Dr. Marcus' Room No. 4

4. Nuclear Power and the Next Kyoto Protocol
Gail H. Marcus, Consultant, USA

Profile (January 2008)
Dr. Gail H. Marcus is presently an independent consultant on nuclear power technology and policy.
She recently completed a three-year term as Deputy Director-General of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency(NEA) in Paris. In this position, she was responsible for the program of work and budget for the agency.
From 1999 through 2004, Dr. Marcus served as Principal Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy,
Science and Technology. There she provided technical leadership for DOE’s nuclear energy programs
and facilities, including the development of next-generation nuclear power systems. Other responsibilities included production and distribution of isotopes for medical treatment, diagnosis andresearch, and oversight of DOE test and research reactors and related facilities and activities.
From 1998-1999, Dr. Marcus spent a year in Japan as Visiting Professor in the Research Laboratory
for Nuclear Reactors, Tokyo Institute of Technology. She conducted research on comparative nuclear
regulatory policy in Japan and the United States.
Previously, Dr. Marcus had been in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). She served in a varietyof positions including Deputy Executive Director of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards/Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste; Director of Project Directorate III-3, providing
regulatory oversight of seven nuclear power plants in the Midwest; and Director of the Advanced
Reactors Project Directorate, where she was responsible for technical reviews of advanced reactor
designs.
She also served as technical assistant to Commissioner Kenneth Rogers at the NRC for over four years,
providing advice and recommendations on a broad range of technical and policy issues of interest to
the Commission. From this position she was detailed for five months to Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry, where she was NRC’s first assignee to Japan, studying Japan’s
licensing of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor.
Prior to her service at NRC, Dr. Marcus was Assistant Chief of the Science Policy Research Divisionat the Congressional Research Service (1980-1985). In this position, she was responsible for policy
analysis in support of Congress covering all fields of science and technology, and played a lead rolein policy analysis and development for energy, nuclear power, and risk assessment and management.

Organization:
From 2001-2002, Dr. Marcus served as President of the American Nuclear Society (ANS), an 11,000 member
professional society. She is a Fellow of the ANS and of the American Association for the Advancementof Science (AAAS). She is a former member of the National Research Council Committee on the Future
Needs of Nuclear Engineering Education, and served three terms on the MIT Corporation Visiting
Committee for the Nuclear Engineering Department. She is just completing a term as the elected Chairof the Engineering Section of AAAS.
Publication:
Dr. Marcus has authored numerous technical papers and publications. Her research interests include
nuclear regulatory policy, energy technology and policy, risk assessment and management, international nuclear policy, and advanced nuclear technologies.
Education:
Dr. Marcus has an S.B. and S.M. in Physics, and an Sc.D. in Nuclear Engineering from MIT. She is thefirst woman to earn a doctorate in nuclear engineering in the United States.

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Introduction
As the world prepares to launch into negotiations
on the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, it is useful
to begin to discuss the successes and failures of theagreement to date, and possible directions in which
it may evolve.
While the Kyoto Protocol was a groundbreaking
agreement in its day, committing the nations that
ratified it to substantial reductions in their emissions of several Greenhouse Gases (GHG), the reports to date on the outcome of the agreement are
mixed. Some nations have met their goals whileothers have not, and it is unclear in some cases
whether the changes in a nation’s emissions are
due to deliberate efforts or to economic or otherfactors. There have also been criticisms of the implementation of some of the mechanisms in the
Kyoto Protocol (more on that below).
Nevertheless, the Kyoto Protocol has had its
successes, and given the importance and global
scope of the issue, these successes are important.
Whether or not countries reach their goals, reductions in GHG emissions have been achieved. The
Kyoto Protocol remains the primary tool we havefor orchestrating multinational efforts to reduce
GHG emissions, and thereby, for trying to stem thetide of global warming. Furthermore, the very existence of the Kyoto Protocol focuses the attentionof both policymakers and the public on the concern
about global warming and on the measures thatmight be taken. If anything, the public and thegovernments are more concerned about global
warming than they were in the late 1990s, when
the Kyoto Protocol was developed, and are therefore likely to expect even more results from a follow-up agreement among the world’s nations.
It is interesting to consider what all of this means
as countries begin to think about forging anagreement that looks beyond the period covered by
the Kyoto Protocol. While the prospects for expanding and improving the Kyoto Protocol seempromising, the perceived shortcomings and concerns will need to be addressed. The world of international diplomacy is at least as complicated as
the world of subatomic particle interactions, andfurther evolution of the Kyoto Protocol in productive directions will not be simple or easy.
It is therefore timely to review the major provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and to consider some of
the issues that the negotiators will face in developing the next agreement. Such a discussion is
likely to be of special interest to the nuclear community. Nuclear power was prohibited from use incertain mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, and the2nuclear community has long wished for that prohibition to be lifted. This may be the time.

Current Kyoto Protocol
As I am sure most readers know, the Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement, adopted in
Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997, which aims totry to reduce GHG emissions globally. It enteredinto force on 16 February 2005 and as of 14 January 2009, has been ratified by 183 countries and 1
regional economic integration organization (theEuropean Union). (The United States signed theProtocol, but did not ratify it.) The Kyoto Protocol
sets binding targets for GHG emissions reductionsin 39 industrialized countries, including the European Union. Six GHGs are identified, including
carbon dioxide. The targets vary by country, but
average about a five per cent reduction to the 1990
levels of emissions by 2012. The focus on developed
countries recognizes that they carry the main responsibility for the current levels of GHGs in theatmosphere as a result of their years of industrial
activity and their current high levels of energy use.
The detailed rules for the implementation of theProtocol were adopted in Marrakesh in 2001, andare called the Marrakesh Accords.
The goal is for countries to meet their targets
primarily through national measures. However,the Kyoto Protocol offers additional means forcountries to meet their targets through threemarket-based mechanisms: Emissions Trading, theClean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Joint
Implementation (JI). The latter two mechanisms
give the developed countries credit for supporting
projects in other countries. In the case of the CDM,
the credit is intended for projects in countries otherthan those with specified targets; in the case of JI,
the credit is intended for projects in other countries
with specified targets (It should be noted that thelist of countries that have binding targets isslightly different than the list of countries specified
for the CDM and JI mechanisms). It has been asource of irritation to the nuclear community that,at the insistence of a small numbers of countries,
explicit provisions to exclude nuclear projects were
written into the CDM and JI requirements.
A very complete discussion of the Kyoto Protocol,
including links to the Protocol itself and to otherdocumentation governing its implementation, canbe found at:
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php
An explanation of the differences between the listof countries with binding targets and the list of
countries specified for the CDM and JI mechanisms can be found at:
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/08_unfc

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cc_kp_ref_manual.pdf.

Looking Ahead
The first Kyoto Protocol took a number of years todevelop. It is therefore time to begin the negotiations for an agreement to follow the Kyoto Protocol.
The new agreement should draw on the experience
gained with the Kyoto Protocol and should take
into account some new realities in the world. These
include the greater understanding we have of the
impacts that mechanisms to increase clean energy
supplies have on critical food and water supplies,
the growing importance of the largest developing
countries as significant emitters of GHGs, and theincreased interest in the use of nuclear power tomeet energy demands in many countries.
Some of the key issues that the negotiators will
have to face in the next round of negotiations include the following:
・Making realistic assessments of the successes andfailures of the mechanisms currently in place:
In recent years, there have been a number of reports questioning the effectiveness of some of themechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, such as the
CDM. Based on the concerns expressed, it is clearthat a very probing analysis of the effectiveness ofthese measures needs to be undertaken. This is
not likely to be easy. Among the allegations areclaims that some of the projects were alreadyongoing or would have been funded anyway. If
that is true, these projects subvert the intent of
the mechanism to fund projects that otherwise
would not have been built. Other reports claim
other shortcomings, both in the underlying requirements of the CDM and in the way it is operated and administered in some countries. Obviously, the existence of the CDM has been beneficial to some interests, and those interests willfight mightily against changes.
Nevertheless, even if there had been no criticism at all, good management demands a periodic review of the results and effectiveness of any
major project or program. This is warranted evenmore if a decision is being made on the continuation of the project or program. In this case,given the concerns that have been raised, it isimperative that the review be thorough and objective.
・Adopt a more holistic approach: In a previous
essay, I argued that we should have foreseen that
increasing the use of cropland for ethanol would
have an impact on food production. It does notmatter now why we did not give this concern
sufficient attention in the past. The fact is that,3

today, we have graphic evidence of the interrelatedness of the major needs of human society―food, water, and energy. It would be too muchto expect one single agreement to deal comprehensively with all the major needs of human society. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon any
energy use strategy to assure that the policies
and practices promoted to address our energy
needs are balanced against the other essential
needs of human life.
This will clearly be a very difficult goal toachieve. Some kind of formula needs to beworked out that doesn’t give full credit for carbon
reductions made at the expense of food production or availability of water for human consumption. Such a formula will have to consider the
specifics of any activity. For example, more advanced forms of ethanol production are being
developed to exploit cellulose products that canbe produced on land that is not suitable for mostfood crops. Such forms of ethanol should be“rated” differently than the current corn-based
ethanol products that do displace food production.
・Developing countries need to commit to participating in the next round of the Kyoto Protocol:
Perhaps the most serious deficiency of the original Kyoto Protocol was the decision that developing countries did not need to have binding
targets for GHG reductions. The argument thesecountries made was a powerful one―they had
made and were making less of an impact on theenvironment than the developed countries, andthey had far greater needs than developed countries for additional energy supplies to meet thebasic needs of their populations. Their ability to“catch up” to the developed world should not be
restrained or slowed. Nevertheless, even at thattime, to some, it seemed counterproductive forthe large developing countries to be increasing
their production of carbon dioxide substantiallyat the same time the developed countries were
working hard to decrease their production. Several of the largest and most populous of the developing countries have had enormous spurts ofgrowth in the past decade or so, even beyond
what was anticipated at the time the first Kyoto
Protocol was developed. With that growth hascome a large increase in their carbon footprint.
It is imperative that the next agreement be
structured so that the developing countries canenjoy continued growth without undercutting
the efforts of developed countries to reduce carbon emissions globally. Obviously, these countries cannot be subject to the same requirements
as the most developed countries. A formula for
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Dr. Marcus' Room No. 4

their carbon goal needs to be based on their current emissions and their expected growth, and on
the cost and availability of low-emission technologies. Further, it should be designed mainly
to limit their increases in emissions rather than,
as is the case for most of the developed countries,
to reduce their emissions. The precedent for thishas already been set in the original Kyoto Protocol, where some developed countries had targets for emission cuts, while others were enjoined merely to stabilize emissions or were evenallowed modest emission increases. Furthermore,
it is clear that the developed countries will haveto step in with some support for the additionalcosts the developing countries may incur in using
more costly low-emission technologies instead ofsimply building new fossil fuel plants. Suchsupport could, perhaps, replace or be integrated
with the CDM/JI. Clearly, the critical factor is to
involve only the largest and fastest growing developing countries in the group of countries with
explicit goals. It would be far too complex, andwould be minimally useful, to try to set goals forthe smallest and poorest countries, as their impact on the total carbon emissions are still verysmall and are likely to remain so.
・Individual country agendas should not drive thedevelopment of the next Kyoto Protocol: One deficiency of the first Kyoto Protocol was thatcountries opposed to nuclear power sought toimpose their viewpoint on the rest of the world
by demanding the exclusion of nuclear powerfrom technologies that could be used in certain
Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, particularly the
CDM and JI. Although a small number of countries held strongly anti-nuclear views, they wereable to impose their views on the rest of theworld. Since that time, the nuclear communityand others have wanted to “level the playing
field,” that is, to have all non-GHG-emitting
technologies treated the same way.
(Of course, the developed countries remained
free to use nuclear power within their own
countries, as well as to provide support to othercountries for nuclear projects. However, suchsupport was not “credited” under the CDM and
JI formulas. Therefore, the restriction has
tended to create a disadvantage for nuclear
power.)The decision to exclude nuclear power from the
CDM and JI should be overturned in the next
agreement. It would appear that the international political environment should be favorable
to making such a change. Several countries thatwere anti-nuclear at the time the Kyoto Protocol
was developed have changed, or are changing,4

their national policies. In addition, if my proposal that countries like China and India become
signatories of the next Kyoto Protocol is adopted,
they will likely add to the voices at the table that
nuclear power be an option in all the provisionsof a new protocol. Finally, a number of countries
that did not have nuclear power before are now
interested in acquiring nuclear power, and allowing nuclear projects to be funded by the CDM(or whatever replaces it) could be helpful to them.
Of course, the host country for any project shouldmake the ultimate decision on what projects it
wishes to permit, and the countries providing
funding should be free, on an individual basis, tolimit their funding to certain types of projects.

Conclusion
The negotiations for the next Kyoto Protocol are
just getting started. It is none too soon, as thepresent agreement is set to expire in 2012. This
type of negotiation is likely to be long and difficult,as each country seeks to protect its own interests.
These interests include minimizing the inconvenience to its own citizens and minimizing the possibility of adverse effects on its economy. The final
shape of the agreement, as before, will require
some compromises, and these are never easy.
Nevertheless, the timing is promising for a new
agreement that builds on the first agreement andimproves it. When the first agreement was being
negotiated, there was still a significant degree ofskepticism about the reality of global warming andthe role of human activity in producing it. There ismuch less skepticism now. More scientific evidenceof global warming and the role of human activity
has been produced. In some countries, changes inweather patterns, in the virulence and spread ofcertain diseases, and in other factors, have provided concrete evidence of detrimental environmental changes. We also will have had more than adecade of experience with the first agreement,
which should be a sufficient time period to allow us
to assess what worked well and what didn’t work
as well. The largest of the developing countries
have made great strides in their development andshould be at a stage where it is more reasonable toexpect them to participate in a global initiative
such as the Kyoto Protocol. And finally, in a number of countries, the public attitudes and official
policies towards nuclear power have changed significantly, and it is much more likely that nuclear
power will be treated more equitably in the next
round of negotiations.
Therefore, it is with cautious optimism that I
await the unfolding of formal negotiations on thenext Kyoto Protocol.

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Thanks again for your attention. I welcome yourreactions to this essay.
My e-mail address is: ghmarcus alum.mit.edu.
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