Dr. Marcus' Room No. 3

3. Nuclear Power Plants and Cheese
Gail H. Marcus, Consultant, USA

Profile (January 2008)
Dr. Gail H. Marcus is presently an independent consultant on nuclear power technology and policy.
She recently completed a three-year term as Deputy Director-General of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency(NEA) in Paris. In this position, she was responsible for the program of work and budget for the agency.
From 1999 through 2004, Dr. Marcus served as Principal Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy,
Science and Technology. There she provided technical leadership for DOE’s nuclear energy programs
and facilities, including the development of next-generation nuclear power systems. Other responsibilities included production and distribution of isotopes for medical treatment, diagnosis andresearch, and oversight of DOE test and research reactors and related facilities and activities.
From 1998-1999, Dr. Marcus spent a year in Japan as Visiting Professor in the Research Laboratory
for Nuclear Reactors, Tokyo Institute of Technology. She conducted research on comparative nuclear
regulatory policy in Japan and the United States.
Previously, Dr. Marcus had been in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). She served in a varietyof positions including Deputy Executive Director of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards/Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste; Director of Project Directorate III-3, providing
regulatory oversight of seven nuclear power plants in the Midwest; and Director of the Advanced
Reactors Project Directorate, where she was responsible for technical reviews of advanced reactor
designs.
She also served as technical assistant to Commissioner Kenneth Rogers at the NRC for over four years,
providing advice and recommendations on a broad range of technical and policy issues of interest to
the Commission. From this position she was detailed for five months to Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry, where she was NRC’s first assignee to Japan, studying Japan’s
licensing of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor.
Prior to her service at NRC, Dr. Marcus was Assistant Chief of the Science Policy Research Divisionat the Congressional Research Service (1980-1985). In this position, she was responsible for policy
analysis in support of Congress covering all fields of science and technology, and played a lead rolein policy analysis and development for energy, nuclear power, and risk assessment and management.

Organization:
From 2001-2002, Dr. Marcus served as President of the American Nuclear Society (ANS), an 11,000 member
professional society. She is a Fellow of the ANS and of the American Association for the Advancementof Science (AAAS). She is a former member of the National Research Council Committee on the Future
Needs of Nuclear Engineering Education, and served three terms on the MIT Corporation Visiting
Committee for the Nuclear Engineering Department. She is just completing a term as the elected Chairof the Engineering Section of AAAS.

Publication:
Dr. Marcus has authored numerous technical papers and publications. Her research interests include
nuclear regulatory policy, energy technology and policy, risk assessment and management, international nuclear policy, and advanced nuclear technologies.

Education:
Dr. Marcus has an S.B. and S.M. in Physics, and an Sc.D. in Nuclear Engineering from MIT. She is thefirst woman to earn a doctorate in nuclear engineering in the United States.

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Dr. Marcus' Room No. 3

Introduction

Analysis

While he was Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), Ivan Selin is reputed to have said, “In France, there are 365 kindsof cheese and one kind of reactor. In the UnitedStates, it’s the opposite.”Among the reasons that have been suggested forthe different paths taken by each country are:

The statement was a reference to the fact that the
U.S. nuclear industry and the NRC were at thattime struggling with the consequences of having
essentially customized many, if not most, of thenuclear power plants built in the United States.
The United States had a fleet of over 100 reactorsthat included both Pressurized Water Reactors(PWRs) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). The
fact that they had one vendor for BWRs, threemajor vendors for the PWRs and several architect-engineers had resulted in numerous variantsof both designs.
Further, the licensing process that existed in the
United States in those days provided no significant
benefit to duplicating a single design, as each license application required a complete review of thedesign, even if it had been previously approved.
This encouraged tinkering to improve the design
and to particularize it for specific sites and utilities.
Finally, as a result of competitive procurements,
and perhaps for other reasons, several utilities had,over time, purchased plants from more than one
vendor. Some even operated both BWRs and PWRs,
and a few operated PWRs from two different vendors.
By contrast, France had adopted a single technology, PWRs. Over the years, the design of theirreactors had been improved, but the improvements
had been introduced in step-wise fashion and applied to a group of plants rather than changing
plant by plant. Thus, the French fleet consisted of afew “generations” of PWRs, with a number of identical plants built in each generation.
While it is usually the United States and France
that are contrasted, because of their diametrically
opposite approaches, it is worth noting that Japan
has taken what might be called a middle way. Japan, unlike France, has both BWRs and PWRs in
its fleet. However, Japan, unlike the United States,
has fewer variations of each design. Furthermore,most of the utilities have chosen one technology(BWR or PWR), and no utility, except one (Japan
Atomic Power Company), operates both types ofreactors.
Both the reasons for such different approaches ineach country and the consequences of those differences have long been debated.

2・ National culture (that is, the propensity ofAmericans to be individualists, and to want toinvent new ways to do things);
・The fact that the United States began developing
its fleet earlier than France or Japan (whichmeant it was the first country to test out many
concepts, necessitating more changes as they“pioneered” discoveries of what did and did notwork well);・The fact that the United States had numerous
small utilities, while Japan had about ten, andFrance had only one;・The stronger central governments in France andJapan and their active role in promoting national industrial development policies; by contrast, the lack of central planning in the UnitedStates and the extremely competitive market
that developed among its vendors; and・The fact, previously mentioned, that U.S. regulation did not give any benefit in its licensing
process to designs that had already been approved.
All of these, as well as other factors, probably hadsome role in the different evolution of the nuclear
industry in each country. However, rather thandwell on the past, it is of more interest to examine
the consequences of what happened in each country and to explore what might be necessary―andpossible―to change the course of nuclear power
development in the future to overcome drawbacksof particular approaches.
The consequences of each approach can be summarized rather simply:
The benefit of continuous modification to reactor
designs is, potentially, the ability to reap the benefits of experience most rapidly. Observations drawn
from experience about how to overcome any problems encountered, how to improve operability, or
how to reduce costs can be implemented immediately in the next plant. There is no need to wait toaccumulate a number of modifications.
The downside, of course, is that unique reactors
limit the opportunities for economies of scale. Different designs need different components, different
operational procedures, and different training.
Staff cannot readily be moved from one unit to anCopyright © JAPAN NUS CO., LTD. All Rights Reserved

Dr. Marcus' Room No. 3other. The resources required to solve any problems or develop any improvements cannot be
spread over as many units. Different regulatory
reviews need to be conducted for each design.
By contrast, standardization provides utilities
and regulatory authorities with many efficiencies
and economies of scale. The resources required tosolve a problem or to design improvements need to
be invested only once, but can be applied a numberof times. Likewise, the licensing reviews required
to approve a change need to be conducted only once,but can be applied a number of times. Procedures
documents need to be written only once, but can beused in several plants. Maintenance and operating
staff can move from one facility to another. Economies of scale may allow for cost reductions insome components.
The only real downside of standardization is thepotential for one serious generic problem to idle awhole fleet. That downside has been discussed
many times. To date, however, such a severe problem has not materialized. The problems that havebeen identified have not been sufficient to require
immediate shutdowns of all affected plants. Rather,it has been possible to implement corrections in astaged fashion. This is not to say that a more severe problem is impossible. Further, it is clear thatthe pressure on the regulator not to shut down all
reactors at once could be considerable if a very serious generic problem is ever identified. However,
the extensive experience does suggest that the potential for severe generic problems is not a strong
argument against standardization. In addition, theexistence of “generations” of plants makes it likelythat a generic problem would not affect the entire
fleet of reactors anyway.
In considering the pros and cons of standardization, Japan’s “middle way” would seem to result inthe best of both worlds. Japan’s utilities draw all
the benefits of dealing with only one kind of reactor
technology, including the efficiencies possible fromtheir investments in training and developing procedures, and the flexibilities of staffing. While eachindividual utility may have some risk of experiencing a generic problem, overall, the country enjoys some protection from such a possibility.
The Japanese regulators have a somewhat
smaller benefit, since they do have to deal withboth BWR and PWR designs. However, Japan still
has more standardization within each of these designs than does the United States, so the Japanese
regulator still doesn’t have to deal with as many
design variations as does the U.S. regulator.

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Looking Ahead
It may be tempting to attribute such differences
to national character or religious background, asConfucianism promotes the idea of a “middle way.”That may well be so. However, the situation is toocomplex to attribute everything to one factor and toassume that change is impossible. I am less interested in what led to the current status than I am inlooking ahead at how the situation is evolving ineach country, and in what can be done to push eachcountry towards a path that avoids past pitfalls
and adopts the best practices of other countries.
In this regard, it is interesting to look at the situation today. When I first lived in Japan in theearly 1990s, utilities in the United States werebeginning to merge and consolidate. I used to makepresentations about the U.S. situation to Japaneseaudiences. In those presentations, I sometimes
said, half-jokingly, that with the mergers and acquisitions I was seeing in the United States, perhaps someday there would be only about ten utilities in the United States, just as is the case in Japan.
Today, I feel that prediction is not so far-fetched!
Perhaps we will not reach ten utilities in the
United States, but we now have a far smaller
number of nuclear utilities than existed in the past.
Between 1990 and the present, the number of utilities operating nuclear power plants has dropped
by almost a factor of 2. (The Nuclear News “World
List of Nuclear Power Plants” showed 50 utilities
operating nuclear power plants in 1990, counting
the joint operation of San Onofre by Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas and Electric as
one utility. Twenty-one of these utilities operated
only one unit. The 2008 edition of the same tablelists 27 entities, including both owner-operatorsand operators, operating nuclear power plants.
Only seven of these entities operate just a single
unit.) More consolidations are possible.
This fact alone goes a large way toward overcoming one of the biggest difficulties of the past in
the United States―the existence of so many utilities in the business of operating nuclear power
plants, many of them owning only one unit. Withfewer utilities operating nuclear power plants, andfewer utilities with only one nuclear plant, utilities
in the nuclear business are much more likely to beable to benefit from some of the economies of scalethat the Japanese utilities have long enjoyed.
I also suspect that U.S. utilities have come to therealization that a significant extra effort is required for one utility to operate nuclear plants ofdifferent types, and will be less likely to follow that

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Dr. Marcus' Room No. 3

path in the future. It should be noted that there
has been no institutional change made in US law
or regulation that would prevent a utility frompurchasing reactors of different designs from different vendors. It is not impossible that we will seesome utilities do so, particularly if not all the vendors presently in the market are able to continue tocompete. Nevertheless, in the future it should be
the exception rather than the rule.
In addition, the licensing process for new reactors
has been changed in the United States. Now, there
is benefit in referencing a previously certified design in a new license application. This change
should help create pressure for the U.S. nuclear
industry to minimize design changes for each new
unit.
However, the outcome of this change is notguaranteed. Even now, in the early stages of license applications for a new generation of reactors
in the United States, many of the applicants are,for one reason or another, not referencing a previously certified design, and design changes to previously certified designs are already being proposed. Some of this situation may be temporary,
and as more designs are certified, there may be lessof a perceived need to submit applications that do
not reference a certified design. At this stage, it is
impossible to know for sure, but the experience so
far raises at least some concern that the UnitedStates may end up with less standardization thanit expected.
All of this is in contrast to the situation in France
and in Japan. In France, the single utility that
operates throughout the country almost guarantees that the past practices will continue. In Japan,
the situation is more complex, but the continued
existence of the current utility infrastructure, andthe recognition of the benefits that the Japaneseutilities have achieved by specializing in one technology certainly make it both likely and desirable
for the present approach to be maintained.
Therefore, in the next round of nuclear development, we are likely to see some convergence in theapproach to acquiring new reactors in some of the
major nuclear countries. In particular, we will most
likely see a significant change in approach in the
United States, and less change, if any, in Japanand France.

So What Does All This Have To Do With Cheese?
Before I answer that question, I should point out
that the quote attributed to Chairman Selin has
been reproduced in several different ways, some ofthem simply saying “hundreds” of types of cheese4

in France. Furthermore, this quote has an antecedent in a quote attributed to Charles de Gaulle:“How can anyone govern a nation that has 365
different kinds of cheese?” (This quote also seems
to exist in several forms, some saying “246” types ofcheese, but the point is the same.)
What I find interesting is that Charles de Gaulle
used the cheese to illustrate the diversity inFrance―presumably of the population that produced and consumed so many kinds of cheeses―while Chairman Selin flipped the argument,
and sought to show a uniformity in France (of reactors, at least) and a diversity in the UnitedStates.
The real message to me in comparing cheese andnuclear power plants in France and the UnitedStates is that it gives us a chance to consider someof the many factors that influence the developmentof nuclear power, to consider the pros and cons of
the outcomes, and to try to factor this understanding into future decisions.
Of course, we are not dealing with simple
one-on-one interactions. In reality, the reasons forthe uniformity in the reactors operated in France
and the diversity of the reactors operated in the
United States are complex. Predicting whatchanges can or cannot be achieved in each country
is similarly difficult. Clearly, a country that has
many kinds of cheeses can, for a variety of reasons,have considerable uniformity in its nuclear power
program. France, like Japan, now has a strong national government system and a tendency towards
industrial policy at the national level. In the
United States, there is less of a tradition for pursuing industrial policy at the national level. Furthermore, in the past, the US regulator took a morepassive role with respect to the evolution of thetechnology and offered few incentives for design
standardization. The benefits of some standardization have now been recognized and an evolution
in that direction is underway for the next generation, suggesting that a country that started out
with multiple unique designs can move toward
greater standardization.
Both Chairman Selin and I have lived in France
at different times in our careers, so I am sure weboth know that, depending on how you count, there
are considerably more than 365 different kinds ofcheeses. I know that I tried to enjoy as many as
possible while I lived in France!
For cheese, the great variety of cheeses is generally a benefit. It is certainly a benefit to a cheese
lover such as myself. For nuclear power plants,
variety has some benefits, but also some drawCopyright © JAPAN NUS CO., LTD. All Rights Reserved

Dr. Marcus' Room No. 3

backs. Fortunately, the situation with respect tonuclear power plants seems to be changing in the
United States. In the future, people will, I hope,continue to be able to observe that there are numerous varieties of cheese in France, but I also
hope that they will not see as much diversity in thedesigns of reactors operating in the United States.
***5

As always, I welcome comments and feedback. I
can be reached at:
ghmarcus alum.mit.edu.
（ An image charactor is used intentionally for@-sign. Please cut the image and put a keystroke@-sign.)December 2008

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