Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 34, Number 2, 2013, pp127-141

Consciousness of Disaster Risk and Tsunami Evacuation:
A Questionnaire Survey in Okitsu, Kochi Prefecture
Yingying SUN*
Katsuya YAMORI**
Ryoya TANISAWA*
Seiji KONDO**Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University**Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University(Received January 18, 2013 Accepted August 30, 2013)
ABSTRACTThe 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake forced a reevaluation of the effectiveness of
disaster management facilities and strategies in coastal communities where damage due
to an earthquake and resulting tsunami from the Nankai Trough can be expected. Specificareas subject to reevaluation include (i) individual-level topics in disaster risk management,such as the use of motor vehicles for evacuation, (ii) challenges initiated by government
reappraisals of tsunami estimation, such as the safety of existing shelters, and (iii) low
tsunami evacuation rates in areas at high risk of tsunami damage, despite evacuation orders
issued at the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake. This study discusses the impact ofthese factors on the consciousness of residents in a community where we performed action
research. The results of a questionnaire survey indicate that Okitsu residents have similar
problems regarding tsunami evacuation as those revealed in the devastated areas of the
Tohoku region. To promote disaster consciousness and improve tsunami evacuation rates,
we suggest a new approach to evacuation drills called the single-person drill. This drillchanges a community practice into an individual activity that we hope will involve more
residents in disaster risk management, and ultimately contribute to their successful tsunami
evacuation.
Keyword: Nankai Trough earthquake, Great East Japan Earthquake, disaster consciousness,tsunami evacuation, single-person drill

1. Introduction

damage from a tsunami caused by a powerful earthquake originating in the nearby Nankai Trough (hereinafter, Nankai Trough earthquake). After the Great
East Japan Earthquake, with the cooperation of thelocal community, we conducted a questionnaire survey. The survey focused on residents’ consciousness

This study focuses on disaster risk management
implemented in the Okitsu community of Shimanto
Town, Kochi Prefecture where we started action research before 2011. This community is at high risk of127

Y. SUN, K.YAMORI, R. TANISAWA, S. KONDO

of tsunami evacuation, with the aim of finding problems in disaster mitigation measures such as thosethat emerged in the Tohoku region. Potential problems
include individual topics in disaster risk management,
the influence of reevaluating damage estimates, andlack of emergency consciousness toward tsunami
evacuation. Based on the survey data and informationcollected through action research, we discuss the effectiveness of facilities, strategies, and problems thatexist in the community. We also consider common issues in huge coastal areas at high risk of devastating
damage from the Nankai Trough earthquake.
This study is an action research aiming to seek
betterment for local communities. Action research
was first elaborated by Lewin (1948) as an intervention that dealt with the improvement of intergroup relations. In this paper, we focus on the conditions andeffects of the disaster management co-practiced byvarious stakeholders, such as pupils, residents, administrators, graduate students, professors, etc., making
different contributions according to their abilities, interests, and even relationships with other people.
The first author, for example, might be deemed
to be a young lady, who always wanders around thecommunity, or to be a foreigner who can speak fluent
Japanese, or to be a disaster researcher who makes
earnest efforts to motivate people to conduct evacuation drills. Similarly, the residents, for instance, havedifferent characteristics and usually become teachersof disaster management in the local community, nomatter whether they are elderly or young, healthy or
disabled. All the stakeholders are co-researchers inthis study, and their roles keep changing with theirdynamic social actions, which can be seen as the mostprecious benefits of action research.
So, for illustrative purposes, the pronoun “we” isapplied to indicate the authors, while contributions
made by others are clearly denoted as “pupils, residents, or administrators,” respectively. This is not toseparate the intimate relationships among co-researchers; conversely, it is to emphasize their specificroles in action research. In addition, the first author ofthis article is in charge of the study and decides what
methodology should be applied and how related information should be collected through frequent interactions with residents. The other three authors also
made a great contribution to the research by participating in community activities occasionally when im-

portant events such as questionnaire surveys, disastereducation symposiums, or evacuation drills had to beplanned or put into practice. The term “disaster experts” in this article especially refers to those who are
majoring in disaster research but have not conductedaction research with local residents in Okitsu community.
2. Impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake
At this time of writing, one and a half years has
passed since the Great East Japan Earthquake. As has
been discussed regarding the major problems in disaster management revealed by the extensive damage,attention has been focused onto preparedness for the
Nankai Trough earthquake. There is a high probability
that such an earthquake will occur in the near future;
preparedness should thus be made in each community
where damage is expected.
In the Great East Japan Earthquake, over 90% of
the approximately 20,000 fatalities (including thosestill officially listed as “missing”) died from drowning, not the earthquake itself (Cabinet Office, 2011).
Even in some regions known to be at high risk of tsunami incursion, residents had more than 10 minutes toevacuate before flooding began; also, residents ofsouthern Miyagi Prefecture had almost an hour (Japan
Meteorological Agency, 2011). The tremendous damage inflicted provides a clear example of how convincing residents to rapidly evacuate is among thegreatest challenges in disaster risk management.
The potential for damage resulting from the Nankai Trough earthquake has been discussed since even
before 2011. Many local governments, related organizations, and residents have invested great energy into
disaster mitigation measures, such as the constructionof hard facilities and the implementation of soft strategies, all of which were based on community-level
conditions. However, the huge impact of the Great
East Japan Earthquake has forced a reevaluation of
the likely effectiveness of these approaches. Specificareas for reevaluation include individual-level topics,
government reappraisals of tsunami estimation, andlow tsunami evacuation rates despite evacuation orders issued at the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake. This paper discusses each of these problems indetail.
Beginning with individual-level issues in disaster
128

CONSCIOUSNESS OF DISASTER RISK AND TSUNAMI EVACUATION

mitigation, one issue is that 64.3% of victims in the
Great East Japan Earthquake were over 60 years old,and 45.5% were over 70 years old. This result is similar to other recent disasters, in which most of the victims were elderly persons (Ushiyama et al., 2012).
Another issue is that before the Great East Japan
Earthquake, there were high expectations placed oncommunity-level support under emergency conditions, particularly on local volunteer firefighters.
However, 253 volunteer firefighters died while trying
to evacuate others. One surviving volunteer firefighter
said that “they knew precisely that the tsunami wascoming, but they couldn’t bring themselves to evacuate while others remained behind” (CeMI, 2011).
These poignant words illustrate the limitations of kyojo, the Japanese principle of mutual assistance. Although tremendous efforts put into community-leveldisaster management and relating achievements havebeen seen, the huge damage motivated us to shift attention from community-level approaches to individual-level ones, such as the tsunami evacuation principle of tsunami tendenko. The Great East Japan
Earthquake led to a significant renewal of interest in
the concept of tsunami tendenko, the importance of an“each for themselves” attitude toward escaping tsunami on the one hand, but the complexity of actually
implementing such strategies for tsunami evacuationon the other (Yamori, 2012).
Another question pointed out is whether people
should use motor vehicles for evacuation. According
to the Central Disaster Prevention Council (2012), up
to 56% of evacuees reportedly used cars for evacuation. This information indicates that while the importance of walking or running to shelters has long been
held as a principle of tsunami evacuation, such rules
are not adhered to during emergency conditions.
Those who used motor vehicles for evacuation encountered various problems, such as traffic jams,
damaged roads, and dysfunctional traffic signals. Indeed, many victims were found drowned in their cars.
A second impact is that the central and local governments have been forced to reappraise damage estimates. The Tohoku disaster was described as “an unprecedented event beyond human conception”
because it exceeded all hazard estimates and hugely
impacted society. Much of the disaster mitigation infrastructure such as tsunami prevention levees did notfunction properly and failed to prevent the tsunami

from reaching residential areas. Some designatedshelters were destroyed as well. According to the Jiji
Press (2012), 16% of the 2,023 shelters in 32 metropolitan regions along the Tohoku coast were inundated.
As an immediate response to the disaster, theCabinet Office (2012) set out to revise estimations ofdamage from the Nankai Trough. Two new estimates
were released in March and August 2012, and many
local governments began to reevaluate disaster estimates based on the new figures. For example, the prescribed height and assumed safety of existing shelters
were modified, and previous designated shelters losttheir designation as new ones replaced them.
Kochi Prefecture, in which the research community is located, received steady support from the governor, who said, “We have done our best, based on theworst-case estimates. Nonetheless, the tragedy of the
Tohoku event taught us valuable lessons about the importance of reevaluating existing disaster management strategies.” Under the governor’s direction, an
expert team was established to support Kochi Prefecture’s early reappraisal of damage estimates and reformulation of disaster management countermeasures(Asahi Shimbun, 2011).
A final problem for consideration is low evacuation rates. Expectations were that the residents of the
Tohoku region had an even higher awareness of tsunami risks than those living in areas likely to be affected by the Nankai Trough earthquake. In the Great
East Japan Earthquake, however, only 57% of residents subject to evacuation orders responded quickly
after the earthquake (Central Disaster Prevention
Council, 2011). A survey conducted by Weathernews
Inc. (2011), with a key feature of having one part thatsought information about the respondents themselves
and a second part that sought information about theirfriends and family who died, indicated that only 23%
of fatalities were among those who evacuated immediately after the earthquake.
On the day of the Great East Japan Earthquake,tsunami warnings accompanied by evacuation orders
were issued all along the Pacific coast of central towest Japan. According to a survey by Kyodo News(2011), only 6% of Pacific coast residents evacuatedto designated shelters on that day.
The tsunami evacuation problems that emergedin the event provided important lessons for Nankai
129

Y. SUN, K.YAMORI, R. TANISAWA, S. KONDO

Trough earthquake-expected areas. Thus, to investigate the details of the three above-mentioned factors
in a certain community would be very helpful for future disaster management. The following sections discuss the consciousness of disaster risks and tsunami
evacuation, by focusing on the living conditions, individual needs, and concerns about the disaster management of residents.

along the sea side and ends up at the intersection of
Omuro and Urabun. Obviously, it is difficult for elderly people to drive through the road, so a common
concern among residents in this isolated, mountainous
area is a major disaster that cuts off ground transport(Sun et al., 2012).

3. Overall Situation
This section summarizes the overall situation of
the Okitsu community. We begin by focusing on thetsunami risks, and then talk about disaster management strategies that have been promoted in the community. Finally, we discuss the influences of the Great
East Japan Earthquake based on the three above-mentioned factors.

Fig.1. Location of Okitsu

3.1 Outline of the Okitsu Community
Okitsu is located in the southwestern coastal areaof Shimanto Town in Kochi Prefecture. There are 552
households and a total population of 1,014 in thecommunity, with 47% being male and 53%, female.
In addition, 48% of the population is over the age of65, while teenagers under the age of 15 account for
only 7.8% (Shimanto Town, 2012).
The Okitsu community is made up of three subunits: Omuro, Gobun, and Urabun. Omuro has 159
households and 305 residents, who are mainly involved in the fishing industry. Urabun has 199 households and 327 residents, who also primarily maketheir living from fishery. Gobun is an agricultural areawith 194 households and 382 residents, with primarycrops that include myoga ginger and peppers.
Okitsu has a southern boundary formed by Tosa
Bay, famous for its clear waters and beautiful beaches. As shown in figure 1, along Tosa Bay, no roads
lead to nearby towns. The only lifeline is Road No.
52, which provides Okitsu residents with access tosurrounding areas. Road No. 52 is a narrow mountainroad with more than 140 curves along its 8 km lengthin Okitsu territory, and can easily be shut down bylandslides or earthquakes. This road comes out of thelong tunnel of Okitsu Hill (394 m) into Okitsu, andthen runs down sharply to the community (10 m on
average). Without passing through residential areas
due to the high density of houses, it goes straight

Before the Great East Japan Earthquake, disaster
experts predicted that a 12 m tsunami would arrive
within 18 minutes after an 8.4 magnitude Nankai
Trough earthquake (Kochi Prefecture, 2005). According to historical records, at least 11 earthquakes withmagnitudes greater than 7.0 have hit the area. In recent years, the 1946 Showa Nankai Earthquake of 8.0
magnitude caused severe damage, including destruction of farmland, sluice gates, and tsunami prevention
levees (Editorial Committee of the History of Kubokawa, 2005). Thus, the priority of disaster management in Okitsu is how to help people survive tsunami
and isolation.
3.2 Disaster Risk Management
The Okitsu community is known for its advanced
disaster risk management, thanks in large part to disaster education efforts by Okitsu Elementary School.
In 2005, Okitsu Elementary School received a directive to “create and develop safe communities with thecooperation of school and community” from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). The goal of this initiative is to enhance student consciousness of disaster risks byinvolving residents’ cooperation. After reflecting on
the future achievements of disaster education in thecommunity, the school principal and community leaders established the Okitsu Disaster Education Com130

CONSCIOUSNESS OF DISASTER RISK AND TSUNAMI EVACUATION

paredness for tsunami risks. We, as researchers conducting action research on tsunami management withlocal residents for several years, felt a greater responsibility for future disaster management. We actively
shared our knowledge and the latest information, suchas the details of tsunami simulation and damage estimation. We also presented cases of tsunami evacuation, inviting survivors from disaster-affected areas. To
ensure residents could make a secondary evacuationfrom shelters situated 15 m above sea level to higher
ground, we suggested that residents build several evacuation roads, as well as repairing existing facilities.
However, cases of failed evacuation of seniorcitizens in Tohoku caused much anxiety in Okitsu.
Opinions collected through the action research, suchas “I am over 80 and have back problems, so it is hardfor me to get to a shelter,” indicate significant individual-level problems. Issues also include the actions oflocal volunteer firefighters during tsunami evacuationand the pros and cons of using motor vehicles forevacuation. We discuss these issues concretely in thefollowing section.
Local government gave Okitsu tsunami warnings
and evacuation orders on March 11, 2012, but only
26.9% evacuated to shelters. This evacuation rate far
exceeds the prefecture-wide average of 5.9% (Kyodo
News, 2011), which was likely a result of the effectiveness of advanced disaster management in thecommunity; yet a 73% non-evacuation rate underemergency conditions is nonetheless problematic.
Thus, it is necessary to investigate residents’ consciousness of tsunami evacuation and disaster management to establish appropriate strategies.

mittee (hereinafter, Okitsu DEC) in October 2005.
Since then, students have engaged in activities
such as issuing disaster management newsletters, disaster mapping, community cooking, etc. During disaster mapping, students discovered many problems
related to disaster mitigation. For example, they observed that bridge piers were in disrepair, despite being important routes to shelters. They also observedthat evacuation routes were difficult for older people
and would easily be destroyed in the event of a major
earthquake. The kindergarten and daycare center werelocated very close to the coast, despite principal users
being vulnerable under emergency conditions. Suchdiscoveries have been sincerely accepted and discussed by residents, and some issues were brought tothe attention of local government. For example, inFebruary 2010, the kindergarten and the daycare center were relocated together to locations at least 30 m
above sea level, becoming a main shelter for Okitsu
called the Sakura Kai.
Due to the efforts of students and residents,
evacuation facilities in Okitsu can hold 1,582 people,
more than the whole population of the community(see figure 2). Sufficient emergency supplies are
stored in each facility to allow long-term occupationin the event that Road No. 52 is shut down. Shelters
store prefabricated cottages to protect evacuees fromrain or wind. Evacuation drills, community cooking,and nighttime camping have been conducted using
these facilities.

4. Questionnaire Survey
We conducted the survey in January 2012 withthe cooperation of Okitsu DEC. As three factors of disaster management have been shown to be importantin the Great East Japan Earthquake, the main purposeof the survey is to find out what kind of specific problems existed in Okitsu compared to the Tohoku region.
Table 1 shows an outline of the survey, whichtargeted all the households in Okitsu (552 families on
January 1, 2012). We received 225 valid responses(46.2%). Table 2 shows the demographic data of gender and age. It turns out that 46% are male and 54%

Fig.2. Okitsu evacuation shelters
3.3 Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake
The Great East Japan Earthquake shocked the
Okitsu community, and called into question its pre131

Y. SUN, K.YAMORI, R. TANISAWA, S. KONDO

are female, almost equal to the gender ratio of thewhole population. In addition, nearly 72% of the respondents are above the age of 60. Table 3 shows different response rates in the community. Omuro had
the lowest (30.2%), but the rates of the other two wereboth near 50%.
Table 4 shows the survey details. Based on thethree factors described in section 2, we categorized all
the questions into individual-level problems (Q5, Q7,
and Q8), the reevaluation of damage estimates (Q1and Q9), and the rate of tsunami evacuation (Q2, Q3,
Q4, and Q6). The idea is that problems of disastermanagement in the Okitsu community somehow revealed similar features to those in the Tohoku region,such as an aging population, the safety of existing
shelters, and evacuation rate. So, using these threefactors to analyze the survey data can lead to an accurate grasp of the problems in Okitsu.

Table 3. Response rates
Omuro Gobun Urabun
Respondents
48
100
96
Households
159
199
194
Response rate 30.2% 50.3% 49.5%
Table 4. Survey item

Q1. What do you think about the damage estimates
for the expected Nankai Trough earthquake andtsunami?
Q2. What would urge you to make an evacuation?
(Select 3 of 7 options.)
Q3. Which shelter would be your first choice?
Q4. How long would it take before you can evacuate
to a shelter?
Q5. How would you evacuate?
Q6. Which would be your second-choice shelter?
Q7. (Dilemma of family evacuation) Would you
pick up your child at school before evacuatingwhen an earthquake occurred?
Q8. (Dilemma of local volunteer firefighter evacuation) In the event of a tsunami, do you think local volunteer firefighters should help others
evacuate before evacuating themselves?
Q9. Which of the following tsunami management
measures do you anticipate in the future? (Select3 of 8 options in decreasing order of importance.)
Q10. (Open-ended question) Do you have any comments regarding disaster risk management inOkitsu?
Demographic items: Location, Age, Gender, Occupation.

Table 1. Survey overview
TargetAll households
Time: January 10, 2012
Distribution Method: local postal service
Number: 552 packages
Time: January 11 to 25, 2012
Method: 10 kinds (returned to the following locations: students in Okitsu
Elementary School and Okitsu JuniorHigh School; top leaders of each subunit; Okitsu Elementary School orCollection
Okitsu Junior High School; local administrative office; fishermen’s union;kindergarten; local office of Japan Agriculture; local assembly hall)
Respondents: 225 households
response rate: 46.2%
Table 2. Age and gender
Age
Male
Female
0~19
0.0%
0.4%
20~29
0.9%
0.4%
30~39
0.9%
5.5%
40~49
2.1%
4.7%
50~59
7.7%
5.5%
60~69
12.8%
15.7%
70~79
15.3%
12.3%
above 80
6.4%
9.4%
Total
46.0%
54.0%
Respondents
108
127

Total
255
552
46.2%

4.1 Individual-level Problems
This section discusses survey results related toindividual-level problems associated with Q5 (methods of evacuation), Q7 (dilemma of family evacuation), and Q8 (dilemma of local volunteer firefighter
evacuation).
Responses to Q5 as shown in table 5 indicatethat more than 80% of residents would evacuate on
foot. Note that the main Gobun shelter is the Sakura
Kai, which is located 1.5 km from residential areas,so almost 20% of residents reported they would use acar or motorcycle. Of the three subunits, residents ofGobun seem to have an advantage in using motor vehicles for evacuation, because Gobun is closest to

Total
0.4%
1.3%
6.4%
6.8%
13.2%
28.5%
27.7%
15.7%
100.0%
235
132

CONSCIOUSNESS OF DISASTER RISK AND TSUNAMI EVACUATION

would similarly choose to help an elderly relative toevacuate, rather than evacuate themselves first. If thisis the case, the implications are serious for Okitsu,
where much of the population is elderly. There aremany reports of delayed evacuations in the Tohoku
event (e.g., Weathernews Inc., 2011; Survey ResearchCenter Co. Ltd., 2011). In many cases, people who
had evacuated to a safe location returned to a dangerous place out of concern for relatives, an act that often
led to avoidable tragedy. In Okitsu, the fact that up to
40% of residents resist tsunami tendenko cannot beignored.
Responses to Q8 (see figure 4) indicate that
opinions toward volunteer firefighters’ responsibilities
during emergency conditions vary. While 70% of respondents think that local volunteer firefightersshould evacuate first, more than 30% believe that theyshould help others first. Disaster risks in the Okitsu
community are such that if volunteer firefighters took
the time to assist in evacuation efforts, they would
likely fail to evacuate themselves and might be engulfed by the tsunami. The problem of varied opinions on the topic of volunteer firefighters’ evacuation
should thus be considered seriously.

Road No. 52, which leads to the Sakura Kai and nearby towns. However, there are also many narrow roads
built between old brick walls that would easily collapse in a large earthquake. Using motor vehicles forevacuation requires consideration of local residents’needs, road conditions, and driving rules in an emergency situation. This calls for special and individual
approaches such as the “single-person drill,” discussed later.
Table 5. Evacuation methods
Walking
BicycleMotorcycle
Car
OthersTotal
Respondents

Omuro Gobun Urabun
89.1% 72.4% 89.1%
6.5%
5.1%
2.2%
0.0%
3.1%
0.0%
4.3% 15.3%
7.6%
0.0%
4.1%
1.1%
100%
100%
100%
46
98
92

Total
82.2%
4.2%
1.3%
10.2%
2.1%
100%
236

Q7 (dilemma of family evacuation) and Q8 (dilemma of local volunteer firefighter evacuation) aredesigned based on the “crossroad” style, a tool for disaster education proposed by Yamori et al. (2005). Q7
asks: “Suppose a big earthquake occurs while yourchild is at school and you are at home. The community radio announces an emergency evacuation. Would
you go to pick up your child or evacuate first?” Answer: (i) I would pick up my child first; (ii) I would
evacuate first. Q8 asks: “Suppose a large tsunami will
arrive within 20 minutes. In this situation, what do
you think local volunteer firefighters should do first:
help others evacuate first, or evacuate themselves?”
Answer: (i) They should help others evacuate first; (ii)
They should evacuate themselves first.
For Q7, more than 40% of respondents answeredthat they would pick up their children before evacuating (see figure 3). In Omuro in particular, over 50%
of residents would go to pick up children. This indicates that the importance of tsunami tendenko has notbeen completely understood and accepted in Okitsu,
despite demonstration of its importance in the Great
East Japan Earthquake. Moreover, as the percentageof teenagers in the community is lower than 8%, butalmost 72% of respondents are above the age of 60,
the “pick up children” result could be largely basedon a hypothetical child instead of a real one. From
this survey result, it stands to reason that many people

70%
60%
50%

Omuro

40%

Gobun

30%

Urabun

20%

Total

10%
0%
Pick up childEvacuate

Fig. 3. Pick up child or evacuate? (N=212)
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Omuro
Gobun
UrabunTotal

Others

Self

Fig. 4. Evacuate self or others? (N = 223)

133

Y. SUN, K.YAMORI, R. TANISAWA, S. KONDO

Various opinions are also reflected in the qualitative data collected through action research. For example, one of the local volunteer firefighters told us thatafter the Great East Japan Earthquake, two new principles of tsunami management were notified by the
local government. One is, “Do not go to close the water gate after a big earthquake.” The other is, “Support
evacuation efforts only while evacuating yourself.”
However, when we asked whether residents were
aware of these policies, the volunteer firefighter was
slightly embarrassed and replied, “They might, but
I’m not sure.”
Opinions also vary in responses to the open-ended question. The opinion from a local volunteer firefighter was: “Question 8 bothered me for a long time.
As a volunteer firefighter, I strongly feel that I should
put others before myself. But I also know that there
are circumstances where I have to protect myself first.
Balancing both is difficult, so I can only hope to findthe best way to protect myself and others from a tsunami.” However, one aged person responded, “I can’t
imagine that volunteer firefighters would give elderly
people a hand under emergency conditions.”
To resolve this dilemma, approaches should be
introduced such as investigating the distribution ofvolunteer firefighter residences in each subunit toplan evacuation routes that maximize the effectiveness of “supporting evacuation efforts while evacuating oneself” (Yamori et al., 2012).

in Kamaishi City (described as “the miracle of Kamaishi”) have also reinforced suspicion against official estimates. This is because Prof. Katada of Gunma
University, who for many years taught emergency
evacuation techniques, emphasized three evacuation
principles that form the core issues of disaster education. One of the three principles that facilitated theabove-mentioned “miracle of Kamaishi” was “Sotei
ni torawareru na” (literally, “do not completely trust
any kind of disaster estimate”) (Katada, 2012). Therefore, it is necessary for Okitsu residents to understandthe importance as well as the limitations of tsunami
predictions.
Table 6. Opinion of tsunami scale
Larger than estimation
Same as estimation
Smaller than estimation
Total
Respondents

Omuro Gobun Urabun
87.5% 73.7% 74.2%
6.3% 20.0% 18.3%
6.3%
6.3%
7.5%
100% 100% 100%
48
95
93

Total
76.7%
16.5%
6.8%
100%
236

Q9 (anticipated tsunami prevention management) asks respondents to select three out of eight options in order of importance. To focus on the mostcompelling needs of residents, we only discuss the results of the highest-ranked option. Table 7 shows that
almost 50% of residents thought that provision of
shelters and evacuation roads were the most urgent
aspects of tsunami management in Okitsu.

4.2 Reappraisal of Disaster Estimation
This section describes the results of Q1 (tsunami
estimation) and Q9 (anticipated tsunami prevention
management), which measure the influence of the reevaluation of damage estimates.
Table 6 shows residents’ thoughts regarding an
expected Nankai Trough earthquake. A total of 76.7%
of residents answered that the scale of the resulting
tsunami might exceed current estimates. As previously noted, revised damage estimates had not yet beenreleased when this survey was conducted, so thesedata demonstrate the discomposure of residents
caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake. An alternative view is that residents have allowed for another“unprecedented event beyond human conception” by
not completely trusting disaster experts and government officials. Events following the Great East Japan
Earthquake, such as the evacuation of school children

Table 7. Anticipated tsunami risk management
Disaster drill
Disaster education symposium
Road and shelter expansion
Information distribution equipment
Increased evacuation tools
Supply stocks
Strengthened sea walls
Other
Total
Respondents

Omuro Gobun Urabun
31.1% 23.2% 33.3%
0.0%
1.1%
3.4%
37.8% 56.8% 41.4%
11.1%
3.2%
3.4%
0.0%
3.2%
2.3%
13.3%
8.4%
6.9%
6.7%
2.1%
4.6%
0.0%
2.1%
4.6%
100% 100% 100%
45
95
87

Total
28.6%
1.8%
47.1%
4.8%
2.2%
8.8%
4.0%
2.6%
100%
227

We mentioned above that shelter capacities already exceed the population of Okitsu. The results of
Q9 indicate that the influence of the Great East Japan
Earthquake has caused significant anxiety about thereevaluation of damage estimates and distrust in the134

CONSCIOUSNESS OF DISASTER RISK AND TSUNAMI EVACUATION

safety of existing shelters, most of which are 15 m
above sea level in the light of the old tsunami estimation of 12 m. Opinions from the open-ended question,such as “The primary Urabun shelter seems too low
when considering the inundated shelters in the Tohoku region. I hope the government will relocate it atleast 10 m higher,” and “More evacuation roads
should be constructed. Bridges leading to shelters
must be repaired as soon as possible. After I heard
about the horrible experiences in the Tohoku region, I
keenly felt that our shelters should be reevaluated,”
verify the survey data.
Sun et al. (2013a) pointed out that several factors
contributed to the extreme anxiety regarding sheltersin Okitsu, including an insufficient understanding of
the efforts made by Okitsu Elementary School andOkitsu DEC, as well as dependence on a number ofresidents who are leaders in promoting disaster management. In the future, key persons in Okitsu should
encourage the majority of residents to become masters in disaster management.

Table 8. What would prompt you to evacuate?
Earthquake
Tsunami warning
Community alarm
Neighbor calling
Others evacuating
TsunamiOthersTotal
Respondents

Omuro Gobun Urabun
87.2% 78.4% 80.9%
8.5% 14.4%
8.5%
4.3%
6.2%
7.4%
0.0%
0.0%
2.1%
0.0%
1.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
1.1%
100% 100% 100%
47
97
94

Total
81.1%
10.9%
6.3%
0.8%
0.4%
0.0%
0.4%
100%
238

We posed Q3 (first choice of shelter) and Q6(second choice of shelter) because 23% of Tohoku
survivors reported that the first place they evacuatedto was inundated by the tsunami (Weathernews Inc.,
2011). Figure 2 and table 9 indicate that most residents selected shelters in their own residential areas(“other” always indicates high ground near the respondent’s house). In particular, 80% of Omuro residents selected the primary Omuro shelter or Warrior
Monument. More than 70% of Gobun residents selected the Sakura Kai. More than 70% of Urabun residents selected Saiho Temple or the Todai Line. Because of the location and the balanced construction of
shelters in the three subunits, most residents know exactly where to evacuate to, which deserves highpraise.

4.3 Issues Regarding Tsunami Evacuation
This section discusses issues related to tsunami
evacuation, based on the results of Q2 (reason forstarting to evacuate), Q3 and Q6 (evacuation destination), and Q4 (expected tsunami evacuation time).
In Okitsu, 81.1% of residents report that theywould evacuate quickly after a big earthquake (table8). This is a much higher rate than the survey data regarding tsunami evacuation in the Great East Japan
Earthquake, and is thus indicative of the effectivenessof disaster risk management in the community. Nonetheless, actual rates have not been verified in a realdisaster, and reported potential actions may not translate into actual behavior. Risks in Okitsu are such that
immediate evacuation following a large earthquake isvital, yet 10.9% of residents reportedly will not evacuate without hearing an evacuation recommendationor order. Worse yet, 6.3% of residents would wait tohear such information on the community warning
alarms. It is rational to want to collect information regarding earthquakes and tsunamis, but “waiting for
more information in lieu of making a quick evacuation” (Katada, 2005; Yamori, 2010) would be a serious problem in Okitsu.

Table 9. First-choice evacuation shelter
Warrior Monument
1st Omuro Shelter
Saiho Temple
Todai Line
Sakura Kai
Mukai Mountain
Evacuation Tower
Other
Total
Respondents

Omuro Gobun Urabun
44.4%
2.0%
0.0%
35.6%
0.0%
1.1%
0.0%
0.0% 56.0%
0.0%
0.0% 14.3%
2.2% 71.4%
8.8%
2.2% 14.3%
4.4%
2.2%
8.2%
2.2%
13.3%
4.1% 13.2%
100% 100% 100%
45
98
91

Total
9.4%
7.3%
21.8%
5.6%
33.8%
8.1%
4.7%
9.4%
100%
234

Earlier, we pointed out the difference in response
rates among the three subunits (the rate in Omuro ismuch lower than the other two). We think there are
two reasons that could explain this phenomenon. One
is that the leader of Omuro also serves as the leader ofthe organization of local volunteer firefighters, and isin charge of disaster management. The other is that135

Y. SUN, K.YAMORI, R. TANISAWA, S. KONDO

sues in disaster management. Q4 asks respondents toguess their estimated evacuation time, rather than selecting options. When the survey was conducted in
Okitsu, there were no official reports on tsunami reappraisal, but lots of information released through TV
broadcasts and newspapers suggest that a ferocious
tsunami would come even within 3-5 minutes. Considering the then-current disaster estimates that a tsunami would arrive within 18 minutes, even several
seconds of evacuation time would be a matter of life
or death. So, we classified the results of Q4 into fivecategories, which are 0-3 minutes, 4-5 minutes, 6-10
minutes, 11-18 minutes, and over 18 minutes, though
unevenly.
Table 11 shows that almost 90% of residents said
they could make a successful evacuation within 18
minutes, and nearly 30% answered that they could
evacuate within 5 minutes. Meanwhile, the results ofeach subunit show that residents living in Gobun require more time than the other two, with 18.4% ofresidents requiring more than 18 minutes. This is likely because the Sakura Kai is somewhat far from residential areas.

multitudinous shelters reduce residents’ vigilance andconsciousness of disaster risks. In fact, the two shelters in Omuro were constructed earlier than the others, which contribute to their high recognition amongresidents.
As shown in figure 2, several evacuation sheltersin Okitsu were constructed according to the residential conditions and the population in each unit. However, people would probably not be at home, or evacuation roads leading to their first-choice shelters
would be blocked by collapsed walls. So, we strongly
suggest that residents be familiar with more than one
shelter to ensure successful escape from a tsunami.
Table 10 shows various ways to deal with inaccessibility to first-choice shelters. Almost 50% of residents
selected evacuation towers at 15 m above sea level, or“other” (high ground near their houses). This indicates that even evacuation towers cannot enable people to evacuate to a higher place, but can serve as asecond evacuation shelter when a tsunami is actually
flooding in. That is to say, towers are “a subordinate
method of tsunami evacuation” (Yamori et al., 2012).
Local residents considered more available shelters besides the designated ones, which was admirable.
Moreover, responses to the open-ended question, such
as “Evacuation shelters cannot fit everyone’s need.
More evacuation roads should be constructed to allow
quick evacuation to high ground,” indicate a proactive
attitude. Nonetheless, from the perspective of safety,
it is necessary to test whether non-designated places
could be used as shelters.

Table 11. Evacuation time
Omuro

Table 10. Second-choice evacuation shelter

Total

0-3 min

10.9%

2.0%

8.8%

6.4%

4-5 min

28.3%

15.3%

24.2%

21.3%

6-10 min

30.4%

36.7%

39.6%

36.6%

11-18 min

19.6%

27.6%

19.8%

23.0%

>18 min

10.9%

18.4%

7.7%

12.8%

Total

100%

100%

100%

100%

Respondents

46

98

91

235

Total
7.5%
2.4%
12.7%
6.6%
9.4%
14.2%
26.9%
20.3%
100%
212

According to survey reports, residents in the Tohoku region spent almost 30 minutes to evacuate to
shelters, including the time period before and during
evacuation (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2011). Thus, the Okitsu data underestimate the required evacuation time, because it wasa supposed one. Tsunami evacuation time is importantfor Okitsu and other coastal regions, so finding out
what elements determine it is important.

Finally, we discuss the results of Q4 (expectedtsunami evacuation time). A tsunami is expected to hit
Okitsu soon after an earthquake, so the time required
to evacuate to shelters is one of the most important is-

4.4 Further Analysis of Tsunami Evacuation TimeTo further discuss the evacuation time, we set Q4(expected tsunami evacuation time) as the explained
variable and all the other questions except the open-

Warrior Monument
1st Omuro Shelter
Saiho Temple
Todai Line
Sakura Kai
Mukai Mountain
Evacuation Tower
Other
Total
Respondents

Omuro Gobun Urabun
15.4%
3.3%
8.5%
12.8%
0.0%
0.0%
20.5%
1.1% 22.0%
0.0%
0.0% 17.1%
7.7% 16.5%
2.4%
5.1% 15.4% 17.1%
10.3% 47.3% 12.2%
28.2% 16.5% 20.7%
100% 100% 100%
39
91
82

Gobun Urabun

136

CONSCIOUSNESS OF DISASTER RISK AND TSUNAMI EVACUATION

Table 13. Cross-table of Q4 and Q3

ended question as explanatory variables, and applied
CATDAP, a categorical data analysis program package for analyzing cross-classified data. CATDAP automates the search for optimal combinations of predictors (explanatory variables) on which a specific response variable (the explained variable) has the strongest dependence.
Specifically, CATDAP calculates Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), which ranges from small tolarge order in the form of cross-classified data on explanatory variables (Sakamoto, 1985). Recognition asa significant category of data occurs when AIC is lessthan -1 (Terado et al., 2004). If the explanatory variables have more than three items or if they are continuous, CATDAP will auto-categorize them into groups
giving the smallest AIC. For example, the items“strongly agree, agree, disagree, and strongly disagree” might be categorized into two groups, such as
one group of “strongly agree” and another of “agree,
disagree, and strongly disagree.”Table 12 shows the top-five AIC values, ranked
from low to high scores of explanatory variables
when Q4 is the explained variable. The corresponding
cross-classified data are shown in tables 13-16. Because we have discussed the relationship between L(location) and Q4 (expected tsunami evacuation time),
here, we limit our discussion to other items, namely,
shelter (Sakura Kai and other), gender, reason forevacuating (earthquake and other), and anticipatedtsunami risk management (disaster drills and other).

Explanatory

Categories of
explanatory variables

AIC

Q3 (shelter)2-15.61

2

G (gender)

2

-7.02

3

L (location)

2

-6.24

4

Q2 (reason for evacuating)

2

-5.42

5

Q9 (anticipated tsunami management)

2

-3.25

0.0% 15.0% 33.7% 28.7% 22.5%

100%

80

Other

7.7% 23.8% 43.1% 20.0%

100%

130

5.4%

Table 14. Cross-table of Q4 and G
G / Q4 0-3 min 4-5 min 6-10 min 11-18 min >18 min Total Respondents
Male

12.1% 22.4% 39.3% 17.8%

8.4%

100%

107

Female1.7% 21.5% 35.5% 24.8% 16.5%

100%

121

It is difficult to explain the difference using only
the survey results, so we suggest the following as possible reasons. Ikeda (2010) noted that compared withmen, women usually have less physical strength andlower coping capacity under emergency situations.
Also, in most cases, the behavior of women is determined by extrinsic factors, for example, in the collection of disaster information or decision-making. When
we discussed this issue with residents in Okitsu, one
female said, “When I go out without taking the bankbook with me, I’m anxious about the future livelihoodof my family should an earthquake strike.” This indicates that different expected actions between men andwomen might lead to delayed evacuation among
women.
Table 15 shows the relationship between expected tsunami evacuation time and reason for evacuating.
The term “other” includes tsunami warning, community warning alarms, neighbors calling, others evacuating, tsunami, and other factors except the earthquake. We find that people who claim they canevacuate within 3 minutes all considered evacuating
immediately after an earthquake. In contrast, 26.8%
of residents who need more than 18 minutes will not

variables1

Total Respondents

Sakura Kai

Next, we discuss the relationship between tsunami evacuation time and gender. Since the questionnaire survey packages were allocated to every household but not the individuals, a gender bias of
respondents can be considered. Nonetheless, amazingly, the gender ratio of respondents (46% male to54% female) is pretty close to that of the whole population (47% to 53%), which indicates that the result of
the questionnaire survey best represents the gendercharacteristics in the Okitsu community. Table 14
shows that 12.1% of males suppose that they canevacuate within 3 minutes, compared to only 1.7% offemales. Twice as many women as men claim theyneed more than 10 minutes to evacuate.

Table 12. Items of explanatory variables
Rank

Q3 / Q4 0-3 min 4-5 min 6-10 min 11-18 min >18 min

To begin with, we discuss the relationship between tsunami evacuation time and shelter shown intable 13. The auto-categorized results for shelters aregrouped into the Sakura Kai and other, where “other”
indicates all other shelters (see figure 2). This result
can be explained that the location of the Sakura Kai is
far from the residential areas.
137

Y. SUN, K.YAMORI, R. TANISAWA, S. KONDO

evacuate even after a big earthquake (in fact, they decide to evacuate because of other motivations).

5. Conclusion
This paper discussed the results of a questionnaire survey conducted in the Okitsu community,
where advanced disaster risk management has beeneffectively promoted in light of the high risks of an
expected Nankai Trough earthquake. Considering theimpact of the Great East Japan Earthquake, we investigated issues concerning tsunami evacuation, such asindividual-level problems, reevaluation of damage estimates, and tsunami evacuation in detail. In Okitsu,
not only have hard facilities been established, but soft
strategies such as disaster education have also been
carried out. These achievements were verified by the
results of the questionnaire survey.
However, as discussed in the above section, numerous issues of disaster risk management remain to
be resolved. For example, according to the survey results, evacuation time in Okitsu is largely underestimated when compared to the Tohoku region because
nearly 30% of respondents replied that they could get
to shelters within 5 minutes, while during the Great
East Japan Earthquake, evacuees spent almost 30
minutes. To resolve these problems, we have pointed
out that it is necessary to take the situation of individual residents into consideration to plan concrete measures. As further analyzed by using the CATDAP
method, differences in evacuation time among thethree subunits, evacuation motivation, and attitudes
toward future tsunami management provided specificinformation for considering disaster risk management
based on concrete individual-level issues.
As researchers conducting action research in the
Okitsu community, we cooperate with Okitsu Elementary School, Okitsu DEC, and the local administration
to promote a new approach called the single-person
drill (Sun et al., 2013b). Space limitations preclude
describing the single-person drill in detail. What weemphasize here instead is that since the questionnaire
survey was conducted through our action research, itwill not only point out problems and analyze pastachievements, but will serve to find further solutions.
This is the real significance of conducting action research. Thus, we want to briefly describe what thesingle-person drill is to show the long-term objectivesof the research.
During the single-person drill, someone plays therole of evacuee carrying GPS equipment while travel-

Table 15. Cross-table of Q4 and Q2
Q2 / Q4 0-3 min 4-5 min 6-10 min 11-18 min >18 min Total Respondents
Earthquake

7.4% 21.6% 40.7% 21.1%

9.3%

100%

204

Other

0.0% 22.9% 20.0% 31.4% 25.7%

100%

35

In those areas where a tsunami will hit shortly
after an expected Nankai Trough earthquake strikes(such as Okitsu), reducing the number of casualties
requires that residents take earthquake tremors as thesign to evacuate. Some Okitsu residents told us thatthey remember the 1946 Showa Nankai Earthquake
and learned the importance of quick evacuation after
an earthquake strikes. One respondent said, “I keep
my purse near my pillow in case an earthquake occurs
in the night.” Such valuable experiences of residents
should be taken seriously and spread to the population
at large.
Finally, we discuss the relationship between tsunami evacuation time and anticipated tsunami prevention management (table 16). Here, the term “other”
includes measures such as disaster education symposiums, building shelters and roads, purchasing information distribution equipment, developing evacuation
instruments, stocking supplies, and strengthening levees. It is interesting that both those who claim tohave the capacity to successfully evacuate within 3
minutes and those who would require more than 18
minutes insist that disaster drills are important. Thistendency might be explained in that people who canevacuate quickly realize the function and achievements of disaster drills and thus praise them, whilepeople who suppose they need more time to evacuate
intend to participate in disaster drills to enhance theirevacuation capabilities. Nevertheless, people who require 3 to 18 minutes to evacuate emphasize the importance of other aspects of disaster risk management.
Thus, we have to introduce more appropriate approaches based on the various individual needs, according to their expected tsunami evacuation time.
Table 16. Cross-table of Q4 and Q9Q9 / Q4 0-3 min 4-5 min 6-10 min 11-18 min >18 min Total Respondents
Disaster drill 10.1% 20.9% 36.4% 17.8% 14.7%

100%

129

Other

100%

108

1.9% 25.0% 37.0% 26.9%

9.3%

138

CONSCIOUSNESS OF DISASTER RISK AND TSUNAMI EVACUATION

ling from home to a designated evacuation shelter.
Pupils record the evacuation process as a lesson in disaster education. Two pupils use video cameras to record the evacuee’s behavior from different angles.
One also measures how long the evacuation takes,
and the other writes down any interesting observations during the evacuation, such as paths that might
be too steep for elderly persons, or bridges that would
collapse in an actual emergency condition. The evacuation route as recorded by the GPS sensor is shown
on a GIS map with an overlaid tsunami inundation
simulation graphic, so that the survivability of thesimulated evacuation route can be seen easily.
Pupils can further participate in the single-person
drill by creating a video record to promote disastereducation. For these video records, a television production company assists with creating a multi-screen
video where the screen is divided into four parts. One
part shows the first student’s video, and the diagonally opposite part shows the second student’s video.
The third part shows the pupils’ comments, and thefourth part shows the GIS map. A clock in the middle
shows the time elapsed, and the entire simulated
evacuation is time-synced. This approach compactly
collects individual-level problems related to tsunami
evacuation, in a form similar to clinical records.
According to Sun et al. (2013b), the single-person drill aims at overcoming the difficulties describedin this paper, by shifting tsunami evacuation from ageneral, non-urgent condition to a specific, concretetask that can be accomplished by an individual resident. The drill also greatly contributes to the improvement of existing evacuation facilities, because the actual experience of evacuating provides a chance tounderstand both the strengths and weaknesses of the
facilities. It also promotes co-learning of tsunami
risks by intergenerational participants, such as elderly
evacuees and young collaborators. It is important thatthe single-person drill combines both the active intervention of researchers in the local community and theneutral research activity of data collection, such asdata on the evacuation behavior of residents or datafor checking the effectiveness of existing facilities.
With information on every resident’s evacuation
accumulated through the single-person drill, we canestablish databases of disaster management in Okitsu.
Also, to have qualitative data on the single-person
drill quantified, we can easily compare them withother data, such as the results of the questionnaire survey analyzed in this paper, or data from other communities, to discuss the differences and similarities
between them, and to assimilate precious experiencefrom both practice and surveys. In this way, it will not
only have a great influence on the practice in Okitsu
and other regions, but on academic researches as well.
As the need for disaster risk management of an
expected Nankai Trough earthquake increases, core
issues of damage mitigation and coping capacities
based on special and individual conditions are indispensable. The research in this paper is an initial step
toward meeting the requirement for action research.
The final purpose of the single-person drill is to motivate individual residents to actively participate intheir own disaster risk management. So the researchdoes not just retain the position of finding out problems, but pursues betterment for the research community.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank the staff of Okitsu Elementary
School and the Headquarter Office of Disaster Risk
Management of Shimanto Town for their assistanceand support, especially members of the Okitsu Disaster Education Committee, for their generous cooperation and valuable input.
References
Cabinet Office. (2011, May 28) Archival documents of thefirst expert panel reports on earthquake and tsunami
countermeasures in light of the lessons learned fromthe 2011 Tohoku-Pacific ocean earthquake. Retrieved
from http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/chubou/higashinihon/1/index.html on June 1, 2012.
Cabinet Office. (2012) Reports on the estimates for an expected Nankai Trough earthquake and tsunami, according to the expert panel discussion on models of the
Nankai Trough earthquake. Retrieved from http://
www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/chubou/nankai_trough/nankai_trough_top.html on September 27, 2012.
Crisis & Environment Management Policy Institute. (CeMI,
2011, May 7) A questionnaire survey on the Great East
Japan Earthquake. Retrieved from http://www.npo-cemi.com/works/image/2011touhoku/0507tsunamisurv
ey.pdf on June 1, 2012.

139

Y. SUN, K.YAMORI, R. TANISAWA, S. KONDO

CN/201104/CN2011041801000295.html on September

Central Disaster Prevention Council. (2011, September 10)

27, 2012.

Reports on the interview survey of residents’ tsunami
evacuation in the Great East Japan Earthquake, accord-

Lewin, K. (1948) Resolving Social Conflicts: Selected pa-

ing to the expert panel discussion on earthquake andpers on Group Dynamics (pp. 201-216). New York:tsunami countermeasures in light of the lessons learned

Harper.

from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific ocean earthquake. Re-

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.

trieved from http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/chubou/hi-(2011, December 26) Reports on tsunami evacuation in

gashinihon/9/2.pdf on September 27, 2012.

the Great East Japan Earthquake. Retrieved from http://
www.mlit.go.jp/common/000186474.pdf on September

Central Disaster Prevention Council. (2012, May 23) Suc-

27, 2012.

cessful and practical strategies for tsunami evacuationby using motor vehicles, according to the Working

Sakamoto, Y. (1985) Categorical data no model bunsekiGroup discussion on disaster risk management. Re-[Model analysis of categorical data] (pp. 51-54, 181-

trieved from http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/chubou/

185). Tokyo: Kyoritsu Shuppan Co., Ltd.

taisaku_tsunami/6/index.html on September 27, 2012.

Shimanto Town. (2012) Data on tsunami evacuees in 2011

Editorial Committee of the History of Kubokawa. (2005)

Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake. Archival materials

Kisho saigai, Kubokawa choshi [Meteorological disas-of the Headquarter Office of Disaster Risk Manage-ters, history of Kubokawa] (pp. 11). Kochi: Gyosei.

ment of Shimanto Town.

Ikeda, K. (2010) Gender sensitive analysis of disaster vul-Sun, Y., Yamori, K., Kondo, S., and Tanisawa, R. (2012)nerability: A case study from Bangladesh. Research

Analysis of community disaster management based on

Report on Human, Society and Nature, Faculty of Edu-

the theory of communities of practice: A case study incation, Shizuoka University, Vol. 3 No. 60:1-16.

Okitsu community. Journal of Japan Society for Natural Disaster Science, Vol. 31 No. 3:217-232.

Japan Meteorological Agency. (2011) Tsunami information.
Retrieved from http://www.jma.go.jp/jp/tsunami/obser-

Sun, Y., Yamori, K., Kondo, S., and Tanisawa, R. (2013a)

vation_04_20110313180559.html on September 27,

Consciousness of disaster risk and tsunami evacuation

2012.

among local residents for an expected Nankai Troughearthquake and tsunami. Journal of Disaster Informa-

Jiji Press. (2012, April 7) Reappraisal of shelters withouttion Studies, No. 11: 68-80.

any progress, 326 inundated shelters in 3 disaster affected prefectures, only 7 areas established temporal

Sun, Y., Yamori, K., and Kondo, S. (2013b) Disaster educa-countermeasures. Retrieved from http://www.jiji.com/

tion based on community of practice: A case study in

jc/zc?k=201204/2012040700142 on September 27,

Okitsu, Kochi Prefecture. Journal of Integrated Disas-

2012.

ter Risk Management. DOI10.5595/idrim.2013.0056.

Katada, T., Kodama, M., Kuwasawa, N., and Koshimura, S.

Survey Research Center Co., Ltd. (2011) Miyagiken engan-(2005) Issue of resident’s consciousness and evacua-bu ni okeru hisaichi chosa hokokusho [Reports on di-tion from the tsunami: From questionnaire survey insaster-destroyed coastal regions in Miyagi Prefecture].

Kesennuma city, Miyagi Prefecture after the Miyagik-

Retrieved from http://www.surece.co.jp/src/research/

en off earthquake. Proceedings of Japan Society ofarea/pdf/20110311_miyagi.pdf on September 27, 2012.
Terado, M., Yoshikawa, H., Sugiman, T., Hibino, A., andCivil Engineers, Vol. 789: 93-104.
Katada, T. (2012) Inochi wo mamoru kyoiku, 3.11 Kamaishi

Akimoto, M. (2004) Analysis on difference of risk per-kara no kyokun [Education for saving lives based on

ception between people engaged in nuclear businessthe miracle of Kamaishi in the Great East Japan Earth-and general public: From social survey for nuclear

quake]. PHP Institution.

power plant. Virginia: 12th International Conferenceon Nuclear Engineering.

Kochi Prefecture. (2005) Tsunami shinsui yosokuzu [Tsunami inundation graphics]. Retrieved from http://www.

Asahi Shimbun. (2011, March 14) Urgent reevaluation of

pref.kochi.lg.jp/~shoubou/sonaetegood/flood/index.

damage estimates by the special project team for an

html on September 27, 2012.

expected Nankai Trough earthquake.

Kyodo News. (2011, April 18) 2% tsunami evacuation rate

Ushiyama, M. and Yokomaku. S. (2012) Jinteki higai noafter tsunami warnings issued in 6 Pacific coastal pre-tokucho [Features of victims]. Journal of Disaster In-

fectures. Retrieved from http://www.47news.jp/

formation Studies, No. 10:7-13.

140

CONSCIOUSNESS OF DISASTER RISK AND TSUNAMI EVACUATION

Weathernews Inc. (2011, September 8) Higashi Nippon
daishinsai chosa [Survey of tsunami damage in the
Great East Japan Earthquake]. Retrieved from http://
weathernews.com/ja/nc/press/2011/pdf/20110908_1.
pdf on September 27, 2012.
Yamori, K. (2010) Saigai jyoho to hinan no shinrigaku[Psychology of disaster information and evacuation].
Colloquiums of “Course A” in the Summer Seminar on
Water Engineering.
Yamori, K. (2012) Revisiting the concept of tsunami tendenko: Tsunami evacuation behavior in the Great East
Japan Earthquake. Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University (Eds.).
Yamori, K., Kikkawa, T., and Ajiro, T. (2005) Game de asobu risk communication, Crossroad he no shotai [Riskcommunication game: An invitation to “crossroad”].
Kyoto: Nakanishiya Shuppan.
Yamori, K., Sun, Y., Tanisawa, R., and Kondo, S. (2012)
Okitsu chiku tsunami hinan ni kansuru tyosa kekka[Results of a questionnaire survey on tsunami evacuation in Okitsu community]. Kochi: Symposium on Disaster Education.

141