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論文

Reconciling National Security,
Ethnicity and Religion:
Institutional Interpretationof Thailand’s Southern Insurgency
Naomi NISHI

Abstract
This article attempts an institutional interpretation of thereconciliation landscape of Thailand. The violent conflict in the southernborder provinces (‘the Deep South’) of Thailand has escalated since2004. Although the reconciliation process is under way, the situation in
the Deep South has not improved. To understand the current situationof reconciliation, it is useful to focus on the institutions dealing with therisks, or how they determine ‘risks’. The current dominance of themilitary in agenda setting determines the way the problem is defined at
the national level. At the present moment, democratic institutions
cannot form an effective counterbalancing force to this situation. Thismay be partly attributed to the existing fragmentation among Muslims
in society. Impediments to reconciliation lie in the political structure,
as well as the oft-expressed issues with history and identity. By
examining the reconciliation in Thailand, we can observe the dynamic
interaction of people struggling for a more pluralistic society. Creating
an open space for diverse interpretations is the most difficult but mostessential issue.

Introduction
Terrorist attacks by Islamic insurgency groups have escalated in Muslimmajority areas of southern Thailand since 2004.1 According to the statistical
data of Deep South Watch, one of the most prominent NGOs operating inSouthern Thailand, there have been more than 14,128 incidents, resulting in26

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17,005 casualties (6,097 dead and 10,908 injured by April 2014).2 During theperiod from 2004 to 2007, this conflict was the world’s most intensive insurgency
after Iraq and Afghanistan.
Thailand’s southern border provinces (Changwat Chaidean Paak Tai)consist of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun.3 Muslims account for
approximately five percent of Thailand’s population in Thailand, and 70 per
cent of them reside in this area.4 The area which is affected by the violence
consists of the three southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat (‘theDeep South’), where the majority of people are Malay-speaking ethnic Malay
and their religion is Islam. They are clearly different from the Thai Buddist
majority, in terms of language, ethnicity, religion and customs. Thailand’ssouthern conflict has a history of over a century.5 The Thai government has
been dealing with the conflict of the Deep South as a domestic and security
problem for a long time. By the late 1990s, however, it was believed that theconflict was on the decline.
The current resurgence of violence seems different from the old separatist
movement, which was motivated by ethno-nationalism. It is still unclear which
actors are involved and their respective aims. For instance, some people suspect
the involvement of international terrorist organizations. Although the Thaigovernment started the reconciliation process since 2005, the situation has not
improved.6 It is a serious potential threat to not only Thailand but also to thebroader region of South-East Asia. For, the vulnerability in the area is easily
affected by the fluid situation of Muslim world.7
Every day in the Deep South, someone is victimized regardless of whethers/he is Buddhist or Muslim, security personnel or civilian. Why has thereconciliation process stalled? This article tries to illustrate the problem ofreconciliation between the Thai government and the Deep South from theinstitutional arrangement dealing with the conflict.
The paper can be divided into four section. The first section provides a
background to the conflict in Southern Thailand, and an overview of theconceptual framework of risk management. Following this, I discuss the factorsthat contribute to military intervention in Thai politics and the bureaucratic
institutions in the Deep South. The last two sections probe the question of why
democratic institutions cannot provide a counterbalancing force against militaryrule by focusing on non-military groups such as political parties and religious

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institutions in the Deep South. By examining this, I aim to show why thesituation in the Deep South stalled, and how the risk management perspective
can reconcile the tensions between ethnicity, religion and security.

I Background of Thailand’s Southern Conflict
Numerous interpretations have been put forward for understanding theroot-causes of the conflict, which can be divided into three broad areas. First,
there are arguments focusing on the history and culture of Malay community in
the Deep South (History). A second, group focuses on the modern politics ofThailand (National Integration). Finally, the root causes of conflict are
attributed to religion (Islamic Revival).
First, explanation of the historical grievances highlights the unique historyof the Malay community in the Deep South.8 The fundamental root-cause of theconflict is the full scale annexation of the area, which was once an autonomous
sultanate kingdom named ‘Patani’ 9, into the kingdom of Siam (later Thailand)in 1909. In the course of modern history, Thailand has been pursuing nationbuilding through Buddhism-oriented and ethno-centric notions of national
identity, which has marginalized the ethnic Malay and Muslim sub-groups.
Second, explaining the issue through modern Thai politics highlights theintegration policies of Thailand and grievances of Malay Muslim people.10 As
such, issues on inequality in access to education, employment in the public
sector and economic development lie at the root of the conflict. Third, contrary
to those explanations emphasizing ethno-national, cultural and economic
grievance, the explanation that focuses on religion emphasizes the growing
influence of Islamist ideology on the conflict. Some analysts highlight the rise ofviolent Jihadist ideology in Thailand.11
Scholars are emphasizing many diverse forces behind the violence, such as
ethnic identity, crime syndicates, social and economic deprivation, power
struggles among politicians, rivalry between the military and police, or weak
intelligence. There is one point, however, on which all observers have agreed.
That is, the conflict escalated dramatically since the former Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006) implemented his hard line policy toward
Malay Muslims in the Deep South.
Thaksin won a majority of seats in the parliament and formed a single-

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party cabinet for the first time in the political history of Thailand. In foreign
policy, Thailand, a long standing ally of the United States, cooperated with the
US-led ‘War on Terror’ and sent troops to Iraq. In domestic policy, Thaksin
implemented various new policies to change the established political systemand stimulatethe Thai economy. The most notorious policy was the ‘War on
Drugs’ implemented in 2003, which attempted to eliminate drugs and thecriminal underworld. Thaksin’s ‘War on Drugs’ caused some 3,000 extrajudicial
killings nationwide, including in the Deep South (Human Rights Watch 2004).
His attitude toward the problem of the Deep South was very clear. According
to the former Prime Minister, the violence was not motivated by separatist or
religious sentiments, but rather criminal activities caused by bandits andcriminals. There were some important institutional changes during this time.
In 2002, he dismantled the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre(SBPAC) and Civil-Police-Military Task Force 43 (CPM 43), which have long
been dealing with the governance and intelligence in the Deep South. This
caused a power vacuum and the dysfunction of the existing governing system,
which contributed to the resurgence of violence in the following year.
The year 2004 was a turning point. On 28 April, lightly armed young
Muslims attacked police and military officials and barricaded themselves into
Krue Se Mosque, Pattani’s historical landmark, and the military shot at them.
107 Muslim and five security officials were killed in this conflict (Krue Se
Mosque incident) 12. On 25 October, Police fired at citizens who were
demonstrating against the unjustified arrest of six Muslims. While beingtransferred to the army camp five hours from the demonstration site, 78 people
died because of suffocation (Tak Bai incident). The government officials incharge who were involved in these incidents were not properly tried. The
Thaksin government’s harsh response to the Muslim populace in the Deep
South caused ineradicable anger and sorrow among Muslims.
On 19 September 2006 Thaksin was ousted by a military coup because of
his alleged power abuse and lèse-majesté. He indeed achieved many reforms
and contributed to economic growth, but at the same time many people, especiallythe urban middle class, and people in the south were fed up with his heavyhanded policy, nepotism and pork barrelling targeting labourers and farmers in
the rural areas. After he was ousted from the centre of the political stage,
Thailand embraced two serious cleavages within the nation. One is the conflictReconciling National Security, Ethnicity and Religion

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between the groups who support Thaksin and those who oppose him, and theother is the conflict between Bangkok and the Deep South. Since the end of
2013, the political conflict between these groups has escalated, eventuallyleading to the military coup on 15 May, 2014. This political turmoil in Bangkok
indeed casts a shadow over the situation in the Deep South.
The removal of Thaksin did not improve the situation. Undoubtedly,reconciliation with Muslim people, or the Deep South, is one of the most serious
challenges facing the Thai government. Seeking a more comprehensive
understanding of history, while narrowing the social and economic inequalities
is an essential part of the reconciliation process. However, grievance-based
interpretations fail to explain the current escalation of violence in the south, ‘ata time when rubber prices were high, when Malay Muslims were better off thanever before and when identity issues were nothing new’.13 In addition to this,though there is an obvious impact of Islamist ideology on southern conflict,there is no concrete evidence of the involvement of international terrorist
organizations.14 Even if the discourse of insurgency groups seem influenced byIslamist ideology, the conflict is limited to these areas at this moment. It is also
undeniable that if the reconciliation process will not work, then there may be
increasing influence from international terrorist organizations.However, it isdifficult to explain the current resurgence by focusing on Islamist ideology.

II Conceptual Framework
This article focuses on political institutions of Thailand by employing ideas
from the studies of risk management. The uniqueness of Thailand’s reconciliation
efforts lies in the fact that the conflict is ongoing, unlike the reconciliation inSouth Africa or East Timor (Timor Leste) where the reconciliation process
started after the conflict. To understand the current situation, it is useful tofocus on how the institutions deal with the risks, or how they determine risks.
Risk is a concept related to unpredictability and uncertainty of the future.
‘Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity’ is a leading research work in the social
science field dealing with the concept of risk.15 In his book, Ulrich Beck pointed
out two categories of risk. One is risk related to environment and life caused byenvironmental destruction and pollution. The other is risk related to social andpersonal connection caused by individualism and political transformation. Risk

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is an important concept which reflects the modern society.
Risk management is the term often used in the business or intelligence
field. There are various attempts to define the concept of risk to clarify thetarget of ‘risk management’, but the definition has yet to be established. For
instance, we can see an attempt to understand by distinguishing risk fromcrisis, hazard and peril 16, an attempt to define risk as something more close tosafety management in the corporate activities and crisis as a sudden and grandscale disaster which needs to be addressed by the government.17 In sum, risk
management processes serve to prevent or minimize the effects from crises andensure the resilience of the systems and organizations, such as corporations,communities, nation-states, and international relations.
Since the conflict is ongoing in the case of Thailand, the reconciliation
process can be considered as part of the risk management process. As risk
management is the process to prevent or minimize the effect from the crisis, thecurrent situation of reconciliation is observable from the arrangement ofinstitutions concerning the conflict.
The economic historian Douglass North defines institution as ‘the rules of
the game in society’ or ‘the humanly devised constraints that shape humanaction’.18 An institution is a ‘script that names the actors, their respective
behavioural repertoires (or strategies), the sequence in which the actors choose
from them, the information they possess when they make their selections, andthe outcome resulting from the combination of actor choices’. There can beformal and informal institutions in theory, but this article focuses on the formal
institutions such as laws, the military and religious institutions, elections andpolitical parties.19
By focusing on the institutions that determine the risks in society, the way
problems are defined in one country can become clearer. In the case of Thailand,
the military dominates agenda setting and the risk management process.
Unification of the processes for determining risks might save decision making
costs. However, this unification also increases the vulnerability of the systemitself. This is because when the information and choices are limited or biased,
the outcome is adversely affected.
The unique political structure of Thailand,which I discuss below in part
three, legitimizes the military to intervene in the political sphere. After thecoup in 2006, this mechanism has been strengthened by the institutional

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arrangement, excessive use of Marshal Law, Emergency Decree, and especiallyby the renewed Internal Security Act of 2008. The main actor here, the military,considers variety of actions or opinions on the political situation are noise forthe order and unity of the nation. They even tend to think the discussion of thedecentralization or democracy by the people are the risks. The military andpoliticians, which are technically separate entities to serve Thai society indifferent ways, now define the risks in Thai society together. This makes Thai
society vulnerable to the discussions of plurality.
Securing the diversification of risk identifying institutions is the foundation
for future reconciliation. This is deeply related to the question of democracy inthe case of Thailand. This article considers that lack of diversity in the risk
identification process is a structural hindrance to reconciliation. Simultaneously,
the fragmented nature of Muslim society is also a substantial hindrance toreconciliation. The next part illustrates Thailand’s unique political institutions
which give power to non-civilian actors, namely the security forces.

III Who Defines “Problems” in Thailand?
Thailand is a country in which over 30 coups and coup attempts have takenplace since the 1932 constitutional revolution that ended the absolute monarchy.
The latest military coup occurred in 2014, followed by a constitutional
amendment and political reform by the military-led government.
In Thailand, the security forces, as well as two other political institutions
exist beyond the control of elected civilians. One is the monarchy, and the otheris the Privy Council. The influence of the monarchy is ubiquitous politically,
economically, and culturally throughout the country. The role of the Privy
Council is also noteworthy in terms of its close ties to the monarchy that enables
the Privy Council to be an institution competing with the cabinet andparliament.20 The Privy Council, which consists of royally appointed members
from various backgrounds such as the military, the judiciary and the academic
world, has been considered as the king’s spokespersons.
Thailand is a country with the king as head of the state, and the territory
is indivisible. In the Thai context, requesting autonomy let alone separatismare lèse-majesté and must not happen. Regional autonomy or decentralization
policies have occasionally been discussed since 1990s by the government, but

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the regional autonomy is achieved only in two major cities, Bangkok andPattaya. In the other areas, the governors are not elected by the people; rather
they are appointed by the Ministry of Interior. Although the influence of theking is decreasing at this moment, there is still a tendency among the people torefrain from discussing the question of autonomy.
Since the end of the Cold War, Thailand’s National Security Policies havechanged to non-traditional security areas, such as terrorism, human trafficking,money laundering, and illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries. In thename of internal security maintenance, the military tried to secure its role inThai politics and attempted to intervene in various policy areas.
The Objectives of National Security Policy 2007-2011 reflect the various
risks Thailand is facing.21 Thailand’s security concerns are multi-faced andmulti-layered, varying from domestic politics to international politics; individual
psychological issues to national unity; from natural resources to science andtechnology.
According to the successive constitutions and laws concerning security, thePrime Minister and civilian powers are empowered to make decisions. However,since Thailand started its full-scale democratization process from 1992, three toseven ex-military/police personnel have consistently joined the cabinet.22 The
influence of the Privy Council also allows the military to constantly affect theagenda setting of the government, especially regarding the issue of national
security.
Two major policy tools to cope with the nationwide political unrest and thesouthern conflict are the imposition of Martial Law, and the enactment of theRoyal Decree on Administration under the State of Emergency B.E.2548 (2005
Emergency Decree). Martial Law allows the military to take control ofgovernance. By this law, the military is able to detain suspected separatists or
terrorists for seven days. In addition to this, Emergency Decree allows 30 daysof detention. Government can detain the suspect for at most 37 days in order tocollect information.
In addition to this, the most notable legal foundation of the Royal Thai
Army’s power is the 2008 Internal Security Act (ISA).23 The role of the ISA wasnot very significant before the violence of 2004. The new ISA of 2008 was, infact, passed by the military junta of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont withsupport from the office of National Security Council. The ISA stipulated theReconciling National Security, Ethnicity and Religion

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establishment of a special governmental agency called the Internal Security
Operations Command (ISOC), the most important mission of which is tomaintain the country’s internal security.
The status of the ISOC is ambiguous. The main task of the ISOC is tomonitor, examine and assess potential threats to internal security and report
those to the Council of Ministers for further action [Section 7(1)]. In section 3,‘Internal security operation’ is defined as maintaining public order or national
security, the measures to preserve, control, solve and restore the state ofnormalcy. This means that the ISOC is not just active temporarily in abnormal
situations, but also acts as a monitoring institution in normal situations.
According to the ISA, the Prime Minister is the director of the ISOC, andunits inside the ISOC are directed by the cabinet. It appears that the organizationis under civilian control. However, the deputy director is the army chief, and thearmy chief of staff serves as the secretary [Section5]. The director delegates his/her authority to the deputy director, or a regional ISOC director [Section8]. In
fact, the secretary is empowered to take responsibility for the ISOC’s direction
and activities.24 Ultimately, in addition to the operational level, policy planningand implementing, which are the key areas of internal administration of ISOC,
the Thai army has succeeded in extending its power over civilian leaders.
ISOC appears under civilian control, maintaining the Prime Minister as
director and enabling civilian ministers to serve for the institution. In reality,with the activation of the ISA and through the operational structure of ISOC,
the military now has power in identifying threats, and if they wish they cantake action when an emergency occurs. The following section examines thegoverning institutions operating in the Deep South to demonstrate thatpersistent changes in the bureaucratic institutions contribute to militaryintervention.

IV Bureaucracy in the South: Persistent Changes on the Surface
The southern border provinces are still under Emergency Decree andMartial Law.25 The institutional settings mentioned above contribute to amilitary’s influence on the issue regarding the Deep South. We can see thisfrom the response of the government in the wake of the violence in 2004. The
military considered the problem as separatism with the need to be supressed by34

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military forces, not by the legal procedure. Thousands of soldiers were deployed,
and a new military division was established. Secret agents were dispatched,resulting in the arrest of many people.26 The power of the military in politicaldecision-making has maintained and in some ways, overrules that of elected
government officials.
Under the national Internal Security Operation Commission, in which
bureaucrats employed by the military outnumber civilians, the Regional Armyis allowed to establish regional and provincial branches [Section11, 13]. This
Regional Security Operation Command (RSOC) parallels Thailand’s four army
regions. A Regional Army Commander becomes the director of each subdivision.
The director exercises ‘command over government officials, employees … andtakes responsibility for implementation of the work of RSOC’.27
Beginning in 1981, the governance of the Deep South has been operated
through the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) and
Civil-Police-Military Task Force 43 (CPM 43). Prem Tinsulanonda established
SBPAC in 1981 (The Order of the Office of the Prime Minister8/2524) to copewiththe development in the area, and to establish collaboration among
government agencies. CPM 43, which was established by National Security
Council, was responsible for the security operation. Both came under control of
the Fourth Army. This institutional setting led to a decrease in government
officials’ abuse of power and human rights violation. Violent insurgency activity
also decreased as a result of increased mutual communication between thegovernment and the people.
Thaksin challenged the established governing system created by Prem, along standing chairman of the Privy Council until now, and famous for being aclose confidant of the present king. In 2002, Thaksin Shinawatra abolished
SBPAC and CPM43, and the authority of security operation in the Deep Southwas transferred to the police (The Order of the Office of the Prime
Minister123/2545). The function of the CPM 43 was transferred to the Fourth
Army and ISOC Region 4, and SBPAC to the Ministry of Interior. These changes
in the institutional setting created a power vacuum within the government andweakened their power to respond properly to any real or perceived threats tonational security. This created opportunities for an increase in insurgent
activities. Following the escalation of violence in 2004, the structure of security
operations in the southern provinces came under the supervision of Southern

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Border Provinces Peace Building Command (SBPPC) (The Order of the Officeof the Prime Minister 68 and 69/2547). Subsequently, Thaksin established theCommittee on Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Policy, and the
SBPPC was placed under the Fourth Army. Here again the military was given
control of civilian activities.
Under the junta of Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008), institutions concerning
the Deep South were thrown into disarray. The re-establishment of the SBPAC(Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center) replaced SBPPC, and cameunder the supervision of ISOC The Order of the Office of the Prime Minister206/2549). Surayud’s government also made SBPAC and CPM 43 permanent
institutions (The Order of the Office of the Prime Minister 229/2550). When
Abhisit Vijjajiva came into power in 2009, he tried to lessen the military’s
influence and establish a new ministry to distribute power to the local elite.
However, political turmoil in Bangkok did not allow it. “Institutional reforms”
were as a matter of fact, balancing the existing power, which is very different
from decentralization.
Overall, persistent changes in the operations and management of theinstitutions has hindered effective policy making and implementation until
now. This has contributed to dysfunction in the cooperation among related
government institutions that existed under previous SBPAC. The government
is not able to collect reliable first-hand information from the area anymore.
Disorder in the operational level is also pervasive, and human rights violations
by the security forces are often reported.28
Since the escalation of the conflict, the security forces composed of military,
police, paramilitary and armed civilians/defence volunteers, which aresupervised by different ministry or department, have been increasingly
mobilized to cope with the problem of the Deep South.29 According to Isra News
Agency, the number of military personnel amounts to 23,704, police:16,918,
paramilitary: 25,000, and militias: 84,768.30 Overall, approximately 160,000
security forces are active. Taking into the consideration the fact that the total
population in the area is near two million, the major strategy for bringing about
peace is apparently the use of military force.
We can see how the problem is coloured by the military’s point of view. Thisis due to the unique political structure of Thailand with the supreme power ofthe monarchy and the Privy Council, which are not subject to politics or laws.

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The military considers itself a loyal defender of the monarchy, which is of theutmost importance for the nation. Thus, the institution legitimizes its
intervention into the political sphere. Thailand has long been pursuing national
integration under the influence of the king. Although the present king is very
old and losing his influence on politics and populace, the king still has ultimate
power and is highly respected by the population. This begs the questions, howdoes democracy work in Thailand? The next section examines other institutions
concerned with Thai Muslims, namely political parties and regional religious
institutions.

V The Questions of Representation: Parties, Factions, and Democracy
The emergence of Chatichai Choonhavan in 1988, the first elected prime
minister in 12 years, marked the beginning of the era of political pluralism, anddemocratization.31 Democratization led to an increase in the number of politicalparties, and more political participation of the people. To understand thepolitical dynamics of southern Thailand, we must look at the Democrat Partyand Wadah faction.
Den Tohmeena, a Malay Muslim intellectual, formed the Wadah group in1986 aiming for reflecting Muslims’ voice in national politics.32 The Wadahgroup made great progress in the Thai political arena by forming a coalition
with the Khwam Wan Mai Party (New Aspiration Party) lead by General
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. After the New Aspiration Party was absorbed into
Thai Rak Thai Party lead by Thaksin Shinawatra, the Wadah group madegreat progress in national politics, gaining ministerial posts. Since its foundationin 1986, five to six Wadah members have been elected by cooperating with adifferent political party every time. Despite being a small faction, Wadah
members obtained important positions such as the President of National
Assembly, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Transportation andCommunication and so on. Wan Muhammad Nor Mata from the Wadah groupserved as the first Muslim President of the National Assembly and as deputy
prime minister. The Wadah group is successful in lobbying on issues concerning
Muslims, such as the development of infrastructure in the south, support forThai pilgrims on the annual haji, right for Thai Muslim women to wear the
hijab, and the Islamic Bank.

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On the other hand, Southern Thailand has traditionally been a Democrat
Party stronghold. The Democrat Party was successful in networking votecollecting systems under the strong leadership of Chuan Leekpai who is fromupper Southern Thailand, Trang.33 By organizing local network, phuak (band,group), hua khanaen (vote canvassers) they could construct a rigid voting bloc.
With the tendency of strong attachment to its friend or family in the South,
Incumbency Advantage was stronger than the other areas in Thailand.
The Democrat Party is also an important actor in the reconciliation process
between government (pro-Thaksin) and anti-government (anti-Thaksin) groups.
The Democrat Party was established in 1947 and gained power especially after
the 1990s in Bangkok and southern Thailand. They have been considered as aparty for southerners, and they also identified themselves as such. They havealso deeply influenced the governance in the Deep South since CPM43 and
SBPAC was established in 1981.
However, the Deep South is more politically divided. According to the resultof the 2007 national election, five out of the twelve MPs from the southernborder provinces belong to the Democrat Party (The Election Commission ofThailand). Among the seven MPs, three persons belong to the Wadah group,
who have joined Puea Pandin Party (Motherland Party). During the Thaksin
administration, the Wadah group could not do anything to prevent the humanrights violation by Thaksin. Facing the escalation of violence, they again were
unsuccessful in calming down the situation. They eventually lost the support
from the people in the Deep South. In the 2011 general election, the Democrat
Party maintained 11 of 12 seats in the southern border provinces. However, thevote-count shows another story. Democrats got less than 50 per cent of the
popular vote in many of the constituencies in the southern border provinces.
An important subcontext to the conflict is a deep-rooted historicalantagonism between the lower and upper south.34 There are indeed salient
differences between Thai-speaking Muslims of south-western Thailand, whohave long standing relationships with southern Thai-speaking Buddhists.
‘Malay Muslims in the lower South resented the way in which Bangkok had
subcontracted the administrative tasks to natives of other Southern provinces,and tends to prefer to deal directly with Bangkok rather than through theunreliable mediation of upper southerners’. The upper South is truly theelectoral heartland of the Democrat Party. The Democrats are much weaker in38

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the three border provinces, dominated by the Wadah group from 1986-2005. In
fact, the Democrat Party has never given a single ministerial position to any
Malay Muslims.
In the course of democratization, the Wadah group has been successful inreflecting the demands of Muslims in national politics. However, by entering
the political arena, the Wadah group has become no more than a small interest
group of no significance. The Democrat Party continues to be a party for ‘upper’southerners, but fails to represent southern Thailand itself, contrary to its selfproclaimed characteristics. Rivalry between the Democrat and the Deep South
legitimize the military to intervene the governance in the Deep South. For,
politician could not or cannot do anything.

VI Politicization of Islam: Communal Division
The increased political participation also raises critical issues of religiouspolitical and socio-cultural concern for Thailand’s Buddhist majority andMuslim minority.35 The official leader of Muslims in Thailand is Chularajmontri
or Shaikh Al-Islam (Thailand’s royally-appointed Islamic leader). The role of
the Chularajmontri is to represent Thai Muslims at the national level, to foster
inter-religious communication, to publish religious literature, to provide
notarial services, to issue fatwa (religious rulings), regulate the administrationof the registered mosques and distribute subsidies and grants to the mosquesand similar activities.36 However, the Chularajmontri have little authority over
Muslims generally.
People select imams, and among imams the members of Provincial IslamicCommittee (majelis) are elected. Provincial Islamic Committees are linked witha Central Islamic Committee. Provincial Islamic Committee co-opt the membersof Central Islamic Committee, and also propose a suitable person for
Chularajmontri. The legal power of the Provincial Committee is limited and it
deals mainly with overseeing imams, mosque committees, and arbitration
relating to family law and inheritance.
In 1997, Wadah politicians led by Den Tohmeena introduced an electoral
system to make provincial councils authorize the democratic process. This new
Islamic Organizations Administration Act eventually led to the national level
politicians and military intervening in local issues.

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Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat had a thirty-member Islamic council, withelectorates of between three hundred and six hundred imams per province. On
24 November 2005, the second ever Islamic Council elections were held. The
increased violence in the South generated considerable interest. The military,
Ministry of Interior, and the political parties all became involved in supportinga particular outcome.37 National level politicians, especially from the Wadahgroup, and religious authorities had been discredited in southern borderprovinces in the course of the election.
Introduction of the electoral system at the local level contributes tofragmentation of communities in another way. This is related to the pervasive
increase in the number of mosques. Communities became fragmented because
a single village contains multiple mosques that represent different schools ofIslam.38 Rivalry between traditionalists and reformists has decades of history.
In 1930s, young local scholars who studied in Mecca or the Middle East returned
to Thailand, and tried to reform the traditional ways of practicing Islam. Manycases can be understood in this context. Young men who studied abroad built
new mosques. However, there are cases of imams who contested elected imams
to build new mosques.39
The politicization of leading Islamic figures in the three provinces, alongwith the extensive use of money and other incentives to buy and extract votes
from individual imams, detracts from the leadership of religious authorities
and contributes to the fragmentation of communities in Malay Muslim society.
Local religious leaders are losing their authority in Thailand.
It is important to bear in mind that this phenomenon is pervasive in therest of the Islamic world as well. Increased globalization and major technology
expansion in the IT field are potentially contributing to this fragmentation in
the practice of Islam. Nowadays, Muslims are easily able to access information
related to other Muslims in the world through online media or Social Network
Service. They are even able to choose preferred religious teachers by themselveson the Internet. Muslims in the Deep South are not living in a closed society.
During the democratization period in 1990s, people failed to form concreteand sustainable representative institutionsto reflect their voice on the national
level. Leading politicians in the Deep South were not able to act as representativesof the people in the national political arena. Institutional reform during thisperiod, including the introduction of an electoral system to the Islamic Council,

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consequently exposed the local people to national politics. In addition to this,the increasing influence of globalization eventually contributed to thefragmentation within the democratic institutions.
By the end of 1990s, the government considered the problems in the Deep
South were successfully ended by their conciliatory approach. This was,however, not actually followed by the empowerment of the political rights ofMuslim people as mentioned above. In the wake of violence in the new millennium,
the government, through the military’s influence, has misinterpreted the
problem as criminal activities that threatened national security rather thanethno-religious grievances.
The security-oriented risk management has not been successful at dealing
with the problem given the tense situation in the area has been ongoing for
more than 10 years. The ubiquity of the security forces is obvious in the region.
This contributes to anxieties and insecurity among the people, which fuels theinsurgent activities. At this moment, the government is managing the risks(insurgency, separatist activities) by increasing the number of military force.
For the future reconciliation, a mutual approach in the risk management
process is important. Participation of the democratic institutions secures thediverse interpretations of the risks themselves,and the withdrawal or reductionof the presence of security forces are the rational actions in terms of mitigating
the risk, namely reducing the number of violent movement and victims.
At the same time, reconciliation within local political groups ranging
from political party to so-called ‘separatist groups’ is inevitable. Although it is
impossible to eliminate the cleavages, it is possible to try to change the negative
cleavages to positive plurality. One possible thing that could derive frominstitutional interpretation is, to abolish the electoral system in the religious
institutions. Keeping distance from politics in order not to be politicized
contributes to reducing the cleavages and reconciliation within the democratic
groups.

Conclusion
This article has attempted to examine the landscape of reconciliation in
Thailand by looking at its unique political institutions. The Internal Security
Act allows the military to have power over policy planning and implementation.

Reconciling National Security, Ethnicity and Religion

41

The dominance of the military in agenda setting deflects the way the problem isdefined at the national level. It is the military that defines the problem ofsouthern border provinces as a security issue, and tries to bring about peace byusing military force. As many analysts point out, the conflict in southern borderprovinces reflects the power struggle playing out in Bangkok.
This could happen partly because of the existing fragmentation within the
Muslim society based on the uneven distribution of political resources. As aresult of increased representation, a process towards self-sabotage has begun.
‘Individuals affected by this process range from the leading Malay Muslim
politicians such as … the Wadah group to local religious leaders, and even wellintentioned Thai bureaucrats.’ 40 At the present moment, democracy cannot
form an effective counterbalancing force to this situation. Impediments forreconciliation lie in the political structure, as well as in the oft-expressed issues
to do with history, identity, cultural economic disparity.
Examining reconciliation in Thailand, we observe the dynamic interactionof people struggling for a more pluralistic society. How to create an open spacefor diverse interpretations is the most difficult but most essential issue,
especially in terms of risk management.
Muslims in the Deep South also have close ties to fellow Muslims in theworld. Thus,the problem of the Deep South is no longer a mere domestic issue.
The situation in the Deep South will be more and more affected by the fluidityof the current Islamic world. It is difficult to analyse the problem only fromnational level politics. Moving forward, a multi-dimensional perspective isrequired.

Notes
1 International Crises Group, “Thailand: The Evolving Conflict in the South”, Asia Report, No.241(Brussels: International Crises Group, 2012), accessed August 11, 2013 http://www.crisisgroup.
org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/241-thailand-the-evolving-conflict-in-thesouth.pdf, several reports on the Southern Thai conflict accessible at the website www.
crisesgroup.org.
2 Deep South Incident Database, (Pattani, Thailand: Deep South Watch, 2012), accessed
December 4, 2014, http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/dsid.
3 This is based on the region set by ministry of education. In the context of Thailand southern
conflict, Songkhla is often included.

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4 National Statistical Office 2012. The Muslim population ranges from 5 to 10 % depending on thescholar. Farouk Bajunid, Omar. (2005). Islam, Nationalism, and the Thai State. In Wattana
Sugnnasil (ed.) Dynamic Diversity in Southern Thailand. Silkworm Books, 45 SeeThanetAphornsuvan, “Origins of Malay Muslim “Separatism” in Southern Thailand”, Asia
Research Institute Working Paper Series, No.32 (2004), accessed August 8, 2013 http://www.ari.
nus.edu.sg/docs/wps/wps04_032.pdf
6 Duncan McCargo, “Thailand’s National Reconciliation Commission: a Flawed Response to theSouthern Conflict”, Global Change, Peace & Security, Vol.22 No.1 (2010), 75-91
7 Sufficient information tells us that the southern part of Thailand hold Rohingya and Uyghur
population.
8 There are various attempts to understand the unique history of the Deep South. See, Ibrahim
Syukri, Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani [History of Malay Kingdom of Patani] (Chiang Mai:
Silkworm Books, 2005); Patrick Jory and Jirawat Saengthong, eds., The Phantasm in Southern
Thailand: Historical Writings on Patani and the Islamic World, (Nakhon Sri Thammarat:
Khrongkan Pgumiphasuksa, Mahawitthatalai Walailak, 2009)
9 The spelling Pattani, which is used officially as the name of province, is based on its descriptionin Thai language. To distinguish historical entity from it, Patani is used.
10 A leading research on Southern Thai conflict from the political viewpoint isDuncan McCargo,
Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand, (Ithaca New York, Cornell
University Press, 2008) For studies of some of these arguments, see Srisompob Jitpiromrsi andPanyasak Sobhonvasu, ‘Unpacking Thailand’s Southern Conflict; The Poverty of Structural
Explanations’, Critical Asian Studies, Vol.38, No.1 (2006), 95-117; Arnaud Dubus and Sor
Rattanamanee Polkla, Policies of the Thai State towards the Malay Muslim South (1978-2010)(Bangkok: Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2011); Ornanong Noiwong
Benbourenane, Political Integration Policies of the Thai Government Toward the Ethnic MalayMuslims of Southernmost Thailand (1973-2000) (Bangkok:Institute of Asian Studies
Chulalongkorn University, 2012)11 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder: Lynne Reinner,2003), 171-173; Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya and Sabrina Chua, Conflict and Terrorism
in Southern Thailand (Singapore: Marshall Gavendish Publisher, 2005), 53-68
12 Regarding these incidents I referred to Human Rights Watch. 2008. No One Is Safe: Insurgent
Attacks on Civilians in Thailand’s Southern Border Provinces, (New York: Human Rights
Watch): “Tak Bai and Krue Se Report”, The Nation, accessed December 7, 2014. http://www.
nationmultimedia.com/specials/takbai/p2.htm
13 McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land, 6, sited as the comment of Srisompob Jitpiromsri.
14 Neil J. Melvin, “Conflict in Southern Thailand: Islamism, Violence and the State in the Patani
Insurgency”, SIPRI Policy Paper No.20 (2007), 23-26
15 Ulrich Beck, “Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity” (London: SAGE publication, 1992)
16 Kato Naoki and Ota Fumio, Kikikanri no Riron to Jissen (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, 2010),24
17 Harvard Business School Press, Crises Management Master the Skills to Prevent Disasters(Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2004); Sasa Atsuyuki, Kikikanri (Tokyo: Gyosei,1997), 223-225
18 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3
19 Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Rational Choice Institutionalism”, in R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder,
and Bart A. Rockman eds. The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (Oxford: Oxford

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43

University Press, 2006), 23-38
20 Paul Handly, “Princes, Politicians, Bureaucrats, Generals: The Evolution of the Privy Council
under the Constitutional Monarchy” (Paper for the 10th International Conference on Thai
Studies, Thammasat University, Bangkok, January 9-11, 2008), 7
21 Paul Cambers ed., Knights of the Realm: Thailand’s Military and Police, Then and Now (White
Lotus Press, 2013), 3-4; Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Redefining Thai National Security Threats”, The
Nation, February 20, 2012, accessed December 10, 2013 http://www.nationmultimedia.com/
opinion/Redefining-Thai-national-security-threats-30176217.html
22 The secretariat of the cabinet. http://www.cabinet.thaigov.go.th/eng/bb_main11.htm
23 International Commission of Jurists, “Thailand’s Internal Security Act: Risking the Rule ofLaw?” (Geneva: International Commission of Jurist, 2010) accessed December 3, 2013http://
www.robinlea.com/pub/icj_report-Thailand_ISA.pdf. For overviews of the military’s attempt toensure its influence in the governing of the country, see Supavud Saicheua. (2007), “Thailand:
Stormy political times ahead”, 2007, accessed December 5, 2013, https://rn.settrade.com/phatra/
Research/upload/0000096397/0402Econ.pdf
24 Chambers, Knights of the Realm, 47
25 Bangkok Post, “Emergency decree gets extension”, accessed September 18, 2013 http://www99.
bangkokpost.com/news/security/370221/emergency-decree-gets-extension; “Emergency law
extended in far South”, accessed March 13, 2014 http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/399320/
paradorn-says-he-does-not-expect-decree-to-be-extended-in-bangkok
26 Ukrist Pathmanand. 2005. “Thaksin’s Policies Go South”, Far Eastern Economic Review, July/
August, 8-13
27 Chambers, Knights of the Realm, 49-50
28 International Crises Group, “Thailand: The Evolving Conflict in the South”, Asia Report, No.241(Brussels: International Crises Group, 2012), 15-18, accessed August 7, 2013 http://www.
crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/241-thailand-the-evolving-conflictin-the-south.pdf;‘Stalemate in Southern Thailand’, Asia Briefing, No.113 (Brussels: International
Crises Group, 2010), 10-11, accessed August 7, 2013.http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/
asia/south-east-asia/thailand/B113%20-%20Stalemate%20in%20Southern%20Thailand.pdf;
Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana, Decentralization, Local Government, and Socio-political Conflict inSouthern Thailand (Washington: East-West Center, 2006), 21
29 Armed security forces are composed of military (tahan), paramilitary rangers (tahan pran), andvillage protection forces (Or Ror Bor) under the Ministry of Defence, police (tamruat), volunteer
defence corps (Or Sor), civil security volunteers (Or Por Por Ror), village defence volunteers(Chor Ror Bor) under the Ministry of Interior. Paramilitary rangers are an institution of
military. Among the volunteer force, Or Sor is paid. Or Ror Bor is organized by the Queen toprotect Buddhists in the region. Or Ror Bor is supervised by Ministry of Defence Royal Aide-deCamp Department.
30 Srisompob Jitpiromsri, “The New Challenge of Thailand’s Security Forces in the Southern
Frontiers” in Paul Chambers ed., Knights of the Realm: Thailand’s Military and Police, Thenand Now (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2013), 563; Isra News Agency http://www.isranews.org/
31 Chatichai took initiative especially in economic and foreign policy. Under the policy of turning
Indochina “from battle field to a market place”, Chatichai administration was successful inthriving Thai economy. See Pasuk Phongphaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand’s Boom and Bust
(Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1998)
32 The name originated from Arabic word meaning ‘Unity’.

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33 Mark Askew, Performing Political Identity: The Democrat Party in Southern Thailand (Chiang
Mai: Silkworm Books, 2008), 48-49
34 McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land, 59; Wanni W. Anderson, Mapping Thai Muslims: Community
Dynamics and Change on the Andaman Coast (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2010),134-150
35 ImitazYusuf “Islam and Democracy in Thailand: Reforming the Office of Chularajmontri/
Shaikh al-Islam”, Journal of Islamic Studies, No.9 Vol.2: 277-298 (1998), 178
36 Shaikul Islam Office.http://www.skthai.org/
37 McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land, 34-35
38 MarteNilsen, “Negotiating Thainess: Religious and National Identities in Thailand’s Southern
Conflict” (dissertation submitted to center for Religious and Theology studies, Lund University,2012), 160-170; McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land, 19-54
39 McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land, 22-33
40 Ibid, 56

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Reconciling National Security, Ethnicity and Religion

Abstract

Reconciling National Security,
Ethnicity and Religion:
Institutional Interpretationof Thailand’s Southern Insurgency
Naomi NISHIThis article attempts an institutional interpretation ofthe reconciliation
landscape of Thailand. The violent conflict in the southern border provinces (‘theDeep South’) of Thailandhas escalated since 2004. Although the reconciliation
process is under way, the situation in the Deep South has not improved. To
understand the current situation of reconciliation, it is useful to focus on theinstitutions dealing with the risks, or how they determine ‘risks’. The current
dominance of the military in agenda setting determines the way the problem isdefined at the national level. At the present moment, democratic institutions
cannot form an effective counterbalancing force to this situation. This may bepartly attributed to the existing fragmentation among Muslims in society.
Impediments to reconciliation lie in the political structure, as well as the oftexpressed issues with history and identity. By examining the reconciliation in
Thailand, we can observe the dynamic interaction of people struggling for a morepluralistic society. Creating an open space for diverse interpretations is the mostdifficult but most essential issue.