FULL REPORT

Unregulated Production
Examining Craft-produced
Weapons from a Global
Perspective
MATILDE VECCHIONI

Acknowledgements
Support from UNIDIR core funders provides the foundation for all the Institute’s activities. This researchis supported by funding for the Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme by the Government ofGermany.
The author wishes to thank the experts and organizations who contributed to the research through interviews and by disseminating UNIDIR’s survey. In particular, the author wishes to extend her thanks to
Rubén Arancibia and to the West African Action Network on Small Arms – Nigeria, the Firearms Trafficking Repression Service of the Brazilian Federal Police and the European Union Agency for Law
Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL). The author is also sincerely grateful to Line Haidar and Ivaylo
Stefanov of the Firearms Programme of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) for
their invaluable contribution to this research, technical inputs and support for distribution of the UNIDIR
survey.
Finally, the author would like to thank the experts who reviewed the report: Frank Grosspietsch, Himayu
Shiotani, Jonathan Rickell, Bailey Henwood, Paul Holtom, Sarah Grand-Clément, Theò Bajon and Fiifi
Edu-Afful.

About UNIDIRUNIDIR is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy
institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue
and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community
to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems.

Note
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply theexpression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning
the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitationof its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of theindividual author. They do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR,
its staff members or sponsors.

Citation
Matilde Vecchioni (2024). “Unregulated Production: Examining Craft-produced Weapons from a Global
Perspective”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

2Author
Matilde Vecchioni
Associate Researcher, Conventional Arms and Ammunition
Programme
Matilde Vecchioni is an Associate Researcher with the Conventional Arms and Ammunition
Programme at UNIDIR. Her work focuses on the artisanal production of small arms and light weapons,
as well as on the prevention of conflict and armed violence. Prior to joining UNIDIR, she worked for
the Political Affairs and Partnerships Section of the United Nations Office at Geneva, as well as for the
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Section of the United Nations Department of
Peace Operations in New York. She holds a master’s degree in international relations and politicalscience from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, and a bachelor’s degree from Università Luiss Guido Carli, Rome.

Research Team
Selma Mustafić
Graduate Professional, Conventional Arms and Ammunition
Programme
Selma Mustafić is a Graduate Professional with the UNIDIR Conventional Arms and Ammunition
Programme. She is a fellow of the Marie Skołdowska-Curie Fellowship Programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has worked as an intern at Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI). Her work focuses on military expenditure, arms transfers and trade,
as well as emerging technologies. She holds a master’s degree in peace and conflict studies from
Uppsala University, Sweden.

Sanem Topal
Candidate Career Diplomat, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Sanem Topal is a Candidate Career Diplomat at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prior to joining
the ministry, she completed the Graduate Professional Programme at the UNIDIR ConventionalArms and Ammunition Programme. Previously, she was an intern at SIPRI and at the United Nations
Office for Disarmament Affairs in Vienna. Her work focuses on arms trafficking, arms transfers andmilitary expenditure. She holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees in international relations from
Bilkent University, Ankara.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

3Acronyms & Abbreviations
ACAD

Computer-aided design

CNC

Computer numerical control

ECOWAS

Economic Community of West African States

GBV

Gender-based violence

ITI

International Tracing Instrument

NSAG

Non-State Armed Groups

P OA

United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

SALW

Small arms and light weapons

SL ECAA

Sierra Leone Commission on Arms and Ammunition

WEO G

Western European and Other States GroupU N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

4Contents
Summary

6

Key Findings

7

1.		

Introduction

8

2.		

Types of Craft-Produced SALW and Manufacturing Techniques

12

3.		

Producers and Users

20

4.		

International Instruments

28

5.		

Regional Instruments

31

6.		

National Regulatory Approaches and Measures

35

7.		

Conclusion42

Box 1		

Methodology

10

Box 2		

"It is not just 3D printing" - Latest Developments in Privately Made Firearms

16

Box 3		

Zooming into Latin America and the Caribbean: Representative Seizures18

Box 4		

Moving past the Dark Web

21

Box 5		Is Craft Production a Men’s Business Only?

24

Box 6		

International Data-Collection and Information-Sharing Tools

30

Box 7		Start National to Change the Regional – Countering Illicit Production in the European Union

34

Box 8		

Easier Said than Done – Challenges to Data Collection and Information-Sharing39

Box 9		Is there an Accessible Alternative to Illicit Craft Production?

41

Figure 1		

Global Overview of SALW Craft Production

11

Figure 2		

Types of Craft-Produced Weapon Identified by Survey Respondents

12

Figure 3		

Types of Craft-Weapon Manufacturing Technique Identified by Survey Respondents

14

Figure 4		

Geographical Distribution of Types of Manufacturing Technique Identified by Survey Respondents

15

Figure 5		

Types of Users and Producers of Craft Weapons Identified by Survey Respondents

26

Figure 6		

Geographical Distribution of Responses per Category of Producers

27

Figure 7		

Geographical Distribution of Responses per Category of Users

27

Figure 8		

National Regulatory Approaches to Craft Production of SALW

35

Table 1		Key Regional and Sub-Regional Instruments Covering Illicit Weapons Manufacturing

32

Table 2		Typology of National Regulatory Approaches to SALW Craft Production

36

Boxes

Figures

TablesU N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

5Summary
Craft production of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a global and long-standing phenomenon.
While manufacturing techniques – both traditional and emerging – evolve at a fast pace, knowledge
on craft production remains localized and fragmented. This is compounded by a lack of a universally
agreed definition of craft production.
In June 2023, UNIDIR initiated research examining craft production of small arms and light weapons(SALW).1 The objective of this research is to increase knowledge and understanding of craft-produced
SALW and raise awareness of the challenges for preventing and addressing their illicit proliferation,
trafficking and misuse. This report aspires to be a first step towards a global and more comprehensive
dialogue on the issue of craft-produced SALW. The findings presented in it draw primarily on UNIDIR’s“Global survey on addressing the global craft production of SALW”, which was distributed to all United
Nations Member States throughout 2023 and in early 2024. A total of 80 countries from all regions of theworld contributed to this study by completing the survey.
This report explores key types of craft-produced weapon and manufacturing techniques, and profiles
the main actors involved in the production and use of these weapons. It also delves into the existing
international, regional, and national frameworks that regulate illicit manufacturing and address, mostoften implicitly, the issue of craft production. Finally, it considers key challenges to efforts to address
this global challenge and avenues to improve these efforts. This report intends to provide internationaland regional organizations and states, in particular their law enforcement agencies, with a representative, yet non-exhaustive, benchmark on the issue of craft production of SALW. The report encourages anew, global dialogue on this critical issue.

1

In the context of this research, craft production of SALW is used as an umbrella term for all types of non-industrially produced
SALW including artisanal, improvised, home-made, workshop-made, self-fabricated or privately made weapons. The key
terms and definitions used in this research are based on the Modular Small-Arms-Control Implementation Compendium,
Glossary of terms, definitions and abbreviations, Version 1.6, 6 June 2022; and the Technical Guide to the Implementation of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

6Key Findings•

Craft production of SALW and their components affects every region of the world. 58 of the 80 United
Nations Member States that responded to the UNIDIR survey indicated that craft-produced SALW
were being used or produced in their country.

•

Craft production of SALW and their components is a transnational issue. Craft-produced SALW aretrafficked across borders. In addition, web platforms enable the sharing of knowledge to produce
weapons (e.g., production manuals, blueprints, guides) and facilitate the movement of key components for manufacturing across borders.

•

The lack of a common understanding and knowledge of craft production, and of the different manufacturing types, poses an obstacle for comprehensive international and regional approaches to mitigating the harm caused by such weapons. International and regional regulatory instruments only
address the issue implicitly via provisions on illicit manufacturing. Discussions on how to ensurethat such instruments cover craft production of SALW are therefore pressing.

•

Based on responses to the UNIDIR survey, there are three main national approaches to regulating
craft production: (a) national laws and regulations that prohibit and criminalize all types of illicit manufacturing, including craft production; (b) national laws and regulations that prohibit and criminalize
certain types of craft production, but which provide for government authorization to permit othertypes; and (c) national laws and regulations that enable government control, registration and monitoring of craft production.

•

Craft production is characterized by a multitude of users and producers. Comprehensive knowledge
on the actors involved in craft production at the national, regional and international levels, is criticalfor understanding drivers of demand and supply, as well as to strengthen regulatory approaches.
This, combined with a wider understanding of available knowledge and tools for production, particularly across online platforms, can contribute to enhancing detection and control and identifying
legal loopholes.

•

In contexts in which craft production represents a deeply rooted cultural and economic activity,
the sustainable provision of alternative livelihoods or accessible licensing mechanisms is critical.
Increased national knowledge and data on local manufacturers, as well as on drivers of demand andsupply, are key. Furthermore, the allocation of resources to build alternative livelihoods needs to besustainable.

•

Scarce data collection and limited information-sharing appear to be significant challenges acrosscountries. These, in turn, negatively affect the implementation and strengthening of national andregional legislative frameworks and their response to developments in craft production. Existing
databases can be improved and better harnessed to facilitate more accurate, accessible and centralized information-sharing.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

71. Introduction
Not all lethal small arms and light weapons (SALW) are industrially manufactured. In recent years, theuse of craft-produced SALW has been increasingly reported in episodes of armed violence, terrorism
and criminality around the globe.2 In Ghana, functioning automatic or semi-automatic weapons areproduced by highly skilled gunsmiths;3 in Australia, the United States and across European countries,
3D-printed weapons are proliferating among enthusiasts and unauthorized users;4 in Brazil, criminals
have been resorting to high-quality copies of industrial sub-machine guns and rifles;5 and in Myanmar,
non-state armed groups have been manufacturing their own arsenals.6 From a global arms control
standpoint, these may seem to be separate issues, each with their own context. However, they are very
similar in nature: these weapons are all produced in a non-industrial manner, and they are being increasingly used to cause human suffering. While in some cases craft production can be licensed, and hence
legal, available evidence shows that most of these weapons are illegally produced and trafficked.7
Craft production is a global phenomenon (see Figure 1). According to one expert, “It is not about if you
will see it in your country, it is about when.”8 Yet, despite its global nature, craft production of SALW
lacks a universally agreed definition. These weapons are also referred to as artisanal, improvised,home-made, workshop-made, self-fabricated or privately made weapons. While most of this terminology – the fragmentation of which is a challenge in itself – hints at relatively rudimentary manufacturing,the quality and sophistication of craft-produced SALW have significantly increased in the last decade.
Not only have new technologies and manufacturing techniques broadened the frontiers of craft production, but skilled blacksmiths and producers around the globe have been refining traditional methods
in order to produce high-quality copies of industrially produced SALW. Existing terminology does notaccurately capture the range of production types and their sophistication. This extends to the lack ofregional and international agreement on appropriate terms for different types of production. Acknowledging the limitations posed by the lack of shared terminology, this research uses the term craft production as an umbrella term for all types of non-industrial manufacturing. It includes all SALW produced or
assembled, by an individual or a group, using a hand-powered toolset, pillar drills, belt grinders, lathes
or other machines, including computer numerical control (CNC) machines and 3D printers, as well as
the conversion or reactivation of non-lethal weapons.

2

In this report, small arms and light weapons are understood as any man-portable lethal weapon designed for individual
use, or for use by two or three people serving as a crew (although some may be carried and used by a single person), that
expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile
by the action of an explosive. This also includes the terms “firearms” and “weapons”, which are used interchangeably in thisreport to refer to any portable barrelled weapon (excluding antique firearms or their replicas) that expels, is designed to expel
or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive.

3

ENACT Africa, “Ghana’s Artisanal Arms Market Should Be Regulated”, 25 October 2023, https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/ghanas-artisanal-arms-market-should-be-regulated.

4

Stefan Schaufelbühl et al., “The Emergence of 3D-Printed Firearms: An Analysis of Media and Law Enforcement Reports”,
Forensic Science International: Synergy, vol. 8 (January 2024): 100464, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsisyn.2024.100464.

5Henry Shuldiner, “Brazil Arms Traffickers Used Portable Technology to Manufacture Gun Parts”, InSight Crime, 18 March
2022, http://insightcrime.org/news/brazil-arms-traffickers-used-portable-technology-to-manufacture-gun-parts/.

6

Robert Bociaga, “Myanmar Fighters Continue Improvising in Struggle Against Junta”, Defense Post, 18 July 2022, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/07/18/myanmar-fighters-improvised-weapons/.

7

Information collected through UNIDIR’s survey and during interviews with experts.

8

Information collected during a UNIDIR interview with expert.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

8The lack of a common understanding of craft production of SALW at the international level has an impact
on regulatory and law enforcement efforts around the world. While existing instruments, such as theUnited Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) and the United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol),call for the criminalization of illicit manufacturing, they make no explicit reference to craft production.
Regulation, detection, and control of such production varies across and within regions. Additionally, lowlevels of knowledge and data, lack of information-sharing, as well as the cultural and economic valueof craft production have made the implementation and improvement of national legislative frameworks
difficult. Addressing and preventing craft production, therefore, goes beyond the binary approaches ofregulation and criminalization: it requires a more comprehensive understanding of the issue that, while
offering a global perspective, acknowledges, builds upon and feeds into local solutions.
While local discussions on contextual approaches have begun, no global mapping of responses andof measures to address craft production has been conducted to date. Knowledge and research on theissue remain mainly national and subregional. This report aspires to lay the foundations for a global
dialogue on craft production, aiming to increase understanding of its characteristics and developments, and to enhance information-sharing on existing challenges, measures and good practices. In
doing so, it intends to contribute to global and regional discussions on illicit manufacturing and trafficking of SALW, drawing attention on the increasing diffusion and complexity of craft production. As a firststep, this report aims to provide states and stakeholders engaging in the Fourth Review Conference of
the PoA with an initial global benchmark to initiate dialogue on effective measures to address craft production in accordance with different local, national and regional contexts.
The report continues by introducing the different types of craft-produced weapons and manufacturing
techniques (in Section 2) and by providing an overview of the actors involved in their production anduse (in Section 3). It then describes the obligations and commitments to counter the illicit manufacturing of weapons and ammunition in international (Section 4) and regional (Section 5) conventional arms
control instruments, although most of these only address illicit craft production implicitly. An overview
of the different approaches taken at the national level to address craft production follows (in Section 6),
based on responses to the UNIDIR survey (see Box 1). It notes in particular that, while most respondent
states criminalize such production, a smaller number seek to regulate craft production and enhancelicensing mechanisms. The report concludes (in Section 7) with an overview of key findings.

Seizure of parts and components for SALW trafficked by an individual via international
shipping services. Source: Brazilian Federal Police.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

9BOX 1.

Methodology
The methodology used to produce this report included: (a) a review of relevant literature and open
sources, (b) distribution of UNIDIR’s global survey on addressing the global craft production of
SALW, and (c) a limited number of targeted interviews with a geographically diverse sample ofnational authorities and experts.
The review of available literature and open-source material on craft production of SALW for theperiod 2013–2024 explored its evolution across time, as well as its different manifestations acrossregions. These sources informed the development of the UNIDIR survey.
The survey itself was distributed to all United Nations Member States between July 2023 and March
2024. It sought to gather information from national authorities to enable a mapping of different typesof craft production around the globe and to identify challenges and effective measures to address
the illicit proliferation of craft-produced SALW. The survey also looked at the period 2013–2024 andfocused only on SALW; it did not collect data on their components, accessories and ammunition.
It was distributed to all national points of contact for the PoA as well as permanent missions andcapitals. Other relevant stakeholders at the national and regional levels, including law enforcement,
civil society organizations and United Nations entities contributed to the survey completion. The
survey was translated and distributed in English, French, Spanish, Arabic and Russian. UNIDIR
received 80 responses from all regions of the world: 31 Africa states (39 per cent of responses), 15
Latin American and Caribbean states (19 per cent), 13 Western European and Other states (16 percent), 11 Asia-Pacific states (14 per cent), and 10 Eastern European states (12 per cent).9This report does not seek to provide a comprehensive overview of cases of craft production aroundthe globe. Rather, it aims to offer a global overview of the phenomenon and its key characteristics,
thereby providing a benchmark for states and stakeholders to enhance further dialogue and cooperation on challenges, effective approaches and good practices. The information presented in thereport primarily draws on the data collected through the UNIDIR survey and interviews with experts
and national authorities.

9

Region here refers to the United Nations regional groups of Member States.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

10FIGURE 1.

Global Overview of SALW Craft Production10

Of the 80 countries that
responded to UNIDIR’s survey,
58 indicated that they face thechallenge of craft-produced
weapons being either used or
produced – or both – in theircountry.

11

C R A F T - P R O D U C E D S A LW P R O D U C E D A N D U S E D
C R A F T - P R O D U C E D S A LW N O T F L A G G E D A S A N I S S U E
C R A F T - P R O D U C E D S A LW U S E D I N - C O U N T R Y B U T P R O D U C E D E L S E W H E R E
R E L I A B L E O P E N - S O U R C E I N F O R M AT I O N I N D I C AT E S C R A F T - P R O D U C E D
W E A P O N S B E I N G U S E D A N D / O R P R O D U C E D I N C O U N T R Y E L S E W H E R E 11

10

The information in this map draws on states’ responses to the UNIDIR survey, complemented by additional open-source
C E D S A L W P R O DinformationU C E D AandN Dresearch.
U S E DThis map is for illustrative purposes only. The boundaries and designations shown do not imply
official endorsement by UNIDIR or the United Nations. The countries represented in light grey did not submit a response to
CED SALW NOT F
L A G Gsurvey
E D AandS AtheN authorI S S Udid
E not have access to reliable and up-to-date open-source information.
UNIDIR’s
11

For relevant open sources see: Philips Alpers, Gun-running in Papua New Guinea: From arrows to assault weapons inthe southern highlands, (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2021); Conflict Armament Research, Illicit Weapons in Afghanistan– Issue(London:https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/e881ff05c7234f62bfdd9f81892a0327; UCED IN COU
N-SOURCE INFORMAT I O N02,I N
D I C A TCAR,E S 2022)
CRAF
T-PRODUCED WEAPONS BEING USED AND/OR PROD
Jamaica Observer, “Antigua and Barbuda police seize ‘ghost guns’”, September 5, 2023, https://www.jamaicaobserver.
com/2023/09/05/antigua-and-barbuda-police-seize-ghost-guns/ ; Rueben Dass, “3D-printed weapons and the FarRight: The Finnish Accelerationist Cell”, Global Network on Extremism & Technology, October 6, 2023; UN News, “Haiti:
Gangs have more firepower than the police”, Global perspective Human stories, April 4, 2024 https://news.un.org/en/
story/2024/04/1148231 ; Omer Ali Saifuden, “Rise of the Underground SE Asian Homemade Gun Industry”, Asia Pacific
Security Magazine, October 12, 2023 https://www.asiapacificsecuritymagazine.com/rise-of-the-underground-seasian-homemade-gun-industry/ ; Conor Gallagher, “Alleged right-wing extremist sympathizer awaiting trial over plan
to make guns using 3D printer”, The Irish Times, July 13, 2022 ; UNODC, Global Study on Firearms Trafficking, (Vienna:2020); Junaid Kamal, “Handmade Guns Popular City”, Medium, April 11, 2023; A.A., “Turkish police seize dozens of illegal
weapons in nationwide ops”, Daily Sabah, December 17, 2023 https://www.dailysabah.com/turkiye/investigations/turkish-police-seize-dozens-of-illegal-weapons-in-nationwide-ops ; Yuri Lyamin, “Craft-produced anti-materiel rifles andlight cannon in Yemen”, The Hoplite, Armament Research Services, September 10, 2017; ATF, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives, “Privately Made Firearms”, reviewed last on August 4, 2023; Ministero della Difesa, Comunicati
Stampa, “23enne indagato per attività con finalità di terrorismo”, March 23, 2024 https://www.carabinieri.it/in-vostro-aiuto/informazioni/comunicati-stampa/23enne-indagato-per-attivit%C3%A0-con-finalit%C3%A0-di-terrorismo ; Kristopher Carlson, Firearms and Ammunition Trafficking in Eastern Africa, Issue Paper 1/2022, (Vienna: UNODC, 2022).

CED SALW USED IN-COUNTRY BUT PRODUCED ELSEWHEREU N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

112. Types of Craft-Produced SALW
and Manufacturing Techniques
Craft production of SALW occurs in all regions of the world. While this is a global issue, it is not homogenous across different regions. Building on responses to UNIDIR’s survey, this section provides a representative, yet non-exhaustive, overview of different types of craft-produced SALW and manufacturing
techniques.
The survey sought information on craft production of five main categories of SALW: (a) pistols,
revolvers and other handguns; (b) rifles; (c) shotguns; (d) sub-machine guns, machine guns and heavymachine guns; and (e) grenade launchers and mortars. Just over half of the countries that responded
to the survey indicated that craft-produced handguns had been encountered there, and just under halfreported the presence of craft-produced shotguns (see Figure 2). Based on an analysis of responses,
the former appear most often in the Western Europe and Other States group (WEOG) and Eastern
Europe, while the latter are more commonly identified in Africa and Latin America. Craft production ofrifles is also reported in Latin America, as well as in WEOG. Globally, the number of countries indicating
the craft production of sub-machine and machine guns is lower (15), with almost half being Western.
Finally, craft-produced grenade launchers and mortars were only rarely reported in responses to the
UNIDIR survey, with only a few instances being reported in Latin America and Africa.
FIGURE 2.

Types of Craft-Produced Weapons Identified by Survey Respondents12

GRENADE LAUNCHERS AND MORTARS

5

SUB-MACHINE GUNS, MACHINE GUNS, HEAVY MACHINE GUNS

15

RIFLES

29

SHOTGUNS

38

PISTOLS, REVOLVERS AND OTHER HANDGUNS

0

5

10

15

20

44

25

30

35

40

45

50

NUMBER OF RESPONSES

12

The bar chart shows the number of state responses that identified each weapons type. Each country, when responding to
UNIDIR’s survey, could flag one or more types of weapons.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

12The manufacturing techniques used to produce these weapons vary. In the absence of an agreed definition of what craft production comprises and, in an attempt to overcome some of the confusion derived
from this, the UNIDIR survey sought information on five main manufacturing techniques (see Figure3) and their geographical distribution (see Figure 4). These five techniques are:1.

Craft production of entire SALW: Starting from zero, this technique fully uses non-industriallymade components to produce lethal-purpose SALW.13 The craft production of entire SALW occurs
mostly in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. Despite the lower response rate to the
UNIDIR survey, this manufacturing technique is also encountered in the Asia-Pacific region.

2.

Conversion: The modification of a replica, non-lethal or less-lethal weapon (e.g. blank-firing
firearms; less-lethal weapons including “traumatic” weapons and less-lethal launchers) to produce
a lethal-purpose one,14 or the alteration of SALW to transform their function. Conversion is mostly
found in WEOG and Eastern Europe. This manufacturing technique was also reported by a smaller
number of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.

3.

Reactivation: The full or partial reactivation of deactivated SALW to an operational state. Deactivated weapons are original-purpose (typically lethal) SALW that should have been rendered “permanently” inoperable.15 Similar to conversion, reactivation is a manufacturing technique that wasmost commonly reported in WEOG and in Eastern Europe. However, cases of reactivation werealso reported by a few African countries.

4.

Assembly of SALW and components: This method uses commercially available, industrially
produced components, at times mixed with non-industrially produced ones, to assemble lethal-purpose SALW. Multiple emerging manufacturing techniques fall within this category including,among others, polymer fabrication kits; metal mining; and modular firearms production with CNC
components (see Box 2). The assembly of SALW is particularly present in Latin America and the
Caribbean and in WEOG. It has also been encountered, at a lower rate, in Easter Europe.

5.

3D printing:16 This refers to the partial or entire production of lethal-purpose SALW with a 3D
printer.17 This process utilizes computer-aided design (CAD) files, which contain, in addition to
designs, all relevant information related to the process (e.g. materials, tolerance). The two mostcommon 3D-printing methods are Fused Deposition Modelling and Stereolithography. 3D printing,of both hybrid and full designs, is generally increasing.18 It is increasingly reported in WEOG, aswell as in Latin America and the Caribbean.19 Africa survey respondents have not yet encountered
3D printing.

13

Fully 3D-printed weapons are included in a stand-alone category (5) below.

14

Nic R. Jenzen-Jones and Matt Schroeder (eds.), An Introductory Guide to the Identification of Small Arms, Light Weapons,and Associated Ammunition (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2018), https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/introductory-guide-identification-small-arms-light-weapons-and-associated-ammunition.

15

Ibid.

16

This report uses the term “3D printing” to refer to the computer-controlled process that allows the production of weaponsand components, otherwise known as additive manufacturing (AM). For an overview of 3D-printed firearms and other manufacturing technologies see G. Hays, Ivan T. and N. R. Jenzen-Jones, Desktop Firearms: Emergent Small Arms Craft Production Technologies (Perth: Armament Research Services (ARES), 2020).

17

3D printing is treated as a separate category here given its potential to fabricate fully functioning SALW. However, it should
be noted that 3D-printed components are also often assembled with other types of parts, either industrially produced or not,to manufacture lethal-purpose SALW.

18

This information is based on findings from UNIDIR’s survey and interviews with experts.

19This information is based on findings from UNIDIR’s survey and an interview with an expert.

FIGURE 3.

Types of Craft-Weapon Manufacturing Technique Identified by Survey
Respondents20
3D PRINTING

19

REACTIVATION OF
DEACTIVATED WEAPONS20CONVERSION OF BLANK-FIRING WEAPONS24ASSEMBLY OF SALW AND COMPONENTS

28

CRAFT PRODUCTION OF ENTIRE SALW

0

5

10

15

32

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

NUMBER OF RESPONSES

3D & CNC Illicit Tec-9 / DC-10 Fabrication Site, Canada, 2014. Source: anonymous.

20

For each type of manufacturing, the bar chart gives the number of state responses that indicated that technique. Eachcountry, when responding to the UNIDIR’s survey, could flag one or more manufacturing technique.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

14Blank firing pistol Zoraki 925, 9 mm, Chile. Source: Rubén
Arancibia.

Converted sub-machine gun blank, 9mm, Chile. Source:
Rubén Arancibia.

FIGURE 4.

Geographical Distribution of Types of Manufacturing Technique
Identified by Survey Respondents21
3D PRINTING
20%

47%

27%

6%

REACTIVATION OF DEACTIVATED WEAPONS
12%

22%

50%

10%

7%

CONVERSION OF BLANK-FIRING WEAPONS
2%

31%

48%

14%

5%

ASSEMBLY OF SALW AND COMPONENTS
7%

20%

35%

34%

5%

CRAFT PRODUCTION OF ENTIRE SALW
29%

0

21

10

11%

20

30

17%

40

50

26%

60

70

AFRICA

WESTERN EUROPE & OTHER STATESEASTERN EUROPE

LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN

15%

80

90

100

ASIA-PACIFIC

The chart represents the regional distribution of responses within each category. To allow data comparison and exclude
the bias generated by the different regional responses rates, the percentages were obtained through a normalization/standardization of proportions. This operation allows the comparison of data that differ in dimension. In this case, it permits thecomparison of data across types of manufacturing.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

15

BOX 2.

“It is not just 3D printing” – Recent Developments in Privately Made
Firearms
Contribution from a firearms investigative and enforcement support specialist (Sgt
Ret’d), Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Among modern and emerging manufacturing techniques used in production of privately madefirearms,22 3D printing receives particular attention.23 While 3D-printed firearms and components arebeing produced, trafficked and increasingly used around the world, other manufacturing techniques
have been used to privately manufacture SALW for years. CNC, for instance, uses computers and
CAD programs to control machine tools (e.g., lathes, mills or routers) and drill or cut the material.
In this way, it can fabricate from an aluminium
blank a complete lower receiver. With the adventof “Ghost Gunner 3”, one of the newest CNC
machines, the firearms’ slide, components andsuppressor parts can also easily be produced.
CNC is also used to complete unfinished 80
per cent polymer lower receivers, which arecontained in 80 per cent Polymer Fabrication
Kits. The latter include all firearm parts necessary
for self-manufacturing, including the unfinishedreceiver, whose drilling is also possible with
Computer Numerical Control Fabricated Semiautomaticcommon hand tools. Both CNC machines andpistol, Canada. Source: anonymous.
80 per cent Kits can be purchased online.
Within the private manufacture domain, and particularly in the United States and Canada, investigators
have identified three key emerging trends:•

Zero per cent firearms: The Ghost Gunner 3
AR-00 kit allows producers to mill a complete
and unregistered receiver from an unformed
block of metal – from 0 per cent. This recent
product consists of a grip module and a
CNC fabricated “firearm control assembly”
frame that uses Glock 19 G3 components.
According to the producer’s website, “the[US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (ATF)] will attempt to ban thepurchase of unserialized 80 per cent lowers.
At that time, Ghost Gunner’s AR-00 receiver

Glock Polymer80 w/22LR Complete Upper, CNC FabricatedAuto-Switch & Suppressor, Canada. Source: anonymous.

22

The United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) defines a privately made firearm as “afirearm, including a frame or receiver, completed, assembled, or otherwise produced by a person other than a licensed manufacturer, and without a serial number placed by a licensed manufacturer at the time the firearm was produced”.

23

Schaufelbühl et al., “The Emergence of 3D-printed Firearms”.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

16will become the only legal and affordable method of making an unregistered metal lower. The age of
80 per cent is ending. The age of zero has begun.”24•

Investment casting for components: This process significantly reduces or removes the needfor secondary machining in gun parts. Using a ceramic mould or a 3D-printed shell, it producessmoothly finished weapon components that are consistent from casting to casting. Investment
casting appears to be increasingly used in unregulated production to avoid importing components.
•

Readily convertible Airsoft lower receiver. Source:
anonymous.

24

Readily convertible “airsoft” firearms:
Globally, the proliferation of readily convertible
firearms disguised as non-lethal devices also
appears to be a trend to monitor. In 2022, theCanada Border Services Agency reported acase of rifles being imported as “airsoft” rifles,
but which would readily accept a semi-automatic and automatic trigger set and all thecomponents required to discharge actual conventional ammunition.

Ghost Gunner, “Zero Percent “, accessed 16 April 2024, https://ghostgunner.net/zero-percent/.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

17

BOX 3.

Zooming into Latin America and the Caribbean:
Representative Seizures
Contribution from International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)
Operation Trigger IX
EcuadorIn 2022, INTERPOL’s Operation Trigger IX identified and dismantled an organizedcriminal group in Ecuador that was engaged in the sophisticated production of
firearms, parts and components with the use of 3D printers and CNC machines.
The investigation, which brought together INTERPOL, the Ecuadorian Police, andthe United States Department of Homeland Security and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives lasted for over eight months. The operation not
only dismantled the group, but also pinpointed its impressive modus operandi: it wouldpurchase parts and components from gun stores in Miami, Florida, concealing them within
industrial materials and clothing. These would then be shipped to Ecuador via various means,including courier services and air and maritime transportation. Once in Ecuador, the weapons wereassembled, stored and distributed to different countries in Latin America. The untraceable firearms
produced by the criminal group, such as high-quality replicas of MP15 rifles, were sold at a fraction of
the cost of their conventional counterparts. On average, it was possible to estimate that the criminalgroup was manufacturing five rifles per week. These weapons are suspected to have been used invarious criminal activities, including murders, in Ecuador.

Craft-produced firearms parts seized, Ecuador, 2023. Source: INTERPOL.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

18ChileAlso within the context of Operation Trigger IX, Chile’s Investigations Police (PDI), in
cooperation with INTERPOL, uncovered a sophisticated operation wherein criminals
used 3D printers to manufacture firearm components, including chargers, sound suppressors and auto-switches. This then enabled the conversion of semi-automatic
firearms into fully automatic firing weapons – notably Glock pistols. Subsequent raids
resulted in the seizure of two 3D printers and digital designs for firearms production. In a
separate instance, in November 2023, the Chilean Customs Service intercepted a parcel
containing metal and plastic parts resembling rifle magazines, prompting further investigation by the PDI. This led to the discovery of a 3D-printed plastic or polymer-based firearm,undetectable by x-ray machines.

Seizure during Operation Trigger IX, Chile, 2023. Source: INTERPOL.

Operation Trigger VII
Saint Kitts and Nevis
In the framework of Operation Trigger
VII – Caribbean, coordinatedby INTERPOL, in September
2022, Saint Kitts and Nevis
conducted its first seizureof unmarked firearms
assembled using semifinished components, also
known as “80 per cent frames”. Following thecompletion of the frames, they were assembled
with other parts and components, most likely trafficked from abroad.

Unmarked firearm assembled using 80 per cent frames,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, 2022. Source: INTERPOL.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

193. Producers and Users
The variety of producers and users is an aspect of craft production that makes it unique. From individual
enthusiasts via experienced gunsmiths to non-state armed groups, craft SALW producers and users
present different characteristics, capabilities and motivations. Overall, the accessibility – even throughonline marketplaces – of commercially available materials used in SALW production, as well as the relatively easy access to know-how and guidance files, play a critical role in expanding the frontiers of manufacturing, and thereby democratizing production. Not only do these elements allow already-skilled
producers to enhance and share their knowledge, but they remove barriers for other actors, such as
enthusiasts and youth, to become craft-producers of SALW.
Producers, however, are not always users. While these groups overlap at times, the demand forcraft-produced weapons is also prompted by actors who do not have the skills, or the will, to produce
their own weapons. To put it simply: some actors are only producers, others are only users, and someare both (see Figure 5). To provide an initial overview of the profiles of key actors, seven main categories of producers and users can be identified.25 For each category of producers and users, the regional
distribution of survey responses is also presented (see Figures 6 and 7).
1.

Collectors and enthusiasts: Production by collectors and enthusiasts is prompted by individual
curiosity and is, most often, not intended for use for violent or criminal purposes. Social media
platforms have become hubs of knowledge-sharing on weapon production, significantly increasing the accessibility of know-how, with little to no control of the end-user of such knowledge (seeBox 4).26 In some cases, collectors may seek to share knowledge with other collectors. However,as these platforms are available to a wide and uncontrolled audience, such knowledge can beused with violent or criminal purposes. Research indicates that some gun enthusiasts in the
United States, Canada and Europe, who share knowledge on manufacturing techniques via online
platforms, follow extreme ideologies or have strong political convictions.27 In these cases, craft-produced weapons could be used to commit violence.28 The skill sets of both collectors and enthusiasts vary, from experienced producers to newcomers to the field of manufacturing. However, forthe reasons mentioned above, such skill sets are generally destined to grow, both in quality and intheir reach.

25

When referring to users, this research also refers to individuals or organizations illegally acquiring these weapons, evenwhen those are seized before potential use.

26

Kyle Dent, Yannick Veilleux-Lepage and Maria Zuppello, Risks and Challenges in Online Communities for 3D-Printed
Firearms Among Extremists and Terrorists (Washington, DC: Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, 2023), Year 3
Working Groups.

27

Rajan Basra, Behind the Mask: Uncovering the Extremist Messages of a 3D‑Printed Gun Designer (London: ICSR, 2023);
Dent et al., Risks and Challenges in Online Communities.

28

Rueben Dass and Benjamin Mok, “Assessing the Impact of 3D-Printed Weapons on the Violent Extremist Milieu”, Global
Network on Extremism & Technology, 20 February 2023.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

20

BOX 4.

Moving Past the Dark Web
Individuals and groups involved in the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of SALW make use of the
Dark Web to spread production guidance, as well as to sell and buy weapons and components.29 Dark
Web forums are, however, only one part of a much larger network. Products, materials, “how-to” files
and instructions on production are accessible on the surface web, across social media platforms andmessenger services.30 Joining a Dark Web forum, while an attractive option to some, is no longer
necessary for those interested in accessing the knowledge and tools to fabricate a small arm.
This has implications beyond the traditional arms control community. A wide range of actors monitor
the online sharing of and access to information (e.g. Google, YouTube, Facebook, Reddit), and thelines between licit and illicit online content seem blurred. Despite existing policies that aim to limit the
spread of dangerous content (e.g., the YouTube Firearms Policy31), it appears that videos and files on
illicit small arms production evade the regulations intended to control them. In addition, online shops
and websites dedicated to selling production tools (e.g., CNC mills) and related guidance exploit
national legal loopholes and multiply options to access the unregulated production of weapons.32
If the web constitutes fertile ground for dangerous content to spread, it also represents a promising
space for cooperation between law enforcement agencies and online service providers. While joint
work in this domain has already led to significant investigative successes, there is great potential forenhancing multi-stakeholder cooperation and research. As affirmed by a YouTube spokesperson, “Ourwork in this area is never done.”33

2.

Civilians with a self-defence purpose: In contexts where the perception of insecurity is highor where there is inter-communal conflict (e.g. farmers–herder tensions), civilians interested inan accessible self-defence option frequently resort to craft production. This is often the case inWest Africa, where craft production responds to high levels of individual demand.34 In Nigeria, forinstance, individual and community insecurity remains a key driver of demand for craft production.35 The types and sophistication of craft-produced weapons generally vary, ranging from rudimentary single-shot guns to more sophisticated semi-automatic pistols.36

29

Christian Ponti et al., Digest of Firearms Trafficking and Related Crimes Cases (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs andCrime, 2023), pp. 65–67.

30

Ibid.

31

Ibid., pp. 23–33.

32

YouTube Firearms Policy, Accessed 10 May 2024, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/7667605?hl=en.

33

Jennifer Bisram, “Why is YouTube Suggesting Ghost Gun Videos to Young People Watching Video Games? Officials Want
Change”, CBS News New York, 25 April 2024.

34

Theodore Leggett et al., Firearms Trafficking in the Sahel (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2022).

35

Matthias Nowak and André Gsell, Handmade and Deadly: Craft Production of Small Arms in Nigeria, Briefing Paper(Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2018).

36

Johanna Kleffmann et al., Factors Driving Weapons Holding in the North East of Nigeria (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2023), https://doi.org/10.37559/MEAC/23/11, pp. 13–14.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

21A craft weapons workshop in Bamako, Mali, 2023. Source: Small Arms Survey, Aline Shaban.

3.

Blacksmiths and gunsmiths: For blacksmiths and artisanal manufacturers, craft production is asource of income and is intended for others’ use. Commonly, these producers also manufactureother tools, such as cooking utensils, ornaments and agricultural tools.37 However, the craft production of SALW and components can be more lucrative in some contexts, such as in West Africa.38
Beyond its economic worth, such production has long-standing cultural roots in many societies,
where it is considered to be a skilful and socially valuable practice passed on across generations.
This traditional set of skills, while generally not relying on high-tech machinery or material, hasalso been the object of improvement. In the past decade, gunsmiths in West Africa and South andSouth-East Asia have been producing perfectly functioning weapons, and copies of industrially
produced ones, on a relatively significant scale. In Ghana, for instance, it has been estimated thatgunsmiths produce about 200 000 illegal weapons a year, constituting one of the most sophisticated craft-production networks in the subregion.39 Similarly, in the Philippines, remote gun-making workshops outside the city of Danao have been, since the 1990s, the go-to destination for individuals and criminals interested in purchasing high-quality copies of industrially produced SALW.40

4.

Hunters and poachers: In several regions, craft-produced weapons have historically beenused for hunting purposes. These weapons are, most often, purchased from gunsmiths. This is,for instance, the case in Nigeria, where hunters constitute an important group of clients for gunsmiths.41 Poachers in Southern and Central Africa have also been reported to make use of craft-pro-

37

Julien Joly and Aline Shaban, Between Tradition and the Law: Artisanal Firearm Production in West Africa (Geneva: Small
Arms Survey, 2023)

38

This information is based on findings from UNIDIR’s survey and interviews with experts.

39

ENACT Africa, “Ghana’s Artisanal Arms Market Should Be Regulated”.

40

Jason Gutierrez, “A Family Craft with a Deadly Toll: Illegal Gun Making”, New York Times, 7 April 2019, https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/04/07/world/asia/philippines-illegal-guns.html.

41

Matthias Nowak and André Gsell, Handmade and Deadly: Craft Production of Small Arms in Nigeria (Geneva: Small Arms
Survey, 2018).

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

22duced weapons in their illegal practices.42 Finally, craft-produced firearms are also used during traditional and cultural celebrations and festivities. This is mostly the case in African countries, where
weapons production and ownership carry a traditional status symbol (see also Box 5). 43
5.

Individuals involved in criminal activities: If access to industrially produced weapons is limited,petty criminals (e.g., robbers, traffickers and dealers) can resort to craft-produced ones. This isoften combined with considerations of the limited traceability of these weapons – that is, they
have erroneous or absent markings that make tracing and identification hard.44 The lower price ofcraft-produced weapons, compared to industrially produced ones, is often also part of the equation.
Depending on the context, petty criminals may produce their own weapons or may purchase themfrom professional gunsmiths. In Thailand, where crimes involving “Thai-style home-made guns”
regularly appear in the news, experienced gunsmiths have been sustaining the civilian demand for
firearms for decades.45 In the European context, while some small criminals have been reported tohave converted blank-firing pistols and other non-lethal purpose firearms,46 others have resorted
to online purchases and trafficking of firearms that have already been converted.47 The quality andsophistication of these weapons are highly dependent on the context and on the manufacturing
technique used. However, the ease of access to materials, guidance and instructions on production facilitates the process and increases individual possibilities to acquire lethal weapons forcriminal purposes.

6.

Criminal organizations: Individual criminals and criminal organizations and groups can be
attracted to craft production due to the limited traceability of these weapons, their higher accessibility, and their lower price compared to industrial counterparts. Any one of these elements can
explain why criminal groups around the globe have been resorting to craft-produced weapons,even if only as part of a larger arsenal.48 Weapons that are produced or assembled by the group ororganization itself can be both for use by the group or for transnational trafficking. In March 2021,
for instance, the Florida Heat operation, jointly conducted by the Brazilian Federal Police and theFederal Public Prosecutor’s Office, revealed that a Brazilian criminal organization was trafficking
gun components and ammunition from the United States for assembly in Brazil (see Box 8 below).
It appears that the weapons were not only for the group’s use, but also to supply other local criminals.49 Globally, the quality, sophistication and scale of production by criminal organizations has
been reported as increasingly high and lethal.

42

Kristopher Carlson et al., “In the Line of Fire: Elephant and Rhino Poaching in Africa”, in Small Arms Survey Yearbook:
Weapons and the World (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2015).

43

Nowak and Gsell, Handmade and Deadly.

44

While in most cases these weapons lack standardized marking, research and law enforcement have documented cases ofcraft-weapons being marked by their producers, either as a way of distinguishing them or as part of their internal logistics.

45

East Asia Forum, “Thailand’s Growing Gun Problem”, 13 December 2023, https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/12/13/thailands-growing-gun-problem/.

46“Converted Handguns Fired More than ‘Real’ Weapons in UK Crimes“, BBC, 16 January 2024, https://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-67895627.

47

Matt Schroeder et al., Privately Made Firearms in the European Union (Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, Small Arms
Survey: 2023).

48

G. Hays and N. R. Jenzen-Jones, Beyond State Control: Improvised and Craft-produced Small Arms and Light Weapons(Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2018).

49“Policia Federal Launches Operation Florida Heat against International Arms Trafficking in Rio de Janeiro”, POST Online
Media, 15 March 2022, https://www.poandpo.com/news/policia-federal-launches-operation-florida-heat-against-international-arms-trafficking-in-rio-de-janeiro/.
U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

23BOX 5.

Is Craft Production a Men’s Business Only?
Contribution from the West African Action Network on Small Arms – Nigeria

Artisanal shotgun, Nigeria, 2017. Source: Small Arms Survey, Matthias Novak.

Concepts of masculinity and manhood in societies are deeply intertwined with SALW acquisition anduse; craft production of SALW is no exception. In Nigeria, manufacturing and holding craft-produced
weapons has deeply rooted cultural connotations that have historically fed into a societal perception of
manhood. This is mainly due to the ownership of such weapons being a status symbol, which motivatespart of the illegal production within communities and contributes to gender-based violence (GBV). Ina country where “it is easier to find a gun than a decent job”, the accessible production and possession of SALW multiplies the possibility of women, girls and marginalized groups being killed, threatened, and intimidated. While the illegal production and possession of SALW to perpetrate GBV has
been observed across other regions of the world, data on this remains limited. The West African Action
Network on Small Arms – Nigeria (WAANSA Nigeria) engages in efforts to monitor the use of locally
craft-produced shotguns and guns in episodes of GBV.
In parallel to this trend, women also participate in the supply chain of craft-produced SALW as carriersof weapons. In Nigeria, women’s marginalized social role means that they are rarely subject to security
controls and checks; combined with their traditional clothing, which are ideal for concealing objects,
this has made them an ideal element in the trafficking chain. Women’s engagement in trafficking may
be a result of coercion, but is also often prompted by economic need, a desire for emancipation or
voluntary engagement with a criminal group.50 Like data on GBV, reliable data regarding women’s rolein the illegal production and trafficking of weapons is limited.

50

Emilia Dungel and Anne-Séverine Fabre, Missing or Unseen?: Exploring Women’s Roles in Arms Trafficking (Geneva: Small
Arms Survey, 2022)

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

24

7.

Non-state armed groups, including listed terrorist groups:51 In settings in which conventional
weapons are difficult to acquire, non-state armed groups (NSAG) have often resorted to creative
solutions. Craft-produced SALW as well as mortars, grenades and rocket launchers have beenturning up in multiple conflict and non-conflict settings. Often, this production is of semi-professional quality or scale. NSAG in Myanmar fighting against the military, such as the People’s Defence
Forces or the Karenni Generation Z Army (KGZA), have largely relied on weaponized commercial uncrewed aerial vehicles and home-made weapons and munitions.52 Based on open-source
evidence, their production appears to be organized in workshops and includes the manufacturing of road and naval mines, rudimentary munitions and bombs, mid- and long-range mortars, aswell as 3D-printed semi-automatic weapons (e.g., FGC-9).53 While arsenals vary from one group
to another, the Myanmar context offers one of the most diverse scenarios of craft-production by
NSAG. Large-scale craft production was also reported in field investigations in Fallujah, Iraq, in
2016, where the Islamic State group established a quasi-industrial manufacturing capacity acrossdifferent workshops.54 Findings from the investigations provided evidence of a relatively sophisticated and organized production chain, supplying the group with improvised rockets and explosives.55 Similar production capabilities have been identified in Syria.56 While these groups do not
rely solely on craft-produced SALW, production has reached a scale that can ensure the manufacture of a high-quality arsenal. This is also the case for smaller groups, such as the Ambazoniangroup in the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon,57 which have significantly reliedon the illegal craft production of SALW and explosives. In recent years, Cameroonian Police haveidentified and dismantled workshops in remote areas of the country used by the group for craft
production. Seizures have indicated an increasing capacity within the separatist group, in both thequality and scale of production.58

51

The term non-state armed groups is used here to refer to armed groups of actors, distinct from the armed and security forcesof a state, that possess and use conventional arms without authorization from the state in which they are based or operate.
This definition includes, but it is not limited to, groups that are listed as terrorist groups at the national or international level.
See Manuel Martinez Miralles, Alfredo Malaret Baldo et al., The Arms Trade Treaty: Diversion Analysis Framework, (Geneva:
UNIDIR, 2021)

52

Rajeev Bhattacharyya, “An Inside Look at Myanmar Resistance Groups’ Weapons Manufacturing Factories”, The Diplomat,
4 October 2023.

53

Bociaga, “Myanmar Fighters Continue Improvising in Struggle Against Junta”.

54

Conflict Armament Research, Weapons of the Islamic State: A Three-year Investigation in Iraq and Syria (London: ConflictArmament Research, 2017).

55

Ibid.

56

Conflict Armament Research, Red Flags and Choke Points: Procurement Networks Behind Islamic State Improvised
Weapon Programmes (London: Conflict Armament Research, 2020)

57

Amnesty International, With or Against Us: People of the North-West Region of Cameroon Caught between the Army, Armed
Separatists and Militias (London: Amnesty International, 2023).

58

This information is based on an interview with a police commissioner from INTERPOL, Cameroon.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

25

FIGURE 5.

Types of Users and Producers of Craft Weapons Identified by Survey
Respondents59
16

COLLECTORS/ENTHUSIASTS

160

GUNSMITHS
22

29

HUNTERS
1247

INDIVIDUALS INVOLVEDIN CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES33

32

CRIMINAL
ORGANIZATIONS

22

NUMBER OF STATES RESPONSES

USERS

20

NON-STATE ARMEDGROUPSPRODUCERS

14

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Building on responses to UNIDIR’s survey, it is worth highlighting some key regional tendencies
regarding the actors involved in craft production (see Figures 6 and 7). The responses indicate ahigh level of SALW craft production among collectors and enthusiasts across WEOG. Collectors andenthusiasts acquiring or producing SALW are, however, also present across Eastern Europe and in
the Asia-Pacific region. Hunters remain a highly frequent category of users and, to a lower extent, of
producers in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Asia-Pacific. Individual criminals andcriminal organizations are reported to use and produce craft SALW across all regions. Craft production appears to be common among criminal organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean and in
WEOG. Individual criminals in these regions are also using craft-produced SALW. This is also the casein Africa, Eastern Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Non-state armed groups are mostly reported to be
craft-producing their own SALW in WEOG, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. In those same
regions, and to a lower extent in the Asia-Pacific, non-state armed groups are also indicated as usersof craft-produced SALW. Finally, and differently from other categories, blacksmiths and gunsmiths are
identified only as producers of SALW, across all regions but particularly in Africa.

59

For each category of producers and user, the bar chart shows the number of state responses that indicated that category.
Each country, when responding to UNIDIR’s survey, could flag one or more categories of producers.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

26

FIGURE 6.

Geographical Distribution of Responses per Category of Producers60
COLLECTORS/ENTHUSIASTS

5%

17%

GUNSMITHS

51%

25%

HUNTERS

16%

24%

30%

INDIVIDUALS INVOLVEDIN CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES4%CRIMINAL
ORGANIZATIONS

4%

21%

14%

28%

38%

7%

30%

45%

40%

10

20

30

7%

44%

25%

0

15%

42%

21%

NON-STATE ARMEDGROUPS

11%

40

35%

50

60

70

80

90

100

F I G U R E 7.

Geographical Distribution of Responses per Category of Users61
COLLECTORS/ENTHUSIASTSHUNTERSINDIVIDUALS INVOLVEDIN CRIMINAL ACTIVITIESCRIMINAL
ORGANIZATIONSNON-STATE ARMEDGROUPS

31%

0

10

30

40

5%
%
5

34%

9%

32%

29%

20

6%

27%

35%

10%

16%

19%

18%

31%

20%

16%

10%

14%

39%

14%

5%

49%

24%

8%

50

60

AFRICA

WESTERN EUROPE & OTHER STATESEASTERN EUROPE

LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN

70

80

90

100

ASIA-PACIFIC

60

The chart represents the regional distribution of responses within each category. To allow data comparison and exclude
the bias generated by the different regional responses rates, the percentages were obtained through a normalization/standardization of proportions. This operation allows the comparison of data that differ in dimension. In this case, it permits thecomparison of data across categories of producers.

61

The chart represents the regional distribution of responses within each category. To allow data comparison and exclude
the bias generated by the different regional responses rates, the percentages were obtained through a normalization/standardization of proportions. This operation allows the comparison of data that differ in dimension. In this case, it permits thecomparison of data across categories of users.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

274. International Instruments
Craft production of SALW is a transnational challenge. But since it lacks an internationally agreed definition and is constituted by a multitude of actors and manufacturing techniques, it is difficult to regulate.
This section provides an overview of international instruments that address craft production. The
following sections then look in turn at the regional (Section 5) and national (Section 6) levels, alongwith key challenges and good practices.
At the international level, different instruments address the illicit manufacturing of SALW. While illicit
craft production has represented, across history and regions, a long-standing challenge, existing instruments do not explicitly integrate this issue into their measures. As part of broader references toillicit manufacturing, the Firearms Protocol, the PoA and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) implicitly cover craft production of SALW. However, the issue is not explicitly included or defined. While
this should not constitute an obstacle to regulation per se, as their requirements apply to all types
of illicit manufacturing, it leaves space for ambiguity and differing interpretations. In fact, the lack ofagreement on definitions at the international level leads to varying national and regional regulations oncraft production of SALW (see below), which in turn contribute to loopholes and gaps in international
efforts to collectively address this issue.
To date, the Firearms Protocol is the only legally-binding global instrument that obliges states to takemeasures to counter the illicit manufacturing of firearms and ammunition.62 The Protocol, adopted in
May 2001, establishes the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms as a criminal offence, alongwith a system for government authorization and licensing mechanisms to ensure legitimate manufacturing.
Within the context of the Firearms Protocol, efforts have been made to address, only in part, the challenges posed by certain types of craft production. At its most recent meeting, in April 2024, the openended intergovernmental Working Group on Firearms – which was established by the Conference of
the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (under which theFirearms Protocol falls) – discussed “Operationalizing the Firearms Protocol in view of technologicaldevelopments relating to the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition”.63 In the relevant background paper, the Working Group secretariat outlined
some key recommendations to be further considered and discussed by state parties. The latter wereencouraged, among other things, to:1.

Revise their domestic legal frameworks to address 3D-printed parts of firearms, readily convertible weapons, polymer firearms, modular weapons, the reactivation of deactivated firearms andother emerging aspects – including regulating blueprints;

62

Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (“Firearms Protocol”), adopted 31 May
2001, General Assembly, A/RES/55/255, 8 June 2001, https://undocs.org/A/RES/55/255.

63

Working Group on Firearms, 11th Session, “Operationalizing the Firearms Protocol in View of Technological Developments
Relating to the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition”, Background paper prepared by the Secretariat, CTOC/COP/WG.6/2024/2, 3–4 April 2024.

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28

2.

Cooperate with the private sector, in particular manufacturers of 3D printers and 3D-printing
companies, to increase the traceability of 3D-printed firearms and firearm parts and components;

3.

Periodically exchange information at the global, regional and subregional levels on emerging
threats (see Box 6).64

In addition, further cooperation and dialogue with postal and courier services, as well as efforts toprevent and combat cyber-enabled trafficking in firearms, were encouraged.
Under the politically binding Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, states havealso committed to control SALW production and to criminalize their illicit manufacture, possession,stockpiling and trade.65 As part of their efforts to prevent the illicit SALW trade, states agreed to takeaction against groups and individuals engaged in illegal manufacturing of SALW.66 Additionally, the International Tracing Instrument,67 established in 2005 within the PoA framework, identifies tracing asa critical aspect of countering the illicit proliferation of SALW and promotes international cooperation
and assistance in marking, tracing and record-keeping. Despite these regulatory efforts, national interpretations of what constitutes “illicit manufacturing of SALW”, and the extent to which this includes
non-industrial production vary. This results in highly contextual and diverse implementation of the
PoA measures. In addition, new technologies in recent years have changed the nature of craft production, marking and tracing of SALW, and of illicit manufacturing more broadly, which poses significant
obstacles to PoA and ITI implementation.68
The issue of craft production and related developments represents, in the PoA framework, a long-standing challenge. In 2008, the need to gain a better understanding of local illicit manufacturing and related
challenges was noted for the first time by Cameroon and Ghana in their national reports on PoA implementation.69 Since then, different states have been drawing attention to the issue of craft production.
Starting from 2016, the outcome documents of PoA meetings have highlighted concerns regarding 3D
printing and the regulation of SALW production. This attention recognizes the importance of these considerations in ensuring the continuous relevance of the PoA and the ITI.70

64

Ibid.

65

Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects(“UN Programme of Action”), A/CONF.192/15, 20 July 2021, https://undocs.org/A/CONF.192/15(SUPP).

66

Ibid., p. 10.

67International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light
Weapons (“International Tracing Instrument”), adopted 8 December 2005, General Assembly, A/60/88, 27 June 2025,
https://undocs.org/A/60/88.

68

Ruben Nicolin, Inputs for Action on Small Arms: Conclusions and Recommendations from the Thematic Expert Seminars(Geneva: UNIDIR, 2024), pp. 42–49.

69

Silvia Cattaneo and Sarah Parker, Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons:
Analysis of the National Reports Submitted by States from 2002 to 2008 (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2008).

70

Nicolin, Inputs for Action on Small Arms.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

29BOX 6.

International Data-Collection and Information-Sharing Tools
To enhance awareness and international cooperation on illicit SALW manufacturing and trafficking, law
enforcement agencies have been working to improve information-sharing and to support states in theirdata-collection efforts. The INTERPOL Firearms Recovery Protocol, for instance, provides a step-bystep guide for supporting national investigators and intelligence units in collecting and analysing theintelligence that can be obtained from seized weapons, with a view to identifying illegal manufacturing, including non-industrial production. In addition, INTERPOL’s databases and tools, such as the
Illicit Arms Records and tracing Management System (iArms), the INTERPOL Ballistic Information
Network (IBIN) and the INTERPOL Firearms Reference Table (IFRT), are accessible to national authorities seeking to improve knowledge, data collection and information-sharing on the production ofillicit weapons. The use of these tools remains, however, largely dependent on national data-collection
and investigative practices, as well as on the extent to which the databases’ structure can reflect thecharacteristics of different types of craft production and national contexts.

Despite increasing international efforts, comprehensive discussions on craft production of SALW inthese forums remain limited to specific manufacturing techniques (e.g. 3D printing), and they generally
tend to proceed at a slower pace than the evolution of production capabilities and technologies.
National regulatory approaches to the issue of craft production, therefore, continue to vary. As recognized during the 11th session of the Firearms Protocol Working Group on Firearms, there is a needto “support [Firearms Protocol] parties . . . in implementing its provisions in a harmonized manner, toprevent gaps and loopholes between different jurisdictions that could be exploited by criminals”.71 To
date, international instruments are struggling to adapt to the variety and the evolution that are typicalof non-industrial production. As a result, craft production and most related manufacturing techniques
continue to occupy an ever-evolving legal grey zone.

835 weapon parts and components, capable of assembling up to 45 AR-15 rifles, were seized in air cargo landed at Guarani
Airport, Paraguay. Source: Brazilian Federal Police.

71

Working Group on Firearms, CTOC/COP/WG.6/2024/2, paragraph 46.

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30

5. Regional Instruments
Regional instruments vary in how comprehensively they regulate illicit manufacturing and, consequently, whether they explicitly refer to craft production. While provisions that explicitly differentiate
between industrial and craft production are scarce, each regional instrument contains regulatory provisions to tackle the illicit manufacturing of SALW, reflecting a broad consensus on the need to regulate the
manufacture and movement of arms. Such regulatory provisions technically apply to craft production,with their emphasis on prohibiting unlicensed SALW production, strict regulation of civilian possession,
standardization of import/export controls, and provisions for marking, record-keeping and reporting.
Although the regional regulatory infrastructure to oversee craft production exists, the lack of clear definitions and awareness on the specificities of the issue make regional implementation more challenging.
There are at least 13 regional instruments that aim to regulate and control SALW production, covering
every region in the world. They range from legal conventions to strategies, road maps and other types ofagreements (see Table 1). Only a handful of these refer to and recognize craft production as a specificissue: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on SALW,72 the Kinshasa
Convention73 and the European Union’s “Securing Arms, Protecting Citizens” strategy.74 These instruments differ in their definitions of craft production, their scopes and their approaches to regulation. For
example, the Kinshasa Convention, while aiming to reduce craft production of SALW in Central Africa,
also contains operational measures that not only require Parties to the Convention to keep records andinventories of local manufacturers but also envision training and educational opportunities for producers
on existing regulatory frameworks, to incorporate them into the legal production sphere. The European
Union strategy recognizes the changing nature of illicit manufacturing and draws attention to the use of
3D-printed parts including craft production, illicit reactivation of deactivated SALW, conversion of signal
guns designed for blank ammunition, and the illicit use of reloading tools.

Description: Seizures from ilegal firearms workshops in the context of a EU-wide investigation, led by
the Spanish Civil Guard (Guardia Civil). Source: Spanish Civil Guard and EUROPOL.

72

Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Materials.’ United Nations Programmeof Action Implementation Support System: Regional Organisations, New York, NY: Economic Community of West African
States Secretariat / United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 14 June.

73

Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and all Parts and Components that can be used for their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly, 30 April 2010.

74

European Union Strategy Against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms and Light Weapons and their Ammunition, “Securing Arms,
Protecting Citizens”, European Council, 19 November 2018.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

31TA B L E 1 .

Key Regional and Subregional Instruments Covering Illicit Weapon
Manufacturing75
REGIONTITLE

TYPE OFE X P L I C I T LY A D D R E S S E S O N E O R M O R E

INSTRUMENTT Y P E S O F C R A F T P R O D U C T I O N O F S A LWWest

ECOWAS Convention on Small

Legally binding

AfricaArms and Light Weapons, theirinstrument

Ammunition and other Related

Contains regulations on craft production,marketing and rec-ord-keeping of local

Materials (2006/9)

producers

Southern

Protocol on the Control ofLegally binding

AfricaFirearms, Ammunition and other

instrument

Related Materials in the Southern
AfricanDevelopment Community (SADC)
AFRICA

Region (2001/04)
East Africa

Nairobi Protocol for the Preven-

Legally bindingtion, Control and Reduction of Small

instrument

Arms and Light Weapons in the
Great Lakes Region and the Horn ofAfrica (2004/05)
CentralKinshasa Convention: Central

Legally binding

AfricaAfrican Convention for the Control

instrumentof Small Arms and Light Weapons,

Contains licensing and record-keeping
regulations on craft production

Their Ammunition and All Parts andComponents That Can Be Usedfor Their Manufacture, Repair or
Assembly (2010/17)
Americas

CIFTA: The Inter-American Conven-

Legally bindingtion Against the Illicit Manufacturing

instrumentof and Trafficking in Firearms
Ammunition, Explosives, and other
AMERICAS

Related Materials (1997/8)

South

Andean Plan of Action to Prevent,Legally binding

America

Combat and Eradicate the Illicit

instrument

Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in All its Aspects (2003)75

Recommends incorporating craft production
regulations into domestic legislation

This table does not include road maps. The following road maps, among others, may be relevant in the context of this report:
Roadmap for a sustainable solution to the illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of small arms and light weapons
and their ammunition in the Western Balkans by 2024 (2018), Caribbean Firearms Roadmap (2020), Central American
Roadmap to Prevent the Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Arms and Ammunition (2022).

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

32

AMERICAS

Caribbean

Caribbean Community

Political(CARICOM) Declaration on Smalldeclaration

Arms and Light Weapons (2011)

ARAB STATESArab Model Law on Weapons,

Model law

Ammunitions, Explosives andHazardous Material (2002)
ASIA AND

Nadi Framework: Legal Framework

THE PACIFIC

for a Common Approach toLegal framework

Weapons Control Measures (2000)
Directive (EU) 2021/555 on control

Legal actof the acquisition and possession ofIntroduces regulations on acoustic, alarm andweaponssignal weapons, preventing conversion; also
includes stricter conditions for online acquisition of firearms

European Union Strategy toStrategy

European Union

EUROPE

combat illicit accumulation andAdvises on regulation of 3D-firearm compo-

trafficking of SALW and their ammu-

nents, craft production and illicit conversion ofnition (2006)

Regulation 258/2012 implement-

firearms and ammunition
Legal act

ing Article 10 of the United Nations’Firearms Protocol (2012)
Regulation 2015/2403 on establishing common guidelines on deactivation standards and technique for
ensuring that deactivated firearms

Legal act
Provides guidelines on deactivation standards
and techniques, preventing reactivation

are rendered irreversibly inoperable(2015)

Regional legal frameworks and instruments are tailored to address specific regional concerns, withvarying scopes and varying legal statuses. Their effectiveness, however, is closely tied to regional commitment and capacity for implementation, which varies across regions. In particular, it strongly relies on
implementation and commitment at the national level (see Box 7).

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

33B O X 7.

Start National to Change the Regional – Countering Illicit Production in
the European Union
Contribution from EUROPOL
All member states of the European Union prohibit individuals from craft producing firearms. However,hybrid firearms – produced with a combination of industrial and non-industrial components – as well as
converted and reactivated weapons are available on the black market and via online retailers. Despite
regional regulatory and law enforcement efforts, these firearms and related components continue tobe seized across Europe. Many of these seized weapons often originate outside the country of use. In
some European countries, upper and lower receivers as well as frames can be purchased by unlicensed
individuals. However, the assembly of these components to manufacture illicit firearms often appears
to be an issue in countries where such purchases are not authorized. Similarly, in several European
countries, blank-firing pistols can be purchased without a firearms possession license and can easily
be converted into lethal-purpose weapons. The latter, however, have mostly showed up in the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, where regulations are strict and target different illicit manufacturing techniques.
While causal linkages are difficult to draw conclusively, this hints at a critical aspect of craft production: it is not just about the regulation of the entire firearm, which strictly applies across the European
Union; it also concerns the legislative approach to specific parts, components, conversion devices
and materials, as well as files for 3D printing and CNC manufacturing materials. The low level of implementation of related European Union directives at the national level has a spill-over effect into othercountries in the region and, in turn, can affect proliferation trends there, as well as regionally.76
Additionally, regional data-collection efforts largely depend on national levels of awareness.
EUROPOL and other European Union agencies and platforms (e.g., European Multiagency Platform
Against Criminal Threats - EMPACT) have been making significant progress in enhancing countries’
knowledge of emerging challenges and trends in this domain – in particular regarding 3D-printed andhybrid designs. However, it appears that countries with the highest reporting levels of seizures (e.g., theNetherlands, Spain, France, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Germany) may not necessarily be themost affected by the issue, but rather are the most attentive to it. In Europe, a relationship can be madebetween countries that prioritize counter-terrorism efforts and those with higher levels of reporting andseizures of non-industrially produced weapons.

76

See also Matt Schroeder et al., Privately Made Firearms in the European Union (Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, Small
Arms Survey: 2023).

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34

6. National Regulatory Approaches
and Measures
Like regional instruments, national laws also vary and tend to not consider craft production of SALW
as a stand-alone issue.77 In most cases, it is implicitly covered by provisions on the prohibition of manufacturing without government authorization (licence, permit etc. to produce SALW). Of the 80 survey
respondents, only 15 states (19 per cent) have developed regulatory frameworks specifically for craft
production of SALW and their components (see Figure 8), with most of them only regulating specificmanufacturing techniques. Fifty-four states (68 per cent) criminalize unauthorized production, implicitly including craft production, and consider it an offence in all its forms.
FIGURE 8.

National Regulatory Approaches to Craft Production of SALW

14%
All forms of illicit manufacturing of SALW are a criminalo ff e n c e u n d e r n a t i o n a l l a w , i n c l u d i n g c r a f t p r o d u c t i o nSome forms of craft production of SALW are regulated
u n d e r n a t i o n a l l a w ( i n c l u d i n g o ff e n c e s f o r n o n - c o m p l i a n c e )

19%

68%

Craft production is not covered under national law

Excluding the few states (14 per cent) that do not address unlicensed craft production at all in theirnational laws, analysis of responses to UNIDIR’s survey indicates three types of national regulatory
approaches for craft production (see Table 2).

77

This section of the report solely focuses on national regulatory approaches to production and does not explore national regulations on transfers of craft-produced SALW.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

35TA B L E 2 .

Typology of National Regulatory Approaches to SALW Craft Production78
N AT I O N A L A P P R O A C H

National laws and regulations
prohibit and criminalize alltypes of illicit manufacturing,
including craft production

MAIN CHARACTERISTICS• No licensing mechanisms or other regulatory provisions are in place
for craft production. All its forms are considered, under national law, acriminal offence.
• Legislative frameworks tend to distinguish between different craft production techniques. All unlicensed production is illegal.
• Penalties for craft production of weapons vary. In most cases, imprisonment related to such an offence usually goes up to 10 years.

National laws and regulations
prohibit and criminalize certain
types of craft production, but
regulate other types (e.g. 3D
printing, conversion,
reactivation)• Illicit craft production of SALW is a criminal offence under national law.
However, depending on the country, legislative frameworks criminalizing or authorizing specific types of manufacturing techniques or types
of weapons are in place.
• Individuals and businesses can obtain an authorization, from the government or the relevant licensing authority, for specific types of manufacture.
• Penalties – often up to 10 years – remain applicable to all production
outside the authorized category or for which official authorization is notsought.

National laws and regulations
enable government control,
registration and monitoring ofcraft production• National legislative frameworks regulate, control and contain provisions for keeping records of craft production of SALW.
• Provisions for marking and record-keeping requirements specific tocraft production are available.
• The extent to which a legal definition of “craft production” is provided
varies. In most cases, such a definition is only partial or is tailored to
the national context.
• The degree to which relevant regulations reflect the evolution of manufacturing techniques and new technologies varies.
• Licences and authorizations can be issued, by the government or the
relevant licensing authorities, both to individuals and to businesses.
• The extent to which transfers of craft-produced weapons and components are regulated varies.
• This approach may find its roots in countries’ socio-historic legacy, inwhich individual possession and production of firearms is generally
accepted.

78

The typology presented aims at providing a simplified categorization of national regulatory approaches to craft production of
SALW. It fully acknowledges – and does not attempt to be an exhaustive representation of – the nuances across approaches.
It intentionally does not indicate names of specific states and laws.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

36

Survey responses indicate that, across regions, the prevalent national approach remains the criminalization of all forms of craft production, with no particular distinction between manufacturing techniques.
The control, registration and monitoring of craft production by governments is an approach adopted bya few African states, where national authorities provide for licensing mechanisms to authorize production. In practice, however, implementation remains ad hoc, and the issuance of licences appears to be
rare.79 The “in-between” approach of criminalizing and regulating specific types of craft production has,to date, only been adopted by few states, but appears to be a model towards which many are shifting.
Respondent countries from all regions indicated that they engage in targeted efforts to adapt existing
national laws to include provisions focused on particular manufacturing techniques. For example,
states in Europe, the Americas and Oceania have expressly prohibited the conversion, reactivationand 3D printing (full or hybrid) of SALW. This is, for instance, the case in the Australian state of New
South Wales, which introduced particularly restrictive regulations qualifying the possession of SALW
blueprints as a criminal offence.80 Similar updates concerning 3D-printed SALW, components and blueprints have been introduced in the national regulations of Jamaica and North Macedonia.81 Several
European countries have also been taking steps to strengthen control on readily convertible devices.82
In contrast, the focus in Africa and the Asia-Pacific appears to be on regulating or prohibiting the production of high-quality firearms using traditional manufacturing methods. National regulations in Mali,
Benin and Burkina Faso, for instance, define and regulate, to different extents, the production of specificartisanal or home-made SALW.83
Despite individual national efforts, the uneven regulation of craft production across countries remains
a critical challenge. The presence and nature of craft production, nationally and regionally, is largely
related to local dynamics: the users, producers, and the availability of materials and technologies, aswell as to supply and demand for industrially-produced conventional weapons. However, national approaches to craft production, or a lack thereof, contribute to determining the proliferation of theseweapons within and beyond a country’s borders. This is the case in the United States, for instance,
where generally permissive laws on firearms possession and trade, as well as those regulating partsand components, have resulted not only in high numbers of fully 3D-printed and assembled weapons
proliferating in-country, but also in an overall increase in the number of non-industrially made components and 80 per cent Kits being trafficked to and assembled in Latin America.84 In the European
Union, where regional directives on blank-firing firearms and on commercially available components
remain unevenly integrated at the national level, illegal conversion into lethal-purpose firearms andthe non-industrial assembly of weapons are spreading regionally (see Box 7 above).85 In West Africa,
where the integration of craft production in national laws is ad hoc and updates are rare, craft weapons

79

Joly and Shaban, Between Tradition and the Law. This information is also based on responses to UNIDIR’s survey and interviews with experts and national authorities.

80

David Bright and Monique Mann, “3D-Printed Guns Are on the Rise in Australia. How Can We Prevent Them Being Made?”,The Conversation, 8 November 2022, http://theconversation.com/3d-printed-guns-are-on-the-rise-in-australia-howcan-we-prevent-them-being-made-193936.

81

Ponti et al., Digest of Firearms Trafficking, pp. 28.

82

Schroeder et al., Privately Made Firearms in the European Union.

83

This information is based on national responses to UNIDIR’s survey. For further information on national regulations in West
Africa, see Joly and Shaban, Between Tradition and the Law.

84

This information is based on an interview with the Firearms Trafficking Repression Service of the Brazilian Federal Police.

85

Schaufelbühl et al., “The Emergence of 3D-printed Firearms”.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

37are circulating in elevated quantities across borders.86 It is therefore critical to shine a light on the interconnected nature of craft production, the uneven regulations between states and related proliferation
trends. National approaches and regulations addressing the issue are, in fact, to be understood as partof a highly dynamic, transnational phenomenon, with consequences far beyond any national context.
In facing this transnational issue, national data collection and related information-sharing also provecritical. With regard to this, UNIDIR’s survey also included questions on available national data on
seizures and on penalties related to illicit craft production. Survey responses demonstrated that, evenin countries where certain regulations are in place, informed and centralized data on craft productionis scarce. This represents a challenge not only in assessing the effectiveness and degree of implementation of national laws, but also in improving existing approaches (see Box 8). Starting from the seizure
stage, it is hard to recognize, handle and correctly identify craft-produced weapons, especially considering their increasing quality as well as the variety and originality of devices.87 Even when correctly
identified by law enforcement, these weapons’ specific characteristics – and often variety of components – can rarely be reflected in available databases. This, in turn, reduces the chances of identifying
trends, similarities and linkages across seizures. Additionally, data tends to be stored across different
national agencies, with limited channels for data sharing and communication.88 As an overall result,states and law enforcement agencies lack the necessary data to develop a national and regional understanding of the nature of craft production and related proliferation trends. This knowledge gap translates into low detection and control capacities, which feed, in turn, into limits on the amount of evidence
that could point to potential legal loopholes.
Acknowledging these challenges, certain states have significantly enhanced their data-collection
and information-sharing efforts. For example, France’s small arms information system TRAFFIC (forTargeted Response for Arms Fraudulently Fabricated, Imported & Commercialized) offers an accessible and relevant data-collection platform to law enforcement in European countries.89 Similarly, theUnited Kingdom’s Project INTERKNOW, a joint initiative between the National Crime Agency (NCA)and other law enforcement agencies, aims to enhance knowledge, information-sharing and cooperative responses across different national jurisdictions to the threat of 3D-printed firearms. It includes,
among other tools, a database for the collection of blueprints.90

86

ENACT Africa, “Ghana’s Artisanal Arms Market Should Be Regulated”.

87

This information is based on findings from UNIDIR’s survey and interviews with experts and national authorities.

88

Ibid.

89

Ibid.

90

This information is based on findings from UNIDIR’s survey.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

38

BOX 8.

Easier Said than Done – Challenges to Data Collection andInformation-Sharing
Contribution from the Firearms Trafficking Repression Service of the Brazilian
Federal Police
In recent years, Brazil has witnessed an unprecedented rise in seizures of non-industrially produced
firearms. According to available data, this mostly concerns rifles assembled using non-industrial partsand semi-finished components – such as 80 per cent lower receivers – and which copy popular conventional models. Unlike their industrial counterparts, these rifles lack markings and serial numbers or,more frequently, have misspelled, irregular or forged engravings. The Federal Police’s approach to thisnew challenge has been twofold: it required a rethink of tracing efforts in the absence of a serial number;and the transnational nature of the traffic has required significant inter-agency cooperation.
In the absence of serial numbers, national tracing efforts have focused on recording information regarding
materials and components and their provenance as well as special markings (including marking left on
ammunition). These have proven useful in connecting different seizures and tracing potential patterns.
Such patterns, however, extend far beyond the national context. In the Brazilian case, parts and components are trafficked both from within Latin America – mostly across the border with Paraguay – andfrom outside the region, mostly from the United States. Cooperation with law enforcement agencies in
the United States has thus proven critical to the Federal Police’s investigations into the production of
non-industrially produced weapons. In cooperation with the United States Department of Homeland
Security and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Brazilian Federal Police has
been making significant efforts to trace the routes of components trafficked into Brazil. As in the case ofoperation Florida Heat, this has led to successfully dismantling criminal organizations engaging in theillicit craft production of SALW.

Operation Florida Heat, Dismantled and concealed arms parts found by The Federal Revenue Service at the Port of Itajaí/SC,
Brazil, 2022. Source: Brazilian Federal Police.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

39Despite the steps forwards, key challenges remain:•

National data-collection and record-keeping efforts depend on knowledge and capabilities tocorrectly identify these weapons. The National Tracing Centre, within the Brazilian Federal Police,
maintains an internal database with specialized information on seizures. However, this depends
largely on the seizures reported by the police of each Brazilian state, on forensic verification and on
the extent of information at hand to properly identify such weapons. It is therefore key that training
capabilities are enhanced and that guidance documents on the latest craft production trends are
disseminated across forensic units and local police forces.

•

Information-sharing at the international level remains limited to ad hoc investigations. Mechanisms for the regular sharing of information between agencies and across borders are currently
in place and have proven crucial when facing such a transnational and rapidly changing issue.
However, the national capacity and international infrastructure to conduct a concrete joint data-collection effort is currently limited. In addition, the lack of internationally agreed definitions of what
constitutes illicit craft production also represents a challenge to consistent data collection. Morecooperative work can be fostered in these areas.

Finally, the economic and cultural significance that craft production has in several countries, particularly in Africa and in the Asia-Pacific region, plays a role in the national implementation of related
laws. In certain communities, craft production is, first and foremost, a skill. As such, it is passed on
across generations and makes for a relatively lucrative and respected business. Firearms are, in mostcases, only one among a range of household and agricultural tools that are produced. In regions where
the demand for weapons is significant, craft production has historically provided employment and has
responded to specific societal needs.91 In such contexts, the existence of mechanisms to prevent illicit
manufacturing, either through alternative livelihoods or licensing, is critical. In the absence of viable alternatives for producers, authorities face significant challenges in implementing and enforcing nationallaws against illicit craft production.92 Building on these considerations, several countries in West Africa
highlighted, in their responses to UNIDIR’s survey, ongoing or recent efforts to map producers andengage with their associations to further understand drivers of demand and supply and to improveaccess to regulatory mechanisms (see Box 9).

Artisanal hunting rifle, Mali, 2022. Source: David Locchead.

91

Joly and Shaban, Between Tradition and the Law.

92

This information is based on responses to UNIDIR’s survey and interviews with national authorities.

U N R E G U L AT E D P R O D U C T I O N

40

BOX 9.

Is there an Accessible Alternative to Craft Production?
Contribution from the Sierra Leone Commission on Arms and Ammunition93
In 2021, the Sierra Leone Commission on Arms and Ammunition (SLeCAA), in cooperation with Network
Research Consultancy Services (NRCS), conducted a national study aimed at capturing data on local
gun manufacturers in Sierra Leone, as well as assessing the socio-economic factors influencing the
production. As in many other countries, craft production is a long-standing economic practice in Sierra
Leone and responds to a high demand for firearms. Despite this, at the time of the study, a promisingfinding was highlighted: 94 per cent of the respondents indicated their willingness to abandon firearms
production for other viable alternative livelihoods. Such a willingness, while being a critical precondition for change, has unfortunately not yet translated into action. As indicated by experts from SLeCAA
in 2024, limited capacity was dedicated to long-term thinking on the resources and initiatives needed toguarantee the sustainable provision of alternative livelihoods. At the time of the study, manufacturers
flagged the need to: (a) have access to alternative practices, (b) receive the necessary training to shift
their expertise towards different practices, and (c) access workshops to conduct manufacturing of legal
items. Despite the efforts, guaranteeing a sustainable and long-term transition to producers remainsa challenge. In the absence of alternatives, they fear that their relapse into illegal manufacturing is unavoidable.
In addition to this, SLeCAA has been cooperating at both the regional and subnational levels to improve
control over craft production of SALW and to enhance knowledge and data collection on the issue. In
cooperation with ECOWAS, Volunteer Task Force Committees were established, particularly in borderareas, to support the identification of risk factors for illicit manufacturing and trafficking. The committees also engage in awareness-raising and community sensitization on the risks related to illicit manufacturing of SALW and related possession and trafficking. Despite their effectiveness, Sierra Leone isfacing significant capacity challenges in maintaining the existence of these committees. At the subnational level, a critical role in raising awareness on the issue is played by Chiefdom authorities. SLeCAA
has been closely cooperating with traditional leaders to prevent illicit production. In particular, the development of Chiefdom bylaws has been discussed, as they would serve as intermediary instruments
to regulate the production of firearms at the local level.
To date, however, regulation remains a challenge and access to licensing mechanisms seems very
limited. “To sum up”, one of the experts flagged, “there is a need to get things in order, starting withsupporting those manufacturers that would like to change practice. Secondly, we should remove the
obstacles within the process of acquiring a licence – these are, today, mostly economic or related toa fear of repercussions. A micro-funding programme and increasing awareness raising, in this sense,are options that could help in both directions.” In order to move towards a comprehensive strategy, “weneed to shed further light on the issue, and we need updated national data to inform a new approach”,
said one of the experts.

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Prior to 7 March 2024, SLeCAA was known as the Sierra Leone National Commission on Small Arms.

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7. Conclusion
Craft production of SALW represents an increasingly significant source of illicit weapons proliferation.
Alongside their conventionally produced counterparts, craft-produced weapons have been posing athreat to the security of individuals and communities around the globe. However, knowledge and understanding on this issue remains limited and siloed. Through an overview of the different types of
weapons, manufacturing techniques, and the actors involved in their production and use, this report
represents an initial attempt to shed light on the global nature of craft production. In doing so, it highlights some key areas for improvement and avenues to foster a global dialogue on this issue.
First, it is important that a higher, shared level of understanding and agreement be reached on
how to best define craft production. While an oversimplification of the specificities of each manufacturing technique and levels of sophistication is not desirable, recognizing them as part of a larger,
global phenomenon is fundamental to address this transnational challenge. To reach such agreement,
it is key to make the most out of existing forums for dialogue and cooperation, such as those offered
by international small arms control instruments and regional organizations. In this sense, the efforts
conducted by law enforcement to inform such discussions, providing technical and up-to-date information to states and regional organizations, are highly valuable.
Second, while international, regional and national instruments criminalize or regulate, to different
extents, illicit manufacturing, the explicit inclusion of craft production in these frameworks remains
limited. Increasing focus and efforts should be made at the multilateral level to promote discussions
around craft production and the ways to integrate its characteristics and developments into existing
frameworks. Where regional instruments targeting specific manufacturing techniques are available, integration into national laws and subsequent implementation requires attention, and where necessaryinternational cooperation and assistance. Further discussions on the challenges faced in this processby states is key. In addition, the compilation of lessons learned, good practices and approaches, at boththe national and the regional levels, should be promoted on a regular basis and used to inform multilateral frameworks.
Third, the improvement of existing legislative frameworks and national regulatory approaches
requires disaggregated, up-to-date and centralized data. Existing data-collection and reporting
mechanisms need to be adapted to recent developments, to recognize the variety of illicitly produced
SALW and to fully reflect the nature of seizures. This is also critical for law enforcement agencies tobe able to draw potential commonalities and trends, improve traceability and address this issue in its
transnational nature. It is also critical to increase states’ awareness of existing reporting mechanisms.
Finally, addressing the issue of craft production requires a complete understanding, at the national,
regional and international levels, of the actors involved in the use and manufacturing of theseweapons. Further research on the drivers of demand and supply for craft-produced SALW, as well as increasing awareness on their impact across communities, are critical to strengthen existing approaches.
While being beyond the scope of this study, further focus on the actors involved in the trafficking ofcraft-produced SALW, as well as on national approaches for regulating transfers, is also critical. Future
work may also investigate developments of craft-produced parts, components and ammunition.

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42This report highlights an overarching point: craft production of SALW – from traditional to high-techmethods – has democratized the field of weapon production far beyond what existing instruments
regulate, making production accessible to a potentially unlimited audience. Simultaneously, it also exponentially increases the number of stakeholders relevant to prevention, control and detection. Whenlooking at this scenario, traditional actors, such as governments, law enforcement agencies, and international and regional organizations, continue to play a crucial role in improving knowledge, data collection, cooperation and regulation in this domain. However, border control and customs authorities,
postal and shipping services, and actors within the surface web also appear to be fundamental. The
time is therefore ripe to promote a global, comprehensive and multi-stakeholder dialogue on the issueof illicit craft production of weapons.

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