Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 21, No.!' June 1983

The Rise and the Fall of the Thai Young TurksThak CHALOEMTIARANA *A Review of Chai-Anan Samudavanija's

The Thai Young Turks**

The Thai Young Tu rks is the work of aprominent young Thai political scientist.

Vibhatakarasa [1966J which unfortunately
was never revised nor published as a text.

Chai-Anan Samudavanija is the first of

The most recent attempts to grapple withhis generation to achieve the rank ofprofessor at a major Thai university. Like
many of his colleagues, he has recently

this subject were rather unsatisfactory[Elliot 1978; Lissak 1976; Welch andSmith 1974J.1)

increased his efforts to publish m

thePublished works on the military written

His research on theby Thais have also been rather scarce.

role of middle ranking officers of theRoyal Thai Army is indeed an important

Books of note are Thawat Mokarapong's
study of the 1932 Revolution, Suchin

and welcome addition to the literature on

Tantikun's coverage of the 1947 coupd'etat,Zl and perhaps my own work on theEnglish language.

modern Thai politics.
Although the military has always beencentral to the Thai political system, au-Sarit regime. In 1978, there was an attemptthoritative works on the subject have notbeen readily forthcoming. David Wilson'smilitary in Thai politics. Young politicalscientists and students met at Chulalong-article in John ]. Johnson's edited volume

korn University to listen to and discuss
six papers which were presented over the[Johnson1962J is perhaps the first of its

kind to examine systematically, and critically, the role of the Thai military. Thereis also the often quoted dissertation of Jin* Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University,Ithaca, New York 14853, U. S. A.

** 1982. Singapore: Institute of Southeast AsianStudies. 120pp.
130

to generate interest in the study of theThese works relied on secondary sources
which proved to be their major weakness.
Also, their fascination with neat theoreticalframeworks overshadowed meaningful insights into reality.
2) See Suchin Tantikun, Ratthaprahan Ph. S.
2490 [The 1947 Coup], Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1972.
1)

T. CHALOEMTIARANA : Book Review

course of several weeks. These meetings
werewell attended.

The book itself is somewhat concise,

The papers were

although ambitiously divided into six chap-

subsequently published [Journal of Social

ters. Chai-Anan provides the reader withSciencehard-to-find information on the structuralorganization of the Thai Army, lists of key

1978].

It is worth noting that this series oflectures was held a year and a half after
the 1976 blood-letting at Thammasat, andat a time when the so-called young turks
were actively on the prowl. From thearmy officers from 1974 to 1981, the namesand commands of the young turks, and ahandy list of Army commanders-in-chieffrom 1932 to 1981. The appendices, charts

papers, one of which was Chai-Anan's, it
was apparent to all present that few con-and figures reflect Chai-Anan's meticulous

crete facts were known of the Thai military. Thai scholars were as much in thedark as their foreign colleagues. While it

reader.

failure to update and illustrate the changes

was easy to discuss and debate the hypotheses of Huntington, Janowitz, Finer, andRajakru and Sisao Deves cliques firstoutlined by Riggs [1966J .3)

Nordlinger, it is a different matter to try touse those conceptual tools to analyze Thaischolarship, which is appreciated by thisandMy

modernChai-Anan's

only criticism

regards hisimplications ofthefirst two chapters

Soicoverpolitics. Too many gaps and questions are

the historical background of Thai politics
and the involvement of the military, instilI left unanswered.
Chai-Anan presented another paper on
the military at a conference held in New

particular, the army. While these chapters
may appear perfunctory, Chai-Anan doesbring out important cultural variables thatDelhi in February 1979. Soon after hisreturn, he was appointed political adviser

affect Thai political behavior. Concepts

to the new prime minister, General Prem
Tinsulanon. As it has now become exceedingly clear, Prem's rise can be attributed
to the lobbying and maneuvering of themuang, kan borihan, plong toll are covered.

While I am sure that they are not developed to the satisfaction of many readers,

young turks. It is also clear that the NIDA
connection brought together the uneasy

concepts is a step in the right direction. 4l
In hindsight, the coup of April 1, 1981

coalition of General Sant Chitpatima, theyoung turks, and several members of theappeared rather foolhardy. Given the nature

Thai intelligentsia. Chai-Anan was amember of this group and thus was able
to become acquainted with these officers.
Also, he was able to observe first hand thein-fighting and political chicaneries thatwere endemic at those rarefied levels ofpolitics.

such as barami, thi phung, greng jai, kan

Chai-Anan's attempt to incorporate these3) Several years ago, while still associated withthe Institute for Southeast Asian Studies inSingapore, Ho Kwan Ping studied these twocliques in some detaiL Perhaps Chai-Ananshould have used these studies to up-date
his information.
4) In this respect, Chai-Anan and his colleague
Sombat Chantornwong are the appropriate
authors to propagate what should be studied
as the fundamentals of Thai political phi131

of Thai politics and the lessons of history,

come skeptical and cynical about the goals

certain conditions are usually met before
a coup can be successful and lasting. It
has been generally observed that mostcoups had a strong leader who had
captured the fancy, or had direct control,

and aspirations of military coup groups.
Anticipation of the event is exciting. The
prediction of imminent coups is also afavourite national past-time. But in mostinstances, broadcasted coup rationale isseen as merely ex post facto justification
for its staging and execution.

of strategic troops, particularly the First
Division. More importantly perhaps, is thereliance on the monarchy as legitimizerof newly acquired power.
Chai-Anan's coverage of the coup andInterestingly, Chai-Anan reveals thatthe young turks controlled 42 key army
battalions and regiments. Most of those

its aftermath discusses these two requisites openly. In the past, the political role

officers were combat veterans who had
fought insurgents and communists. Evenof the monarchy has been discussed insacrosanct and cosmological terms. De facto

the assessment of the least biased ofobservers will concede that the young turks
held preponderant firepower within theinfluence and involvement were ignored,
in fact, forfeited to the de jure concept ofnational palladium--magical, and above
politics. The April 1, 1981 coup in effectnormalized the anomaly between theory
and practice. It deflated the institutionof the monarchy to the level of mundane
secular politics. The throne was no longer
merely a ceremonial legitimizer of power.
It had become a prominent actor in theschema of political succession.
Despite the young turks' rhetoric of
democratic representation, socio-economic
justice, legal rights, and order, the generalpublic was sluggish to embrace theseunderlying principles as adequate bases
for governance. There had been too manycoups--14 since 1932.

Thais have be-losophy since they had jointly published
Khwamkid thang kanmuang lae sangkhom
thai [Thai Political Philosophy and Society],

Bankok: Banakit Press, 1980. I agree withthem that basic conceptualization is still
very much in need in the study of politicalbehavior in Thai society.
132

army. Yet they failed in the crunch.
The weak spot in their armor was theirfailure to anticipate the actions of membersof the royal family. They underestimatedthe antagonism that the royalty had against
General Sant, the coup's titular leader. Itis also clear that middle-ranking officers
did not have direct access to the monarchy. The young turk's socialization had
been one of ritualistic obedience to thethrone, and their perception of the monarchy was based on the sense of duty andhistorical purity, not political pragmatism.
It is ironic that the young turks did
not openly criticize members of the royalty
for politicizing the monarchy. Instead,they admonished and protested Generals
Prem and Athit's monopoly of loyalty tothe throne. Their decision not to resist
the Prem countercoup was predicatedupon the realization that if they had won
the battIe, they would ipso facto destroy
the prestige and thus the sanctity of theT. CHALOEMTIARANA: Book Review

throne. Their actions confirmed the dictum

Academy. This provided the initial linkthat political power in Thailand remains
with those who have the backing of thearmy and king.
Finally, the incident inaugurated a newphase of Thai politics. It openly legiti-and basis for group cohesion. Furthermore, they were head cadets and leaders
since Academy days. They came frommiddle-class backgrounds. They were allfrom the Central region. They attended
the Army Staff College. They all served inVietnam. Colonel Chamlong and Colonel
Manoon, the two primi inter pares, had

mized the political role of the throne andmembers of the royal family. It hinted at
the possibility of a prismatic segmentationof various political groups backed byfactions within the army and factions
within the royal family and its entourage.
As the Chalard coup of 1976 highlighted
the importance of controlling the major
broadcasting networks, the young turks'

advanced education in the United States.
It was also noted that 11 members of thisclass--Class 7--were senators. Several
held influential positions in the Prem government.

coup brought up lessons that one invariably
learns in the game of chess-- the kingis important, but in many gambits, it is

While the author has succeeded in tantalizing us with the preceding information,
he does not develop these leads muchfurther. For example, we get glimpses of

the queen that must receive particularattention.
Theoretically, middle level officers areimportant to a coup d'etat. However, they
are seldom central actors. 5l The young

the significance of the common Vietnam
experience, the shared middle-class beginnings, but yet we seem to fail to understandfully how these contributed to their collective philosophy and vision.

turks' episode confirms this. It is nevertheless important that we should study
and learn more about them as a pressuregroup.
Chai-Anan noted that there were sev-

One would hope to find that theAmerican experience for Chamlong had
a more lasting effect than the pai ihiew/
joyride. Also, the significance of theVietnam experience seems pregnant witheral factors common to the leadership of
the group. The seven leaders were in theinformation which may explain the group's
emotional and political character. Perhaps

same cadet class at the Thai Military

this reviewer is asking for something thatis not there, and in fact, the young turks
are merely officers with good intentions,5) Chai-Anan contends that there have beenfew studies on the middle-ranking officers.
This is substantiated by a review of what
has appeared in the journal Armed Forcesand Society, 1974-present. Of course, exceptions are studies of young armies emerging
from a colonial past. One of the best is
Robin Luckham, The Nigerian Military,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1971.

but have yet to fully develop their political acumen.
The latter may be closer to the truth.
Chapter 5 entitled "In Search of a Better
Society" is rather revealing. Although
they insisted that they were professional
133

soldiers, in fact the young turks were notdifferent in kind from their seniors whomthey despised. It is impossible to defend
the army's corporate interests, which was
the group's goal, in the milieu of politics
of scarce resources without dirtying theirhands. The allocation of society's values
and resources are determined throughauthoritative political action. For example,However, I seriously doubt whether they
were equipped, or had the foresight, togovern and spearhead reform and development. A conservative revolution seems
destined to fail from the start as the thrustof the group's ideology contained internal
weaknesses and contradictions. They failed
to understand that it is impossible (exceptconceptually) to compartmentalize thethe counterexhibition of captured communist weapons, while students at Thammasat were immersed in Red China week, isby nature political. It also seems unrealistic
for a professional soldier to sit in parliament and not be involved in politics.

social, the economic, and the political,
to change one and keep the others on
hold. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether
the nature of capitalism and free enterprise
was fully understood by the young turks. 5 )On final balance, however, Chai-Anan's

Not only were they confused about
their own professionalism, their expressed

efforts should be roundly applauded. It tookcourage and foresight on his part toideology was rather sterile. Perhaps ChaiAnan had given too much credit to theprepare this volume. Chai-Anan has indeed
raised relevant and important issues, issues

formulation of the young turks' ideology.
Major Sanchai's slim volume on Why do
Soldiers Stage Coups? [Thahan Dek 1978]

that are now perhaps easier to tackle as theyoung turks had inadvertantly let the royalcat out of the bag.

in essence summarized the theories ofJanowitz and Huntington. In fact, infatuation with the Huntingtonian reformist zeal
is not new.

References

What came out of it was essentially abid for conservative revolution. Analytically,
it can even be depicted as neo-Marxist, as
the group's plan for national salvationstipulates that initial attention should befocussed upon socia-economic reforms. The
group believes that political equality will
be stable as it will be based on a developed and correct economic and social substructure.
As long as the young turks acted as apressure group within the army they wereable to bide their time as king-makers.
134

Elliot, David. 1978. Thailand: Origins of Military Rule. London: Zed Press.
Jin Vibhatakarasa. 1966. The Military in Politics:
6) Chai-Anan concedes that "they did notunderstand the market mechanisms of thefree enterprise system," p. 61. On top of
this ideological confusion, we get very little
sense of how far the young turks will go on
economic and bureaucratic reform. In fact,
they talk about having the magical "sword",
but we do not get any sense how it would
be wielded and how deep a cut was intended.
Reminiscent of the movie "Z" and pronouncements of Sarit, societal ills were seen as
cancerous and must be drastically andviolently expurgated. Thais would ask: "Arethe young turks det khat (unrelentlesslydecisive) enough?"

T. CHALOEMTIARANA: Book Review

A Study of Military Leadership in Thailand.
Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Oregon.
Johnson, John ]., ed. 1962. The Role of theMilitaryin
UnderdevelopedCountries.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Journal of Social Science XV. April-June, 1978.
(in Thai)
Lissak, Moshe. 1976. Military Roles in Modernization: Civil-military Relations in Thailand
and Burma. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Riggs, Fred W. 1966. Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity. Honolulu:
East West Center Press.
Thahan Dek (Pseud.). 1978. Thahan Pattiwat
Thammai [Why do Soldiers Stage Coups?].
Bangkok: Changphimpetcharat Press.
Welch, Claude E.; and Smith, Arthur K. 1974.
Military Role and Rule. North Scituate:Duxbury Press.

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