Strategic Annual Report 2019
China’s Foreign Policy and Other Countries’ China Policies

China’s Foreign Policy and Other Countries’ China Policies

The 40th anniversary of China's reform at the Great Hall of the People, Dec. 2018, Beijing. (Photo Xinhua/AFLO)

On October 1, 2019, China marked 70

drive changes in the power structure ofyears since Mao Zedong declared thethe international community.

establishment of the Central People’s

17

Government of the People’s Republic

However, it is also true that, especiallyof China (PRC). At the ceremony,over the past few years, various problems

Xi Jinping, President of China andthat could hinder China’s progress

General Secretary of the Communist

toward “the great rejuvenation” have

Party of China, reiterated that thebecome apparent. The first is relations

Chinese people are on the brink ofwith the United States; friction between

achievingrejuvenation”

the two countries in areas such as tradearound the centenary anniversary ofand science and technology is developing

the founding of the PRC. It is true that

into a full-scale, long-term confrontation

China’s economic and military powerover hegemony in the internationalcontinues to grow at a faster pace thancommunity. In addition, many Asian“developed countries”. Although theand European countries have criticizedpace of its economic growth has slowed

the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI),

in recent years, China will continue towhich is the linchpin of Xi’s foreign“thegreatpolicy. Domestically, there are said

after the 19th Party Congress in 2017,

to be many voices of dissatisfaction

and his power base can be evaluatedand doubt within the party over Xi’s

as stable for the time being. On thetendency toward dictatorship and theother hand, it is true that the aggressive

deterioration of relations with the United

behavior that the Xi administration hasStates. Some observers say the economy

consistently adopted has created friction

has already lost a lot of its momentum

with many countries, and this may be

and the growth rate is slowing down

one of the factors that will potentiallywell below official statistics (6%-6.5%).

destabilize his power base.

Recently, large-scale demonstrations
by Hong Kong residents, triggered byRelations with society are, of course,

a proposed bill amending the Fugitive

an important factor in ensuring theOffenders Ordinance, have begun tostability of power. Under the Xi

show rejection of the Communist Party’s

administration, there has been a strong

rule in Hong Kong itself. Failure by thepush to strengthen ideological control

Communist Party to take appropriate

and control over the media. As a result,measures may lead to a situation whereanti-establishment

the stability of the mainland’s system

in domestic politics has been tightly

would be negatively impacted.

contained and, in diplomacy, control bypublicopinion

the government over the nationalistic
With these lofty goals and destabilizing
factors,

whereisChina

public discourse has increased.

heading

now? How does this trend affect theAnotherfactor

thatcannot

beexisting international order?

overlooked in assessing Xi’s poweris his relationship with the military.

One of the most important factors inSince taking office as Chairman of theChina’s domestic politics and foreign

Central Military Commission, Xi has

policy is the stability of the current

clearly strengthened his grip on theadministration, especially the power ofmilitary through a large-scale reformthe General Secretary of the Communistof the military structure carried outParty. General Secretary Xi Jinping

before the 19th Party Congress. The

succeeded in promoting a large numberreform primarily seems to be aimedof his followers to the leadership groupat strengthening the military’s ability18

Strategic Annual Report 2019
China’s Foreign Policy and Other Countries’ China Policies

to wage war, while further analysis isof the Xi administration’s power base,needed before it can be fully evaluated.

the slowdown of the Chinese economy,
the deterioration of US-China relations,

How is China’s foreign policy actuallyand the improvement of the Chinese

expressed? Relations with the United

public’s perception of Japan. On theStates have reached a major turning

other hand, most of the security andpoint. During the “Beidaihe Conference”

confidence-buildingin the summer of 2018, Xi and his aides

Japan and China remain unresolved.

issuesbetweenwere reportedly criticized for worsening
relations with the United States. The
Xi administration is trying hard tomanage relations with the United Statesby refraining from mentioning “Madein China 2025”. On the other hand,some complained about Xi making too
many concessions to the United Statesin trade negotiations and, around May
this year, the administration turned toa hardline stance in the negotiations.
In October, due in part to the domestic
political considerations of the Trumpadministration, the first deal wasconcluded, but it is not certain thatfurther progress will be made. In thisway, China’s foreign policy toward theUnited States is based on a delicate
domestic balance and is expected tofluctuate within a certain range.
Under these circumstances, relationswith Japan have clearly improved,
particularly since the mutual visitsby their leaders in 2018. Contributing
factors behind this are the strengthening
19

The Belt and Road Forum, April 2019, Yanqi Lake venue.
(Photo AP/AFLO)The Xi administration’s foreign policy
is symbolized by the BRI. A notable
trend is the diversification of businessin recent years away from traditional
infrastructure investments. The current
situation surrounding China is quite
different from the time the concept
was formulated. Domestically, foreignexchange reserves and excess production
capacity have both declined, while,
externally, the conflict with the Trumpadministration has surfaced. Under
these circumstances, some adjustments
have been made since the initial plan. Acase in point is the fact that the China hasstarted to refer to a “high-quality BRI”

countries is a “central challenge” to thesince the 2019 Belt and Road Forum forsecurity and prosperity of the UnitedInternational Cooperation, where loans

States. In recent years, this attitude hasto emerging countries were criticized as

led the United States to exclude Huawei

being “debt traps”. It can be seen that theTechnologies in connection with thehigh-quality infrastructure investment“5G” next-generation communications

and the four conditions for cooperation

standard and label China a “currencyfor BRI that Japan advocates – openness,manipulator”, while the “trade war”

transparency, economic profitability,with China has begun to show signs ofand fiscal soundness of the host country

developing into a full-fledged “economic– have had a certain influence on thewar”.

direction of China’s policy. In addition
to its domestic policy banks, China

In contrast to the US-China relationship,

co-finances various projects throughthemultiple funding sources, including

seen improvement. President Xi and

the Asian Infrastructure Investment

President Putin have met nearly 30

Bank (AIIB) and the New Development

times, and the relationship between

Bank (NDB). However, China tends tothe two countries was upgraded to a

independently finance the construction“comprehensive strategic partnershipof strategically important infrastructureof coordination” in June 2019. Thisin developing countries.

partnership is not limited to theChina-Russia

relationshiphasdomains of politics and economy;
How have foreign countries reacted toit aims to also further cooperation

China’s domestic situation and foreign

security-wise,

policy in recent years?

technology and cybertechnology. Itincluding

militaryis said that discussions are being held
Since the beginning of the second year

about deepening cooperation in missileof the Trump administration, the US

defense. It goes without saying thatgovernment has been exhibiting abehind these developments are the twostrong wariness about China’s foreigncountries’ relationships with the Unitedpolicy as a whole. China was definedStates.

as a “revisionist power” and it wasasserted that “the reemergence of long-

Yet beneath the surface, Russia remains

term, strategic competition” with suchwary of China; this is due to security
20

Strategic Annual Report 2019
China’s Foreign Policy and Other Countries’ China Policies

concerns caused by China’s rise and thedevelopment of China-DPRK relations

shift in the power balance. For example,

is still a dependent variable for US-

Russia’s strategy to have intermediate-

DPRK relations. The DPRK does notrange nuclear forces even if it violates

want China to intervene excessively

the INF Treaty may have been related toin the process of establishing a peaceits intention to eliminate its asymmetry

regime on the Korean Peninsula, andwith China in this field. Although

the current China-DPRK “honeymoon”

China recognizes this Russian wariness,

is not guaranteed to hold.

it has put on display a harmonious
relationship between the two countries

Among the countries involved in thebecause of strategic necessity. Regarding

disputes over sovereignty in the Southeconomic relations, numerous initiatives

China Sea, the Philippines under thehave been launched; however, as theDuterte administration has adopted

economic benefits for China are nota conciliatory policy toward China.

necessarily large, the projects have notContributing factors behind this areseen concrete progress.

the Philippines’ policy of placing thestabilization of domestic security andChina-DPRK

relationsarealsoeconomic development at the top of theseeing close cooperation, at least on“security” agenda, China’s stance ofa superficial level. Relations between

responding positively to such a posture,

China and the DPRK had deteriorated

andfrom the first half of 2017 but, in early

perception that US involvement in2018, when Kim Jong-un, Chairman

South China Sea issues is passive. Onof the Workers’ Party of Korea,

the other hand, Vietnam tends to show

mentioned

andmore clearly its wariness of China

when preparations were underway

on the South China Sea issue. On thefor the US-DPRK summit meetings,

economic front, although China’s direct

Kim visited Xi in Beijing in March ofinvestment in Vietnam has increased

that same year. Since then, Chairman

sharply due to the US-China trade war

Kim has visited China four times as

since the beginning of 2019, there is aof October 2019, and in June 2019,strong inclination to avoid excessive

President

dependence on China.

“denuclearization”

Xivisited

Pyongyangfor the first time. Nevertheless, the21

thePhilippines

government’s

India’s

relations

with

China

had

the current administration has taken

worsened from the middle of 2016, duea tough stance on “interference” fromin part to the military confrontation on

China with its August 2018 decision tothe Doklam plateau. Since April 18,virtually exclude Chinese companies

however, India, which like China hassuch as Huawei and ZTE from its 5G

a huge trade surplus with the Unitednetworks.

States, has been inclined to ease its
confrontation with China as the US-

The trend of worsening relations withChina trade war rages in the background.

China is also seen in Europe. The “EU-AfterremovedChina – A strategic outlook” released

India from the Generalized System ofby the European Commission in March

Preferences (GSP) in June 2019, Indian

2019 strongly reflected the EU’s mistrust

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whoof China and positioned China not only

attended the Shanghai Cooperation

as a partner but also as a “systemicOrganization (SCO) summit in thatrival”. There is concern that the “16 + 1”

same month, criticized the move as

framework established in 2012 between

unilateralism and protectionism while

China and 16 Central and Eastern

avoiding mentioning the US by name,European countries may be a Chineseandwithploy to divide Europe, and there isChina. However, strategic mistrust still

growing concern about the penetration

underlies India’s view of China.

of China’s political influence throughtheUnitedconfirmed

Statescooperation

economic means. On the other hand, inSince 2018, Australia’s relations withresponse to Xi’s visit to Europe in March

China have been deteriorating to the2019, some countries, including Italy

point where they are said to be the worst

and Luxembourg, have announced theirsince the normalization of diplomatic

intention to deepen their cooperation

relations between the two countries.

with China on BRI.

Behind this is the growing awarenessresearch

Given these circumstances, it is expected

institutes that China is using its financial

that the risk of destabilization of thepower to spread its influence, whichinternational order will increase over a

has heightened the threat of its “sharp

relatively long period of time. The risepower”. Under these circumstances,of China and the confrontation between

among

universities

and22the United States and China are now

or seek any sphere of influence, but

long-term trends. Even if trade friction,

its explanations and actions are notwhich has captured the attention of theconvincing.

Trump administration, is alleviated,
there will still be a wide gap between

The confrontation between the United

the two countries in terms of governing

States and China is making the lattermodels and values, as evidenced bydraw closer to Japan, which at thisVice President Mike Pence’s Octobermoment has a positive effect on Japan-2018 speech. As China continues toChina relations. However, if the United

declare its goal of increasing its wealthStates starts to seek Japan’s cooperationand military strength, there is a risk

in various ways in its policy of pressuringthat it will intensify its confrontation

China, Japan could be placed in awith the United States in the future.

dilemma between the United States andFurthermore, this could develop into aChina. Needless to say, the Japan-US

wider struggle for hegemony between

alliance remains the linchpin of Japan’s

the United States and China.

diplomacy. On the other hand, there
might be some room to deepen Japan-

Other23

countries

areincreasingly

China cooperation on issues common

wary of China because of politicalto Japan’s vision of a “Free and Openand security concerns, even thoughIndo-Pacific (FOIP)” and China’s BRI

they need the economic benefits that(for example, strengthening regional

relations with China bring. Manyconnectivity), with the condition that

democracies,

China ensures the recipient countries’

includingJapan,

areconcerned that China will export

financialsoundness,

openness,

its governing model, which relies ontransparency, and economic efficiency.

surveillance and coercion, and seek to

At the same time, it is important for Japanestablish its own sphere of influence by

to monitor the perceptions and policies

strengthening its ties with authoritarianof other countries toward China and tostates. Other neighboring countries are

pursue coordinated policies with these

also apprehensive about the excessive

countries if they match Japan’s national

expansion of China’s influence, whileinterests. In doing so, it is necessary

maintaining good relations with China

to urge China, as a key member of theon the surface. China has stressed thatinternational community, to act in line

no matter how it might develop, itwith the principle of maintaining thewill never threaten any other country

liberal international order.■