now to the second ambiguous term in “applied
HWKLFV´²³DSSOLHG´:KDWLVLWWRDSSO\HWKLFVDVD¿HOG
of-philosophy?

AppliedWe may distinguish at least seven ways in which ethicsas-a-field-philosophy might be said to be applied: 1)
FODUL¿FDWLRQRIWHUPVDIIHFWLQJPRUDOSUDFWLFH DQDO\VLV
of arguments affecting moral practice; 3) systemizationof arguments affecting moral practice; 4) invention ofarguments relevant to moral practice; 5) big ideas about
moral practice; 6) use of the products of the forgoingby non-philosophers in moral practice; and 7) use of
the foregoing by philosophers in moral practice. Let usEULHÀ\FRQVLGHUWKHVHLQRUGHU
1. Clarification. Much that goes by the name“applied ethics” has been undertaken to clarify thelanguage of public debates concerning moral practice.7
Observing a public debate concerning moral practice that
seems confused because participants use a significant
term loosely or in several unacknowledged ways, aphilosopher might offer a definition or a distinction (aset of related definitions), hoping to clear up what thedebate is about and thereby help those participatingin the debate to identify what, if anything, actuallydivides them. Among terms that have recently received
such philosophical treatment are: “coercion”, “conflictof interest”, “informed consent”, “person”, “race”,“terrorism”, and “war”. Philosophers have, of course,
also discussed the merits of this or that definition and
SURSRVHGDOWHUQDWLYHV,QRQHUHVSHFWFODUL¿FDWLRQRIVXFKterms is an application of ethics-as-a-field-philosophy,that is, philosophers use knowledge, skill, or judgment
VKDUSHQHGLQHWKLFVDVD¿HOGRISKLORVRSK\WRDFKLHYHD
clarity others did not. They seek to understand the termsof public debate as they clarify them. In another respect,however, this activity is not an application of ethicsas-a-field-of-philosophy. In general, the clarifications
do not exist in ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy waiting
to be applied. They are created for a practical purpose,6

For more on judgment and related concepts, see Michael
Davis, “A Plea for Judgment”, Science and Engineering
Ethics 18 (December 2012): 789-808.
7 Of the remainder, some of what is called “applied ethics”
seeks to help with the problems of individuals (as in, forexample, philosophical counseling or medical consultation)and some with questions that might become matters of
public debate but have not yet (such as the morality of plural
marriage or designing humans to be immortal).

4

the clarification of a public debate. That is one reason
that many philosophers prefer to describe what they do
as “practical ethics” rather than “applied ethics”. Whilethey may be applying philosophical knowledge, skill,or judgment, they are not applying ethics-as-a-fieldof-philosophy. They are, instead, adding to that field,
applying methods common to philosophy as a whole or,
OHVVRIWHQUHVXOWVIURPDQRWKHU¿HOGRISKLORVRSK\VXFKas metaphysics or philosophy of law.
2. Analysis of arguments. Much the same is true ofthe analysis of arguments. The arguments philosophers
typically analyze when they do applied ethics are notarguments belonging to philosophy but arguments
belonging to a public debate concerning moral practice,for example, the argument against abortion relying on
the premise that the fetus is a person from the momentof conception. What philosophers do is try to state the
DUJXPHQWDVIDLUO\DVSRVVLEOHFODULI\FUXFLDOWHUPV¿OO
in tacit premises, identify the argument’s strengths andweaknesses, and so on. While doing that, a philosopher
may contribute to ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy, forexample, to understanding the concept of person as amoral category. But there is no application of ethicsas-a-field-of-philosophy as such to the analysis of theargument in question. What is applied is primarily
philosophy’s general methods of analyzing arguments,
though occasionally it is a method drawn from another¿HOGRISKLORVRSK\
3. Systemization. A moral theory is (in large partat least) the systemization of certain moral arguments,
LQFOXGLQJUHODWHGGH¿QLWLRQVLQWRDQHQOLJKWHQLQJZKROH
Moral theory, that is, the field containing all moral
theories, including their criticism and defense, seems to
EHWKHFRUHRIHWKLFVDVD¿HOGRISKLORVRSK\7KHUHDUH
many criteria of adequacy for moral theories: internalconsistency, coherence with what we know of the natural
world, and so on. One of these criteria of adequacy isthat the theory be (relatively) determinate, that is, that it
JLYHDQVZHUVWRPRVWLIQRWDOOVLJQL¿FDQWTXHVWLRQVSXW
to it concerning how we should act. Another criterion
is that the answers the theory gives should (in general
at least) be plausible. It is in the context of showingthat a theory does, or does not, satisfy the criterionof determinacy or plausibility that the philosophicaldiscussion of theory may seem to join a public debate:a philosopher will apply the theory to a public debate,
for example, use the theory as the major premise in anargument about when abortion is morally permissible.
While this is applied ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy insome sense, it is, strictly speaking, not applied ethics
as commonly understood. The philosopher is merely
showing that her preferred theory is determinate orplausible in the exemplary case. The application is amere byproduct of the philosophy, not an attempt tocontribute to a particular public debate. An example fromHow Applied Should Applied Ethics Be? Michael Davisanother public debate might have served just as well.
4. Invention of arguments. The line between
analyzing old arguments and inventing new ones is
fuzzy. Sufficiently analyzed, what began as an oldargument may not only seem new to those participatingin the debate where it has long been used but actually
be used in startlingly new ways or with startlingly newforce. Though old (in some respects), the argument
will also be new, at least in consequences drawn.
Nonetheless, in addition to this sort of invention by
analysis, philosophers may now and then actually add
to the stock of arguments. Consider, for example, Sally
Markowitz’s argument that women have a moral rightto abortion until they have the moral equality that thecurrent sexist society denies them.8 Whatever its merit,
Markowitz’s argument certainly seems more than an
improved version of an old one.
Inventing arguments about moral practice is partof ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy—or, rather, it is if
the invented arguments are designed at least in partto convince other philosophers. But, being new, sucharguments cannot be mere applications of ethics-asa-field-of-philosophy. Indeed, they cannot be mere
applications of philosophy of any sort, however muchthey rely on pre-existing methods, analogies with oldarguments, or the like. Invention always adds to what
exists. Still, newly invented arguments are examples ofapplied ethics in a straightforward sense, that is, theyboth concern moral practice and augment ethics-as-a¿HOGRISKLORVRSK\5. Big ideas. For an analytic philosopher likeme, much that passes for the history of philosophy
is an embarrassment, consisting (as it does) of “bigideas” beside which the definitions, arguments, andsystemizations just described seem no more thanunimportant details.9 Big ideas, such as Plato’s Cave,
KDYHDQDSSHDOLQGHSHQGHQWRIDQ\SDUWLFXODUGH¿QLWLRQ
argument, or theory. They seem to be much of what
attracts students to philosophy.10
What is true of philosophy in general is certainly
true of ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy. Among the
big ideas of ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy are: care,the categorical imperative, practical wisdom, thesocial contract, and utility. While such ideas seem to
8 Sally Markowitz, “A Feminist Defense of Abortion”, Social
Theory and Practice 16 (Spring 1990): 1-17.
9 Compare Richard Rorty, “Universalist Grandeur andAnalytic Philosophy”, The Hedgehog Review 18 (Summer2016): 63-75.
10 Think, for example, of Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy(The Pocket Library, 1954), with its “lives and opinionsof the world’s greatest philosophers from Plato to John
Dewey”, one of several books that together attracted me tophilosophy.

5

Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy Vol. 9

help philosophers shape their particular definitions,arguments, or theories in ways they might not haveshaped them otherwise, the big ideas have only a modest
place in philosophy itself. They are primarily part ofthe scaffolding of thought, something to be taken downby the time a definition, argument, or systemization iscompleted. Big ideas are seldom, if ever, what ethics-asa-field-of-philosophy offers practice. What philosophy
as such, including ethics-as-a-field-philosophy,
RUGLQDULO\RIIHUVSUDFWLFHDUHGH¿QLWLRQVDUJXPHQWVDQG
systemizations.
6. Use by non-philosophers. Philosophers typicallyhave students, both the official students who sit intheir classes and the unofficial students who read what
SKLORVRSKHUVZULWHRUKHDUIURPWKHSKLORVRSKHU¶VRI¿FLDO
students. Typically, neither type of student will have a
deep understanding of a philosopher’s work. Indeed,even other philosophers may not. That is one reason
why, for example, more than a century after publication,
central features of Kant’s or Mill’s moral theory arestill controversial among philosophers. What students
typically take from philosophy, if they take anything,
are the big ideas, a philosopher’s special way of seeing
the world. From Kant, for example, they may learn to
try to do what is morally right whatever the actual or
probable consequences; from Mill, to do what gives
the best consequences whatever ordinary morality may
say; and so on. “The great philosophers” seem to be
those whose big ideas catch on with non-philosophers,leaving behind all the fine distinctions and delicate
arguments with which the philosopher originally hedged
them. What Bismarck said about making sausage andstatutes may also be true of much of the application by
non-philosophers of ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy, forexample, in a hospital ethics committee or corporate
HWKLFVRI¿FHIRUSKLORVRSKHUVDWOHDVWLWLVEHWWHUQRWWR
see.11 Application by non-philosophers, though common
and often beneficial, is only the application of ethicsas-a-field-of-philosophy in an analogical or degenerate
sense. Philosophy’s special contribution to understandingis missing. What is applied is more like a poetic image orpedagogue’s heuristic than philosophy.
7. Use by philosophers. Philosophers can entera public debate concerning moral practice either as
philosophers or as ordinary participants. I will soon
consider participation as philosophers, that is, as
recognized experts of a certain sort. Right now I wantto consider philosophers as ordinary participants, that
is, as participants with no special status. They enter the
11 What Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), a famous German
politician, said (or, at least, is commonly believed to havesaid) is, “Laws are like sausages, it is better not to see them
being made.” https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Otto_von_Bismarck (accessed May 8, 2017).

debate as philosophers only insofar they use whatever
they have learned from philosophy, for example, how toformulate their arguments more clearly than they would
have were they in some other discipline. This, it seems
to me, is an unproblematic kind of participation. But,
because it does not rely on the authority of philosophy,
it is the participation that a non-philosopher mightalso be capable of, having sharpened her skills in aphilosophy class. The public can take it for what it seems
to be worth—independent of its undisclosed origin in
philosophy. It does not seem to be applied ethics-as-a¿HOGRISKLORVRSK\LQDVHQVHUHOHYDQWWRRXUTXHVWLRQ

Experts
So far, I have treated applied ethics primarily as a ¿HOG
of philosophy, that is, as a set of questions, methods, andproposed answers. We can also treat applied ethics as acommunity, that is, as all the individuals working in that
¿HOGDJURXSVKDULQJFHUWDLQLQWHUHVWVDQGSUDFWLFHV,IDQ
expert is someone recognized as able to do certain thingsfor others that not everyone can, for example, provide
specialized information or replace a defective heart, thenmembers of the philosophical community are typicallyexperts in some part or all of philosophy. 12 Experts
in ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy might contributeto a moral practice, such as public debate concerningsocial policy, for example, by writing popular articles,
serving on a government commission, or acting as acorporation’s ethics officer. They would act as experts
insofar they have special (epistemic) authority because
they are supposed to draw (and typically do draw) on
ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy when they contribute(or at least try to contribute) to moral practice.13 Suchexperts might contribute to moral practice in at least
one of four ways (other than as ordinary participants).
They might contribute as resource, counselor, adviser, ordecision-maker.
1. Resource. For our purposes, a resource is anindividual called upon as needed to provide informationor tools. A philosopher is a resource in applied ethics
if she has knowledge or skill in ethics-as-a-field-ofphilosophy (beyond what most people have) so that
she can, for example, authoritatively answer a question12 )RUDIXOOHUGH¿QLWLRQRI³H[SHUWLVH´VHH0LFKDHO'DYLV³2Q
the Possibility of Ethical Expertise”, International Journal ofApplied Philosophy 29 (Spring 2015): 71-84.
13 Thinking of applied ethics as a community (as well asa field) also makes the question of expertise in morality
political (as well as epistemic). For more on this point, see
Joan C. Tronto, “Who is Authorized to Do Applied Ethics?
Inherently Political Dimensions of Applied Ethics”, Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2011): 407–417.

6about a moral theory (“What does Augustine’s theoryof virtue say about this?”), tell what ethics-as-a-fieldof-philosophy has to say about a certain concept orargument, or even use skill developed in ethics-asa-field-of-philosophy to provide a new definition,argument, or systemization. Serving as such a resource
in deliberation concerning moral practice should, it
VHHPVFRXQWDVDSSO\LQJHWKLFVDVD¿HOGRISKLORVRSK\even though it is not telling anyone what to do (or what
it is right or wrong to do). It is “applied ethics” in therelatively uncontroversial sense of bringing the content
of ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy to moral practice.14
Serving as a resource in this way is also, I think, close towhat philosophers often do when they teach. It is, then,something philosophers certainly can do.
Of course, other disciplines can also provide moral
practice with resources. A social scientist can provide
information about such empirical matters as what people
believe is or is not moral; a physician can provide
information about the likely medical consequences ofa certain social policy; and so on.15 Philosophers aredefinitely not the only resource likely to be helpfulwhen someone is trying to choose a course of action.
Philosophers are also not the only resource that canbe ignored. It is therefore worth noting that a resource
brings information or tools to practice, that is, to thethreshold of practice. Whether what is brought topractice ever affects practice, that is, actually gets appliedin practice, is generally beyond the resource’s control.
2. Counselor. While a counselor may serve as aresource, what distinguishes a counselor from a mere
resource is that she is supposed to ask helpful questions,
not just provide information or tools. 16 A counselorseeks to guide deliberation in ways that those counseledshould find useful or at least enlightening. Whatcounselors do is, in this respect at least, close to what
philosophers do when they teach in the Socratic style.
They help the people counseled structure their thinking
about conduct, leaving it to the counseled to answer
the practical questions (for example, “What should wedo?”). So, like serving as a resource, counseling seems a

How Applied Should Applied Ethics Be? Michael Davis

relatively unproblematic form of applied ethics, a naturalextension to (non-philosophical) practice of ethics-as-afield-of-philosophy. Counseling is certainly somethingphilosophers can do.
3. Adviser. For our purposes, advisers differ fromcounselors in at least one important way: advisers may—and typically do—explicitly recommend, condemn, rank,or otherwise judge courses of action. 17 The practical
judgment of an adviser, though typically carrying
weight with the person advised, leaves him free to dowhat he thinks best. Advisers do not command thosethey counsel or even act for them. What they do may
nonetheless seem problematic for philosophers as such.
Advisers typically go beyond what philosophers dowhen they teach. Advice seems to presuppose practicalknowledge, skill, or judgment for which philosophy
as such cannot vouch. What can? The obvious answer
is that the philosopher in question must have regularly
given good advice in the past (“good” here meaningsatisfying whatever interest the advisee sought to serve
when she sought advice or, at least, whatever interest sheshould have sought to serve). But there is a problem withthis obvious answer. It presupposes that the philosopher
has given advice before success could vouch for it. What
could vouch for an adviser’s expertise before the successof past advice could do that? We must, it seems, look forless obvious ways to evaluate the advice, for example,
by the adviser’s success in analogous parts of his own
life, by the number of alternatives he considered, by thesophistication of the reasons he gave in support of what
he recommended, or by the self-evident good sense of
the advice itself.18
That philosophers can give practical advice seems
obvious. It is one of the things they seem to do when,for example, they serve on a government commission.
That the advice of philosophers is often good may also
seem obvious. But that is not the question. The question
now is whether mere status as a philosopher or expert
in ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy entitles one to any
special authority as adviser. I think not. We seem to lack17

14 Compare Bruce D. Weinstein, “The Possibility of Ethical
Expertise”, Theoretical Medicine 15 (1994): 61-75.
15 Ruth Chatham, “What is ‘Applied’ in Applied Ethics?”
Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy 1 (2009): 1-7.
16 Shunzo Majima reminded me that there are also people
called “counselors” who merely listen. I ignore suchcounselors here for at least three reasons: 1) because they are
more accurately described as “listeners”, “sounding boards”,
or the like, since they do not offer counsel; 2) because
what they do is not what philosophers typically do; and 3)
because, if just listening were what philosophers sometimes
did, such “counseling” would be even less problematicthan the Socratic questioning I have in mind, since (almost)anybody can listen.

From Joe Hill’s perspective (that of a non-believer), a
preacher is a kind of adviser, typically one whose advice
is unsought—and unwelcome (a possibility Peter Singer
seems to have missed); but, from the perspective of someone
belonging to the same religious tradition, a preacher can bea resource, reporting what the tradition, properly interpreted,would have to say on a practical question under discussion.
18 The self-evidence I have in mind is, I think, unobjectionable.
For two examples (the commode and the air conditioner),see Arthur L. Caplan, If I were a rich man could I buy apancreas? And other essays on the ethics of health care(Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1992), p. 4 (thoughthese are, I think, both technically examples of counselingrather than advising, their self-evident good sense is plain
enough).

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Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy Vol. 9

evidence that experts in ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy
in particular, much less experts in philosophy in general,are, as such, good advisers on questions of moral
practice. Philosophy as such trains for understanding, notfor advising.19
4. Decision-maker. Decision-makers answer thepractical question before them with an action, notjust with information, counsel, or even advice. The
decision-makers we are interested in here have powerover others; they can command others, as military
RI¿FHUVGRRUDWOHDVWDFWIRURWKHUVDVDVXUJHRQGRHV
during an operation. Insofar as decision-makers arealso philosophers, they are the equivalent (more or less)of Plato’s philosopher-kings. Among recent notable
examples of philosopher-kings is Kiyokazu Washida
who, after many years in clinical philosophy and ethics,
served as President of Osaka University, 2007-2011.20 I
do not know what part philosophy-derived knowledge,
skill, or judgment had in his success as a decision-maker.
What I do know is that no country in the world draws
many decision-makers from the ranks of philosophers,
not even from the ranks of experts in ethics-as-a-fieldphilosophy. What is true now seems to have been true forall of recorded history. I now want to consider why thatshould be.

19 Insofar as “ethicists” are taught to advise, not justunderstand, they are being trained in a discipline other thanphilosophy. We may then expect the future of applied ethics
to include the separation of ethicists from philosophers,much as the past century or so saw the separation of
psychologists and linguists from philosophers.
20 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kiyokazu_Washida (accessed
June 11, 2016). I owe this example to Shunzo Majima
who also informed me of another Japanese “philosopherking”: Hisatake Kato, a Hegelian and Professor of Ethics at
Kyoto University, who introduced applied ethics in Japan,
before becoming President of Tottori University of theEnvironment. There are a few living examples in America as
well, though none quite so good. The best is Amy Gutmannwho, along with many respected publications in ethics-asa-field-philosophy, has successfully served as President of
the University of Pennsylvania since 2004. Though mybest example, she is not a particularly good one. All her
degrees are in political science, not philosophy, as are all her
academic appointments. If she is a philosopher (rather than apolitical theorist), she is one only because philosophers haveadopted her. Miles Brand, President of Indiana University,
1994-2002, would, for our purposes, be a better example
of a recent philosopher-king—except that his work was inmetaphysics and epistemology, not ethics.

ShouldHaving worked out what the relation of applied ethics
to practice can be, we may now return to our originalquestion, that is, what the relation of applied ethics-as-a¿HOGRISKLORVRSK\WRSUDFWLFHshould be. Unfortunately,“should” is as ambiguous as the two other terms of thatquestion. There are at least four senses relevant here: the“should” of expectation (“That scratch should hurt”);
the “should” of skill (“Here’s how you should show anargument to be valid”); the “should” of prudence (“Ifyou want happiness, you should aim for it”); and the“should” of morality (“You should save that drowning
child”).21 Let us consider these four ways of interpreting
our original question—in that order.
Aristotle is supposed to have written a work, now
mostly lost, On Kingship, in which he criticized Plato for
advocating philosopher-kings:
it [is] not merely unnecessary for a king to be aphilosopher, but even a distinct disadvantage. Whata king should do [is] listen to and take the adviceof true philosophers. In doing so he would enrich
KLVUHLJQZLWKJRRGGHHGVDQGQRWPHUHO\ZLWK¿QH
words.22
Aristotle seems to have thought that philosophers—or, atleast, “true philosophers”—should be mere academics,
OLPLWHGWR³¿QHZRUGV´7KH\VKRXOGQRWDVVXFKH[SHFW
to perform “good deeds” (beyond the good deeds we call³¿QHZRUGV´ 7KH\FHUWDLQO\VKRXOGQRWUXOH$QXPEHU
of other philosophers since have said much the same.23
21 Among other senses of “should”, two deserve at least amention here: the “should” of law (what, according tolaw, one should do) and the “should” of sociability (what,
according to society, one should do). I shall say no moreof these two senses of “should” here because our question
does not seem to concern either what the law requires ofus or what society asks of us. I would like to thank Ryo
Chonabayashi for reminding me of these senses.
22 Anton-Hermann Chroust, “Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s‘Philosopher King’”, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie
111 (1968): 16-22.
23 Marx may seem an exception because his Theses on
Feuerbach includes the famous XI: “Philosophers have onlyinterpreted the world in various ways; the point is to changeit”. I am, however, skeptical about the claim that Marx is
an exception. After all, Marx did not say that changing theworld is the point for philosophers. Perhaps it is only the
point for people in general. Marx might also have addedthat philosophers, as such, can change the world by helping
others to see it in new ways, for example, by helping themsee how changing the world for the better is possible. That
was in fact something Marx attempted.

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How Applied Should Applied Ethics Be? Michael Davis

Here, for example, is Kant on that subject:
That kings should philosophize or philosophers
become kings is not to be expected. Nor is it
to be wished, since the possession of power
inevitably corrupts the untrammeled judgment of
reason. But kings… should not suffer the class ofphilosophers to disappear or to be silent, but should
let them speak openly. This is indispensable to theenlightenment of the business of government…24
The argument justifying the separation of philosophy
and kingship seems clear enough: The philosopher assuch offers the “untrammeled judgment of reason”,
a product of the attempt to understand a practicalquestion uncorrupted by the possession of power. Suchunderstanding can enlighten the business of government.
In contrast, the king (that is, anyone tasked with making
decisions for others) must exercise practical wisdom,a judgment “the possession of power” necessarily
influences—and, in a sense, “corrupts”, that is, mixes
with impurities, the accidents of practice. Whatdistinguishes philosopher from king is, then, not a meredifference but a fundamental opposition. The philosopher
should keep a certain distance from practice, enoughto keep his reason “untrammeled”.25 Because the kingmust be fully involved in practice, taking all relevant
considerations into account when he acts, he must giveup philosophic distance, the clarity of theory, for theuseful compromises of practice. The king who is his own
philosopher has a fool for a sovereign.26
This is, it seems, a plausible claim, though empiricaland itself deserving a paper. But, if we assume its truth,
we have an answer to the question, “How applied should
applied ethics be?”—where the “should” is the “should”
of expectation. We should expect experts in applied
ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy, being philosophers, toserve as resources or counselors on moral questions
because philosophy, including teaching philosophy,
prepares them for that. We should also expect them toserve as advisers now and then, that is, when—owing
24 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, Second Supplement,“Secret Article for Perpetual Peace” (The Library of Liberal
Arts, 1957), p. 34.
25 Compare Mike W. Martin, “Professional Distance”, The
International Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (1997): 3950. Note that the “distance” I emphasize is not (primarily)
psychological but organizational, the avoidance of certain
situations rather than a “hardening of the heart” that Martinemphasizes.
26 This is, of course, an adaptation of the old legal saying,“The lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client.”
The saying makes the equivalent point about “professional
distance” in law that I am making about the distance aphilosopher needs to give good advice.

to other experience—they can successfully combine
philosophical understanding with practical judgmentof the appropriate sort. What we should not expect isthat philosophers as such should be decision-makers forothers (that is, command or otherwise act for them). We
should not expect even those who are good at giving
advice (“true philosophers”) to be the same people as
those who are good at choosing which advice to act on(“kings”).
We also have an answer to our original question
where the “should” is the “should” of skill or prudence.
An adviser who is a philosopher should be careful tokeep his distance from decision, for example, preferring
to advise in secret or as part of a committee rather thanin public or as an individual. As much as possible, askilled philosopher-adviser will avoid having “his own
skin in the game”. A decision-maker should equallykeep her distance from the process out of which advice
emerges. A prudent decision-maker will, for example,
avoid “incentivizing” a philosopher-adviser in a certain
direction. Since it is prudent for those who seek advice toseek it from those most likely to give the best advice, theprudent decision-maker will, all else equal, seek among
philosophers those advisers who keep a reasonabledistance from the consequences of their advice. So,for example, the prudent decision-maker will not, allelse equal, take advice from an philosopher who would
benefit personally from recommending one course ofaction rather than another. It therefore seems prudent forphilosophers to avoid becoming “kings”—or, at least,
to find others to advise them when they do. Even thewisest decision-maker needs advisers whose judgment is
independent of the biases that responsibility for decision
imposes or at least risks.27 There is much to be said forthe much-maligned “ivory tower”.
Which brings us to the moral interpretation of ouroriginal question. Clearly, it is morally wrong to use theclaim of expertise in ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy tojustify making decisions for others. The very credential
supposedly justifying the philosopher-king making suchdecisions (his status as philosopher) vanishes as soon
as he undertakes to make such decisions. To justify
making decisions for others by appeal to one’s status as a
SKLORVRSKHULVWRRIIHUQRMXVWL¿FDWLRQDWDOO7RH[HUFLVHSRZHURYHURWKHUVZLWKRXWDJRRGMXVWL¿FDWLRQLVDOOHOVH
equal, morally wrong.
27 This concern about independent judgment suggests a
close connection between what I have said about why
philosophers should keep a certain distance from decisions
on which they advise and the more general discussion of
ZK\DGYLVHUV DQGGHFLVLRQPDNHUV VKRXOGDYRLGFRQÀLFWVRI
LQWHUHVW)RUPRUHVHH0LFKDHO'DYLV³&RQÀLFWRI,QWHUHVW´
Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, ed. Ruth Chadwick(Academic: San Diego, 1997), 589-595.

9

Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy Vol. 9

Is it also morally wrong to justify advising a decisionmaker based even in part on a claim of expertise in
ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy? The answer to thatquestion seems to be: it depends on how close theadviser is to the decision. If the philosopher maintains
enough distance from the decision on which she advises,
she may be morally justified in citing her expertise in
ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy as part (but only part)of her credentials for serving as an adviser. If, however,she is too close to the decision on which she is advising,she should not cite (or otherwise rely on) her expertisein ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy. For example, aphilosopher who knows in advance that her advice will
be taken should not advise—or, at least, should pointout that she cannot claim to be acting as a philosopher.
She is, in effect, the decision-maker; she is therefore too
close to the decision to claim the authority of philosophy.
How close is too close is, of course, contingent on
circumstances.

making those decisions, is rightfully claim the authorityof philosophy for those decisions. Ethics-as-a-field-ofphilosophy should not be applied in that way. Much of
the discussion of the role experts in philosophy shouldhave in practice rests on a mistake. Neither philosophy as
VXFKQRUHWKLFVDVD¿HOGRISKLORVRSK\JLYHVDQH[SHUWthe moral or epistemic authority to tell people what to do
all things considered.29

Conclusion
Insofar as we think of ethics as a field of philosophy,
ethics cannot be applied to ordinary practice; philosophy
as such is never practical. Within philosophy, applied
ethics is merely a field of philosophy close to ordinary
practice—an attempt to understand the reasonableness ofa certain part of that practice, the application of morality
to particular decisions. What brings applied ethics-asa-field-of-philosophy close to practice is its focus on
clarification of terms used in moral practice, analysisof arguments used in moral practice, and systemizationof those arguments. Ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy canmake sense of moral practice without affecting it.
Ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy can affect moral
SUDFWLFHRQO\WKURXJKWKHPHGLXPRIH[SHUWVLQWKH¿HOG
A philosopher who is expert in applied ethics-as-afield-of-philosophy may serve as a resource, counselor,or adviser on practical questions.28 Ethics-as-a-fieldof-philosophy enters practice only when those seeking
resources, counsel, or advice apply to practice what
philosophers offer them. What philosophers should
not do, while claiming the authority of philosophy,
is command others, act for them, or advise them incircumstances in which they are reasonably sure thatthe advice will be taken. A philosopher can, of course,
become a successful decision-maker (as Professor
Washida did). What philosophers cannot do, while
28 Philosophers outside the field of ethics may also serveas advisers on moral practice—but, all else equal, are
not going to be as expert. Of course, much depends on
personality, experience, chemistry with advisee, and so on,
considerations we may ignore here.

29

For example, Gesang, p. 153, argued that because
moral philosophers are expert in moral philosophy, “thedoctors and the lawyers of the council [should] dispensewith their moral judgements because the [philosophers]
see it differently and thus reveal them to be mistaken”.
Philosophers with that much authority would seem to be
too much like decision-makers for their advice to deserve
the authority of philosophy. It is a mistake to understandphilosophic expertise that way.

10

Forms of Organizing Human Society Inspired by Technological Structures Alfons Josef Schuster

Forms of Organizing Human Society Inspired byTechnological Structures
Alfons Josef Schuster
Waseda University

Abstract
Fundamentally, any system consists of objects and relationships between these objects.
A major goal in ‘systems theory’ concerns the systematic discovery of general patterns or
principles that are broadly applicable across a wide range of domains. From this perspective, weinvestigate the patterns and other relationships that may emerge between computer networks
and organizations of human society. Our investigation emphasizes not only that computer
networks reflect human society in various ways, but also that new ways of organizing humansociety inspired by technological structures may be emerging.
Key words: technology, society, organization

1. Introduction
This paper contributes to our ongoing work in computerscience, artificial intelligence (AI), information study,
and new media study (Schuster 2007; 2008; 2009;2011).1 More specifically, the paper is on the interface
between the aforementioned areas and the domains of
the social sciences and the humanities. From a bird’seye view, the paper is motivated from observations, inour previous work and elsewhere [e.g., in Caldarelli
and Catanzaro (2012), or Kadushin (2012)], that there
is a rich and profound interplay between computers andhumans that may require some attention for various
reasons.2
1 Please note that this paper is an extended version of ourwork (Schuster 2016) presented at the 4th International
Workshop on Philosophy and Logic of Social Reality(SOCREAL 2016), 20-30 October 2016, at Hokkaido
University, Sapporo, Japan.
2 Although we casually speak about computers andhumans here, we would like to mention that these terms
stand representatively for various types of entities andenvironments including, but not necessarily limited tocomputer networks, virtual reality worlds, or robots, as well

From observation, the various forms of theaforementioned interplay frequently seem to be mirror
images of each other. As such the emphasis of this paper
is an exploration of this relationship. For instance, in thedomain of computer network topologies, a mirror image
for a ‘centralized’ or ‘decentralized’ computer network
might be a federal or confederal mode of government
adopted by a particular state. There are, however,many more properties (physical and non-physical),patterns of behavior (visible and invisible), and forms oforganization that are common between human society
and technological structures. As an initial example,
consider the complex systems of software programming
languages and protocols that allow the form of organized
and global communication we experience through theInternet today. If we compare these languages andprotocols with those utilized in human communication,then we must acknowledge that there obviously are many
similarities between technological structures and formsof organizing human society.
In order to understand these and other similarities
more comprehensively, we first look at formative
as the many facets of human nature and society. In addition,
we would like to reemphasize the focus of our work, whichis that of the wider computer technology domain.

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Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy Vol. 9

interactions between human society and technologicalstructures from a systems theory perspective (Section 2).
Section 3 and Section 4 demonstrate a variety of ways
in which human society and technological structures
influence, shape, and inspire each other, and also thatthese interactions may lead to novel patterns of societalorganization (referred to as ‘swarm’, ‘entropic’, and‘computational artistic society’ in this paper). Section 5
proposes a potential explanation for the emergence of
these patterns and, perhaps, the process of interaction
between human society and technological structures
more generally. Section 6 ends the paper with asummary.

2. Formative interplay as a feedback system
The motivation in this section is twofold. One goal is tointerpret the process of formative interaction between
human society and technological structures fromsystems theory. The second goal is to point out that theroots of this formative interaction reach back deep into
our history, and we demonstrate this next through an
example from ancient Greek mythology.

2.1 L’amour triomphe
The elegiac poem Metamorphoses written by the
Roman poet Ovid (Publius Ovidius Naso, BC 43-AD
14) includes the famous myth of the Greek sculptor
Pygmalion who fell in love with his own creation (Ovid
2008, 232-4). In the myth, the obscene Propoetides had
dared to deny the divinity of the goddess Venus. In an
act of revenge, Venus turned the Propoetides into vulgar
women of the street (the first prostitutes). After seeing
these women in their wicked ways, Pygmalion lived
celibate, lacking the companionship and love married
live can provide. Deep in his heart, however, Pygmalion
desires for a bride. In his yearning, he begins to carvea woman out of ivory. As the statue grows in shape,
Pygmalion becomes overwhelmed by the beauty andrealism of his work and falls in love with his creation.
Secretly, Pygmalion wishes he could have a wife likethis. The goddess Venus, to whom Pygmalion prays in
his despair, eventually grants this wish. When Pygmalion
returns home one day and kisses the statue, Pygmalion
realizes that it had turned human. The story ends with
Pygmalion and the woman getting married and having adaughter.
In the context of this work, the ancient myth of
Pygmalion describes the interaction between a memberof human society and a structure of technology, namely
the statue Pygmalion carved out of ivory. In a creative
process of transformation, the statue becomes more
and more - human. The main protagonist in this story,
Pygmalion, also changes. Actually, he changes in two

distinctive ways, internally, and externally. For instance,
Pygmalion moves through the internal (invisible)
states of being sad and disappointed to that of being inlove.3 On the other hand, he also experiences several
clearly external (visible) transformations includingthat of becoming a married man and a father, forinstance. Please note the significant weight these lattertransformations carry in human society.

2.2 The triumph of new media
2XUVHFRQGH[DPSOHFRPHVIURPWKH¿HOGRIQHZPHGLD
and the so-called new media environment. Although thehistory of these fields is relatively young, both terms
stand for important developments in the fast-moving,
modern-day world of the Internet.4
Perhaps, we all understand that, media are integral to
our everyday-life. In its essence, the role of media is thatof a mediator through which we interact and establish
an understanding of the world, of our experiences, andbeyond. In the last few decades, the development of thepersonal computer had an impact on the professionaland social lives of individuals and organizations aroundthe globe. The design of a global communication
network in the form of the Internet and the inventionof an interactive information space in the form of theWorld Wide Web (WWW) accelerated and guided thisdevelopment into the omnipresent, creative information
environment we all share today.
In the realm of academia, the relatively young,interdisciplinary field of new media studies is a childof this development. New media can be understoodas on-demand content that is available anywhere andanytime on a range of devices (PCs, tablet computers,
smartphones, etc.) through the Internet. The new
dimension of the Internet, which allows interactive
user feedback and creative user participation, therefore,
makes new media fundamentally different from old
media such as television, radio, or print media.
What is important for us to know is that a basic design
pattern underlying the new media environment is thatof a (closed-loop) ‘feedback’ system (see Figure-1).
Although, in reality, the new media environment includes
many more components (hardware, software, etc.), it
is possible to imagine the new media environment in
Figure-1 as a multi-dimensional, technology-based,interactive communication platform for society.

3 Here, it is interesting to understand that the creation,
integration, and controlled utilization of such feelings andemotions in machines (e.g., robots, intelligent personal
assistants, or virtual reality agents) is one of the goals of
current AI.
 )RUDJRRGLQWURGXFWLRQWRWKH¿HOGVHH3UHVVDQG:LOOLDPV(2010), or the classic work on media by McLuhan (2001).

12

Forms of Organizing Human Society Inspired by Technological Structures Alfons Josef Schuster㼟㼥㼟㼠㼑㼙㻌㼎㼛㼡㼚㼐㼍㼞㼥㼟㼛㼏㼕㼑㼠㼥㻌㻛㻌㼡㼟㼑㼞㼟㼣㼑㼎㼟㼕㼠㼑㼟
㼕㼚㼜㼡㼠㼢㼕㼐㼑㼛㻌
㼓㼍㼙㼑㼟㼟㼛㼏㼕㼍㼘㻌
㼙㼑㼐㼕㼍㼛㼡㼠㼜㼡㼠
㼎㼘㼛㼓㼟㼛㼚㼘㼕㼚㼑㻌
㼚㼑㼣㼟㼜㼍㼜㼑㼞㼟 㼣㼕㼗㼕㼟PHGLDHQYLURQPHQWDUHRIWHQGLI¿FXOWWRTXDQWLI\$VWXG\by Lin et al. (2016), for instance, reports on a possible
type of behavioral pattern between social media use
and depression among US young adults. Depression,
LQFOXGLQJLWVTXDQWL¿FDWLRQLVDWURXEOHVRPHDQGGLI¿FXOW
condition, of course. Although similar problems arise
when it comes to issues such as fake news, sexuality,
violence, privacy, or security, for the sake of space, theseissues cannot be addressed in this text.

㼒㼑㼑㼐㼎㼍㼏㼗㻌㼘㼛㼛㼜Fig.1. The new media environment as an example of a modern
technological structure. The underlying feedback design patternprovides opportunities for a society to reorganize (and perhaps
reontologize) in various ways.

On a higher level of abstraction, the way in which
the system in Figure-1 works is relatively simple.
Fundamentally, the system receives input from its
users, does some processing, and produces some‘desired’, tangible output. Usually, this output is directly
accessible to its users through various devices. The
crucial feature of the system is the potential it provides
for user feedback, hence, creative user involvement andparticipation. This involvement may range from passive
opinion forming to more active forms of participation.
Ultimately, the complete experience encourages users to
consume current output and to provide new input into thesystem (instantly, continuously, and voluntarily). Overtime, this process can lead to the development of (local
and global) dynamic patterns of structural and behavioral
formation, reorganization, and, perhaps, reontologizationin the system environment. Of course, this is theunderlying idea and drive behind the so-called ‘social
web’ (also called Web 2.0) with its various outlets suchas YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, etc.
As an example, imagine an on-line newspaper article(desired output) appearing on a website according
to specific web-design criteria. So far, the process ispassive (input generates output, no feedback). In termsof active feedback, we need to consider that many online newspapers provide a space (e.g., an Internet forum
or a message board) where people can engage in aconversation by posting messages on-line. Such an online discussion site, therefore, is an environment where
not only old or incorrect information can be updated orcorrected (instantly, because on-line), but also where
new information and opinions may emerge in relatively
short intervals of time. It is exactly this rapid and instantdynamism that makes the new media environment so
powerful.
Before we investigate the formative interplay between
society and technological structures more deeply, let us
spend one last thought in this section on the observationthat the (net-)effects of a user interaction in the new

3. Formative interplay between society andtechnological structures
We already mentioned before that the interplay between
society and technological structures is bidirectional. The
organization of this section appreciates this interplay
by first looking into the ‘from society to technologicalstructures’ direction and then into the ‘from technologicalstructures to society’ direction.

3.1 Society shaping technological structures
Perhaps, the Internet is a relatively attractive
computerized environment to begin with. Althoughthe ‘client-server’ model (one of the most common
network architectures on the Internet) and the ‘peer-topeer’ model are not necessarily restricted to the Internet
domain, they represent two ways in which the resourcesin a distributed application on a large computer network
may be organized (Gray 2011, 67-88).
In the client-server model (e.g., for a businesswebsite), one or more computers act as servers to therest of the network (the clients). In contrast, in a peer-topeer network (e.g., for a file sharing application) there
is no central service provider (server). All participating
computers (clients) have equal status. From theviewpoint of our work, we find that these two types ofarchitecture map into the domain of human society withease. For instance, a peer review process may involvethe evaluation of some body of work between peopleof similar standing and competence (the peers), while
a travel agent (the server) may provide its services to alarge customer base (the clients).
In the client-server and the peer-to-peer examples justmentioned, the clients, servers, travel agents, and peers,
are tangible objects. It is necessary to understand thatparallel to this physical dimension there also exists a lesstangible dimension when objects communicate (e.g., twosmartphones over a wireless connection). In this domain,
it is possible to distinguish communication protocols
such as ‘broadcast’ or ‘token ring’ technology. It is easy
to understand these protocols in the human domain.
Imagine a teacher handing out assignments to his
students. (Please note that for the sake of simplicity, we
use ‘his’ as a gender-free pronoun throughout this text.)

13

Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy Vol. 9

In a broadcast, the teacher would simply call the name ofstudent ‘X’. In the case that student is present, they mightraise a hand and receive the assignment from the teacher.
Note that in a broadcast the call goes out to all students atthe same time. In a token ring scenario, the teacher goesfrom one student to the next student asking ‘Are you
student X "¶,QWKHDI¿UPDWLYHFDVHWKHVWXGHQWUHFHLYHV
the assignment. In the negative case, the teacher moves
on and repeats the question to the next student. Note thatin the token ring case the call goes out individually andsequentially. In reality, the number of communication
protocols in computer networks is large, and so is therange of tasks they cover, which includes: preventing
data packets from colliding on a network, routing of data,
DYRLGLQJQHWZRUNWUDI¿FFRQJHVWLRQSUHYHQWLQJHUURUVLQ
incoming and outgoing data, or some form of security.
Although there are many more examples worth
mentioning in this section, we feel that the evidence forour case is already rather substantial, namely - that there
is no doubt that technological structures can be mirror
images of various aspects of human society.

3.2 Technological structures shaping society
From the reversed point of view, the ‘from technologicalstructures to society’ direction, we can observe that thevery creations of human enterprise (e.g., the computer
networks) feed back a stimulus that encourages the
emergence of new behaviors and organizational patterns
in human society, too.
For instance, the production of a reliable and robust
network (out of unreliable parts) was a major design
goal of the early Internet. In order to achieve these goals,
the designers of the Internet invented the now wellknown, but at the time groundbreaking, design principles
of decentralization, end-node verification, dynamic
routing, or packet switching (Casad 2011; Tanenbaumand Wetherall 2013). In return, the Internet and theimpact it has on everyday-life encourages scientists aswell as activists in various areas to contemplate new
types of society that may emerge in the so-called ‘global
village’. A decentralized society, may be one such typeof society. Such a society may embrace concepts suchas decentralized communication, decentralized law,decentralized energy production, and decentralized
finance, all facilitated by the Internet. 5 Clearly, the
5 Johann Gevers. The four pillars of a decentralized society.

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㻯㼛㼙㼜㼡㼠㼑㼞㼟㻯㼛㼙㼜㼡㼠㼑㼞
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Fig. 2. Evolution of computer and network technology.

intensity with which these ideas can be pursued today
would have been impossible in the same way (if at all) in
the pre-Internet (pre-computing) era.
Of course, whether we are going to witness the
migration of our society into such a decentralized form,
or whether it may be a process of meandering into an
all-embracing ‘infosphere’, a reality envisaged by the
SKLORVRSKHU)ORULGL RQHRIWKHNH\¿JXUHVLQWKH¿HOGRIthe ‘philosophy of information’), is debatable (Floridi
2010; 2011). Equally debatable might be some of theideas and concepts we are going to introduce in theforthcoming Section 4. Due to the nature of our work, thematerial we are going to present in that section requires
us to comment on ideas and phenomena (e.g., network
theory, social networks, crowdsourcing, or computer art)
that are more or less well-known in the wider context
of our work (Barabasi 2003; Caldarelli 2012; Kadushin
2012; Greenberg 2011). Beyond these establishedmaterials, however, we also would like to introduce anddescribe types of organizational patterns that seem tohave a degree of novelty according to our understanding
RIWKH¿HOG,QWKLVSDSHUZHUHIHUWRWKHVHQRYHOSDWWHUQV
of organization as ‘swarm society’, ‘entropic society’,and ‘computational artistic society’.

4. Swarm, entropic, and computational
artistic societies
In order to appreciate this section for what it may be
worth, we first would like to set the ballpark in which
we intend to identify and investigate the aforementioned
forms (swarm, entropic, and computational artistic) oforganization of society.
・ First, we would like to emphasize that we do
not claim that these forms of organization are‘everywhere’, ‘obvious’, or ‘clearly visible’ inour society. Actually, in many cases, these formsof organization are often spontaneous and shortlived. Our argument, therefore, would be thatthese forms of organization exist in some places
and situations in our society, and that these formsof organization are worth being interpreted andhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8oeiOeDq_Nc.
Accessed: 2017-03-14.

㼃㼛㼞㼘㼐㻌㼃㼕㼐㼑㻌㼃㼑㼎㼃㼑㼎㻌㻞㻚㻜
㻔㻿㼛㼏㼕㼍㼘㻌㼃㼑㼎㻕㻫

14Forms of Organizing Human Society Inspired by Technological Structures Alfons Josef Schuster

investigated.
・ Second, we would like to stress that theenvironment in which we discuss these forms oforganization, largely, though not exclusively, isthe Internet, WWW, and new media environment.
After these relatively important clarifications,
we continue this section by first compressing thedevelopment of computer and network technology into
three distinguishable phases (see Figure-2).
Although there are various other names worth
mentioning, the first phase may include Alan Mathison
Turing (1912-1954), John von Neumann (1903-1957),
or Claude Elwood Shannon (1916-2001). In simple
terms, Turing outlined the limits of what computers can
do by formulating the ultimate digital machine, the socalled ‘Universal Turing Machine’. Von Neumann’scontributions include the description of a computerarchitecture, the so-called ‘von Neumann architecture’,that remains a fundamental design feature of any
modern-day computer. On the other hand, Shannon
is often referred to as the father of the mathematicaltheory of information. Crudely, this theory describes
the effective encoding and transfer of data through acommunication channel (e.g., a computer network).
The second distinct phase includes inventors suchas William Henry (Bill) Gates III (born 1955), Steven
Paul (Steve) Jobs (1955-2011), Vinton Gray Cerf (born1943), or a Sir Timothy (Tim) John Berners-Lee (born1955). These names stand representatively for many
people involved in the realization of powerful computer
systems, their underlying hardware and software, as well
as for the powerful inventions of the Internet and the
WWW.
Lastly, the third phase of progress revolves around thefounders of companies such as Google (founded 1998),
Facebook (founded 2004), YouTube (founded 2005), or
Twitter (founded 2006). All of these companies pursue
their business under the aforementioned social web. The
social web is an extremely powerful abstraction. For one
thing, the social web urges our (information) society toredefine traditional values such as ownership (Heaven2013), friendship (Brent 2014), or (digital) ethics (Han2013). In addition, the term also stands synonymously
for the seamless integration, augmentation, andinfiltration of computing devices (tablet computers,
smartphones, computer games, virtual reality glasses,
brain machine interfaces, and others), - plus the plethoraof services these devices provide - into our information
hungry society as a new way of life.
The relatively young, interdisciplinary academic
field of new media studies mentioned earlier, might
be seen as a response to these developments. The field
explores a wide range of issues on the intersection ofcomputing, science, the humanities, and the visualand performing arts (Press and Williams 2010). It is
important to understand that a crucial feature of this newenvironment lies in the potential for individual users (whodo not need much technical expertise) to contribute andexpress themselves in a variety of ways on the Internet(e.g., from literary expressions such as blogs and digital
graphic novels, to the visual and performing arts such as
YouTube videos and on-line role playing games).
In the social web domain, so-called ‘content
management systems’ are among the technologies
facilitating this kind of participation. A content
management system is like a tool that allows users todecorate an empty room according to their individual
tastes - from the distance (i.e., over the Internet). Such aroom could be a social web account, such as Facebook.
Initially, a user registers for an account that is empty
in terms of user-provided, personal content. Over time,
however, the content in an account usually evolves, until
it represents a form of virtual home or second identityof its owner.6 Let us use an analogy to summarize thisprocess. The early Internet was like a skeleton onto
which the WWW began to weave a skin and some cloths.
Content management systems transformed this poorly
dressed entity into a catwalk where users metamorphose
into attractive virtual models that in some way behave
DUWL¿FLDOO\DOLYH
From a historical perspective, the social web (newmedia environment) appears to constitute a form of
reality visionaries such as Paul Marie Ghislain Otlet(1868-1944), Vannevar Bush (1890-1974), or theGerman artist and political activist Joseph Beuys (19211986) contemplated several decades ago. Paul Otlet isoften considered to be the father of ‘information science’.
Together with like-minded people, notably the Nobel
Prize for Peace laureate Henri La Fontaine (1854-1943),
Otlet carried the vision that knowledge is going to havea positive impact on humanity and world peace. The socalled Mundaneum, a partially realized, global (universal)
repository for all the world’s knowledge, used to stand as
a powerful testament of this vision.77KHLQÀXHQFHRIWKH
American Vannevar Bush was similarly profound. He is
widely acknowledged for his understanding of scienceand technology, as well as for his foresight in terms of
the ways in which the emerging digital technology might
affect society (Bush 1945). On the other hand, Joseph
Beuys developed a view of a society in which ‘jeder
Mensch ein Künstler sei’ (where everyone is an artist)
through the mystical term ‘social sculpture’ (Stachelhaus
6 Here, it is interesting to mention that the word ‘avatar’,
which is commonly used to describe entities in some virtual
reality environment, is a concept borrowed from Hindu
religion, where it refers to some form of ‘incarnation’.
7 The Mundaneum. http://www.mundaneum.org/en. Accessed:
2017-03-14.

Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy Vol. 9

1995, 78-98). Interpretations of this term understandsocial sculpture foremost as a process of transformationor shaping of society through the collective creativity ofits members into an entity of cultural, moral, and ethical
VLJQL¿FDQFH
Maybe, we should emphasize here that, in the past,
driving this process should have been, or was indeed, therole of the ‘traditional’ artist. The difference today is that
this artist could be you, me, or indeed everyone else (whohas access to the Internet).8 Nevertheless, with this brief
introduction to the development of the wider computer
environment, we are ready to organize the various
examples mentioned so far, plus some new ones, into
various (rather frequently overlapping) strands of society.

4.1 Swarm society
We investigate swarm societies from the points ofcentralization and decentralization. In computing, thefield of ‘swarm intelligence’ (Hassanien and Emary2015) studies the collective behavior of decentralized,
self-organized systems (natural or artificial). Usually,
individual agents in such systems do have limited
ability. Nevertheless, the combined outcome theseagents achieve often demonstrates behaviors that seemto surpass the ability of each individual agent. Take the
FDVHRIWKHFDSWLYDWLQJÀLJKWEHKDYLRUDPRQJPLJUDWLQJ
birds. In a close-up, the trajectory of a single bird looks
erratic and unorganized. Yet, from a wide-angle shot
perspective, the flock of birds remains together and
VWDEOHLQDODUJHO\µVHOIRUJDQL]HG¶FRQ¿JXUDWLRQHuman societies exhibit various forms of (de)centralization, too. Casually speaking, a human society
may have a center in terms of location (e.g., fromcaves to our solar system), or leadership (e.g., fromtribal chiefs to emperors). Likewise, a society may feeldecentralized as in being lost in the vastness of space(location), or enjoy a status of equality as in ‘animal
farms’ (leadership).
It is not too difficult to identify swarm-like,
decentralized, self-organizing behavior in our more
recent time, too. To begin with, we could take the caseof the recent refugee crises that is happening in various
places across the world. The way in which many ofthese refugees (migrants) travel (migrate) carries the¿QJHUSULQWVRIGHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQDQGVHOIRUJDQL]DWLRQ,W
is instructive to notice the role various new media tools
and applications play in this crisis, too. Perhaps, one of
the most valuable possessions a refugee may have could
be a smartphone. The smartphone is all in one, compass,navigation tool, job finder, entertainer, communication
tool, and organizer of all possible things. Ultimately, it is
8 It may be even a machine such as the ‘painting fool’, which
is a computational creativity project in the AI domain. http://
www.thepaintingfool.com/. Accessed: 2017-03-14.

15

the lifeline that provides those who have very little witha virtual ‘home’. In order to support the case of swarmlike societal behavior further, we provide a few more
H[DPSOHVDURXQGWKHWRSLFVRIµ¿UHVWRUP¶FKLOGDEXVHLQ
the so-called ‘darknet’, and decentralized communication
in so-called ‘mesh networks’.
A firestorm (Pfeffer at al. 2014) could be described
as a sudden, massive reaction or outburst of negative
criticism or protest on social media (Twitter, Facebook,etc.) concerning a wide range of issues including gender,
race, sexuality, politics, popular culture, and others.
Although there seems to be a daily pool of cases fromwhich we could take examples, a recent case concerns
the actress Jodie Whittaker who was chosen to be thefirst female incarnation of the main protagonist, ‘The
Doctor’ in the hugely popular British TV series ‘Doctor
Who’. 9 Without going into the details of the actualsocial media messages posted, which involve genderbias, abuse, support, etc., it is interesting to analyze the
G\QDPLFRID¿UHVWRUP7KHDJHQWVLQYROYHGKDYHZHDN
ties (almost anonymity between each other) and limited
forms of interaction (posts on social media), while theglobal pattern (which has a kind of temporal dynamic
and stability) of the interaction appears decentralized,
self-organized, erratic, and short-lived, which are all
swarm-like characteristics.
Our next example concerning swarm-like featuresof organization of (elements of) society, considers thedisturbing case of child abuse and child molestationin the so-called darknet [(a computer network thatcan be accessed only with specific software, and thatthrough this software provides a considerable degreeof anonymity for its users (Biddle et al. 2002)]. The
article 10 we are referring to, explicitly comments on
issues how such a platform functions (i.e., the strategies
and behaviours, providers and users of such a platform
apply in order to remain anonymous, informed,
and coordinated). Largely, these strategies revolvearound mobility, flexibility, rapid communication,
decentralization, and self-organization, which are all
swarm-like features.
In order to somewhat counterbalance the upsetting
example in the previous section, let us briefly
GHPRQVWUDWHDFDVHZKHUHHOHPHQWVRIVRFLHW\FDQEHQH¿W
from technology that operates on emergent, swarmlike behaviors. Beekman and Beekman (2013, 309310) mention that mesh networks are an alternative
to networks that rely on centralized routers. In adecentralized mesh network, a message hops from
9 Der Spiegel. Erster weiblicher ‘Doctor Who’. Viel Lärm um
was? http://www.spiegel.de/. Accessed: 2017-07-28.
10 D e r S p i e g e l . D a r k n e t - F o r u m ‘ E l y s i u m ’ . Wi e d i e
Kindesmissbrauch-Plattform funktionierte. http://www.
spiegel.de/. Accessed: 2017-07-28.

16

Forms of Organizing Human Society Inspired by Technological Structures Alfons Josef Schuster

wireless device to wireless device until it finds adestination. The route the message takes, therefore, is adhoc, which means that the network topology at any timeis self-organized and could be in any form at any stage.
What is the advantage? Mesh networks can be employedin areas where there is a lack of broadband Internet.
Actually, this would be the case of a self-organized(because anybody can do this wherever he/she wantsto) implementation of a self-organized network. Mesh
networks are also useful in situations where individuals
want to set up a temporary (private) communication
network in order to achieve a certain goal. Such a group
could be an emergency team (e.g., fireman fighting a
KD]DUGRXV¿UHRUVRPHRWKHUNLQGRIGLVDVWHUVLWXDWLRQ 
On the other hand, a mesh network also could be
employed by a group of protesters or activists during
an uprising or some other form of campaign. (Oneadvantage here could be that the mesh network can becontrolled by the protestors/activists, which can be thecause of governmental concern and interference.) There
are many more applications of mesh network technology.
What is important here, however, is that mesh networks
are an example where a technology that operates on
the principles of decentralization and self-organization
supports situations in which groups of society organize
themselves and operate in a swarm-like fashion. For
instance, although firefighters and political activists
are organized in some kind of structure, in action, the(unforeseen) events unfolding in a particular situation
may dictate a course of action that may require rapid
decision-making and spontaneous (unplanned) responses,
which are a form of self-organization.
2XUODVWH[DPSOHLQWKLVVHFWLRQUHÀHFWVWKHFDVHWKDWhuman societies may be prone to a form of intellectual(de)centralization, too. An example from the domain ofliterature may support this view. The so-called ‘literarycanon’ is an important idea in literature and culture.
Simplistically, a literary canon may describe a body ofbooks (e.g., the works of William Shakespeare) thathave been traditionally accepted by scholars as the most
LPSRUWDQWDQGLQÀXHQWLDOLQWKHLUVRFLHW\RUFXOWXUH0RUH
recently, those researchers who investigated large-scale
WUHQGVLQOLWHUDU\VW\OHIRXQGWKDWWKHLQÀXHQFHRIFODVVLF
literature (the literary canon) on contemporary writers
is declining (Hughes et al. 2012). Their research on alarge body of literary works (current and past) revealed
several trends including that: (i) authors of any given
period are similar in style to their contemporaries, (ii)the stylistic influence of the past is decreasing, and(iii) authors writing in the late 20th century are instead
VWURQJO\LQÀXHQFHGE\RWKHUFRQWHPSRUDU\ZULWHUV)URP
our point of view, therefore, the literary canon represents
a centralized form of literature, while the current literary
scene appears more decentralized, self-organized,
and swarm-like. The literary canon is one example.

Other examples, may come from the world of on-line
publishing, open-access, blogs, wikis, and various otherhighly dynamic and versatile environments holding an
ingrained capacity to shape and impact the intellectual
sphere of human societies.

4.2 Entropic society
Entropy is a fundamental concept in physics. We
distinguish two types of entropy: ‘natural’ entropy andµDUWL¿FLDO¶HQWURS\11 An instance of natural entropy could
be an ice cube melting away in a glass of water. The
ice cube changes from a state of low entropy (generally
associated with a form of higher organization, here ice)
to a state of increased entropy (generally associated witha state of lower organization, here water). The process
happens without any enforcement, spontaneously andnaturally, according to the laws of physics. Artificial
entropy is similar to natural entropy in consideringsituations where systems change from states of highorganization (low entropy) to those of low organization(high entropy), and vice versa. Crucially, however, it ishuman thought and rational thinking that initiates thesestate changes.12
Events such as the French Revolution, for instance,
represent cases of artificial entropy. The French
Revolution transformed a monarchy (high organization,
low entropy) in a process of social and political upheaval
into an intermittent state of chaos (low organization, highentropy), before converging into a modern democracy(high organization, low entropy again). For us, theinteresting step is the intermittent state of chaos with
its rapid increase of artificial entropy. More generally,
we suggest the concept of artificial entropy as a tool
for analyzing situations where systems, triggered byhuman thought and intent, experience rapid and massive
organizational change. The Internet and the social
network domain represent such a system in our eyes.
Let us elaborate more concretely on two examples
from the domain of art (past and current), in order tobetter understand our argument about entropic society.
From a past perspective we look at the art movement of‘Dada’. In his book on Dada, Kuenzli (2006, 14) writes
that‘… Dada, more than any other movement,
has shaken society’s notion of art and cultural
11 Please note that this distinction is not entirely new. The
philosopher Floridi (2010; 2011) speaks about antientropic information entities and processes in his work. Our
motivation here is to pursue and understand (and, perhaps,
expand) this distinction in some way.
12 Understandably, such a distinction should lead to a wider
discussion. For the sake of brevity, however, this text omits a
detailed exploration of this topic.

17

Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy Vol. 9

production. Fiercely anti-authoritarian and antihierarchical, Dada questioned the myth oforiginality, of the artist as genius, suggesting
instead that everybody should be an artist and that
almost anything could be art.’
How could a transformation into such a radical formof art emerge, and what does it have to do with entropic
society, or with society in the first place? Scholars in
WKH¿HOGLQFOXGLQJ.XHQ]OL  DOZD\VSRLQWRXWWKH
cultural crisis period of the First World War (WW1), andthat Dadaists (as well as other intelligentsia) believedthat the systems used for constructing an interpretationof the world were inadequate (as demonstrated by
the horrors of WW1). Dada, therefore, is a form of
deconstruction (please note that we consciously avoid
going into the work of Derrida here) of a cultural
sign system through a new sign production, namelythat of Dada. According to the people involved,
this new system should be able to change society’s
interpretation of the world not only in the domains ofart and literature, but as a whole Kuenzli (2006, 17).
Although the rebellious impact of Dada was profound,some individuals perceived it as a means rather thanan end in itself. These individuals looked at Dada as a
¿UVWVWHSLQWRDQHZEHJLQQLQJZKHUHDIWHUWKHQHJDWLYH
work of deconstruction (the result of which individuals
perceived as a kind of void), a new interpretation of theworld could be generated in a creative, positive process(e.g., through the various successors of Dada such as
Surrealism or Constructivism). Let us stop here, andlook at what this may have to do with entropic society.
Our argument would be that society goes through stagesof high organization (low entropy), such as a pre-WW1
society, through a phase of low organization (highentropy), such as the state created by the (negative)
deconstruction of Dada, to enter again a state of highorganization (low entropy), for instance by inventing or
creating new systems of interpreting the world.
Let us now move to our second example, which
involves the work of the audiovisual multimedia artist
Davide Quagliola (born 1982, artist name Quayola). The
starting point in Quayola’s work are popular paintings(high organization, low entropy) of the ‘Old Masters’(e.g., Botticelli, or Rubens).13 Initially, Quayola produces
high-resolution digital images of these paintings. A
computer program then repeatedly fragments these
digital images in an iterative process into a series ofintermittent images (low organization, high entropy)
until, in a process of inspection, a new object of art (highorganization, low entropy again) that is aestheticallypleasing to the artist’s eye emerges, and thereby, may
13 Meet Audiovisual Auteur Quayola. https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=fTw8b9Pwmr4. Accessed: 2017-03-14.

require a new way of interpretation.
In order to summarize our thoughts on entropic
society in this section, we would like to hypothesize thatthe processes of iterative destruction and reorganization
are an essential part of human existence. Old ideas
and concepts not only gradually change, they are also
often (consciously, as well as unconsciously) smashedand utterly destroyed. Far from being useless debris,
eventually, these high entropy remnants are the material
out of which new, low entropy structures and forms oforganization will emerge. We feel that the Internet andits environment are a platform where such processes canthrive and grow deep into the fabric of human society
and beyond. This is why we feel that calling such formsof organization entropic societies may carry some value
in it.

4.3 Computational artistic society
We mentioned earlier that the boundaries between thevarious types of society we propose in this paper are
rather flexible and often overlapping. The work of theartist Quayola mentioned before typifies this flexibility
rather well. As we shall see shortly, his work (and viceversa for the works of other artists mentioned in thissection) deserves a place in what we call ‘computational
artistic society’, too. Let us give an idea about thisconcept by modifying the quote ‘everyone is an artist’,
attributed to Joseph Beuys earlier in this text, in thefollowing way:
‘In the new media environment everyone can be an(a computational) artist.’
It is obvious from this quote that the new media
environment forms the backbone of a computational
artistic society. We need to remember now that thefield of new media studies deals with a wide range ofissues on the interface between computing, science,
the humanities, and the visual and performing arts. The
remainder of this section uses examples from these
domains in order to demonstrate the potential thatcomputational art provides for preserving, changing,and extending various dimensions of ‘traditional’ art in acreative and formative dialog with society.
Out of many possible examples, let us begin with
so-called ‘fractal art’, also called algorithmic art. This
relatively young art form concerns the computer(software)-based creation of images and structures thatare self-similar under different scales of magnification.
Fractals and fractal art emerged in the 1980s in thewider context of ‘chaos theory’ (Mandelbrot 1982;
Greenberg 2011). One of the underlying ideas of this art
form (and chaos theory) is that complex (natural, andartificial) structures (e.g., that of a tree, a snowflake,
an organ, a landscape, or a Quayola image) can be18Forms of Organizing Human Society Inspired by Technological Structures Alfons Josef Schuster

generated from relatively few and simple building blocks(e.g., geometric shapes such as lines and triangles, ormathematical equations such as those describing thefamous ‘Mandelbrot set’) in an iterative, software-driven
process. We already indicated that the work of Quayola
follows a process that is very similar to this approach.
Another possible work in this category could be thepaintings based on color charts or the famous stained
glass window in Cologne Cathedral produced by theGerman artist Gerhard Richter (born 1932). Similar to
Quayola, Richter, at some point in his career, utilized
procedures that involved various elements of randomness(e.g., for the arbitrary arrangement of colors in a work)in the production process of his paintings, and, in adifferent medium, the aforementioned stained glass
window in Cologne Cathedral. The important point tounderstand here is that in these cases, neither the artist(Quayola, or Richter), nor the computer (software) workin isolation. Rather, the artist and the computer are in aconstant dialog (though maybe not on equal terms) about
the direction into which their creation should evolve.14
Another area in which the new media environment
impacts dimensions of traditional art (its creation,
presentation, consumption, preservation, etc.) is thatof literature. Let us consider the case of digital graphic
novels by referring to the exciting children fantasy‘The Wormworld Saga’ created by Daniel Lieske(born 1977). 15 Of course, in these diametrical media
environments (digital versus traditional paint) there
are the obvious differences in terms of the production
tools. Keyboards, sensitive graphics tablets, monitors,
or computer graphics programs, for instance, have
replaced old fashioned pen, paper, brush, canvas, or
palette. However, it is also important to take note of the
profound changes concerning the physical and sensuous
dimensions of old media. For instance, the weightless,never-aging ebook edition we can download and read on
any computer screen has replaced weighty, voluminous,
bulky, new or second-hand, smelly, stained, or otherwise
sensuous paperback and hardcover editions. Likewise,
on-line, the concept of a ‘page’ has been transmuted into
14 In terms of computer creativity we would like to mention
that a software program is a completely deterministic
procedure. Nonetheless, there is often an element ofcreativity, which may express itself in the reaction (e.g.,surprise) the creation may evoke in an observer. This
reaction arises out of the huge number of arrangements thesoftware can explore and produce in a relatively short periodof time. Creativity, therefore, is related to the generation of
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comprehend for the human involved in the process. Please
note that the paper by Boden (2009) provides an interesting
introduction to this topic.
15 The Wormworld Saga. https://wormworldsaga.com/.
Accessed: 2017-03-14.

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surface where readers use a ‘mouse’ or a touch pad to (atthe same time) ‘watch’ and ‘scroll-read’16 through a text.
The case of The Wormworld Saga also provides
an opportunity to comment, briefly, on new models
of project financing. The Wormworld Saga, among
other ways, is partially funded by a ‘Kickstarter’ 17
crowdfunding (a form of crowsourcing) campaign.
Alternative finance environments like Kickstarter
provide an opportunity for creative artists to propose
their projects on the Internet to a global audience,
thereby maximizing the possibility to raise funding.
The last example we would like to present in thissection relates to performance art. In his 2003 endurance
stunt ‘Above the Below’, the popular American magician
and illusionist David Blaine18 (born 1973) spent 44 daysin a transparent Plexiglas case, suspended in the air (in an
altitude of about 9 meters) on the south bank of the River
Thames in London. The stunt attracted considerable
public interest and media attention. An important factorof the performance was the Internet, which allowed
viewers around the globe to witness this extraordinary
spectacle live on-line. We are less concerned here about
the physical and mental experiences a body may go
through in such a challenge. Rather, we are interested in
the environment in which the event took place, which
includes its physical location (London, England) as wellas its virtual location in the Internet. In the past, lacking
adequate media support, the direct experience of such
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and confined local space (e.g., a circus, a cabaret, afestival, or a market). Obviously, these restrictions would
have impacted spectators in various ways. In terms ofparticipation, the impact is clearly visible in the decisionmaking, the preparation, and the effort it may take togo, for instance, to a circus (or to London), and the time
it takes to quickly check on the Internet how David isdoing in his cage today. On the other hand, in terms ofthe ‘lasting’ impact an event may have on an individual,
there is no doubt in our mind that experiencing themastery of an extraordinary artist directly, as opposed
to indirectly through an intermittent agency, are twodifferent things entirely.
The final point we want to make here in relation to
the Above the Below endurance challenge, is to hint
16 In cases such as The Wormworldsaga, we would like to add
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FDQYDVGH¿QHVDQHZW\SHRIPHGLDH[SHULHQFHZHPD\FDOO
‘SmoVel’, because it is a hybrid between watching a movie
in slow-motion and reading a novel.
17 Kickstarter. https://www.kickstarter.com/. Accessed: 201703-14.
18 David Blaine. http://www.davidblaine.com/. Accessed: 201704-08.

Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy Vol. 9

at the dimension of ‘preservation and cultivation ofhistory’ the new media environment also provides. The
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human being, of course. Despite this realism, we may
feel that a number of spectators, perhaps, was readyto consume the experience in the spirit of a somewhat
VXSHU¿FLDOVKRUWWHUPHYHQWUDWKHUWKDQLQWKHZD\RID
somewhat more penetrating experience that stimulates
a mind more profoundly. In the past, traditional books
used to be associated with guiding consumers to exactly
this kind of deeper, more lasting type of experience.
It is interesting, therefore, to mention the short story‘Ein Hungerkünstler’ (English: A Hunger Artist) by
Franz Kafka (1883-1924). In all likelihood, this sad andpainful work by Kafka (2013) describes several of theexperiences David Blaine may have had while hoveringin his Plexiglas framed isolation over the River Thames.
To what all this boils down to is that although rather
different in space and time, Blain’s Above the Belowand Kafka’s Ein Hungerkünstler have a lot in common.
From this point of view of commonness, preservationin the new media environment (as in all othercommunication environments throughout the courseof human history and culture) does not always mean
plain copying or recording only - rather it also often
means inter-contextual preservation, transformation, andextension. In any case, in all these forms and instances ofpreservation and presentation, we can clearly recognize
some basic elements of humanity and society. Indeed,
if we look at this recognition a bit more introspectively,then, we also may recognize a process that is similar tonatural, biological reproduction, which is a thread weshall explore more deeply in the remaining sections of
this paper.

5. On the origins of formative interactions
The previous sections showcased the multifacetedinterrelationship between human society andtechnological structures. Despite various examples,
however, we have not arrived at a meaningful‘explanation’ of this phenomenon, yet. We would like to
use the remaining space in this text in order to attemptsuch an explanation. Although we have to acknowledge
that our forthcoming exposition is speculative, we
hope that it evokes some kind of response about theimportance of this phenomenon in the mind of the reader.
To begin with this undertaking, let us consider the role ofan artist (computational, or otherwise) in the new media(or any other) environment.

5.1 The role of the artist
Please note that in this section, we cut the comprehensive
discourse about the role of the artist short by looking

19at the works of a few scholars only. We also intend to
approach the topic through the lens of our previous
writing in some way, for instance, by rephrasing thequote mentioned earlier that ‘everyone is an artist’ in thefollowing inquisitive ways:‘Why should everyone be an artist (computationalor otherwise)?’‘Is it possible that everyone can be an artist(computational or otherwise)?’‘What happens when everyone is an artist(computational or otherwise)?’If we envisage the new media environment as anopen space into which human culture and life can move,progress, and evolve, then we could look at the workof the German scholar Erich Fromm (1900-1980) for a
discourse from a social science perspective about ‘why’
this directed development might happen. In some of
his works, Fromm, among other considerations, writes
about the ‘liberation’ of man through ‘love’ and ‘work’[e.g., Fromm (1979; 1993; 2005)]. Our interpretationof these terms would be that Fromm may consider love
as a universal gesture in which humanity acknowledges
and embraces everything that exists in this world ina positive, caring, forward-looking, i.e., loving way.
On the other hand, the stance Fromm takes on work,
might be that of a perpetual process of self-assessment,
self-refinement, and self-fulfillment (individually, andcollectively) that allows everyone to grow and develop
into a stable, firmly grounded, and well-functioning
member of society. Ultimately, this experience is one of
freedom, a kind of comfortableness in oneself, society,and, perhaps, the world at large.
We are inclined to respond to the second question,
whether it is possible that everyone can be an artist(computational or otherwise), with a ‘conditional yes’
for various reasons. For one thing, we simply share
the positive analysis Fromm provides in his work. Our
encouragement also comes from the huge number ofpossibilities for positive growth, development, andelucidation the new media environment seems to provide
for individuals. On the flip-side, we say conditional
yes, because the creative participation in the new
media environment requires an understanding about theadequate utilization of the tools of new media, which
requires various forms and levels of skill in terms of
new media (and computer) literacy. Of course, as it doesin all ways of life, this requirement only revitalizes andcontinues the ancient relationship between the teacher
and his student.
For the last question, what may happen when
everyone is an artist, we turn to the German philospher

20

Forms of Organizing Human Society Inspired by Technological Structures Alfons Josef Schuster

Fig. 3. Identity, indistinguishableness, and entropy. The entropic death of art.

Byung-Chul Han, who writes on a range of topics(e.g., burnout society, transparency, neoliberalism, ordigital swarm society) related to the digital new media
landscape (Han 2010; 2012; 2013; 2015). The conceptthat we are going to hijack here from Han’s thoughtful
discourse is that of ‘transparency’ (Han 2012). As far
DVZHXQGHUVWDQGLW+DQUHÀHFWVRQWUDQVSDUHQF\DVDQ
effect in the form of a kind of information overflow,
omnipresence, and exhibitionism caused by a systemicpressure (innate, and/or artificially created) in the new
digital landscape. Of course, it is easy to associate
this effect with the many details, which are often very
private, individuals post about themselves in the various
mainstream social media outlets. Han considers this formof neurotic exhibitionism as a kind of nakedness thatis close to pornography. Figure-3, which relates to thisview in some way, considers transparency from the pointof our work.
The point Figure-3 tries to make is that when
everyone is an artist, then art simply no longer exists. For
instance, one of the roles of an artist (patterned circles
in Figure-3) is similar to that of an explorer charting thewilderness of limitations and extremes on the fringes of
the human condition. The exploring artist distinguishes
himself from others (circles without a pattern inFigure-3) exactly because those others are ‘not’ artists.
That is, we need a contrast against which the artist canstand out and distinguish himself. When this contrast
disappears (picture to the right in Figure-3), everyone
is the same. (Of course, the contrast also disappears
when nobody is an artist.) Perhaps, one way in which
we can recognize this phenomena today is in the floodof creations that appear daily on the Internet in the formof videos, images, podcasts, or literary works (including
graphic novels). Of course, we do not say that this is abad thing in itself, or that the quality of these works is
ORZ:KDWZHDUHVD\LQJLVWKDWLWLVLQFUHDVLQJO\GLI¿FXOW
to distinguish between what a work of art actually is - notbecause art has disappeared or that it got extinct, on thecontrary - it is because it is everywhere.
In order to conclude our excursion into bohemiansociety, we go back to Section 4.2 where we elaborated

on the idea of entropy as a state of sameness, or shallwe say indistinguishableness. The same section alsomentioned that a system in such a state may be thecanvas on which new forms or structures of organization
may emerge (e.g., remember Quayola and his work, aswell as the ideas of chaos theory). A pressing question,
therefore, is what sort of society may succeed an artistic
society? We shall return to this question later. For the
moment, we want to pick up on an issue we mentioned
at the end of Section 4.3, where we seemed to recognize
a similarity between the process of formative interaction
between society and technological structures (e.g., thelarger new media environment) and natural, biologicalreproduction.

5.2 Formative interplay from an evolutionary
point of view
Let us introduce our view on the process of formativeinteraction between society and technological structures,and its relationship to natural, biological reproduction
through the following proposition:
Proposition-1: In its essence, the process offormative bidirectional interaction between
human society and technological structures
is an expression of an evolutionary principle.
The process is similar to natural, biologicalreproduction. However, it is also different to thisform of reproduction, because of the involvement of
the dimensions of human intelligence and rational
thinking.
As a starting point, let us look at the concept ofa ‘meme’, which the evolutionary biologist Richard'DZNLQV ERUQ LQWURGXFHGLQKLVERRNµ7KH6HO¿VKGene’ (Dawkins 1976). In his book and elsewhere, 19
Dawkins considers memes as agents that are similar to
19 Richard Dawkins on memes. https://www.theguardian.com/
media/video/2013/jun/20/richard-dawkins-memes-cannesvideo. Accessed: 2017-04-08.

21

Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy Vol. 9

self-replicating genes. In contrast to genes, which areresponsible for the inheritance of phenotypical traits,
however, memes are responsible for the transmission ofcultural ideas. So far, so good. Unfortunately, an idea isan idea, it is something that lacks a ‘real’ representationin this world such as, for instance, a tree has. Ultimately(acknowledging controversy), an idea is a construct ofthe mind.
By speaking about the concrete material realization
LQVWDQWLDWLRQ RILGHDV3URSRVLWLRQJRHVDVLJQL¿FDQW
step beyond mere ideas (genes and memes). From theperspective of this work, what we seem to see in these
realizations of ideas is, of course, not bound to be interspecies inheritance (in the sense that elephants breed
elephants). The realization of an idea, as we perceived
it throughout this text, may find its manifestation in a
ZLGHUDQJHRIREMHFWVDQGHQYLURQPHQWV$W¿UVWJODQFH
because these expressions are ‘trans’ rather than ‘inter’,these structures bear little resemblance to humans. Closer
inspection, however, shows - and this is an important
point of our work - that many of these structures arepermeated by, let’s say phenotypical expressions, hinting
at a human creator.
We have almost reached the end of our journey.
The final issue we would like to address here is thegrowing degree of similarity we can find in humancreated technological structures. The issue is particularlypressing when we think about the AI domain. Thisdomain is special in the sense that it is not a simple
human trait that we try to transfer into a structure oftechnology. Actually, it is quite the opposite, because the
IHDWXUHZHWDONDERXWKHUHLVRQHRIWKHGH¿QLQJWUDLWVRI
being human - intelligence. Essentially, by attempting tobuild AI, we transfer the ultimate valuable thing into a
structure of technology.20
Let us contemplate such a structure in the shape ofa future version of a ‘Robo Thespian’21 that is poweredby a ‘Cray’22 supercomputer. We can only speculate and maybe keep a lock on the drawer where the knifes
are (Wilde 2015) - about what might be going on in thecircuitry of such a ‘Thespian Cray’ when it looks back at
itself, or at some weird carbon-based biological structure,through the idealistic mirror of self-contemplation.
20 Please note that there is a problem in AI that is similar to
the inter versus across species issue mentioned earlier.
Traditionally, AI applications perform extremely well insingle domains (Silver et al. 2016), but struggle in problems
that require the ability to reason and generalize acrossmultiple domains (Mnih et al. 2015).
21 Robo Thespian is one of the world’s most advanced
humanoid robots (Verner et al. 2016). https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=Rx38lkbLZLk. Accessed: 2017-04-09.
22 Cray Inc. supercomputers. http://www.cray.com/. Accessed:
2017-04-09.

6. Summary
The motivation in this work was to investigate therelationship and formative interplay that may emerge
between human society and technological structures.
With a focus on computerized environments, notably
the Internet and the new media environment, our work
explored this relationship via a great variety of examples.
In terms of formative interplay, we noticed various formsof emerging organizations of society (swarm, entropic,
and computational artistic). In one of the central sectionsof this paper, we interpret this formative interplay as aprocess that is similar to natural, biological reproduction.
Overall, we feel that our work could lead to stimulating
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Notes to Contributors
1. All submitted papers are subject to anonymous peer-review, and will be evaluated on
the basis of their originality, quality of scholarship and contribution to advancing theunderstanding of applied ethics.
2. Papers should not exceed 8,000 words including references.
3. Papers must be accompanied by an abstract of 150-300 words.
4. Submission should be made through e-mail to caep@let.hokudai.ac.jp
5. In-text references should be cited in standard author-date form: (Walzer 1977; Kutz LQFOXGLQJVSHFL¿FSDJHQXPEHUVDIWHUDGLUHFWTXRWDWLRQ :DO]HU  $FRPSOHWHDOSKDEHWLFDOOLVWRIUHIHUHQFHVFLWHGVKRXOGEHLQFOXGHGDWWKHHQGRIWKH
article in the following style:Walzer, M. (1977), Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations, New York: Basic Book.
Kutz, C. (2004), ‘Chapter 14: Responsibility’, in J. Coleman and S. Shapiro (eds.),
Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
548-87.
Cohen, G.A. (1989), ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, Ethics  
7. Accepted papers will appear in both web-based electronic and printed formats.
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