Bull. Hiroshima Inst. Tech. Research Vol. 54（2020）29-38

ArticleHarris and His Opponents

Naoki ARAKI ＊（Received Oct. 31, 2019）

Abstract
Roy Harris points out that linguistics has twin assumptions: telementation and fixed codes.
Telementation explains verbal communication as transferring one person’s thought to anotherperson. Furthermore, fixed codes necessarily accompany telementation. If fixed codes do not exist,
telementation fails to achieve verbal communication successfully. In this sense, telementation and
fixed codes are the head and tail of the same coin. But Harris insists that that is not the case. On
the other hand, some criticize Harris’s claim above. In this paper, we shall examine and consider
arguments between Harris and his opponents.
Key Words: telementation, fixed codes, generative grammar‘translation theory’ of understanding:Introduction
Harris argues that Saussure’s theory of language

Saussure’s speech circuit is essentially a

is based on telementation, which is the transference

schemat ic summa r y, [ …] of a psycholog ica lof a person’s thought to another person. Moreover,

explanation of oral communication of the kind

generative linguistics, Harris insists, also assumes

propounded in its classic form in the seventeenthtelementation. Furthermore, telementaton, Harris

century by John Locke, and sometimes called theclaims, presupposes a fixed code, which is also called‘translation theory’ of understanding (Parkinson“I-language” in Chomsky’s terminology of generative

1977). (Harris 1987: 205)

grammar. In response to Harris’s criticism, Borsley
and Newmeyer argue that generative linguistics
does not adopt telementation as a premise and that

Then, why is Locke’s psychological theory called
the ‘translation theory’ of understanding?

“I-language” is not a fixed code in Harris’s sense.
In this paper, we shall examine and consider both
Harris’s and Borsley and Newmeyer’s insistence.

The term ‘translation theory’ refers to thefact that, according to the theory in question,
when language is the vehicle of communication

1. Telementation

understa nding requires a double process of

1.1. Harris’s Criticism of Telementation‘translation’: a speaker’s thoughts are first translated

Harris points outs that Saussure’s speech circuit

into sounds, and then the sounds uttered areis a psychological explanation of oral communication,translated back again into thoughts by the hearer.

which dates back to John Locke and is called theThis is clearly the basic idea behind Saussure’s＊ epartment of Information Systems and Management, Faculty of Applied Information Science, Hiroshima Institute of Technology,
D
Hiroshima 731-5193, Japan. E-mail: araki@cc.it-hiroshima.ac.jp― 29 ―Naoki ARAKI

account of what happens when A and B engage indiscourse.

1.2. Borsley and Newmeyer’s Criticism of Harris
According to Borsley and Newmeyer, generative(Harris 1987: 205)

linguists never endorse telementation, to which
So Saussure, according to Harris, takes over two

generative grammar, Harris insists, is committed:

claims of John Locke’s theory and adopts them as
The question, then, is whether generative

assumptions in his theory of communication:

grammar is committed to such a conception
Saussure simply takes over two basic claims of[telementation]. Harris’s only support for the idea

this old psychological theory [John Locke’s theory]that it is comes from one decades-old passage fromand incorporates them as premisses in his model.

Katz (1966) that he cites over and over again. This

These are: (ｉ) that communication is a process

hardly constitutes an impressive body of evidence.

of ‘telementation’ (that is, of the transference ofWe have found no more recent example of athoughts from one human mind to another), andgenerative linguist endorsing telementation.
(ⅱ) that a necessary and sufficient condition for(Borsley and Newmyer 1997: 46)

successful telementation is that the process of
But Harris argues against their criticism of his

communication, by whatever mechanisms it employs,
should result in the hearer’s thoughts being identicalwith the speaker’s. claim:(Harris 1987: 205)In that case, Borsley and Newmeyer have not

As we have seen, according to Harris, for Saussure,troubled to look very far. For a start, Katz himself

communication is a process of ‘telementation’, which

repeats his telementational account in 1972, in ameans that the same thought is transferred from one

book which explicitly acknowledges his indebtedness

person to another.

to Chomsky (Semantic Theory, New York: Harper

Furthermore, Harris points out that generativeand Row, p. 24). But even if we count Katz as an

linguistics also assumes telementation, quoting

unrepresentative maverick, that hardly explains how

Katz’s account of linguistic communication:

one of the most widely used introductory textbooks
in linguistics during the 1970s, written by two

The speaker’s message is encoded in the form ofAmerican generativists, tells students on page 1 thata phonetic representation of an utterance by meansof the system of linguistic rules with which theWhen you know a language, you can speak andspeaker is equipped. This encoding then becomes abe understood by others who know that language.

signal to the speaker’s articulatory organs, and heThis means you are able to produce sounds which

vocalizes an utterance of the proper phonetic shape.

signify certain meanings and to understand orThis is, in turn, picked up by the hearer’s auditory

interpret the sounds produced by others.

organs. The speech sounds that stimulate these(Fromkin and Rodman 1978: 1-2)

organs are then converted into a neural signal fromwhich a phonetic representation equivalent to the

How students were expected to understand thisone into which the speaker encoded his message

statement except in terms of speakers (successfully)

is obtained. This representation is decoded into acommunicating messages to hearers it is difficult torepresentation of the same message that the speaker

imagine. (Harris 1997: 249-250)

originally chose to convey by the hearer’s equivalentsystem of linguistic rules.F u r t he r m o r e , H a r r i s e nu me r at e s o t he r

(Katz 1966: 103-4)

generativists, who are no less explicitly committed
But is Harris right? Next we shall examine

to telementation:

criticisms of Harris’s insistence that generative
Another generativist no less explicitly committed

grammar is committed to telementation.
― 30 ―

Harris and His Opponents

grammar).

to telementation is J. A. Fodor, who claims:(Pinker 1994: 85)

Verbal communication is possible because, whenThus equipped, clearly, we can all “get information

U is a token of a linguistic type in a language

into” one another’s heads in a very “reasonable

that they both understand, the production/amount of time” and with remarkably little effort.

perception of U can effect a certain kind of

Pinker even undertakes to demonstrate that, withcorrespondence between the mental states of thethis equipment, we have an extraordinary form of

speaker and the hearer.

control over the minds of others.

(Fodor 1979: 103)

Likewise, E. Matthei and T. Roeper in theirS imply by making noises with our mouths, we canUnderstanding and Producing Speech (London:

reliably cause precise new combinations of ideas

Fontana, 1983) present a “model of the communicational

to arise in each other’s minds. (Pinker 1994: 15)

process” which is manifestly a generativist version of(Harris 1997: 250-251)

Saussure’s, and introduce it with the comment:
So Harris concludes that generative linguists
It takes almost no effort and very little, if any,

have endorsed telementation contrary to Borsley andconscious thought to turn our thoughts into

Newmeyer’s insistence that they have not. In otherwords and sentences in order to communicate

words, Harris thinks that there is no doubt thatthem to others; and, likewise, we ordinarily havegenerative linguists have been explicitly committed

no trouble in getting at the thoughts that others

to telementation:

express in their words and sentences. (p. 13)
One can only conclude from all this that Borsley(Harris 1997: 250)

and Newmeyer have not read very widely in their
Moreover, Harris points out that very recently

own subject area. I note that their own definition of

Steven Pinker states that the goal of linguistica “generative linguist” is one whose work (whether

communication is “to get information into a listener’s

in grammar or elsewhere) is ultimately indebted tohead in a reasonable amount of time”:

Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures (1957) and Aspectsof the Theory of Syntax (1965). All the writers I

Nor can one argue that any allegiance tohave cited above including Katz, count as generative

telementation within the generativist camp is now

linguists under this definition. So Borsley anda thing of the past. Very recently, one of Chomsky’s

Newmeyer’s ignorance of what generativists havecurrent colleagues at M. I. T., Steven Pinker,

claimed about linguistic communication over thestates plainly in a much acclaimed book (Thepast few decades is truly remarkable. (All the more

Language Instinct, 1994) that the goal of linguistic

so since they accuse me of “refusal to attend to what

communication is “to get information into a listener’s

generativists actually say” (p. 64). It seems they havehead in a reasonable amount of time”. How is itdifficulty in following their own advice.)

possible for the speaker to do this? It is possible(Harris 1997: 251)

because, according to Pinker, languages provide
Furthermore, Borsley and Newmeyer insist

both speaker and listener with the necessary verbal

that Chomsky himself explicitly rejects theequipment.

telementational conception of communication:
T he way language works, then, is that each
person’s brain contains a lexicon of words andChomsky, for example, has explicitly rejected

the concepts they stand for (a mental dictionary)

the idea that communication involves a mechanicaland a set of rules that combine the words toimplementation of our mental grammars. As he has

convey relationships among concepts (a mental

noted in a recent paper:― 31 ―Naoki ARAKI

… in real world communication, virtually any

conception of language has been less radical thaninformation and strategy can be used to try to

it might have been, and has thus laid itself open to

determine what some person is saying in a given

Harris’s valid accusation that generative linguistics

situation. Furthermore, little knowledge needsubscribes to the myth of telementation.

be shared by the speaker and the interpreter.

(Carr 1997: 66)(Chomsky 1991a: 18)
Harris comments on what Carr says above:
One could not ask for a more explicit rejection of
the telementational conception of communication.


Carr points out (against Borsley and Newmeyer)—(Borsley and Newmeyer 1997: 46)

and quite rightly in my view—that there is a basic
inconsistency between generativist preaching andHarris, however, again argues against Borsley

generativist practice. He argues that the most recent

and Newmeyer that vague is what the passage

Chomskyan version of an “I-language” does indeed

above from Chomsky says:“commit the generative enterprise to a version of
the telementation thesis” (p. 65), and agrees that

They [ Borsley and Newmeyer] also cite athere is some substance to “Harris’s valid accusationpassage from Chomsky [1991a: 18] which allegedlythat generative linguistics subscribes to the myth

proves that their hero in person explicitly rejectsof telementation” (p. 66). If Carr is right, Chomsky

telementation. But what the passage says is vague inmust be even more confused about language than I

the extreme. It simply acknowledges that in practice

had hitherto supposed: that is, he fails to see his own

we use all kinds of clues to interpret what othercommitment to the myth. The only alternative is topeople say, and that “little knowledge need be shared

suppose that Chomsky is an extremely competentby the speaker and the interpreter”. As an example

non-telementational theorist, who unfortunatelyof the explicit rejection of telementation, this ishappens to have great (performance) difficulties inludicrous: it does not even address the question.

saying what he means. (My own opinion is slightly

different from Carr’s: I think Chomsky has shifted(Harris 1997: 251)

his ground so often that he no longer knows what he
By the way in relation to Harris’s insistence thatmeans.)

(Harris 1997: 251-252)

generative linguists have endorsed telementation,
Philip Carr says:

Furthermore, Harris claims that Chomsky’s
distinction between competence and performance does

I will seek to show, [ …] , that the current

not make any sense without assuming telementation:“minimalist” conception of I-language (Chomsky
1992), under which I-language is conceived of

It is difficult to make any sense of one of theas generating linguistic expressions (structural

main planks in the generativist platform—namely,

descriptions) which are instructions for performancethe notorious distinction between competencesyst ems, does indeed commit the generativeand performance—unless we take it as tacitly

enterprise to a version of the telementation thesis. I

presupposing a telementational scenario of theargue that Harris is right to deny the existence ofSaussurean type. That is to say, performancesuch a phenomenon, and that a strict “internalist”

corresponds to parole and competence to langue. A’sconception of language, of the sort that Chomsky has

linguistic competence is manifested in the kind of

all along been seeking to elaborate, conflicts withlinguistic performance that functions in the speech

the telementational thesis which current work finds

circuit both as acoustic product of A’s initiative anditself committed to. 

as auditory “input” to B’s comprehension, while B’s(Carr 1997: 65)

linguistic competence is manifested in correctly
In brief, generative thinking on the internalist“decoding” that input. To say that A does not need

― 32 ―

Harris and His Opponents

B at all in order to produce a linguistic performanceremains invariant from speaker to speaker andis trivially true but irrelevant. A might well befrom occasion to occasion within the sphere instanding alone in the middle of the Sahara. But if

which it operates. It is fixed in the sense in which

A had been alone in the middle of the Sahara since

the institutionalized rules of a game such as

birth (and miraculously survived), A would havechess are fixed. (Harris 1990c: 29)

no linguistic competence to manifest, either qua

(Borsley and Newmeyer 1997: 47)

speaker or qua listener. In short, A would have no
language at all.

(Harris 1997: 252)

But Borsley and Newmeyer insist that generative
linguists do not adopt a fixed-code view of language

In any case, according to Harris, telementation

because they do not claim the telementational theory

and fixed codes are twin assumptions, one of whichof communication, which entails, Harris maintains, adoes not exist without the other. In other words,

fixed-code view of language:

they are head and tail of the same coin. Also, we
can neither identify the invariant units of form and[ …] no generative linguist since the 19 6 0s

meaning nor explain how identical sets of such units

has advocated the telementational theory ofare provided to speakers and hearers respectively:

communication. So even if Harris is right thattelementation entails a fixed code view of language,

However, my main point […] is that—whoever

generative linguists are not required to adopt such

we think held it or did not hold it—telementation,a view. Do they adopt one anyway? One might

as a model of speech communication, will not do

suppose that Harris is on firmer ground here.
even in principle unless coupled with a fixed-code(Borsley and Newmeyer 1997: 48)

theory of the linguistic sign; and it is precisely
this conjunction which generates the internal

Moreover, Borsley and Newmeyer say that ancontradictions of those forms of linguistic analysis

I-language is not a fixed code although Chomsky

which are based upon it. Not only is it impossible

sees it as something relatively fixed. The reason is

to identify the invariant units of form and meaningthat an I-language is an individual cognitive system

which the model presupposes, but it is impossible tothat is only “partially shared by others in the

explain how speaker and hearer could independently

various communities”:

come to be supplied with identical sets of such units
in the first place. (Harris 1997: 252)

Chomsky sees an adult speaker’s I-language
as constituting a “relatively stable steady state …

Next, we shall consider fixed codes, on whichtelementation is based.

which then undergoes only peripheral modification”(Chomsky 1986b: 25). In other words, he sees it assomething (relatively) fixed.

2. Fixed Codes

But is I-language a “code”? For Harris, a code is2.1. Borsley and Newmeyer’s Criticism of Harris

invariant from speaker to speaker. But generative

Borsley and Newmeyer take up Harris’s second

linguists have never made such an assumption.

criticism of generative grammar, saying:

Chomsky, for example, has repeatedly stressed thatan I-language is an individual cognitive system that

We now consider the second of the mainis only “partially shared by others in the various

criticisms that Harris advances against generative

communities with which people associate themselves

grammar: that it is committed to the mistaken viewin their normal lives” (Chomsky 1991a: 19; emphasisthat languages are “fixed codes”, defined as “someadded). In this sense, then, I-language does not meet

fixed set of correlations between ideas and verbal

Harris’s criteria for being a fixed code.

symbols” (Harris 1981a: 10), which― 33 ―(Borsley and Newmeyer 1997: 48)

Naoki ARAKI

Furthermore, Borsley and Newmeyer claimthat I-language is not a fixed code in Harris’s

grammar is not consistent with Harris’s idea of whata “code” is.(Borsley and Newmeyer 1997: 48-49)

sense although they admit that representations ofphonetic form (PF representations) are linked with

Here Borsley and Newmeyer unconsciously

representations of logical form (LF representations),

admit that context is involved in understanding

which means that I-language is, in fact, a (relatively)

meaning, saying “Utterance meaning is a result of

fixed code:the interaction between sentence meaning and thecontext of the utterance.” Their “utterance meaning”

A code for Harris links “ ideas and verbal

is what Harris claims to be what is conveyed insymbols”, i.e. meaning and form. Since under the

linguistic communication. However, Borsley andmainstream approach to generative grammar,

Newmeyer criticize Harris’s idea above, saying:

the principles-and-parameters theory of Chomsky(1981; 1986b), representations of phonetic form (PFHarris thinks that the view that sentence

representations) are linked with representations of

meaning and utterance meaning are distinct islogical form (LF representations), there is a sense inuntenable (see especially 1987a). But the only

which I-language is in fact a (relatively) fixed code.

argument that we were able to detect in support ofHowever, as we will argue below, it is not one inhis position is that no discovery procedure reliably

Harris’s sense of the term, and hence the objections

separates out the two levels of meaning. This is true,that he advances against the idea that languages are

but quite irrelevant in any non-empiricist approach

fixed codes are irrelevant to generative grammar.

to language (for further remarks on this point, see(Borsley and Newmeyer 1997: 48)§7).

(Borsley and Newmeyer 1997: 49)

To be exact, Borsley and Newmeyer distinguish

But is it true that the distinction between“sentence meaning” from “utterance meaning”

sentence meaning and utterance meaning is

and insist that generative grammar treats theirrelevant in any non- empiricist approach toformer, which is different from the latter, which islanguage? If we cannot separate out the two levels

equivalent to Harris’s meaning that is combined in aof meaning, then non-empiricist approaches to

fixed code:

language will not be able to deal with “sentence
meaning”, which Borsley and Newmeyer insist,

Chomsky’s position is that at LF, certain aspects

generative linguists treat!

of meaning, notably anaphoric relations and

Next, Borsley and Newmeyer go on to consider

quantifier scope, are made explicit. LF is a level that

Harris’s five arguments against fixed codes one by“interfaces … with conceptual-intentional systems”

one:(Chomsky 1993a: 2), and thus it helps to provide
a basis for determining what a sentence means

Harris does attempt a series of empiricalwhen it is used. The mechanisms that effect thisarguments against fixed codes (1990c: 32f.), and it

determination, however, are proper to pragmaticis worth reviewing them. We will argue that thetheory, not grammatical theory (for discussion,

first four are all in reality arguments against thesee Kempson 1988). That is, generative grammar

telementational theory of communication, which

distinguishes between the grammatical encoding(in order to effect a mechanical exchange of ideas)of meaning (sentence meaning) and the actual

demands that speaker and hearer have precisely

messages that are conveyed when language is used

the same code. His fifth argument is simply an(utterance meaning). Utterance meaning is a result

unsupported objection to the study of I-language.

of the interaction between sentence meaning and the(Borsley and Newmeyer 1997: 49)

context of the utterance. Since LF is not equivalent
to the actual message conveyed, Chomsky’s view of― 34 ―First of a ll , B orsley a nd Newmeyer ta ke

Harris and His Opponents

up Harris’s first argument that in order forwell as the purely grammatical features of sentence

communication to be successful A and B need tomeaning.

(Borsley and Newmwyer 1997: 49-50)

have exactly the same linguistic knowledge andpoint out that if communication were a matter of

It should be noted that at the end of the passage

telementation then his argument would be true. So it

above, Borsley and Newmeyer admit the distinction

comes to be impossible that one person understands

between utterance meaning and sentence meaning

the meaning of a word by asking another:although they say that the distinction is difficult
to make. Also we should not overlook the fact that

Harris begins by arguing that “a fixed code

Borsley and Newmeyer think that utterance cantheory … must attribute exactly the same linguistic

be conveyed like a ball when playing catch, andknowledge to A and B if communication is to bethat cultural and personal factors are involved insuccessful. On this theory, therefore, it is impossible

understanding linguistic communication.

for anyone to come to know the meaning of a word

As Harris already points out, appealing toby asking another person” (ibid.: 33). But this would

the distinction between sentence and utterance

be true only if communication were a matter of

meanings is a segregationalist favorite way oftelementation.

explaining meaning. Similarly, Saussure’s distinction(Borsley and Newmeyer 1997: 49)

between langue and parole is also often adopted as a
If Borsley and Newmeyer understand what
Harris insists on, they will not argue as theway of escaping from attacking on segregationalists’views on meaning.

passage above says. They claim the same thing as

Next, Borsley and Newmeyer mention Harris’s

Harris because he insists that if communication issecond, third, and fourth arguments against fixedinterpreted as telementation, then a fixed code mustcodes and they dismiss them because generative

attribute exactly the same linguistic knowledge

linguists reject the telementational theory of

to A and B. Otherwise communication will not be

communication:

successful between A and B. So the next passage,
which follows the above, is quite the same as what

Harris’s second, third, and fourth objections

Harris insists on although Borsley and Newmeyer

are also based directly on telementation and its

do not notice this at all:concomitant idea that communication between
individuals requires that they have precisely the

Since telementation is clearly an untenable

same code. He asks, for example, how the same

conception [Harris could not disagree with this],

fixed code could get established for all speakers,

there is no reason why communication should

given their differences in linguistic experience;

demand identical codes. And, indeed, it manifestly

how innovation could ever happen, since that would

does not; communication can take place even whenlead to individuals having different codes; andcodes differ to some degree [Quite so!]. Thus, if the

how speakers and hearers could ever be sure that

British co-author of the present paper were to say

they were using the same code. But, again, since

to the American co-author “You read Synonymy

generative linguists reject the telementational theory

and Linguistic Analysis in one sitting? You couldn’t

of communication, these objections are without force

have done! ”, the latter would understand him,

as a critique of generative grammar.
even though the second sentence is not admitted(Borsley and Newmeyer 1997: 50)

by his I-language—the auxiliary systems of our
two varieties of English differ. It is an interesting

Last of all, concerning fixed codes, Borsley andquestion how different codes have to be before

Newmeyer take up Harris’s fifth argument against

communication is impaired; certainly, intelligibility

fixed codes and they point out that Harris insists(i.e. the successful conveyance of utterance meaning)that linguistics deals with fixed codes, which areis a function of cultural and personal factors, as

uniform and different from real languages, which are― 35 ―Naoki ARAKI

not uniform and fixed codes. According to Borsley

all occasions … Worse still, if synchronic systems

and Newmeyer, Chomsky has already said the same

exist only on the idiolectal level, then ex hypothesithing as Harris. But on one hand, Harris claims

if Smith and Brown ever manage to engage inthat linguistics should treat real languages but not

successful communication it will be sheer good

fixed codes, on the other hand, Chomsky maintains

luck. The identification of synchronic systems

that linguistics should deal with “grammars”—thewith idiolects is theoretically self-defeating forinternalized systems of speakers, that is, I-language.

orthodox linguistics. It is no good for Smith toBorsley and Newmeyer deny that “Smith’s andhave a fixed code which is shared with no one

Brown’s I-language must be identical in order for

else. (ibid.: 36)

them to communicate successfully.” But this is notwhat Harris claims. On the contrary, Harris says

Once again, there is no reason to believe, andthe same thing as Borsley and Newmeyer: Linguistic

every reason to doubt, that Smith’s and Brown’scommunication is possible without fixed codes:

I-language must be identical in order for them tocommunicate successfully.

His “fifth objection is perhaps more powerful(Borsley and Newmeyer 1997: 50-51)

than any of these [others]” (ibid.: 35):
After all, Harris’s and Borsley and Newmeyer’s
I f linguistics deals with synchronic speech-arguments seem to miss each other’s points.

systems … and these systems are fixed codes,
then they do not correspond to “languages” in the

Next, we shall examine how Harris reacts to
Borsley and Newmeyer’s criticism of him.

everyday sense in which English, French, andGerman are reckoned to be languages typically

2.2 Harris’s Criticism of Borsley and Newmeyer

spoken by most people brought up in, say, theFirst of all, Harris points out that Borsley andUnited Kingdom, France, and Germany. These

Newmeyer claims that I-language is not a fixed code

are not fixed codes, whatever else they may be,

in Harris’s sense, and that Harris’s criticism of fixed

because they are manifestly not uniform … Thus

codes is irrelevant to generative grammar:

it appears prima facie that linguistics cannot deal
with languages like English, French, and German;

Borsley and Newmeyer try hard to wriggle out

or if it does it cannot be dealing with fixed codes.

of the generativist commitment to fixed codes. They
admit that “there is a sense in which I-language

Quite so! As Chomsky notes, “… the commonsense

is in fact a (relatively) fixed code” (p. 48), but

notion of language has a crucial sociopoliticalclaim that it is not a fixed code in Harris’s sense.

dimension … That any coherent account can

So my objections to fixed codes are “irrelevant tobe given of ‘language’ in this sense is doubtful;generative grammar” (ibid.).

(Harris 1997: 253)

surely none has been offered or even seriously
attempted. Rather, all scientific approaches have

Next, Harris criticizes Borsley and Newmeyer’s

simply abandoned these elements of what is called

explanation of why fixed codes are irrelevant to‘language’ in common usage” (Chomsky 1986b: 15).

generative grammar, saying that “this is simply

Grammatical theorists do not study “languages”, but

playing with words”:

rather “grammars”—the internalized systems of
speakers. That is, they study I-language. But since

Explaining why this is so, they cite vague

Harris arbitrarily rejects the study of I-language,

waffle from Chomsky about “logical form”. This is,

his only recourse is to retreat to another attack onallegedly, a linguistic “level” that “interfaces … withtelementation and its requirement of identical codes:

conceptual-intentional systems” (ibid.). (Readers,please note the computer jargon.) Thus, it appears,

Smith’s English may not be the same English on

the “(relatively) fixed code” that generativists― 36 ―

Harris and His Opponents

own up to is a set of correspondences between

through this smokescreen of apologies, however.

representations of logical form and representations

There is quite plain evidence of the acceptance ofof phonetic form. In short, they think they have

fixed codes in the generativist camp. Pinker, again,

answered the charge that generative linguistics isprovides a clear example. His account of how we cancommitted to a fixed-code concept by removing the“reliably cause precise new combinations of ideas”

code to some quite obscure area of abstraction, andto arise in one another’s minds would not work

redescribing it in thoroughly opaque terms. This is

at all without the assumption that both speakersimply playing with words.

and hearer attach the same meanings to the same

(Harris 1997: 253)

sounds. Pinker is quite explicit about this. The
According to Harris, Borsley and Newmeyer“power” of a word, he says,

admit that fixed codes are involved in generative
linguistics but they distinguish between “sentence

comes from the fact that every member of ameaning” and “utterance meaning” and attributelinguistic community uses it interchangeably in

fixed codes to “sentence meaning”. So what Harris

speaking and understanding. (Pinker 1994: 151)

claims to be “meaning” comes to correspond to“utterance meaning”, which is “a result of theThis for Pinker, is a crucial property of ainteraction between sentence meaning and theword. Words are “a universal currency within acontext of the utterance”. In this way, Borsley andcommunity”. What does he mean by that, if not that

Newmeyer try to escape from Harris’s criticism of

they have fixed values? A word, he tells us,

generative linguistics:
is not merely a person’s characteristic behavior
Obviously what they wish to safeguard isin affecting the behavior of others, but a shareda distinction between “sentence meaning” andbidirectional symbol, available to convert meaning“utterance meaning” (which in turn rests on theto sound by any person when the person speaks,

pre-generative Saussurean distinction between

and sound to meaning by any person when thelangue and parole). They cheerfully concede to me

person listens, according to the same code. (Pinker

that “no discovery procedure reliably separates

1994: 151-2)

out the two levels of meaning”, but then claimthat although this “is true” it makes no difference.

There could hardly be a clearer demonstration

Right, it doesn’t—if you are doing cloud-cuckoo-landt h at , i n s pit e of B or s ley a nd New meye r ’s

linguistics, as Chomsky and his fellow-travellers

obfuscations, fixed-code theory is still alive, well andclearly are. So what this in the end amounts to is,thriving at M.I.T.

(Harris 1997: 254)

quite literally, that the generativists concede a fixedcode component in their analysis but claim it cannot

Harris’s criticism of Borsley and Newmeyer is

be faulted because in practice no one can sort out aone of the severest that I have ever read in academic

criterion which could possibly test it anyway. Thus

writings.
How, I wonder, do Borsley and Newmeyer react

it takes its place alongside the medieval doctrine ofhumours in the honours list of unfalsifiable theories
of human behaviour.

(Harris 1997: 253)

to Harris’s criticism of them?

Conclusion

Next, Harris stops commenting on Borsley

As we have seen, Harris’s and Borsley andand Newmeyer’s arguments and then cites Steven

Newmeyer’s arguments do not seem to go smoothly

Pinker’s passage as evidence of the acceptance ofuntil the end. Probably the reason is that their

fixed codes in generative linguistics:

stance on language is quite different. For Harris,languages are media that facilitate communication

We do not have to follow Borsley and Newmeyer

between people in a community. So Harris even

― 37 ―Naoki ARAKI

says that language has no meanings just as Keynes

Linguistics No. 1. 1992.

claims that money has no value (Harris 1990c: 51-

Chomsky, Noam. “A Minimalist Program for

52). On the other hand, for generativists like Borsley

Linguistic Theory.” The View from Building

and Newmeyer, language is like God and controls

20: Essays in Honor of Sylvain Bromberger (ed.)

everything concerning communication. First comes

Knneth Hale & S. J. Keyser. pp. 1-52. MIT Press.

language and next, communication. They believe

1993a.

that we are genetically programmed to speak a

Fodor, Jerry A. The Language of Thought. Harvard

language. They are interested in clarifying how we

University Press. 1979.

are genetically programmed, that is to say, what

Fromkin, V. and R. Rodman. An Introduction to

Universal Grammar is like. So it is not their concern

Language, 2nd ed. Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

how language is used for communication to be

1978.

achieved successfully. But for Harris, it is the subject

Harris, Roy. The Language Myth. Duckworth. 1981a.

matter how communication is successfully enabled

H a r r is , Roy. Re a d in g S a u s s u r e : A Cr it i c a l

to make use of language. In short, their interest in

Comment ar y on the Cours de linguistiquelanguage is completely different from each other. If

générale. Duckworth. 1987.

so, however hard or long they may argue about thisHarris, Roy. “Language as Social Interaction:

matter, probably they will not agree on any point in

Integrationalism Versus Segregationalism.”language.

Language Sciences 9/2 , pp. 131-143. 1987a.
(Reprinted in The Foundations of Linguistic

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