Outline
Causality and Evidentiality

1Japanese Evidentiality

Yurie Hara

2

Davis & Hara (2014)
Cancellable Prejacent
Evidentiality via Causality

3

Causal Premise Semantics
Deriving evidentiality from causality

4Conclusion

Waseda/Hokkaido University

Amsterdam Colloquium 2017

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

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AC2017

1 / 50Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E

Sentence-final Evidential Auxiliary

Outline(1)

1

Japanese Evidentiality

2

Davis & Hara (2014)
Cancellable Prejacent
Evidentiality via Causality

3

Causal Premise Semantics
Deriving evidentiality from causality

4

Conclusion

Ame-ga futta youda.
rain-nom fell evid
‘It seems that it rained.’
Message 1: “It rained.”
Message 2: “The speaker has indirect evidence for ‘it rained’.”

AC20172 / 50AC20174 / 50

Question 1
What are the statuses of Messages 1 & 2?
—At-issue entailment? Presupposition? Implicture? ...

Question 2
What is indirect evidence?

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

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AC20173 / 50Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&EOutline

1

Japanese Evidentiality

2

Davis & Hara (2014)
Cancellable Prejacent
Evidentiality via Causality

Previous analyses

Evidentiality as presupposition(Izvorski, 1997; Matthewson et al., 2006; McCready & Ogata, 2007)(2)

3

Causal Premise Semantics
Deriving evidentiality from causality

4Conclusion

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E

AC2017Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

5 / 50At-issues cannot be cancelled

Ame-ga futta youda.
rain-nom fell evid
‘It seems that it rained.’
At-issue commitment: “It might/must have rained.”
Presupposition: “The speaker has indirect evidence for ‘it rained’.”

C&E

AC20176 / 50Youda: cancellable implicature

Bare assertion(3)#Ame-ga futta kedo, jitsu-wa futte nai.
rain-nom fell but, in.fact fall neg# ‘It rained, but in fact it didn’t.’(5)

Ame-ga futta youda kedo, jitsu-wa futte nai.
rain-nom fell evid but in.fact fall neg‘It seems that it rained but in fact it didn’t.’

Canonical Modal(4)

The prejacent p is a cancellable implicature.

#Ame-ga futta darou
kedo, jitsu-wa futte nai.
rain-nom fell probably but in.fact fall neg# ‘Probably it rained, but in fact it didn’t.’

A similar argument is made for reportative evidentials (Faller, 2002;Murray, 2010; AnderBois, 2014)

The prejacent proposition p is a semantic commitment.

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

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AC2017

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C&E

AC20178 / 50Youda: prejacent not committed

Summary(7)(6)

Gojira-ga
abareta youda.
Godzilla-nom raged evid
‘It seems/looks as if Godzilla raged wildly.’‘?It seems that Godzilla raged wildly.’Ame-ga futta youda.
rain-nom fell evid
‘It seems that it rained.’

Division of Labour
cancellable implicature It rained
semantic commitment The speaker has indirect evidence for ‘it rained’

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E

AC20179 / 50Outline1Japanese Evidentiality

2

Davis & Hara (2014)
Cancellable Prejacent
Evidentiality via Causality

C&E

AC2017

10 / 50

McCready and Ogata (2007)

What is indirect evidence?

McCready and Ogata’s answer

3

Causal Premise Semantics
Deriving evidentiality from causality

4

Conclusion

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E

Evidence for p is some information q that raises the agent’s subjective
probability of pAC2017

11 / 50Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E

AC2017

12 / 50

M&O: Probability accountUnexpected asymmetry
Wrong prediction if we switch the evidence q and the prejacent p(8)a.
b.

(Looking at a wet street)Ame-ga futta youda.
rain-nom fell youda‘It seems that it rained.’(9)1

The speaker learned the information:‘The streets are wet’2

The speaker raised her subjective probability
for the proposition:‘It rained’(prejacent p)‘It rained-youda’ is felicitous.

(Evid(p) OK)

3

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E(evidence q)

AC201713 / 50

Takubo: conditional dependencya. (Looking at falling raindrops)
b. #Michi-ga
nureteiru youda.
streets-nom wetyouda# ‘It seems that the streets are wet.’

1

The speaker learned the information:‘It is raining’2

The speaker raised her subjective probability
for the proposition:‘The streets are wet’

3‘The streets are wet-youda’ is felicitous.
↑ Wrong Prediction

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)(12)

Takubo’s (2009) answer

(13)

(11)

Abductive reasoning
Major premise p → q
Minor premise qConclusion
pHara (Waseda/Hokudai)

AC201714 / 50

Major premise
Minor premise
Conclusion

If it rains, the streets are wet
The streets are wet
It rains.

Abductive Reasoning → youda is attachable ⇐ Correct Prediction

Evidence for p is a minor premise q in the abductive reasoning given amajor premise p → q
Deductive reasoning
Major premise p → q
Minor premise p
Conclusion
q(q)(Evid(q) OK)

Abductive reasoning

What is indirect evidence?

(10)

C&E

(p)

a.
b.

(Looking at a wet street)Ame-ga futteru youda.
rain-nom falling evid
‘It seems to be raining.’

Deductive Reasoning → youda is not attachable ⇐ Correct Prediction
(14)

C&E

AC201715 / 50

a. (Looking at falling raindrops)
b. #Michi-ga
nureteiru youda.
streets-nom wetevid# ‘It seems that the streets are wet.’Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E

AC201716 / 50

Problem: Symmetric Conditional Dependency

Symmetric Conditional Dependency

You have red-brown spots on the skin. ↔ You have measles.

(15)

You have measles. → You have red-brown spots on the skin.
Major premise
Minor premiseConclusion

If you have measles,
you have you have red-brown spots on the skin.
Taro has red-brown spots on the skinTaro has measles.

abductive inference to ‘Taro has measles.’youda is attachable ⇐ Correct Prediction(16)

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E

AC201717 / 50

Symmetric Conditional Dependency(Looking at Taro’s skin)Taro-wa hashika no youda.
‘Taro seems to have measles.’Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E

AC201718 / 50

Davis and Hara (2014): Asymmetric causation

You have red-brown spots on the skin. → You have measles.
Major premise(17)

Minor premise
Conclusion

If you have red-brown spots on the skin,
you have measles.
Taro has measles
Taro has red-brown spots on the skin.

“What is indirect evidence?”

Davis and Hara’s answer
Evidence for p is some event/state q that is usually caused by p.

abductive inference to ‘Taro has red-brown spots on his skin.’‘p-youda’ ≈ ‘I perceive q which is caused by p’

youda is attachable ⇐ Wrong prediction(18)

See also Takubo (2007); Sawada (2006).

(Learning that Taro has “measles”)#Taro-no hifu-ni akachairo-no shisshin-ga aru youda.
‘Taro’s skin seems to have red-brown spots.’

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

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AC201719 / 50

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

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AC201720 / 50

Asymmetric Causal Relation 1

Deriving the asymmetry 1

Rain causes wet streets.
Wet streets do NOT cause rain.

(19)

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

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AC201721 / 50

Deriving the asymmetry 1a.
b.

(Looking at a wet street)Ame-ga futta youda.
rain-nom fell youda‘It seems that it rained.’≈ I perceive some event q (=wet street)
which is caused by p (=it rained).

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E

AC201722 / 50

AC201724 / 50

Asymmetric Causal Relation 2

Measles causes red-brown spots.
Red-brown spots do NOT cause measles.

(20)

a. (Looking at falling raindrops)
nureteiru youda.
b. #Michi-ga
streets-nom wetyouda#‘It seems that the streets are wet.’≈ I perceive some event q (=falling raindrops)
which is caused by p (=wet streets)
FALSE!

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E

AC201723 / 50

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E

Deriving the Asymmetry 2(21)

Deriving the Asymmetry 2(22)(Looking at Taro’s skin)Taro-wa hashika no youda.
‘Taro seems to have measles.’≈ I perceive some state q (red-brown spots)
which is caused by p (=measles)

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E

AC2017Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

25 / 50

Summary

C&EAC201726 / 50

AC201728 / 50

OutlineDavis & Hara’s interpretation of evidentials
Evid(p) is true at w iff ∃q such that the speaker perceives a state q at w
and p causes q.

1

Japanese Evidentiality

2

Davis & Hara (2014)
Cancellable Prejacent
Evidentiality via Causality

3

Causal Premise Semantics
Deriving evidentiality from causality

4

Conclusion

GoalFormalize the causal component.

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)(Learning that Taro has “measles”)#Taro-no hifu-ni akachairo-no shisshin-ga aru youda.
‘It seems that Taro has red-brown spots on his skin.’≈ I perceive some state q (=measles)
which is caused by p (=red-brown spots)
FALSE!

C&E

AC201727 / 50

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&EFormalize the causal component(23)

A causal network

Davis & Hara’s interpretation of evidentials
Evid(p) is true at w iff ∃q such that the speaker perceives astate q at w and p causes q.
R

Proposal: interpretation of evidentials (formal)
Evid(p) is true at fc , g, w iff ∃q such that the speaker perceives q at wand Mustp (q) is true at fc , g, w .

HD

Kaufmann’s (2013) causal premise semantics
Kratzer-style (Kratzer, 2005) premise sets are ranked.

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E

AC201729 / 50

Causal modal base fc (w )Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

AC201730 / 50

Causal premise backgrounds

Rfc (w ) ∶= {X ⊆ Πw ∣X is closed under ancestors in Πw }(Kaufmann, 2013, 1153)(24)

HD

Example:R

fc (w ) consists of causally relevant truths at w .

Ucausally relevant truths at w ΠU
w = {p ∈ Π ∣p is true at w }¯Example: ΠUr , h, d}w = {¯C&E

H
D

causally relevant propositions ΠU : the set of all cells of all partitions in U.
¯
Example: ΠU = {r , r¯, h, h̄, d, d}.

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E¯Πw = {¯r , h, d}¯fc (w ) = {∅, {¯r }, {h}, {¯r , h}, {¯r , h, d}}¯ {¯¯ {d}¯ are NOT closed under{h, d},r , d},anscestors

Ordering source g
constrained by the Causal Markov condition relative to a causal structureC.

AC201731 / 50

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

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AC201732 / 50

Hypothetical Update(25)

Outlineinterpretation of evidentials (formal)
Evid(p) is true at f, g, w iff ∃q such that the speaker perceives q
at w and Mustp (q) is true at f, g, w .
Mustp (q): If p is true, q must be true.

1Japanese Evidentiality

2

Davis & Hara (2014)
Cancellable Prejacent
Evidentiality via Causality

3

Causal Premise Semantics
Deriving evidentiality from causality

4

Conclusion

Built on the general interpretation of conditionals.

Hypothetical update
For all w : f[p](w ) ∶= {{p}} ∗ f(w ).
(26)(Kaufmann, 2013, 1148)

Example¯a. fc (w ) = {∅, {¯r }, {h}, {¯r , h}, {¯r , h, d}}¯b. Prem(fc [r ](w )) = {{r }} ∗ {∅, {¯r }, {h}, {¯r , h}, {¯r , h, d}}= {⟨{r }, ∅⟩, ⟨{r }, {h}⟩}= {r ., r .h}Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E

AC201733 / 50

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&E

No commitment to p

Causal Asymmetry: Cause-youda OK(27)(28)

Ame-ga futta youda kedo, jitsu-wa futte-nai.
rain-nom fell evid but fact-top fall-neg‘It seems that it rained, but in fact it didn’t.’

Evid(r ) is true at fc , g, w
¯ is true at fc , g, w .
iff Sp perceives d¯ at w and Mustr (d)HD(Looking at wet streets)
Ame-ga futta youda.
rain-nom fell evid
‘It seems that it rained.’¯Πv = {r , h̄, d}¯fc (w ) = {∅, {¯r }, {h}, {¯r , h}, {¯r , h, d}}Prem(fc [r ](w )) = {r ., r .h}¯ {h → d}}¯g(w ) = {∅, {h̄}, {r → d},

Rmax Prem((fc [r ] ∗ g)(w ))¯ r .h.(h → d)}¯= {r .h.(r → d),C&E

HD¯ is true at fc , g, w ⇒ Evid(r ) is true at fc , g, w ,Mustr (d)even though r is not true at w .
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Evid(r ) is true at fc , g, v
¯ is true at fc , g, v .
iff Sp perceives d¯ at v and Mustr (d)¯Πw = {¯r , h, d}Ra.
b.

AC2017¯
fc (v ) = {∅, {r }, {h̄}, {r , h̄}, {r , h̄, d}}¯Prem(fc [r ](v )) = {r ., r .r , r .h̄, r .r h̄, r .r h̄d}
¯ {h → d}}¯g(v ) = {∅, {h̄}, {r → d},¯
max Prem((fc [r ]∗ g)(v )) = {r .h̄.(r → d),¯ r .r h̄d.(r¯ → d),¯ r .r h̄d.(h¯ → d)}¯r .h̄.(h → d),¯ is true at fc , g, v ⇒ Evid(r ) is true at fc , g, v
Mustr (d)AC201735 / 50

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&EAC201736 / 50

Causal Asymmetry: Effect-youda BAD(29)Outlinea. (Looking at falling raindrops)
b. #Michi-ga nureteiru youda.
street-nom wetevid‘#It seems that the streets are wet.’1

Japanese Evidentiality

2

Davis & Hara (2014)
Cancellable Prejacent
Evidentiality via Causality

3

Causal Premise Semantics
Deriving evidentiality from causality4Conclusion¯ is true at fc , g, v iff Sp perceives r at v and Must ¯(r ) is true atEvid(d)dfc , g, v
¯Πv = {r , h̄, d}RHD¯fc (v ) = {∅, {r }, {h̄}, {r , h̄}, {r , h̄, d}}¯ )) = {d.,¯ d.r
¯ , d.
¯ h̄, d.rh}¯Prem(fc [d](v¯ {h → d}}¯g(v ) = {∅, {h̄}, {r → d},¯ ∗ g)(v ))max Prem((fc [d]¯ h̄.(r → d),¯ d.
¯ h̄.(h → d)}¯⊇ {d.

¯ is NOT true at fc , g, v
Mustd¯(r ) is NOT true at fc , g, v ⇒ Evid(d)Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&EAC201737 / 50

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

C&EAC201738 / 50

Concluding remarks
Davis & Hara’s (2014) interpretation of evidentials
Evid(p) is true at w iff ∃q such that the speaker perceives a state q at w
and p causes q.

Correct predictions▸

Meaning statuses
cancellable implicature prejacent p
semantic commitment indirect evidentiality▸uttering p-youda only commits the speaker to Mustp (q) but not to theprejacent p,
successfully derive the asymmetry between the prejacent p and theevidence source q.

Causality

Indirect evidence is the effect state of the cause-effect dependency▸

Formalized the causal component using Kaufmann’s causal premisesemantics▸

indispensable to interpretation of evidentiality
independently needed for interpretation of counterfactuals

Interpretation of evidentials (formal)
Evid(p) is true at fc , g, w iff ∃q such that the speaker perceives q at wand Mustp (q) is true at fc , g, w .
Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

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Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

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Acknowledgement

References I
AnderBois, Scott. 2014. On the exceptional status of reportative evidentials. In
Proceedings of SALT 24, 234–254.
Faller, Martina. 2002. Semantics and Pragmatics of Evidentials in Cuzco Quechua:
Stanford University dissertation.
Izvorski, Roumyana. 1997. The Present Perfect as an Epistemic Modal. the proceedingsof SALT 7. 222–239.

This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 17H07172(PI: Yurie Hara).

Kaufmann, Stefan. 2013. Causal premise semantics. Cognitive Science 37. 1136–1170.
Kratzer, A. 2005. Constraining premise sets for counterfactuals. Journal of Semantics
22. 153–158.
Matthewson, Lisa, Hotze Rullmann & Henry Davis. 2006. Evidentials are epistemic
modals in St’át’imcets. In Masaru Kiyota, James L. Thompson & Noriko
Yamane-Tanaka (eds.), Papers for the 41st International Conference on Salish andNeighbouring Languages University of British Columbia Working Papers in Linguistics
18, 221–263.
McCready, Eric & Norry Ogata. 2007. Evidentiality, modality and probability. Linguisticsand Philosophy 30(2). 35–63.
Murray, Sarah E. 2010. Evidentiality and the Structure of Speech Acts: Rutgers
dissertation. http://www.semanticsarchive.net/Archive/WViOGQxY/.

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References II

Sawada, Harumi. 2006. Modaritii. Kaitakusha.
Takubo, Y. 2009. Conditional modality: Two types of modal auxiliaries in Japanese. In
B. Pizziconi & M. Kizu (eds.), Japanese Modality: Exploring its Scope andInterpretation, Palgrave Macmillan.
Takubo, Yukinori. 2007. Two types of modal auxiliaries in japanese: Two directionalities
in inference. In Japanese/Korean Linguistics, vol. 15, University of Chicago Press.

Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

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Hara (Waseda/Hokudai)

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