Bull. Hiroshima Inst. Tech. Research Vol. 53 (2019) 29– 37

ArticleAnti-Chomskyans

Naoki ARAKI*(Received Nov. 1, 2018)

Abstract
A Japanese linguist, Katsuhiko Tanaka says that Noam Chomsky interprets meanings of words without considering contexts, in which words are used. Furthermore, he claims that Chomsky derives
meanings of words from deep structures. But according to Tanaka, deep structures are determined byextra-linguistic factors such as culture, situations, expectations and so on. So if Tanaka is correct, wecannot interpret meanings only from deep structures. Moreover, Tanaka insists that grammar is inlanguage and is derived from language although Chomsky claims that grammar generates language.
Tanaka’s thought about language is similar to Roy Harris’s integrational linguistics, according to which
language is a medium that enables linguistic communication to be successful among people in communities. Harris also insists that words do not have any meanings at all just as the Keynesians claimthat money, whether coins or bills, does not have any value at all.
Key Words: meaning, context, deep structure, extra-linguistic factors, grammar, integrational linguistics, medium

and grammar. Chomsky thinks that grammar gener-

Introduction

ates language while Tanaka says that grammar is in

A Japanese linguist, Katsuhiko Tanaka says that

language, that is, grammar is derived from language.

Noam Chomsky interprets linguistic meanings without

Unlike Chomsky, Roy Harris insists that meanings

considering contexts, in which linguistic expressions

include situations and contexts and that words do not

are used. Also, according to Tanaka, Chomsky analy-

have meanings, which are not determinate in advance.

ses only printed characters, excluding other factors. If

His insistence is similar to Tanaka’s.

we understand meanings by taking into account only
printed characters, Chomsky’s analysis will be correct.

1. Interpretation of Meanings without Contexts

But if we take meanings to be something that is
involved in contexts, his interpretation of meanings

Tanaka points out that Chomsky interprets meanings of sentences without contexts:

will not be correct. Furthermore, Tanaka goes on topoint out the problem of deep structures. Chomsky

Chomsky’s theory of language treats language

derives meanings from deep structures, which are,separated from other factors of human expressions

according to Tanaka, decided by extra-linguistic fac-

[communication]. Chomsky’s ambiguous sentences

tors such as culture, contexts, and so on. So meanings

are intended for allowing ambiguities without consid-

are closely connected with other things than language.

ering any contexts. Furthermore, the sentences are

Also, Tanaka takes up the relation between language

interpreted in terms of printed materials [written lan-

* Department of Information Systems and Management, Faculty of Applied Information Science, Hiroshima Institute of TecŠology,
Hiroshima 731-5193, Japan. E-mail: araki@cc.it-hiroshima.ac.jp
─ 29 ─Naoki ARAKI

guage]. But in reality sentences are not interpreted

not have bare syntax that does not depend on semantic

only from themselves. They are connected with facialinterpretation of each word. Grammar depends on

expressions, gestures, extra-linguistic situations based

words that conveys only their concepts but cannot beon the scene, and so on. It varies not only in structureclassified into parts of speech. (My translation)(Tanaka 1990: 177)of language but also in differences of cultural environment and social hierarchy whether deep structure is

Here Tanaka denies the autonomy of syntax fromexpressed in surface structure in visible form and at
face value. (My translation)(Tanaka 1990: 174)

semantics that Chomsky claimed. In relation to this,Tanaka mentions subjects in ancient Chinese:

Chomsky insists that children must have someform of structure related to language because theyJyunzo Nishi says, “It is a groundless excuse tocannot learn complicated meanings of sentences fromsay that Chinese has no grammatical subjects, which

experience. As Tanaka says, Chomsky’s line of logic or

are often just omitted.” After all, when we interpret

reasoning is based on interpretations of meanings

Chinese applying a transformational rule that infrom sentences without contexts. Chomsky is right if

Chinese, subjects, which should be in deep structure,children can interpret meanings of sentences without

are omitted in surface structure, this means that we

contexts. But Chomsky is wrong if they can interpret

make Chinese something else that is not Chinese. It

meanings of sentences using extra-linguistic factors ascannot be a study of language itself to study such an

Tanaka says. If Tanaka is right, we do not need Univer-

operational rule, which is never a rule of language.

sal Grammar that Chomsky assumes to be pro-

(My translation)(Tanaka 1990: 180-181)

grammed in our brain at birth.
By the way Tanaka’s “deep structure” will need to

According to Tanaka, Chomsky’s theory of lan-be explained in more detail later. In some cases heguage is not a study of language when he insists thatuses the word “deep structure” as an equivalent ofemergence of subjects is determined by setting of a

Universal Grammar, the existence of which Chomsky

null subject parameter of Universal Grammar. Tanaka

claims.

criticizes Chomsky’s theory of language, which resem-

Returning to Tanaka’s insistence, he refers tobles a Procrustean bed:

ancient Chinese, bearing Chomsky’s theory of lanI will not accept that a prototype [Universal Gram-

guage in mind:mar] is made to measure all other languages by a criIn ancient Chinese, one word functions as a noun,

terion of a specific dominant language [English],a verb, an adjective, or an adverb, etc., depending on

assuming universality of languages only by theory

contexts. Also, what is interpreted as a subject does

based on authority of traditional Western thought. The

not often appear. It is not a grammar but a meaning of

reason is that it leads to a way towards a terrible self-each word that decides its grammatical role.

righteous attitude and rigid control of thought.

Ancient Chinese does not have grammatical ele-

Chomsky says that it makes the USA good toments but only meanings because its words do not“dispel all illusions of social sciences” participating inhave their morphology. Therefore grammar does notpolitical policy of the USA. This criticism, which iscontrol words but meanings of words determines

directed towards various established disciplines, must

grammar. Furthermore the whole meaning of linguis-be also directed towards Chomsky’s theory of lan-tic expression is determined by situations [scenes]. So

guage itself. (My translation)in ancient Chinese, it is very difficult to derive only aform of sentence construction [syntax?] apart from its(Tanaka 1990: 204)

2. The Problem of Deep Structure

content. In other words, it is extremely hard to elimi-

Tanaka regards “deep structure” as one of thenate content of sentence and build its logical form

devices in what is called Chomskyan revolution in(grammar = syntax). In short, ancient Chinese does

linguistics:

─ 30 ─

Anti-Chomskyans

Deep structure is one of the devices in Chomskyan

As an example, Chomsky takes up the sentence,

revolution. Chomsky explains linguistic phenomena by“Invisible God created the visible world”, referring tosetting another language [deep structure] outside ofGeneral and Rational Grammar: The Port-Royal Gram-

real language [surface structure] and then by returningmar (1660):

linguistic phenomena to it or correlating them with it.
(My translation)[…] the deep structure underlying the proposi-(Tanaka 1990: 42)tion Dieu invisible a créé le monde visible [Invisible
Chomsky himself elucidates the relation between

God created the visible world] consists of three
abstract propositions, each expressing a certain sim-deep structure and surface structure as follows:

ple judgment, although its surface form expresses
The central idea of transformational grammar isonly the subject-attribute structure. Of course, thisthat they [deep and surface structures] are, in general,

deep structure is implicit only; it is not expressed but

distinct and that the surface structure is determinedis only represented in the mind: (Chomsky 1966: 34)

by repeated application of certain formal operations
The following are the “three abstract proposi-called “grammatical transformations” to objects of ations”, of which the proposition “Invisible God createdmore elementary sort [deep structure].
(Chomsky 1965: 16-17)

the visible world” consists:
God is visible.

The former [deep structure] is the underlying
abstract structure that determines its semantic inter-He created the world.

pretation; the latter [surface structure], the superficial

The world is visible.

organization of units which determines the phonetic
interpretation and which relates to the physical form

In this way, Chomsky explains a relation betweenof the actual utterance, to its perceived or intended

deep structure and surface structure. Furthermore,form. In these terms, we can formulate a second fun-Chomsky insists that “deep structure” is the samedamental conclusion of Cartesian linguistics, namely,

across all languages:that deep and surface structures need not be identical.
The underlying organization of a sentence [deep struc-The deep structure that expresses the meaning isture] relevant to semantic interpretation is not neces-common to all languages, so it is claimed, being asarily revealed by the actual arrangement and phras-

simple reflection of the forms of thought. The transfor-ing of its given components [surface structure].

mational rules that convert deep to surface structure(Chomsky 1966: 33)

may differ from language to language. The surface
structure resulting from these transformations does

Here if Chomsky is right, we can assume what-

not directly express the meaning relations of theever deep structures we like independently of surface

words, of course, except in the simplest cases. It is the

structures.

deep structure underlying the actual utterance, aAccording to Chomsky, a basic proposition, which

structure that is purely mental, that conveys theconsists of a deep structure, is equipped with a subject

semantic content of the sentence. This deep structure

and a predicate:is, nevertheless, related to actual sentences in thateach of its component abstract propositions (in the

The deep structure consists of a system of propositions, organized in various ways. The elementary

cases just discussed) could be directly realized as asimple propositional judgment.

(Chomsky 1966: 35)

propositions that constitute the deep structure are of
the subject-predicate form, with simple subjects andHere Chomsky clearly declares that deep struc-predicate (i.e., categories instead of more complex

tures are the same across all languages, explainingphrases).

that surface structures differ from language to lan-

(Chomsky 1966: 40)

─ 31 ─Naoki ARAKI

guage because transformational rules, which relate

the word deep and confuse it with invariant. Once

deep structures to surface structures, are not theagain, the only thing I claim to be “invariant” is univer-same across all language. According to Chomsky, forsal grammar.

(Chomsky 1979: 171-172)

example, “classical cases” are incorporated in deep
Chomsky might have forgotten that he himself

structures of every language (including Latin or
Greek) although “the means for their expression” maywrote above:

be different in languages with no (case) inflections:
The deep structure […] is common to all lanIt is important to realize that the use of the names

guages,(Chomsky 1966: 35)

of classical cases for languages with no inflections[…], a belief that deep structures are fundamen-

implies only a belief in the uniformity of the grammatical relations involved, a belief that deep structures

tally the same across languages, […](Chomsky 1966: 45)

are fundamentally the same across languages, although
the means for their expression may be quite diverse.

Tanaka mentions about the fact that Chomsky has

This claim is not obviously true—it is, in other words,
a nontrivial hypothesis. So far as I know, however,changed his principles to fit in with his system:

modern linguistics offers no data that challenge it [aWhere does misunderstanding lie in our reading

belief that deep structures are fundamentally the sameof Chomsky? That is not misunderstanding, but is it

across languages] in any serious way.
(Chomsky 1966: 45)

not the truth that ten years [from 1966 to 1977] ofdevelopment of his research have made Chomsky

However, about ten years later Chomsky denies

change his declaration (in 1966)? (My translation)(Tanaka 1990: 55)

his insistence that deep structures are the same acrossall languages:

In fact, surprisingly enough, Chomsky admits that
More or less. I have continued to use the term
[deep structure] for the structure generated by the

we are very likely to change our ideas on somethingin some period of time:base, which is transformed into well-formed surface
Anybody who teaches at age fifty what he wasstructure. The source of confusion lies in the fact thatteaching at age twenty-five had better find another

we employ the same term in two different senses.
However, the greatest confusion comes from peo-

profession. If in twenty-five years nothing has hap-

ple working at the periphery of the field, for example,

pened which proves to you that your ideas weresome literary critics who use the term [deep struc-wrong, it means that you are not in a living field, orture] in a vaguely Wittgeinsteinian sense. Many people

perhaps are part of a religious sect.
(Chomsky 1979: 177-178)

have attributed the word deep to grammar itself, perhaps identifying “deep structure” and “universal gram-

Here if Chomsky is right, then does it mean thatmar.”
I have read many criticisms saying how ill-con-

what Chomsky claims to be true now in 2018, turns

ceived it is to postulate innate deep structures. I neverout to be wrong in “twenty-five years” later in 2043? Or

said that, and nothing I have written suggests anything

if in “twenty-five years” later in 2002 from 1977 nothingof the sort, though such a view has been maintained

happened which proved to him that his ideas wereby others.

wrong, then does it mean that he was not in a living

Similarly, I have often read that what I am propos-

field, or perhaps was part of a religious sect? We can-ing is that deep structures do not vary from one lan-

not avoid thinking that Chomsky assumes a defiant

guage to another, that all languages have the same

attitude here. Tanaka comments on Chomsky’s atti-

deep structure: people have apparently been misled bytude:─ 32 ─

Anti-Chomskyans

We could agree with what Chomsky says as a

guistic expressions. (My translation)(Tanaka 1990: 141)

generalization. But it is just ad hoc replacement rather
than fast-advancing development that an important

If Tanaka is right, then “deep structures” createdconcept like “deep structure” collapses or is distorted

by Chomsky are based on just one pattern of logic thatin only as short as ten years. (My translation)(Tanaka 1990: 55-56)

is derived from only one language, English. So such“deep structures” are just like the Procrustean bed. In

Then, even if deep structures exist as Chomsky

other words, every logic is based on some language.
This means that we cannot think about anything with-insists, are there not any problems with them?

3. Deep Structures and Extra-Linguistic Factors

out language. Thought and language are closely interconnected with each other. Tanaka explains this point:

Tanaka says that if there are deep structures,
The device called “deep structure” is made pos-then what deep structures can we postulate for thesible by assuming a situation behind “surface struc-following phrases?

ture” and clarifies hidden items. But the situation itself(3) cooking of fox

can be grasped only by language. So the relation(4) cooking of kitten

between the situation and language is dialectic in thisWe cannot postulate deep structures of (3) cooking ofcase. That is to say, language is involved in setting

fox or (4) cooking of kitten so easily as before. In a

deep structures and languages have a lot of different

fairy tale or something like that, a fox or a kitten mightparts from other languages. (My translation)(Tanaka 1990: 148)

cook some food and serve it to other animals. Or insome community, some people might prefer to eat fox

Therefore “deep structures” are prescribed byor kitten.
The phrases above, which have the same syntac-

some specific language (English?) and they cannot be

tic structure at the level of “surface structure,” some-universal to all languages. If so, the same is true oftimes can allow different interpretations. It is not lan-

Universal Grammar. Does this mean that Sapir-Whorf

guage itself […] but life in each community, in short,

hypothesis is correct? Can logic based on English

cultural environment that determines each interpreta-(Universal Grammar) deduce all languages on thetion. […] In any case, these phrases are usually inter-

earth? Furthermore, Tanaka refers to another charac-

preted in environment and context where they areteristic of deep structures:

used. In other words, linguistic activities never happen
I said that deep structures are close to logic

without taking into account environment or situations.
(My translation)(Tanaka 1990: 138-140)

before. But there are a lot of phenomena in which weneed to think that deep structures are not one-layered

According to Tanaka, deep structures are related

but multi-layered. This characteristic of deep struc-not only to language (surface structures) itself but alsotures will be one of the causes by which Chomsky’s

to extra-linguistic situations:transformational grammar produced various schools
he himself did not expect. (My translation)(Tanaka 1990: 148-149)

The so-called deep structures […] are not originally related to language itself in the least but to extralinguistic situations. When a situation is expressed by

As Tanaka points out, there have spread a lot of

language, we have a lot of options because there are aschools from Chomsky’s original theory of language.

lot of interconnections of elements that consist of a

It is thought that Chomsky is searching for Uni-situation. We say the minimum amount of words,

versal Grammar, which is the Procrustean bed based

thinking about present situations, hearers’ backgroundon one of the languages in the world, English. Tanaka

knowledge and so on, and omitting unnecessary lin-points out contradiction involved in grammar:

─ 33 ─Naoki ARAKIAs we have seen, here is an essential contradic-

explain sound using mind. Therefore it was a common

tion involved in grammar. Linguistic activities byidea among American linguists to stop explaining phe-humans are not independent of other factors, but innomena called language including sound, using asome cases they appear, accompanying more impor-concept like mind. In 1939, W. F. Twaddle wrote abouttant and more essential extra-linguistic activities orthis matter:they are employed to supplement those activities.
Generally speaking, words are always used in situa-[…] Because we do not have any right to guesstions. From a pragmatic standpoint, language is not

linguistic function of mind, which we cannot touch

used independently of human behavior or the whole[…] and we cannot gain any profit from such a guess.

situation mentioned above. Returning to the examples

We cannot observe something like linguistic process

above, the phrases, “cooking of fox” and “cooking ofof mind, and something like introspection of linguistic

kitten” are not separated from context of a story andprocess can be compared to burning in a wooden

not used by themselves unless they appear on thestove. The only information concerning mind can bemenu of a restaurant. (My translation)

derived only from behavior of a person who has the(Tanaka 1990: 143)

mind [the motto of behaviorism]. If we explain the
behavior using mind, then we will make a logical mis-

4. Language and Grammar

take in which we give a name to an unknown cause

Tanaka lays bare his thoughts about language:

and take up the name again as a cause of a fact, thatis, we try to explain something using the unknown

Modern linguistics, empirical linguistics in Chom-cause. Mind is the name that contains the unknown

sky’s term, which does not a priori start from thecause of human behavior. (On Definition of Pho-“general”, does not allow itself to postulate a medium

nemes)

with an assumption [deep structure] between languages. In it, eternal grammar is a contradiction in

There are few examples by such a vivid metaphor

terms. The reason is that grammar should be valid

like this passage above where it is opposed for mind

only in a specific synchrony. That is to say, what pre-to intervene in the study of language, that is, it iscedes real language [deep structure] is not grammar

declared that mind is invalid. Also this passage will

because grammar exists only in existent particularremain as a famous quotation where behaviorism for

language. The reason is that grammar does not makelinguistics was announced scrupulously without an

language but language makes grammar. Linguistics

affected attitude. (My translation)

does not call grammar that precedes and transcends(Tanaka 1990: 36-37)

language [deep structure] by the name of grammar. It
is general grammar that is repeatedly insisted on by

I would like Chomsky to read this passage if

Beauzée and Chomsky. Grammar which is formless in

he did not. But probably he would argue against

reality, is incorporated in a container called deep struc-Twaddle’s idea. In any case, Twaddle was forgotten

ture. General grammar is incorporated in deep struc-and history repeats itself, first as a tragedy, but second

ture because it is in there. (My translation)

as a farce:(Tanaka 1990: 92)
About thirty years after it was decidedly declared
Furthermore Tanaka criticizes Chomsky’s men-that we should eliminate mind [by Twaddle], Chomsky

talism, quoting the following passage from Twaddle:

bases foundation of his linguistics on mind and tries toderive principles of language from mind but not lan-

Science has never tried to explain clearer things

guage itself that is material. (My translation)(sound) using something more ambiguous (mind). In(Tanaka 1990: 37)

other words, even though mind has an aspect that canbe explained by sound, it is a reversal of logic to try to─ 34 ─

What a big change from Twaddle to Chomsky

Anti-Chomskyans

Saussure adopted telementation as his theory of

regarding the method of linguistics! These two lin-

communication, although he does not designate it by

guists are like oil and water:that term. Nevertheless, the adoption is explicitly
Chomsky and his followers have been devoting
their efforts to reducing temporary phenomena called

spelled out in Saussure’s account of what he calls the‘speech circuit’.

(Harris 1990: 26)

diversity to the general because they are concerned
How, then, does Saussure explain human linguis-with a property of language as a general class above
all. Their devotion seemed to appear encouraged bytic communication using the speech circuit?

not language itself but something other than language.
Traditionally linguists, although they are concerned

In order to separate from the whole of speech thewith generality or universality, have a behavior of ear-part that belongs to language, we must examine thenestly searching for details of exotic and namelessindividual act from which the speaking-circuit [speechlanguages and of getting satisfaction from finding

circuit] can be reconstructed. The act requires thehumanity or a connection between language and cul-presence of at least two persons; that is the minimum

ture. They do not usually attempt to reduce language

number necessary to complete the circuit. Suppose

to something other than language [logic?]. (My trans-

that two people, A and B, are conversing with eachlation)other […]

(Tanaka 1990: 39-40)(Saussure 1959: 11)

So there lies so great a gap between Chomskyans

Saussure continues his explanation, showing an

and non-Chomskyans that we can never bury it (jumpillustration where two persons are facing each other:over it) so easily.
Suppose that the opening of the circuit is in A’s

5. Roy Harris’s Integrational Linguistics

brain, where mental facts (concepts) are associatedHere is another linguist, who is skeptical about
Chomsky’s theory of language.

with representations of the linguistic sounds (soundimages) that are used for their expression. A given

Roy Harris criticizes the orthodox linguistics andconcept unlocks a corresponding sound-image in the

proposes his integrational linguistics, which integrates

brain; this purely psychological phenomenon is fol-verbal and non-verbal communication:

lowed in turn by a physiological process: the braintransmits an impulse corresponding to the image to

By rejecting a telementational model of communi-

the organs used in producing sounds. Then the soundcation [proposed by Saussure] and substituting anwaves travel from the mouth of A to the ear of B: aintegrationalist model (i.e. one in which the sign is not

purely physical process. Next, the circuit continues ingiven in advance of the communication situation but isB, but the order is reversed: from the ear to the brain,

itself constituted in the context of that situation by

the physiological transmission of the sound-image; invirtue of the integrational role it fulfils) the foundation

the brain, the psychological association of the image ofis laid for an entirely new approach to the study ofthe corresponding concept. If B then speaks, the new

language. It becomes possible to treat linguistic com-

act will follow—from his brain to A’s—exactly themunication as a continuum of interaction which may

same course as the first act and pass through the samebe manifested both verbally and non-verbally.

successive phases […](Saussure 1959: 11-12)(Harris 1990: 45)
After the passage above, a diagram is shown to
Then, what is the telementational model of com-

illustrate what is explained above by Saussure. Accord-

munication by Saussure? According to Harris, Saussure

ing to Harris, speech communication, for Saussure, is

explains human linguistic communication as the trans-

a process of telementation, or thought-transference. In

ference of thoughts from one person to another:other words, the same thoughts are transferred fromA’s mind to B’s or from B’s mind to A’s via exactly the─ 35 ─Naoki ARAKI

same linguistic procedures laid down by and constitu-

receives as a result of hearing what A said. Just as intive of the same language:

chess, A and B must be following the same rules inorder to guarantee that each correctly understands

This simple scenario [speech circuit by Saussure]what the other is doing.

(Harris 1990: 29)

assumes that A and B are speaking the same language.
If the only language known by A were Catalan and the

So according to Harris, Saussure assumes that

only language known by B were Cantonese, this exchange

forms and meanings of languages need to be determi-

would not constitute a speech circuit in Saussure’s sense,

nate in advance. This is also true of Chomsky’s indi-

regardless of how A and B eked out their oral utter-

vidual grammar (I-language):ances and their mutual tolerance with gestures, facial[…] the expressions of a language have to be

expressions and other varieties of non-verbal communication.

(Harris 1990: 26)

determinate both in respect of ‘form’ and in respect of‘meaning’.

(Harris 1990: 46)

Here Harris insists that Saussure’s telementational theory of communication is based on the idea

Furthermore Harris insists that his integrationalthat language is a fixed code shared by people in alinguistics bears a striking similarity to Keynesian

speech community. Chomsky regards this fixed code

economics, comparing orthodox linguistics with eco-

as a specific grammar (I-language) deduced from his

nomics attacked by the Keynesians:

Universal Grammar:
Just as orthodox linguistics treats sounds as hav[…] once any theorist adopts a telementationaling meanings by standing for concepts or for objects

theory of communication, […] the inevitable result isand persons in the external world, so the basic idea ofthat it leaves only one option open for explaining what

economic theory which the Keynesians called in ques-a language is. The only option open is to construe ation was the idea that a pound note had a value by

language as a fixed code, the fixed code known to bothstanding for a quantity of gold.

A and B.

(Harris 1990: 51)(Harris 1990: 28-29)
Then, what did the Keynesians insist on?

Then, are languages fixed codes? According toHarris, the idea that languages are fixed codes is a

The Keynesians strategy is to point out that thelogical conclusion that human communication is a

assumption that currency notes are pieces of paper

process of telementation:

standing for quantities of precious metals fails to makesense of economic reality, where in practice money[…] construing a language as a fixed code isfunctions as a complex of mechanisms which facili-demanded by the internal logic of Saussure’s speechtates the distribution of goods and services. Money

circuit. Unless the code is fixed, then invoking linguis-

does not in addition need to ‘stand for’ anything.

tic knowledge simply does not explain how speech

Analogously in the linguistic case, once we see that

communication works. Given any utterance by A, it islanguage can be treated as a complex of mechanisms

essential that B must not only recognize this utterance

for facilitating communication there is no need toas an example of the words A intended to pronounce,

insist that linguistic signs ‘stand for’ anything else in

but must also attach to those words the same meaning

addition.

(Harris 1990: 52)

as A does. Otherwise speech communication between
Then, what is integrational linguistics, which Har-

A and B necessarily breaks down. This in turn follows
from the telementational theory of communication,

ris insists on?

according to which it is both a necessary and sufficient condition of communication that the ideas which

Integrationalism redefines linguistics as a mode

A intends to convey are identical with those which B

of inquiry into the construction and articulation of our─ 36 ─

Anti-Chomskyans

linguistic experience. It enquires not into the hypo-ings beforehand but they are a medium that works asthetical structure of abstract linguistic systems [pro-part of what we call communication. Harris compares

posed by Saussure], nor into their even more hypo-

his integrational linguistics to Keynesian economics,

thetical representations in the human brain [proposed

which insists that money, whether coins or bills, doesby Chomsky], but into the everyday integrational

not have its value but functions as a medium for facili-mechanisms by means of which the reality of the lin-tating the distribution of goods and services. In theguistic sign as a fact of life is established.

same way, words do not have meanings but work as a(Harris 1990: 50)

mediumformakingcommunication

successful

between people in their community.
So Harris’s linguistics is quite different from ortho-

References

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Chomsky, Noam. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. The

Conclusion

MIT Press. 1965.

Tanaka insists that Chomsky interprets meanings

Chomsky, Noam. Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter inwithout taking contexts into account because mean-

the History of Rationalist Thought. University

ings can be derived from deep structures, which werePress of America. 1966.

once thought to be common across all languages. But

Chomsky, Noam. Language and Responsibility Basedaccording to Tanaka, we cannot assume deep struc-on Conversations with Mitsou Ronat (translatedtures without contexts because meanings are con-from the French by John Viertel). Pantheonnected with non-linguistic factors such as culture,

Books. 1979.

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Harris, Roy. “On Redefining Linguistics.” Redefining

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Linguistics, edited by H. G. Davis and T. J. Taylor.

guage (linguistic expressions) but grammar can be

pp. 18-52. Routledge. 1990.

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Lancelot, C. and Arnauld, A. Grammaire générale etHarris insists on the same idea as Tanaka’s, pro-raisonnée, les pondements de l’art de parler (Gen-posing the integrational approach to language. Accord-eral and Rational Grammar). 1660.

ing to Harris, a fixed code is assumed for Saussure’s

Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics

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─ 37 ─

Japanese)