The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 34 (2023)

Copyright © 2023 The Japanese Association for American Studies. All rights reserved.

What Kind of “America” Mattered in
the State Building of South Korea?
The “Tudor” Polity and the “Progressive” State*
Seong-Ho LIM**
The primary arguments of this article are threefold. First, from atheoretical perspective, importation of foreign models plays a critical role in
new nations’ processes of state building, but the multiplicity of dimensionsof foreign exemplars permits politicians in new nations to enjoy broad
discretion in how they strategically employ diﬀerent aspects and versions of
a foreign model. Second, the American model, arguably the most inﬂuential
foreign exemplar in the 20th century, has historically manifested two
widely contrasting images: that of a so-called “Tudor” polity, characterized
by decentralization of power and the prominence of local authority, anda “Progressive” state, prioritizing eﬀective and rational governance andcentralized initiatives. Third, existence of both these versions of theAmerican model enabled South Korea’s ﬁrst President Syngman Rhee toselectively highlight each of them in his public speeches (1948–1950) tostrategically support his vision for the daunting task of South Korean statebuilding.

1.

INTRODUCTIONA crucial question in international and comparative politics is the extent
to which leaders of a new nation, or of an established nation undergoinga process of political, social, and economic transition, import and employ
models of other nations in the processes of state building. Models of*An early version of this paper was delivered online at the 2022 Annual Conference of theJapanese Association of American Studies (June 4, 2022).
** President 2022/23, the American Studies Association of Korea and Professor, Departmentof Political Science, Kyung Hee University

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America played an outsized role in this complex and multifaceted processduring the second half of the twentieth century and continue to do sotoday. This is because of the United States’ dominant role in defeating the
Axis powers in World War II and its leadership in opposing communism
thereafter, as well as its leading economic and military presence, itstradition and myth of democracy, and its pervasive popular culture.
Some political leaders of countries across around the world as wellas American politicians themselves have openly praised and expressedgratitude for American presence, hailed American examples to be adopted
universally, and created oversimplified narratives of the nation’s history.
At first glance, the American global presence may appear clear andunmistakable, and American examples abound across the globe. But on
closer examination, we see that each country’s construction of the Americanmodel and its relationship to it takes on nuanced meaning in a reframed
form. People in other countries—notably political elites—have their own
interests, values, and agenda they pursue strategically. Apart from what
American leaders intend and hope, foreign players consider their own
contexts and accordingly view American presence and examples throughdiversely refracted perspectives. No matter what image of their country
Americans may value and desire to project to the world, people in othercountries will perceive America through their own prisms, modifyingthat image and constructing their own concept of America in ways thatare relevant and useful to them in the context of their nation. Indeed,
local contexts in which an American model is imported vary greatly, as
do interpretations of the meaning of American presence, examples, andmodels.
South Korea’s interpretation and use of American models of governanceduring the late 1940s when the nation was founded as an independent
republic provide an illustrative example. Like politicians elsewhere who
often referred to or studied a foreign country as a model from which tolearn, South Korean politicians at that time felt the need to look to the
U.S. as the modern exemplar of governance. Korea had been liberated
from Japanese colonial rule in 1945 by the U.S. victory in WWII and thesouthern half of the Korean peninsula was under American military rule fornearly three years through 1948. Upon independence and the creation of
the Republic of Korea or “South Korea” in 1948, the country was alreadyfacing the threat of the communist North which was growing rapidly under
the influence of the Soviet Union.
South Korean political leaders, having just launched a republican form

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of government with no prior experience with democracy, naturally looked
to America as a sacred model to follow in those early years. This was
especially the case for the country’s first president Syngman Rhee, who
had lived in exile in the U.S. for many decades before returning to his
homeland. Rhee and his supporters idealized and extolled almost everything
related to America as something to yearn for in the fledgling stage of statebuilding.
Yet, the U.S. example, like that of any country, offered a variety ofsometimes conflicting aspects and lessons, whose interpretation depended
on the interests and intention of the observer. Strategically minded Koreanpoliticians pondered what conceptions of America would best suit them asa model to guide the country’s daunting task of state building. Although
American military and economic strength in particular made Americanpresence overwhelming and unchallengeable at the time, shrewd Koreanpoliticians, particularly President Rhee with his reputation for politicalcunning, had their own ideas about the distinctive characteristics of the U.S.
and how best to utilize them for their own purposes. They, as policymakers
attentive to their normative obligations and practical calculations, hadstrong motivations to characterize America in selective ways.
This paper offers an exploratory investigation of how Korean politicalleaders, in particular President Rhee, employed various versions of America
to support their process of state building. It investigates what kind of
America stood out in the public speeches of President Rhee as he struggled
to build and stabilize a new state. What kind of picture of America did
Rhee, the dominant figure in the founding years, draw? Which aspects of
the image of America did Rhee highlight and which did he downplay in his
speeches? In other words, what particular elements of America’s complex
and multidimensional character loomed large in the political discourses ofstate building in newly independent South Korea?
Scholarly attention to these questions may enrich the fields of Korean
history, American studies, and comparative politics. First, it helps us
identify and understand more fully the conceptions—perceptual artefacts—of America that were imprinted on the minds of Koreans when they set out
on the uncertain, untrodden journey of modern state building. Images ofAmerica through the eyes of Koreans during this critical transitional period,in particular, remain blurred even today under a veil of noble, almost divine,
tint. Attempting to answer these questions holds the potential to help clarify
this picture.
Second, this paper may contribute to the discipline of American studies

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by identifying multiple faces that America projects to the world. The term“America” itself resonates with non-Americans in many different ways andconnotes many different things of which Americans themselves may not
be aware or wish to acknowledge fully. Identifying what kind of America
mattered in the largely traditional Korean society of more than seventy
years ago may help deepen and broaden our understanding of America
itself.
Third, the questions raised in this paper may help rekindle a debate in
the field of comparative politics regarding the relevance, or lack thereof, of
the American model in other nations’ state building. The issue of America’s
influence was intensely debated in the 1950s and 1960s. But it was debatedas if there existed only one version of the American model. Proponents
praised the American model as offering a sweeping guideline for newly
independent nations, while opponents stressed the harms that non-Western
nations who were former colonies suffered. This paper, by contrasting
differing versions of the American model, makes clear the need for further
discussion and analysis from new angles on what images and aspectsof America have best suited the task of state building in other nations
historically.
Addressing the questions posed in this paper may provide insights foraddressing contemporary problems as well. Various symptoms of crisis—
economic malaise, social conflicts, political polarization, governmental
impasse, environmental degradation, and pandemics—have plagued
nearly every country in the world to a greater or lesser degrees over the
past decade. Many people across the globe feel confusion, instability,
anxiety, and even generalized but potent resentment, anger, and animosity.
These conditions have given rise to renewed reforms of institutions inmany nations, which some political pundits have dubbed a “Second State
Building.” Indeed, in the past several years, numerous South Koreanpoliticians, civil activists, and media commentators have vigorously
proposed a Second State Building for the nation. The issue of state building,long dormant in South Korea and many other countries but now resurfacing
to address contemporary needs, thus demands a reassessment of the global
influence of the American model.
This paper represents an initial exploration of the subject as it applies toSouth Korea. There are many methodological challenges for research in thisarea. The most serious one is the difficulty in determining how to observeand interpret images of America in the minds of Koreans living more thanseventy years ago. No polling data exists. Newspapers, magazines, andWHAT KIND OF “AMERICA” MATTERED IN THE STATE BUILDING OF SOUTH KOREA?

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literature provide only partial, arbitrary, or even skewed pictures. Hence,
this paper examines the public speeches of President Rhee in which hementioned the word “America” in an effort to conjecture more broadly
about the different aspects of America that composed Koreans’ perceptions.
I recognize problems in focusing on these speeches, in particular theissue of whether the language President Rhee employed in his speeches
communicates something far different from what the Korean citizenry
actually perceived of America. I believe that a number of aspects of Korean
culture and history and the characteristics of Korean people at the time
support the proposition that Rhee’s speeches simultaneously mirrored andshaped the views of ordinary people to a significant extent in the late 1940s.
They are the high levels of illiteracy and poverty, the importance of eldercentered Confucian values, hierarchical colonial legacies, and the lack ofexperience with democratic-republican rule in Korea at the time. A majorityof Korean people could be assumed to have regarded themselves as passive
subjects and to have largely believed or at least followed what politicalleaders told them.
This paper consists of five sections. Section 2 reviews the literature on
the relevance, or lack thereof, of the American model for state building inother countries. Whether favorable or not to importing the American model,
the literature tends to understand it overly simplistically as if there were
only a single version of it. This criticism is supported in Section 3, which
distinguishes the two widely contrasting versions of America: the “Tudor”
polity prevailing before the twentieth century and the “Progressive” staterising to prominence during the turn of the twentieth century. Section 4
explores the Korean experience and analyzes the presidential speeches ofPresident Rhee, identifying the concepts of America he highlighted andarticulated to Korean audiences. The final section discusses implications of
the research findings and suggests areas for future research.
2. THEORETICAL REVIEW: STATE BUILDING AND THE AMERICAN MODEL
Issues regarding state building have attracted the keen attention ofleaders of nations, politicians, policy makers, academics, and the publicmore generally. Scholars tend to define state building as a very broadly
encompassing task every country—new and old alike—must tackle. For
example, Professor Stephen Skowronek (1982) delineates the U.S.’sstate building as a long evolving process begun in the late eighteenth
century and extending at least through the early twentieth century: “Short

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of revolutionary change, state-building is most basically an exercise inreconstructing an already established organization of state power. Successhinges on recasting official power relationships within governmental
institutions and on altering ongoing relations between state and society”(p. ix). But in more casual usage, state building refers to requisite activities
performed when a new nation is created. A newly independent nation’stasks are many: establishing a political system, structures of governance,
and foundational laws; consolidating state power and determining theallocation of authority within the nation; and creating national unity andpolitical identity as a single country. All these activities and functions are
subsumed under the concept of state building.
During the 1950s and 1960s, state building was a salient and urgent
matter worldwide. A host of newly independent nations who had beencolonies had to build state structures and establish legal and institutional
authority from scratch. Some of them adopted hierarchical and oppressive
communist approaches or less ideological forms of statist authoritarianism.
Others broadly followed or attempted to follow somewhat loose andambiguous forms of Western liberal democracy. State building in noncommunist countries did not tread a clear-cut ideologically driven route,and instead evolved in more complex ways. Accordingly, it generated a vastacademic literature featuring diverse and competing perspectives.
However, that literature failed to produce an all-encompassing
theoretical model. This was no surprise given the wide variety of formsof state building that had emerged globally, depending significantly on
the particular local contexts and conditions of each new nation. Every
theoretical model or argument offered in the literature, insightful as it may
have been, could not avoid having to admit some descriptive exceptions toit or some limitations to its applicability or explanatory value. Theoreticalinsufficiency is particularly evident in the two leading theories applicable
to non-communist nations: Professor David Easton’s theory based on theliberal democratic tradition, and Professor Carl Schmitt’s theory based on acollectivistic statist worldview (Easton, 1953; Schmitt, 1996). Both display
fundamental drawbacks in accounting for state building.
Turning first to Easton, Easton’s theoretical approach looks inward to thedevelopment of institutions within the state itself as an autonomous entity.
To him, politics relate to allocation of values by authoritative coordination.
A state is where allocative processes take place; state building involves
the establishment and expansion of those allocative processes. Easton’s
famous theory may be convincing as far as fully autonomous and stable

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states are concerned. But virtually all states in their early launching stages
do not enjoy high levels of autonomy or stability. With colonial legacies
lingering and with no prior experiences with a modern form of democratic
rule, newly independent states struggle to distance themselves from foreign
influences. Regardless of their desires or intentions, most new states
confront considerable challenges as they begin their perilous journeys
as independent nations and face formidable pressures from other moreestablished and powerful countries that necessitate interaction with them(Pye, 1964, pp. 11–14). Often, these external forces make it impossible toreach wholly self-interested, independent decisions on value allocation.
Easton’s theory thus fails to account for state building in new states as
most new states acquired their independent status not through gradualself-directed progression, but rather by abrupt change influenced by global
dynamics.
Unlike Professor Easton, Professor Schmitt looked outward to foreign
influences and defined politics in terms of a state’s distinguishing its friends
from its foes among nations. Politics involves recognizing external friends
and foes, thereby assuring a nation and its people’s survival against thethreat posed by foes. Only when people belonging to the same national
territory correctly distinguish foreign friends from foes, and are shieldedfrom the threats of foes, can the state and its politics succeed. To Schmitt,“[t]he ultimate political decision is existential, not normative” (Poggi, 1978,
p. 7).
Schmitt’s outward-looking theory nicely suits new states in theirfledgling phase. Most of the new states in the post-WWII era acquired
independence amid the large-scale global confrontations and intricate
strategic dynamics of the Cold War. These new states felt the squeeze ofinternational political forces at play. Their need for foreign support as
fledgling states forced them to be dependent on other more establishedforeign powers. And it put them in the difficult position of quickly needing
to discern friends from foes as a means of survival, as Schmitt highlighted
as of paramount importance in his theory of state building. While Easton’svalue-allocating thesis might apply accurately to autonomous and stablestates, Schmitt’s coldly realistic approach more accurately describes thepredicaments and experiences of newly independent states struggling tostand on their own feet.
But Schmitt’s approach falls short too. First, while heeding theimportance of international conditions in defining a state and its politics, histheory barely touches the very process of state building. A state is depicted

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as if it were already well past the launching phase. As Professor Gianfranco
Poggi explained, “[a state] is itself the product of politics, which mustfirst create it and can only then defend it. And in creating the collectivity
in the first place, politics can hardly do without precisely those symbolic
public processes that Easton emphasizes and Schmitt disdains” (Poggi,
1978, p. 11). Before or at least during the time that the crucial outwardlooking process of identifying external friends or foes takes place, state
structure must have taken form and state power must have gained traction
inside the national boundary. In other words, state building precedes or atleast coincides with the political function of a state determining who its
foreign foes are and deterring them. Schmitt’s theory unfortunately does notappreciate the crucial importance of this initial process of state building.
Second, Schmitt’s theory overemphasizes perhaps to the point of
single-minded obsession threats from foes. Security against enemies isundoubtedly of utmost importance to any country, especially vulnerable
infant states. But new countries find not just foes in the world, but
beneficent friendly nations as well with which they become allied. A newnation’s aspiring leaders and its citizenry may seek to learn from thesecountries and even try to resemble them.
Newly independent states, with neither prior experience of their own
as a nation nor a prevailing native model of state building, tend to takeexemplary cues from one or more advanced foreign nations. Importing aforeign model from abroad, trying to replicate its success, and injecting
its components into domestic settings are often important components
of new states’ strenuous task of state building. This type of importation
often proves to be a relatively effective way of persuading and rallying alarge public audience to support the process of state building. Citizens of
new nations, who are generally undereducated and ill-informed, tend tofeel perplexed regarding which leaders to listen to and follow, and what
direction the nation or they themselves personally should take. For suchpeople, the model of an exemplary foreign country provides an appealing
paradigm to pursue.
Saying that new independent nations completely lacked their own nativemodels of state building would also be a significant overstatement. Allnations with sizable populations have at least some type of vision of theirown for their future, but imported foreign models often take center stage in
new nations’ state-building process. Highly uncertain and volatile political,
social, and economic conditions that many new states face can result ininternal feuds among various local leaders advancing different visions for

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the nation. These competitions over the course of the future for the country
can motivate the country’s citizens to look for foreign exemplars thatprovide clearer or perhaps idealized visions for the future. Foreign nations
that achieved success and estimable status on the world stage may appear
very attractive to populations of new nations that are much less prosperous,
modern or otherwise successful. Some of these foreign countries that people
may wish their nation to emulate may be perceived as beneficent. Local
political leaders themselves may prefer to resort to foreign rather thanindigenous models, believing the former would more easily gain public
support.
Examining new Asian and African states in the 1950s and 1960s, Pye(1964) notes a clear outward-aspiring tendency: “[T]here is also what we
may call a ‘world’ or a ‘cosmopolitan’ culture which is closely related to
the nation-state system. . . It is based upon a secular rather than a sacredview of human relations, a rational outlook, an acceptance of the substanceand sprit of the scientific approach, a vigorous application of an expanding
technology, an industrialized organization of production, and a generally
humanistic and popularistic set of values for political life” (p. 15). To theeyes of former colonial residents who wished to build a functional statesystem and did not subscribe to a rigid Marxist doctrine, Western countries
that were seen as modern and civilized naturally emerged as the enviable
models to emulate. Those model countries boasted of economic prosperity
they attributed to mature capitalism. They exemplified political development
driven by the mass appeal of liberal democracy. And most impressive to
new nations who perceived themselves mired in social backwardness, themodel countries exhibited modern advances in rational social management,scientific progress, technological breakthroughs, cultural vibrancy andsophistication, and a generally improved quality of life.
The United States led the non-communist advanced model countries in
the post-WWII era. This comes as no surprise, given the U.S.’s decisive rolein ending the WWII and ushering in the age of post-colonialism. During
the ensuing Cold War, America’s global leadership was not confined tosecurity and economic dimensions; it reached the psyches of people aroundthe world. The cultural and moral values of intellectual elites as well as
the general public, at least in the so-called Free Bloc, displayed the heavy
imprint of America during the 1950s and 1960s. The concept of America—a
name with a more casual nuance and mythical import than the technicalname the United States—seemed effortlessly to gain prominence as theleading global exemplar of an imagined progress of civilization that was

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irreversible. America became the symbol of the blossoming of the modern
world and optimistic hope for a better future. The American model provided
newly independent nations in the post-WWII world with a promising vision
for state building. It was not just an example to follow and learn from, it
was a blueprint for future success. Just copy and transplant the Americanmodel into the soil of new nation, and the future would be bright.
Both leaders of new nations and policymakers in the U.S. drove theappeal of the American model of governance. As discussed above, politicalelites in new nations prioritized the importation of the American model as
an easy and effective way of gaining popular support for their state-building
projects. American policymakers, anxious to expand the country’s sphereof influence over the Cold War globe, welcomed the trend in many new
nations to venerate America as a model for state building.
American social science scholars of the time also joined in. Politicalscientists specializing in political development and modernization, inparticular, did not hesitate to promote the American model to the world.
Professor Donal O’Brien (1979) succinctly summarizes this tendency
among 1950s and 1960s political scientists such as Gabriel Almond: “Theprocess of modernization, in less advanced areas of the world, is therefore
very simply to be understood as one of ‘transition’ in which backward
polities will grow increasingly to resemble the American model” (p. 51).
But the initial enthusiasm among political scientists soon faded. An
increasing number of scholars and pundits began to cast doubt on theuniversal applicability of the American model. The persisting dismal
conditions of some newly independent countries—political chaos,
economic misery, and social instability—inevitably fueled suspicion
about whether the American model would work in less advanced and lessfavorable conditions in Asia and Africa. Most of the new nations in theseregions, which neither adopted a hard-core Marxist approach nor inherited
the British colonial legacy, tried to import at least some parts of theAmerican model. History, however, has demonstrated how disappointing
some of the consequences were. Equating modernization and politicaldevelopment and the imported American model proved naïve.
Samuel Huntington, one of the prominent political scientists of thesecond half of the twentieth century, voiced vigorous criticism of theAmerican model as a universal exemplar (Huntington, 1968). To him, theAmerican model was a product of America’s particular historical context,
thereby confining its relevance to the U.S. itself. Describing the Americanmodel as being inherited from colonial settlers in the early years of theWHAT KIND OF “AMERICA” MATTERED IN THE STATE BUILDING OF SOUTH KOREA?

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18th century, Huntington (1968) declared emphatically: “the effort to seeconnections and/or parallels between what happened in America in theeighteenth century and what is happening in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere in
the twentieth century can only contribute to monstrous misunderstandingsof both historical experiences” (p. 409). According to Huntington, newpost-WWII nations had their own historical experiences that differed
greatly from that of the U.S. Huntington (1968) stressed that these newnations would be ill-advised to apply directly the American model to theirstate building, observing that “the problems of government and politicalmodernization that the contemporary modernizing states face differ
fundamentally from those that confronted the United States” (p. 409).
What distinguished contemporary new nations from the America of thenineteenth century and before from Huntington’s perspective had to do withthe differing needs for state authority and accordingly differing visions ofwhat it would entail. “Today, in much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America,
political systems face simultaneously the needs to centralize authority,
to differentiate structure, and to broaden participation” (Huntington,
1968, pp. 412–3). To Huntington, these values were the most urgent
needs and concerns for state building at the time. But in Huntington’sview, the American model was derived from the pre-industrial past anddid not prioritize them. To the contrary, the American model based on
the unique history of the U.S. consisted of decentralization of power,
complex interrelated structures, and filtration of the public will throughinstitutional labyrinths. Huntington called the American model a “Tudor”
polity, invoking the historical colonial legacy of the Tudor royal familyof sixteenth and seventeenth century Great Britain. Tudor polity, which
evolved out of the British colonial legacy in America, does not map well
to modern non-Western countries, created from very different historicalcircumstances. Huntington thus viewed the American model as falling
far short of providing for the most important need of new nations’ statebuilding in the latter half of the twentieth century: political order throughcentralization (concentration of power), differentiation (clear division of
responsibilities and authority in government structure), and participation(direct and broad engagement of the public). Indeed, Huntington argued thatin new Asian and African nations “the primary need is the accumulation andconcentration of power, not its dispersion, and it is in Moscow and Peking,and not in Washington that this lesson is to be learned” (Huntington, 1968,
p. 138).
Huntington and some of his American colleagues who emphasized the

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importance of stable political development opposed universal adoption of
the American model, as did neo-Marxian critics. Of course, their reasons fordoing so were diametrically opposed. Neo-Marxian scholars vociferously
condemned the American model because they feared and objected to thespecter of American imperialism that they perceived to be an undemocratic
influence on fledgling new states. As O’Brien (1979) observed,“Commitment to an imperial mission in these [U.S. policymaking] circles
has involved a declining emphasis on the desirability of democratic
politics in America’s client states” (p. 61). By contrast, Huntington andhis colleagues considered the American model based on liberal values andfeaturing decentralized limited authority to be out of date and an ineffectivemeans of establishing political order and social stability for new lesser
developed nations (O’Brien, 1979, p. 69). Pye (1964) summarizes the
doubts that scholars who prioritized the establishment of order harbored on
the applicability of the American model to post-WWII state building: “Isa commitment to liberal democratic values likely to be a major handicap
in nation building? Doesn’t the situation call for hardheaded and singleminded leadership?” (p. 6).
On one hand, these critiques of the “American model” are legitimate.
As both Huntington and his colleagues as well as neo-Marxists agree, theAmerican model is not universally relevant. But we need to be careful
not to represent the American model simplistically. Huntington depicts
the American model as a Tudor polity, but the model is more complex
and multifaceted than he suggests. The Tudor polity is only one aspect,albeit a very important one, of the American model. In the eyes of leadersand citizens of new nations, some elements of the American model are
positive while others are negative, and some are passively inward looking
while others are actively overreaching. The issue of state building involves
so many dimensions and aspects that it defies a simplistic approach.
The common problem that discredits critics of the American model—
Huntingtonians and neo-Marxians alike—is their neglect of this complexity.
3. THE “TUDOR” POLITY AND “PROGRESSIVE” STATE MODELS OF AMERICAThe United States of America is the country’s official name, but, in amore casual sense, people inside and outside the country often call it simply
America. This semantic distinction bespeaks the questions that some people
have when thinking about the country: Is it more a unified single entity
or more a democratic federation of semi-independent states? Its large size

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and complex economic and social history make it impossible to paint one
simple picture of the nation and its culture. And the single word “America”
which does not convey the reality that the country consists of fifty states,
further blurs its perceptual shape to the non-American. Two contrasting
images of America emerge from this ambiguity. One is the so-called Tudor
polity that, in Huntington’s description, represented the country before
the twentieth century. It highlights decentralization, a limited government,
and democratic governance. The other I call the “Progressive” state in thespirit of the turn of the century Progressive Movement. It emphasizes the
progress of human civilization, rational management and governance, andglobal leadership.
However, one model did not simply replace the other in whole at a
specific time. The Tudor polity, though significantly weakened in thetwentieth century, has persisted and co-existed with the new Progressive
state. America since the early 1900s has had a mixed character
simultaneously containing the old and new systems. Depending on the
aspects of America upon which one chooses to focus, one may find thecountry to resemble one or the other of them. In this way, we can say that
the American model has been a hybrid since the early twentieth century.
Because the Tudor polity preceded the Progressive state, let me begin bydescribing it first.
Skowronek (1982) noted that America in its early years “presumed theabsence of extensive institutional controls at the national level” (p. 4).
As the name suggested, the United States was, on the surface, formed inpursuit of such values as unity, unification, and cohesiveness that the preConstitutional Confederation and colonial system lacked. But the reality fell
far short. The newly founded United States maintained most of its colonial
culture, and a Tudor polity, characterized by decentralization and limited
governmental power. Skowronek (1982) even called the early U.S. a “fictive
state” in the sense that concentrated state power and a clearly differentiatedstate structure—core components of a state—were largely missing (p. 7).
Even after independence from Great Britain, the new country continued to
be a polity where communal societies formed during the colonial period
remained intact and retained much of their status and influence. Here,national governmental institutions, trapped in the lingering old polity,
existed as a nascent and feeble part of locality-centered social and political
networks.
The power vacuum at the national level was filled by the courts andpolitical parties. Skowronek (1982) observed, “this broad dispersion of

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governing power” to “widely scattered regional centers of action” meant“[t]he triumph of the state of courts and parties” (p. 23). “Parties … werethe cornerstone of an old order, an order that presumed the absence ofstrong national controls,” and “[t]he judiciary’s governing capacities werestretched … to fill the ‘void in governance’ left between party hegemony
and rapid social change” (Skowronek, 1982, p. 41). The Tudor polity,
despite power dispersion and weak state leverage, could survive andfunction through the nineteenth century largely because of “the ingenious
extraconstitutional framework of courts and parties . . . that articulated acoherent mode of governmental operations” (Skowronek, 1982, p. 287).
Some may idealize Tudor-like America as a place of idyllic communal
life, but it was far from paradise. As Professor Charles Bright explained,“[i]t was dominated by small elite factions,” while [t]he federal government
remained remote from everyday life” (Bright, 1984, p.128). Local politicalelites reconciled their differences and maximized their interests in a
symbiotic manner. The earlier impetus toward a modicum of centralized
national power, generated by the creation of the United States, dissipatedin the face of growing resentment from local political elites or “bosses”
who cloaked themselves under the mantle of “Jacksonian democracy.”
The “Jacksonians were active in checking and reversing the growth ofstate power, … and historians have often noted a steady decline in federal
activity, especially in economic promotion, after about 1830” (Bright, 1984,
p. 133). Voter mobilizations, precipitated by the campaign of Jacksonian
democrats, opened the door for mass democracy, but also helped toconsolidate political parties flexing their muscle in local settings (Bright,
1984, p. 135).
Locally based party systems dominated throughout the entire country,
and party-brokered political connections prevailed as the backbone ofAmerican political life. The political elites in local party organizations
found an ally in the judicial branch. “It was left to the courts to supervise
the activities of business in the economic sphere,” and the courts cameto play a role in a case-based piecemeal manner “as policemen of theboundary between state and economy” (Bright, 1984, p. 139).
However, this Tudor polity consisting of many parochial small worlds
ultimately began to erode as every part of the country became nationallyinterconnected in the late nineteenth century in the wake of industrial
revolution. The state lacked sufficient power and capability to tackle
national-level problems. “A system designed to distribute favors andrewards found it very difficult to formulate policy based on choices

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17

and the reconciliation of conflicting interests” (Bright, 1984, p. 147).
Crisis symptoms included growing recognition of economic inequality,
urban unrest, rural alienation, labor disputes, ethnic conflicts, andpolitical disenchantment. These crises frightened many intellectuals andprofessionals and led to amplified voices calling for multi-dimensional
reforms in economic and political systems. The Tudor polity no longer
addressed the needs of the newly urban and industrial country, andsystematic reforms characterized as the Progressive state gained traction,
particularly in urban centers and among business and intellectual elites.
The leaders of the Progressive movement were mostly middle-class
intellectuals working in specialized professions: lawyers, teachers,
professors, scientists, engineers, accountants, journalists, writers, andsocial workers. “The challenge of building a new kind of state in America
was taken up … by an emergent intelligentsia rooted in a revitalized
professional sector and a burgeoning university sector” (Skowronek,
1982, p. 42). These Progressives advocated a long list of reform measures
embodying such values as rationalism, science, pragmatism, and morality(Wiebe, 1967; Hofstadter, 1955). Regulation of monopolies and industry,
improvement of work environments, prohibition of child labor, urban
development, merit-based bureaucratic recruitment, and greater citizen
involvement in public affairs topped the Progressive reform list. Their
agenda for civic enlargement, in particular, included the secret ballot,
direct election of U.S. Senators, party primaries for electoral nomination,
ballot initiatives, and women’s suffrage. Progressive reformers viewed
big business monopolists and local party bosses as dual enemies ofAmerica, whose business and political collusion posed a grave national
threat. Progressives thought their reform goals would require national
centralization and efficient management of government by capablenonpartisan bureaucrats and prioritized creating an effective federal
government to solve urgent problems and build an advanced and civilizedcountry.
As the Progressive Movement gained political support and resonatedmore popularly, nonpartisan bureaucrats, who carried out the reforms
and undertook systematic management of the federal government, rose toprominence and took the place of some of the political and social base of
local party machines. Along the way, the President as chief executive took
center stage both domestically and globally (Bright, 1984, p. 151). This
turn-of-the-century Progressive departure to a new America meant “thereconstruction of the American state” and brought “a qualitatively different

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kind of state” (Skowronek, 1982, p. 4). Stimulated and propelled by the
Progressive Movement, America in the early twentieth century experienced“the reconstitution of institutional power relationships” (Skowronek, 1982,
p. 166). The new America came to witness an emboldened presidency
and “a national administrative apparatus as the centerpiece of a new
governmental order” (Skowronek, 1982, p. 165).
This historical transition was a repudiation of the time-honored Tudor
polity, whose decentralized character had resulted in parochial local party
bossism and big business monopolies. The new Progressive state called
for national centralization and governmental initiatives to establish abetter democracy and more sound governance. “Modern American statebuilding was pursued in the name of re-harnessing the vital energies ofpolitical democracy and the private economy to ever higher levels ofachievement” (Bright, 1984, p. 287). Although advocates for Progressive
reforms played a key role in the process, this type of fundamental change
would have never occurred without the symptoms of crisis described above.
Rapid industrialization in the late nineteenth century stoked urbanizationand economic nationalization as well as increased social complexity andstruggles between labor and capital, thus revealing the inadequacy of a
Tudor polity to confront these modern problems, some of which wereenormous.
The American Progressive state grew in the years surrounding the turnof the twentieth century in two phases: “state-building as patchwork”(1877–1900), followed by “state-building as reconstitution” (1900–1920)(Skowronek, 1982, pp. 3–18). The second phase was particularly critical,
with its effect of “restructuring the institutional supports for democracy
and capitalism” (Skowronek, 1982, p. 17). Notably, Progressives pursued
the dual goals of more participatory democracy and better governing,and “merged hopes for a responsible new democracy with hopes for a
responsive new political economy” (Skowronek, 1982, p. 165). Unlike
their Tudor-oriented predecessors, reformist Progressives sought effective
governing and policy achievements, acting as “independent policy
advocates” and stood “in the vanguard of American state-building”(Skowronek, 1982, pp. 44–45).
Compared to earlier generations’ emphasis on decentralization and local
and community governance, Progressives envisioned a new state which
made national integration and government-led stability top priorities.
Centralization on a federal level with the government playing a much more
active role required a strong bureaucracy equipped with policy expertiseWHAT KIND OF “AMERICA” MATTERED IN THE STATE BUILDING OF SOUTH KOREA?

19

and management skill. As Skowronek (1982) noted: “By transforming
ideological conflicts into matters of expertise and efficiency, bureaucrats
promised to reconcile the polity with the economy and to stem the tide ofsocial disintegration” (p. 166). A decentralized polity began to give way toa multi-institutional but integrated governmental system with institutional
checks and balances that also possessed policy-making capability. The
state took prominence, wielding its clout vis-à-vis the authority of local
communities, although internal feuds over governing initiatives also
emerged: “Structural reform no longer pitted institutional outsiders against
a firmly entrenched structure of political and institutional power; it now
pitted institutional insiders against each other in a struggle to redefine
political and institutional prerogatives” (Skowronek, 1982, p. 169).
Deviating from a decentralized local-based polity with no need forstrong national leadership, the new Progressive state prioritized national
centralization under presidential leadership. “The bureaucratic remedy
promised the chief executive his own national political constituency,
independent institutional resources, and an escape from the limitations thata locally based party state imposed on national leadership” (Skowronek,
1982, p. 170). Nonpartisan Progressive reformers, most of whom were
professionals, found an ally in independent-minded presidents, in particular
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, and to a lesser degree William
Howard Taft. “The creative dimension in state-building politics—carriedlargely by new cadres of professionals standing outside established centersof institutional power in the late nineteenth century—was taken up in theexecutive office by three consecutive Presidents in the early twentiethcentury” (Skowronek, 1982, p. 171). An old polity dominated by partisan
politicians and the judiciary declined, while a newly arising reform systemempowered the executive branch. As Skowronek (1982) observed, “theexecutive-professional reform coalition pursued a course of redistributing
institutional powers and prerogatives away from Congress and the courts
toward the President and the bureaucracy” (p. 172).
Of course, the executive branch did not have absolute dominance in the
Progressive state; there was a balance of power between the President andCongress. President Taft, for one, stressed the importance of “reconciling[new bureaucratic powers] with the original constitutional design”(Skowronek, 1982, p. 174). Taft, who had been a lawyer and would serve asa Supreme Court Chief Justice (1921–30) after his presidency, argued thata strict interpretation of the Constitution would be necessary to legitimize
the task of “rearticulating lines of authority and reestablishing governmental

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order while expanding national administrative capacities” (Skowronek,
1982, p. 173). Taft’s successor Woodrow Wilson, who was a former scholarof legislative politics, also advocated a balanced, cooperative partnership
between an active executive and democratic Congress. During the
Wilson administration, Skowronek (1982) noted, “national administrative
development became an extension of party development and was worked
through the President’s cooperative partnership with fellow partisans inCongress” (p. 175).
In the early twentieth century, America was reformed, reframed,and even reconstituted into a Progressive state. It eventually evolved
into a strong Keynesian governmental system with activist executive
branch initiatives culminating in the New Deal and with the extensive
administrative programs and services becoming the centerpiece ofgovernmental operations. A Tudor polity run in a piecemeal way by the
courts and party organizations gave way to a Progressive state centrally
planned and operated by national administrative apparatuses. Concrete
Progressive achievements that created a solid foundation for a new
America included: anti-trust laws, tight business regulations, improved
workplace environments, prohibition of child labor, merit-based bureaucrat
recruitment, direct election of U.S. Senators, the secret ballot, party
primaries, ballot initiatives, and women’s suffrage.
The historic rise of the Progressive state meant a significant
diminishment of Tudor polity, but not complete extinction of it. The
two different concepts of America have since co-existed and sometimes
competed with each other. Some aspects of American institutions andgovernance have continued to maintain their decentralized nature, whileothers now feature more centralized, efficiency-seeking, and achievementbound governmental initiatives. Observers can find both Tudor legacies
and Progressive inventions, depending on which aspects of the country theyexamine. American governance has become a complex hybrid.
This multifaceted and hybrid character of American governance affords
people in other countries with a wide variety of images when attempting
to characterize America. Politicians, in particular, have great latitude tohighlight different versions of America strategically in accordance with
their own interests and priorities and in different contexts of their countries.
Especially politicians in newly independent nations, who seek foreign
exemplars either to follow or to justify their actions could strategicallychoose different versions of the American model to utilize with ease. For
instance, founding leaders could point to the Tudor model to legitimize a

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21

democratic-republican form of government with free and fair elections ofrepresentatives. But they could invoke the Progressive model if they sought
to build efficient government structures, consolidate governmental authority
on the national level, and exercise active central leadership. In the following
section, I will apply this theoretical framework to the historical experienceof South Korea during its founding years from 1948 to 1950.
4.

“AMERICA” IN PUBLIC SPEECHES OF PRESIDENT SYNGMAN RHEE

Having lived in exile in the U.S. for decades, Syngman Rhee notsurprisingly viewed America as a touchstone even prior to South Korea’s
independence. A combination of historical events—the U.S.’s decisiverole in the liberation of the Korean peninsula from colonial rule in 1945,
U.S. military rule in the South for three years following liberation, and theSouth’s hostile confrontations with the North Korean communist regime
backed by the Soviet Union—further contributed to Rhee’s heavy relianceon the U.S. as an authoritative reference point after he became South
Korea’s first president in 1948. As theorized in Section 2, political leaders
in a new nation tend to resort to foreign models to assist them in the highly
uncertain, uncharted, and complex task of state building. President Rhee,in particular, found America the most suitable foreign exemplar. But, as
discussed in Section 3, the American model is a hybrid of two substantiallydivergent approaches, and President Rhee was able to use different aspectsof the American model selectively and purposefully in presenting images ofAmerica to the South Korean public.
In Rhee’s speeches, he sometimes emphasized the democratic origins andcharacter of America that I have referred to as Tudor polity; at other times
he stressed America’s strong central government and its national policies
and programs to provide effective assistance to the weak and poor acrossthe country, which I have termed the Progressive model. On one hand, Rhee
wanted to institute a democratic form of government as soon as possible
and wanted Korean people to embrace democratic principles and values.
The Tudor polity provided an ideal model. On the other hand, he had a
responsibility to secure national integration, social stability, and economic
well-being for the fledgling nation, and accordingly tried to exercise strong
leadership and centralized authority over the South Korean population, whowere largely supportive of him. The Progressive model fit extremely well inthis context.
President Rhee’s public speeches delivered in the two-year span from

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his inauguration (July 24, 1948) to the outbreak of the Korean War (June25, 1950) provide a multitude of examples of Rhee’s employing bothmodels selectively in his political maneuverings as South Korea’s founding
leader.*** Turning first to Rhee’s use of the Tudor model, on August 15,
1948, day of independence after American military rule when the newnation was officially launched, Rhee delivered a speech in which he touted
America as a country founded on the principles of justice, human rights,
and popular sovereignty, that sought to spread those ideals and makethem a reality worldwide (Public Speech, August 15, 1948). Rhee wanted
to bestow legitimacy on the new South Korean state by articulating andemphasizing how he and the new nation also embraced those ideals andconsidered them the foundation of their new nation as well. Just over
six months later, to justify a democratic-republican form of new Korean
government, Rhee recalled the American Revolution which ended British
monarchical rule in America and how the newly independent United Statescreated a new republican form of government, embodying ideals of freedom
and popular sovereignty (March 1, 1949). In a speech urging Koreans tobuild a stable and peaceful country, Rhee identified the U.S. as its mostbenign foreign partner because its democratic system naturally cultivated
the values of peace and stability (August 4, 1949).
Trying to bolster his legitimacy as the first democratically elected South
Korean president (albeit indirectly by National Assembly members rather
than directly by the people), Rhee emphasized free elections as a corecomponent of American democracy. American politicians banding together
in rival political parties, Rhee said, engaged in fierce confrontations
during election campaigns, but once the election was over and regardlessof the result, they ceased to fight, and instead formed a broad coalition
to work for the betterment of the country (December 28, 1949). Rheeparticularly extolled examples of losing candidates conceding elections andcongratulating the winners, regardless of how narrow the electoral margins
may be, and no matter how hostile they had acted toward each other as they
competed for the seat. He praised America’s peaceful processes of transitionof power through elections in such a glorified way because he wanted toquiet grumbling critics and political opponents and to gain cooperation andsupport from all political circles and the South Korean public as well.
Rhee also emphasized the fundamentally democratic nature of America*** Rhee’s public speeches are documented in the Presidential Archives, Korean Ministry of
Public Administration and Security. https://pa.go.kr.

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to justify his heavy reliance on U.S. aid and assistance for state building.
He described what he considered to be a noble and self-reinforcing
mechanism of democratic systems: the peace-loving attitudes of citizens ofa democracy are reflected in their government’s tangible policymaking, andthose benign actions of their government in turn further deepen the peacefulvalues of the people, which leads to further policymaking promoting peace.
In other words, democracy begets peace, and vice versa. Rhee then claimed
that foreign assistance from the U.S., one of the most advanced democraticnations, entailed no imperialistic ambitions and simply manifest naturally
from pure respect for freedom, justice, peace, and welfare of humankind(November 2, 1949).
Rhee often emphasized the liberal democratic tradition of America in
his speeches because he wanted to draw a sharp contrast between it andwhat he considered to be the harmful and dangerous communist regime inNorth Korea and its primary sponsor, the Soviet Union. He drew a stark
distinction between what he characterized as America’s benign foreign
policy and hegemonic ambitions and imperialist motivations driving thecommunist forces rooted in North Korea (March 1, 1950). As politicalleader of a new and fragile new nation, Rhee found making such clear-cut
distinctions between communist ideology and American liberal democraticvalues to be an effective strategy to prevail over communist advocates andsympathizers both in North and South Korea. He endeavored to let theSouth Korean citizenry know how ideologically opposite America, which
he considered a benign savior, was from their northern enemy and its big
brother, the Soviet Union.
Making this distinction was an important component of Rhee’s strategy
to build a South Korean state that could stand up against communist threats
and aggression from the north. In a speech to the National Assembly,
Rhee quoted his American “friends,” who claimed that democracy andcommunism could not exist together and that for global peace and order toexist, communism needed to perish completely (May 3, 1949). Wheneveran opportunity arose, Rhee did not neglect reiterating how the American
President and Congress sought to exterminate communists for the sake ofworld peace and prosperity as well as for Korea’s sociopolitical order andeconomic growth (June 14, 1949).
But images of America in President Rhee’s public speeches were notconfined to its democratic dimensions reflected in the Tudor model ofAmerica. Rhee also frequently depicted America through the lens of theProgressive model as a nation with strong governmental institutions and24

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active engagement in both domestic and global affairs. As the founding
president of a newly independent nation, Rhee must have felt an urgent
need to establish state structure and government authority as soon as
possible—no less than the need to establish democratic institutions andpractices. The Progressive model of America as a foreign exemplar to
support and justify his actions was a favorite topic in Rhee’s public talks.
He extolled America for having achieved an advanced civilization basedon scientific progress, lauding the U.S. commitment to environmental
preservation and protection as an example of such advancement (March
28, 1949). In his speeches, Rhee repeatedly ascribed America’s prosperous
civilization to its pragmatic tradition of learning by doing; Americans
respected practical values and common sense over abstract ideologicaldogmas or purely academic theories. He praised Americans for prioritizing
engineering and other applied fields over literature, philosophy, or theology(July 15, 1949). In highlighting the broad capabilities and efficient
governing mechanisms of the American Progressive state, Rhee identified
the importance of the U.S.’s making systematic management of government
a top priority of state polity. For example, Rhee pointed to America’s
systematic management of firefighting and fire prevention as a successfulmodel for South Korea to follow (November 10, 1949). A government
managed and operated in a systematic and efficient manner, a key feature of
the American Progressive model, was what Rhee desperately sought for his
urgent task of state building.
President Rhee also felt the utmost need for law and order, as do allpolitical leaders of newly launched nations in varying degrees. Enforcementof law and order, however, could easily fall a prey to sociopolitical rivalries
and conflicts in new nations. On this subject, Rhee again resorted to theAmerican model in his speeches. He articulated how American democracy
never meant creating lawless conditions in which people could do whatever
they wanted without limitation. According to Rhee, America, despite its
democratic tradition that cultivated a culture of personal freedom andexpression and individualism, had accepted the concept of political bossism
and had never neglected the importance of order based on hierarchy (April
18, 1950). To Rhee, maintaining law and order based on existing social
hierarchy was crucial to South Korea’s state building, just as it was to theAmerican Progressive state in the twentieth century to create a more stableand prosperous U.S.
The image of the American Progressive state that Rhee tried to impress
upon the South Korean public not only featured a strong government with

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25

effective leadership, but also projected benign state authority actively
helping and protecting poor and disadvantaged people domestically andglobally. This active and beneficent image looms large in the Progressivemodel of America. The Tudor version certainly offered the image of afriendly neighbor but did not provide an active means to achieve such a
relationship. Rhee needed to justify the U.S.’s continuing overwhelming
presence in South Korea and his heavy reliance on American aid andassistance during the process of state building. The Progressive image ofAmerica as a benign older brother actively helping a weaker sibling solve
problems was ideal for this purpose. To imprint this Progressive imageof America onto the South Korean public, Rhee persisted in speech after
speech to portray America as Korea’s savior from Japanese colonial rule.
In a speech on the very day of official independence, Rhee emphaticallypointed out that Korea had been liberated from Japanese colonial rule
thanks to America’s active involvement (August 15, 1948). In many
subsequent addresses, he attributed Korean liberation specifically to therole of the American military led by General Douglas MacArthur (October
21, 1948; November 28, 1949). In fact, Rhee’s speeches did not confine the
U.S.’s role as a savior to Korea; he underlined America’s active benevolent
outreach and unhesitating engagement it offered to all fledgling nonWestern countries (March 23, 1949; August 4, 1949).
This image of the Progressive American state as a savior was ubiquitousthroughout Rhee’s public addresses. America had not only saved Korea
from Japanese colonial rule, but it was at that moment protecting South
Korea from communist aggression and economic disaster, the two mostpressing issues threatening the infant republic. Rhee stressed that without
U.S. President Harry Truman’s active leadership against communist threats,
Korea as well as other democratic countries would have succumbed tothem (March 1, 1950). Rhee specifically expressed his appreciation for
U.S. military assistance on numerous occasions (November 17, 1948;
April 19, 1949; May 10, 1949; June 14, 1949; August 15, 1949; November
2, 1949; March 1, 1950). Also, touting America as a savior from poverty,
Rhee repeatedly thanked the U.S. for economic aid both in terms ofsupplying goods and supporting the country financially (October 22,
1948; June 14, 1949; June 28, 1949; August 15, 1949; November 2, 1949;
January 21, 1950; March 1, 1950). Specific areas of American aid thatRhee underscored were: construction of infrastructure, transportation, andcommunication (January 25, 1949), food supplies (November 23, 1948),
technical and technological assistance (May 10, 1949), and social welfare

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support through such organizations as the Red Cross (May 1950).
Indeed, the United States played a highly influential role in almost
every dimension of South Korean state building in the nascent years of
the nation, 1948 to 1950. But this overwhelming presence drew suspicions
and criticisms from some segments of the South Korean society. Anti-Rheepolitical groups, in particular, criticized the close ties with the U.S. thatRhee ardently prioritized. Accordingly, Rhee attempted to fend off these
attacks from his opponents by repeatedly showcasing in his speeches theProgressive images of America as a beneficent global leader that provided
aid and assistance to all new and weak nations engaged in the difficult
task of state building (June 9, 1949; December 10, 1949). Rhee placed his
fragile new nation under the broad global umbrella of a benign America
to bestow strong legitimacy on his decisions and policy. In so doing, heelevated the Progressive model of America to the fore, regulating the Tudor
model to the background in these aspects of his rhetoric.
In sum, President Syngman Rhee in the first years of South Koreanstate building selectively emphasized various aspects of the multifaceted
American model in his public speeches. He employed the conceptof foreign importation of the American model to support his goal ofestablishing and stabilizing his new state. By selectively highlighting
elements of the Tudor and Progressive versions of the American model at
different times, Rhee tried to justify to his South Korean audience particularcomponents of his vision of South Korean state building: a democraticrepublican form of South Korean government, his strong authority andautonomy as President, his government’s staunch anti-communist stance,
and the new nation’s heavy reliance on U.S. aid and assistance.
5.

CONCLUSION

I consider this paper to be an initial exploration into Rhee’s use ofvarious aspects of the American model in his speeches during the launchof the South Korean nation, not a final and definitive study of the subject.
Further research is needed to reach deeper into the details of Rhee’s ideas
as they relate to his rhetoric and to examine more closely the particular
contexts in which particular speeches were delivered. We also need toinvestigate the degree to which Rhee’s public speeches reflected South
Koreans’ attitudes at the time and in turn how much they might have shaped
Korean people’s perceptions of these issues and perspectives on them.
We cannot assume that they accurately represented the average Korean

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27

citizen’s point of view during those early years. And as a twenty-firstcentury observer, I humbly acknowledge the potential for my own bias inanalyzing Rhee’s public speeches delivered over seventy years ago andhave endeavored to be attentive to such risk. Below are three other specificareas for further scholarly inquiry.
First, there are many other models of America that have been imprinted
on people around the world other than the two versions I have discussed
in this article, and there are many other countries and widely divergent
historical contexts in which different versions of the American model
have been applied. Investigating and analyzing these myriad situations
offers an almost unlimited number of areas for future research. Systematiccomparison of those images of America in a variety of national contexts
would generate a broad range of knowledge about the multifacetedcharacter of America in the eyes of the world.
Second, the strategies political leaders especially of new nations have
employed to import foreign models to support state building deserve
extensive further research. This article specifically addresses President
Rhee’s use of versions of the American model in the process of South
Korean state building. But politicians around the world have had theirown particular reasons to import foreign exemplars. Savvy leaders of newnations often stress their determination to repeat the success of a foreigncountry in their own nation through selective use of only favorable aspectsof a foreign exemplar to legitimize government authority and their policy
positions. Research into such strategic use of importation of foreign models
in many diverse nations would create a wealth of knowledge about the
dynamics of state building.
Third, although this paper focuses on importation of a foreign exemplar
for state building at the formation of the Republic of Korea over seventy
years ago, insights into this history may be applicable to reform efforts
across the globe today. Recently, worsening symptoms of system fatigue
and decay, evident in political polarization, policy gridlock, and social
confrontation, have prompted many advanced democracies to initiate newstate-building reform drives. As Professor Skowronek (1982) explained,
the concept of state building is not necessarily confined to the beginningyears of new nations. The concept is useful to understanding long-evolving
reconstructions and rearrangements of systems and priorities of governance.
Strategically using a foreign exemplar—notably the U.S. because of its
global status—can be an important component of reform projects.
The image of a ‘Tudor’ America may be referred to when prioritizing

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democratic advancement, and a Progressive America may be evoked insofar
as coordinated effective governing is concerned regardless of whether anation is new or well established. But, unlike the immediate post-WWII
period when America thrived as a paragon of national virtue and enjoyedvirtually unchallenged global respect and influence outside the communist
world, today America itself is mired in crisis. With America no longer
perceived as the ideal global model of governance, political leaders incountries around the world may no longer view importing an Americanmodel as an effective strategy for state building. As the future unfolds,
research into this subject will be of vital relevance.
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