"GFJ Commentary" introduces news analyses andopinions in Japan on the relations of Japan with therest of the world, but they do not represent the views ofGFJ as an institution.

June 26, 2012

Will World Uyghur Congress Sink a GreatShip?
By MUTSUJI Shoji
The 4th General Assembly of the ʺthe World Uyghur Congress (WUC)ʺ was held in Tokyo
on May 14. With parliamentarians from various countries including Japan attending theCongress, Rabiye Qadir, a representative of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region criticized therepression against ethnic minorities in the Region by the Chinese government and emphasizedthat China would not be able to forge solid footing in the international community unless sheshould come to respect such principles as human rights and freedom. Meanwhile, while theChinese government had tried to press the Japanese government not to convene the Congress,
visas were, in the end, issued to the parties concerned including Chairperson Qadir. This
created a wide range of effects, as exemplified by that fact that the Chinese government inresponse virtually cancelled a summit meeting between President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister
Noda, claiming that their repeated requests to defend ʺChinaʹs core interestʺ had been
neglected.

Along with the issue of Tibet, which is well‐known among other ethnic minority issues in
China, the Chinese government is quite nervous about the issue of Uighur. Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region, westernmost of China and adjacent to boundaries with countries inCentral Asia, covers approximately one‐sixth of China in terms of space. The Uighurs, having
the largest population of more than 7.2 million in the region, is one of the biggest of 55 ethnic
minority groups in China. The Uighurs, inspired by their own cultural identity, had longgroped for independence, even after the region was seized by the Qing Dynasty, and in 1944
declared establishment of the ʺEast Turkestan Republicʺ which was then recognized by theSoviet Union. However, China, wary of extension of the Soviet influence, formally incorporated
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region into the country as its own territory in 1955, and this wastacitly approved by the Soviet Union under the international environment of the Cold War.

In Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, there has been observed periodical occurrence ofriots and demonstrations by Uighurs since the beginning of the 1990s after the end of the Cold
War. Along with it, Uighur‐related organizations which had long been working outside thecountry also gained momentum. These organizations are roughly divided into two lines ofactivities; one adheres to such human‐right‐related secular norms as ʺright to nationalself‐determinationʺ and the other to Islamic doctrine with propensity to armed struggle. Bothlines of activities have rapidly expanded their influence since the 1990s, but their greatest
difference from those in Tibet is that their resistance is not unified.

The Chinese government regards the riots provoked within Xinjiang by Uighurs, whichhave been spurred since the 1990s along with the activities of those foreign‐based
Uighur‐related organizations, as ʺacts of terrorism agitated by the separatistsʺ, and implements
the draconian ʺstrike hardʺ security campaign against them. However, now that the ʺwar on
terrorʺ is almost over and that ʺArab Springʺ stormed throughout the Middle East, it is quitedifficult to justify everything at least with such rhetoric. Just as Chairperson Qadir of WUC
stated, there is no denying that Chinaʹs argument on human rights that ʺa strong state is the
only guarantee of individual rights and is therefore paramountʺ quite deviates from the global
norms on human rights.

On the other hand, no matter how much criticism China receives from the outside world,
it is least expected at this stage that Xinjiang should secede from China and become
independent. There will arise big friction if a foreign country should, for whatever reasons,support separation and independence of a region of any one country.

Besides, Uighurs living in Xinjiang do not seem to wish for ʺseparation andindependence,ʺ either. According to an investigation conducted by H. S. Yee in Xinjiang in 2003,
it was confirmed that, while Uighurs have an strong ethnic consciousness and are moredissatisfied than Chinese with economic disparities among ethnic groups caused by theopen‐economic policy, they take a negative attitude either toward separatist and independence
movements or toward the ʺstrike hardʺ campaign by the government. Notwithstanding thedisparities with the Chinese, it cannot be denied that Uighurs are also beneficiaries of thepolicies of ʺreform and opennessʺ as in job opportunity, etc.

Frequent occurrence of demonstrations and riots should be considered to be not so muchtheir quest for ʺseparation and independenceʺ as manifestation of their frustration caused bytheir dissatisfied coexistence with the Chinese. Should it be the case, the claim for ʺseparationand independenceʺ would be welcomed neither by the international community nor theUighurs in Xinjiang themselves.

From this point of view, we could understand why WUC, at its General Assembly on May
14, made no direct reference to ʺseparation and independence,ʺ but focused on criticism torepression against the ethnic minorities by the Chinese government. Again, it is assumed thattactical consideration was made when the Tibetan government‐in‐exile, also in conflict withBeijing, switched its policy from ʺindependenceʺ to ʺa high degree of autonomy ʺ so that it
could gain domestic and international support more easily. Thus, it could be said that the centerof gravity of the ethnic minority issues in China is shifting from ʺseparation and independenceʺto ʺreduction of disparities among ethnic groups in terms of politics, economy, and culture.ʺ

Besides, even if the Uighurs approve that they belong to China in return for the benefit
they receive, though only partially, from Chinaʹs economic growth, it is clearly impossible tosustain her economic growth almost indefinitely, and thus, winning the hearts and minds ofethnic minorities by dangling ʺa carrotʺ before them would not always be a viable option.
However, the Chinese government maintains a hardline stance, sheltering behind the principleof ʺnon‐interference in internal affairs.ʺ They may fear that only one concession would erupt all
the ethnic minority issues in China, just as a leak will sink a great ship. This is, in other words,
an issue which might uproot the basis of the Communist regime. Therefore, while it isinconceivable that the Chinese government should revise the existing system of autonomous
region in the foreseeable future, the frustration of Uighurs is expected to be increasinglyexacerbated. Since her shift to a route of ʺreform and openness,ʺ China has realized remarkableeconomic growth with an unprecedented degree of pragmatism. However, that pragmatism isfatally lacking when it comes to political and social issues in particular. It should be noted that,as long as this goes on, the Communist Party and the Chinese government will gradually becaught in their own trap.

(This is the English translation of an article written by MUTSUJI Shoji, Lecturer,
Yokohama City University, which originally appeared on the BBS
Hyakushutsuʺ

of GFJ on May 20, 2012.)

ʺGiron ‐