NATUNA SEA INCIDENT – SINGAPORE’s EXPERIENCE
By
Captain Mark Heah Eng Siang
Deputy Director (Port Division and Shipping Division)
Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore

INTRODUCTION
1Singapore, an island nation and home to the world’s busiest port, issituated at the cross-roads of major shipping lanes linking the east and west andis next to the Strait of Singapore that serves as an important route for VLCCs
travelling to and from the Far East. The Port of Singapore received more than
145,000 vessel calls totalling some 910 million gross tons last year (2000). In atypical day, the Vessel Traffic Information Service (VTIS) receives calls from about
1,000 vessels, including those transiting the Strait. Singapore is also a global oilrefining centre and the world's top bunkering port. It received more than 15,000
tankers each year and sold some 18.7 million tonnes of bunker last year. As resultof which, the port's exposure to oil pollution risk is very much higher that manyother ports in the world.
2

Conscious of the port's vulnerability to oil pollution risk, the Maritime andPort Authority of Singapore (MPA) has proactively sought to prevent theoccurrence and mitigate the consequences of any oil pollution if it occurs.
Promoting a safety-conscious culture that permeates all sectors of the marine
industry ranks high in MPA objectives of oil spill prevention and crisis
management. We adopt a comprehensive approach that entails strict
enforcement of our legislation on oil pollution prevention and those international
conventions that Singapore has ratified, implementing and enhancing various
navigational safety measures, and maintaining the highest state of readiness torespond at all times. Such an approach have put us in good stead when we cameface to face with the tanker EVOIKOS oil spill disaster on the night of 15 October
1997.
3The EVOIKOS spilled some 28,500 tonnes of heavy marine fuel oil andpolluted a large portion of Singapore port waters. It was Singapore's largest oil
spill ever. Some 80 craft and 650 personnel were deployed in the cleanup. Within
3 weeks, the port waters were cleaned. Throughout that period, we were able tokeep the port completely open and operational. I have presented a paper on the1

experiences and lessons learnt from the EVOIKOS incident at the 1998 Petroleum
Association of Japan (PAJ) Oil Spill Symposium.

GROUNDING OF NATUNA SEA
4Nearly 3 years after the EVOIKOS oil spill, Singapore experienced anothermajor oil spill from the grounded tanker NATUNA SEA. Let me give a brief
account of the events leading to the spill.
5

It was a clear and calm morning on 3 October 2000 when the grounding

took place. The 51,096 gross ton Panamanian tanker NATUNA SEA carrying
some 70,000 tonnes of Nile Blend crude, was en-route from Middle East to China
and was proceeding eastward in the Strait of Singapore Traffic Separation
Scheme (TSS). Just before daybreak, at about 0615 hours, the tanker went
aground at the Batu Berhanti Reef at Latitude 01° 11.3’N and Longitude 103°53.1’E, in Indonesian waters. The location was about 8 km south of Singapore's
popular island resort - Sentosa.
6The grounding ruptured 4 cargo tanks of the tanker and about 7,000 tonnesof oil escaped into the sea. Fortunately, none of the 32 crew was injured and thetanker was stable. The grounding did not obstruct the traffic flow in the Strait. But
the oil spread fast because of the strong tidal streams in the Strait.

IMMEDIATE RESPONSES
7

Without delay, navigational warnings were broadcast to warn ships of thegrounding and the oil in the Strait. MPA activated its Marine Emergency Action
Procedure (MEAP)’s Oil Spill Contingency Plan. The Emergency Operations
Committee (EOC) was convened to manage the spill. It was chaired by ourDirector-General who was assisted by MPA's Director (Port Division) and thespeaker/author. As a procedure in the Standard Operating Procedures for Joint
Oil Spill Combat in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, we also informed theIndonesian and Malaysian authorities of the spill.
8The EOC assessed the situation and determined that it was necessary todisperse the oil slick quickly. We know that Nile Blend crude oil becomes too thick2

to be dispersed easily if quick action was not taken. Although the slick had not
moved into the Port of Singapore, it was imminent then that the oil slick would
strike Singapore shores due to the change in tidal flows. Resources weretherefore immediately mobilised to safeguard the port waters from the threats ofthe slick in the Strait. Booms were laid to protect sensitive areas in the port, suchas Sentosa and East Coast beaches, lagoon of the pink dolphins, entrance to theMarina Bay and fish farms. The Underwater Sea World and facilities using seawater, also took preventive measures.
9

Very shortly after the Singapore Port Operations Control Centre wasinformed of the grounding and spill, the EOC was already meeting the tanker's
Singapore manager – Tanker Pacific Management (Singapore) Private Limited.
Decisions were quickly reached to stop the gush and disperse the oil in the Strait.
A salvage company was promptly engaged by the tanker manager. Salvage tugs
were deployed to salve the tanker and to disperse the oil slick in the Strait. Apartfrom surface clean up operations and close monitoring, the MPA started plans toconduct an aerial dispersant spraying.
10In the same afternoon of 3 Oct 2000 at about 1600 hours, some 15,000

litres of dispersants were sprayed from a C-130 aircraft in the Singapore Strait
but clear of vessels navigating in the TSS.

This boosted the spraying ofdispersants which until then was only carried out from surface craft. Another aerial
dispersant spraying was planned for the morning of 4 Oct. Unfortunately, thissecond aerial dispersant spraying could not be conducted because ITOPF
advisers had wanted to go on an aerial recce and conduct an oil sampling
analysis before endorsing the aerial spraying. In our view, this delay caused aloss of opportunity to make use of dispersant whilst it was still effective.
11On 4 Oct 2000, at about 2300 hours, some of the treated oil was sighted in

Singapore port waters. Thereafter, strong south-westerly winds and tidal changes
pushed more treated oil to the shores of the southern islands. A part of thebeaches at Sentosa Island and a few other islands in the south were polluted.
Subsequently, the East Coast beaches and anchorages in the east were also
polluted. During the next few days, more treated oil and 'tar-balls' (hardened lumpsof the untreated spilled oil) drifted into the port.
12While cleaning up progressed in the port and in the Strait, the salvage

company, in consultation with MPA, started planning on refloating the tanker. The3tanker’s remaining cargo was transferred to other tankers and measures taken toprevent any further pollution. It was re-floated on 12 Oct 2000 and towed to a safe
anchorage off Pulau Sambu in Indonesia. Six (6) tugs were engaged in the towing,nine (9) other vessels on standby and as many as 100 technicians, were involvedin the re-floating and towing operation which was carefully co-ordinated by theEOC and our Port Operations Control Centre. Traffic in the Singapore Strait was
not impeded and no further spillage had resulted in the process of re-floating andtowing away the tanker to safety.
13The Strait and the port waters were cleaned and operations stood down at

1700 hours on 19 Oct 2000. Beach and shore cleaning, however, continued until
22 Nov 2000.

EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS
14The clean up operation for the NATUNA SEA was laborious as the spilled

oil thickened and became lumpy with dispersants having little or no effect on themafter 2 days. The strategy of the clean up operations had to be changed torecovery through scooping and grabbing by cranes. Oil booms were used to corral
the oil and, subsequently, they were removed by grab cranes. The clean up action
was round-the-clock in order to contain the damage and prevent further spreadingof the oil.
15At the height of the operation, additional oil booms totalling some 1300

metres had been laid to protect oil spill sensitive areas. Many more booms andequipment were used in rounding up and scooping up of 'tar balls'. A total of some
72,000 litres of dispersants were used. Some 920 tonnes of oily waste werecollected and disposed at reception facilities in the port. Seventeen (17)organisations including ministries, agencies, oil terminals, salvage and responsecompanies were involved in the clean up operations. Some 60 craft and 400
personnel were deployed. PAJ’s equipment was also deployed by its contractors.
For that, we wish to thank PAJ for their continual support. Once again, like theEVOIKOS incident, PAJ had offered their assistance without hesitation. Despite
the rapid thickening of the oil, we managed to localise the oil pollution and cleanup the oil spill in our waters in 2 weeks. There was no disruption to port andterminal operations and ships navigating in the Strait of Singapore.

4SUCCESS FACTORS
16Having a contingency plan in place as well as an annual oil spill exercise(known as the Joint Oil Spill Exercise - JOSE) contributed positively to thesuccess of the operation. The plan had enabled us to respond quickly. Actions
were taken promptly and effectively. We were able to minimise marine
environmental damage and economic losses. Some of the key factors that
contributed to the successful cleaning up operation are as follows:(a)Marine Emergency Action Procedures (MEAP)
All key officers were familiar with the MEAP and adhered closely tothe procedures laid down for cleaning up operation. Procedures on
the Control and Co-ordination, Seaward Operations, Shallow Water
Operations and Air Reconnaissance in the MEAP were very practicaland most useful.

(b)Command and Control
With the good support and sound decisions from MPA topmanagement, the seaward and landward clean-up operations werewell controlled and co-ordinated. Responses of the tanker manager
and other response organisations were well co-ordinated and theresults were commendable. The chain of command and line ofcommunication between EOC and On-Scene Commanders wereeffective. The delegation of various tasks to officers and teamwork
ensured the successful execution of various strategies as planned tocombat the oil spill and manage the crisis.

(c)

Quick Initial Response and 24-hour Operations
The MPA EOC was promptly convened to manage the incident. The
EOC was maintained round-the-clock. The initial management ofmarine traffic in the Strait and navigational broadcast ensured that the5shipping lanes were safe and vessel movements in the Singapore
Strait and port were not hampered by the clean up vessels.

(d)Multi-prong Action Plan
Implementation of a multi-prong action plan to localise and clean up
the oil was very effective. This included utilising MPA’s OilMap(Computerised Oil Spill Model) with hourly updated wind direction,
aerial and ground recce inputs to track the movement of oil. Aerial
recce was conducted twice a day. MPA’s network of closed-circuit
television (CCTV) provided pictures of the exact locations of oil slicks.
Based on such predictions, surveillance reports and CCTV images,
anti-pollution craft and personnel were deployed effectively round-theclock to expedite clean up operations. The ability to combine andadopt appropriate clean up strategies in the various phases reflected
MPA’s ability to respond effectively. The response strategies wereadopted in sequence as follows:(1)

isolating the spill source - by transferring the remaining oil inthe breached tanks of the tanker to other tanks while carrying
out lightening and laying of oil booms around the tanker;(2)

protecting sensitive areas - by booming areas such asrecreational beaches and water in-takes;(3)

dispersing the oil - by dispersants during the period when thespilled oil can still be dispersed;(4)

conducting the aerial dispersant spraying to complement
spraying from surface craft;(5)containing and recovering (when dispersants were no longer
effective on the spilled oil) as follows:(i)by flotsam retrieving craft to recover the oil whendispersants were no longer effective on the spilled oil;
6

(ii)

by retrofitting low-freeboard bumboats to trawl 'lumpy oil
and tar-balls' and deployed with workers on board to
manually scoop up the weathered oil which had turned
lumpy and waxy;(iii)

by trawl nets and snare booms to entrap the oil patches
and the soiled nets/booms were placed on the craft for
disposal at oily waste reception facilities; and(iv)by using oil booms to corral and contain the oil slick forsubsequent removal and disposal.

(e)Communication
Response craft, fitted with communication equipment, have directaccess to the EOC and other response agencies and informationexchange was good. The EOC met external agencies to co-ordinate
the operation and to keep them updated of the cleanup progress.
Meetings were also held to update the tanker managers, P&I Cluband ITOPF representatives on the cleanup progress and to discuss
future action plans. This ensured the successful execution of overall
response plan. The EOC also kept our Indonesian and Malaysiancounterparts informed of the situation. Good communication was
therefore another success factor.

(f)Media Management
The promptness in our response to local and foreign media queries
and the regular updates issued to them have minimised media
speculation. The smooth and transparent information flow to themedia, the factual status reports and reassurance to the public thatthe situation was under control demonstrated MPA’s effective mediamanagement. Mutual consultation between MPA and Tanker Pacific
was well co-ordinated.

LESSONS LEARNT7

17The EVOIKOS incident had generated some lessons to be learnt such as

the need for quick response by the shipowners and their decision to appoint theoil spill response company and salvage company as soon as possible. For
example, shipowners' response has improved after our meetings with the shipping
community and oil industry as a result of the EVOIKOS. The NATUNA SEA
incident tested our responses and measured our progress in oil spill management.
The NATUNA SEA's managers responded very promptly and probably it wasbecause they are located in Singapore. With the managers' prompt and activeinvolvement, we were able to decide and implement the response strategy andactions at a very early stage.
18

Some other noteworthy findings and feedback from the NATUNA SEA

incident are as follows:(a)Expert Advice
In the EVOIKOS incident, ITOPF experts advised that it was futile tocontinue spraying dispersants after the initial few days and that it
was best to let the oil hit the beaches. Contrary to their advice, wemanaged to achieve good results from dispersants applied evenbeyond the recommended and very conservative deadlines given byITOPF. For the NATUNA SEA incident, the need for a second runof aerial dispersant spraying on 4 Oct 2000 was delayed and finallyaborted. This was because the ITOPF representative who had justarrived on 4 Oct from London had demanded an aerial recce on theafternoon of 4 Oct as well as a laboratory test of the effectiveness ofdispersants on the spilled oil before deciding whether to have asecond aerial spraying. We were fully conscious of the fact that by
the time samples could be collected and brought back for testing, it
would already be dark thereby making it impossible to conduct theaerial spraying which had to be done at very low level. So thespraying was aborted.

(b)

Weathered Oil
As we did not disperse the oil slick in the Strait sufficiently for theabove reason, we were faced with a substantial amount of waxy and8

hardened oil wastes and lumps ie 'tar balls'. This prolonged ourcleanup operations as the oil lumps were difficult to be recoveredfrom the water. A large specialised oil recovery vessel had its
suction pumps choked with 'tar balls and wastes glued to the oil'. It
was demobilised as it became ineffective. Garbage retrieval craft
were found to be most effective to recover lumpy oil and wastes.

(c)

Oil Booms - Fixed Securing Points
The fixed oil booms protecting the swimming lagoons and othersensitive facilities should have pre-prepared fixed points foradditional oil booms to be connected. In this way, the craft and tugs
holding these booms could be re-deployed for other useful clean up
work.

(d)

Craft and Equipment for Waxy and Lumpy Oil
MPA’s garbage retrieving craft were found to be very effective toremove such waxy and lumpy oil. More such craft would be modified
for this purpose. Apart from using the conveyor belt system on ourgarbage craft to remove the waxy and lumpy oil and waste, there
would be a need to have scoops for manual removal. Such scoops
were needed to be fabricated during the NATUNA SEA clean up
operations. These scooping equipment should be made ready andstored for quick deployment. There was also a need to pre-identify
low-freeboard craft for such manual clean up operations.

(e)

Spill Response Companies
NATUNA SEA ship managers were quick in engaging the servicesof an oil spill response company. They even employed the servicesof oil spill clean up consultants to support MPA’s overall commandand control for the operations. However, we cannot confidently saythat all tanker owners and managers are of similar dedication andact responsibly. It may be timely that all tankers should subscribe toa spill response company when navigating in the Strait and Port ofSingapore.
9CONCLUSION
19Our pollution risk management approach has worked well for us in theEVOIKOS and NATUNA SEA incidents. MPA maintains the philosophy ofPrevention, Preparedness and Response for any crisis management. Stringentflag and port State inspections, reliable aids to navigation, state-of-the-art VTIS,ratification, enforcement and compliance of international conventions, nationallegislation, exercises and good co-operation with neighbouring States havehelped us to minimise oil pollution in our waters and the Strait. We are also
prepared to combat a large oil spill, if it occurs. However, ultimately, it must be theshipmaster who must play a more important role to safeguard our marine
environment from oil pollution by ships. Human error has been a key culprit forsuch disasters.

20

Pollution has no respect for national boundaries. Greater co-operation

amongst all affected by the spill is one essential step forward in effective
management of oil pollution risk. Quick effective use of the right strategy andmethods of clean up operations must be executed immediately especially in thewaters of the Singapore Strait as the oil slick will move quickly to the shores ofIndonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. We do not have the luxury of time on our side.
21

Two weeks were spent on cleaning up the oil pollution caused by theNATUNA SEA. It was costly. Another painful wait is when the parties would becompensated for their contribution to the successful operations. Thankfully, for thisincident, the NATUNA SEA owners and the P&I Club have assured us of quick
compensation.
22We must co-operate and make all efforts to prevent any incident and oilpollution. Prevention is definitely less costly than having an accident. And, in manycases, it will cost money to save money.
Thank you.
**************10©Copyright (2000)
Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore
All rights reserved
No reproduction without attribution to source11