The Nakhodka Incident and Subsequent Changes in Japan’s Oil-spill Response SystemSeiji Noma

Director
Maritime Disaster Prevention Division
Guard and Rescue Department
Japan Coast Guard (JCG)

I.

Outline of the Wreck of the Nakhodka and Resulting Oil Spill

1.

Date and place
January 2, 1997
Approximately 106 kilometers north-northeast of the Oki Islands in Shimane Prefecture

2.

3.

Overview of ship
(1)

Name: Nakhodka(2)Type: Oil tanker(3)

Total tonnage: 13,157 gross tonnage(4)

Cargo: Approximately 19,000 kl of fuel oil C(5)

Number of crew: 32(6)

Owner: Prisco Traffic (Russia)

Outline of Incident(1)

On January 2, 1997, while en route to Petropavlovsk, the ship broke in two; the stern sank,while the bow drifted. An estimated 6,240 kl of fuel oil C leaked from a broken tank, andpart of that oil reached the Japanese coast on January 7. The presence of oil wasconfirmed in a total of nine Japanese prefectures.

(2)

[1]

The bow portion drifted with an estimated 2,800 kl of fuel oil C still on
board and arrived at the town of Mikuni in Fukui Prefecture on January 7,
1997.

[2]

The stern portion sank immediately at the site of the shipwreck.

14.

Status of Clean-up Operations(1)

The Japan Coast Guard, the Maritime Self Defense Force, the Ports and Harbor
Construction Bureau of the Ministry of Transport, the Maritime Disaster Prevention Center,and other organizations implemented oil clean-up measures and essentially completed
recovery operations by February 18, 1997.

(2)

Concerning the oil still left in the floating bow section, the Maritime Disaster Prevention
Center, working under the supervision of the Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard,
engaged in oil-transfer and rec overy operations using a temporary road, completingrecovery on February 25, 1997.
Work on removing the temporary road was begun on June 7, 1997, and restoration work
was essentially completed by January 1998.

(3)

5.

II.

The bow section was removed by a crane-equipped salvage barge on April 20, 1997, in an
operation that was completed in a single day.

Instructions and Orders Received by Related Organizations(1)

The Maritime Disaster Prevention Center received a commission from the agent of the
ship’s owner (I nchcape PI Japan (?)) on January 5, 1997 to initiate oil clean-up procedures.
After the Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard had confirmed that the bow section had
drifted into Japanese waters (off the coast of Mikuni town in Fukui Prefecture), and that oil
was leaking, he ordered the Maritime Disaster Prevention Center to commence oil clean-up
procedures on January 14.

(2)

The 8 Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, working through Ports and Harbor
Construction Bureau No. 3, requested that Ports and Harbor Construction Bureau No. 5
dispatch its large oil-recovery ship on January 4. The division also asked the Maritime
Self Defense Force to dispatch emergency personnel on January 6.

thJapan’s Oil-spill Response System Since the Nakhodka Incident

The Nakhodka incident prompted a great deal of reflection and training that resulted in changes in theway that Japan handles oil spills, such as the following:* Strengthening the rapid-response system by clarifying how information should be communicatedand how related organizations should maintain contact.

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* Strengthening oil clean-up capabilities by acquiring more materials and equipment for dealing
with large quantities of viscous oil on the open seas.
* Strengthening the system of the Maritime Disaster Prevention Center, which is the coreprivate-sector organization that undertakes maritime disaster prevention activities.
* Strengthening cooperation and contact systems with foreign countries.
* Strengthening preventive policies.
1.

Revising the Law relating to the Prevention of Marine Pollution and Maritime Disaster
In May 1998, the Law was revised to: expand the scope of directions given to the Maritime
Disaster Prevention Center by the Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard; enhance the system bywhich the Commandant makes requests to the heads of other related administrative organizations;and effect other measures.
Previous to the revision, foreign ship owners were under no obligation to clean up spills thatoccurred outside of Japanese waters. This meant not only that the ship owner in question did not
make adequate emergency preparations, but also that the clean-up directions could not be quickly
sent to the Maritime Disaster Prevention Center because they were premised on the responsibilityof the ship owner to engage in clean up. Furthermore, no one had anticipated a spill of themagnitude of the Nakhodka on the open seas, and therefore the rapid response system, the contact
with related organizations, the division of labor, and other matters were not clearly enoughdefined.
With the lessons learned from the Nakhodka incident, officials concerned studied these issues
together and the following policy designed to provide an appropriate response to large-scale oilspills that occur outside Japanese waters w as incorporated into the law.
* The Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard can direct the Maritime Disaster Prevention
Center to implement the necessary clean-up measures even when oil is leaking from aforeign-owned ship outside Japanese waters. The funds for these operations are to beprovided by the Japanese government.
In addition, in view of the measures that must be taken by related organizations when alarge-scale oil spill occurs, communication is indispensable between different administrative
organs that have specific functions. In recognition of this, it is necessary to make systemicclarifications and further strengthen connections among related organizations. Therefore, thefollowing was incorporated into the revised law.
* The Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard has the power to request the heads of related
administrative agencies to implement the necessary clean-up measures.

3Furthermore, the parties who caused the spill must take full responsibility, and there must be acollateral system to ensure that the burden borne by the responsible parties is both appropriate andlimited to what is necessary. Therefore, the following was incorporated into the revised law.
* The Law gives the authority to require related administrative agencies, etc., to pay the costs
associated with clean up on a mandatory basis.

Oil Clean-up System as Modified by the Revised Law

LegendRecent changes made inaccordance with therevised law.

Report ofaccident

Japan Coast Guard
Mobilization orders

Directive (Addition of cases inwhich foreign vessels spill oil
outside Japanese waters)

Demand for payment
to cover costs:
guidance/orders

Ship owners, etc.
Demand for
payment tocover costs

Commission

Demand for
payment tocover costs

Contract

Maritime Disaster
Prevention Center

Relatedadministrative
agencies, etc .

Contract

Headquarters for onsite
countermeasures of theJapan Coast Guard(Contact andcoordination)
Headquarters for onsite
countermeasures of related
administrative agencies

Private-sector implementer ofdisaster prevention measures

Implementation of oilclean -up measures

2.

Systemic Organization of the Japan Coast Guard(1)

Establishing a base in Yokohama for mobilizing a clean-up task force
Using the national strike team of the US Coast Guard as a model, a clean-up task force wascreated in April 1995 comprised of eight people in two squads, under the jurisdiction of therd
Search and Rescue Division, Guard and Rescue Department, 3 Regional Coast Guard
Headquarters. This task force is a specialized group that is ready to provide guidance,4

advice, and coordination services in cases of maritime disasters where oil, harmful liquids,
and other hazardous materials are spilled or otherwise released at sea.
In the aftermath of the Nakhodka incident, this task force was strengthened by creatingrdYokohama National Strike Team Station as an office of the 3 Regional Coast Guard
Headquarters, and adding a third squad of four additional people.
(2)

Procuring materials and equipment
In December 1997, the Committee for Comprehensive Study of Oil-spill Response
Systems of the Ministry of Transport’s Council for Transport Technology examined thequestion of how to procure materials and equipment for clean-up efforts. The Committee
found that materials and equipment were inadequate for mounting clean-up missions inwaters outside Japan, and that there was a difference in quality between the clean-up
systems in the Japan Sea as compared with systems in the Pacific. The Committee went
on to recommend that the following materials and equipment should be procured: large
oil-recovery equipment; large oil recovery vessels; oil recovery equipment for use withviscous oil; equipment for the aerial spraying of dispersants; dispersants for use withviscous oil; recovery nets, etc.
To date, the Japan Coast Guard has procured the following materials and equipment forcleaning up oil spills.
* Oil recovery equipment (LORI Side Collector (?) LSC) that can handle viscous oil (10units)
Mikuni, Fushiki, Yokohama, Wakkanai, Monbetsu, Shiogama, Kochi, Fukuoka,Kagoshima, Naha
* Large vacuum-type oil recovery equipment (1 unit)
Abashiri* Oil boom for use on the open sea (3 units)
Niigata, Hakodate, Fukuoka* Recovery nets for viscous oil (119 units)* Dispersant for viscous oil in 18-liter drums (4,111 drums)* Self-mixing dispersant in 18-liter drums (540 drums)5

In addition to the items listed above, Ports and Harbor Construction Bureau No. 4 of theMinistry of Transport (now the Kyushu Regional Development Bureau of the Ministry ofLand, Infrastructure and Transport) has commissioned the Kaishomaru, a vessel capable ofboth dredging and oil recovery operations berthed in Kita-Kyushu. Similarly, thePetroleum Association of Japan operates three large oil recovery units (transrec in Ichihara(Chiba), Niigata, and Muroran, and the Maritime Disaster Prevention Center operates afourth unit in Moji.

Equipment Capable of Cleaning Up OilSpills on the Open Sea
LSC (Monbetsu)
Large-scale oil recovery equipment(transrec)

LSC (Wakkanai)
Large-scale vacuum type (Abashiri)

Oil recovery equipment (LSC) for viscous oil
Transrec (Petroleum Association ofJapan, Muroran)

Oil boom for open-sea use
Large-scale vacuum-type oil recovery
equipment
Acquired in fiscal 1999
Acquired in fiscal 2000

Transrec (PetroleumAssociation of Japan, Niigata)
Oil boom for open-sea use(Niigata)

Oil boom for open-sea use (Hakodate)

LSC (Shiogama)Transrec (Maritime Disaster Prevention Center, Moji)

LSC (Fushiki)
LSC (Mikuni)

LSC (Fukuoka)
Transrec (Petroleum Association of Japan, Ichihara)

LSC (Yokohama)
Oil boom for open-sea use (Fukuoka)

LSC (Kochi)

LSC (Kagoshima)3.

LSC (Naha)

Review of Oil Spill Response Program
According to Article 43-2 of the Law relating to the Prevention of Marine Pollution and Maritime
Disaster , the Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard is required to formulate an oil spill response
program that supports the aims of the national contingency plan. It must contain all necessary
items for the implementation of rapid and accurate oil clean-up measures, as well as methods ofensuring safety during the implementation of those measures, in the event that a major oil spill
occurs in designated waters.
The oil spill response program was formulated for the following six designated marine areas in
1978: Tokyo Bay; Ise Bay; Osaka & Harimanada Bay; and the east, central, and western regionsof and Seto Inland Seas. In 1996, the program was revised to include all waters immediately
surrounding Japan, divided into 16 districts.

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Then, in the wake of the Nakhodka incident in 1998, the program was revised a third time toinclude international waters that are contiguous with Japanese coastal waters where Japan has
exclusive economic interests, with countermeasures to clean up any large oil spills that occur.
4.

Promoting Exchanges with Foreign Clean-up Organizations
Japan has held several meetings of specialists with South Korea, Russia, and the U.S.,
respectively. In past meetings, the focus has been on creating common recognition of eachother’s oil clean-up systems. Little has been done, however, to improve Japan’s clean-up
technologies and knowledge through the sharing of on-site oil clean-up technologies and joint
operations with other countries. Steps are therefore being taken to remedy this situation.
To take some examples from the current fiscal year, a joint clean-up operations drill using atransrec was performed with South Korea at Moji in October 2000, based on a scenario of a majoroil spill. At the meeting of clean-up specialists held in February this year in Tokyo, in which thehead of the State Marine Pollution Control, Salvage and Rescue Administration of Russia(SMPCSRA), the head of the Far East Basin Salvage & Rescue Company (BASU), and the headof Sakhalin BASU participated, the program included a role-play exercise based on a scenario in
which a tanker runs aground in the Soya Strait.

5.

Acquiring Information on Coastal Environmental Protection
To efficiently implement clean-up operations and minimize damage when oil drifts near or onto
shore, we began gathering information concerning coastal environmental protection in fiscal 1997,
and developed a database that includes the most important coastal areas requiring protection.
Using the database, we then created a “management system for coastal area information,” which
presents an electronic display that also contains status reports about oil diffusion and predicted
drifting patterns. This system began operating in April 1999 and is updated as necessary.

6.

OtherIn addition to the measures cited above, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport isworking diligently to establish an international cooperative system in ways such as the following:
strengthening regulations on tanker construction, including the promotion of double -hulled ships;
strengthening “port state control” oversight to ensure that foreign vessels conform with treaty
standards; and providing support for the establishment of a regional coordinating unit (RCU) in
the Northwest Pacific Region Action Plan as proposed by the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP).

7III.

Responding to the Development of Sakhalin’s Offshore Oil Fields

In July 1999, commercial oil production began in part of the Sakhalin II oil field development project
located off of the Sakhalin coast north of Hokkaido. Because of concerns that a large oil spill could begenerated from this development project, a conference was held among 22 related ministries andagencies of the Japanese government, with secretariat duties performed by the Cabinet Office for
National Security Affairs and Crisis Management of the Cabinet Secretariat in conjunction with theJapan Coast Guard. In February 2000, the items discussed and the conclusions reached concerning
safety assurance in oil-field development and measures to be taken in response to an accident werecompiled in final form.
In addition, the Japan Coast Guard has selectively placed large-scale oil recovery materials andequipment (made for use on open seas in rough weather) and formulated a mobilization plan for
deploying the said materials and equipment, as well as patrol boats, in the event that an accident occurs,
and has revised its oil
spill response program for the Hokkaido coastal region.
1.

Selective Deployment of Large Oil Clean-up Materials and Equipment in Hokkaido* Large oil recovery equipment (transrec)

Muroran (Petroleum Association of Japan)- For recovering large oil spills on the open sea in rough weather (2.5m waves)- Can be mounted on a 1,000-ton PL type patrol vessel with helicopter deck3

- Recovery capacity of 250m /h- Total of 4 units in Japan (3 owned by the Petroleum Association of Japan and 1 owned by theMaritime Disaster Prevention Center)* Large vacuum-type oil recovery equipment

Abashiri- For recovering large quantities of viscous oil- Can be mounted on a 1,000-ton PL type patrol vessel with helicopter deck
- Recovery capacity of 90m3/h- One unit in Japan* Recovery equipment (LSC) for viscous oil

Wakkanai, Monbetsu- Equipment designed to recover viscous oil- Can be mounted on a 1,000-ton PL type patrol vessel8- Recovery capacity of 25m3/h- Total of 10 units in Japan* Oil booms for open sea operations

Hakodate- Can be used on open seas in rough weather (length: 300 meters)- Can be mounted on a 1,000-ton PL type patrol vessel with helicopter deck
- Can be deployed and retracted very quickly in rough weather on open seas
- Total of 3 units in Japan
2.

Revision of the Oil Spill Response Program Along the Hokkaido Coast
The program was revised to ensure a rapid and appropriate response in case oil accidentally spills
from the Sakhalin offshore oil fields or from tankers that are transporting crude oil from those
fields, and when the spill threatens to have an effect on the waters surrounding Hokkaido.
[Content of Revisions]* Countermeasures against an accidental spill from the Sakhalin offshore oil fields-The fourth edition of the program includes newly formulated “Countermeasures Against
Oil Spills from the Sakhalin Oil Fields” that were added to deal with any spills that mightoccur at the offshore oil production facilities off Sakhalin.

-The newly formulated measures include the following provision: “In the event that an oil
spill occurs at the Sakhalin offshore oil fields, a plan has been formulated to mobilize
patrol boats that can be fitted with large oil recovery equipment capable of recovering all of
the oil from the surface of the sea. The plan is based on the scenario of a large spill ofapproximately 8,000 to 13,000 kl that is drifting in mousse condition.”

9* Countermeasures against spills from tankers carrying crude oil form the Sakhalin offshore oilfields
A response system has been set in place to deal with crude-oil tanker accidents occurring in
the Tsugaru and Soya Straits.

Sakhalin II Mobilization System for Oil Spill Accidents
Command ships (PLH, 2 vessels)

Transrec (stag type (?), 3 vessels)
Vacuum type (stag type (?), 1 vessel)
Gut vessels, 3 vessels

LSC fleet (PL, 10 vessels)
Net ships for recovering viscousoil (PM, 5 vessels)Special assignment ships(PS, PC, CL, 6 vessels)

Aerial surveys conducted three days before the spillcrosses the Russia -Japan boundary
Recovery operations initiated when the spill crosses the Russia -Japan boundary
Implementation of No. 2 Operations (?) by the Maritime Disaster Prevention
CenterImplementation of countermeasures against onshore oil contamination by localauthorities

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