論文Superficial Reciprocity:
The Chinese Educational Mission and
the Burlingame Treaty
Guochao Zhao

INTRODUCTION
The Chinese Educational Mission (CEM) was China’s first governmental
sponsored study abroad program in the United States. Started in 1872 andterminated in 1881, this nine-year project was an integral part of the Qing
government’s Self Strengthening Movement, which sought to modernize China
through, as the contemporary slogan put it, “Chinese studies for the essence,
Western studies for the practical application.” In addition, through theirexperiences in the United States, the CEM graduates became the core nucleus
of China’s modern state bureaucracy.1 As a result, the CEM forms an extremely
important part of the story of China’s late nineteenth-century modernization,and of early US-China relations.
As many scholars have pointed out, the CEM was made possible by the 1868
Burlingame Treaty, negotiated in Washington between the US Secretary ofState William Seward and the Chinese delegation’s chief diplomat, the American
Anson Burlingame. Overall, Burlingame hoped the treaty would “placate theWestern nations,”2 and serve as a model for diplomatic reciprocity on a “strictly
reciprocal basis”3 between western nations and China. Scholars have largely
agreed, calling it “the first equal treaty between the two countries, and perhaps
the only equal treaty the Qing signed in the nineteenth century.”4
And yet a closer look at the origins of the CEM, and the treaty’s seventh
article, which granted Chinese most favored nation treatment in access toAmerican government controlled schools, reveals that the treaty was far fromthe reciprocal agreement many assume. This paper uses the seventh article andsubsequent negotiations over the CEM to demonstrate that the treaty ultimately
served American interests.
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Scholars exploring the CEM’s origins generally assume that the seventh
article of the Burlingame Treaty is the key for establishing the mechanism bywhich Chinese students could study in the United States. So for instance, Liang
Biyin in her book writes that this treaty clause, is the “contractual basis” for the
CEM to be conducted in the United States. 5 Few, however, have actually
analyzed or even questioned why this particular treaty provision was made in
1868.
The seventh article was certainly not written to satisfy demands from the
Chinese side. In fact, the Chinese government at that time was not ready tosend students to study in any foreign country. Nor did the Chinese educational
system reward or admire overseas education. After all, the first Chinese
graduate from an American school and the CEM’s most vigorous advocate,
Yung Wing, spent more than a decade failing to convince Qing government
officials to adopt just this sort of educational project. Despite his belief thatstudying overseas was a vital part of China’s modernization, Chinese officials
repeatedly ignored him.
While the seventh article of the Burlingame Treaty granted Chinese students
most favored nation treatment, this paper shows how the original purpose was
far more limited and gave only an appearance of reciprocity. This paper
reexamines the US State Department archives to reveal vital clues that explainthat the seventh article was actually intended to build an interpreter-training
school to provide American consulates with qualified interpreters and consuls
in China. The stipulation of the most favored treatment to Chinese students
was, therefore, created to maintain the appearance of treaty reciprocity. The
CEM was therefore not the planned outcome of the treaty, but an unforeseen
development in which neither the Chinese nor the American governments weredeeply involved. Instead, the CEM was established through the private efforts ofindividuals like Yung Wing, who turned the treaty stipulation’s original purpose
on its head. In short, rather than as a symbol of diplomatic reciprocity, theeducational provision in the treaty’s seventh article was actually inserted tobenefit US diplomatic and commercial interests in China, not to lay thegroundwork for student exchange. This not only challenges our understandingof the CEM and the Burlingame Treaty, but also suggests that early Sino-US
relations were far more unequal than they at first appeared.

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The Perseverance of Yung Wing
The CEM was China’s first governmental attempt at sending its people
abroad for education. Between 1872 and 1875, the Qing government dispatched
to New England 120 students in annual installments of 30 students. They were
expected to live and study there for fifteen years to acquire the “foreigntechniques” relevant to the army and navy, such as astronomy, mathematics andengineering, so that “China could gradually be strengthened.”6 Although thisproject was terminated prematurely in 1881, the students who had participatedstill “made groundbreaking contributions” to the technological development ofChina and “served as vital mediators” between China and the West during thelast decades of the Qing dynasty.7
The CEM also helped nurture China’s modern diplomacy. Six years before theChinese legation was built in Washington, CEM officials undertook the sorts oftasks usually reserved for diplomats. They reported to the Qing government,
for instance, on the activities of Chinese communities in the Americas, 8 andparticipated in President Ulysses Grant’s inauguration.9 The CEM was therefore“practical spadework” that prepared the way for sending permanent diplomatic
legations, and was a “valuable training ground” for future Chinese diplomaticand consular personnel.10
The most favored nation provision in the seventh article of the Burlingame
Treaty launched this educationally and diplomatically influential project. Thisparticular stipulation is therefore believed to indicate China’s willingness to
conduct an educational exchange with the United States.11 But the experiencesof Yung Wing, to a large extent, tells quite a different story.
Starting in the 1830s, Yung Wing spent nearly two decades abroad studyingin Macao, Hong Kong and the United States. He eventually obtained a degreefrom Yale in 1854, which unquestionably distinguished him from his traditionallyeducated Chinese counterparts. This particular background also influenced his
belief t hat Wester n educat ion was “t he most feasible met hod ” for t he“reformation and regeneration” of China.12 To realize this ambition, he was, as
he wrote in his autobiography, “determined that the rising generation of China
should enjoy the same educational advantages that I had enjoyed.”13 This ideal,plus his experience in the United States, and his persistent urging upon Qing
officials of the necessity of foreign education, were critical for the imperial court
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to approve the CEM.14 Accordingly, he was hailed as the “head and front of thisprogram.”15
Nevertheless, Yung Wing went through “thick and thin” over seventeen yearsof “laboring and waiting.”16 One year after graduating from Yale, Yung Wing
returned to China in 1855, aiming to materialize his dream of overseas
education by presenting his proposal to some influential officials.17 But the civil
servant examination system largely hampered his efforts, because it was basedon mastering traditional Chinese literature, and required no expertise inWestern learning. This examination was not abolished until 1905, and was
almost the only way for a young man to enter officialdom and subsequently
attain fame and fortune. Given that, most Chinese in the 1850s did not find it
appealing to go abroad for an education. As Yung Wing’s own experiencedemonstrated, even with a Yale diploma, he had no access to influential officials,
because he had not been educated in the traditional exam system. Thus, from1855 to 1860 he “was going from one thing to another and keeping himself
poor” while accomplishing nothing.18
The Self-Strengthening Movement the Qing government launched in early
1860s provided an opportunity for people with overseas backgrounds like Yung
Wing to have influence among progressive Chinese officials. Subsequently, he
was introduced to Zeng Guofan ( 曾 国 藩 ), who was one the most powerful
officials as the viceroy of the Liangjiang area ( 两 江 总 督 )19, and was a major
advocate of this self-strengthening campaign. But this movement was notintended to comprehensively reform China. Instead, it only aimed at protecting
the Confucian order through adopting Western technology. 20 This meant thatthe scope of Zeng’s modernization was primarily confined to the military, andhe had little knowledge or concern about Western education more broadly. 21
This narrow perception compelled Yung Wing to put his plan of study abroad“in the background” during his first interview with Zeng, although the influenceof this influential man strongly tempted him to bring it up. 22 Although following
the meeting Yung Wing received an official position, the first mission Zengassigned him was purchasing machinery in America. This had little to do withhis passion for foreign education.
Despite the Self-Strengthening Movement’s attempts to modernize aspects ofChina’s bureaucracy, the conservatism of Chinese officialdom was a major
obstacle that held back the momentum of implementing any study abroad plan.
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Compared with schools that taught Western subjects in China, sending students
abroad was a far more rapid way of training Chinese students who could thenoversee the factories, and replace hired foreign experts whose loyalty to China
was suspect. 23 But conservative officials, still the majority, insisted that learningfrom other countries damaged the nation’s dignity and betrayed its traditional
values. 24 Fearing these dominant influences, even if Li Hongzhang ( 李章 )25 in1865 envisioned sending students abroad for an education that would help China
step into the future, he still had to keep this opinion private. 26
He served as a translator from 1865 to 1870, 27 and during those years mostQing officials heard his lobbying with indifference. 28 Facing opposition from “allforces of conservatism,” even influential and progressive officials with prominent
positions like Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang who favored his plan, “were notre ady t o ve nt u re t he at t empt t o c a r r y it t h roug h w it h t he I mp er i a l
Government.”29 Additionally, when Yung Wing first tried to propose his plan offoreign education in 1868, the year the Burlingame Treaty was concluded, hefirst brought out other proposals, and placed the educational plan second in thesequence to avoid its “over prominence.” 30 However, even these meticulous
preparations failed to convince any official to bring his plan before the imperial
court. 31
Yung Wing’s waiting, was eventually yet unexpectedly terminated by the
Tianjin Massacre ( 天 津 教 案 ) in 1870. This incident was due to the locals’
misunderstanding on the work conducted by the Roman Catholic Church in thecity, and resulted in the burning down of foreigner-owned properties such as achurch and hospital, and the murder of several priests and nuns. To settle
matters, a commission including Zeng Guofan was assigned to negotiate withthe representatives of foreign powers, and Yung Wing was called on to act as
the interpreter. He used the opportunity to restate his plan, and used the riot todrive home his points about the dangers caused by popular ignorance, as wellas the disadvantages the commissioners encountered when negotiating directlywith foreigners. 32 This time, Zeng Guofan agreed to incorporate his project in amemorial to the throne and subsequently composed another two with Li
Hongzhang to elaborate the planning. Eventually, the CEM obtained approval
from the imperial court in 1872. To Yung Wing, the role played by the Tianjin
Massacre in materializing his enterprise was entirely unexpected. 33 Ironically,
without the Tianjin Massacre, it is possible the CEM plans would have been
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further delayed.
Based on Yung Wing’s frequent and often frustrated attempts to pushforward educational opportunities abroad, we can see that the CEM was not a
top-down project pushed by the Chinese government. Before it approved
carrying out the CEM, in fact, it was barely involved in materializing thisoversea s educ at ion scheme . I nstead , t he rea l i zat ion of t he CEM wa s
predominantly attributed to Yung Wing’s perseverance as well as the patronage
of a handful of open-minded officials, and was fortuitously accelerated by the
Tianjin Massacre.
In this sense, the CEM was actually a premature project for China. Itsestablishment rested on the work of just a few individuals, it was launched whenthe momentum for sending students abroad was still weak, and only came aboutbecause of an accidental opportunity provided by the Tianjin Massacre. Thus,
even in 1872, when the first batch of the CEM students were dispatched toAmerica four years after the Burlingame Treaty was signed, the Qing
government was still not willing to fully embrace the idea of study abroad.
The Qing government’s plans quickly confirmed this assumption. For
instance, although Yung Wing’s American education and the decisive role heplayed in turning the CEM into a reality would have made him the obvious
choice to lead t he m is sion , he wa s i nstead appoi nted a s it s a s so ciatecommissioner. The commissioner’s position was instead given to Chen Lanbin( 陈兰彬 ), a traditionally-educated Chinese scholar official who knew no English
and who measured things and students only by Chinese educational standards. 34
He was in fact selected “as a counterbalance to Yung Wing” 35 because in
principle and significance, the CEM “was against the Chinese theory of national
education.” 36 This peculiar arrangement indicates the Qing government’s
concern over the influence an overseas education would have on student
behavior a nd thought . This reveals that the Qing government was nott horoughly prepa red for cult ivat ing overseas students when t he CEM
launched. 37
All told, the Qing government’s lack of preparation, its ambivalence, and its
limited involvement in the CEM’s construction reveal that the Burlingame
Treaty’s most favored nation stipulation was not made at the Chinese
government’s request. Instead, the clause was inserted to cater to United Statesinterests.
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The Burlingame Treaty and its Seventh Article
Anson Burlingame was critical to the signing of the Burlingame Treaty. After
serving in Beijing as the United States minister to China for six years from1862 to 1867, he was appointed as China’s envoy to lead its first diplomatic
mission to the West asking their “forbearance and patience.” 38 To be more
precise, the mission asked foreign powers “to give to those treaties which weremade under pressure of war, a generous a nd Christia n construction.” 3 9
Burlingame’s amicable attitude towards China and the country’s lack of qualified
diplomats jointly contributed to his nomination.
The conclusion of the 1868 Burlingame Treaty is the culmination of thedelegation Burlingame led to the United States. The pact recognized thejurisdiction of Chinese authorities within land granted to America for trade andcommerce. It confirmed the empire’s control over its own dominions, and it
denied the right of the United States to intervene in the domestic administrationof China. The treaty also contains stipulations such as granting Chinese andAmericans the right of free migration to their mutual countries, and affirming
the most favored nation treatment to Chinese who visited or resided in America
and vice versa. It thus reflected the spirit of diplomatic reciprocity. Burlingame
considered it “the out growth of that co-operative policy,”40 which attachedimportance to the territorial and administrative integrity of China, and which
he conceived and implemented when he served in Beijing. Wu Tingfang ( 伍 庭芳 ), the Qing government’s sixth minister to the United States, regarded thetreaty as “the first attempt on the part of a Western power to apply theprinciple of reciprocity in dealing with the Government and people of China.”41
While recognizing the Burlingame Treaty’s attempts at reciprocity and amity,
it is worth noting that the treaty was reached when there was a wide power
gap between China and the United States. This imbalance of power could makearticles appear reciprocal that in fact could only be implemented by theAmericans.42 For example, the clause that conferred Chinese and Americans
the right to free migration to each other’s country benefited the United States
more because it needed workers for constructing the transcontinental railroad.
With this particular provision, as Burlingame himself contended, “we have beenenabled to push the Pacific Railroad over the summit of Sierra Nevada.”43 China,
on the other hand, had no urgent need for American immigrants. The demand
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for Chinese labors may also have led the treaty to forbid the coolie trade, since
Burlingame thought such a ban would encourage free emigration.44 The coolie
trade was also prohibited from the US, though the possibility of this trade
or ig i n at i ng i n A mer ic a wa s “neit her ver y c om mo n or eve n l i kely.”4 5
Furthermore, the most favored nation treatment concerning travel andresidence failed to protect the people of the two countries equally, as the antiChinese movements in the US during the 1870s overtly demonstrated.
To put it simply, in the light of the power gap between the two countries, it is
not surprising that the treaty ultimately served the interests of the UnitedStates, and that some of the reciprocal stipulations were to China just paper
promises that were actually made merely for an appearance of reciprocity. This
argument provides the lens to analyze the seventh article of the Burlingame
Treaty.
The treaty’s seventh article gave the reciprocal right to Americans andChinese to attend government-controlled schools, and further stipulated that
Americans and Chinese may establish and maintain schools on each other’s’territory. Given the lack of interest among Qing officials in Yung Wing’s plan fora study abroad program, and that the CEM was not finally launched until four
years after the Burlingame Treaty, the most favored nation clause for Chinese
students was actually another form of reciprocity on paper only. When thetreaty was signed there Qing officials demonstrated little interest in sending
students abroad. It was also extremely unlikely that, given circumstances, theQing government would found schools in the United States, and equally unlikelythat Americans would study in Chinese government-controlled schools.
Therefore, in reality, the goal of the seventh article was to allow American
citizens to build and operate schools in China. The Americans hoped that thiswould solve a significant problem they faced operating in China.

The Interpreter and Consul Problem of the United States in
China during the 1860s
No direct documents survive from the Burlingame Treaty negotiations
because they were not recorded. It was instead “conducted by means of
personal interviews and confidential conversations” between Anson Burlingame
and the Secretary of State William Seward.46 But despite that, the treaty’s
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motivation can still be effectively explored by investigating the correspondence
between the U.S. legation and consulates in China and the Department of Stateduring Burlingame’s term. As the preamble of this treaty claims, it was
concluded based on circumstance that had arisen after a previous pact signed in
1858. Meanwhile, it was an embodiment of Anson Burlingame’s six years ofministerial experiences in China. 47 Additionally, the timeframe of these
documents almost paralleled Yung Wing’s pleading with Chinese officials to
adopt the CEM.
Throughout the official correspondence, no official encouraged Chinese to
study in America, nor did they mention the possibility of establishing Chinese
schools in America or Americans attending schools controlled by the Chinese
government. This absence of discussion further proves that the provision
granting most favored nation treatment to Chinese students was merely asuperficial reciprocity.
On the other hand, American diplomats in China constantly urged the State
Department to establish a school in China for interpreter-training. According to
Burlingame, a lack of trained interpreters hampered American interests.
Creating a school in China to teach American youth the Chinese language
would effectively place the consulates of the United States, he wrote, “in a more
respectable position.”48 Because of their language fluency, in the future thosetrained interpreters could assist in American consulates and become Chinesespeaking consuls.49 The insufficiency of qualified interpreters and consuls helped
drive an interest in education on the American side, and is a manifestation of
the peculiar Sino-American relationship in the 1860s.
China and the United States in the 1860s “were not important to, or eveninterested in, each other,” and the American Civil War further aggravatedAmerica’s indifference. 50 The involvement of the United States in China at thattime was hence chiefly confined to carrying on a “relatively small but profitabletrade” and protecting its citizens there. 51 Its arrangements concerning the
diplomatic, consular establishments and personnel in China, is an illustration ofthis moderate involvement as well.
In 1863, the Secretary William Seward rejected a request for reorganizing
and reforming the legation and consulates in China. Arriving amidst theAmerican Civil War, the request was pushed aside because it was “absolutely
necessary” to avoid attention on interests that were not important or urgent. 52
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As a result, the American legation in Beijing was dwarfed by the “extensive
precinct” of other powers. 53
In addition to deficient working conditions, the legation and consulates also
constantly faced a lack of personnel. As Burlingame noted, the American andBritish legation “have the same law to execute, and the same diplomaticquestions to consider.”54 However, Burlingame could not find anyone to write forhim, while the British minister, “has three interpreters, two attachés, and ten
consular pupils, and he keeps them all busy.”55
In terms of the consulates, Britain in 1863 had consuls and interpreters at allof the fourteen treaty ports in China, and almost every consul spoke Chinese,while the United States only had eight consuls and three interpreters. 56 For“practicing the utmost possible economy” during the Civil War, the position of
consul in some ports was often assumed by merchants because the U.S.
government had no need to pay them a salary. 57 Besides, regardless of whether
those consular positions were undertaken by merchants or professional
diplomats, they were frequently changed and nearly all of them were illiterate
in Chinese. 58 Consequently, they could neither directly converse with native
officials, nor be credible judges and representatives of their countrymen in
China. 59 Samuel Wells Williams, who acted as the secretary and chargé d'affairein the American legation during the 1860s, noted that those consuls inevitably“weaken our national character with the Chinese rulers” and “injure thestanding of the consular office in the estimation of Americans themselves.”60
Because the United States claimed extraterritoriality in China, interpreters
were crucial for ensuring all cases in the consular courts between Americans
and natives could be intelligently decided. 61 In addition, interpreters wererequired to present in the Chinese courts, and act as assessors when Americans
faced criminal and civil action against Chinese.62 Corresponding with native
officials was also another important responsibility, and all these duties were, as
the consul general George Seward in Shanghai wrote, “extensive and difficult.”63
The manner in which such works were performed, “will always go far todetermine the nature of our relations with the authorities.”64
Yet, the United States was unlike other powers such as Britain, France andRussia, whose consulates in China “are all supplied with trained interpreters.”65
The American consuls were, by contrast, “compelled to request the aid of
missionaries in their interviews or correspondence with Chinese officials,” or258Superficial Reciprocity: The Chinese Educational Mission and the Burlingame Treaty

even turn to Chinese interpreters whose English was often imperfect.66 This
chronic embarrassment resulted in continuous requests to the Department ofState for competent interpreters, and rendered Samuel Williams afraid of“wearying by repetition.”67 Having interpreters was “vital to the efficiency of ourconsular service and measurably to the honor of our nation,” he emphasized, so“the country must educate them.”68 Consul general George Seward shared thisview. He saw the absurdity of a “consulate in China without the means ofcommunication with the Chinese” and believed this awkwardness could be
avoided by establishing interpreter-training schools.69 By doing so, he reckoned,
the consulates may subsequently be made “comparatively effective.” 70 Moreover,because those interpreters would be “eligible to the higher posts” after havingsome training in the consulates, the school was thought to help prepare
Americans for consuls who were conversant with the language and customs of
China.71
Evidently, Burlingame, Samuel Williams and George Seward all agreed on theneed to establish an interpreter-training school. They understood the criticalrole played by American diplomatic officers in China. Before Secretary of StateJohn Hay inaugurated the Open Door Policy in 1899, America’s China policy
was often what its chief diplomatic representative in that empire said it was,rather than formulated at the Department of State.72 Given this, Burlingame
promoted the education plan to ref lect “lasting honor upon our beloved
country,” 73 and pointed out that even some relatively small countries such as
Holland and Portugal had students in China training for consular duties.74 So,even a few months before Burlingame headed for America to negotiate thetreaty, he still expected the adoption of this plan.75 William Seward, however,
did not respond to Burlingame’s repeated request for consideration. On top oflongstanding indifference at the State Department, the American Civil War only
aggravated the problem, making China diplomacy less important than America’s
national survival.
A ll of t h is is t he key context for u nderst a ndi ng t he i nclusion of t heeducational provision in the Burlingame Treaty. It was not to promote Chinese
students studying in America. Instead, the need to train interpreters for
American diplomatic and commercial negotiations, was the actual intention forincluding the educational reciprocity provision.

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Conclusion
After the signing of the Burlingame Treaty, Anson Burlingame claimed that
it was an agreement in which “the United States have asked nothing forthemselves.” 76 As evidence, he specifically pointed to the seventh article, which“opens the gleaming gate of our public institutions to the students of China.” 77
For this reason, many scholars praise this treaty for its reciprocity and amity.
Moreover, when exploring the origins of the CEM, scholars usually agree with
Burlingame that the treaty laid the legal foundation for the CEM. However,they rarely analyze or even question why this particular article was placed in
the treaty.
As this essay has shown, the treaty stipulation on education was in fact notmade to satisfy the demands of the Chinese government. It had no such demandwhen it negotiated the Burlingame Treaty, and had displayed little interest in
educating students overseas. Nor was the Qing government eager to send
students abroad. Instead, it repeatedly ignored and rejected Yung Wing’s plans.
Considering that Yung Wing was the CEM’s most vigorous advocate, thisindifference demonstrates that the seventh article was included to satisfy
American interests, rather than those of China.
The US State Department archives are vital to recovering the motivation of
the Burlingame Treaty. Extensive correspondence demonstrates that theseventh article was actually intended to materialize the plan for building aninterpreter-training school to fill American consulates with qualified interpretersand consuls in China. What’s more, a closer attention to this specific clauseshows the stipulation of the most favored treatment to Chinese students was
actually created to maintain the appearance of treaty reciprocity. Simply put,the seventh article of the Burlingame Treaty was created to serve theAmerican interests in respect to diplomacy and commerce in China, not as apath for student exchange.
As a result, we need to understand how the CEM was the unintended resultof the Burlingame Treaty. The treaty’s original purpose was far more limited
and gave only an appearance of reciprocity. In the end, neither the Chinese nor
the American governments did much to develop the CEM. Instead, thiseducational project was predominantly launched by the efforts of private
individuals like Yung Wing, who turned the treaty seventh article on its head.
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Consequently, the paper challenges the current understanding of the CEM’s
origins. It also suggests that closer examination of the Burlingame Treaty is
l i kely to revea l a much more nu a nced u nderst a nd i ng of t h is t reat y’s
management of Sino-US relations in the 1860s. While the treaty was praised for
its reciprocity and respectful treatment of the Chinese government, the seventh
article suggests a broader pattern of surface reciprocity that disguised
embedded American interests. The CEM, therefore, provides the possibility to
re-examine the origins of early student exchange, as well as to deepen thehistory of early US-China relations.

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Endnotes
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2

3
4
5
6

7
8

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10

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12
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Stacey Bieler, “Patriots” or “Traitors”? A History of American-Educated ChineseStudents (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), xii.
David M. Pletcher, The Diplomacy of Involvement: American Economic Expansion
across the Pacific, 1784-1900 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001), 108.
Thomas La Fargue, China’s First Hundred: Educational Mission Students in the
United States. 1872-1881 (Pullman: The State College of Washington Press, 1942), 32.
Thomas La Fargue, China’s First Hundred: Educational Mission Students in the
United States. 1872-1881 (Pullman: The State College of Washington Press, 1942), 32.
Guoqi Xu, Chinese and Americans: A Shared History (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2014), 58.
Biying Liang, Chen Lanbin and the Diplomacy of Late Qing Dynasty (Guangdong:
Guangdong People’s Press, 2011), 97.
Guofan Zeng, “The Memorial of Selecting and Sending Intellectual and Bright Lads to
Study Abroad,” in Materials on Modern Chinese History: Self-Strengthening Movement(Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 1961), 153.
Stacey Bieler, “Patriots” or “Traitors”? A History of American-Educated ChineseStudents (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), xii.
Charles Desnoyer, “‘The Thin Edge of the Wedge’: The Chinese Educational Mission and
Diplomatic Representation in the Americas, 1872-1875,” Pacific Historical Review 60,
no. 2 (1992): 243-4.
Edward J. M. Rhoads, “In the shadow of Yung Wing: Zeng Laishun and Chinese
Educational Mission to the United States,” Pacific Historical Review 71, no. 1 (2005): 42.
Charles Desnoyer, “‘The Thin Edge of the Wedge’: The Chinese Educational Mission and
Diplomatic Representation in the Americas, 1872-1875,” Pacific Historical Review 60,
no. 2 (1992): 242-3.
Biyin Liang, The Study on Sino-American Cultural Exchange in Modern History(Guangdong: Sun Yatsun University Press, 2009), 75.
Yung Wing, My Life in China and America (New York: Henry Holt Company, 1909),
preface.
Ibid., 15.
“Mr. Low to Mr. Fish,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,
July 12, 1872, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1872p1/d84.
Joseph H. Twitchell, “An Address Delivered before Kent Club of the Yale Law School,
April 10, 1878,” in My Life in China and America, ed. Yung Wing (New York: Henry
Holt Company, 1909), 87.
Yung Wing, My Life in China and America (New York: Henry Holt Company, 1909), 15.
Joseph H. Twitchell, “An Address Delivered before Kent Club of the Yale Law School,
April 10, 1878,” in My Life in China and America, ed. Yung Wing (New York: Henry
Holt Company, 1909), 89.
Ibid., 90.
The Liangjiang area ( 两 江 地 区 ) included Jiangsu Province, Anhui Province, Jiangxi
Province and Shanghai ( 江 省、安徽省、江西省、上海市 ). As the viceroy, Zeng Guofan
was in charge of the political, civil and military affairs in these places.
Edward J. M. Rhoads, Stepping Forth into the World. The Chinese Educational
Mission to the United States, 1872-1881 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press,2011), 216.

Superficial Reciprocity: The Chinese Educational Mission and the Burlingame Treaty

21 Chris Robyn, The Chinese Educational Mission to the United States. A Sino-American
Historico-Cultural Synthesis, 1872-1881 (Master Dissertation, Chinese University ofHong Kong,1996), 22.
22 Yung Wing, My Life in China and America (New York: Henry Holt Company, 1909), 52.
23 Thomas La Fargue, China’s First Hundred: Educational Mission Students in the
United States. 1872-1881 (Pullman: The State College of Washington Press, 1942), 29.
24 Stacey Bieler, “Patriots” or “Traitors”? A History of American-Educated ChineseStudents (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 4.
25 Li Hongzhang was the protege of Zeng Guofan and was another main advocate of the
Self-Strengthening Movement. He was in charge of the CEM after Zeng Guofan died in
March, 1872.
26 Ni Shi, Ideology and Tragedy: the Analysis of the Fate of the CEM Students, (Shanghai:
Shanghai People’s Press. 1996), 76.
27 Joseph H. Twitchell, “An Address Delivered before Kent Club of the Yale Law School,
April 10, 1878,” in My Life in China and America, ed. Yung Wing (New York: Henry
Holt Company, 1909), 91.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Yung Wing, My Life in China and America (New York: Henry Holt Company, 1909), 60.
31 Ibid.
32 Joseph H. Twitchell, “An Address Delivered before Kent Club of the Yale Law School,
April 10, 1878,” in My Life in China and America, ed. Yung Wing (New York: Henry
Holt Company, 1909), 92.
33 Yung Wing, My Life in China and America (New York: Henry Holt Company, 1909), 61.
34 Ibid., 70.
35 Edward J. M. Rhoads, Stepping Forth into the World. The Chinese Educational
Mission to the United States, 1872-1881 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press,2011), 78.
36 Yung Wing, My Life in China and America (New York: Henry Holt Company, 1909), 63.
37 Ni Shi, Ideology and Tragedy: the Analysis of the Fate of the CEM Students (Shanghai:
Shanghai People’s Press. 1996), 146.
38 Knight Biggerstaff, “The Official Chinese Attitude Toward the Burlingame Mission,”
The American Historical Review 41, no. 4 (1936): 686.
39 “Anson Burlingame, Speech in New York, June 23, 1868,” USC US-China Institute,accessed August 15, 2020, https://china.usc.edu/anson-burlingame-speech-new-yorkjune-23-1868.
40 A n s o n B u rl i n g a m e , “ S p e e c h of H o n . A n s o n B u rl i n g a m e ,” i n R e c e p t i o n a n dEntertainment of the Chinese Mission by the City of Boston (Boston: Alfred Mudge &Son, 1868), 24.
41 Philip Chin, “Anson Burlingame-the Diplomat,” Chinese American Heroes, accessed
August 23, 2020, https://www.burlingame.org/library/Anson%20Burlingame/Anson%20
Burlingame-The%20Diplomat_CAH.pdf.
42 Biying Liang, Hard Diplomacy: The Study on Chinese Ministers to the United States inthe Late Qing Dynasty (Tianjin: Tianjin Ancient Books Press. 2004), 105.
43 A n s o n B u rl i n g a m e , “ S p e e c h of H o n . A n s o n B u rl i n g a m e ,” i n R e c e p t i o n a n dEntertainment of the Chinese Mission by the City of Boston (Boston: Alfred Mudge &Son, 1868), 27.
44 “Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United

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States, November 14, 1867, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1867p1/
d444.
45 John Schrecker, “‘For the Equality of Men-For the For the Equality of Nations’: Anson
Burlingame a nd China’s First Embassy to the United States, 18 6 8 ,” Jour n al of
American-East Asian Relations 17, no.1 (2010): 29.
46 Frederick W. Williams, Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese Mission to the Foreign
Powers (New York: Scriber’s, 1912), 144-5.
47 Zhongbo Hu, Sino-U.S. Educational Exchanges from the Perspective of Sino-U.S.
Relations (PhD Dissertation, Central China Normal University 2016), 31.
48 “Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, May 19, 1862, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1862/ch18.
49 “Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates. November 18, 1863, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1864p3/
d396.
50 Guoqi Xu, Chinese and Americans: A Shared History (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2014), 29.
51 David L. Anderson, Imperialism and Idealism: American Diplomats in China, 18611898 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 10.
52 “Mr. Seward to Mr. Burlingame,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, February 28, 1863, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1863p2/
d252.
53 “Mr. Williams to Mr. Burlingame,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of theUnited States, March 12, 1867, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1867p1/
d392.
54 “Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, June 2, 1864, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1864p3/d419.
55 Ibid.
56 “Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, November 18,
1863, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1864p3/d396.
57 “Mr. Seward to Mr. Burlingame,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, February 4, 1863, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1863p2/d250.
58 “Mr. Williams to Mr. Burlingame,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of theUnited States, October 2 4, 1865, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1866p1/d375.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 “Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, May 19, 1862, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1862/ch18.
62 “Mr. G.F. Seward to Mr. Burlingame,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of theUnited States, September 16, 1865, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1866p1/d376.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 “Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, May 19, 1862, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1862/ch18.
66 Ibid.
67 “Mr. Williams to Mr. Burlingame,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the264Superficial Reciprocity: The Chinese Educational Mission and the Burlingame Treaty

68
69

70
71

72
73

74

75
76

77

United States, October 2 4, 1865, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1866p1/d375.
Ibid.
“Mr. G.F. Seward to Mr. Burlingame,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of theUnited States, September 16, 1865, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1866p1/d376.
Ibid.
“Mr. Williams to Mr. Burlingame,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of theUnited States, October 2 4, 1865, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1866p1/d375.
David L. Anderson, Imperialism and Idealism: American Diplomats in China, 18611898 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), preface.
“Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, November 18,
1863, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1864p3/d396.
“Mr. Williams to Mr. Burlingame,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of theUnited States, October 2 4, 1865. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1866p1/d375.
“Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, July 14, 1867, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1867p1/d426.
A n s o n B u rl i n g a m e , “ S p e e c h of H o n . A n s o n B u rl i n g a m e ,” i n R e c e p t i o n a n dEntertainment of the Chinese Mission by the City of Boston (Boston: Alfred Mudge &Son, 1868), 28.
Ibid., 27.

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Abstract

Superficial Reciprocity:
The Chinese Educational Mission and
the Burlingame Treaty
Guochao Zhao

Started in 1872 and terminated in 1881, the Chinese Educational Mission(CEM) was China’s first governmental sponsored study abroad program in the
Un ited St ates . It wa s a n i nteg ra l pa r t of t he Q i ng gover n ment ’s S el fStrengthening Movement, and forms an extremely important part of the storyof China’s late nineteenth-century modernization.
The seventh article of the 1868 Burlingame Treaty granted Chinese mostfavored nation treatment in access to American government controlled schools.
Therefore, scholars exploring the CEM’s origins generally assume that thisarticle is the key for establishing the mechanism by which this pioneering
project was carried out in the United States. Additionally, they largely assume
that this provision demonstrates that the Burlingame Treaty overall was thefirst equal treaty between China and the West.
However, few have actually analyzed or even questioned why this particulartreaty provision was made. Closer study reveals that when the treaty was
signed, China was not ready to send students to study in any foreign country.
Nor did the Chinese educational system reward or admire overseas education.
After all, the first Chinese graduate from an American school and the CEM’s
most vigorous advocate, Yung Wing, spent more than a decade failing toconvince Qing government officials to adopt just this sort of educational project.
D espite h is b el ief t h at st udy i ng over sea s wa s a v it a l pa r t of Ch i n a’s
modernization, Chinese officials repeatedly ignored him.
As a result, this paper reexamines US State Department archives to reveal
vital clues that explain why that the seventh article was actually intended tobuild an interpreter-training school to provide American consulates withqualified interpreters and consuls in China. The stipulation of the most favored268

Superficial Reciprocity: The Chinese Educational Mission and the Burlingame Treaty

treatment to Chinese students was, therefore, created to maintain theappearance of treaty reciprocity. In short, the treaty’s seventh article wasactually inserted to benefit US diplomatic and commercial interests in China,
not to lay the groundwork for student exchange.
Although the seventh article of the Burlingame Treaty granted Chinese
students most favored nation treatment, this paper shows how the original
purpose was far more limited and gave only an appearance of reciprocity. The
CEM was not a planned outcome of the treaty, but an unforeseen developmentin which neither the Chinese nor the American governments were deeply
involved. Instead, the CEM was established through the private efforts ofindividuals like Yung Wing, who turned the treaty stipulation’s original purpose
on its head. Closer attention to the seventh article of the treaty, therefore,
demonstrates that aspects of the treaty that look reciprocal were in fact waysof strengthening the US position in China. As a result, this paper challenges thecurrent understandings of the Burlingame Treaty, and re-examines both theorigins of the CEM and the early years of US-China diplomacy.
Keywords: Chinese Educational Mission, Burlingame Treaty, Sino-US Relations269