Bull. Hiroshima Inst. Tech. Research Vol. 53 (2019) 11– 19

ArticleDescartes and Turing

Naoki ARAKI*(Received Nov. 1, 2018)

Abstract
René Descartes does not think that machines can speak like human beings because they do not have“reason.” About three hundred years later, Alan Turing insists that if machines can speak like humanbeings, they can think. In other words, Turing stands Descartes’s insistence on its head, as Roy Harrisand Noam Chomsky point out. But Descartes insists that only human beings have “reason” so he neverassumes that machines can speak. On the other hand, Turing insists that it is a matter of words
whether machines can think or not. This means, as Turing claims, that the question, “Can machines
think?” is not worth discussing. So Descartes’s and Turing’s arguments are not the same although
Turing stands Descartes’s argument on its head.
Key Words: Descartes, reason, Turing, machines, Turing test

Chomsky also interprets the Turing test as a test

Introductionof whether a machine has a mind like a human being’s,

Roy Harris points out an interesting view on thecontrasting it with Descartes:

relationship between Descartes and Turing:
The Cartesian tests for the existence of other
Descartes’s argument, as Turing and others later

minds have been resurrected in a new guise in recent

realized, can in any case be stood on its head. Should

years, most notably by the British mathematician Alannot a machine that can handle words as well as a

Turing, who devised what is now called the Turing

human being be reckoned as having the ability totest, to determine whether a machine (for example, athink?

programmed computer) exhibits intelligent behavior.

(Harris 2003: 168)

We apply the Turing test to a device by submitting toHere “Descartes’s argument” means that a machineit a series of questions and asking whether its

cannot handle words like a human being because theresponses can deceive a human observer who will

former does not have the ability to think. On the otherconclude that the responses are being offered byhand, according to Harris, what Turing later realized isanother human being. In Cartesian terms this wouldthat if a machine can handle words like a human being,

be a test of whether the device has a mind like ours.

then the former should be reckoned as having the abil-(Chomsky 1988: 141)

ity to think. In this sense, Harris insists, “Descartes’s
argument” can be stood on its head by Turing. Whether

In this paper, from this point of view above, we

Turing and others realized or not, Harris’s view is very

shall discuss Turing’s question, “Can machines think?”,

interesting indeed.

focusing on Descartes’s and Turing’s arguments.

* Department of Information Systems and Management, Faculty of Applied Information Science, Hiroshima Institute of TecŠology,
Hiroshima 731-5193, Japan. E-mail: araki@cc.it-hiroshima.ac.jp
─ 11 ─Naoki ARAKI

ficient to enable it to act in all the occurrences of life,

1. Descartes’s Argumentin the way in which our reason enables us to act.

First of all, Descartes insists that there are two(Descartes: Discourse on the Method, Part V)

tests, which can distinguish a machine from a humanbeing:

Here Descartes asserts that human beings have“reason”, but machines do not. It is this “reason” that[…] if there were machines bearing the image ofenables human beings to act quite differently fromour bodies, and capable of imitating our actions as far

machines. For example, thanks to “reason” humanas it is morally possible, there would still remain two

beings can speak language, which machines cannot

most certain tests whereby to know that they were notspeak like human beings.

therefore really men.

Moreover Descartes maintains that not only

(Descartes: Discourse on the Method, Part V)

machines but also animals cannot speak language
because they do not have “reason” like machines

As the first test, Descartes insists that a machine

either:cannot use language in the same way as a humanbeing can:[…] we observe that magpies and parrots canutter words like ourselves, and are yet unable to speak

Of these the first [test] is that they [the machines]
could never use words or other signs arranged in suchas we do, that is, so as to show that they understandwhat they say;a manner as is competent to us in order to declare our(Descartes: Discourse on the Method, Part V)

thoughts to others: for we may easily conceive amachine to be so constructed that it emits vocables,

John Searle discusses the same point as Descartes

and even that it emits some correspondent to thedoes from a different viewpoint. He proposes aaction upon it of external objects which cause athought experiment called a “Chinese room.” By thischange in its organs; for example, if touched in a par-experiment, Searle shows that a person who neverticular place it may demand what we wish to say to it;

understands Chinese could answer questions asked

if in another it may cry out that it is hurt, and suchin Chinese. So he insists that even if a machine canlike; but not that it should arrange them variously socommunicate with a human being, it does not mean thatas appositely to reply to what is said in its presence, as

the machine understands the meanings of Chinese. The

men of the lowest grade of intellect can do.

machine only manipulates the symbols of Chinese(Descartes: Discourse on the Method, Part V)(Searle 1980: 417-457).
On the other hand, Yuval Noah Harari insists that

Furthermore, Descartes insists on the second
test to distinguish a machine from a human being:

we do not need “consciousness,” which may be called“reason” in Descartes’s term, in order to operatemachines that function like human beings:

The second test is, that although such machines
might execute many things with equal or perhaps

The algorithms controlling the autonomous car

greater perfection than any of us, they would, without

make millions of calculations each second […] the

doubt, fail in certain others from which it could be

autonomous car successfully stops at red lights, […]discovered that they did not act from knowledge, but

The car does all that without any problem—but with-solely from the disposition of their organs: for while

out any consciousness either. […] Many other com-

reason is an universal instrument that is alike available

puter programs make allowances for their own actions,on every occasion, these organs, on the contrary, need

yet none of them has developed consciousness,a particular arrangement for each particular action;(Harari 2015: 114)

whence it must be morally impossible that there
should exist in any machine a diversity of organs suf─ 12 ─

So Harari thinks that the Turing test examines a

Descartes and Turingsocial and legal convention, which means that the test

normal use of the words, but this attitude is danger-

is a matter of the usage of a word “think”:

ous. If the meaning of the words ‘machine’ and ‘think’
are to be found by examining how they are commonly[…] it [the Turing Test] examines only social

used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that theconventions […] the computer has passed the Turing

meaning and the answer to the question, ‘Can machines

Test, and we should treat it as if it really has a mind

think?’ is to be sought in a statistical survey such as a[“reason” in Descartes’s term]. However, that won’t

Gallup poll. But this is absurd.

(Turing 1950: 433)

really be a proof, of course. Acknowledging the existence of other minds is merely a social and legal con-

In order to solve the problem above, Turing pro-

vention. […] It won’t matter whether computers willposes the “imitation game.” Then, what is the “imita-

actually be conscious or not. It will matter only whattion game”?:

people think about it.

(Harari 2015: 120)
It [the imitation game] is played with three peo-

Furthermore, Harari thinks that biochemicalple, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C)organisms, including human beings, are algorithms,

who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in aso there are no differences between organisms androom apart from the other two. The object of the gamemachines that are also algorithms. This means thatfor the interrogator is to determine which of the otherhuman beings are machines, which idea Descartes

two is the man and which is the woman. He knows

never accepts (Harari 2015: 319). So Harari may be athem by labels X and Y, and at the end of the game hephysicalist. For Harari, consciousness (reason insays either ‘X is A and Y is B’ or ‘X is B and Y is A’.
(Turing 1950: 433)

Descartes’s term) does not matter.
In any case, Descartes asserts that human beings
can speak language because they have “reason”, which

Then Turing replaces the part of A by a machinemachines and animals do not have. If Descartes’sin the imitation game. This is what is called the Turing

argument above is right, then what will happen whentest, which Turing thinks replaces the question, “Can

we stand it on its head? If machines or animals weremachines think?”:

to be able to speak like human beings, then theyshould have “reason”, which human beings have. This

We now ask the question, ‘What will happen whenis precisely what Turing’s thought experiment, thea machine takes the part of A in this game?’ Will theTuring test insists on. The reason is that Turing

interrogator decide wrongly as often when the gameasserts that if a machine can pass the Turing test (thisis played like this as he does when the game is playedmeans that it can speak like human beings), it will

between a man and a woman? These questions replace

think like human beings. So, next we shall examine

our original, ‘Can machines think?’ (Turing 1950: 434)

Turing’s question, “Can machines think?” How does
Turing stand Descartes’s argument on its head?

According to Turing, if a machine can replace thepart of A, then we will be able to answer the question,

2. Turing’s Question“Can machines think?” by saying, “Yes, they can”.

First of all, Turing insists that the answer to the

Furthermore, Turing predicts that computers willquestion, “Can machines think?” is ambiguous if weplay the imitation game so well in about fifty years’

begin with definitions of the meanings of the terms

time. Therefore, he thinks that the question, “Can“machine” and “think” used here:

machines think?” is too meaningless to deserve discussion, and that the use of words will have altered so

I propose to consider the question, ‘Can machines
think?’ This should begin with definitions of the mean-much that we will be able to say, “Machines (or computers) can think (or think)”:

ing of the terms ‘machine’ and ‘think’. The definitions
might be framed so as to reflect so far as possible the─ 13 ─

I believe that in about fifty years’ time it will beNaoki ARAKI

possible to programme computers, with a storage

Descartes’s argument on its head, saying that if

capacity of about 109, to make them play the imitation

machines can communicate with human beings, thengame so well that an average interrogator will not havethey can think. This turns over Descartes’s argument

more than 70 per cent. chance of making the rightthat machines cannot talk with human beings because

identification after five minutes of questioning. The

they do not have reason, or mind, in other words,

original question, ‘Can machines think?’ I believe to bebecause they cannot think.
Next, we shall see how Roy Harris deals with both

too meaningless to deserve discussion. Nevertheless I
believe that at the end of the century the use of words
and general educated opinion will have altered somuch that one will be able to speak of machines think-

Descartes’s and Turing’s arguments.

3. Roy Harris’s Reference to Descartes and Turing

ing without expecting to be contradicted.

Roy Harris insists that Turing’s test has its root in(Turing 1950: 442)

Descartes’s idea that use of language distinguishes
human beings from machines, quoting the same pas-

But now even in 2018, despite Turing’s prediction,
we still do not say, “Machines can think” without

sage as ours from Descartes but the English translation is a little different from ours:

expecting to be contradicted.
Chomsky takes up Turing’s argument and thinks[…] the view expressed by Descartes in the Dis-

that Turing’s question, “Can machines think?” is a mat-cours de la méthode [Discourse on the Method]: thatter of the usage of a word. This is what Harari insists

even if there were machines physically indistinguish-

on by “a social convention.” Furthermore Chomsky

able from human bodies, it would always be possible

claims that Turing proposes that we should build ato tell the difference, because of the linguistic limita-

machine model designed to speak like a human being

tions of the machines.

and consider what human thinking is. But, as we haveseen before, Searle is skeptical about how much such

For we can conceive of a machine so constructeda model contributes to the question of what thinking isthat it utters words, and even utters words which cor-

(Searle 1980: 417-457):

respond to bodily actions causing a change in its
organs (e.g. if you touch it in one spot it asks what you

He [Turing] said, look, the question whether awant of it, if you touch it in another it cries out that you

machine can think is too meaningless to deserve dis-

are hurting it, and so on). But it is not conceivable thatcussion. It’s like asking in 1900 whether an airplanesuch a machine should produce different arrange-

flies. It’s not a meaningful question. It flies if you wantments of words so as to give an appropriately meaning-to call that flying. It doesn’t fly if you don’t want to call

ful answer to whatever is said in its presence, as thethat flying. It’s just like asking, “Does my brain think?”

dullest of men can do.

That’s not the way we talk English. But if you want to(Descartes, Discours de la méthode, Part V)change the language you could say it. The same is true
about this breathing device or about machines thinking and so on.

(Chomsky 1993: 91)

Here in Descartes we find the source of Turing’smuch debated proposal three centuries later that aquestion-and-answer test would suffice to determine

What Turing suggested is, let’s drop the question

whether or not machines can think.

of what thinking is, and let’s try to create models of(Harris 1987: 27-28)

intelligence, computational models of intelligence.
That’s perfectly reasonable. […] Turing’s point was
maybe this will teach us something about thinking.

Then, what is the Turing’s test? Harris explains it,
quoting the same passage as ours from Turing:(Chomsky 1993: 92)
In this test, the machine on trial has to take part
In any case, as we have seen, Turing stands

in what Turing calls the ‘imitation game’.

─ 14 ─Descartes and Turing

It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman

Here Roy Harris points out that Turing proposes(B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex.

that machines are supposed to think if they can com-

The interrogator stays in a room apart from the othermunicate with human beings. In other words, Turing,two. The object of the game for the interrogator is tounlike Descartes, thinks that it may be possible todetermine which of the other two is the man andmake machines that can talk with people. However,which is the woman. He knows them by the labels X

according to Roy Harris, Descartes would deny thatand Y, and at the end of the game he says either ‘X ismachines can pass the Turing test and would not think

A and Y is B’ or ‘X is B and Y is A’. The interrogator isthat the imitation game is acceptable:

allowed to put questions to A and B thus:
But undoubtedly Descartes would have denied

C: Will X please tell me the length of his or herthat any machine built by Turing, or by Turing’s

hair?
Now suppose X is actually A, then A must answer.

imagination, could produce answers to satisfy or con-

It is A’s object in the game to try to cause C to make thefuse the interrogator in the ‘imitation game’. Descartes,

wrong identification. His answer might therefore bein short, would have refused to accept the imitation‘My hair is shingled, and the longest strands aregame as a legitimate ‘ontological experiment’: notbecause of any technical flaw in the experimental

about nine inches long.’
In order that tones of voice may not help the inter-design, but because from a Cartesian point of view therogator the answers should be written, or better still,question is already begged once the teleprinter text

typewritten. The ideal arrangement is to have a tele-

produced by the machine in the next room is con-printer communicating between the two rooms. Alter-

strued as an ‘answer’ to the interrogator.
(Harris 1987: 29)

natively the questions and answers can be repeated byan intermediary. The object of the game for the third
player (B) is to help the interrogator. The best strategy

According to Roy Harris, however, Descartes’sfor her is to give truthful answers. She can add such

criterion for distinguishing between human beings

things as ‘I am the woman, don’t listen to him!’ to her

and machines becomes meaningless:answers, but it will avail nothing as the man can make
The point is of some importance since Descartes’

similar remarks.
We now ask the question, ‘What will happen when

linguistic criterion for distinguishing between humana machine takes the part of A in this game?’ Will the

beings and machines becomes meaningless once weinterrogator decide wrongly as often when the gamestart envisaging communication situations which areis played like this as he does when the game is playedquite beyond the capacity of the communication sys-

between a man and a woman? These questions replacetem. To put the same point slightly differently, there is

our original, ‘Can machines think?’

no universal Turing test valid science-fictionally across(Turing 1950: 433-434)‘all possible worlds’. The reason for this is simply thatit soon becomes radically unclear by what criteria theTuring’s originality in devising this test is theanswers to Turing-test questions are to be judged

originality of having taken Descartes’ argument at faceappropriate or inappropriate once the basic assump-value and squared up to its challenge. Turing assumes,

tions of our familiar everyday world are abandoned orin other words, that if a machine can be built whichsuspended. The further we venture from those basic

passes the test of the ‘imitation game’, that will consti-

assumptions the more difficult it will become to distin-tute an empirical disproof of Descartes’ thesis [thatguish reliably between ‘intelligent’ responses andmachines cannot speak like human beings]. For in‘unintelligent’ ones; or indeed between intelligible

order to pass the test, Turing clearly assumes that the

responses and unintelligible ones. All Descartes seems

machine must possess a linguistic capacity: that ofto have had in mind was that it is quite easy to detect

analyzing the interrogator’s questions and returninga speaking automaton, however cunningly disguised

appropriate answers.

as a human, by asking it a straightforward question it(Harris 1987: 28)

─ 15 ─Naoki ARAKI

has not been programmed to answer (‘What day of thedismissed as a mere figment of Cartesian mentalism,week is it?’, ‘What colour is grass?’, ‘What do you use

or else reinterpreted by reference to a second cerebral

a knife for?’, etc.). The assumption, clearly, is thatmechanism, distinct from but interacting with theautomata cannot be built which provide appropriate

mechanism of vocalization. By the end of the nine-answers to a general range of such questions. But

teenth century, many people—including many lin-

what becomes of Descartes’ criterion if advances inguists—believed that the exact location of this second

technology prove that assumption unsound? Turing’s

mechanism in the brain had at last been identified.

answer is plain enough: we then have to stop claiming

Thus in spite of the fact that Descartes was a commit-that machines (or monkeys, if monkeys can be trained

ted anti-mechanist where language was concerned, theto pass the Turing test) cannot think.

Cartesian contribution to the modern myth of the(Harris 1987: 34-35)

language machine is in its way no less crucial than thecontribution which was to be made by Saussure. For

According to Roy Harris, Turing stands Descartes’s

Saussure, however, the distribution of ‘mechanical’language-machine argument on its head, taking a

explanations is almost the opposite of Descartes’: itbehaviourist position:

was to be parole over which individuals could exercise
rational control in the Cartesian sense, whereas over

Turing’s position is in all essentials a radical

langue they had none.

(Harris 1987: 35-36)

behaviourist position, which treats ‘thinking’ as being
simply speech minus vocalization. The only evidence

Furthermore, according to Roy Harris, Turingthat the Turing test accepts or requires about thought

thinks that if a machine produces translations which

is verbal evidence. The implication is that provided

are indistinguishable from those of a human translator,

this verbal evidence convinces the human investigatorthen it has understood what the texts mean:

as being appropriate to the questions asked, there isnothing more that can be demanded as evidence of think-

Could a machine understand the meaning of aing. Turing’s behaviourist strategy of taking Descartes’

text? Turing’s answer, clearly, would have been that if

language-machine argument seriously thus stands thea machine produces translations which are indistin-

traditional view of language [by Descartes?] on its head.

guishable from those of a human translator, then it has

The irony is that Descartes himself had opened the way

understood what the texts mean (at least to the extent

for this move by so strenuously denying any connex-

that such an understanding is necessary for purposes

ion between having reason and having a voice. Hisof translation, which is all that we demand of a humanassimilation of animals to machines, his acknowledge-translator).

ment that animals can vocalize, and his insistence on

Turing’s view would not have been shared bylanguage as the hallmark of rationality jointly obliged

those who regarded research in automatic translation

Descartes to distinguish sharply in human speech

as aiming at

between a mechanical and a non-mechanical component. The legacy of that dualism survived into nine-

a machine which, while remaining an object

teenth-century linguistics, which still accepted a dis-devoid of intelligence and of judgment, and per-tinction between purely mechanical, physiologicalforming a series of strictly predetermined opera-

processes (as evidenced in phonology) and non-tions, is capable of respecting certain of the origi-

mechanical ‘intellectual’ processes (as evidenced innal and individual characteristics of discourse andsemantics and the workings of analogy). However, theof reproducing them faithfully in another lan-

Cartesian concept of la bête machine had already pre-guage.

pared the ground for the anti-Cartesian concept ofl’homme machine. Given the theory of l’homme

But even theorists who took this more cautious

machine, Descartes’ mysterious non-mechanical com-view were sometimes prepared to admit that the analy-

ponent of human speech had in the end either to be

ses which mechanization programmes required had─ 16 ─Descartes and Turing

thing as what is happening in a computer when it isthe effect offunctioning, we may be able to say that “computers are
drawing attention to the purely mechanical charac-

thinking.” Although Searle denies such an argument

ter of various operations formerly performed by a

and Chomsky says that it is not computers but humans

human being and accepted as mental operations.

that think, Harari may agree to this, saying that we do
not need the mind in understanding humans and Kaku

Concessions even of this order would have[2014: 240] may also accept this, saying that the question [Turing’s question] will cease to have any impor-attracted the critical attention of Descartes.
(Harris 1987: 79)

tance when machines will come to know language
better than humans as HAL 9000 in 2001: a Space

Conclusion

Odyssey does.

(Araki 2018: 40)

As Chomsky and Harris point out, it is safe to say
Harari says about this matter:that Turing stands Descartes on his head. Descartes
insists that machines never speak like human beings
because they do not have “reason.” On the other hand,Current orthodoxy holds that consciousness is

Turing insists that if machines speak like us, then it

created by electrochemical reactions in the brain, andmeans that they think. In this case, Turing’s words canthat mental experiences fulfil some essential data-pro-

be interpreted as the following: if machines think, thencessing function. […]they have “reason.” So if this interpretation is accepted,[…] scientists have certainly identified correla-then this leads to the conclusion that Descartes andtions and even causal links between electrical currents

Turing insist on the same thing in different ways as

in the brain and various subjective experiences. […][…] When billions of neurons send billions ofChomsky and Harris comment on this matter.
However, Descartes does not think at all thatelectric signals back and forth, subjective experiencesmachines can speak like human beings because they

emerge. Even though the sending and receiving of

do not have “reason.” For Descartes, “reason” belongs

each electric signal is a simple biochemical phenome-

to mind, which is existent only in us and quite distinctnon, the interaction among all these signals createsfrom “body,” of which machines are made. So neversomething far more complex—the stream of conscious-

can machines made of “body,” which is quite different

ness.

(Harari 2015: 107-108)from “mind,” speak like us.
On the other hand, Turing thinks that if machines

Here Harari points out that our consciousness

speak like human beings, they think. So if we take(probably including thinking) emerges as the result ofTuring’s words at face value, this leads to the conclu-

biochemical algorithms (phenomena) in the brain.

sion that machines have “reason” in Descartes’s sense.

This is just what physicalists insist on.

But Turing also thinks that this is a matter of words.

On the other hand, Harari also says about three

So probably Turing does not think that even if

possibilities concerning the relationship between “con-machines speak like us, it means that they have “rea-sciousness” and “biochemical algorithms”:

son” like human beings. If this line of reasoning iscorrect, it means that Descartes and Turing insist on

1. Consciousness is somehow linked to organic

the same thing from different perspectives as Chomsky

biochemistry in such a way that it will never beand Harris point out.

possible to create consciousness in non-organic

Or would it be possible that Turing might havebeen thought to have a different story? It is as follows:

systems.
2. Consciousness is not linked to organic biochemistry, but it is linked to intelligence in

But we may have a totally different story aboutsuch a way that computers could develop con-this matter [Turing’s question]. If what is happening

sciousness, and computers will have to develop

in our brain when we are thinking is quite the same

consciousness if they are to pass a certain

─ 17 ─Naoki ARAKI

Harris insists that Chomsky is a physicalist, who

threshold of intelligence.
3. There are no essential links between con-denies mind, which is distinct from body:sciousness and either organic biochemistry or
high intelligence. Hence computers might

The syntax machine [a human being] of 1957 [ofdevelop consciousness—but not necessarily.

Chomsky] has no other function than to generate ‘sen-

They could become super-intelligent while stilltences’, and the ‘sentences’ have no other status thanhaving zero consciousness.

that of ‘products’ of an otherwise purposeless machine.

(Harari 2018: 69-70)[…]
Even more remarkable was the warm welcome

The third possibility above, which Harari pro-this [Chomsky’s idea in 1957] received from thoseposes, could be very close to Descartes’s insistence, tophilosophers who hastened to congratulate linguists

which Chomsky could not agree more:on having dispensed altogether with the assumption‘that the corpus of utterances studied by the linguist

Chomsky accepts Descartes’s idea and refers to

was produced by a conscious organism [a human

his own theory of language as “Cartesian Linguistics.”

being]. (Putnam 1960: 95)’. The reason why they were

So he, like Descartes, will insists that machines do not

so pleased is clear. They saw this great ‘advance’ in

speak because he thinks that speaking is what human

linguistics [Chomsky’s idea in 1957] at last letting

beings do. In fact, thinking is what human beings do.

them off the painful hook of the ‘mind-body’ problem[…]

altogether.

(Harris 1987: 75)[…] As we have already seen, Chomsky thinks
the same way as Descartes. According to Chomsky,

According to Harris, some philosophers inter-thinking is what human beings do but not what

preted that Chomsky drove ‘mind’ away from ‘body’machines do.

just as a behaviorist, Gilbert Ryle expelled “the ghost(Araki 2018: 41)of the machine.”
On the other hand, Roy Harris says the same

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─ 19 ─