From the Margins to theMainstream
Advancing Intersectional Gender
Analysis in Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament
REBECCA DAVIS GIBBONS ▎ ANA LEVINTAN ▎ MICHAL ONDERCO ▎ MARÍA PÍA DEVOTO
MARIEL R. LUCERO BAIGORRIA ▎ LOUIS REITMANN ▎ ELLEN WILLIO ▎ PEIXUAN XIE
EDITED BY RENATA HESSMANN DALAQUA

Acknowledgements
Support from UNIDIR core funders provides the foundation for all of the Institute’s activities. The
Gender and Disarmament Programme is supported by the governments of Canada, Germany, Ireland
and Norway.
The editor would like to thank authors and reviewers for their participation in this project. Additionally,
the editor is thankful to Paula Jou Fuster, for her assistance with background research and the preparation of this publication, and to Dr James Revill for his helpful comments and suggestions.

About UNIDIRUNIDIR is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy
institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue
and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community
to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems.

About the Gender and Disarmament Programme
The Gender and Disarmament Programme contributes to the strategic goals of achieving gender equality
in disarmament forums and effectively applying gender perspectives in disarmament processes. It encompasses original research, outreach activities and resource tools to support disarmament stakeholders in translating gender awareness into practical action.

Notes
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply theexpression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning
the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitationof its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of theindividual authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR,
its staff members or sponsors.

Citation
Renata H. Dalaqua, ed. From the Margins to the Mainstream: Advancing Intersectional Gender
Analysis of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2024.

Cover Image: © Takeo Nakaoku.

FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM

2

About the Editor
Renata Hessmann Dalaqua
Head of the Gender and Disarmament Programme, UNIDIR
Dr Renata Hessmann Dalaqua is a political scientist and Head of the Gender and Disarmament
Programme at UNIDIR. A recipient of the United Nations Women Scholarship for Peace, she has
conducted research and published on international cooperation on security, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, and nuclear energy governance. She holds a PhD in history and politics fromthe Vargas Foundation, Brazil, and a master’s degree in international politics and security from University College London. Her areas of expertise include gender and multilateral disarmament forums,
nuclear energy policymaking and technology governance.

About the Authors
Rebecca Davis Gibbons
Associate Professor, University of Southern Maine
Dr Rebecca Davis Gibbons is an associate professor of political science at the University of SouthernMaine. She previously served as a fellow and associate of the Project on Managing the Atom at theHarvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Her book The Hegemon’s
Tool Kit: US Leadership and the Politics of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime was published byCornell University Press in 2022.

Ana Lucía Levintan
Legislative Adviser, Argentina
Ana Lucía Levintan holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of Buenos Aires.
She is a legislative adviser in the Senate of Argentina and a collaborator with the Human Security
Network for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEHLAC).

FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM

3

Michal Onderco
Full Professor, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Dr Michal Onderco is Full Professor of International Relations in the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam. His main interest lies in the institutional structures
for governing international security, including their origins and functioning. During the academic year
2018–2019, Professor Onderco was CISAC Junior Faculty Fellow at Stanford University. Before coming
to Erasmus University, he obtained his PhD in political science from Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam in
2014. In the academic year 2014–2015, he was Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute.
Between 2012–2013, he was a Fulbright Visiting Researcher at Columbia University's Saltzman
Institute of War and Peace Studies. He is the author of Networked Nonproliferation (SUP, 2022).

María Pía Devoto
Director, Asociación para Políticas Públicas
María Pía Devoto is the Director of the Argentinean organisation Association for Public Policies (Asociación para Políticas Públicas - APP) and a specialist in international security and non-proliferation issues, disarmament, arms control and gender. She is an active member of various civil society
network, including the Latin American and Caribbean Human Security Network (SEHLAC). Her work
has been recognized multiple times by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament in
Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC). In 2013, she received the "Future Policy Award" at theUnited Nations for the implementation of the Gun Buy Back Plan in Argentina.

Mariel R. Lucero Baigorria
PhD Candidate, Universidad Nacional de La PlataMariel R. Lucero Baigorria is a researcher and adjunct professor at the Universidad Nacional de Cuyo andthe Universidad Champagnat. She holds a master’s degree from FLACSO/Argentina and is currently a
PhD candidate at the Universidad Nacional de La Plata. She specializes in feminism and gender issues
in International Relations, focusing on diplomacy, defence and security. She is a member of the Federal
Council of International Studies of Argentina (COFEI) and the International Political Science Association (IPSA). She is part of the #NoSinMujeres Network of Political Scientists.

FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM

4

Louis Reitmann
Research Associate, Vienna Center for Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation
Louis Reitmann is a research associate at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,
focusing on export controls and diversity, equity and inclusion in nuclear policy. He previously served
as an export control officer at Imperial College London and has worked with the EU Special Envoy for
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in Brussels. He holds an MSc in international relations from theLondon School of Economics.

Ellen Willio
Master’s Student, University of Antwerp
Ellen Willio holds a bachelor’s degree in social economic sciences and is currently pursuing a master’s
degree in international relations and diplomacy at the University of Antwerp, with a focus international
security. Her primary areas of interest include Middle Eastern studies, as well as arms control and proliferation, particularly concerning nuclear weapons. In the summer of 2023, she completed an internshipat the European Union Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium at the University of Rotterdam.

Peixuan Xie
Humanitarian Affairs Analyst, Médecins Sans Frontières
Peixuan Xie is a Humanitarian Affairs Analyst at Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) with extensive
research and analytical experience on gender, conflict and peace. Her focus has been the Women,
Peace and Security (WPS) norms and its intersectionality with emerging issues in global peace andsecurity, often with a focus on the Asia Pacific region. Most recently, Peixuan was a German Chancellor Fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) in Germany. She has also assumed various
roles at UN agencies and international organisations, including WFP, UNDP and Humanity & Inclusion(formerly Handicap International). Peixuan holds degrees in Development Studies and Human Rightsfrom universities in the UK, China and Sweden.

FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM

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Contents
Introducing the edited volume

10I.

The scientific case for diversity in nuclear weapons policymaking

13

1.

Introduction

13

2.

Who makes nuclear weapons policy?

15

2.1

How a lack of diversity leads to greater nuclear risk

15

2.2

Inside the nuclear “priesthood”: Dynamics of a homogeneous group

16

2.3

Impact on human capital

18

2.4

Limiting leaders’ horizons

19

by Renata Hessmann Dalaqua

by Louis Reitmann

3.

Why the business case is ineffective and inaccurate

20

4.

What is the scientific case for diversity?

21

5.

A guide to talking diversity

24

6.

Walking the talk: Harnessing the benefits of diversity

26

7.

Reflections on the risk of co-optation

29

8.

Conclusions

31

II.

Achieving nuclear justice: A survivor-centric framework

32

1.

Introduction

32

2.

What type of justice?

34

2.1

Restorative justice

34

2.2

Transitional justice

35

2.3

Intersectionality and justice

36

2.4

Intergenerational justice

39

2.5

Relevance to nuclear justice39

Nuclear justice claims from nuclear victims

39

3.1

Compensation

40

3.2

Policy change

44

3.3

Acknowledgement of harm

45

3.4

Apology47

3.5

More data and information

49

3.

4.

by Rebecca Davis Gibbons

Conclusions and recommendations

50
FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM

6

Public opinion on nuclear weapons: Is there a gender gap?

52

1.

Introduction

52

2.

Public opinion and policy change

533.

Measuring the gender gap in attitudes towards nuclear weapons

55

4.

So, what is the gap?

56

4.1

Proliferation

56

4.2

Use

58

4.3

Arms control and disarmament

61

III.

by Ellen Willio and Michal Onderco

5.

Conclusions and recommendations

63

IV.

Foreign policy, gender, nuclear disarmament and the environment:
Perspectives from the South

67

1.

Introduction

67

2.

Feminist foreign policy and foreign policy with a gender perspective

683.

Why should States with a feminist foreign policy or with a foreign policy with a72

by María Pía Devoto, Mariel R. Lucero Baigorria and Ana Levintan

gender perspective support nuclear disarmament?
4.

The panorama in Latin America and the Caribbean

74

4.1

Analytical focus: Nuclear disarmament

74

4.2

Analytical focus: Environment

78

5.

Conclusions and recommendations

81

V.

Gender-transformative change in nuclear disarmament: Challenges andopportunities in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

83

1.

Introduction

83

2.

Connecting the dots between gender and nuclear politics

85

3.

Gender and the TPNW: Potential and limitations

88

3.1

Normative progress

88

3.2

Operational challenges

89

3.2.1

The pitfalls of “add women and stir”

89

3.2.2

Insufficient mechanisms for redressing racialized injustices

89

by Peixuan Xie

4.

Women, Peace and Security: Links and disconnects

91

4.1

Where is (nuclear) disarmament?

92

4.2

Where is race and power?

93

4.3

Where is environmental security?

94

FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM

7

5.

Conclusions and recommendations

94

5.1

Changing the discourse

94

5.2

Addressing nuclear use past and present through an international trust fund

95

5.3

Promoting meaningful and inclusive participation

96

5.4

Supporting and funding diverse knowledge production

96

5.5

Overcoming fragmentation in multilateral policymaking

96

Appendices98

Appendix A. Testimonials surveyed by Rebecca Davis Gibbons

98

Appendix B. Information about interviews conducted by María Pía Devoto, Mariel R.

106

Lucero Baigorria and Ana Levintan

FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM

8

A gender turn has taken place inarms control and disarmament.
Gender-related discussions have
moved from side events to theconference room, from civil society
statements to official decisions andaction plans, from the margins to themainstream.

FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM

9

Introducing the edited volume
by Renata Hessmann Dalaqua
A gender turn has taken place in the practice and study of arms control and disarmament, including in
the nuclear field. In multilateral forums, gender-related discussions have moved from side events to theconference room, from civil society statements to official decisions and action plans, from the margins
to the mainstream.
This can be observed in the meetings of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT). The previous NPT review cycle (2017–2022) saw a record number of working papers and statements addressing issues related to women’s participation and gender equality in the NPT; the different
impacts that ionizing radiation can have on women and men; and the importance of gender analysis in
nuclear policymaking. Gender-related topics were also reflected in the draft final document of the Tenth
Review Conference of the NPT, and the language was seemingly accepted by all states parties, despite
there being no consensus on a final document. This conversation has been carried forward into thecurrent NPT review cycle and will be the subject of new working papers, statements, discussions and,hopefully, decisions too.
However, it is in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) that gender mainstreaming
has gained more solid ground. The TPNW includes a clause mandating states parties to provide ageand gender-sensitive assistance to survivors of nuclear weapons use and testing, including medicalcare, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as to provide for their social and economic
inclusion. Moreover, the negotiations that led to the TPNW were shaped by the engagement of women
diplomats, activists and survivors and very much informed by gender equality considerations. Thisgender focus has been further advanced in the Vienna Action Plan, adopted in 2022, in which statesagreed to integrate gender considerations into the treaty’s implementation, including in TPNW-related
national policies, programmes and projects.
Positive as these developments are, significant challenges persist. One such challenge is the reachof the gender turn; not everyone is convinced of the importance of gender equality and gender perspectives in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. A second challenge is the misperception thatgender equals women or women’s issues. This view neglects the broad range of perspectives covered
in a gender analysis and ignores the potential of adopting an intersectional approach to international
security issues.
To overcome these challenges, UNIDIR has worked with a diverse group of experts to uncover newissues that could benefit from being examined not only through a gender lens but also through anintersectional analysis. Whereas a gender analysis examines the relationships between people of
all genders and the power dynamics that underpin those relationships, an intersectional analysis
addresses diversity within gender groups by examining how gender intersects with other aspects,
including ethnicity, age, religion, class, sexual orientation and disability, among others.

FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM

10

Building on decades of work by gender scholars, women’s rights organizations and nuclear disarmament advocates, the authors of the papers in this collection have explored gendered and intersectional
dimensions of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: from public opinion on nuclear weapons
across dozens of countries to justice claims of nuclear survivors and feminist foreign policies in Latin
America and the Caribbean. When defining research questions and methods, authors were encouraged to take into account a plurality of perspectives, in order to avoid replicating Western-centric framesof analysis that have, to a large extent, shaped International Relations scholarship. Throughout the
research process, however, they were confronted with the unevenness of publicly available information on sensitive issues. Generally, Western countries tend to be more open in relation to their policymaking processes, which in part explains the preponderance of Western examples and case studies inthis collection.
Despite these limitations, the papers presented in this collection outline paths for future research thatare applicable across various scholarly cultures and contexts. Additionally, they all include ideas forstates and multilateral stakeholders on how to translate awareness of injustices and inequalities intomeaningful action. UNIDIR hopes that the analyses presented here will represent a springboard for new
and inclusive efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Walking the diversity talkIn the first paper of this collection, Louis Reitmann tackles the need for diversity in the nuclear field. The
author avoids the common “business case” and, instead, develops a scientific case for diversity, basedon findings from psychology and behavioural science about how demographic diversity can shapehuman interaction and work outcomes. The paper includes a guide to talking diversity, which advocates
can use to make more evidence-based, nuanced and persuasive arguments for greater demographic
diversity in the nuclear field. It also includes good practices to help organizations walk the diversity
talk, such as commitment from leadership; transparency in recruitment and promotion processes; aworkplace culture that offers opportunities for learning across diverse identities; and openness to addressing resistance in a participatory manner.

Placing survivors at the centre
The second paper illustrates the affinities between a gender approach and a survivor-centric approach,as both shed light on people’s needs and the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. By surveying
testimonies, Rebecca Davis Gibbons listened to survivors, learned about the harms they have faced,and explored what they perceive as nuclear justice. Developing a survivor-centric nuclear justiceframework, the author outlines justice mechanisms encompassing compensation, policy change, acknowledgement of harm, apology and data collection. These areas for action could be pursued collectively by a diverse group of states, providing an avenue for bridge-building between TPNW states
parties and non-states parties.

Understanding public opinion on nuclear weapons
The third paper examines public opinion on nuclear weapons and asks, Is there a gender gap? Ellen
Willio and Michal Onderco try to answer this question by reviewing academic articles and opinion polls
spanning from 1990 to 2023 and covering 47 countries. Their findings indicate that women tend to be
more opposed than men to nuclear proliferation and express greater discomfort about the existence of
nuclear weapons. Results on opinions about the use of nuclear weapons are conflicting: some studies

FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM

11

suggest that men are more inclined than women to approve of nuclear weapons use, while other studies
argue the opposite, that women are more likely to approve than men. In relation to arms control andnuclear disarmament, no distinct gender differences in public opinion were identified. The findings underscore the importance of interrogating notions of masculinities and of patriarchal attitudes that may
be present in men’s and women’s opinions on the use of force. Overall, the paper concludes with a callfor gender diversity as a means of diversifying perspectives in nuclear research, advocacy and policymaking.

Interrogating feminist foreign policies
The fourth paper looks at the growing trend of countries implementing a feminist foreign policy or aforeign policy with a gender perspective. María Pía Devoto, Mariel R. Lucero Baigorria and Ana Levintan
direct their analysis to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, which have been among the most
vocal supporters of this foreign policy approach. By examining official policy documents, the authors
seek to understand whether and how gendered approaches to foreign policy in Latin America and the
Caribbean address relevant links between gender equality, nuclear disarmament and the environment.
The authors conclude with proposals to strengthen the leadership of Latin America and the Caribbean
in this field, including by fostering South–South dialogue on nuclear disarmament in the context of thegender equality initiatives.

Bridging the TPNW and the Women, Peace and Security agenda
The final article of this collection draws on feminist scholarship and examines the progress and thelimitations in realizing the TPNW’s ambitions for gender and racial equality. Building on long-existing
feminist activism around nuclear disarmament and inclusive peace, Peixuan Xie considers possibilities
for increasing synergies between the TPNW and the Women, Peace and Security agenda – a normative
framework that seeks to integrate gender considerations into all aspects of international security. The
author concludes by setting out five proposals for gender-transformative change in nuclear regimes:change in discourse, commitment to supporting survivors, genuine inclusion and equity, enhanced
synergies among related policy frameworks, and knowledge production that incorporates gender andracial issues.

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12

I. The scientific case for diversity innuclear weapons policymaking
by Louis Reitmann1
1. Introduction
There is a lack of diversity in the nuclear weapons space. This is especially pronounced among theofficials involved in the strategic military aspects of nuclear weapons policy – including arsenal development, nuclear posture and deterrence strategy – in nuclear-armed countries.2 This lack of diversity
has contributed to the reproduction of traditional nuclear weapons thinking in nuclear-armed states,with little innovation, despite significant criticism that such thinking is ineffective at reducing nuclear
risk and incentivizing arms control and disarmament.
While the conversation around the importance of diversity in the nuclear weapons space has grown,
there has been little development in the arguments commonly made for addressing this lack of diversity.
Arguments based on the moral and social justice elements of boosting the participation of women,
people of colour, especially Indigenous Peoples, and others in decision-making on nuclear weapons
may be quickly dismissed by sceptics as liberal-progressive politics.
In an attempt to demonstrate diversity’s value irrespective of political conviction, advocates have reliedheavily on the “business case”, which simply claims that greater diversity leads to better performance.
Upon closer examination, however, this simple logic neither accurately describes the mechanics ofdiversity nor incentivizes the measures necessary to activate diversity’s benefits for nuclear weapons
policymaking.
Instead, this paper proposes a scientific case for diversity, based on strong empirical findings from psychology and behavioural science about diversity’s complex positive and negative effects on how groupmembers think and collaborate, demonstrating how diversity can contribute to more effective, moreinnovative nuclear weapons policy.
This paper begins by addressing the lack of diversity among the officials controlling arsenal development, deterrence and nuclear strategy in the United States, as an illustration of common issues affecting

1

The author is grateful to the officials whose detailed, nuanced and candid insights enriched the findings presented in thispaper. The author gives special thanks to the reviewers Sarah Erickson, Dr Renata Hessmann Dalaqua, Paula Jou Fuster
and Dr Marion Messmer, who helped this paper deliver key learnings for the nuclear field more effectively.

2

Where not specified otherwise, this paper defines diversity as demographic diversity, meaning the presence of visible or noticeable differences – gender expression, skin colour, age, demeanour, speech, etc. – within a group. Speech is included as acommunicator of differences such as nationality, education, class or age. This understanding of diversity builds on researchthat demonstrates that how we think and interact with others is shaped significantly by outer differences, not only by differences in skills, opinions or experiences.

FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM

13

nuclear-armed states3 The paper explains the deficits in effectiveness and innovation from which these
homogeneous groups suffer, how this homogeneity reproduces traditional nuclear weapons thinking,and how it limits leaders’ horizons for policy innovation. The paper concludes that the lack of diversity
within this so-called nuclear priesthood4 ultimately contributes to growing nuclear risk.
Given the need for enhanced demographic diversity in nuclear weapons policymaking, the paper findsthat a line of reasoning based on morality, social justice or the business case for diversity is insufficientfor building accurate, nuanced and persuasive arguments for change. To fill this gap, the scientific casepresented in this paper explains why diverse teams tend to better understand tasks, make fewer errors
and be more innovative. It also examines how the social friction that comes with diversity can havedetrimental effects on collaboration. The paper presents management strategies for maximizing diversity’s positive effects while minimizing social friction and offers a short guide on making persuasive
pro-diversity arguments in the nuclear weapons field.
These are important issues for the nuclear weapons field, which has seen growing interest in measures
to increase the share of women, people of colour and other previously excluded groups in the nuclear
weapons space. The paper criticizes the corporate feminist approach of the nuclear weapons complex,
which follows the business case logic of diversifying staff without addressing structural inequities,
reforming working methods and transforming workplace cultures. Not only are superficial diversity programmes like this unlikely to activate diversity’s potential for more effective or innovative policymaking, they may actually be used to uphold traditional nuclear weapons thinking and eliminate the criticalpotential of alternative perspectives.
Given the limitations of publicly available material, this paper focuses mostly on Western states, which
also tend to adopt a transparent approach to policymaking. In addition to studies and documents, thispaper relies on the openly available testimonies of deterrence officials, as well as on key interviews
carried out by the author.5 These interviews helped illustrate the status quo of demographic diversity inthe government structures that make nuclear weapons policy. They also helped examine whether theeffects of demographic diversity found in psychological and behavioural studies match the real-life experiences of those working on nuclear weapons policy.

3This paper focuses exclusively on national policymaking processes. For a study on the role diversity can play in multilateraldiplomacy on nuclear weapons issues, see John Borrie and Ashley Thornton, The Value of Diversity in Multilateral Disarmament Work (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2008), https://www.unidir.org/publication/value-diversity-multilateral-disarmament-work.

4

The term “nuclear priesthood” has emerged as a synonym for the policy community in charge of the strategic military aspectsof nuclear weapons policy in the United States. While it has no connection to any religious community, it is a metaphor todescribe that this policy community is similarly closed-off, hierarchical and regulated by traditions and conventions as thosein holy orders.

5

As part of this research, the author conducted interviews with experts and practitioners involved in nuclear weapons policy.
In total, eight people were interviewed – six women and two men – from Italy, Mexico, South Africa, the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

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14

2. Who makes nuclear weapons policy?
2.1 How a lack of diversity leads to greater nuclear risk
The need for greater diversity in nuclear weapons policymaking is best illustrated by the continued prevalence of nuclear orthodoxy among the officials who control the strategic military aspects of nuclear
weapons policy. But today’s expansion of arsenals and the growing threat of nuclear use call for innovative approaches that improve on or transcend traditional theories on deterrence, crisis stability andmutually assured destruction.6 These theories have well-documented critical weaknesses, such as
gaps in what we know about the human decision-making processes they are based on and the theories’
disregard for severe risks of accidental and unintended nuclear use.7
Experts have proposed options for updating deterrence thinking, for example retiring the idea thatan adversary’s nuclear capabilities and deployment must be matched like for like,8 reducing launchreadiness levels,9 and promoting minimal deterrence and (limited) no-first-use policies.10 Yet nuclear
orthodoxy has been perpetuated by the policy community in charge of nuclear posture, arsenal development and deterrence strategy. In other words,
politicians and analysts fall back on the old standby of nuclear deterrence – “deterrence willhold”. But the world has changed dramatically since the Cold War…. A confluence of changes
to technological, domestic and strategic landscapes has destabilized nuclear deterrence,and it would be dangerous to maintain a continued, unquestioning reliance on it.11
In an interview for this paper, Laura Holgate, a former Pentagon official with the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program, said,
This community has settled on nuclear deterrence theory as if it were not an unproven theory
but rather an evidence-based principle. You have to suspend a lot of your natural thoughtprocess to comprehend what deterrence means. The priesthood’s insistence on nuclear deterrence being indispensable for national security sidelines the reality that many of today’sacute nuclear threats are related to the safety and security of nuclear material and facilities.
I think there is an insecurity at the heart of this insistence that prevents re-examining the assumptions underpinning traditional deterrence theory.12

6Peter Rudolf, “US Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Its Problems”, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 6 November 2018, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/us-nuclear-deterrence-policy-and-its-problems; Michael Krepon, “Donald Trump’s
Challenge to Nuclear Orthodoxy”, Stimson Center, 15 August 2016, https://www.stimson.org/2016/donald-trumps-challenge-nuclear-orthodoxy.

7

Ward Wilson, “Reconsidering Nuclear Deterrence”, European Leadership Network, 1 March 2022, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/reconsidering-nuclear-deterrence.

8

John Gower, “The Dangerous Illogic of Twenty-First-Century Deterrence Through Planning for Nuclear Warfighting”,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 March 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/06/dangerous-illogic-of-twenty-first-century-deterrence-through-planning-for-nuclear-warfighting-pub-75717.

9

Sico van der Meer, “Reducing Nuclear Weapons Risks: A Menu of 11 Policy Options”, Clingendael, June 2018, https://www.
clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/PB_Reducing_nuclear_weapons_risks.pdf.

10

Tytti Erästö, “Revisiting ‘Minimal Nuclear Deterrence’: Laying the Groundwork for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament”, SIPRI,
June 2022, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/sipriinsight2206_minimal_nuclear_deterrence_1.pdf.

11

Maria Rost Rublee, “Nuclear Deterrence Destabilized”, in Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century (London:
Chatham House, 2020), 14–18, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-04-20-nuclear-deterrenceunal-et-al.pdf.

12Interview with the author, 24 October 2023.
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15

This community’s lack of diversity – meaning the under-representation and marginalization of women,
people of colour, especially Indigenous Peoples, and others – makes it vulnerable to groupthink, inhibits
innovation and prevents the critical questioning of baseline assumptions. Considering the stakes ofnuclear weapons policy, this community’s inability to develop innovative strategies to reduce nuclear
risk and make progress towards arms control and disarmament is concerning.13 In this way, the lack ofdiversity in nuclear weapons policymaking may contribute to greater nuclear risk.

2.2 Inside the nuclear “priesthood”: Dynamics of a homogeneous group
Indicators from the wider nuclear field show that white men still make up the vast majority of officials andexperts in this space. UNIDIR has measured the average proportion of women participating in meetings
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at 32% between 2017 and 2022.14 The
share of women among heads of delegation was only 24% in 2019.15 A mere 25% of staff in the nuclear
sector are women; the share is even lower in scientific and leadership roles.16 A similar trend can beobserved within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), where women are over-represented inadministrative roles and make up only 35.4%, on average, of nuclear engineers, safeguards inspectors
and physicists.
While the data are even sparser than on the inclusion of women, people of colour are under-represented
too; for example, only 34.6% of the IAEA’s professional and higher staff are from non-white-majority
regions (i.e., Africa, Asia and Latin America).17 Both findings are echoed in countless testimonies by
women and people of colour at all levels and in all areas of the nuclear field.
Combining these data with insights about women’s representation in military structures – for example,
women occupied only about 30% of positions at assistant secretary level or higher at the US Department of Defense between 2009 and 2018 – we can draw conclusions about the lack of diversity in the
nuclear priesthood.18 Laura Holgate, who continues to work with members of this community, and othersenior officials from the nuclear field confirmed its drastic lack of demographic diversity.19

13

Heather Hurlburt et al., “The ‘Consensual Straitjacket’: Four Decades of Women in Nuclear Security”, New America, 5March 2019, https://www.newamerica.org/political-reform/reports/the-consensual-straitjacket-four-decades-of-women-in-nuclear-security.

14

UNIDIR, “Gender and Disarmament Hub”, https://unidir.org/tools/gender-disarmament-hub.

15

Renata Hessmann Dalaqua, “How Can We Achieve Gender Break-Throughs in Nuclear Negotiations and TechnicalCooperation?” IAEA Bulletin 62-4 (December 2021), https://www.iaea.org/bulletin/how-can-we-achieve-gender-break-throughs-in-nuclear-negotiations-and-technical-cooperation.

16

This percentage is based on a study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Nuclear Energy
Agency, conducted across its 34 Member States; see World Nuclear News, “Getting More Women in Nuclear ‘Crucial to
Hitting Climate Targets’”, 8 March 2023, https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Getting-more-women-in-nuclear%E2%80%98crucial-to-hitting.

17

This excludes the approximately 1,100 general service staff that carry out administrative, technical and scientific support
duties. For more, see IAEA, Personnel: Staffing the Agency’s Secretariat (Vienna: IAEA, 2023), 5, https://www.iaea.org/
sites/default/files/gc/gc67-18.pdf.

18

Heather Hurlburt, Elizabeth Weingarten and Elena Souris, National Security: What We Talk About When We Talk About
Gender (Washington, DC: New America, 2018), 20, https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/National_
Security_What_We_Talk_About_When_We_Talk_About_Gender_2018-12-10_214208.pdf.

19Interview with the author, 24 October 2023.

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16

The most detailed account of the state of diversity in nuclear weapons policymaking is Hurlburt etal.’s milestone study, which found that the community of US officials working on nuclear posture anddeterrence policy is “closed-off and highly hierarchical, tending to value long experience and insider
knowledge over innovation”.20 Insiders describe it as “male-dominated, and unwelcoming, with a small
group of long-time insiders controlling what new ideas and individuals would be considered”.21
As further explained in Section 4 of this paper, empirical findings show that homogeneous groups likethe priesthood are more prone to misunderstanding problems and tasks, make mistakes more frequently, and discourage the exchange and serious consideration of new perspectives. They are lesslikely to re-examine working methods and assumptions, which increases the risk of systemic fallacies,
meaning ineffective or counterproductive strategies based on false assumptions.
According to senior US officials, policy processes controlled by the priesthood are determined by established scripts among individuals with similar backgrounds and views.22 Proposals to reconsider underlying assumptions or past experience tend to be dismissed as naive or unprofessional. As elaborated later in this paper, even if the priesthood was more demographically diverse, restrictive working
methods and innovation-averse cultures like this prevent teams from accessing diversity’s benefits forcollaboration.
Joining or having influence within the priesthood depends on alignment with nuclear orthodoxy, rather
than on what change or outside expertise an individual can bring.23 The premium attached to deep
technical knowledge, subscription to certain theories, and long-term niche experience continues thedominance of the same norms and ideas in this policy space. This makes entering and having an impact
in this community difficult. As former US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy put it,“You had to master the technical details before you could have an opinion.”24 Other US officials confirm
that “the high demand for technical knowledge was...used to exclude people from the nuclear elite”.25
Personal connections are crucial for professional success in the nuclear weapons space. Due to confirmation bias, by which people are more attentive to others similar to them, those who have traditionallybeen under-represented in the priesthood – young people, women, people of colour, and simply thosewith experience in other areas – are less likely to be identified as desirable talent. Senior women in US
nuclear policy report that their experience working for NGOs, especially on arms control and non-proliferation matters, was used to question their seriousness about the military side of nuclear weapons
policy.26
These implicit and explicit restrictions on who is included or has influence in nuclear weapons policymaking reproduce the reality and image of nuclear weapons policy as a white, male space, illustrated

20

Hurlburt et al., “The ‘Consensual Straitjacket’”, 9.

21

Ibid.

22

Ibid., 30.

23

Carol Giacomo, “The Nuclear Weapons Sisterhood”, New York Times, 15 May 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/
opinion/women-national-security.html.

24

Hurlburt et al., “The ‘Consensual Straitjacket’”, 10.

25

Ibid., 18.

26

Carol Giacomo, “The Nuclear Weapons Sisterhood”, New York Times, 15 May 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/
opinion/women-national-security.html.

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17

by gender-coded language describing experts as “graybeards”27 or “silverbacks”.28 It also cements a
separation of people and perspectives between the fields of deterrence and of arms control and disarmament, the latter of which has seen a remarkable rise of women in leadership positions.29 Eirini Lemos-Maniati, Deputy Director of the Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre at
NATO, has observed the growing divide between these two communities over the last 20 years: “If you
look back at the late 1990s or early 2000s, including the negotiations towards the INF Treaty [Treaty on
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] and New START [new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty], the deterrence and arms control communities used to work together very closely.”30
All this puts the priesthood at a disadvantage; the over-emphasis on technical accuracy comes at theexpense of skills like diplomacy and empathy.31 These are critical weaknesses for a policy communitythat needs to understand adversaries’ perceptions and interests to be effective. Richard Johnson,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Policy, stressed the importance of understanding the full range of perspectives present in the nuclear
weapons space for making sound policy.32 This is ever more crucial, as new challenges arise, suchas effectively responding to the impacts of climate change and extreme weather and of emerging anddisruptive technologies on the safety and security of nuclear deterrence. Eirini Lemos-Maniati also underlined the importance of diversifying the expertise in order to be able to address the complex security
landscape.33
Another downside of the homogeneity in the priesthood may be a reduced capacity for effective participation in cross-governmental decision-making. Where working methods and cultures differ significantly between homogeneous and diverse teams, collaboration may be difficult. This impediment wasnoted by a South African official, reflecting on collaboration between foreign policy and military officials
on international security issues.34

2.3 Impact on human capital
Despite their negative effects on decision-making, the problematic standards and exclusivity set by thepriesthood create an undeserved attraction. There is a sense of having to “make it” in a hyper-competitive environment like the priesthood. As former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
and Missile Defense Policy Elaine Bunn described, “[A mentor said to me] if you’re going to stay in the
Defense Department, you need to do the nuclear, the targeting, the hard side of this, not just the arms
control side or you’re not going to be taken seriously.”35

27

Nathan Hodge, “World Without Nukes? Not So Fast, Graybeards Say”, Wired, 6 May 2009, https://www.wired.com/2009/05/
world-without-nukes-not-so-fast-graybeards-say.

28

Arms Control Association, “New Risks and New Arms Control Solutions”, 15 April 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/
armscontrol2019.

29

Isabel Martinez and Anna Schumann, “Who Runs the Nukes? Women!” Nukes of Hazard (blog), Center for Arms Control
and Non-Proliferation, 19 February 2021, https://armscontrolcenter.org/who-runs-the-nukes-women.

30Interview with the author, 21 November 2023.

31

Hurlburt et al., “The ‘Consensual Straitjacket’”, 11.

32Interview with the author, 9 November 2023.

33

Interview with the author, 21 November 2023.

34

Interview with the author, 31 October 2023.

35

Hurlburt et al., “The ‘Consensual Straitjacket’”, 10.

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18

For women and people of colour, working in such environments can be taxing.36 Explicit and implicit
expectations of how they should act in a majority-men and majority-white space can cause significant stress. Senior US women in the nuclear space describe having to perform the “constant mental
and emotional calculus that comes with implicit sexism...and gendered expectations” and reportthat “adopting stereotypically masculine traits [firm demeanour and assertiveness] was crucial tosuccess”.37 Stereotypically feminine qualities, such as “being a team player, and being able to get
buy-in from all relevant stakeholders”, were discounted.38 However, exhibiting masculine traits against
expectations of femininity also led to discrimination.
Women and people of colour expend significant time and energy walking this tightrope and experience
imposter syndrome and self-censorship as a result. Attempts to drown out prejudiced expectations anddiscrimination by working extreme hours and being over-competent lead many to feel dissatisfied andburnt out and, eventually, to leave the field.39 Additionally, the lack of peers and role models for womenand people of colour considering a career in strategic defence may lead them to pursue other opportunities, which reinforces homogeneity within the priesthood. Laura Holgate explained that the “conservative way of thinking” and the “very little intellectual risk-taking”, the lack of women role models in thisspace, and the priesthood’s requirement for in-depth, niche knowledge of deterrence theory by way of
a military background or PhD all contributed to her transitioning to other nuclear policy issues.40

2.4 Limiting leaders’ horizons
Ultimately, the disproportionate agenda-setting power and long-standing privileged access to thehighest levels of government accorded to the priesthood can prevent alternative proposals fromreaching senior decision makers. This, in turn, shapes political leaders’ expectations of what constitutes sound nuclear weapons policy and limits what they consider possible, thus reinforcing nuclear
orthodoxy.
An example that illustrates this horizon-limiting effect is the refusal by several nuclear-armed countries
to consider a no-first-use policy to advance risk reduction. Opposition to a no-first-use policy is rooted
in the idea that ruling out a first strike invites aggression with conventional weapons, based on outdated
deterrence concepts that are inconsistent with historical evidence, most recently, the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine.41
Lack of diversity among the officials making nuclear weapons policy reduces innovation and problem-solving potential; it excludes and diminishes the qualities and expertise offered by traditionally
under-represented actors, which is crucial for sound decision-making. The structural problems of the36

Renata Dwan, “Women in Arms Control: Time for a Gender Turn?”, Arms Control Today 49, no. 8 (2019): 6–11, https://www.
jstor.org/stable/26823065.

37

Hurlburt et al., “The ‘Consensual Straitjacket’”, 19.

38

Ibid.

39

Colleen Walsh, “Closing the Gender Gap in Nuclear Security”, Harvard Gazette, 3 November 2021, https://news.harvard.
edu/gazette/story/2021/11/closing-the-gender-gap-in-the-field-of-nuclear-security.

40

Interview with the author, 24 October 2023.

41

Nina Tannenwald, “It’s Time for a U.S. No-First-Use Nuclear Policy”, Texas National Security Review 2, no. 3 (2019):
131–137, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/its-time-for-a-u-s-no-first-use-nuclear-policy; Andrew Futter, “Five Nuclear Reflections on the Ukraine War”, European Leadership Network, 19 June 2023, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.
org/commentary/five-nuclear-reflections-on-the-ukraine-war.

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19

priesthood and the resulting vulnerabilities serve as an example to leaders that increasing diversity is alegitimate policy tool for addressing contemporary security challenges, such as nuclear risk – not just a“nice to have” human resources policy.

3. Why the business case is ineffective andinaccurate
To raise awareness of diversity’s transformative potential for nuclear weapons policy, advocates should
employ arguments that build on diversity’s studied effects on human behaviour and collaboration. With
the premium that the priesthood attaches to technical detail, a scientific case for diversity promises tobe more persuasive to this key audience.
The argument already commonly used is the business case for diversity. It claims that simply having
more diverse staff leads to better performance. Popularized by a 2015 McKinsey study, which indicateda positive relationship between diverse corporate leadership and financial profit, this idea has been
adopted across many sectors.42 It is repeated in numerous statements, policies and research papers
in the nuclear field.43
The business case, however, is reductive. It says little about how behaviour and collaboration are
different in diverse versus homogeneous teams. It leaves a “black box” around the socio-psychological dynamics that purportedly translate demographic diversity into performance gains. Ultimately, itsuggests that governments and organizations can benefit from diversity by merely adding more staff
from under-represented groups. This idea has been disproven.
The McKinsey study, for example, was found to be irreplicable. Its findings did not hold up when linking
diversity with other performance metrics, like sales growth or shareholder returns. When adjusting forother variables, like company size, the relationship between boardroom diversity and profits disappeared.44 Similar issues were found with successor studies.
It has become clear that diversifying staff alone leads to neither higher profits nor better teamwork nor
more effective decision-making.45 In fact, diversity messaging that emphasizes performance benefits– like the business case – has been shown to increase concerns about tokenization among people

42

Vivian Hunt, Dennis Layton and Sara Prince, “Why Diversity Matters”, McKinsey & Company, 1 January 2015, https://www.
mckinsey.com/capabilities/people-and-organizational-performance/our-insights/why-diversity-matters.

43

Sarah Bidgood at “Pipelines and Ceilings: The Gender Gap in Nuclear Policy”, Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, 29 October 2021, https://www.belfercenter.org/event/pipelines-and-ceilings-gender-gap-nuclear-policy; “Joint
Statement on Gender, Diversity and Inclusion at the 10th NPT Review Conference”, Reaching Critical Will, August 2022,
https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/statements/4Aug_Gender.
pdf; Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Our Commitment to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion”, https://www.nti.org/about/diversity-equity-and-inclusion-at-nti; Gender Champions for Nuclear Policy, “Why Gender Equity?”, https://gcnuclearpolicy.
org/about/about.

44

Alex Edmans, “Is There Really a Business Case for Diversity?”, Medium, 30 October 2021, https://medium.com/@alex.
edmans/is-there-really-a-business-case-for-diversity-c58ef67ebffa.

45

Robin Ely and David Thomas, “Getting Serious about Diversity: Enough Already with the Business Case”, Harvard
Business Review, November/December 2020, https://hbr.org/2020/11/getting-serious-about-diversity-enough-already-with-the-business-case.

FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM

20

from under-represented groups, reducing their sense of belonging to the workplace and raising doubts
about the authenticity of the organization’s interest in diversity.46 Defining diversity by performancegains neither accurately captures how diversity changes the way people think and interact nor attracts
talent from under-represented groups.
Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that introducing greater diversity into teams is not without
risks. Diversity is a complex phenomenon that requires structural change and skilled management tohave a positive effect. Only by better understanding the psychology behind it can we develop accurate,evidence-based, persuasive arguments for diversity and maximize its benefits for nuclear weapons
policymaking.

4. What is the scientific case for diversity?
The scientific case complements arguments resting on the moral and restitutive benefits of including
marginalized groups in decisions about nuclear weapons. These arguments focus on women, whohave been denied access to what is seen as a masculine policy domain, and people of colour, especiallyIndigenous Peoples, who are disproportionately affected by nuclear weapons production and testing
but whose voices are seldom heard in nuclear weapons policymaking. However, as values-based
arguments, they may be easily written off by sceptics as liberal-progressive politics.
Instead, the scientific case demonstrates the value of diversity beyond ideas of what is “right”. By incorporating consistent empirical findings from studies in psychology and behavioural science, it opens
the black box that the business case leaves shut. It highlights the processes by which demographic
diversity shapes human thinking and interaction, but it also exposes the negative effects diversity canhave through social friction.
Though an awareness of the different objectives that diversity efforts may serve is important, the scientific case is agnostic about the outcomes of the policymaking processes it seeks to diversify. Whereas
moral arguments often state or imply that nuclear disarmament is their ultimate ambition or consequence, the scientific case does not prescribe a policy goal. Instead, it focuses on how diversity canmake decision-making processes more immune to superficial assumptions and systemic fallacies andmore open to innovation, in turn producing more effective solutions to policy challenges. This makes
the scientific case accessible and persuasive to deterrence traditionalists and disarmament advocatesalike, providing an opportunity to find common ground and incentivize enhancing diversity across thenuclear weapons space.
The scientific case incorporates the following findings:•

Diverse teams are less likely to misunderstand tasks because they discuss them more extensively,
developing a shared task interpretation.

•

Diverse teams make fewer mistakes because they frequently re-examine assumptions and evidence
due to team members’ increased accountability.47

46

Oriance Georgeac and Aneeta Rattan, “Stop Making the Business Case for Diversity”, Harvard Business Review, 15 June
2022, https://hbr.org/2022/06/stop-making-the-business-case-for-diversity.

47

David Rock and Heidi Grant, “Why Diverse Teams Are Smarter”, Harvard Business Review, 4 November 2016, https://hbr.
org/2016/11/why-diverse-teams-are-smarter.

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21

•

Where errors happen, they are more likely to be addressed in discussion. Diverse teams are better
problem solvers too.

•Diverse teams have been shown to identify the correct solutions to puzzles more consistently thanhomogeneous teams.48

These effects have common origins. We assume that colleagues who look and act differently to us also
hold different knowledge than we do, causing us to evaluate our own arguments more carefully.49 In
an interview for this paper, Laura Rockwood, long-time senior legal affairs official at the IAEA, said,“Working in a diverse environment taught me not to assume that others share my assumptions, think inthe same way, or come to the same conclusions.”50
We are also more likely to expect people who are different to disagree with us.51 This makes us consider
dissent from someone of a different gender, age or race more seriously than from someone close to us,
and it makes us put greater effort into defending our own view in response.52 By encouraging criticalthinking and discussion, diversity helps teams avoid task misunderstanding and mistakes. As one US
official put it: “I have to think harder and communicate better in a diverse environment.… When I sharemy thoughts, I must reflect and provide support for my positions.”53
Diversity increases the exchange of unique information and new ideas. Members of homogeneous
teams are more likely to assume that the information they hold is already known to their colleagues.
The opposite is true in diverse teams.54 Another important dynamic is social cohesion. Homogeneous teams have stronger social cohesion. To avoid exclusion, their members are incentivized not tochallenge what they expect or know to be the consensus. Diverse teams have weaker social cohesion.
This lowers the barriers to sharing new or dissenting views for all team members, including those fromthe majority.55 In short, the research demonstrates that for innovative proposals to be made, heard andconsidered, it is important to have capable individuals who can contribute smart ideas, but it is evenmore important that these individuals are grouped in diverse teams.
However, interviews for this paper highlighted that individuals tend to be unaware of the specific effectsof outer differences. Whereas interviewees confirmed that their awareness of others’ backgrounds,
opinions and preferences shapes how they approach and interact with them, they generally did notreport an awareness of outer differences having a discernible influence. Laura Holgate, recalling hertime working at the US Department of Defense, said,

48

Katherine Phillips, “How Diversity Makes Us Smarter”, University of California, Berkeley, 18 September 2017, https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/how_diversity_makes_us_smarter.

49

Katherine Phillips, Gregory Northcraft and Margaret Neale, “Surface-Level Diversity and Decision-Making in Groups: When
Does Deep-Level Similarity Help?”, Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 9, no. 4 (2006): 467–482, https://doi.
org/10.1177/1368430206067557.

50Interview with the author, 13 October 2023.

51

Phillips, “How Diversity Makes Us Smarter”.

52

Ibid.

53

Jay Porter, “Diversity: Not Just a Cause for the Underrepresented”, Foreign Service Journal, September 2018, https://afsa.
org/diversity-not-just-cause-underrepresented.

54

Phillips, Northcraft, and Neale, “Surface-Level Diversity”, 468.

55

Ibid.

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22

It’s difficult to pinpoint whether I was sometimes undermined specifically because I was the
only woman in the room or because I was civilian and not military or because I was a political
appointee. All of these may have played a role but it is difficult to isolate the effects of genderfrom other factors.56
Further, it should be recognized that many of the findings about the advantages of diverse teams werereached in experiments under controlled conditions. To translate them into real-life environments, it isimportant to account for the social friction that diversity can cause.57
Studies consistently show that individuals prefer to work with others who are like them and tend to
distrust those who are different.58 We tend to categorize individuals into subgroups by outer differences, such as skin colour, gender expression and speech. If team members become set in their perception of colleagues in subgroups, the same presence of outer differences that helps diverse teams
avoid mistakes and generate innovative ideas can create distrust, conflict, poor communication andlow morale.59 Subgroup formation can lead to stereotyping and an “us–them” mentality.60 This situation
removes the incentives for exchanging diverging or new ideas and shrinks diverse teams’ innovation
potential.
The sociopolitical context of different identities adds a layer to this friction. A senior US national
security official recalled instances where policy discussions between men and women staff deteriorated because of underlying societal tensions around gender.61 This highlights that demographicallydiverse teams can suffer from “othering” not only based on outer differences but also based on the sociopolitical meaning that these differences carry, (e.g., contested ideas of what is typically masculine
or feminine behaviour).
Increasing demographic diversity in a team can have other negative effects too: A greater diversity ofviews, leading to more critical examination of evidence and assumptions, can reduce a group’s confidence in joint decisions and work outcomes because they may not align with the preferences and experiences of some team members. In short, diverse teams may make more accurate decisions, but they
may feel less certain that their decisions are correct. This can have negative implications for the implementation of agreed decisions. Since consistent shared understanding within an administration andclear, coherent signalling to others are vital for reducing the likelihood of unintended nuclear weaponsuse, this is a particularly relevant risk of diversity in relation to nuclear weapons policy.
Finally, diversity measures can alienate those traditionally in the majority: Experiments suggest thatwhite men are likely to expect unfair treatment at organizations that emphasize diversity, regardlessof their personal politics or views on diversity.62 A zero-sum mentality, believing equitable access toopportunities to come at the expense of those who have been enjoying privileged access to the same,
seems to be commonplace. If left unaddressed, this can lead to pushback against diversity measures.

56

Interview with the author, 24 October 2023.

57

Phillips, “How Diversity Makes Us Smarter”.

58

Catarina Fernandes and Jeffrey Polzer, “Diversity in Groups”, in Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences, ed.
Robert Scott and Stephan Kosslyn (Hoboken: Wiley, 2015), 2.

59

Ibid.

60

Astrid Homan and Lindred Greer, “Considering Diversity: The Positive Effects of Considerate Leadership in Diverse Teams”,
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 16, no. 1 (2013): 105–121, https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430212437798.

61

Interview with the author.

62

Porter, “Diversity”.
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23

A former senior Pentagon official, who had been involved in developing the most recent Nuclear Posture
Review, noted an example for such pushback from the nuclear priesthood. Some officials in nationaland multilateral settings questioned the utility of promoting policy innovation through the inclusion ofdiverse officials in the Review, expressing concern over whether a Review with “too much innovation”
would be effectively implemented by traditionalist elements of the nuclear policy community.63

5. A guide to talking diversity
Diversity advocates may consider the following tips on making more evidence-based, nuanced andpersuasive arguments for greater demographic diversity in the nuclear weapons space.

 Diversity is more than the “business case”
A simplistic framing of diversity, as in the business case, is counterproductive. Its suggestion that simply
adding more diverse staff to an organization produces performance gains is not only wrong, it promotes
the tokenization of those belonging to under-represented groups. Diversity advocates should retire thisline of reasoning.
Instead, advocacy should present a holistic picture of diversity as a long-term strategy that has opportunities and risks and requires skilled implementation to be successful, like any other strategy. With thisapproach, diversity advocates can help leaders differentiate between effective and ineffective diversity
programmes that take into account risks and potential pushback, using the added insights into how
diversity shapes human thought and collaboration. This can help make diversity efforts more realistic,
sustainable and effective.

 Demographic diversity mattersThose opposing an emphasis on demographic diversity often argue that only a person’s skills and credentials should decide whether they enter or rise within the structures that control nuclear weapons;
their gender, race, and so on, should not matter. Ironically, this ignores the reality that women, people ofcolour, and others have long been denied access to nuclear weapons policymaking precisely becauseof their outer characteristics or structural disadvantages (e.g. a lack of mentorship or personal connections). It is not by coincidence that, in Western nuclear-armed states, leadership in strategic defence
has consistently been staffed with white men.
The scientific case adds another counterargument by pointing to evidence that shows the importanceof diversity for effective policymaking. Studies show that, without diversity in outer differences, criticalquestions that help eliminate false assumptions and errors are less likely to be raised and innovative
proposals are less likely to be made, heard and enacted. Having capable people on a team is only the
first step; for more effective and innovative policymaking, those capable people should be demographically diverse.

63Interview with the author, 17 November 2023.

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24

 Connecting the dots is crucial
Sometimes, pro-diversity arguments can lack a sense of direction. Promoting diversity for diversity’s sakehas inherent value; it supports equitable participation in high-stakes decisions about nuclear weapons.
However, connecting the dots between the benefits of diversity and the positive outcomes they canhelp achieve, or between the lack of diversity and the negative consequences thereof, strengthens
the argument that diversity is an effective solution to security challenges and not just a “nice to have”
human resources policy.
Eirni Lemos-Maniati, a senior NATO official, stressed, “We need to get better at communicating to what
end we want to increase diversity in the nuclear weapons field. We need to be clear about what we wantto achieve through diversity rather than focusing on diversity as an end in itself.”64 Being specific about
the change that diversity is intended to effect underlines that it is a policy tool that leaders should use,
like others, to achieve their strategic objectives.

 Testimonies from the field are a vital data source
There is still very little information available about the state of diversity in the nuclear weapons establishment and how this affects nuclear weapons policy. Comprehensive studies involving officials will
likely not be possible due to the degree of secrecy involved. This makes personal testimonies fromthose who work, or have worked, on nuclear weapons policy essential for diversity advocacy, especiallywhere direct lines between the diverse composition of a team and the outcomes of policy processes
can be drawn. Not only do these accounts lend credibility to the case for diversity, they help make themore abstract findings from the studies cited in this paper more graspable for practitioners.
Eirini Lemos-Maniati recalled the update of NATO’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
Defence Policy in 2022 as one such example.65 The demographic diversity among headquarters staff
in 2022 ensured that this policy included gender considerations for the first time. By recognizing andaddressing gender-based differences in requirements for equipment, medical management, protection
and capacity-building, the policy makes an important contribution to increasing military readiness andsupporting national resilience against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.

64

Interview with the author, 21 November 2023.

65

Interview with the author, 21 November 2023.

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25

6. Walking the talk: Harnessing the benefits ofdiversity
To reap the benefits of diversity, leaders have to create conditions that release its positive effects on
behaviour and collaboration and reduce stereotyping and conflict. How can they do this? This section
offers five concrete good practices, the effectiveness of which has been shown in psychological andbehavioural research and in the experiences of senior officials in the nuclear weapons space.

 Investigate bias and activate social accountability
The benefits of diversity become accessible when all team members are able to openly discuss hierarchies and work processes, shape the agenda, influence strategy and policy, exercise leadership, andreceive recognition and reward.66
Emphasizing that equality in numbers is not sufficient for a work environment that thrives on diversity,
Mexico’s Coordinator for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Maria Antonieta Jaquez, added that,while the number of women in nuclear weapons policymaking has grown, less palpable limits toinclusion remain: “It’s not just about being able to speak up or contribute, but also about the weight orauthority your contributions carry. The work of most women in the field, even in senior positions, is often
subject to review or approval by men at the same seniority level.” This structural inequity limits the innovation potential of gender-diverse teams.67
A key step in improving the conditions for diversity to have a positive effect is investigating how the allocation of opportunities, influence and rewards in a team may be biased.68 As referenced earlier, this bias
arises because leaders recognize and remember talented staff more quickly when they can identify withthem. Especially in high-pressure situations, leaders tend to rely on staff who are like them. This leads
others to be denied the experience they need to be promoted and leaves significant leadership and innovation potential untapped.
Because of this, the successful de-activation of bias depends to a large extent on changes in decision
makers’ personal behaviour. This is why their deep involvement in the change process, especially ifthey belong to the majority group of white men, is crucial. Having analysed structural inequities, leadership should communicate a clear vision for change, motivate and guide its implementation, and ensure
continual monitoring and adjustments.
An emphasis on data and transparency is especially important for successful change as they activatesocial accountability. Once people know that their decisions may be compared against objective data,
they tend to base those decisions more closely on an evidentiary basis. In a case from the legal services
industry, a task force was created to gather data about the career progress of women. Once managers

66

Sylvia Ann Hewlett, Melinda Marshall and Laura Sherbin, “How Diversity Can Drive Innovation”, Harvard Business Review,
December 2013, https://hbr.org/2013/12/how-diversity-can-drive-innovation.

67

Interview with the author, 23 October 2023.

68

Ely and Thomas, “Getting Serious about Diversity”.

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26

knew that their promotion decisions would be transparent, the share of senior women staff tripled overa few years because of the incentive to base decisions on clear reasoning and trackable evidence.69

 Promote a community workplace culture
Diversity is more likely to increase effectiveness in teams with a culture that emphasizes shared objectives, equity between interests, and commonalities among members, instead of individuals’ traits
and achievements.70 This helps colleagues base their sense of belonging on being members of theteam rather than being members of a particular subgroup within the team (e.g., men, women), helping
prevent the us–them thinking that inhibits collaboration and innovation. This community workplaceculture increases creativity, reduces conflict and makes debate productive and results-oriented rather
than obstructive. 71
From his experience as a mediator between different perspectives within the US government, especially between the deterrence and the arms control and non-proliferation communities, Richard
Johnson highlighted that a participatory culture that promotes open discussion can enhance the procedural justice of policymaking and ensure that decisions are more widely accepted because they werereached through an inclusive process.72 This may also help remedy the reduced confidence in decision-making outcomes that diverse teams may have a higher risk of experiencing.
Interviews for this paper also highlighted the essential role that effective leadership plays in creating
a culture that activates diversity’s benefits. “Leadership makes a key difference in group identity
formation. An effective leader makes all team members feel that they are pulling in the same direction”,
Laura Rockwood concluded from her 28 years serving at the IAEA.73
A South African government official reflected on their experience working in a demographically diverse
team, saying, “With the right culture, you might have intense discussions, but there is a trust factor. We
are aware that we are a cohesive unit and when we disagree, we disagree on positions, not personality.”74 These experiences match findings about collaboration and the team identity of diverse groups,
in which the initial friction caused by the presence of differences is either ameliorated or exacerbated,largely depending on interventions by leadership.75

69

Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev, “Why Diversity Programs Fail”, Harvard Business Review, July/August 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/07/why-diversity-programs-fail.

70

Fernandes and Polzer, “Diversity in Groups”, 3.

71

Jennifer Chatman et al., “Being Different Yet Feeling Similar: The Influence of Demographic Composition and Organizational
Culture and Work Processes and Outcomes”, Administrative Science Quarterly 43, no. 4 (1998): 749–780, https://web.mit.
edu/cortiz/www/Diversity/PDFs/Chatman%20et%20al,%201998.pdf.

72

Interview with the author, 9 November 2023.

73

Interview with the author, 13 October 2023.

74

Interview with the author, 31 October 2023.

75

Frederick Herbert and Paris Will, “The Effects of Diversity on Teams Change over Time”, LSE Business Review, 23 November
2021, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2021/11/23/the-effects-of-diversity-on-teams-change-over-time.

FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM

27

 Count on integration and learning, not equality
An emphasis on equality risks penalizing the distinctive skills and approaches that diverse teammembers bring to the table.76 For example, competitive work cultures that reward assertiveness candisadvantage women, who tend to favour collaboration, for not conforming to expectations based on
masculine stereotypes.77 When those differences are valued as a learning resource, work processes
and outcomes are more closely examined and improved, and staff become more effective because
they are more confident in bringing the full breadth of their qualities to bear, including those that differentiate them from the majority. Psychological safety (the freedom to be oneself without reprisal) andinterpersonal congruence (the alignment of self-perception with the perception by others) are high.78
A crucial finding is that learning across diverse identities within a team is inherently positive for performance and morale, even when learnings do not relate to specific tasks.79 When people with different
backgrounds show vulnerability by asking for help and are met with support, this strengthens relationships, increases team resilience and improves problem-solving. Creating workplace cultures that
promote learning and openness to change has attractive pay-offs for collaboration in high-pressure,high-stakes situations.80
The benefits of integration and learning have already been demonstrated in the nuclear weapons space.
Michèle Flournoy reports that performance improved significantly once a human capital strategy, whichinvested in staff by providing mentoring, training and constructive feedback, was implemented.81 The
positive impact of such measures was echoed by a South African official, who attributed the positive
work culture of their team to a leadership style that prioritized openness to new proposals, active mentorship, and constructive rather than dismissive feedback.82
Other senior US officials from the nuclear weapons space corroborate that greater diversity broadened
the range of perspectives and challenged previously unquestioned assumptions. This outside-the-box
thinking led to better-informed policy decisions when leadership encouraged unconventional and innovative ideas.83

 Accept and plan for resistance to diversity measures
As stated above, studies have found that white men, who constitute the majority in the nuclear weapons
field, tend to feel threatened by diversity measures. Studies show that resisting challenges to ourbiases is natural. Biases are cognitive rules that help us make decisions more quickly and confidently;
as default reactions they are, by their nature, resistant to change.84

76

Ely and Thomas, “Getting Serious about Diversity”.

77

Ibid.

78

Jeffrey Polzer, Laurie Milton and William Swann, Jr., “Capitalizing on Diversity: Interpersonal Congruence in Small WorkGroups”, Administrative Science Quarterly 47, no. 2 (2002): 296–324, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3094807.

79

Ely and Thomas, “Getting Serious about Diversity”.

80

Ashley Groggins and Ann Marie Ryan, “Embracing Uniqueness: The Underpinnings of a Positive Climate for Diversity”,
Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology 86, no. 2 (2013): 264–282, https://doi.org/10.1111/joop.12008.

81

Hurlburt et al., “The ‘Consensual Straitjacket’”, 32.

82Interview with the author, 31 October 2023.

83

Hurlburt et al., “The ‘Consensual Straitjacket’”, 32.

84

Christine Wiggins-Romesburg and Rod Githens, “The Psychology of Diversity Resistance and Integration”, Human
FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM

28

However, they can be unlearned if challenged correctly. Accepting resistance enables openness andengagement with the change process. Stigmatizing resistance, instead, allows the resistor to perceive
the change process, rather than their own bias, as the problem. Leaders should address resistors’ psychological needs for acceptance, positive self-image and inclusion in the change process. Participation in diversity programmes helps resistors shift the source of their validation from acting in line with
their bias to acting in line with a new diversity culture.

 Avoid boilerplate diversity measures
Traditional measures like compulsory training and complaint procedures are not effective at creating
diverse and inclusive workplaces. “Outlawing” bias does not work. Instead, it often fuels resistanceto change and disadvantages women and people of colour; for example, managers are more likely todismiss allegations of discrimination when an organization prescribes diversity training.85 A long-term
study of over 700 US companies demonstrated that traditional diversity training had little to no positiveeffect on demographic diversity.86 Instead, leaders should define an organization’s lack of diversity andequity as a problem and invite staff to help find effective solutions, just as they would for other challenges facing their organization.
In doing so, they can use cognitive dissonance: When sensing a disconnect between their beliefs
and actions, people tend to correct either. Evidence shows that, if prompted to actively participate indiversity measures, even sceptical staff start to think of themselves as diversity champions. Effective
measures are those that promote individuals’ responsibility for solving an organization’s diversity
challenges, for example by implementing diversity-focused recruitment, mentoring programmes andtask forces.87

7. Reflections on the risk of co-optation
While focusing on diversity’s effect on policymaking, this paper is also mindful of the different goals thatdiversity efforts can serve. There is a growing awareness in the field that diversity efforts by the nuclear
weapons establishment regularly fail to achieve structural change beyond simply raising the share ofstaff from under-represented groups and that they often undermine the critical approaches to nuclear
weapons that women, people of colour and others have been championing.88

Resources Development Review 17, no. 2 (2018): 179–198, https://doi.org/10.1177/1534484318765843.
85

Dobbin and Kalev, “Why Diversity Programs Fail”.

86

Tessa Dover, Brenda Major and Cheryl Kaiser, “Diversity Policies Rarely Make Companies Fairer, and They Feel Threatening
to White Men”, Harvard Business Review, 4 January 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/01/diversity-policies-dont-help-womenor-minorities-and-they-make-white-men-feel-threatened.

87

Dobbin and Kalev, “Why Diversity Programs Fail”.

88

Kjolv Egeland and Hebatalla Taha, “Experts, Activists, and Girl Bosses of the Nuclear Apocalypse: Feminisms in Security
Discourse”, Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 12 May 2023, https://doi.org/10.1007/s42597-023-00100-3;
Senem Kaptan, “​Feminist Perspectives Towards ‘Excessive Military Spending’: An Intimate Dialogue With Cynthia Enloe”,
Women’s International League of Peace and Freedom, 17 October 2019, https://www.peacewomen.org/node/103744;
Ray Acheson, “Notes on Nuclear Weapons & Intersectionality in Theory and Practice: A Working Paper”, Princeton University, June 2022, https://sgs.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/2022-06/acheson-2022.pdf.

FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM

29

Diversity, particularly women’s representation and empowerment, is becoming a consensus objectivein Western nuclear weapons establishments. The nuclear weapons industry and state institutions likethe UK Atomic Weapons Establishment89 and US national nuclear laboratories advertise their commitment to diverse workforces and have created staff resource groups for women and people of colour.90
They organize promotional events on International Women’s Day and run programmes to recruit
women and advertise their career paths to girls; for example, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and others
have funded and cooperated with the Girl Scouts of the USA and Girl Security.91
Why is this problematic? To be sure, there is inherent value in a greater diversity of people being included
in decision-making on nuclear weapons, given their indiscriminate nature. Increasing diversity in the
nuclear weapons complex is the necessary condition for activating diversity’s positive potential for
nuclear weapons policymaking.
However, a simplistic understanding of diversity’s effects on human behaviour and collaboration, akinto the business case, is inadequate to address the systemic fallacies in traditional nuclear weapons
thinking. Current diversity efforts in the nuclear weapons complex are limited to adding diverse staff
into existing hierarchies, working methods and thinking. Continuing top-down control and intellectual
orthodoxy leaves little room for diverse staff to introduce alternative approaches.
These corporate feminist practices may actually uphold traditional nuclear weapons thinking.92 They
help “future-proof” the nuclear weapons enterprise by dressing up existing power structures to fit
modern expectations about progressiveness. Whereas critical feminism aims to highlight injustices in
traditional nuclear weapons policy and erode nuclear weapons’ legitimacy as “guarantors of security”,
the corporate feminist efforts of the nuclear weapons complex appropriate ideas like gender equality to
aid recruitment and legitimize nuclear armament.
There is a risk that the nuclear weapons space as a whole will conflate corporate feminism with thecritical academic and activist feminism that has informed 60 years of disarmament advocacy. Given the
resources and reach of state and industry actors, the nuclear field’s understanding of feminism could
be reduced to an equal share of men and women carrying out an unchanged set of policies.
Critical feminism is an effective tool for promoting policy change by analysing the conceptual errors
in traditional deterrence thinking and making visible how the production, maintenance, testing anduse of nuclear weapons have harmed people.93 Corporate feminism, however, is unlikely to trigger
policy change.

89

Atomic Weapons Establishment, “Diversity and Inclusion”, https://www.awe.co.uk/responsible-business/our-people/
diversity-and-inclusion; Atomic Weapons Establishment, “Celebrating the Women of AWE”, 8 March 2018, https://www.
awe.co.uk/2018/03/celebrating-the-women-of-awe.

90

C.J. Bacino, “The Diversity Issue”, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 28 November 2022, https://discover.lanl.gov/publications/national-security-science/2022-winter/the-diversity-issue.

91

Egeland and Taha, “Experts, Activists, and Girl Bosses”, 10.

92

Egeland and Taha, “Experts, Activists, and Girl Bosses”, 3–4.

93

Feminism is a form of critical theory. It investigates structures of power, “common sense” narratives, and the ways in which
they relate to ideas of masculinity and femininity. A feminist perspective on nuclear weapons questions the validity of

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30

8. Conclusions
The scientific case represents key changes in how the nuclear weapons field should understanddiversity. It demonstrates that diversity shapes how group members think and interact in complex waysthat can create more effective and innovative outcomes but also disrupt collaboration through social
friction. This approach moves the field beyond the logic of the business case that adding more diverse
staff automatically produces performance gains. It retires the simplistic idea of diversity as a one-dimensional scale on which more always equals better.
The scientific case creates an awareness that the presence of diversity is necessary but not sufficient for
activating its positive potential. It shows that leaders must adapt hierarchies, working methods and organizational cultures to create the conditions in which diversity’s benefits can be accessed. In this way,
the scientific case enables leaders to differentiate between effective and ineffective diversity measuresand provides them with good practices for implementing diversity, based on empirical evidence.
Crucially, the scientific case demonstrates that demographic diversity matters. It uses consistentempirical evidence about human thought processes and social dynamics to underline that a group’s
diverse composition plays at least as important a role as the individual capabilities of its members increating efficacy and innovation in policymaking. This emphasis on empirical evidence also makes
the scientific case a more accessible argument for the nuclear priesthood, a key audience for diversity
advocacy.
In these ways, the scientific case provides an effective, nuanced, evidence-based and more persuasive
line of reasoning that diversity advocates should employ to complement arguments based on ethics
and social justice.
Further research should focus on tracing the effects of diversity on collaboration and work outcomes
identified in psychological and behavioural studies in the real-life experiences of those working, or
having worked, in the nuclear priesthood to reinforce the learnings presented in this paper. Likewise,
identifying more case studies of (in)effective diversity measures in the nuclear weapons space would
help leaders implement diversity more successfully and sustainably.
As important as increasing demographic diversity in nuclear weapons policymaking is raising awarenessof the purposes that different diversity efforts serve. While there is inherent value in expanding accessto work in the nuclear weapons complex, this is unlikely to enable policy innovation if not accompaniedby structural change in hierarchies, working methods and intellectual orthodoxy. Those committed toreducing the influence of traditional nuclear weapons thinking should be diligent in assessing if andhow corporate diversity programmes may serve to legitimize the status quo.

traditional deterrence thinking and the association of power and status in the international system with the masculinizedcapacity to inflict mass violence. It highlights the harms nuclear weapons have inflicted on marginalized groups. Focusing
on human security, it prioritizes the rights and well-being of people over the abstract idea of national security. It perceives
nuclear weapons as contributors to global insecurity rather than as a source of security. For more, see Ray Acheson, “Mobilizing Feminist Action for Nuclear Abolition”, Arms Control Today, March 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-03/
features/mobilizing-feminist-action-nuclear-abolition-0.

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31

II. Achieving nuclear justice:
A survivor-centric framework
by Rebecca Davis Gibbons94
1. Introduction
Beginning in 2010, diplomats, scholars and anti-nuclear activists placed renewed emphasis on the detrimental and unjust humanitarian effects of nuclear weapons in order to push forward the nuclear disarmament agenda. At that year’s Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), the final consensus document included language on the “catastrophic humanitarian consequences” of nuclear use.95 After that, the Humanitarian Initiative on the Impact of Nuclear
Weapons held three conferences in 2013–2014, highlighting scientific research on nuclear risks andeffects as well as the voices and experiences of individuals and communities directly harmed by
nuclear detonations.96 The experience of these survivors97 helped build momentum for negotiating andadopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. The treaty, which enteredinto force in January 2021, prohibits the possession and use of nuclear weapons and all nuclear weapon-related activity.98 The TPNW does not explicitly mention justice, but the treaty’s positive obligations in Articles 6 and 7 represent a broad conception of nuclear justice by requiring treaty members toprovide for victim assistance and environmental remediation.

94

The author is grateful to Dr Steven Herzog, Dr Renata Hessmann Dalaqua, Paula Jou Fuster, Dr Jaroslav Krasny, Elizabeth
Minor and Franziska Stärk for their helpful feedback, to Jacob Beaulieu for research assistance, and to survivors of nuclear
use and testing who have bravely shared their stories.

95

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Volume
I, Part I (New York, 2010), https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I).

96

John Borrie, “Humanitarian Reframing of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of a Ban”, International Affairs 90, no. 3 (2014):
625–646; Becky Alexis-Martin, Matthew Breay Bolton, Dimity Hawkins, Sydney Tisch, and Talei Luscia Mangioni, “Addressing the Humanitarian and Environmental Consequences of Atmospheric Nuclear Weapon Tests: A Case Study of UK and US
Test Programs at Kiritimati (Christmas) and Malden Islands, Republic of Kiribati”, Global Policy 12, no. 1 (2021): 106–121,
https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12913; Sébastien Philippe, Sonya Schoenberger, and Nabil Ahmed, “Radiation
Exposures and Compensation of Victims of French Atmospheric Nuclear Tests in Polynesia”, Science & Global Security 30,
no. 2 (2022): 62–94, https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2022.2111757; Matthew Breay Bolton, “Human Rights Falloutof Nuclear Detonations: Reevaluating ‘Threshold Thinking’ in Assisting Victims of Nuclear Testing”, Global Policy 13, no.
1 (2022): 76–90, https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13042; Aiko Sawada, Julia Chaitin, and Dan Bar-On, “Surviving
Hiroshima and Nagasaki – Experiences and Psychosocial Meanings”, Psychiatry 67, no. 1 (2004): 43–60, https://doi.
org/10.1521/psyc.67.1.43.31249; Masao Tomonaga, “The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: A Summary of
the Human Consequences, 1945–2018, and Lessons for Homo sapiens to End the Nuclear Weapon Age”, Journal for Peaceand Nuclear Disarmament 2, no. 2 (2019): 491–517, https://doi.org/10.1521/psyc.67.1.43.31249.

97

Although the term “survivor” is generally preferred over the term “victim”, many of the key international instruments use thelatter (e.g., victim assistance). In this article, both terms will be used interchangeably.

98

Rebecca Davis Gibbons, “The Humanitarian Turn in Nuclear Disarmament and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons”, The Nonproliferation Review 25, nos. 1–2 (2018): 11–36, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1486960;
Alexander Kmentt, The Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons (London: Routledge, 2021); Ray Acheson, Banning the Bomb,
Smashing the Patriarchy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2021).

The need for nuclear justice stems from the US bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in August1945 and the over 2,000 nuclear test explosions conducted by at least eight countries since then.99
More than 500 of those tests were conducted above ground, spreading harmful radiation throughout
the atmosphere.100 Radiation harmed those in the vicinity of the tests, including those living in the area
and those in the military who were assigned to the tests.101 These survivors of nuclear use and testing
face consequences such as higher risk of disease (including many types of cancer), polluted land andwater, and negative psychological effects.102 In addition, approximately 214,000 people died by the endof 1945 as a result of the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.103
Despite recent strong interest in the topic,104 there is not yet a consensus framework laying out themechanisms that would make up an ideal form of nuclear justice for those affected by nuclear use andtesting.105 At the first and second Meeting of States Parties and in intersessional meetings in between,
members of the TPNW began working towards implementing Articles 6 and 7.106 One prominent idea isestablishing a fund to provide aid to survivors and communities. But are there additional mechanisms
for providing justice?
Some advocates call for employing restorative justice or transitional justice to redress nuclear harms.
Others argue for gender-sensitive and feminist foreign policy approaches. Applying a feminist foreign
policy lens should involve an inclusive process of listening to survivors, learning about the harms they
have faced, and exploring what they perceive as nuclear justice.
Acknowledging the ongoing work of TPNW members to establish a means to provide aid and assistance, this article explores the priorities and values reflected in recent calls for nuclear justice and thenemploys the testimonies of survivors to propose additional key justice mechanisms – defined as “ajustice response, process, activity, measure, or practice”107 – to develop a survivor-centred form of
nuclear justice.108

99

At least eight states have conducted nuclear tests: China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, France, India, Pakistan,
USSR/Russian Federation, United States of America and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. For a detailed
timeline of nuclear testing, see Daryl Kimball, “Nuclear Testing and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Timeline”, Arms
Control Association, December 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NuclearTestingTimeline.

100

Daryl Kimball, “The Nuclear Testing Tally”, Arms Control Today, August 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/
nucleartesttally.

101

For example, see, Steven L. Simon and Andre Bouville, “Radiation Doses to Local Populations Near Nuclear Weapons Test
Sites Worldwide”, Health Physics 82, no. 5 (2002): 706–725.

102

Matthew B. Bolton and Elizabeth Minor, “Addressing the Ongoing Humanitarian and Environmental Consequences of
Nuclear Weapons: An Introductory Review”, Global Policy 12, no. 1 (2021): 81–99.

103

Bolton and Minor, “Addressing the Ongoing Humanitarian and Environmental Consequences of Nuclear Weapons”, 84.

104See, for example, the vast amount of work conducted by Bonnie Docherty at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (https://hhi.
harvard.edu). Also see Franziska Stärk and Ulrich Kühn, “Roundtable: Making Nuclear Injustice an Agenda for Change”,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2 February 2023, https://thebulletin.org/2023/02/roundtable-making-nuclear-injustice-an-agenda-for-change/#post-heading.

105

Bonnie Docherty, “From Obligation to Action: Advancing Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation at the First
Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament
3, no. 2 (2020): 253–264, https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2020.1842657.

106

Rebecca Davis Gibbons and Stephen Herzog, “The First TPNW Meeting and the Future of the Nuclear Ban Treaty”, Arms
Control Today, September 2022, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-09/features/first-tpnw-meeting-future-nuclear-ban-treaty.

107

Kathleen Daly, “What Is Restorative Justice? Fresh Answers to a Vexed Question”, Victims & Offenders 11, no. 1 (2016): 18,https://doi.org/10.1080/15564886.2015.1107797.

108

This article focuses on those affected by nuclear use and testing. However, individuals and environments are negatively

Why is this effort important? Justice claims – consistent with David Welch’s definition, “the drive tocorrect a perceived discrepancy between entitlements and benefits”109 – are increasing around the world
as the international community becomes more aware of and sensitive to environmental, economic,
racial and Indigenous justice. Establishing a framework of nuclear justice is long overdue, as harm fromthe nuclear weapons enterprise began almost 100 years ago. Many of those affected never received
recognition, but it is not too late for everyone. The TPNW, as well as recent developments in the United
Nations General Assembly,110 offers an opportunity to renew efforts to achieve nuclear justice. This
article seeks to contribute to discussions on the mechanisms suitable for providing justice for individuals and communities affected by nuclear use and testing. Inspired by different perspectives on justice,
the article recommends specific mechanisms based on the justice claims of survivors of nuclear use
and testing.

2. What type of justice?
When it comes to nuclear justice, scholars and advocates have called for concepts to be borrowed
from existing justice frameworks and mechanisms. Though no extant theory of justice fits nuclear
justice perfectly, several such theories offer important insights and inspiration. This section explores
the relevance of restorative justice, transitional justice, gendered perspectives, intersectionality andintergenerational justice.

2.1 Restorative justice
Restorative justice is commonly invoked by those calling for nuclear justice. For example, the Good
Energy Collective writes, “restorative justice places an obligation on the part of the federal government…players who knowingly harmed communities through nuclear weapons production andtesting”.111 Similarly, Matt Korda argues that the United States of America should begin a process ofrestorative justice for victims of the nuclear weapons enterprise.112

impacted throughout the cycle of developing nuclear weapons: mining and milling uranium, enrichment, reprocessing,assembly, testing, dismantlement, and waste storage. As early parts of the nuclear fuel cycle have commercial applications,
untangling commercial activities from weapon activities may be challenging. Moreover, Article 6 of the TPNW, “Victim assistance and environmental remediation”, calls for the treaty’s states parties to address the needs of individuals and environments“affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons”, though the treaty’s preamble acknowledges broader effects of nuclear
weapons. See https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/tpnw. Other non-governmental organizations involved in the
TPNW meetings note the harms existent throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. See, for example, “First Meeting of States Parties to
the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, working paper submitted by Manhattan Project for a Nuclear-Free World, 8June 2022, https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/TPNW.MSP_.2022.NGO_.14.pdf.
109David Welch, Justice and the Genesis of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 19. I am grateful to Franziska
Stärk for pointing out this definition.

110

United Nations General Assembly, “Addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons: providing victim assistance and environmental remediation to Member States affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons” A/RES/78/240, 28 December 2023,
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4032824.

111

Jackie Toth, Jessica Lovering, Ariel Gould and Colter Schroer, “Interim Nuclear Justice Roadmap”, Good Energy Collective,
31 October 2022, https://www.goodenergycollective.org/policy/interim-nuclear-justice-roadmap.

112

Matt Korda, “We Need a Green New Deal for Nuclear Weapons”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11 September 2019,https://thebulletin.org/2019/09/we-need-a-green-new-deal-for-nuclear-weapons.

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Restorative justice has an intuitive appeal for addressing the suffering faced by survivors of nuclear
use and testing. It implies that the survivors and their communities would be “restored” in some way
through the justice process. However, restorative justice is most commonly used in criminal justicesettings, with the goal of repairing the harm caused by an offender.113 For example, a victim of harassment or other interpersonal harm may directly communicate with the perpetrator and vice versa,
supported and witnessed by other members of the community. Kathleen Daly, an expert on restorative
justice, argues that it is best defined as a justice mechanism “to address crime, disputes, and bounded
community conflict.”114 Her definition explicitly “exclude[s] civil war, state violence, and wider socio-political conflicts and cleavages, for which other justice mechanisms are appropriate.”115
When defined narrowly as a specific justice mechanism, restorative justice does not address state violations, but those calling for this type of justice in the nuclear context are likely considering a broader
definition. For instance, a values-based conception of restorative justice emphasizes that humans
are “deeply connected to one another and to the environment” and sees this approach “as a widersocial movement with an aim to transform individuals and social structures to be in alignment with thisconnected and relational worldview.”116 In other words, applying a broader view of restorative justiceto the nuclear realm could mean repairing the broken relationships between affected communities andnuclear-armed governments by creating systems to aid harmed individuals and the environments inwhich they work and live.
This more expansive version of restorative justice appears to be what New Mexican Senator Ben Ray
Lujan meant when talking about the “downwinders” in his state, those who were exposed to radiationfrom US nuclear tests. He explained, “This is an issue of justice – of making New Mexicans whole who
played a role in our national security. They paid a price for it – their health, livelihoods, and lives.”117
Thus, although the specific mechanism may not apply, nuclear justice can take inspiration from thevalues of restorative justice in terms of transforming and restoring the connections between thoseaffected and governments and aiding individuals with a goal of restoring (to the extent possible) theirhealth, economic well-being, community and environment.

2.2 Transitional justice
Others argue that nuclear justice should take the form of transitional justice, a means by which societies
respond to the legacies of massive human rights abuses.118 Some commentators have proposed
the development of a fund to aid both survivors and the environment as part of a transitional justice113

Christian B. M. Gade, “Is Restorative Justice Punishment?” Conflict Resolution Quarterly 38, no. 3 (2021): 127–155, https://doi.org/10.1002/crq.21293; Masahiro Suzuki and Xiaoyu Yuan, “How Does Restorative Justice Work? A Qualitative Metasynthesis”, Criminal Justice and Behavior 48, no. 10 (2021): 1347–1365, https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854821994622.

114

Daly, “What Is Restorative Justice?” 11

115

Daly, “What Is Restorative Justice?” 21.

116

Lindsey Pointer, Chloe Dutreuil, Brianna Livelli, Catalina Londono, Clare Pledl, Paula Rodriguez, Ping Showalter and Rodney“Page” Tompkins, “Teaching Restorative Justice”, Contemporary Justice Review 25, nos. 3–4 (2022): 272, https://doi.org/10.1080/10282580.2023.2181286.

117

Lesley M. M. Blume, “Collateral Damage: American Civilian Survivors of the 1945 Trinity Test”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
17 July 2023, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-07/collateral-damage-american-civilian-survivors-of-the-1945-trinity-test.

118

See, for example, Colleen Moore, “Seeking Justice for Victims of Nuclear Testing”, Inkstick Media, 29 August 2019, https://
inkstickmedia.com/seeking-justice-for-victims-of-nuclear-testing.

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35

approach.119 The final document of the first meeting of TPNW states parties in July 2022 also proposeda fund for victims, which will be discussed later in the article.120
The United Nations Secretary-General has defined transitional justice as “the full range of processes
and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale
past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.”121 Transitional
justice mechanisms have been employed in many countries transitioning out of conflict and/or dictatorial regimes, including Argentina, Chile, Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Africa. Among the mostcommonly used mechanisms are trials, truth commissions, amnesty for perpetrators, reparations forvictims and relatives of victims, and lustration (or removal) of certain officials or group members.122
As the goal of transitional justice is to help transform a country from one in which large-scale humanrights abuses occur into one in which they would not, the state transformation is often significant, suchas moving from an authoritarian regime to a democracy. Cases of nuclear testing are quite different.
As such, some of the common mechanisms of transitional justice, such as lustration, are less likely toapply to injustices stemming from nuclear use and testing decades ago. In addition, reparations usually
imply taking responsibility for the abuses, so compensation (without taking responsibility) may be more
likely when it comes to aiding nuclear survivors. Nonetheless, practitioners of nuclear justice may beable to borrow research and insights from specific transitional justice mechanisms, particularly thoseseeking truth and providing compensation.

2.3 Intersectionality and justice
Many in the nuclear disarmament and advocacy fields emphasize the importance of an intersectional
approach when considering nuclear justice mechanisms. Intersectionality brings attention to the factthat factors such as gender, age, ethnicity shape the impacts of nuclear weapons, including socialand psychological effects burdening victims.123 For instance, children are more negatively affected byionizing radiation than adults exposed to a similar amount, with girls facing the most harm.124 Research

119

See, for example, Jana Baldus, Caroline Fehl and Sascha Hach, “NPT 2022: An Opportunity to Advance Nuclear Justice”,
Global Policy, May 2022, https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/articles/conflict-and-security/npt-2022-opportunity-advance-nuclear-justice.

120

Report of the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, TPNW/MSP/2022/6(Vienna, 21–23 June 2022), https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=TPNW%2FMSP%2F2022%2F6&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False.

121

United Nations Security Council, Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justicein Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, S/2004/616 (23 August 2004), 4, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/527647.

122

Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne and Andrew G. Reiter, “Transitional Justice in the World, 1970–2007: Insights from a New
Dataset”, Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 6 (2010): 805, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20798965.

123

For instance, women in Kazakhstan exposed to radiation from testing were more likely than exposed men to develop digestivecancers. See Susanne Bauer, Boris I. Gusev, Ludmila M. Pivina, Kazbek N. Apsalikov and Bernd Grosche, “Radiation
Exposure due to Local Fallout from Soviet Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing in Kazakhstan: Solid Cancer Mortality
in the Semipalatinsk Historical Cohort, 1960–1999”, Radiation Research 164, no. 4, part 1 (2005): 409–419, https://www.
jstor.org/stable/3581526. Women and girls were more likely to suffer with solid cancers in the decades following thebombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. See Kotaro Ozasa, Yukiko Shimizu, Akihiko Suyama, Fumiyoshi Kasagi, Midori Soda,
Eric J. Grant, Ritsu Sakata, Hiromi Sugiyama and Kazunori Kodama, “Studies of the Mortality of Atomic Bomb Survivors,
Report 14, 1950–2003: An Overview of Cancer and Noncancer Diseases”, Radiation Research 177, no. 3 (2012): 229–243,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41433189.

124

National Research Council, Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation: BEIR VII Phase 2 (Washington,
DC: National Academies Press, 2006), 7, https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/11340/chapter/1.

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36

also indicates that women may have greater negative psychological effects from radiation exposure,with mothers of children experiencing particularly high levels of stress.125 Many women victims of theHiroshima and Nagasaki bombings faced especially harsh discrimination when it came to marriage.126
Men also face sex-specific and gendered effects, including potential infertility from exposure to radiationand the loss of traditional and cultural roles due to the loss of land to nuclear testing.127 Nuclear justice,therefore, must take these gendered effects into account when considering justice for each individual.
In addition to gender, there are other identity-based aspects of nuclear effects,128 making an intersectional perspective essential for developing a survivor-centric form of nuclear justice. Intersectionality refers to the fact that “race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nation, ability, and age operate notas unitary, mutually exclusive entities, but as reciprocally constructing phenomena that in turn shapecomplex social inequalities.”129
An intersectional perspective is especially important when contemplating the effects of nuclear testing,as tests were conducted in locations perceived as peripheral to power centres and among groups thatwere often marginalized by more powerful political actors, including Indigenous communities, colonies
and former colonies.130 Intersectionality “helps build a more holistic definition of ‘justice’ from both alegal and socio-cultural perspective, which can lead to a fuller understanding of what remediation could
look like.”131 Gender, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, prior colonization and geography may allintersect when it comes to nuclear justice.
With intersectionality and gender in mind, this article takes inspiration from the many countries thathave adopted feminist foreign policy approaches to inform their framework for nuclear justice. Theinternational community’s normative commitment to gender equality was formalized in the United
Nations 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with a more recent incarnation found in United
Nations Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, adopted in October 2000.
The landmark resolution calls for bringing women and girls into peacebuilding and conflict-reduction
activities and recognizes that women and girls may have different needs from men and boys throughout

125

Anne Guro Dimmen, “Gendered Impacts: The Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons from a Gender Perspective”, ILPI-UNIDIR Vienna Conference Series (International Law and Policy Institute, 2014), https://unidir.org/sites/default/files/
publication/pdfs//gendered-impacts-en-620.pdf.

126

Elaine Natalie and Katie Yoon, “Hibakusha: The Human Cost of Nuclear Weapons”, Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, 30 March
2021, https://www.apln.network/analysis/commentaries/hibakusha-the-human-cost-of-nuclear-weapons#_ftnref11.

127

Renata Hessmann Dalaqua, James Revill, Alastair Hay and Nancy Connell, “Missing Links: Understanding Sex- and Gender-Related Impacts of Chemical and Biological Weapons” (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2019), https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/19/
gen1.

128

Mariana Budjeryn and Togzhan Kassenova, “Nuclear Shades of Red Racism”, Inkstick Media, 24 September 2020, https://
inkstickmedia.com/nuclear-shades-of-red-racism.

129

Patricia Hill Collins, “Intersectionality’s Definitional Dilemmas”, Annual Review of Sociology 41, no. 2 (2015): 1–20, https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-soc-073014-112142.

130

Robert Jacobs, “Nuclear Conquistadors: Military Colonialism in Nuclear Test Site Selection during the Cold War”, Asian
Journal of Peacebuilding 1, no. 2 (November 2013): 157–177, https://ipus.snu.ac.kr/eng/archives/ajp/volume-1-number-2-november-2013/research-article/nuclear-conquistadors-military-colonialism-in-nuclear-test-site-selection-during-the-cold-war.

131

Mari Faines, “No Justice Is Possible without Studying the Injustices of Nuclear Weapons”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
2 February 2023, https://thebulletin.org/2023/02/no-justice-is-possible-without-studying-the-injustices-of-nuclear-weapons.

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37

conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes.132 Bringing gender to the fore eventually led somestates to codify feminist approaches to foreign policy, under which a gender lens would be used beyond
conflict and conflict resolution and would include considerations of equal participation in all areas ofinternational security. However, equal participation is yet to be achieved in the nuclear realm.133
Sweden, in 2014, was the first country to explicitly bring in a feminist approach to its foreign policy.134
Three themes have been noted in the development of the approach in Sweden: feminist ethical principles of inclusion and human security (i.e. greater inclusion of women and girls in security considerations); gender cosmopolitanism (i.e. security for all human beings and communities); and empathetic
cooperation (i.e. emphasizing dialogue).135 In terms of inclusion, the Swedish government highlighted
the importance of “listen[ing] to stories of women and other marginalized groups subjected to violence
and conflict”,136 an important factor in developing a survivor-centric nuclear justice framework.
Germany has also pursued a feminist foreign policy, with government guidance from 2023 highlighting
the inclusivity and intersectionality:
Feminist foreign policy is…for all members of a society. It is inclusive rather than exclusive.
It takes into account the fact that discrimination is never one-dimensional. And therefore it
stands up for everyone who is pushed to societies’ margins because of their gender identity,
origin, religion, age, disability or sexual orientation or for other reasons.137
Significantly, the German guidelines for feminist foreign policy note the necessity of “fac[ing] up tohistorical responsibility, including for our colonial past”,138 an important point for nuclear justice. The
German guidance states: “We support efforts to recognise and compensate the victims of nuclear tests.
We strengthen humanitarian arms control and advocate for a safe world without nuclear weapons.”139
Other countries with feminist foreign policies include Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Luxembourg,
Mexico, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain.140

132

Louise Olsson and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, “An Introduction to UNSCR 1325”, International Interactions 39, no. 4 (2013):
425–434, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2013.805327.

133

See, for example, Renata Hessmann Dalaqua, Kjølv Egeland and Torbjørn Graff Hugo, Still Behind the Curve: Gender
Balance in Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Diplomacy (Geneva, UNIDIR: 2019), https://unidir.org/files/
publication/pdfs/still-behind-the-curve-en-770.pdf.

134

Though Sweden was an innovator in pursuing a feminist foreign policy, the new government elected in 2022 disavowed thepolicy. See, for example, Merlyn Thomas, “Sweden Ditches ‘Feminist Foreign Policy’”, BBC News, 19 October 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63311743.

135

Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman-Rosamond, “Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy in the Making: Ethics, Politics, andGender”, Ethics & International Affairs 30, no. 3 (2016): 326, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679416000241.

136

Aggestam and Bergman-Rosamond, “Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy in the Making”, 326.

137

Federal Foreign Office, “Shaping Feminist Foreign Policy”, (Federal Government of Germany, 2023), 3, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/ffp-guidelines/2585074.

138

Federal Foreign Office, “Shaping Feminist Foreign Policy”, 3.

139

Federal Foreign Office, “Shaping Feminist Foreign Policy”, 16.

140

For more on the connection between nuclear weapons policy as a feminist issue, see Laura Rose Brown, “Feminist Foreign
Policy and Nuclear Weapons: Contributions and Implications”, Non Proliferation and Disarmament Papers 86 (2023),

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2.4 Intergenerational justiceIntergenerational justice is another key perspective that can influence the development of nuclear
justice. While legal scholars note that intergenerational justice is not yet “standard” for internationallaw, “questions of intergenerational justice pervade many international legal problems, from climatechange to human rights to the law of war.”141 Generations following those exposed to radiation facehardships in terms of health, economics and the environment. They may face unhealthy land and waterand the loss of cultural heritage sites that remain polluted.

2.5 Relevance to nuclear justice
As the above discussion attests, values and mechanisms from other justice perspectives could be
useful in informing a survivor-centric nuclear justice framework. Restorative justice highlights the importance of making victims whole to the extent possible and restoring relationships undermined bya history of distrust. Transitional justice emphasizes moving beyond the harms caused by humanrights abuses and brings attention to the importance of information and truth-telling. Intersectionality is
inclusive and historically responsible; it highlights a holistic interpretation of security. Intergenerational
perspectives take into account the harms that continue across generations.
With these perspectives and values in mind, this article develops a survivor-centric form of nuclear
justice based on the claims made by survivors themselves. The approach is consistent with restorative
justice, transitional justice, the intersectional lens and intergenerational justice as it focuses on humansecurity in terms of restoring physical, community, economic and environmental well-being; emphasizes listening to and engaging in dialogue with survivors and pursuing data collection; notes present
and historical circumstances that may increase the challenges faced by survivors; and envisages transitioning to a system that provides justice for all people.

3. Nuclear justice claims from nuclear victims
What mechanisms do victims seek when providing testimonials about the harms caused by nuclear
use and testing? The discussion in this section is based on 68 English language (or translated into
English) testimonials available online, in articles and in books from survivors of nuclear use and testing.
Geographic diversity was a prime consideration in sourcing these testimonials, which cover cases ofnuclear weapons use and testing in Algeria, Australia, China, French Polynesia, Japan, Kazakhstan,
Kiribati (specifically, Kiritimati – formerly known as Christmas Island), the Marshall Islands and theUnited States. Civilian and military survivors are both represented among the 68 individuals, encompassing 45 men and 23 women.142 Though limited, this sample provides representation across several
demographic categories: geography, gender, Indigenous identity, age, and civilian or military status.

https://www.nonproliferation.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/EUNPDC_no-86.pdf.
141

Hirokazu Miyazaki and Annelise Riles, “Theorizing Intergenerational Justice in International Law: The Case of the Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law 7, no. 122(2022): 122–145, https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucijil/vol7/iss1/6.

142

A list of these testimonials is presented in Appendix A.

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The analysis of these testimonials is useful to better understand justice claims and identify potential
mechanisms that could address the harms of nuclear use and testing. These mechanisms were divided
into five categories: compensation for victims143 (to include the provision of health care); acknowledgement of harm by those responsible; more available data and information regarding the harm and thecircumstances of the harm; apologies; and policy change. Table 1 indicates how many times survivors
made reference to each justice claim.

Table 1. Justice mechanisms identified in testimonials by 68 survivors of nuclear
weapons use and testing
JUSTICE CLAIM

TIMES MENTIONED

Compensation

16

Policy change

14

Acknowledgement of harm

9

Apology

6

More data/information

5

3.1 Compensation
Of the justice mechanisms discussed in the testimonials, the provision of compensation was the mostsought by survivors. In several testimonials, individuals called for compensation for victims, whileothers called for increasing the amount already provided. American veteran Francis Lincoln Grahlfs,
who served at Operation Crossroads in the Marshall Islands, defends the idea of compensation:
Compensating nuclear testing survivors should not be controversial. In many ways, the communities subjected to nuclear testing are unacknowledged casualties of World War II and theCold War. Their country has sacrificed their health and that of their loved ones, without asmuch as a draft or any of the benefits we offer our veterans. People ought to be recompensed
for what they were put through, through no choice of their own.144
Providing compensation is an often-used transitional justice mechanism in cases of human rights
abuses. Indeed, a nuclear detonation and its associated radiation “is likely to result in the finding ofa violation of…human rights” including “the rights to life, to humane treatment, to a healthy environment and to the highest attainable standard of health”.145 In other words, nuclear use during times ofconflict and nuclear testing at any time both undermine human security, a key focus of feminist foreign
policy. In addition, compensation in the form of direct payments, the provision of health care and other143

The term “compensation” is used here instead of “reparation”, as reparation generally implies the acknowledgement ofwrongdoing. While reparations are appropriate in nuclear justice, some nuclear-armed states do not acknowledge responsibility and so, at minimum, compensation should be awarded.

144

Francis Lincoln Grahlfs, “Veterans of US Atomic Age Deserve Compensation”, The Military Times, 2 December 2021, https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2021/12/02/veterans-of-us-atomic-age-deserve-compensation.

145

Quoted in Stuart Casey-Maslen, “The Use of Nuclear Weapons and Human Rights”, International Review of the Red Cross
97, no. 899 (2015): 671–672, https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irc97_10.pdf.

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40

assistance, and environmental remediation all serve intergenerational justice by improving conditions
for the next generations.
The responsibility to address the harm experienced by all survivors of nuclear use and testing146 is recognized in the TPNW’s Article 6, which calls for assistance to include “medical care, rehabilitation andpsychological support as well as…social and economic inclusion.”147 As a result of this treaty language,
scholars and treaty parties have explored this nuclear justice mechanism in the most detail to date. The
first meeting of TPNW states parties in June 2022 established an informal working group, led by Kazakhstan and Kiribati, to begin working on the treaty’s implementation of victim assistance and environmental remediation.148 Many of those involved in the discussions have recommended the developmentof a trust fund to aid victims. This recommendation was reflected in the Vienna Action Plan, adopted at
the first Meeting of States Parties of the TPNW, in July 2022:
Action 29: To discuss the feasibility of, and propose possible guidelines for, establishing aninternational trust fund for States that have been affected by the use or testing of nuclear
weapons, taking into account relevant precedents for such a trust fund. The purpose of sucha fund would be, inter alia, to provide aid to assist survivors and to support measures toward
environmental remediation.149
Since then, TPNW states parties have held discussions to explore the establishment of such a fund,150
and several organizations have offered recommendations.151 According to a decision taken by thesecond meeting of TPNW states parties, the informal working group will prepare a report on the “feasibility of, and possible guidelines for, the establishment of an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation”.152 The report will be presented at the third meeting of TPNW
states parties, in 2025, where further discussions are expected to take place.

146

Of course, defining who is a victim in these instances is another challenge for nuclear justice. As one example, those inJapan exposed to “black rain” following the Hiroshima bombing fought for recognition for years, only receiving this recognition in 2020–2021. See Eric Johnston, “Hiroshima Hibakusha Have Won Their ‘Black Rain’ Lawsuit. This Is How They Got
There”, Japan Times, 27 July 2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/07/27/national/hibakusha-black-rain-ruling-precedent. I thank Jaroslav Krosny for this point.

147

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 2017.

148

Joint Statement on behalf of Kiribati and Kazakhstan, 2023 NPT Preparatory Committee, General Debate, Delivered by
H.E. Ambassador Teburoro Tito, 31 July 2023, https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_
Nuclear_Weapons_-Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_(2023)/Kiribati_
and_Kazakhstan_Joint_Statement_General_Debate.pdf.

149

Report of the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, TPNW/MSP/2022/6(Vienna, 21–23 June 2022), 15, https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=tpnw%2Fmsp%2F2022%2F6&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False.

150

On these meetings, see: International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, “Article 6 & 7 Informal Working Group
Meetings”, https://www.icanw.org/tpnw_article_6_7_meetings#14-09-2023.

151

Elliot Serbin and Laila Ujayli, “Designing a Trust Fund for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: Report Examines
Precedent and Offers Proposals”, Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, 19 January 2023, https://humanrightsclinic.law.harvard.edu/designing-a-trust-fund-for-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons-report-examines-precedent-and-offers-proposals; ICRC, “The Obligation to Assist Victims and Remediate the Environment within
a Framework of Shared Responsibility under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, (ICRC, 2023), https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4702-obligation-assist-victims-and-remediate-environment-within-framework-shared;
ICAN, “Recommendations on an International Trust Fund for Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation”, (Geneva:
ICAN, 2023), https://www.icanw.org/international_trust_fund_recommendations.

152

Report of the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, TPNW/MSP/2023/14(New York, 27 November–1 December 2023), 13 https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=TPNW%2FMSP%2F2023%2F14&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False.
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41

The mixed record of state-based compensation programmes illustrates the need for a single trust fundto provide aid and assistance. Some governments that tested or hosted nuclear tests have compensated survivors, but few – if any – receive adequate aid to address their struggles.
For a long time, the French government argued that no individuals received a harmful dose of radiationfrom its nuclear tests in Algeria and French Polynesia.153 In 2001 and 2002, French nuclear veteransand members of the affected communities began to advocate for compensation. The French government eventually passed a compensation law in 2010, which states: “Full reparation for harm can beobtained by any person (military, civilian and residents of the surrounding area) suffering from radiation-induced diseases listed in decree (18 cancers) that resulted from exposure to ionizing radiation
due to French nuclear testing, or by their rightful claimant.”154 The most recent French government
report available indicated the country had compensated 616 individuals and rejected 1,645 claims.155
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland also has a compensation plan for veterans
but argues that its studies have found no link between those serving in testing sites and higher rates ofmany types of cancer.156
The US government passed a law in 1990 for those affected by the US testing programme, the Radiation
Exposure and Compensation Act. The act provides “compassionate compensation” to uranium
millers, miners and ore transporters, to test workers, and to downwinders, with lump sums of $100,000,$75,000, and $50,000, respectively, but only if they develop the cancers included on a specific list.157
Victims do not need to prove causality, but they must have held the specified jobs or lived in the vicinityof tests. As of January 2023, the US government had paid out over $2.5 billion to over 40,000 individuals harmed by testing.158 For those in the Marshall Islands, the United States has paid out lump sums
over the years through the Compact of Free Association agreements between the two states. Though a
new agreement was signed in 2022, the Marshallese government is currently arguing that more moneyis necessary, given the legacy of US nuclear testing.159
The most comprehensive care for victims appears to come from governments that were not responsible
for nuclear use or testing: Japan and Kazakhstan. These programmes provide a combination of compensation and social welfare. Japan has the most elaborate programme, dating back to the 1950s, after

153

Sébastien Philippe, Sonya Schoenberger and Nabil Ahmed, “Radiation Exposures and Compensation of Victims of French
Atmospheric Nuclear Tests in Polynesia”, Science & Global Security 30, no. 2 (2022): 62–94, https://doi.org/10.1080/089
29882.2022.2111757. Also see Sebastien Philippe and Tomas Statius, Toxique: Enquête sur les essais nucléaires françaisen Polynésie (Presses universitaires de France and Disclose, 2021).

154

Government of France, “LOI no 2010-2 du 5 janvier 2010 relative à la reconnaissance et à l’indemnisation des victimes desessais nucléaires français”, Journal Officiel de la République Français (2010), https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/45/087/45087591.pdf?r=1.

155

Comité d’Indemnisation des Victimes des Essais Nucléaires, Rapport d’Activité, 2022 (Paris, 2022), https://www.vie-publique.fr/files/rapport/pdf/290358.pdf.

156

See, for example, this UK government leaflet for military veterans: Ministry of Defence, “Information for British Nuclear Test
Veterans”, 26 August 2020, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5f461d0ae90e074c4d303333/NTVleaflet.pdf.

157

US Department of Justice, “Radiation Exposure Compensation Act”, https://www.justice.gov/civil/common/reca.

158

US Department of Justice, “Awards to Date 01/13/2023”, https://www.justice.gov/civil/awards-date-01132023.

159

David Brunnstrom, “Marshall Islands Seeks More U.S. Nuclear Legacy Funds to Settle Strategic Deal”, Reuters, 13 July
2023, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-07-13/marshall-islands-seek-more-u-s-nuclear-legacyfunds-to-settle-strategic-deal. Also see Daryl G. Kimball, “U.S., Marshall Islands Sign Deal on Nuclear Testing Impacts”,
Arms Control Today, March 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-03/news/us-marshall-islands-sign-deal-nuclear-testing-impacts.

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42

strong advocacy by hibakusha – those in Japan affected by the nuclear bombings in Hiroshima andNagasaki in 1945. The Japanese government provides health care and a monthly financial allowancefor the victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.160
A 1992 Kazakh law provides several forms of compensation for victims of the Soviet nuclear testingat the Semipalatinsk site. Unlike many other compensation plans, including those in France and theUnited States, the Kazakh government provides compensation for individuals who were proximate to
the tests and not just for those who show symptoms or have specific types of cancer.161 In fact, Kazakh
residents who live close to the test site report many different negative health impacts including arthralgia, arthritis, high-blood pressure, heart disease and digestive system disease.162
Though it did not provide as much compensation as Japan and Kazakhstan, it is notable that the Government of Fiji also compensated its soldiers who were involved in the British thermonuclear tests on
Kiritimati in the 1950s, after the British refused and the Fijian government found the United Kingdom
was not meeting its responsibility to these veterans.163 The Fijian prime minister explained at the time,“Fiji is not prepared to wait for Britain to do the right thing.”164
Detailed information about compensation plans in other states can be difficult to find. In China, the government began providing compensation to some military personnel involved in nuclear testing in 2007
(after advocacy by veterans)165 but not to the local Uyghur population.166
In many of these cases, seeking compensation is made extra difficult by the long period of time between
exposure and the development of cancers, by difficulties in proving a causal link in these instances, andby challenging bureaucratic processes that require proof of exposure and of an individual’s location at
the time of testing. Moreover, the long delay between nuclear testing and the establishment of compensation plans – where they exist – means many victims never had the chance to seek compensation before they passed away. There is little, if any, evidence that these compensation plans takeknown gender differences into consideration or otherwise address the specific hardships faced by theintersecting identities of victims. Poverty, lack of local health care options, and isolated locations arecommon challenges that can make access to proper medical care difficult, especially in states withprivate health insurance.

160

Hibakusha Stories, “Who Are the Hibakusha?” https://hibakushastories.org/who-are-the-hibakusha.

161

Kyoko Hirabayashi, “Support Measures for Victims of Soviet Nuclear Testing in Kazakhstan”, CPHU Research Report Series
35 (2022): 82–92, https://ir.lib.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/00052461.

162

Noriyuki Kawano, Kyoko Hirabayashi, Masatsugu Matsuo, Yasuyuki Taooka, Takashi Hiraoka, Kazbek N. Apsalikov, Talgat
Moldagaliev and Masaharu Hoshi, “Human Suffering Effects of Nuclear Tests at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan: Established on
the Basis of Questionnaire Surveys”, Journal of Radiation Research 47 (2006): A209–A217, https://doi.org/10.1269/jrr.47.
A209.

163

Agence France Presse, “Fiji Compensates Its Veterans of British Nuclear Tests in the Pacific”, The Guardian, 30 January
2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/30/fiji-compensates-its-veterans-of-british-nuclear-tests-in-thepacific.

164“Nuclear Test Veterans: Britain Urged to Compensate Fijians over 1950s Christmas Island Tests”, ABC News, 2 February
2015, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-03/britain-urged-to-compensate-fijian-nuclear-test-veterans/6066296.

165

David Lague, “China Now Pays Troops Involved in Nuclear Tests”, New York Times, 28 January 2008, https://www.nytimes.
com/2008/01/28/world/asia/28china.html.

166

Yang Xiaoping, “Compensation Measures for Victims of Nuclear Testing in China”, CPHU Research Report Series 35(2022): 47–62, https://ir.lib.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/00052459.

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43

After reading or listening to the stories of survivors of nuclear use and testing, it is clear that no amountof money can bring back their lost relatives or make up for the suffering of facing various cancers,
sometimes many times over. Scholars of transitional justice note the inadequacies of many reparation programmes in other areas caused by implementation challenges and financial limitations. In her
study of reparations in the transitional justice context, Lauren Marie Balasco argues for thinking of reparations as a mechanism not just for redressing the past but for putting “the reparation of lost life opportunities at the centre of their [the reparations’] concerns.”167 In this way, compensation can take ona gendered and intersectional focus by examining what individuals have lost through their exposure,
such as reproductive health.
Balasco also calls for community reparations, which is relevant for communities where radiation
polluted the land and water. Taking the community into account is necessary for a truly intersectional
approach to compensation. Moreover, in line with restorative justice, environmental remediation mustbe part of justice if communities are to be restored. The remediation of the environment is paramountfor Indigenous groups whose sacred and traditional lands were poisoned.

3.2 Policy change
The second most common justice mechanism sought by victims in their testimonials was policy change
aimed at making sure that no one else would suffer as they and their communities had. For this reason,
most of these claims called for the abolition of nuclear weapons, though a few called for an end to all
nuclear testing. In this context, many of the victims discussed their children and grandchildren andwanting to protect future generations from the effects of radiation. For example, like many hibakusha,
Lee Gyuyeo, a survivor of the Hiroshima bombing, advocates for nuclear abolition. He explains:
No words can describe the gravity of the aftereffects on the second and third generations,
not to mention on us, the first generation of nuclear victims. Our children and grandchildren, the second and third generations of the survivors, continue to suffer from unexplained
illnesses and are in unspeakable pain.168
Similarly, the late Marshallese leader Tony DeBrum stated, “Our people have suffered the catastrophic
and irreparable damage of these weapons, and we vow to fight so that no one else on Earth will everagain experience these atrocities.”169 These survivors may have faced significant injustices, but they
do not want the next generations to suffer.
As survivors, many individuals feel a deep obligation to make policy change while they are able. Keiko
Ogura, another Hiroshima survivor, tells visitors to the city that she worries what she will tell those who
perished as a result of the bombing when she meets them after death – “What did you do?” she imagines

167

Lauren Marie Balasco, “Reparative Development: Re-Conceptualising Reparations in Transitional Justice Processes”,
Conflict, Security & Development 17, no. 1 (2017): 2, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2016.1231842.

168

Peace Boat, “Lee Gyuyeo”, World Nuclear Survivors Forum 2021, streamed live 2–3 December 2021, YouTube video,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kG5nPzZVZ7c&feature=youtu.be.

169

Dan Zak, “He Saw a Nuclear Blast at 9, then Spent His Life Opposing Nuclear War and Climate Change”, Washington Post,
24 August 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/he-saw-a-nuclear-blast-at-9-then-spent-his-life-opposingnuclear-war-and-climate-change/2017/08/24/5b6d10e6-882e-11e7-a94f-3139abce39f5_story.html.

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44

they will ask – an added burden for survivors to carry.170 Ogura’s testimony indicates that justice is notjust for present and future generations, but for past victims as well.
In a sense, policy change would be the ultimate form of acknowledgement. Governments making
policy changes to reduce or eliminate the chance of nuclear use or testing in response to the stories
of survivors (after listening to them) indicates that officials truly reflected on what they heard and recognized the pain and the harms caused by nuclear use and testing. Policy change would be a form of
restorative justice as it would help repair relationships in society. Today, many victims of nuclear use
and testing advocate for states to join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to end all nuclear
testing and the TPNW, as it is a treaty that delegitimizes nuclear weapons, seeks abolition, and provides
for victim assistance and environmental remediation.

3.3 Acknowledgement of harm
Presumably, all the individuals who provided public testimony about their family’s experiences with
nuclear use and testing are seeking acknowledgement. They hope that sharing their stories will spreadawareness of the dangers associated with nuclear weapons and help change policy. Nonetheless, thecategory was only coded for those individuals who explicitly called for the responsible government’s
recognition. These victims felt the relevant governments never truly acknowledged the harm caused or
the extent of suffering, especially in the cases of nuclear testing.
Without acknowledgement, victims feel almost invisible, as if their sacrifices or burdens did not occur.
As one former British soldier who served during the Kiritimati tests expressed, “[I’m] so angry about ourgovernment not recognising us, our cause. Our children are affected and their genes are affected and…
their children are going to be affected. And this radiation isn’t going to go away.”171 The British government has explicitly rejected the acknowledgement of harm, noting in a 2020 pamphlet about veterancompensation related to testing: “The policy is however not an acknowledgement that those present at
the tests were exposed to harm.”172
This sense of invisibility is compounded because many victims of nuclear testing are already partof a community or communities on the periphery of nuclear-armed states’ power structures or areotherwise marginalized due to their race, ethnicity, poverty, gender, location or a combination thereof.173
For example, several Indigenous communities in the western United States live nestled among environmental pollution from nuclear tests, uranium mines and nuclear waste facilities.
In Australia, the United Kingdom tested amid First Nations communities, perceiving that the land wasuninhabited,174 and then tested in the South Pacific, and has long claimed that no First Nations people
were affected. The French government claimed the area of its first test, close to Reggane, Algeria, was170

Atomic Heritage Foundation, “Keiko Ogura’s Interview”, https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ranger/tour-stop/keiko-oguras-interview.

171

Peace Boat, “Gordon Coggon”, World Nuclear Survivors Forum 2021, streamed live 2–3 December 2021, YouTube video,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KC_vn1nU4RM.

172“Information for British Nuclear Test Veterans”, Ministry of Defence, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5f461d0ae90e074c4d303333/NTVleaflet.pdf.

173

Jacobs, “Nuclear Conquistadors”.

174

Jon Donnison, “Lingering Impact of British Nuclear Tests in the Australian Outback”, BBC News, 31 December 2014,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-30640338.

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45

selected for its isolation, despite the fact that a community of 6,000 Algerians lived close by.175 China’s
Lop Nor nuclear test site is situated in the Xinjiang Province of western China, the homeland of the
Uyghurs. While access to data is limited, scholars and journalists report higher levels of cancer and birthdefects in the communities surrounding Lop Nor, at which 47 nuclear tests have been conducted.176
Nuclear testing in Pakistan occurred in Baluchistan, which has the highest poverty rate in Pakistan.177
An intersectional perspective means recognizing that communities harmed by nuclear testing havecommonly already been underserved by their governments and are facing numerous challenges.
Acknowledgement is especially important for nuclear justice because of the devastating consequencesof radiation and the limited knowledge of these effects among the broader public. The suffering fromradiation sickness is just the beginning. In testimonials, victims recount their many cancers or thelitany of people in their families and communities who have died of cancers and suffered other healthproblems.
Then there are the ways in which parents uniquely suffer, with women giving birth to stillborn babies orbabies who cannot survive long once born. There are reports of an increase in infant mortality in New
Mexico following the Trinity test178 and in Australia following the Maralinga tests.179 At the time, manyof the parents did not know the cause of their immense losses. Some survivors did understand thepossible effects of radiation on infants and, for those survivors, pregnancy and labour after exposure
took on added psychological stress. As Hiroshima survivor Keiko Ogura recounts:
Before I delivered my baby until the last moment, I was so scared, you know. Everybody
had a hard time. “My baby, my child, is he okay or not?” always mothers are thinking. [With]
nuclear weapons stays future fear. Not all casualties are burned or have scars. No, fear. Yes,
fear, so deep in our hearts. Everybody had fear.180
This fear continues among those affected by nuclear use and testing to this day. A British veteranexplains, “When a grandchild is born, [other atomic veterans] don’t ask if it’s a boy or a girl, but if it’sokay.”181 While there is scientific debate over the generational effects of exposure to radiation, many
victims believe the illnesses and birth defects in their children and grandchildren are connected to their
original exposure to radiation.

175

BBC News, “France-Algeria Relations: The Lingering Fallout from Nuclear Tests in the Sahara”, 27 April 2021, https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-africa-56799670.

176

Becky Alexis-Martin, “The Nuclear Imperialism-Necropolitics Nexus: Contextualizing Chinese–Uyghur Oppression in Our
Nuclear Age”, Eurasian Geography and Economics 60, no. 2 (2019): 158, https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2019.164561.

177

World Bank, “Poverty & Equity Brief, Pakistan”, April 2019, https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_
download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Archives-2019/Global_POVEQ_PAK.pdf.

178

Kathleen M. Tucker and Robert Alvarez, “Trinity: ‘The most significant hazard of the entire Manhattan Project’”, Bulletinof the Atomic Scientists, 15 July 2019, https://thebulletin.org/2019/07/trinity-the-most-significant-hazard-of-the-entire-manhattan-project.

179

Megan Palin, “Children of Maralinga Atomic Bomb Test Veterans ‘Suffering Deformities and Early Deaths’ because of‘Genetic Transfer’”, news.com.au, 10 March 2016, https://www.news.com.au/national/south-australia/new-generations-of-australian-families-suffering-deformities-and-early-deaths-because-of-genetic-transfer/news-story/6e1e0328063fe48142234c7c74848fea.

180

Atomic Heritage Foundation, “Keiko Ogura’s Interview”, https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ranger/tour-stop/keiko-oguras-interview.

181

Chris Wood, “Nuclear Test Veterans: ‘My Dad Was Treated Like a Guinea Pig’”, BBC News, 31 May 2021, https://www.bbc.
com/news/uk-wales-57157476.
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46

There are different ways in which governments can acknowledge victims of nuclear use and testing.
The city of Hiroshima holds an annual remembrance ceremony on 6 August, in which the prime
minister often addresses the participants, including many hibakusha. This ceremony is in addition
to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and Peace Memorial Park, which do much to commemorate victims. Nagasaki hosts a similar ceremony on 9 August and maintains a peace park and a publicmuseum.
The British government recently created a symbolic means to acknowledge veterans who worked on
nuclear testing. In 2022, the government agreed to the creation of the nuclear test medal, which one
veteran called a “massive step” in terms of recognition.182
In 2023, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution entitled “Addressing the legacyof nuclear weapons: providing victim assistance and environmental remediation to Member Statesaffected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons”183 – another means of recognition. The resolution,
which explicitly acknowledges the many physical and psychological harms caused by nuclear use
and testing, received overwhelming support from countries around the world, but not from the ninecountries that possess nuclear weapons.
For many survivors, acknowledgement appears necessary for restorative justice – for repairing relationships between victims and their governments or the governments that tested nuclear weapons.
Providing compensation is another form of acknowledgement in that it directly addresses the harmcaused by exposure to radiation, though some governments have not officially acknowledged harmeven when paying compensation. The call of acknowledgement appears to be about more thanresources, a human desire to have one’s suffering and sacrifice recognized by others. Victims are
no longer invisible when governments publicly acknowledge the harm of nuclear use and testing. A
speech acknowledging harm, or a monument to victims and survivors, could go a long way in beginning
to repair relations between governments and those harmed by nuclear use and testing.

3.4 Apology
Going beyond seeking recognition, some victims want the governments involved in nuclear use andtesting to apologize for the harm they caused through these activities.184 The 2001 United Nations International Law Commission report on reparations includes the need for “satisfaction”, which it notes,“may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or anotherappropriate modality.”185

182

Graeme Baker, “Nuclear Test Medal: UK Veterans to Receive Recognition after Years-Long Campaign”, BBC News, 28 July
2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-66330471.

183

United Nations General Assembly, “Addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons: providing victim assistance and environmental remediation to Member States affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons” A/RES/78/240, 28 December 2023,
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4033026.

184

Some scholars consider apology a subset of acknowledgement, but this article maintains them as analytically distinct andargues that apologies represent a more significant step than a simple acknowledgement of harm.

185

Quoted in Michael R. Marrus, “Official Apologies and the Quest for Historical Justice”, Journal of Human Rights 6, no. 1(2007): 87, https://doi.org/10.1080/14754830601098402.

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Several nuclear victims in the sample mentioned the importance of governments apologizing. As one
French Polynesian anti-nuclear activist explained, “We would like the French state to apologize for the
many nuclear tests that transformed our island paradise into hell.”186 Some victims of the Japanesebombings also seek apologies. In the words of one Hiroshima survivor, “It’s a very unbelievable thingthat U.S. presidents after Truman have never even thought of apologizing for dropping A-bombs on twocities.”187
Despite a recent increase in government apologies for many types of historical wrongs,188 nuclear-armed
states thus far have resisted the call to apologize for nuclear activities. In 2016, when President Obama
became the first US president to visit Hiroshima since the Second World War, some survivors called for
him to apologize for the 1945 bombing.189 In response to these justice claims, Obama’s deputy national
security adviser explained, “He will not revisit the decision to use the atomic bomb at the end of WorldWar II. Instead, he will offer a forward-looking vision focused on our shared future.”190 Even without
making any apology, President Obama’s 2016 visit to Hiroshima was attacked by domestic critics, who
saw it as being part of a “shameful apology tour”.191 In other words, the domestic politics of apologizing
can appear too costly for leaders.192
Nonetheless, some form of apology is warranted in many cases, given the long-term harm caused byradiation from nuclear use and testing. Civilians were either not told about the potential harm or told
it was nothing to be concerned about. At the very least, governments that have engaged in nuclear
testing could express that, recognizing what humanity now knows, they apologize for the inadvertent
harm they caused decades ago. They could acknowledge the multitude of ways in which people of
all ages and genders suffered physically and psychologically from nuclear use and testing. Apologies
serve the goals of transitional justice, restorative justice and intergenerational justice by helping communities make peace with the past and anticipate a different future.

186

Nic Maclellan, “‘We Would Like France to Apologise’: Nuclear Test Survivors in French Polynesia”, DiaNuke.org, 28 July
2020, https://www.dianuke.org/we-would-like-france-to-apologise-nuclear-test-survivors-in-french-polynesia.

187

David E. Decosse, “An Interview with a Survivor of the Hiroshima Bombing”, National Catholic Reporter, 19 December 2016,
https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/ncr-today/interview-survivor-hiroshima-bombing.

188

Marrus, “Official Apologies and the Quest for Historical Justice”, 75; Juliette Schaafsma, Marieke Zoodsma and Thia Sagherian-Dickey, “Closing Chapters of the Past? Rhetorical Strategies in Political Apologies for Human Rights Violations acrossthe World”, Journal of Human Rights 20, no. 5 (2021): 582–597, https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2021.1977919.

189

For example, see Abigail Leonard, “Hiroshima Survivors Want Obama to Apologize. But the Japanese Government Probably
Doesn’t”, VOX, 27 May 2016, https://www.vox.com/2016/5/27/11791766/obama-hiroshima-apology.

190

Susan Heavey, Matt Spetalnick and Minami Funakoshi, “Obama to Visit Hiroshima, Will Not Apologize for World War Two
Bombing”, Reuters, 10 May 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-japan-obama/obama-to-visit-hiroshimawill-not-apologize-for-world-war-two-bombing-idUSKCN0Y11KC.

191

John R. Bolton, “Obama’s Shameful Apology Tour Lands in Hiroshima”, New York Post,26 May 2016, https://www.aei.org/
articles/obamas-shameful-apology-tour-lands-in-hiroshima. See also, Callum Borchers, “Obama’s Trip to Hiroshima,
and the Looming ‘Apology Tour’ Narrative”, Washington Post, 10 May 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-fix/wp/2016/05/10/obamas-trip-to-hiroshima-and-the-looming-apology-tour-narrative.

192

Risa Kitagawa and Jonathan A. Chu, “The Impact of Political Apologies on Public Opinion”, World Politics 73, no. 3 (2021):
441–481, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887121000083.

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3.5 More data and information
Some survivors seek more information about the circumstances around nuclear use and testing, as
well as data about radiation doses and effects. This desire is understandable as many nuclear-armed
governments have kept information about tests and their effects classified. The lack of candour aroundnuclear effects and the many examples of missing data can breed distrust towards governments that
tested nuclear weapons.
In one example from 2023, British veterans involved in nuclear testing said newly found UK government
documents indicated that the government knew more about the damage from radiation at the time ofits early nuclear testing than it had admitted.193 Indeed, the British military took samples of blood andurine from those involved in nuclear testing, but the results are missing from veterans’ medical files.194
Or take the example of the French government. France long denied that individuals were harmed by its
nuclear testing, which delayed victims from receiving compensation for decades. French government
documents declassified in 2013 indicated greater radioactive active fallout from French Polynesian
nuclear testing than had previously been admitted.195
The United States recognized victims of radiation earlier than its allies, but there were also instances inthe early nuclear age in which the government may have withheld information from the public. One Utah
resident, for example, remembers government officials coming to her school with Geiger counters totest the students. They were told the tests were related to recent dental X-rays, which she knew she had
not had.196 The residents in the area were told that the nuclear testing would not have effects beyond
the test site’s perimeter.197
The US government also made incorrect assumptions about the radioactive fallout during the tests
conducted in the Marshall Islands.198 For instance, in 1968, the US government told Bikinians they
could return to Bikini Atoll (they left at the request of the US government in 1946 for nuclear testing),
only to reverse course ten years later and tell those who had moved back that the atoll was unsafe forhumans. In 2016, scientists determined that levels of radiation were still too high for human habitationon the atoll.199 The Bikinians lost their ancestral homeland, including the graves of their family members
as well as their traditional way of life, in what has become a permanent relocation.

193

Dominic Casciani, “Nuclear Bomb Test Veterans Relaunch Legal Action”, BBC News, 20 September 2023, https://www.
bbc.com/news/uk-66869017.

194

Casciani, “Nuclear Bomb Test Veterans Relaunch Legal Action”.

195

Adrian Cho, “France Grossly Underestimated Radioactive Fallout from Atom Bomb Tests, Study Finds”, Science,
11 March 2021, https://www.science.org/content/article/france-grossly-underestimated-radioactive-fallout-atom-bomb-tests-study-finds.

196

Lesley M.M. Blume, “U.S. Nuclear Testing’s Devastating Legacy Lingers, 30 Years after Moratorium”, National Geographic, 26 September 2022, https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/history-and-civilisation/2022/09/us-nuclear-testings-devastating-legacy-lingers-30-years-after-moratorium.

197

Blume, “U.S. Nuclear Testing’s Devastating Legacy Lingers”.

198

Walter Pincus, Blown to Hell: Blown to Hell: America’s Deadly Betrayal of the Marshall Islanders (New York: Diversion
Books, 2021).

199

Bob Yirka, “Radiation Levels on Bikini Atoll Found to Exceed Safety Standard”, Phys.org, 7 June 2016, https://phys.org/
news/2016-06-bikini-atoll-safety-standard.html. For a compilation of studies on radiation levels in the Marshall Islands,
see https://k1project.columbia.edu/news/marshall-islands-radiological-studies-2017-2019.

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In other cases, it is difficult to find any information about testing and radiation doses. The Chinese
government continues to refuse to acknowledge harmful radiation affecting civilians in its Xinjiang
Province, while medical researchers (using models of nuclear tests elsewhere) believe “conservatively”
that “1.2 million received doses high enough to induce leukemia, solid cancers and fetal damage” inChina.200 The Soviet Union collected health data from individuals around the Semipalatinsk test site inpresent-day Kazakhstan, but these data – now held by the Russian government – have not been madeavailable to the Kazakh government, despite “repeated plead[ing] with Russian authorities.”201 The
villages adjacent to the Indian nuclear test site report higher instances of cancer as well as trouble withlivestock and agriculture in the aftermath of the 1974 test and the 1998 tests and have requested that
their government study the effects of radiation.202 The story appears similar in neighbouring Pakistan,where those living in Baluchistan also claim significant illnesses following the 1998 tests.203
Seeking information about nuclear use and testing from relevant governments is another way to makesurvivors’ suffering more visible to the public at large. Data collected about radiation doses can help
make the case that victims should be acknowledged and that governments should contribute to compensation schemes that address differential effects depending on gender and other relevant factors.
Data collection could perhaps contribute to arguments in favour of government apologies (as well as
the acknowledgement and compensation schemes already mentioned) and may ultimately contribute to policy change. Just as with truth commissions in the transitional justice setting, part of the goalof truth-telling is to acknowledge suffering at the hands of the state and to ensure these harms never
happen again.

4. Conclusions and recommendations
Pursuing nuclear justice for survivors of nuclear use and testing is long overdue. Many of the victims
have passed away in the decades since the nuclear age began. Nonetheless, a system of nuclear justicemechanisms is worth contemplating and creating. Influenced by a broadly defined conception of restorative justice, the theory and relevant mechanisms of transitional justice, gender and intersectional
perspectives, feminist foreign policy, and intergenerational justice, this article has sought to develop asurvivor-centric form of nuclear justice by using the words of survivors themselves. The justice mechanisms of compensation, policy change, acknowledgement, apology and data collection can work intandem to create a system of nuclear justice. These mechanisms could help inform the ongoing intersessional work of TPNW states parties on victim assistance and environmental remediation.
Though nuclear-armed states and their allies have rejected the TPNW thus far, this is an area inwhich some non-treaty members could also become involved. To truly provide justice for survivors,

200

Zeeya Merali, “Did China’s Nuclear Tests Kill Thousands and Doom Future Generations?” Scientific American, 1 July 2009,https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/did-chinas-nuclear-tests.

201

Togzhan Kassenova, Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2022),
266–267.

202

Swati Vashishtha, “Give Peace a Chance, Say Villagers Near Nuclear Test Sites in Pokhran”, CNN-News18, 5 October 2016,
https://www.news18.com/news/india/give-peace-a-chance-say-villagers-near-nuclear-test-sites-in-pokhran-1298772.
html.

203

Shah Meer Baloch, “The Fallout from Pakistan’s Nuclear Tests”, The Diplomat, 29 May 2017, https://thediplomat.
com/2017/05/the-fallout-from-pakistans-nuclear-tests.

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50

significant funding will be necessary, and many states will need to contribute. Non-TPNW members,
such as Germany204 and Norway,205 have expressed some interest in participating in discussions on
victim assistance and environmental remediation, suggesting a meaningful avenue for bridge-building between members and non-members of the TPNW regime. An important forum to foster dialogue
and cooperation between these groups of states are the conferences on the humanitarian impacts ofnuclear weapons. While these conferences have become linked to the TPNW, they are valuable independently of the treaty. They help to inform young people and diplomats, among others, about the detrimental effects of nuclear weapons. The continuation of these conferences could offer an opportunity
to discuss issues like victim assistance with a diverse group of states.
The NPT is also a potential forum for discussions on the impact of nuclear weapons and what could
be done to address harm caused to individuals and communities. Despite recent disagreements, it isimportant to remember that, in 2010, NPT states parties were able to agree to language on the devastating effects of nuclear weapons. The outcome document of the Review Conference of the NPT adopted
in 2010 noted the “catastrophic humanitarian consequences” of nuclear weapon use.206 Moreover, if
the TPNW membership continues to expand, NPT states parties may feel additional pressure to takeseriously its goals. In such a scenario, NPT states parties, including the nuclear-weapon states, may
look for ways to behave consistently with the norms of the TPNW, even if they do not join the treaty. This
type of pressure mechanism has been observed in other humanitarian disarmament treaties, illustrating the power of global norms to influence the behaviour of states.207
Going beyond the nuclear regimes, it is worth highlighting that many states have signed on to United
Nations General Assembly resolutions expressing concerns regarding the harmful effects of nuclear
use and testing. To address those concerns, it is important that states cooperate and put in place mechanisms such as compensation, policy change, acknowledgements, apologies and data collection.
With enough interest, perhaps even those states responsible for nuclear use and testing will eventuallyagree as well.

204

Federal Foreign Office, “Statement by Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock at the 10th Review Conference of the Parties to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, 1 August 2022, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/
news/-/2545450. Baerbock stated: “We want to improve dialogue and cooperate in addressing the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons – in the field of victim assistance or the remediation of areas contaminated by nuclear testing”.

205

Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, “The Obligation to Assist Victims”, https://banmonitor.org/positive-obligations-1/the-obligation-to-assist-victims.

206

2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Volume
I, Part I (New York, 2010), https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010.

207

An example of this pressure mechanism can be seen with the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. The United States
did not join the treaty, but the Obama administration reviewed its anti-personnel landmine policy in line with the convention and limited the use of landmines to the Korean peninsula. See Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “U.S. Antipersonnel
Landmine Use Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 29 September 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/
pdf/IF/IF11440.

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III. Public opinion on nuclear
weapons: Is there a gender gap?
by Ellen Willio and Michal Onderco208
1. Introduction
The recent decision of the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists to place
the symbolic Doomsday Clock to 90 seconds before midnight – the closest it has ever come to global catastrophe – highlights the rising nuclear risks.209 As weapons of mass destruction persistently dominate
international discourse and debate, it is crucial to recognize that these weapons can affect any and all
citizens. Hence, this paper aims to examine the crucial significance of public opinion in the context of
nuclear arms. An important but relatively unexplored issue is that attitudes towards nuclear weapons
can vary significantly between different demographic groups within society.
This paper focuses specifically on gender. Academics have long studied gender gaps in public opinion
in other policy domains, but little research has yet been conducted on this issue in relation to nuclear
weapons. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to examine whether and to what extent a gender gap exists
in attitudes towards nuclear weapons. This research adopts the definition of gender employed by theUnited Nations Statistics Division: “socially constructed differences in attributes and opportunities associated with being female or male”.210 Specifically, the paper aims to answer the following researchquestions: Is there a gender gap in attitudes towards nuclear weapons? What do existing public opinion
polls and academic surveys reveal about how men and women view the proliferation and use of nuclear
weapons and nuclear disarmament?
The research conducted for this paper systematized existing public opinion polls and academic surveys
on issues related to nuclear weapons. The findings indicate that women tend to be more opposed thanmen to nuclear proliferation and express greater discomfort about the existence of nuclear weapons.
Results on opinions about the use of nuclear weapons are conflicting: some studies suggest that men
are more inclined to approve than women, while others argue the opposite, that women are more likely
to approve than men. In relation to arms control and nuclear disarmament, no distinct gender differences in public opinion were identified.

208

We thank Andrey Baklitsky, Dr Stephen Herzog, Dr Renata Hessmann Dalaqua and Paula Jou Fuster for their suggestions
on the framing of our paper. We thank Tom Etienne for helpful methodological tips.

209“A moment of historic danger: It is still 90 seconds to midnight”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2024, https://thebulletin.
org/doomsday-clock/current-time/.

210

See “Integrating a Gender Perspective into Statistics: Glossary of Terms”, UN Statistics Wiki, 2020, https://unstats.un.org/
wiki/display/genderstatmanual/Glossary+of+terms. While this paper recognizes that gender goes beyond the binary
notion of men and women, it restricts itself to these two categories. It does so in view of the limitations of existing surveys,
which rarely offer other options of gender identification.

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Understanding the gendered differences in attitudes towards nuclear weapons matters for two primaryreasons. Firstly, if there are systematic differences in opinion between men and women, this would underscore that gender diversity among decision makers is a means to achieve diversity of perspectives,a proven asset in decision-making. Thus, such as finding would strengthen the case for advocating fordiverse teams in nuclear policymaking institutions.211
Secondly, in democracies, policy responsiveness to public opinion plays an important role in policymaking. An issue as grave and impactful as nuclear weapons makes this responsiveness even more
relevant. Examining demographic differences in public opinion sheds light on potential polarization,
which could influence policymaking. By highlighting these potential gender differences, this paper aims
to contribute to a more informed and nuanced understanding of public opinion on nuclear weapons.

2. Public opinion and policy change
Public opinion often serves as an important driving force for policy change within democracies.212 The
magnitude of this influence is contingent on factors such as the nature of public opinion and the type ofpolicy issue.
Policies typically move in a similar direction to public opinion when that change in opinion is substantial
and remains stable.213 Additionally, the effect of public opinion on policy is more pronounced for issues
that are highly salient than for those of lesser significance,214 because when citizens exhibit a significant level of concern about a particular issue, they are more inclined to consider the actions of elected
officials on that issue when voting. By implication, responsiveness to public opinion tends to be higher
in issues of high public salience, given the limited attention capacity of both the public and legislative
bodies.215
The literature is divided on the relationship between responsiveness and type of policy issue. Earlier
studies found the responsiveness of governments to be higher on domestic issues than on foreign
affairs, attributed to the heightened salience of domestic issues. However, more recent research has
shown that the influence of public opinion on policy is notably more pronounced in areas of defence,
foreign policy and economic policies than on other issues.216 Existing work has shown that public
opinion can influence how military leaders217 and elected officials218 think about policy options.

211

For more on this topic, see Louis Reitmann’s chapter in this edited volume, “The scientific case for diversity in nuclear
weapons policymaking”.

212

Paul Burstein, “The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda”, Political Research Quarterly 56,
no. 1 (2003): 29–40, https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290305600103.

213

Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy”, American Political Science Review 77, no. 1(1983): 175–190, https://doi.org/10.2307/1956018.

214

Page and Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy”, 175–190.

215

Bryan D. Jones, Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994),
432–433.

216

Burstein, “Impact of Public Opinion”.

217

Erik Lin-Greenberg, “Soldiers, Pollsters, and International Crises: Public Opinion and the Military’s Advice on the Use ofForce”, Foreign Policy Analysis 17, no. 3 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orab009.

218

Jonathan Chu and Stefano Recchia, “Does Public Opinion Affect the Preferences of Foreign Policy Leaders? Experimental
Evidence from the UK Parliament”, Journal of Politics 84, no. 3 (2022): 1874–1877, https://ssrn.com/abstract=4016051.

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53

In the United States of America, as an example, the salience of nuclear weapons as a policy issue has
been largely dependent on public concern about nuclear weapons. Consequently, its salience has
shifted several times since the Trinity test in 1945.219 During the Cold War, its salience was very high:nuclear weapons were perceived as a great threat and nuclear issues were a matter not only of foreign
policy but of domestic policy, since the public was confronted with them in their daily lives through duckand-cover drills.220 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, popular perception of the threat
declined, rendering nuclear disarmament less important and decreasing the need to discuss nuclear
weapons issues.221
Over the past decade, public interest and concern have increased again as a result of international
events, such as the threat of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear ambitions;222 a series of heatedexchanges between then US President Trump and the leader of the Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea Kim Jong Un , which led to a comparison of the magnitude of their nuclear buttons;223 and, mostrecently, the war in Ukraine, which brought the nuclear issue back to the forefront of the international
political scene.224
Among the general public in the United States, substantial gender disparities have been reported
in policy preferences on issues related to violence and the use of force.225 Indeed, existing studies
drawing on long-term trends in primarily the United States indicate a pronounced gender gap in support
for military intervention in overseas conflicts, with women being less likely than men to endorse the government’s use of force and showing greater sensitivity to the humanitarian aspects of conflict.226 This
inclination can be attributed to concerns about both the financial and human costs of war,227 as well as
to fears of potential retaliation or further escalation.228
Moreover, existing work argues that the gender gap in attitudes towards the use of violence could be attributed to widespread, gender-specific early cognitive learning and to potentially affective orientations

219

Jacob M. Nebel, “The Nuclear Disarmament Movement: Politics, Potential, and Strategy”, Journal of Peace Education 9,
no. 3 (2012): 225–247, https://doi.org/10.1080/17400201.2012.668494.

220

Eleonora Mattiacci, “How Nuclear Issue Salience Shapes Counterproliferation”, Global Studies Quarterly 1, no. 3 (2021):
23–33, https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksab026.

221

Alexander K. Bollfrass and Stephen Herzog, “The War in Ukraine and Global Nuclear Order”, Survival (2022): 7–32.

222

Mattiacci, “Nuclear Issue Salience”.

223

Ashley Lytle and Kristyn Karl, “Understanding Americans’ Perceptions of Nuclear Weapons Risk and Subsequent Behavior”,
International Journal of Communication 14 (2020): 299–323, https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/12369/2909.

224

Bollfrass and Herzog, “War in Ukraine and Global Nuclear Order”.

225

Pamela Johnston Conover and Virginia Sapiro, “Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War”, American Journal of Political
Science 37, no. 4 (1993): 1079–1099, https://doi.org/10.2307/2111544.

226

Richard C. Eichenberg, “Gender Differences in Public Attitudes toward the Use of Force by the United States, 1990–2003”,
International Security 28, no. 1 (2003): 110–141, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137577; Richard C. Eichenberg, “GenderDifference in American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force, 1982–2013”, International Studies Quarterly 60, no.
1 (2016): 138–148, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqv019; Val Burris, “From Vietnam to Iraq: Continuity and Change in
Between-Group Differences in Support for Military Action”, Social Problems 55, no. 4 (2008): 443–479. https://doi.
org/10.1525/sp.2008.55.4.443.

227

Mary E. Bendyna, Tamara Finucane, L. G. Kirby, John P. O’Donnell and Clyde Wilcox, “Gender Differences in Public
Attitudes toward the Gulf War: A Test of Competing Hypotheses”, Social Science Journal 33, no. 1 (1996): 1–22, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0362-3319(96)90002-6.

228

Lisa Brandes, “Public Opinion, International Security, and Gender: The United States and Great Britain since 1945” (PhD
diss., Yale University, 1994), https://www.proquest.com/openview/ba569c44c5c9fd922184cd5d3a4b8257/1.

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54

towards the use of violence.229 A study in the US indicates that these gender differences are context
specific and socially constructed. Indeed, even when other explanatory elements are controlled for, thedifferences cannot be eliminated, suggesting that they result from socialization and the adoption of genderroles. Women tend to delay resorting to violence during conflict, escalate its use more gradually and experience more emotional distress as a result.230 Research in the United States argues that men may feel
more comfortable with the use of violence due to a socialization that emphasizes physical aggression.231

3. Measuring the gender gap in attitudes towards
nuclear weapons
For this paper, a systematic effort was made to catalogue academic articles and public opinion polls232that investigated attitudes towards nuclear weapons in which gender was considered as a variable.
The search terms included “nuclear weapons attitudes”, “gender gap”, “public opinion” and variations
thereof. The search was limited to polls published worldwide over the past three decades and papers
from journals published by major international publishers and/or journals ranked in Journal Citation
Reports, an annual publication by Clarivate which features bibliographic and bibliometric data on social
science journals.233 In total, 39 academic articles and opinion polls were surveyed, spanning from 1990
to 2023 and covering 47 countries and territories in all United Nations regional groups. The complete
list of polls can be found in the online appendix.234
Instead of a full meta-analysis, this paper provides a systematic review of public opinion regarding
nuclear weapons, considering gender as a significant variable, throughout different countries andcontexts. The questions asked in these surveys were categorized as follows: “proliferation”, “use” and“arms control and disarmament”. The questions covered a range of opinions and attitudes relating to
nuclear weapons, with the outcomes being measured in proportional terms, that is, the share of men
and women respondents who agreed or disagreed with a given question.
If the prior research (academic study or poll) reported the effect of gender on attitudes, those findings
are included here as well. If the prior research did not report the effect of gender on attitudes, it wascalculated using the existing data. The Z Score calculation for two population proportions was used

229

Patrice M. Miller, Dorothy L. Danaher and David Forbes, “Sex-related Strategies for Coping with Interpersonal Conflictin Children Aged Five and Seven”, Development Psychology 22 (1986): 543–548, https://doi.org/10.1037/00121649.22.4.543.

230

Conover and Sapiro, “Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War”.

231

Amanda B. Diekman and Monica C. Schneider, “A Social Role Theory Perspective on Gender Gaps in Political Attitudes”, Psychology of Women Quarterly 34, no. 4 (2010): 486–497, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.2010.01598.x.

232

The main difference between the data from academic surveys and from public opinion polls is that the academic surveys
have often been developed with a particular hypothesis in mind. This translates to very specific questions. Furthermore,academics often do not report descriptive findings and, even less so, results by gender. By contrast, the public opinion
surveys conducted by pollsters might be designed in cooperation with their client and hence might have somewhat leading
questions, but they often do report descriptive findings and specific results by gender.

233

Papers published in Journal Citation Reports tend to exhibit a strong Western bias, which is very strongly tilted towards dataon and from the United States. See also Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Proliferating Bias? American Political Science, Nuclear
Weapons, and Global Security”, Journal of Global Security Studies 4, no. 3 (2019): 384–392, https://doi.org/10.1093/
jogss/ogz025.

234

The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.25397/eur.24995684.

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55

to determine whether the differences observed in the responses of men and women were statisticallysignificant.235 A 95% confidence interval was used as the standard, and a 99% confidence interval
was also employed for a more stringent assessment. The proportions and population sizes reported insurveys were used for the Z Score calculations. If the population size was not reported, an equal split
between men and women was assumed.236 These surveys are presented in the online appendix, where
the statistically significant differences between the responses of men and women are highlighted indifferent colours.237

4. So, what is the gap?
Let us now dive into the existing work on the gender gap in attitudes towards nuclear weapons. The
existing work is not unequivocal about this. Each section first discusses the existing literature and thenexplores the data from the polls.

4.1 Proliferation
In the existing academic studies and polls, there is a clear pattern of higher aversion to nuclear proliferation among women than among men in various geographical settings.
Studies in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States show thatwomen are generally more against nuclear proliferation than men are.238 In 1994, a study examined
all polls in the United Kingdom and the United States from 1945 to 1988 regarding attitudes towards
nuclear weapons; notable gender differences emerged. The study found that women were generally
less supportive than men of the production of nuclear weapons. Specifically, during the 1950s and1960s, fewer women endorsed the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially those weapons associated with high radiation risks, such as the neutron bomb. Additionally, women in the United Kingdom
exhibited significant reluctance to approve the deployment of US cruise missiles in the United Kingdom
due to concerns about the risk of attack and the loss of control. The research highlighted that men weremore likely than women to express a sense of increased security thanks to nuclear weapons, while
women were more likely to see these weapons as hazardous. The perception of potentially catastrophic
and uncontrollable consequences associated with nuclear weapons led to greater disapproval among
women regarding their acquisition.239 A 2020 study that explored public attitudes towards nuclear technologies in the United States similarly revealed that women were notably more likely than men to have a235

This method was applied to the following studies: Simons Foundation, Global Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons; International Committee of the Red Cross, “They Didn’t Start the Fire”; Körber Stiftung, “Eine Studie von Kantar”; Baron andHerzog, “What the American Public Likes and Hates”; Greenpeace, “Umfrage zu Atomwaffen”, (Greenpeace, 2019, 2020,2021); IPPNW, “Meinungen zu Atomwaffen”; British Pugwash, “2023 UK Public Opinion Survey”; YouGov, “Which of theFollowing”; YouGov, “What Should Happen”; YouGov, “As Far as You Are Aware”; YouGov, “Study of War”; YouGov, “Would
You Support?”

236

This method was applied to the following study: Jonathon Baron and Stephen Herzog, “Poll: What the American Public
Likes and Hates about Trump’s Nuclear Policies”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 27 April 2020, https://thebulletin.
org/2020/04/poll-what-the-american-public-likes-and-hates-about-trumps-nuclear-policies.

237

The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.25397/eur.24995684.

238

Brandes, “Public Opinion, International Security”; Jonathan Baron and Stephen Herzog, “Public Opinion on Nuclear Energy
and Nuclear Weapons: The Attitudinal Nexus in the United States”, Energy Research and Social Science 68: 101567 (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101567.

239

Brandes, “Public Opinion, International Security”.

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56

negative attitude towards the continuing research into, development of and storage of nuclear weapons
in their country.240
In a different geographical context, namely India and Japan, signs of a gender gap were also found,though less clearly than in the United Kingdom and the United States. In India, research on the viewsof individuals within high social circles found that men were less likely than women to be opponents ofnuclear weapon acquisition. Yet the differences were slight, and the sample of women respondents was
small, reflecting the dominance of men in high social circles in Indian society.241
In Japan, a 2023 study examined the influence of external threats on public opinion about the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In particular, the study looked at whether aversion to the acquisition of
nuclear weapons was unconditional or could erode in the face of events that would worsen Japan’s
security situation, such as the withdrawal of the US security–nuclear umbrella or more nuclear weapon
tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The study found that regardless of a hypotheticalworsening in the external security environment, men were more supportive than women of the acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, the study also showed that women responded more forcefully thanmen to a deterioration in Japan’s external security environment. The study concluded that women in
Japan appear to start with a lower level of support than men for a Japanese nuclear option, yet women
may be more inclined to offer such support when there is a raised perception of international threat.242
Studies conducted in the Republic of Korea, however, show no significant gender differences, noreven a reserved pattern, in opinions on nuclear proliferation: No significant differences between men
and women were found when researching public opinion about whether the Republic of Korea should
pursue nuclear capabilities243 or when examining the underlying factors influencing public opinion on
nuclear weapon acquisition.244 One study found that childhood experience of war violence influencesindividuals’ preferences for nuclear proliferation, with people in war zones being more supportive of
nuclear weapons and seeing them as a deterrent to invasion. However, there was no significant difference when gender was controlled for.245 Moreover, a 2020 study found that an increase in the credibility of the US nuclear security guarantee led to more support for nuclear proliferation among the respondents in the Republic of Korea; the same study found a positive relationship between women andsupport for proliferation.246

240

Jonathan Baron and Stephen Herzog, “Public Opinion on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons: The Attitudinal Nexus in
the United States”, Energy Research and Social Science 68: 101567 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101567.

241

David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, “Elite Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons Policy in India”, Asian Survey 36, no. 6(1996): 545–560, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2645790.pdf.

242

Naoko Matsumura, Atsushi Tago and Joseph M. Grieco, “External Threats and Public Opinion: The East Asian Security Environment and Japanese Views on the Nuclear Option”, Journal of East Asian Studies 23, no. 1 (2023): 23–44, https://doi.
org/10.1017/jea.2022.40.

243

Sangyong Son and Man-Sung Yim, “Correlates of South Korean Public Opinion on Nuclear Proliferation”, Asian Survey
61, no. 6 (2021): 1028–1057, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2021.1429174; Keunsik Jung et al., 2016 Unification Perception
Survey, SNU IPUS Unification Research Series 32 (Seoul: Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, 2017), https://ipus.
snu.ac.kr/wp-content/uploads/files/attach/binaries/12865/101/087/334e968d3cc5a71eb03915f261460da1.

244

Kyung Suk Lee, “The Microfoundations of Nuclear Proliferation: Evidence from South Korea”, International Journal of Public
Opinion Research 35, no. 4 (2023): 13–15, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edad033.

245James D. Kim, “The Long-Run Impact of Childhood Wartime Violence on Preferences for Nuclear Proliferation”, Journal ofConflict Resolution 68, no. 1 (2023): 108–137, https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231159287.

246

Lauren Sukin, “Credible Nuclear Security Commitments Can Backfire: Explaining Domestic Support for Nuclear
Weapons Acquisition in South Korea”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 64, no. 6 (2020): 1011–1042, https://doi.

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57

The Millennials on War survey, commissioned by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
in 2019, shows a general pattern of women being more likely than men to oppose nuclear proliferation. There were few differences between men and women when it came to endorsement of the core
non-proliferation norm (“Countries which don’t have nuclear weapons should not develop or obtainthem”), except for in Ukraine, where women were more likely than men to endorse the norm, and in the
United States, where men were more likely to endorse it than women. In the same survey, women in
most countries247 were less likely than men to indicate that possession of nuclear weapons would maketheir country safer. With two exceptions where there was no difference (Malaysia and the Syrian Arab
Republic), women were additionally much less likely than men to support their country in developing or
keeping nuclear weapons.248
In other polls, women were less likely than men to endorse the proliferation norm. In France, Germany,
Israel, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, men were more likely than women to express
that nuclear weapons make them feel safe;249 and in a nuclear host country – Germany, in the sample
examined for this paper – men were more likely than women to be opposed to the replacement of thedelivery vehicles.250 In the United Kingdom, men were more likely than women to support the theircountry possessing nuclear weapons251 and allowing the United States to deploy nuclear weapons on
British soil.252 Women in the United Kingdom were less likely to report knowing that their country has
nuclear weapons.253
Overall, the results from the academic studies and the polls indicate that the nuclear non-proliferation norm is more strongly held by women than by men. Despite some surveys and countries in which
this pattern does not hold, the general tendency is clear, and applies to studies conducted in nuclear-weapon states (primarily the United Kingdom and the United States and, to a lesser degree, France),
in countries that are allies of the nuclear-weapon states (mainly European NATO states that hostnuclear weapons on their territory), and in other geographical settings.

4.2 UseWhen it comes to public views on the use of nuclear weapons, the results are more mixed, and whether
a gendered pattern emerges depends on the study.

org/10.1177/0022002719888689.
247

France, Indonesia, Israel, Nigeria, Russian Federation, South Africa, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine, United
Kingdom and United States.

248“They Didn’t Start the Fire: Millennial Views on War and Peace”, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2019, https://www.icrc.org/en/millennials-on-war.

249

Simons Foundation, Global Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons (Simons Foundation, 2017), https://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/2007%20Poll%20on%20Global%20Public%20Opinion%20on%20Attitudes%20
Towards%20Nuclear%20Weapons_0.pdf; Greenpeace, “Umfrage zu Atomwaffen”, (Greenpeace, 2019, 2020, 2021).

250

IPPNW, “Meinungen zu Atomwaffen”, IPPNW, 2016, https://www.ippnw.de/commonFiles/pdfs/Atomwaffen/forsaumfrage_Atomwaffen_2016.pdf; Greenpeace, “Umfrage zu Atomwaffe”, (Greenpeace, 2019, 2020, 2021).

251“2023 UK Public Opinion Survey on Nuclear Weapons: Article and Data”, British Pugwash, 9 May 2023, https://britishpugwash.org/2023-uk-public-opinion-survey-on-nuclear-weapons-article-and-data.

252“Would You Support or Oppose Allowing the US to Station Nuclear Weapons in Britain?” YouGov, 31 August 2023, https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/survey-results/daily/2023/08/31/4b0b8/1.

253“As Far as You are Aware, Does the UK Have Nuclear Weapons?” YouGov, 18 June 2020, https://yougov.co.uk/topics/
politics/survey-results/daily/2020/06/18/a9715/3.

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Early research on public opinion of and approval for the use of nuclear weapons in Australia, Sweden,
the United Kingdom and the United States shows a clear gender gap, with women more opposed
than men and showing more fear of a nuclear escalation. A 1990 study in Australia on the relationshipbetween gender and nuclear attitudes found that men were more likely than women to favour the phrase“some nuclear weapons are necessary for use in extreme threats”.254 A 1994 study found that in boththe United Kingdom and the United States, significantly fewer women than men approved of the useof nuclear weapons. The genders differed most in their support for a nuclear strike when the circumstances involved greater uncertainty or risk. Far more men than women favoured the use of nuclear
weapons to stop a conventional attack, escalating a conventional conflict into a nuclear one. Yet men
and women did not differ much on whether they would strike back if their country had been hit by anuclear attack – in other words, once the damage had already been done and uncertainty had been
removed.255 Additionally, a study in 1990 conducted in Sweden, the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates concluded that men showed much less nuclear anxiety than women, less concern about the useof nuclear weapons or nuclear conflict, more nuclear denial,256 and less fear for the future.257
More recent studies have shown negative attitudes among women towards the use of nuclear
weapons. Research conducted in Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, both of which are
nuclear umbrella countries, and a study in Israel revealed that women tend to be less inclined than men
to support a nuclear strike.258 An experimental study in Japan tested the strength of the nuclear taboo,and it was found that gender was one of the key factors in explaining who supported the use of nuclear
weapons, with men showing more endorsement than women.259 Moreover, women in the United States
showed a more negative attitude than men when asked whether the use of nuclear weapons was an
appropriate option to defend national security interests.260
However, contrary findings were offered by a 2017 study, which revealed that women in the UnitedStates were just as likely as men, or in some cases more likely than men, to support the idea of sacrificing large numbers of foreign civilians to prevent the death of US soldiers. The interaction between
gender and the context of nuclear or conventional scenarios was only marginally significant; nonetheless, it was concluded that the findings provided rather surprising evidence of a reversed pattern.261

254

Candida C. Peterson, Jeanette A. Lawrence and Irene Dawes, “The Relationship of Gender, Sex Role, and Law-and-Order
Attitudes to Nuclear Opinions”, Sex Roles 22 (1990): 283–292, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00288334.

255

Brandes, “Public Opinion, International Security”.

256

Nuclear denial occurs when governments and the nuclear power industry, as well as individuals, downplay the harmful
effects of radiation from nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants (Charles Perrow, “Nuclear Denial: From Hiroshima to
Fukushima”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69, no. 5 (2013): 56–67, https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340213501369).

257

Jerome Rabow, Anthony Hernández and Michael D. Newcomb, “Nuclear Fears and Concerns among College Students: A
Cross-National Study of Attitudes”, Political Psychology 11, no. 4 (1990): 681, https://doi.org/10.2307/3791478.

258

Michal Onderco, Tom W. Etienne and Michal Smetana, “Ideology and the Red Button: How Ideology Shapes Nuclear
Weapons’ Use Preferences in Europe”, Foreign Policy Analysis 18, no. 4 (2022): orac022, https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/
orac022; Doreen Horschig, “Israeli Public Opinion on the Use of Nuclear Weapons: Lessons from Terror Management
Theory”, Journal of Global Security Studies 7, no. 2 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac006.

259

Yanyuan Cheng, Ryoma Eguchi, Haruki Nakagawa, Tatsuru Shibata and Atsushi Tago, “Another Test of Nuclear Taboo: An Experimental Study in Japan”, International Area Studies Review (2023): 1–13, https://doi.org/10.1177/22338659231212417.

260

Baron and Herzog, “Public Opinion on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons”.

261

Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valentino, “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think about Using
Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants”, International Security 42, no. 1 (2017): 41–79, https://doi.org/10.1162/
ISEC_a_00284.

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Other studies found no significant gender differences. In a 2022 study that examined national differences in attitudes towards nuclear weapons in France, Israel, the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates, no significant disparities between men and women were found.262 A 2013 study examining thestrength of the nuclear taboo in the United States detected no gender differences.263 A further study(2020) found no difference between men and women when it came to choosing which type of strike tolaunch (nuclear or conventional) to defend US interests.264
In contrast, a survey conducted in the Russian Federation indicated that although women in the RussianFederation have a clear aversion to any proposed military attack in a conflict, men seem relatively supportive of conventional attacks but are more opposed to nuclear attacks, narrowing the gender gap.265
When looking at (extended) deterrence,266 mixed results again emerge. Research in Morocco foundthat women are more likely than men to trust an ally’s nuclear umbrella, explaining that women perceive
more risks in the possession of nuclear arms and energy.267 However, findings from the United Statesindicate that men are more likely than women to support the nuclear umbrella and the stationing of
nuclear weapons in Europe, as well as efforts by the United States to strengthen itself as a deterrent.268
In Australia, men have been found more likely than women to say that the use of nuclear weapons as adeterrent is the best path towards peace.269
The large-scale public opinion surveys show some evidence of gender gap when it comes to the use of
nuclear weapons; however, the evidence is not unequivocal. In the Millennials on War survey, in half ofthe countries and territories,270 women were more likely than men to say that it is never acceptable touse nuclear weapons in a war. In the other half,271 there was no discernible difference between womenand men (although there is no clear pattern of countries in which the public thinks that use of nuclear
weapons might be acceptable).272

262

Janina Dill, Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valentino, “Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel”, Security Studies 31, no. 1 (2022): 1–31,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2038663.

263

Daryl G. Press, Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valentino, “Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons”, American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (2013): 188–206, https://doi.
org/10.1017/S0003055412000597.

264

Lisa Langdon Koch and Matthew Wells, “Still Taboo? Citizens’ Attitudes toward the Use of Nuclear Weapons”, Journal of
Global Security Studies 6, no. 3 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa024.

265

Michal Onderco and Michal Smetana, “From Moscow with a Mushroom Cloud? Russian Public Attitudes to the Useof Nuclear Weapons in a Conflict with NATO”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 67, no. 2–3 (2022): 183–209, https://doi.
org/10.1177/00220027221118815.

266

Deterrence is a strategy aimed at preventing undesirable actions through the threat of severe consequences, and extended
deterrence involves the extension of this deterrent umbrella to protect allies or partners.

267

Matt Buehler and Arjun Banerjee, “Who Would Trust a Nuclear Umbrella? Results from an Original Survey on Public Confidence in Future Nuclear Guarantees in Morocco”, The Nonproliferation Review (2023): 1–21, https://doi.org/10.1080/107
36700.2023.2205299.

268

Baron and Herzog, “What the American Public Likes and Hates”.

269

Peterson, Lawrence and Dawes, “The Relationship of Gender”.

270

Colombia, France, Israel, Mexico, Russian Federation, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.

271

Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic and Ukraine, and the Occupied Palestinian
Territory.

272

International Committee of the Red Cross, “They Didn’t Start the Fire”.

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In a different survey, women were more likely than men to consider that the use of nuclear weapons
by their country273 would never be justified.274 In a survey conducted in the United Kingdom there
was, however, no gender difference found when respondents were asked whether the use of nuclear
weapons would ever be justified.275 Men in the United Kingdom were also less likely than women to
expect that a nuclear attack would happen in the coming 5, 10 or 20 years.276
When it comes to (extended) deterrence, the data suggest a more negative attitude among women.
Men in Germany, for instance, were more likely than women to indicate that Germany should rely on
the nuclear umbrella of the United States in the future.277 In two thirds of the countries and territories
surveyed by the ICRC278 women were less likely to say that nuclear weapons were an effective instrument of deterrence.279
Overall, evidence was found in the literature for a gender gap in opinion on the use of nuclear weapons,
although there was no uniformity. Results from public opinion polls painted a clearer picture, with women
more likely than men to disapprove of the use of nuclear weapons, even in the case of a counter-attack.
Men, however, were more likely than women to find the use of nuclear weapons in a war unlikely in the
coming years, which could indicate less nuclear anxiety and more nuclear denial.

4.3 Arms control and disarmament
Academic articles and opinion polls generally did not show clear differences between the opinions ofmen and women on arms control and disarmament. A 1994 study found significant gender differencesin support for the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons; however, it found no gender gap when
focusing on nuclear disarmament. The study concluded that neither women nor men were more likely
than the other to agree with arms control and disarmament proposals.280
Similarly, no gender gap was found when asking respondents in Morocco whether nuclear weapons
should be globally banned.281 A 2017 study that examined the attitudes of the younger generation ofEuropean Union citizens towards nuclear weapons also found no gender gap when it came to respondents’ awareness of the dangers of nuclear weapons, their involvement in debates on nuclear weapons
and their support for nuclear weapon policies.282 Moreover, a study examining public support for theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in the United States in 2017 found no significant differencesin support levels between men and women.283

273

France, Germany, Israel, Italy or the United Kingdom.

274

Simons Foundation, Global Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons.

275

British Pugwash, “2023 UK Public Opinion Survey”.

276

YouGov, “Study of War”.

277

Körber Stiftung, “Eine Studie von Kantar im Auftrag der Körber-Stiftung. Deutsche Außenpolitik”, Körber Stiftung, 2019,https://koerber-stiftung.de/site/assets/files/18600/pulse-umfrage.pdf.

278

Colombia, France, Israel, Nigeria, Russian Federation, South Africa, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine, United
Kingdom and United States.

279

International Committee of the Red Cross, “They Didn’t Start the Fire”.

280

Brandes, “Public Opinion, International Security”.

281

Buehler and Banerjee, “Who Would Trust”.

282Benoît Pelopidas, “The Next Generation(s) of Europeans Facing Nuclear Weapons: Forgetful, Indifferent, but Supportive?”in Non-Proliferation Papers (Brussels: EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, 2017), 1–15.

283

Jonathon Baron and Stephen Herzog, “Public Support, Political Polarization, and the Nuclear-Test Ban: Evidence from a

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61

However, a few other studies did find such differences. A 2022 study observed that support for theretention of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent is associated with men,284 and in further studies
looking at support for disarmament treaties, women in Israel, Japan, the Kingdom of the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom were found to be more supportive than men of joining the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).285
Mixed results emerge from the polling data when looking at disarmament treaties. In a series of polls
conducted in Germany, no significant gender differences were found in support for joining the TPNW.286
However, in Afghanistan, Nigeria, South Africa and the United Kingdom, it is men who are more likely tosupport joining the TPNW.287 In all 16 countries and territories included in the Millennials on War survey,288
men were also much more likely than women to indicate being familiar with the TPNW.289 This is not surprising, as studies have shown that women respondents are more inclined to select “don’t know” whenanswering questions related to foreign policy, especially in the context of nuclear weapons.290
Women were in some surveys found to be more supportive than men of the principles of nuclear disarmament, when examined on their own, rather than within the context of disarmament treaties. In a
survey conducted in Germany, women were more likely than men to indicate that nuclear weapons
should be banned under international law.291 Moreover, over a decade ago, a Simons Foundation poll
covering six countries found that, in four of the polled countries, women were more likely than men to
indicate that nuclear weapons should be eliminated worldwide,292 the exceptions were in Israel andthe United States. Additionally, in all six polled countries, women felt that nuclear weapons made theworld a more dangerous place.293 In contrast, in France, the United Kingdom and the United States,
men said they felt safer knowing their country had nuclear weapons.294 In the United Kingdom, women
have been found more likely than men to indicate that “on the whole nuclear weapons make the world
a more dangerous place by increasing the chance that any war involving nuclear-armed countries may
escalate into a nuclear war”.295

New US National Survey”, The Nonproliferation Review 24, no. 3–4 (2017): 357–371, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.
2018.1429884.
284

Ben Clements and Catarina P. Thomson, “The ‘Ultimate Insurance’ or an ‘Irrelevance’ for National Security Needs? Partisanship, Foreign Policy Attitudes, and the Gender Gap in British Public Opinion towards Nuclear Weapons”, European
Journal of International Security 7, no. 3 (2022): 360–381, https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2021.17.

285

Michal Onderco, Michal Smetana, Sico van der Meer and Tom W. Etienne, “When Do the Dutch Want to Join the Nuclear Ban
Treaty? Findings of a Public Opinion Survey in the Netherlands”, The Nonproliferation Review 28, no. 1–3 (2021): 149–163,
https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2021.1978156; Jonathon Baron, Rebecca Davis Gibbons and Stephen Herzog,“Japanese Public Opinion, Political Persuasion, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, Journal for Peaceand Nuclear Disarmament 3, no. 2 (2020): 299–309, https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2020.1834961.

286

Greenpeace, “Umfrage zu Atomwaffen”, (Greenpeace, 2019, 2020, 2021).

287

British Pugwash, “2023 UK Public Opinion Survey”; International Committee of the Red Cross, “They Didn’t Start the Fire”.

288

Afghanistan, Colombia, France, Israel, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russian Federation, South Africa, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

289

International Committee of the Red Cross, “They Didn’t Start the Fire”.

290

Brandes, “Public Opinion, International Security”; Michal Onderco, “When It Comes to Nuclear Weapons, Women ‘Don’t
Know’ A Lot. Why Is It a Problem?” in Crossing Borders: Liber Amicorum for Professor A. Geske Dijkstra, ed. Markus
Haverland, Wil Hout and Michal Onderco (Rotterdam: Erasmus School of Social and Behavioural Sciences, 2023), 27–41.

291

IPPNW, “Meinungen zu Atomwaffen”.

292

France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom.

293

Simons Foundation, Global Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons.

294

Simons Foundation, Global Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons.

295“Which of the Following Comes Closest to Your View on Nuclear Weapons?” YouGov, 9 August 2017, https://yougov.co.uk/
topics/politics/survey-results/daily/2017/08/09/25dfa/1.

In the Millennials on War survey, however, there is no clear pattern of gender gap in opinions held in the
16 countries and territories considered. In seven countries, women were more in favour than men of
the elimination of nuclear weapons.296 Also in seven countries,297 women were more likely than men to
consider the existence of nuclear weapons to be a threat to humanity. In Nigeria and South Africa, thistrend was reversed, as men were more likely than women to consider the existence of nuclear weapons
to be a threat to humanity.298 Additionally, in other surveys, women in the United Kingdom were not more
likely than men to support giving up nuclear weapons completely.299
In conclusion, while gendered patterns are clear when it comes to the opinions of men and women on
the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons, the gendered patterns are much less clear when it comesto arms control and disarmament.

5. Conclusions and recommendations
The aim of this paper was to investigate whether and to what extent a gender gap exists in attitudes
towards nuclear weapons. Based on the review of existing literature and public opinion polls, there isevidence that the views of men and women on nuclear weapons are not uniform. However, it was notpossible to find a clear pattern among the various countries included, making it difficult to generalize
the findings.
The paper first looked at proliferation and found that the norm against nuclear proliferation applies morestrongly to women than to men. Although the magnitude of the effect is not uniform, most academic
studies and polls show that women are indeed more opposed than men to nuclear proliferation300 andare more likely than men to express that they do not feel safe with nuclear weapons.301 Only studies
in the Republic of Korea found no significant gender differences.302 One study even found a reversed
pattern in the Republic of Korea.303
The paper then examined the gender gap in attitudes towards the use of nuclear weapons, on which theliterature was more divided. Some studies found men more inclined than women to approve of the use

296

Colombia, France, Israel, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Ukraine and United Kingdom.

297

Colombia, France, Israel, Russian Federation, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.

298

International Committee of the Red Cross, “They Didn’t Start the Fire”.

299“What Should Happen to Trident at the End of Its Useful Life?” YouGov, https://yougov.co.uk/topics/economy/trackers/
what-should-happen-to-trident-at-the-end-of-its-useful-life?crossBreak=female.

300

Brandes, “Public Opinion, International Security”; Baron and Herzog, “Public Opinion on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear
Weapons”; Cortright and Mattoo, “Elite Public Opinion”; Matsumura, Tago and Grieco, “External Threats and Public
Opinion”; International Committee of the Red Cross, “They Didn’t Start the Fire”; IPPNW, “Meinungen zu Atomwaffen”;
Greenpeace, “Umfrage zu Atomwaffen”(Greenpeace, 2019, 2020, 2021); British Pugwash, “2023 UK Public Opinion
Survey”; YouGov, “Would You Support or Oppose”.

301

Brandes, “Public Opinion, International Security”; International Committee of the Red Cross, “They Didn’t Start the Fire”;
Simons Foundation, Global Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons; YouGov, “Study of War”; Greenpeace, “Umfrage zu Atomwaffen”, (Greenpeace, 2019).

302

Son and Yim, “Correlates of South Korean Public Opinion”; Jung et al., 2016 Unification Perception Survey; Kim, “Long-Run
Impact of Childhood Wartime Violence”; Lee, “Microfoundations of Nuclear Proliferation”.

303

Sukin, “Credible Nuclear Security”.

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63

of nuclear weapons.304 Yet others did not305 or found that it was women who would approve more of theuse nuclear weapons.306 The issue of (extended) deterrence also produced mixed results.307
The public opinion polls showed more evidence of a gender gap in attitudes, although the findings were
not uniform across countries. In most polls, women were more likely than men to say that the use of
nuclear weapons is never justified.308 Men, on the contrary, were more likely than women to indicate that
nuclear weapons are an effective tool for deterrence309 and were less likely to worry about their potential
use during war.310
With regard to arms control and disarmament, no clear gender differences in attitude were found, either
in the literature or in the public opinion polls. Although women in some countries did indicate more often
than men that nuclear weapons should be eliminated,311 they were in most research no more supportive
than men of disarmament treaties such as the TPNW or the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.312
The only clear difference was that men were much more likely than women to indicate that they were
aware of the existence of the TPNW.313 This comes as no surprise since analytical studies have identified
that women respondents are more inclined to select “don’t know” when answering questions related toforeign policy, especially in the context of nuclear weapons.314 Possible explanations for this phenomenon have been put forward, focusing on differences in socialized expectations; in other words, that men
are more culturally expected to be knowledgeable about international security.315 Another explanation
may be related to women’s reluctance to answer questions related to specialized knowledge, in thiscase on defence and foreign policy, in contrast to men’s greater eagerness to demonstrate expertiseon such topics.
These findings are relevant to policymaking, as public opinion, especially in democracies, can havea significant influence on policy.316 The effect of public opinion is, however, dependent on the degree

304

Peterson, Lawrence and Dawes, “The Relationship of Gender”; Rabow, Hernández and Newcomb, “Nuclear Fears”;
Brandes, “Public Opinion, International Security”; Onderco, Etienne and Smetana, “Ideology and the Red Button”;
Horschig, “Israeli Public Opinion”; Baron and Herzog, “Public Opinion on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons”.

305

Press, Sagan and Valentino, “Atomic Aversion”; Dill, Sagan and Valentino, “Kettles of Hawks”; Koch and Wells, “Still
Taboo?”

306

Sagan and Valentino, “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran”.

307

Buehler and Banerjee, “Who Would Trust”; Baron and Herzog, “What the American Public Likes and Hates”; Peterson,
Lawrence and Dawes, “The Relationship of Gender”; Körber Stiftung, “Eine Studie von Kantar”; International Committee of
the Red Cross, “They Didn’t Start the Fire”.

308

International Committee of the Red Cross, “They Didn’t Start the Fire”; Simons Foundation, Global Public Opinion on
Nuclear Weapons; YouGov, “As Far as You Are Aware”.

309

International Committee of the Red Cross, “They Didn’t Start the Fire”.

310

International Committee of the Red Cross, “They Didn’t Start the Fire”; YouGov, “As Far as You Are Aware”.

311

International Committee of the Red Cross, “They Didn’t Start the Fire”; Simons Foundation, Global Public Opinion on
Nuclear Weapons.

312

International Committee of the Red Cross, “They Didn’t Start the Fire”; Simons Foundation, Global Public Opinion on
Nuclear Weapons; Greenpeace, “Umfrage zu Atomwaffen”,(Greenpeace, 2019, 2020, 2021); Baron and Herzog, “Public
Support, Political Polarization”; British Pugwash, “2023 UK Public Opinion Survey”.

313

International Committee of the Red Cross, “They Didn’t Start the Fire”.

314

Brandes, “Public Opinion, International Security”; Onderco, “When It Comes to Nuclear Weapons”.

315

Brandes, “Public Opinion, International Security”; Onderco, “When It Comes to Nuclear Weapons”.

316

Burstein, “Impact of Public Opinion”.

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of salience the issue has.317 As studies have indicated, the salience of nuclear weapons is increasing
again due to events such as the war in Ukraine, which caused a rise in public concern surrounding
these weapons.318 However, the growing awareness surrounding these weapons of mass destruction
does not necessarily translate to increased support for nuclear disarmament.319 Recent opinion polls
in Germany, for example, indicate that 52% of Germans now want US tactical nuclear weapons (longunpopular) to remain in their country.320 To focus this increased awareness on nuclear disarmamentrather than proliferation, there is a need for enhanced engagement of disarmament advocates.
Given that gender differences have been found in attitudes towards nuclear weapons, it is important forpolicymakers to keep this in mind. The findings also underscore the importance of gender balance inthe decision-making structures linked to nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. Women continue
to be under-represented in these structures, comprising, on average, only a third of diplomats accredited to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament conferences.321
Efforts are needed to improve gender equality in decision-making and to ensure that women’s perspectives and concerns are taken into account. Since women are found to oppose the spread of nuclear
weapons more than men and have greater concerns about these weapons’ effects (which translates
into less willingness to support their use), civil society actors advocating for nuclear disarmament mightfind women a more receptive audience than men. Here, campaigners for nuclear disarmament couldemphasize the humanitarian consequences of nuclear proliferation and use, as women were foundto be more concerned than men about these issues. Civil society actors might also want to consider
designing specific strategies and messaging to engage more men in their campaigns. In all cases, itwould be important to present credible arguments about how nuclear disarmament would not lead toincreased risks or uncertainty.
Academic research related to public opinion and policy response, gender gaps in public opinion andresearch on attitudes towards nuclear weapons is still mainly focused on the United States and theWest in general. This paper has tried to broaden the geographical scope by including research carriedout in almost 50 countries. More research is needed, however, to properly explore the patterns acrossdifferent countries. Future work could also study papers published outside the journals catalogued in
major databases such as Journal Citation Reports. This will help the existing research go beyond theWestern bias in general and the US bias in particular.322 Scholars could also consider developing a multilingual database of surveys and survey questions to facilitate future scholarship.
One pattern noticed during the review of academic articles on public opinion was the underlying assumption that men’s attitudes represent the “norm”, while women’s views are regarded as deviant
from this “norm”. Researchers should be aware of this bias and avoid perpetuating such assumption.

317

Page and Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion”.

318

Bollfrass and Herzog, “War in Ukraine and Global Nuclear Order”.

319

Ibid

320

Robert Bongen, Hans-Jakob Rausch and Jonas Schreijäg, “For the First Time, a Majority is in Favour of Keeping Nuclear
Weapons”, Tagesschau, 2022, https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/panorama/umfrage-atomwaffen-deutschland-101.
html.

321

Renata Hessman Dalaqua, Kjølv Egeland and Torbjorn Graff Hugo, Still behind the Curve: Gender Balance in Arms Control,
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Diplomacy (UNIDIR, 2019), http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/still-behind-the-curve-en-770.pdf.

322

See also Braut-Hegghammer, “Proliferating Bias?”

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Recent research in political science has showed that notions of masculinities and patriarchal attitudes
play an important role in opinions on the use of force.323 In empirical studies of attitudes towards nuclear
weapons, similar research is thus far missing. Future work on attitudes towards nuclear weapons would
benefit from adopting a gendered perspective, which would allow researchers to interrogate patriarchal
views that may be present in public opinion.

323

Elin Bjarnegård, Anders Engvall, Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Erik Melander, “Armed Violence and Patriarchal Values: A
Survey of Young Men in Thailand and Their Military Experiences”, American Political Science Review 117, no. 2 (2022):
439–453, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422000594.

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IV. Foreign policy, gender, nuclear
disarmament and the environment:
Perspectives from the Southby María Pía Devoto, Mariel R. Lucero Baigorria
and Ana Levintan324
1. Introduction
Concerns about the production, testing, and use of nuclear weapons have been on the international
agenda since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But according to the Doomsday Clock of theBulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the world now is closer than ever to a global catastrophe.325 Renewing
efforts towards nuclear disarmament is of utmost urgency. The same is true for addressing nuclear
threats in conjunction with gender equality and environmental security.
As noted by Ray Acheson, “nuclear weapons are gendered. They have gendered impacts; their
existence is predicated on and perpetuated in part due to gendered norms about power, violence, andsecurity; and their abolition is challenged by the lack of gender and other forms of diversity in discussions and negotiations related to nuclear policy”.326 Building on this point, the main objective of thisdocument is to give visibility to the intricate relationship between nuclear disarmament, gender, and theenvironment on the agendas of States in Latin America and the Caribbean. In order to do so, the paper
will focus on selected States that have implemented a feminist foreign policy (FFP) or a foreign policy
with a gender perspective (FPGP).
The emergence and advancement of the FFP and FPGP phenomena are still recent in the region,
although they can be taken as a reference for the development of foreign policy with a gender equality
focus from the Global South. This article provides an overview and discussion of central concepts
regarding FFP and FPGP. It then identifies States in the region that are aligned with these concepts;
namely Argentina, Barbados, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.327 The analysis focus on each State’s position on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as on environmental policies.

324

The authors express their gratitude to UNIDIR for the opportunity to present their research and to María Garzón Maceda, Dr.
Renata Hessmann Dalaqua, Paula Jou Fuster and Daniela Philipson Garcia for their helpful feedback. The editor would liketo note that this paper was originally written in Spanish, citing official documents in Spanish language. The present version
contains non-official translations from Spanish to English.

325“A moment of historic danger: It is still 90 seconds to midnight”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2024, https://thebulletin.
org/doomsday-clock/current-time/.

326

Ray Acheson, “The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and Gender, Feminism, and Intersectionality”,
Reaching Critical Will, February 2023, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/publications-and-research/publications/16762-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons-and-gender-feminism-and-intersectionality.

327

The Latin American and Caribbean States chosen are those that have officially declared their adoption of an FFP, as well asStates that have strong national action plans on Women, Peace and Security.

The methodology used in this work is qualitative, involving analysis of academic articles, relatednews, speeches, official documents and international treaties, complemented by information obtained
through semi-structured interviews with 15 key informants from the academic and political spheres,
specialists, activists, and members of non-governmental organizations from various countries.328
So far, official documents on Latin American and Caribbean FFP and FPGP do not establish a direct relationship between gender, the environment and nuclear disarmament. These areas are not addressed
together in terms of preventive responsibility, nor in terms of analysing the causes of these phenomena,
nor their impact on women.
Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the linkages between the three topics and place them on the international agenda, and for this, we consider that FFP and FPGP are the valid interlocutors possessing theappropriate tools for their effective activation. The Latin American and Caribbean States analysed here
demonstrate interest and expertise in gender policies, in addition to extensive background in conventional disarmament and the environment, coupled with the regional nuclear disarmament trajectory, which
provides them with the necessary legitimacy to lead the proposals presented at the end of the analysis.

2. Feminist foreign policy and foreign policy with agender perspective
While FFP and FPGP generate debates and resistance in the face of a strong advance of autocratic andconservative governments, the reality is that there is a slow but steady growth in the adoption of these
foreign policies in various parts of the world.
The initial push came in 2014 with the proposal from the Swedish government,329 based on its experience in mainstreaming gender policies domestically, and its participation in international forums forthe promotion of women’s rights, thanks to the contributions of then Minister of Foreign Affairs Margot
Wallström. This initiative was followed by Canada in 2017, with the partial adoption of the model, specifically applied to international cooperation through the Feminist International Assistance Policy. Then,
France and Luxembourg followed suit in 2018; Mexico in 2020; Libya and Spain in 2021; Chile, Germany,
Liberia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 2022; and Argentina, Colombia, Mongolia and Slovenia in
2023.330 Similarly, there are more interested States that are still preparing their statements and positions.

328

For further information regarding the interviews, please see Appendix B.

329

The FFP proposal is organized around three “R’s”: Rights—active advocacy in defence of the rights of women and girls at theinternational level, combating all forms of violence and discrimination; Representation—promotion of women’s representation in dialogue and decision-making at all levels, in civil service and in civil society, particularly in peace processes; andResources—promotion of the allocation of resources to promote equal opportunities and gender equality at a global level.
A fourth “R” was added, Research, which refers to empirical research, data collection and reporting as inputs for foreign
policy formulation. Government Offices of Sweden. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “Swedish Foreign Service Action Plan for
Feminist Foreign Policy 2015–2018 including focus areas 2016”, 2016, https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/
action-plan-feminist-foreign-policy-2015-2018.pdf.

330

In this regard, we mention the States that maintain this position through official documents and speeches by their ministers for
Foreign Affairs. Among them, the “Handbook: Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy”, 2022, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, https://fojo.se/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/handbook-swedens-feminist-foreign-policy.pdf [NB: Sweden has currently
abandoned this position]; “Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy”, Global Affairs Canada, 2017, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/assets/pdfs/iap2-eng.pdf; “France’s International Strategy on Gender Equality”, Ministry
for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2018, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/human-rights/women-srights/france-s-international-strategy-for-gender-equality-2018-2022/; “Feminist Foreign Policy of the Government of
Mexico”, Foreign Affairs, 2020, https://embamex.sre.gob.mx/grecia/images/politicos/PDF/POLEXTFEM.pdf; “Spain’s

The context that favoured the promotion and impact of FFP and FPGP had key international sources,
such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), theBeijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) and its follow-ups, and United Nations Security
Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (2000) and the nine subsequent resolutions. It is also connected to transnational feminist movements, particularly since 2015, with the
emergence of #NiUnaMenos in Argentina, the “green tide”331 and its impact at the local, regional andinternational levels, followed later by #MeToo, and the International Women’s Strike adopted every 8
March since 2016.
There are various debates and definitions surrounding the idea of FFP. However, for practical purposes,
we will take what we consider to be the most comprehensive, drafted by Lyric Thompson, Gayatri Patel,
Gawain Kripke and Megan O’Donnell, who argue that:[Feminist foreign policy is the] policy of a state that defines its interactions with otherstates, as well as with movements and other non-state actors, in a manner that prioritizes
peace, gender equality, and environmental integrity; enshrines, promotes, and protects thehuman rights of all; seeks to disrupt colonial, racist, patriarchal, and male-dominated power
structures; and allocates significant resources, including research, to achieve that vision.
Feminist foreign policy is coherent in its approach across all levers of influence, anchoredby the exercise of those values at home and co-created with feminist activists, groups andmovements, at home and abroad.332
This definition, which includes peace as a priority and the protection of human rights, focuses on issues
in the Global North and lacks a precise mention of the fight against the various forms of violence against
women; the latter being one of the most relevant issues in the Global South, marked by poverty anddistinct types of exploitation.
There is also no explicit mention of intersectionality (and the multiple voices of the South that characterize it), homogenizing the concept of feminism, with scarce analysis of the multiple oppressions
that women suffer. Neither disarmament nor nuclear disarmament is mentioned, but the environmental
issue is acknowledged in general terms.

Feminist Foreign Policy: Promoting Gender Equality in Spain’s External Action”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021, https://www.exteriores.gob.es/es/PoliticaExterior/Documents/PoliticaExteriorFeminista/2023_10_PLAN%20ACCION%20
POLITICA%20EXTERIOR%20FEMINISTA%20v3.pdf; “Luxembourg’s Foreign Policy Address”, Ministry of Foreign andEuropean Affairs, 2019, https://maee.gouvernement.lu/content/dam/gouv_maee/minist%C3%A8re/d%C3%A9clarations-de-politique-%C3%A9trang%C3%A8re/2019/EN-Declaration-de-politique-etrangere-2019.pdf;“Shaping
Feminist Foreign Policy. Germany’s Federal Foreign Office Guidelines”, Federal Foreign Office, 2022, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2585076/4d2d295dad8fb1c41c6271d2c1a41d75/ffp-leitlinien-data.pdf; “Política ExteriorFeminista de Chile”, Chile en el Exterior, 2023, https://politicaexteriorfeminista.minrel.gob.cl/inicio; Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, International Trade and Worship of Argentina, “Agenda para la progresiva institucionalización de una Política
Exterior Feminista en Argentina”, 2023, https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/userfiles/ut/hoja_de_ruta_repef.pdf. Following
the change of government in Argentina in December 2023, the institutional changes and public statements of the current administration suggest that the government will not continue with an FFP. For Libya, Liberia, Slovenia, Colombia and Mongolia,
no official documents had been published at the time of drafting of this paper, but they have publicly stated their intention to
adopt this foreign policy.
331

The women’s pro-abortion movement in Argentina is known as the “green tide”.

332

Lyric Thompson et al., Defining Feminist Foreign Policy: The 2023 Edition, (Feminist Foreign Policy Collaborative2023): p. 1, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/637d4cec8d2cf97e81431a25/t/650afcebdad5b336f49db48c/1695218
925596/Defining+Feminist+Foreign+Policy-finalized.pdf.
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In contrast to FFP, FPGPs are positioned in a gradualist manner, understanding that the various characteristics encompassed by their definition are applied step by step, attempting to achieve a balanced
combination of improvements in various areas of both foreign and internal policy, allowing for a credibleand solid definition of a State with FPGP.
Among the conceptual differences, FPGPs highlight the importance of including, as central elements inthe construction of the concept of insecurity, the everyday violence (institutional, intrafamily, workplace,economic, physical, sexual, etc.) suffered by women. They also emphasize the importance of not
emptying the concept of feminism of its content333 and, therefore, specifying what type of feminism isbeing referred to when talking about FFP, incorporating intersectionality so as not to homogenize what
is understood by women and their concerns.
In this sense, it is useful to consider the definition proposed by Juan Martín Barbas, Dulce Chaves andMariel R. Lucero for FPGP as a better fit to represent States that either are in the process of having aninternal debate on FFPs or even question the representativeness of FFPs. An example is Costa Rica,with a long history of implementing gender perspective policies but which did not adopt FFP. As such,
FPGP refers to:
A set of decisions and actions taken by a government, in coherence with both internaland external policies, guided by a feminist perspective of diversity and intersectionality [in defence of the environment], weighing strategies and discourses that contribute to
the economic, social, political, and cultural emancipation of women and LGBTQ+ individuals, people with disabilities, Afro-descendant identities, peasants, indigenous peoples,
migrants, ethnic and/or religious minorities (...) in the confrontation against the structuresthat sustain ‘multiple oppressions’ (...) anti-capitalist, anti-militarist, anti-colonial, anti-racist, anti-xenophobic (...). These are policies that recognize gender inequality and promoteactions seeking greater formal representation and presence of women, [while adding] theimportance of including substantive representation (...) and symbolic representation.334
The emphasis here is placed on resistance from a post-colonial perspective, accentuating therelevance of intersectionality and a gradual and coherent articulation between internal and external
gender policies, in line with local and regional needs to build the legitimacy of the proposal and avoid
gender washing. This phenomenon occurs when an actor adopts the feminist struggle as its own
without making real or coherent changes in other areas of its internal or external policy.
The content of this definition, built from dialogue, gives dynamics to the concept and emphasizes thecommitment to involve various internal actors (Indigenous Peoples, the LGBTQ+ community, people
with disabilities, and a range of social movements such as feminist movements, civil organizations andgrassroots organizations). Daira Arana Aguilar, director of Global Thought, agrees with this, highlighting the importance of having resources that allow for dialogue with diverse counterparts.335

333

There is a broad debate about the use of the term feminism in the singular or plural, since adopting the singular implies essentializing women and their diverse issues; in other words, it leaves out the intersectionality that it claims to pursue andproposes a feminism identified with issues of the Global North.

334

Juan Martín Barbas, Dulce Daniela Chaves and Mariel R. Lucero, “Problematizar y deconstruir el concepto hegemónico de
Política Exterior Feminista desde Abya Yala: hacia una propuesta de gradualidad en la implementación”, Relaciones Internacionales, 49 (2022): pp. 84-6, https://revistas.uam.es/relacionesinternacionales/article/view/14003.

335

Interview conducted with Daira Arana Aguilar on 22 September 2023.
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While this definition also does not explicitly mention conventional and nuclear disarmament, it
expresses concern and importance about opposing the multiple forms of violence suffered by
women—mainly physical, economic, and institutional336—and a general defence of the environment
linked to regional ancestral cosmogonies and cultures, a manifestation of which is the opposition to
the extensive exploitation of natural resources and the defence of water, including food sovereignty.
For the authors, these concepts are not interchangeable, and the definitions and differentiation of FFP
and FPGP matter because, as Celia Amorós argues, “the effectiveness of the concept (...) accounts
for the reality it names”.337 Despite their differences, these frameworks of FFP and FPGP agree that theconcept of the State is interpreted, in the terms of Carole Pateman,338 as masculinized. The State regulatory system is constructed taking men as the reference, as occurs in the symbolic world—which isreflected both domestically and internationally, and even in issues related to nuclear policies.
In this sense, the use of a gendered framework in policy formulation alerts us and allows us to identify
large inequalities between women and men, highlight women’s current subalternity and/or marginalization, visualize the presence of women, and propose planning for substantive and symbolic women’s
representation to achieve equality, both in nuclear disarmament and environmental matters.
There are different definitions of FFP as conceived in the Global North that relegate the issues of thevarious ‘Souths’. The implication of language in the definition seems central to us. Therefore, and in
the face of various works questioning FFPs, and States proclaiming themselves as fervent defenders(believing that merely mentioning FFP lends them the characteristics that define such foreign policy),
some States would prefer to develop new concepts, such as FPGP.
However, we consider that the objective of this work forces us to overcome theoretical discussions
about these issues since at the core of both policies are elements that facilitate their empirical application. From here, we can focus on linking them with the environment and nuclear disarmament.

336

Latin America and the Caribbean have the second highest rate (1.4%) of physical violence against women compared toother continents: Africa 2.5%; Oceania 1.2%; Asia 0.8% and Europe 0.6%; data extracted from UNODC/UNWOMEN, “Gender-related Killings of Women and Girls Improving (Femicide/Feminicide)”, UNODC Research, March 2022.

337

Rosa Cobo Bedia, “El género en las ciencias sociales”, Cuadernos de Trabajo Social, Vol. 18 (2005): p. 250.

338

Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Barcelona: Anthropos; Mexico: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 1995).

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3. Why should States with a feminist foreign policy
or with a foreign policy with a gender perspective
support nuclear disarmament?
States with FFP and with FPGP are the actors that, in the current context, have the values and impetus
to reactivate global alliances in order to renew efforts for nuclear disarmament, highlighting the unequal
impacts that radiation and nuclear weapons have not only on women’s health but also on their social
integration.
FFP and FPGP present a two-fold advantage: they promote leadership and participation, still scarce, ofwomen in decision-making on nuclear disarmament policies, and they incorporate a gender perspective that the mere presence of women does not guarantee.339
In the document “Gender, Development, and Nuclear Weapons”, produced in 2016 by the Institute ofInternational Law and Policy (ILPI) and UNIDIR, a series of health impacts are listed for women exposed
to radiation generated by the impact of nuclear weapons, including cancers and problems affecting reproductive health. These data were collected from the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and theaccidents of Chernobyl and Fukushima.340
Although detonations and radiation exposure have severe permanent effects on a population’s health,studies in recent years have pointed out that women are 50 per cent more vulnerable than men, particularly given the incidence of breast, ovarian or thyroid cancers.341 In this regard, nuclear engineer anddirector of INVAP S.A., Verónica Garea, argues that “there is no significant difference in the radiosensitivity of cells between men and women, although, for example, sperm are produced and disappear, while
eggs are permanently housed in a woman’s body”.342 On the other hand, exposure to large volumesof ionizing radiation reduces fertility rates, increases the risks of spontaneous abortion, and results
in a high rate of birth defects,343 all of which mainly affect women’s sexual and reproductive health—while also deepening women’s stigmatization in societies with strong patriarchal cultural connotations,which exclude impacted women, turning them into outcasts.
Garea also points out that it is significant to ask “what were women doing at that moment—it may havemore to do with gender roles than with radiation itself”.344 Gender-based division of labour finds womenin charge of cleaning in contaminated areas and/or in direct contact with people exposed to radiation
who are under their care. Women’s higher exposure due to gender-role stereotypes compromises theirhealth and employability.

339

Laura Rose Brown, “Feminist Foreign Policy and Nuclear Weapons: Contributions and Implications”, Non Proliferation
and Disarmament Papers, no. 86, November 2023, https://www.nonproliferation.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/
EUNPDC_no-86.pdf.

340

John Borrie et al., Gender, Development and Nuclear Weapons: Shared Goals, Shared Concerns, ILPI & UNIDIR, 2016,
https://unidir.org/publication/gender-development-and-nuclear-weapons-shared-goals-shared-concerns.

341

Anne Guro Dimenn, Gendered Impacts: The Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons from a Gender Perspective,
ILPI & UNIDIR, 2014, https://unidir.org/publication/gendered-impacts-the-humanitarian-impacts-of-nuclear-weapons-from-a-gender-perspective/.

342

Interview conducted with Verónica Garea on 26 September 2023.

343

Borrie et al., Gender, Development and Nuclear Weapons, pp. 11-2.

344

Interview cited ut supra.
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To this, another factor must be added, which is the displacement forced by nuclear explosions due tothe effects of radiation, further accentuating existing processes of feminization of migrations,345 which
overlap with processes of feminization of poverty.
In this context, situations of discrimination and sexual and psychological violence are exacerbated,
and the rights to health, housing and property are severely violated. Hibakusha—a term used to referto survivors of the atomic bombings in Japan—were stigmatized and segregated, even by Japanesesociety itself, being considered ‘contaminated’.346
The 1945 Project,347 driven by photographer Haruka Sakaguchi, collects testimonies from somesurvivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Below, we quote one of them:“This will put you at a disadvantage for marriage”, my father warned me. (...) I married at
the age of 24 (...) I never told anyone that I was a hibakusha. “You’ll be better off if you don’ttell anyone”, another hibakusha once told me. (…) When I turned 46, I was diagnosed withretinal detachment. The costs of the operation were, to say the least, formidable. Later, it was
revealed that the retinal damage had been caused by the radiation from the atomic bomb.
After 44 years, I finally applied for the hibakusha techou [health care subsidies available toatomic bombing survivor].348
The main humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons were highlighted and addressed
in intergovernmental conferences prior to the development of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons (TPNW) in 2017. Some of the most significant meetings were in Oslo, Norway, in 2013, and in
Nayarit, Mexico, in 2014. Among the conclusions of both meetings, it was emphasized that it is unlikelythat any State or international body can adequately address the humanitarian emergency caused by
the detonation of a nuclear weapon. Hence the urgency to develop tools and preventive measures.
The historical experiences of the use and testing of nuclear weapons have demonstrated immediateand long-term devastating effects. These effects are not limited to national borders but affect othercountries and populations in multiple ways, at regional and global levels, causing impacts that hinderand severely damage socioeconomic and environmental development. A report by the International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War indicates that “the detonation of nuclear weapons produce
incinerating heat, powerful shockwaves, overpressures, ionizing radiation, and massive amounts ofsmoke and soot that can alter the Earth’s climate”.349

345

In this sense, the process of feminization of migration refers to a new and sexual international division of labour that places
women in the most precarious and poorly paid jobs, which is particularly harmful to migrant women. International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Ministry of Social Development of the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires,“Las mujeres migrantes y la violencia de género. Aportes para la reflexión y la intervención”, 2014, p. 77, https://www.iom.
int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/2018-07/Manual_OIM-digital.pdf.

346

Borrie et al., Gender, Development and Nuclear Weapons, pp. 14-5.

347

Haruka Sakaguchi, “About”, 1945 Project, 2017, https://www.1945project.com/about/.

348

Testimonial by Kiyoko Koizumi, 1945 Project, https://www.1945project.com/portfolio-item/kiyoko-koizumi/#14982063
02968-41dc96a7-7877.

349

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, World Medical Association, World Federation of Public Health
Associations, International Council of Nurses, “The Health and Humanitarian Case for Banning and Eliminating Nuclear
Weapons”, 2016, pp. 1-2, https://www.ippnw.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/HealthEnvironmentalCase2016.pdf.
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A report by the Director-General of the World Health Organization in 1993, emphasized that the effectsof nuclear explosions can cause severe damage to the atmosphere, aquifers and land, with extensive
long-term effects, affecting biodiversity irreversibly, leaving follow-on effects for several decades in thehealth of survivors and their offspring.350
In other words, the harmful impact of the use and testing of nuclear weapons must be recognized, which
deepens the crisis of climate change and its effects on societies (increased global warming, extreme
temperatures, land and water contamination, etc.). Following this line, various economic activities
would also be affected globally, deepening concerns about food sovereignty, particularly in southerncountries, as well as the lives of the population in general, and especially of women. All the aforementioned consequences expose the urgency of an issue that cannot be postponed.

4. The panorama in Latin America and the
Caribbean
4.1 Analytical Focus: Nuclear disarmament
In the documents of FFP and FPGP in Latin America and the Caribbean, there is no explicit commitment
to nuclear disarmament, and this is also not observed in other international experiences. However, thedocuments of the States analysed in this study show a strong commitment to the Women, Peace, andSecurity (WPS) agenda and to conventional disarmament.
The WPS agenda has been promoted since the approval of resolution 1325 in 2000,351 which recognizes the significant role of women in sustaining peace and the need for States to promote their participation in decision-making processes to prevent and resolve conflicts. Since then, States have beenencouraged to develop their national action plans (NAPs). The development of NAPs on WPS is one of
the tools available to States to integrate disarmament topics into the WPS agenda. This was recognizedin the recommendations of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the WPS Focal Points Network (2023), where
the emphasis is on “increased focus on the prevention pillar of [resolution] 1325 (...) and investment inarms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament and a range of human security interventions”.352
Disarmament is intertwined with the historical pacifist legacy of Latin America and the Caribbean,
crystallized in the establishment of the first nuclear-weapons-free zone, along with the fight against
violence against women and environmental concerns. However, the analysis of official documents andstatements from the following Latin American and Caribbean States with FFP and FPGP shows that
attention to the issue of nuclear disarmament varies from one State to another.
 Argentina
In the case of Argentina, the roadmap of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade andWorship for the institutionalization of FFP (2023) recognizes women as key and necessary participants

350

World Health Assembly, 46, “Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons”, WHO, 1993, https://iris.who.int/
handle/10665/176493.

351

Security Council, S/RES/1325, 2000, p. 1. http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1325.

352

WPS Focal Point Network, “5th Capital-Level Meeting – Joint Communique”, 2023, https://wpsfocalpointsnetwork.
org/2023/11/01/5th-capital-level-meeting-joint-communique/.

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in disarmament processes, conflict prevention and peacekeeping. It also highlights the Arms Trade
Treaty as a fundamental pillar in its strategy on arms control.353
 Barbados
Barbados does not have a specific document on its FPGP, but in recent years, gendered policies havebeen promoted following the assumption of office by Prime Minister Mia Mottley.354 Regarding disarmament, Barbados participates in various thematic forums as a member of the Caribbean Community(CARICOM).355
 ChileIn relation to Chile’s FFP, the WPS agenda is among its priority topics. It is worth noting that Chile was
the first State in the region to begin work to implement resolution 1325 through a NAP.356 Currently, it isin the process of developing its third NAP on WPS.357 Chile is also active in promoting gender perspectives in nuclear regimes, especially within TPNW discussions. It has acted as the gender focal point of
the TPNW (2022-2023), organizing discussions and events and presenting a report with recommendations to strengthen gender mainstreaming efforts.358
 Colombia
At the end of 2022, Colombia began the process of developing its NAP,359 through which it seeks to“promote gender equality, protect the human rights of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations, and strengthen peace and security in the country with the ultimate purpose of achieving Total,
Sustainable and Lasting Peace”.360 Although it is not finalized, much of the guidance on these issues
can be identified in the Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting
Peace (2016) and its Framework Plan for Implementation, which includes the gender approach with122 specific measures.361

353

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of Argentina, “Agenda para la progresiva institucionalizaciónde una Política Exterior Feminista en Argentina”, 2023, pp. 26-31, https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/userfiles/ut/hoja_de_
ruta_repef.pdf.

354

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC),“Fuerzas de cambio IV: Mujeres de América Latina y el Caribe promueven el desarme, la no proliferación y el control dearmas”, 2020, https://unlirec.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Fuerza-de-Cambio-IV-CASTELLANO.pdf.

355

For example “Non-Nuclear-Armed States Get Nothing in Return for Fulfilling Commitments Except Threat of Potential Annihilation”, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases of the United Nations, 14 October 2022, https://press.un.org/en/2022/
gadis3690.doc.htm.

356

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, “Feminist Foreign Policy”, June 2023, p. 34, https://politicaexteriorfeminista.minrel.
gob.cl/.

357

Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Ministra (s) inaugura el primer encuentro con la sociedad civil para la elaboración del
III Plan de Acción Nacional para la implementación de la Resolución 1325”, 25 August 2023, https://minrel.gob.cl/noticias-anteriores/ministra-s-inaugura-el-primer-encuentro-con-la-sociedad-civil-para-la.

358

Report of the gender focal point (Chile): 2nd Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,
New York, 27 November-1 December 2023, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4025818.

359

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, “Por primera vez Colombia presenta avances de la agenda de Mujeres, Paz y
Seguridad y de la Resolución 1325 ante la ONU”, 25 October 2023, https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/newsroom/news/primera-vez-colombia-presenta-avances-agenda-mujeres-paz-seguridad-resolucion-1325.

360

Chancellery of Colombia, “Con tres foros macrorregionales y cofinanciación internacional, el Gobierno de Colombia avanzaen el Plan de Acción Nacional de la Resolución 1325: Mujeres, Paz y Seguridad”,18 May 2023, https://www.cancilleria.
gov.co/newsroom/news/tres-foros-macrorregionales-cofinanciacion-internacional-gobierno-colombia-avanza.

361

Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace, 24 November 2016, https://www.
refworld.org/legal/agreements/natlegbod/2016/en/121520.

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Furthermore, the Colombian Foreign Ministry announced the design of its FFP in July 2023, in collaboration with women’s organizations and LGBTQI+ communities, but it has not yet been published
for further analysis.362
 Costa Rica
Costa Rica is internationally recognized for its efforts in various disarmament processes, and for the
inclusion of a gender perspective in its proclamations and declarations at multilateral meetings andforums,363 although it has not adopted a NAP on WPS.
In her statements during the Eighth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS8) on the United Nations Programmeof Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in June
2022, Ambassador Maritza Chan emphasized the need for the instruments and agreements that areconcluded to include a gender perspective and guarantee the full participation of women in arms control
and peace and security initiatives.364
Costa Rica also stated in the First Committee of the General Assembly that the under-representationof women in disarmament is one of the root causes of the problem in nuclear issues: “Without incorporating a gender lens, the world would run the risk of never fully understanding the gendered impactof ionizing radiation”.365 Furthermore, it emphasized that the TPNW is the democratization of nuclear
disarmament, stating that Latin America and the Caribbean were the launching platform for this Treaty,
with the support of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).366
It is worth recalling the leadership of Costa Rican women in nuclear disarmament matters, as illustrated
by Gioconda Úbeda Rivera, former Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), and Elayne Whyte, who presided over the
TPNW negotiations.
 Dominican Republic
In the case of the Dominican Republic, an official document on its FPGP has not been found. However,there appears to be an increased collaboration between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministryof Women in monitoring and fulfilling international treaties with a gender approach.367 With respect to its
disarmament work, Dominican Republic is active in the prevention of weapons of mass destruction.368

362

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, “Cancillería inicia el diseño de la Política Exterior Feminista, de la mano de organizaciones de mujeres y personas LGTBIQ+”, 6 July 2023, https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/newsroom/news/cancilleria-inicia-diseno-politica-exterior-feminista-mano-organizaciones-mujeres.

363

Statement by Maritza Chan, representative of the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations, at the General
Debate of the First Committee, Reaching Critical Will, 3 October 2022, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/
Disarmament-fora/1com/1com22/statements/4Oct_CostaRica.pdf.

364

The Eighth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS8), “Joint Statement - Costa Rica”, 30 June 2022. Document provided courtesyof Maritza Chan.

365“World Must Step Back from ‘Brink of Nuclear Madness’ Amid Growing Risk of Miscalculation, Accidental Use”, Meetings
Coverage and Press Releases of the United Nations, 17 October 2022, https://press.un.org/en/2022/gadis3691.doc.htm.

366

Interview conducted with Maritza Chan on 27 September 2023.

367

Ministry of Women of the Dominican Republic, Directorate of International Relations, https://mujer.gob.do/index.php/departamentos/unidades-consultivas/item/296-direccion-de-relaciones-internacionales. Ministry of Women’s Affairs of
the Dominican Republic, “Plan Nacional de Igualdad y Equidad de Género - PLANEG III 2020-2030”, 2019, https://mujer.
gob.do/transparencia/phocadownload/Publicaciones/Planeg/PLANEG%20III%202020-2030.pdf.

368

UNLIREC, “Fuerzas de cambio IV”.

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 Mexico
In the official document of Mexico’s FFP, there is no explicit mention of nuclear disarmament and arms
control in the main thematic areas. However, Chancellor Alicia Bárcena Ibarra stated in July 2023 “thatMexico’s priorities include promoting initiatives such as the prohibition of nuclear weapons, combating
the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, eradicating the illegal trade in cultural goods, andrecovering the cultural heritage of indigenous peoples”.369 Mexico’s contributions to nuclear disarmament include its leadership during the negotiations of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weaponsin Latin America and the Caribbean, known as Treaty of Tlatelolco, which opened for signature in 1967.370
Mexico participates actively in initiatives aimed at integrating gender perspectives into the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and at strengthening the gendered provisions of the
TPNW.371 In 2023, Mexico succeeded Chile as the TPNW’s gender focal point.
 Panama
Panama does not have a specific document on its FPGP, but its commitment to gender equality in its
foreign policy is mentioned in the Plan Misión Panamá (2021).372 Regarding the gender–disarmament
nexus, it should be noted that Panama participates in various initiatives aimed at integrating gender
perspective into the NPT.373
 Trinidad and Tobago
An official document from Trinidad and Tobago on its FPGP has not been found, but strong participationin policies linked to the WPS agenda is observed. Additionally, since 2010, Trinidad and Tobago has
led the resolution on women, disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control in the First Committeeof the General Assembly. This biennial resolution urges Member States to promote “equal opportunities for the representation of women in all decision-making processes with regard to matters related
to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control”.374 In 2022, the resolution was co-sponsored by

369

Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Comunicado Nº 289. El gobierno de México ejecutará una política exterior responsable, humana y feminista: Alicia Bárcena”, 7 July 2023, https://mision.sre.gob.mx/oea/index.php/actividades/45-actividades-2023/887-el-gobierno-de-mexico-ejecutara-una-politica-exterior-responsable-humana-y-feminista-alicia-barcena-07-jul-23.

370

It should be noted that the signing of this Treaty inspired the creation of other nuclear-weapon-free zones such as the Treatyof Rarotonga (1985) in the South Pacific; the Treaty of Bangkok (1995) in South-East Asia; the Treaty of Pelindaba (1996) in
Africa; the Treaty of Semipalatinsk (2006) in Central Asia; and the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia (1998)— agreements covering 50% of the planet’s surface with the commitment of 116 United Nations Member States.

371

United Nations, “From pillars to progress : gender mainstreaming in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”,
working paper submitted by Australia, Canada, Columbia, Spain, the Philippines, Ireland, Mexico, Namibia, Panama,
Sweden and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Digital Library, 17 May 2022, https://digitallibrary.
un.org/record/3976139; United Nations, “Operationalizing the gender provisions of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons” (TPNW/MSP/2022/WP.2), working paper submitted by Ireland, Mexico, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 08 June 2022, https://undocs.org/en/TPNW/MSP/2022/WP.2.

372

United Nations Development Programme, “Plan Misión Panamá: Fortaleciendo la política exterior y el posicionamiento
internacional de Panamá para contribuir al desarrollo sostenible del país”, 2021, p. 6, https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/
Documents/PAN/PRODOC_00129007-%20Plan%20Mision%20Panama.pdf.

373

United Nations, “From pillars to progress : gender mainstreaming in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”,
working paper submitted by Australia, Canada, Columbia, Spain, the Philippines, Ireland, Mexico, Namibia, Panama,
Sweden and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Digital Library, 17 May 2022, https://digitallibrary.
un.org/record/3976139.

374“Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control”, resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December
2022 (A/RES/77/55), para. 1, https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=A/RES/77/55&Lang=E.

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45 States and mentioned issues such as the impact of the illicit proliferation of small arms and light
weapons on women and girls, the relevance of NAPs on WPS, and the need to collect disaggregateddata by gender, age and geographical area, among others, to better understand the effects of armed
violence.
 Uruguay
Presently, Uruguay’s five-year strategic plan for its foreign policy does not include an approach to disarmament or gender in particular, but it does establish among its general principles “the peaceful resolution of disputes” and “the maintenance of international peace and security”.375 Its participation invarious disarmament forums (including nuclear) has acknowledged the relevant role of women in disarmament and the importance of incorporating gender equity in these matters are highlighted.376

4.2 Analytical focus: Environment
Regarding environmental issues, we observe that in the official documents of Latin American and
Caribbean States with FFP and FPGP, there are no mentions related to the relationship with nuclear disarmament. However, these States have a long history of adherence to international treaties on environmental matters such as biodiversity, land and agriculture, water, climate change, and the atmosphere.
Examples of these are the Paris Agreement and the region’s participation in the Conferences of theParties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1994. The latest
advancement was the Escazú Agreement, which entered into force in 2021377 with the aim of guaranteeing access to information, public participation, and access to justice in environmental matters in theregion, with an emphasis on the importance of protecting environmentalists.378 In many of these official
documents, there is greater reference to climate change, and in others, it extends to other more generalenvironmental issues.
In summary, none of the documents of the analysed States allude to the link between the environment
and nuclear disarmament. However, in the vast majority, there is explicit mention of the connection
between the climate and environmental action and gender policies.

375

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, “Plan Estratégico de Política Exterior 2020-2025: Objetivos estratégicos, objetivos
específicos, indicadores e identificación de prioridades”, 2 August 2021, p. 1, https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-relaciones-exteriores/institucional/plan-estrategico/bases-para-politica-exterior-del-uruguay.

376

Uruguay, “Intervention by Uruguay for the General Debate of the First Committee of the United Nations”, Reaching CriticalWill, 4 October 2023, https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com23/
statements/4Oct_Uruguay.pdf. Uruguay, “Debate temático sobre Armas Convencionales del Primer Comité de Naciones
Unidas”, Reaching Critical Will, 20 and 21 October 2022, https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com22/statements/24Oct_Uruguay.pdf.

377

Observatory on Principle 10 in Latin America and the Caribbean, “Acuerdo Regional sobre el Acceso a la Información,la Participación Pública y el Acceso a la Justicia en Asuntos Ambientales en América Latina y el Caribe”, CEPAL, n.d.,
https://observatoriop10.cepal.org/es/tratado/acuerdo-regional-acceso-la-informacion-la-participacion-publica-acceso-la-justicia-asuntos.

378This agreement is relevant given the fact that the Latin American–Caribbean region is one of the most violent regions forenvironmental leaders and groups. According to the non-governmental organization Global Witness (2023), 88% of themurders perpetrated against environmentalists worldwide in 2022 occurred in Latin America—the majority of which wereconcentrated in Colombia (60), Brazil (34), Mexico (31) and Honduras (14). For more information, see https://www.globalwitness.org/es/standing-firm-es/.

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 Argentina
In the case of Argentina, its third priority issue in the roadmap towards the institutionalization of the FFP
is: “Sustainable development as equality” (2023), based on the Escazú Agreement and the UNFCCC.379
 Barbados
Although no specific documents have been found regarding its environmental policy linked to gender,
Barbados stands as one of the main actors against the climate crisis in various international forums.380
 ChileChile presents “Climate change and gender” (2023) as one of its priority issues of the FFP, recognizing
the unequal impact that the former has on society, severely affecting women and girls, who are more
vulnerable to a series of factors that historically place them in a situation of structural inequality.381 In
this regard, Chile was one of the States pushing for the Escazú Agreement. Among other actions, it
promotes the participation of women in climate change deliberations, strengthens the work of environmental defenders, and promotes their protection, along with that of other vulnerable sectors.
 Colombia
Colombia, through the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, published in 2023 its
roadmap for a plan of action of gender and climate change, in collaboration with the German Development Cooperation (GIZ).382
 Costa Rica
Costa Rica published its national climate and gender action plan in 2023, developed in cooperation
with the United Nations Development Programme.383
 Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic has a gender action plan, linked to programmes for reducing carbon emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation.384

379

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of Argentina, “Agenda para la progresiva institucionalizaciónde una Política Exterior Feminista en Argentina”, 2023, pp. 16-20, https://www.cancilleria.gob.ar/userfiles/ut/hoja_de_
ruta_repef.pdf.

380

United Nations Environment Programme, “Barbados PM leads the charge against climate change”, 7 December 2021,
https://www.unep.org/es/noticias-y-reportajes/reportajes/la-primera-ministra-de-barbados-lidera-la-batalla-contra-el-cambio. Spencer Feingold, “Prime Minister of Barbados Calls for ‘Urgent Action’ on Climate Crisis”, World Economic
Forum, 27 June 2023, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/06/amnc-2023-mia-mottley-prime-minister-of-barbados-call-for-urgent-action-on-the-climate-crisis.

381

Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Feminist Foreign Policy”, June 2023, p. 35, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1N3jfEOMn-mxT4nFfg_wTOkmM_-bwwCGw/view.

382

Colombian Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de Administración y Políticas Públicas (FIIAPP), ProNDC Support to Colombia’s climate goals by the German Technical Development
Cooperation (GIZ), “Hoja de Ruta: Plan de Acción de Género y Cambio Climático de Colombia”, 2022, https://www.minambiente.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GIZ_Genero_Hoja-de-Ruta_Final-2023-Baja.pdf.

383

National Women’s Institute, Ministry of Environment and Energy and the United Nations Development Programme, “Plande Acción Nacional sobre Igualdad de Género en la Acción por el Clima”, 25 September 2023, https://www.undp.org/es/
costa-rica/publicaciones/plan-de-accion-nacional-sobre-igualdad-de-genero-en-la-accion-por-el-clima.

384

World Bank, “Plan de acción de género: Programa de Reducción de Emisiones de REDD+ República Dominicana”, 2021, https://ambiente.gob.do/app/uploads/2022/08/Plan-de-Accion-de-Genero-Programa-REDD-Republica-Dominicana.pdf.

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79 Mexico
Although in its official document on FFP Mexico does not explicitly mention the link between environment and gender, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has worked in numerous spaces related to climate
action and gender, and in reviewing programmes that recognize the differential impact of climatechange on women.385 In 2022, then Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights, Martha
Delgado Peralta, stated that “as part of its human rights foreign policy and its feminist foreign policy,
Mexico has promoted the incorporation of a cross-cutting perspective of gender equality and humanrights in all multilateral negotiation topics for effective climate action”.386
 Panama
In the case of Panama, there is a national climate and gender action plan (2021) being carried out inconjunction with the United Nations Development Programme.387
 Trinidad and Tobago
Trinidad and Tobago, in the publication of its National Environmental Policy in 2018, recognized theinteraction between environmental sustainability and gender equality, and the negative impact on
women due to pre-existing structural disparities, in terms of lack of access to land, low representationand poverty.388
 Uruguay
In its latest strategic plan for foreign policy (2020–2025), among its priority issues Uruguay only alludes
to the protection of the environment but does not indicate any connection with gender or nuclear disarmament.389

385

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Under-Secretary for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights, “La Política ExteriorFeminista del Gobierno de México”, n.d., https://embamex.sre.gob.mx/grecia/images/politicos/PDF/POLEXTFEM.pdf.

386

Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, “Comunicado Nº 437. México presenta su Plan Nacional de Acción de Género yCambio Climático”, 14 November 2022, https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/mexico-presenta-su-plan-nacional-de-accion-de-genero-y-cambio-climatico.

387

Ministry of Environment of Panama and the United Nations Development Programme, “Plan Nacional de Género yCambio Climático de Panamá”, September 2021, https://www.undp.org/es/panama/publications/plan-nacional-de-g%C3%A9nero-y-cambio-clim%C3%A1tico.

388

Government of Trinidad and Tobago, “National Environmental Policy of Trinidad & Tobago 2018”, 2018, p. 2, https://www.
planning.gov.tt/sites/default/files/National%20Environmental%20Policy%20%28NEP%29%20T%26T%202018.pdf.

389

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, “Plan Estratégico de Política Exterior 2020-2025: Objetivos estratégicos, objetivos
específicos, indicadores e identificación de prioridades”, 2021, p. 1, https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-relaciones-exteriores/institucional/plan-estrategico/bases-para-politica-exterior-del-uruguay.

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5. Conclusions and recommendations
Gender perspectives provide a particular approach to analysing reality and addressing problems,
allowing for the visibility of the current subalternity of women and emphasizing the importance of their
inclusion, both in resolving these problems and in considering the solutions themselves.
Incorporating nuclear disarmament issues into FFP and FPGP allows not only the participation of
women but also the identification of specific problems associated with gender roles assigned in relation
to the nuclear issue, and areas of health that affect women in distinct ways, which have been excluded
until now. In this sense, incorporating a gender perspective through FFP and FPGP goes beyond afocus on numerical representation of women or the counting the number of women victims of a nuclear
explosion, but aims for a substantive incorporation of the gender issue.
As Karen Hallberg, a researcher at the National Scientific and Technical Research Council of Argentina(CONICET), maintains, “the trend is towards highly risky peace, where a minimal human error cancause total destruction. We have already witnessed what the two nuclear bombs dropped on the townsof Nagasaki and Hiroshima were. This cannot happen again. And for this, the only solution is the total
abolition of nuclear weapons. And to achieve this, the participation of women is fundamental”.390
Moreover, the integration of gender perspectives is also of critical importance.
There is an interrelationship between gender, environment and nuclear disarmament, although all three
topics appear disconnected in official documents, and even disjointed in political proposals. If we findany stated connection, it is only a partial approach to two of the three aspects. Consequently, one of
the conclusions we reach is that this connection is weakly recognized by the regional community, andwe could even say internationally. However, several Latin American and Caribbean States present
expertise in gender policies, reinforced by the adoption of FFP or FPGP, a pacifist trajectory regarding
nuclear disarmament, and environmental commitment, all of which provide them with the necessary
legitimacy to lead a gender approach to nuclear disarmament.
Another conclusion we can draw is that these States with FFP and FPGP in Latin America and the
Caribbean share, in their official documents, values associated with the fight against violence and infavour of pacifism as consolidated bases to work on the issue, in addition to the agreements signed
at regional and international levels. This, together with their commitment to the WPS agenda, offers avaluable path to promote the linkages between gender and disarmament in the region. Moreover, theagenda of FFP and FPGP in Latin America and the Caribbean can lead the promotion of alliances withother foreign policies of similar characteristics in different regions, linking the inclusion of nuclear disarmament and arms control policies.
The interviews carried out for this research demonstrate that, more often than not, gender issues areinterpreted as merely descriptive (numerical) representation, rather than substantive and symbolic.
Many still think that incorporating women on a numerical basis in some areas implies incorporating agender perspective. Therefore, we underscore the importance of training in gender analysis for both
men and women as a way of strengthening FFPs and FPGPs. Another important aspect is the need forinstitutionalization, to avoid interruptions of these policies in the face of government changes.

390

Interview conducted with Karen Hallberg on 22 September 2023.

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Finally, another conclusion refers to a perceived appropriation of the discourse on FFP by the Global
North, which brings the risk of replicating a colonialist model in the Global South, without consideringintersectionality and regional differential contexts. In this sense, in one of the interviews, a key actor
deemed it necessary for “Latin America and the Caribbean to have their own FFP model”.391 This would
position the region as a reference in gender equality issues internationally and would allow it to shapefeminist agendas on nuclear disarmament and the environment.

 Proposals to advance nuclear disarmament through feminist foreign policies
and foreign policies with a gender perspective:
1.

Encourage dialogue through various regional and international forums to build binding nuclear disarmament policies from feminist foreign policies and foreign policies with a gender perspective.

2.

Facilitate the organization of meetings at the Latin American and Caribbean regional level to build
consensus on integrating gender perspectives into nuclear disarmament as a priority among
States.

3.

Develop joint strategies for nuclear disarmament and strengthen exchanges of best practices
through South–South cooperation with Asia and Africa. This has the potential to increase thenumber of States in the Global South incorporating a gender perspective into their foreign policy
and connecting with nuclear disarmament and environmental issues.

4.

Promote the inclusion of disarmament and nuclear disarmament in the WPS agenda, including
through the adoption of NAPs.

5.

Participate in and encourage discussions on these topics by presenting papers and hosting side
events at meetings of the NPT and the TPNW, as well as meetings, seminars and events on FFP
and FPGP. Utilize mass media campaigns to raise awareness among the general public.

391

Interview with official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Mexico on 26 September 2023.

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V. Gender-transformative change innuclear disarmament: Challenges
and opportunities in the Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
by Peixuan Xie392
1. Introduction
The incomparably destructive nature of nuclear weapons, starkly observed in Hiroshima, Nagasaki andelsewhere, led to initial waves of reflection on the human consequences of nuclear use in conflict, andgenerations of policies and mechanisms were subsequently drawn up to put limits on the use of nuclear
weapons.393
The call for the comprehensive dismantling of nuclear weapons is not only a humanitarian endeavour
but also a feminist anti-colonial one. Burgeoning academic and policy-level inquiries have shed light on
the gendered social, economic, environmental and health impacts that nuclear weapons can have on
different groups of society.394
With heightened attention on the human and environmental implications of nuclear use past andpresent, often at Indigenous sites, voices calling for justice – with special focus on women and girls – arebeing amplified in anti-nuclear advocacy.395 In tandem, the under-representation of women in nuclear

392

The author is grateful to Dr Renata Hessmann Dalaqua, Paula Jou Fuster and Dr Jana Wattenberg for their helpful feedbackon this paper and to Dr Simone Wisotzki at PRIF for her kind encouragement.

393

See, for example, R.D. Gibbons, “The Humanitarian Turn in Nuclear Disarmament and the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons”, Nonproliferation Review 25, no. 1–2 (July 2018): 11–36, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.201
8.1486960; E. Minor, “Changing the Discourse on Nuclear Weapons: The Humanitarian Initiative”, International Reviewof the Red Cross 97, no. 899 (2015): 711–730, https://doi.org/10.1017/S181638311600014X; J. Borrie, “Humanitarian
Reframing of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of a Ban”, International Affairs 90, no. 3 (2014): 625–646, https://www.jstor.
org/stable/24538512.

394

R.H. Dalaqua et al., Missing Links: Understanding Sex- and Gender-Related Impacts of Chemical and Biological Weapons(Geneva: UNIDIR, 2019), https://unidir.org/publication/missing-links-understanding-sex-and-gender-related-impacts-of-chemical-and-biological-weapons; N. Ritchie and M. Kupriyanov, Understanding the Humanitarian Consequences and Risks of Nuclear Weapons: New Findings from Recent Scholarship (Federal Ministry of Austria and University
of York, 2023), https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/Understanding_the_Humanitarian_Consequences_and_Risks_of_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf.

395

See, for example, J. Baldus, C. Fehl and S. Hach, Beyond the Ban. A Global Agenda for Nuclear Justice, PRIF Report
4/2021 (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2021); B. Barrillot, “Human Rights and the Causalities of Nuclear
Testing”, Journal of Genocide Research 9, no. 3 (2017): 443–459; P. Kaiku, Nuclear Justice for the Marshall Islands in theAge of Geopolitical Rivalry in the Pacific (Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,

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policymaking in the highly masculinized space of deterrence-based security is also being brought tothe fore by activist, academic and policy communities.396
The impact of such calls for gender equality, as well as of gender-mainstreaming initiatives, can beobserved in the international nuclear regimes. Meetings of states parties to both the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons(TPNW) have featured discussions on the equal participation of women, the different effects ionizing
radiation has on men and on women, gender-sensitive victim assistance, and intersections of race,
gender, economic status, geography and nationality.397 In the case of the TPNW, in particular, gender
has been a topic for discussion as well as the subject of several action points adopted by states parties
under the Vienna Action Plan (2022).
Similarly, interventions to incorporate gender in all aspects related to peace and security under theUnited Nations Security Council’s landmark Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda could support
calls to “connect the dots” between nuclear disarmament and feminist foreign policy. These calls echo
long-existing feminist activism around nuclear disarmament and inclusive peace.398
Both the TPNW and the WPS agenda are ambitious instruments with ground-breaking potential toreshape global nuclear disarmament, peacebuilding and security governance. Despite affinities
between the TPNW and the WPS agenda, there have been no focused discussions on the synergies,
limitations and potential of bringing these two processes closer together. To overcome this gap, thispaper will ask the following questions:•

How do gender considerations feature in the TPNW? What is needed to ensure that those words arematched with action?

•

Where are nuclear disarmament and environmental security in the WPS agenda? How can webridge this gap?

These reflections are important in promoting a more inclusive understanding of what security means in
the TPNW and in ensuring that this understanding is reflected in the practice of TPNW states parties.
This discussion can also help broaden the scope of the WPS agenda to include nuclear disarmamentand environmental security.

2023); M.B. Bolton and E. Minor, “Addressing the Ongoing Humanitarian and Environmental Consequences of Nuclear
Weapons”, Global Policy 12, no. 1 (2021): 81–85; J.M. Collin and P. Bouveret, Radioactivity under the Sand: The Waste
from French Nuclear Tests in Algeria (Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2020), https://www.boell.de/en/2020/07/08/radioactivity-under-the-sand.
396

See, for example, R.H. Dalaqua, K. Egeland and T.G. Hugo, Still Behind the Curve: Gender Balance in Arms Control,
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2020), https://unidir.org/still-behind-the-curve-gender-balance-in-arms-control-non-proliferation-and-disarmament-diplomacy.

397

See the UNIDIR Gender and Disarmament Hub for summaries of gender provisions in the NPT and the TPNW: https://unidir.
org/tools/gender-disarmament-hub.

398

H. Myrttinen, Connecting the Dots: Arms Control, Disarmament and the Women Peace and Security Agenda (Geneva:
UNIDIR, 2020), https://unidir.org/publication/connecting-the-dots; Laura Rose Brown, “Feminist Foreign Policy andNuclear Weapons: Contributions and Implications”, Non Proliferation and Disarmament Papers 86 (2023), https://www.
nonproliferation.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/EUNPDC_no-86.pdf.
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2. Connecting the dots between gender andnuclear politics
Applying a gender lens to nuclear weapons illustrates the gender-specific impacts of nuclear detonation and exposure to ionizing radiation. While the detonation of one or more nuclear weapons would
cause immediate catastrophic humanitarian consequences, there is clear evidence that, over the longterm, women and girls would have a far higher risk of developing cancer than men or boys if exposed
to ionizing radiation. A lifespan study of survivors of the 1945 nuclear weapon attacks on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki in Japan found that the risk of developing and dying from solid cancer due to ionizing
radiation exposure was nearly twice as high for women as for men.399 Pregnant women exposed to highdoses of ionizing radiation face a greater risk of delivering children with birth defects and of experiencing stillbirths, as well as a greater risk of maternal mortality.400
Sex and gender are therefore key aspects that shape how a person experiences conflict and how the biological and physiological impacts of weapons may manifest over the long term. Yet gender also affects
access to participation in arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament negotiations. Women aresystematically under-represented in discussions on nuclear weapons, comprising, on average, only
one third of accredited diplomats to NPT and TPNW meetings.401 Men are over-represented as headsof delegations. For instance, at the 2019 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of theParties to the NPT, approximately 76% of heads of delegations were men and 24% were women, while
attendees overall were 71% men and 29% women.402
But gender is not only an analytical category to shed light on women’s under-representation in international security, it is also a tool to decode power relations embedded in nuclear discourse and activities,
for example the feminization of resistance and disarmament.403 Nuclearism intersects with gender inthe way it masculinizes nuclear activities and feminizes resistance. When militarized and masculinized
nuclearism becomes the norm, divergent narratives, especially those based on gendered and racialized perspectives, risk being feminized and labelled irrelevant.
Beyond gender, an intersectional analysis of nuclear policies must also consider sexual orientation,
race, class, caste, ethnicity, geographic location, disability and other forms of marginalization. That

399

“Risk” here refers to excess relative risk per Gray. See Ozasa et al. “Studies of the Mortality of Atomic Bomb Survivors,
Report 14, 1950–2003: An Overview of Cancer and Noncancer Diseases”, Radiation Research 177, no. 3 (2012): 229–243,
https://doi.org/10.1667/RR2629.1.

400

A. Guro Dimmen, “Gendered Impacts: The Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons from a Gender Perspective”, ILPI–UNIDIR Vienna Conference Series 5 (2014): 1–8, https://unidir.org/publication/gendered-impacts-humanitarian-impacts-nuclear-weapons-gender-perspective; ICAN, “Gender and Nuclear Weapons”, https://www.icanw.org/gender_
and_nuclear_weapons.

401

See the UNIDIR Gender and Disarmament Hub: https://unidir.org/tools/gender-disarmament-hub.

402

R. Hessmann Dalaqua, “How Can We Achieve Gender Break-Throughs in Nuclear Negotiations and Technical Cooperation?” IAEA Bulletin 62-4 (2021), https://www.iaea.org/bulletin/how-can-we-achieve-gender-break-throughs-in-nuclear-negotiations-and-technical-cooperation.

403

C. Eschle, “Gender and Valuing Nuclear Weapons” (working paper, Department of Politics, University of York, 2012; R.
Acheson, Banning the Bomb, Smashing the Patriarchy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021); R. Acheson, “A Feminist
Critique of the Atomic Bomb”, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 12 October 2018, https://www.boell.de/en/2018/10/12/feminist-critique-atomic-bomb.

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some 70% of the world’s uranium is located around sites inhabited by Indigenous Peoples, as are mostnuclear testing and waste repository grounds, highlights the importance of considering intersectionality.404 A conceptual toolbox is needed to examine the geographic location of nuclear impacts versus the
inhabitants’ power and dominance in current global order. The critical analysis presented in this paper
is anchored in the following concepts.

 Feminist post-colonial perspectives
Feminist post-colonial perspectives look at intertwining racialized, class and gender relations and theassociated structure of power and dominance. In particular, this approach examines relations within
and between states predicated on gendered and racialized power and hierarchy.405

 GenderGender refers to the roles, behaviours, activities and attributes that a given society at a given time
considers appropriate or a “norm” for women and men and girls and boys, as well as non-binary or gender-fluid persons.
Gender norms are socially constructed differences – as opposed to biological differences (sex) – andthey function as social rules of behaviour. In most societies, gender norms have resulted in differences
and, thus, inequalities between women and men in terms of their socially assigned responsibilities,
roles, access to and control over resources, and decision-making opportunities.406

 Gender analysis
Gender analysis is a critical examination of how differences in gender roles, activities, needs, opportunities, rights and entitlements affect men, women, girls, boys, non-binary persons and gender-fluid
persons in certain situation or contexts. Gender analysis examines the relationships between genders,
their access to and control of resources, and the constraints they face relative to one another.
Gender analysis can be integrated into all sector assessments or situational analyses to ensure thatgender-based injustices and inequalities are not exacerbated by interventions and that, where possible,
greater equality and justice in gender relations are promoted.407

404

W. Churchill and W. LaDuke, “Native North America: The Political Economy or Radioactive Colonization” in The State of
Native America: Genocide, Colonization and Resistance, ed. M. Annette Jaimes (Boston: South End Press, 1992), 241–266;
R. Panchasi, “‘No Hiroshima in Africa’: the Algerian War and the Question of French Nuclear Tests in the Sahara”, Historyof the Present: A Journal of Critical History 9, no. 1 (2019): 88; D. Endres, “The Rhetoric of Nuclear Colonialism: Rhetorical Exclusion of American Indian Arguments in the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Siting Decision”, Communication andCritical/Cultural Studies 6 (2009): 45.

405

S. Choi and C. Eschle, “Rethinking Global Nuclear Politics, Rethinking Feminism”, International Affairs 98, no. 4 (2022):
1129–1147; J.A. Tickner, “Feminism Meets International Relations: Some Methodological Issues”, in Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, ed. Brooke Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

406

UNIDIR, “What Is Gender?”, Gender and Disarmament Hub, https://unidir.org/gender-perspective.

407

This is an expanded definition based on the UN Women Training Centre’s Gender Equality Glossary, https://trainingcentre.
unwomen.org/mod/glossary/showentry.php?eid=49.

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 Gender mainstreaming
Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women, men,
girls, boys, non-binary persons and gender-fluid persons of any planned action, including legislation,
policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a way to make everyone’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies andprogrammes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that men, women, girls, boys, non-binary
persons and gender-fluid persons benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.408

 Masculinities
Masculinities refers to the set of socially constructed attributes that are considered characteristic ofmen. In international relations, masculinized politics is a form of symbolic gender-coding that relies onhierarchical power relations, thus representing certain qualities and realms of international affairs as
more masculine (such as international security because it involves “rational” or “unemotional” decision-making) and gives these representations a degree of legitimacy while devaluating the opposite.
In nuclear politics, hyper-masculine nuclearism “associates the possession of nuclear weapons withmanliness, sexual potency, and the importance of demonstrating resolve, strength, political advantage
and security through military/masculine power”.409

 Nuclearism
Nuclearism refers to the belief system and policy orientation that supports the development, possession and use of nuclear weapons as a means of national security, deterrence or geopolitical influence. It
encompasses the ideological, military and technological frameworks that prioritize nuclear capabilities
and doctrines as essential means of security. Nuclearism emphasizes the maintenance and expansionof nuclear arsenals, nuclear deterrence strategies and the pursuit of military dominance.410

 Nuclear colonialism
Nuclear colonialism refers to the interplay between nuclear technology, imperialism and colonialism.
It highlights the historical and ongoing relationships between nuclear power, nuclear weapons and thelegacies of colonialism. Nuclear colonialism encompasses the exploitation of colonized lands and Indigenous communities for nuclear testing, uranium mining and nuclear waste disposal. It underscores
the disproportionate burden of environmental, health and social impacts on marginalized and colonizedcommunities. It examines the intersectionality of power, race and environmental justice, challenging
the prevailing narrative of nuclear progress while calling for the recognition of colonial legacies and theequitable treatment of affected populations.411

408This is an expanded definition based on the UN Women Training Centre’s Gender Equality Glossary, https://trainingcentre.
unwomen.org/mod/glossary/showentry.php?eid=61.

409

N. Ritchie, “A Contestation of Nuclear Ontologies: Resisting Nuclearism and Reimagining the Politics of Nuclear Disarmament”, International Relations (2022): 1–24, https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221122959.

410

Definition provided by the Decolonizing Nuclear Studies project, https://highlynriched.com/dns-course-definitions. See
also A.S. Runyan, “Disposable Waste, Lands and Bodies under Canada’s Gendered Nuclear Colonialism”, International
Feminist Journal of Politics 20, no. 1 (2018): 24–38; S. Biswas, Nuclear Desire: Power and the Postcolonial Nuclear Order(Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2014).

411

Definition provided by the Decolonizing Nuclear Studies project, https://highlynriched.com/dns-course-definitions. See
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3. Gender and the TPNW: Potential andlimitations
3.1 Normative progress
The establishment of the TPNW in 2017 marked an unprecedented turn in nuclear discourse fromsecurity concerns towards humanitarian impacts. Unlike prior frameworks, the TPNW offers theprospect of contesting the hyper-masculine and militarized thinking of nuclear-based security. Adopted
to obligate the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear arms with no conditions, the TPNW incorporates,
to various degrees, gender, humanitarian, environmental and justice elements.
The preamble of the TPNW acknowledges that nuclear weapons have a disproportionate impact on
women and girls, including as a result of ionizing radiation. It also recognizes the need for the “equal,
full and effective participation of both women and men” in promoting peace and security and for the engagement of women in nuclear disarmament.412 This has clear synergies with gender-mainstreaming
efforts in peace and security governance, including the WPS agenda.
Moreover, the TPNW includes a clause mandating states parties to provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance to individuals under their jurisdiction affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons,
including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, and to provide for their social andeconomic inclusion (Article 6).413
The transboundary humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use and testing, justice for thevictims of these practices, and impacts on Indigenous communities are also mentioned in the treaty.
Their inclusion is a progressive step towards unprecedented people-centred nuclear accountability
and casts a ray of hope for redressing the social, health and environmental impacts of nuclear use pastand present.
Broadly considered, these developments indicate an expanded institutional space for discussions
on gender and Indigenous justice in the nuclear policymaking sphere. They strengthen the pursuit ofhuman security, the right to a healthy environment, and positive peace, underpinned not only by theabsence of war but also by the realization of human rights and justice.

also Endres, “The Rhetoric of Nuclear Colonialism; R. Jacobs, “Nuclear Conquistadors: Military Colonialism in Nuclear Test
Site Selection during the Cold War”, Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 1, no. 2 (2013), 173.
412

See the TPNW: https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=A/CONF.229/2017/8&Lang=E.

413

See the TPNW: https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=A/CONF.229/2017/8&Lang=E.

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3.2 Operational challenges
With its standing provisions, however, the TPNW would have to overcome several marked barriers toachieve feminist and racial equality in nuclear disarmament.

3.2.1 The pitfalls of “add women and stir”
The classic “add women and stir” approach to guarantee “equal participation” replicated in the TPNW
assumes women in nuclear policymaking form a hegemonic group with a unitary profile, voice andvision for equality. In traditionally hyper-masculine spaces, women have been shown to often internalize the space’s logic of power and dominance to keep up with their men counterparts. Merely increasing the participation of women, without probing the foundational inequalities between womenfrom different locations and of different race, age, class, disability or sexual orientation, would prevent
essential questions about power relations being raised.
Disarmament negotiations remain dominated by men.414 In 2022, women represented only 37% ofdelegates to the First Committee of the United Nations, which deals with disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control issues.415 Gender imbalances increase with higher ranking positions, movingfrom diplomatic personnel to ambassadors, posts in the foreign ministry, and heads of government.416
A recent study on the TPNW conclude that, in relation to the treaty, gender matters were “represented
but not always heard”.417 A further evaluation of the gender provisions of the TPNW – nuclear impacts on
women and girls, and women’s under-representation in nuclear policymaking and masculine discourse– demonstrated a mismatch between the gender visions and deliverables of the treaty.418
These findings show how “ticking the gender box” could pave the way for a minimum institutionalization of equality but might not challenge the gendered power dynamics within the nuclear policymaking
sphere and translate into genuine and meaningful representation. The under-representation of womenamong governmental delegates is in stark contrast to the long history of feminist anti-nuclear activism,
best illustrated by the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.

3.2.2 Insufficient mechanisms for redressing racialized injustices
With the ground laid for discussions focused on Indigenous Peoples, the TPNW opens a critical opportunity to redress racialized nuclear injustice, but specific mechanisms are still required to support theimplementation of key provisions.

414

M. Huscha, “Might Feminism Revive Arms Control? Why Greater Inclusion of Women in Nuclear Policy Is Necessary andHow to Achieve It”, International Institute for Peace, April 2020, https://www.iipvienna.com/news-reports-publications/2020/4/28/might-feminism-revive-arms-control-why-greater-inclusion-of-women-in-nuclear-policy-is-necessary-and-how-to-achieve-it.

415

UNIDIR Gender and Disarmament Hub, https://unidir.org/tools/gender-disarmament-hub.

416

Dalaqua, Egeland and Hugo, Still Behind the Curve.

417

M. Chan and E. Romani, “Represented but Not Always Heard: An Analysis of the Progress of Gender Equality at the United
Nations through the Lens of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung 12 (2023): 267–288.

418

See, for example, R.H. Hogue and A. Maurer, “Pacific Women’s Anti-nuclear Poetry: Centring Indigenous Knowledges”, International Affairs 98, no. 4 (2022) 1267–1288, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac120.

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Although TPNW states parties are called on to provide “adequate assistance” in Article 7, the responsibilities of victim assistance and environmental remediation (Article 6) are primarily shouldered byaffected states.419 Those states will need to allocate funds to deliver medical care, rehabilitation andpsychological support, as well as to ensure the social and economic inclusion of affected individuals.
In addition, to ensure the delivery of age- and gender-sensitive victim assistance, affected countries
will need to develop mechanisms to collect age- and gender-disaggregated data related to the needs ofsurvivors and take those needs into consideration when designing, implementing and reviewing victim
assistance programmes.420
To implement their environmental remediation obligations, affected states will need to assess contaminated areas and the risks they pose to the environment and health. The states should then consider
options for rehabilitation, including methods and technologies to reduce the amount of radioactive
material and stifle the spread of radiation. They will need to devise strategies, policies and programmes
to ensure remediation measures are implemented. This may require dedicated legislation, researchand development efforts, as well as funding schemes to clear contaminated areas.421 Even thoughmost of these actions will take place within national boundaries, it should be noted that harm resulting
from nuclear activities is, in many instances, transboundary.
While victim assistance and land clearance have been accomplished in the realm of conventional
weapons, these processes are likely to be more challenging when applied to nuclear damage. Ionizing
radiation from nuclear weapon explosions is known to have adverse impacts on humans, but it can bedifficult to establish direct causality between radiation exposure and health impacts, which may extend
beyond a generation.422 The main difficulty in environmental remediation may be obtaining the financial
resources and technology required for radiological clean-up.
The TPNW’s preamble stresses that none of its provisions shall be interpreted as affecting the “inalienable right of its States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peacefulpurposes without discrimination”.423 With the global nuclear order seated in a deeply unequal political
economy built on exploitation of the labour and natural resources of developing countries to fuel globalized capitalism and technological advancement, mostly controlled by Western countries, the implications of this preambular paragraph warrant careful examination. Resources from Indigenous lands
continue to be exploited in the name of nuclear technology and research, with detrimental effects on thelocal social, environmental and cultural ecology.
This continued exploitation reinforces the message that technological development trumps Indigenous living and beliefs. The “without discrimination” requisite of this TPNW provision risks passively
defending the imbalanced status quo without acknowledging the dominance that exists in nuclear
energy development as much as in nuclear weapons governance.

419

See the TPNW: https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=A/CONF.229/2017/8&Lang=E.

420

J. Revill, R. Hessmann Dalaqua and W. Wan, “The TPNW in Practice: Elements for Effective National Implementation”,
Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 4, 1 (2021): 13–33, https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.1930737.

421

Ibid.

422

N. Pelzer, “Nuclear Accidents: Models for Reparation”, in Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law, Volume III, ed. J.L.
Black-Branch and D. Fleck (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2016), 355–401.

423

See the TPNW: https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=A/CONF.229/2017/8&Lang=E.

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4. Women, Peace and Security: Links anddisconnects
One avenue for strengthening the gender component of the TPNW would be to strengthen the links with
the WPS agenda. Premised on United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace andSecurity (WPS),424 widely considered a turning point in global efforts to mainstream gender in peaceand security governance, the WPS agenda has developed through nine follow-up Security Council
resolutions. The WPS agenda has four main pillars: prevention of violence and violations of women’shuman rights; participation in all peace processes as well as women’s representation in formal andinformal decision-making at all levels; protection from violence and abuse of women’s human rights;
women’s equal access to aid distribution mechanisms and services in relief and recovery.425
The decades after resolution 1325 witnessed a surge of national actions plans (NAPs) on WPS
developed by 107 countries426 and incremental adoption of feminist foreign policy by at least ten countries.427 The NAPs of Ireland (2019), the Philippines (2009) and Rwanda (2010) acknowledge nuclear
politics, while scholarly interventions from the United States of America explore opportunities toconnect the WPS agenda to the National Nuclear Security Administration.428
Feminist international relations scholarship identifies nuclear weapon politics as a feminist issue that
requires a feminist response, as such politics contribute to ideas about a state’s interests and its positioning in the international order.429 Nuclear disarmament arguably falls under the purview of feminist
security, with its potential to contribute to greater human and environmental security. The WPS agenda
has the potential to facilitate multilateral processes to increase meaningful women’s participation in all
aspects of security governance, including nuclear disarmament.
At the United Nations level, attempts to table the WPS agenda to harness stronger institutional
momentum on women’s participation in nuclear disarmament are on the rise. Most remarkably, in his
2020 report on WPS, the United Nations Secretary-General encouraged the WPS and disarmament
movements to combine forces to enhance human security.430 The disarmament branches of the United

424

Security Council, S/RES/1325, 2000, https://undocs.org/S/RES/1325(2000).

425

All resolutions and draft resolutions on WPS are available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/security-council-resolutions/page/1?ctype=Women%2C+Peace+and+Security&cbtype=women-peace-and-security#038;cbtype=women-peace-and-security.

426

London School of Economics, Centre for Women, Peace and Security, WPS National Action Plans (database), accessed 11
November 2023, https://www.wpsnaps.org.

427

These include Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Slovenia
and Spain. Sweden, which was the pioneer of this movement, announced in 2023 that it would no longer pursue a feminist
foreign policy.

428

Centre for Women, Peace and Security, WPS National Action Plans (database); M.E. Gallagher and E. Howell, “Opportunities for Linking Women, Peace and Security to the US Department of Energy”, International Journal of Nuclear Security 8,
no. 2 (2023): art. 12.

429

Laura Rose Brown, “Feminist Foreign Policy and Nuclear Weapons: Contributions and Implications”, Non Proliferation andDisarmament Papers 86, November 2023, https://www.nonproliferation.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/EUNPDC_
no-86.pdf.

430

Security Council, “Women and Peace and Security”, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2020/946, 25 September 2020,
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2020_946.
pdf.

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Nations are also involved in this process: UNIDIR, an autonomous institution within the United Nations,has an established Gender and Disarmament research programme. In 2022, the United Nations Officefor Disarmament Affairs launched a new Policy on Gender and Disarmament.431
In principle, the WPS agenda is well positioned to leverage state commitment to security for womenacross all forms of disarmament. There are other dedicated efforts linking gender equality and disarmament, but the WPS agenda remains the most systematic, with stronger global discursive momentum. It
could offer an entry point for enhanced advocacy and policy for gender and nuclear disarmament.
Despite its origins in progressive feminist activism and vision of peace, the WPS agenda eventually
took shape as an array of political documents from the fierce power contestation ground of the United
Nations Security Council and was reduced in both ambition and feminist ownership. The WPS agenda’s
compromised focus on negative peace and militarized security has long been subject to critique.432
Three main gaps in the WPS agenda pose hurdles to connecting with the TPNW, undermining a critical
opportunity to realize gendered and racialized justice:•

No mention of the impacts of nuclear weapons use and/or testing in WPS resolutions;•

No acknowledgement of racialized hierarchy in international security; and•Near-silences and shortcomings on environmental security.

4.1 Where is (nuclear) disarmament?
As it has expanded, the WPS agenda has embraced an increasing body of topics at the critical intersection of gender and peace and security, such as sexual violence, violent extremism, transitional justice
and arms trade.433 However, from founding resolution 1325 (2000) to the latest resolution (resolution
2493 in 2019), the disarmament and governance of nuclear weapons have never been overtly included.
Within the WPS agenda, some progress has been made regarding the topics of small arms and light
weapons control, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration for women combatants.434
However, initiatives in the field of nuclear weapons control and disarmament to improve women’s participation and tackle the gendered impacts of weapons have not been framed explicitly in the WPS
agenda.435

431

UNODA, “UNODA Launches Policy on Gender & Disarmament at Event Co-hosted with Sweden”, 6 June 2022, https://disarmament.unoda.org/update/unoda-launches-policy-on-gender-disarmament-at-event-co-hosted-with-sweden.

432

See, for example, P. Kirby and L.J. Shepherd. “The Futures Past of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda”, International
Affairs 92, no. 2 (2016): 373–392; L.J. Shepherd. “Making War Safe for Women? National Action Plans and the Militarisationof the Women, Peace and Security Agenda”, International Political Science Review 37, no. 3 (2016): 324–335. N. Pratt. “Reconceptualizing Gender, Reinscribing Racial–Sexual Boundaries in International Security: The Case of UN Security Council
Resolution 1325 on ‘Women, Peace and Security”’, International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 4 (2013): 772–783.

433

See summaries and details of the resolutions at PeaceWomen: https://www.peacewomen.org/why-WPS/solutions/resolutions.

434

C. Chinkin, “Arms Control, Disarmament and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda”, UNIDIR, 3 March 2020, https://unidir.org/arms-control-disarmament-and-the-women-peace-and-security-agenda.

435

R.H. Dalaqua, “Lost in Translation? Understanding the Relevance of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in the Field ofArms Control and Disarmament”, European Leadership Network, 30 November 2020, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/lost-in-translation-understanding-the-relevance-of-the-women-peace-and-security-agenda-in-the-field-of-arms-control-and-disarmament.

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This crucial disconnect arguably stems from the lingering belief in militarized security (embedded in
the “making wars safer for women” tendency) often seen in the WPS agenda, as well as in individual
countries’ NAPs on WPS.436 Consequently, the world’s biggest gender and peace agenda bypasses
the conversation of comprehensive disarmament, including nuclear weapons. This approach creates a
discrepancy between states’ endorsement of the WPS agenda and their genuine commitment towards
nuclear disarmament.

4.2 Where is race and power?
Thus far, the WPS agenda has not addressed issues related to race and/or colonialism. In fact, feminist
inquiries contend that the racialized hierarchy is carefully maintained in the knowledge production in
the WPS and in the making of NAPs. Critical racial reflections about the WPS agenda question who the
WPS agenda is about and who it is for. These lines of enquiry seek to deconstruct the global racial hierarchies in WPS practices, wherein the “peaceful Global North” calls for militarized actions of rescue
for the “insecure Global South”.437 In this way, liberal prescriptions of peace can be imposed to open up
local markets and resources for the global economy, further cementing hierarchies between post-conflict and intervening countries.438
Scholars also highlight the Global North’s domination of WPS knowledge and discourse production,with research centres, programmes and students of WPS largely situated in the Global North.439 Global
South actors contesting the WPS power space take part in efforts to rewrite the WPS agenda throughadvocacy in the United Nations, taking part in the drafting of NAPs, or engaging in conscious non-implementation.440
Together, these critical realizations could create significant momentum for the decolonization of the
WPS agenda. But as it stands, it remains a distant prospect for the agenda to meaningfully address
racialized power imbalances, including in the sphere of nuclear politics, by putting women at the centreof peace and security. To unlock this potential, the WPS agenda would need to seek positive peace,justice and human security for all, across gender, race and geographic location.

436

Shepherd, “Making War Safe for Women?”

437

T. Haastrup and J.J. Hagen, “Global Racial Hierarchies and the Limits of Localization via National Action Plans”, in New
Directions in Women, Peace and Security, ed. S. Basu, P. Kirby and L.J. Shepherd (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2020),
133.

438

Pratt, “Reconceptualizing Gender”; S. Basu, “The Global South Writes 1325 (Too)”, International Political Science Review
37, no. 3 (2016): 362–374, https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512116642616.

439

T. Haastrup and J.J. Hagen, “Racial Hierarchies of Knowledge Production in the Women, Peace and Security Agenda”,
Critical Studies on Security 9, no. 1 (2021): 27–30; M. Henry, “On the Necessity of Critical Race Feminism for Women, Peaceand Security”, Critical Studies on Security 9, no. 1 (2021): 22–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2021.1904191.

440

Basu, “The Global South Writes”; Security Council Report, Golden Threads and Persisting Challenges: The Security
Council Women, Peace and Security Presidencies Initiative (New York: Security Council Report, 2022); V. Newby and A.
O’Malley, “WPS 20 Years On: Where Are the Women Now?”, Global Studies Quarterly 1, no. 3 (September 2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksab017.

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4.3 Where is environmental security?
With its primary focus on women’s security from conflict-related violence, the WPS agenda has beenslow to recognize environmental impacts as a security risk for women and girls.441 So far, the response of
the United Nations Security Council to the surging inquiries regarding the environment aspects of WPS
is a minimal mention in the preamble of resolution 2242 (2015), which states the Security Council’s
intention to “increase attention to women, peace and security as a cross-cutting subject in all relevant
thematic areas of work on its agenda” for the “changing global context of peace and security” including“the impacts of climate change”.442
Reviews of the integration of climate change and environment degradation into NAPs on WPS also
reveal, with only occasion exceptions, a general reluctance among states to take on gender and environmental peacebuilding.443
Conversations about nuclear-related, gendered environmental impacts are thus hindered in the WPS
arena. In comparison, the short- and long-term implementation goals of the TPNW give pronounced
attention to victim assistance and to environmental compensation with gender considerations.

5. Conclusions and recommendations
This paper has argued that norms development in nuclear governance could improve through change
in discourse, commitment to supporting survivors, genuine inclusion and equity, enhanced synergies
among related policy frameworks and knowledge production that incorporates gender and racial issues.
Effective nuclear disarmament must be feminist and inclusive within established normative frameworks
and beyond. The following recommendations are put forward to advance inclusive nuclear justice.

5.1 Changing the discourse
The TPNW presents nuclear disarmament as a means to avoid the detrimental consequences of nuclear
weapons. That it is “cognizant that the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately addressed” is a central theme throughout the text.444 Such a focus on the humanitarian risksof nuclear weapons is a solid basis for levelled-up redress and justice efforts. However, it is important
to go beyond the consequences of nuclear weapons and address the discourse that underpins nuclear
deterrence.
The ongoing consultative process on the security concerns of states is an opportunity to sharpen
arguments about how the TPNW provides for security. This process, which was initiated by a decisionat the second Meeting of States Parties in 2023, will advance arguments and recommendations to441

K. Yoshida and L.M. Céspedes-Báez, “The Nature of Women, Peace and Security: A Colombian perspective”, International
Affairs 97, no. 1 (2021): 17–34; K. Yoshida, H. Bond and H. Kezie-Nwoha, Defending the Future: Gender, Conflict and Environmental Peace (LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security, 2020), https://www.lse.ac.uk/women-peace-security/
assets/documents/2021/Defending-the-Future.pdf.

442

Security Council, S/RES/2242, 2015.

443

E. Smith, “Climate Change in Women, Peace, and Security National Action Plans”, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security
No. 2020/07 (2020), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/sipriinsight2007.pdf.

444

See the TPNW: http://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8.

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promote the legitimate security concerns and the threat and risk perceptions enshrined in the TPNW
that result from the existence of nuclear weapons and the concept of nuclear deterrence. The process
will also seek to “challenge the security paradigm based on nuclear deterrence by highlighting andpromoting new scientific evidence about the humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons
and juxtaposing this with the risks and assumptions that are inherent in nuclear deterrence.”445
This is an opportune moment to re-examine the structural security inequalities, with inherent genderand racial underpinnings, within the policies that govern the most destructive weapon in human history.
Gender, social and environmental aspects must be a part of this process, which has the potential toshake up masculinized, statist nuclear security credos.

5.2 Addressing nuclear use past and present through an international
trust fundIn the Vienna Action Plan adopted at the first Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW, Action 29 documented a consensus forming between states parties to propose guidelines for the establishment of aninternational trust fund that could support victim assistance and environmental remediation activities.446
At the second Meeting of States Parties in 2023, the states parties agreed that an informal working
group would continue to exam this issue and prepare a report on the “feasibility of, and possible guidelines for, the establishment of an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation”.447 This report will be presented at the third Meeting of States Parties in 2025, where further
discussions are expected to take place.
This process could lead to greater momentum for gender- and race-sensitive justice and remedy procedures. Civil society actors have endorsed the idea of the trust fund, as an enhancement to the TPNW, toredress nuclear legacies and mobilize “those who can” in support of “those who need”. It is also seen
as an opportunity for rights-based discussions and a point of focus for engaging states not party to thetreaty in humanitarian work.448
Discussions on the establishment of the fund should be based on questions such as how to mobilize
proportionate contributions that are reflective of accountability rather than merely goodwill, how to centralize victims in the decision-making process, how to make sure different needs are equally heard andsupported, what kind of infrastructure should be in place, and how to monitor implementation. Good
examples can be drawn from other disarmament programmes – the Oslo Action Plan of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, for instance – that institutionalize considerations of local ownership,gendered needs, survivor participation, community dialogue, and synergies with other interventions
from development, peacebuilding, human rights and humanitarian arenas.

445

Report of the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, TPNW/MSP/2023/14,
13 December 2023, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4033034/files/TPNW_MSP_2023_14-EN.pdf.

446

First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, TPNW/MSP/2022/CRP.7, 22 June 2022,
https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/TPNW.MSP_.2022.CRP_.7-Draft-Action-Plan-new.pdf.

447

Report of the Second Meeting of States Parties.

448

See, for example, ICAN, “An International Trust Fund for Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation”, 16 February
2023, https://assets.nationbuilder.com/ican/pages/3166/attachments/original/1676637600/ICAN_written_comments_
Trust_Fund_questions_UPDATED.pdf.

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5.3 Promoting meaningful and inclusive participation
Feminist perspectives are highly relevant when reviewing the inclusivity of nuclear norm-making. Theypose such questions as what is considered central and relevant to the subject matter, what may beunspoken and excluded, whose accounts are regarded as important, and who is left out.449 In the caseof the TPNW, there is a risk that diverse grassroots voices and profiles will be merged into a generic,
unitary identity assigned to “victims”. To avoid that, it is imperative to acknowledge that simplistic
grouping risks blurring distinct voices from within marginalized groups.
Applying an intersectional approach that incorporates gender, sexual orientation, race, class, caste,ethnicity, geographic location, disability and other forms of marginalization is crucial for justice andfor inclusive disarmament. To facilitate inclusion, both normative and logistical barriers need to be
overcome, including travel costs, visas, mobility constraints, access to information, procedural rules,
stigmatization and discredit. The TPNW and other international frameworks must tackle these barriers,
as they often have limited grassroot participation.450

5.4 Supporting and funding diverse knowledge production
One critical concern that has recently emerged from feminist interrogations of global nuclear politics
is the West-concentrated geographic locations of the most high-profile theoretical deliberations on
feminist nuclear politics, despite scholarly debates from “peripheral” nuclear countries shedding
equally important light on gendered nuclear realities.451 This concern highlights the power and legitimacy dynamics in global knowledge generation for nuclear disarmament decision-making. These
dynamics could determine what aspects of the nuclear order are studied, to what extent, from whatperspectives, and by whom.
Giving the most-affected communities the lead in producing the most relevant knowledge, and advisory
status on intersectional nuclear weapons issues, could circumvent the one-way street of imposing
Western or top-down solutions. The genuine inclusion of feminist and anti-colonial causes would
also be a critical driver of attitudinal change and, essentially, a prerequisite for policy inclusivity. When
provided with adequate funding, the research branches of relevant United Nations bodies are well positioned to bring non-Western expertise and better age- and gender-disaggregated data from thesecontexts into analysis and research to inform nuclear norms development.

5.5 Overcoming fragmentation in multilateral policymaking
Both the TPNW and the WPS agenda have the potential to generate disarmament and human security
policy that is sensitive to gendered and racialized power relations, but their respective limitations aredelaying genuine change. Synergy between the two movements is pivotal to garner more inclusive
dialogues around gender, nuclear accountability and security; to translate their normative advancements into practical impacts; and to leverage greater state commitment to full disarmament.

449

J. Tickner, “Feminism Meets International Relations: Some Methodological Issues”, in Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, ed. B. Ackerly, M. Stern and J. True (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 19–41; L.J. Shepherd,
Gender Matters in Global Politics: A Feminist Introduction to International Relations (Routledge, 2014).

450

LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security, Our Generation for Inclusive Peace, An Inclusive and Sustainable Approach
to Relief and Recovery (Policy Brief 05/2022, LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security, 2022), https://www.lse.ac.uk/
women-peace-security/assets/documents/An-inclusive-and-sustainable-approach-to-relief-and-recovery-policy-brief-05.pdf.

451

Choi and Eschler, “Rethinking Global Nuclear Politics”.

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Among other things, bridging the TPNW and WPS agenda communities could help expand what
security means in the TPNW, promoting a more inclusive understanding and ensuring that understanding is reflected in the practice of TPNW states parties. Strengthening these links could also broaden thescope of the WPS agenda to include nuclear disarmament and environmental security. Civil society andacademic circles addressing the intersectionality of gender, nuclear use and security could connect thecurrently fragmented initiatives and mechanisms working on these issues.
To drive the advancement further, policy-level engagement – starting with identifying champion states– would be a necessary next step. For instance, states that have ratified the TPNW and adopted WPS
NAPs, especially those with nuclear provisions in their NAPs, would be well positioned to lead this work.
State-to-state communications add impetus to other advocacy towards states and aid the creation ofan enabling environment within existing institutional platforms (e.g. the United Nations and regionalorganizations) for reflections on gender in nuclear politics and security. Some other existing processes
that could be mobilized to address gendered nuclear injustice and to create a network of accountability include the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Special Rapporteuron Human Rights and Environment, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

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Appendices
Appendix A. Testimonials surveyed by Rebecca
Davis Gibbons
NAME

GENDERNATIONALITY

LOCATION OF

SOURCEEXPOSURE

Abderrahmane
Toumi

Man

Algeria

Algeria“France-Algeria Relations: The Lingering Fallout
from Nuclear Tests in the Sahara”, BBC, 27 April
2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56799670

Abdelkrim
TouhamiMan

Algeria

Algeria“France’s Nuclear Tests in Algeria”, Witness
History (BBC World Service Podcast),
2023, https://podcasts.apple.com/us/
podcast/frances-nuclear-tests-in-algeria/
id339986758?i=1000595403544
Simon Speakman Cordall, “France Faces Up To
Its Nuclear Fallout”, The New European, 22 April
2023, https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/
france-faces-up-to-its-nuclear-fallout/

Sue ColemanHaseldine

Woman

Australia

Australia“Sue Coleman-Haseldine”, Peace Boat (video)
4 March 2022, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Cuf6eP1lGBA“Testimony by Sue Coleman-Haseldine, Nuclear
Bomb Testing Survivor”, The Future of Life
Institute, 29 March 2017, https://futureoflife.
org/nuclear/testimony-by-sue-coleman-haseldine-nuclear-bomb-testing-survivor/

Jim
Marlow

Man

Australia

Australia

Amelia Searson and Peter Bar, “Montebello Islands Nuclear Test Research Finds
Radiation Still Present 70 Years after Blast”,
ABC.AU, 6 October 2022, https://www.abc.
net.au/news/2022-10-07/montebello-islands-nuclear-test-research-examines-radiation-risk/101500896

Alan
BatchelorMan

Australia

Australia

Megan Palin, “Children of Maralinga Atomic
Bomb Test Vet-erans ‘Suffering Deformities and
Early Deaths’ because of ‘Genetic Transfer’”,News.Com.Au, 10 March 2016, https://www.
news.com.au/national/south-australia/
new-generations-of-australian-families-suffering-deformities-and-early-deaths-because-of-genetic-transfer/news-story/6e1e0328063fe48142234c7c74848fea

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98

StevePurse

Man

Australia

Australia

Dominic Casciani, “Nuclear Bomb Test Veterans
Relaunch Legal Action”, BBC, 20 September
2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-66869017
Chris Wood, “Nuclear Test Veterans: ‘MY DADWAS TREATED LIKE A GUINEA PIG’”, BBC,
30 May 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/ukwales-57157476

HilaryWilliams

Woman

Australia

Australia

Jon Donnison, “Lingering Impact of British
Nuclear Tests in the Australian Outback”, BBC, 31
December 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-australia-30640338

KarinaLester

Woman

Australia

Australia“Karina’s Father Went Blind at Emu Field. Now,
She’s Fighting for a Treaty On Nuclear Weapons”,
NITV, 14 June 2023, https://www.sbs.com.au/
nitv/article/karinas-father-went-blind-at-emufield-now-shes-fighting-for-a-treaty-on-nuclearweapons/g67uk5oea“Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons: Karina Lester(podcast)”, Aboriginal Way, 31 July 2023, https://www.nativetitlesa.org/treaty-to-ban-nuclear-weapons-karina-lester/“70 Years after Emu Field”, www.abc.net.au, 14
October 2023, https://www.abc.net.au/listen/
programs/sundayextra/emu-field/102976162
Erin Jones, “South Australian Woman Karina
Lester Presents Anti-Nuclear Speech to United
Nations in New York”, The Ad-vertiser, 23 June
2017, https://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/
south-australia/south-australian-woman-karina-lester-presents-antinuclear-speech-to-united-nations-in-new-york/news-story/be7b9ecb4ae5e0f0c568908f117c4be9“Black Mist and the Ban”, Australian Red
Cross, 2023, https://www.redcross.org.au/stories/2023/black-mist-and-the-ban/

Enver
Tohti

Man

China

China

Zeeya Merali, “Did China’s Nuclear Tests Kill
Thousands and Doom Future Generations?”
Scientific American, 1 July 2009, https://www.
scientificamerican.com/article/did-chinas-nuclear-tests
Ursula Gelis, “‘The Peoples Bomb’: China’s
Nuclear Weapons Testing Program”, WILPF
Norway, 9 July 2015, https://www.ikff.no/the-peoples-bomb-chinas-nuclear-weapons-testing-program/

Liu
Qing (alias)

Man

China

China

Xia Muozhu, “Nuclear Testing in China’s Western
Territory”, The Epoch Times, 13 March 2021,
https://www.theepochtimes.com/article/nuclear-testing-in-chinas-western-territory-1487841

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Hinamoeura
Cross

Woman

French Polynesia

French Polynesia

Jean-Tenahe Faatau, “Hinamoeura Cross Wants
to ‘Educate and to Denuclearize Memories’”,Beyond Nuclear International, 26 September
2022, https://beyondnuclearinternational.
org/2022/09/26/interview-nuclear-tests-in-polynesia/

AugusteUebe Carlson

Man

French Polynesia

French Polynesia

Nic Maclellan, “‘We Would like France to Apologise:’
Nuclear Test Survivors in French Polynesia”,
Dianuke.Org, 28 July 2020, https://www.dianuke.
org/we-would-like-france-to-apologise-nucleartest-survivors-in-french-polynesia/

Ashok
Bishnoi

Man

India

India

Neha Dixit, “The People of the Fallout”, Outlook,
5 February 2022, https://www.outlookindia.
com/magazine/story/the-people-of-the-fallout/294065

ManishBishnoi

Man

India

India

Swati Vashishtha, “Give Peace a Chance, Say
Villagers Near Nuclear Test Sites in Pokhran”,
News18, 5 October 2016, https://www.news18.
com/news/india/give-peace-a-chancesay-villagers-near-nuclear-test-sites-inpokhran-1298772.html

Om
Prakash

Man

India

India

Shweta Desai, “Forty Years after Pokhran Nuclear
Tests, Villagers Complain of Frequent Cancer
Deaths”, Scroll.in, 18 May 2014, https://scroll.in/article/664440/forty-years-after-pokhran-nuclear-tests-villagers-complain-of-frequent-cancerdeaths

Setsuko
Thurlow

Woman

Japan

Hiroshima, Japan“Setsuko Thurlow”, Peace Boat (video). 4 March
2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DtF2sPuwbgw

Jiro
Kawatsuma

Man

Japan

Hiroshima, Japan

Lorena Rodriguez, “My Journey to Hiroshima: Reflections on Memory”, Rotary Voices, 12 June 2018,https://blog.rotary.org/2018/06/12/my-journey-to-hiroshima-reflections-on-memory/
Jiro Kawatsuma, “What’s It Like To...Survive an
Atomic Bomb”, werribeerotary.org.au, (n.d.),https://werribeerotary.org.au/stories/what-s-itlike-to

Sueichi
Kido

Man

Japan

Nagasaki, Japan

Mari Yamaguchi, “Atomic Bomb Survivors Look
to G7 Summit in Hiroshima as a ‘Sliver of Hope’for Nuclear Disarmament”, AP, 19 May 2023,
https://apnews.com/article/atomic-bomb-survivors-g7-hiroshima-dc5564ead989e7c3e75aa32521e12071

YasuakiYamashita

Man

Japan

Nagasaki, Japan“Interview: Goal of First-ever UN Resolution
Resonates Even Now – A Hibakusha’s Story”,
United Nations - UN News, 22 January 2016,
https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/01/520662interview-goal-first-ever-un-resolutionresonates-even-now-hibakushas-story

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100

SadaeKasaoka

Woman

Japan

Hiroshima, Japan

Laura Goehler, “Hiroshima Survivors Warn
G7 Leaders about Using Nuclear Bombs”,
Aljazeera, 19 May 2023, https://www.aljazeera.
com/features/2023/5/19/hiroshima-survivors-warn-g7-leaders-about-using-nuclear-bombs

Ryohei
TanabeMan

Japan

Hiroshima, Japan

Justin McCurry, “Hiroshima Survivors Urge G7
Leaders to Unite against Atomic Weapons”, The
Guardian, 15 May 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/16/hiroshima-survivors-urge-g7-leaders-to-unite-against-atomicweapons

Tsutomu
Yamaguchi

Man

Japan

Hiroshima andNagasaki, Japan“Tsutomu Yamaguchi: The Man Who Miraculously
Survived Two Atomic Explosions”, Yourstory, 27
July 2023. https://yourstory.com/2023/07/tsutomu-yamaguchi-double-atomic-survivor

Yasujiro
TanakaMan

Japan

Nagasaki, Japan“After The Bomb: Survivors of the Atomic Blasts
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Share Their Stories”,
Time, (n.d.), https://time.com/after-the-bomb/

TakatoMichishita

Man

Japan

Nagasaki, Japan“After The Bomb: Survivors of the Atomic Blasts
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Share Their Stories”,
Time, (n.d.), https://time.com/after-the-bomb/

YoshiroYamawaki

Man

Japan

Nagasaki, Japan“After The Bomb: Survivors of the Atomic Blasts
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Share Their Stories”,
Time, (n.d.), https://time.com/after-the-bomb/

Emiko
Okada

Woman

Japan

Hiroshima, Japan“After The Bomb: Survivors of the Atomic Blasts
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Share Their Stories”,
Time, (n.d.), https://time.com/after-the-bomb/

Masakatsu
Obata

Man

Japan

Nagasaki, Japan“After The Bomb: Survivors of the Atomic Blasts
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Share Their Stories”,
Time, (n.d.), https://time.com/after-the-bomb/

KumikoArakawa

Woman

Japan

Nagasaki, Japan“After The Bomb: Survivors of the Atomic Blasts
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Share Their Stories”,
Time, (n.d.), https://time.com/after-the-bomb/

Fujio
Torikoshi

Man

Japan

Hiroshima, Japan“After The Bomb: Survivors of the Atomic Blasts
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Share Their Stories”,
Time, (n.d.), https://time.com/after-the-bomb/

Inosuke
Hayasaki

Man

Japan

Nagasaki, Japan“After The Bomb: Survivors of the Atomic Blasts
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Share Their Stories”,
Time, (n.d.), https://time.com/after-the-bomb/

Ryouga
Suwa

Man

Japan

Hiroshima, Japan“After The Bomb: Survivors of the Atomic Blasts
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Share Their Stories”,
Time, (n.d.), https://time.com/after-the-bomb/

ShigekoMatsumoto

Woman

Japan

Nagasaki, Japan“After The Bomb: Survivors of the Atomic Blasts
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Share Their Stories”,
Time, (n.d.), https://time.com/after-the-bomb/

SachikoMatsuo

Woman

Japan

Nagasaki, Japan“After The Bomb: Survivors of the Atomic Blasts
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Share Their Stories”,
Time, (n.d.), https://time.com/after-the-bomb/

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101

Norimitsu
Tosu

Man

Japan

Hiroshima, JapanDavid E. Decosse, “An Interview with a Survivorof the Hiro-shima Bombing”, National Catholic
Reporter, 19 December 2016, https://www.
ncronline.org/blogs/ncr-today/interview-survivor-hiroshima-bombing

Koko
Kondo

Woman

Japan

Hiroshima, Japan“‘We Are Not Screaming Loud Enough’: Hiroshima’s Last Sur-vivors Feel Urgent Need to Bear
Witness”, LA Times, 4 August 2020, https://www.
latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-08-04/hiroshima-survivors-urgency-bear-witness.

Matashichi
Oishi

Man

Japan

Marshall Islands

Nic Maclellan, Grappling with the Bomb: Britain’s
Pacific H-Bomb Tests (Canberra, ANU Press:
2017).

Lee
Su-Young

Woman

Japan

Hiroshima, Japan

Choe Sang-Hun, “Korean Survivors of Atomic
Bombs Renew Fight for Recognition, and
Apology”, New York Times, 25 May 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/world/asia/korea-hiroshima-nagasaki-survivors.html

Sunao
TsuboiMan

Japan

Hiroshima, Japan

Justin McCurry, “The Man Who Survived
Hiroshima: ‘I Had Entered a Living Hell on
Earth’”, The Guardian, 3 August 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/31/
japan-atomic-bomb-survivors-nuclear-weapons-hiroshima-70th-anniversary

Keiko
Ogura

Woman

Japan

Hiroshima, Japan“Keiko Ogura’s Interview (video)”, Atomic Heritage
Foundation, 2019, https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.
org/ranger/tour-stop/keiko-oguras-interview/

Karipbek
KuyukovMan

Kazakhstan

USSR“Karipbek Kuyukov”, Peace Boat (video), 4
March 2022, Video, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=ZYdkwvyVfBc https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=VuigJcECXBs

Dmitriy
VesselovMan

Kazakhstan

USSR“First Person: Life Story of a 3rd Generation
Survivor of Soviet Nuclear Tests in Kazakhstan”,
InDepthNews, 23 August 2023, https://indepthnews.net/first-person-life-story-of-a-3rd-generation-survivor-of-soviet-nuclear-tests-in-kazakhstan/

Teeua
Tetua

Woman

Kiribati

Kiritimati, Kiribati

Alexis-Martin, Becky, “The Atomic History of Kiritimati – a Tiny Island where Humanity Realised Its
Most Lethal Potential”, The Conversation, 4 July
2019, https://theconversation.com/the-atomic-history-of-kiritimati-a-tiny-island-where-humanity-realised-its-most-lethal-potential-114870

Emori
LigicaMan

Kiribati

Kiritimati, Kiribati

Nic Maclellan, Grappling with the Bomb: Britain’s
Pacific H-Bomb Tests (Canberra, ANU Press:
2017).

Pita
Rokoratu

Man

Kiribati

Kiritimati, Kiribati

Nic Maclellan, Grappling with the Bomb: Britain’s
Pacific H-Bomb Tests (Canberra, ANU Press:
2017).

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102

Philomena
Lawrence

Woman

Kiribati

Kiritimati, Kiribati

Becky Alexis-Martin, “The Atomic History of Kiritimati – a Tiny Island where Humanity Realised Its
Most Lethal Potential”, The Conversation, 4 July
2019, https://theconversation.com/the-atomic-history-of-kiritimati-a-tiny-island-where-humanity-realised-its-most-lethal-potential-114870

Paulah poyMan

Kiribati

Kiritimati, Kiribati

Nic Maclellan, Grappling with the Bomb: Britain’s
Pacific H-Bomb Tests (Canberra, ANU Press:
2017).

GordonCoggonMan

Kiribati

Kiritimati, Kiribati“Gordon Coggon”, Peace Boat (video), 4 March
2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KC_
vn1nU4RM

Lee
GyuyeoMan

Republic of Korea

Hiroshima, Japan“Lee Gyuyeo”, Peace Boat (video), 4 March 2022,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kG5nPzZVZ7c&feature=youtu.bePeterson
Jibas

Man

Marshall Islands

Marshall Islands

Rebecca Davis Gibbons, “What Justice Meansto Communities Affected by Nuclear Testing”,
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 2 February 2023,
https://thebulletin.org/2023/02/what-justice-means-to-communities-affected-by-nuclear-testing/#post-heading

NeisenLaukon

Woman

Marshall Islands

Marshall Islands“The U.S. Tested Atomic Bombs, Then I Got
Cancer (video)”, AJ+, 13 July 2022, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=UDNLrOSCOf8

Tony
deBrumMan

Marshall Islands

Marshall Islands

Dan Zak, “He Saw a Nuclear Blast at 9, thenSpent His Life Op-posing Nuclear War andClimate Change”, Washington Post, 24 August
2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
he-saw-a-nuclear-blast-at-9-then-spenthis-life-opposing-nuclear-war-and-climatechange/2017/08/24/5b6d10e6-882e-11e7-a94f3139abce39f5_story.html

Darlene
Keju

Woman

Marshall Islands

Marshall Islands

Tilman A. Ruff, “The Humanitarian Impact and Implications of Nuclear Test Explosions in the PacificRegion”, International Review of the Red Cross 97,
no. 899 (2015): 775-813,https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1816383116000163

LemeyoWoman

Marshall islands

Marshall Islands

Nic Maclellan, Grappling with the Bomb: Britain’s
Pacific H-Bomb Tests (Canberra, ANU Press:
2017).

Abon

Tilman A. Ruff, “The Humanitarian Impact and Implications of Nuclear Test Explosions in the PacificRegion”, International Review of the Red Cross 97,
no. 899 (2015): 775-813, https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1816383116000163
Lani
Kramer

Woman

Marshall Islands

Marshall Islands

Renee Lewis, “Bikinians Evacuated ‘for Goodof Mankind’ Endure Lengthy Nuclear Fallout”,
Aljazeera America, 28 July 2015, http://america.
aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/28/bikini-nuclear-test-survivors-demand-compensation.html

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103

TariqRafiq

Man

Pakistan

Pakistan

Shweta Desai, “The Fallout FROM Pakistan’s
Nuclear Tests”, The Diplomat, 29 May 2017,https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/the-fallout-from-pakistans-nuclear-tests/

Terry
QuinlanMan

United Kingdom

Kiritimati, Kiribati

Becky Alexis-Martin, “The Atomic History of Kiritimati – A Tiny Island where Humanity Realised Its
Most Lethal Potential”, The Conversation, 4 July
2019, https://theconversation.com/the-atomic-history-of-kiritimati-a-tiny-island-where-humanity-realised-its-most-lethal-potential-114870

Eric
BartonMan

United Kingdom

Australia

Dominic Casciani, “Nuclear Bomb Test Veterans
Relaunch Legal Action”, BBC, 20 September
2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-66869017

John
Ward

Man

United Kingdom

Kiritimati, Kiribati“Nuclear Test Veteran Wants Government
Apology over Blasts”, BBC, 18 June 2018,https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-derbyshire-44508192

Mary
Dickson

Woman

United States

Utah, UnitedStates“Mary Dickson”, Peace Boat (video), 4 March
2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cknMPqfr3kY&feature=youtu.be

GeorgeColemanMan

United States

Nevada, UnitedStates“The Story of a Nuclear Test Veteran”, ICAN, 29
May 2019, https://www.icanw.org/the_story_
of_a_nuclear_test_veteran

Paul
Pino

Man

United States

New Mexico,
United States“People Exposed to Fallout from 1st Atomic Bomb
Test Still Fighting for Compensation”, NPR (AllThings Considered), 30 July 2023, https://www.
npr.org/2023/07/30/1191006283/people-exposed-to-fallout-from-1st-atomic-bomb-teststill-fighting-for-compensat

Wayne
BrooksMan

United States

Johnston Island,
Marshall Islands

Jennifer Lafleur, “America’s Atomic Vets: ‘We
Were Used as Guinea Pigs – Every One of Us’”,
Reveal, 27 May 2016, https://revealnews.
org/article/us-veterans-in-secretive-nuclear-tests-still-fighting-for-recognition/

Jim
Bunting

Man

United States

Johnston Island,
Marshall Islands

Jennifer Lafleur, “America’s Atomic Vets: ‘We
Were Used as Guinea Pigs – Every One of Us’”,
Reveal, 27 May 2016, https://revealnews.
org/article/us-veterans-in-secretive-nuclear-tests-still-fighting-for-recognition/

Lincoln
Grahlfs

Man

United States

Johnston Island,
Marshall Islands

Jennifer Lafleur, “America’s Atomic Vets: ‘We
Were Used as Guinea Pigs – Every One of Us’”,
Reveal, 27 May 2016, https://revealnews.
org/article/us-veterans-in-secretive-nuclear-tests-still-fighting-for-recognition/
Francis Lincoln Grahlfs, “Veterans of US Atomic
Age Deserve Compensation”, Military Times, 2
December 2021, https://www.militarytimes.
com/opinion/commentary/2021/12/02/veterans-of-us-atomic-age-deserve-compensation/

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104

Barbara
Kent

Woman

United States

New Mexico,
United States

Lesley M. M. Blume, “Collateral Damage:
American Civilian Survivors of the 1945 Trinity
Test”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 17 July
2023, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-07/
collateral-damage-american-civilian-survivors-of-the-1945-trinity-test/
Leila Fadel, Justine Kenin, Gabe O’Connor,“Survivors of the Trinity Nuclear Test Weren’t
Warned — Then Were Lied To After”, NPR.org (AllThings Considered), 27 September 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/09/27/1040983335/survivors-of-the-trinity-nuclear-test-werent-warnedthen-were-lied-to-after

Kathleen
Bogle

Woman

United States

Mississippi,
United States

Barrett Ervin, “A Personal Account”, ATOMIC MS,
10 December 2015, https://atomicms.olemiss.
edu/2015/12/10/a-personal-account
Leila Fadel, Justine Kenin, Gabe O’Connor,“Survivors of the Trinity Nuclear Test Weren’t
Warned — Then Were Lied To After”, NPR.org (AllThings Considered), 27 September 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/09/27/1040983335/survivors-of-the-trinity-nuclear-test-werent-warnedthen-were-lied-to-afterBernice
Gutierrez

Woman

United States

New Mexico,
United States

Danielle Prokop, “New Mexico Downwinders
Demand Recognition, Justice”, El Paso Matters,
27 January 2022, https://elpasomatters.
org/2022/01/27/new-mexico-downwinders-demand-recognition-justice/
Duane Pohlman, “The ‘Downwinders’: Living andDying in the Fallout of Oppenheimer’s Bomb”,
WKRCSat, October 7 2023, https://local12.com/
news/investigates/the-downwinders-living-dying-fallout-of-oppenheimers-bomb-duane-pohlman-investigate-investigation-manhattan-project-trinity-site-atomic-nuclear-gadget-mushroom-cloud-plutonium-radioactive-cancer-sickness-contamination-missile-geiger-counter-nuclides

Anatoly
Korsunov

Man

USSR/RussianFederation

Orenburg Oblast,Russian Federation/USSR

M. Franchetti, “Nuclear Survivors Tell Tale ofHorror”, Calgary Herald, 24 June 2001.

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105

Appendix B. Information about interviews
conducted by María Pía Devoto, Mariel R. Lucero
Baigorria and Ana Levintan
Semi-structured interviews were conducted based on the following questions.
1.

What do you understand by:a. Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP)?
b. Foreign Policy with a Gender Perspective (FPGP)?

2.

How is the incorporation of FFP or FPGP in foreign policy envisaged?
a. Do you see the incorporation of FFP or FPGP in foreign policy as a trend or as an essential axis?
b. Is the person in charge of the FFP or FPGP area included in the core decision-making group?

3.

How is FFP or FPGP applied/implemented in your country?

4.

What are the priority topics on the foreign policy agenda of X (interviewee’s country)? What actions
does your country take in FFP and FPGP?

5.

Do you believe that disarmament (nuclear), gender, and environmental issues should be
addressed?

6.

How do you think the Global South (Latin America and the Caribbean) can influence the implementation of these topics: disarmament, gender, environment, or others?

7.

How do you think these topics can be implemented in practice? What recommendations would you
give to increase the influence of FFP and FPGP?

List of Interviewees•

Carlos Umaña, Co-President of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War•

Diaria Arana Aguilar, Director General of Global Thought•

Gloria De La Fuente, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile•

Karen Hallberg, Research Director at the Bariloche Atomic Centre, Balseiro Institute, Argentina•

Marita Perceval, Special Representative for Feminist Foreign Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
International Trade, and Worship of the Argentine Republic•

Maritza Chan, Ambassador of the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations•

Ray Achenson, Disarmament Director at the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom•

Verónica Garea, President of INVAP S.A., Technological Development Institute, Argentina

Additionally, interviews were conducted with three officials from the Directorate of International Security,
Nuclear, and Space Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade, and Worship of theArgentine Republic, and four officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Mexico.

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106

UNIDIR hopes that the analyses
presented here will represent a
springboard for new and inclusive
efforts towards nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.

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107

@unidir/unidir/un_disarmresearch/unidirgeneva/unidir

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