Toward Post-Fukushima No. 13

13. Never Again
Lars Hogberg
Former Director General, Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate SwedenFirstly, let me express my deepest sympathy toimprovement of nuclear safety, based on thethe Japanese people for all the suffering they had

lessons that so far have been learned fromand still have to endure due to the consequences ofFukushima? Already in late March, I became athe March 11 earthquake and the ensuing tsunami.

member of an informal ad hoc group on theLet me also express my admiration for all theInternet of 17 “nuclear safety veterans” from 11

brave and dedicated crews who have worked andcountries, mainly former and present members ofstill work so hard to manage an unforeseen andIAEA INSAG. On May 31, our group published a

unprecedented situation at the Fukushima plantstatement entitled “NEVER AGAIN: Suggestions

and its surroundings.

for Achieving the Essential Goal of Nuclear

In April 1986, I served at the Swedish

Safety”1, which lists safety issues that the group

emergency management center when a radioactive

believes need to be reassessed in each country withcloud from Chernobyl deposited about as manynuclear power plants without waiting for a fullterabequerels of iodine and cesium over Swedish

analysis of lessons learned from Fukushima. Mysoil as have been released at Fukushima, at thefollowing observations are largely based on thatsame time as we realized that the situation at thedocument.

Chernobyl reactor was not under control for weeks.
The radioactivity was spread out over much larger

Firstly, I believe that the events, features andareas than at Fukushima so there was no need forprocesses taken into account in the design and theevacuation of people, but strict food control

design objectives should be reassessed for both newprograms had to be implemented. This experienceand existing nuclear power plants, and thehas helped me when trying to understand at least

appropriate safety improvements implemented.

to some extent the challenges you have to cope with

The reassessments should include both of thein Japan. I have tried to follow developments atfollowing types of events:

Fukushima from the first days, mainly via theTEPCO, NISA and NHK websites. I am impressed・Events and conditions (internal and external)

by the information you managed to provide inwith which the plant shall be able to cope

English, especially taking into account that so

without significant radioactive releases andmuch instrumentation was destroyed and access towithout irreparable damage, thus enabling

various parts of the plants was very limited.

return to power production in at most a year ortwo. Design objectives of these first level events

So, how should we proceed with further
1

include protection of the public and of theCopyright © JAPAN NUS CO., LTD. All Rights Reserved

Toward Post-Fukushima No. 13

national electricity supply.

means of rigorous audits, including international

・Events and conditions that will likely lead to more

peer reviews. These audits and reviews should

severe damage to parts of the plant, including

address the existence of a questioning attitude andthe core, but with which the plant should be able

a quest for excellence at least as much as formal

to cope without requiring significant off-sitecomplianceemergency response, such as evacuation up tointernational standards.

withexisting

nationalandtens of km from the plant. The main design
objectives of these second level events areIf all nuclear countries proceed along the route

protection of the public and the associatedindicated here (and described more in detail in thesocietal structure.

statement of the ad hoc “veteran group” referred toabove), I believe that nuclear technology canSecondly, I believe on-site accident management

achieve the trust needed by politicians, investors

capabilities should be reassessed and strengthened

and the general public so that nuclear power canat all plants. Such capabilities include specificcontinue to play an important role in many

plant design features as well as availability ofcountries as a part of an energy supply mix thatappropriate mobile equipment for back-up ofcombines security of supply with minimal releaseessential safety functions if needed, and last butof greenhouse gases.

not least staff who is well trained in applying
appropriate accident management procedures.

In Sweden, it seems that the Fukushima
accident has so far had limited impact on public

Such reassessments of the capabilities to cope

opinion. In May 2011, an opinion poll showed thatwith also very unlikely accident conditions (known79% supported continued operation of existing

as “stress tests”) are now well underway in thereactors, compared to 84% in August, 2010. As toEuropean

Europeandecisions on replacement of existing Swedish

countries. In Sweden, we anticipate that the severereactors with new build, it seems that Swedish

accident management capabilities implemented atutilities will wait some time while assessing

all Swedish plants in the 1980’s (see fig 1) will

ongoing developments in the regional electricity

contribute substantially towards a good “score” inmarket, including impact of new build underway inthese stress tests. Nevertheless I cannot at thisFinland and Russia. Moreover, I believe we need apoint exclude that additional measures may bemuch broader political agreement in the Swedishneeded to ensure that these accident management

parliament on a stable, long term nuclear policy

capabilities will function also under much morethan seems possible at present. The frequent

severe conditions than originally envisaged.

changes in policy over the past 30 years have noUnion

and

some

other

doubt made utilities and investors wary, when
Thirdly, I believe the international nuclear

looking at the political risks associated with thesafety regime should be strengthened. Binding

very large and long term investments that newinternational

nuclear build requires.

considered.

safetySuchstandards

standards

shouldshould

beinclude

requirements that safety culture and safety
management in industry as well as in government
authorities are put under constant vigilance by2(Note 1) The statement was transmitted to DG Amano atthe IAEA on May 31, 2011. See cover letter

August 2011

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