"GFJ Commentary" introduces news analyses andopinions in Japan on the relations of Japan with therest of the world, but they do not represent the views ofGFJ as an institution.

February 28, 2013

On Treninʹs Proposal for Russia to Return
Four Disputed Islands to Japan
By HAKAMADA Shigeki
Recently, a note‐worthy monograph was published in Russia on the issue of Northern
Territories, a territorial issue that exists between Japan and Russia concerning the Northern
Territories (the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai). It is a monographpublished by the Carnegie Moscow Center on its website on 11 December, 2012, entitledʺRussia’s Pacific Future: Solving the South Kuril Islands Dispute,ʺ which is a unique and boldproposal toward the solution of the issue of Northern Territories. To sum up its content in a few
words, ʺSolving the issue requires a compromise made by both parties and a forward‐looking
approach instead of debates on the past.ʺ And the most remarkable point is a proposal to theeffect that ʺRussia should immediately hand over Habomai and Shikotan. Russia should
initially continue to exercise sovereignty over Kunashiri and Etorofu over the period of fifty
years under a distinct economic cooperation system and a legal regime. After the fifty years,
these two islands will transition to Japanese law and sovereignty. Furthermore, Russia willretain economic and other special interests for another fifty years.ʺ

The monograph is co‐authored by Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow
Center, and Yuval Weber. Trenin is a top Russian political scientist with worldwide fame.
Incidentally,

hislatestbook,

Post‐Imperium:A

EurasianStory(Japaneseedition:

ʺRoshia‐Daisenryaku: Yurashia No Daihendo Wo Yomitoku,ʺ translated by Kawato Akio, Yuasa
Takeshi, Koizumi Yu, Sakuhin‐sha, 2012.) was highly acclaimed in book reviews of major
newspapers of Japan. Co‐authored as it is, the very idea of the proposal (hereafter ʺTrenin paper(or proposal)ʺ) comes from Trenin himself, according to my direct inquiry to Trenin on thephone. Besides, I am quite familiar with his enthusiasm with which he intends to improveradically the Japan‐Russia relations by managing to resolve tough and sensitive issues.

During the period between the last years of Perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet
Union, namely from the late 1980ʹs to 90s, there were not a few opinions openly arguing that thefour islands should be returned to Japan among those in the democratic and reformist wing inRussia including Grigorii Yavlinskii. However in recent years, with the rise of nationalism andgreat‐power ideology within Russia, there is a growing tendency to view that even Habomaiand Shikotan should not be returned to Japan. Under the circumstances, it is worthy of note thatan influential intellectual of Russia makes a proposal for Russia to return four islands to Japan,
though from a long‐term perspective.

However, closer study of his proposal highlights several problems. Above all, it
should be noted that this proposal is too far‐reached from the current atmosphere shared by theRussian presidential office, the parliament and the public at large. Before summarizing the main
points of Treninʹs proposal, let me stress that mass media should not deal with this proposal
sensationally for reasons given later on. Trenin states as follows. Qualitative improvement ofJapan‐Russia relations requires resolving the issue of Northern Territories. The only conceivable
solution is a compromise made by both parties between the official Japanese position oftransferring the four islands to Japan and the offer made by Moscow to hand over only
Habomai and Shikotan. Russia must give up more than many Russians think, and Japan needs
to receive less than most Japanese believe it ought to. Leaders in both countries must haveenough support to make these compromises. Solving the issue will not only settle the border
between the two countries but also enhance their standing in the Asia‐Pacific region.

Based on these views, Trenin stresses the importance of Russia being integrated into
the Asia‐Pacific region, importance of Japan as ʺa Germany in the eastʺ for Russia, need ofJapan‐Russia relations being qualitatively improved, and, for all these ends, the need of theterritorial issues being solved. In conclusion, he proposes the following steps to be taken forsolving the territorial issue.

(1) Russia should immediately and fully give up the two islands, Shikotan andHabomai, which Russia already agreed to hand over under the 1956 joint declaration. The
reason formerly given to cancel that accord is no longer relevant as the U.S. military bases inJapan are not a direct threat to Russia. (2) Japan should begin supporting economic activity in
the South Kuril Islands (the Northern Territories) and across Russia through public sector
investment and direct private sector investment. (3) Russia and Japan should establish a ʺjoint
economic zoneʺ covering the four islands that is run by a Russian‐Japanese authority
administering a distinct economic and legal regime. Japan and Russia must reach a politicalagreement that underlies this economic arrangement. From the beginning, the entire fourislands will be demilitarized. Russia will continue to exercise sovereignty over Etorofu andKunashiri for the period of fifty years. Russian civilian migration to these islands will not be
restricted and Japanese people will be free to move to all four islands. (5) At the end of a

fifty‐year period, Etorofu and Kunashiri will transition to Japanese law and sovereignty. But thejoint economic regime will continue for another fifty years. And Russian permanent residentswill be free to stay, enjoying the right to hold dual citizenship of Japan and Russia.

Trenin argues that the United States, in contrast to the Cold War period, has no reason
to oppose rapprochement between Japan and Russia, nor interest that could be served by thecontinuing dispute. And he even sees that a closer Japan‐Russia relationship will help stabilize
the Asia‐Pacific region and be beneficial for the U.S. strategy in the region. Besides, byimproving the Japan‐Russia relations, investment climates of the Russian Far East will bedramatically improved and Russia is not so much giving up the islands as gaining thelong‐term benefits for the entire Pacific coast of Russia. Vladivostok would become a ʺRussianShanghai.ʺ

Furthermore, while stressing that a strengthened cooperative ties between Japan andRussia does not constitute a safeguard against China, he says that Japan, having a complicatedrelation with a rising China, would see a peaceful relationship with Russia as a geopoliticalreassurance. Naturally, he claims that a peaceful settlement of the decades‐old territorial
dispute between Japan and Russia will also positively affect other contested island territories in
the Sea of Japan and the East and South China Seas. Trenin consciously stresses that hisproposals are not ʺagainst China.ʺ However, against the background of his argument as well as
the recent rise in the interest in Japan in Russia, there is, needless to say, a China factor.

As for the evaluation of this proposal, it is worthy of note that a world‐renowned
Russian political scientist proposes an eventual return of the four islands, while encouraging
Japan to make a compromise. However, there are several problems as well. First of all, as statedat the front, this proposal is too far‐reached from the current atmosphere shared by the Russianpresidential office, the parliament and the public at large, and is highly susceptible to severe
criticism and oppositions within Russia rather than from Japan. Secondly, Trenin calls for Japanto engage in public sector investment and direct private sector investment in the Northern
Territories and other areas, before Japan and Russia reach a political agreement. But this idea isno different from the conventional proposal of joint economic activities in the Northern
Territories long offered by Russia or so‐called ʺexit strategies.ʺ In this case, there is a concern
that, without any firm commitment to the political solution, economic cooperation will only beexploited by Russia. With regard to a distinct legal regime under the sovereignty of Russia,
what could possibly be done in a concrete manner is a quite tough question.

Besides, there is a question over the evaluation of Putinʹs intention and competence.

Trenin says that Putin, who is pragmatic enough to have concluded a ʺland‐for‐peaceʺ deal withChina, is not averse to concluding a ʺland‐for‐developmentʺ deal with Japan. This implies acompromise to be made by Russia over the territorial issue in return for the development ofRussian Far East. However, most Russians do not believe that solving the territorial issue withJapan will promptly boost investments in the Far East nor Vladivostok will become a ʺRussianSan Francisco.ʺ

Also, while Putin positively shows a willingness to improve Russia’s relations withJapan, the question are how flexible he could be on the issue of the Northern Territories orwhether he could ever be competent enough to be flexible on the issue. In March 2012, Putin
verbally expressed a seemingly ʺcompromisingʺ stance toward the solution of the territorial
issue, by using such judo terms as ʺHikiwake (draw)ʺ and ʺHajime (begin).ʺ However, on thatoccasion, Putin bluntly ruled out negotiations over Kunashiri and Etorofu and even impliedthat the ʺhandoverʺ of Habomai and Shikotan under the Japan‐Soviet Joint Declaration of 1956
does not mean ʺreturnʺ of them and Russia would thereafter continue to exercise sovereignty
over these islands. In short, Putin takes a quite hardline stance on the territorial issue.
Interpreting Treninʹs proposal in the following manner would be too optimistic a fantasy. Thatis, as Putin has of late newly put forward an ʺAsia‐focusedʺ policy, this proposal should beviewed as a realistic proposal or a trial balloon devised in this context.

At any rate, there are certain signs of change in the current Japan‐Russia relations
driven by such entangled factors as ʺChina,ʺ ʺenergy,ʺ ʺfocus on Siberia and Far East,ʺ andʺintegration of the Asia‐Pacific region.ʺ Under the circumstances, Treninʹs proposal is worthy ofthorough examination to grasp its significance. Meanwhile, as I stated at the front, mass media
should not deal with this proposal sensationally. It is because, firstly, this proposal is unlikely to
be seriously regarded or supported in terms of reality. And secondly, such an institute as theCarnegie Moscow Center is officially regarded as a foreign agent in Russia.

(This is the English translation of an article written by Prof. HAKAMADA Shigeki,Professor, University of Niigata Prefecture, which originally appeared on the BBSʺGiron‐Hyakushutsuʺ of GFJ on January 13, 2013.)