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Ethnic Inequality, Institutions andGovernance Trajectory in Kenya
David Muroni

1.0 Introduction
Ethnicity is quite often underestimated or outright overlooked in correcting
profound anomalies that arise and hinder the deliverance of better governance.
The manipulation and piracy of ethnicity by the state apparatus involving
politicians, business cliques, civilians, foreigners and the likes for ulterior
motives and selfish personal gains often weaken institutions and worsen
endeavors for better governance. These compromised institutions and theresulting ethnic inequality are obstacles to the necessary socioeconomic fabricthat allow anchoring better governance and development.
This paper focuses on indigenous power-sharing consociational governanceadvocating for term limits of all elected and appointed public officials. This candemystify their political bias restricting them to a fixed one-term participatory
position minus terminal benefits. This study also endeavors to show Kenya’s
position on relevant reforms to accommodate challenges from ethnic inequality,
institutions and governance trajectory by making a situational analysis of Kenya
as it relates to ethnicity and governance. It also aims to describe multi-ethnicity,
discuss ethnic inequality and politics by explaining political manipulations andpractices leading to ethnic domination or politicized ethnicity. It recommends
the operationalization of “indigenous power sharing in a consociational
governance system as an ultimate solution. Consociational governance is
def i ne d a s a s et of non - m aj or it a r i a n , el it e - level for m a l a nd i n for m a larrangements that limit threats to democratic stability in societies where ethnicor other societal cleavages are politicized.1 Democratic nation-state building has
to be shielded from negative ethnicity-defined as ethnic hatred and bias, 2 badinstitutions and poor governance. When democracy is under siege it should beanchored to reduce conflicts and violence by embracing the best practices like

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the Swiss experience.
This study also endeavors to inspire various stake-holders, learners andscholars on this theme. It adopts both quantitative and qualitative methodology
using both hard and soft data in books and journals available online embracing
power-sharing in a consociational 3 discourse plus representative fieldwork
narratives. This can neutralize ethnic inequality, violence and conflicts andboost better governance outcomes in multi-ethnic societies embedded in
empowered institutions.
This paper covers types of governa nce a nd its institutions in Kenya
highlighting on their compositions. It also covers term limits, elections andelectoral reforms. Ethnic inequality in Kenya is also covered with analysis onpolitical parties, democracy and horizontal inequalities. Consociational powersharing governance can create cohesion and peace. Moreover, it also endeavors
to offer solutions to politics of exclusion that accompany corruption andimpunity. The paper concludes by suggesting recommendations and solutions toproblems with bad leaders.

2.0 Types of GovernanceGood governance4 is a generic term and a prominent theme in development
forums of state governments, national governments, regional institutions andinternational organizations indispensable for development. It refers to themanner in which organizations interact with their key stakeholder groups toachieve their goals. This entails certain principles of decision-making andconduct of public affairs such as transparency, efficiency and accountability that
apply to a ll the processes that constitute public sector operations a ndinteractions with stakeholders. Static democracy is also a source of political
decay. 5 Examples of governance in practice include network, interactive, multilevel, open and customary.
Network governance is inter-firm coordination characterized by organic or
informal social system. It differs from bureaucratic structures within firms andformal contractual relationships between them.6 The concepts of privatization,
public private partnership and contracting are defined in this context.
Network governance therefore constitutes a distinct form of coordinating
economic activity contrasting and competing with markets and hierarchies.7
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These contracts are socially unbinding legally hence governance networks
distinguish themselves from the hierarchical control of the state and thecompetitive regulation of the market. 8 This mode is most commonly associatedwith the concept of governance in which autonomous stakeholders work
together to achieve common goals.9
Governance in its broad sense suggests that the state, the market and thecivil society have prominent roles in the governing of modern societies, fromlocal to international levels. Assessments of such governability are approachedby recognizing this whole to consist of three coherent analytical components:
the system-to -be-governed, its governing system and their governanceinteractions. Distinguishing and conceptualizing these components forms a stepin the process that allows assessing the governability of societal systems.10
In many developing countries, organizational structures copied from the eastor the west, differ from the stark reality on the ground.
Multi-level/layer governance is an approach in political science and public
administration theory that originated from European integration studies
associated with political scientists Liesbet Hooghe and Garry Marks. Theydeveloped the concept of multi-level governance in the 1990s and still relevant
today.11
Multilevel governance in the European Union is understood as respecting
competences, sharing responsibilities and cooperating between the various
levels of governance within and among member states. Therefore, multi-levelgovernance refers to the principle of subsidiarity, which places decisions as close
as possible to the citizens and ensures that Union level action is justified in thelight of the possibilities available at national, regional or local level.12
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) define
open gover nment as a culture of gover na nce based on in novat ive a ndsustainable public policies and practices. These are inspired by principles oftransparency, accountability and participation, which foster democracy andinclusive growth.13
Customary governance is the administration of a local unit or a village by anappointee of the immediate authority. This leadership is responsible for
upholding justice in all aspects of life within that local domain with landownership and arbitration taking the center stage. It has its own local council ofelders to help manage affairs of the unit.
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The main pillars of good governance that are widely accepted across theethnic divide are openness, transparency and accountability. This involves
fairness and equality in dealings with citizens that include mechanism for
consultation and participation, efficient and effective services; clear transparent
and applicable laws and regulations; consistency and coherence in policy
formation; respect for the rule of law and high standards of ethical behavior.
These principles represent the basis upon which to build open government - onethat is more accessible, responsive and transparent in its operation.14 These
forms of governance when well engaged ensure efficiency in managing state
affairs with a sense of belonging by the varied power stakeholders sharing thereigns of governance nurturing strong institutions for better governance.
Kenya should walk its governance endeavors along most of these devolved
power-sharing networks to arrive at the acceptable platform for its multi-ethnic
society steering towards an all-inclusive cohesive national development.

2.1 Governance and Institutions in Kenya
Kenya’s current Constitution was enacted on 27th August 2010. This replaced
the previous independence (1963) Constitution. It provides the structure of theGovernment of Kenya to consist of the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciaryand the Devolved County Governments.15 The manipulation of labor distribution
by the political elites and allies has influenced labor force composition in thesethree institutions to reflect ethnic inequality.
The 2010 Constitution is a direct outcome of the 2007 election revolts. It
discarded the imperial presidency allowing for a devolved regional government
with an independent Senate and Supreme Court at the national level. These
reforms have bolstered the Constitution to safeguard the nation-state from local
coopted predators arising from these cartels which have just regrouped and arestill hell bent.
The Parliament, civilians and the civil society are cautioned to be on alert tosafeguard and protect the Constitution from errand members wishing to defile
it for their hidden selfish interest. The position of Prime Minister recreated in
2008, was part of the Grand Coalition Agreement to end post-election violence.
This was merely an administrative role and entrusted with authority tocoordinate and supervise the execution of the functions and affairs of the56

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Government of Kenya and its Ministries. The New Constitution in 2013
abolished this post when negotiated consociational power-sharing coalition
ended.
This all-inclusive arrangement for the first time fostered an element of trust,
integrity, cohesion and coexistence in Kenya as a modern united nation.
However, political manipulations watered down the New Constitution opening
the Pandora box of mistrust and conflicts between and among ethnic groups.
Kenya experienced open governance and contestability in a Grand Coalition
government with two centers of power - the President and the Prime Ministeras checks and balances.
This was a working indigenous consociational power sharing governancewhich lasted until the 2013 elections. However the elites decamped andrebranded to exclude opposing cartels in a winner takes it all election outcomes.

2.2 The Executive
The President, the Deputy President, and the cabinet constitute the executive
a rm of the Kenya G overnment . The President is the head of state a nd
Government, Commander-in- Chief of the Kenya Defense Forces, and thechairperson of the National Security Council. The President is elected directlyby all registered voters for a five-year term. To win the presidential election,
the candidate(s) must receive 50 per cent plus one of the total votes cast, plus atleast 25 per cent of the votes cast in more than a half of the 47 counties.
The Deputy President is the President’s principal assistant. During thepresidential election, each presidential candidate nominates a running mate.
Upon elections, the running mate becomes the Deputy President. The cabinet
comprises of the President, the Deputy President, the Attorney General, and 1422 cabinet secretaries.
The President appoints the cabinet secretaries upon approval by the National
Assembly. Kenya has 21 cabinet secretaries as of April 2016, appointed fromoutside parliament. The President and the Deputy President are no longer
Members of Parliament.16

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2.3 National Assembly and Senate
Article 93 of the 2010 Constitution stipulates that the Parliament consists of
the National Assembly (350) and Senate (68) including the speakers of the two
Houses. Article 97 of the Constitution of Kenya provides for membership of the
National Assembly comprising of the elected and nominated members. Free andfair elections can boost democracy, strengthen institutions and preserve
integrity. Politicization of ethnicity captures governance and promotes politicalimpunity and corruption.

2.4 The Judiciary
The constitution created an independent judiciary consisting of the courts oflaw and tribunals with the Chief Justice as the head of the judiciary, appointed
by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission
subject to the approval of the National Assembly.
The Supreme Court is the highest court in Kenya with the Chief Justice as its
President. An independent Supreme Court should be empowered to guard its
independence to ensure that justice is always done and sustained.

2.5 Terms of Office Limits, Elections and Electoral Reforms
The independence Constitution adopted a majoritarian multi-party democracy.
The 2010 Constitution allows for two consecutive five years terms for the
President if reelected. It also requires the incumbent to relinquish power if
defeated in the election. The euphoria of independence denied the setting ofterm limits. It also failed on how to deal with unexpected scenarios before theera of life presidents and coups became the currency of governance. Youngdemocracies have to design checks and balances on power to minimize its
abuse. The founding fathers and their sponsors’ were hell bent on establishinghereditary ethnic based domination. Kenya holds elections once every five
years.
Gross impunity and corruption found a home in Kenya. This was an era ofpolitical manipulations and marginalization. Integrity and openness associatedwith better governance are sacrificed when institutions decay. Moreover, this58

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two-term regime is a big liability supporting the status quo of establisheddespots.
Elections in Africa give the incumbent immense influence on the electorate.
Other countries like Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and elsewhere with presidential
terms have colluded and coopted with Parliament to remove term and age
limits creating dictatorship status quo for continuity and power hoarding. Kenya
stands out in this region for following the Constitution with respect to
Presidential terms.
General elections in Kenya reflect the British system as a Westminister
Majoritarian democracy where the winner takes it all.17 Flawed elections
promote i mpu n it y a nd a f fect del iver y of publ ic goods . The u n i latera lmonopolization of power in plural societies divides the electorate into winners
and losers. This weakens institutions and breeds impunity from the tyranny of
numbers. Table 2.1 shows the chronology of Kenya’s Presidential elections from1997 to 2017.
Table: 2.1 Kenya’s Presidential Elections 1997 - 2017
Candidates

Parties

Votes

Percentages(%)

Total Votes

Turn-out (%)

Date

2,500,856

40.6

9,063,390

65.43

29 Dec 1997

10,498,122

57.2

27 Dec 2002

14,296,180

91.6

27 Dec 2007

14,352,533

85.91

4 Mar 2013

19,611,423

75.51

8 Aug 2017*

10,498,122

57.2

26 Oct 2017**

Daniel arap
Moi

KANU

Mwai Kibaki

Democratic

1,911,743

31.0

Mwai Kibaki

NARC

3,647,277

61.3

Uhuru
Kenyatta

KANU

1,835,890

30.2

Mwai Kibaki

PNU

4,584,721

46.42

Raila Odinga

ODM /
CORD

4,352,993

44.07

Uhuru
Kenyatta

TNA /JUBILEE

6,173,433

50.07

Raila Odinga

ODM /
CORD

5,340,546

43.7

Uhuru
Kenyatta

JUBILEE

8,203,290

54.27

Raila Odinga

ODM /
NASA

6,762,224

44.74

Uhuru
Kenyatta

JUBILEE

7,483,895

98.3

Raila Odinga

ODM /
NASA

73,2281.0*Supreme Court cancelled Presidential Election.
**Raila Odinga’s ODM/NASA boycotted this Presidential re-election citing uncorrected irreducible
minimum flaws.
Sources: Election Commission of Kenya (ECK) 1997, 2002, 2007 and the Independent Electoral andBoundaries Commission of Kenya (IEBC) 2013 and 2017.

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In the 2013 Presidential Election’s Final Results,18 Uhuru Kenyatta andWilliam Ruto (Jubilee Alliance/TNA Coalition Party) received 6,173,433 votes
which was equivalent to 50.07 percent. Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka(Coalition for Reforms and Democracy/ODM) garnered 5,340,546 votes whichis equivalent to 43.7 percent. The total number of valid votes was 14,352,533(85.91 percent). Again, the tyranny of numbers (less than one percent) enabled
the winners to exclude the losers from the national government for five years!
The August 2017 Presidential election was riddled with irregularities. The
incumbent Uhuru got 8,203,290 votes (54.27 percent) and Odinga received
6,762,224 votes (44.74 percent). The Supreme Court cancelled the results for arerun after sixty days. Odinga boycotted it citing a lopsided playing ground.
Uhuru went ahead and won the Presidency unilaterally on 26th October 2017with 7,483,895 votes (98.3 percent). This was a turnout of about 57.2 percent.19
This exclusion builds frustration and mistrust, leads to ethnic conflicts andviolence. It also destroys national cohesion and promotes struggles towards selfdetermination for neglected and marginalized regions.
Why are these percentages this low? This also illustrates the status quo
manipulative power plays. Therefore, a flimsy majority is enough to exclude
outsiders and establish political dynasties and monopolies. Political manipulations
are responsible for creating negative ethnicity (ethnic hatred and bias). It isthen used as a weapon to instill fear and mistrust in inter-ethnic relations which
destroys the social fabric for political mileage. Consensus power sharing
governance discourse must be geared to integrity to build trust for open
government and better governance.
Negative ethnicity and tribalism together with multiple political parties playthe ethnic card and trigger ethnic civil strife and violence especially during andafter the elections. 20 This paper argues for one term limit for the President aswell as public officials elected or appointed. This is a point of deviation with pastand contemporary studies as there is need to create a marking scheme that cananchor democracy and integrity in Africa. Politics should not be an occupation
but a call of national participative duty. And it must not be a monopoly of a few
co-ethnic elites with their alliances and bargains.
How do we get out of this bottomless pit? Going the Swiss way could be thesilver bullet. Demanding a lifetime single one-year term for the President andhis Deputy with no reelection option can stem the rot in African democracy to60

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anchor indigenous power-sharing consensus coalitions.
Democracy should pave way for meritocracy to eliminate costly elections in
multiethnic societies in Africa and beyond. To reign in conflicting interests;
spouses, siblings, family and relatives must also be legally banned from
appointive and electable positions. These can assist check the wanton abuse of
power associated with impunity and corruptive tendencies. African leaders need
to be constantly challenged and prosecuted for their abuses and failures.
Prosecuting errant presidents in and out of office the Korean style is thegolden bullet. Ossome argues that ethnicization of state’s bureaucratic
apparatuses and the civil society minimizes the liberal state’s ability to stabilize
society. Her study illustrates that the politicization of ethnicity is a central locus
of political expression in Kenya’s trajectory of democratization. 21
There is a need to anchor and deepen the acceptance of consensus democracy.
A search for holistic local hybrid solutions to ethnic inequality in Kenya must
continue to delegate and share power across the multiple stakeholders, build
trust networks and nurture open government for better governance outcomes.
Electoral reforms are necessary to protect the fragile democracy in Kenya.
How do we do this? Limit the term public leaders stay in office. A one-year
fixed term and you ship out can be the savior. Electoral reforms are necessary
to legalize and constitutionalize it. This should change the requirement thatcivil servants resign before seeking electable posts. This creates inequality andbreeds conflict, bitterness and vengeance in the event of flawed election defeat.
The solution is to allow losers to resume their previous jobs for stability andreconciliation.
Winners and losers should embrace each other as participants in the national
development. Once this becomes a noble call of duty and service to the nation,
it will be the ultimate goal to achieve sustainable national cohesion.
Kenya needs Parliamentary Prime Minister System for fair proportional
representation but must deal with corruption with a death penalty. 22 Thisnarrative reflects strong sentiments of an abused citizenry frustrated withinstitutionalized impunity and disregard of integrity. Kenya has tried both
systems with mixed outcomes. I strongly think that Kenya needs a new hybrid
governance system with independent checks and balances on the status quo.
This can mitigate state capture and decay. There is need for selfless leaders
and a culture to support a new value system.
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In the Swiss consensus democracy model, the President goes back to his/her
old job after his/her one-year term expires. This is practical and guaranteed.
What is holding Kenya back?
These challenges are correctable through open and fair democratic elections
on the way to an indigenous consensus democracy. Once institutions mature
and are professionally administered then democratic elections can be a good
remedy for hybrid net-works and multi-level better governance. Pronounced
disruptive political manipulation fuels lopsided and polarized institutions
beckoning the questions - Why do we need elections anyway? Who do they
serve? Why not institutionalize meritocracy?
This paper argues that institutions comprising of the Judiciary, Parliamentand Presidency where public officials are elected, appointed or otherwise from afavored or preferred ethnicity are compromised. This is flawed since it breeds
ethnic hatred and violence. These coalitions strive for permanency in sustaining
their tight-knit closed elitist status quo which capture, divert and control publicresources as their cash cows. Continuous electoral reforms to embrace thesechanges are indispensable to find a common ground for sustainable integrity.
Moreover, this will open new avenues for future research.

3.0 Ethnic Inequality in Kenya
Kenya has about 42 ethnic groups. Ethnic conflicts and tensions in themaking and sharing of the national cake are also prevalent. The most importantdimension of Kenyan society particularly relevant to ethnic inequality is ethnic
identification. Kenya is a multi-ethnic23 society with a diverse mix of ethnicities
without a dominant group. Kikuyu (22) is the largest, Luhya (14), Luo (13),Kalenjin (12), Kamba (11), Kisii and Meru (both 6), other African (15) and NonAfrican (1) out of 100 per cent. 24 A decade later these figures are still slightly
the same. 25
These groups used to raid and counter raid each other in territorial resources
accumulations and expansions. Colonialism made them one basket case thereby
exploiting these trade-offs to support colonial consolidation and expansion. The
legacy of this ethnic inequality is reflected in ethnic violence and politicalmanipulative marginalization policies adopted and sustained by independent
Kenya to impoverish opposition strongholds. Despite, the relative equality of the62

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five main groups as seen above, only the Kikuyu and Kalenjin have madewinning coalitions. 26
These political dynamics have produced fluctuating and uneven outcomes in
Kenya’s public sector governance. It is also important to note that this winningcombination is also what causes ethnic conf licts and violence. The first
President Jomo Kenyatta’s reign (1963-78) dominated the public sector by the
Gikuyu Embu Meru Alliance (GEMA).
Daniel arap Moi as the second President (1979-2002) made the Kalenjin(fourth largest ethnic group) dominant. Mwai Kibaki, also a Kikuyu took thereign for a controversial decade thereafter. Between 1963 and 1978, 29 percentof the cabinet posts were Kikuyu who are only 21 percent of the population.
These fluctuating inequalities were observed in the civil service too.
The Kalenjin dominance under Moi, accounted for 21.6 percent and increased
to 30 percent during multiparty rule (1994-2001). The share of the Kikuyu
dropped to 20 percent and it was only 10 per cent between 1994 and 2001. Dataon ambassadorial postings also indicate Kikuyu and Kalenjin dominance with achange in the presidency.
Afrobarometer 27 survey data also shows that there is a high perception of
unfair treatment and mistrust among and within ethnic communities.
Kenya comprises of three cases of concentrated multi-ethnic settings allowing
for some strategic coalitions which lock out losers. Five groups are relatively
equal in size and constitute an overwhelming majority of the population. Elite
cartels in each group collude to govern by constructing selective coalitions.
Electoral rules of first-past-the-post (FPTP) and the presidential system ofgovernment have reinforced such choices. 28
This is where manipulative politics use or play the ethnic card to entrench
the status quo leveraging on their ethnic numbers. The history of Kenya showsadverse effects of weak cohesion and integration on socio-economic development.
Pre-colonial migrations of ethnic groups were often as a result of a search for
improved livelihoods leading to inter-ethnic conflicts and collaborations.
The British colonists capitalized on these conflicts as tools to acquire land fortheir settlement in return for protection from other ethnic groups. Native
reserves created by the colonists prevented inter-country movement of theindigenous population. This resulted into ethnic enclaves as illustrated by
Mwangi Kimenyi which shows that the Kikuyu account for 91.8 percent of their63

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ancestral Central Kenya and the Luhya with 84 per cent of their Western
Kenya homeland. 29
The colony depended on the settler agriculture and the Ugandan railway line
as its f lagship project. The expropriated medium to high potential landmonopolized the extensive colonial infrastructure investment neglecting the restof the country which had low economic potential.
At independence in 1963, wide socio-economic inequalities were evident
favoring the higher agriculture potential areas with most of the social andphysical infrastructure. Ethnic groups in its proximity as inheritors had a headstart on development than the rest of other Kenyans.
Therefore, the independence development blue-print known as the Republic of
Kenya Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, 30 asserted that the government would
concentrate scarce resources in areas with the highest absorptive capacity. This
became a recipe for further balkanization of Kenya into developing andoverlooked areas, without adequate framework for the redistribution previously
proposed by the Sessional Paper.
The World Bank aptly refers these dimensions as ‘leading’ and ‘lagging’ areas
respectively. 31 Hence, Kenyans in arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) are confined
to be nomadic or pastoralists and not rangers despite any market economy
endeavors in the highlands or lowlands.
This also worsened as independent Kenya came to be known as a classcountry with ‘ten millionaires and ten million beggars’. This statement gained
currency by then populist Kenyan politician, the late J.M. Karuiki, whose
assassination was linked by a parliamentary commission of inquiry to key
national security officers in March 1975. 32
These are illustrative cases of governance failures, embedded in ethnic
enclaves presiding over flawed elections and failed institutions.

3.1 Multiparty Politics
Kenya’s independence multiparty state had become a de facto single party
state by 1965 after the opposition party Kenya African Democratic Union(KADU) willingly joined the ruling party for national political cohesion.
However, elite disunity emerged with Kenya People’s Union (KPU) opposition
party in 1966 and was banned in 1969 due to growing political intolerance. 33
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Successive de facto single party repressive governments firmly muted struggles
against increasing socio-economic inequalities.
The cha nge of g ua rd at St ate House fa i led to remedy t h is sit uat ion
culminating in the attempted 1982 coup that increased repression from the fouryear old Moi regime. The erratic mid-1980s espousal structural adjustment
programs (SAPs) systematically worsened ethnic inequality as liberalization
undermined access to basic public services, such as free or subsidized publichealth care, education and water. Sessional Paper No. 10 was biased towards
areas with high absorptive capacity.
The evolution of a constitutionally imperial presidency was accompanied byweak scrutiny of public finances. Public audit arrears increased while inhibiting
Parliament’s watchdog role over public spending. These shortfalls polarized thedemand for and allocation of cabinet positions and other senior public offices ascomplete misappropriation of budgeted funds, and their diversion to preferredillegal spending areas remained unpunished.
Table 3.1, shows how the ethnicity of the President has influenced thecomposition of Kenya’s independence era cabinet supporting Wrong’s position‘it’s our turn to eat’. 34 This stems from the fact that cabinet ministers now
called secretaries could only be appointed from serving Members of Parliament
belonging to the ruling party.
Thus the one-party rule of Kenyatta and Moi eras enabled them to appointfrom all ethnic groups; but the 1991 return of multi-party rule led to exclusionof prominent K ikuyus in Moi ’s K A N U in 2 0 01. Kenyatta’s cabinet had
disproportionate share of the Kikuyus repeated in subsequent governmentswith succeeding Presidents’ ethnic groups dominating ministerial positions andTable 3.1: Ethnic percentage shares of Kenyan cabinet positions
Ethnicity
KikuyuLuhya
Luo
Kalenjin
Total

Kenyatta I(Kikuyu)
1966
1978
28.6
28.6
9.5
4.8
14.3
14.3
4.8
4.8
21
21

Moi (Kalenjin)

Kibaki (Kikuyu)

1979
30
11
11
11
26

2003
16
16
16
7
25

2001
4
14
7
17
28

2005
18.1
21.2
3.1
6.1
33

Kenyatta II(Kikuyu)
2011
2017
19.5
33
17.1
9.5
12.2
4.8
9.8
9.5
42
21

Source: Stewart (2010) plus author’s updates
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across the entire public service, foreign service and especially in state
corporations.
Incumbent President’s ethnic group controls the presidency, finance, internal
security, energy, state corporations and agencies. They anchor and monopolize
the ‘eating’ business, cultivating mistrust and hatred. These systematic ethnic
blunders are governance failures undermining integrity and development.
There is a pattern where powerful ministries like finance, defense, internal
security, foreign affairs are a monopoly of the ruling parties. They penalize andmarginalize the opposition parties in a winner’s Lion’s share spoils.

3.2 Political Parties and Democracy
The first 40 years since independence, Kenya was a single party state ruledby Kenya African National Union (KANU) with President Jomo Kenyatta andvice president Daniel arap Moi respectively. The first elections considered
democratic by global standards took place in 2002. This saw a peaceful powertransfer from KANU to National Rainbow Coalition (NARC).
Mwai Kibaki won the elections on pledges of economic growth, curbing
corruption, improving education and rewriting the Constitution. Kibaki met
most of these goals given an impressive economic growth. He sought re-election
against Raila Odinga (Prime Minister) in 2007 elections which were termed
flawed by global standards: Odinga declared himself “people’s president”, but
Kibaki claimed a last-minute victory positing that his stronghold votes came inlate. Kibaki’s mandate confirmation escalated ethnic violence between Kibaki’s
tribe Kikuyu and minor tribes, which killed about 1000 and displaced 600,000. 35
The late former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s mediation culminated in
the formation of a Grand Coalition, with Odinga as ad hoc post of Prime
Minister and Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) party and Kibaki’s
Party of National Unity (PNU), equally sharing power at 20 ministers each.
The approval of the new constitution in 2010 was big gain. It eliminated thep o st of t he P r i me M i n i st er, re duc e d P re s ide nt i a l p ower s , e n h a nc e ddecentralization via devolved county governments and instituted a Bill of Rights.
Political tensions are fueled by ethnic salience when an incumbent president
is contesting. Former Prime Minister Odinga’s Coalition for Reform and
Democracy (CORD) contested the election of Uhuru Kenyatta in 2013, resulting
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Ethnic Inequality, Institutions and Governance Trajectory in Kenyain renewed fresh ethnic violence. He contested again in August 2017. The
Supreme Court of Kenya citing electoral irregularities cancelled the Presidential
elections. He also boycotted the reelections in October because of lack oftransparency.
The flagship ruling Jubilee Alliance Party has a big following in President
Kenyatta’s Central County (Kikuyu) and in Deputy President Ruto’s Rift Valley
County (Kalenjin) respectively, with some scattered allies countrywide. The
same applies to the National Super Alliance (NASA) and its affiliated parties ofthe leading Opposition Party main contenders of Odinga (Nyanza) and hisrunning mate Musyoka (Eastern).
Weak leadership also impedes accountability and capacity of the state onservice provision. The 2004 Peace Nobel Laureate Professor Wangari Maathai
pointed out that leaders worsen when they “get trapped”36 in office for too long.
Ma ath ai observes that ethnicity is either a factor or non-factor in good
governance in Kenya. She noted that the Kibaki government was fine in its firstterm (2002-7) but accusation of corruption and bad governance haunted his
second term. 37 This is supportive to political decay predicament as observed bySamuel Huntington in 1965. 38
Professor Calestous Juma argues that “Africa needs more, not fewer,
governance prizes”. 39 He is critical of Mo Ibrahim’s Foundation on Governanceand tacitly states that much of the debate has focused on the relevance of
rewarding Presidents with funds they probably do not need. Africa could benefit
from a new generation of prizes that celebrate, reward and inspire ministers,
governors, and mayors. Recognizing young leaders who demonstrate integrityin public governance would play an important role in creating a culture of
excellence.
It is hard for leaders to deviate from the social norms from which they
emerged. Good governance is not a single act. This is a cultural expression
acquired through long periods of political education. The lack of recent
awardees identifies a scarcity of good leaders.40 Why have titles? Perhaps,
naming and shaming bad performers can be a better alternative.
Methew (2018) points out in a recent narrative that there are deeper issues
affecting Kenyans that are in the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission
Reports (TJRC) that can cause conflicts if not resolved well.41 Human rights
abuses increase with bad governance.
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The 1979, Nobel Economics Prize Laureate William Arthur Lewis argued
back in 1965 that absolutely fair elections cannot be held in West Africa.42 Thisis also applicable to East Africa as well. There is always some element of
intimidation, especially in rural areas. The electoral machinery is also imperfectand lack of consensus limits willingness to accept results when the contest is a
close call or flawed if not rigged.

3.3 Horizontal Inequalities and Population
Horizontal inequalities are disparities across groups in at least four aspects
which encompass economic, social, political and cultural dimensions.43 There is astrong correlation linking horizontal inequalities positively with ethnic tensions
and social upheavals. 4 4 However, the mechanisms through which groupinequalities cause conflicts remain unclear. Hino et al conclude that: “Ethnic
diversity itself does not appear to be correlated with instability. Rather, it is thedegree of inequality among ethnic groups (horizontal inequality) that is closely
correlated with instability.”45
The significance of these public positions for horizontal inequality is that the
decline of public scrutiny into the 1970s consigned social infrastructure
investment to community-dependent Harambee; a self-help fund raising, whichfavored areas with politically connected elites.46 This made the provisioning of,and access to, basic needs like health care, education and safe water, as well as
physical infrastructure conditioned on political linkages and not comparativeneed.
Table 3.2 shows the relative population share of the main ethnic groups in
Kenya. The Kikuyu ethnic group is still the leading group but with no outrightmajority status. They are concentrated in Central Kenya but also spread
elsewhere given the patronage of their co-ethnic first, third and fourthpresidents. This strategy perpetuates the hierarchical vertical inequality acrossindividuals while also creating horizontal inequality across regions and groups
of individuals.47
Kikuyu domination is evident in Kenya. This can be neutralized throughindigenous power sharing consociational democracy as the ultimate solution.
Power sharing can boost governance by empowering institutions to check andbalance the waste generated by an artificial state monopoly of the public sector.
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Table 3.2 Relative Population percentages of the Main Ethnic Groups in Kenya
Ethnicity
Kikuyu
Luhya
Luo
Kamba
Kalenjin
5 groups
Kisii
Meru
Mijikenda
3 groups
8 groups
32 groups

Group population as a percentage of national population
1962
1969
1979
1989
1999
19
20.1
20.9
20.8
18.5
12.6
13.3
13.8
14.4
14.2
13.3
13.9
12.8
12.4
10.8
10.8
10.9
11.3
11.4
10.3
10.5
10.9
10.8
11.5
12.1
66.2
69.1
69.6
70.4
65.9
6.2
6.4
6.2
6.2
7.2
5.1
5.1
5.5
5.1
4.8
4.8
4.8
4.7
7.2
16.1
16.3
16.5
15.9
82.3
85.4
86.1
86.3
17.7
14.6
13.9
13.7

2009
22
14
13
6
12
67
6
6
6
18
85
-

Sources: Republic of Kenya - Kenya Population Census 1962 - 2009

3.4 Vision 2030
Vision 2030 aims to transform Kenya into a newly industrializing middleincome country providing high quality life to all its citizens by the year 2030.
Thus, maintain a sustained economic growth of 10 per cent per annum andprovide a cohesive society enjoying equitable social development in a clean andsecure environment. An issue-based people-centered, results-oriented andaccountable political system is a necessity48. Power sharing can boost equitabledevelopment when contestability is well anchored in the governance discourse.

4.0 Zero-sum Equation
One consequences of the politicization of ethnicity is its ‘zero-sum’ character:winn ers exclude losers 49 from state power, generally seen as a ‘ field ofaccumulation’. Ethnic coalitions appear and disappear based on elite cartels
calculations of gains and losses in interactions with other groups. If losers canlegally resume their old jobs, their fear of losing or being rigged can be
minimized.
Election is a process which must be free and fair and once it is over life mustmove on peacefully. Voters across the ethnic and political divide are and will
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still be Kenyans at the end of the day. Hence, it is important step to stem andcheck the politicization of ethnicity and promulgation of the culture of impunity
accompanied by political decay. 50

4.1 Corruption and Impunity
Corruption and nepotism pose great challenge to good governance. Corruption
harms the accountability power that citizens are able to exercise on the statea nd ot her prov ider s of go o ds a nd ser v ices . Kenya is ra n ked 13 9 t h byTransparency International (TA) scoring 27 per cent (0 as the most corrupt).
Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia perform better than Kenya in this respect.
Kenya is particularly weak in punishing corrupt individuals given her frail
impunity infested institutions. Bureaucracy destroys accountability that thestate exercises on service providers.
Horowitz provides an in-depth analysis of ethnicity and institutions in a wide
range of countries and singles out ethnicity as important institution that is
responsible for many outcomes observed in those societies. 51 Ethnically diverse
societies are prone to corruption and poor governance, conflict and slow
economic growth.
The sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is home to multiple distinct ethnic groups withmultiple languages, cultures and traditions. Recognizing heterogeneity in Africa
is a positive step to celebrate its diversity.
Impunity in Kenya relates to corruption. 52 Kenya has made a tradition toinvestigate corruption through expensive public inquiry commissions whosefindings never see the light. The Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC)
concludes that ... “most of these ‘truth seeking’ mechanisms in Kenya haveproduced reports which are either not fully acted upon (if implemented at all) or
are never made public”. 53 They therefore become the conduits for cover-up andentrenchment of the culture of impunity.
The failure to prosecute past impunity has repeatedly denied the country adeterrent against future corruption. While the New Constitutional orderprovides vast opportunities against impunity and corruption, success against
abuse of power and corruption requires that statutory order be aligned with
Constitution’s values and principles; an imperative recognized by those resistingthe (timely) implementation of the Constitution and related reforms. 54
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Ethnic Inequality, Institutions and Governance Trajectory in Kenya

The persistence of impunity and corruption worsens inequalities. 55 Luis
Franceschi argues that impunity is under siege in Kenya and accountability will
ultimately win. The more Kenyan leaders focus on ethnicity, the slower socialchange will come and the more its democracy will suffer. Hence, negative
ethnicity is not the way, no matter how appealing it may look at first sight. 56
Extractive institutions make nations fail economically which ensure that thesecountries remain poor and prevent them from embarking on a path towards
economic growth. They persist because of a vicious circle that victimizes theircitizens despite disparities in their intensity. 57
Ednette notes that colonialism created unfair distribution of resources, divide
and rule policy which bred un-tolerant political culture in post-independence
Kenya. 58 However, Kenya as an independent country exploited and failed tocorrect that anomaly.

5.0 Summary and Conclusion
Colonial era ethnic inequality in Kenya arose from land displacements, neglect
and preferences in where infrastructure was developed or modified. These
inequalities still persist on five decades later. Better governance outcomes
flourish when constitutional culture takes root and there is a consensus on
issues of national unity like elections, administration and provision of public
goods. Kenya started well fighting ignorance disease and poverty but elite
cartels have captured the whole mechanism adding one more challenge - theculture of impunity.
A solution to this predicament requires a holistic indigenous power sharing ina consociational governance discourse embedded in empowered institutions.
These can defuse conflicts in a multi-ethnic society. The first-past-the-post(FPTP) system of democracy in Kenya is flawed and needs to be replaced witha workable alternative. Electoral reforms could be the way to go. Amending theConstitution to further clip Presidential powers or abolishing that office outrightis indispensable for better governance.
Co-ethnic Kenyans associate the Presidency with possession or property. The
President and his Deputy should be elected fairly for a single term of one year
and return to civilian life without terminal benefits given their rampant abuseof power. With time this will create a new African consensus meritocracy. The
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Parliament and other arms of the executive acting as checks and controls cansafeguard and protect civil liberties with a social contract.
Switzerland is one of the few multilingual countries in Europe without
political difficulties with its linguistic minorities. Modern Switzerland is not one,homogeneous ethnic nation but a creation by different ethnic groups speaking
different languages and following different religions. It has had its share ofsocietal conflicts as elsewhere but has been fortunate over the past one and ahalf century, in finding political ways of achieving multicultural understanding
based on two concepts.
First, Switzerland renounced the idea of creating a culturally homogeneous
nation-state, embracing an ‘artificial’ multicultural nation. Second, is its successwith creating a type of democracy, which favor and enforces power sharing
between the different cultural groups. This has led to social and political
integration, peaceful conflict-resolution by negotiation, and national consensus
among a once fragmented and heterogeneous population. 5 9 Switzerland
exemplifies the so-called consensus democracy, which is based on integration ofminorities through proportionate representation and political participation.
Politics is characterized by compromise among over-sized coalition.
There is a vertical division of power through federalism, with devolved
autonomy to sma ller units ‘consociationa l ’ or ‘power- sharing’ model of
democracy.60 Kenya can learn from this Swiss model and localize it to suit her
plural interests.
The current Presidential candidate’s minimum of 50.01 percent to carry the
day must be raised to over 80 per cent requiring a winner to share power withlosers in proportion to their margins. This consociation must be inclusive
because leaders need to be continuously challenged and reminded when their‘eating time’ is over.
One-term limit should be applied uniformly to all appointed and elective
public positions and once it takes root, a win and win environment for allparties involved will be a reality. The colonialists ignored African potentials forsolving conflicts.61 Local issues can be resolved with the best practices from ourdiverse backgrounds as long as we agree to disagree over salient aspects of ourshared heritage. Independent African leaders too have also ignored these
African potentials with flamboyant impunity. A constitutional single one year
term limit will eliminate the impunity to steal elections.
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Leaders worsen in power and must never be allowed to be trapped and decay
in leadership, which promotes impunity and hinders better governance delivery.
The task of creating a New Kenyan Identity with new value systems andinstitutions is huge and the sustainable capacity to ensure open governance isenormous but must start now. Kenya needs to discard parts of its cultures notin sync with modernity to bridge the ethnic imbalances preventing thistransition. Transcending into separate but equal entities amicably can also be apeaceful option.

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Endnotes
1
2
3

4
5
6

7

8

9

10

11

12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21

See A. Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 494-95.
Koigi wa Wamwere. Negative Ethnicity from Bias to Genocide. (New York: Seven Stories
Press, 2003), 22.
See A. Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in
Twenty-one Countries. (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1984); A.
Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six
Countries. (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1999)
Ari-Veikko Anttiroiko and Pekka Valkama, Good Governance. Critical Resources andFinish Development Knowledge (University of Tampere, n.d.), 268-9.
Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay,” (1965).
Jones Candice et al., “A General Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions
and Social Mechanisms,” Academy of Management Review 22, no. 4 (October 1997) 911945, https://www.jstor.org/stable/259249
Tom Dedeurwaerdere, “The Contribution of Network Governance to Sustainability
Impact Assessment,” in SopheThoyer and Benoît Martimort-Asso, Participation for
Sustainability in Trade (Vermont: Ashgate, 2007), 209-228.
Eva Sorenson and Jacob Torfing, “The Democratic Anchorage of Governance Networks,”
Scadinavian Political Studies, 2 8, no.3 (September 20 05) 195 -218, https://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2005.00129.x
Jens Newig, et al., “Synapses in the Network: Learning in Governance Networks in theContext of Environmental Management,” Ecology and Society Resilience Alliance15 no.4
(2010) article 24, http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/art24/
Jan Kooiman et al., “Interactive Governance and Governability: An Introduction,” The
Journal of Transdisciplinary Environmental Studies 7, no.1 (2008) 1-11, http://www.
journal-tes.dk/
Liesbet Hooghe and Garry Marks, Europe with the Regions’: Channels of Regional
Representation in the European Union, Publius: The Journal of Federalism 26, no. 1(1996), 73-91.
Committee of the Regions. “Multi-level governance: Building Europe in Partnership,”
http://cor.europe.eu./en/activities/governance/Pages/mlg.aspx
OECD, Open Government: The Global Context and the Way Forward (Paris: OECD
Publishing, 2016), 19-20, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264268104-en
OECD, Pillars of Governance (Paris: OECD Online Publication, 2016) http://www.oecd.
org/governance/pillars/
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), Kenya Facts and Figures (Nairobi: Herufi
House, 2016), vii.
Ibid., vii.
See A. Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in
Twenty-one Countries (1984); and A. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government
Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries (1999).
See the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC: 2016), http://www.
iebc.or.ke/index.php/election-results
Ibid., (2017).
Ruth, Fieldwork Narratives (Nairobi: August 2018).
Lyn Ossome, Gender, Ethnicity, and Violence in Kenya’s Transition to Democracy: States

74

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Ethnic Inequality, Institutions and Governance Trajectory in Kenya

of Violence (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2018), 18.
22 Alex, Fieldwork Narratives (Nairobi: August 2018).
23 Yusufu Bangura, “Introduction: Ethnic Inequalities and Public Sector Governance,” inEthnic Inequalities and Public Sector Governance, Y. Bangura, ed., (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 12-17.
24 Karuti Kanyinga, “Governance Institutions and Inequality,” in SID (Society forInternational Development), Readings on Inequality in Kenya (Nairobi: SID, 2006), 354.
25 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). World Factbook: Kenya. (Washington D.C.: 2018),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html.
26 Kanyinga, Governance Institutions and Inequality. 2006. 354-7.
27 AFROBAROMETER, Kenyans Decry Incessant Corruption but Reluctant to Report
Incidents: Findings from Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey in Kenya (Nairobi: Nairobi
Safari Club April 14, 2015), WWW.AFROBAROMETER.ORG.
28 Bangura, Ethnic Inequalities and Public Sector Governance, 13.
29 Mwangi S. Kimenyi, “The Politics of Identity, Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict in
Kenya ,” in Preventing Violent Conf lict in Africa : Inequalities, Perceptions andInstitutions, Yoichi Mine, Frances Stewart, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Thandika
Mkandawire, eds. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 156.
30 Republic of Kenya, Sessional Paper no. 10 of 1965 on Planning and its Application to
African Socialism in Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965).
31 World Bank, A Bumpy Ride to Prosperity: Infrastructure for Shared Growth in Kenya.
Unit Africa Region (Nairobi: PREM, 2010).
32 Mwangi wa Githinji. Ten Millionaires and Ten Million Beggars: A Study of Income
Distribution and Development in Kenya (Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2000)
33 Oginga Odinga. Not yet Uhuru (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1966)
34 Michela Wrong. It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower (New York:
Harper Collins, 2009)35 Peter Kagwanja & Roger Southall, “Introduction: Kenya-A Democracy in Retreat? ”
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27, no. 3 (2009), 260.
36 Wangari Maathai, The Challenge for Africa (New York: First Anchor Books Edition,2010), 111-128.
37 Ibid.
38 Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics 17, no.3
(1965)
39 Calestous Juma, “Africa Needs More, Not Fewer Governance Prizes”, Daily Nation,
March 5, 2015, Opinion Section, Kenyan Edition.
40 Ibid.
41 Mathew, Fieldwork Narratives (Nairobi: August 2018).
42 William Arthur Lewis, Politics in West Africa (Toronto: Oxford University Press), 37.
43 Frances Stewart. Note for Discussion: Kenya Horizontal Inequalities and the PoliticalDisturbances of 2008 (CRISE: University of Oxford, 2010), 133-159.
44 Graham, K. Brown and Francis Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities and Market Instability
in Africa,” in Ethnic Diversity and Economic Instability in Africa: Interdisciplinary
Perspectives,” Hino, Hirofumi, John Lonsdale, Gustav Ranis and Frances Stewart, eds.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012), 254-285.
45 H i r oy u k i H i n o et a l . , Et h n i c D ive r s it y a nd E c o n o m i c I n st a b i l it y i n A f r i c a :Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 55.
46 Edward Miguel and Mary K. Gugerty, “Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions and Public

75

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Goods in Kenya,” Journal of Public Economics 89, (2004), 2325-2368.
47 Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), Inequalities andSocial Cohesion in Kenya: Evidence and Policy Implications (Nairobi: KIPPRA, 2013), 7.
48 United Nations Development Programme, Country Programme Document Report 201415 (Nairobi: UNDP, 2015), iv.
49 Winners with as little as 50.07 percent can exclude Losers of 49.03 percent from thegovernment.
50 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay (London: Profile books, 2014), 278.
51 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1985).
52 Migai Akech, “Abuse of Power and Corruption in Kenya: Will the New Constitution
Enhance Government Accountability?” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 18, Iss. 1,
Article 15 (2011).
53 Kenya Human Rights Commission, Lest We Forget: The faces of Impunity in Kenya(Nairobi: KHRC, 2011) 3.
54 Akech, “Abuse of Power and Corruption ...” (2011).
55 John Githongo, Inequality, Ethnicity and the Fight against Corruption in Africa: A
Kenyan Perspective. Economic Affairs 26, no. 4 (2006), 19-23.
56 Luis Franceschi, “Impunity is Under Siege in Kenya and Accountability will Ultimately
Win,” Daily Nation August 25, 2017. Opinion Section, Online Edition. http://www.nation.
co.ke/oped/blogs/dot9/franceschi/2274464-4070590-packou/index.html
57 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail? The Origin of Power,
Prosperity and Poverty. (London: Profile Books Paperback Edition, 2013), 398-9.
58 Ednette, Fieldwork Narratives (Nairobi: August 2018).
59 Wolf Linder and Isabelle Steffen, “Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance in the
Public Sector in Switzerland,” in Ethnic Inequalities and Public Sector Governance,
Yusuf Bangura, ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 221-223.
60 Ibid.
61 Sam Moyo and Yoichi Mine (eds), ‘African Potentials’ for Resolving Conflicts in Southern
Africa - What Colonialism Ignored (Bameda: Langaa RPCIG, 2016), 1-98.

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List of Representative Fieldwork Narratives (First names used for privacy)
1. AlexNairobi, August 2018.

2. Ednette

Nairobi, August 2018.

3. Mathew

Nairobi, August 2018.

4. RuthNairobi, August 2018.

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Ethnic Inequality, Institutions and Governance Trajectory in Kenya

Abstract

Ethnic Inequality, Institutions andGovernance Trajectory in Kenya
David Muroni
This paper focuses on ethnic inequality, institutions and governance trajectoryin Kenya. Governance in Kenya and its public institutions have deteriorated.
Checks and balances against impunity have also been eroded significantly since
independence in 19 63. Cartels of political elites play the ethnic card inpoliticizing ethnicity to serve their own myopic selfish interests. An absence ofsustainable and inclusive power-sharing mechanism is a recipe for political
decay and violence. Ethnicity also shapes and determines social outcomes in a
multi-ethnic society like Kenya. The status quo creates inequalities and bad
governance to sustain its alliances, monopoly on power and authority. Most
developing countries perform badly as a result of poor institutions nurtured to
exploit and benefit from manipulative negative ethnicity. Rules of the game haveto change to enable respect for the rights of the citizenry. This paper advocatesan inclusive indigenous power-sharing, a form of consociational governance in
Kenya, with corresponding institutions, which can nurture and redistributen at ion a l g a i n s a nd bu rden s a cro s s t he et h n ic d iv ide i nc lu s ively a nd
proportionately.
Key words
Consociation, decay, democracy, ethnicity, governance, inequality, institutions, Kenya andviolence81

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