Toward Post-Fukushima No. 6

6. Swedish Nuclear History and The First Days and Weeks
with Fukushima - From Sweden No.1 Carl G. Lindvall，former Barsebäck Kraft AB, Sweden
Karl Östlund, SSM, Sweden

Who am I

My name is Carl G. Lindvall. I’ve worked inon site, but still support our CEO and the Swedish

different management and staff positions in theindustry

nuclear industry in Sweden since the 80-ies,organisations, for example in Committee on

mainly in the areas of health physics, dosimetry,Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH)

fire protection and occupational health, in later

ofyears also with QA systems.

committee, World Nuclear Association (WNA) andSince last year I’ve retired from the daily work

inOECD/NEA,nationalISO

andnuclear

international

standardisation

lots more.

Barsebäck NPP, Sweden

Over the years my job gave me lots ofWorld Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO),

possibilities to interact with and work together

members of different committees and workgroups

with international organizations such as technicalunder OECD, Chairman for the Information

and OSART missions for IAEA, peer reviews for

System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE) system1Copyright © JAPAN NUS CO., LTD. All Rights Reserved

Toward Post-Fukushima No. 6of OECD/NEA, WNA WG etc. Many of thesegovernment inquiry in 1956 in which it wasmissions have included contacts with lots ofpredictedcolleagues in the Japanese nuclear industry, JNES,

investigation assume that 5-6 nuclear-powered

TEPCO, Kansai, CRIEPI, JANUS and more.

(power) plants can be added during the next 10"...except

experiments

reactors

theyears ... ".This aimed mainly to reduce the Swedish
When I got the invitation to this essay series independence on imported oil.

the early summer, I was most flattered andhonoured but also a bit scared, can I really live up

As Sweden has large deposits of minerals

to the expectations? After a few days intensive

containing uranium, though with low grade, anddiscussion, with my self, I decided that this isthat there was a difficulty to enrich uranium ore topossible, but only with good help from my friends. Ihigher

hope that we, in this and coming essays, convey anindustry decided to go for heavy water reactors.

echo from Sweden on how we reacted and what we

The first, entirely Swedish designed reactor washave learned from the accident, and where to go

projected in 1957 and was finished for commercialandgive

operation in 1963. After this grand venture inJapan

which the Swedish government and industry

through questioning and critical and positive

jointly drive the development, the next reactor wasreflections. With this as an overall goal it’s obvious

a pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR). Thisthat I need to cooperate with a few colleagues,

was however a mistake and it was never loadedsome you will meet more often than others.

and later re-designed to an oil fired power plant.

howtoencouragements

getthereandhopefullyto

ourcolleagues

ingrade,theSwedish

government

andAfter this, the Swedish industry, ASEA ATOM laterIn this first essay I’ll try to give a description,

ABB ATOM, changed over to the light water

background and history to the Swedish nuclear

technology and BWR reactors. In total 9 BWR

industry. In coming essays we will more focus onreactors were build and taken in operation fromour views on the Fukushima incident from1972 – 1985. Also three PWRs from Westinghousedifferent

were built in this period.

angles,emergency

preparedness

organization, public information/communication,information exchange, political reactions, andmore.

After the TMI accident the political support for
nuclear energy decreased and after a public
referendum in 1980, the government decided that

To be noted: All texts and aspects are our privateviews.

all nuclear power should be phased out by 2010! In
addition, a law was established that banned all
new planning for and design of nuclear power.
Under these dark clouds lived the Swedish nuclear

The Swedish nuclear history
Sweden was relatively early in the planning ofpower industry until 2000 when the end-date wascommercial nuclear power. The first plans wereremoved. However, during thesedrawn already around 1950, and after the "Atoms

reactors in Barsebäck was forced, by the law, tofor Peace" conference the door was opened for

close. Since2010 the "prohibition law" has been

sharing reactor technology over the borders. The

removed and it is now again open and allowed tofoundation for the great national effort to embraceplan for new nuclear power in Sweden. However, athisnew nuclear power plant must replace an old one.

2newtechnology

wasformulated

inaperiod twoCopyright © JAPAN NUS CO., LTD. All Rights Reserved

Toward Post-Fukushima No. 6

Today’s number (10) of reactors currently inmeasurements at good estimation of the release

operation may not be increased.

would have been produced. Many other countries
with similar reactors would benefit from this, now

The First Days and Weeks with Fukushima in
Sweden (Karl Östlund)1
When the tsunami and nuclear facility accident

the iodine is decayed leaving only Cesium-137 andmuch less information to base our national
resources and methods on.

occurred, many people felt deep sorrow andcompassion for the Japanese people. The great

What are the first lessons learnt

majority felt the tsunami was the most criticalFirst of all nuclear accidents happen.

issue to address and in the beginning the problems

While we of course always strive for 100% correctwith the nuclear facility was clouded in the news

maintenance and operational management of theby the devastation from the tsunami. Soon we

nuclear facilities, but we can never trust that westarted to receive information about the critical

will succeed completely. Nor can we expect that thereactor situation and at authority level much work

public have confidence in this. We have to admit

had to be done on what could happen and the effectthatof those scenarios. Our main source of info wasindividually and as an organisation. This in itself

media,

is nothing new or restrictive. Our challenge lies inwhich

wasunfortunate

since

these

segments often fail to grasp the important details,

people/employees

makemistakes,

both

how these realities are addressed.

focusing mainly on events easy to present to theworld.

The future of nuclear power will rest on fragile
foundations, as long as the general perception isSweden never questioned the Japanese ability tothat nuclear power is a serious threat to humanhandle this situation but was very concerned about

well-being. Our goal must be to explain to

not receiving quality information directly from thepoliticians and the public that even the worst

Japanese Government. This would have been apossible accident with an extremely low probability

good platform for communication and receiving

is still possible to handle and that its consequencessuggestions to what this country could do for Japan.

are not of "Judgement day" calibre. We must also

Sweden were impressed by the commitment thedemythologize “nuclear power”. We in industry andJapanese workers showed the world during theuniversities

critical weeks after the accident, we were very

cooperation with governments and other opinion

concerned about dosimetry and tried to figure out

makers to increase public understanding andhow this was handled.

acceptance for the nuclear technology.

must

increase

ourefforts,

inSince Sweden and EU had several thousand

Unfortunately one of the problems is that wecitizens in Japan we had to prepare for scanning

ourselves build up the image that nuclear power isthose if a large release of activity would occur. This

uniquely dangerous, by using difficult words andwas prepared mainly in theory but a true

accepting limitations that are more stringent than

deployment of the equipment was estimated to be 8

in other industry/activities. For example, radiation

hours, which never had been tried before.

standards/limits are much more restrictive forradiation sources from nuclear power than for

If Japan had invited other countries to do field

3“natural radiation"

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Toward Post-Fukushima No. 6

The new CRPPH Expert Group
Talking about environmental issues, most of ourAs agreed during the last CRPPH meeting May

scientists and politicians actually share the2011, a new Expert Group on the Radiologicalconviction that nuclear power must play a central

Protection Aspects of the Fukushima Accidentrole in the energy mix if we are to avert radical(EGRPF) to manage any Fukushima related workclimate change. Then it is not acceptable forhas been established and the first meeting of theshort-term populist, political moves to take control

Expert Group will most likely be held before theof the debate. We, the nuclear industry, must be aend of the year. National nomination should bepart and trustworthy counterweight in thesesent to CRPPH by the 15th of September. As a firstdiscussions.

start of this groups work a short summary of ournational lessons learned should be sent to CRPPH

Actualities, Whats onby the 30th of September.

Next week I’m on my way to another volcanicisland, ISLAND, for the Nordiska Sällskapet förStrålskydd, NSFS (Nordic Society for Radiation
Protection) meeting/symposium. NSFS is thenational/regional part of International Radiation
Protection Association (IRPA). I myself have been amember of the Swedish part of the board for thelast six years and will now resign. Many(Note 1)Have a degree in medical physics and have, since2005 side by side with his Ph.D. studies, been working
at Lunds University and the Swedish Radiation Safety
Authority (SSM) with radionuclide methods and issues
within the field of emergency preparedness planningand response.

September 2011

interesting papers are on the list and someconnections to Fukushima is to be foreseen in thediscussions. More from this meeting later.
See also:http://yourhost.is/nsfs-2011/home.html

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