Discussion Paper No. 1002

EDUCATION AND
PRO-FAMILY ALTRUISTIC DISCRIMINATIONAGAINST FOREIGNERS:FIVE-COUNTRY COMPARISONS
Shusaku Sasaki
Naoko Okuyama
Masao Ogaki
Fumio Ohtake

May 2017

The Institute of Social and Economic Research
Osaka University
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan

Education andpro-family altruistic discrimination against foreigners:
Five-country comparisons
Shusaku Sasaki1, Naoko Okuyama, Masao Ogaki, and Fumio Ohtake
May 8th, 2017

Abstract
We measure differences between altruism toward a family member and toward an
unknown foreigner using hypothetical questions in internet surveys across fivecountries: Germany, the US, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan. Our analysis showsthat people in all five countries exhibit greater altruistic tendencies toward family
members compared to their behavior toward foreigners. However, the degree of
discrimination differs across countries. It is lowest in Germany and largest in Japan; theremaining three countries fall within this demarcated range. Further analysis shows that
correlation structures between education and altruistic discrimination differ widely. In
Germany, people who have spent less time in education exhibit lower altruism towardforeigners compared to toward family members. However, in Japan, South Korea, andSingapore, people with higher education levels tend to discriminate against foreigners.
The degree of discrimination is insensitive to the educational background in the US
sample.
Keywords: Altruism, Attitude
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition
JEL classification: D64, F22, J01

toward1

foreigners,

Immigration,

Education,

Corresponding Author: Mail to ssasaki.econ@gmail.com. The author belongs to Faculty of Economics,
Keio University, and Japan Society of the Promotion of Science (JSPS Post-doctoral Research Fellow).

11. Introduction
Identity economics suggests that social identity, or group identity, facilitates cooperation
within a group (Akerlof and Kranton 2010). When an individual belongs to a group andshares a social identity with members in that group, he/she acts altruistically toward
them. This tendency is called “in-group favoritism.” In contrast, that individual willtend to discriminate against another group’s members (“out-group discrimination”).
Several experiments have demonstrated that when a subject is paired with someone
from the same group, thereby emphasizing their social identity, this promotes
cooperative behaviors, including the provision of public goods (Kramer and Brewer
1984; Eckel and Grossman 2005; Charness et al. 2007; Chen and Xin Li 2009).
The boundaries between in-groups and out-groups are a function of gender,
age, educational background, job classifications, race, religion, etc. When differences
expand in terms of the altruism shown toward in-groups (more) and out-groups (less),social discrimination ensues, including gender, racial, and religious discrimination(Tajfel and Turner 1979).
This study focuses on social discrimination against foreigners, including
racial and religious discrimination, and pro-in-group discrimination against foreigners
that could be a function of these factors. Immigration is a politically, socially, andeconomically important issue in advanced countries, including redistribution andintegration policies in those countries. This importance clearly manifests itself in recent
events including the referendum in Great Britain, which decided that the country will
leave the EU, and the anti-immigration rhetoric that was a hallmark of the Republican
party’s campaign trail in the lead-up to the recent US presidential election. If citizens ina country exhibit much lower altruism toward foreigners than familiar people, national
governments could encounter difficulties in promoting policies that are open andinclusive, vis-à-vis immigration and foreign workers. 2
Experimental studies in economics and psychology have measured levels ofgeneral altruism and in-group bias in several countries and discovered the existence ofcross-country differences (Mann et al. 1985; Triandis et al. 1988; Engel 2011). However,
it is still unclear whether pro-in-group altruistic discrimination exists against foreigners,
how this type of discrimination varies across countries, and what determines each2

Recent empirical studies show that non-economic factors, including compositional concerns andaltruism, explain citizens’ attitudes towards immigrants and foreign workers. Interestingly, these
non-economic factors contribute more to explaining attitudes than do concerns about economic impacts(Card et al., 2012; Hainmueller et al., 2015).

2

country’s level of discrimination and its differences with other countries.
Related studies have been conducted by Jones and Rachlin (2006, 2009). They
first measured “subjective social distance,” which is equivalent to a feeling of closeness,for various other people. In addition, the authors paired a participant with recipients indifferent subjective social distances, conducted dictator games, and estimated altruistic
parameters at each subjective social distance. Their results showed that as subjective
social distance widens (feelings of closeness drop), the altruistic parameter decreases.
Furthermore, Strombach et al. (2014) conducted similar experiments for university
students in both Germany and China and showed that as subjective social distancewidens, the altruistic parameter tends to decrease in both countries, but heterogeneities
exist in terms of country-specific trends. These results could support the possible
existence of pro-in-group altruistic discrimination against foreigners, and suchdiscrimination could differ across countries, if we assume that we generally have ashorter subjective social distance for a familiar person and a longer one for a foreigner.
In this study, we use online questionnaire surveys with respondent samples
diversified along the dimensions of gender, age, and state/county/prefecture in Germany,
the US, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan. We create hypothetical questions bymodifying Jones and Rachlin’s questions for our purposes. In our questions, we pair aparticipant with a family member (this study defines an in-group member as a family
member) and with an unknown foreigner, and measure the altruistic parameter toward
each recipient. By subtracting the altruistic parameter toward a foreigner from thattoward a family member, we calculate our measure of pro-family altruistic
discrimination against foreigners.
Two main differences exist between previous experimental studies of social
distance and this study. Firstly, the extant literature measures the altruistic parameter at
a range of subjective social distances, while this study measures it for two objective
targets, namely a family member and a foreigner. The previous models allow different
subjective social distances and an identical degree of altruism to a foreigner amongindividuals. In contrast, the latter model allows different degrees of altruism to aforeigner among individuals. It should be noted that both types of models aretheoretically isomorphic. However, in terms of measurements, subjective social distancein the previous literature does not have to include any foreigner when asking anexperiment participant to mentally place people on the distance scale. Thus, the lattermodel is more suitable in the terms of measurements for our study’s purposes of
expanding the political discussion about discriminations against foreigners.

3

The second difference is that the previous literature reports experiments
conducted among university students in some countries, while this study uses
questionnaire surveys to gain data from samples diversified across the dimensions ofgender, age, and state/county/prefecture of residence. This approach is utilized because
it is suitable for our specific aims.
Adopting this methodology allows us to answer the following two researchquestions: (1) does pro-family altruistic discrimination exist against foreigners, and (2)how different is the altruistic discrimination between countries. Furthermore, we use
question sets in our surveys and Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition methods (Blinder 1973;
Oaxaca 1973) to determine the factors that explain cross-country differences in
pro-family altruistic discrimination against foreigners. This analysis answers our third
question: what determines each country’s level of altruistic discrimination and what
influences its cross-country differences.
The main findings are as follows. Firstly, pro-family altruistic discrimination
does exist against foreigners in all five countries. Secondly, the degree of discriminationdiffers across countries. It is lowest in Germany and largest in Japan; the remaining
three countries’ degrees fall between these two extremes. Finally, the correlation
structure between education and altruistic discrimination differs across countries. In
Germany, people who have spent less time in education exhibit much lower altruism
toward foreigners compared to that toward family members. In Japan, South Korea, andSingapore, people with higher education levels discriminate against foreigners.
Interestingly, altruistic discrimination is insensitive to educational backgrounds in the
US sample.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our methodology anddata. Section 3 presents each country’s level of altruistic discrimination. Section 4
discusses national differences as determined through the application of Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition analysis, and Section 5 discusses the study’s implications, limitations,and areas for future research.

42. Methodology and data description
2.1. Overview
In this study, we conduct online questionnaire surveys 3 on samples diversified along thedimensions of gender, age, and state/county/prefecture for participants in Germany, theUS, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan. We modify Jones and Rachlin’s hypotheticalquestions for our purposes, analyze the responses, and measure pro-family altruistic
discrimination against foreigners. In addition, we capture survey participants’socio-economic and demographic characteristics (gender, age, family structure,
education, and household income4) and their personality, behavioral, and psychologicalcharacteristics (Big 5 personality traits, time preferences, and worldviews) 5.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 posit two hypothetical questions. We use the answers from
Figure 1.1 to measure the altruistic parameters toward a family member, and we use theanswers from Figure 1.2 to measure the altruistic parameters toward an unknown
foreigner. Next, by subtracting the latter from the former, we obtain our measure of
pro-family altruistic discrimination against foreigners.
[Figures 1.1 and 1.2 are here]
In each question, we present eight situations in which participants have tochoose Option 1 or Option 2. The choice requires participants to decide if the individual
participant or a different recipient will receive a certain amount of money. For example,
in Situation 4 of Figure 1.1, the choice is whether the participant receives 500 yen
personally or their family member receives 7,500 yen. If the participants choose Option
1 in Situation 4, they have to relinquish Option 2, in which their family member could3

We asked research institutes in each country, including Nikkei Research Inc., to administer aninternet-based survey in the official language of each country (restricted to English in Singapore, thus
excluding Malay, Mandarin, and Tamil). We obtained 1,294 respondents in Germany, 1,283 respondents
in the US, 1,290 respondents in Singapore, 1,284 respondents in South Korea, and 10,047 respondents inJapan. Furthermore, note that we conducted the Japan survey in 2013 and the others in 2014.
4
We standardize household income by purchasing power parity for analytical consistency.
5
Big 5 personality traits are frequently used to capture a respondent’s conscientiousness, extraversion,agreeableness, openness to experience, and neuroticism. We measured the Big 5 Personality traits byusing 10 short-phrase items developed by Gosling et al. (2003). The surveys in the US and Singapore
directly used their query expressions. The surveys in Germany, Singapore, and Japan used thosetranslated, respectively, by Muck et al. (2007), Ha et al. (2013), and Oshio et al. (2012).
Time preference implies a tendency to avoid a choice, which generates current costs and future benefits.
Also, worldviews are defined as people’s perceptions of how the world works.

5

have received 7,500 yen.
We calculate altruistic parameters using the following approach. We first takethe average of the two monetary amounts 6 for Option 1 at the point of switching from
Option 2 to Option 1, and we divide the numerator by 7,500 yen. For example, if aparticipant switches from Option 2 to Option 1 between Situations 4 and 5, we look at
the two monetary amounts offered under Option 1, which are 500 yen and 1,000 yen.
Then, we add these two amounts, take the average amount, which is 750 yen, divide theaverage amount by 7,500 yen, and calculate the amount of 0.100. We call this the
log-normalized amount of our altruistic parameter.
We calculate our measure of pro-family altruistic discrimination against
foreigners by subtracting the altruistic parameter toward the latter from the former.
When altruistic discrimination takes a positive value, the altruistic parameter toward afamily member is larger than that toward a foreigner. 7 The nearer this figure is to zero,
the more the altruistic parameters toward family members and foreigners converge.

2.2. Methodological validity
We create hypothetical questions by modifying experimental designs by Jones andRachlin (2006, 2008). Those authors adopted a Multiple Price List format, 8 conducteddictator games with different allocation patterns between a dictator and recipient, andestimated altruistic parameters for recipients. As shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, we alsopresent multiple dictator games with different allocation patterns.
One of the main differences between their experimental designs and ourquestions is that the former measures the altruistic parameter at each subjective social
distance, while our study measures it for two objective targets, namely a family member
and a foreigner. As explained in the Introduction, this reflects the fact that our study’s
aim is to use our measure of pro-family altruistic discrimination against foreigners to
explore the political implications of social discriminations against foreigners.
Our methodology is associated with certain concerns and potential limitations.
6

Switching points on boundaries were calculated as follows. If a participant chooses Option 1 in all eightsituations, we define the switching point as the middle point between - 10 yen and 0 yen. On the other
hand, if a participant chooses Option 2 in all eight situations, we define it as the middle point between
9,000 yen and 10,800 yen.
7
When the amount is a negative value, the altruistic parameter toward a family member is smaller thanthat toward a foreigner. Such ‘pro-foreigner altruistic discrimination against family members’ rarely
occurs in practice.
8
The Multiple Price List methodology has been frequently used in laboratory experiments andquestionnaire surveys when seeking to elicit time and risk preferences (Andersen et al., 2006).

6

The first concern is whether experimental outcomes with monetary incentives differ
from those offering only hypothetical incentives. However, Locey, Jones, and Rachlin(2011) already determined that no statistically significant difference exists between the
two. This tendency is found also in experimental studies on time preferences (Madden
et al. 2003). Given these experimental results, we think that our hypothetical questions
can be used for our study’s purposes.
A second concern is whether the Multiple Price List format introduces errors(or bias) in participants’ answers, because it repeatedly presents similar situations andcould impose a strain on the participants. To address this concern, we adopt a titration
methodology, which presents the least number of situations necessary to capture aparticipant’s switching point from Option 2 to Option 1. The titration method has often
been used in economics (Read et al., 2005; Linardi and Tanaka, 2013; Krupka andStephens, 2013), psychology (Weber et al., 2007), and marketing (Zauberman, 2003).
However, this method requires us to assume that after a participant’s choice switchesfrom Option 2 to Option1, he/she will definitely continue to choose Option 1 in all
subsequent presented situations.
Third, some might debate whether our hypothetical questions elicit only
altruism toward each recipient. Indeed, reasonable concerns exist that our measurement
could capture additional phenomena aside from altruism toward family members andforeigners. Ida and Ogawa (2012) advanced a relevant argument; they pointed out thatthe parameters of Jones and Rachlin (2006, 2008) can consist of different altruistic
parameters toward different recipients and a common inequality-aversion parameter9
across all recipients; using conjoint analysis with hypothetical questions, they
empirically determined the existence of the latter.
Importantly, their model indicates that we can remove this common
inequality-aversion parameter by subtracting Jones and Rachlin’s parameter toward one
recipient from another recipient. 10 Accordingly, this study subtracts this parameter
toward a foreigner from that toward a family member. This captures only differences in
9Inequality aversion implies a tendency to avoid inequalities between a dictator and a recipient. Bartling
et al. (2009) differentiate several kinds of inequalities, which are aheadness aversion (aversion to positive
payoff inequality), behindness aversion (aversion to negative payoff inequality), etc. Ida and Ogawa(2012) call the former inequality aversion and call the latter envy.
10
Based on Ida and Ogawa (2012), we assume the following utility function:
𝑈𝑖(𝑥) = log 𝑥𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖,𝑗 log 𝑥𝑗 − 𝛼𝑖 log max{(𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖 ) + 1, 1} − 𝛽𝑖 log max{(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗 ) + 1, 1}
where 𝑥𝑖 (𝑥𝑗 ) denotes the vector of monetary payoff for a dictator 𝑖 (a recipient 𝑗), and 𝜃 is theparameter of altruism, which can vary across different recipients. In equality aversions, 𝛼 is theparameter of behindness aversion and 𝛽 is the parameter of aheadness aversion. These parameters arecommon across different recipients.

7

altruism between the two.
Finally, others might question our definition of a family member as an in-groupmember. Several empirical studies have shown that people generally hold a strong
feeling of closeness toward family members (Jones and Rachlin, 2006, 2009; Strombach
et al., 2014). Therefore, our in-group assumption is plausible. However, sincedifferences exist in family structures and relationships across countries and cultures,some people in some countries might not recognize a family member as an in-groupmember. To militate against this concern, our empirical model includes members in a
respondent’s current household. 11 Differences in current household members should
consider cross-country differences in family structures and relationships.

2.3. Data description[Table 1 is here]
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. The data are obtained from internet surveys.
Internet surveys have several advantages, including lower research costs (Fricker andSchonlau, 2002); some recent important economic studies have used them in place ofinterviews and mail surveys (Benjamin et al. 2014; Kuziemko et al. 2015). On the other
hand, concerns have been raised regarding the extent to which internet samples departfrom nationally representative samples and therefore, the extent to which data derived
from internet surveys are biased.
To address these concerns, we first use sampling information provided by the
aforementioned research institutes, 12 construct sample weights, and modify the
distribution of our samples accordingly using those weights. Table 1 shows that the
distributions of gender and age are indifferent between our samples and census data.
However, some differences might exist in family structures, educational year, andhousehold income. 13
Second, our estimation model includes variables of personality andbehavioral characteristics as covariates. We do so to control potential deviations in
Our surveys identify respondent’ current household members in detail (single or spouse, children,
children’s spouse, grandchildren, grandfather, grandmother, father, mother, spouse’s father, spouse’s
mother, siblings, and others).
12
Again, the research institute diversified samples along the dimensions of gender, age, andstate/county/prefecture in the five countries.
13
The education variable is based on the educational system in each country. We report each country’s
educational background and years in education in Appendix A.
118psychological endowments and characteristics between our samples and the census data.
However, even if some deviations and biases exist in our samples and subsequent
survey answers, and even if these deviations and biases are similarly present in eachcountry’s sample, this does not crucially influence our cross-country comparative
analysis.

93. Cross-country comparisons of pro-family altruistic
discrimination against foreigners[Figure 2 is here][Table 2 is here]
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 = 𝛽1 𝑈𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝐽𝑃𝑖 + 𝑍𝑖′ 𝛿 + 𝑢𝑖
(1)This section examines the results shown in Figure 2 and Table 2, addressing thefollowing questions:
1.
2.

Does pro-family altruistic discrimination exist against foreigners?
If such discrimination does exist, how does it differ across countries?

Figure 2 depicts levels of pro-family altruistic discrimination against foreigners
in the five sampled countries: Germany, the US, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan. In
Table 2, we use model (1) to regress the dependent variable (altruistic discrimination)
on countries’ dummies in addition to socio-economic and demographic variables(gender, age, family structure, educational year, and household income) and personality
and behavioral variables (Big 5 personality traits, time preference, and worldviews).
Our regression analysis uses sample weights to consider differences in sample sizes
across the five countries, and uses cluster-robust standard errors at state, county, or
prefecture levels.
Before presenting the estimated results, we will summarize the method used tointerpret the dependent variable. We calculate pro-family altruistic discrimination
against foreigners by subtracting the altruistic parameter toward the latter from that of
the former. When altruistic discrimination takes a positive value, the altruistic parameter
toward a family member is larger than that toward a foreigner. As the discrimination
value approaches zero, the altruistic parameters associated with family members andforeigners increasingly converge. 14
The estimated results suggest that pro-family altruistic discrimination against
14

With respect to some participants, the altruistic parameter toward a family member is lower than thattoward a foreigner. However, this is not commonly observed. Excluding such observations and re-running
the regression analysis, produces results which are near-identical to those discussed in this section.

10

foreigners exists in all five countries. According to Figure 2 and column 1 of Table 2,
altruistic discrimination values are as follows: 0.310 (Germany), 0.386 (the US), 0.390(Singapore), 0.381 (South Korea), and 0.434 (Japan). Column 1 also illustrates that all
country dummy coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Clearly, people across all five sampled countries exhibit lower levels of altruism towardforeigners compared to that toward family members.
The results also reveal cross-country differences in altruistic discrimination. We
reject, at the 1% level, the null hypothesis that German altruistic discrimination is notdifferent from that in the other four countries, and that Japanese altruistic discrimination
is not different from that in the other four countries. Pro-family altruistic discrimination
against foreigners is lowest in Germany but greatest in Japan; the remaining three
countries fall between these two countries in this respect.
Socio-economic and demographic characteristics explain to some degree eachcountry’s level of altruistic discrimination. Column 2 of Table 2 shows that when adding
such variables to the model, country dummies become significant, but the countries’
effects become smaller than those in column 1. Furthermore, column 3 shows that evenafter adding personality and behavioral variables to the model, the effect sizes remainsimilar to those in column 2, and the country ranks in terms of altruistic discrimination
do not differ from those in columns 1 and 2. These results nullify the idea that altruistic
discrimination is strongly influenced by systematic deviations in psychologicalendowments and characteristics between our samples and the census data.
One remaining concern15 is that our survey respondents include non-natives ineach country. If the ratio of non-natives in the sampled German respondents is higher
than that in the other countries, it could conceivably explain the lower pro-family
altruistic discrimination against foreigners there. This is because such non-native
German residents might consider “foreigners” as native German neighbors, to whomthey feel closeness as a result. In fact, the ratio of foreign-born residents to the total
German population is 14.9%, which is relatively high compared to the ratio in othersampled countries (United Nations Population Division, 2017).
To address this concern, we incorporate the ratio of foreign-born residents by
15

Another potential concern is that our survey procedure may serve to artificially decrease pro-family
altruistic discrimination against foreigners in Germany, the US, Singapore, and South Korea. We,
Japanese researchers, conducted the survey, and specify the nature of its content when recruiting
respondents. Thus, respondents in the four other countries could be relatively favorable towards
foreigners, including Japanese people. However, if so, there should exist little difference in altruistic
discrimination across the four countries; therefore, we judge that this concern is not crucial for ouranalysis.

11

state/county/prefecture in the model. Appendix B shows that the directionality of thecountry dummies’ parameters and their relative rank are insensitive to this model
addition. Interestingly, the ratio of foreign-born residents has a negative effect on
altruistic discrimination. This implies that when respondents live in areas with higher
ratios of foreign-born residents, they will be more likely to exhibit lower pro-family
altruistic discrimination against foreigners. Again, this could be because a respondent is
a non-native.
The forgoing analysis addresses our two research objectives, namely (1)whether pro-family altruistic discrimination exists against foreigners, and (2)assessment of cross-country differences in altruistic discrimination. In terms of theformer, altruistic discrimination exists the world over, and altruism toward foreigners islower than that exhibited toward family members. In terms of the latter, altruistic
discrimination differs across countries; altruistic discrimination is lowest in Germany
and highest in Japan. That is, altruism exhibited toward foreigners is relatively similar(low) to that exhibited toward family members in Germany (Japan).

12

4. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analysis
Table 3 demonstrates that pro-family altruistic discrimination against foreigners islowest in Germany but highest in Japan, with the remaining three countries’ fallingwithin the range set by these two extremes.
[Table 3 is here]
It therefore remains to determine what factors determine each country’s level ofaltruistic discrimination and what, in turn, influences cross-country differences. Thissection uses Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition methods (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973) toanswer these questions. We focus on the results of the Japan–Germany comparison inthis section because German (Japanese) altruistic discrimination is lowest (highest) andstable. We present further comparisons in Appendix C. The method used is̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐽𝑃 − ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝐸 =′(𝑋̅𝐽𝑃 − 𝑋̅ 𝐷𝐸 )′ 𝛽̂ 𝐷𝐸 + 𝑋̅ 𝐷𝐸 (𝛽̂ 𝐽𝑃 − 𝛽̂ 𝐷𝐸 ) + (𝑋̅𝐽𝑃 − 𝑋̅ 𝐷𝐸 )′ (𝛽̂ 𝐽𝑃 − 𝛽̂ 𝐷𝐸 )(2)

Before presenting our comparative results, we will briefly explain
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition methods. Model (2) shows that Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition methods entail conducting a regression analysis on each country’s
sample, the results of which are used to decompose a two-country difference in thedependent variable into endowment effects, coefficient effects, and interaction effects.
Endowment effects refer to how the distributional differences in independent variables
explain the two-country difference in the dependent variable. Coefficient effects denote
how independent-variable coefficient differences explain the latter. In addition,interaction effects equal the other effects with the exception of endowments andcoefficients effects. Here if a coefficient effect is statistically significant andindependent variables are exogenous, causal effects differ between the two countries.
Conversely, if independent variables are endogenous, a coefficient effect implies
differences in correlation structures between the dependent and independent variables.
Both of these cases contribute to discovering international differences in altruistic
discrimination and correlated variables.

13

4.1. Japan–Germany comparison[Table 4 is here]
Table 4 indicates that the Japanese–German differences in altruistic discrimination(0.125) can be explained mainly by differences in directionality and coefficientmagnitudes. Panel A reports that the overall endowment effect is 0.022 (at10%significance level) and the overall coefficient effect is 0.106 (at 1% significancelevel). In contrast, the overall interaction effect is not statistically significant. The
coefficient effect is equivalent to around 84.8% of the two-country difference in thedependent variable.
We also find that most of the coefficient effect is associated with years ineducation, and this variable can be endogenous. According to column 2 of Panel A, thecoefficient effect consists of three socio-economic and demographic variables: years ineducation, household income, and a female dummy. Years in educational and householdincome can be endogenous, and this result implies that differences exist in thecorrelation structures between altruistic discrimination and years ineducation/household income. In contrast, the female dummy is more exogenous.
Therefore, its coefficient effect means that causal effects of being female differ between
Japan and Germany, and this difference partly explains the two-country difference in thedependent variable.
We examine how the correlation structures of altruistic discrimination andyears in education differ between Japan and Germany16,17 because the coefficient effectof educational year is 0.120, so its effect is larger than the overall coefficient effect(0.106). Panel B shows that there exists a positive (negative) correlation between thetwo in Japan (Germany). Japan’s correlation coefficient is 0.003 (at 5% significancelevel), and that associated with Germany is −0.006 (at 1% significance level). These16

The correlation structure between altruistic discrimination and household income is equivalent to theeducational year case. Panel B shows that a positive correlation exists between the two in Japan; thecorrelation coefficient is 0.0002 (at 5% level). Conversely, a negative correlation exists in Germany; thecorrelation coefficient is −0.0004 at 10% significance level. That is, Japanese people with higher
household incomes exhibit lower altruism toward foreigners compared to that toward family members,
whereas German people with higher household incomes exhibit more equal levels of altruism towards
these two groups.
17
How different are the causal effects of being female between Japan and Germany? Panel B presents thecoefficients and standard errors of these three variables from the regression results pertaining to eachcountry’s sample. In Japan, the female dummy has a statistically insignificant effect on the dependent
variable. Conversely, in Germany, the dummy has a negative causal effect. That is, German females act
altruistically toward foreigners, in contrast to the behavior of Japanese females.

14results imply that Japanese people who have spent a longer amount of time in education
exhibit lower altruism toward foreigners compared to family members, and that German
people who have spent a longer amount of time in education exhibit more equal levelsof altruism toward the former compared to the latter.
We also explore the coefficient effect for years in education. Since differencesin educational systems exist between Japan and Germany, the correlation structures
between altruistic discrimination and education could differ non-linearly, rather thanlinearly. To consider cross-country differences in educational systems, we replace thesingle educational year variable with dummy variables of educational background,which we use instead to conduct regression analysis in each country’s sample.
[Tables 5.1 and 5.2 are here]
Japanese altruistic discrimination is highest among people with a Master’s
degree and higher. Table 5.1 shows that when setting the dummy of high school or lessas a baseline, the junior college coefficient is statistically insignificant. In contrast, thecoefficients on a bachelor’s degree and Master’s degree and higher are statisticallysignificant and positive. In particular, the coefficient on a Master’s degree and higher isthe largest and statistically significant at the 1% level. These results indicate thatJapanese people with Master’s degrees or higher exhibit much lower altruism towardforeigners compared to that toward family members.
On the other hand, German altruistic discrimination is largest among people
with elementary, intermediate, and high intermediate vocational education levels (called
Hauptschule, Realschule, and Berfsschule, respectively). Table 5.2 shows that whensetting the dummy variable of Realschule as a baseline, the coefficients of Hauptschuleand Berfsschule are insignificant. In contrast, the coefficients of advanced vocationaland higher general educations (Fachoberschule and universities) are negative at a 1~5%
significance level. These results indicate that German people with elementary,intermediate, and high intermediate vocational education levels exhibit much lower
altruism toward foreigners than toward family members.
The main finding is upheld that the correlation structures between altruistic
discrimination and education differ widely across Japan and Germany. Japanese people
who have spent a longer amount of time in education exhibit much lower altruism
toward foreigners compared to their behavior toward family members. In contrast,
German people who have spent less time in education exhibit much lower altruism

15toward foreigners compared to that expressed toward family members. The estimation
results with the linear education variable approximating those found using the dummy
variables of educational background. Concretely, Japanese people with a Master’s
degree or higher exhibit greater pro-family altruistic discrimination against foreigners,
while in Germany, this behavior is more prevalent among people with elementary,intermediate, and high intermediate vocational educations.
Appendix C shows that the correlation structures in South Korea and Singapore
are similar to that of Japan, i.e., in South Korea and Singapore, people with a Master’s
degree and higher tend to discriminate against foreigners. Interestingly, in the US,
altruistic discrimination is insensitive to educational background.

4.2. Education and pro-family altruistic discrimination
against foreigners
This section explores the findings regarding education level in more detail, with an aim
to determine why correlation structures differ across Japan and Germany. Three possible
explanations exist. First, causal effects of receiving higher education vary between thetwo countries. Possibly, Japan’s higher education (university and professional
education) might serve to increase discrimination against foreigners, while Germany’s
might promote altruism toward non-nationals. Secondly, people exhibiting lower
altruism toward foreigners might tend to enter higher educational institutes in Japan,
and vice versa in Germany. In this explanatory paradigm, sample selection might bemore important. Third, people with a higher education might be more competitive withimmigrants and foreign workers in Japan, while people with a lower education are morecompetitive with them in Germany. That is, characteristics of labor market
environments might shape pro-family altruistic discrimination against foreigners.
We show that we cannot dismiss the third explanation to the extent it has been
dismissed by previous literature and evidence. However, similarly, we also fail to reject
the first or second explanations.18
There is indirect evidence to suggest that Japanese nationals with a higher
education are more competitive with foreign workers having a similar level of education.
First, the ratio of foreign-born residents in the total population of Japan has been, and18

Our data does not contain instruments to elicit a causal effect from higher education on altruistic
discrimination. Therefore, we cannot test whether the first and second explanations are reasonable.

16

continues to be, small. Rather, Japan faced a dramatic increase in population after WorldWar II, and the government encouraged native workers to find work abroad. Second,
non-native workers could have zero or marginal impacts on the wages and employment
of Japanese workers. Nakamura et al. (2009) empirically illuminate that an increase inforeign labor force does not decrease Japanese native workers’ wages, but rather, it
increases the wages of high school graduates in Japan. These observations support thenotion that Japanese workers with a lower education are less competitive with foreign
workers.
Recently, a larger number of foreign experts with high skills have migrated toJapan. Japan has recently faced a severe decrease in population, and the government has
intervened to encourage and accept foreign experts with high skills (Hayakawa, 2015).
Machikita (2015) showed that these experts are employed in non-manufacturingindustries, including information technologies and commercial trades. This supports theidea that Japanese workers with a higher education are more competitive with foreign
workers in these non-manufacturing industries.
We also find some indirect evidence suggesting that German natives with alower education are more competitive with foreign workers having a similar educationlevel. First, the ratio of foreign-born residents in the total population is quite large, andtheir average education is relatively low. This is because Germany accepted a large
number of immigrants from Turkey and other countries in their reconstruction process
following World War II. Most of these immigrants settled in Germany, along with theirfamilies. Second, foreign workers with a lower education could have significant impacts
on the wages or employment of native workers with similar education levels. Brücker etal. (2014) offer empirical evidence suggesting that accepting immigrants causes
unemployment among German people with lower incomes.
These factors provide one reasonable pathway to explain the observed
Japan–Germany differences in the correlation structures between altruistic
discrimination and education. In Appendix C, South Korea’s and Singapore’s histories
show the possibility that people with a higher education could be competitive withforeign workers, similar to observations in Japan.

17

5. Discussion, implications, limitations, and future researchThis study assesses the differences in altruism between a family member and an
unknown foreigner as measured using hypothetical questions in internet surveys
completed by respondents in Germany, the US, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan. Ourcross-country analysis answers the following three questions:
1.
2.
3.

Does pro-family altruistic discrimination against foreigners?
What is the extent of cross-country differences in altruistic discrimination?
What determines each country’s level of altruistic discrimination and what
influences its cross-country differences?

The main answers to the first and second questions are as follows. First, wefound that altruistic discrimination exists in all five countries, and the degree of
discrimination differs across these countries. Specifically, the degree of discrimination
is lowest in Germany and highest in Japan; the remaining three countries’ fall within therange demarcated by these two countries.
These findings are consistent with those in the related literature. Strombach etal. (2014) estimated altruistic parameters at each social distance (a feeling of closeness)both in Germany and China. With respect to their German subjects, their findings
showed that if a paired recipient was switched from an in-group member to an
out-group member, the German subjects’ altruism drops moderately. In contrast, thesame configuration with Chinese subjects was associated with a more substantive drop
in altruism compared to the German case.
Regarding the third question, the correlation structures of altruistic
discrimination and education differ widely across the five countries. In Germany, people
with fewer years in education exhibit much lower altruism toward foreigners comparedto that exhibited toward family members. In Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, people
who have spent longer in education tend to discriminate against foreigners. In aninteresting departure, altruistic discrimination is indifferent across educational
backgrounds in the US.
The findings with respect to Germany are consistent with the extant literature.
It has been established that the more-educated natives of that country are
pro-immigration and support international redistribution efforts (Scheve and Slaughter,
2001; Mayda, 2006; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Bechtel et al., 2014). Conversely,18

the findings with respect to Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are more novel. This
study is the first to present the possibility that the correlation structures of altruistic
discrimination and education differ across countries.
Why do the correlation structures differ across these five countries? This can be
explained by considering country differences in labor markets as they relate toimmigrants and foreign workers. Germany has accepted a large number of less-educatedforeign workers since World War II, and thus natives with a lower education arecompetitive with immigrants and foreign workers in Germany. In contrast, Japan, South
Korea, and Singapore have only recently become accepting of immigrants, who tend to
be more-educated foreign experts with high skills; thus natives with higher educationlevels are competitive with foreign workers in these three countries. We suggest that thisreasoning is plausible according to the previous literature and national/international
statistics. We expect future research to empirically demonstrate that labor market
environments are causative of pro-family altruistic discrimination dynamics against
foreigners.
Here, we note that we cannot reject another, alternative explanation concerning
cross-country differences in the effects and implications of receiving higher education.
D'Hombres and Nunziata (2016) use European Social Survey and Labor Force Survey
data to demonstrate that an exogenous increase in the number of years in education
causes a softening in natives’ attitudes toward immigrants. If we find the opposite effectfrom Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, the alternative explanation would be valid.
Future research should explore this possibility.
There is one possibility that both of these explanations are complimentary,rather than substitutes. D'Hombres and Nunziata (2016) do not empirically reveal
mechanisms of positive causal effects. In their discussion, they provide one possible
mechanism wherein receiving higher education qualifies people for occupational
positions where they face less competition with immigrants and foreign workers. Thismechanism is one example of our explanation that labor market environments shapepro-family altruistic discrimination against foreigners.
Another possibility is that the explanatory mechanism itself also differs
across countries. For example, in Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, labor market
environments might shape pro-family altruistic discrimination dynamics against
foreigners, while the other explanations might be valid in Germany. Card et al. (2012)used European samples to show that non-economic factors, including compositional
concerns and altruism, better explained citizens’ attitudes toward immigrants and19foreign workers than concerns about the economic impact on employments and wages.
Testing this possibility is also left to future research.
In sum, our current empirical results contribute to deepening political
discussions about social discrimination against foreigners. Pro-family altruistic
discrimination against foreigners is larger in the following order: Japan, the three
countries of South Korea, Singapore, the US, and Germany. These results imply that the
governments in Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and the US face difficulties inpromoting policies for accepting immigrants and foreign workers with concomitantredistribution and post-migration integration policies. We further find that people with ahigher education exhibit the highest level of altruistic discrimination in Japan, South
Korea, and Singapore. This is surely an observation that warrants attention and scrutiny
by governments in these three countries. However, those governments now actively
accept highly educated foreign experts who are potentially competitive with native
workers of similar education levels. Government policies thus are likely to have causedor triggered high altruistic discrimination in Japan, South Korea, and Singapore.

20

Tables and figures
Figure 1.1. Hypothetical question (Family member’s case)
Option 1

Option 2

Situation 1$0.00 for you alone$75.00 for a family member

Situation 2$0.10 for you alone$75.00 for a family member

Situation 3$1.00 for you alone$75.00 for a family member

Situation 4$5.00 for you alone$75.00 for a family member

Situation 5$10.00 for you alone$75.00 for a family member

Situation 6$30.00 for you alone$75.00 for a family member

Situation 7$75.00 for you alone$75.00 for a family member

Situation 8$90.00 for you alone$75.00 for a family member

Figure 1.2. Hypothetical question (Unknown foreigner’s case)
Option 1

Option 2

Situation 1$0.00 for you alone$75.00 for a unknown foreigner

Situation 2$0.10 for you alone$75.00 for a unknown foreigner

Situation 3$1.00 for you alone$75.00 for a unknown foreigner

Situation 4$5.00 for you alone$75.00 for a unknown foreigner

Situation 5$10.00 for you alone$75.00 for a unknown foreigner

Situation 6$30.00 for you alone$75.00 for a unknown foreigner

Situation 7$75.00 for you alone$75.00 for a unknown foreigner

Situation 8$90.00 for you alone$75.00 for a unknown foreigner

21

Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Observations:

The US
1,245
CensusGermany
1,157
CensusSingapore
1,231
CensusSouth Korea
1,207
Census

8,800

Japan
CensusDemographic Variables:
Female (Dummy)
0.500
0.505
0.493
0.497
0.503
0.512
0.488
0.493
0.492
0.504
20s
0.215
0.218
0.168
0.178
0.285
0.291
0.168
0.187
0.157
0.162
30s
0.202
0.201
0.180
0.180
0.252
0.248
0.226
0.221
0.216
0.205
40s
0.207
0.201
0.249
0.231
0.200
0.197
0.247
0.238
0.205
0.216
50s
0.217
0.214
0.226
0.238
0.167
0.162
0.230
0.226
0.197
0.190
60s
0.158
0.165
0.177
0.173
0.095
0.101
0.128
0.128
0.225
0.227
Spouse (Dummy)
0.581
0.469
0.566
0.630
0.652
Education Year
14.99812.985
14.58415.06514.523
Household Income (Standardized by PPP)
66.01351.83674.18463.60260.670
Personality Variables:
Extraversion
7.860
7.532
7.872
7.878
7.754
Agreeableness9.790
10.728
9.364
9.049
9.529
Conscientiousness
10.82410.554
9.688
8.724
8.247
Neuroticism
9.371
8.765
8.841
8.338
8.056
Openness
9.392
9.019
9.087
8.337
8.130
Behavioral Variables:
Time-Discounting Factor
0.781
0.799
0.739
0.801
0.811
Worldview Variables:
General Trust
5.316
4.883
5.404
5.229
4.757
Religious
2.709
2.057
2.762
2.435
1.544
Asceticism
3.608
3.659
3.702
3.456
3.475
After Death
3.556
2.914
3.414
3.115
2.597
Presentism
4.165
4.014
4.028
3.744
3.750
Other-consideration
3.146
3.284
3.148
2.895
2.940
Self-efficacy
2.847
3.382
3.084
3.152
3.225
Self-centeredness
2.035
2.831
2.559
2.802
2.640
Not Society-consideration
2.350
2.630
2.643
2.517
2.213
Notes: Our internet surveys obtained 1,294 respondents in Germany, 1,283 respondents in the US, 1,290 respondents in Singapore, 1,284 repondents in South Korea,
and 10,047 respondents in Japan. However, some respondents refused to report their household income. Our analysis uses the samples who answered all the necessary
questions. Furthermore, we obtained census data from the "International Data Base" of U.S. Census Bureau (2017a).

22

Figure 2. Cross-country pro-family altruistic discrimination (Graph)

Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

23

Table 2. Cross-country pro-family altruistic discrimination (Regression results)
N=13,640(1)
Dependent Variable:

Germany
The US
Singapore
South Korea
Japan
Demographic Variables
Personality and Worldviews Variables

(2)

(3)

Pro-Family Altruistic Discrimination
against Foreigners
0.310***(0.007)0.386***(0.015)0.390***(0.012)0.381***(0.011)0.434***(0.003)0.249***(0.039)0.327***(0.043)0.322***(0.042)0.309***(0.045)0.367***(0.040)0.245***(0.068)0.333***(0.071)0.353***(0.072)0.328***(0.071)0.359***(0.068)

NO
NO

YES
NO

YES
YES

R-squared
0.575
0.582
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

24

0.604

Table 3. Five-country differences
Means and Differences of
Altruistic Discrimination
Germany0.310***(0.009)Japan
0.434***(0.003)
Japan － Germany
0.125***(0.009)South Korea
0.381***(0.009)South Korea － Germany
0.072***(0.013)25

Singapore0.390***(0.012)Singapore － Germany
0.080***(0.015)The US
0.386***(0.013)
The US － Germany
0.076***(0.016)

Table 4. Japan–Germany comparison
Panel A:
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition

Overall:
Details:
FemaleIncomeEducation Year
Age
FamilyPersonality and Worldviews

Japan-Germany Comparison
(1)
(2)
(3)
Endowments
CoefficientsInteraction
EffectEffectEffect0.022*
0.106***-0.003(0.011)(0.010)(0.012)0.000(0.001)-0.003(0.002)-0.009**(0.004)0.002(0.003)0.028***(0.005)0.005(0.012)

Constant

0.018**(0.008)0.029**(0.013)0.120***(0.039)0.002(0.002)-0.041*(0.022)0.037(0.110)-0.000(0.001)0.005*(0.003)0.014***(0.005)-0.002(0.002)-0.021***(0.006)0.001(0.012)-0.059(0.127)

9,957
(4)
(5)
Japan
Germany-0.001-0.037**(0.005)(0.015)
Income0.0002**-0.0004*(0.0001)(0.0002)
Education Year0.003**-0.006***(0.002)(0.003)
Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Observations
Panel B:
Parts of Regression Results
Female26

Table 5.1. Education and altruistic discrimination in Japan
N=8,800 (Japan Sample)

(1)

(3)

Pro-Family Altruistic Discrimination
against Foreigners

Dependent Variable:
Educational Year(2)0.003**(0.002)High School or Lower

0.333***(0.040)0.340***(0.035)0.348***(0.039)0.361***(0.039)Junior College
Bachelor's Degree
Master's Degree or Higher
Constant

0.293***(0.049)No Constant

Demographic Variables
YES
YES
Personality and Worldviews Variables
YES
YES
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.007(0.010)0.015*(0.008)0.028***(0.010)0.333***(0.040)YES
YES

Table 5.2. Education and altruistic discrimination in Germany
N=1,157 (Germany Sample)(1)

Dependent Variable:
Educational Year(3)

-0.006**(0.003)Elementeary Vocational Educationor LowerIntermediate Vocational Education

0.245**(0.093)0.298***(0.101)0.251**(0.095)0.202*(0.099)0.245**(0.106)0.218**(0.096)0.246**(0.098)High Intermediate Vocational Education
Advanced Vocational Education
General Education
College
University or Higher
Constant(2)

Pro-Family Altruistic Discrimination
against Foreigners

0.330**(0.118)

No Constant

Demographic Variables
YES
YES
Personality and WorldviewsVariables
YES
YES
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

27-0.053(0.032)-0.047(0.029)-0.095**(0.035)-0.052**(0.022)-0.079**(0.030)-0.052**(0.023)0.298***(0.101)YES
YESAppendix A
The Tables below present each country’s educational background and years in education.
Our internet surveys grasp respondents’ educational background. We use education
system diagrams (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2013)
to convert educational background into years in education. We also combine someeducational background and construct a new classification variable.

Table Appendix A.1. Germany’s education system
Educational Background
Grundschule
HauptsschuleRealschule
Berufsschule
Fachoberschule
Gymnasium
Gesamtschule
Fachhochschule
Universitat
Graduiertenkolleg

Classification
Elementary Vocational Educationor LowerIntermediate Vocational Education
High Intermediate Vocational Education
Advanced Vocational Education
General Education
College
University or Higher

Educational
Year
4
9
10
12
17
13
13
17
17
22

Obs.

6
92
230
300
52
147
8
132
186
4

Table Appendix A.2. Japan’s education system
Educational Background
Elementary and Junior High Schools
Dropout from High Schools
Graduated from High Schools
Dropout from Junior College
Dropout from University (Bachelor's Degree)
Graduated from Junior College
Graduated from University (Bachelor's Degree)
Dropout from Graduate School (Master's Degree)
Graduated from Graduate School (Master's Degree)
Dropout from Graduate School (Doctoral Degree)
Graduated from Graduate School (Doctoral Degree)

Classification

High School or Lower

Junior College
Bachelor's Degree

Master's Degree or Higher

28

Educational
Year
9
9
12
12
12
14
16
16
18
18
21

Obs.

72
109
2,313
89
192
1,442
3,993
28
432
32
98

Table Appendix A.3. South Korea’s education system
Educational Background
Elementary School
Junior High School
High School
Special School
Junior College
University (Bachelor's Degree)
Graduate School (Master's Degree)
Graduate School (Doctoral Degree)

Classification

High School or Lower

Junior College
Bachelor's Degree
Master's Degree or Higher

Educational
Year

Obs.

6
9
12
12
14
16
18
21

4
5
205
7
170
692
96
28

Table Appendix A.4. Singapore’s education system
Educational BackgroundPrimary School
Secondary School
Institute of Technical Education
Polytechnics
Centralised InstituteJunior College
University (Bachelor's Degree)
Graduate School (Master's Degree)
Graduate School (Doctoral Degree)

Classification
Secondary School or Lower
Vocational Education
Polytechnics or Centralised InstituteJunior College
Bachelor's Degree
Master's Degree or Higher

Educational
Year
6
10
13
13
13
12
17
19
22

Obs.

7
178
57
254
25
94
476
123
17

Table Appendix A.5. The US’s education system
Educational Background
Grade SchoolSome High School
Graduated from High SchoolSome College (No Degree)
Graduated from College (Associate's Degree, 2 Year)
Graduated from College (Bachelor's Degree, 4 Year)Some Post Graduate Studies (No Degree)
Master's Degree
Doctoral Degree

Classification
High School or Lower
Some College (No Degree)
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate School (No Degree)
Master's Degree or Higher

29

Educational
Year
6
9
12
14
14
16
18
18
21

Obs.

3
21
195
270
142
349
60
175
30

Appendix B
Table Appendix B. Cross-country pro-family altruistic discrimination (Robustness
check)
N=12,409(1)
Dependent Variable:

Germany
The USSouth Korea
Japan
Ratio of Foreigners
Demographic Variables
Personality and Worldviews Variables

(2)

(3)

Pro-Family Altruistic Discrimination
against Foreigners
0.358***(0.013)0.444***(0.016)0.387***(0.010)0.442***(0.003)0.293***(0.038)0.380***(0.040)0.312***(0.044)0.373***(0.040)0.280***(0.068)0.375***(0.072)0.329***(0.071)
0.362***(0.068)-0.455***(0.112)-0.444***(0.114)-0.343***(0.106)

NO
NO

YES
NO

YES
YES

R-squared
0.578
0.585
0.606
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We obtained the ratio of foreign born residents by state/county/prefecture from each country's
foreign population statistics (DESTATIS, 2017; US Census Bureau, 2017b; Statistics Korea 2017;
Ministry of Justice, 2017). We did not find that in Singapore.

30

Appendix C.1
We conduct Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analysis between Germany and South Korea,
Singapore, and the US. We investigate whether the similar results found in the Japan–
Germany comparison are observed in the other comparisons. First, we only find a positiveand statistically significant coefficient effect of educational years in the SingaporeGermany comparison, not in the South Korea–Germany or US–Germany comparison.
Next, when we use the dummy variables of educational backgrounds and conduct the
regression analysis with each country’s sample, we find that similarities with Japan exist
in the South Korean and Singaporean correlation structures between altruistic
discrimination and education. Specifically, people with a Master’s degree and higher
exhibit rather lower altruism toward foreigners than toward family members in those twocountries. Furthermore, histories, previous literature, and statistics support the possibility
that South Korean and Singaporean people with a higher education could be competitive
with foreign workers, similar to the situation in Japan.

31

Table Appendix C.1. Other comparisonsPanel A:
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition

Overall:
Details:
FemaleIncomeEducation Year
Age
FamilyPersonality and Worldviews
Constant

South Korea-Germany Comparison
(1)
(2)
(3)
Endowments
CoefficientsInteraction
EffectEffectEffect-0.0020.085***-0.011(0.011)(0.027)(0.023)Singapore-Germany Comparison
(6)
(7)
(8)
Endowments
CoefficientsInteraction
EffectEffectEffect-0.0170.063***
0.034*(0.011)(0.015)(0.019)The US-Germany Comparison
(11)
(12)
(13)
Endowments
CoefficientsInteraction
EffectEffectEffect-0.038***0.068***
0.046***(0.009)(0.021)(0.018)0.000(0.001)-0.005(0.003)-0.012**(0.005)-0.001(0.002)0.042***(0.008)-0.027***(0.010)-0.000(0.001)-0.009(0.005)-0.009**(0.004)0.003(0.004)0.044***(0.010)-0.046***(0.008)-0.000(0.001)-0.006(0.004)-0.012**(0.005)0.001(0.002)0.013***(0.004)-0.034***(0.009)0.008(0.011)-0.004(0.019)0.125(0.090)-0.002(0.002)-0.082**(0.032)0.007(0.146)-0.000(0.000)-0.001(0.004)0.020(0.014)0.002(0.003)-0.049***(0.012)0.017(0.012)0.033(0.187)0.022(0.015)0.032**(0.015)0.116***(0.040)0.001(0.004)-0.021(0.031)0.232(0.148)0.000(0.001)0.014**(0.007)0.014***(0.005)0.018**(0.008)-0.011(0.013)-0.001(0.017)-0.318*(0.173)Observations
Panel C:
Parts of Regression Results
Female

2,364
(4)
(5)
South Korea
Germany-0.022-0.037**(0.016)(0.015)
Income-0.0005*-0.0004*(0.0003)(0.0002)
Education Year
0.004
-0.006***(0.006)(0.003)
Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

2,388
(9)
Singapore
0.007(0.028)0.0002(0.0002)0.003**(0.002)32

0.031***(0.012)0.033**(0.016)0.059(0.071)
0.003(0.003)-0.046(0.031)
0.016(0.135)0.000(0.001)0.009*(0.005)0.009(0.011)-0.003(0.003)-0.007(0.006)
0.037***(0.014)-0.028(0.157)(10)
Germany-0.037**(0.015)-0.0004*(0.0002)-0.006***(0.003)

2,402(14)
the US
0.025(0.018)0.0002(0.0002)-0.001(0.005)(15)
Germany-0.037**(0.015)-0.0004*(0.0002)-0.006***(0.003)

Appendix C.2. South Korea–Germany comparison
Column 2 of Appendix Table C.1 reports that the coefficient effect of educational years
is 0.127 in the South Korea–Germany comparison, but the effect is not statisticallysignificant at any level. When conducting the regression analysis with the South Koreansample and educational background dummy variables, Appendix Table C.2 shows thatpro-family altruistic discrimination against foreigners is lowest among South Koreans
with junior college, but highest among those with a Master’s degree or higher. The latter
result is consistent with the results from Japan.
When investigating South Korean immigration policies, we find similarities withJapan in the labor market environments related to foreign workers (The Japan Institutefor Labour Policy and Training, 2012). After World War II, the South Korean government
sent native workers abroad, similar to Japan. Because of current labor shortages, thegovernment is now starting to accept foreign workers. However, when accepting lesseducated workers without skills, the government allocates them to some industries where(native) labor shortages are particularly pronounced. By contrast, the government accepts
more-educated experts with high skills across the board. These observations support thepossibility that natives with higher education are competitive with foreign workers in theSouth Korean labor market and can thus perhaps explain why South Korean people witha Master’s degrees and higher exhibit lower altruism toward foreigners.

33

Table Appendix C.2. Education and altruistic discrimination in South Korea
N=1,207 (South Korea Sample)

(1)

0.004
(0.007)

High School or Lower

0.380**(0.137)0.364**(0.150)0.390***(0.131)0.453***(0.145)

Junior College
Bachelor's Degree
Master's Degree or Higher
Constant(3)

Pro-Family Altruistic Discrimination
against Foreigners

Dependent Variable:
Educational Year(2)0.325*(0.164)

No Constant

Demographic Variables
YES
YES
Personality and Worldviews Variables
YES
YES
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

34

0.016
(0.036)0.025(0.024)0.088**(0.035)0.364**(0.150)YES
YESAppendix C.3. Singapore–Germany comparison
Column 7 of Appendix Table C.1 reports that the coefficient effect of educational years
is 0.118 in the Singapore–Germany comparison. Similar to the Japan–Germany
comparison, the effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. When conducting theregression analysis with the Singaporean sample and dummy variables of educational
backgrounds, Appendix Table C.3 shows that altruistic discrimination is low among
Singaporeans with a technical education, but rises among those with a Master’s degrees
and higher. The latter result is also consistent with the results from Japan.
In the 1950s, Singapore set an immigration policy to accept foreigners who could
contribute to the country’s socio-economic development (Fong and Lim, 1982).
Specifically, lower-skilled foreign workers were allowed to live there temporarily, butwere prohibited from settling permanently, bringing their families to settle there, ormarrying Singaporean citizens. By contrast, Singapore actively accepts more-educatedworkers and wealthier people, who are also allowed to be permanent residents. These
facts support the possibility that natives with a higher education are also competitive withforeign workers in the Singaporean labor market, and could explain why Singaporean
people with a Master’s degrees and higher exhibit lower altruism toward foreigners.

35

Table Appendix C.3. Education and altruistic discrimination in Singapore
N=1,231 (Singaporean Sample)(1)

Dependent Variable:
Educational Year

(3)

0.003
(0.002)

Secondary School or Lower

0.164(0.167)0.083(0.166)0.188(0.170)0.083(0.168)0.161(0.172)
0.192(0.177)

Vocational Education
Plytechnics or Centralised InstituteJunior College
Bachelor's Degree
Master's Degree or Higher
Constant(2)

Pro-Family Altruistic Discrimination
against Foreigners

0.099(0.157)

No Constant

Demographic Variables
YES
YES
Personality and Worldviews Variables
YES
YES
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

360.081*(0.034)0.105***(0.014)-0.000(0.040)0.077**(0.024)
0.108**(0.024)0.083(0.166)YES
YES

Appendix C.4. US–Germany comparison
Column 12 of Appendix Table C.1 reports that the coefficient effect of educational year
is 0.061 in the US–Germany comparison. The effect size is relatively small andstatistically insignificant at any level. When conducting the regression analysis with theAmerican sample and dummy variables of educational background, Appendix Table C.4
shows that American altruistic discrimination is insensitive to educational background.
This result indicates that the American correlation structure between the dependent
variable and education is different not only from that in Germany but also from those inJapan, South Korea, and Singapore.
Why was no correlation found between altruistic discrimination and educationin the US sample? One possible explanation here is that natives are not competitive
toward foreign workers in all educational strata. We find some evidence that supports this
explanation; in 2009, the government enforced the Employ American Workers Act, where
the government prohibited employers from dismissing a native worker to employ aforeign worker. In addition, several empirical studies based on US data show thatreceiving immigrants and foreign workers has a marginal or zero impact on native
workers’ wages and employment (Card, 2005). These facts support the possibility thatnatives in any education stratum are not competitive with foreign workers in the US.
However, another possible explanation is that natives are rather competitive towardforeign workers in all educational strata. Thus, the underlying mechanism is unclear interms of the lack of a significant correlation between altruistic discrimination andeducation.

37

Table Appendix C.4. Education and altruistic discrimination in the US
N=1,245 (The US Sample)(1)

Dependent Variable:
Educational Year(3)

-0.001(0.005)High School or Lower

0.247**(0.103)0.249**(0.109)0.264**(0.103)0.242**(0.112)0.230*(0.122)0.249**(0.107)

Some College (No Degree)
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate School (No Degree)
Master's Degree or Higher
Constant(2)

Pro-Family Altruistic Discrimination
against Foreigners

0.264**(0.113)

No Constant

Demographic Variables
YES
YES
Personality and Worldviews Variables
YES
YES
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

38

0.002
(0.026)0.017(0.031)-0.006(0.035)-0.017(0.056)0.002(0.028)0.247**(0.103)YES
YES

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