Journal of the National Institute of Public Health 2013 Vol.62 No.2 p.196−203

Topics：Risk communication for existing exposure situation after the nuclear disaster＜Commentary＞
A new perspective on radiation risk communication in Fukushima, Japan
Erik R. SVENDSEN
Department of Global Environmental Health Sciences, Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine
Abstract
The March 11, 2011 cascading disasters of the historic earthquake, unprecedented tsunami, andsubsequent radioactive substances release from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant haveshocked the world. But the specter of radiation exposure has complicated the earthquake and tsunami
disaster aid activities. Herein is a personal commentary on the current status of the risk communication
activities within the disaster populations in Fukushima prefecture. A literature review of the current
scientific literature was performed focusing on risk communication within the Fukushima region during
the disaster recovery phase. I have limited my commentary to only the 5 most relevant of the
publications which focus exclusively on the issue of risk communication and the problems which havegenerated the urgency to improve risk communication. There were several themes which wereconsistently identified across the articles and echo some of the personal observations of the many typesof responses which victims are now demonstrating: fear, anger, distrust, denial, confusion, uncertainty,
ambivalence, and hyperbole stood out regarding their varied responses to the current radiologicalsituation and, regarding the government role in risk communication, corruption and lack oftransparency. Two recommendations for helping to address these issues in risk communication are theinclusion of a community intermediary and great use of community engagement in the disasterrecovery process. Improved risk communication, perhaps using established guidelines and including
both community intermediaries and improved community engagement, may prove useful within theradiation affected populations of Japan.
keywords: Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, risk communication, disaster recovery phase,community intermediary, community engagement(accepted for publication, 23rd April 2013)

I.

Introduction

The March 11, 2011 cascading disasters of the historic
earthquake, unprecedented tsunami, and subsequent
radioactivity release from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power plant have shocked the world. These disasters areunlike any other in recorded history due to theconvergence of the natural and anthropogenic
contributions. As the after-shocks rattled on, the peopleof Japan were blanketed with a radioactive cloud that wasboth perplexing and terrifying to those who were in it.

Disaster assistance needs were vast, beyond what any
nation would have reasonably anticipated during routine
disaster preparedness planning exercises.
But thespecter of radiation exposure has complicated theearthquake and tsunami disaster aid activities.
The responses to these cascading events from exposed
populace, governments and experts from both within andoutside of Japan have varied from unbridled humanitarianaid [1-16] to self-preservation [17, 18] and criticism forallowing such a catastrophic radiation failure and inability
to manage it [19-29]. Countries from all over the world

Corresponding author: Erik R. Svendsen
ENHS SL-29, 1440 Canal St., Suite 2100, New Orleans, LA 70112
Phone: 504-988-7314
Fax: 504-988-1726
E-mail: esvendse@tulane.edu

196

J. Natl. Inst. Public Health, 62（2）: 2013

A new perspective on radiation risk communication in Fukushima, Japan

started monitoring to see if they were being poisoned byradiation from Fukushima. Dozens of papers have reported
very low-level radiation exposures in the air or water
across the globe, even in remote locations like Cuba [30],Monaco [31], Vietnam [32], and arctic Norway [33]. A
recent model showed the global dispersion of theradioactive plume, which may be alarming to an
uneducated reader [34]. In addition, many countries anddisaster relief organizations jumped to help the people ofJapan [1-4, 10, 15, 35-38]. But the disaster recovery needs
still outweigh the resources to sufficiently mitigate
them [39-43]. Furthermore, balancing the risks andresponsibilities germane to this series of disasters has
been proven to be enigmatic. People can easily
understand that their house is unsafe after an earthquakeor tsunami when they can see the damage right there in
front of them. But they often struggle to understand therisks of radiation because it is something that they cannot
see, something that they have little understanding of in
their daily lives [16, 44, 45]. They understand that theearthquake and tsunami were outside the control of any
government official. But that was not the case with theradiation release from the power-plant inundated fromthe tsunami, or was it [21]?
After spending time working beside my colleagues in
the National Institute of Public Health during theirdisaster recovery efforts in Northern Japan I havelearned much more than I have taught through myprofessional consultation assistance. There is so muchthat I could share about the disaster itself, the people it
has affected, and those who have tirelessly put their own
lives on hold so that they could help those in need within
the disaster populations. But the most unique andvexing disaster recovery activity on-going within theradiation exposed populations is the effort to communicate
with the public the risks of and exposures toradiation [12, 15, 46, 47]. Herein is my commentary on
the current status of the risk communication activities
within the disaster populations in Fukushima prefecture.

II. Methods
To lend context to this commentary, I performed aliterature review of the current scientific literature
focused on risk communication within the Fukushimaregion during the disaster recovery phase. Threeinternet-based academic research search engines wereused to assess the published academic literature as ofearly May 2013: PubMed, Web of Science, and Google
Scholar. The following search terms were initially used in
all three search engines from anywhere in the citation for
publications between 2011-2013: Fukushima, Japan, andnuclear or radiation. I then further limited my review to
only those journal articles which discussed risk

communication.

III. Results
There were 280 articles cited in PubMed, 347 in Web
of Science, and 114 in Google Scholar resulting from thesearch using the terms Fukushima, Japan, and nuclear orradiation. After further limiting the review to risk
communication focused articles only I found 6, 9, and 88
publications, accordingly. Most of the 88 search results
identified in the Google Scholar were not from peerreviewed publications or were general science papers
which were not focused on the situation in Fukushima,
rather only cited it. Over a dozen papers discussed theissues of risk communication within their broader study.
But I have limited my commentary to only the 5 most
relevant of the publications found within these three
search tools which focus exclusively on the issue of risk
communication and the problems which have generated
the urgency to improve risk communication [16, 27, 48-50].
Within these journal articles there were several
themes which were consistently identified across thearticles and echo some of my observations of the many
types of responses which victims are now demonstrating.
Within the affected populations, themes like fear, anger,
distrust, denial, confusion, uncertainty, ambivalence,and hyperbole stood out regarding their varied
responses to the current radiological situation. Regarding
the government role in risk communication, the two mostprofound related themes were of corruption and lack oftransparency, in addition to the previously mentioned
general distrust, denial, confusion, uncertainty, andhyperbole. Fear is now rampant within the Japanese
population [45], often coupled with anger, distrust of
government, confusion about risks, uncertainty of
exposures and their interpretation [15]. Other common
responses within the Japanese population were denial of
the risks or ambivalence towards them. These responses
may be driven by disaster-related stress [51-53]. The
governments were often perceived as corrupt, because of
their influence from the Tokyo Electric Power Company
which runs the crippled nuclear power-plant, or prone to
hyperbole, herein defined as exaggerating the absence of
health risks [22]. Activist groups and misinformed
spokesmen used hyperbole, also, but in the otherdirection by inflating the real health risks [50]. Nongovernment experts may be guilty by association due totheir professional connections with either the government,
the nuclear power industry, or environmental activist
groups which are exploiting the Fukushima disaster toadvocate for a world free of nuclear power.

J. Natl. Inst. Public Health, 62（2）: 2013197

Erik R. SVENDSEN

IV. Recommendations
1. Community intermediaries- these are membersof the disaster-affected community who areknowledgeable of the health risks, relevant science
supporting the risk assessments, and are perceived
as objective by the community. Such community
intermediaries are needed to assist with the risk
communication so that the necessary risk messages
can be appropriately received by the public. We
witnessed the efficacy of this approach with one
such skilled community intermediary who has
sacrificed countless hours of his life in the past year
to teach his community about the real radiation
risks (Terumi Hangai).
2. Community engagement- another approach which
could help build trust within the disaster recovery
activities would be the use of community
engagement in the disaster recovery process [5457]. These efforts work in concert with that of thecommunity intermediaries, but build upon the newknowledge of the disaster community by engaging
them within the disaster recovery activities anddecision-making processes [46]. There is a verylarge literature on the science of community
engagement in decision making which I will notentertain here. In brief, the integration ofcommunity engagement within the disaster recovery
process is becoming increasingly recognized asvitally important to successful disaster recovery
planning.

V． Discussion
Thousands of news articles have been publishedchronicling the Northern Japan Disaster since March 11,
2011. Millions of people have read those and viewed theplethora of social media cites which have provided thealternative views from within the disaster population. But
the risk communication dialogue is surprisingly scant.
The existing risk communication literature regarding the
Fukushima disaster is profoundly critical of thegovernment activities in response to the radiation releaseand their subsequent poor risk communication which hasbred distrust, anger, fear, hyperbole, confusion,
uncertainty, and denial.
1．
Comments on Critiques
There are many reasons why there now is a widespread distrust of the Japanese government regarding
the Fukushima radiological disaster. As pointed out by
Figueroa [27], there is a common mis-perception that the
government chose not to disclose much detail about the198

projected path of the radiation, the levels of radiation, andthe potential prognosis of the power-plant during theimmediate emergency period. That perceived lack ofdisclosure has been critiqued by Figueroa [27] and bycountless others, even an independent commission [21].
However, such a point of view is possibly biased byexaggerated media accounts and discounts the very realrisk of mass panic within a population exposed to
uncertain levels of radiation [44], even more so within an
island-bound population which has limited mobility. Mass
panic within the Tokyo region and surrounding cities
would have killed and injured thousands and caused
property and environmental damage in excess of thevalue of the damage from the crippled power-plant itself.
A hard and judicious decision was made to prevent panic.
But such decisions created distrust. The government
decisions were made in the best interest of the people ofJapan, and the people of the world. We must rememberthat those decision makers who made those difficult
decisions were disaster victims themselves, having lost
loved ones, property, and family memories to the events
that unfolded in March of 2011. Many spent countlesshours for weeks working to help manage the disaster,
sacrificing their own family’s disaster response needs forthe needs of the country and the world at large. Rather
than criticizing the decision makers for the decisions thatwere made and stigmatizing the workers who are stillrisking their lives during the clean-up activities, I think
those public servants should be lauded for their heroismin the face of great adversity [51]. Yet they are often
lampooned in the press and criticized by the watercoolers worldwide despite their best efforts. Yes, there
are always lessons that can be learned from disasters or
any governmental action, right or wrong. But now is thetime for patience, support, and assistance not for
dissecting the response and recovery efforts minute-byminute. Would it not be more productive to focus on thecurrent needs in the disaster population, the current
crises in Japan, than on pointing fingers and attributing
blame?
There is a common saying in the disaster management
community that the initial data are always wrong but
better than no data at all. During disasters decisions need
to be made quickly and for the best interest of the
population at risk. Disaster plans are made so that suchdecisions can be made rapidly with little debate ordeliberation. Such decisions may feel right or wrong, butthey are made according to the disaster plans available atthat time. Sometimes there are no options for gooddecisions, only for less bad decisions- decisions which
maximally protect the public, yet not comprehensively.
Disaster managers can only do their best to mitigate thedisaster circumstances and are bound by their existingdisaster plans- they are not gods which can fully erase

J. Natl. Inst. Public Health, 62（2）: 2013

A new perspective on radiation risk communication in Fukushima, Japanthe consequences of a disaster. Rather than pointing out
the flaws in the Fukushima disaster response andrecovery efforts now from offices in non-irradiated cities,
in non-evacuated populations, in non-aftershock prone
provinces, and non-tsunami ravaged coasts, we ought toremember the enormity of what the Japanese people face
every day as they march through their disaster recovery
and the gravity of the decisions which the Japanese
officials needed to make when they were individually
struggling with their own disaster responses and humanemotional fortitude. Right now the people andgovernment workers of Japan need our help; they need
our compassion; they need our understanding. It would
be much more prudent to delay such critiques until later
after the full scope and context of the disaster isunderstood, the urgency of the public health recovery
activities have dissipated, and the emotional biases
implicit within the horror of disaster are abated.
2.Comments on Research
It is well known within environmental epidemiologythat one of the hardest tasks in study design isfinding a uniquely exposed population suitable for study.
Therefore, it is understandable that many environmental
epidemiologists see disasters which involve uniqueenvironmental exposures as scientific research
opportunities [58-61]. But disaster populations withunique environmental exposures are still inherently
susceptible to all of the public health struggles which
natural disaster populations have. Therefore, suchdisaster populations first need aid, not observational
study. As Ono rightly points out, in Fukushima thescientific opportunities for longitudinal research within
the radiation-exposed disaster populations should remain
secondary to the humanitarian and public health aid [62].
Despite the many challenges and failures by the Soviets
after the Chernobyl disaster, at least they initially focusedon the public health needs of the affected populations
above any scientific observations which could bemade [63]. So too were the early efforts in the Hiroshima
and Nagasaki populations, which were assessed earlyon [63, 64] but not extensively studied until years after
their disaster [65]. In our discussions with community
members across Fukushima prefecture during April of2013, some people felt that the focus on recruiting
Fukushima disaster victims into studies has made themfeel as if they were being treated like laboratory research
animals rather than the disaster victims in need of help
which they truly were. Perhaps that is why their current
response rate is so low [45]. However, I am certain thatsuch an insensitive focus was never the intention of theresearchers in Japan who have been leading the
Fukushima studies on-going across the country because
they clearly are focused on addressing the healthcare

needs of the victims first [66]. Rather, I think it isevidence of the risk communication problems within theregion because the health studies being conducted in
Fukushima and surrounding areas are intended toprovide medical assistance to those affected by theradiation release while the researchers track their healthover time to observe any changes which might beassociated with their radiation exposure [61, 67].
Although some may believe these research activities tobe moot [60], the simple act of longitudinal healthassessment can be very reassuring to individual disastervictims and can benefit public health even if the resulting
science is weak. Such studies should continue, and with
their current focus on the health services for the exposed
population rather than basic scientific inquiry.

VII. Conclusions
Improved risk communication efficacy in the
Fukushima region should help better inform the affected
populations about the rationale for the on-going studies
and their sensitivity to the individual medical needs of theradiation-exposed populations. Improved risk communication,
perhaps using the guidelines of Perko [68] or Slovic [47]or others and including both community intermediaries
and improved community engagement, may prove useful
within the radiation affected populations of Japan. But
these efforts should be in concert with the other ongoing disaster recovery services which are still needed toaddress the many medical service provision needs in theaffected regions [12, 69, 70].

References[1] Low WY, Binns C. Disasters and public healthconcerns. Asia-Pacific Journal of Public Health. 2011;23(3):277-9.
[2] Kikuchi S, Kikuchi T. The medical association
activity and pediatric care after the earthquake
disaster in Fukushima. The Keio Journal of
Medicine. 2012; 61(1):23-7.
[3] Koyama A, Fuse A, Hagiwara J, Matsumoto G,
Shiraishi S, Masuno T, et al. Medical relief activities,
medical resourcing, and inpatient evacuation
conducted by Nippon Medical School due to the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident
following the Great East Japan Earthquake 2011.
Journal of Nippon Medical School = Nippon Ika
Daigaku Zasshi. 2011; 78(6):393-6.
[4] Becker SM. Learning from the 2011 Great East
Japan Disaster: insights from a special radiologicalemergency assistance mission. Biosecurity andBioterrorism. 2011; 9(4):394-404.
[5] Mori K, Tateishi S, Hiraoka K, Kubo T, Okazaki R,

J. Natl. Inst. Public Health, 62（2）: 2013199

Erik R. SVENDSEN

Suzuki K, et al. How occupational health cancontribute in a disaster and what we should prepare
for the future-lessons learned through Support
Activities of a Medical School at the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Summer 2011.
Journal of Occupational Health. 2013;55(1):6-10.
[6] Ugawa Y. [One year after the earthquake inFukushima]. Rinsho Shinkeigaku = Clinical Neurology.
2012; 52(11):1339-42. (in Japanes)[7] Morimura N, Asari Y, Yamaguchi Y, Asanuma K,
Tase C, Sakamoto T, et al. Emergency/disastermedical support in the restoration project for the
Fukushima nuclear power plant accident. Emergency
Medicine Journal. 2012: doi:10.1136/emermed-2012201629.
[8] Shigemura J, Tanigawa T, Nomura S. Launch ofmental health support to the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant workers. American Journal of
Psychiatry. 2012;169(8):784.
[9] Okamoto T. [The front line management of healthrisks from Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster].
Nihon Geka Gakkai Zasshi. 2012;113(3):308. (inJapanese)[10] Kamei Y, Lee SH. [Disaster nursing: one nurse’s roleand experience during the Fukushima Power Plant
disaster following the Great East Japan Earthquake].
Hu li za zhi The Journal of Nursing. 2012;59(3):8792. (in Chinese)[11] Nagata T, Kimura Y, Ishii M. Use of a geographic
information system (GIS) in the medical response to
the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan. Prehospitaland Disaster Medicine. 2012;27(2):213-5.
[12] Miyazaki M, Yamashita S. [History of healthmanagement for radiation accident and disaster].
Nihon Rinsho=Japanese Journal of Clinical Medicine.
2012;70(3):375-82. (in Japanese)[13] Sugimoto A, Krull S, Nomura S, Morita T,
Tsubokura M. The voice of the most vulnerable:
lessons from the nuclear crisis in Fukushima, Japan.
Bulletin of the World Health Organization. 2012;90(8):629-30.
[14] Tominaga T, Hachiya M, Akashi M. Lessons learned
from response to the accident at the TEPCO
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant: from theviewpoint of radiation emergency medicine andcombined disaster. Radiation Emergency Medicine.
2012;1(1-2).
[15] Ishikawa K. [What has been brought to residents
and communities by the nuclear power plant
accident? Special and serious disaster relief
procedure modification after the 2011 Tohoku
earthquake and tsunami in Fukushima]. Nihon
Ronen Igakkai Zasshi=Japanese Journal of Geriatrics.
2011;48(5):489-93. (in Japanese)200[16] Robertson AG, Pengilley A. Fukushima nuclear
incident: The challenges of risk communication. AsiaPac J Public Health. 2012;24(4):689-96.
[17] Akabayashi A, Takimoto Y, Hayashi Y. Physician
obligation to provide care during disasters: should
physicians have been required to go to Fukushima?
Journal of Medical Ethics. 2012;38(11):697-8.
[18] Akabayashi A. Must I stay? -- the obligations ofphysicians in proximity to the Fukushima Nuclear
Power Plant. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare
Ethics. 2012;21(3):392-5.
[19] Sasakawa Y, Kiikuni K, Kikuchi S, Niwa O,
Yamashita S, Heymann DL, et al. Conclusions andrecommendations of the International Expert
Symposium in Fukushima: Radiation and Health
Risks. Journal of Radiological Protection. 2011;31(4):381-4.
[20] Rubin GJ, Amlot R, Wessely S, Greenberg N.
Anxiety, distress and anger among British nationals
in Japan following the Fukushima nuclear accident.
British Journal of Psychiatry. 2012;201(5):400-7.
[21] Normile D. Fukushima meltdown. Commission
spreads blame for ‘manmade’ disaster. Science. 2012;
337(6091): 143.
[22] Akabayashi A, Hayashi Y. Mandatory evacuation ofresidents during the Fukushima nuclear disaster: an
ethical analysis. J Public Health (Oxf). 2012;34(3):348-51.
[23] Tanaka S. Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi
nuclear power stations of TEPCO--outline & lessons
learned. Proceedings of the Japan Academy Series
B, Physical and Biological Sciences. 2012;88(9):47184.
[24] Kai M. Some lessons on radiological protection
learnt from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi
nuclear power plant. Journal of RadiologicalProtection. 2012;32(1):N101-5.
[25] Ohnishi T. The disaster at Japan’s FukushimaDaiichi nuclear power plant after the March 11, 2011
earthquake and tsunami, and the resulting spread ofradioisotope contamination. Radiation Research.
2012;177(1):1-14.
[26] Schnoor JL. Lessons from fukushima. Environmental
Science & Technology. 2011; 45(9): 3820.
[27] Figueroa PM. Risk communication surrounding the
Fukushima nuclear disaster: an anthropologicalapproach. Asia Eur J. 2013;11(1):53-64.
[28] Gonzalez AJ. The recommendations of the ICRP visa-vis the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident
aftermath. Journal of Radiological Protection. 2012;32(1):N1-7.
[29] Fukuda Y, Fukuda K. Fukushima nuclear power
plant accident: issues on radiation monitoring and its
relation to public health. Journal of Epidemiology

J. Natl. Inst. Public Health, 62（2）: 2013

A new perspective on radiation risk communication in Fukushima, Japanand Community Health. 2012;66(12):1083-4.
[30] Alonso-Hernandez CM, Guillen-Arruebarrena A,
Cartas-Aguila H, Morera-Gomez Y, Diaz-Asencio M.
Observations of fallout from the Fukushima reactor
accident in Cienfuegos, Cuba. Bulletin ofEnvironmental Contamination and Toxicology. 2012;
88(5):752-4.
[31] Pham MK, Eriksson M, Levy I, Nies H, Osvath I,
Betti M. Detection of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power plant accident radioactive traces in Monaco.
Journal of Environmental Radioactivity. 2012;114:131-7.
[32] Long NQ, Truong Y, Hien PD, Binh NT, Sieu LN,
Giap TV, et al. Atmospheric radionuclides from the
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear reactor accident
observed in Vietnam. Journal of Environmental
Radioactivity. 2012;111:53-8.
[33] Paatero J, Vira J, Siitari-Kauppi M, Hatakka J,
Holmen K, Viisanen Y. Airborne fission products in
the High Arctic after the Fukushima nuclear
accident. Journal of Environmental Radioactivity.
2012;114:41-7.
[34] Evangeliou N, Balkanski Y, Cozic A, Moller AP.
Global transport and deposition of 137Cs following
the Fukushima NPP accident in Japan: Emphasis on
Europe and Asia using high-resolution modelversions and radiological impact assessment of thehuman population and the environment using interactive
tools. Environmental Science & Technology. 2013.
[35] Ooe Y. Report on support activity for the East Japan
Great Earthquake (May 27-29, 2011). Japan-hospitals: the journal of the Japan Hospital Association. 2012;(31):63-9.
[36] Takayama S, Kamiya T, Watanabe M, Hirano A,
Matsuda A, Monma Y, et al. Report on disastermedical operations with acupuncture/massage
therapy after the great East Japan earthquake.
Integrative Medicine Insights. 2012;7:1-5.
[37] Kato Y, Uchida H, Mimura M. Mental health andpsychosocial support after the Great East Japan
Earthquake. The Keio Journal of Medicine. 2012;
61(1):15-22.
[38] Takahashi T, Iijima K, Kuzuya M, Hattori H, Yokono
K, Morimoto S. Guidelines for non-medical careproviders to manage the first steps of emergency
triage of elderly evacuees. Geriatrics & Gerontology
International. 2011;11(4):383-94.
[39] Government FP. Sixth Fukushima Medical Plan. In:
Welfare MoHa, editor. Fukushima, Japan: Fukushima
Prefectural Government; 2013. p. 267.
[40] Seki H, Oda N, Aita T. [The events of the last one
year in Fukushima Hamadori]. Rinsho Shinkeigaku= Clinical Neurology. 2012;52(11):1345-7. (in Japanese)[41] Yasumura S, Goto A, Yamazaki S, Reich MR. Excess
mortality among relocated institutionalized elderly

after the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Public Health.
2013;127(2):186-8.
[42] Irisawa A. The 2011 Great East Japan earthquake: areport of a regional hospital in Fukushima
Prefecture coping with the Fukushima nuclear
disaster. Digestive Endoscopy. 2012;24 Suppl 1:3-7.
[43] Akabayashi A. Fukushima research needs world’s
support. Science. 2011;333(6043):696.
[44] Alevritou-Goulielmou H. Nuclear accidents, consumers’
perspectives and demands. Journal of Environmental
Radioactivity. 2005;83(3):433-5.
[45] Brumfiel G. Fukushima: Fallout of fear. Nature.
2013;493(7432):290-3.
[46] Orita M, Hayashida N, Urata H, Shinkawa T, Endo Y,
Takamura N. Determinants of the return tohometowns after the accident at Fukushima Dai-Ichi
Nuclear Power Plant: A case study for the village ofkawauchi. Radiation Protection Dosimetry. 2013:
doi:10.1093/rpd/nct082.
[47] Slovic P. The perception gap: Radiation and risk. B
Atom Sci. 2012;68(3):67-75.
[48] Ng KH, Lean ML. The Fukushima nuclear crisis
reemphasizes the need for improved risk
communication and better use of social media.
Health Physics. 2012;103(3):307-10.
[49] Murayama T. Social impacts induced by radiation
risk in Fukushima. In: 32nd Annual Meeting of theInternational Association for Impact Assessment; 27
May- 1 June 2012; Centro de Congresso da Alfândega,
Porto-Portugal. Proceedings.
[50] Sakai K. Reference levels in the context ofFukushima - lessons learned and a challenge for theradiation protection system. Annals of the ICRP.
2012;41(3-4):282-5.
[51] Sano SY, Tanigawa T, Shigemura J, Satoh Y, YoshinoA, Fujii C, et al. [Complexities of the stressexperienced by employees of the Fukushima nuclear
plants]. Seishin Shinkeigaku zasshi = Psychiatria et
Neurologia Japonica. 2012;114(11):1274-83. (inJapanese)[52] Loganovsky KN, Zdanevich NA. Cerebral basis of
posttraumatic stress disorder following the Chernobyl
disaster. CNS spectrums. 2013;18(2):95-102.
[53] Wada K, Yoshikawa T, Hayashi T, Aizawa Y.
Emergency response technical work at Fukushima
Dai-ichi nuclear power plant: occupational healthchallenges posed by the nuclear disaster.
Occupational and Environmental Medicine. 2012;69(8):599-602.
[54] Schoch-Spana M, Franco C, Nuzzo JB, Usenza C.
Community engagement: leadership tool forcatastrophic health events. Biosecurity andBioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, andScience. 2007;5(1):8-25.

J. Natl. Inst. Public Health, 62（2）: 2013201

Erik R. SVENDSEN[55] Svendsen ER, Whittle NC, Sanders L, McKeown RE,
Sprayberry K, Heim M, et al. GRACE: Public healthrecovery methods following an environmental
disaster. Archives of Environmental & Occupational
Health. 2010;65(2):77-85.
[56] Wennerstrom A, Vannoy SD, 3rd, Allen CE, Meyers
D, O'Toole E, Wells KB, et al. Community-based
participatory development of a community healthworker mental health outreach role to extend
collaborative care in post-Katrina New Orleans.
Ethnicity & Disease. 2011;21(3 Suppl 1):S1-45-51.
[57] Burkle FM, Jr. The limits to our capacity: reflections
on resiliency, community engagement, and recovery
in 21st-century crises. Disaster Medicine and Public
Health Preparedness. 2011;5 Suppl 2:S176-81.
[58] Dominici F, Levy JI, Louis TA. Methodologicalchallenges and contributions in disaster epidemiology.
Epidemiol Rev. 2005;27:9-12.
[59] Burkart W. Radioepidemiology in the aftermath of
the nuclear program of the former Soviet Union:
unique lessons to be learnt. Radiat Environ Biophys.
1996;35(2):65-73.
[60] Boice JD, Jr. Radiation epidemiology: a perspectiveon Fukushima. Journal of Radiological Protection.
2012;32(1):N33-40.
[61] Akiba S. Epidemiological studies of Fukushimaresidents exposed to ionising radiation from the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant prefecture-a preliminary review of current plans. Journal ofRadiological Protection. 2012;32(1):1-10.
[62] Ono M. Ethics should trump science in Fukushima.
BMJ. 2011; 342: d3853. doi:10.1136/bmj.d3853.
[63] Svendsen ER, Runkle JR, Dhara VR, Lin S, Naboka

202

M, Mousseau TA, et al. Epidemiologic methods
lessons learned from environmental public healthdisasters: Chernobyl, the World Trade Center,
Bhopal, and Graniteville, South Carolina. Int J Env
Res Pub He. 2012;9(8):2894-909.
[64] Kodama K, Mabuchi K, Shigematsu I. A long-termcohort study of the atomic-bomb survivors. J
Epidemiol. 1996;6(3 Suppl):S95-105.
[65] Sasaki H, Kodama K, Yamada M. A review of fortyfive years study of Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic
bomb survivors. Aging. J Radiat Res (Tokyo). 1991;
32 Suppl:310-26.
[66] Yasumura S. Newsmaker interview: Seiji Yasumura.
Fukushima begins 30-year odyssey in radiation
health. Interview by Dennis Normile. Science. 2011;
333(6043):684-5.
[67] Yasumura S, Hosoya M, Yamashita S, Kamiya K, Abe
M, Akashi M, et al. Study protocol for the
Fukushima Health Management Survey. Journal of
epidemiology / Japan Epidemiological Association.
2012;22(5):375-83.
[68] Perko T. Importance of risk communication during
and after a nuclear accident. Integrated Environmental
Assessment and Management. 2011; 7(3):388-92.
[69] Ishikawa K, Kanazawa Y, Morimoto S, Takahashi T.
Depopulation with rapid aging in Minamisoma City
after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant
accident. Journal of the American Geriatrics Society.
2012;60(12):2357-8.
[70] Tsubokura M, Gilmour S, Takahashi K, Oikawa T,
Kanazawa Y. Internal radiation exposure after the
Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster. JAMA.
2012;308(7):669-70.

J. Natl. Inst. Public Health, 62（2）: 2013

A new perspective on radiation risk communication in Fukushima, Japan＜論壇＞
福島での放射線リスクコミュニケーションの新しい視点抄録
２
０
１１年３月１１日の連動的な災害である歴史的な地震，未曾有の津波，そしてそれに引き続く福島第一原子力発電所からの放射性物質の放出は，世界に衝撃を与えた．その中でも，放射線被ばくへの恐怖は，地震と津波の災害援助活動を困難にしている．ここでは福島県内の被災集団内でのリスクコミュニケーション活動の現状を解説する．
この解説の内容として，災害復旧フェーズ中における福島県のリスクコミュニケーションに焦点を当て，現在の科学文献をレビューした．その結果，リスクコミュニケーションそのものとリ
スクコミュニケーションを向上させるための緊急性を要する問題を扱った５つの関連する論文に限って言及する．これらの論文では，一貫性を持って指摘できるテーマがある．それらは筆者が直接観察した，今なお，被災者から示される恐怖，怒り，不信，否定，混乱，不確実性，アンビ
バレンスや誇張とも整合している．これらの被災者の反応は，現在の放射線状況に対する彼らの様々な対応としてあらわれるものであり，政府機関によるリスクコミュニケーションの不調や透明性の欠如にも由来するものである．
リスクコミュニケーションにおけるこれらの問題の対処に役立てるために，地域社会での仲介者活用と災害からの回復期における地域社会巻き込みを大いに活用することの２つを推奨したい．
ガイドラインとして示されると思われるが，地域社会での仲介者活用と地域社会巻き込みの両方を含むことで改善されるリスクコミュニケーションは，日本で放射線の問題に影響を受けた人々の間で有効であることが証明されるであろう．
キーワード：福島第一原子力発電所，リスクコミュニケーション，災害からの回復期，地域中間支援（コミュニティ・インターミディアリー），地域住民による取り組み
Erik R. SVENDSEN
Department of Global Environmental Health
Sciences, Tulane University School of Public
Health and Tropical Medicine

J. Natl. Inst. Public Health, 62（2）: 2013203