The Legacy of Authoritarianism in a Democracy
Pramod Kumar Sur
Asian Growth Research Institute (AGI) and Osaka University
Working Paper Series Vol. 2022-01
February 2022

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Asian Growth Research InstituteThe Legacy of Authoritarianism in a Democracy∗
Pramod Kumar Sur†
January 2022

Abstract
Recent democratic backsliding and the rise of authoritarian regimes around theworld have rekindled interest in understanding the causes and consequences of authoritarian rule in democracies. In this paper, I study the long-run political consequences of authoritarianism in the context of India, the world’s largest democracy.
Utilizing the unexpected timing of the authoritarian rule imposed in the 1970s andthe variation in a draconian policy implemented during this period, I documenta sharp decline in the share of the then incumbent party’s, the Indian National
Congress, votes and the probability of its candidates winning in subsequent elections. The decline in the incumbent party’s political dominance was not at theexpense of a lower voter turnout rate. Instead, a sharp rise in the number of opposition candidates contesting for election in subsequent years played an importantrole. Finally, I examine the enduring consequences, revealing that confidence inpoliticians remains low in states where the draconian policy was high. Together,
the evidence suggests that authoritarianism in a democracy has a persistent effecton voting behavior, political representation, and confidence in institutions.

JEL classification: D72, N45, J13, P16
Keywords: Democracy, authoritarianism, voting behavior, voter turnout, confidence ininstitutions, family planning, India∗

I thank Rikhil Bhavnani, Charles Crabtree, Masaaki Higashijima, Yusaku Horiuchi, Harunobu Saijo,
Kimiko Terai, Yasutora Watanabe, and numerous seminar and conference participants for their excellent
feedback. All remaining errors are my own. I am grateful for financial support from the Japan Society
for the Promotion of Science (No. 21K13307).
†
Asian Growth Research Institute and Osaka University Email: pramodsur@gmail.com

1

1

Introduction

The world has been in the grip of a democratic recession and authoritarian regimes andautocratic rules are on the rise.1 Figure 1 presents the change in the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) of countries for the period 2012–2017 from the Varieties of Democracy
database.2 Although several countries are transitioning toward more democratic rule (especially in Africa), the figure clearly suggests that even more countries have become lessdemocratic over this period, especially in Asia, Europe, and the Americas, thereby giving
rise to regimes popularly known as “electoral autocracies.” 3 Even more strikingly, recent
democratic setbacks and surges of authoritarian rule are emerging in well-establisheddemocracies (such as India) and in wealthier countries (such as Venezuela, Turkey, Hungary, and Poland). With more countries backsliding rather than improving in their overall
democratic performance, and especially with mainstream political parties (and leaders)in these countries transitioning toward authoritarian rule, the global trend toward authoritarianism should be viewed with concern, and its consequences should be assessed
appropriately.
Figure 1 about here

In this article, I explore the political consequences of authoritarianism in the world’s
largest democracy, India. The unexpected authoritarian rule in India during the 1970s
provides a unique natural setting in history to study the legacy of authoritarianism in a
democracy. Between 1975 and 1977, India went through a brief period of authoritarianrule under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of the ruling Indian National Congress (INC)
party. Her draconian rule during this period was the first experience of electoral autocracy
in India. On June 25, 1975, she unexpectedly proclaimed a state of emergency, popularly
known as “the emergency” in India, which, under the Indian constitution, suspended awide range of civil liberties. In the subsequent periods, she implemented several draconianpolicies, imposed a series of new legislation, and made constitutional amendments togovern the country. However, in January 1977, she unexpectedly called an election andlifted the emergency rule.4 Figure 2 presents the (sudden) change in the democratic index
during this brief period in India.
Figure 2 about here
1

For example, see Diamond (2021), Hodal (2019), and Hyde (2020).
Figure A.1 in the Appendix additionally presents the countries that have become substantially either
autocratic or democratic between 2010 and 2020.
3
For example, see Alizada et al. (2021), Bloomberg (2018), and Lührmann and Lindberg (2019).
4
The emergency rule officially ended in March 1977 after the defeat of the INC in the lower house of
the parliament.
22My empirical strategy is to investigate the impact of the authoritarian rule on political outcomes in the subsequent periods in India. I interpret the authoritarian rule
between 1975 and 1977 as an exogenous shock to Indian democracy and trace the political responses in subsequent periods. I use the universe of election data from the lower
house of the parliament (Lok Sabha) between 1962 and 2019 to investigate the politicalconsequences of the authoritarian rule.
My main finding is that the authoritarian rule has had a first-order impact on the
decline of the political dominance of the then incumbent party, the INC, in India. Usinga difference-in-differences (DID) estimation approach, I document a significantly lower
INC vote share and a lesser number of INC candidates winning elections in subsequent
years. My estimates suggest that the authoritarian rule between 1975 and 1977 accounts
for about a four-percentage point decline in the INC’s vote share in subsequent elections.
Furthermore, the draconian rule can explain as much as a 28-percentage point drop in
the INC candidates’ probability of winning elections in subsequent years.
I bolster this interpretation with several exercises. First, I show that an alternative
source of variation of the authoritarian rule provides similar results. If the decline of the
INC was partly a response to the brief period of authoritarianism, then a draconian policy
implemented during this period intensifying the authoritarian rule should have similar
results. I document that this is the case. I focus on an aggressive policy undertaken
during this period, that is, the forced sterilization policy, and use the excess sterilizations
performed at the state level as a second level of variation. As historians have argued, andas I will explain in detail in the next section, among all authoritarian policies, aggressive
family planning through forced sterilization was a hallmark of the emergency period and apolicy that directly affected the general population (Chandra, 2017; Dhar, 2000; Gwatkin,1979; Nayar, 2013; Panandiker et al., 1978; Shah Commission of Inquiry, 1978; Williams,
2014). Using this as my second-level variation in the authoritarian rule, I implement a
triple-difference (DDD, henceforth) estimation strategy and find results consistent withmy interpretation. Second, I estimate a flexible DDD model that allows for the estimationof election year-specific treatment effects through an event study design. I find that theestimates for preemergency periods, i.e., the years prior to 1977, fluctuate around zeroand do not follow any specific trend. However, most postemergency years’ coefficients arenegative and highly statistically significant. The legacy of the authoritarian rule persists
and has continued to affect the INC’s political representation up to the most recent
election in 2019. In both cases, the results are consistent with a causal interpretationthat the authoritarian rule imposed by the INC has had a first-order impact on the decline
of its political dominance in India.
Then, I explore the plausible mechanisms. I first show that the decline in the INC’s
political dominance did not occur because of a lower voter turnout rate in subsequent
elections. The voter turnout rate did not decline after the authoritarian rule, suggest3

ing that voters switched their voting behavior favoring non-INC candidates. However,
the autocratic rule gave rise to the formation of new political parties. In particular, I
document a sharp increase in the number of candidates contesting elections from a constituency after 1977. This may have been because the authoritarian rule and draconianpolicy imposed during the emergency may have created a credibility gap in the INC’s
rule over India. As a result, it may have had a direct impact on the formation of new
opposition parties as a direct deterrence to the INC rule, which thereby captured someof the INC votes.
Finally, I explore the durable consequences that endure in present-day India. Usingstate-level variation in the draconian forced sterilization policy, I document that households belonging to states heavily exposed to the draconian policy exhibit a lower levelof confidence in politicians today. My interpretation is that the authoritarian rule anddraconian policy implemented by the INC, then the largest political party in India, may
have delegitimized the political establishment. Thus, the legacy of this historical event
persists today.
This paper builds on and contributes to the political economy literature on authoritarian regimes in democracies. The recent democratic backsliding and the rise of electoral autocracies and authoritarian populist regimes has sparked a new generation ofstudies on the erosion of democracy and the process of autocratization (e.g., Bermeo,
2016; Coppedge, 2017; Diamond, 2008a,b, 2015; Hyde, 2020; Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018;Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019; Mechkova et al., 2017; Runciman, 2018). In addition,
they have rekindled our interest in understanding and exploring what lies behind theascendancy of such regimes in democracies. Popular explanations include cultural backlash (e.g., Margalit, 2019; Mutz, 2018; Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Sides et al., 2019),
economic shocks such as financial crises (e.g., Algan et al., 2017; Dehdari, 2021; Fetzer,
2019; Funke et al., 2016; Mian et al., 2014), trade and globalization (e.g., Autor et al.,2020; Colantone and Stanig, 2018), immigration (e.g., Dustmann et al., 2019; Halla etal., 2017; Tabellini, 2020), and the interactions of these factors.5 However, there is limited systematic evidence and few econometric studies about the legacy of such regimes in
the long run. Understanding the legacy is important as the institutional change causedby the authoritarian rule—both formal and informal—and citizens’ experience with theregime may persist. My paper is most closely related to the strand of political economy
literature that focuses on the rise of fascism and its legacy in Italy (e.g., Acemoglu etal., 2020; Fontana et al., 2018). Relying on a unique natural experiment in the history of
the world’s largest democracy, I present evidence that authoritarianism in a democracy
can have a persistent effect on voting behavior, political representation, and confidence
in institutions.
5

For a detail review of literature in this field, particularly the recent rise of authoritarian populism,
please refer to Berman (2021); Guriev and Papaioannou (2020); Rodrik (2020), and the references therein.

4This paper also contributes to the literature on the Indian political economy and theevolution of political parties in India. For a long period, beginning from its independence
in 1947, a single major party governed India. However, since the late 1970s, it has transitioned from single-party dominance to multiparty competition, particularly, coalition
governments, with the formation of several regional parties. I contribute to the literatureon change in the party structure (Chhibber and Verma, 2018; Dasgupta, 2018; Ziegfeld,2012), political cleavages (Banerjee et al., 2019), and the evolution and popularity of the
populist party in India (Kenny, 2017; Suryanarayan, 2019). I present evidence that thestate of emergency rule between 1975 and 1977 as a shock to Indian democracy has had
a profound impact on Indian political economy and the evolution of political parties inIndia. Additionally, the legacy of this brief period of authoritarian rule persists today.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides thehistorical context. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis and its sources.
Section 4 discusses my empirical strategy to identify the causal effect. Section 5 presents
some stylized facts and the main results. Section 6 explores the mechanisms. Section
7 examines the present-day consequences on confidence in politicians, and Section 8
concludes. The online Appendix provides additional robustness checks and results.

2

The Emergency as an Exogenous Shock to Indian
Democracy

On June 25, 1975, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of the INC party proclaimed a national
emergency under Article 352 of the Indian constitution.6 The exact reason for the proclamation of emergency remains controversial. However, political scientists, historians, andsociologists argue that a combination of political and economic problems facing the Prime
Minister and India could be the most predictable factor.7
The executive power associated with the proclamation of emergency allowed Mrs.
Gandhi to suspend a wide range of civil liberties under the Indian constitution. Acting in
an authoritarian manner, she misused this power, repressed the opposition, and instituted
censorship in the name of law and order during this period. Hundreds of thousandsof people, including leading opposition leaders, were arrested, the press censored, and6
Article 352 (1) states that “If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the
security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression
or armed rebellion, he may, by Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect in respect of the wholeof India or of such part of the territory thereof as may be specified in the Proclamation Explanation.
A Proclamation of Emergency declaring that the security of India or any part of the territory thereofis threatened by war or by external aggression or by armed rebellion may be made before the actual
occurrence of war or of any such aggression or rebellion, if the President is satisfied that there is imminent
danger thereof.”7
For a detail overview of this period, please refer to Jaffrelot and Anil (2021); Dhar (2000), and Nayar(2013).

5

public gatherings and strikes were declared illegal. With all the power in her hands as
Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi undertook a series of new legislation and constitutional
amendments to govern the country and extend the emergency period. Furthermore, shedelayed the parliamentary elections several times, indicating her intention to remain in
power (Gwatkin, 1979). In January 1977, however, Mrs. Gandhi unexpectedly called
an election, released opposition leaders from jail, lifted press censorship, and once again
permitted public meetings. The emergency period officially ended in March 1977 after
the defeat of the INC party in the Lok Sabha election.
A hallmark policy synonymous with the emergency that directly affected the general population during this period was the aggressive family planning program involving
forced sterilization.8 The program commenced in April 1976 with a new population policy introduced to the parliament by the Union Ministry of Health and Family Planning.
The principal aim of the policy was to lower the population growth rate by boosting thefamily planning program. The new policy incorporated a series of fundamental changes
to reduce population growth, including a substantial increase in monetary compensation
for acceptors of sterilization, state-level introduction of incentives and disincentives attached to family planning policies, the disenfranchisement of states that failed to control
fertility rates, allocation of central assistance to states according to family planning performance, and, most controversially, provisions for state governments to pass compulsory
sterilization legislation (Singh, 1976).
With the introduction of the new population policy, the central government endorsed
various coercion measures for sterilization and, in extreme cases, compulsory sterilization. The central and state governments increased the financial rewards for those who
accepted sterilization. Through a range of incentives and disincentives, they pressured
government employees to become sterilized and motivated others to do so. In several
instances, quotas were imposed on central and state government employees to produce acertain number of individuals for sterilization. In other cases, citizens were required to
produce sterilization certificates to access basic facilities, including housing, irrigation,
subsidized foods through ration cards, and public health care. Other extreme measures
were undertaken; for example, the state government in Maharashtra passed a bill allowing compulsory sterilization of couples with three or more children (Shah Commission ofInquiry, 1978).9
The aggressive family planning program led to more than 8 million sterilizations
between April 1976 and March 1977, more than three times the number in the previous
year (see Figure A.2). Over 1.7 million sterilizations were performed during September
1976 alone, a figure that was equivalent to the annual average number of sterilizations
8

Although India’s family planning program existed prior to the emergency, the sterilization drive wasintensified during this period.
9
However, the bill was not approved by the central government and was eventually returned to thestate for revision.

6

performed during the preceding 10 years (Gwatkin, 1979). Most of the sterilizations
performed during the period involved men undergoing vasectomies. Of the approximately
8.3 million sterilizations performed in 1976–1977, about 6.2 million (75%) were achieved
through vasectomies.
Survey evidence suggests that individuals were influenced or, in most cases, coerced
into accepting sterilization during the forced sterilization period. In a survey of individuals who accepted sterilization during this period, Panandiker et al. (1978) documentthat about 72% underwent sterilization due to the influence of government officials. Only
about 19% were sterilized on their own initiative, while the remaining 9% were motivatedby friends and relatives. Strikingly, no individuals were sterilized because of the lure ofmoney (as a result of the increased compensation) and no one cited any case where money
had played a motivating role. This evidence suggests that most individuals underwent
sterilization involuntarily during this period.
The draconian forced sterilization during the emergency period was the first major
program since independence under which Indian citizens directly suffered at the handof the government. Tarlo (2000) noted that the word “emergency” itself became synonymous with “sterilization” and, even today, individuals refer to the emergency period
as the period of sterilization. The impact was such that the Indian government had tochange the name of its ministry of health from the Department of Health and Family
Planning to the Department of Health and Family Welfare in 1977 (Scott, 2017). In thepostemergency period, the family planning program shifted its focus from vasectomies
to tubectomies, under which women emerged as the primary sterilization target (Basu,
1985). The emergency period remains controversial today and is regarded as one of thedarkest periods in the history of Indian democracy.
Mrs. Gandhi misused the Indian constitution and proclaimed a national emergency.
As a result, Indian citizens directly suffered at the hands of the government during thisperiod. Therefore, this brief period of authoritarian rule may have generated a backlash
against the central government in general and the political party (the INC) pursuingauthoritarian rule in particular. Additionally, as an alternative definition of the authoritarian rule, my analysis tests for hypotheses examining whether states heavily affectedby the draconian forced sterilization policy during the emergency period have different
effects in terms of political representation and voting behavior in the subsequent elections.

3

Data Sources and Description

3.1

Electoral Data

The election data that I use are taken from all general election results in the Lok Sabha
during 1962–2019. The data come from the statistical reports published by the Election
7

Commission of India.10 Recently, they have been digitalized and harmonized by the
Trivedi Center for Political Data, Ashoka University (Agarwal et al., 2019).11 The dataon general election results since 1962 are available at both candidate and constituency
levels.
To study the change in voting behavior toward the INC party, I focus on the election
data at the candidate level. The data set contains the number of votes and the share ofeach candidate’s vote in an election in a constituency. I rely on the percentage of the voteobtained by each candidate in a constituency as my primary outcome variable.12 Thedata set also contains constituency level data on the number of candidates contesting anelection and the percentage of eligible voters who turn out to vote in each election. I use
this information to study the mechanisms by examining contestants’ behavior and voter
turnout rates.

3.2

Data on Family Planning During the Emergency

The estimates on India’s aggressive family planning policy during the emergency periodcome from the yearbooks published by the Ministry of Health and Family Planning, Government of India.13 Along with various demographic and health statistics, the yearbook
reports yearly statistics on family planning programs performed at the national and statelevels from April in each year to March of the following year. Concerning the sterilization
statistics, the yearbook reports the number of sterilizations performed each year at thestate level. Additionally, it reports the number of vasectomy (male sterilization) andtubectomy (female sterilization) operations performed by each state in each year.
I estimate the aggressive family planning policy by constructing two sterilization measures.14 First, as my baseline measure, I use all excess sterilizations (both male andfemale) performed during 1976–1977 compared with 1975–1976. Additionally, as an alternative measure, I consider the excess vasectomies performed during 1976–1977 compared with the 1975–1976 period because the forced sterilizations largely targeted malesterilization, with about 75% of the sterilizations performed during this period involving
vasectomies.
10

See https://eci.gov.in/statistical-report/statistical-reports/
See http://lokdhaba.ashoka.edu.in/
12This is because the number of votes may provide biased results because the voting population varies
substantially between constituencies.
13
In 1977, the name of the department changed to Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Governmentof India.
14
I primarily compare data from one year with data from the previous year to account for the emergency
period because the emergency period continued from 1975 until 1977.
11

8

3.3

Data on Confidence in Politicians

My additional outcome variable to explore the present-day consequence of authoritarianrule is based on the data on confidence in institutions from the Indian Human Development Survey-II in 2011–2012 (IHDS-II) (Desai and Vanneman, 2012). The IHDS-II is anational representative survey that asks households questions about their confidence inpoliticians to fulfill promises. The respondents can choose between three answers: a great
deal of confidence, some confidence, and hardly any confidence. The IHDS-II assigns values of 1, 2 and 3, respectively, to each of the answers.15 I use these data to explore
whether authoritarian rule in general and the forced sterilization during this period inparticular have any durable consequences for confidence in politicians in India.

4

Empirical Strategy

I use four empirical strategies to present my main findings. My first strategy consists ofproviding descriptive evidence by comparing voting outcomes between INC and non-INC
candidates in a constituency across different periods before and after the emergency rule.
To provide a visual representation, I present the raw data in a scatter plot. I then present
the difference in means using simple two-by-two tables.
Second, I implement a DID strategy and present the results in a regression framework controlling for differences across regions, parties, and election years. My baseline
estimation equation is:
Yicspt = βP ostt ∗ IN Cp + γt + δγp + γc + γs + icspt(1)

where Yicspt denotes one of the voting outcome measures of candidate i, contested
from constituency c of state s, under party p, in year t. P ostt takes a value of one forelections held after the emergency period (that is, 1977 and after), and a value of zerootherwise. IN Cp is an indicator variable for candidates belonging to the INC party. γt
are election year fixed effects. γp represents party-level controls (in particular, party andparty-type fixed effects). Because constituencies and states have changed over time, I use
both constituency fixed effects γc and state fixed effects γs . Standard errors are clusteredat the constituency level from which a candidate contests electoral districts.
The main identifying assumption for my DID estimation approach above is that in
the absence of the emergency rule, the evolution of the voting outcomes between the INC
and other parties would have been similar. This may be a strong assumption, which may
not be satisfied on several grounds. In particular, comparing outcomes between INC andnon-INC candidates is problematic because INC has been the largest political party inIndia since independence in 1947.
15

Therefore, a higher score constitutes a lower level of confidence.

9

To account for this issue, my third strategy consists of imposing a second level ofvariation in the authoritarian rule and implementing a DDD estimation strategy. I exploit
the aggressive policy undertaken during this period, that is, the forced sterilization policy,
and use the excess sterilizations performed at the state level as a second level of variation.
More specifically, I estimate the following DDD specification:

Yicspt = βP ostt ∗ IN Cp ∗ Ss + γt + δγp + γc + γs + µ0 Interactions + icspt(2)

where Ss is the number of excess sterilizations performed between April 1976 andMarch 1977 at state s normalized by performance in 1975–76. Specifically, I define Ss as

ExcessSterilizations =#sterilizations(1976 1977)s − #sterilizations(1975 1976)s#sterilizations(1975 1976)s

Additionally, Interactions represents the interaction terms required to perform the DDD
analysis. The other variables are the same as those defined in equation (1).
Finally, I estimate a flexible DDD model that allows for the estimation of election
year-specific treatment effects. To do this, I estimate the following regression:

Yicspt =X

βt Dt ∗ IN C p ∗ Ss + γt + δγp + γc + γs + µ0 Interactions + icspt ,(3)twhere Dt is a dummy variable indicating whether the election belongs to year t.16
The other variables are the same as those defined in equation (2). The coefficient ofinterest is βt , which captures the cohort-specific treatment effects. The pattern of βt inthe preemergency period allows me to check the validity of the identification assumption.
In the absence of any existing trends that correlate with excess sterilization, I expect tofind no effects for preemergency periods, i.e., βt ≈ 0.

5

The Effects of Authoritarianism on Voting Behavior

My main outcome variable for voting behavior is the share of votes held by candidates
and by the winner in a constituency. As highlighted above, the 1977 election was heldin March, after the emergency rule was relaxed in January. Hence, throughout, I interpret voting behavior in 1977 and after as belonging to the postauthoritarian period.
16

The omitted category corresponds to the immediate major election year before the emergency (i.e.,1971).

10Additionally, I consider the INC party candidates as my treatment group because theemergency was declared solely by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of the INC party, and all
the opposition leaders (including the senior leaders) were imprisoned during this period.17

5.1

Descriptive Evidence

I begin by presenting the raw data through simple scatter plots in Figure 3.18 Panel
A of Figure 3 plots the average vote share of INC and non-INC candidates received ina constituency in each election year. In panel B, I additionally plot the probability ofwinning for INC and non-INC candidates in a constituency in each election year. The
red dashed line represents the end of the authoritarian rule in India. As we can observe,
the average voting share and the probability of winning of INC candidates show an
upward trend in the preemergency era but decline sharply in the postemergency period.
In contrast, the non-INC candidates’ average share of votes and winning probability
demonstrate a downward or constant trend in the preemergency era and remain flat in
the postemergency period.19 Overall, the figure reveals that the INC’s share of votes andwinning probabilities show a declining trend after the authoritarian rule, whereas thoseof the non-INC remain more or less flat.
Figure 3 about here

Table 1 presents the levels and changes in vote share and winning probabilities using
simple two-by-two tables. I present the results on vote shares in columns (1) and (2),and probabilities of winning in columns (4) and (5). In addition, I show the differences inaverage vote shares between INC and non-INC candidates in column (3) and the averagewinning probabilities between INC and non-INC candidates in column (6). Row (3) of
the table presents the changes in average vote shares and winning probabilities before
and after the emergency rule.
Table 1 about here

As Table 1 indicates, for INC candidates, both average vote shares and the winning probabilities declined after the emergency period, which is similar to the results
17

Anecdotal evidence suggests that Mrs. Gandhi declared the emergency without even consulting mostof her INC party members. For an overview of this period and a detailed insider’s account, see Dhar
(2000) by the head of the Prime Minister’s secretariat, who was one of her closest advisers during thisperiod.
18
In Figure A.3 in the Appendix, I restrict the raw data to major election years only and present it
for clear visualization.
19
The average share of votes and winning probabilities of INC and non-INC candidates do not sum to
100 and 1, respectively, because more than one non-INC candidate contested their electoral constituency.

11

documented in Figure 3. More interestingly, the non-INC share of votes and winningprobabilities also declined.20 However, it declined more for INC candidates. The difference in these differences (see the estimates in column (3) row (3) and column (6) row(3)) suggest that, on average, INC candidates received 1.25% less votes, and their probability of winning was 27% lower. These estimates are highly statistically significant.
This simple estimator can be interpreted as the effect of the authoritarian rule, under
the assumption that in the absence of the emergency, the decline in voting share and theprobability of winning would not have been systematically different between INC andnon-INC candidates. In the remainder of this paper, I will elaborate on this assumption
step by step in detail to provide a more convincing result.

5.2

DID Estimates

I present the DID estimates of equation (1) for vote shares in Table 2. The coefficient incolumn (1) is my most parsimonious specification for performing the DID estimation in aregression framework. It includes only candidates’ political party and year fixed effects.
These fixed effects are included in all of my specifications, which ensures that the results
are not driven by some unobserved political party characteristics and periodic trends overtime. The post-INC variable (the DID term, henceforth) has a coefficient of -4.409 with astandard error of 0.568 (and is thus significant at less than 1%). The coefficient estimate
implies that the authoritarian rule is associated with declines in INC candidates’ shareof the votes by about 4.4 percentage points in the subsequent years.
Table 2 about here

The rest of the table shows that this relationship is robust when I control for a range ofother covariates. In column 2, I include additional party-level controls (particularly typesof political party fixed effects, which proxy for the geographical representation of a party
for which candidates are contesting, such as national, state-based, local, and independent
parties). The inclusion of these additional party-level fixed effects has virtually no effects
on my coefficient estimates. In columns 3 and 4, I separately add state and constituency
fixed effects, which control for permanent differences in political attitudes in the states
and constituencies. In column 5, I include both state and constituency fixed effects. The
inclusion of these geographic level controls, separately or together, has no discernible
impact on the coefficient estimates for the DID term.
Finally, in column 6, I restrict my analysis to major elections only and exclude special
elections (such as byelections) held between general elections to fill vacant positions. The
coefficient estimates for the DID term in column 6 do not change and are similar to those20

We will explore the reason for these interesting phenomena in more detail in the mechanism section.

12

presented in column 5. My overall interpretation of the results in Table 2 is that theauthoritarian rule had a first-order impact on the decline of the INC’s share of votes inthe subsequent elections.
Next, I present the DID estimates of the probability of winning the elections in Table
3. In addition to validating my results using shares of votes, this measure is of interest
because it directly captures the political outcome in constituencies that oppose the INC
and because it is informative about the evolution of political parties in India and how
the authoritarian rule has impacted the decline of the INC’s dominance.
Table 3 about here

Table 3 has a similar structure as Table 2. In all six columns of Table 3, we see a sizable
impact of the authoritarian rule on the subsequent decline in the winning probability of
INC candidates. In my most parsimonious specification in column 1 (which includes party
fixed effects and election year fixed effects as in column 1 of Table 2), the coefficientestimate is -0.276, with a standard error of 0.017. This magnitude implies that theauthoritarian rule is associated with declines in INC candidates’ probability of winning theelections in the subsequent years by about 28 percentage points. Hence, the authoritarianrule between 1975 and 1977 accounts for a significant portion of the decline in the INC’s
political dominance in India.
The estimates in the remaining columns are stable. Columns 2 and 3 add party-type
fixed effects and state fixed effects, but the coefficient does not change. Column 4 includes constituency fixed effects in place of state fixed effects, but the coefficient varies
only slightly (from -0.276 to -0.274). Columns 5 and 6 present my most demanding specification, including all the controls in column 5 and excluding special elections in column
6, suggesting that my results are robust and fairly stable to alternative specifications.

5.3

DDD EstimatesNow, I turn to the DDD estimation approach using a second level of variation in theauthoritarian rule. I exploit a distinctive, aggressive policy undertaken during this period
and use the number of excess sterilizations performed between April 1976 and March 1977,
normalized by the previous year’s performance, to implement my DDD estimation. As
noted previously, among all authoritarian policies, aggressive family planning throughforced sterilization was a hallmark of the emergency period that directly affected thegeneral population. This measure is of particular interest because it uniquely captures
the INC’s authoritarian policy at the height of the emergency rule and because it isinformative in capturing some of the legacies that might have directly impacted later
support for the INC party.
13

Table 4 presents the DDD results exploiting this source of variation. Panel A presents
the DDD estimates of vote shares. In panel B, I present the DDD estimates of the probability of winning the elections. Table 4 has an identical structure to Table 2 and 3. The
results in this table are uniformly consistent with our hypothesis that the authoritarian
rule, as captured by excess sterilization, has a large and statistically significant effecton the INC’s election outcomes in subsequent years. For example, the estimate for theshare of votes in panel A of Table 4 in our most demanding specification in column 6 is
-0.874 (with a standard error of 0.313), which implies that constituencies with a meanlevel of excess sterilization (about 3.38 times) are associated with a decline of about 2.95
percentage points in the INC candidates’ shares of votes in the subsequent years. The
estimate for the probability of a win in the same specification is -0.035 (with a standard
error of 0.009) and implies a sizable negative effect as well: a constituency with a meanlevel of excess sterilization is associated with a decline of 11.86 percentage points in the
INC candidates’ probability of winning the elections in the subsequent years.
Table 4 about here

5.4

Flexible DDD Approach: Event Study Design

Finally, I turn to the flexible DDD approach described in equation (3) that allows forthe estimation of election year-specific treatment effects. I present the βt coefficients
through event study graphs in Figure 4 and in tabular form in Table B1 in the Appendix.
For better visualization, I present the coefficient estimates for major elections only andexclude special elections held between general elections as there are few observations inthese years.21
Panel A of Figure 4 plots year-specific estimates for vote shares. The black line shows
the main impact, with 95% and 99% confidence intervals represented by the dashed grayand light blue lines. As we observe, the estimates of vote shares for preemergency periods,
i.e., the pre-1977 years, in panel A of Figure 4 fluctuate around zero and do not follow
any specific trend. This finding constitutes a validity check on my main identification
assumption of a lack of existing trends. However, the coefficients for the postemergency
years are negative, except for 1984, and most years are highly statistically significant. The
positive coefficient of the 1984 election remains unclear and needs further investigation.
However, the most likely reason is that the 1984 election was held immediately after
the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who declared the emergency andinstituted the authoritarian rule in India.22 The results in panel A of Figure 4 suggest
21

I present the coefficient estimates for all elections in Figure A.4 in the Appendix.
Indira Gandhi was assassinated on October 31, 1984, and the general election was held in December
1984. Most of India voted for the INC during the 1984 election and it is the only time in history in whicha single party won more than 400 seats.
22

14

that authoritarian rule accounts for a persistent decline in the INC’s vote share, and thatthe effect remains up to the recent election in 2019.
Figure 4 about here
Next, I present the year-specific estimates of the probability of winning the elections
in panel B of Figure 4. Panel B has a similar structure to the vote shares shown in panel
A and it is evident that the figures both panels are quite similar. Almost all coefficientsfor the postemergency years remain negative. However, a major difference is that theestimates of the probability of winning for the preemergency years sometimes remain
positive and statistically significant.
My overall interpretation of Figure 4 is that the authoritarian rule between 1975 and1977 had a first-order impact on the decline in the INC’s political dominance in India.
Additionally, the legacy of the authoritarian rule persists and continues to affect the
INC’s political representation to the present day.

5.5

Robustness

Further robustness checks for the results in this section are provided in the Appendix.
Briefly, in Table B2, I show that the results of my DDD estimates are robust to considering an alternative measure of aggressive policy undertaken during this period (forced
sterilization) measured by excess vasectomy, which constituted the majority of sterilization operations (about 75%) during this period. Finally, the results are very similar if I
conduct a flexible DDD estimation approach using excess vasectomy as my alternative
measure of aggressive policy (see Figure A.5 in the Appendix).

6

Understanding the Mechanisms

In the previous section, I showed that the authoritarian rule instituted between 1975
and 1977 directly impacted the decline in the INC’s political dominance in India. In
this section, I investigate the possible mechanisms. In particular, I first show that thevoter turnout rate did not decline after the authoritarian rule, suggesting that lower
voter turnout did not cause the decline in the incumbent’s share of votes in subsequent
elections. Additionally, I provide suggestive evidence that the authoritarian rule gave riseto the formation of new political parties.

6.1

Where Did the INC Votes Go?

As a first step in building up the evidence for my mechanism, I check whether there isany change in the overall voter turnout rate. A possible direct mechanism is that the15

INC party’s share of votes declined because many of their supporters who voted for them
before the authoritarian period did not turn up to vote in subsequent years. I address thisissue directly by examining the percentage of eligible voters who vote in a constituency.
I present the raw data in Figure 5. Figure 5, which plots the average voter turnout rate
in a constituency, shows that the voter turnout rate did not decline. Instead, the voter
turnout rate increased after the end of the authoritarian rule.
Figure 5 about here

Next, I implement a DID strategy and present the results in a regression framework,
controlling for differences across regions and election years, and consider a variation in
the authoritarian rule measured by excess sterilization. My baseline estimation equationis:Ycst = βP ostt ∗ Ss + γt + γc + γs + cst ,(4)

where Ycst denotes the voter turnout rate in constituency c of state s in year t. The
other variables are the same as those defined in equation (2). I present the results inTable 5. Columns 1–4 present the coefficient estimates with excess sterilization as themeasure of authoritarian rule. Columns 5–8 present the estimates with excess vasectomy
as an alternative measure of authoritarian rule.
Table 5 about here

The results from Table 5 support the evidence shown in Figure 5 that the voter
turnout rate did not decline. Indeed, the relationship is positive, although not statisticallysignificant, in every specification. Thus, this suggests that earlier INC supporters did notrefrain from casting their vote but rather switched away from the INC and toward nonINC candidates in the postauthoritarian period.

6.2

Evolution of New Political Parties

As an alternative interpretation of my proposed mechanism, I examine whether the authoritarian rule led to the formation of new political parties. This insight is motivatedby the results presented in Table 1. As the Table 1 shows, the share of votes and winningprobability declined in the postemergency period for both the INC and non-INC parties.
These findings are counterintuitive because, in the absence of any change in the number ofcandidates contesting in a constituency, the decline in INC voting outcomes should cause
the non-INC candidates’ share of votes and winning probability to increase on average.

16However, I find the opposite effect. I explore the intuition behind this result in detail inthis subsection.
The INC was the largest political party when authoritarian rule was imposed in India
in the 1970s. From the first election in 1951–1952 after India become a republic, the INC
party was constantly in power. Moreover, there were few other political parties during
this period and, in particular, no strong opposition parties.23
My alternative interpretation is that the authoritarian rule and the draconian policy
imposed during the emergency may have created a credibility gap in the INC’s ability torule India, which lead to the formation of new opposition parties in direct opposition to
the INC rule, which then captured the INC votes.
I provide direct evidence of my interpretation. I consider the number of candidates
contested in an election from a constituency as a proxy measure for the number of political parties in a constituency. I plot the average number of candidates contested from a
constituency in every election year in panel A and major election years in panel B of Figure 6. It is evident from the raw data that there was a sudden increase in the number ofcandidates in the postauthoritarian period. In particular, there was a sudden rise in thenumber of candidates after the 1977 election. The 1977 election was announced unexpectedly in January during the authoritarian rule and was held less than two months later, inMarch. Hence, there was a short lag before the increase in non-INC candidates increase
because there was very little time to form new political parties and stand candidates forthe election in 1977.
Figure 6 about here

Next, I implement a DID strategy (similar to equation 4) and present the resultsin Table 6. This table has an identical structure to Table 5. The results from Table
6 support the evidence presented in Figure 6 and my interpretation suggesting that thedraconian sterilization policy as a measure of the authoritarian rule had a positive impact
on the number of candidates contesting for election in the postauthoritarian period.
Table 6 about here

I provide additional support for this interpretation by conducting an event study
analysis. In Figure 7, I conducted a flexible DID approach and present the election yearspecific treatment effects through event study graphs. Panel A of Figure 7 plots the yearspecific treatment effects considering excess sterilization as the measure of authoritarian23
For example, the INC received 352 seats in the 1971 Lok Sabha election, the major election immediately before the authoritarian rule. The main opposition parties, the Communist Party of India(Marxist) (CPI(M)) and the Communist Party of India (CPI), received only 25 and 23 seats, respectively.

17rule. Panel B additionally presents the year-specific treatment effects considering excess
vasectomy as a measure of authoritarian rule. Overall, the consistency in the pattern of
the findings bolsters my interpretation that the decline in the INC’s share of votes wascaused by the formation of new opposition parties as a direct deterrence to the INC rule.
Figure 7 about here

7

Present-Day Consequences

In this section, I investigate whether there are any durable political consequences of theauthoritarian rule in India. In particular, I focus on present-day confidence in politicians. I use data from the IHDS-II in 2011–2012 on confidence in institutions(Desai and
Vanneman, 2012). Figure 8 presents the association between excess sterilizations as ameasure of authoritarian rule and confidence in politicians through scatter plots. We
see a positive association in the raw data, suggesting that households located in statesheavily exposed to sterilization during the authoritarian period exhibit a lower level ofconfidence in politicians.24
Figure 8 about here

Next, I examine this relationship in a regression framework controlling for household
and geographic characteristics in Table 7. The coefficient in column (1) is the mostparsimonious specification, where I estimate the association without any controls. The
coefficient estimate is positive and similar to the association I found in Figure 8. The
rest of the table shows that this relationship is robust when I control for a range ofother covariates. In column 2, I include household-level controls. The inclusion of thesecontrols has hardly any effect on the coefficient estimate. In column 3, I additionally
include geographic controls. Again, there is no discernible impact on the coefficientestimate. Overall, I find a consistent and sizable negative effect of excess sterilization instates during the authoritarian rule period on present-day confidence in politicians.
Table 7 about here

My overall interpretation of these results is as follows: the authoritarian rule anddraconian sterilization policy implemented by the then-largest political party in India
24

Recall that the IHDS-II assigns values of 1, 2, and 3 to the responses “a great deal of confidence,”“only some confidence,” “hardly any confidence at all,” respectively. Therefore, a higher score constitutes
a lower level of confidence.

18

reduced confidence in the credibility of politicians on a long-term basis. Thus, the legacyof this historical event persists today.25

8Conclusion

In this paper, I examined the political consequences of authoritarianism in the context
of India, the world’s largest democracy. The state of emergency rule implemented by
the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of the INC party between 1975 and 1977 was thefirst brush with authoritarian rule in India since independence in 1947. The unexpectednature of the emergency rule provides a unique natural setting in history to study thelegacy of authoritarianism in a democracy.
Using universe of election data set from India’s lower house of parliament for theperiod 1962–2019, I documented that the authoritarian rule had a first-order impact on
the decline of the INC’s political dominance in India, with a sharp decline in the shareof votes for the incumbent party (INC) candidates in subsequent elections. Moreover, I
found that the draconian rule can explain as much as 28 percentage points of the dropin the INC candidates’ probability of winning elections in subsequent years. I provided
support for this interpretation by using several alternative estimation strategies, including
DID, DDD, and an event study approach. Finally, the political consequences of theauthoritarian rule persisted until the most recent election in 2019.
The decline in the incumbent party’s share of votes and winning probability was notcaused by a lower voter turnout rate. I found that the voter turnout rate did not decline.
Instead, there was a sharp rise in the number of opposition candidates contesting forelection in subsequent years. This suggests that the authoritarian rule gave rise to theformation of new political parties in the following years and played an important rolein the decline of the INC. Finally, I examined the durable consequences and found thathouseholds in states heavily exposed to the draconian policy implemented during thisperiod exhibit lower confidence in politicians today. Thus, the enduring legacy of thishistorical event persists to the current day.
A key question is how generalizable this historical episode in India is to other contexts.
The most direct parallel is to countries that have faced or are currently facing extreme
levels of democratic backsliding. Authoritarian regimes in democracies are not uncommon. For example, many Latin American democratic countries have had at least someexperience with the authoritarian governments since World War II. Fujimori’s government in Peru in the 1990s is a prominent example that plausibly aligns with the Indiansituation. Other countries facing extreme democratic breakdown include Turkey and25

Note that the evidence presented here is cross-sectional and that the survey was conducted in 2011–2012 when the INC held power in the central government. This should be kept in mind when interpretingthese findings.

19Hungary, where the current governments have consolidated authoritarian power throughconstitutional amendments, and the Philippines, where the current regime is engaged in a
dictatorial policy of war on drugs. Poland’s right-wing polarization on religious and gender grounds and Brazil’s use of dictatorship-era law to detain and investigate critics are
two other examples. Figure A.6 in the Appendix presents the decline in the democracy
index in these countries.
What are the lessons for India today? The recent democratic backsliding in the world’s
largest democracy is of grave concern. The Variety of Democracy Institute has classified
India as an “electoral autocracy” since 2019, and Freedom House downgraded India from“free” to a “partly free” country in 2021 (Hellmeier et al., 2021; FreedomHouse, 2021).
The findings from this paper have important implications for India as the current regime ispursuing authoritarian policies, including the introduction of the Citizenship Amendment
Act in 2019 and the misuse of sedition law to crack down on freedom of expression. Perhaps more importantly, the findings presented here have present-day policy implications
as Uttar Pradesh, the most populous state in India, proposed a controversial population policy in July 2021, and the draft bill for population control “primarily throughsterilization,” coercion, incentives, and disincentives are currently being discussed.26

26

A similar population policy is being discussed in Assam, a state in the northeastern part of India.

20

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25

FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: Changes in Democracy Between 2012 and 2017

Notes: The figure presents the country-level change in the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) between 2012 and 2017. Darker blue indicates countries that have become more democratic, anddarker red indicates countries that have become less democratic. The LDI considers constitutionally protected civil liberties, a strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective
checks and balances that limit the exercise of executive power. The index also considers thelevel of electoral democracy.
Data Source: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). https://www.v-dem.net/en/
Figure Source: https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-democracy-decline/ Accessed on
20th July 2021

26

Figure 2: Democratic Changes in India

Notes: The figure presents the change in the Democracy Index in India between 1900 and 2020.
The blue, red, and green lines indicate Electoral Democracy Index, LDI, and Participatory
Democracy Index, respectively.
Data Source: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). https://www.v-dem.net/en/ Accessed on 20th
July 2021

27

Figure 3: The Effects of Authoritarianism on Voting Behavior(a) Panel A: The Effects of Authoritarianism on Vote Share(b) Panel B: The Effects of Authoritarianism on Probability of Win

Notes: The figure plots the effect of authoritarianism on voting behavior and election outcomesin India. The data are from all the general elections to the lower house of the Indian parliament(Lok Sabha) between 1962 and 2019. Panel A plots the average vote share of INC and non-INC
candidates received in a constituency in each election year. Panel B plots the probability inwhich INC and non-INC candidates won in a constituency in each election year. The (red)dashed line represents the end of the authoritarian rule in India. The average of INC and nonINC voting share and probability of win does not sum to 100 and 1 respectively, because there
are more than one non-INC candidates contesting for election in a constituency.

28

Figure 4: DDD Estimates: Event Study (Major Election Years)(a) Panel A: Vote Share(b) Panel B: Probability of Win

Notes: The figure presents the political consequences of authoritarianism in India through anevent study framework. The data are from all major general elections to the lower house of
the Indian parliament (Lok Sabha) between 1962 and 2019. Panel A plots the year-specifictreatment effects of INC candidates’ vote share. Panel B presents the year-specific treatment
effects of INC candidates’ probability of winning an election. The (red) dashed line represents
the end of the authoritarian rule in India.

29

Figure 5: Average Voting Turnout Rate(a) Panel A: All Election Years(b) Panel B: Major Election Years

Notes: The figure presents the evolution of the voter turnout rate in India. The data are fromthe general elections to the lower house of the Indian parliament (Lok Sabha) between 1962 and2019. Panel A plots the percentage of eligible voters who turn out to vote in a constituency
in each election year. Panel B plots the percentage of eligible voters who turn out to votein a constituency in major election years. The (red) dashed line represents the end of theauthoritarian rule in India.

30

Figure 6: Average Number of Candidates Contested(a) Panel A: All Election Years(b) Panel B: Major Election Years

Notes: The figure presents the evolution of new political parties in India. The data are fromthe general elections to the lower house of the Indian parliament (Lok Sabha) between 1962 and2019. Panel A plots the average number of candidates contested from a constituency in eachelection year. Panel B plots the average number of candidates contested from a constituency
in major election years. The (red) dashed line represents the end of the authoritarian rule inIndia.

31

Figure 7: Event Study - Number of Candidates Contested(a) Panel A: Event Study Using Excess Sterilization(b) Panel B: Event Study Using Excess Vasectomy

Notes: The figure presents the impact of authoritarianism on the evolution of new politicalparties in India. The data are from all major general elections to the lower house of the Indian
parliament (Lok Sabha) between 1962 and 2019. Panel A plots the year-specific treatment
effects considering excess sterilization as a measure of authoritarian rule. Panel B presents theyear-specific treatment effects considering excess vasectomy as a measure of authoritarian rule.
The (red) dashed line represents the end of the authoritarian rule in India.

32

Figure 8: Association Between Excess Sterilizations and Confidence in Politicians

Notes: The figure presents the correlation plots of the present-day consequences. It plots theassociation between excess sterilizations in 1976–1977 and confidence in politicians. The data on
confidence in politicians are from IHDS-II. It assigns the value 1 to “a great deal of confidence,”
2 to “only some confidence,” and 3 to “hardly any confidence at all.” (Therefore, a higher scoreconstitutes a lower level of confidence.) The fitted lines are weighted by the population of thestate and union territory.

33

Table 1: Average Vote Share and Probability of Win Before and After theEmergency

Notes: The data are from all general elections to the lower house of the Indian parliament (Lok
Sabha) between 1962 and 2019. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05,* p< 0.1

34

Table 2: Effect of Authoritarianism on Vote Share

Notes: The data are from all general elections to the lower house of the Indian parliament (Lok
Sabha) between 1962 and 2019. The unit of observation is a candidate. Each column reports
estimates from OLS regression. Party FE includes the dummy variable of each party from which
the candidate is contesting (independent party if the candidate has no party affiliation). Year
FE includes election year fixed effects. Party Type FE includes the dummy variable of types ofthe political party (such as a national, state-based, local party), which proxies for geographicalrepresentation of a party. Constituency FE and State FE include the dummy variable of eachconstituency and state from which the candidate is contesting, respectively. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1

35

Table 3: Effect of Authoritarianism on Election Win

Notes: The data are from all general elections to the lower house of the Indian parliament (Lok
Sabha) between 1962 and 2019. The unit of observation is a candidate. Each column reports
estimates from OLS regression. Party FE includes the dummy variable of each party from which
the candidate is contesting (independent party if the candidate has no party affiliation). Year
FE includes election year fixed effects. Party Type FE includes the dummy variable of types ofthe political party (such as a national, state-based, local party), which proxies for geographicalrepresentation of a party. Constituency FE and State FE include the dummy variable of eachconstituency and state from which the candidate is contesting, respectively. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1

36

Table 4: DDD Estimation

Notes: The data are from all general elections to the lower house of the Indian parliament (Lok
Sabha) between 1962 and 2019. The unit of observation is a candidate. Each column reports
estimates from OLS regression. Party FE includes the dummy variable of each party from which
the candidate is contesting (independent party if the candidate has no party affiliation). Year
FE includes election year fixed effects. Party Type FE includes the dummy variable of types ofthe political party (such as a national, state-based, local party), which proxies for geographicalrepresentation of a party. Constituency FE and State FE include the dummy variable of eachconstituency and state from which the candidate is contesting, respectively. Each Regression
includes interaction terms to perform DDD analysis but not reported here. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1

37

38

Notes: The data are from all general elections to the lower house of the Indian parliament (Lok Sabha) between 1962 and 2019. The unit ofobservation is a constituent-year. Each column reports estimates from OLS regression. Year FE includes election year fixed effects. Constituency
FE and State FE include the dummy variable of each constituency and state from which the candidate is contesting, respectively. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1

Table 5: Effect of Authoritarianism on Voting Turnout

39

Notes: The data are from all general elections to the lower house of the Indian parliament (Lok Sabha) between 1962 and 2019. The unit ofobservation is a constituent-year. Each column reports estimates from OLS regression. Year FE includes election year fixed effects. Constituency
FE and State FE include the dummy variable of each constituency and state from which the candidate is contesting, respectively. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1

Table 6: Effect of Authoritarianism on Number of Candidates Contested in Elections

Table 7: Effect of Authoritarianism on Confidence in Politicians

Notes: The data are from IHDS-II. The unit of observation is a household. The IDHS-II assigns
the value 1 to “a great deal of confidence,” 2 to “only some confidence,” and 3 to “hardly any
confidence at all.” Therefore, a higher score constitutes a lower level of confidence. Each column
reports estimates from OLS regression. The household controls include household size, income,ten sources of main income fixed effects, eight religion fixed effects, five caste fixed effects, twowealth class fixed effects (poor, middle class, (comfortable as the reference group)), 16 educationof the household head fixed effects, an indicator for whether any household member is covered bygovernment health insurance, and an indicator for whether the household has a BPL card. The
geographic controls include state-level population density (in log) and three places of residence
fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. *** p< 0.01,** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1

40Online Appendix
The Legacy of Authoritarianism in a Democracy

41

A

APPENDIX Figures

Figure A.1: Countries Becoming Substantially Autocratic and Democratic(2010–2020)

Note: The figure presents the countries that have become substantially autocratic or democratic
between 2010 and 2020. Darker red indicates countries where the Liberal Democracy Index(LDI) has declined substantially and significantly over 2010 and 2020. Darker blue indicatescountries where the level of democracy has advanced substantially during this period. Countries
in gray are substantially unchanged.
Data Source: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). https://www.v-dem.net/en/ Accessed on 20th
July 2021

42Figure A.2: Total Number of Sterilizations and Types of Sterilizations Performed in India (1956-82)

Notes: The figure presents the total number of sterilizations along with the types of sterilization performed in India every year since the beginning of the program in 1956. The solidline represents the total number of sterilizations performed every year. The dashed and shortdashed lines represent the total number of vasectomies and tubectomies performed every year,
respectively.

43

Figure A.3: The Effects of Authoritarianism on Voting Behavior (Major Elections Only)(a) Panel A: The Effects of Authoritarianism on Vote Share(b) Panel B: The Effects of Authoritarianism on Probability of Win

Notes: The figure plots the effects of authoritarianism on voting behavior and election outcomesof major elections in India. The data are from all major general elections to the lower houseof the Indian parliament (Lok Sabha) between 1962 and 2019. Panel A plots the average voteshare of INC and non-INC candidates received in a constituency in each major election year.
Panel B plots the probability of which INC and non-INC candidates won in a constituency ineach major election year. The (red) dashed line represents the end of the authoritarian rulein India. The average of INC and non-INC voting share and probability of win does not sum
to 100 and 1 respectively, because there are more than one non-INC candidates contesting forelection in a constituency.

44

Figure A.4: DDD Estimates: Event Study (All Election Years)(a) Panel A: Vote Share(b) Panel B: Probability of Win

Notes: The figure presents the political consequences of authoritarianism in India through anevent study framework. The data are from all general elections to the lower house of the Indian
parliament (Lok Sabha) between 1962 and 2019. Panel A plots the year-specific treatment
effects of INC candidates’ vote share. Panel B presents the year-specific treatment effects of
INC candidates’ probability of winning an election. The (red) dashed line represents the end of
the authoritarian rule in India.

45

Figure A.5: DDD Estimates: Event Study (Using Excess Vasectomy)(a) Panel A: Vote Share(b) Panel B: Probability of Win

Notes: The figure presents the political consequences of authoritarianism in India throughan event study framework considering excess vasectomy as a measure of draconian rule. The
election data are from all major general elections to the lower house of the Indian parliament(Lok Sabha) between 1962 and 2019. Panel A plots the year-specific treatment effects of INC
candidates’ vote share. Panel B presents the year-specific treatment effects of INC candidates’
probability of winning an election. The (red) dashed line represents the end of the authoritarianrule in India.

46

Figure A.6: Change in Democracy Index in Brazil, Hungary, the Philippines,
Poland, and Turkey

Notes: The figure presents the change in the Liberal Democracy Index in Brazil, Hungary, thePhilippines, Poland, and Turkey between 1900 and 2020.
Data Source: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). https://www.v-dem.net/en/ Accessed on 20th
July 2021

47

B

APPENDIX Tables

48

Table B.1: Flexible DDD Approach (Tabular Form)

Notes: The data are from all major general elections to the lower house of the Indian parliament (Lok Sabha) between 1962 and 2019. The unit of observation is a candidate. Each column
reports estimates from OLS regression. Party FE includes the dummy variable of each party
from which the candidate is contesting (independent party if the candidate has no party affiliation). Year FE includes election year fixed effects. Party Type FE includes the dummy variableof types of the political party (such as a national, state-based, local party), which proxies forgeographical representation of a party. Constituency FE and State FE include the dummy
variable of each constituency and state from which the candidate is contesting, respectively.
Each Regression includes interaction terms to perform DDD analysis but not reported here.
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05,* p< 0.1

49

Table B.2: Robustness to DDD Estimates Using Alternative Measures of Force
Sterilization Policy - Male Sterilization

Notes: The data are from all general elections to the lower house of the Indian parliament (Lok
Sabha) between 1962 and 2019. The unit of observation is a candidate. Each column reports
estimates from OLS regression. Party FE includes the dummy variable of each party from which
the candidate is contesting (independent party if the candidate has no party affiliation). Year
FE includes election year fixed effects. Party Type FE includes the dummy variable of types ofthe political party (such as a national, state-based, local party), which proxies for geographicalrepresentation of a party. Constituency FE and State FE include the dummy variable of eachconstituency and state from which the candidate is contesting, respectively. Each Regression
includes interaction terms to perform DDD analysis but not reported here. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at constituency level. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.150