Bull. Hiroshima Inst. Tech. Research Vol. 53 (2019) 1– 10

ArticleSapiens and Language

Naoki ARAKI*(Received Nov. 1, 2018)

Abstract
Yuval Noah Harari says that it is thanks to language that Homo sapiens can create fictions, whichenable it to cooperate collectively and establish civilizations, which other animals do not have. In short,
he insists that language has made Homo sapiens what it is now. Can language produce fictions as hethinks? Some linguists such as Ferdinand de Saussure, Noam Chomsky and B. L. Whorf deny thatwords refer to things in the world. In other words, they insist that things do not exist in advance of
language. If this idea is correct, then it leads to that language can create fictions as Harari says. Has
language enabled Homo sapiens to produce fictions and thereby to cooperate collectively and to establish civilizations?
Key Words: fictions, language, inter-subjective, nomenclaturism, Sapir-Whorf hypothesis

Harari’s interpretation of history depends on whether

Introduction

language enables sapiens to create fictions.

Harari proposes one interpretation of history ofIn this paper, first we examine Harari’s interpreta-humankind, in which he insists that Homo sapiens hastion of history, then we consider linguists’ idea of rela-created civilizations by means of language. Accordingtion between words and objects.

to him, sapiens got language, which enabled it to makefictions such as money, state, or human rights. Fur-

1. Homo Sapiens

thermore, believing in fictions has enabled it to coop-

Harari answers a question of why Homo sapiens

erate in large numbers. As a result, sapiens, unlike

has continued to exist since all other human species,

other animals, was able to create civilizations. In short,

Homo soloensis, Homo denisova, and Neanderthals

Harari insists that language has made sapiens what itwere extinct:

is now.
Then, can language create fictions? Some lin-

What was the Sapiens’ secret of success? How did

guists say that words are not related to things. This

we manage to settle so rapidly in so many distant andmeans that language can create something that does

ecologically different habitats? How did we push all

not exist independently of language.

other human species into oblivion? Why couldn’t even

If this is true, it leads to the idea that sapiens can

the strong, brainy, cold-proof Neanderthals survive

make fictions using language. So if sapiens believes inour onslaught? The debate continues to rage. The

the fictions, as Harari says, it will cooperate to achieve

most likely answer is the very thing that makes thesomething that other animals cannot. Therefore,

debate possible: Homo sapiens conquered the world* Department of Information Systems and Management, Faculty of Applied Information Science, Hiroshima Institute of TecŠology,
Hiroshima 731-5193, Japan. E-mail: araki@cc.it-hiroshima.ac.jp
─ 1 ─

Naoki ARAKI

Like Harari, Chomsky says that we can acquire

thanks above all to its unique language.
(Harari 2011: 20-21)

the world of imagination by language, explaining theorigin of language (Chomsky 1988: 183).

How, then, did Homo sapiens acquire its uniqueFurthermore Chomsky says that human beings

language? Harari says that language emerged throughgot biological success by gaining language, which

mutation just as Chomsky insists:

originated from mutation (Chomsky 1988: 183-184).
Thus, Homo sapiens acquired language and came

The appearance of new ways of thinking and communicating, between 70,000 and 30,000 years ago,

to be able to speak about fictions. They enabled it tocooperate flexibly in large numbers:

constitutes the Cognitive Revolution. What caused it?
We’re not sure. The most commonly believed theory

How did Homo sapiens manage to cross this criti-[of Chomsky?] argues that accidental genetic muta-

cal threshold [the threshold of 150 individuals], even-tions changed the inner wiring of the brains of Sapiens,

tually founding cities comprising tens of thousands ofenabling them to think in unprecedented ways and to

inhabitants and empires ruling hundreds of millions?

communicate using an altogether new type of language.

The secret was probably the appearance of fiction.

We might call it the Tree of Knowledge mutation. Why

Large numbers of strangers can cooperate success-did it occur in Sapiens DNA rather than in that offully by believing in common myths. (Harari 2011: 30)

Neanderthals? It was a matter of pure chance, as far as
we can tell. But it’s more important to understand theHere “this critical threshold” is the threshold ofconsequences of the Tree of Knowledge mutation than

150 individuals. According to sociological research,

its causes. What was so special about the new Sapiens

the maximum natural size of a group is about 150 indi-

language that it enabled us to conquer the world?

viduals. So people cannot cooperate successfully, if(Harari 2011: 23-24)

they are more than 150. In other words, common
myths, which are based on language, enabled more

Harari says that the new Sapiens language, which
originated from mutation, evolved through gossiping

than 150 people to cooperate successfully (Harari
2011: 30).
So, Harari says that there do not exist gods,(Harari 2011: 25-26).
Thus Homo sapiens conquered the world with its
language, which emerged through mutation andnations, money, human rights, laws, and justice outside our imagination (Harari 2011: 31).

evolved as a way of gossiping. Sapiens language trans-

To illustrate this, Harari takes up Peugeot, one ofmits not only information about existing entities, but

the oldest and largest of Europe’s carmakers, as analso information about non-existent things (Harari

example of a modern institution, which does not exist

2011: 27).

outside the common imagination of human beings

Fictions are what Sapiens can never see, touch or(Harari 2011: 31).
How, then, was the company, Peugeot created bysmell. Thanks to the ability to speak about fictions,
Sapiens could develop its unique cooperation as wellits founder, Armand Peugeot?

as the ability to imagine things:
How exactly did Armand Peugeot, the man, cre[…] fiction has enabled us not merely to imagine

ate Peugeot, the company? In much the same way thatthings, but to do so collectively. We can weave common

priests and sorcerers have created gods and demons

myths such as the biblical creation story, the Dream-

throughout history, […] In the case of Peugeot SA

time myths of Aboriginal Australians, and the national-[the company’s official name] the crucial story was

ist myths of modern states. Such myths give Sapiens

the French legal code, as written by the French Parlia-

the unprecedented ability to cooperate flexibly in large

ment. According to the French legislators, if a certified

numbers.

lawyer followed all the proper liturgy and rituals, wrote(Harari 2011: 27)

all the required spells and oaths on a wonderfully─ 2 ─Sapiens and Language

decorated piece of paper, and affixed his ornate signa-

But both Hammurabi and the Americans are notture to the bottom of the document, then hocus

right because their claims are based on “imagined

pocus—a new company was incorporated. When in

realities”:

1896 Armand Peugeot wanted to create his company,
he paid a lawyer to go through all these sacred proce-

In fact, they [the Americans and Hammurabi] aredures. Once the lawyer had performed all the rightboth wrong. Hammurabi and the American Founding

rituals and pronounced all the necessary spells andFathers alike imagined a reality governed by universal

oaths, millions of upright French citizens behaved as

and immutable principles of justice, such as equality orif the Peugeot company really existed.

hierarchy. Yet the only place where such universal(Harari 2011: 34-35)

principles exist is in the fertile imagination of Sapiens,and in the myths they invent and tell one another.

Thus, Peugeot SA was created just as priests andThese principles have no objective validity.
(Harari 2011: 122)

sorcerers have created gods and demons throughout
history. But it exists not in the real world but as a ficSo Harari boldly says:tion. Things like Peugeot SA are called “fictions,”“social constructs” or “imagined realities” (Harari

It is easy for us to accept that the division of peo-

2011: 35).
Moreover, myths created by words can be alteredple into ‘superiors’ and ‘commoners’ is a figment of theimagination. Yet the idea that all humans are equal isbecause they are fictions:also a myth.

(Harari 2011: 122)

Since large-scale human cooperation is based onmyths, the way people cooperate can be altered byHence Harari tries to translate the most famouschanging the myths—by telling different stories.

line of the American Declaration of Independence

Under the right circumstances myths can change rap-

below into biological terms (Harari 2011: 122):

idly. In 1789 the French population switched almost
overnight from believing in the myth of the divine

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all

right of kings to believing in the myth of the sover-men are created equal, that they are endowed byeignty of the people.

their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that

(Harari 2011: 36)

among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of hapTherefore, myths created by Homo sapiens mightpiness.

(Harari 2011: 122)

sometimes contradict one another because they are
So “all men are created equal” is rewritten as “allnot based on truth. For example:

men evolved differently” (Harari 2011: 122). FurtherThe two texts [the Code of Hammurabi and themore, “endowed by their Creator” is altered as “born”

American Declaration of Independence] present us(Harari 2011: 123). Next, “unalienable rights” is rewrit-with an obvious dilemma. Both the Code of Hammurabi

ten as “mutable characteristics” (Harari 2011: 123).

and the American Declaration of Independence claim

Last of all, “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”

to outline universal and eternal principles of justice,is translated into “life and the pursuit of pleasure”

but according to the Americans all people are equal,(Harari 2011: 123).

whereas according to the Babylonians people are

Here is the most famous line of the American

decidedly unequal. The Americans would, of course,

Declaration of Independence, which is rewritten in

say that they are right, and that Hammurabi is wrong.

biological terms:

Hammurabi, naturally, would retort that he is right,
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all

and that the Americans are wrong.
(Harari 2011: 121-122)

men evolved differently, that they are born with certain mutable characteristics, and that among these are─ 3 ─

Naoki ARAKI

life and the pursuit of pleasure.

Harari’s inter-subjective phenomena or people’s(Harari 2011: 123)

collective imagination may be like a French socioloSome people may object to Harari’s insistence

gist, E. Durkheim’s fait social, which is not physical or

above but he has already prepared his counterargu-

psychological but constrains individuals from outside

ment against their criticisms:of them. He says that law, beliefs, fashions are examples of fait social (Durkheim 1982: 57). Or they may

Advocates of equality and human rights may beresemble a British biologist, R. Dawkins’s meme,

outraged by this line of reasoning. Their response iswhich is a unit of cultural transmission. He says thatlikely to be ‘We know that people are not equal bio-the idea of God is one example of meme (Dawkins

logically! But if we believe that we are all equal in

1989: 192-193) as Harari refers to it (Harari 2011: 270).

essence, it will enable us to create a stable and pros-

In any case, Peugeot SA, the dollar, human rights, andperous society.’ I have no argument with that. This is

the United States of America exist in the shared

exactly what I mean by ‘imagined order’. We believe inimagination of billions of people. So no single individ-

a particular order not because it is objectively true, but

ual can change these imagined orders. This reminds

because believing in it enables us to cooperate effec-

us of Saussure’s statement—individuals cannot change

tively and forge a better society. Imagined orders arelangue (Saussure 1983: 71). So is langue also an inter-not evil conspiracies or useless mirages. Rather, theysubjective phenomenon?

are the only way large numbers of humans can cooper-

In order to change an existing imagined order, we

ate effectively. Bear in mind, though, that Hammurabi

must first believe in an alternative imagined order. So

might have defended his principle of hierarchy using

we cannot escape from an imagined order at all

the same logic: ‘I know that superiors, commoners and(Harari 2011: 133).

slaves are not inherently different kinds of people. But

So, according to Harari, a hierarchy of people isif we believe that they are, it will enable us to create aalso a fiction (Harari 2011: 150, 161). Moreover, evenstable and prosperous society.’ (Harari 2011: 123-124)

a concept of manhood and womanhood is based onhuman imagination but not biological reality (HarariMoreover, “the imagined order is not a subjective
order existing in my [Harari’s] own imagination—it is2011: 166). So “sex” is a biological category and “gender” a cultural category (Harari 2011: 170).

rather an inter-subjective order, existing in the shared

Furthermore, money is also a fiction as is said

imagination of thousands and millions of people”

before (Harari 2011: 197). Consumerism and national-(Harari 2011: 131). What, then, is the inter-subjective

ism are also fictions (Harari 2011: 406).
Harari also says about the meaning of life (Harariorder?

2011: 438). For Harari, human life is also a fiction, a
The inter-subjective is something that exists

delusion. Then, if Harari is right, is Harari’s insistence

within the communication network linking the subjec-

also a fiction, or a delusion? Does Harari not fall into ative consciousness of many individuals. If a single

trap of self-reference? Does he not notice the self-ref-individual changes his or her beliefs, or even dies, it iserence?

of little importance. However, if most individuals in theThus, Harari insists that Homo Sapiens has devel-

network die or change their beliefs, the inter-subjec-

oped civilizations, which animals do not have, based

tive phenomenon will mutate or disappear. Inter-sub-on language, which enables Homo Sapiens to create

jective phenomena are neither malevolent frauds nor

fictions and thereby to cooperate collectively.
Then, have linguists thought that language enables

insignificant charades. They exist in a different way
from physical phenomena such as radioactivity, but

us to create fictions?

their impact on the world may still be enormous. Many

Next we shall examine what linguists haveof history’s most important drivers are inter-subjec-

thought of the relation between things and language.

tive: laws, money, gods, nations.

(Harari 2011: 132)─ 4 ─

Sapiens and Language

tionship:

2. Saussure’s Criticism of Nomenclaturism
Thus, Harari insists that language creates something that does not exists, or fiction. Then, what does
Saussure say about the relationship between words
and things?

whereas in fact the real configuration is: a—b—c,

For some people a language, reduced to its essen-

outside of any knowledge of a functional relationshipsuch as *— a based on an object.

tials, is a nomenclature: a list of terms corresponding(Saussure 2006: 162)

to a list of things. […] This conception is open to anumber of objections. […], it leads one to assume that

According to Saussure, it is just an accident thatthe link between a name and a thing is somethingwords, for example, a horse, fire, and the sun, corre-quite unproblematic, which is far from being the case.

spond to the things in the world not the concepts[…] A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and(signifié) respectively. But, then, if Saussure is right,a name, but between a concept (signifié) and a soundwhere do words or concepts (signifié) come from? Hepattern (signifiant).

says nothing about this question. He, however, only

(Saussure 1983: 65-66)

explains how language, or a system of signs, which
Here Saussure denies nomenclaturism, saying

consists of signifiants and signifiés, emerges:that language is not a link between a thing and a namebut between a signifié and a signifiant. We recognize an

Psychologically our thought—apart from its

example of nomenclaturism in the Old Testament

expression in words—is only a shapeless and indis-(Genesis, Chapter II).

tinct mass. Philosophers and linguists have always

Saussure criticizes the idea above that first things

agreed in recognizing that without the help of signs weexisted in the form of segmented entity and thenwould be unable to make a clear-cut, consistent dis-

names were given to them:tinction between two ideas. Without language, thought
is a vague, uncharted nebula. There are no pre-exist-

Most of the models of language which philosophers have or at least put forward are reminiscent of

ing ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language.

our first ancestor Adam calling unto him the various

Against the floating realm of thought, would

animals and giving each one its name. […] language

sounds by themselves yield predetermined entities?

is not fundamentally made up of names. Only accident

No more so than ideas. Phonic substance is neither

makes a linguistic sign happen to correspond to an

more fixed nor more rigid than thought; it is not aobject with a definite meaning such as a horse, fire, themould into which thought must of necessity fit but asun, rather than to an idea such as θηκε ‘he put’. What-

plastic substance divided in turn into distinct parts toever the importance of the previous case there is no

furnish the signifiers [signifiants] needed by thought.

clear reason, indeed quite the opposite, for taking it as

The linguistic fact can therefore be pictured in its

the defining characteristic of language. Doubtless for

totality—i.e. language—as a series of contiguous sub-those who wish to consider it as such, this is, in adivisions marked off on both the indefinite plane ofcertain sense, merely a case of choosing a bad exam-

jumbled ideas (A) and the equally vague plane ofple. But implicit in this is a certain way of conceptual-sounds (B).

(Saussure 1959: 111-112)

izing the definitive nature of language which we should
not allow to pass: that is, language as a naming ofIn this way, Saussure insists that there are neither

objects. Of objects which are given beforehand. First

pre-existing ideas nor sounds in advance of language.

the object, then the sign; hence (and this we will

If so, then, how does language segment both ideas andalways reject) a prior external basis for the sign, and asounds?

depiction of language according to the following rela─ 5 ─

Naoki ARAKI

Thought, chaotic by nature, has to become

which is a combination of sound (signifiant) and con-ordered in the process of its decomposition. Neither

cept (signifié), is a positive entity although sound (sig-are thoughts given material form nor are sounds trans-

nifiant) or concept (signifié), if one is separated fromformed into mental entities; the somewhat mysterious

the other, is negatively delimited (defined):fact is rather that “thought-sound” implies division,
Whether we take the signified [signifié] or theand that language works out its units while taking

signifier [signifiant], language has neither ideas nor

shape between two shapeless masses.
(Saussure 1959: 112)

sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but
only conceptual and phonic differences that have

Certainly it is somewhat mysterious that “thought-

issued from the system. The idea or phonic substancesound” implies division and that language works outthat a sign contains is of less importance than theits units while taking shape between two shapelessother signs that surround it. Proof of this is that themasses, i.e. ideas and sounds. To make his explanation

value of a term may be modified without either its

clear, Saussure compares this mysterious process tomeaning or its sound being affected, solely because athe waves:neighboring term has been modified.
But the statement that everything in language is

Visualize the air in contact with a sheet of water;

negative is true only if the signified [signifié] and theif the atmospheric pressure changes, the surface ofsignifier [signifiant] are considered separately; when

the water will be broken up into a series of divisions,

we consider the sign in its totality, we have something

waves; the waves resemble the union or coupling ofthat is positive in its own class. A linguistic system isthought with phonic substance. (Saussure 1959: 112)a series of differences of sound combined with a seriesof differences of ideas; but the pairing of a certain

But the waves cannot be formed only by the

number of acoustical signs with as many cuts madechanges of the atmospheric pressure. Other factors

from the mass of thought engenders a system of val-

are also involved in the making of the waves. Further-ues; and this system serves as the effective link

more, Saussure, who might have noticed that his

between the phonic and psychological elements withincomparison of the waves to language was not appropri-

each sign. Although both the signified [signifié] andate, compares language to a sheet of paper:

the signifier [signifiant] are purely differential andnegative when considered separately, their combina-

Language can also be compared with a sheet oftion is a positive fact; it is even the sole type of facts

paper: thought is the front and the sound the back; onethat language has, for maintaining the parallelism

cannot cut the front without cutting the back at the

between the two classes of differences is the distinc-same time; likewise in language, one can neither

tive function of the linguistic institution. […]divide sound from thought nor thought from sound;

When we compare signs—positive terms—with

the division could be accomplished only abstractedly,

each other, we can no longer speak of difference; theand the result would be either pure psychology or

expression would not be fitting, for it applies only topure phonology.

the comparing of two sound-images, e.g. father and(Saussure 1959: 113)

mother, or two ideas, e.g. the idea “father” and the idea
But Saussure’s explanation above only shows how“mother”; two signs, each having a signified [signifié]

closely ideas and sounds are linked to each other. Stilland signifier [signifiant], are not different but only

he does not tell us how a sheet of paper is cut and also

distinct. Between them there is only opposition. The

who does advance this process and so on. Nothing is

entire mechanism of language, with which we shall bemade clear by his explanation. So we cannot help say-concerned later, is based on oppositions of this kinding that mysterious is his description of emergence ofand on the phonic and conceptual differences that theylanguage.

imply.

Furthermore, Saussure admits that each sign,─ 6 ─(Saussure 1959: 120-121)

Sapiens and Language

After all, Saussure cannot explain why the combination of a negative concept (signifié) and a negative

objects that we take to exist in the world are not mindindependent:

sound (signifiant) produces a positive term. He stands
the real process of signs on its head. In reality, every

Referring is an action, and the internal symbols

sign is positive but if we break up signs into two parts:that are used to refer do not pick out mind-indepen-

concept (signifié) and sound (signifiant), then eachdent objects. On investigation, it turns out that whatpart becomes negative. Saussure inverts this process

we understand to be a house, a river, a person, a tree,

and thinks that linkage of a negative sound (signifiant)water, and so on, is not a physical construct of somewith a negative concept (signifié) produces a positivekind. Rather, these are creations of what seventeenth

sign. So his insistence is not convincing. Things andcentury investigators called our “cognoscitive pow-words are interrelated to each other contrary to hisers,” which provide us with rich means to interpretthought that words do not refer to things. If Saussure

and refer to the outside world from certain perspec-

is right, there is no explaining why words came into

tives.

(Chomsky 2010: 57)

being. Probably he thinks that from the outset there islanguage. This means that we human beings have

Here Chomsky completely separates language

innate ideas corresponding to words. Chomsky also

from the outside world, saying that a house, a river, a

has the same idea as Saussure’s. He explicitly says that

person, a tree, water, and so on are what our mind cre-

we are born with ideas, which are linked with words

ated from certain perspectives:

after birth. He claims that this proves that children
learn a lot of words accurately and in a very short[…] there need be no objects in the world thattime. On this respect, Saussure and Chomsky havecorrespond to what we talk about, even in the simplest

almost the same insistence.

cases, […]. About all we can say at a general level isThus, Saussure insists that words do not corre-that the words of our language provide complex perspectives that offer us highly special ways to thinkspond to things in the world.

3. Chomsky’s Thought about Things and Words
Then, what does Chomsky think of the relationship between things and words?

about things—to ask for them, tell people about them,etc. Real natural language semantics will seek to discover these perspectives and the principles that underlie them. People use words to refer to things in complex ways, reflecting interests and circumstances, but[…] a lexical item provides us with a certain

the words do not refer; there is no word-thing relation

range of perspectives for viewing what we take to beof the Fregean variety, nor a more complex word-

the things in the world, or what we conceive in otherthing-person relation of the kind proposed by Charles

ways; these items are like filters or lenses, providing

Sanders Peirce in equally classic work in the founda-

ways of looking at things and thinking about the prod-tions of semantics. […] A word-thing (-person) rela-ucts of our minds. The terms themselves do not refer,tion seems as much of an illusion as a word-molecular

at least if the term refer is used in its natural-language

motion (-person) relation, though it is true that eachsense; but people can use them to refer to things, view-use of a word by a person is associated with a specificing them from particular points of view—which aremotion of molecules, and sometimes with a specificremote from the standpoint of the natural sciences, as

thing, viewed in a particular way.

noted.

(Chomsky 2000: 36)(Chomsky 1996: 22-23)

Here Chomsky insists that humans look at the

According to Chomsky, a word-thing relation is an

world from a particular point of view. His idea is simi-

illusion, in other words, words do not refer to things

lar to Kant’s. Kant claims that humans are equippedin the world. Words are used, reflecting special ways

(endowed) with a framework to look at the world atto think about things such as interests and circum-

birth (Kant 2003: 22). So according to Chomsky,

stances.

─ 7 ─

Naoki ARAKI

Chomsky repeatedly insists that words do not[…] construing a language as a fixed code isrefer to things in the world, but that words provide us

demanded by the internal logic of Saussure’s speechwith specific ways to think about the world (Chomsky

circuit [telementation model of communication].

1996: 24). This means that we do not derive words orUnless the code is fixed, then invoking linguistic

concepts from things in the world, but we have words

knowledge simply does not explain how speech com-or concepts in advance of experiencing things in themunication works. Given any utterance by A, it isworld.

essential that B must not only recognize this utterance

So Chomsky thinks that we human beings areas an example of the words A intended to pronounce,born with ideas in advance of experiencing the world

but must also attach to those words the same meaning(Chomsky 1988: 134):

as A does. Otherwise speech communication between
A and B necessarily breaks down.

(Harris 1990: 29)

The speed and precision of vocabulary acquisition
So, Harris insists that a telementation theory

leaves no real alternative to the conclusion that thechild somehow has the concepts available before expe-

assumes a fixed code:rience with language and is basically learning labels[…] if speech communication is a telementation

for concepts that are already part of his or her conceptual apparatus.

(Chomsky 1988: 28)

process, it demands a fixed code which A and B share.
If A and B do not share this fixed code, […] thenFurthermore Chomsky explains how children

speech communication between them must at somelearn language, taking the word “climb” for an exam-

point break down, […] So the theoretical assumption

ple:must be that, somehow or other, those who manage tocommunicate with each other via speech share and
There is, in fact—just to give one example—arecent issue of a linguistics journal that has a long

operate a fixed code, […] The fixed code is their common language.

(Harris 1990: 30)

detailed article trying to give the meaning of the word“climb.” And it is very complicated. But every child

So if Harris is right, Chomsky’s insistence that welearns it perfectly right away. Now that can only mean

are born with concepts, may be a logical conclusion

one thing. Namely, human nature gives us the conceptfrom a theory of a fixed code, which is I-language in“climb” for free. That is, the concept “climb” is justChomsky’s terminology and langue in Saussure’s

part of the way in which we are able to interpret expe-

respectively.

rience available to us before we even have the experi-

But Harris argues that a fixed-code theory causes

ence. […] We simply learn the label that goes with thea problem of how a common language emerges frompreexisting concept. So in other words, it is as if thethe rich variety of linguistic experience at the individ-

child, prior to any experience, has a long list of con-ual level. The solution to this problem, Harris insists,

cepts like “climb,” and then the child is looking at theis that homo sapiens is a creature uniquely endowed

world to figure out which sound goes with the concept.

with a special apparatus, which is Universal Grammar(Chomsky 1988: 190-191)

in Chomsky’s terminology, in the brain, geneticallydesigned to perform the miracle of constructing com-

But if Chomsky is right, then how did words,

munal linguistic systems:

which went with concepts, come into being? Here
Chomsky evidently agrees to Descartes’s thinking that

The language myth of post-Renaissance European

concepts are innate. In relation to this, Roy Harris

culture presents languages as fixed codes which

points out that both Saussure’s and Chomsky’s theo-enable individuals to communicate their thoughts tories are based on the idea of a fixed code that contains

one another by means of words, and portrays linguis-parings of sound and meaning:tic communities as groups of individuals who use thesame language. This is a myth which defines commu─ 8 ─

Sapiens and Language

nication between human beings as thought-transfer-of language, but that language segments nature one

ence, and then postulates a social institution (the lan-way or another:guage) which makes that possible. […]It is essentially a language myth which ignores[…] segmentation of nature is an aspect of gram-differences between individuals, in favour of emphasis-

mar—one as yet little studied by grammarians. We cut

ing collective conformities. In so doing it generates an

up and organize the spread and flow of events as weinternal problem of its own. Since, from the cradle todo, largely because, through our mother tongue, we

the grave, the personal linguistic history of every indi-

are parties to an agreement to do so, not because

vidual is unique, how is it possible that this rich variety

nature itself is segmented in exactly that way for all toof linguistic experience at the individual level should

see.

(Whorf 2012: 308)

ever give rise to a common language of the kind which
If Whorf is right, then the way languages segment

the myth postulates? […]Mythical problems demand mythical solutions.

nature varies from language to language:

The solution in this case lay in constructing a supporting explanatory mythology, according to which Nature

Languages differ not only in how they build theirprudently foresaw the difficulty and provided thesentences but also in how they break down nature toanswer in advance. The answer turns to be that homo

secure the elements to put in those sentences. Thissapiens is a creature uniquely endowed with a special

breakdown gives units of the lexicon. “Word” is not aapparatus [Chomsky’s Universal Grammar] in thevery good “word” for them; “lexeme” has been sug-brain, genetically designed to perform the miracle ofgested, and “term” will do for the present. By these

constructing communal linguistic systems.

more or less distinct terms we ascribe a semifictitious(Harris 1987: 7)

isolation to parts of experience.

(Whorf 2012: 308)

But if we are not aware of this segmentation ofHere, needless to say, Harris criticizes Chomsky’s

nature by language, we think that words correspond

Universal Grammar as a myth.

to distinct objects as classical physics or astronomy

4. Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis

explains:

According to Whorf, what is called “snow” inEnglish is segmented by Eskimos quite differently:

English terms, like ‘sky, hill, swamp,’ persuade us
to regard some elusive aspect of nature’s endless vari-

We have the same word for falling snow, snow on

ety as a distinct THING, almost like a table or chair.

the ground, snow packed hard like ice, slushy snow,

Thus English and similar tongues lead us to think ofwind-driven flying snow—whatever the situation may

the universe as a collection of rather distinct objects

be. To an Eskimo, this all-inclusive word [the English

and events corresponding to words. Indeed this is theword “snow”] would be almost unthinkable; he would

implicit picture of classical physics and astronomy—

say that falling snow, slushy snow, and so on, are sen-that the universe is essentially a collection of detachedsuously and operationally different, different things to

objects of different sizes.

(Whorf 2012: 308)

contend with; he uses different words for them and forother kinds of snow.

(Whorf 2012: 276-277)

As we have seen, Whorf’s idea is similar to
Saussure’s and Chomsky’s. But Whorf does not insist

If “snow” exists in advance of language, do Eskimosthat language existed from the outset like Saussureclassify “snow” into several kinds of snow they call it? Are

and that human beings are born with concepts likewords linked with something as St Augustine thought

Chomsky. For Whorf, language is what human beings(Augustine 2009: 10)? Or are words not connected withcreated through experiences in the world.

things in the world as Saussure and Chomsky insist?

Thus, some linguists have not thought that things

Whorf claims that nature is not segmented in advanceexist in advance of language. In a sense, this means

─ 9 ─

Naoki ARAKI

that things exist after language segments the world

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