STRATEGIC THEORY FOR THE 21st CENTURY:
THE LITTLE BOOK ON BIG STRATEGY

Harry R. Yarger

February 2006

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ISBN 1-58487-233-0

ii

CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. A Theory Stated: Strategy’s Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
III. The Strategic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
IV. Theory in the Real World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
V. The Strategy Paradigm in Short: A Theory Restated . . . . . . . . . 65
VI. Concluding Thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

iii

FOREWORD
The word “strategy” pervades American conversation and ournews media. We tend to use strategy as a general term for a plan, aconcept, a course of action, or a “vision” of the direction in which toproceed at the personal, organizational, and governmental—local,
state, or federal—levels. Such casual use of the term to describe
nothing more than “what we would like to do next” is inappropriate
and belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking. It
reduces strategy to just a good idea without the necessary underlying
thought or development. It also leads to confusion between strategy
and planning, conﬁning strategic possibilities to near-time planningassumptions and details, while limiting the ﬂexibility of strategic
thought and setting inappropriately speciﬁc expectations ofoutcomes.
This “little book”—actually a monograph—talks about big
strategy, strategy at the highest levels of the nation-state. It isapplicable to grand strategy, national security strategy, national
military strategy, and regional or theater strategy. The monographdoes not propose a strategy for the United States; rather, it provides
a framework for considering strategy at any of the levels mentioned
above. It is an examination of theory, exploring those aspects ofstrategy that appear to have universal application. The theory also
may have application to the strategy of nonstate actors, institutions,and businesses, but the explicit purpose and perspective offeredherein focus on the nation-state.
This Letort Paper is written to expose emerging senior leadersand strategists at the U.S. Army War College to the vocabulary,ideas, and concepts that will enable them to construct a frameworkfor developing their own strategic perspective of the trends, issues,
opportunities, and threats confronting the United States in the 21st
century.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institutev

PREFACE
This monograph has been constructed by borrowing freely
from the ideas and concepts of others, some of whom have global
recognition and others who toiled namelessly as faculty members
and students at various senior service colleges. I apologize to all
for those instances wherein I may have misrepresented their ideas
or paraphrased too closely without proper recognition in my quest
for a synthesis of thought that might qualify as pure theory. I also
apologize to readers for the frequent redundancy and complexity of
my work—but strategy is a complex thing that is better understoodwhen examined from different perspectives. In the same light, I
have used examples very sparingly and reluctantly, only as a means
to indicate the path of my thinking. To do more would beg forthe illustration to be challenged instead of the thought, or suggest
the direct application of the “lessons” of the example to similar
circumstances. A theory of strategy is neither a simple checklist
nor a cookbook solution. It is a way to understand how you mightdevelop a perspective and approach for deﬁning and selecting
alternative choices in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing
world—focusing on “how to think” as opposed to “what to think”—
and articulating your choices in ways that can be understood andimplemented. Strategy is neither simple nor easy, but the goodstrategist seeks to express the logic of strategy in the simplest, clearest
terms.

vii

SUMMARY
Strategy for the nation-state is neither simple nor easy. Good
strategy demands much of the military professional whether he isformulating, articulating, evaluating, or executing strategy. Few do it
well. It requires the professional to step out of the planning mindset
and adopt one more suited for the strategic environment. This isparticularly true in periods of great change and turmoil when asuccessful military strategy must be closely integrated with and may
depend on other national strategies of the interagency community. A
theory of strategy helps in this transition by educating the professionaland disciplining his thinking in any of his roles. This monographadvances a theory of strategy that provides essential terminology
and deﬁnitions, explanations of the underlying assumptions andpremises, and substantive hypotheses that explain the nature of thestrategic environment and the role and expectations of strategy. The
environment is explained in theoretical and practical terms, and theimplications for strategic thinking are developed with a distinction
being made between strategy and planning mindsets. The typicalproblems practitioners have in formulating and articulating strategy
are discussed. Strategy formulation is recognized as both an art andscience, and the U.S. Army War College strategy model of ends,
ways, and means is expounded on and advocated as a methodology
for articulating strategies.

ix

I. INTRODUCTION
Like politics, strategy is the art of the possible; but few can discern what
is possible.1
William Murray and Mark Grimsley

In simplistic terms, strategy at all levels is the calculation of
objectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk tocreate more favorable outcomes than might otherwise exist by chanceor at the hands of others. Strategy is deﬁned in Joint Publication 102 as “the art and science of developing and employing instrumentsof national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion toachieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”2 Both ofthese deﬁnitions are useful, but neither fully conveys the role andcomplexity of strategic thought at the highest levels of the state. At
these levels, strategy is the art and science of developing and using
the political, economic, social-psychological, and military powers of
the state in accordance with policy guidance to create effects that
protect or advance national interests relative to other states, actors, or
circumstances. Strategy seeks a synergy and symmetry of objectives,
concepts, and resources to increase the probability of policy successand the favorable consequences that follow from that success. It isa process that seeks to apply a degree of rationality and linearity tocircumstances that may or may not be either. Strategy accomplishes
this by expressing its logic in rational, linear terms—ends, ways, andmeans.
Strategy is far from simple, and understanding a theory of strategy
allows us to grasp and work with its complexity by understanding
its logic. A theory of strategy provides essential terminology anddeﬁnitions, explanations of the underlying assumptions and premises,
substantive propositions translated into testable hypotheses, andmethods that can be used to test the hypotheses and modify thetheory as appropriate.3
Why study a theory of strategy? Theory’s value lies not in aprescription for success but in how it helps us expand and discipline
our thinking. As Clausewitz reminds us, theory should be for study,
not doctrine.

1

Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war
from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, training his judgment,
and help him to avoid pitfalls. . . . Theory exists so that one need not start
afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but willﬁnd it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mindof the future commander. . . .4

A theory of strategy educates the strategist’s mind. It helps discipline
our thinking in order to deal with the complexity and volatilityof the strategic environment and the changes and continuities,
issues, opportunities, and threats inherent to it. It encourages us torethink our own assumptions and prejudices, but it also encourages
us to consider the possible assumptions and prejudices of ouradversaries and other actors. Strategic theory opens the mind to
all the possibilities and forces at play, prompting us to consider
the costs and risks of our decisions and weigh the consequences of
those of our adversaries, allies, and others. On another level, theory
allows the members of the military profession and the interagency
community to communicate intelligently in regard to strategy. It
serves as a common frame of reference for the development andevaluation of an appropriate strategy and the communication of it tothose who must implement it. A disciplined theory of strategy also
allows the professional to evaluate the merits of a particular strategy
and critique it in meaningful terms for those who determine policy
and make decisions.
Strategic thinking is difﬁcult. It is best viewed as both an art
and a science. The framework of theory provides a methodologicalbasis for a disciplined thought process to assist the strategist
in developing strategy, and it also serves as a guide for others tofollow in comprehending, evaluating, and critiquing the merits of aparticular strategy. While theory is an important aid for educating themind, it is not a substitute for “genius” as described by Clausewitz.
History’s great strategists possessed “a very highly developed mental
aptitude” for both the art and science. They had the ability to perceive
the realities and relationships of their environment, and apply themsuccessfully in developing strategy.5 True genius is rare, and some
say that it is no longer applicable in the modern, complex world. It
is, they argue, too difﬁcult for a single person—even a genius—to2

comprehend all the nuances of the modern world, and they proposethat strategy is better served by an organizational process. In spiteof these views, however, strategies often are linked to individual
personalities in the public eye, and some individuals appear to havea particular talent for this art and science.6
It is useful to consider the roles of strategists today. At the U.S.
Army War College, three roles for strategists are considered: leader,practitioner, and theorist. Each of these roles requires a distinct
set of skills and competencies. The leader provides the vision,
inspiration, organizational skills, direction, and personal impetus
necessary to enable others to act in a focused and coherent manner.
The practitioner thoroughly comprehends the levels of strategy andtheir relationships and develops strategy. He translates broad policy
guidance into integrated strategies that lead to policy success. The
theorist develops theoretical concepts through study and thought andteaches and mentors others. A master of the strategic art is proﬁcientin all three of these areas and may approach Clausewitz’s genius.7
Strategists function at different levels or in different roles within
the state’s organizational hierarchy, but they all need to understandcomprehensive strategies and communicate them effectively among
themselves and to the leadership, the planners, and the people who
make up the organizations that ultimately implement strategy.
Strategy, then, provides direction for the state, seeking tomaximize positive outcomes and minimize negative outcomes, as thestate moves through a complex and rapidly changing environment
into the future. Strategists thoroughly examine the environment anddevelop a strategy that identiﬁes objectives, concepts, and resources
required to accomplish the goals established by policy. Theory
disciplines strategic thinking by explaining strategy’s inherent logic;
it serves to remind all involved with strategy neither to promise
too much nor fail to consider any of the attributes of strategy. A
coherent theory also helps leaders, planners, and others to evaluate
and execute strategy.

3II. A THEORY STATED: STRATEGY’S LOGIC
There is an essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods ofhistory because nothing vital to the nature and function of war andstrategy changes.8
Colin S. Gray

Strategy provides a coherent blueprint to bridge the gap between
the realities of today and a desired future. It is the disciplined
calculation of overarching objectives, concepts, and resources within
acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable future outcomesthan might otherwise exist if left to chance or the hands of others.
It is the consideration of the relation of how to apply resources toachieve desired results in a speciﬁc strategic environment over time.
In the context of the state, strategy is the employment of speciﬁc
instruments of power (political/diplomatic, economic, military,
and informational) to achieve the political objectives of the state incooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own—
possibly conﬂicting—objectives.9 In other words, it is the applicationof the power inherent in the natural and societal resources of thestate toward policy ends in an emerging, dynamic, and competitive
strategic environment. Both strategy and planning are subordinate
to the nature of the environment. Strategy has distinct attributes anddiffers from planning in its scope, assumptions, and premises, but it
provides the structure and parameters for more detailed long-range
and short-term planning. Both strategy and planning use ends, ways,
and means, and are bounded by the criteria of suitability, feasibility,
and acceptability. Strategy has its own inherent logic that can beunderstood and applied.
An underlying assumption of strategy from a national perspectiveis that all nation-states and nonstate actors have interests they will
pursue to the best of their abilities. Interests are desired end statescategorized in terms such as survival, economic well-being, favorable
world order, and enduring national or group values. Interests arederived from these broad categories as reﬂected in the strategic
environment and can be stated more speciﬁcally in the context of
issues. The elements of power are the resources used to promote or5advance national or group interests. Resources are applied throughthe use of instruments of power.
The role of strategy is to ensure that the pursuit, protection,or advancement of these interests—which are achieved throughthe application of the instruments of power to speciﬁc objectives
to create strategic effects in favor of the interest based on policy
guidance—is accomplished in a coherent and optimal manner.
Strategy is fundamentally about choices; it reﬂects a preference fora future state or condition and determines how best to get there. In
doing so, strategy confronts adversaries, allies, and other actors;
and it addresses resource and organizational issues; even then somefactors simply will remain beyond control or maybe unforeseen.10
Rational choice, chance and probability, irrational actors, allies,
and competitors are all part of the strategic paradigm.11 Strategy
is inherently comprehensive; its foremost purpose is to favorably
inﬂuence the complex and volatile strategic environment by
providing direction for the judicious application of power towardachievement of policy-driven objectives.12
The strategic process is all about how (concept or way) leadershipwill use the power (resources or means) available to the state toexercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations
to achieve objectives (ends) in accordance with state policy.13 Strategy
provides direction for the coercive or persuasive use of this power
to achieve speciﬁed objectives. This direction is by nature proactive,
but it is not predictive. Strategy assumes that while the future cannot
be predicted, the strategic environment can be studied, assessed,
and, to varying degrees, anticipated and manipulated. Only withproper analysis can trends, issues, opportunities, and threats be
identiﬁed, inﬂuenced, and shaped through what the state chooses
to do or not do. Thus good strategy seeks to inﬂuence and shape
the future environment as opposed to merely reacting to it. Strategy
is not crisis management. It is to a large degree its antithesis. Crisis
management occurs when there is no strategy or the strategy fails toproperly anticipate. Thus, the ﬁrst premise of a theory of strategy isthat strategy is proactive and anticipatory, but not predictive.
A second premise is that political purpose dominates all strategy;
this idea has been perhaps best set forth in Clausewitz’ famous
dictum, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”14
6

Political purpose is stated in policy. Policy is the expression of thedesired end state sought by the government. In its ﬁnest form,
policy is the clear articulation of guidance for the employment of
the instruments of power towards the attainment of one or moreobjectives or end states. In practice, it tends to be much vaguer.
Nonetheless, policy dominates strategy by its articulation of the end
state and its guidance regarding resources, limitations on actions, orsimilar considerations. The analysis of the end state and guidance
yields strategic objectives. Objectives provide purpose, focus, andjustiﬁcation for the actions embodied in a strategy.15 Achievement of
the objectives creates strategic effects contributing to the desired end
state. National strategy is concerned with a hierarchy of objectives
determined by the political purpose. Yet, as Clausewitz notes, that
does not mean that policy is a tyrant. The development of strategy
informs policy; policy must adapt itself to the realities of the strategic
environment and the limits of power. Thus, policy ensures thatstrategy pursues appropriate aims, while strategy informs policy of
the art of the possible.16
A third premise is that strategy is subordinate to the nature of
the strategic environment. Strategy is developed from a thoroughconsideration of the strategic situation and knowledge of the natureof the strategic environment. The strategic environment possesses
both physical and metaphysical attributes. It has both domestic andexternal components. The international environment is the external
component, consisting of the physical geographic environment, theinternational system, and other external actors—and their cultures,
beliefs, and actions. The domestic environment consists of internal
physical realities and the internal actors, constituencies, institutions,and organizational roles at play within the United States. Indeed,within the United States, there are groups that have worldviews
signiﬁcantly different from those of the national leadership, whichmakes the domestic element of strategy formulation even more
complex. Nascent contradictions always exist to challenge the statusquo and initiate a search for a new equilibrium. Stability within theenvironment resists change; instability within the environment urges
adoption of a new strategy. The nature of the strategic environment
can be described as an interactive, chaotic, complex system of7systems. Strategy must be consistent with the nature of the strategic
environment in its formulation and execution.
A fourth premise is that strategy is holistic in outlook. It demands
comprehensive consideration. That is to say, while the strategist
may be devising a strategy from a particular perspective, he must
consider the whole of the strategic environment in his analysis inorder to arrive at a proper strategy to serve his intended purpose
at his level. He is concerned with external and internal factors at
all levels and the horizontal and vertical integration of his strategy.
In formulating a strategy, the strategist must also be cognizant
that each aspect, objective, concept, and resource has effects on
the environment around him. Thus, the strategist must have acomprehensive knowledge of what else is happening within thestrategic environment and the potential ﬁrst-, second-, third-,
etc., order effects of his own choices on the efforts of those above,
below, and on the same level with him, whether they be friendly,
adversary, or indifferent actors. The strategist’s efforts must be
integrated fully with the strategies or efforts of senior, coordinate,
and subordinate elements. Strategists must think holistically—that is,comprehensively. They must be cognizant of both the “big picture,”
their own organization’s capabilities and resources, and the impactof their actions on the whole of the environment. Good strategy isnever developed piecemeal or in isolation.
A ﬁfth premise is that any strategy creates a security dilemma
for the strategist and other actors.17 Any strategy, once known or
implemented, introduces change into the strategic environment,even when it seeks to maintain the status quo. Change can occur
on multiordered levels and may be nonlinear. Change threatens
the existing equilibrium or status quo in the strategic environment,
raising the question of whether the results of doing nothing are
better or worse than the consequences of doing something. Strategy
can anticipate the future though the pursuit of proper objectives, but
strategy cannot predict the future with absolute certainty, neither
the achievement of its objectives nor the precise consequences ofachievement or failure. The strategist must determine whether theattainment of the speciﬁed end justiﬁes the risks of initiating action,and the strategist must also consider how other actors may react.

8Comprehensiveness of Strategy

National Interests
Desired End States in External Environment

Grand Strategy(All elements of power but rarely documented and published.)

National Policy

National Policy

National Policy

External Environment

Domestic Environment
National Security Strategy
All Elements of Power

National Military Strategy
Military Element of Power
Theater Strategy
Operational Art
Tactics

Theater Strategy Theater Strategy
Operational Art
Tactics

Operational Art
Tactics

Figure 1.
Strategy thus poses a dilemma for the strategist and other states andactors.
A sixth premise is that strategy is grounded in what is to beaccomplished and why it is to be accomplished—strategy cannot be
formulated in a policy or intellectual vacuum. The strategist must
know the end state he is trying to achieve. Strategy rightfully focuses
on a desired or preferred end state among an array of possible end
states in a dynamic environment. Strategy provides direction for the
persuasive or coercive use of the instruments of power to achieve
specified objectives to create strategic effects leading to the desired end
state. It is essential that the strategist analyze and fully understand thedesired end state in the context of the strategic environment (bothdomestic and external) in order to develop appropriate objectives inregard to the desired end state. Hence, before proper objectives can be
determined, the strategist must comprehend the nature of the strategic
environment, the intent of the policy, and the nation’s aggregateinterests as determinative of necessary and appropriate strategic
effects.

9

A seventh premise is that strategy is an inherently humanenterprise. Not solely a consideration of objective factors, “strategy
involves human passions, values, and beliefs, few of which arequantiﬁable.”18 The role of belief systems, worldviews, and cultural
perceptions of all the players is important in the formulation ofstrategy. Strategists must be careful to eliminate counterproductive
bias while ensuring the strategy meets criteria of acceptability athome and abroad—compensating for differences as appropriate.
An eighth premise is that friction is an inherent part of strategy.
Friction is the difference between the ideal strategy and the applied
strategy—how it is suppose to work versus how it actually unfolds
in execution. Friction is a natural consequence of the chaotic andcomplex nature of the strategic environment, chance, and humanfrailty.19 Friction cannot be eliminated, but it can be understood andaccounted for by the strategist to a greater or lesser extent in theformulation of the strategy.
A ninth premise is that strategy focuses on root causes andpurposes. Such primary foci make strategy inherently adaptableand ﬂexible by emphasizing strategic purpose and empowering
subordinate levels. Strategy incorporates learning from experienceand is sufﬁciently broad in its construction to adapt to unfolding
events and an adversary’s countermoves.20 Strategy addresses
linear and nonlinear phenomena. Unlike planning, which is largely
cause and effect, strategy is a process interacting with the strategic
environment: “strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to shifting
conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty,
and ambiguity dominate.”21 Process is facilitated by constructing
strategy with ﬂexibility and adaptability in its component parts.
Strategy’s focus on root causes and purposes ensures that thedirection provided to subordinate levels is sufﬁciently broad toallow adaptability and ﬂexibility while not deviating from strategic
purpose.
A 10th premise is that strategy is hierarchical. The politicalleadership ensures and maintains its control and inﬂuence overthe instruments of power through the hierarchical nature of state
strategy. Strategy cascades from the national level down to the lower
levels. Generally strategy originates at the top as a consequence ofa grand strategy (often undocumented), national security strategy
10

or other stated national-level strategies and policy statements inregard to speciﬁc issues. Grand and national security strategies lay
out broad objectives and direction for the use of all the instrumentsof power. National policy provides broad strategic guidance frompolitical leaders, generally articulating the national interests as they
relate to speciﬁc strategic circumstances. From these strategies andpolicies the major activities and departments develop subordinate
strategies. For the military, a National Defense Strategy and National
Military Strategy are derived from the National Security Strategy. Inturn, the National Military Strategy leads to theater strategies.
The U.S. Army War College (in consonance with Joint Pub 1-02)
deﬁnes the levels of strategy as they pertain to the military elementof power within the state as:
Grand Strategy. An overarching strategy summarizing thenational vision for developing, applying, and coordinating all
the instruments of national power in order to accomplish thegrand strategic objectives, viz., preserve national security; bolster
national economic prosperity; and promote national values.
Grand Strategy may be stated or implied.22
National Security Strategy (also sometimes referred to as Grand
Strategy and National Strategy). The art and science of developing,
applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power(diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve
objectives that contribute to national security.23
National Military Strategy. The art and science of distributing andapplying military power to attain national objectives in peace andwar.24
Theater Strategy. The art and science of developing integrated
strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing
the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy
and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or
operations not involving the use of force within a theater.25

Other levels of strategy, such as The National Defense Strategy of The
United States of America, may be inserted in the hierarchy by leadershipat various times.26 The hierarchical nature of strategy facilitates spanof control. It provides a logical means of delegating responsibility,
authority, and accountability within the senior leadership. It also
11

suggests that if strategy consists of objectives, concepts, andresources, each should be appropriate to the level of strategy andconsistent with one another. Thus strategy at the national militarylevel should articulate military objectives at the national level andexpress the concepts and resources in terms appropriate to thenational level for the specified objective.
At some level, thinking and action fall below the strategic
threshold. Under the National Military Strategy, the CombatantCommanders develop Theater Strategy and subsequent campaign
plans. At this juncture, the line between strategy and planning blurs
with campaign planning that may be either at the theater strategiclevel or in the realm of pure operational art. Graphically, therelationship between strategy and the levels of war is shown in
Figure 2.

Levels of War and Hierarchy of Strategy

National Security Strategy
National Defense Strategy

Strategic Level

National Military Strategy
Theater Strategy
Campaign Planning

Operational Level
JTF’s & Corps

TacticalCorps, Divisions& Below

Tactical Planning

Figure 2.
Strategy differs from operational art and tactics in functional,
temporal, and geographic aspects. Functionally and temporally,tactics is the domain of battles, engagements of relative short12

duration that can be as small as a ﬁreﬁght between two small units
or as large as a battle between corps. Operational art is the domain of
the campaign, a series of battles taking place over a longer period oftime. Strategy is the domain of war which encompasses the spectrumof conﬂict among nations and other international actors. Tactics
concerns itself with the parts or pieces, operational art with the
combination of the pieces, and strategy with the combinations of these
combinations. Geographically, tactics are very narrowly deﬁned,
the operational level is broader and more regional in orientation,and strategy is theater-wide, intercontinental, or global. The time
horizon is greater at the strategic level than at the operational andtactical levels. However, it is worth noting that with the advancesin transportation and communications, there has been a spatial
and temporal convergence of strategy, operational art, and tactics.
Increasingly, in part due to increasing communications capabilities,
events at the tactical level have strategic consequences.27
An 11th premise of strategic theory is that strategy has a symbiotic
relationship with time. A key component of strategic competency isthinking in time—the ability to foresee continuity of strategic choiceswith the past and the consequences of their intended and unintended
effects in the future. A strategic choice must have continuity withthe past as it bridges to the future. Strategy must account for the
past in its formulation, acknowledging preceding interaction andhistory within the strategic environment. A strategic action that has
characteristics contrary to the past experience or culture of the society
it affects is less likely to be successful. The strategist extrapolates
the possible futures from the present strategic circumstances with aclear sense of the long past from which these possible futures ﬂow;
he then constructs a paradigm of change from which planning seeks
to shape a more favorable future. Deciding when to undertake astrategy is also critical. If the historical timing is correct, then small
actions can have large strategic effects. If the timing is wrong, results
invariably take larger efforts and cost more in terms of tangible andintangible resources. The strategist is concerned with continuities
and change, with both history and the future. History suggests
the right questions to ask and provides perspective for the futureconsequences of the available choices.28 Futurism identiﬁes the13possibilities and probabilities of change. Strategic analysis suggests
the timing.
A 12th premise is that strategy is cumulative. Effects in thestrategic environment are cumulative; once enacted, they becomea part of the play of continuity and change. Strategy is cumulativefrom several different perspectives. It is cumulative from theperspective that once implemented, a strategy becomes part of thecontinuities of the strategic environment. Regardless of whether it
is successful or not, it becomes a part of the fabric of change andinteraction in the strategic environment, and its consequences must
be considered in any future strategy. Strategy is cumulative from astratiﬁed perspective also. The effect of a policy is the summation of
the strategy and subordinate planning at all levels and the interaction
related to them; the cumulative effect often exceeds the sum of theparts. It is also possible that the value of one level of strategic efforts
might be negated by the effects of another level. Strategies at different
levels interact, with the cumulative effects inﬂuencing the success ofhigher and lower strategy and planning over time.
A 13th premise is that efﬁciency is subordinate to effectivenessin strategy. This is not to say that efﬁciency is not desired. Good
strategy is both effective and efﬁcient, but the purpose of strategy
is to create strategic effect. Strategic objectives, if accomplished,create or contribute to the creation of strategic effects that favor
the achievement of the desired end state at the level of strategy
being analyzed and, ultimately, serve national interests. Strategy
must emphasize effectiveness because failure, however efﬁciently
executed, creates much greater risk of undesirable and unanticipatedmultiordered consequences. Concepts and resources serve objectives
without undue risk of failure or unintended effects—efﬁciency isnecessarily subordinate to effectiveness in strategy.29
A 14th premise is that strategy provides a proper relationship orbalance among the objectives sought, the methods used to pursue
the objectives, and the resources available for the effects sought at
its level in the hierarchy. In formulating a strategy, the ends, ways,
and means are part of an integral whole and work synergisticallyto achieve strategic effect at that level of the strategy, as well as
contribute to cumulative effects at higher levels. Ends, ways, andmeans must be in concert qualitatively and quantitatively, internally14and externally. Thus qualitatively, a National Security Strategy(NSS) objective seeks to achieve the desired effect using any of thenecessary and appropriate instruments of power available to thestate—the qualitative questions ask whether achieving the objective
will produce the strategic effects and whether the effects will justify
the objective chosen, the methods used, the resources required, andthe social and political costs incurred. A National Military Strategy
will identify at the national level appropriate military ends using
national military concepts and resources. The National Military
Strategy is bounded by the NSS and is subject to the qualitative
questions, but the state cannot logically ask the military to dowhat it is incapable of accomplishing because of lack of ability or
resources—which are qualitative relationships. In a similar manner,a theater or combatant commander would have appropriate theaterlevel objectives for which he would develop theater concepts anduse resources allocated to his theater. In some cases, concepts might
include the integration of other than military instruments of power, if
they can be integrated and capabilities and resources are available.
The levels of strategy, as well as war, are distinct but interrelated
because of the hierarchical and comprehensive nature of strategy
and war. Hence, operational or tactical concepts achieve operationalor tactical objectives and cannot be elevated to a strategic level eventhough operational or tactical objectives contribute to the cumulative
nature of strategy, and actions at these levels on occasion create
strategic consequences. In a similar manner, strategic objectives
and concepts have a proper relationship within a strategy, butmust also relate properly within the hierarchy. The quantitative
relationship suggests that the concept employs and is resourced
with the appropriate types and quantity of resources. From thesynergistic balance of ends, ways, and means, the strategy achieves
suitability and acceptability—the attainment of the objectives using
the instruments of power in the manner envisioned accomplishes thestrategic effects desired at acceptable costs. The synergistic balancealso achieves feasibility—the strategic concept is executable with theresources made available.
The 15th and ﬁnal premise of strategy is that risk is inherent in all
activity. The best we can do is seriously consider the risks involved,
producing a favorable balance against failure. Strategy is subject to15

the nature of the strategic environment, and uncertainty is inherent inthat environment as a result of chance, nonlinearity, and interaction
with other states and actors. Risk can be assessed and often mitigatedby questioning the thinking behind the strategy. For example, whatassumptions were made in developing the strategy, and what are theconsequences if an assumption is wrong? What internal or external
factors are the bases for this strategy? What changes would enhanceor detract from this strategy? What ﬂexibility or adaptability isinherent in the components of the strategy? How can the strategy be
modiﬁed and at what costs? Nonetheless, no matter how probing thequestions, risk of failure will always remain. Failure can be either the
failure to achieve one’s own objectives, thus providing a signiﬁcantadvantage to one’s adversaries, or creating unintended adverse
effects.
In sum, strategy has an inherent logic that can be understood andapplied. It is distinct from planning and serves a unique purpose.
It differs from planning in its attributes, scope, assumptions, andpremises, but provides the overall structure and parameters formore detailed long-range and short-term planning. Both strategy
and planning use ends, ways, and means, and are bounded by thecriteria of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Good strategy
is founded in a proper understanding and analysis of the strategic
environment and national interests and policy, and an understandingof the theory and role of strategy. The strategist accepts that the
future cannot be predicted, but believes that it can be anticipatedand shaped in favorable terms through creation of judicious strategic
effects. Strategic theory guides and disciplines the development andexecution of good strategy.

16III. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
Everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean thateverything is very easy.30
Clausewitz

Strategy seeks to cause speciﬁc effects in the environment—toadvance favorable outcomes and preclude unfavorable ones. For thestate, the strategic environment is the realm in which the leadershipinteracts with other states or actors to advance the well-being of thestate. This environment consists of the internal and external context,
conditions, relationships, trends, issues, threats, opportunities,
interactions, and effects that inﬂuence the success of the state inrelation to the physical world, other states and actors, chance, andthe possible futures. The strategic environment functions as a selforganizing complex system. It seeks to maintain its current relativeequilibrium, or to ﬁnd a new acceptable balance. In this environment,
some things are known (predictable), some are probable, some areplausible, some are possible, and some remain simply unknown. It
is a dynamic environment that reacts to input but not necessarily ina direct cause-and-effect manner. Strategy may focus on a particularinterest or policy, but the holistic nature of the environment resultsin both intended and unintended effects.31 The strategist ultimately
seeks to protect and advance the interests of the state within thestrategic environment through creation of multiordered effects.
Conceptually, a model of strategy is simple—ends, ways, andmeans—but the nature of the strategic environment makes it difﬁcult
to apply. To be successful, the strategist must comprehend the natureof the strategic environment and construct strategy that is consistent
with it, neither denying its nature nor capitulating to other actors or
to chance.
The nature of the strategic environment has been describednumerous times by different authorities. This environment,
encapsulated by the U.S. Army War College in the acronym VUCA,
is marked by:a world order where the threats are both diffuse and uncertain, where
conﬂict is inherent yet unpredictable, and where our capability to defend

17and promote our national interests may be restricted by materiel andpersonnel resource constraints. In short, an environment marked byvolatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA).32

Characterized by the four earmarks—volatility, uncertainty,
complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA)—the strategic environment isalways in a greater or lesser state of dynamic instability or “chaos.”
The role of the strategist is to exercise inﬂuence over the volatility,
manage the uncertainty, simplify the complexity, and resolve theambiguity, all in terms favorable to the interests of the state and incompliance with policy guidance.
VUCA thinking argues that the strategic environment isvolatile. It is subject to rapid and explosive reaction and change,
often characterized by violence. Uncertainty also characterizes thisenvironment, which is inherently problematic and unstable. New
issues appear, and old problems repeat or reveal themselves in new
ways so that past solutions are dubious, and the perceived greater
truth often vacillates with time. Everything is subject to question andchange. This environment is extremely complex. It is composed of many
parts that are intricately related in such a manner that understanding
them collectively or separating them distinctly is extremely difﬁcultand often impossible. Sometimes the environment is so complicatedor entangled that complete understanding and permanent solutions
are improbable. The strategic environment is also characterized
by ambiguity. The environment can be interpreted from multiple
perspectives with various conclusions that may suggest a variety ofequally attractive solutions, some of which will prove to be good andothers bad. Certain knowledge is often lacking and intentions may
be surmised, but never entirely known. VUCA thinking describes
the appearance of the environment without providing a theoreticalunderstanding of it. Since the role of the strategist is ultimately to
advocate actions that will lead to desirable outcomes while avoiding
undesirable ones, the strategist must understand the nature of theenvironment in order to exert inﬂuence within it.33
The nature of the strategic environment, as the VUCA acronym
suggests, is difﬁcult to grasp and is perhaps the most challenging task
for the strategist. Yet understanding its nature explains strategy’s
possibilities and limitations, and provides the insight and parameters
18for articulating strategic objectives, concepts, and resources. Twotheories—chaos theory and complexity theory—serve as appropriate
metaphors for understanding the nature of the strategic environment,
providing an analogous description of its attributes and functioning.
While founded in abstract mathematical extrapolations, these twotheories capture the essence of the observed VUCA behavior of thestrategic environment and have been adapted by some politicalscientists to describe the international strategic environment. Someeven suggest these theories might be applied directly to the evaluationand selection of strategic choices, but that is not the purpose of theiruse in this monograph. 34 Here, chaos theory and complexity theory
are used to help the strategist think conceptually and pragmatically
about the functioning of the strategic environment.
Chaos theory was popularized by Edward Lorenz, a diligent
meteorologist who, while searching for a way to produce moreaccurate weather predictions, discovered the “butterﬂy effect.” Henoticed that miniscule changes in his initial input to mathematical
calculations for weather predictions could have extraordinary andunpredictable effects on the outcomes. He concluded that the future
behavior of complex and dynamic systems is incredibly sensitive
to tiny variations in initial conditions.35 Over 150 years earlier,
Clausewitz understood and described this phenomenon in war andwrapped it into his deﬁnition of friction: “Everything in war is very
simple, but the simplest thing is difﬁcult. The difﬁculties accumulate
and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless
one has experienced war.”36 Likewise, folklore captured this same
reality: “For want of a nail, the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe,
the horse was lost; for want of a horse . . . , the kingdom was lost!”
Computers allow scientists to do the calculations to study this effectin mathematically simple systems, thereby illuminating the “chaotic”
behavior of the strategic environment and other complex systems.
Chaos theory is a different way of viewing reality. Prior to thedevelopment of chaos theory, two world views dominated thinking.
Systems were deﬁned as deterministic and predictable, or random
and disordered—thus unpredictable. Deterministic systems are
predictable because the same inputs will yield the same outputs
every time the experiment is conducted. In math’s chaos theory,chaos is not a state of utter confusion—random, unpredictable, and19uncontrollable—but an observable reality that adheres to certain rules
even as it appears chaotic in the evident sense. It explains observed
physical behavior that possesses characteristics in common withboth order and randomness as opposed to the more traditional either
orderliness or randomness. Put more scientiﬁcally, chaos theory
describes unstable aperiodic behavior in deterministic nonlinear
dynamical systems. A dynamical system is one that interacts andchanges over time. Behavior in chaotic systems is aperiodic, meaningthat no variable describing the state of the system undergoes aregular repetition of values—each changes in some part over time.
The behavior in a chaotic system continues to manifest the effects
of any small difference, and consequently a precise prediction of afuture state in a given system that is aperiodic is impossible. On theother hand, chaotic behavior as a mathematical process does possess
structure or patterns and, as a consequence, can be predicted andinﬂuenced to some extent, with the most inﬂuence occurring in theinitial conditions.37
Chaos theory is important because it helps explain why
deterministic or linear systems sometimes produce unpredictablebehavior. Chaos theory also demonstrates that much that appears
as random, in reality is not—there are indirect cause-and-effectrelationships at work, sometimes not detectable. The deterministic
nature of a chaotic system ensures there is some manifestation ofcontinuity from one state to the next, while the nonlinearity meansthat the consequences of any changes may appear as spontaneousand extreme. In a chaotic system, early changes can have an
extraordinary effect on the long term, but the results are boundedfrom the extremity of total randomness. Thus chaotic systems are a
mixture of continuities and change. The strategic environment canbe viewed as a chaotic system in which human history represents
aperiodic behavior—broad patterns in the rise and fall of civilizations
are evident, but no event is ever repeated exactly.38
Complexity theory also offers insights into the nature of thestrategic environment, often shared by or augmenting chaos theory.
The strategic environment is by deﬁnition a complex system. A system
exists when a set of elements are interconnected so that changes insome elements or their relations produce changes in other parts ofthe system, and the system taken as a whole exhibits properties and20behaviors that are different from those of the sum of the parts. Systems
are generally dynamic, and social systems are especially so. Systems
may be very large or very small, and in some complex systems, large
and small components live cooperatively. Complexity occurs in bothnatural and man-made systems. The level of complexity depends onthe character of the systems, the environment, and the nature of theinteractions among them. The different parts of complex systems arelinked and affect one another in a synergistic manner through both
positive and negative feedback. In a complex system, the numerous
independent elements continuously interact and spontaneously
self-organize and adapt for survival in increasingly more elaborate
and sophisticated structures over time. Cause and effect are notproportional to each other and often cannot be related. Such a system
is neither completely deterministic nor completely random, butrather exhibits both characteristics—adhering to the chaos theorymodel. Complex systems, therefore, are not precisely predictable,
and the sum of their interactions is greater than the parts.
Complex systems appear to evolve naturally to a state of selforganized criticality, at which time they lie on the border of orderand disorder, teetering on the “edge of chaos.” At the point where acomplex, dynamical, chaotic system becomes sufﬁciently unstable, anattractor (such as a minor event similar to Lorenz’s tiny mathematicalchanges) instigates the stress, and the system splits. This is calledbifurcation—the point at which signiﬁcant change occurs, and the
newly resulting systems are distinct from the original while still
having continuities. The edge of chaos is important; it is the stage
when the system can carry out the most complex operations andthe point when both opportunities (positive feedbacks) and threats(negative feedbacks) are greatest. If the system cannot maintain its
balance, it seeks a new equilibrium. At the point of bifurcation, littlechanges produce great outcomes.39
Chaos and complexity theories offer a perspective that describes
the strategic environment as it is, as opposed to a direct and simplistic
cause-and-effect linear model. These theories recognize that the worldis composed of both linear and nonlinear dynamics. Grasping this
distinction is critical to the kind of analysis the strategist undertakes!
Complexity theory does not seek prediction but understanding of
the various elements of the environment and the actors involved. It
21

offers a complex worldview that accepts contradictions, anomalies,
and dialectic processes. It alerts the strategist to the existence ofmulticausal situations, unintended consequences, circumstances ripe
for change, the roles of feedback and self-fulﬁlling expectations, andother abnormalities discounted, or even disparaged, by the rational
planning model.40
Chaos and complexity theories serve as useful metaphors forthe strategic environment because they provide insights to VUCA
phenomena and the relationship between the strategic environmentand strategy. The strategic environment is composed of elements
representing both continuity and change. Relationships andinteraction are the keys to understanding the nature and dynamismof the strategic environment. Characterized by instability andaperiodic behavior, it does not repeat itself precisely, although
situations may closely approximate those of the past. Thus it
possesses the attributes of both linearity and nonlinearity. The
strategic environment is deterministic in that change is bounded bya variety of factors, including, to some degree, by what has occurred
before. It will have continuities, but the exact nature and extremityof change are not necessarily predictable because of the nonlinear
attributes. The strategic environment is often particularly sensitive
to early changes at critical times, and the outcomes are often notproportional to the inputs, thus creating unpredictable, and at times
unintended, outcomes.
Major changes at the strategic level often can have very
simple causes. Any change that occurs creates feedback (effect)
which eventually must be accounted for within the equilibriumof the strategic environment. Chaotic behavior is more evident inlong-term systems than in short-term systems. This observation
illuminates why planning’s shorter time horizons support morecertainty than strategy’s longer view. At the same time, a chaotic
system actually can evolve in a way that appears to be smooth andordered, suggesting that strategy is practical and can produce results.
Strategy therefore must account for the chaotic, complex nature of
the strategic environment and shape it by creating and anticipating
effects in order to be successful.41
Often referred to as a system of systems in order to emphasize
its complexity, the strategic environment is a composite of complex
22

systems, linked vertically and horizontally. As such, the strategic
environment exhibits complex, self-organizing behavior—it
continuously seeks to ﬁnd an acceptable order or relative balance inwhich it can exist. Its complexity results from individual decisions
or acts and the interactions resulting from the decisions or changing
circumstances. Its numerous parts and agents act individually orcollectively, according to their own circumstances and interests. In
acting, these parts and agents can globally affect the circumstances
and interests of all other parts or agents. Some of the interactions are
predicable, some are chaotic, and some are stochastic (determinedby chance). What this means is that the strategic environment isinherently uncertain, and that unpredictability must be taken as anatural part of the system. As a result, traditional ideas of control—
direct cause and effect—are not as applicable. We ﬁnd instead aform of control that is macroscopic, not seeking to impose precise
domination over details because these are inherently uncontrollable
at the strategic level. Strategy provides broad, meaningful direction
and structure suitable to the changing complexity of the strategic
environment—retaining adaptability and ﬂexibility by directing
actions to favorably alter the environment rather than trying tocontrol it absolutely.42
As the theories illustrate, all complex systems are inherently
nonlinear, and outcomes cannot be predicted or understood by thesimple act of adding up the parts and the relationships. In linear
systems, changes in output are nearly proportional to input; the sumof the inputs equals the output in a more-or-less predictable fashion.
Most people think from a linear perspective and in a linear fashion,and indeed planning operates in large measure on linear assumptions
even though practical experience often belies this approach. The
difference is accounted for in planning with reserve forces andplanned branches and sequels. In a system at the strategic level,complexity enters the simplest actions, no matter how deterministic
they appear. The effect of one action may depend on or conﬂictwith the status of another variable, and the net effect may change
the conditions that affect other or all variables. On a primary level,
then, to understand outcomes the strategist must examine his own
choices in light of the goals, resources, and policies of the opposing
actor and the continuities and variables of the rest of the strategic
23

environment. However, strategic acts are not one-sided, and the
opposing or other actors may make choices in regard to responding
to an action or even preempt it, so that the complexity confronting
the strategist is compounded by what the other actors may choose
to do. On yet another level, the chaotic nature of complex systems
means that initial behaviors and outcomes cause changes that
produce unintended dynamics with cascading effects that can alter,
limit, enhance, or otherwise affect future choices or require reaction.43
Thus the nonlinear characteristics of the strategic environment result
from the interaction among chance and subordinate or integral selforganizing and adaptive systems—states, other actors, and thephysical world.
Nonlinearity suggests a world in which the future has both
continuities and unpredicted threats and opportunities. It suggests aninteractive process in which strategic choices produce effects that inturn generate reactions that may or may not create major or complex
changes. Other actors—friendly, adversarial, or indifferent—with
regard to a strategy’s objectives may choose to act, react, or preempt.
The smallest “friction,” whether by lack of foresight, slow execution,or factors beyond the actor’s control, can amplify itself into a cascadeof things going wrong to create potential chaos. Further, chance
events, purely stochastic phenomena, occur and shape the strategic
environment in favor of or against the strategy. And, of course,
actors, friction, and chance function interactively to further inﬂuence
the strategic environment and affect the strategy.
Thus the world is more a place of instability, discontinuity,
synergies, and unpredictability than planners prefer. Although ameaningful degree of linearity can be achieved, results often vary fromthe original intent, at times costing more than anticipated becauseof the need to manage the chaos within the strategic environment
over the strategy’s timeline. Thus, in the strategy process, scientiﬁcanalysis must be combined with historical perspective to create
a comprehensive strategy that provides for dynamic change,
innovation, responsiveness, ﬂexibility, and adaptability.44 The artof strategy allows the strategist to see the nature of the strategic
environment and a path or multiple paths to his goals; and thescientiﬁc aspect of strategy provides a methodology to quantify a24

path and marshal the resources to shape the strategic environment
in favorable terms.
As a complex system, the strategic environment is interactive andadaptive because the states and actors have the capacity to respondindividually and collectively (in a myriad of bilateral and multilateralrelationships) to new challenges to the relationships and structuresthat provided stability in the past. When the balance is lost, the states
and actors, individually and collectively, seek to self-organize theirpatterns of behavior into new patterns intended either to restore theformer equilibrium or to obtain changes favorable to their interests.
As in any complex system, to do this they must accommodate change,changing or responding in ways that provide for success in the newenvironment. At the same time, continuities with the past remain andare embedded in the emergent order. The adaptive task for the stateor other actor is to maintain an acceptable balance between internal
needs and external demands; sufﬁcient actions and resources must
be dedicated to the demands of the external environment, but at thesame time the needs and expectations of the domestic environment
must be appropriately addressed. The actors must adapt more orless in concert with the strategic environment, making external
adjustments of their relationships with each other and the overall
environment in order to survive.
If sufﬁcient coevolution does not occur—whether because of alack of adaptability on the part of leadership, insufﬁcient material
resources, or whatever other reason—one or more states or actors andtheir internal systems collapse, and new structures and relationships
emerge in their place. This process of adaptation and change does nothave to occur continuously or evenly; varying periods of stasis may
be punctuated by rapid change until a new equilibrium is reached.
Given this phenomenon, small events can sometimes seemingly
trigger major changes—the so-called “butterﬂy effect.” In a similarmanner, small decisions made or not made early in a period ofenvironmental change can have a dramatic impact, possibly leading
to irreversible consequences that may result in signiﬁcantly different
outcomes than would otherwise be the case. The strategist canfall victim to this phenomenon—reacting to its consequences—or,
through judicious study and analysis, seek to use it to advance theinterests of the state.
25

Again, the strategic environment is a complex system consistingof systems within systems. The strategist must recognize that, tobe successful, a strategy must account for both the external andinternal components of the strategic environment. For the politicalstate, these can be identiﬁed as the domestic and international
environments on a grand scale, but external elements can be further
divided into adversaries, allies, and other actors. In addition, thephysical or natural environment is one of the external elements,
acting as another complex system within the strategic environment.
Internal environments can be subdivided into the general public,
interest groups, other parts of the governmental bureaucracy, andthe subsystems or actors of the strategist’s own organization. The
strategic environment on all its levels is characterized by VUCA,
but to say that the strategic environment is VUCA is not to say thatit deﬁes study, analysis, and evaluation, or that future changes ordevelopments cannot be anticipated. It is simply to say that to predict
or control it with any signiﬁcant degree of certainty is exceptionallycomplex and difﬁcult. The chaotic and complex nature of the strategic
environment has implications for the development of strategy at alllevels.
Like any complex system, the international environment isconstantly subject to change, experiencing periods of stability andinstability. Instability tends to increase as the degree of interaction
rises, particularly if one or more actors seek to impose change on thestrategic environment. Periods exhibiting lower degrees of interaction
are generally more stable. Periods characterized by stability tend tofavor linear approaches to problems or challenges, while periods
exhibiting greater instability tend to require nonlinear perspectives
and problem-solving. As the level or complexity of interaction rises,
the strategic environment potentially moves into a state of selforganizing criticality, at which time it lies on the border of order anddisorder, and then is highly susceptible to a radical new rebalancing.
The strategic equilibrium is adjusted continuously, but on theseoccasions the strategic environment experiences dramatic change.
Such major changes really reﬂect upheavals in the key continuities ofthe strategic environment. Strategists in the ﬁrst quarter of the 21st
century must recognize that the emerging strategic environment is
the product of such an upheaval. In terms of chaos or complexity
26

theory, the strategic environment is in the process of bifurcation. The
order or relative balance of the bipolar Cold War becomes part of thepast as a new order is formed. While not all the rules must change,
many will need to be changed or reinterpreted as states and actors
seek a new equilibrium.

Figure 3.
What is the nature of this new strategic environment? A vastarray of existing literature that attempts to grasp or describe the newstrategic environment in terms meaningful to different communities—business, government, academic, military, religion, etc.45 What theyshare in common is an appreciation that the strategic environmentis in the midst of a major reshaping as a result of changes generally
attributed to the convergence of a number of events or trends: theend of the Cold War, massive changes in economic relationships,
the rise of globalization, and seminal advances in technology. At
the heart of these changes is the “establishment of informationand knowledge—their production, dissemination, storage, and27

use—as the fundamental social and economic activity, rather thanthe cultivation of agriculture or the production of manufactured
goods.”46 It is a transformation of social and economic life on a
global scale. Such a widespread change in multiple subsystems has
dramatic implications for the strategic environment and the states
and actors that compose the international system. Morever, it will
impose further change both at the international and domestic levelsof most, if not all, actors.
This period of great and rapid change presents both threats andopportunities. The period has already displayed its characteristics
in broad terms. It favors service economies over industrial
manufacturing economies; it is global and local in scope at the sametime—global in its reach and local in its focus; it allows and encourages
decentralized production while it democratizes decisionmaking;it challenges and replaces authorities who cannot compete; and it
appears to be ushering in a period of hyper-competition among
businesses, cultures, and nation-states or other new state-like
actors.47 In essence, it will be a period of revolutionary change until
a new equilibrium is achieved, with the strategic environment now
teetering on the edge of chaos. It is a period of great opportunity
and risk for the strategist in any system. In retrospect, the latter Cold
War period appears to have been relatively stable, with establishedrules for the international strategic environment that orchestrated
the relationships and interaction among the states and actors—in
short, an equilibrium.
Strategy is made difﬁcult by the chaotic and complex natureof the strategic environment. It represents a daunting challenge
for the military profession, but it is this very nature that justiﬁes a
discipline of strategy—otherwise, planning would sufﬁce. If chaosand complexity theory apply, the radical alteration of the strategic
environment that resulted from the end of the Cold War offers
even greater opportunities and risks (or threats) as the strategic
environment reorders itself toward a new and as-yet undeﬁned
equilibrium in the 21st century. The role of the strategist is evenmore critical in this period as policymakers seek help in ensuringthat the reshaping of the strategic environment occurs in terms
favorable to the state. The strategist’s role increases in importanceas the instability and difﬁculty increase. Yet the fundamental tasks
28remain the same: understand the nature of the strategic environment
and its various subsystems and construct a strategy that focuses thestate on its long-term well-being. How well the strategist is able todo this depends on his ability to anticipate the interaction within thestrategic environment and to develop appropriate strategic actions
to serve national interests.

29

IV. THEORY IN THE REAL WORLDIn theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practicethere is.
Yogi BerraIf strategy is simply the calculation of objectives, concepts, andresources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable
possibilities than might otherwise exist by chance or at the handsof others, why do effective strategies so often appear to elude thestrategist? The answer, of course, is that successful strategy is much
more complex than the calculation of objectives, concepts, andresources. Strategic theory in the real world confronts the dynamic
nature of the strategic environment and the mind of the strategist—
how strategists approach strategy-making in the context of theirstrategic environments. It also depends on the caliber of the executionof the strategy. Good strategy ﬂows from understanding the natureof the environment and creating a symmetry and synergy of objectives,
concepts, and resources that offer the best probability of achieving thepolicy aims. The strategist is assisted by the logic of strategy andthe construct of planning, but the strategist is not a planner. Good
strategy development provides for ﬂexibility and adaptability sothat planning and execution can be tailored to more immediate
circumstances and respond to unanticipated opportunities andconstraints. Good strategy remains, however, valid in its focus anddirection and achieves its intent even when these opportunities
and constraints are taken into account. This chapter discusses theimplications of the environment for strategy development, thenecessary and distinct mindset required of the strategist, and the
obstacles encountered as the theory of strategy is applied in the realworld.
Implications of the Strategic Environment.
Strategists must comprehend the nature of the environment inwhich the strategy they are developing is to be applied—understandthe kind of world they live in or that will emerge.48 As advanced
in Part III with the analogies of chaos and complexity theories,

31the strategic environment is not totally random, unpredictable, or
uncontrollable. Rather, the environment exhibits some characteristics
of both randomness and order. Change may be induced in it bydesign or chance, but, because of its complexity, any change may
produce results totally out of proportion to the initiating change—
either greater or lesser than anticipated—and thus a degree of
uncertainty and unpredictability is inherent to its nature. Changes
come from actors, interactive circumstances, or chance. Actors may
introduce rational and irrational changes through action or selective
inaction, or through simple indifference or ignorance. Yet many
strategists reduce strategy to overly linear and detailed directives
that do not allow for the ﬂexibility and adaptability to accommodate
such unpredictability.
On the other hand, much of the strategic environment isdeterministic and adheres to certain rules; continuities guide its
general behavior over time and extend—to varying degrees—into
periods of major upheaval and new equilibriums. These rules areboth physical, as is the case with gravity, geography, and weather,and incorporeal. Rules of international behavior are an example ofan incorporeal continuity. When in effect, these rules bound what
is workable and acceptable within the international environment.
Continuities may be codiﬁed and thus formally acknowledged, or
may just be accepted practices. In some cases, they exist below theawareness level of the actors in the environment. Continuities always
seek to reassert themselves, but their validity cannot be taken for
granted. Continuities can be leveraged so that a strategy is assisted by
the environment’s natural inclinations, thus moving with the ﬂow ofhistory. Collective security is arguably a continuity that emerged in
the 20th century and may be leveraged into the 21st century. On theother hand, a particular continuity’s role may not be the same eventhough it still exists. Gravity continued to exist after the invention of
the airplane, but its effect on warfare changed. Too few strategists
critically consider the role of continuities in strategy development,
missing opportunities or making invalid assumptions. For example,
with the collapse the Soviet Union, many strategists focused on thepromises of liberal capitalism and globalization and missed theimplications of the resurgence of the continuities of nationalism andreligion. Critical examination of continuities and change focuses32the strategist on what needs to change, what continuities can beleveraged for the necessary changes, and what should not or cannot
be changed. All are important!
Understanding the strategic environment as a system of systems
is a daunting intellectual challenge. Each system within it has external
and internal components—and all interrelate to varying degrees. The
multilayered interaction results in complexity and nonlinearity. The
chaotic nature of this interaction is difﬁcult to fathom, and it is evenmore difﬁcult to manipulate effectively. Nothing is ever quite what
it seems and all is subject to greater or lesser changes. It is a worldof unlimited possibilities and seemingly great promise, temperedby competing interests and often unclear or less than desirable
alternatives. Much appears insidious and Machiavellian or subject tonature and chance. Policy is often stated in lofty and ideal terms withtoo little regard for political reality and available resources—leaving
the strategist without practical goals and adequate resources. All areinterrelated, often confusing and convoluted, and very complex. A
strategist must be comfortable in the VUCA environment. Too few
professional military ofﬁcers are prepared for this actuality.
The strategist is immersed in the complexity of the system ofsystems represented by the strategic environment. For example, a U.S.
strategist assigned to NATO sees it from a national perspective as anexternal component even as he works within NATO to shape the restof the international environment. Within NATO, he is an internalpart of an organizational actor in the international environment. The
complexity of relationships and interactions grows exponentially.
The domestic environment is an internal component of the strategic
environment relative to any national defense strategy. It consists ofdomestic actors, constituencies, institutions, and organizational roles,
as well as the physical realities of resources and capabilities. The
strategist is confronted with the domestic interaction of individuals,
news media, special interest groups, civilian think tanks, branches ofgovernment, other departments of the executive branch, and ofﬁces
and sub-organizations within DOD itself. Thus, any strategy is
subject to interaction and reaction with domestic interests and actors,
the nuances of interests within the strategist’s own organization, andthe interests and actors of the international arena. Some domestic
interests may actually be working at odds with the strategist, trying
33

to frustrate his efforts for political or other reasons. Too few national
security professionals are willingly capable of accepting andworking with this complexity and nonlinearity. Strategy remains in
the too-hard box, and insufﬁcient time and resources are devoted
to its consideration. As a result, strategic thinking is often reduced
to simple assumptions that are often ill-founded, but misleadingly
seem to allow “strategy” to unfold like good planning. Strategists
must study and analyze the whole environment and then shape it by
the design and articulation of strategy.
Strategy is too critical to be ignored or placed at risk by virtueof erroneous assumptions or by relegating it to a planning model.
Strategic environments may be difﬁcult to analyze, but goodstrategy—which must be based on sound strategic-level analysis—
can shape the environment more positively than chance or lack ofstrategic direction. For as surely as uncertainty characterizes the
future, the future will nonetheless come: “Strategy abhors a vacuum:
if the strategic function is lacking, strategic effect will be generated
by the casual accumulation of tactical and operational outcomes.”49
Carefully crafted strategic initiatives bound future results inoutcomes more acceptable to policymakers than those offered bychance, expediency, or adversaries. As chaos theory suggests, early
actions can have a disproportionate effect on the overall pattern ofchange in the strategic environment. Strategists, particularly when
over-focused on immediate demands of decisionmakers, often failto look to the future with sufﬁcient depth of analysis and act toolate to create positive strategic effects at relatively low costs. Relying
on expediency and planning methodologies in lieu of proper
strategic thinking ignores the advantages that accrue from intended
cumulative effects and increases the costs for and risks to the state’ssecurity.
The strategic environment can be analyzed from different
perspectives. In this monograph, the reader is asked to consider it fromthe perspective of systems within systems interacting in both linear andnonlinear ways. The strategist must understand the systems, but theproper focus of strategy is on the dimensions of interaction. Strategy
has many dimensions, and all are in play to a greater or lesser extent
at all times. A weakness in considering any one dimension can provefatal to the whole enterprise. Colin Gray suggests that there are 17
34

or more of these dimensions: people, society, culture, politics, ethics,
economics and logistics, organization, administration, informationand intelligence, strategic theory and doctrine, technology,
operations, command, geography, friction/chance/uncertainty,
adversary, and time. These must be considered holistically—that
is, individually—but at the same time in context with the others.50
Some have argued that the transformation of strategy has occurred
over the last 2,400 years on a more extended and integrated scale.
They would list the major dimensions as bureaucracy, mass politics,
ideology, technology and economic power. Here, too, it is recognizedthat the interaction of these affect outcomes exponentially.51 History
makes clear that particular dimensions play a greater role or are
more critical at particular times, and that none can be ignored overtime. Hence, as the Cold War wound down and the new world orderbegan to emerge, ideology (communism versus liberal capitalism)
appeared to wane in importance only to reemerge in the Global War
On Terror (radical Islam versus secularism). It matters signiﬁcantly
what the topic of confrontation or the dimension of competition orcollaboration is in developing a strategy. An economic issue may
demand a conceptualization or model of interaction different froman ideological one and a different weighting of effort among the
instruments of power. Just so, any other dimension may be affected,
and all must be considered in the development of a strategy. As acomplex system of systems, the strategic environment may evolve
into new dimensions that must also be considered. Many strategists
think too little about interaction, the dimensions in which it occurs,
and the relationships among the dimensions.
All strategy is about “the future.” The future is where strategy
has its effect. In dealing with unknowns and uncertainties, strategy
forecasts from a knowledge and understanding of the systems of thestrategic environment—what they are (facts and assumptions) andhow they interact (observation, reason, and assumptions) within
the dimensions of strategy. From this understanding, the strategist
derives the key factors which contribute causally to the achievementof policy aims—assisting or precluding success. These factors may betangible or intangible, representing any aspect of the environment.
The existence of other states and actors, internal and external, is oneof many factors that must be considered in any strategy development
35

effort. Factors constitute the key facts, continuities, and emerging
trends—they are at the point of interaction within the system
and among systems. In strategic analysis these factors are keys todeveloping an effective strategy, because using or inﬂuencing them is
how policy goals are achieved. The strategist seeks to change, leverage,or overcome these, in effect modifying the equilibrium within thestrategic environment to support policy aims. Balancing continuities
and emerging trends is the most intellectually challenging task indeveloping strategy—seeking to address one aspect of a complex
system without inducing unfavorable ripple effects elsewhere in thesystem. The strategist’s analysis of how best to do this is reﬂected
in his selection of ends, ways, and means—the rational output ofstrategic thought. Too often in strategy development, insufﬁcient
analysis is applied to the identiﬁcation and use of key factors, and asa consequence key factors are often overlooked, misidentiﬁed, or ill
addressed.
Strategy is about thinking big and over time. Strategic thinking
is not about reductionism, although the strategy eventually will be
simpliﬁed and stated clearly as ends, ways, and means. Strategic
thinking is about thoroughness and holistic thinking. It seeks tounderstand how the parts interact to form the whole by looking
at parts and relationships among them—the effects they have on
one another in the past, present, and anticipated future. It shares
this perspective with chaos and complexity theories. Articulating
strategic thinking as ends, ways, and means is only one step in a
sophisticated intellectual process seeking to create a synthesisof consensus, efforts, and circumstances to inﬂuence the overall
environment favorably while managing the risks involved inpursuing opportunities or reacting to threats.52 While ends, ways,
and means get at the essence of the strategy and must ﬂow froma strategic perspective, thus collectively creating a strategic effect,
they do not obviate an explanation of”why,” one of the paramountpurposes of strategy. A strategy must work on different planes
and speak to different audiences. In this sense, another purpose of
strategy development is to explain and forecast in order to generate
a domestic and foreign consensus in favor of the policy pursued. To
do this, strategy must have a sense of where the state has been andwhere it is headed. Anything less in regard to the past “is to neglect36

the direction in which the historical winds have been blowing. And
the best grand strategies, like the most efﬁcient navigators, keep
the winds behind them.”53 Anything less in regard to the future is
to strike blindly into the dark at nothing, even while asking others
to follow you into the darkness. Balancing continuities of the pastand emerging possibilities is essential; a strategy must articulate thetransition from the past state to the future in a manner that resonateswith multiple audiences.
As a result of the complexity of the environment, strategy
inherently creates a “security dilemma” for other states andactors that must be considered. Actions taken or not taken by one
state or actor always have the potential to affect other states andactors, particularly their role in the strategic environment andtheir perception of that role. Any action risks changing the statusquo for friends and adversaries alike, creating an element of
instability in the equilibrium and introducing an element of risk
for all. Because of its chaotic nature, the environment is subject tounintended multiordered effects and chance.54 Strategy is never tobe undertaken lightly and must be approached comprehensively.
At the state level, according to MacGregor Knox, “Violence, chance,and politics; danger and friction; escalatory interaction between
adversaries, remain the terrain of those who make strategy.”55 The
stakes are always potentially high! Many strategists too often focus
on one-dimensional ﬁrst-order effects, foregoing consideration of
second- and third-order effects, how a strategy will be perceived
by others, or the role of chance. In failing to properly consider themultidimensional and multiordered effects, strategists increase thepotential risks.
Effects in the strategic environment are cumulative, but canbe accommodated or nulliﬁed by interactions within the system,
counterstrategies, or chance. As a complex system of systems, theenvironment seeks an equilibrium that allows its subsystems tocoexist. As subsystems, states and actors seek to survive or advancein the environment according to what they deem acceptable and thesystem will tolerate. Changes can cancel one another in whole orpart—although states and actors tend to have long memories, andimportant interests persevere. Once a change becomes part of thefabric of the environment, it lingers, inﬂuencing the nature of future37

change. It then becomes one level of consideration among many for
future strategies but often reemerges in a different context. Much ofthis activity may appear below the noise level of the strategist, but
the role of the strategist is to be aware of what and who inﬂuence thewell-being of the state and how. Too few strategists give consideration
to the role of continuities—what they are, the roles they play, andwhen they are important to strategy.
As a chaotic, complex system, the strategic environment isalso time sensitive—timing and rate of change matter. Somewhat
paradoxically, periods of stability are the best time to contemplatebold shifts in strategy and the most difﬁcult time to get a decision to
do it. The environment is always rebalancing itself at the margins,
and states apply the nuances of diplomacy and force in a peacefulworld very carefully. At such times of relative stability, strategy
rightfully focuses on what the state wants to achieve and thenconsiders how the state will accomplish its goals over the longterm. Yet few decisionmakers are willing to risk disturbances inthe equilibrium or expend political capital for future gains withouta clear threat or clarion opportunity, particularly in a democratic
state. This makes it difﬁcult to advocate strategies to preclude major
upheavals in the environment. Thus, the governments of Franceand Great Britain appeased Germany during the 1930s instead ofconfronting it. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was able to move
the United States only incrementally, and relatively insufﬁciently,
toward preparedness for World War II. Yet strategy serves the state
best when it anticipates and leads change. Preemptive or proactive
strategies—or well-articulated grand strategies—too often are
ignored by the strategic community as a result of the preference fornear-term stability and the avoidance of political risk.
When the strategic equilibrium is disrupted in a major way, inchaos theory termed a potential bifurcation, the more numerous,
rapid, and complex changes require a much more responsive
strategy. Again, paradoxically, periods of major instability are thebest time to advocate bold, broad strategies but provide the least time
for consideration, thus magnifying the risk. Here decisionmakers
perceive the risks of not changing to be greater than the risks ofadopting a bold strategy. Thus, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor opened
the way for Roosevelt to go to war to defeat Japan and the Axis
38

Powers. But the Roosevelt administration, in concert with its allies,
used success in the war to establish a “new world order” deﬁned
by the establishment of the United Nations and the institutions forinternational ﬁnance. In periods of great instability, strategy-making
is accelerated but can be enhanced by the strategist’s preparation prior
to the upheaval. The strategist who fully comprehends the natureof the environment and its continuities and manifestations during
periods of stability can leverage this mastery during such periods.
This leverage could be particularly useful if the instability cannot be
preempted favorably through proactive strategies. Such mastery also
allows the clariﬁcation of what constitutes well-being and anticipates
objectives, while fostering familiarity with potential courses of action
and resource requirements. In the unstable environment, the strategist
gives great consideration to the multiordered effects of the rate andsigniﬁcance of change, and the fact that predictability decreases aschange increases in rate and scope. This means that change itself ismagniﬁed in the process and must be managed carefully. In thesecircumstances, the strategist must compete on the edge, creating arelentless ﬂow of competitive advantages that collectively move thestate forward in the preferred strategic direction. The demands upon
the strategist and strategy differ from those of a stable environment inthat they are now confronting less clear boundaries, less predictable
adversaries and allies, a more VUCA-like future, less time in which
to develop strategy, or various combinations of these factors. In
such an environment, the strategist anticipates whenever possible,
reacts when necessary, and leads when circumstances are right.56
Strategists must prepare themselves in times of stability for periodsof instability by mastering knowledge and understanding of themany subsystems and their interactions, as well as the whole of thestrategic environment.
The strategic environment readily compares to a chaotic,
complex system. To be successful, the strategist and senior military
professionals must understand its nature and implications for thedevelopment of good strategies that advance and protect the interestsof the state. It requires that the professional maintain a level of interestand knowledge in the past, the present, and the future, and immerse
himself in the continued study of the strategic environment.

39

The Strategist’s Mindset.
Strategic thinking is both an art and science and an essential
element of military professionalism. True strategic genius is able tocomprehend the nature of the strategic environment, especially its
complexity and multiordered interactions, and derive rational ends,
ways, and means that solicit consensus and create strategic effects
leading to the desired end state. Not all senior military ofﬁcers canaspire to reach the apex of strategic skill, but all senior leaders shouldbe able to evaluate and execute a coherent and relevant strategy.
In this regard, a proper understanding of the strategist’s mindset
further helps the professional, genius or not, to assess his role andresponsibilities in regard to strategy. Leadership can delegate thestrategy formulation function to strategic genius if it is present andcan be recognized, but the leader retains responsibility for the qualityof both the strategy and its execution.
Strategy is essentially a human enterprise, with all of humanity’s
genius, frailties, and shortcomings. It is both an individual andcollective undertaking that bears fruit from its successful anticipationof requirements and effects and the successful execution of its
methodology. The strategist and the implementers of strategy areactors pitted against other actors—including other strategists,
circumstance, and chance in the chaotic and complex strategic
environment. History is replete with examples of people making
irrational, as opposed to rational, decisions, and wrong rational
decisions based on inaccurate information and assumptions.
Study can help gain insight into human behavior, but simplicity,
stability, and universality do not apply to human behavior, evenas assumptions about human behavior help us deal with it.57 As ahuman enterprise, every aspect of strategy is subject to exception,and the strategist must be open to this reality. This reality applies
to all participant allies and their enemies, and even to onlookers,whether they be strategist, leader, or executor.
Ideology and culture are powerful inﬂuences on the shapingof strategy and strategic success. Both inﬂuence the making andexecution of strategy in multiple ways. Human participants instrategy all wear a set of analytical blinders composed of theirideological and cultural assumptions and preferences regarding40

the strategic environment and how to shape it. These blinders area potential weakness for exploitation by our adversaries and otheractors when we wear them, but opportunities for exploitation by us
when they are worn by others.58 The strategist’s frame of reference
affects how he sees the world and how he advocates interacting
within it. These human preferences inﬂuence how strategy isconstructed and executed. For example, strategists looking at theworld from the perspective of realism, liberalism, or constructivism
will have divergent worldviews and will likely arrive at different
strategic approaches.59 Strategists are both aided and limited by these
constructs. Such constructs discipline thinking but also potentiallylimit consideration of alternatives.
Ideology and culture not only shape the expectations and goalsof those who formulate and approve strategy but the ferocity andstamina of those who execute it. In addition, ideology and culture
inﬂuence national popular support and global acceptance of thelegitimacy of a national strategy.60 Consequently, the strategist
must consider the cultural and ideological perspectives of strategy
internally and externally, as well as personally. Internally, there
are preferences that garner and sustain acceptability and support,
and externally there are differences based on nationality, ideology,
religion, and culture that must be considered in the development
and execution of strategy. One needs to look no further than theAmerican experience in Vietnam to illustrate this. Once the war
was publicly reframed into a nationalist struggle for Vietnameseunity, both domestic and foreign support waned. For Americans,sustainment of a nonrepresentative South Vietnamese government
no longer justiﬁed the costs in lives on both sides. The strategist must
know what motivates him and others, and what meets the criteria ofboth internal and external acceptability. Strategy founded on false
constructs or beliefs, or on inconsistency with acceptability criteria
at home or abroad, is at greater risk.
Strategy must be consistent with national values and acceptable
to international norms. For the United States, this can be particularly
problematic. U.S. liberal culture (free markets, equal opportunity,
free elections, liberal democracy, constitutionalism, rule of law,and individualism) fundamentally clashes with that of many othersocieties. Cultural conﬂicts about faith and identity are reﬂected41

at the individual and societal levels. As the universal nation, themodern United States has a distinct culture that does not include to
the same degree the elements of hierarchy, community, tradition, andcustom so evident in older, more stratiﬁed societies. Consequently,
U.S. strategy is prone to clash with the elites and populations of
non-Western cultures and to differ on speciﬁc issues even withtraditional Europe.61 Historical experience and outlook differ by
nationality and culture, with these differences often posing issues
for strategy formulation and execution. It does not follow, however,that the United States must change these elements in other societies;
they need only to be recognized and accommodated by strategy.
Legitimacy, morality, and cultural appreciation are keys to longterm effective strategy because they address the human dimensionof interaction within the strategic environment. Expediency in regard
to them may produce short-term gains but risks alienating too manyother actors. In the end, we must learn to see ourselves, our allies,
our adversaries, and others as an integral part of strategy.62 We must
understand that “strategy is as much about psychology as it is facts
on the ground.”63 Above all, strategy is about seeing the complexityand long-term possibilities inherent in the strategic circumstances.
As a minimum they [strategists] must see clearly both themselves andpotential adversaries, their strengths, weaknesses, preconceptions, andlimits—through humility, relentless and historically informed criticalanalysis, and restless dissatisfaction even in victory. They must weighimponderables through structured debates that pare away personal,organizational, and national illusions and conceits. They must squarely
address issues that are bureaucratic orphans. They must unerringly
discern and prepare to strike the enemy jugular—whether by surprise
attack or attrition, in war or in political and economic struggle. And
in the end, makers of strategy must cheerfully face the uncertainties ofdecision and the dangers of action.64

Strategists must swim in complexity to understand the strategic
environment and be open to all its possibilities, while planners seek
to simplify and clarify so that they can act directly.65 These distinct
roles call for two different thought processes, but Westerners, with
their unitary outlooks, are culturally at a disadvantage in perceiving
possibilities from the strategic realm, marked by complexity andambiguity. Western thinking is primarily scientiﬁc or Newtonian.
42

To get the rationality of western logic, the reality of the world isexpressed in either or terms—it is assumed to be either black or white.
The strategic environment is much less objective than Western logic
portrays it, often containing more gray than black and white. Good
strategists have always recognized this ambiguity and how to think
about it. It is only recently that a discipline of so-called “fuzzy logic”
has emerged to describe the greater complexity and corresponding
openness in thinking required of the strategic environment. Fuzzy
logic or “fuzzy thinking,” however poorly named, helps illuminate
the realities of the strategic environment because it provides
allowance for degree, probability, and ambiguity in the formulationof objectives and concepts.
The science of fuzzy logic is an attempt to contrast reality withthe binary logic inherent to Western scientiﬁc thought. Binary logic
is rooted in Aristotle’s philosophical law that something is either A
or “not A.” It cannot be A and “not A.” It is either true or false. Thusin Western science, math, logic, and much of culture, we assume aworld of blacks and whites that does not change—this is bivalent
logic—two-valuedness. This assumption permeates Western
thinking. For example, you are either with us or against us. Everystatement is either true or false; it has a truth value of 1 or 0. Thus if
you are asked if a number is a 1 or a 0, it is clearly one or the other. In
reality, the world is very much gray. If you are asked if 0.4 is a 1 or a0, in Western bivalent thinking you must decide which it is and act
accordingly. In reality it is more than a 0 and less than a 1, something
in between, or gray. Hence, fuzzy logic argues that everything is amatter of degree or multivalence—with three or more options or an
inﬁnite spectrum of options instead of the two extremes of true or
false. Fuzzy logic advocates argue that, for the sake of simplicity,
our culture traded off accuracy—the way the world is in reality—
for a black or white answer. Western scientiﬁc thought is limited orhindered by this bivalent logic. As shown by recent developments,“fuzzy thinking” better reﬂects reality in both math and science. New“smarter” appliances, computers, and other products are already inthe marketplace as a result of the application of this science.66
Fuzzy logic also has application in strategy, but scientiﬁc
or Newtonian thought dominates most Western thought. As aresult, military planners tend to seek certainty in their planning43

processes—direct cause and effect—even at the expense of accuracy
or reality. In the sense that executors of strategy need to work fromfacts and concrete assumptions about cause and effect to coordinate
and implement their activities, this practice serves organizational
planning needs well. But such Newtonian thinking at the strategiclevels distorts reality and obscures the actual complexity, leading tofaulty assumptions and hiding potential issues and options. Strategic
thinking is better served by openness to possibilities rather than aconstrained perspective.
Again, Clausewitz recognized the difference in reality andplanning with his concept of friction. He cautions that: “The good
general must know friction in order to overcome it wheneverpossible, and in order not to expect a standard of achievement in
his operations which this very friction makes impossible.”67 Friction
results from what cannot be known, what changes from what you
knew, and all those glitches that can beset an operation—the realityof war. Friction at the operational and tactical levels is mitigated byproper planning and appropriate anticipation and reaction—branches
and sequels to the plan. In essence, the good general creates a black
and white reality by attempting to account for everything possible
in the planning process. Since friction affects the enemy army aswell as one’s own, the commander who creates reality best is at anadvantage in overcoming friction and winning the engagement.68 At
the strategic level, the degree of uncertainty and complexity is muchgreater because of the scope of time and nature of the environment.
The future cannot be predicted with sufﬁcient precision because
the “frictions” are too great to plan for successfully. Good strategy
is designed to accommodate, deter, and seek advantages in therealities of degree, probability, and ambiguity—all incident to acomplex chaotic system. It accommodates and uses friction. Fuzzy
logic helps to explain the ambiguity and uncertainty observed at thislevel—revealing more of the possibilities to the strategist, while atthe same time qualifying expectations. The future is shaped from thestructuring of these “possibilities” and expectations into a coherent
strategy, expressed as ends, ways, and means, leading to a better end
state.
Since strategy can be formulated at different levels, the strategist
should be clear in regard to the level at which he is working even44

as he remains holistic in his outlook. At the national level, strategy
is concerned with maintaining internal systems in balance with one
another, while creating effects in the external environment that favor
the state over time. When it focuses on lower levels or speciﬁc issues,
strategy is really a case of particular generalization—what strategic
effect is required to what purpose and how does it affect the wholeof the environment. On the other hand, strategy at any level is notproblem-solving in a classic sense. It does not seek to solve a speciﬁc
problem as much as to anticipate a future and shape an environment
in which fewer problems arise and those that do can be resolved infavorable terms. Causation in strategy is contingent, not categorical.
Context always matters. Ultimately the success of strategic effects
depends on what the adversary and others choose to do and on
what reality turns out to be. Hence strategists must cultivate a weblike sense of reality, seeing everything as connected in some way
to everything else and being open to all possibilities. The strategist
provides direction that is consistent with the past as it bridges tothe future.69 In this process, strategy must be inherently ﬂexible as
it anticipates the future. Thus, strategy is always seeking a balance
between speciﬁcity and ﬂexibility in establishing boundaries forplanning. Strategy does not dictate the future, but it does anticipate it
and seeks to shape it in favorable terms at whatever level it functions,maintaining an appropriate degree of adaptability and ﬂexibility.
The true purpose of strategy is to create favorable effects insupport of policy goals for the advancement or protection of national
interests. Strategic effects are the impact that the accomplishment ofstrategic objectives has on the environment. Effect ﬂows from strategic
performance—the synergy of the objective(s) achieved, the concept(s)employed, and the resources used. Thus, strategic performance isthe measure of the quality of actions actually executed to achieve
the policy aims.70 Effects occur on different levels and from different
causes within the environment. Effects must be comprehended in
at least three dimensions. First, good strategy deliberately seeks
to create multiple-order effects—a chain of effects that culminatesin strategic-level success. Such intended ﬁrst-, second-, and thirdorder effects, etc. are a rational product of the strategist’s analysis,
with the purpose of stimulating and inﬂuencing interaction orconditions within the environment in favor of the policy aims.
45

When a strategic concept is implemented to achieve an objective that
produces an intended reaction from the adversary or a direct change
within the environment—a first-order effect is created. But if thestrategist has foreseen and sought multiordered effects as a result of
the concept in action, he has deliberately created cascading effects—
intended second- and third-order effects. On the other hand, adifferent dimension of effects occurs when the strategist fails to fullycomprehend the consequences of his choices, with the strategy
creating unanticipated consequences in the environment. A third
dimension of effects that must be considered is the intervention ofchance or adversaries and others in reacting to the effects of theoriginal strategy. The good strategist seeks to understand all these
dimensions of effects and to capitalize on or compensate for them inhis strategy. Thus, he prepares for those effects he foresees andmaintains a degree of adaptability and flexibility for those he cannot
foresee. Fuzzy “thinking” helps the strategist to understand thepossible manifestations of effects by revealing the shades of reality.

ts

cts
effe

effects

Strategic Environment
strateg
ic effec

c
tegi
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t
fec

Strategy
Ends
Ways Means

Figure 4.

46

strateg
ic effe

cts

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National Policy
eg
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Chancestrategic

National Interest
v
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Ultimately the role of the strategist is to evaluate the complex
and evolving environment and translate policy goals into terms
from which planning can proceed. Strategic thinking must see theenvironment as it actually is, identify the factors that favor or hinder
the policy aims, and anticipate the possibilities for achievementof policy goals. The strategist is concerned with facts, factors, andassumptions in this process. Each must be right. Facts are reality as
it is—the grayness of fuzzy thinking as opposed to invariable black
and white. Factors are facts that affect policy aims. Assumptions
bridge the unknown. Through the formulation of appropriate ends,
ways, and means to manipulate the factors and take advantage ofthe possibilities, the strategist creates favorable effects on behalfof policy goals. Openness and recognition of personal biases andpreferences move the strategist closer to a proper assessment ofreality. This assessment tempered by an appreciation of chance andothers’ ideological and cultural biases and preferences—in light ofinterests and policy goals—deﬁnes the effects desired. A proper
mindset on the part of the strategist is critical to the development ofgood strategy.
Strategy is Not Planning.
Military professionals come from a world of very adept planners;
they learn planning methodologies from the day they enter service.
Strategy is not planning. As described above, it partakes of a different
mindset. Planning makes strategy actionable. It relies on a highdegree of certainty—a world that is concrete and can be addressedin explicit terms. In essence, it takes a gray world and makes it black
and white through its analysis of the facts and assumptions about theunknown. Planning is essentially linear and deterministic, focusingheavily on ﬁrst-order cause and effect. It assumes that the future
results can be precisely known if enough is known about the facts
and the conditions affecting the undertaking. The planning process
is essential to reduce uncertainty at the tactical level—it allows
detailed actions to be prescribed. In reality, uncertainty can neverquite be achieved even at that level, and it increases exponentially as
we ascend from the tactical to the operational to the strategic level.
The planning process works because the lower the level, the more47

limited the scope and complexity, and the shorter the timeline; hence,
the number of unknowns is limited and can be compensated for inbranches and sequels to create “certainty.” Planning is not strategy.
It is essential for the successful execution of a strategy—making
strategy actionable, but requires a different mindset. The military
professional is trained for the certainty of planning throughout his
career, but must be educated for uncertainty as he enters the strategic
realm.
The strategist must understand the difference between strategy
and planning in order to produce good strategy. The planner must
understand the difference between planning and strategy in order
to execute strategy successfully. Planning bridges the gap between
strategy and execution. The purpose of planning is to create certainty
so that people and organizations can act. The purpose of strategy
formulation is to clarify, inﬂuence, manage, or resolve the VUCAof the strategic environment through the identiﬁcation and creationof strategic effects in support of policy goals. Strategy lays down
what is important and to be achieved, sets the parameters for thenecessary actions, and prescribes what the state is willing to allocate
in terms of resources. Thus, strategy, through its hierarchal nature,
identiﬁes the objectives to be achieved and deﬁnes the box in which
detailed planning can be accomplished—it bounds planning. Withinthat box, planning adapts strategy to a concrete world with facts,
ﬁgures, and interrelated and sequenced actions calculated to achieve
the strategy’s objectives. The planner is Newtonian or scientiﬁc in his
approach; the strategist is more “fuzzy.” Both share the paradigmof ends, ways, and means. Too many military professionals confuse
strategy and planning. As a consequence, planning-level thinking isoften applied in the strategy development process or when planningobjectives and concepts are elevated to the strategic level. When thisoccurs, even though the plan may be successful, the resulting strategic
effects fail to adequately support, or are actually counterproductive
to, the stated policy goals or other interests.
Development of Strategic Objectives.
In strategy formulation, getting the objectives (ends) rightmatters most! Too often in strategy development, too little time is48

spent on consideration of the appropriate objectives in the context
of the desired policy, national interests, and the environment. Yet
it is the identiﬁcation and achievement of the right objectives thatcreates the desired strategic effect. Objectives are the true focus ofstrategy formulation and, if not properly selected and articulated, aproposed strategy is fundamentally ﬂawed and cannot be effective.
If the wrong objectives are identiﬁed, the concepts and resources
serve no strategic purpose. Thus, the logic of strategy argues that
objectives are primary even though concepts and resources are also
crucial to success—action and costs are subordinate to purpose instrategy. Yet in strategy formulation, efﬁciency is often confusedwith effectiveness by both strategists and leadership. Strategy must
reﬂect a preference for effectiveness. In this regard, objectives areconcerned with doing the right things. Concepts are concerned withdoing things right. Resources are concerned with costs. Objectives
determine effectiveness; concepts and resources are measures of
efﬁciency. A lack of efﬁciency increases the cost of success, but a lackof effectiveness precludes success. Ultimately, strategy’s success canbe measured only in terms of the degree to which its objectives areaccomplished. Thus, again, efﬁciency is subordinate to effectiveness.71
At the point where constraints on concepts or resources risk
achievement of the objectives, the strategy is in question.
For the nation-state, strategy and strategic objectives are derived
from the policy consideration of protecting or advancing national
interests within the context of the strategic environment as it is, andas it may become. In the past, security policy largely has focused on
the international strategic environment in regard to national security
needs—the external strategic environment. The domestic strategic
environment, the internal component, was less identiﬁed withnational security concerns. “Globalization” and its derivatives, suchas an integrated world economy and the Global War On Terror, haveforced a general acceptance that the concept of internal and external
strategic environments is less distinct than in the past. Within the
United States, such realization has subordinated national security
strategy to a larger grand strategy concerned with both domestic
and international issues in many current theorists’ thinking. In either
case, strategy is driven by national interests at the state level, and the49strategist must consider both the external and internal components ofthe strategic environment in the development of strategy.
Donald E. Nuechterlein, in America Overcommitted: United States
National Interests in the 1980’s, describes national interests as the perceived
needs and desires of a sovereign state in relation to other sovereignstates which constitute its external environment.72 The DoD Dictionaryof Military Terms deﬁnes national security interests as “the foundation
for the development of valid national objectives that deﬁne U.S.
goals or purposes. National security interests include preserving U.S.
political identity, framework, and institutions; fostering economic
well-being; and bolstering international order supporting the vitalinterests of the United States and its allies.”73 The nature of thestrategic environment, as developed in this monograph, suggests a
more generalized deﬁnition, such as “the perceived needs and desiresof a sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states and actors in
the emerging strategic environment expressed as desired end states.”
This broader deﬁnition encapsulates the dynamism of a strategic
environment in which multiple actors, chance, and interaction playa role, and both external and internal components are recognized.
Interests are expressed as general or particular desired end states
or conditions. “U.S. economic well-being” would be a generalizedinterest; “international access to Middle Eastern oil” illustrates a moreparticular economic interest. Interests may change over time, althoughgeneral interests such as free trade and defense of the homeland are
immutable.
At the highest level, political leadership uses policy to articulatestate interests and guidance in achieving them. Policy provides
guidance for strategy. Such guidance may be quite general, as in avision statement that relates interests to the strategic environment,
or a more speciﬁc statement of guidance containing elements ofends, ways, and means. It is found in various documents, speeches,policy statements, and other pronouncements made on behalf of thegovernment by various ofﬁcials or provided by leadership as direct
guidance for the development of strategy. Policy may be implied aswell as stated. It may be the result of a detailed strategic appraisal
or arrived at intuitively. The strategist must understand national
interests and policy in order to formulate appropriate strategy. Given
the complexity of the strategic environment, the strategist must50

be holistic in his deliberations and apprise the policymaker of theinteraction and any conﬂict between a particular policy and larger
interests or policies. Lower-level leaders may state more deﬁnitive
guidance as policy, but such policy is subordinate to higher-level
policy and strategy. Strategists at lower organizational levels musthave a comprehensive grasp of interests, higher policy and strategy,
and their own guidance in order to formulate subordinate strategies.
In all cases, strategy is subordinate to policy and hierarchical inapplication. Nonetheless, the strategy development process by its
nature evaluates the appropriateness, practicality, and consequencesof policy, and thus informs policy of the art of the possible and thecosts and beneﬁts of achievement or failure.
Military subordination to civilian policymakers is a recurring andsensitive issue in civil-military relations within the United States. The
political leadership and the American people expect their military
to execute the guidance provided by elected ofﬁcials faithfully.
Yet, the American people also demand that their military performprofessionally and win the nation’s wars. Civil-military relations are
not an exclusively American issue. Clausewitz provided a proper
perspective on the relationship of the military and policy in On War:“The assertion that a major military development or the plan for one,should be a matter of purely military opinion is unacceptable and canbe damaging. Nor indeed is it sensible to summon soldiers, as many
governments do when they are planning for a war, and ask themfor purely military advice.”74 Policy provides guidance for objectives
and use of the instruments of power, but the strategy formulation
process logically informs policy. In a democratic society, the military
professional must build a relationship with civilian leadership thatfacilitates the essential two-way communication between policy andstrategy. If policy misguides, asks the improbable, or unnecessarily
conﬁnes strategy, the level of risk associated with the strategy rises.
In the world of the military strategist, strategy can be demanded
even when inadequate or no policy guidance has been provided. Insuch a case, the strategist’s responsibility is to seek policy clariﬁcationfrom leadership. Often this is best done by recommending alternative
policy choices based on an analysis of interests in relation to strategic
circumstances—a necessary analysis for strategy formulation also.
The distinction is that the policy alternatives are derived directly from51

the interests. Both policy and strategy should be consistent with theprotection or advancement of overall state interests in the strategic
environment. It is the responsibility of the strategist to identify all
the viable alternatives.
Strategy seeks to protect or advance a particular interest, or
the general interest, of the state within the strategic environment
relative to other actors, circumstances, and chance in accordancewith guidance provided by policy. In doing this, strategy uses
analysis to determine the relevant factors—facts, issues, threats, andopportunities—that act or interact to affect the interest. Strategy seeks
to act on or use these factors to inﬂuence the strategic environment
favorably without inadvertently creating other unfavorable
circumstances within the environment. These factors are the primary
focus of strategy; their relationship to the interest and policy
guidance leads to appropriate objectives and concepts—what is tobe accomplished and how to use the state’s instruments of power
to accomplish the objectives. Instruments of power may be usedsingularly or in combination, and directly or indirectly. Given thecomplex and chaotic nature of the environment, deﬁning the rightobjectives for desired strategic effect, developing a proper concept,
and providing resources are all formidable tasks.
Since strategy is hierarchical, the strategist must understand thelevel of strategy at which he is working, the nature of the strategic
environment at his level in regard to internal and external factors, andthe comprehensiveness of strategy—the consequences of his choices inregard to other levels of strategy. With this in mind, the strategist candevelop objectives. Strategic objectives may be derived from policy,
higher levels of strategy, or independent analysis of the strategic
environment. The primary question in determining objectives is this:What end(s), if accomplished, will create the desired strategic effect insupport of policy or interests without detrimental collateral effects?
Objectives (ends) explain “what” is to be accomplished. They ﬂow
from a consideration of the interest, which is expressed as a desiredend state, and the factors in the strategic environment affecting therealization of this desired end state. Objectives are bounded by policy
guidance, higher strategy, the nature of the strategic environment, andthe capabilities and limitations of the instruments of power available.
Objectives are selected to create strategic effect. Strategic objectives, if
52accomplished, create or contribute to creation of strategic effects thatlead to the achievement of the desired end state at the corresponding
level of strategy, ultimately serving national interests. In strategy,
objectives are expressed with explicit verbs (e.g., deter war, promote
regional stability, destroy Iraqi armed forces). Explicit verbs force
the strategist to consider and qualify what is to be accomplished andhelp establish the parameters for the use of power.
A number of problems plague the strategic community in regard
to the development of objectives. Objectives too seldom receive thedepth of thought and reﬂection they merit. The objectives establish
the parameters of all that follows. Objectives must reﬂect a thoroughunderstanding of the end state desired, the nature of the environment,
policy guidance, and the multiordered effects required to create theconditions for the end state. The diversity of outcomes possible in
the environment means that the totality of speciﬁc results rarely canbe predicted at the outset.75 Strategy, as a matter of principle, must
be ﬂexible and adaptable. Thus, strategy cannot be made static by
objectives that are too conﬁning. In its formulation, it must focus
on “comprehensive” objectives that reﬂect an understanding of the
dynamic nature of the strategic environment and are sufﬁciently
encompassing to allow for change in execution without losing focus
on policy or interests. On the other hand, objectives so broad orvague that they can be misinterpreted or fail to provide appropriate
direction risk the success of policy. Strategic objectives logicallybound but do not unnecessarily conﬁne subordinate levels.
Strategic objectives maintain their validity, while providing
for adaptability and ﬂexibility, by focusing on root purposes andcauses. If objectives are set at the strategic level with a focus onroot purposes and causes and an appreciation of the nature of thestrategic environment (chaos, complexity, human nature, chance,
friction, etc.), they are logically of sufﬁcient breadth to provide thenecessary adaptability and ﬂexibility to confront the unforeseen.
In turn, they also logically broaden the scope of consideration
for ways and means—further enhancing the preconsideration ofadaptability. Most strategists make the objectives too narrow andprecise, pushing their thinking down to the planning level. At theplanning level, exactness of detail is more valued because it can bequantiﬁed and made actionable. Such detail works in the planning53

realm because of the reduced scope and greater certainty. Planninglevel objectives elevated to the strategic level are more susceptible
to failure as a result of the scope and chaotic nature of the strategic
environment, which exponentially multiplies possibilities forfriction and asymmetric reactions by others. In strategy, the focus
is on clarity of objectives appropriate for the level, not prescribing
detailed instructions for lower levels. Strategic objectives directly
serve the strategic purpose—the desired end state.
Simply put, if the strategic objective is to win the war, thenlosing a battle is regrettable but does not necessarily preclude
achievement of the strategic objective. The state can seek additional
battles or apply other instruments of power. On the other hand, if
the objective is to win every battle, then the state has been denied
its strategic objective as soon as a single battle is lost. The strategy
has failed, producing different repercussions in the internal andexternal components of the strategic environment, even if the war
is ultimately won. The “win-every-battle” strategy also has conﬁned
its use of power to the military instrument. In modern war, winning
battles is a planning objective; winning wars is a strategic objective.
Strategy focuses on root purposes and causes. To do otherwise isto divert focus and power, lessening probabilities for success andincreasing the probability of unintended second- and third-ordereffects. This eventuality appears evident in the U.S. national-levelstrategic approach in the second Iraq War.
While the Bush administration has been somewhat ambiguous
on root purposes in the second Iraq War, one expressed root purposein going to war with Iraq was to effect a regime change in Baghdad
so that international terrorists would be denied state sponsorshipand potential weapons of mass destruction. A number of “strategic”
objectives emerged from this purpose: (1) defeat Iraqi military forces inwar, (2) remove Saddam Hussein from power, and (3) establish a new
democratic Iraqi regime. One could postulate that the ﬁrst objective,
defeat Iraqi military forces, was inappropriate as a national securitylevel objective and should have been subordinated by locating it at
the theater-military level. In practice, these objectives were sought
sequentially. Through its elevation and sequential expression, thedefeat of Iraq military forces became the focal point of the strategy
when, in fact, the key objective and point of focus should have been54

the establishment of a new democratic regime, with the militarydefeat of Iraqi forces and the removal of Saddam Hussein expressed
as acceptable strategic outcomes in guiding subordinate levels.
As a consequence of this misdirected focus, the military objective
occupied the time and talent of the policymakers and national-level
military leadership with consequent neglect of the third objective.
While this proposition is debatable, it is clear that the presumptionof the strategy was that the defeat of the Iraqi military would leaddirectly to accomplishment of the other objectives. In actual fact,
more thought and a more intense focus and effort on how to achieve
the democratic regime objective was needed. The inappropriate
elevation of the objective and the sequencing also illustrate themindset that inﬂicting military defeat is essential to the achievementof the other two objectives. Again, this may or may not have beentrue, but the point is that defeat of the Iraq military forces was an
appropriate focus for a lower level of strategy or planning. The closer
you approach planning, the easier the conceptualization becomes—
it quantiﬁes and can be made more precise. People prefer certainty
and migrate toward it—it is more comfortable. Strategy deals with
ambiguity and uncertainty. Most people are uncomfortable with theseand seek to move toward the known at the expense of improperly
analyzing and thus jeopardizing the recognition and achievement of
the proper objectives.
Developing Strategic Concepts.
Strategic concepts (ways) explain “how” the objectives are to beaccomplished by the employment of the instruments of power.
Instruments of power are the manifestation of the elements of power(the state’s resources) in action. Thus a naval blockade might be theinstrument to apply the economic and military elements of power.
Strategic concepts link resources to the objectives by addressing who
does what, where, when, and why to explain how an objective will
be achieved. Since concepts convey action, they often employ verbs
in their construction, but are descriptions of “how” the objectiveof a strategy is to be accomplished. However, the verb choice isimportant, as is word choice throughout the articulation of strategy.
Word choices imply levels of effort and degrees of acceptability.
55

Strategic concepts provide direction and boundaries for subordinate
strategies and planning—words matter! A strategic concept must
be explicit enough to provide planning guidance to those selected
to implement and resource it, but not so detailed as to eliminate
creativity and initiative at subordinate strategy and planning levels.
Logically, concepts become more speciﬁc at lower levels as details
are pushed down to the subordinate strategic and planning levels,
but the complexity of the strategic environment is resolved at the
responsible strategic level.
Strategic concepts are often the central focus of a strategy. Somewould label the concept as the strategy, but strategy always consistsof ends, ways, and means—and the focus is on how they interact
synergistically with the strategic environment to produce the desired
effects. Some concepts are so accepted that their names have been
given to speciﬁc strategies. Containment, forward defense, assured
destruction, and forward presence are illustrative. In actual practice,these strategies had speciﬁc objectives and resources associatedwith them, and the concept was better developed than the short
title might imply. Good strategy is an integral whole of the rightobjectives pursued through appropriate concepts and supportedwith the necessary resources. Wrong objectives supported by brilliant
concepts will not protect or advance national interests.
Concept development can be understood best as a competitiveenterprise. Good ideas and capabilities compete for consideration andadoption and/or adaptation and inclusion. More than at the tactical,
or even the operational, level, strategic success comes from diversityof thought and approaches that leads to a full consideration of thecomplexity involved and development of simple but comprehensive
concepts that ensure accomplishment of the objectives. Few strategic
objectives are accomplished with only one element or instrument of
power, and strategy must consider, prioritize, and assign dominantand subordinate roles to the elements and instruments of powerin the concepts and resources based on the environment and theobjectives. Our earlier examination of the nature of the environment
suggests how problematic this can be for the strategist in light oflinear, nonlinear, and stochastic behavior. Given the nature of theenvironment, “how” you seek to accomplish an objective will itself
produce interaction within the environment. Part of the complexity
56

is that an inappropriate instrument or a faulty application may well
produce undesired second- and third-order effects. It is entirely
possible to achieve a speciﬁed strategic objective but have the positive
results sought subverted in the long run by the negative effect of themethods used. For example, the German military strategy in 1914
required that France be defeated rapidly ﬁrst in order to preclude a
prolonged two-front war. In order to accomplish the defeat of France,
the German Army’s strategic concept called for the army to invade
through Belgium. However, Belgium’s neutrality was guaranteedby treaty, and the British leadership honored its commitment.
Implementation of the German strategic concept thus led to GreatBritain’s entry into the war, which in turn precluded a rapid defeatof France and eventually led to the entry of the United States. The
United States provided the resources to defeat Germany.
The strategist must actively seek and consider diverse and multiple
concepts for the achievement of strategy’s objectives. A thoroughexamination of multiple strategic concepts allows the strategist to
avoid concepts entailing the most egregious undesirable secondand third-order effects, or to develop appropriate ways to mitigate
them. It allows for the selection of the concept that best meets thecriteria of suitability, acceptability, and affordability. Examinationof all strategic concepts has the additional advantage of allowing
the strategist to consider ﬂexibility and adaptability in the selectionof an appropriate concept. Moreover, if a concept employed is not
successful, the effort devoted to considering multiple approaches
allows for the quicker shift to a new concept—so that national
efforts can be more rapidly redirected toward accomplishment of
the objective. Good strategy is about examining all viable concepts.
One area of particular confusion associated with concepts resultsfrom the hierarchical nature of strategy. The concept for a higher
strategy often states or implies the objectives of subordinate levels ofstrategy or planning as part of the “how” of achieving the strategic
objective. Strategists or others often want to elevate these to an
objective for the higher strategy. Such elevation is inappropriate as
discussed earlier. It appears to add precision but actually detracts
from the focus of what is most important to achieve. A simple testfor distinguishing whether such an objective is part of the concept57

is to ask “in order to do what?” The answer to this question should
lead directly back to the appropriate strategic objective. What you
need to accomplish as an end when you ask this question is the real
strategic objective. At the same time, a higher-level objective maytransfer directly to the lower level, or the higher strategic concept
may establish objectives for lower levels. Both the higher-levelobjective and concept may create implied objectives for the lower
levels. In a hierarchical strategic system, higher strategy dictates tolower levels of strategy plus planning in objectives, concepts, andresources; lower levels inform higher but are subordinate to higher
strategy.
Another alluring trap for the strategist and leadership is strategic
monism, the belief that one strategic concept ﬁts all situations.76
History is replete with overzealous advocates of such strategic
singularity. Usually the appeal appears to lie in its directness,
application of technology, and appearance of efﬁciency—cheaper,
quicker, and less complex. Nuclear deterrence was a strategic
concept initially embraced by the United States following WorldWar II in large part as a substitute for conventional forces. Yet when
conﬂicts emerged, such as the Korean War, use of nuclear weapons
was barred on policy grounds, and conventional military forceswere required—a failure of the strategist to see the environment as
it really existed. The initial strategic monism of nuclear deterrence
left the United States without an appropriate military instrument
to support policy short of nuclear war until the adoption by the
Kennedy administration of a strategy of ﬂexible response.77 The
precision strike argument, a modern version of strategic bombing,is a potential contemporary military example of strategic monism. It
substitutes technology for manpower, reduces casualties, and seeks
to force the adversary to concede with limited collateral damage. It
is a powerful capability, and may be an essential one, but it is not a
singular solution to military strategy. Technology does not change
the essence of war, or even the cruel face of it in all circumstances.
Technology is an enabler at the strategic level, not a substitute fora strategic concept.78 But technology often outruns political andstrategic maturity, creating strategic conditions or consequences thatneither are prepared to deal with appropriately.79 The strategist thus
must avoid strategic monism.
58

Strategic monism can occur on a grander scale. Strategic ﬂexibility
and adaptability at the highest levels are relative to the ability of thestate to bring to bear the whole range of the capabilities inherent
to its elements of power. A State Department that is inadequately
resourced limits the application of diplomatic instruments. An
inadequately funded military would create a similar problem. On
the other hand, if all the state has is a strong military, every strategic
issue begins to look like a nail calling for the application of themilitary hammer. Expediency also can instigate a siren’s call for theuse of an existing capability. Strategists at the highest levels must
recognize the value of ﬂexibility and, as a part of a grand strategy,
determine what instruments to maintain and at what levels.
Another disastrous tendency in concept development is to elevate
an operational concept to the strategic level. German blitzkrieg inWorld War II offers a classic example. Blitzkrieg sought to capitalizeon the combined technology of armor and air power to create amodern “Kesselschlacht,” in effect a strategic envelopment of theFrench army to force France’s capitulation. While this operational
concept enjoyed initial success and indeed had signiﬁcant strategic
consequences for those nations overrun, as a strategic concept it did
not have the ability to achieve Germany’s strategic objectives or create
the strategic effects that Hitler sought at the national level. In thelong run, it neither brought an end to the war in the west nor isolated
England. It did not create the conditions to achieve Lebensraum or
result in a better end state for Germany. It was rapidly negated by
the Allied employment of strategic objectives and concepts thatunited multiple nations in opposition and sought to defeat Germany
by total mobilization and a multi-front war. Hitler’s over-relianceon military operational superiority proved misplaced as the Allies
developed countermeasures and brought superior forces to bear.
In a similar manner, one could argue that the much-hyped “shock
and awe” in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was elevated from an
operational concept to a strategic one in the minds of some strategists
and planners. In such a misconception, the operational concept does
not have the sophistication or comprehensiveness to achieve andsustain strategic successes, and invariably produces contrary effects
in the strategic environment. Good operational concepts are crucial

59

in support of strategy, but are subordinate to the strategic concept
and are part of operational art.
The logic of strategy argues that the strategic concept answers the
big question of “how” the objectives will be achieved by articulatingclearly for subordinate levels who does what, when, where, how,
and why in such a manner that the subordinate strategist or planner
can see with clarity how the execution of the concept leads to theaccomplishment of the objective and what he is required to do inorder to support the strategy. It conﬁnes the subordinate strategy
or planning to the strategic objectives and the relevant aspects ofthe strategic environment without unduly limiting the subordinate’s
creativity or prerogatives.
Resources in Strategy.
Resources (means) in strategy formulation determine the types andlevels of resources that are necessary to support the concepts of thestrategy. In strategy, resources can be tangible or intangible. Examplesof tangible resources include forces, people, equipment, money, andfacilities. The primary issue with tangible resources is that they are
seldom sufﬁcient to support the best concept optimally. This shortage
can be an actual inability to resource, or the result of the desire on
the part of leadership to be prudent and efﬁcient with government
funding, or competing demands. Intangible resources include things
like national will, international goodwill, courage, intellect, or evenfanaticism. Intangible resources are problematic for the strategist inthat they often are not measurable or are volatile. National will in a
democracy is certainly an essential resource, particularly in a longterm strategy, but the issue for the strategist is that it is more apt
to need engendering and sustainment than be a given and reliable.
Hence, intangible resources should always be suspect. They require
close examination to determine whether they are actually improperly
expressed concepts or objectives. The responsibility of the strategist
is to ensure that the resources necessary for the accomplishmentof the objectives as envisioned by the concepts are articulated andavailable.
The hierarchy and logic of strategy also function in considerationof resources. Resources increasingly are deﬁned in detail as the60

planning level is approached. A national security or grand strategy
could list “military forces” as a resource for its concepts, even if theappropriate type of forces did not exist, and still be consistent as longas the development of the forces was funded and the concept allowed
the time for building the force. It would then be the responsibility ofthe subordinate level of strategy to develop an objective and concept
for creating the force—moving from the general to the particular.
Assignment of resources requires no verb. It merely expresses what
is to be made available for use in applying the concepts to accomplish
the objectives. Thus “to develop, build, or establish a larger force” isa way; the “force” itself, or the dollars to build it, is the resource.
In articulating strategy, using the discussion of means to describe
concepts should be avoided, as should articulating concepts as
resources. In a very simpliﬁed manner, “diplomacy” is a strategic
concept, but diplomats are among the resources required for the useof diplomacy. Imprecision in the vocabulary and logic of strategy
leads to confusion and encourages friction at lower levels. The
student of On War knows Clausewitz preferred “overthrow of theenemy’s government” as the end, to ﬁght a decisive battle as theway, and a large army as the means. He saw the large army as an
appropriate resource to support his way—the decisive battle. But
saying “to use a large army” implies a range of different concepts for
success. The employment of verbs to describe resources frequently
suggests a problem within the logic of the strategy.
The rule of thumb to apply is that resources can usually bequantiﬁed, if only in general terms: the Army, the Air Force, the Navy;units and armed forces of the United States; DoD personnel; dollars;
facilities; equipment—trucks, planes, ships, etc.; and resources oforganizations—Red Cross, NATO, etc. The strategist should statethese as resources in terms that make clear to subordinate levels what
is to be made available to support the concepts. How the resources
are to be used is articulated in the concept. The speciﬁc developmentof resources is reﬁned in the subordinate strategy and planning
processes.
Resource selection, like concepts, has implications in regard to
multi-level effects. Military resources can do a lot of things—ﬁght
wars, conduct humanitarian operations, and perform nation-61

building are examples. While military forces may be the only
available resources, the choice may have consequences. Militaryforces providing tsunami relief may not be as effective as experienced
civilian nongovernment agencies or may be perceived as a threat tothe sovereignty of the supported nations. Military forces involvedin nation-building may be perceived by some as an occupying force,thus becoming the problem as opposed to part of the solution. If
policy or circumstances dictate the use of the resources in suchcircumstances, the strategist’s responsibility is to be aware of thepotential second- and third-order effects and to consider such effects
in the development of the strategy.
Resources are an integral part of good strategy. And while
efﬁciency can be gained in the aggregate by doing things better,resources are usually the focus of efﬁciency advocates who promote
doing the same things with less. Allocating inadequate resources
for a strategic concept is a recipe for disaster, and will cause evengreater costs in recovering. Another commonly heard refrain among
the military profession at large is that resources drive strategy.
There is an element of truth in this statement. Resources are almost
always limited at the strategic level because of competing demands
from diverse needs. The strategist’s responsibility is to ensure thatthe strategic concept will accomplish the objective, and that it isresourced to do so. A better concept may require less or different
resources. A strategy that is not adequately resourced is not a viablestrategy at all.
Testing Strategy’s Logic and Risk.
All strategy has its own inherent logic which can be assessed todetermine validity and risk. The identiﬁcation of resources in thedevelopment process is a good starting point for testing a strategy’sinternal logic. The strategist should think backward through theprocess to ensure the resources provided are adequate to implement
the concepts, that the concepts envisioned can achieve the statedobjectives in an acceptable manner, that the accomplishment of theobjectives will create the strategic effects to satisfy the policy aims
and promote and protect the national interests, and so forth. Thus,62the strategist questions suitability—will the strategy’s attainment
accomplish the effect desired; he questions feasibility—can theaction be accomplished by the means available; and he questions
acceptability—are the effects as well as the methods and resources
used to achieve those efforts justiﬁed and acceptable to the bodypolitic? In this process, the strategist considers tangibles, such as
resource availability, weapons capability, and geography, andintangibles, such as national will, public opinion, world opinion, andactions/reactions of U.S. allies, adversaries, and other nations andactors. A strategy that clearly can be labeled as unsuitable, infeasible,
or unacceptable is not valid. However, if an appropriate strategy
formulation process has been adhered to, this will rarely be the case.
The strategy is likely to be assessed as valid with qualiﬁcations—thequaliﬁcations being the measure of risk.
Risk is an assessment of the balance among what is known,
assumed, and unknown, as well as the correspondence between what
is to be achieved, the concepts envisioned, and resources available.
Risk assessment is not just a measure of the probability of successor failure. It is also an assessment of the probable consequencesof success and failure. The strategic environment responds as acomplex system—acting successfully, acting unsuccessfully, andfailing to act must be anticipated and weighed. Since there are
seldom enough resources or a clever enough concept to guarantee
absolute success, there is always some risk in a dynamic strategic
environment. Complexity, friction, and freedom of choice of otheractors also guarantee some element of risk. Risk weighs the potential
advantages and disadvantages of adopting the strategy.
Risk assessment examines the strategy in its entire logic—ends,
ways, and means—in the context of the environment and seeks todetermine what effects are created by the implementation of thestrategy. It seeks to determine how the equilibrium is affected, andwhether the environment is more or less favorable for the state as aresult of the strategy. It asks how other actors will react to what has
been attempted or achieved; how they will react to the way in which
the strategy was pursued; what the balance is between intended
and unintended consequences; how chance or friction will play inthis strategy. The strategist must assess how the assumptions made63

or factors that might change could impact on success or effects. He
must ask how much ﬂexibility is inherent to the strategy, how it canbe changed or recovered, and at what cost; what are the elementsof the strategic environment the strategy is relying on for success;and what are the consequences if these change, and is the strategy
ﬂexible or adaptable enough to accommodate these changes. Risk
assessment is an integral part of the strategy formulation process andshould lead to acceptance, modiﬁcation, or rejection of the strategy.
The strategist seeks to minimize risk through his development of
the strategy—the relationship or balance of ends, ways, and means.
But ultimately the strategist informs the decisionmakers of the risks
in the strategy so the leaders can decide if the risks are acceptable ornot. The strategist continuously contemplates the possibilities as the
future unfolds.

64

V. THE STRATEGY PARADIGM IN SHORT:
A THEORY RESTATED[S]trategy has a complex nature and a function that is unchanging overthe centuries.80
Colin S. GrayAt the highest level of strategy, the nation-state has interests thatit pursues to the best of its abilities through the use of the instrumentsof power. Policy articulates the reﬂection of these interests in thestrategic environment. In pursuing its policies, the state confronts
adversaries and other actors, while some factors simply remainbeyond control or unforeseen. Strategy, acting within the conﬁnesof theory, is a method of creating strategic effects favorable to policy
and interests by applying ends, ways, and means in the strategic
environment. In doing this, strategy has an inherent logic that can beunderstood as a theoretical construct and applied in the development
and consideration of strategy at all levels.
Strategy applies in the realm of the strategic environment which
is characterized by greater or less degrees of chaotic behavior
and complexity—VUCA. The environment can be addressed at
different levels of strategy. It has external and internal components,
i.e., the international environment and the domestic environment,
respectively. Rational and irrational choice, chance and probability,competitors, allies, and other actors are all part of the strategic
paradigm.
Strategy is fundamentally a choice; it reﬂects a preference for a
future state or condition in the strategic environment. It assumes
that, while the future cannot be predicted, the strategic environment
can be studied and assessed. Trends, issues, opportunities, andthreats can be identiﬁed with analysis, and inﬂuenced and shaped
through what the state chooses to do or not do. Thus strategy seeks
to inﬂuence and shape the future environment as opposed simply toreacting to it. Strategy at the state level can be deﬁned as:
The art and science of developing and using the political, economic,
social-psychological, and military power of the state to create strategic
effects that protect or advance national interests in the environment in65

accordance with policy guidance. Strategy seeks a synergy and symmetryof objectives, concepts, and resources to increase the probabilities andfavorable consequences of policy success and to lessen the chances ofpolicy failure.

Assumptions and Premises of Strategy.
1. Strategy is proactive and anticipatory but not predictive.
Strategy seeks to promote or protect national interests as the
future unfolds. In doing this, it must consider change and makeassumptions. Both change and assumptions are bounded byexisting facts and realistic possibilities. Strategy is clear on what
are facts, assumptions, and possibilities.
2. Strategy is subordinate to policy. Political purpose dominates alllevels of strategy. Policy ensures that strategy pursues appropriate
aims in an acceptable manner. However, the development ofstrategy informs policy; policy must adapt itself to the realitiesof the environment and the limits of power. Thus, policy ensuresthat strategy pursues appropriate aims, and strategy informs
policy of the art of the possible.
3. Strategy is subordinate to the nature of the environment. Strategy
must identify an appropriate balance among the objectives
sought, the methods to pursue the objectives, and the resources
available within the particular strategic environment. Strategy
must be consistent with the nature of the strategic environment.
4. Strategy maintains a holistic perspective. It demands
comprehensive consideration. Strategy is developed from athorough consideration of the strategic situation and knowledgeof the nature of the strategic environment. Strategic analysis
highlights the internal and external factors in the strategic
environment that help deﬁne strategic effect and the speciﬁc
objectives, concepts, and resources of the strategy. Strategy
reﬂects a comprehensive knowledge of what else is happening
within the strategic environment and the potential ﬁrst-, second-,
and third-order effects of its own choices on the efforts of thoseabove, below, and on the strategist’s own level.

66

5. Strategy creates a security dilemma for the strategist and otheractors. Any strategy, once known or implemented, threatens thestatus quo and creates risk for the equilibrium of the strategic
environment.81 The strategist must determine if the end justiﬁes
the risks of initiating action, and other actors must decide whether
to act and in what manner.
6. Strategy is founded in what is to be accomplished and why it
is to be accomplished. Strategy focuses on a preferred end state
among possible end states in a dynamic environment. It provides
direction for the coercive or persuasive use of the instruments ofpower to achieve speciﬁed objectives, thereby creating strategic
effects leading to the desired end state. The strategist must
comprehend the nature of the strategic environment, the policy,
and the nation’s aggregate interests to determine what strategic
effect is necessary before proper objectives can be determined.
7. Strategy is an inherently human enterprise. It is more than an
intellectual consideration of objective factors. The role of belief
systems and cultural perceptions of all the players is importantin the development and execution of strategy.
8. Friction is an inherent part of strategy. Friction cannot be
eliminated, but it can be understood and accounted for to agreater or lesser extent.
9. Strategy focuses on root purposes and causes. This focus makes
strategy inherently adaptable and ﬂexible. Strategy learns fromexperience and must be sufﬁciently broad and ﬂexible in its
construction to adapt to unfolding events and an adversary’s
countermoves. Strategy’s focus on root causes and purposes
ensures that direction of subordinate levels is sufﬁciently broad
to be adaptable and ﬂexible.
10. Strategy is hierarchical. Just as strategy is subordinate to policy,
lower levels of strategy and planning are subordinate to higher
levels of strategy. The hierarchical nature of strategy facilitates
span of control.
11. Strategy exists in a symbiotic relationship with time. Strategy must
be integrated into the stream of history; it must be congruous withwhat has already happened and with the realistic possibilities of67

the future. Small changes at the right time can have large andunexpected consequences. Consequently, an intervention at an
early date has greater effect at less cost than a later intervention.
Strategy is about thinking and acting in time in a way that isfundamentally different from planning.
12. Strategy is cumulative. Effects in the strategic environment are
cumulative; once given birth, they become a part of the play ofcontinuity and change. Strategies at different levels interact andinﬂuence the success of higher and lower strategy and planningover time.
13. Efﬁciency is subordinate to effectiveness in strategy. Strategic
objectives, if accomplished, create or contribute to creation ofstrategic effects that lead to the achievement of the desired end
state at the level of strategy being analyzed. In that way, theyultimately serve national interests. Good strategy is both effective
and efﬁcient, but effectiveness takes precedence over efﬁciency.
Concepts and resources serve objectives without undue risk offailure or unintended effects.
14. Strategy provides a proper relationship or balance among theobjectives sought, the methods used to pursue the objectives, andthe resources available. In formulating a strategy, the ends, ways,
and means are part of an integral whole and work synergisticallyto achieve strategic effect at that level of strategy, as well as
contribute to cumulative effects at higher levels. Ends, ways,
and means must be in concert qualitatively and quantitatively,internally and externally. From the synergistic balance of ends,
ways, and means, the strategy achieves suitability, acceptability,and feasibility.
15. Risk is inherent to all strategy. Strategy is subordinate to
the uncertain nature of the strategic environment. Success is
contingent on implementation of an effective strategy—ends,
ways, and means that positively interact with the strategic
environment. Failure is the inability to achieve one’s objectives,
the thwarting of achievement of one’s objectives by other actors
or chance, or the creation of unintended adverse effects of suchmagnitude as to negate what would otherwise be regarded as
strategic success.
68Ends, Ways, Means.
Strategy is expressed in terms of ends, ways and means. Ends,
ways, and means that lead to the achievement of the desired end state
within acceptable bounds of feasibility, suitability, acceptability, andrisk are valid strategies for consideration by the decisionmaker.
Objectives (ends) explain “what” is to be accomplished. Theyﬂow from a consideration of the interests and factors in the strategic
environment affecting the achievement of the desired end state.
Objectives are bounded by policy guidance, higher strategy, thenature of the strategic environment, the capabilities and limitations of
the instruments of power of the state, and resources made available.
Objectives are selected to create strategic effect. Strategic objectives,
if accomplished, create or contribute to creation of strategic effects
that lead to the achievement of the desired end state at the level ofstrategy being analyzed and, ultimately, serve national interests. In
strategy, objectives are expressed with explicit verbs (e.g., deter war,
promote regional stability, destroy Iraqi armed forces). Explicit verbs
force the strategist to consider and qualify what is to be accomplishedand help establish the parameters for the use of power.
Strategic concepts (ways) answer the big question of “how”
the objectives are to be accomplished by the employment of the
instruments of power. They link resources to the objectives byaddressing who does what, where, when, how, and why, with theanswers to which explaining “how” an objective will be achieved.
Since concepts convey action, they often employ verbs in theirconstruction, but are actually descriptions of “how” the objective ofa strategy is to be accomplished. Strategic concepts provide direction
and boundaries for subordinate strategies and planning. A strategic
concept must be explicit enough to provide planning guidance tothose designated to implement and resource it, but not so detailed
as to eliminate creativity and initiative at subordinate strategy andplanning levels. Logically, concepts become more speciﬁc at lower
levels.
Resources (means) in strategy formulation set the boundaries forthe types and levels of support modalities that will be made available
for pursuing concepts of the strategy. In strategy, resources can betangible or intangible. Examples of the tangible include forces, people,
69

equipment, money, and facilities. Intangible resources include
things like will, courage, spirit, or intellect. Intangible resources areproblematic for the strategist in that they are often immeasurable orvolatile. Hence, intangible resources should always be suspect andclosely examined to determine whether they are actually improperly
expressed concepts or objectives. The rule of thumb to apply is that
resources can usually be quantiﬁed, if only in general terms. The
strategist expresses resources in terms that make clear to subordinate
levels what is to be made available to support the concepts.
Validity and Risk.
Strategy has an inherent logic of suitability, feasibility, andacceptability. These would naturally be considered as the strategy isdeveloped, but the strategy should be validated against them once it
has been fully articulated. Thus, the strategist asks:
Suitability—Will the attainment of the objectives using the instrumentsof power in the manner stated accomplish the strategic effects desired?
Feasibility—Can the strategic concept be executed with the resources
available?
Acceptability—Do the strategic effects sought justify the objectives
pursued, the methods used to achieve them, and the costs in blood,treasure, and potential insecurity for the domestic and international
communities? In this process, one considers intangibles such as national
will, public opinion, world opinion, and actions/reactions of U.S. allies,
adversaries, and other nations and actors.

The questions of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability as
expressed above are really questions about the validity of thestrategy, not risk. If the answer to any of the three questions is “no,”the strategy is not valid. But strategy is not a black and white world,
and the strategist may ﬁnd that the answer to one or more of thesequestions is somewhat ambiguous.
Risk is determined through assessment of the probableconsequences of success and failure. It examines the strategy in its
entire logic—ends, ways, and means—in the context of the strategic
environment, and seeks to determine what strategic effects are created70

by the implementation of the strategy. It seeks to determine how
the equilibrium is affected and whether the strategic environment ismore or less favorable for the state as a result of the strategy. Risk isclariﬁed by asking:• What assumptions were made in this strategy, and what isthe effect if any of them is wrong?
• What internal or external factors were considered in thedevelopment of the strategy? What change in regard to thesefactors would positively or adversely affect the success oreffects of the strategy?
• What ﬂexibility or adaptability is inherent to the componentsof the strategy? How can the strategy be modiﬁed and at whatcost?
• How will other actors react to what has been attempted or
achieved? How will they react to the way in which the strategy
was pursued?
• What is the balance between intended and unintended
consequences?
• How will chance or friction play in this strategy?

71VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTSPower is a means, not an end.82

Good strategy development requires the military professional
to step out of the planning mindset and adopt one more suited forstrategic thinking. In the strategic mindset, the professional military
strategist embraces the complexity and chaos of the strategic
environment and envisions all its continuities and possibilities inseeking to create favorable strategic effects in support of national
interests. From an accurate analysis of the strategic environment,
the strategist determines the threats to and opportunities for theadvancement or protection of these interests. From policy, thestrategist receives the political leadership’s vision, guidance, andpriorities of effort in regard to interests. Thus, in constructing avalid strategy, the strategist is bounded by the nature of the strategic
environment, the dictates of policy, and the logic of strategy. The
strategist is responsible for mastering the external and internal
facets of the strategic environment, adhering to policy or seeking
change, and applying the logic of strategy to strategy formulation.
He articulates the strategy in the rational model of ends, ways, andmeans; but leadership remains responsible for the decision to executethe strategy.
Good strategy demands much of the strategist. The strategist
must be a constant student of the strategic environment, both
externally and internally. He must be emerged in the events of today
while aware of the legacies of the past and the possibilities of the
future. In one sense, the strategist must sort through an arena of
cognitive dissonance to arrive at the “real” truth. The real truth best
serves interests and policy in the long run; the strategist must reject
the expedient, near-term solution for the long-term beneﬁt. The
strategist intervenes through action or selected nonaction to createa more favorable strategic environment. In this process, everythinghas meaning, and everything has potential consequences. The
strategist cannot be omniscient, but the strategist can be open andaware—open to the possibilities and aware of the consequences. If
the strategist is sufﬁciently open and aware, he can anticipate thefuture and formulate successful strategy. If in practice the strategist73is not immersed in uncertainty and ambiguity and examining
the context of the past, the emerging events of today, and thepossibilities of tomorrow, he is probably not doing strategy—butrather planning under the label of strategy. Thus, the proper focusof strategy is to clarify and exert inﬂuence over the VUCA of thestrategic environment in order to create strategic effects favorable tothe policy and interests of the state. This is done by articulation ofends, ways, and means that create the desired strategic effect.
Strategy is neither simple nor easy. Nothing in this “little book”
should suggest either. Strategic thinking is difﬁcult because it
deals with the incredible complexity and unpredictability of thestrategic environment. Its essence is to simplify this complexity anduncertainty—the VUCA—in a rational expression of ends, ways, andmeans so that planners can create a degree of certainty and a morepredictable outcome. In this regard, it bounds planning but does
not unnecessarily restrict the planner. Nor should anything in thismonograph suggest that strategy is vague or imprecise. The complex
and ambiguous must be reduced and made clear without loss ofunderstanding of the comprehensiveness of interaction within thestrategic environment. Strategy seeks great clarity and precision indeveloping and articulating objectives and concepts—but it does thisin a manner appropriate to the strategic level. The logic of strategy
requires that these be expressed in terms that allow for ﬂexibility
and adaptation; thus they do not unnecessarily conﬁne innovationand initiative at subordinate levels. This requirement reinforces theneed for clarity of thought and word so that strategic purpose anddirection are evident.
Relative success is the product of good strategy: relative toobjectives; relative to “current” reality; relative to the future; relative
to risk; relative to costs; and relative to adversaries and allies. Strategy
should be precise and clear its articulation, but it is anticipatory—
not predictive. The future changes as it unfolds because the strategic
environment is dynamic. Core interests remain over time, but theirexpression in regard to strategic circumstances changes with time.
Once implemented, strategy by deﬁnition changes the fundamental
conditions and perspective generating it and is at risk in some part.
Thus, strategy can be measured relatively against its objectives and74the strategic effect they seek to produce, but it cannot guarantee thefuture. The future situation is always the product of more than thesum of the parts of a given strategy.
The theory of strategy teaches the military professional “how tothink” about strategy, not “what to think” for a strategy. It educateshis mind and disciplines his thinking for the environment that
confronts him as a strategic leader, practitioner, and theorist so hecan serve the nation well. So armed, the professional is prepared todevelop, evaluate, and execute strategy appropriate for his place
and time. Strategy formulation and terminology are less pure in
execution than in their original conception. “Strategic planning”
and other such “strategic labeling” are commonplace, and zealous
advocates of various concepts and practices often seek to co-opt
such terms to gain visibility. The professional should be neither
seduced nor distracted by these manipulations but remain focusedon strategy proper—never confusing strategy with planning nor the
strategic level of war with the others. In this way, the professional’s
formulation, evaluation, and execution of strategy will adhere to
strategy’s logic, and his advice and recommendations will fully
support policy in achieving the desired end state.
And, ﬁnally, strategy formulation is not the domain for thethin of skin or self-serving. Detractors stand ever ready to magnify
a strategy’s errors or limitations. Even success is open to criticism
from pundits who question its role, methods, or continued validity.
Furthermore, strategy achieves strategic consequences by themultiorder effects it creates over time—always a point of contention
in a time-conscious society that values quick results and lacks
patience with the “long view.” In the end, it is the destined role ofthe strategist to be underappreciated and often demeaned in his
own time. Consequently, strategy remains the domain of the strong
intellect, the life-long student, the dedicated professional, and the
invulnerable ego.

75

ENDNOTES
1. Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy,” The
Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994; 1997, p. 22.
2. Joint Staff, J-7, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary and
Associated Terms, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Staff, November 30, 2004, p. 509.
3. Gregory D. Foster, “A Conceptual Foundation for a Theory of Strategy,” The
Washington Quarterly, Winter, 1990, p. 43. Foster’s analysis of the assumptions andpremises of strategy is particularly thought-provoking.
4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. andtrans., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 141.
5. Clausewitz, pp. 100-102.
6. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.
33-34, 51-54.
7. Major General Richard A. Chilcoat, Strategic Art: The New Discipline for the
21st Century, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, 1995, pp. 6-9.
8. Gray, p. 1.
9. David Jablonsky, Why Is Strategy Difﬁcult? Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992; repr. 1995, p. 10.
10. Foster, pp. 47-48.
11. Clausewitz, p. 89.
12. Foster, p. 50.
13. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,”chap. in Military Strategy: Theory and Application, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Departmentof National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College, 1989, pp. 3-8.
14. Clausewitz, p. 87.
15. Foster, p. 50.
16. Clausewiz, pp. 86-87, 607-608.
17. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 60.
18. Murray and Grimsley, pp. 1, 13; Clausewitz, pp. 86, 89.
19. Stephen J. Cimbala, Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy,
Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001, pp. 7-14. While somewhat controversial, this bookcontributes important insights to the nature of the strategic environment.
20. Ibid., p. 8.
21. Murray and Grimsley, p. 1.
77

22. Course 2 Course Directive AY 2005: “War, National Security Policy & Strategy,
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army
War College, 2004, p. 158.
23. Joint Publication 1-02, p. 360.
24. Ibid., p. 359.
25. Ibid., p. 535.
26. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, The National Defense Strategyof The United States of America, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March
2005.
27. Foster, pp. 56-57.
28. Murray and Grimsley, pp. 6-7. See also Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R.
May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decisionmakers, New York: The Free
Press, 1986, for practices and examples of how to do this.
29. Robert H. Dorff, “Strategy, Grand Strategy, and the Search for Security,”
The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century, Max G.
Manwaring, Edwin G. Corr, and Robin H. Dorff, eds., Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003,
pp. 128-129.
30. Clausewitz, p. 178.
31. William J. Doll, “Parsing the Future: A Frame of Reference to Scenario
Building,” Unpublished Paper: Joint Warfare Analysis Center, 2005, pp. 2-3.
32. Roderick R. Magee II, ed., Strategic Leadership Primer, Carlisle Barracks, PA:
U.S. Army War College, 1998, p. 1.
33. Alvin M. Saperstein, “Complexity, Chaos, and National Security Policy:
Metaphors or Tools,” Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, David
S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., 1997, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/
books%20-%201998/Complexity,%20Global%20Politics%20and%20Nat’l%20Sec%20%20Sept%2098/ch05.html, Internet, accessed December 8, 2004.
34. Alan D. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Importance of
Imagery,” Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, David S. Alberts andThomas J. Czerwinski, eds., 1997, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20-%201998/
Complexity,%20Global%20Politics%20and%20Nat’l%20Sec%20-%20Sept%2098/
ch07.html, Internet, accessed December 8, 2004.
35. Manus J. Donahue III, “ An Introduction to Mathematical Chaos Theory
and Fractal Geometry,” December 1997; available from http://www.fractalﬁnance.
com/chaostheory.html, Internet, accessed December 13, 2004.
36. Clausewitz, p. 119.
37. Major Susan E. Durham, “Chaos Theory for the Practical Military Mind,”
March 1997; available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/97-0229.pdf,
Internet, accessed on December 13, 2004. See also Donahue.
38. Donahue. See also Gaddis, The Landscape of History, pp. 71-90.
7839. Vicente Valle, Jr., “Chaos, Complexity and Deterrence,” Student Paper at
National War College, April 19, 2000; available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/
awcgate/ndu/valle.pdf, Internet, accessed December 18, 2004, p. 4.
40. James N. Rosenau, “Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity Theory
and World Affairs” Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, David S.
Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., 1997, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/
books%20-%201998/Complexity,%20Global%20Politics%20and%20Nat’l%20Sec%20%20Sept%2098/ch03.html, Internet, accessed December 8, 2004.
41. Valle, pp. 2-3.
42. John F. Schmitt, “Command and (Out of) Control: The Military Implicationsof Complexity Theory,” Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, David
S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., 1997, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/
books%20-%201998/Complexity,%20Global%20Politics%20and%20Nat’l%20Sec%20%20Sept%2098/ch09.html, Internet, accessed December 8, 2004.
43. Robert Jervis, “Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions,” Complexity,
Global Politics, and National Security, David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski,
eds., 1997, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20-%201998/Complexity,%20Glo
bal%20Politics%20and%20Nat’l%20Sec%20-%20Sept%2098/ch03.html;
Internet,
accessed December 8, 2004.
44. Beyerchen.
45. Any query into a research data base will substantiate this assertion. The
subject is manifest in various sources ranging across a spectrum of interests:
The New York Times, Washington Quarterly, New Political Economy, Foreign Affairs,
Parameters, The World Economy, Journal of Business Ethics, Third World Quarterly,etc.
46. Michael J. Mazarr, “Theory and U.S. Military Strategy: A ‘Leapfrog’
Strategy for U.S. Defense Policy,” Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security,
David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., 1997, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20-%201998/Complexity,%20Global%20Politics%20and%20Nat’l%20Se
c%20-%20Sept%2098/ch11.html, Internet, accessed December 23, 2004 .
47. Ibid.
48. Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the 21st Century,
New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003, p. 5.
49. Gray, p. 50.
50. Ibid., pp. 23-43.
51. MacGregor Knox, “Conclusion: Continuity and Revolution in the Makingof Strategy,” The Making of Strategy:Rulers,States, and War, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994; 1997, p. 615.
52. John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 61.

79

53. John Lewis Gaddis, “Grand Strategy in the Second Term,” Foreign Affairs,
January-February 2005, p. 14.
54. Jervis, pp. 10-28, 60.
55. Knox, p. 643.
56. Shona L. Brown and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Competing on the Edge: Strategy
as Structured Chaos, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998, pp. 3-4, 7.
57. Gaddis, The Landscape of History, pp. 56-57, 59.
58. Beyerchen.
59. Jack Synder, “One World Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy, NovemberDecember 2004, pp. 53-62.
60. Knox, p. 627.
61. James Kurth, “Inside the Cave: The Banality of I. R. Studies,” The National
Interest, Fall 1998, pp. 38-40.
62. Knox, pp. 645.
63. Gaddis, “Grand Strategy,” p. 10.
64. Knox, p. 645
65. Gaddis, The Landscape of History, p. 65.
66. Bart Kosko, Fuzzy Thinking: The New Science of Fuzzy Logic, New York:
Hyperion, 1993, pp. 4-22. The humanities are a noteworthy exception to thispervasiveness, but even here quantiﬁcation has been applied by some to seek the“right” explanation.
67. Clausewitz, p. 120.
68. Ibid., p. 119.
69. Gaddis, The Landscape of History, pp. 61, 64, 68-69.
70. Gray, pp. 19-20.
71. Dorff, pp. 128-129.
72. Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted: United States National
Interests in the 1980s, Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984, p. 4.
73. Joint Publication 1-02, p. 360.
74. Clausewitz, p. 607.
75. Gaddis, The Landscape of History, p. 66.
76. Mackubin Thomas Owens, National Review Online, January 5, 2005;
availablefrom
http://www.nationalreview.com/owens/owens200501050715.asp,
Internet, accessed January 5, 2005.
77. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States
Military Policy and Strategy, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973, pp. 411424.
80

78. Owens.
79. Cooper, pp. viii-xi.
80. Gray, p. 2.
81. Jervis, p. 60.
82. Murray and Grimsley, p. 13.

81

ABOUT THE AUTHORHARRY R. (Rich) YARGER is the Professor of National Security
Policy in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S.
Army War College. Currently he teaches courses in Fundamentals ofStrategic Thinking, Theory of War and Strategy, National Security
Policy and Strategy, and Grand Strategy. His research focuses onnational security policy, strategic theory, and the education anddevelopment of strategic level leaders. In addition to teachingpositions, Dr. Yarger served 5 years as the Chairman of the War
College’s Department of Distance Education and is considered one of
the Army’s leading experts in on-line education. Dr. Yarger has alsotaught at the undergraduate level at several local colleges. A retired
Army colonel, he is a Vietnam veteran and served in both Germany
and Korea. Dr. Yarger is a graduate of the Army War College andobtained his doctorate in history from Temple University.

83