1

Contents
Introduction

3

Methodology

6

Difficulties and Limits
Context and History of the Conflict

8
9

Efforts in Ending the Boko Haram Conflict – Military Efforts Punctuated by Tactical
Negotiations
10
Overview of the Dialogue and Negotiation Efforts with Terrorist Groups

15

Findings

19

Perceptions of the Different Boko Haram Factions and Implications for Dialogue and Negotiation
Prospects
20
Perceptions of JAS and Prospects for Dialogue and Negotiations

21

Perceptions of ISWAP and Prospects for Dialogue and Negotiations

24

Foot Soldiers and Leadership: An Apparent Disconnect

27

Past Dialogue and Prospects for Future Dialogue

28

Past Negotiations and Prospects for Future Negotiations

32

Authority to Negotiate within Boko Haram

33

Negotiation Agenda

34

Parties to the Negotiations

36

Other Faction’s Reaction to Negotiations

38

Security Actors and Dialogue and Negotiation Efforts

39

Gendered Perspectives on Negotiations

41

Considerations for Future Dialogue and Negotiation Efforts

41

Citation: Francesca Batault, Malik Samuel, Celestin Delanga with Mohammed Bukar, Fatima
Yetcha Ajimi Badu, Fanna Abdu Muhammad, Fatima Ajimi, Sani Boubacar and Siobhan
O’Neil, Prospects for Dialogue and Negotiation to Address the Conflict in the Lake Chad Basin,
UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024, https://doi.org/10.37559/MEAC/24/03

2

Introduction
For more than a decade, the Boko Haram insurgency has plunged the Lake Chad Basin into adevastating security and humanitarian crisis.1 The insurgency and associated militaryresponse have left 3.2 million people displaced and led to another 280,000 refugees pushed
across borders.2 The economies of the region have faltered, and today 11.1 million people
across Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon are in need of humanitarian assistance.3 Despitesome initial successes, kinetic efforts to defeat Boko Haram’s factions have fallen short, andinsecurity continues and even appears to be worsening in certain parts of the region, as intrafactional fighting has taken hold.
With the 2021 death of factional leader Abubakar Shekau, which was followed by the mass exits
of some 160,000 people associated with Boko Haram and occurred during a period of
improving security in much of the North East, the local population saw a glimmer of hope. The
convergence of favourable circumstances raised the question as to whether there was anopportunity to finally end the insurgency. In response to the sense of optimism that infused thisperiod, and some of the emerging dynamics around the mass exits, UNIDIR and ISS partnered
to examine the prospects – and support for – different conflict resolution tools, including
approaches that are rarely openly considered for listed terrorist groups like Boko Haram –dialogue and negotiation. Oft dismissed as capitulation, dialogue and negotiations, when partof a broader strategy, can be central in weakening and ultimately ending armed groups and/or
finding a negotiated settlement to the broader conflict. Dialogue and negotiation can help
provide crucial information about shadowy groups that are not well understood, expose groupleaders to outside options beyond violence, weaken groups through defection, and/or
marginalize their population support.4 Moreover, dialogue and negotiation may be used formore immediate, narrow, or tactical reasons – gaining humanitarian access, protection ofcivilians, handover of children, or agreeing to short term ceasefires. As self-imposed political
red lines remain one of the primary obstacles to talking or negotiating with terrorist groups,
gauging public perceptions on engagement with such groups, and potential concessions that

1 The authors recognize that Boko Haram is sometimes considered a derogatory name for the group and is not thename used by the different factions itself. However, recognizing that the name Boko Haram is often used by local
populations as an umbrella name – although this varies by geography and interaction – this report will use BokoHaram to encompass both factions. When reference is made to a specific faction, this will be clearly indicated, andthe names (Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)
will be used.
2 UN OCHA, “Lake Chad Basin: Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 28 August 2023),” 08 September 2024.
3 Ibid.
4 For example, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Negotiating with groups that use terrorism: Lessons for policy-makers.”
Background Paper (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2008).
3

could eventually be made to them, is important. With this information, officials may have abetter picture of the spectrum of conflict resolution tools available to them and anticipate theirconstituents’ reactions to their use.
This report builds on prior research from each team on alternate approaches to listed terroristgroups and negotiation prospects with Boko Haram.5 The report details extensive qualitative
research undertaken in the four countries of the Lake Chad Basin region by UNIDIR and ISS
from May – June 2023. It draws from key informant interviews and focuses on group
discussions with military personnel, members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and othercommunity security actors, former associates of Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād(JAS) and of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), government officials and local
leaders, staff of NGOs and civil society groups, and community members across the region,
who represent key stakeholders and/or have interesting vantage points on their respective
country’s counterterrorism strategy. The report aims to contribute to a better understanding of
the full range of tools that could potentially be employed to bring about an end to the BokoHaram crisis. Findings highlight a range of key considerations related to dialogue andnegotiations – and how different segments of local populations view them – which may be ofuse when considering dialogue and negotiation strategies.
The report finds that:●

Dialogue can serve as an important precursor to negotiations aimed at a peacefulresolution of the conflict. Exchanges between respective governments and Boko Harammay serve to gradually develop trust that had been eroded and explore pathways away fromviolence for the group’s members. Further, dialogue between communities and BokoHaram – both individual associates and the group more broadly – can serve to promotereconciliation and acceptance.

●

A lack of trust and unfulfilled promises are a recurrent issue cited and may be abarrier to negotiations. Former Boko Haram associates interviewed cautioned that their
inclination to participate in any future negotiations would depend on the governments’ability to fulfil promises made. Former associates were initially encouraged to exit the group
after hearing calls from Borno State Governor Babagan Zulum referenced promises thatthey would not be harmed as a primary reason for their exit and had messaged back these55

United Nations University and Institute for Integrated Transitions, The Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justiceand Violent Extremism (2018); Akinola Olojo, “How Viable is Dialogue with al Shabaab and Boko Haram,” Policy
Brief 130, (Institute for Security Studies, 2019); Véronique Dudouet and Karin Göldner-Ebenthal, “Challenges andopportunities for conflict resolution with Salafi jihadi armed groups,” Policy brief No. 10, (Berlin: Berghof Foundation,2020).
4

positive experiences back to the group to encourage further defections. However, theuncertainty faced by many who exited as well as unmet expectations over promised socioeconomic support and poor conditions in reintegration centers and camps appear to be
impacting current decisions to exit the group.
●

Boko Haram factions do not have the same capacity and motivations to negotiate an
end to the conflict. While ISWAP exhibits certain characteristics, notably strong
leadership, coherence and group loyalty, that may make it a more credible negotiation
partner, it is less likely to negotiate. The group’s transnational nature (notably its role as anaffiliate of the Islamic State and its influence over the group’s actions), maximalist goals andhardline ideology, and present military strengths disadvantage efforts to negotiate. On theother hand, JAS appears more motivated to engage in negotiations as conditions appearedripe following the death of Shekau and the mass exits that followed. However, lacking thesame level of centralized control over its fighters, JAS appears less of a credible negotiating
partner and may have difficulties in following through on the terms of the negotiations or
mitigating potential spoilers.

●

There is an apparent disconnect between the lower-ranking members and theleadership when it comes to negotiations. Lower-ranking members of Boko Haram are
more widely perceived to be accepting of negotiations compared to the group’s leadership.
As such, it is expected that negotiations could prove successful with lower-ranking
members, notably if key factors that influenced low ranking recruitment – a lack of economic
opportunities and livelihood concerns – are addressed as part of the negotiations.

●

Even if the group’s highest leadership opposes negotiation, there are influential
individual commanders who may be open to negotiation and exiting the group with
their fighters, notably within JAS. While there is often a focus on a singular approach tonegotiations with armed groups, a multi-faceted approach that targets individual units orregional commanders could help incrementally reduce the overall standing and capacity ofJAS. Entry points to negotiations with these individual commanders should be explored,
and safe exit pathways should continue to be made available to encourage further
demobilizations and exits from the group.

●

Amnesty will be central to a negotiated peace agreement and will serve to encourage
further defections. However, amnesty may not need to be viewed as zero sum – provided
to everyone or not provided at all. Amnesty and legal leniency for lower-ranking members
can be complemented with criminal justice procedures for leaders and those accused of5atrocities. Alternate justice approaches may serve as a parallel approach to the state-run
processes which could help bring about a sense of accountability at the community leveland promote reconciliation and peacebuilding.
The findings presented herein reflect the perspectives of communities and key stakeholders in
the Lake Chad region at a particular moment of optimism (May and June 2023), prompted by
improved security, waves of disengagements, and high levels of community acceptance offormer associates. In the months since that time, there have been a number of notabledevelopments that may impact perspectives on how to resolve the conflict includingheightened factional infighting which has seen JAS gaining significant grounds and ISWAP
militarily weakened6 and recent Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)7 campaigns that havegreatly affected the factions by reducing and denying ISWAP space to operate.8 This is to say,that the findings presented in this report may not reflect current perspectives in the region,
which may have shifted over the last few months with evolving conflict dynamics. Nevertheless,the findings present a unique evidence base for the consideration of policymakers in the region
and beyond, particularly because it offers underreported perspectives of the viability ofunderutilized tools in the conflict resolution toolbox that could potentially be deployed
alongside other kinetic and non-kinetic interventions to address the Boko Haram conflict.

Methodology
The general objective of this research was to understand perspectives on the feasibility of
dialogue and negotiations with Boko Haram and its factions in Nigeria and the other Lake ChadBasin countries. For the purpose of this report, primacy is placed on Nigeria given that it has
been the birthplace and epicenter of the Boko Haram conflict and is on the frontline of managing
the exit of defectors from JAS and ISWAP. While Nigeria is the starting point for the analyses
that follow, where significant divergence in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger were observed, they
are noted.

6 International Crisis Group, “JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters,” 28 March 2024; Malik Samuel,Boko Haram factional violence worries Islamic State, ISS Today, 25 April 2024.
7 Created in 2014 by Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin, the MNJTF is an effort among these countries tocoordinate military operations and counterinsurgency efforts as a regional response to the Boko Haram conflict.
8 This – at least temporarily – resulted in fewer large-scale attacks by ISWAP but more small-scale attacks by JAS,targeting civilians for survival.
6

UNIDIR (Nigeria) and ISS (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger) ran several qualitative studies
that form the basis of the report.

LOCATIONS OF INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS

These included:

GROUPS●

85

key

informantinterviewsinMaiduguri, Nigeria (May-June 2023).
●

69 key informant interviews and sevenfocus group discussions in the Far North
and North regions of Cameroon (MayJune 2023).

●

49 key informant interviews and two
focus group discussions in the Lac andHadjer-Lamis provinces●(June 2023).

92 key informant interviews and 26 focus
group discussions in the Diffa region(May-June 2023).

Participants came from key stakeholder groups who may have a stake or role in dialogue andnegotiation efforts. For key informant interviews, this included government officials (12 percent), former associates of JAS and ISWAP (21 per cent), community leaders and community
members (23 per cent), representatives of NGOs and CSOs (18 per cent) and community
security actors (CSAs) (17 per cent) and members of the armed and security forces (9 percent). The gender breakdown for participants in key informant interviews was 27 per centfemale and 73 per cent male.
A mini survey was administered across all key stakeholder groups in order to facilitate acomparative analysis of viewpoints. Survey questions were designed as a way to understandif, and in what ways, dialogue and subsequent negotiations may play in ending the Boko Haram
conflict. Participants were asked for their perspectives on several key aspects of dialogue andnegotiations, including who should be involved in negotiations, whether conditions wereappropriate for negotiations to occur, and possible outreach strategies.

7

TABLE 1 – KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW SAMPLES
Total

Governmen

FormerCommunity

NGOs

Community

Armedt officials

Boko

Leaders andandSecurity

andand civilHarammembers

CSOs

ActorsSecurity

servants

Associate

Forcess

Nigeria Total

85

12

25

18

15

15

0

Men

79

10

25

18

11

15

0

Women

6

2

0

0

4

0

0

Cameroon

69

8

7

24

12

9

9

Men

54

6

5

21

10

4

8

Women

15

2

2

3

2

5

1

Chad Total

49

3

8

16

6

8

8

Men

44

3

8

13

4

8

8

Women

5

0

0

3

2

0

0

Niger Total

92

12

22

11

20

17

10

Men

78

7

22

8

16

17

8

Women

14

5

0

3

4

0

2

Total

Key informant interviews were also complemented by focus group discussions in Cameroon,
Chad, and Niger. The discussions were held with members of the community, given that theyplay a key role in any peacebuilding process, including dialogue. As those who are also
expected to receive and live with former members of the group, and many have been victims of
Boko Haram violence themselves, community members’ views are key. Community members
were recruited based on their knowledge and experiences in the conflict and their positions in
the communities.

Difficulties and Limits
The research took place in an active conflict context and the security situation in the four
countries where the research was conducted was often precarious and fluid. In Nigeria, as
security concerns precluded the research team from accessing villages and communities
located in remote areas of Borno, respondents from communities outside Maiduguri weretransported to Maiduguri for the interviews and then returned to their communities. In Chad and
Cameroon, the rainy season limited road access to several communities, and several
respondents were unavailable as they were engaged in farming activities during the day. In
8Chad, Cameroon and Niger, certain subsets of the selected respondents were reluctant toanswer some questions given the political sensitivities and local laws about engaging in
dialogue with armed groups.
Cultural practices and insecurity made it difficult to get access to women participants in somecountries, notably in Chad and Niger. For example, in Chad, several women refused to beinterviewed and instead requested the enumerators to speak to their husbands, male family
members or colleagues. Efforts were made to include women respondents where possible,
including through women-only focus group discussions to encourage their participation. In
Cameroon, especially in the Far North, it was easier to gain access to women notably fromChristian communities, as women are seen as educators, peacemakers, and counsellors
within their communities. Women also play an important role within community security
groups, such as the Comités de Vigilance (COVIs) and therefore also formed part of those
focus group discussions.
Given the fluid and rapidly changing dynamics of the conflict, ex-associates were chosen fromthe group’s factions who left recently in order to ensure their insights were timely. The focus
was therefore placed on individuals who left the group within the last two years, following thedeath of Shekau, as they would better be able to speak to the current dynamics within andbetween the factions.

Context and History of the
Conflict
The emergence of Boko Haram dates back to 2002 in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria.
Originally founded by Mohammed Yusuf and focused on preaching against the corruption ofpolitical elites and the perniciousness of the Western way of life, the group gradually slid into
violent actions against the Nigerian State and its symbols. Boko Haram took advantage of thesituation of widespread poverty and state absence in most of the Lake Chad Basin
communities to attract people into its ranks with a discourse that combined religious ideology,
denunciation of the State, and the proposal of a new order based on the group’s interpretationof Islam. Following a series of attacks on police stations and government buildings, the Nigerian
security forces attacked the group's headquarters and arrested Yusuf and some of his
supporters. Yusuf later died in police custody.

9Abubakar Shekau, who took over the leadership of the movement after Yusuf's death in 2009,
enshrined the use of indiscriminate violence, targeting communities, schools, security
services, as well as other symbols of the State. The group's abduction of 276 schoolgirls in
Chibok, Nigeria, in April 2014 increased its international visibility. Starting in 2013, the groupextended its actions in Cameroon, then in Niger and Chad and by 2015, the group was
conducting attacks in each country, including in the heart of the Chadian capital. At its height in
2014, Boko Haram was the deadliest terrorist group globally, responsible for over 6,000 deaths
that year alone.9
In March 2015, the group pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
becoming its official affiliate in the Lake Chad Basin, and rebranding itself as the Islamic State
West Africa Province (ISWAP). However, internal disagreements over the group’s approach –primarily over the treatment of Muslim civilians and IS overview of internal dynamics – led to a
split in the group’s central leadership, splintering the group into two factions. Abu Musab alBarnawi headed the faction known as ISWAP from 2016 to 2018 and again from 2021 to 2023,
while Shekau continued to lead the faction known as JAS until his death in May 2021 when
intra-factional fighting culminated in an ISWAP attack on JAS’ Sambisa Forest stronghold
south of Maiduguri.10 Although given the option of surrendering to ISWAP, Shekau insteaddetonated a suicide vest, killing himself and others. Following his death, more than 160,000
people who had been associated with the group or lived in areas under its control left Sambisa
and surrendered to the Nigerian Government.11 Although reduced in size, Shekau’s followers
continue to operate, led by Bakura Doro, and intra-factional fighting continues to this day.

Efforts in Ending the BokoHaram Conflict – Military
Efforts Punctuated by
Tactical Negotiations
The use of kinetic force has been the predominant strategy of the four affected countries in theLake Chad Basin in combating the Boko Haram insurgency. The largely military strategy that
9 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index (2015).
10 After some leadership changes between 2016 and 2020, al-Barnawi returned as the leadership of the faction inearly 2021 and then led the attack in Sambisa that resulted in Shekau’s death.
11 Daily Nigerian, “Over 160,000 Boko Haram insurgents surrender to Nigerian troops – Zulum,” 28 November 2023
10was pursued alongside interventions and policies to promote armed group defections, hasbeen punctuated, however, with a slew of tactical negotiations, and in the early days of thegroup, attempts at dialogue. Two years after the group’s initial uprising in Maiduguri, at a time
when the group’s military capacity was rapidly growing, the first attempt at dialogue between
the Nigerian government and JAS occurred. Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo
met with Babakura Fugu, the brother-in-law of Mohammed Yusuf in September 2011.12 The
Obasanjo talks, as they were referred to, were reportedly initiated at the request of aggrieved
JAS members and centred around objections to the handling of the 2009 uprising, including
the rebuilding of mosques, schools, and homes destroyed by the government; the release ofdetainees; and compensation to the families of those killed by security personnel. 13 The talks
were however cut short by Fugu’s assassination. Initial suspicions pointed towards JAS
members opposed to the talks, although the group strongly refuted this.14
A second attempt at dialogue occurred shortly thereafter in March 2012, when JAS voluntarily
chose the president of the Supreme Council for Sharia, Sheikh Ahmed Datti, as an intermediaryfor negotiations.15 Pre-conditions for dialogue once more centred around the release ofdetainees and the guarantee of safety for its leaders.16 Having selected a trusted intermediaryof its choice, JAS leadership was reportedly serious in its commitment to dialogue, with thegroup going insofar as nominating members to attend the dialogue.17 However, the initiativecame to an unexpected end when JAS’ chosen representative for the dialogue was arrested in
Kaduna, Nigeria during preparatory meetings for the peace talks.18 News of the talks was
shortly thereafter leaked to the press, with Sheikh Ahmed Datti accusing the government of
insincerity.19 JAS publicly criticized the “outright deception and betrayal” and announced thatthey would not engage in any further talks with the government in light of what had occurred.20

12 Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, “A Matter of Faith? Negotiations with Boko Haram in Nigeria,” International

Negotiation, Vol 25, no.3 (2020).
13 International Crisis Group, “Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency,” Africa Report no. 216(Brussels, 2014).
14 Akinola Olojo, “Engaging Boko Haram: Militarization, Mediation, or Both?,” IPI Gobal Observatory, 26 September
2012
15Daniel E. Agbiboa, “Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria.” Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism Vol 37, no.1 (2014); International Crisis Group, “Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The BokoHaram Insurgency,” Africa Report no. 216 (Brussels, 2014).
16 Ibid.
17 Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, “A Matter of Faith? Negotiations with Boko Haram in Nigeria,” International Negotiation
Vol 25, no.3 (2020).
18 International Crisis Group, “Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency,” Africa Report no. 216(Brussels, 2014).
19 Akinola Olojo, “How Viable is Dialogue with al Shabaab and Boko Haram,” Policy Brief 130, (Institute for Security
Studies, 2019).
20 Alexander Thurston, Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2018).
11

As initial attempts at dialogue failed, the kinetic response to the crisis escalated. In 2015, the
MNJTF received deployment authorization21 and its subsequent military campaigns eventually
succeeded in reducing the group’s territorial control. Despite marking a regionalization andfurther militarization of the crisis response,22 Boko Haram has proven adept at adapting its
tactics. As the MJNTF pushed the group into more rural areas, they reverted to guerrilla-styletactics and employed suicide bombings and the use of improvised explosive devices.23 Since
2019, the Nigerian military has resorted to a so-called ‘super camp’ strategy, which seessoldiers pulled from smaller posts into larger, more fortified camps to prevent Boko Haram fromoverrunning camps.24 While this has reduced military casualties, it has nevertheless left
civilians exposed to more attacks, notably in rural areas.25 Excessive militarization and thecorresponding environment of armed violence have inadvertently amplified grievances among
affected communities, with some indications that this alienation of the civilian population may
have served to bolster Boko Haram’s ranks.26
Parallel to counterinsurgency efforts, several tactical negotiations for the release of hostages
occurred during the aforementioned period. The most covered was the kidnapping of 276
Chibok girls in 2014, which marked "an important turning point in the conflict and critical forcontinued negotiation attempts, which henceforth focused almost exclusively on the release of
the girls.”27 Several negotiation tracks were reportedly initiated in the wake of the attack,including one led by the Chadian government, and another facilitated by the Swiss and theInternational Committee of the Red Cross.28 The inauguration of a new administration under
President Buhari, who had previously signalled opposition to negotiations, along with internal
rifts in Boko Haram leadership, presented significant obstacles to negotiations. 29 Whileultimately a number of the girls were released following two rounds of the Swiss-led
negotiations, the negotiation agenda was not extended beyond the release of the Chibok girls,
despite hopes that the negotiations could be a springboard to facilitate a broader settlement
towards peace in the North East.30 According to one source, the Nigerian government and21 Multinational Joint Task Force “About the Force”, 27 March 2024

22 William Assanvo, Jeannine Ella A Abatan and Wendyam Aristide Sawadogo, “Assessing the Multinational Joint

Task Force against Boko Haram,” Issue 19, (Institute for Security Studies, 2016).
23 Saskia Brechenmacher, “Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram,” Working Paper, (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2019).
24 The Guardian, “Army opens 20 super camps to check terrorism in North East,” 04 September 2019.
25 Malik Samuel, “Nigeria’s super camps leave civilians exposed to terrorists,” ISS Today, 30 November 2020.
26 Saskia Brechenmacher, “Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram,” Working Paper (Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 2019).
27 Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, “A Matter of Faith? Negotiations with Boko Haram in Nigeria,” International
Negotiation, Vol 25, no.3 (2020).
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
12some members of the mediation team reportedly were against any further efforts aimed at a
broader resolution of the conflict.31
Nigerian government engaged with both factions in simultaneous negotiations for the releaseof oil explorers and policewomen abducted by ISWAP and JAS, respectively. These 2018
negotiations reportedly formed part of a broader negotiation effort to try to end hostilities andincluded discussions about the release of detained Boko Haram associates, ending attacks
against civilians, and possible amnesty for those who surrendered.32 While all the hostages
covered by the more narrow negotiations were eventually released, the broader negotiation
initiative did not end the attacks or make progress toward a negotiated resolution of the conflict.
Several important lessons can be drawn from the past efforts at dialogue and negotiations thathave been reported. It must be acknowledged that most negotiations with terrorist groups
occur in secret, many are never revealed, and even when there is some reporting on
negotiations, it can be difficult to ascertain the details necessary to fully interrogate their impact.
That said, from what we know, it appears that with regard to the negotiation efforts mentioned
above, the initiative to seek dialogue came from either Boko Haram members themselves or
third parties seeking to facilitate dialogue, rather than from governments. Despite at least two
government committees set up to identify avenues for dialogue, 33 the government of Nigeria
does not appear to have played a significant role in initiating direct dialogue with the group to
date.34 In other instances, the government’s publicizing of talks, without the apparent
knowledge of the group and without an agreement being reached, appears to have derailed
negotiations. These experiences have further served to decrease Boko Haram’s trust in thepromise and usefulness of negotiations. In light of this history, it can be contended that any
future attempts at negotiations would benefit from the involvement of external mediators andnegotiators to bring the two parties to the table and help build trust that was eroded by pastnegotiations.
Further, the agenda of past negotiations may shed light on some of the central demands that
could feature in any future strategic negotiations. Initial attempts at dialogue and negotiations(before the group’s violence and reach expanded exponentially) were primarily driven by Boko
31 Ibid.
32 Premium Times, “How Nigerian govt, Boko Haram negotiated ceasefire, release of militants,” 26 February 2018
33In 2011, a presidential committee consisting of eight members was formed to provide recommendations for ending

violence in the North East. The committee’s report, which recommended amnesty for members who denounced
violence and broader talks, was dismissed by the government. In 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan establisheda 26-person “Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful resolution of Security Challenges in the North” which was tasked
with exploring a framework for amnesty and disarmament of the groups. Despite public announcements from thegovernment that Boko Haram agreed to a ceasefire agreement, Shekau refuted these claims.
34 Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, “A Matter of Faith? Negotiations with Boko Haram in Nigeria,” International
Negotiation, Vol 25, no.3 (2020).
13

Haram’s grievances against the government, namely the release of detained group members
and the payment of compensation to the families of those killed in security crackdowns.
Opportunities to engage in broader peace negotiations faltered after the escalation of thearmed conflict in 2013, which were then replaced by tactical negotiations primarily concernedwith ceasefires or the release of hostages. Notably, to date, negotiations do not appear to havecentred around the group’s religious demands, namely the implementation of Sharia law or theestablishment of an Islamic caliphate.35 This may be due to insufficient evidence available onnegotiations, and/or the fact that the group’s religious claims are already in part

realized: theextension of Sharia law into criminal matters dates back to 2000 in both the North East statesof Borno and Yobe.36 While the degree of application of Sharia in these areas may continue tobe a matter in question for the group, its exclusion from the negotiating agenda may reflect that
religious claims are only one aspect of the group’s objectives. Rather, these religious ambitions
may reflect a critique of the state embodied in that ideology, which saw Western values
undermining the pious Muslim existence sought after by its leaders.37 Indeed, the repeatedemphasis on grievances such as accountability and compensation for extrajudicial killings at
the hands of security forces and detention of group members may be more important thanpreviously recognized.38 If there are future negotiations, addressing some of these specificgrievances – and other, more recent excessive force claims – may go a long way as a show ofgood faith in engaging in credible negotiations that seek to move into the strategic realm.
A key part of the response to Boko Haram has been the exit programmes designed toincentivize individuals to come out of the group and reintegrate into civilian life. These
programmes have required dialogue (even if one-sided in the form of communication
campaigns about amnesty offers) and at times, negotiation. These programmes include
Operation Safe Corridor, a federal programme established in 2016 that targets low-level
individuals;39 the Sulhu programme for high-level individuals who held roles of importance withthe group;40 and in recent years, the Borno Model,41 which has received thousands ofsurrenders to date. These efforts are relevant to mention here, as they overlap with dialogue
and negotiation efforts, and often serve similar goals. In addition to providing a bridge to peace,these programmes serve to deplete the ranks of Boko Haram’s factions and thus reduce their
35 Ibid.

36 Heather Bourbeau with Dr Muhammad Sani Umar and Peter Bauman “Shari’ah Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria”(United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2019)37 Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, “A Matter of Faith? Negotiations with Boko Haram in Nigeria,” International
Negotiation, Vol 25, no.3 (2020).
38 Ibid.
39 International Crisis Group, “An Exit from Boko Haram? Assessing Nigeria’s Operation Safe Corridor,” 19 March
2021.
40 The New Humanitarian, “Nigeria’s secret programme to lure top Boko Haram defectors ,” 19 August 2021
41 May Salem, Lina Raafat,Maya Ragab and Norhan Amin, Advancing Holistic and Comprehensive Efforts toConfront Africa’s Growing Terrorism Challenge, (CCCPA, 2022).
14

overall capacity to fight. Over time, such programmes could help build trust in the government’s
messaging to potential defectors, who while still in the group can influence its approach todialogue and negotiations. For example, for several years now, the Borno State Government
has issued radio messages and distributed flyers calling upon fighters to put down their
weapons and come out of the group. Although there is limited visibility on how these calls fit
into a grand strategy to end the conflict, they are arguably an example of well-timed andsuccessful outreach. As individuals came out, they were encouraged to communicate theirexperiences back to those still with the factions, resulting in a cascade effect of surrenders.
Indeed, respondents interviewed for this study mentioned that they had trusted the message
as it came from the Borno State Governor himself – and perhaps more importantly – because
the promises from the Governor that they would not be harmed if they defected were bolsteredby the experiences of those who left before them and had messaged back that they had notbeen harmed.42 The impact and sustainability of these efforts will have to be assessed overtime and will likely yield insights that are important for future dialogue (as well as one-sided
communication) and negotiation efforts, including on how to build trust with and conduct
outreach with hard-to-reach and isolated populations.

Overview of the Dialogue
and Negotiation Efforts withTerrorist Groups
After more than a decade, it is clear that military efforts alone against Boko Haram are nopanacea. Indeed, military campaigns against terrorist groups rarely bring about the desired
outcome – a strategic defeat of the group in question. Studies on the effectiveness of militaryforce against terrorist groups suggest a poor record, with only 7 per cent of terrorist groups
operating from 1968 to 2006 ending due to military campaigns.43 Political processes are themost common way terrorist groups have historically come to an end: 43 per cent of terroristgroups that existed between 1968 and 2006 ended their campaigns by negotiating an end tothe conflict.44
42 MEAC, Key Informant Interviews with former Boko Haram associates, (Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria, 25 May2023).
43 Seth G Jones and Martin C Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida (Santa Monica,
RAND Corporation, 2008), p. 19.
44 The second most common reasons terrorist groups end is because “local law-enforcement agencies arrest or kill
key members of the group (40 percent).” P. 18-19. Ten percent of groups achieved victory during this period. Ibid.,
p. 18-19.
15

States have traditionally been reluctant to engage armed groups – particularly listed terroristgroups – in dialogue and negotiations, for fear of legitimizing their violence, and the possibilityof these groups exploiting ceasefire arrangements for military gains.45 Following the ‘Global
War on Terror,’ this approach has become entrenched in international policy and practicewhere engagement with proscribed groups is de facto forbidden through a complex system ofsanctions regimes which places significant obstacles to their participation in negotiations.46
Yet, engagement with these groups may be a necessary step in resolving conflict through anumber of means, including, ultimately, working towards a negotiated settlement. Dialogue –where conflict parties share their positions and views, although without necessarily making
concessions – preceeds negotiations. The threshold for establishing contact for dialogue islower than the commitments needed to enter into negotiations and may take various forms,
including one-way strategic communications campaigns to broader talks with all conflictparties. Dialogue is an important engagement strategy to identify key intermediaries anddecision-makers with parties to conflict and establish relationships, and even trust, that could
be built upon for future negotiations. Dialogue may also serve to clarify the views, grievances,and priorities of the group beyond those laid out in their public messaging and propaganda andthus identify entry points to engagement.47 Not all members may share an equal commitment
to the group’s publicized goals or their commitment to violence: identifying such variations
within the group speaks to engagement and disengagement dynamics and may allow for an
opening to be identified for formalized negotiations.48
Moving beyond dialogue, negotiations are a dynamic process aimed at resolving
disagreements and differences between conflict parties by finding common ground andreaching some form of mutually acceptable solution. Negotiations with armed (including
terrorist) groups can be thought of as existing in two categories: tactical or strategic. Tacticalnegotiations are those whereby a specific issue or set of limited demands are being discussed.
For example, in situations of armed conflict, armed groups often exercise some level ofterritorial control and in many cases, perform some form of governance in these territories,

45 Harmonie Toros, “We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts,” Security

Diloague, Vol 39, no. 4 (2008)
46 Thomas Biersteker and Zuzana Hudáková, “UN sanctions and peace negotiations: possibilities forcomplementarity,” Oslo Forum Papers. no.004 (Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2015).
47 Audrey Kurith Cronin, “When Should we Talk to Terrorists?” Special Report (United States Institute of Peace,2010).
48 Ibid.
16

including determining access to the territory and its population.49 In such cases, it may therefore
be necessary for humanitarian actors to negotiate with these groups to facilitate the provisionof humanitarian assistance and protection for vulnerable populations.50 Closely linked, tacticalnegotiations may also occur following kidnappings or hostage-taking situations, where thelimited goal of the negotiations is the timely and safe release of those who have been abducted.
While tactical negotiation may have limited ambitions that are closely related to a singularissue, they can nevertheless serve to establish trust and the communication structures uponwhich strategic negotiations can later be built.
Strategic negotiations are those negotiations geared towards bringing about an end of
hostilities as part of a broader peace agreement, whereby a state seeks to address some of thegroup’s overarching demands. Such negotiations can be a catalyst to the decline, end, ortransformation of the group, which would see members disarm and transition to civilian life. In
some cases, armed groups transition into a political party.51
While strategic negotiations with terrorist groups are possible, they are challenging and often
are impervious to the lessons derived from interstate negotiations. Unlike state counterparts,
armed, including terrorist, groups are not necessarily rational, monolithic actors with clear
command and control structures and easily identifiable leaders who could enter into
negotiations on behalf of a clearly identifiable constituency.52 Difficulties can arise in identifying
the right gatekeepers to negotiations while decentralized membership may mean that
individual cells act independently of one another, and do not abide by centrally made decisions,
thereby potentially derailing negotiations. Such is the case with JAS, which has, since the deathof Shekau seen independent cells operate throughout the region and beyond. These nodes ofpower, led by influential commanders such as the likes of Aliyu Ngulde in the Mandara
Mountains or Adamu Sadiqqu in the North Central and North West of Nigeria, each operate withsignificant autonomy in their operations, and often compete amongst themselves for influence,resources and territory.53 Closely linked is the issue of the ideology of terrorist groups, who areoften dismissed as potential negotiating partners because the goals or ideology they promote
publicly is seen as too broad or maximalist for finding common ground. For example, research

49 According to the ICRC, between 50-60 million individuals globally live under the full control of armed groups, while

an additional 100 million live in an area where this control is contested. See: Irenee Herbet and Jerome Drevon,“Engaging armed groups at the International Committee of the Red Cross: Challenges, opportunities and COVID19,” International Review of the Red Cross, Vol 102, no. 915 (2020)
50 IASC, Humanitarian Negotiations With Armed Groups A Manual for Practitioners (2005)
51 Seth G Jones and Martin C Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida (Santa Monica:
RAND Corporation, 2008).
52 Audrey Kurith Cronin, “When Should we Talk to Terrorists?” Special Report (United States Institute of Peace,2010).
53 Malik Samuel, “Boko Haram teams up with bandits in Nigeria,” ISS Today, 03 March 2021.
17

found that amongst self-proclaimed Islamist groups, those with religious ambitions of atransnational nature were less likely to be involved in negotiations than those groups that had“separatist or revolutionary Islamist claims."54 The issue of commitment to the group’s
professed ideologies and ambitions also varies within groups, with some extreme hardliners
unwilling to negotiate or seeking to spoil potential agreements. As negotiated settlements
rarely find compromised solutions that address the demands of all individuals involved,
assessing the influence, position and goals of potential spoilers must occur during preliminary
preparations for negotiations. Identifying potential spoilers is likely to be of particular relevancewhen considering which actors should be included in peace processes. A broader approachthat includes a range of actors and interests in society may serve to prevent excluded parties
from emerging as spoilers later on.55
Terrorist groups are not generally perceived to be credible negotiation partners, a reputationthat is not helped by their opaque nature. This is a central obstacle to negotiations, where
governments generally distrust the terrorist group’s willingness and capacity to keep its
promises. Unlike in inter-state negotiations, there are no enforcement mechanisms that exist
to punish these groups for reneging on their commitments, and this may exacerbate thegroup’s incapacity to keep to negotiated settlements.56 Indeed, past tactical negotiations with
Boko Haram have shown the group does not always abide by agreements, which makes astrong impression on governments. For example, following the hijacking of a Kaduna-boundtrain from Abuja by suspected bandits and the JAS cell led by Adamu Sadiqqu, the government
began negotiations for the release of the hostages. Despite the government initially meeting
demands to release one of the group leaders’ wives, and secondary demands for the releaseof detained children, the group continued to renege on agreements and escalate its demands. 57
A final demand for a ransom payment was denied by the government, and eventually paid by
the families.58
Beyond a terrorist group’s capacity to negotiate, contextual factors will influence the prospectsof successful negotiations with these groups. Negotiations are best initiated when both sides
sense they have reached a mutually hurting stalemate or a situation where further violence ispainful to both parties. This mutually hurting stalemate is a key opportunity, or moment of
54 Desiree Nilsson and Isak Svensson, “Resisting Resolution: Islamist Claims and Negotiations in Intrastate Armed

Conflicts,” International Negotiation, Vol 25, no.3 (2020).
55 Lisa Blaydes, and Jennifer de Maio, “Spoiling the Peace ? Peace Process Exclusivity and
Political Violence in North-Central Africa.” Civil Wars, Vol 12, no. 3 (2010).
56 Navin Bapat, “State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups.” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 50, no.
1 (2006).
57 Ahmad Sahabi, “Train attack: FG did what kidnappers asked… we expected all captives freed, says Garba
Shehu”, The Cable, 12 August 2022.
58 Daily Trust, “Exclusive: families paid N800 million to secure release of 7 Kaduna train captives”, 11 July 202218

ripeness, when both parties find themselves locked in a conflict which they cannot win, and thisdeadlock is painful to both.59 It is in this situation when an alternative policy or ‘way out’, which
has oftentimes been aired before, begins to look increasingly attractive compared to thedeadlock in which they presently find themselves. Moments of ripeness may both be about
objective and subjective considerations. Objective evidence of such a stalemate may include
increasing casualties or battlefield losses, while subjective perceptions may include
calculations that further violence may not advance the group’s cause or result in diminishedpopular support.60 Ultimately, understanding the conditions and motivations that have givenrise to this moment of ripeness is important in determining whether negotiations are likely tolead to a resolution of the conflict. Such moments of ripeness occur infrequently and can only
bring about positive negotiations if seized and built into momentum. Indeed, while dialogues,
and to a certain extent, tactical negotiations, have historically occurred throughout the BokoHaram conflict, these do not appear to have contributed to a sustained push for strategic
negotiations. Prompted by a sense that Nigeria was experiencing a moment ripe for resolving
the conflict in 2023, as demonstrated by the mass exits and a period of improved security, thisreport examines prospects and support for dialogue and negotiations with Boko Haram’s
factions.

Findings
This section presents perspectives from various respondent populations in Cameroon, Chad,
Niger and Nigeria who were interviewed about the prospects of a negotiated end to the BokoHaram conflict. Key aspects of dialogue and negotiations are explored, and the report places
particular attention on how both factions are perceived by key stakeholders involved in theconflict. Lessons are drawn from past attempts at initiating dialogues and negotiations, and thereport concludes with policy and programmatic recommendations as well, as key
considerations for policymakers and government officials as they pertain to future negotiations
are explored.

59 William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments,” The Global Review

of Ethnopolitics, Vol 1, no. 1 (2001).
60 Ibid.
19

Perceptions of the Different Boko Haram
Factions and Implications for Dialogue and
Negotiation Prospects
Whether or not a distinction is made between the different Boko Haram factions depends on
who you ask and where they are from. The perceptions of Boko Haram factions also vary withconflict experiences. In Nigeria, interviewees often differentiated between the various factionsof Boko Haram, with references made exclusively to JAS and ISWAP, but in Cameroon, Niger
and Chad, participants rarely differentiated between the various factions unless prompted by
the survey question. For example, respondents in the three countries differentiated between
the ISWAP and JAS when asked which faction cannot be negotiated with, but otherwise
referred to the group as “Boko Haram.” While JAS and ISWAP are active across the North Eastof Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, the epicentre of the conflict has indeed been the states of
Borno, Adamawa and Yobe in North East Nigeria. In particular, intra-factional fighting has
occurred mostly in the North East of Nigeria, in the Sambisa and Alagarno forests, in Borno
State.61 After the 2016 split, fighters from both sides were also known to differentiate theirfactions to civilians when they entered into villages.62 It is therefore to be expected thatknowledge of these various factions is greater in the North East of Nigeria than in the rest of theLake Chad Basin.
The perspectives on the different factions across all four countries of the Lake Chad Basin,
particularly from key stakeholder groups who influence counterterrorism strategy andimplementation, have implications for dialogue and negotiation efforts. Perceptions regarding
both factions’ capacity and motivation to negotiate – and whether these match reality – arediscussed below.

61 International Crisis Group, “Fighting among Boko Haram Splinters Rages On,” 30 May 2023.
62 Respondents formerly associated with ISWAP were keen to stress to civilian populations in villages that they werefrom “Tabkin Chadi”, which in Hausa translates as ‘Lake Chad Area’, and that they were not after civilians. They alsostressed that they were interested in protecting civilians, sometimes telling them evacuate to avoid being caught infighting with security forces. On the other hand, JAS fighters, during raids against communities, would boast thatthey were “Yaran Mallam,” meaning “Mallam’s followers”. Mallam (title associated with someone knowledgeable in
the Koran, a cleric or teacher) was what JAS fighters called Shekau. JAS fighters also use the words Yaran Mallam
to instil fear and command compliance from civilians when they attacked their villages. For instance, they would say
everything belonged to Mallam as the Imam of the Dawla (Islamic state) and that they (civilians) were his slaves:saying this to the civilians meant the fighters could take whatever belonged to the civilians without their consent.
ISWAP views the population as a source of recruits, taxes, and support, whereas JAS takes a more predatory
approach towards civilians.
20Perceptions of JAS and Prospects for Dialogue
and Negotiations
Perceptions of armed groups lend themselves to interesting insights into how these groups
may be viewed at a negotiating table. Integral characteristics of these groups – their ideology,
leadership structure and relative strength – will influence whether the group is capable of andwilling to negotiate and abide by negotiated terms. Generally, across the different types of
respondents, JAS was perceived as brutal, predatory towards civilians and exhibiting little
cohesion and control over its fighters after the death of its leader Shekau. At the time of
conducting the interviews, it appeared Bakura Doro did not exhibit the level of centralized
control over JAS as Shekau had done during his leadership. On the other hand, respondents
perceived ISWAP as the ideological hardliner amongst the two factions, although it was
acknowledged to have adopted a more moderate stance towards civilians and noted for
exhibiting greater control amongst its ranks. These perceptions align with documenteddifferences in the way JAS and ISWAP treat Muslim civilians and the way they govern the
territory they exert control over.63 JAS treats civilians with brutality and predation. All thoserefusing to join JAS and live under its rulings and within its Dawla (state), whether Muslim ornot, are described as Kafir (apostate), thereby making it permissible to attack and raid thesecommunities.64 The indiscriminate targeting of civilians by JAS was seen as a key factor incontributing to Boko Haram’s split in 2016. Its indiscriminate violence, alongside its
decentralized and unstructured nature, undermines JAS as a credible negotiation partner,
which would have the capacity to follow through on the terms of the negotiations and ensure its
members do not spoil the negotiations, or violate the terms of the negotiations.
While the JAS faction may not have as much credibility or capacity as a potential negotiation
partner, it was generally perceived by respondents to be the more motivated of the two factions
to engage in negotiations. Former associates of JAS linked this motivation to the group’s
relatively weaker position amid factional infighting and mass defections. Following the death ofShekau and the loss of territory in Sambisa, among the former JAS associates interviewed, it
became clear that they did not see a military way forward for JAS. Rather, at that time, they saw
themselves as having three options: either they could join the ranks of ISWAP; make the risky

63 UNDP, Conflict Analysis in the Lake Chad Basin 2020-2021, (2022)
64 International Crisis Group, “Fighting among Boko Haram Splinters Rages On,” 30 May 2023.

21

journey from Sambisa to Niger to join the new JAS leader Bakura Doro; or surrender.65 Several
former JAS associates in Nigeria (including a notable contingent of middle-ranking
commanders (e.g., Munzir and Naqib) whose responsibilities specifically included carrying out
raids on communities), chose to surrender following the death of Shekau. Some disengaged
because they thought they would have no way of surviving without conducting raids oncommunities or abducting civilians and/or were afraid of the punishment that would be metedout to them for violating ISWAP’s no-raid orders. ISWAP’s prohibition on attacking civilians andraiding villages – and its reputation for harsh punishments – proved as a deterrent for switching
to the group from JAS. The same fear of punishment exists within JAS66 and has influenced
disengagement from the group. For example, while conducting the research for this study, acommunity leader in Nigeria informed the interviewer that he had been in contact with a JAScommander from the Mandara mountains who was looking for a way out with his fighters.
Having been encouraged by the Borno State governor to support exits from Boko Haram, thiscommunity leader sought to help this defecting commander by brokering safe passage with theauthorities and relevant security forces. During later interviews, reference was made to thisspecific incident, whereby it was revealed that the commander and his fighters had raided acivilian community without Aliyu Ngulde’s permission and did not disclose their raid. Ngulde
issued an order for their arrest, prompting them to defect as they feared they would be executedfor their actions. These factional differences not only impact perceptions of their viability as
negotiation partners but also contribute to the conditions conducive to negotiations.
Several respondents were optimistic that the mass exits had created conditions ripe for anegotiated solution to the conflict. Another key factor that contributed to their optimism was thegroup infighting in JAS. At the time of writing, at least five senior commanders (all of the rank of
Qa’ids), led by a senior commander called Abu Hasana (later killed), including Ba Isa, Abu
Sulaiman, Bakura Jega, Ikrima, and Bayero, were known to have opposed the Bakura Doroled JAS leadership. When they were interviewed, former JAS associates believed that if thegovernment could negotiate with the senior commanders challenging Bakura Doro, it would
incentivize further exits among their followers and seriously weaken JAS. The commanders
were known to have grievances against the group leadership including the killing of Abu
Sa’alaba, who took over as JAS' Imam after Shekau, by Bakura in a power tussle. 67 Sa’alaba
65 Bakura Doro is reportedly based on the Barwa island in the Diffa Region. He reportedly fled the Nigerien side of

the Lake in 2016 when the Mamman Nur and al-Barnawi-led faction arrived from Sambisa after the split, given thathe opposed the split and denounced the current ISWAP group.
66 While ISWAP outlaws unsanctioned raids on civilian communities, JAS only frowns upon it if those who engage
in it do not remit or declare what they get from the raids or if they keep some for themselves.
67 Bakura, who was Amirul Jaish (JAS’ head of military) wanted to become Imam after the death of Shekau, butclerics and some commanders favoured Sa’alaba because of his position as a respected senior cleric. Around theweek of 1 April 2022, Sa’alaba was killed by Bakura after some leadership tussles. There was a lot of discontent
22was the one who had promoted them to their present ranks, and his killing was therefore badly
perceived by these commanders who were loyal to him. In light of these divides within the JASfaction, and as proven by the mass surrenders, negotiations with middle-ranking commanders– not just Bakura Doro – should be considered. Offering exit pathways for aggrieved middleranking commanders and their men may therefore help to bypass the reluctance of some of thecentral leadership and deplete the group’s rank and file.
Looking beyond intra-group fighting, it is important to consider current battlefield dynamics,
and how these play into the group’s willingness to engage in negotiations. Particularly for JAS,
logistical challenges, fighting with ISWAP, and internal discord have exacerbated, further
weakened and impacted the decisions of those within the faction. The attack on Sambisa andthe subsequent mass exits have greatly strained the ability of these JAS cells to accessnecessary resources such as food and fuel. Such logistical difficulties have significantly
diminished their ability to conduct operations and engage in combat with the other factions (orthe State). For the remaining cells led by the five aforementioned commanders68 challenging
the Bakura Doro-led JAS leadership, the situation is all the more dire. They are not only
contending with operations by security forces but are also engaged in fighting with ISWAP and
the Ali Ngulde-led cells. In part fuelled by their continued attacks on civilians and control overterritory, these commanders have engaged in intense fighting with ISWAP. In one of suchclashes in March 2023, according to a respondent, who was a bodyguard to one of the JAS’senior commanders involved, ISWAP killed 100 of their fighters. Many of those who survived
chose to exit the group and surrender to the authorities. Indeed, when considering the current
dynamics faced by JAS, it appears they are logistically and morally weakened and havereached a hurting stalemate. A former associate from Nigeria explained that “since the incident
that happened between the two factions and led to the leader's death, the group is now notorganized as before and almost all the members are fed up with the operations and are readyto leave the group.” Such a stalemate, especially when considered against the backdrop ofinternal discontent with the Bakura Doro-led leadership may present a unique entry opportunity
for dialogue, and possibly negotiations to occur.

surrounding his death, but people feared openly criticizing Bakura for fear of being executed. The five commanders
were able to get away with their opposition because they were far away from Bakura in the Sambisa area.
68 Former associates interviewed estimate there to be 2,000 active members across these five cells. These cells
have tried to carve out a territory, which they call Darul Gazuwa, comprising villages in the local government areasof Bama, Konduga, Dikwa, and Mafa in Borno state, but current conflict dynamics make it difficult for this sub-faction(or factions) to hold or control territory.
23

Perceptions of ISWAP and Prospects for
Dialogue and Negotiations
As ISWAP sought to strategically differentiate itself from JAS, it adopted a more moderate
stance towards civilians than its rival faction. The group’s centralized leadership hands out
harsh punishments for those who do not respect the group’s rules with regard to the treatmentof civilians. For example, one former JAS leader explained that, after having joined ISWAP, heand his associates were detained by the leadership for 15 days for having raided a village. The
group’s centralized leadership and strict enforcement of its rules have brought about a renewed
sense of professionalism, coherence and loyalty among associates, which has allowed ISWAP
to establish a strong presence in remote areas near the Lake Chad Basin. In the absence ofstate presence in these communities, ISWAP has sought to fill the gap by establishing a
modicum of governance. It has established and secured trade routes, enhanced conditions forcommerce; carried out humanitarian services; and set up measures for civilians to reportabuses by fighters. ISWAP taxes the revenues of those living under its control.69 By presenting
itself as an alternative government to these communities, ISWAP seeks to advance its goal ofestablishing a legitimized state based on its interpretation of Sharia law.70 By showcasing that
it is not only able to govern but also effectively control its rank and file, ISWAP gains credibility
in the eyes of local populations. Such credibility is crucial in a potential negotiating partner, withregard to both 1) having the capacity to ensure that conditions for and compromise made in
negotiations are met and respected, and 2) speaking on behalf of a constituency.
Overall, ISWAP was perceived by survey respondents to be less likely to engage innegotiations. The group’s transnational nature and international command structure weregenerally perceived by respondents as an obstacle to negotiation efforts. ISWAP’s integration
with ISIL is well documented and the latter’s organization, financing, and ideological beliefs
have fused with that of its local affiliate. ISIL is reported as having influenced the factional
divides between JAS and ISWAP and authorized the operation that ultimately killed Abubakar
Shekau.71 ISWAP has benefitted from financial support and training from ISIL, allowing it todevelop and maintain a better-trained and more disciplined rank and file. Today, ISWAP has adesignated command structure, recruitment strategy and training regiment, comprised of both

69 These taxes are critical to ISWAP’s operation and sustenance, for more, see: Malik Samuel, “Boko Haram’s

deadly business: an economy of violence in the Lake Chad Basin,” ISS Today, 05 October 2022.
70 UNDP, Conflict Analysis in the Lake Chad Basin 2020-2021, (2022)
71 International Crisis Group, “After Shekau: Confronting Jihadists in Nigeria’s North East” Africa Report no. 180(Brussels, 2022).
24

physical and ideological education.72 To various extents, ISIL’s financial, operational, andideological influence over ISWAP will likely reduce the capacity and interest ISWAP would havein pursuing a negotiated end to the conflict.
Indeed, ISIL’s influence has been crucial in establishing the current setup and re-organizationof ISWAP, starting with the return of al-Barnawi as interim leader around 2021. Before his
return, the group was weighed down by widespread corruption, the mismanagement of
resources, and the settling of personal scores through detention and sometimes the executionof fighters, amongst other problems. As a result, many fighters fled the group, some moving to
Sudan and Libya, while others either surrendered or discreetly reintegrated into communities. 73
Al-Barnawi’s success in reforming ISWAP could ultimately make it more difficult to potentiallynegotiate with.74 After al-Barnawi’s return, ISWAP reorganized into at least four semiautonomous units under the control of a central Shura Council. This was done to enhance thestability of the group’s leadership, which had previously been shaky. Between Boko Haram’s
split in 2016 and 2021, power tussles within ISWAP resulted in five known leadershipchanges.75 In the three years since al-Barnawi’s return, however, there were no known changes
in leadership suggesting a more stable command and control structure had been established.
It is unclear if that stability has been due to al-Barnawi’s leadership, the structural
reorganization, and/or some other factors as in late 2021 several Nigerian security sources
reported al-Barnawi’s death.76 Since then, however, the al-Barnawi status has been disputed.
Other sources with insights into ISWAP operations have reported that al-Barnawi is alive andwas given a larger, although yet unspecified, role within ISIL following an injury incurred during
fighting with JAS.77 Sources familiar with ISWAP in Nigeria said al-Barnawi was promoted to a
position on the ISIL Shura Council as a reward for ISWAP’s expansion both within and beyond
Nigeria’s North East under his leadership.78 As ISIL’s biggest affiliate in terms of fighting force
size, organizational structure, operational success, longevity, and revenue generation, al-

72 Bulama Bukarti, It’s a Bit Tricky: Exploring ISIS’s Ties with Boko Haram (George Washington University, 2022)
73 Malik Samuel, “Islamic State’s determined expansion into Lake Chad Basin,” ISS Today, 03 August 2021.
74 Upon his assumption of ISWAP’s interim leadership, Al-Barnawi released an audio message targeting membersof the group, including those who had left. He admitted that a lot of wrong had been done to fighters. He promised
reforms, starting with investigation and accountability for the corruption and human rights abuses that had become
rampant within ISWAP. Crucially, he addressed the issue of fighters’ welfare by declaring that fighters would havecontrol of what they did with their shares of spoils of war. The issue of spoils of war had been pivotal in the disputewithin ISWAP and fighters leaving. Usually, after every attack, the spoils of war would be shared, and a portion given
to fighters that took part in the attack. This is a way of compensating and motivating fighters, but the previous
leadership refused to implement this and kept everything for the Dawla.
75 Malik Samuel, “Islamic State fortifies its position in the Lake Chad Basin,” ISS Today, 13 July 2021.
76 Aljazeera “West Africa’s top ISIL leader is dead, says Nigerian army,” 14 October 2021
77 International Crisis Group, “After Shekau: Confronting Jihadists in Nigeria’s North East” Africa Report no. 180(Brussels, 2022).
78 Malik Samuel, “Islamic State fortifies its position in the Lake Chad Basin,” ISS Today, 13 July 2021
25

Barnawi is viewed by the global terror group as strategic in its African expansion. Either
scenario – with al-Barnawai still at the helm or someone(s) else taking over would significantly
impact potential prospects for negotiations with the faction. Both situations suggest there is aleadership vacuum within ISWAP. At present, there have been no official communications from
ISWAP or ISIL regarding al-Barnawi’s successor in the Lake Chad Basin, and there appears tobe some confusion on who holds the leadership and influence within the group. 79 The inability
to identify the key leaders within the group with the position to make decisions on its behalf
undermines the potential for dialogue or negotiations. The continuity of ISWAP military actions
and the steadfastness of the group’s members in light of these leadership questions highlights
the success of reforms and discipline implemented by al-Barnawi. ISWAP maintained a steadyflow of operations against the JAS faction. Its ranks (which experienced fewer defections thanJAS) were also bolstered as people fled Shekau’s faction. Whether or not its military assault on
JAS and lack of defections continue in the absence of clear leadership will significantly factor
into ISWAP’s decision-making, including its interest, and prospects for being a viable party, in
negotiations. Maintaining its military strength – both vis à vis JAS and the States in the region –the group would be even less likely to negotiate, as its violent tactics would appear to be yielding
some successes, and thus undermine the perceived utility of a negotiated settlement. Separate
from the issue of military strength, if al-Barnawi has indeed moved up in the ISIL hierarchy, thetwo entities may be more deeply intertwined and as a result, ISWAP may be more constrained
and thus may find it harder to pursue dialogue or negotiations, even if its interests changed.
While further integration into ISIL appears to limit the prospects of dialogue or negotiation with
ISWAP, there are potential opportunities associated with it that can be exploited by States in
the region. It is possible that not everyone within ISWAP is happy or will be happy with further
integration and related reforms, especially if they think they are excluded from benefiting fromthem. This applies to both fighters and commanders, and these individuals can be targeted forpiecemeal dialogue or negotiation. For instance, researchers for this study independently
spoke to a former senior commander of the rank of Qa’id and a former rank-and-file member
who recently left ISWAP (in December and November 2023, respectively)80. According to theformer rank-and-file member, he left because he was dropped from the fighter payroll in
ISWAP’s reorganization. ISWAP had decided to pay its fighters a monthly salary,81 but knowing
it couldn’t pay them all, had screened out those not deemed fit. The Qa’id, who confirmed thereorganization of ISWAP’s fighting force, said he left because he needed better medical

79 Ibid.
80 While originating from other research conducted by members of the research team outside the scope of this study,

the information reinforces findings within the context of this study
81 International Crisis Group. JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters, 28 March 2024
26

attention for shrapnel wounds than what ISWAP’s clinics could provide.82 The stories of these
two individuals highlight how recent reorganization efforts may alienate ISWAP members, adynamic that could be seized by States. In addition, despite its military capacities and attempts
at governance, some fighters and leaders within the group are likely to be frustrated by its
limitations in providing for them – including medical care – and there may be frustrated
individuals who can be enticed to leave through defector programmes, dialogue, and/or
piecemeal negotiation efforts.

Foot Soldiers and Leadership: An Apparent
Disconnect
Notwithstanding the varying prospects for dialogue and negotiations with the leadership of both
Boko Haram factions, there appears to be a general disconnect between how negotiations
would likely be seen by high-ranking leaders and the rank and file across both ISWAP and JAS.
Across all four countries, lower-ranking members of Boko Haram self-identified – and wereidentified by key stakeholders – as being more open to negotiations and exit opportunities.
Former associates, notably those of JAS, cited the difficulties they faced while with the groupas the primary motivations for wanting to exit the group and being open to negotiations.83 These
included limited food, difficult living conditions, deteriorating psycho-social well-being anddisillusionment with the group’s ambitions and ideology. Some respondents were made awareof better conditions in rehabilitation centers by their former colleagues who had alreadydefected and assured them they would be treated well should they leave the group. Indeed, one
former associate from Nigeria explained: “I personally left because my parents called me andasked me to leave the group and join them in the Hajj camp. They also told me that life outside
the group is far better than the group in terms of food, health and peace of mind.” This anecdote
is indicative of the strong ties existing between former associates who have left and those who
remain with the group that could be leveraged to further communicate exit options with lowerranking members experiencing similar difficulties.
Interviews and focus groups showed that the leadership of both ISWAP and JAS were
overwhelmingly perceived as unlikely to accept a negotiated end to the conflict. Former
associates in Nigeria appeared to have greater insights into the JAS leadership, with several

82 While he had visible wounds to suggest he was telling the truth, some former fighters questioned his reason forleaving. Some of these former fighters, who knew him during The Qa’id’s time with ISWAP, claimed he was caught
taking drugs and detained. They claimed he escaped for fear that his hand would be amputated for his offense.
83 Fonteh Akum, Remadji Hoinathy and Malik Samuel, “Managing the Journey Out of Violent Extremism in the Lake
Chad Basin,” West Africa Report 32 (2021)
27

respondents naming the anticipated response of specific leaders, including Bakura Doro, who
it was thought would oppose negotiations. Respondents from the other three countries agreed
but did not ruminate on the specific perspectives of individual JAS leaders, but rather talked
about the group’s leadership more broadly, potentially suggesting less visibility on theleadership. For ISWAP, former associates in Nigeria noted that the leadership would not beable to accept any negotiated end if the group’s foreign ISIL leadership disagreed. As such, asingular approach to negotiations through the leadership to bring an end to a faction’s fighting
may not be viable, but that does not rule out the possibility of using dialogue and negotiations
entirely. By separately targeting lower-ranking members and mid-ranking leadership or
renegade Qa’ids, especially in light of the hardships they face and resentments they have,States in the region could chip away at the military capacity and reach of each group. Suchapproaches, especially if combined with other "carrots and sticks," could significantly alter
conflict dynamics and the level of support that each faction enjoys internally and with thecommunities that live under their influence.

Past Dialogue and Prospects for Future
Dialogue
Respondents across all key stakeholder groups were asked if they were aware of previous
efforts to dialogue with any of the Boko Haram factions. Efforts at past dialogue were more
likely to be known in Nigeria and Niger than in Chad and Cameroon, which may indicate thatsuch approaches have been employed more frequently as an alternative form of resolution to
the conflict in these contexts (or were more reported).
In Nigeria, when asked which dialogue efforts they were aware of and their consequences,former associates overwhelmingly referenced government messages heard on the radio aimed
at encouraging Boko Haram associates to surrender and promising them that they would not
be harmed. They also cited promises of support from the government, notably in terms ofeducation, shelter, and capital to set up their own businesses. These are very likely references
to a strategic communications campaign by the Borno Government, which sent messages
from Governor Babagana Zulum encouraging defections from the group. In Niger, similar
mentions were made to broadcasts by the military on their radio platform Radio Bouclier thatencouraged members of Boko Haram to leave the group. Crucially, former associates acrossboth countries were aware of the success of these efforts, with several respondents claimingthat “thousands of Boko Haram members” had surrendered after hearing these messages.
Although not a typical dialogue effort given its one-sided nature, it is increasingly evident that28

these strategic communications campaigns had positive effects on encouraging mass exits
from the group. In a context where Boko Haram associates feared they would be killed by
security forces should they surrender, reassuring safe pathways for exits influenced membersof Boko Haram to defect, particularly those disillusioned with the group’s ideology. 84
Interestingly, dialogue efforts mentioned by former associates in Nigeria were not limited toefforts between Boko Haram and the government: two former Boko Haram associates also
referenced intra-factional dialogues between JAS and ISWAP. During these dialogues, ISWAP
reportedly sought to encourage the JAS faction to change its mode of operations and ceasekilling and kidnapping Muslim civilians and looting and destroying property. Ultimately,
however, the dialogue was unsuccessful and led to intense inter-factional fighting, which
culminated in the death of Shekau. Even after Shekau’s death, there were attempts at dialogue
between both factions, with the latest (confirmed by the time of writing) taking place between
September and October 2023. Those familiar with the talks said both sides agreed to arrest andreturn fighters from either faction, who were caught trying to defect and surrender togovernments in the region. Talks broke down when ISWAP rejected JAS's demands to notintervene when its fighters attack civilian communities, a red line for ISWAP. Despite having
failed, the attempts at dialogue between the two factions nevertheless indicate that they arecapable of at least trying to address issues through non-violent means when it is in their interest– even with another faction with which it has been actively fighting. While the talks are apotentially positive signal for dialogue with other stakeholders, their breakdown may present
an opportunity for States to exploit as they engage with one or the other in order to isolate – andtry to delegitimize – its rival.
In Niger, a notable majority of respondents across the respondent sub-populations surveyed
were aware of the government’s declaration of a general amnesty for Boko Haram associates
in 2016, which launched the country’s official DDRR process.85 Respondents generally viewed
the call for amnesty as a successful dialogue effort – even if one-sided, citing the many
defections that have since occurred. Interestingly, among the former associates of BokoHaram interviewed, the majority of respondents also highlighted the promises of socioeconomic reintegration made by the government during the call for amnesty. The emphasis
placed on socio-economic reintegration by former associates surveyed may indicate a key
negotiation point going forward. Reports of Boko Haram offering food, money, and other basic
material goods to recruits suggest that the group exploits poor economic conditions for
84 International Crisis Group, “An Exit from Boko Haram? Assessing Nigeria’s Operation Safe Corridor” Africa

Report no. 170 (Brussels, 2021).
85 IOM, Gendered Dimensions of Disengagement, Disassociation, Reintegration and Reconciliation: The Niger.
(IOM, Geneva. 2022).
29

recruiting.86 Indeed, past research by MEAC in Niger found that boys with low economic wellbeing were found to be significantly more likely to become associated with Boko Haram. 87
Promises of basic economic support to associates who exit Boko Haram may therefore be key
in successful communications campaigns to promote defections with lower-ranking membersof the group or even in piecemeal negotiations with individual mid-ranking commanders.88
As was the case when asked about knowledge of past dialogue efforts, there was notableregional variation regarding the possibility of future dialogue efforts. Respondents from Niger
appeared to be most open and optimistic about dialogue between Boko Haram and thegovernment. Indeed, 90 per cent of former associates in Niger felt that their faction would be
open to dialogue, with similar optimism expressed in Nigeria (87 per cent of ex-associates). In
stark contrast, not a single former associate in Chad viewed dialogue with their former factions
to be possible. It is possible that ex-associates view dialogue in terms of calls for defection andamnesty offers as perceived support appears correlated with the level of maturity of defectors
and DDR programming in each country. The state of DDR programming is most advanced in
Nigeria89 and Niger90, where the respective governments have devised national programmes
aimed at incentivizing and managing exits from the group.91 At present, there is no dedicated86 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Debriefing statement on its mission to Chad,

16 – 23 April 2018,” 25 April 2018; International Crisis Group, “Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency,”
Africa Report 245 (Brussels, 2017).
87 Niamh Punton, Juan Armando Torres Munguía, Kato Van Broeckhoven, Siobhan O’Neil, Mohammed Bukar,
Fatima Yetcha Ajimi Badu, Anamika Madhuraj, and Saniya Ali, “Child Recruitment in the Lake Chad Basin,” MEAC
Findings Report 22 (New York: United Nations University, 2022).
88 The basic needs of low-ranking associates must be understood against the backdrop of the wide scale
humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Basin countries, which is dire. The latest projections suggest approximately
5.6 million people face severe food insecurity. UN OCHA, “Lake Chad Basin: Humanitarian Snapshot (As of 08
December 2022)” 15 December 2022 . Needs are often more acute for individuals who were once associated with
Boko Haram. Past MEAC research has shown former Boko Haram associates were even less likely to report having
food than unassociated community members (46 per cent versus 54 per cent). Kato Van Broeckhoven, Siobhan
O’Neil, Niamh Punton, Juan Armando Torres Munguía, Fatima Yetcha Ajimi Badu, Mohammed Bukar, and Anamika
Madhuraj, "Child Exits from Armed Groups in the Lake Chad Basin," Findings Report 31, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2023.
89 In Nigeria, such programmes include Operation Safe Corridor for low-risk defectors, the Sulhu programme forhigh-level defectors, and the more recent Borno Model in the North East. Individuals entering these exit corridors
are screened and categorized into high or low risk. Low-risk members of the group are the target of the government
DDR programme and are typically sent through a DDR programme prior to being handed over to their state
government for reintegration, while high-risk individuals are meant to go through the criminal justice process. For
more, see Fonteh Akum, Remadji Hoinathy and Malik Samuel, “Managing the Journey Out of Violent Extremism in
the Lake Chad Basin,” West Africa Report 32 (2021).
90 In Niger, there is the National Programme for the Management of the Surrender of Boko Haram Elements. The
penal code was specifically amended to guarantee that Boko Haram members who had not been involved in terrorist
activities or atrocities would not be prosecuted but rehabilitated and reintegrated back into society after screening
and participation in DDR programming at a Socio-Economic Reintegration Center in Goudoumaria.
91Sophie Huvé, Dr Siobhan O'Neil, Dr Remadji Hoinathy, Kato Van Broeckhoven with Mohammed Bukar, Fatima
Yetcha Ajimi Badu, Teniola Tayo, Jessica Caus, and Adja Faye, "Preventing Recruitment and Ensuring Effective
Reintegration Efforts: Evidence from Across the Lake Chad Basin to Inform Policy and Practice," MEAC Lake ChadBasin Case Study Report (New York: United Nations University, 2022).
30

DDR programme for Boko Haram associates in both Cameroon92 and Chad,93 although there
are efforts in the latter to redress this.
Dialogue between the government and Boko Haram was seen to be an important precursor to
any future negotiations by respondents. Furthermore, dialogue – broadly conceived – was seen
as a means for promoting reconciliation among community members and former Boko Haramassociates, both individually and with the group. Across all four countries, former Boko Haramassociates overwhelmingly noted that strategic dialogue efforts should include community
members to facilitate their reintegration and acceptance. As explained by a former associate in
Nigeria, “Dialogue with the government alone is not enough. Communities must also be
included because repentant Boko Haram will be staying with the community members and notwith the government, so it is important to prepare communities to accept returnees.” Indeed,
past MEAC and ISS findings have indicated that communities are very receptive to having
former Boko Haram associates, both men and women and children and adults, return to theircommunities.94 Acceptance of former associates rose when presented with more specific,
albeit fictionalized profiles of former associates were provided that gave respondents additional
information, including age, names and the fact they were repentant.95 Receptivity rose evenhigher when it was grounded in their experience; respondents expressed even higher levels ofreceptivity were asked about people they knew (community members or family) who had beenwith the group and returned home.96 Indeed, these results suggest that, beyond community
engagement before and after the arrival of former Boko Haram associates, there is value ininvesting in communications campaigns around reintegration. Communication campaigns
aimed at further bolstering acceptance may benefit from highlighting returns and normalizing
reintegration experiences through real stories of positive or even just uneventful reintegration
experiences.97

92 In Cameroon, a National Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Committee (NDDRC) was founded in2018, which is tasked with managing the return of former Boko Haram associates and Anglophone separatists in
the South West. Former Boko Haram associates meant for DDR programmes are currently received at a provisional
facility in Meri, in the Far North. However there has not yet been any official reintegration of these individuals into
communities. A new DDR center, which will reportedly see reintegration activities occurring, is currently being built
in Mora, although there are no indications at present when the new center will be ready to host former associates.
93 In Chad, exits from Boko haram are currently occurring without an official DDR programme, although efforts are
ongoing to remedy this, with the creation of a DDR Steering Committee, an Inter-Ministerial Committee, and thecreation of a National DDR Framework which is presently under review.
94 Rebecca Littman, Siobhan O’Neil, Kato Van Broeckhoven, Mohammed Bukar, and Zoe Marks, "Community
Acceptance of Former Boko Haram Affiliates," MEAC Findings Report 7 (New York: United Nations University,2021), and Fonteh Akum, Remadji Hoinathy and Malik Samuel, “Managing the Journey Out of Violent Extremism in
the Lake Chad Basin,” West Africa Report 32 (2021).
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
31

Past Negotiations and Prospects for Future
Negotiations
Respondents across all key stakeholder groups were asked if they were aware of previous
efforts to negotiate with any of the Boko Haram factions. The purpose of this question was
twofold. First, it served to clarify if, and to what extent, past negotiations were known about andidentify any regional variations that may be present. For those that were aware of past efforts
to negotiate, a subsequent question was asked on the outcome of the negotiation, and what
lessons may be drawn from these attempts.
In all four countries, awareness of negotiation efforts among respondents was limited to tacticalnegotiations for the release of hostages taken by Boko Haram factions. Once again,
respondents in Nigeria appeared to have more knowledge of these negotiations thanrespondents in the other countries. This higher rate of knowledge among respondents in
Nigeria may be explained by the country’s more frequent experience with mass kidnappings by
the Boko Haram factions, notably of school children, than the other three countries, where
mass kidnappings remain an anomaly.98 The kidnappings in Nigeria have been widely
publicized and have served to bring international attention to the group. In addition to negative
attention, they also may serve to boost morale within the group, attract new recruits, and,through the payment of ransoms, sustain the campaign of armed violence.99 Amongrespondents across all four countries, the most well-known negotiation effort was to releasethe 276 Chibok girls captured by JAS in 2014. In Nigeria, almost all former associates had
detailed knowledge of the various negotiations that occurred, with some former associates
even appearing to have been personally involved in the negotiations. Associates described thelocations where several of the girls were held and the subsequent conditions for their release,which included large sums of cash and the release of Boko Haram leaders detained by the
Nigerian government.100
In Niger, there was a sharp contrast between what security actors knew and what local
communities did. All CSAs interviewed indicated knowledge of past efforts, and 90 per cent of
security force respondents similarly expressed knowledge of negotiations. However, similarly
to Nigeria, none of the community leaders interviewed knew about past negotiation efforts. In

98 International Crisis Group, “Preventing Boko Haram Abductions of Schoolchildren in Nigeria” Africa Report no.

137 (Brussels, 2018).
99 Ibid.
100 The Nigerian government has denied that any prisoners were released as part of the negotiations to release the
Chibok girls.
32some sense, this is surprising. In both Nigeria and Niger, community leaders such as Bulamas,
Lawans, camp leaders, chairmen, women’s leaders and district/ward heads have some degreeof responsibility for the safety of their communities and have been found to exert significant
influence in communities’ acceptance of former Boko Haram associates.101 In light of theirposition, it would be reasonable to expect they would have had some knowledge about pastefforts. This significant discrepancy may very well be indicative that historically, local
community leaders have not been engaged as interlocutors in outreach and negotiation with
the Boko Haram factions in Niger.
In Nigeria, there was significant optimism in the potential of negotiations between thegovernment and Boko Haram. In interviews and the mini survey, most respondents (76 percent) said that a negotiated end to the conflict could be achieved. A successful resolution was,however, perceived to be dependent on several key factors, namely the affiliation and rank of
the interlocutors involved and the ability of the government to fulfil promises made. Based on
their experiences and knowledge of past dialogue and negotiations, former Boko Haramassociates also cautioned that their inclination to participate in future negotiations, as well as
the negotiation’s success, would be contingent upon the government fulfilling the promises it
has made. Indeed, the issue of unfulfilled promises and unaddressed grievances appears
throughout several past initiatives and has had a detrimental effect on the group’s trust in
negotiations,102 and the same unmet expectations appear to be impacting current decisions toexit the group. As described by a former associate, “There were a lot of people in the group who
wanted to surrender after hearing about the promises made, but when they found out that thepromises were not fulfilled, they decided not to surrender.” The importance of government
credibility and follow-through and the affiliation and rank of interlocutors involved innegotiations are explored in detail across the sections that follow.

Authority to Negotiate within Boko HaramAs expected, when thinking of negotiation potential, most respondents focus on each faction’s
top leadership. Several former JAS associates unsurprisingly cited Bakura Doro as theindividual who would have the authority to enter into negotiations for a peace settlement. JAS’s
decentralized nature, characterized by distinct operating cells, each with its own commanders,loyalties, and dynamics, also raises the possibility of using negotiations with individual

101 Hilary Matfess, Siobhan O’Neil, Kato Van Broeckhoven, and Mohammed Bukar, "Community Leaders’

Receptivity to Returning Former Boko Haram Associates and its Impact on Peacebuilding," MEAC Findings Report
15 (New York: United Nations University, 2022).
102 Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, “A Matter of Faith? Negotiations with Boko Haram in Nigeria,” International
Negotiation Vol 25, no.3 (2020).
33

commanders to demobilize components of the faction in the absence of a broader negotiatedsettlement. It is also important to note that entering into an agreement is not the same asabiding by one. In discussing who would be key in possible negotiations, several respondents
referenced specific lower-level commanders who would be crucial in ensuring that theirfollowers abide by a negotiated agreement, given the loyalty they command among fighters.
For example, Ali Ngulde, a commander in the Mandara Mountains near the Cameroonian
border, exerts significant influence over his followers, and respondents explained his followers
would follow him should he negotiate an exit with the government. Another notable commander
mentioned at the time was Ari Gana, who was later killed by Nigerian security forces in
September 2023.103 After his death, many fighters loyal to him exited the group andsurrendered to the government. In general, the former Boko Haram associates emphasizedthat JAS members would support, or at least not oppose, negotiations in the event that theirdirect leadership decided to negotiate with the government. These responses highlight theimportance of recognizing the role of other high- and even mid-ranking leaders and theirrelationships with their fighters in considering possible negotiations with the JAS faction.
Understanding the complex power dynamics and everchanging relationships at play between
the faction’s tiers of leadership will be crucial when deciding if to pursue, and which individuals
would need to be engaged in, any potential negotiations.

Negotiation Agenda
Each group of respondents had their distinct views on what should be included in a potential
negotiating agenda. While some groups, such as former associates, addressed potential
realities and red lines of negotiation, other groups were less explicit and rather gave insights
into what their respective groups could, and could not, support in exchange for a negotiatedend to the conflict.
Regional variations were once again evident in the responses from former Boko Haramassociates across countries. In both Cameroon and Chad, former JAS associates
overwhelmingly stated that their faction would be unlikely to make any concessions duringnegotiations. In contrast, all former associates interviewed in Niger, and the majority of thoseinterviewed in Nigeria (which included former associates of both JAS and ISWAP) felt that theirfaction would be open to certain concessions, including cease attacking and kidnapping
civilians, conducting raids on communities, and attacking government infrastructure. It should

103 Sahara Reporters, “Nigerian Troops ‘Kill Top Boko Haram Commander, Ari Gana, 5 Others’ In Borno Ambush,”

26 September 2023.
34

be noted that the latter are tactical concessions, not the strategic ones of focus when
considering negotiating with Boko Haram – i.e., abandoning political violence.
Among former associates, an obvious red line emerged when it came to the implementation of
Sharia law. Across both factions, former associates cited that their factions’ leadership would
be unlikely to accept a negotiated settlement that did not include some provisions for the
implementation of Sharia law instead of the existing democratic system. This raises several
challenges for a negotiated end to the conflict, as the imposition of Sharia is in sharp contrast
with the national legal system of surveyed countries, which generally underscore secularity anda non-denominational approach to public life. That notwithstanding, conventional wisdom on
the conflict has not only overly simplified Boko Haram’s religious ideology but also
overemphasized its role in the group’s rise, which rather emerged due to local grievances andsentiments of injustices against the Nigerian State. Considering that the North East of Nigeria
and many other affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin already abide by conservative religious
norms, and elements of Sharia law are already in place, such an impasse to negotiations may
not be as inherently unsurmountable as thought.104
Interestingly, in Niger, a majority of respondents formerly associated equivocally stated thatprosecution at the hand of a national judicial body would be unacceptable to group members,
irrespective of whether they were low-ranking foot soldiers or part of the group’s leadership. In
Nigeria, respondents were split on the possibility of faction leadership accepting that theywould go through the criminal justice system but did not make any reference to the potential
reaction of lower-ranking members. Many former associates felt that their leadership would
only agree to negotiate if there was a formal amnesty deal as part of the negotiations. As one
respondent explained, “accepting to be prosecuted would mean they accept that they were
wrong, which they would not.” The concept of amnesty for top-ranking former Boko Haram
officers is not new. Indeed the Nigerian State Security Services (SSS)105 has been operating
the Sulhu programme for several years which is specifically aimed at senior Boko Haramleaders and officials, who, once having left the ranks of the group, work with the SSS to
encourage other commanders to surrender.106 Approximately 150 individuals have reportedly
defected through the programme between 2019 and 2021, with some suggesting that this isevidence of the programme’s effectiveness.107 However, visibility on the Sulhu programme islimited, with no official comment from authorities in Abuja given its sensitivities.108 While
104 In 1999, the Nigerian constitution allowed for the enshrinement of Sharia law in the country’s northern states as

far as civil and criminal matters are concerned.
105 The State Security Services are also referred to as the Department of State Services (DSS).
106 The New Humanitarian, “Nigeria’s secret programme to lure top Boko Haram defectors ,” 19 August 2021.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
35

amnesty may prove to be a key incentive to defect or take part in a negotiated settlement, it
would be incorrect to view amnesty as zero-sum – either it is absolute, total, and provided toeveryone, or there is no amnesty at all. Past negotiations with other rebel – and even terrorist –groups have balanced amnesty or legal leniency for lower-level members or for those who havenot committed certain crimes or atrocities while subjecting certain leaders or those credibly
accused of certain acts to the criminal justice process.109 In addition to the state-run criminal
justice system, there is a range of other complementary alternate justice approaches that could
help advance justice and accountability, redress the needs of victims, and ultimately promotereconciliation and peacebuilding.
Transitional justice approaches (e.g., traditional justice, community service, public apologies,
truth and reconciliation commissions) have been promoted and adopted in a number of postconflict-affected countries. However, support for these measures tends to dissipate when they
involve listed terrorist groups. Past MEAC findings indicate, however, that the evidence for
Nigeria is more mixed, and there is public interest in transitional justice approaches, includingfrom victims of the conflict.110 Interest in such approaches is crucial given the size of the
population that has been associated with the group at some level, the inability to distinguishbetween victims and perpetrators, and the limited capacity of the criminal justice systems inaffected countries.111 For victims and communities, transitional justice approaches may havegreater appeal than those that are hierarchical and associated with the State. Transitional
justice applications, such as public apologies, generally occur at the community level where
they are visible to community members. This visibility that comes from local, traditional justicemechanisms may be greater than that on State prosecutions or national reorientation
programmes, which have thus far, been minimally communicated to the public.

Parties to the Negotiations
Based on past experiences with negotiations, it is reasonable to expect the Boko Haramfactions would not embrace direct negotiations with the state, at least initially. The dearth oftrust between the factions and the government, particularly in Nigeria, was reflected in many of
the survey responses, which indicated the need for a trusted intermediary to facilitate indirect
negotiations between the parties.
109 United Nations University and Institute for Integrated Transitions, The Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justiceand Violent Extremism (2018) and Akinola Olojo and Maram Mahdi, “Transitional justice: testing the waters in theLake Chad Basin,” West Africa Report 39 (2022).
110 Rebecca Littman, Siobhan O’Neil, Kato Van Broeckhoven, Mohammed Bukar, and Fatima Yetcha Ajimi Badu,"Criminal and Transitional Justice Preferences for Former Boko Haram Associates," MEAC Findings Report 12(New York: United Nations University, 2021).
111 UNDP, The State of Play: Process and Procedures for Screening, Prosecution, Rehabilitation and Reintegrationin the Lake Chad Basin Region (2023).
36

Traditional and religious leaders were an obvious preference among respondents to facilitate
negotiations given the respect and authority they hold. Their role could also further ensurecommunity buy-in for any resulting settlements, given the important historical role traditionaland religious leaders tend to play as mediators and peacebuilders within their communities.
While this response is in part not surprising from many of the groups surveyed, it is interestingthat this finding holds for former associates, who also indicated this preference, given that
under Shekau, JAS specifically targeted local religious leaders who opposed its strict
interpretation of Sharia or methods. The focus on local leaders among former associates may
indicate the former’s general position in society but also may highlight disagreement withShekau’s actions. With Shekau’s death and the broad support for local leader engagement, thelatter’s potential to serve as trusted intermediaries in future dialogue or negotiation efforts must
be recognized.
In Nigeria, former associates suggested that recently surrendered commanders with theirsignificant influence amongst former associates – would be well placed to serve asintermediaries. As explained by a former associate: “Those [leaders] who surrendered earlier
should be the link because they are now familiar with both the government and the group. I also
believe it is easier for other Boko Haram members to trust what people who left the group say
to them than any other person who was not part of them.” Leveraging the trust in andknowledge of former commanders to facilitate negotiations may serve to identify a key entry
point in the factions for outreach in Nigeria. This may, however, be less relevant to ISWAP,
which has not experienced mass defections at the same scale,112 nor has seen as many
commanders exit through the Sulhu programme. Few commanders are believed to have left
the faction before al-Barnawi’s 2021 assumption of interim leadership. While there may be
fewer opportunities to leverage former ISWAP commanders given their smaller numbers andtimeline of exit, any opportunities with former faction leadership who have exi ted are worth
exploring. In general, with their high profile, influence and loyalty from rank and file, former
commanders could foreseeably play important roles in State efforts to reach other fighters andconvince them to exit. However, the former commanders’ experience since they defected may
influence how much role they want to play. A few former ISWAP commanders are known tohave regretted leaving the group because of their experience at the hands of the government.
For instance, at least one former senior and popular commander escaped from governmentprovided accommodation while waiting for enrolment into the Sulhu Programme113 because ofunmet promises and a lack of clarity as to when they would start their reintegration. Another
112 International Crisis Group. JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters, 28 March 2024
113 Malik Samuel, Boko Haram teams up with bandits in Nigeria, ISS Today, 03 March 2021.

37

reason for the regret was the reformation that ISWAP underwent after they left, which included
giving more attention to fighters’ welfare (a grievance that had motivated some defections).
While those who fled to Libya, Sudan, and other places without surrendering to government
forces were welcomed back, those who joined the government Sulhu programme wereconsidered traitors by their former faction, further contributing to their regret. While States have
limits in addressing all of these issues, they can ensure that they manage expectations fordefectors – especially high-level ones – and keep their promises when dealing with them –which will be key in any future dialogue and negotiation efforts.
There was no regional consensus on the value of involving State forces in negotiations. In
Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad, respondents were mostly favourable to the military’s
involvement in both dialogue and negotiations. As a party to the conflict, and their frontline
experience in combatting Boko Haram, the military was perceived as bringing additional value
and perspectives to the negotiations. However, in Niger, respondents overwhelmingly did notwant the military to be involved in either dialogue or negotiations. Reasons for their exclusionfrom negotiations centred primarily around the anticipated reaction of Boko Haram, who would
not accept the military’s presence and the belief that negotiations did not form part of themilitary’s purview. Some even saw the military as a potential spoiler in future negotiations. Thisis particularly interesting when compared with respondent views on the involvement ofcommunity security actors in negotiations, which was overwhelmingly favourable.
While both CSAs and the military have been involved in the conflict, there were diverging
attitudes with regard to their potential involvement in negotiations. CSAs were viewed ashaving a peacebuilding role within their communities, having already facilitated the return offormer associates. In this respect, they were viewed as being better placed to be involved innegotiations given that they are more likely to inspire confidence among Boko Haram
representatives at the negotiation table. This support for CSA involvement may stem from thefact that they are not part of the core of the state security apparatus and are viewed first andforemost as community members by many in the region.

Other Faction’s Reaction to Negotiations
Amid the ongoing factional infighting between JAS and ISWAP, formerly associated membersof Boko Haram were asked how their rival faction would react to news their faction was
negotiating with the government. The responses showcased several interesting observations
about inter-faction dynamics. The majority of JAS respondents surveyed, unsurprisingly, said
that ISWAP would view JAS’ negotiations with the government negatively. They would confirm
38

ISWAP’s view that JAS supporters are “non-believers.” Several respondents expressed
concerns that public knowledge that their faction is negotiating may result in attacks against its
members. Other respondents expressed that ISWAP might view JAS negotiations as being
favourable, as they would no longer have a rival and would therefore be able to exert control
over the entirety of contested territory. Some thought JAS exiting the conflict throughnegotiations could lead to ISWAP adopting more extreme positions or lead to an uptick in
attacks as there would no longer be a countervailing ideological or military competitor tohamper it. This further highlights the sensitivity of negotiations and the need to ensure theconfidentiality of talks, both so that trust between parties is built, and to ensure the safety of
those still associated with the group, as well as those living under the group’s control. Any
physical reprisals towards members – whether of the faction that is negotiating or others – andcivilians may risk derailing negotiations or discouraging future talks.

Security Actors and Dialogue and Negotiation
Efforts
Since the start of the Boko Haram conflict, communities across the four countries haveorganized various vigilante committees and self-defence groups to protect themselves andcontribute to the response against the insurgency. The existence of many of these groups,
such as the Hunters and Charmers in Nigeria, actually preceded the conflict, and some wererepurposed towards supporting the conflict against Boko Haram.114 While these community
security actors (CSAs) have been instrumental in protecting communities, they havenevertheless been implicated in various atrocities against civilians,115 and there are concernsthat these armed vigilantes may become the region’s next security threat or spoil efforts at
broader peacemaking for their own ends.116 In light of this, the survey also sought to gauge therole that security actors, whether formal or informal, may play in potential dialogue andnegotiations to holistically end the conflict. Such a holistic approach would cover all harmcaused during the conflict, including by CSAs and the military.
Across all four countries, community security actors were perceived by other groups of
respondents to be generally supportive of both dialogue and negotiation efforts between BokoHaram and the government. This corresponded with the responses of current CSA members
114 Kato Van Broeckhoven, Zoe Marks, Siobhan O’Neil, Mohammed Bukar, and Fatima Yetcha Ajimi Badu,"Community Security Actors and the Prospects for Demobilization in the North East of Nigeria," MEAC Findings
Report 18 (New York: United Nations University, 2022).
115 Center for Civilians in Conflict, Civilian Perceptions of the Yan Gora (CJTF) in Borno State, Nigeria (2018).
116 Saskia Brechenmacher, “Achieving Peace in Northeast Nigeria: The Reintegration Challenge,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 05 September 201839

themselves, who frequently indicated that their groups would overwhelmingly support
negotiation efforts to bring an end to the conflict and believed their groups should be involvedin negotiations. The end of the conflict would, in fact, be a point of pride for CSAs, given thatthey joined to protect their communities.117
Respondents across various groups highlighted two key reasons for the involvement of CSAs
in negotiations. Firstly, many felt that the extensive knowledge of Boko Haram that CSAs had
acquired by fighting against the group may prove beneficial in negotiations. Indeed, many
CSAs have extensive local intelligence, and knowledge of local terrain, and languages, which
formal security agencies lack.118 As one respondent from Nigeria explained: “The CJTF leads
the military in terms of knowing the nooks and crannies of Boko Haram hideouts. Therefore,
involving us in negotiations will bring about positive results.” Secondly, some CSAs surveyed
felt that including them in negotiations would be a sign of respect and value from thegovernment for the role they have played in the Boko Haram conflict. Indeed, the groups havereceived varying levels of recognition for their work, with many members expressing discontent
over the lack of recognition and remuneration. Such discontent may increase the potential for
escalated violence and a new phase of the conflict if not properly addressed.119 As such, their
inclusion in dialogues and negotiations may not be about the value they bring, but it may beneeded as recognition for past sacrifices.
This recognition could assist with managing potential CSA spoilers to a negotiated settlement,
but such recognition is not likely to be sufficient on its own. Indeed, without a comprehensive
reintegration plan for CSAs, the end of the conflict with Boko Haram may result in these
individuals – who are trained in combat functions and potentially desensitized to violence –being left without meaningful ways to sustain themselves in civilian life. CSAs surveyed
expressed mixed views on the above point. A significant majority indicated that the end of theconflict would not have an impact on their daily lives, as they would either return to the tradesthat they were engaged with prior to the start of the conflict or believed they would be able tofind alternative employment due to the skills they have acquired during their time with theirrespective group. In Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, almost all CSAs emphasized that they did
not receive remuneration for their role. Concerns for future employment were however mostevident in Chad, where several CSA respondents feared that due to the end of the conflict, andtherefore their current engagement, they would be plunged into poverty.

117 Kato Van Broeckhoven, Zoe Marks, Siobhan O’Neil, Mohammed Bukar, and Fatima Yetcha Ajimi Badu,"Community Security Actors and the Prospects for Demobilization in the North East of Nigeria," MEAC Findings
Report 18 (New York: United Nations University, 2022).
118 Ibid.
119 Center for Civilians in Conflict, Civilian Perceptions of the Yan Gora (CJTF) in Borno State, Nigeria (2018).
40

Gendered Perspectives on Negotiations
The respondents surveyed for this report were overwhelmingly men, with only 14% (40 of 295)
of individuals interviewed identifying as women. While the number of women interviewees
appears low, the number nevertheless represents a fairly accurate level of gender
representation within the subgroups interviewed (e.g., State militaries), which aredisproportionately made up of men.120 The focus groups and interviews with community
members were exceptions and had greater gender diversity. The sample of women interviewed
across the four countries may not represent the typical views of women in the region. The
women interviewed generally held some position of authority or power within their respective
social groups, and therefore had greater knowledge and access to information than can be
expected from the average woman in these communities. It is possible their prominence also
impacts their conflict exposure level as well.

Considerations for Future
Dialogue and Negotiation
Efforts
The data collected as part of this UNIDIR and ISS study highlight various considerations when
exploring dialogue and negotiations as conflict resolution tools for the Boko Haram conflict.
Several important reflections stand out that may be of practical consideration for policymakers
and government officials:●

Dialogue and negotiations with listed terrorist groups are not signs of capitulation.
Rather, these can form part of a broader, more robust long-term conflict resolution
strategy to manage, and ultimately end political violence. Indeed, dialogue andnegotiations can occur simultaneously with kinetic, counterterrorism and intelligence
operations aimed at weakening the group’s military capacities and reducing its space
to operate, potentially pressuring the group into negotiations if the cost of continued
operations becomes increasingly unsustainable.

120 Zoe Marks, Fatima Yetcha Ajimi Badu, and Rebecca Littman, "Understanding Receptivity to Returning Former

Boko Haram Associates Through a Gender Lens," Findings Report 30, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2023.
41

●

Dialogue and negotiations do not necessarily take the same form and can be used in a
myriad of ways, at various points in time, to achieve specific desired ends. As shown inthe case of Boko Haram, one-sided communications campaigns have successfully
prompted the exits of several respondents to this study, while tactical negotiations withboth factions have resulted in the release of various hostages. Piecemeal negotiations
may be used to achieve specific desired ends, such as an end to attacks against
civilians and may signal a desire to engage in further negotiations and serve to build
trust among parties.

●

While recognizing the challenges posed by the fact that Boko Haram consists of several
factions, each with its own internal bureaucracies, rivalries and personalities, thesefindings have shown that alternate entryways exist to dialogue and negotiate rather than
through the highest leadership. Identifying individual influential commanders who may
have their own motivations to negotiate an exit for their fighters, and engaging with them
directly may serve to bypass ISWAP’s centralized hierarchy and capitalize on JAS’s
decentralized structure.

●

While reflective of a particular moment in time, the findings from this study neverthelessindicate a more positive vantage point towards dialogue and negotiations with BokoHaram than previously assumed. Of notable interest is the position of community
security actors, who were generally supportive of dialogue and negotiation efforts for an
end to the conflict, despite concerns that a loss of their employment may cause them tospoil efforts for their own ends. Without a comprehensive plan to professionalize,
integrate or retrain these security actors, there is considerable risk of a new phase of
the conflict.

●

A holistic end to the conflict must therefore take into account the role that security actors– both formal and informal – have played in the conflict. Addressing the atrocities andharm caused by these security actors, while recognizing their uncertainties about theirprofessional future, in a context where many do not have other livelihood options, isequally crucial in ending political violence.

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