Bull. Hiroshima Inst. Tech. Research Vol. 53 (2019) 21– 28

ArticleSaussure’s Speech Circuit

Naoki ARAKI*(Received Nov. 1, 2018)

Abstract
Ferdinand de Saussure explains speech communication using the ‘speech circuit’. According to him,
between two persons A and B, speech communication can be achieved successfully as if A’s thought
were transferred from A to B or vice versa. But Saussure’s ‘speech circuit’ is challenged by Tokieda,
Harris, and Moore and Carling, who all have an idea in common that words do not have meanings.
Words can be compared to a ‘water pipe,’ ‘money’ or a ‘catalyst’ for communication. For them, words
are just ‘media’ used in communication, but not entities that have their own inherent meanings.
Key Words: speech circuit, signifié, signifiant, integrational linguistics, medium, catalyst, container
view of meaning, epiphenomenalist

and heterogeneous; straddling several areas simulta-

Introduction

neously—physical, physiological, and psychological—

Saussure illustrates speech communication as theit belongs both to the individual and to society; we‘speech circuit’. For example, between two persons A

cannot put it into any category of human facts, for weand B, first A utters some word. In this behaviour, A

cannot discover its unity.

associates some concept with some sound and thensays the word. In turn, B hears the sound A utters andLanguage [langue], on the contrary, is a self-contained whole and a principle of classification.

associates the sound with the concept A associates(Saussure 1959: 9)with the word. In this way, Saussure explains thatspeech communication is successfully achieved. How-As Tokieda says, according to Saussure, speech

ever, is there not anything implausible in Saussure’s(langage) is so heterogeneous that we cannot derive‘speech circuit’? In this paper, we examine Saussure’s

the object of linguistics from it. So Saussure attempts‘speech circuit’, referring to Tokieda, Harris, andto formulate langue as the subject matter of linguistics:

Moore and Carling.
[…] there is only one solution […]: from the very

1. Tokieda’s Criticism of Saussure

outset we must put both feet on the ground of language

Motoki Tokieda says that Saussure attempts toestablish a unit that is ‘a self-contained whole’, in ana-[langue] and use language [langue] as the norm of allother manifestations of speech [langage].

lyzing langage, quoting the following (Tokieda 1941:(Saussure 1959: 9)61):
Then, what is Saussure’s langue?
Taken as a whole, speech [langage] is many-sided* Department of Information Systems and Management, Faculty of Applied Information Science, Hiroshima Institute of TecŠology,
Hiroshima 731-5193, Japan. E-mail: araki@cc.it-hiroshima.ac.jp
─ 21 ─Naoki ARAKI

It [langue] is not to be confused with human

But it [the idealization] is more like proposing

speech [langage], of which it is only a definite part,that the black-and-white photograph be taken as athough certainly an essential one. It is both a social

model of what the eye actually sees [the real linguistic

product of the faculty of speech and a collection ofphenomena].

(Harris 1998: 41)

necessary conventions that have been adopted by a
Like Tokieda, Harris proposes that we should ask

social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty.

(Saussure 1959: 9)

what the real linguistic experience is like:
The demythologization that integrational linguis-

But Tokieda criticizes Saussure’s procedure oftics proposes starts not from any convenient reduction

formulating langue as the object of linguistics:

of complexity [the idealization] but, on the contrary,
Our concrete object [of study of language] is aby allowing that language may be no less complex

phenomenon of mental and physical process. So it isthan the individual circumstances of which particular

clearly an escape from the object to search for a homo-

linguistic episodes are the product. (Harris 1998: 41)

geneous unit [langue] because of its being heterogeneous. This means that a method delimits its object.

Furthermore, Tokieda criticizes the relationship

Even though he [Saussure] can formulate his own

between langue and parole, which Saussure himself

langue, which is a self-contained whole, as the object

does not mention but a Japanese Saussurean, Hideoof linguistics by delimiting the concrete object, it is

Kobayashi develops from Saussure’s idea:

clear that his methodology is not the study of concrete
linguistic experience itself. Our purpose of study is to

Now the potential [langue] is finite in its number,ask what concrete linguistic experience is like. (Mybut infinite in its quality. For example, I know only one

translation)

word, town to refer to a specific town. The word town

(Tokieda 1941: 62)

is not determined to refer to what kind of town in
Roy Harris points out the same thing as Tokieda

advance of being used. The moment I tell you to go to
the town, the meaning of the word town is decided.

does, thinking of Saussure’s langue as a fixed code:

The potential [langue] is delimited. (The Philosophy ofA third ground for rejecting the fixed code [ofGrammar, pp. 5-6)

both Saussure’s and Chomsky’s] as a linguistic model
concerns the ontogeny of the model itself. Manifestly,

Parole is individual. For the individuality [ofit is a theoretical abstraction arrived at by suppressing

parole] to be understood by other people, existence ofas many dimensions of variation [pointed out by

the general [langue] must be approved. Parole can be

Tokieda] as possible: in particular, variations in what

understood only as realization of langue. (The Philoso-

integrationists [like Roy Harris] regard as the unavoid-

phy of Grammar, p. 6) (My translation)(Tokieda 1941: 68-69)

able biochemical, macrosocial and circumstantial
parameters of communication. The result is that one

But Tokieda criticizes Kobayashi’s explanation

deliberately simplified artificial construct [langue]
comes to be proposed as a basis for explaining every-

above as follows:

thing else. This is sometimes defended by segregaIf the word ‘son’ can be interpreted as referring totionists [like Saussure and Chomsky] as a ‘necessarya specific person [as Kobayashi says], an old man [hisidealization’ essential to ‘scientific’ analysis.
(Harris 1998: 41)

father] can make a stranger understand every meaning delimited by this word [son] by telling him that his

Moreover Harris compares the idealization, which

son is dead. But this is not the case. On the contrary,

Tokieda criticizes as an escape from the object of

the stranger only understands the concept of the word

research, to black-and-white photographs as follows:[son]. Therefore, in order to make it clear what the─ 22 ─

Saussure’s Speech Circuit

son is like, it is necessary to modify the word ‘son’ bysible in a metaphorical sense, but it does not describe

other words. Nevertheless, that only leads to repeat-

concrete experiences of language as they are. (Mying the concepts of other words. It is impossible thattranslation)(Tokieda 1941: 10-11)

we can express the individual as such not as the conIf words do not have any meanings as Tokieda

cept of a word. In a sense, language is like this. (Mytranslation)(Tokieda 1941: 70)

insists, then what are dictionaries, which are generally
thought to tell us meanings of words?

As Tokieda insists, a word expresses something
as a concept, which is not concrete or individual. Then,

Dictionaries register vocabulary and it seems that

how can we understand something, which is expressed

we recognize listing of words apart from our subjec-

as a concept? We can understand what a speakertive action. But to think closely, vocabulary registeredmeans by a clue of words expressing concepts. For

on dictionaries is abstracted from concrete words. It is

example, we can understand words by unconsciously

like an illustration of cherry blossoms on books oftaking into account extra-linguistic factors such as

natural history, and just a sample of concrete individu-

facial expressions, gestures, knowledge, and so on.

als. Dictionaries are compiled through scientific

If we discard such extra-linguistic factors, we havemanipulation of concrete language, therefore theyno choice but to rely on only words themselves inthemselves do not consist of concrete words. If weorder to understand how language can convey one

assume that something like words in dictionaries

person’s thought to another. This leads to the idea thatexists outside of us and we use the words, this means

parole is what is realized by langue.

that we ignore concrete experiences and regard scien-

After all, Saussure, as Tokieda criticizes, derives

tifically abstracted conclusion as the object of research.

langue from heterogeneous langage and explains that

This is against fundamental attitude of linguistic study

parole is what is realized by langue.

as discussed before. We must always take up concrete

Therefore, Tokieda insists that words themselves

experiences as the object of study and seek the theory

do not have any meanings whether they are spoken or

and the law concerning them. To say one more thing

written:about words of dictionaries, it is not strictly the rightthing to say that dictionaries register vocabulary. In

Sounds, which we hear as observers, cannot be

fact, dictionaries do not register vocabulary but arelanguage even though they can be derived as such. We

just a medium, which enables action of linguistic pro-

can recognize the existence of language only when

duction or understanding. For example, even though ameanings emerge after being uttered. It is generally

dictionary registers the word “contemptuous [an old

said that language is sounds that have meanings. But

Japanese word for this meaning],” it is not a word but

we cannot observe sounds with meanings anywhere injust only mere characters, strictly speaking, a group of

the same sense as animals that have backbones. We canlines. But dictionary users can get a linguistic experi-

recognize concrete experiences of language only whenence by this entry, the explanation, the definition, andmeanings emerge for us observers or we express

so on added to the word. As we have seen, we cannot

thoughts through sounds. The same is true of charac-

say any more that there is language in dictionaries.

ters. Characters written on a sheet of paper is just an(My translation)(Tokieda 1941: 13-14)

optical impression. They are, by themselves, no differSo Tokieda compares language to a “water pipe”

ent from cracks in stones. We regard characters as
language because meanings are understood throughas follows:them. In this case, we may think that characters themselves have meanings because meanings are under-[…] language can be thought to be somethingstood through characters. But this means that subjec-

like a water pipe that conveys thought and has only ative action [understanding of meanings] is projected

form but not a content. […] we must think that the

onto objects [characters]. Such an explanation is pos-essence of language consists in a form itself like this.

─ 23 ─Naoki ARAKI(My translation)(Tokieda 1941: 53)

generating in his own mind a thought identical withthat which A wished to communicate.
(Harris 1996: 134)

As we shall see later, Roy Harris also mentions
dictionaries from a different point of view fromSo Harris calls Saussure’s ‘speech circuit’ a ‘tele-

Tokieda’s.
How, then, does Harris treat Saussure’s theory ofmentational process’ and says that the ‘speech circuit’model assumes a fixed code:

language, who has the same idea as Tokieda’s?

2. Harris’s Criticism of Saussure[…] if speech communication is a telementational

First of all, Harris takes up Saussure’s ‘speechprocess, it demands a fixed code which A and B share.
If A and B do not share this fixed code, […] thencircuit’:speech communication between them must at some
The starting point of the circuit [circuit de lapoint break down, […](Harris 1990b: 30)

parole] is in the brain of one (person), call him A,
where […] concepts, are associated with representa-

But Harris insists that if speech communication istions of linguistic signs or acoustic images, […]. […]based on a fixed code, then linguistic innovation willa given concept triggers in the brain a corresponding

be impossible:

acoustic image: […] the brain transmits to the organsof phonation an impulse corresponding to that image;[…] if the speech circuit depends on the opera-

then sound waves are propagated from A’s mouth to B’stion of a fixed code then innovation becomes a theo-ear […]. Next, the circuit continues in B in inverse

retical impossibility. If A attempts to introduce a neworder: from ear to brain […] in the brain, the psycho-

word, B will certainly fail to understand it since exlogical association of this image with the corresponding

hypothesi the word is not part of the code they share.

concept. If B speaks in turn, this new act will follow—

On the other hand, if either A or B can introduce inno-

from his brain to A’s—exactly the same progression as

vations which are communicationally successful, thenthe first, and will pass through the same consecutive

the code is not fixed.

(Harris 1990b: 34)

phases … (Saussure, 1922: 28; author’s [Roy Harris’s]translation).

Furthermore, Harris ironically says that if Saussure’s(Harris 1990a: 142)

theory of communication is correct, then his Cours deHere, between A and B, A’s thought can be transferred from A to B or vice versa. Roy Harris explains

Linguistique Générale should have been incomprehensible:

the same thing as this from a different perspective:
The failure to deal with it [linguistic innovation]
Thus if A thinks, for instance, that Socrates was

has a particular irony, since the development of lin-

Plato’s teacher and wishes to convey this thought to B,

guistics has been heavily dependent on the introduc-

his task as communicator is to find a language or othertion of new terminology, and Saussure’s Cours [design system which is (i) known both to himself and to

Linguistique Générale] itself is a case in point. The

B, and which (ii) allows the possibility of expressing

work should have been incomprehensible if the theory

this thought. A selects from the repertory of signsof communication it advances is correct.
(Harris 1990b: 34)

provided by the fixed code whichever sign or signs
correspond to the thought in question. Transferring

Furthermore, Harris says that the fixed-code the-this thought to B is then simply a matter of the physical implementation or execution of the sign(s) in ques-ory could not explain polysemy and homonymy:

tion in the presence of B, or in such a manner as will
be brought to B’s attention. B then ‘decodes’ this mes-

This [the old chestnut of ‘homonymy’ and ‘poly-sage on the basis of the code shared with A, thussemy’] arises in synchronic linguistics because a com-─ 24 ─

Saussure’s Speech Circuit

prehensive description of the fixed code requires thesame meaning in all contexts. Since the theory of

linguist to identify a determinate number of forms andpolysemy imposes no upper limit on the number of

allocate to each a determinate meaning or meanings.

meanings that a word can have, it is always possible to

The problem was set up in canonical fashion by

explain away any apparent example of context altering

Bloomfield when he pointed out the difficulty of decid-

meaning. All that needs to be done is add yet anothering whether what he called ‘the English verb bear’ in,meaning to the number of meanings assigned to thefor example, bear a burden, bear troubles, bear fruit andword in question. Thus the doctrine of invariant mean-

bear offspring is to be regarded as ‘a single form’ oring is preserved, paradoxically, by multiplying the

as a set of ‘two or perhaps even more homonyms’

number of meanings that the word has, but claiming(Bloomfield, 1935, p. 145).

that speakers only use them one at a time. The ques-(Harris 1998: 73)

tion of which meaning is used in any given instance is
One way of solving the problem above is an

relegated to the study of parole without sacrificing theclaim that the word itself has a fixed complement ofappeal to etymology, but it does not work:

them.

(Harris 1996: 159)

The traditional way of dealing with such cases
lexicographically often appealed to two factors. One

How, then, can we successfully achieve linguistic

was etymology. Thus if the form in question wascommunication? So next Harris proposes a new

known to have had two quite different sources, theapproach to the study of language:

dictionary would list them as two separate words[…] the sign is not given in advance of the com-[homonyms]. […]The snag here for synchronic linguistics is thatmunication situation but is itself constituted in thethe lexicographical solution appeals to historical fac-

context of that situation […] It becomes possible [bytors and this is inadmissible evidence for the descrip-

this new approach] to treat linguistic communication

tive linguist.

as a continuum of interaction which may be mani-(Harris 1998: 74)

fested both verbally and non-verbally.
(Harris 1990b: 45)

Another way of treating with the problem above isthe use of spelling, but it does not work, either:

If the meaning of a word cannot be determined in
The other traditional criterion applied by lexicog-

advance of being used, then its meaning shouldraphers was that of spelling. Thus in English dictionar-

emerge when it is used. This is a logical conclusion as

ies flower is listed as a separate word from flour, even

Harris insists. Here, speech communication is treatedthough they are said to derive etymologically from thenot only verbally but also non-verbally. Needless to say,same source. This criterion too is inadmissible in

the word ‘non-verbally’ means using extra-linguistic

orthodox linguistics, as a consequence of the fact thatfactors.

writing is treated as constituting a different form ofFurthermore, Harris denies the idea that words

communication. The language is the spoken language

or signs have meanings because he insists that linguis-and sound is its medium, not paper and ink.

tic communication should be dealt with by taking into

(Harris 1998: 74)

account not only linguistic factors but also extra-linguistic factors:

After all, polysemy and homonymy cannot be[…] this [that each sign has a meaning] is ansolved by a fixed-code theory. Furthermore, Harrisassumption […] By denying that words, or othersays about polysemy:signs, have meanings what the integrationalist [Harris
This [the concept of ‘polysemy’] can be deployedhimself] is rejecting is the orthodox claim that there isas an exercise in damage-limitation when it turns out

some invariant semantic value which attaches to a

to be implausible to claim that the same word has the

linguistic sign in all circumstances, and from which its

─ 25 ─Naoki ARAKIinterpretation is derived by those who use it. […] thedictionaries, referring to their history:

communicational function of a sign is always contextually determined and derives from the network of inte-

The monolingual dictionary started life as a com-

grational relations which obtain in a particular situa-

pilation of textual glosses; but in the process thetion.

glosses became decontextualized. Thus instead of(Harris 1990b: 48-49)

providing interpretations of particular words in parTherefore, like Tokieda, Harris insists that dic-

ticular texts, the correlation a : bc [for example,
brother : male sibling] acquired a generalized function

tionaries do not give us meanings of words:of much wider and vague scope. That lexicographers
The monolingual dictionary, after all, appears tothemselves assign no specific limits to this semiologi-

set out the words we use, along with their meanings:

cal formula can be seen from the wide variation in its

both words and meanings being presented as decon-

lexicographical use.

(Harris 1996: 201)

textualized abstractions. How would this be possible ifwords had no such meanings? Or if their being mean-

In order to reinforce his claim that words do notingful at all depended on their users and the precise

have meanings, Harris points out the similarities

circumstances of their use?

between linguistics and economics:(Harris 1996: 198)

They [similarities between linguistics and eco-

So Harris takes up a definition of the word

nomics] are similarities which hinge on a common‘brother’ and points out its invalidness:concept of ‘value’. Just as orthodox linguistics treats[…] if a dictionary correctly states that the wordsounds as having meanings by standing for concepts

brother has the same meaning as male sibling, thenor for objects and persons in the external world, so thepresumably the two will be intersubstitutable in any

basic idea of economic theory which the Keynesians

statement without change of meaning. (Some critics

called in question was the idea that a pound note had

fail to appreciate—or even deny—the force of this. But

a value by standing for a quantity of gold.
(Harris 1990b: 51)

if intersubstitutability is rejected, then the segregationalist position collapses in toto.) However, grantedThen, what did the Keynesians do and what, doesintersubstitutability, then to say ‘A brother is a malesibling’ is no more nor less than to say ‘A brother is a

Harris say, linguistics should do?

brother’. The latter statement is an empty tautology,
whereas the former does not appear to be. Indeed, if it

The Keynesian strategy is to point out that thewere, then a dictionary that defined brother as maleassumption that currency notes are pieces of paper

sibling would be no more informative than one which

standing for quantities of precious metals fails to makeglossed brother tautologically as brother. But if ‘Asense of economic reality, where in practice money

brother is a male sibling’ is not an empty tautology, it

functions as a complex of mechanisms which facilitate

seems that the expressions brother and male sibling

the distribution of goods and services. Money does

must somehow differ in meaning. Yet if they differ in

not in addition need to ‘stand for’ anything. Analo-

meaning, then it cannot be entirely accurate to provide

gously in the linguistic case, once we see that lan-one of these expressions as a definition for the other.

guage can be treated as a complex of mechanisms for[…] the very idea that it is possible to state thefacilitating communication there is no need to insist

meaning of a word exactly by citing some other wordthat linguistic signs ‘stand for’ anything else in addi-

or phrase synonymous with it turns out to be illusory,tion.

(Harris 1990b: 52)

and a central assumption of segregational lexicography thus collapses.

For Harris, words do not have meanings just as(Harris 1996: 199-200)

the Keynesians say that money, whether bills or coins,
Why is that? Harris explains how this happens todoes not have a value by standing for a quantity of─ 26 ─

Saussure’s Speech Circuit

veyed or transmitted to another individual.

gold.

(Moore and Carling 1982: 11)

Next we shall examine what Moore and Carling
have to say about this matter.

3. Moore and Carling’s Criticism of Chomsky
First of all, Moore and Carling take up Saussure’s

Just as Harris criticizes Saussure’s ‘speech circuit’, Moore and Carling denies the ‘container view of
meaning’:view of language:[…] nothing is conveyed from one language user
Saussure argued that language could be sepa-

to another.

(Moore and Carling 1982: 161)

rated from local instances of language in use andviewed as a system, self-contained and common to all[…] language does not, indeed cannot, convey

language users. That system Saussure called ‘langue’;

meaning. […] meaning does not inhere in utterances

the task of the linguist he saw as characterizing

but emerges from them. […] meaning is not an inher-‘langue’—the linguistic system which language users

ent but an emergent property of language.
(Moore and Carling 1982: 162-163)

might be said to share. (Moore and Carling 1982: 64)
Moore and Carling express their own view ofFurthermore, Moore and Carling think of lan-language, contrasting it with Chomsky’s, which dates

guage as a catalyst and contrast their view with theback to Saussure:container view:[…] actual language in use is dynamic, involving

The perspective that sees language as a catalyst

as it does the complex interaction of language users’

or trigger serving to initiate a complex series of pro-knowledge, intentions, beliefs and expectations both ofcessing mechanisms has an important consequence.

one another and of the world as they individually per-

Unlike the container view, there is no longer a relation

ceive it.

to be established between language and the world, or(Moore and Carling 1982: 63)

between the structure of language and the structure ofMoreover, Moore and Carling take up ‘the con-the world.

(Moore and Carling 1982: 162)

tainer view of meaning’, which is involved in the idea
So Moore and Carling call their approach to lan-that meaning can be studied independently of lan-

guage “epiphenomenalist”:

guage users:
The container view of meaning, a view that under-

In our alternative approach to the study of lan-lies both formal and informal theories of word mean-

guage, an approach we call epiphenomenalist, we looking, presupposes that meaning can be studied indepen-at language as necessarily dependent upon language

dently of language users. On the container view, people

users and their individual ‘states’.

do not mean something by words rather words them-[…] Within this perspective, language may beselves have meanings. (Moore and Carling 1982: 150)

thought of as a medium whereby our language user
can cause another to access his own ‘store’ of accumu-

If words have meanings, then it will follow that

lated and generalized knowledge and experience, tomeanings are transferred from one person to another.

locate what appears to make sense of the sounds heThis is the same idea as Saussure’s ‘speech circuit’,

hears. […][…] language does not, indeed cannot, convey

which Roy Harris criticizes:

meaning. From the epiphenomenalist perspective, lanThis [the container view of meaning] is the view

guage acts as a locating medium enabling one indi-that words, […] contain meaning within themselves; avidual to cause another to gain access to knowledge,

meaning which, in the course of language use, is con-or to draw inferences from knowledge that he already─ 27 ─Naoki ARAKI

has. On this view of language, meaning does notcontainer view of meaning insists that meanings are

inhere in utterances but emerges from them. For thecontained in words before they are used. Words are

epiphenomenalist, meaning is not an inherent but ansomething like a water pipe, money or a catalyst,

emergent property of language. […]which serves as a medium facilitating communication

One of the consequences of the epiphenomenalist

between people in communities.

view is that it becomes considerably easier to call into

References

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Bloomfield, Leonard. Language. Allen & Unwin. 1935.

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Harris, Roy. “Communication and Language.” The

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their ‘data stores’. Bodily movements, facial expres-

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Harris Roy. “On Redefining Linguistics.” Redefining

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J. Taylor. pp. 18-52. Routledge. 1990b.
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Harris, Roy. Signs, Language and Communication: Inte-right, we cannot help saying that modern linguistics,

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Words are media that intervene between speakers

Language: Towards a Post-Chomskyan Linguistics.

and hearers. So they do not have any meanings at all.
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The MacMillan Press Ltd. 1982.
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circuit assumes that words have meanings indepen-

Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics

dently of situations where they are used. But words do(translated by Wade Baskin). Philosophicalnot have meanings as animals have backbones

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Tokieda, Motoki. The Principles of Japanese Linguistics.

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Iwanamisyotenn. 1941. (in Japanese)