OSIPP Discussion Paper : DP-2012-E-006

Horizontal Transfer and Promotion: New Evidence and an
Interpretation from the Perspective of Task-Specific Human Capital
April 03, 2012
Masaru Sasaki, Osaka University and IZA
Katsuya Takii, Osaka University
Junmin Wan, Fukuoka University【キーワード】J62, M51; Rotation, Promotion and Task-Specific Human Capital【要約】This paper provides new evidence about horizontal transfer and promotion
using the largest available personnel panel data in Japan and interprets them fromthe perspective of task-specific human capital. We find that firms synchronize theiremployees' promotion and horizontal transfers. Then, we show theoretically thattask-specific human capital can naturally generate such synchronization. We alsofind that the directors in an accounting department have the highest probability of
being promoted to become board members, while those in a research department havethe lowest. This suggests that top managers need a balanced skill set, in which
allocative skill is relatively important.
We are grateful to Ken Ariga, Shingo Ishiguro, Takao Kato, Fumio Ohtake and Kengo
Yasui, as well as the seminar participants at the Trans-Pacific Labor Seminar 2011
and Kansai Labor Workshop, for helpful comments. Financial support from theJapanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology(Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research) is ggratefullyy acknowledged.
gMasaru Sasaki:
Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University 1-7 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka,
Osaka 560-0043 Japan. sasaki@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp. Katsuya Takii: Osaka School ofInternational Public Policy, Osaka University, 1-31, Machikameyama, Toyonaka,
Osaka, 560-0043, Japan. takii@osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp. Junmin Wan: Faculty of
Economics, Fukuoka University, 8-19-1 Nanakuma, Jonanku, Fukuoka City, 814-0180,
Japan.
p
wan@econ.fukuoka-u.ac.jp.
jp

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1. Introduction
The internal labor market has been widely investigated since Doeringer and Piore(1971) described the characteristics of an internal labor market quite diﬀerently
from those of an external labor market. Many theories have been proposed andmore evidence has been accumulated, but there are still many unexplored aspects
of internal labor markets.
The relationship between horizontal transfer and promotion is one of them.
Although several excellent surveys of internal labor markets have been published,
they typically do not deal with horizontal transfers [e.g., Lazear (1998), Gibbons
and Waldman (1999b) and Lazear and Oyer (2007)].

Knowing that there are

frequent horizontal transfers in reality, this lack of attention to them by academics
is surprising. One possible reason is the lack of suitable data. Data on internal
labor markets are typically confidential, and it is not easy to access data that
describe individual movements across several functional departments. Without
reliable evidence, it is conceivable that economists find it diﬃcult to develop areasonable theory on horizontal transfers.
In fact, the relationship between horizontal transfer and promotion is likely
to provide useful information on the benefits and costs of skills acquisition. On
one hand, as horizontal transfers lead to the acquisition of multitask skills, theobserved career path should be designed to acquire the necessary task-specificskills after promotion. Hence, we may possibly obtain information on the types ofskills required of top managers. On the other hand, as the reallocation of workers
across jobs is accompanied by reallocation costs, observed career paths must be
designed to save such costs. As the loss of skills inherent in reallocation acrossjobs is likely to be a main candidate for the costs of reallocation, investigation of2

the interaction between horizontal transfer and promotion should provide useful
information on the transferability of skills across jobs.
This paper provides new evidence on the relationship between horizontal transfer across functional departments and vertical promotion using the largest personnel panel data set in Japan. In order to obtain coherent information from thatdata, this paper adopts, as a conceptual framework, the notion of task-specifichuman capital, the importance of which is emphasized by Gibbons and Waldman(2004, 2006). They conjectured that the reason firms employ job rotation is tominimize the underutilization of task-specific human capital when promotions takeplace. However, because they do not have any evidence about horizontal transfers, their formal model in Gibbons and Waldman (2006) is designed to explain
evidence about promotion without horizontal transfer and, therefore, their modeled task-specific human capital cannot be distinguished from rank-specific humancapital. This paper shows that the diﬀerence between task-specific human capitaland rank-specific human capital is important in understanding evidence on therelationship between horizontal transfer and vertical promotion.
Four findings are worthy of special mention.

Firstly, we find that there isa robust correlation between the timing of promotion and horizontal transfer.
Eriksson and Ortega (2006) identify three promising theories of horizontal transfer: horizontal transfer makes employees acquire multitask skills, helps employers
learn about employees’ abilities, and mitigates boredom. Ariga (2006) points outthat job creation and destruction can influence the pattern of horizontal transfer.
However, none of these theories can explain the synchronization of decisions.
We construct a model that shows that the synchronization of promotion andhorizontal transfer occurs if and only if the reallocation cost is strictly submodular
with respect to vertical promotion and horizontal transfer. In order to derive an3

economic interpretation of this result, we also provide a theoretical basis for thesubmodular cost function from the perspective of task-specific human capital.
This shows that the reallocation cost resulting from the accumulation of the taskspecific skills required for a new position is in general submodular, and that it isstrictly submodular if and only if there is duplication of new tasks required forthe new functional department and ranked position.

Through the lens of thistheory, the synchronization of the promotion decision and the horizontal transfer
decision can be interpreted as a practice to save the reallocation costs that arise
from the duplication of the required tasks.
Note that the strict submodularity of the reallocation cost function cannot bederived from department-specific human capital and rank-specific human capital
because it must have common tasks and therefore common skills between functions
and ranks. Therefore, only task-specific human capital can explain the evidence.
Secondly, we find that directors are more frequently transferred to other functional departments than section managers. Task-specific human capital can also
explain this evidence. We show theoretically that if the marginal benefits frommultitask skills are larger for directors than for section managers, the higherranked managers are more likely to be transferred to other functional departments.
Thirdly, we find that directors who belong to an accounting department havethe highest probability of being promoted to board membership, while those who
belong to a research department have the lowest. In particular, even after controlling for the measure that is likely to be correlated with unobserved ability,
those department dummy variables never lose their significance. Note that there
is no other hierarchical position in between directors and board members. Hence,
if skills accumulated during directorships are needed after promotion, the theory4

of task-specific human capital predicts that there must be tasks that are common between directors and board members. That is, our findings provide useful
information on skills that are relatively important for top managers. With theassistance of several theories of entrepreneurial ability [e.g., Schultz (1975), Takii(2003) and Lazear (2005)], we interpret our evidence that top managers needbalanced skill sets with relatively large weighting on their allocative skills.
Fourthly, we also find that once we restrict our attention to relatively large
firms, not only the coeﬃcient of the accounting department dummy on promotion
but also that of the personnel department dummy retain their significance after
controlling for the proxies of unobserved ability. This is interesting, because thelarge role of personnel departments is likely to be specific to Japan.

Jacoby(2005) points out that, compared with U.S. companies, human resource staﬀs
are centralized and conduct organization-oriented employment decisions in Japan,
and human resource departments rank relatively highly in the corporate hierarchy.
Knowing that the role of the personnel department is more than just allocating
workers, evidence indicates that not only allocative ability but also the ability
to supervise workers to maintain Japanese employment practices is an importantskill for top managers in Japan’s large companies.
Several previous papers have empirically investigated internal labor markets.
Although the majority of papers focus on promotion (e.g., Rosenbaum (1984),
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b) and Ariga, Ohkusa and Brunello(1999)), as horizontal transfer is a common practice in the major companies inJapan, Japan’s labor economists accumulate relatively more evidence on horizontal transfer. Among them, Koike (1991) proposed an influential hypothesis.
Koike argues that the breadth of horizontal transfers measures the level of ‘intelligent skill’, which is needed to deal with uncertainty.

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Following this Koike

hypothesis, many Japanese economists examine the breadth of horizontal transfer(e.g., Kakizawa et al. (2004)) and its eﬀect on promotion (e.g., Ariga (2006)),
based on evidence from a single firm or questionnaires from a small sample. In
contrast to these papers, this paper focuses on the skills that are relatively important for top managers, and on the cost of acquiring multitask skills, based on arepresentative sample of relatively upper-level managers in Japanese companies.
Although most empirical studies on the internal labor market are based oncase studies or questionnaires from a small sample, Eriksson and Ortega (2006) is
a notable exception. They conduct a firm-level analysis using a large employer—
employee matched data set in Denmark.

Our personnel data set is based onquestionnaires from all publicly traded companies and many privately owned companies in Japan. It covers all board members in publicly traded companies and alarge sample of directors and section managers. Hence, we can demonstrate theaverage features of Japan’s internal labor market for relatively upper-level managers. Using the advantages of the unique data set we have not seen elsewhere, we
conduct an individual-level analysis and provide more detailed information on therelationship between promotion and horizontal transfer. Hopefully, our evidence
nicely complements the existing case studies.
Finally, several recent papers point out the importance of task-specific skills.
Lazear (2009) derives a firm-specific human capital as a firm-specific combinationof task-specific human capital and discusses why firms pay for the cost of skill
accumulation that do not appear to be firm specific.

Geel, Mure and Backes-

Gellner (2008) provide evidence that supports the prediction of Lazear’s model.
Gathmann and Schönberg (2007) measure the level of task-specific human capitaland show empirically that task-specific human capital is an important determinantof wage growth and occupational mobility. Unlike these papers, we use the model6

of task-specific human capital as a device to obtain coherent information from ourdata. We also show that task-specific human capital can generate synchronizeddecisions on promotion and horizontal transfer. We believe that our theory andevidence is complementary to theirs.
The paper is organized as follows.

The next section overviews features ofinternal labor markets in Japan. The third section explains our data set. The
fourth section compares our data set with publicly available aggregate statistics
to examine potential biases due to sample selection.

The fifth section investi-

gates career paths when managers are section managers or directors.

We payspecial attention to the timing of promotion and horizontal transfer, and showrobust evidence that the timing is fairly closely correlated. We also provide our
explanation for the synchronized decisions from the perspective of task-specifichuman capital. The sixth section investigates the probability of promotion fromdirector to board member. In particular, we are interested in how the likelihoodof promotion to board membership depends on the department where they werea director. We provide robust evidence that being in an accounting department
has the strongest impact on the promotion, and discuss a possible interpretationof our finding. The final section concludes and discusses future extension of theresearch.

2. The Internal Labor Market in Japan
Japan’s labor market is said to be unique. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) describe
common views on human resource practices in major Japanese firms: long-term
employment guarantees, and recruiting of permanent employees at early stages of
their careers.

Ariga, Brunello and Ohkusa (2000) characterize several features7

of the internal labor market in large Japanese firms as having (1) seniority-based
promotion and a late selection approach, (2) centralized allocation of workers tojobs, (3) extensive job rotation and internal transfers, and (4) well-defined portsof entry and a strong preference for recruitment of those have just left school
without having been employed elsewhere . Finally, as Kaplan (1994) documents,
it is also well known that the majority of board members in Japanese companies
are selected from inside the companies and that most CEOs are chosen fromamong board members.
These features of the Japanese data give us several advantages. Firstly, longterm employment guarantees can mitigate an attrition bias due to turnover. Ourdata set is based on questionnaires to major companies in Japan.

Therefore,

we lose observations when an employee quits those companies. Although there
may be concern about possible selection bias, the relatively low turnover rateof middle managers in Japan makes it possible to believe that the bias is fairly
small. Secondly, centralized allocation of workers to jobs means that observing
reallocation of employees inside a firm allows us to infer intended strategies held by
the firm. In particular, if horizontal transfer is a way to accumulate skills needed
after promotion, and a firm tries to save the cost inherent in the reallocation of
employees, the firm’s intentions should be reflected in the data.
Of course, this unique feature of Japan’s labor market is likely to influencesome dimensions of the statistics.

Koike (2002a) compares the career paths ofwhite-collar workers in companies in Japan, the U.S., England and Germany,and summarizes three unique features of internal careers in Japan: (1) Japanesecareer paths in a firm are relatively broader than in other countries, (2) whilemost promotion is from inside firms in Japan, more managers are employed fromoutside in other countries, and (3) the Japanese promotion system is relatively

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slow. Jacoby (2005) compares Japan’s internal labor market with the U.S. internal
labor market and points out the stronger role of personnel departments in Japan.
As we discuss later, we can confirm some of these features from our data: thespeed of promotion is still slow, and there are relatively high promotion probabilities from personnel as well as accounting departments to board membershipin relatively large firms.

After experiencing a burst bubble, Japanese life-longemployment practices are now often accused of being inflexible and in need ofrestructuring. Interestingly, our observations indicate that employment practices
in Japan have not changed much, even after several critiques of the employment
system.
Nonetheless, this uniqueness does not mean that the lessons from the Japaneseinternal labor market are irrelevant to other countries. Koike (2002a) also points
out some common features of the internal careers of white-collar workers: (1) in all
countries, workers spend most of their careers in a functional department, and (2)on-the-job training (OJT) plays a major role in skills acquisition. Because OJT
plays a major role in skills acquisition, it is necessary for top managers to acquire
multitask skills, and firms in most countries must face similar problems: how toeconomize on reallocation costs. Therefore, at least the qualitative relationshipbetween promotion and horizontal transfer is less likely to be specific to Japan.

3. Data Description
Our personnel data are based on the information files for board members, regardless of representation rights, directors (Bucho) and section managers (Kacho)collected by Diamond Inc.. Diamond Inc. sells its files to customers who needthem for a variety of reasons: developing marketing strategies, maintaining cus-9

tomer information or sending direct mail to the relevant personnel in a company.
We obtained the historical data in this file from 1998 to 2005, which comprises
our unbalanced panel data.
As our data were not originally designed for research purposes, we need totake particular care in our use of the data.

After reading various documents,

we conducted an interview with an editor in chief at the editorial department in
the information service oﬃce of Diamond Inc.

In order to investigate the rep-resentativeness of the data, we also compare the aggregate statistics constructedby our data set with the aggregate statistics based on the Basic Survey on Wage
Structure (BSWS hereafter), which is released by the Ministry of Health, Labourand Welfare (MHLW hereafter).

In this section, we first describe features of thedata revealed by the documentation and our interview. In the next section, we
describe the results of our comparison of the aggregate statistics sets.
Diamond Inc. sends out its questionnaire to the general aﬀairs department
or personnel department of companies once a year, and collects information forboard members, directors and section managers. It also collects data from several
press releases to maintain up-to-date information. According to the chief editor,
80 percent of publicly traded firms reply to their questionnaires. If they do notreceive any response from a firm, they fill out part of the questionnaire from thatfirm’s financial reports.

As board members in the publicly traded companies

are obligated to reveal their names, our data set contains all board members of
publicly traded companies.
It also covers many nonlisted companies.

According to the chief editor, al-though the precise criteria for sending a questionnaire change slightly over time,they send them to all relatively large companies. For example, in 2006, DiamondInc. sent a questionnaire to nonlisted companies that had more than 100 employ-10ees and capital stock (Shihon Kin) of more than 30 million yen.

In total, thedata set contained about 14,000 companies in September 2006. Hence, it covers
most of the major companies in Japan.
We initially wondered why so many firms had an incentive to answer thequestionnaire, and suspected that there might have been some monetary compensation. However, the editor in chief denied our presumption, and insisted thatfirms were not motivated by any monetary incentive. According to him, as Diamond Inc. has provided personnel information since 1935, many firms consider
being listed in the data set as prestigious. He conjectured that the prestige of
their products would be the reason for many records.
Another advantage of this information file is that it contains information on
directors and section managers. Hence, we can potentially examine the average
career patterns for relatively upper-level managers in Japan.
Unfortunately, the disclosure of information is not mandatory, and the disclosure strategies of firms are not well specified. The presumption for our analysis isthat their disclosure strategies are independent of unobserved characteristics of individuals that can influence the speed of promotion and the probability of transfer
to another department. Several assignment theories (e.g., Waldman (1984)) suggest that firms have incentives to hide information on the talents of their workers
so that outside firms cannot make selective oﬀers to the more talented workers. If
these theories are correct, because the disclosure policies of firms that reflect theirevaluations of their workers reveal information about the unobserved abilities of
their workers, we expect that the disclosure policies of the firms should be independent of their evaluations of their workers. The interview with the editor inchief roughly confirmed our presumption. According to him, each firm has its own
policy about how willing they are to reveal their information, and firms routinely

11

answer the questionnaire every year based on their specific policies.

Althoughrelatively larger and more traditional firms tend to disclose more information, he
did not think that firms’ disclosure strategies depended on unobserved individual
characteristics. He also said that because employees themselves can access theirown information, if firms’ disclosure strategies depended on unobserved individual characteristics, the firms’ disclosure decision could cause the employees someconcern.
In order to check the validity of his statement, we checked potential bias bycomparing the aggregate statistics constructed from our data set with the aggregate statistics based on BSWS in the next section.

4. Comparison between Diamond Survey and Basic Survey
on Wage Structure
In order to understand a potential bias inherent in the Diamond survey, we compared the aggregate statistics of the Diamond survey with those of the BSWS. In
this section, we briefly explain the notable characteristics of the Diamond survey,
and have placed more detailed information in the Appendix.
The BSWS aims to obtain a clear picture of the wage structure of employees
in major industries. The MHLW sends the survey to randomly selected establishments every year from July 1st to July 31st. Establishments are selected by auniform sampling method from establishments (private establishments and establishments of public corporations) with 10 regular employees or more and private
establishments with 5 to 9 regular employees. Then, the employees are selectedby a uniform sampling method from the selected establishments.

The BSWS

contains information on directors (Bucho) and section managers (Kacho). The

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MHLW provides the age distribution and the length of tenure by industry andthe size of firms. We use this aggregate data to assess the potential biases of the
Diamond survey.
During our investigation, we realized that age distributions in the manufacturing sector in the two data sets were relatively similar, while there were somenotable diﬀerences in other industries. Hence, we decided to use only the manufacturing sector for our investigation.
The BSWS was conducted as of June 30th for facts in fixed time such as age
and tenure.

On the other hand, the Diamond survey updates an individual’srecord every time there are press releases, and we often observed that the record
was updated more than once within one year. To create yearly-based panel data,
we picked up information on the individual as of August every year. The Diamondsurvey collects questionnaires from all publicly traded companies between Juneand August of each year, and roughly 62 percent of data is updated in July or
August. Hence, we aggregated the Diamond survey at the end of August, whichroughly corresponds to the information around June.
Because the instructions on the BSWS state that deputy managers of a department (ji-cho) are not included in either directors or section managers, we also
excluded deputy managers of a department for the purpose of this comparison1 .
However, as there is no economic reason to exclude deputy managers of a department from our analysis, we include them in the directors’ group for our analysis in
the following section. The BSWS instructions also suggest that when an employee
is both a director and a board member, he is treated only as a director.
1

The

Including deputy managers of a department in section managers or directors does not change
the results of a comparison between the two data sets. Estimation results are available uponrequest.

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Diamond survey identifies the main and secondary positions for each respondent
separately. We considered a person as a director only when a company reported
that his main position was as a director2 .
Because the BSWS reveals information only for male managers, we compare
data for male managers. Because female managers are scarce, this does not reduce
the number of observations very much. We also drop samples that show logicallyinconsistent observations: one who is less than 15 years old, has a negative valueof tenure, and starts a job when their age is less than 15. These data selection
processes eliminate 18.14 percent of data.
Figure 1 shows the ratio of the number of directors and section managers in
the Diamond survey to that in the BSWS. Because the number appearing in
the BSWS is the estimated population, figures show the estimated proportion of
directors and section managers that the Diamond survey actually covers.
There are three notable features of the Diamond survey. Firstly, there is large
coverage of male directors in the manufacturing sector. In particular, even after
data selection for our analysis, it covers 60 percent of male directors in companies
with more than 1000 regular employees until 2000.
Secondly, the coverage gradually declines, especially in large companies. During this period, Japanese society was quite sensitive regarding the protection of
personal information. In order to introduce the Basic Resident Register Network
in 2002, the protection of privacy became a political issue. In addition, several
information leakages occurred in this period. In the end, the Diet passed a personal information protection law in 2003. This change in public opinion is likely
to reduce the number of responses to the Diamond survey. However, it should
2

Including secondary positions does not influence the results from the comparison of the twodata sets.

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be noted that the Diamond survey still covered more than 10 percent of directors
in Japan in 2005. Hence, this is still the largest data set we can obtain for the
analysis of upper-level managers’ careers in Japan.
Finally, the number of directors is much larger than the number of section
managers. It indicates that most firms have strategies to reveal more information
for higher-ranked managers. As the data do not show the hierarchical structurethat is typical of most organizations, these data are not suitable for examining
the structure of firms.
In order to understand the features of the Diamond survey in detail, we investigate the ratio of the number of directors and section managers in the Diamondsurvey to that in the BSWS by age group.

In order to save space, we discuss

only the data for 1998 and 2005, but similar results are obtained in other years3 .
Figure 2 shows that the response rate is roughly the same between ages 40 and
60, while it is fairly high for other age groups. As shown below, the majority of
directors and section managers are aged between 40 and 60. Hence, this unaccountable feature of the data is less likely to influence the analysis below, although
in order to check the robustness of our results, we also conduct our analysis using
the subsample covering ages 40 to 60.
We compare the age distribution and the length of tenure by age group in bothdata sets by a firm size. Because we obtain similar results in other years, we again
report only the results in 1998 and 20054 . Note that the response rate is highest
in 1998 and lowest in 2005. Hence, the deviation of the Diamond survey fromthe BSWS is smallest in 1998 and largest in 2005. Figure 3 shows the results.
3

The results in other years are reported in figures A-1 to B-6 of the Appendix.
The results for the other firms in other years are reported in figures C-1 to H-6 in the
Appendix.
415

Despite several diﬀerences between the Diamond survey and the BSWS, theage distribution and the length of tenure by age group in both data sets are quite
similar. In particular, the age distribution in 1998 is almost identical in any firm
size groups.

Although some notable diﬀerences between the Diamond Survey

and the BSWS appear in 2005, the age distribution in the Diamond Survey stillbroadly captures the respective age distributions in 2005. We can also find some
diﬀerences in the length of tenure after the age of 60. However, the overall pictureis the same before the age of 60.
Note that the similarity of the age distribution and the length of tenure by
age group holds, even though there is no clear-cut definition of directors (Bucho)
and section managers (Kacho). The Diamond Inc. itself classifies several categories of positions into directors and section managers, while in the BSWS, eachestablishment is asked to classify them.

As there is no objective definition of

directors and section managers, some classifications are influenced subjectively.
Nonetheless, the similarity of age distribution and length of tenure suggests that
there are some common views on these hierarchical ranks. This means that there
is some merit in statistically investigating hierarchical ranks in an economy.
In summary, the Diamond survey captures the overall picture of age distribution and length of tenure by age very well, at least for a carefully chosen subsample. This observation is consistent with one of our presumptions, namely that thefirm’s disclosure strategy is independent of unobserved individual characteristics.
Knowing that this is the largest currently available data set that contains information on careers for upper-level managers, it is worth extracting information fromthis data set, albeit with some caution.

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5. From Section Managers to Directors
In this section, we first analyze the relationship between horizontal transfer andpromotion when managers are section managers or directors. Let us first describe
the simple summary statistics for the speed of promotion to become a director, thetransition matrix across functional departments and the breadth of job transfer
across functional groups.
Table 1 shows the average tenure and age when employees are promoted to
become a director. It shows that the average tenure is roughly 24 years and theaverage age is 48 years when employees are promoted to directorships in Japan.
These numbers roughly confirm the standard view that the speed of promotion
in Japanese firms is slow.

Table 1 also shows that the average tenure and theaverage age do not change over time. Because we know the composition of firm
size changes in our sample, we also report the average tenure and the average
age for firms with 1000 or more employees. Observing that the average age andtenure remain unchanged using the sample of large firms, the selection problem
seems minimal. Hence, slow promotion is less likely to be the result of sample
selection.
In order to investigate horizontal transfers, we categorize departments intonine functional groups: general aﬀairs & press, personnel, accounting, planning,international aﬀairs, research & development, production, sales and others. Table
2 and Table 3 show the transition probabilities across functional groups between
the previous year and the current year. Table 2 shows the transition probability
matrices when section managers and directors are not promoted; Table 3 shows
the matrix for when section managers are promoted to become directors.
The prominent feature of the transition matrixes is that the diagonal of the17matrix is fairly large. This means that transition across functional groups does
not occur frequently. This is consistent with Koike’s observation that employees
spend most of their careers in one functional group (2002a).
More importantly, a comparison of Table 2 and Table 3 reveals a notablediﬀerence: the transition across functional departments increases at the sametime that employees are promoted. That is, the promotion and horizontal transfer
decisions are synchronized.
In order to quantify the magnitude of the diﬀerence, we construct a measureof the average breadth of a job transfer across functional departments. We define
the breadth of job transfers across functional groups at company j as follows:

Breadthj = 1 −9Xsharei P (fj,+1 = i|fj = i)iwhere P (fj,+1 = i|fj = i) is the probability of having a job in functional group i
at company j in the next year when one currently has a job in the same functionalgroup at the same company, and sharei for i = 1...9 represents the distributionof section managers (or directors) among functional departments.

The aver-age breadth of job transfer is a weighted average of this breadth measure acrosscompanies with the number of observations as its weight. This measure can beinterpreted as the average probability of being transferred to a diﬀerent functionalgroup.
Table 4 shows our measure of the average breadth. It shows that when they
are section managers (directors), only 11 (17) percent of employees are transferred to other functional departments; when employees are promoted from section managers to become directors in a year, 33 percent of employees experience
job transfers. Hence, the transition probability to a diﬀerent functional group is18

two or three times larger when they are promoted. That is, a firm synchronizes
its promotion and transfer decisions. Note that the result is also robust acrossyears, implying that it is less likely to be the result of measurement error.
Interestingly, the measure of average breadth also reveals that directors are
more likely to be transferred to other functional departments than section managers. It indicates that when there is no promotion, higher-ranked managers are
more likely to be transferred to other functional departments.
Because these observations are not emphasized in previous literature, it isworth scrutinizing them more closely.

Firstly, we examine whether location

changes may influence the measure of breadth. We split the sample by whether
employees move from headquarters to headquarters, from branch to headquarters,from headquarters to branch or from branch to branch, and estimate our measureof average breadth by each subsample. The results are also reported in Table 4.
This shows that the overall picture does not change across subsamples. It showsthat the probability of being transferred to other functional departments whenemployees are promoted from section managers to become directors is still two or
three times larger than when they stay as section managers (when they stay as
directors) in all samples. This indicates that location changes have little eﬀect
on the frequency of horizontal transfers.
We also investigate whether controlling several observable characteristics of
employees and firms eliminates the results. For this purpose, we investigate thefollowing random logit model. We assume that horizontal transfer occurs betweent + 1 and t if and only if ytj ≥ 0 where ytj is an unobserved latent variable of jth
individuals at year t. We also assume that ytj is determined by:
ytj = α0 + αp I (promotion) + αd I (directors) + β 0 xtj + γ t + γ j + εtj

19

where I (promotion) ( I (directors) ) is 1 when the promotion occurs (an employee is a director) and 0 otherwise, xtj is a vector of observed characteristics
of jth individuals at year t, γ t is a year dummy, γ j is an unobserved individual
specific factor that is independently identically normally distributed with mean 0
and variance σ 2γ , and εtj are independently identically Gumbel distributed. The
control variables include individual characteristics such as tenure, experience atother companies and education dummies, the characteristics of the firm to which
the individual belongs, such as the dummy for listed companies, firm size and thetwo-digit classification of manufacturing industry, and year dummies. The detailsof the control variables are explained in the Appendix.
Table 5 reports the result of the random logit model. It shows that the promotion dummy is positive and significant, which suggests that there are some
unobservable reasons for the synchronization of promotion and horizontal transfer5 .

It also shows that the director dummy is also positive and significant,although the coeﬃcient is much smaller than that of the promotion dummy. We
also conduct two robustness checks. Firstly, because we know that data would
be more reliable between ages 40 and 59, we only use data for this age groupand conduct the same regression analysis. Secondly, because there are gradualreductions in the response rate in our sample over time, we also conduct the same
regression using the subsample that contains a relatively high response rate: between 1999 and 2002. The second and third columns in Table 5 show the resultsof these robustness checks.

This shows that the coeﬃcient and significance ofthe promotion dummy and the director dummy do not change very much, which
5Here, we pay attention to the synchronization of promotion and horizontal transfer, but not
the causality. Therefore, we have no intention of claiming from this evidence that the promotion
decision causes horizontal transfer.

20

confirms that firms synchronize their promotion decisions and horizontal transfer
decisions and that higher-ranked managers are likely to be transferred to otherfunctional departments.

A Formal Model to Explain the Evidence: Now we are ready to formalize
our explanation of the evidence. Suppose that the order of functional transfers is
exogenously given. For example, a firm might decide to transfer a worker withexperience in the sales department to the planning department. If a firm uses thetransfer as a means of building its workers’ multiple job experience, the sequence oftransfers must be designed to achieve the accumulation of skills. Our assumptionmeans that we take this sequence as exogenously given.

This assumption canbe relaxed, but greatly simplifies our notation. Let i denote the ith functional
department to which a worker is transferred. This means that i also measures
the amount of multitasking an employee obtains by working in diﬀerent functional
departments.
Suppose that when employees with characteristics x and i functional experiences produce y (r, i, x) + ε (r, i), r ∈ {s, d} when they are section managers, s, ordirectors, d and y (b, i, x)+ε (b) when they are board members. It is assumed thatε (s, i), ε (d, i) and ε (b) are independently identically Gumbel distributed. Thisrandom variable captures the demand eﬀects on promotions and horizontal transfers suggested by Ariga (2006). The vector, x, can include observable variables
for individual characteristics, firm characteristics and time dummies. We assume
that x evolves through the function x0 = g (x, u) where u is some stochastic factor. These dynamics allow human capital accumulation through experience andemployer learning about the ability of employees. Hence, the model by Gibbons
and Waldman (1999a) can be consistent with this model.

21Suppose that both promotion and horizontal transfer of section managers anddirectors are accompanied by reallocation costs, C (p, h), where p means the decision on promotion and h means the decision on horizontal transfer. Both p andh are 0 or 1, where 0 means that workers stay in the same position and 1 meansthat workers move to new positions.

The reallocation cost from directors who

belong to the ith functional department to board members is given by Cb (i).
We assume that wage payments can be negotiated in each period without
any transaction costs.

Therefore, the Coase theorem suggests that we can fo-

cus on Pareto optimal reallocation of employees without questioning who makes
a decision. Hence, without loss of generality, we assume that a firm makes thereallocation decision and maximizes the total surplus between a firm and an employee.
After producing output, a firm must decide whether the section manager
should stay in the current position, move to another functional department asa section manager, be promoted to become a director of the same functional department, or be promoted to become a director of another functional department.
Similarly, after producing output, a firm must decide whether the director should
stay in the current position, move to another functional department as a director,
or be promoted to board membership. Let β (x) ∈ (0, 1) for all x denote a discount factor, which is a mixture of a standard discount factor and the probabilityof employees staying in this firm. We allow that the probability of staying in thefirm can be a function of x.
We assume that the reservation values of both employees and the firm are 0.
Then, the present value of the stream of the total surplus from employing section
managers, directors and board members with i diﬀerent department experience,
W (s, i, x), W (d, i, x) and W (b, i, x), are expressed by the following Bellman equa-22tions:W (s, i, x) = y (s, i, x) + ε (s, i) + β (x)Z

V (s, i, x0 ) dFs ({ε (r, j)} , u) ,⎧⎫⎨ W (s, i, x0 ) − C (0, 0) , W (s, i + 1, x0 ) − C (0, 1) , ⎬,r ∈where V (s, i, x0 ) = max⎩ W (d, i, x0 ) − C (1, 0) , W (d, i + 1, x0 ) − C (1, 1) ⎭{s, d} and j ∈ {i, i + 1}, andW (d, i, x) = y (d, i, x) + ε (d, i) + β (x)Z

V (d, i, x0 ) dFd ({ε (d, j)} , ε (b) , u)where V (d, i, x0 ) = max {W (d, i, x0 ) − C (0, 0) , W (d, i + 1, x0 ) − C (0, 1) , W (b, i, x0 ) − Cb (i)}and j ∈ {i, i + 1}, andW (b, i, x) = y (b, i, x) + ε (b) + β (x)Z

W (b, i, x0 ) dFb (ε (b) , u) .

The cost C (0, 0) can be 0, but it does not have to be. It can be interpreted as
the cost of maintaining the current skill.
Let Pss (i + 1|s, s, i) Psd (i + 1|d, s, i) and Pdd (i + 1|d, d, i) denote the probability of moving to another functional department when section managers are notpromoted, when section managers are promoted to become directors and when directors are not promoted, respectively. Then, we can prove the following theorem.
The proof is established in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. The probability of being transferred to another functional department is larger when promotion occurs than when employees are directors if and23

only if the reallocation cost is strictly submodular with respect to promotion andhorizontal transfer:
Pdd (i + 1|d, d, i) < Pds (i + 1|d, s, i) , if f C (0, 0) + C (1, 1) < C (0, 1) + C (1, 0) .
Suppose that the marginal benefits from multitask skills are larger for directors
than for section managers, y (d, i + 1, x) − y (d, i, x) > y (s, i + 1, x) − y (s, i, x).
Then, there exists β ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all β (x) ≤ β ∗ , the probability of

being transferred to another functional department is larger when employees are
directors than when they are section managers:
Pss (i + 1|s, s, i) < Pdd (i + 1|d, d, i) .
The second part of theorem 1 shows how multitask skills influence the differences in the transfer probability of directors and section managers.

When

additional new functional experience is more valuable for directors than for section managers, unless the discount factor is too big, the probability of changing
functional departments should be higher for directors than section managers.
More importantly, the first part of theorem 1 derives the condition that thesynchronization of promotion and horizontal transfer does occur. The intuition
behind these results is as follows. Suppose that y (r, i, x) = y and that there isno cost of maintaining skills, C (0, 0) = 0. In this case, the random realizationsof {ε (d, i)} are the only reason for the reallocation of employees.

If a section

manager in a functional department i is transferred to a functional department
i + 1 without promotion, the reallocation cost is C (0, 1); if a section manager
in a functional department i is transferred to a functional department i + 1 as24

a director, the reallocation cost is C (1, 1). Note that when a firm decides thatan employee should be promoted, the firm has in eﬀect already decided to pay
the reallocation cost of C (1, 0). Hence, the additional cost for transferring theemployee to the other functional department is C (1, 1) − C (1, 0). The theorem
shows that synchronized decisions are likely to occur if and only if the additional
cost of reallocation is larger when section managers are not promoted than when
they are promoted, C (0, 1) > C (1, 1) − C (1, 0).

Micro Foundation of Submodular Reallocation Cost Function: Evidence
suggests that transportation costs are unlikely to be the source of the reallocation cost. We conjecture that the cost accompanying skills accumulation is analternative candidate.

We provide a theoretical basis for the submodular costfunction from the perspective of task-specific human capital.
³´
Let Y, Θ, Ĉ be a measure space where Y is a set, Θ is a σ−algebra of its

subsets, and Ĉ is a measure defined on Θ. We assume that the measure Ĉ (H)where H ∈ Θ represents the cost of acquiring skills in a task set H. Let Hr ∈ Θand H j ∈ Θ denote the set of tasks required to perform a job at rank r ∈ {s, d}and in functional department j ∈ {i, i + 1}, respectively.
Suppose that an employee is currently assigned to a functional departmentj = i as a section manager r = s and obtains all the skills corresponding to thetasks in Hs ∪H i . Let H n (p, h) ∈ Θ denote the set of new tasks needed to performnew jobs, where p ∈ {1, 0} means the decision on promotion and h ∈ {1, 0}
means the decision on horizontal transfer, where 0 means that workers stay inthe same position and 1 means that workers move to a new position. Therefore,Ĉ (H n (p, h)) represents the cost of acquiring the task-specific skills required for a25

new position. Assume that there is no depreciation of human capital. We canderive the following theorem. The formal proof is established in the Appendix.
Theorem 2. Suppose that for any set H ∈ Θ\∅, Ĉ (H) > 0. Then, the reallocation cost is submodular with respect to promotion and horizontal transfer:Ĉ (H n (0, 0)) + Ĉ (H n (1, 1)) ≤ Ĉ (H n (0, 1)) + Ĉ (H n (1, 0)) ,¡¢c
where the inequality is strict if and only if Hd ∩ H (i+1) ∩ (Hs ∪ H i ) 6= ∅.

Figure 4 explains the intuitive logic behind Theorem 2. When employees stayin the same position, they do not need to acquire any new skills: H n (0, 0) = ∅.
When employees are promoted to directorships in the functional department, theymust additionally acquire all skills in the sets A or B: H n (1, 0) = A ∪ B. Whenemployees are transferred to another functional department as section managers,
they need to acquire all skills in the sets B or C. Therefore, H n (0, 1) = B ∪ C.
When employees are transferred to another functional department as directors,
they need to acquire all skills in the set A, B or C: H n (1, 1) = A ∪ B ∪ C. Hence:
h
i h
i
n
n
n
n
Ĉ (H (0, 1)) + Ĉ (H (1, 0)) − Ĉ (H (0, 0)) + Ĉ (H (1, 1))= Ĉ (B ∪ C) + Ĉ (A ∪ B) − Ĉ (A ∪ B ∪ C) = Ĉ (B) ≥ 0.

Hence, the reallocation cost is in general submodular and equality holds if and¢¡conly if B = ∅ where B = Hd ∩ H (i+1) ∩ (Hs ∪ H i ) .
Combining the theorems 1 and 2, the following corollary follows.

Corollary 3. Suppose that for any set H ∈ Θ\∅, Ĉ (H) > 0. Then:
Pdd (i + 1|d, d, i) ≤ Pds (i + 1|d, s, i) ,

26

¡
¢
c
where the inequality is strict if and only if Hd ∩ H (i+1) ∩ (Hs ∪ H i ) 6= ∅. Fur-thermore, if the marginal benefits from multitask skills are larger for directors

than for section managers, y (d, i + 1, x) − y (d, i, x) > y (s, i + 1, x) − y (s, i, x),then there exists β ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all β (x) ≤ β ∗ :Pss (i + 1|s, s, i) < Pdd (i + 1|d, d, i) ≤ Pds (i + 1|d, s, i) ,¡¢c
where the inequality is strict if and only if Hd ∩ H (i+1) ∩ (Hs ∪ H i ) 6= ∅.

Hence, insofar as there is a task-specific skill that cannot be acquired as asection manager in a functional department i, but is required to perform new tasks
in a functional department i + 1 and as a director, it is cost eﬀective to transfer
employees when they are promoted. For example, if functional department i + 1
is bigger than functional department i, dealing with a larger staﬀ might be an
important task in functional department i + 1. This task may also be important
for a director, but it may not be important for a section manager in functional
department i. Alternatively, if the accounting department requires more paper
work than the sales department, the tasks in the accounting department might
have similarity to those of directors.
Note that rank-specific skills and department-specific skills cannot explain region B. Region D captures general skills, and regions A and C capture directorspecific skills and functional department i+1-specific skills, respectively. However,the skills in region B are not purely general, purely rank-specific or purely department specific. The corollary suggests that the existence of these types of skills isnecessary in order to explain synchronized decisions of promotion and horizontaltransfer. That is, our analysis suggests that the concept of task-specific humancapital is essential in order to understand the observed synchronized decisions.

27

6. From Director to Board Member
In this section, we investigate the transition from director to board member. We
raise the question of how promotion from director to board member varies acrossfunctional departments. Note that there is no other hierarchical position between
directors and board members. Hence, if skills accumulated as directors are usefulafter promotion, they are only the skills needed for the tasks of board members.
This reasoning makes us separate relatively important task-specific skills for board
members from other kinds of task-specific skills. We show later that our results
are broadly consistent with several theories on entrepreneurial ability.
Let us first describe some simple summary statistics on the speed of promotion
to board membership. Table 6 shows the average tenure and age to be promoted
to board membership, respectively. It shows that the average tenure is roughly 27
years and the average age is 54 years when one is promoted to board membershipin Japan.

These numbers are also consistent with the view that the speed ofpromotion in Japanese firms is slow.

Interestingly, the speed of promotion toboard membership has become slightly slower over time. The average tenure was
26 years and the average age was 53.6 years in 1998, while the average tenure was
29 years and the average age was 54.3 years in 2005.
In order to obtain information on the relative importance of skills necessary
for becoming a board member, we estimate a random logit model. We assume
that promotion of the jth individual occurs between t + 1 and t if and only if
ytj ≥ 0 where ytj is an unobserved latent variable of the jth individual at year t.
We also assume that ytj is determined by:
ytj = ψ 0 +mXhψ h I (j ∈ h) + φ0 xtj + γ t + γ j + εtj ,28

where I (j ∈ h) is a dummy variable of functional departments to which the jthindividual belongs, xtj is a vector of observed characteristics of the jth individual
at year t, γ t is a year dummy, γ j is an unobserved individual-specific factor thatis independently identically normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2γ ,and εtj are independently identically Gumbel distributed. The control variables
are the same as those in the previous section, the details of which are explainedin the Appendix6 .
Table 7 shows our estimates. The first column shows that the directors who
belong to general aﬀairs & press, personnel, accounting and planning departments
have a higher probability of being promoted to board membership, while those who
belong to research and production departments have a lower probability7 . Notethat the benchmark is the sales department. Hence, the coeﬃcient represents thevalue relative to the sales department’s value.
Although we control for standard individual characteristics, if able employees
are more likely to be assigned to these departments, the obtained result may be
influenced by this selection mechanism. In order to separate the skill accumulation eﬀect in each functional department from the selection mechanism, we use
the headquarters dummy as a proxy for unobserved ability.

Our presumption

is that a worker’s boss can observe his/her unobserved ability and select an able
6

For this estimation, we extract the data of individuals who are either directors or board
members, and eliminate the data of individuals who have served as board members during theentire sample period because our focus is on estimating the determinants of directors’ promotion
to board membership. Note that after an individual becomes a board member, subsequent dataon her/him are not used for this estimation.
7“Directors in other departments” also have a higher probability of being promoted to board
membership. We consulted the chief editor in Diamond Inc. about what “other departments”
meant. He said that if they are not able to find a clear category for the positions in questionnaires, they assign it as “other departments”. Because the fraction of “other departments” isless than 0.6 percent in the sample used for this regression analysis, it cannot be representative.
Hence, we simply report the results without any interpretation.

29

worker for transfer to headquarters.
The second column shows that, as expected, the headquarters dummy has
a strong positive eﬀect on the promotion probability, which supports our presumption. More importantly, once we control for the headquarters dummy, thecoeﬃcients of general aﬀairs & press, personnel, planning and production department dummies lose their significance.

Hence, only the accounting department

dummy remains positively significant, and only the research department dummy
remains negatively significant.
We are worried about the possibility that the headquarters dummy captures
a diﬀerent eﬀect than that of unobserved ability.

If many general aﬀairs &press, personnel and planning departments are located at headquarters, it is not
surprising that the coeﬃcients of these departments lose their significance after
controlling for the headquarters dummy. In order to examine how this possibility
influences the result, we only use observations of those working at headquarters.
Based on this relatively more homogenous sample, we obtain the same result,which is reported in the third column: only the accounting department dummy ispositive and significant.
We also conduct other robustness checks by restricting our study to ages between 40 and 59 years and the period between 1999 and 2002. The fourth column
and fifth column report the results of these robustness checks. Although generalaﬀairs & press and personnel departments sometimes show significance, their results are not robust. On the other hand, the coeﬃcients of the accounting andresearch & development department dummies are quite robust: the accounting
department dummy is always positive and significant, while the research & development department dummy is always negative and significant.
How can we interpret these results? Note that the role of directors in Japan is30

diﬀerent from that in the U.S. As indicated in Kaplan (1994), Japan’s corporate
governance system is said to be more consensus-oriented and boards of directors
are granted strong powers to manage the corporation.

That means Japaneseboard members are at least partially involved in the decision processes determining
the strategy of a company. Hence, it is reasonable to receive assistance from thetheory of entrepreneurship in order to interpret these results.
On one hand, the low promotion probability from the research department
implies that specialists are less likely to be top managers. This interpretation isconsistent with arguments in Lazear (2005). Lazear (2005) provides a theory thatagents with a balanced skill set become entrepreneurs and finds that those whohave varied work and educational backgrounds are much more likely to start theirown business than those who have focused on one role at work or concentrated on
one subject at school. As researchers are likely to focus on one subject at work,
our evidence confirms his statement.
On the other hand, the relatively high promotion probability from the accounting department is consistent with the view that emphasizes allocative ability as
the essence of entrepreneurial ability [e.g., Welch (1970), Schultz (1975) and Takii(2003, 2008)]. Welch (1970) points out that the eﬀect of education on the production process can be decomposed into two components. Higher education enables
a worker to increase the amount of output produced from a given quantity of
inputs (the worker eﬀect), while it also allows the worker to interpret information
about the profitability of resource allocation, which enables the worker to makebetter use of resources (the allocative eﬀect). Schultz (1975) describes allocative
ability as entrepreneurial ability and Takii (2003, 2008) models managers’ prediction ability as a source of their allocative ability. Because one of the main tasksof accounting is to allocate funds across several departments, it is reasonable to31

assume that this helps to improve managers’ ability to attain the best allocation.
This assumption is supported by evidence from case studies. Koike (2002b)
conducts several case studies on accounting departments in a Japanese company
and two British companies and finds that the most important skill in accounting
departments is predicting the source of diﬀerences between the planned budget
and actual results. Because of unexpected changes in the environment, the actual
results are always diﬀerent from the original plan. Skillful managers can quickly
detect the reasons for this. Koike (2002b) insists that this skill can be obtained
only from OJT. This evidence supports our interpretation that the relatively
high promotion probability from the accounting department to board membershipindicates that allocative skill is the essence of entrepreneurial ability.
We also conduct the same estimation on firms with 1000 or more employees.
The results are reported in Table 8. Interestingly, not only the accounting department dummy but also the personnel department dummy have a significantly
positive eﬀect on the probability of promotion to board membership. This result
does not change even when we restrict the sample to headquarters, the age tobetween 40 and 59 years and the period to between 1999 and 2002. It implies
that the personnel department is quite important in large firms.
This is interesting, because a major role for personnel departments is likely to
be specific to Japan. Jacoby (2005) points out that, compared with U.S. companies, human resource staﬀs are centralized and conduct organization-oriented
employment decisions in Japan, and that human resource departments rank relatively highly in the corporate hierarchy. Jacoby (2005) also points out that personnel departments in Japan play diverse roles: managing promotion sequencesof employees, negotiating with ubiquitous enterprise unions, weighting employee
pay toward internal factors rather than market rates, maintaining centralized

32

programs for employee training, organizing recreation and welfare. Hence, skills
accumulated in personnel departments are likely to be broader than allocative
ability on its own. That is, evidence suggests that the top managers in Japan’slarge firms needs not only allocative skills but also the skills to supervise workers
in order to maintain Japanese employment practices.

7. Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on the relationship between horizontal transfer
and vertical promotion using the large personnel panel data sets available in Japan,
and interprets this evidence from the perspective of task-specific human capital.
We find that a firm synchronizes its promotion and horizontal transfer decisions.
Using the model of task-specific human capital, we interpret the evidence as thepractice of saving the reallocation cost that arise from the duplication of required
tasks.

We also find that the directors who belong to accounting departments

have the highest probability of being promoted to board membership, while those
who belong to research departments have the lowest.

This suggests that top

managers need balanced skill sets, in which their allocative skills are relatively
more important.
Note that our findings show that some particular pairs of movement are more
frequent than others. Evidence indicates the possibility that the transferability ofhuman capital is likely to be multidimensional. However, this cannot be explainedby either rank-specific skill or department-specific skill. This paper demonstrates
how the concept of task-specific skill can be used to interpret multidimensional
job mobility.
Of course, it might be possible to construct an alternative theory to interpret

33

our evidence. We have no intention of denying other possibilities, but we notethat task-specific human capital can provide a coherent story from the evidence
on promotions from section managers to directors and from directors to board
membership. Hence, we believe that the concept of task-specific human capitalcan be useful for obtaining guidance from the data on career paths.
Hopefully, our analysis provides a meaningful benchmark for stimulating alternative theories, that make it possible to distinguish empirically the importanceof task-specific human capital from other theories.

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㻟㻜㻚㻜㻜

㻞㻜㻚㻜㻜

㻝㻜㻚㻜㻜

㻟

㻠

㻡

㻞㻜
㻜

㻞㻜
㻜

㻝
㻞㻜
㻜

㻞㻜
㻜

㻜
㻞㻜
㻜

㻞

㻥
㻝㻥
㻥

㻞㻜
㻜

㻤
㻝㻥
㻥

㻜㻚㻜㻜

㼅㼑㼍㼞
㻺㼛㼠㼑㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻓㻌㼙㼑㼍㼚㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼌㻮㼍㼟㼕㼏㻌㻿㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼛㼚㻌㼃㼍㼓㼑㻌㻿㼠㼞㼡㼏㼠㼡㼞㼑㻓㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼡㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼌㻹㼕㼚㼕㼟㼠㼞㼥㻌㼛㼒㻌㻴㼑㼍㼘㼠㼔㻘㻌㻸㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼃㼑㼘㼒㼍㼞㼑㻧㻓㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻓㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼙㼑㼍㼚㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻰㼍㼠㼍㼎㼍㼟㼑㻌㻿㼑㼞㼢㼕㼏㼑㻓㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼡㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㻵㼚㼏㻚㻲㼕㼓㼡㼞㼑㻌㻝㻌㻔㻮㻕㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼟㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼒㼕㼞㼙㻌㼟㼕㼦㼑㻌㼕㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼡㼒㼍㼏㼠㼡㼞㼕㼚㼓㻌㼒㼕㼞㼙㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼠㼛㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼛㼚㼑㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻾㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㻔㼟㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㻕
㻡㻚㻜㻜
㻠㻚㻡㻜
㻠㻚㻜㻜

㻾㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㻔㻑㻕

㻟㻚㻡㻜
㻟㻚㻜㻜
㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻜㻜
㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻡㻜㻜㻌䡚㻌㻥㻥㻥㻝㻜㻜㻌䡚㻌㻠㻥㻥

㻞㻚㻡㻜
㻞㻚㻜㻜
㻝㻚㻡㻜
㻝㻚㻜㻜
㻜㻚㻡㻜

㻡
㻞㻜
㻜

㻞
㻞㻜
㻜

㻠

㻝
㻞㻜
㻜

㻞㻜
㻜

㻜
㻞㻜
㻜

㻟

㻥
㻝㻥
㻥

㻞㻜
㻜

㻤
㻝㻥
㻥

㻜㻚㻜㻜

㼅㼑㼍㼞
㻺㼛㼠㼑㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻓㻌㼙㼑㼍㼚㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼌㻮㼍㼟㼕㼏㻌㻿㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼛㼚㻌㼃㼍㼓㼑㻌㻿㼠㼞㼡㼏㼠㼡㼞㼑㻓㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼡㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼌㻹㼕㼚㼕㼟㼠㼞㼥㻌㼛㼒㻌㻴㼑㼍㼘㼠㼔㻘㻌㻸㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼃㼑㼘㼒㼍㼞㼑㻧㻓㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻓㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼙㼑㼍㼚㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻰㼍㼠㼍㼎㼍㼟㼑㻌㻿㼑㼞㼢㼕㼏㼑㻓㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼡㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㻵㼚㼏㻚

38

㻜

㻝㻜㻜

㻞㻜㻜

㻟㻜㻜

㻠㻜㻜

㻡㻜㻜

㻢㻜㻜

㻣㻜㻜

㻤㻜㻜

㻝㻣
䡚

㻝

㻝㻥
㻤䡚

㻞

㻞㻠
㻜䡚

㻞

㻞㻥
㻡䡚

㻟

㻟㻠
㻜䡚

㻟

㻟㻥
㻡䡚

㻠

㻠

㻠㻥
㻡䡚

㻭㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜

㻠㻠
㻜䡚

㻡

㻡㻠
㻜䡚

㻾㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㻔㼐㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼕㼚㻌㻝㻥㻥㻤㻕

㻡

㻡㻥
㻡䡚
㻢

㻢㻠
㻜䡚
㻢

㻡䡚

㼘
㼠㼍
㼀㼛

㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻜㻜
㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻡㻜㻜㻌䡚㻌㻥㻥㻥㻝㻜㻜㻌䡚㻌㻠㻥㻥㻲㼕㼓㼡㼞㼑㻌㻞㻌㻔㻭㻕㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼐㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼠㼛㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼛㼚㼑㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻌㻔㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼒㼕㼞㼙㻌㼟㼕㼦㼑㻕

㻝㻣
䡚

䡚
㻝㻤

㻝㻥

䡚
㻞㻜

㻞㻠

䡚
㻞㻡

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䡚
㻟㻜

㻟㻠

䡚
㻟㻡

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䡚
㻠㻜

䡚
㻠㻡

㻠㻥

㻭㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜

㻠㻠

䡚
㻡㻜

㻡㻠

㻾㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㻔㼐㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼕㼚㻌㻞㻜㻜㻡㻕

䡚
㻡㻡

㻡㻥
䡚
㻢㻜

㻢㻠
䡚
㻢㻡
㼠
㼀㼛

㼍㼘

㻝㻜㻜㻌䡚㻌㻠㻥㻥㻡㻜㻜㻌䡚㻌㻥㻥㻥㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻜㻜

㻺㼛㼠㼑㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻓㻌㼙㼑㼍㼚㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼌㻮㼍㼟㼕㼏㻌㻿㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼛㼚㻌㼃㼍㼓㼑㻌㻿㼠㼞㼡㼏㼠㼡㼞㼑㻓㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼡㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼌㻹㼕㼚㼕㼟㼠㼞㼥㻌㼛㼒㻌㻴㼑㼍㼘㼠㼔㻘㻌㻸㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼃㼑㼘㼒㼍㼞㼑㻧㻓㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻓㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼙㼑㼍㼚㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㼌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㻰㼍㼠㼍㼎㼍㼟㼑㻌㻿㼑㼞㼢㼕㼏㼑㻓㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼡㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㻵㼚㼏㻚

㻜

㻡

㻝㻜

㻝㻡

㻞㻜

㻞㻡

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㻟㻡

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㻡㻜

㻲㼕㼓㼡㼞㼑㻌㻞㻌㻔㻯㻕㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼐㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼠㼛㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼛㼚㼑㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻌㻔㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼒㼕㼞㼙㻌㼟㼕㼦㼑㻕㻺㼛㼠㼑㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻓㻌㼙㼑㼍㼚㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼌㻮㼍㼟㼕㼏㻌㻿㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼛㼚㻌㼃㼍㼓㼑㻌㻿㼠㼞㼡㼏㼠㼡㼞㼑㻓㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼡㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼌㻹㼕㼚㼕㼟㼠㼞㼥㻌㼛㼒㻌㻴㼑㼍㼘㼠㼔㻘㻌㻸㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼃㼑㼘㼒㼍㼞㼑㻧㻓㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻓㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼙㼑㼍㼚㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㼌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㻰㼍㼠㼍㼎㼍㼟㼑㻌㻿㼑㼞㼢㼕㼏㼑㻓㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼡㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㻵㼚㼏㻚㻾㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㻔㻑㻕

㻜

㻡

㻝㻜

㻝㻡

㻞㻜

㻞㻡

㻝㻣
䡚
㻝㻤

㻝㻥
䡚
㻞㻜

㻞㻠
䡚
㻞㻡

㻞㻥
䡚
㻟㻜

㻟㻠
䡚
㻟㻡

㻟㻥
䡚

㻠㻠
㻠㻥
䡚
䡚
㻠㻜
㻠㻡
㻭㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜

㻡㻜

㻡㻠
䡚

㻾㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㻔㼟㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㻌㼕㼚㻌㻝㻥㻥㻤㻕

㻡㻡

㻡㻥
䡚

㻢㻜

㻢㻠
䡚

㻢㻡

䡚

㼘
㼠㼍
㼀㼛

㻝㻜㻜㻌䡚㻌㻠㻥㻥㻡㻜㻜㻌䡚㻌㻥㻥㻥㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻜㻜

㻲㼕㼓㼡㼞㼑㻌㻞㻌㻔㻮㻕㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼟㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼠㼛㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼛㼚㼑㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻌㻔㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼒㼕㼞㼙㻌㼟㼕㼦㼑㻕

㻝㻣
䡚

㻝㻤

㻝㻥
䡚

㻞㻜

㻞㻠
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㻟㻜

㻟㻠
䡚

㻟㻡

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䡚

㻠㻠
䡚

㻠㻡

㻭㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜

㻠㻜

㻠㻥
䡚

㻡㻜

㻡㻠
䡚

㻡㻡

㻡㻥
䡚

㻾㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㻔㼟㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㻌㼕㼚㻌㻞㻜㻜㻡㻕

㻢㻜

㻢㻠
䡚

㻢㻡

䡚

㼘
㼠㼍
㼀㼛

㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻜㻜
㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻡㻜㻜㻌䡚㻌㻥㻥㻥㻝㻜㻜㻌䡚㻌㻠㻥㻥㻺㼛㼠㼑㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻓㻌㼙㼑㼍㼚㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼌㻮㼍㼟㼕㼏㻌㻿㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼛㼚㻌㼃㼍㼓㼑㻌㻿㼠㼞㼡㼏㼠㼡㼞㼑㻓㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼡㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼌㻹㼕㼚㼕㼟㼠㼞㼥㻌㼛㼒㻌㻴㼑㼍㼘㼠㼔㻘㻌㻸㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼃㼑㼘㼒㼍㼞㼑㻧㻓㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻓㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼙㼑㼍㼚㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㼌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㻰㼍㼠㼍㼎㼍㼟㼑㻌㻿㼑㼞㼢㼕㼏㼑㻓㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼡㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㻵㼚㼏㻚

㻜

㻜㻚㻡

㻝

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㻞

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㻝㻣

㻜

㻭㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻺㼛㼠㼑㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻓㻌㼙㼑㼍㼚㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼌㻮㼍㼟㼕㼏㻌㻿㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼛㼚㻌㼃㼍㼓㼑㻌㻿㼠㼞㼡㼏㼠㼡㼞㼑㻓㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼡㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼌㻹㼕㼚㼕㼟㼠㼞㼥㻌㼛㼒㻌㻴㼑㼍㼘㼠㼔㻘㻌㻸㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼃㼑㼘㼒㼍㼞㼑㻧㻓㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻓㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼙㼑㼍㼚㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㼌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㻰㼍㼠㼍㼎㼍㼟㼑㻌㻿㼑㼞㼢㼕㼏㼑㻓㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼡㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㻵㼚㼏㻚㻺㼛㼠㼑㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻓㻌㼙㼑㼍㼚㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼌㻮㼍㼟㼕㼏㻌㻿㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼛㼚㻌㼃㼍㼓㼑㻌㻿㼠㼞㼡㼏㼠㼡㼞㼑㻓㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼡㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼌㻹㼕㼚㼕㼟㼠㼞㼥㻌㼛㼒㻌㻴㼑㼍㼘㼠㼔㻘㻌㻸㼍㼎㼛㼡㼞㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼃㼑㼘㼒㼍㼞㼑㻧㻓㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻓㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼙㼑㼍㼚㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㼌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㻰㼍㼠㼍㼎㼍㼟㼑㻌㻿㼑㼞㼢㼕㼏㼑㻓㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼡㼏㼠㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㻵㼚㼏㻚

41

42

Table 1: Promotion Speed (Section Managers -> Directors)
all firms
Obs. Mean year
tenure5339
23.986Overallage
5369
48.280tenure832
24.132
1998
age
832
48.105tenure892
23.9361999
age
888
47.894tenure774
24.292
2000
age
812
48.740tenure964
23.5102001
age
955
47.936tenure654
24.0862002
age
653
48.513tenure550
24.2252003
age
551
48.782tenure379
23.8342004
age
379
48.596tenure294
24.0102005
age
299
47.933tenure342
32.298High Schoolage
344
52.471tenure1966
23.443National University
age
1998
48.189tenure188
24.452Public Universityage
189
49.005tenure2843
23.331
Private University
age
2838
47.789We define that large firms hire 1000 employees or more.

43

S.D.
6.912
4.955
6.913
4.537
6.688
4.616
6.989
5.114
7.429
5.124
7.110
5.208
6.578
5.063
6.560
4.929
6.175
5.141
8.134
4.105
6.280
4.731
6.659
4.697
6.531
4.979

large firms
Obs. Mean year
3447
23.7543477
47.906524
24.321524
47.996619
23.654615
47.506482
24.394520
48.783673
22.966670
47.284438
23.957437
48.037363
23.931363
48.581172
23.465172
48.122
176
23.097176
46.881
168
33.780169
52.4971431
23.0521463
47.767115
24.426116
48.8281733
23.3171729
47.512

S.D.
6.619
4.884
6.305
4.464
6.604
4.514
6.276
4.783
7.320
5.166
6.712
5.204
6.522
4.889
6.131
4.966
5.787
5.044
6.144
3.492
6.074
4.731
6.623
5.019
6.310
4.888

Table 2: Transition Matrix (Non-Promoted Sample)
Non-Promoted Section Managers
present term

previous term

generaldepartment
affairs & personnel accounting planningpress
general affairs & press
83.74
2.62
1.31
1.38
personnel
5.06
88.55
0.36
0.60
accounting
2.10
0.26
93.43
1.40
planning
1.86
1.43
0.64
80.23
sales
0.82
0.19
0.27
1.16
international affairs
0.66
0.16
0.00
1.48
research & development (R&D)
0.48
0.46
0.06
2.03
production
1.29
0.36
0.10
0.89
others
3.45
3.45
0.00
6.90
total
5.14
2.95
3.82
5.02

research &internation
developme production
al affairs
nt (R&D)
3.86
0.28
0.96
5.58
2.05
0.12
0.96
2.17
1.31
0.00
0.44
0.88
5.85
0.50
5.71
3.57
90.14
0.68
2.81
3.93
5.43
87.50
2.47
1.81
3.53
0.23
88.16
5.00
4.02
0.04
4.16
89.09
3.45
0.00
3.45
0.00
31.20
2.11
21.81
27.81

sales

others
0.28
0.12
0.18
0.21
0.01
0.49
0.06
0.06
79.31
0.15

total
100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00Non-Promoted Directors
present term

previous term

generaldepartment
affairs & personnel accounting planningpress
general affairs & press
79.19
1.81
0.96
2.69
personnel
4.41
82.44
0.30
2.74
accounting
3.06
0.34
88.33
3.09
planning
2.19
0.92
1.01
73.43
sales
1.28
0.33
0.17
1.96
international affairs
0.96
0.15
0.34
2.64
research & development (R&D)
0.80
0.27
0.08
2.73
production
1.37
0.45
0.10
1.48
others
4.20
0.70
0.93
5.59
total
4.71
2.11
2.13
6.28

44

research &internation
developme production
al affairs
nt (R&D)
7.02
0.26
2.47
5.45
3.92
0.34
2.23
3.39
3.02
0.16
0.79
1.08
8.91
0.76
8.28
4.31
86.25
0.80
4.39
4.69
12.92
78.27
2.55
2.04
5.77
0.28
82.92
7.04
6.12
0.24
6.84
83.33
19.58
2.33
8.16
10.26
36.35
2.35
23.56
22.33

sales

others
0.15
0.23
0.13
0.19
0.13
0.13
0.10
0.08
48.25
0.20

total
100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00Table 3: Transition Matrix (Promoted Sample)
Section Managers promoted to be a director
present term

previous term

generaldepartment
affairs & personnel accounting planningpress
general affairs & press
48.51
5.94
3.63
7.26
personnel
15.47
53.59
0.55
7.73
accounting
7.17
1.35
67.71
7.17
planning
5.56
1.67
3.89
47.78
sales
2.17
0.53
0.66
3.28
international affairs
1.29
0.65
0.65
4.52
research & development (R&D)
1.53
0.89
0.06
5.17
production
2.28
1.07
0.38
3.79
others
0.00
0.00
8.33
12.50
total
4.84
2.52
3.04
6.75

45

research &internation
developme production
al affairs
nt (R&D)
17.49
0.66
4.29
10.89
9.39
0.00
3.87
8.29
8.52
0.45
1.35
3.59
15.83
1.94
13.33
7.78
74.14
1.55
7.79
8.50
25.81
49.03
9.03
5.81
9.89
0.64
65.50
14.41
10.62
0.63
15.23
64.85
16.67
0.00
12.50
4.17
32.87
2.12
23.02
23.11

sales

others
1.32
1.10
2.69
2.22
1.37
3.23
1.91
1.14
45.83
1.73

total
100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00100.00Table 4: The breadth of transfers across departments
S.M. -> S.M. S.M. -> D.M. D.M. -> D.M.
Obs.
487
494
1598
Overall
Mean
0.114
0.333
0.165
S.D.
0.074
0.162
0.067
Obs.
52
57
60
1998 to 1999
Mean
0.109
0.328
0.169
S.D.
0.075
0.160
0.067
Obs.
62
69
71
1999 to 2000
Mean
0.111
0.325
0.168
S.D.
0.074
0.177
0.067
Obs.
66
79
88
2000 to 2001
Mean
0.113
0.335
0.166
S.D.
0.070
0.159
0.067
Obs.
96
80
145
2001 to 2002
Mean
0.116
0.326
0.165
S.D.
0.072
0.158
0.068
Obs.
71
76
205
2002 to 2003
Mean
0.118
0.330
0.163
S.D.
0.075
0.150
0.067
Obs.
54
73
269
2003 to 2004
Mean
0.125
0.332
0.161
S.D.
0.076
0.171
0.067
Obs.
86
60
760
2004 to2005
Mean
0.116
0.375
0.158
S.D.
0.077
0.154
0.069
HQ to HQ
Obs.
209
182
701
Mean
0.110
0.327
0.167
S.D.
0.079
0.180
0.072
HQ to Branch Offices
Obs.
11
65
41
Mean
0.127
0.338
0.181
S.D.
0.066
0.165
0.062
Branch Offices to HQ
Obs.
7
30
69
Mean
0.139
0.372
0.182
S.D.
0.082
0.148
0.063
Branch to Branch Office
Obs.
260
217
787
Mean
0.114
0.328
0.161
S.D.
0.070
0.151
0.064
S.M. represensts a section manager while D.M. indicatesa director.

46

Table 5: Randon Logit Estimations of Functional Transfer (Marginal Effects)
(1)
(2)
(3)
full samples
40-59 years of age
1999-2002
horizontal transfer
horizontal transfer
horizontal transfer
promotion (1)1.618 ***
1.616 ***
1.637 ***
(section manager to director)(0.055)(0.056)(0.065)
director (=1)
0.498 ***
0.492 ***
0.496 ***
(0.038)(0.038)(0.043)HQ
0.405 ***
0.403 ***
0.377 ***
(0.019)(0.019)(0.022)company type
0.145
0.102
0.073
(0.112)(0.113)(0.159)large firm
-0.303 ***-0.318 ***-0.018(0.075)(0.076)(0.152)
midium firm
-0.425 ***-0.444 ***-0.086(0.077)(0.078)(0.153)small firm
-0.665 ***-0.674 ***-0.373 *(0.078)(0.079)(0.154)
national univerity
1.005 ***
1.027 ***
1.152 ***
(0.174)(0.186)(0.198)public university
0.879 *
0.889 *
1.015 *
(0.342)(0.367)(0.395)
private university
0.573 ***
0.563 **
0.637 ***
(0.168)(0.180)(0.192)Yes
Yes
Yes
year dummy
Yes
Yes
Yes
home area
Yes
Yes
Yes
manufacturing typeindividual characteristics
Yes
Yes
Yes
(tenure and other_tenure)Yes
cohort effectYes
Yespanel-lelvel variance component-0.007-0.0170.134 ***
constant(0.034)(0.035)(0.039)N
12613912246494585
log likelihood-5.61E+04-5.47E+04-4.23E+04
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. The coefficients are the marginal
effects of the independent variables. The reference group for the firm size is the smaller firm where thenumber of employees is 99 or less. The reference group for education is high school graduates. The cohort
effect is defined by the dummies of education times the time trend term. The dependent variable is adummy indicating one if an employee transferred across departments over the past year. The second
column restricts the sample to those aged 40 years or more and 59 years or less. The third column uses the
subsample covering the period from 1999 to 2002. Note that the data as of 1999 cover promotion from1998 to 1999.

47

Table 6: Promotion Speed (Directors->Boad Members)

Overall
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
High School
National University
Public University
Private University

tenureage
tenureage
tenureage
tenureage
tenureage
tenureage
tenureage
tenureage
tenureage
tenureage
tenureage
tenureage
tenureage

Obs. Mean year
8904
26.9448928
53.943711
26.065710
53.6441042
26.0061043
53.8961107
26.2111111
53.8381339
26.7071346
53.9131174
26.5951180
53.7041324
27.1581332
53.9781192
27.7681187
54.1491015
28.7941019
54.345220
29.25022054.0273744
26.2243759
54.218357
27.868359
54.3124583
27.3504590
53.68648

S.D.
10.1693.935
10.8383.650
11.0693.897
10.8004.038
10.362
3.781
10.239
4.230
9.962
3.819
9.469
4.070
8.269
3.852
12.527
4.399
10.717
3.474
9.455
3.543
9.578
4.265

Table 7:

Marginal Effects on the Promotion Probability: Random Logit Estimations (All Firms)
all firms
all firms
all firms
Dependent variable:
without HQwith HQ
only with HQ=1
promotion (2)general affairs & press
personnel
accounting
planning
international affairs
research & development(R&D)
production
others0.164 *
(0.068)0.413 ***
(0.091)
0.788 ***
(0.082)0.244 ***
(0.061)0.020(0.097)-0.274 ***(0.045)-0.095 *(0.042)0.897 ***
(0.250)No

HQ
company typefirm size dummy
year dummy
manufacturing typeindividual characteristics
cohort effecthome area
panel-level variancecomponent-0.434 **(0.132)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.067(0.072)0.179(0.096)
0.465 ***
(0.087)0.011(0.064)-0.174(0.103)-0.287 ***(0.047)0.020(0.045)0.780 **
(0.266)
1.128 ***
(0.041)-0.394 **(0.140)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.072(0.112)0.2358(0.150)0.7034 ***(0.132)0.0252(0.098)-0.29(0.161)-0.4188 ***(0.080)0.0396(0.081)1.1477 **(0.409)No-0.4347(0.225)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

all firms
40-59 years of age
with HQ-0.084(0.075)0.244 *
(0.099)0.482 ***
(0.091)0.018(0.067)-0.169(0.107)-0.267 ***(0.049)0.020(0.047)0.880 **
(0.283)
1.132 ***
(0.043)-0.383 **(0.145)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

all firms
1999-2002 years
with HQ-0.295 **(0.105)0.202(0.129)0.436 ***
(0.118)0.061(0.086)-0.242(0.138)-0.344 ***(0.062)-0.067(0.060)0.678(0.364)1.036 ***
(0.055)-0.895 ***(0.211)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.061
0.422 **
1.7912 ***0.522 ***
0.880 ***
(0.163)(0.141)(0.108)(0.143)(0.176)N11844811844852986
11526287098-2.12E+04-1.41E+04-2.28E+04-2.22E+04-1.36E+04
log likelihood
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. The coefficients are the marginal effects of the independent variables. The
reference group for departments is the sales department. There are four types of firm size determined by the number of employees: large,
medium, small and minute. The individual characteristics include individual tenure, tenure at other firms and education. The reference groupfor education is high school graduates. Cohort effect 1 (2 and 3) is defined by the dummy of a national university graduate (public and private
university graduate, respectively) times the time trend term. The dependent variable "Promotion (2)" implies promotion from being a director
to board membership. The fourth column restricts the sample to those aged 40 years or more and 59 years or less. The fifth column uses the
subsample covering the period from 1999 to 2002. Note that the data as of 1999 cover promotion from 1998 to 1999.
constant

49

Table 8:

Marginal Effects on the Promotion Probability: Random Logit Estimations (Only Large Firms)
large firms
large firms
large firms
large firms
large firms
Dependent variable:
40-59 years of age
1999-2002 years
without HQwith HQ
only with HQ=1
promotion (2)with HQwith HQ-0.011-0.207-0.227-0.247 *-0.481 **general affairs & press(0.102)(0.108)(0.169)(0.112)(0.153)0.511 ***
0.313 *
0.454 *
0.412 ***
0.376 *
personnel(0.116)(0.122)(0.193)(0.124)(0.153)0.935 ***
0.632 ***
0.974 ***
0.668 ***
0.642 ***
accounting(0.119)(0.125)(0.190)(0.129)(0.157)0.199 *
-0.0280.003-0.0270.085
planning(0.081)(0.085)(0.129)(0.087)(0.106)-0.030-0.209-0.314-0.204-0.302international affairs(0.125)(0.130)(0.204)(0.135)(0.169)-0.316 ***-0.313 ***-0.405 ***-0.300 ***-0.337 ***research & development(0.059)(0.061)(0.103)(0.063)(0.076)(R&D)-0.184 **-0.047-0.064-0.043-0.114
production(0.059)(0.062)(0.111)(0.063)(0.078)0.872 **
0.719 *
1.203 *
0.676
0.627
others(0.337)(0.357)(0.558)(0.377)(0.491)1.211 ***
1.219 ***
1.118 ***
No
HQ
No
(0.055)(0.058)(0.071)-0.918 ***-0.710 **-0.765 *-0.678 **-1.275 ***company type(0.232)(0.244)(0.376)(0.251)(0.311)
No
No
No
No
No
firm size dummy
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
year dummy
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
manufacturing type
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
individual characteristics
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
cohort effect
Yes
Yes
Yes
home area
Yes
Yes
panel-level variancecomponent
0.386 *
0.639 ***
1.932 ***
0.694 ***
0.913 ***
constant-0.187-0.1660.094(0.174)(0.221)
79090
79090
33969
77420
61615
N
-8.81E+03-7.79E+03-1.25E+04-1.34E+04-1.30E+04
log likelihood
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. The coefficients are the marginal effects of the independent variables. We
use samples of large firms. A large firm is defined as having 1000 employees or more. The reference group for departments is the sales
department. There are four types of firm size determined by the number of employees: large, medium, small and minute. The individual
characteristics include individual tenure, tenure at other firms and education. The reference group for education is high school graduates.
Cohort effect 1 (2 and 3) is defined by the dummy of a national university graduate (public and private university graduate, respectively) times
the time trend term. The dependent variable "Promotion (2)" implies promotion from being a director to board membership. The fourth column
restricts the sample to those aged 40 years or more and 59 years or less. The fifth column uses the subsample covering the period from 1999 to
2002. Note that the data as of 1999 cover promotion from 1998 to 1999.

50

8. Appendix
The Proof of Theorem 1: Let Pwvzy (w, v|z, y) denote the probability of reallocation from the yth functional department at rank z to the vth functional
department at rank w. Define W ∗ (r, i, x) = W (r, i, x) − ε (r, i), r ∈ {s, d}, andW ∗ (b, i, x) = W (b, i, x) − ε (b). Then, we can derive:

exp [W ∗ (d, i + 1, x0 ) − C (1, 1)],M
exp [W ∗ (d, i, x0 ) − C (1, 0)],Pdisi (d, i|s, i) =M
exp [W ∗ (s, i + 1, x0 ) − C (0, 1)],
Ps(i+1)si (s, i + 1|s, i) =M
exp [Ws∗ (s, i, x0 ) − C (0, 0)],Psisi (s, i|s, i) =M

Pd(i+1)si (d, i + 1|s, i) =where M = exp⎡⎤

W ∗ (s, i, x0 )⎣ s⎦−C (0, 0)⎤⎡∗0W (d, i + 1, x )
⎦ and
exp ⎣
−C (1, 1)⎡+exp ⎣∗0

W (s, i + 1, x )−C (0, 1)⎤⎡⎦+exp ⎣∗0

W (d, i, x )−C (1, 0)⎤⎦+

exp [W ∗ (d, i + 1, x0 ) − C (0, 1)],N
exp [W ∗ (d, i, x0 ) − C (0, 0)],
Pdidi (d, i|d, i) =N

Pd(i+1)di (d, i + 1|d, i) =⎡where N = exp ⎣∗0W (d, i, x )⎤⎡⎦+exp ⎣∗0

W (d, i + 1, x )⎤⎡⎦+exp ⎣∗0

W (b, i, x )⎤⎦.

−C (0, 0)−C (0, 1)−Cb (i)Hence, Psd (i + 1|i, s, d), Pss (i + 1|s, s, i) and Pdd (i + 1|d, d, i) can be derived by51

applying Bayes’ rule:Pds (i + 1|d, s, i) =1
1 + exp {[W ∗ (d, i, x0 ) − C (1, 0)] − [W ∗ (d, i + 1, x0 ) − C (1, 1)]}1
1 + exp {[W ∗ (s, i, x0 ) − C (0, 0)] − [W ∗ (s, i + 1, x0 ) − C (0, 1)]}
1
Pdd (i + 1|d, d, i) =∗0
1 + exp {[W (d, i, x ) − C (0, 0)] − [W ∗ (d, i + 1, x0 ) − C (0, 1)]}
Pss (i + 1|s, s, i) =Comparing Pds (i + 1|d, s, i) and Pdd (i + 1|d, d, i), we can obtain the following
relationship.
Pdd (i + 1|d, d, i) < Pds (i + 1|d, s, i)
if f C (0, 0) + C (1, 1) < C (0, 1) + C (1, 0) .
This proves the first part of the theorem. Moreover, we can also obtain:
Pss (i + 1|s, s, i) < Pdd (i + 1|d, d, i)
if f [W ∗ (d, i + 1, x0 ) − W ∗ (d, i, x0 )] > [W ∗ (s, i + 1, x0 ) − W ∗ (s, i, x0 )] .
Note that[W ∗ (d, i + 1, x0 ) − W ∗ (d, i, x0 )] − [W ∗ (s, i + 1, x0 ) − W ∗ (s, i, x0 )]= [y (d, i + 1, x) − y (d, i, x)] − [y (s, i + 1, x) − y (s, i, x)] + β (x) V ∗

⎧ £R
¤ ⎫
R
⎨
0
0
V (d, i + 1, x ) dFd ({ε (d, j)} , ε (b) , u) − V (d, i, x ) dFd ({ε (d, j)} , ε (b) , u) ⎬where V ∗ =
£R
¤
R
⎩
⎭
− V (s, i + 1, x0 ) dFs ({ε (r, j)} , u) − V (s, i, x0 ) dFs ({ε (r, j)} , u)Because V ∗ is bounded, if y (d, i + 1, x)−y (d, i, x) > y (s, i + 1, x)−y (s, i, x), then52

there exists β ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all β (x) ≤ β ∗ :Pss (i + 1|s, s, i) < Pdd (i + 1|d, d, i) .
Hence, the desired result is immediate. Q.E.D.

¡¢
The Proof of Theorem 2: Note that H n (0, 0) = ∅, H n (0, 1) = Hs ∪ H (i+1) ∩¡¢cc(Hs ∪ H i ) , H n (1, 0) = (Hd ∪ H i ) ∩ (Hs ∪ H i ) and H n (1, 1) = Hd ∪ H (i+1) ∩cc(Hs ∪ H i ) . Hence, it is rewritten that H n (0, 1) = H (i+1) ∩(Hs ∪ H i ) , H n (1, 0) =
£
c
c¤ £
c¤
Hd ∩(Hs ∪ H i ) and H n (1, 1) = Hd ∩ (Hs ∪ H i ) ∪ H (i+1) ∩ (Hs ∪ H i ) . Therefore:Ĉ (H n (0, 0)) + Ĉ (H n (1, 1))££¡¡¢c ¤ £¢c ¤¤= Ĉ Hd ∩ Hs ∪ H i ∪ H (i+1) ∩ Hs ∪ H i
¡
¡
¡
¢c ¢
¡
¢c ¢
≤ Ĉ H (i+1) ∩ Hs ∪ H i+ Ĉ Hd ∩ Hs ∪ H i= Ĉ (H n (0, 1)) + Ĉ (H n (1, 0))

Because, for any set H ∈ Θ\∅, Ĉ (H) > 0, the inequality is strict if:£¢c ¤ £¢c ¤¡¡Hd ∩ Hs ∪ H i ∩ H (i+1) ∩ Hs ∪ H i¢c¡= Hd ∩ H (i+1) ∩ Hs ∪ H i .

∅ 6=

Q.E.D.

53

Appendix table: Definition of Variables
Variables
promotion (1)promotion (2)horizontal transfer
Department type
General affairs & press

Definition= 1 if an individual is promoted from a director to a board member= 1 if an individual is promoted from a section manager to a director= 1 if an individual transfers across departments= 1 if an individual belongs to the department of general affairs and press when she/he is adirector.

Sales
Personnel
Accounting
Planning
International affairs
Research & development= 1 if an individual belongs to the sales department when she/he is a director.
= 1 if an individual belongs to the personnel department when she/he is a director.
= 1 if an individual belongs to the accounting department when she/he is a director.
= 1 if an individual belongs to the planning department when she/he is a director.
= 1 if an individual belongs to the international affairs department when she/he is a director.
= 1 if an individual belongs to the research and development department when she/he is adirector.

Production
Others= 1 if an individual belongs to the production department when she/he is a director.
= 1 if an individual belongs to other departments when she/he is a director.

Company type
HQ

= 1 if a company is listed on a regional stock market or the JASDAQ.
= 1 if an individual works in the headquarters.

TenureTenure is defined by the difference between the current year and the year an individual
joined the company.

Other_tenure

Other_tenure is defined by the difference between the year an individual joined the current
company and her/his graduation year.

National univ.
Public univ.
Private univ.

= 1 if an individual graduated from a national university.
= 1 if an individual graduated from a prefectural or municipal university.
= 1 if an individual graduated from a private university.

Cohort 1
Cohort 2
Cohort 3

national univ. dummy × a time trend
public univ. dummy × a time trend
private univ. dummy × a time trend

Manufacturing types

Middle-classified manufacturing sector where an individual belongs to a firm in the textile,
pulp/paper, chemistry, drug medicine, petroleum & coal, rubber, glassware, steel,
nonferrous metal, metal, machinery, electric, accurate instrument, transportation, or otherindustries.
The block area where an individual is from (Hokkaido/Tohoku, Kita-Kanto/Koushinetsu,
Minami-Kanto, Hokuriku, Tokai, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku, Kyushu/Okinawa)Home area

year dummy

1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005
Note that the data as of 1999 cover promotion from 1998 to 199954㻭㼜㼜㼑㼚㼐㼕㼤㻌㻔㻭㻙㻝㻕㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼐㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㼟㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼠㼛㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼛㼚㼑㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻌㻔㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼒㼕㼞㼙㻌㼟㼕㼦㼑㻕㻭㼜㼜㼑㼚㼐㼕㼤㻌㻔㻭㻙㻞㻕㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼐㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼠㼛㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼛㼚㼑㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻌㻔㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼒㼕㼞㼙㻌㼟㼕㼦㼑㻕㻾㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㻔㼐㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼕㼚㻌㻞㻜㻜㻜㻕㻾㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㻔㼐㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㼕㼚㻌㻝㻥㻥㻥㻕
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㻭㼜㼜㼑㼚㼐㼕㼤㻌㻔㻮㻙㻝㻕㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼟㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼠㼛㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼛㼚㼑㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻌㻔㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼒㼕㼞㼙㻌㼟㼕㼦㼑㻕㻭㼜㼜㼑㼚㼐㼕㼤㻌㻔㻮㻙㻞㻕㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼟㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼠㼛㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼛㼚㼑㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻌㻔㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㼒㼕㼞㼙㻌㼟㼕㼦㼑㻕㻾㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㻔㼟㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㻌㼕㼚㻌㻝㻥㻥㻥㻕㻾㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㻔㼟㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㻌㼕㼚㻌㻞㻜㻜㻜㻕
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㻭㼜㼜㼑㼚㼐㼕㼤㻌㻔㻯㻙㻝㻕㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼐㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼠㼛㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼠㼛㼠㼍㼘㻌㼛㼚㼑㼟㻘㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼠㼑㼚㼡㼞㼑㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼐㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㼍㼚㼐㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻌㼕㼚㻌㻝㻥㻥㻥㻭㼜㼜㼑㼚㼐㼕㼤㻌㻔㻯㻙㻞㻕㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼟㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼠㼛㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼠㼛㼠㼍㼘㻌㼛㼚㼑㼟㻘㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼠㼑㼚㼡㼞㼑㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼟㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻌㼕㼚㻌㻝㻥㻥㻥㻿㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㻌㻔㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻕㻰㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌䠄㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻕
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㻭㼜㼜㼑㼚㼐㼕㼤㻌㻔㻰㻙㻝㻕㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼐㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼠㼛㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼠㼛㼠㼍㼘㻌㼛㼚㼑㼟㻘㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼠㼑㼚㼡㼞㼑㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼐㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㼍㼚㼐㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻌㼕㼚㻌㻞㻜㻜㻜㻭㼜㼜㼑㼚㼐㼕㼤㻌㻔㻰㻙㻞㻕㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼟㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼠㼛㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼠㼛㼠㼍㼘㻌㼛㼚㼑㼟㻘㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼠㼑㼚㼡㼞㼑㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼟㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻌㼕㼚㻌㻞㻜㻜㻜㻿㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㻌㻔㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻕㻰㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㻔㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻕
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㻭㼜㼜㼑㼚㼐㼕㼤㻌㻔㻲㻙㻝㻕㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼐㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼠㼛㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼠㼛㼠㼍㼘㻌㼛㼚㼑㼟㻘㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼠㼑㼚㼡㼞㼑㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼐㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㼍㼚㼐㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻌㼕㼚㻌㻞㻜㻜㻞㻭㼜㼜㼑㼚㼐㼕㼤㻌㻔㻲㻙㻞㻕㻦㻌㼀㼔㼑㻌㼞㼍㼠㼕㼛㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼚㼡㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼟㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼠㼛㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼠㼛㼠㼍㼘㻌㼛㼚㼑㼟㻘㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼠㼑㼚㼡㼞㼑㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼍㼘㼑㻌㼟㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㼟㻌㼎㼥㻌㼍㼓㼑㻌㼓㼞㼛㼡㼜㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻰㼕㼍㼙㼛㼚㼐㻌㼟㼡㼞㼢㼑㼥㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻮㻿㼃㻿㻌㼕㼚㻌㻞㻜㻜㻞㻰㼕㼞㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㻌㻔㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻕㻿㼑㼏㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼙㼍㼚㼍㼓㼑㼞㻌㻔㻻㼢㼑㼞㻌㻝㻘㻜㻜㻜㻕

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