PDPRIETI Policy Discussion Paper Series 13-P-003

Foreign Direct Investment in East Asia

THORBECKE, Willem
RIETI

Nimesh SALIKE
Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University

The Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry

http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/

RIETI Policy Discussion Paper Series 13-P-003
March 2013

Foreign Direct Investment in East Asia *Willem THORBECKE
Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry
Nimesh SALIKE
Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University
Abstract
This paper surveys research on foreign direct investment (FDI) in East Asia. The pattern of FDI in theregion has changed over time. Outward FDI from Asia began in earnest when Japanese multinational
corporations (MNCs) shifted production to other Asian economies following the 60% appreciation of theyen that started in 1985. The major destinations for Japanese FDI initially were South Korea and Taiwan.
However, as labor cost in these economies rose, Japanese FDI shifted to Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) economies. MNCs from South Korea and Taiwan responded to the increase in laborcosts by also investing in other Asian economies. Following the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, China
became a favored destination for FDI. As Kojima (1973) noted, one of the striking features of East Asian
FDI is its complementary relationship with trade. The complementary nature of trade and FDI in Asia ispartly due to the rise of regional production networks. Parts and components rather than final products aretraded between fragmented production blocks. To understand the slicing up of the value chain, it is
helpful to compare the production cost saving arising from fragmentation with the service cost of linking
geographically separated production modules (Kimura and Ando, 2005). This has been called “networked
FDI” by Baldwin and Okubo (2012). It is a complex form of FDI in which horizontal, vertical, and export
platform FDI take place to differing degrees at the same time. The fragmentation strategy adopted
especially by Japanese MNCs is to allocate production blocks across countries based on differences infactor endowments and other locational advantages. The paradigm example of this type of production
fragmentation is the electronics sector, where parts and components are small and light and can easily be
shipped from country to country for processing and assembly. In this sector, the quality of a country’s
infrastructure plays an important role in its ability to attract FDI.
JEL classification: F21, F23, O53
Keywords: East Asia, Foreign direct investment, Production networks, Fragmentation, Parts andcomponents trade, Networked FDI, Horizontal FDI, Vertical FDI
RIETI Policy Discussion Papers Series is created as part of RIETI research and aims to contribute to policy discussions
in a timely fashion. The views expressed in these papers are solely those of the author(s), and do not represent those of
the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.

*

Corresponding author: Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, 1-3-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku,

Tokyo, 100-8901 Japan; Tel.: + 81-3-3501-8248; Fax: +81-3-3501-8414; E-mail: willem-thorbecke@rieti.go.jp

11. Introduction
What is foreign direct investment (FDI), and what determines the flow of FDI in Asia?
How has Asian FDI changed over time? How can we understand the flow of FDI withinregional production networks? This paper seeks to answer these questions.
It begins with a background section. After reviewing some definitions, it considers various
theories of FDI. Dunning (1988) has modeled FDI by focusing on firms’ ownership, locationand internalization advantages. Kojima (1973) posited that FDI flows from the labor-intensive
industry in the capital abundant country into the labor-intensive industry in the capital scarcecountry. As wages in the capital abundant country increase, he argued that firms would transfer
production to lower wage countries, and export capital-intensive intermediate goods andequipment goods to the host country. In Kojima’s model FDI and trade are thus complementary.
On the other hand Mundell (1957) presented a model where capital flows from a capitalabundant country to a capital-scarce country when the capital-scarce country has trade barriers
that hinder the import of capital-intensive goods. The capital flow into the capital scarce countrycauses the production of capital-intensive goods to increase and the production of less capitalintensive goods to contract. These changes in the patterns of comparative advantage theneliminate the basis for trade. Thus Mundell argues that FDI and trade are substitutes .
Following the Plaza Accord in 1985, the Japanese yen appreciated significantly. To cut
production costs, Japanese companies shifted production to other Asian economies. As Section
3 documents, exports of sophisticated capital and intermediate goods from Japan to these Asian
economies tended to increase together with the FDI flows. Thus the evidence indicates that there
has been a complimentary relationship between FDI and trade in Asia. South Korea and Taiwan
also followed a similar pattern.

2The traditional perspective on FDI by Japan and the Newly Industrializing Economies(NIEs) focuses on multinational corporations (MNCs) from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan
shifting production to developing and emerging Asia and then exporting the finished goods
primarily to the West and to other developed markets. Recently, though, MNCs have taken amore nuanced approach. Baldwin and Okubo (2012) have described this approach using theterm “networked FDI”. This means that MNCs source some intermediate goods from the hostcountry and sell some final goods to the host country. Section 4 discusses networked FDI andsummarizes some of the main findings of Baldwin and Okubo.
Section 5 then focuses on understanding the slicing up of the value added chain in Asia.
It first documents that parts and components within regional production networks have largelygone to China and ASEAN and have by-passed India and certain other countries. To understandwhy, it presents a model where firms decide to fragment production when the production costsaving arising from fragmentation exceeds the cost of linking geographically separated
production blocks (the service link cost). It then argues that the service link cost is closely linked
to the quality of physical and market-supportive institutional infrastructure in the host country.
The quality of infrastructure can then help to explain why some countries and regions have done
so much better at attracting FDI and becoming part of regional supply chains. For instance, it
has been noted that even if labor costs were zero in India, it would still be cheaper for MNCs to
produce in China because the quality of the infrastructure is so much better.
Sections 1 through 5 provide an overview of FDI in Asia. Section 6 concludes.

2. FDI: Background32.1 Definitions
International capital flows can be divided into three major categories: Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI), portfolio equity investment, and debt flows. FDI gives a controlling stake inthe local firm. It includes equity capital, reinvested earnings and financial transactions between
parent and host enterprises. Portfolio equity investment involves purchases of a local firm's
securities without a controlling stake.

It includes shares, stock participations, and similarvehicles that usually denote ownership of equity. Debt flows include bonds, debentures, notes,
and money market or negotiable debt instruments.
Capital and particularly financial flows tend to be highly volatile and reversible. The
degree of volatility depends upon the type of capital flow. In particular, short-term financing is
considered the most volatile. Bank credits, portfolio flows, and financial derivatives are highly
volatile. FDI is less volatile, making it more valuable for developing economies. This stability
especially applies to equity capital flows, the largest of the three components of FDI.
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
direct investment is a category of international investment made by a resident entity in one
economy (the direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterpriselocated in an economy other than that of the investor (the direct investment enterprise). i“Lasting interest” implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor
and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the direct investor on the managementof the direct investment enterprise. Direct investment involves both the initial transaction
between the two entities and all subsequent capital transactions between them and affiliatedenterprises. The direct investor may be an individual, an incorporated or unincorporated public
or private enterprise, a government, a group of related individuals, or a group of related4

incorporated and/or unincorporated enterprises that has a direct investment enterprise (that is, asubsidiary, associate or branch) operating in an economy other than the economy or economies
of residence of the foreign direct investor or investors. A direct investment enterprise is anincorporated enterprise in which a foreign investor owns 10 per cent or more of the ordinary
shares or voting power for an incorporated enterprise or an unincorporated enterprise in which a
foreign investor has equivalent ownership. Ownership of 10 per cent of the ordinary shares orvoting stock is the guideline for determining the existence of a direct investment relationship. An“effective voice in the management”, as evidenced by an ownership of at least 10 per cent,implies that the direct investor is able to influence, or participate in, the management of anenterprise; absolute control by the foreign investor is not required. Direct investment enterprises
are entities that are either directly or indirectly owned by the direct investor and comprise:• subsidiaries (an enterprise in which a non-resident investor owns more than 50 per cent);• associates (an enterprise in which a non-resident investor owns between 10 and 50 per cent)and;• branches (unincorporated enterprises wholly or jointly owned by a non-resident investor);
When the 10 per cent ownership requirement for establishing a direct investment linkwith an enterprise is met, certain other enterprises that are related to the first enterprise are also
regarded as direct investment enterprises. Hence the definition of direct investment enterpriseextends to the branches and subsidiaries of the enterprise (so called “indirectly owned direct
investment enterprises”).

2.2 Theory5

Dunning (1988) argued that firms’ willingness to engage in foreign production depends
on a firm’s ownership, location and internalization advantages. A firm will shift production
abroad if it can leverage these advantages in its target market. The advantage of ownershipsprings from the technological superiority of the direct investor relative to firms in the hostcountry. This superiority must more than offset the extra costs arising from differences inbusiness customs, laws, languages, and other factors. The larger the share of the direct
investment enterprise owned by the direct investor, the greater the control. Firms in arms’length relationships retain some control when they are involved in long-term relations.
Locational advantages include wage levels, factor endowments, technology transferability,
exchange rates, physical and human infrastructure, and market-supportive institutions andpolitical regimes.

Internalization advantages concern the benefits accruing to the direct

investor from being able to conduct intra-firm transactions. The FDI firm needs to compare
costs arising from asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, and similar factors with theefficiency gains available through subcontracting and outsourcing.
In traditional models, FDI and exports are substitutes. Mundell (1957) demonstrated that
capital will flow from a capital-abundant country to a capital-scarce country when the capitalscarce country has trade barriers that hinder imports of capital-intensive goods. The capitaloutflow from capital-abundant country into the capital scarce country causes the production ofcapital-intensive goods to increase and the production of less capital-intensive goods to contract.
These changes in the patterns of comparative advantage then eliminate the basis for trade. Thus
Mundell argues that FDI substitutes for trade.
Kojima (1973), on the other hand, presented a model where FDI and trade are complements.
In his framework FDI flows from the labor-intensive industry in the capital abundant country

6into the labor-intensive industry in the capital scarce country. To understand Kojima’s model
consider a case where wages in the capital abundant country increase and where products
become more capital and knowledge intensive. Firms in the investing country then transfer
production to lower wage countries, and export capital-intensive intermediate goods andequipment goods to the host country where in labor intensive process is completed. Thus
Kojima argues that FDI and trade are complements.
Kojima modeled FDI as a means of transferring a package of capital, managerial skill,
and technical knowledge to the host country. The resulting technology transfer comes in theform of know-how or of general industrial experience. According to Kojima, this could include
assembly techniques; material selection, combination, and treatment techniques; machine
operation and maintenance techniques; provision of blueprints and technical data; training ofengineers and operators; plant lay-out; selection and installation of machinery and equipment;
quality and cost controls; and inventory management.

3. FDI: The East Asian Experience
3.1 Japanese FDI
The appreciation of the Japanese yen after the Plaza Accord in September 1985 was themost important macroeconomic factor leading to the surge of Japanese FDI in the latter half of
1980s. There are two reasons for this. First, the 60 percent appreciation of the yen made it lesseconomical to perform labor-intensive activities in Japan, thereby reducing exports of thesegoods. This led Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) to transfer many of these operations
to other Asian economies where production costs are lower. Second, Japanese outward direct
investment during the period was stimulated by the “wealth effect” arising from the appreciationof the yen. Japanese firms became wealthier in terms of increased collateral and liquidity and7were able to finance their investment more cheaply relative to the foreign competitors (Urata and
Kawai, 2000).
Figure 1 examines Japanese FDI, intermediate goods, and capital goods flows to Asian
economies over the 1980-2004 period. The figure shows that as Japanese FDI increased, Japan’s
exports of intermediate goods and capital goods to these economies increased in tandem. This
supports Kojima’s (1973) hypothesis that Japanese FDI and exports are complements rather thansubstitutes.
Following the Plaza Accord, Panel A of Figure 1 shows that there was a surge ofJapanese direct investment going to South Korea and Taiwan. However, as Thorbecke andSalike (2011) discussed, in the late 1980s their currencies appreciated and their wage rates
skyrocketed. The locational advantages of producing in South Korea and Taiwan fell, andJapanese FDI shifted to the ASEAN countries. Wages remained competitive and, at least until
the 1997-98 Asian Crisis, exchange rates were stable.
Because of the disruptions and instability associated with the Asian Crisis, the locational
advantages of producing in ASEAN declined and Japanese FDI flows plummeted. However, theflow of parts and components from Japan to ASEAN continued (see Figure 1, Panel B). Thisshows that Japanese MNCs continued to run their operations in ASEAN although few newinvestments were directed towards the region. Once a Japanese firm establishes a cross borderproduction network in another country, it is reluctant to withdraw from that country. This isbecause firms pay high costs in identifying locational advantages and reliable business partners(Kimura and Obashi, 2010). They thus seek to maintain stable transactions in the face ofdisruptions.

8

The momentum of Japanese FDI then shifted to China, especially after China joined the
WTO in 2001. There was a surge in Japanese FDI and particularly Japanese parts andcomponents and capital goods flowing to China. This is clear in Figure1 Panel C. China’s WTO
accession increased investors’ confidence that China would provide fair enforcement of therelevant laws and regulations and thus increased their willingness to invest in China.
Several benefits accrued to Asian economies from the inflow of Japanese FDI. The IMF(2012), for instance, found that the rest of Asia gained from Japanese FDI. They reported
regression evidence indicating that every 1 percent increase in Japanese FDI to an emerging
Asian economy over the 1985-2011 period increased growth in that economy by between 0.58
and 0.69 percent. According to the IMF, this is much more than the increase in growth causedby FDI from other countries.
The higher growth from Japanese FDI partly reflects its characteristics. As Kojima(1973) noted, it is associated with technology transfer and learning in emerging Asia. Lim andKimura (2009) discussed how, once economies in Asia host a critical mass of FDI, industrial
agglomeration occurs and local firms penetrate production networks. This in turn leads totechnology spillovers. In this context, the authors point out the importance of Small and Medium
Enterprises (SMEs) in the age of globalization, production networking and regional economic
integration. ii
Lee and Shin (2012) presented regression evidence indicating that FDI led to substantial
technology spillovers. They then used these measures to calculate welfare gains from FDI flows.
They concluded that FDI flows lead to large welfare gains in countries like China, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

9

The Japanese FDI described above was designed largely to take advantage of lower
production costs. The final goods were then largely shipped to developed economies, especiallyin Europe and North America. Huang (2012) has described this kind of FDI as the traditional
Japanese type.
More recently, however, Japanese companies have expressed concern that Westernmarkets are drying up. A survey of Japanese firms by the Japanese Bank for International
Cooperation (JBIC) (2010) reported that one of the primary motives now for Japanese firms toship production to places like China, India, and ASEAN is to try to reach middle class consumers
in these countries. This issue is discussed further below.

3.2 Outward FDI from Other Asian Economies

While Japanese firms were at the vanguard of the shift in labor-intensive activities tolower-wage locations in Asia, other Asian firms soon followed. Figure 2 shows outward FDIfrom China, South Korea and Taiwan. FDI is measured as a percentage of each country’s grossdomestic product.
The figure shows that Taiwanese FDI soared in the late 1980s. The locational advantage
of producing in Taiwan fell at that time. The US Treasury named Taiwan as a currency
manipulator and the Taiwanese central bank let its exchange rate appreciate. Taiwan also ran outof redundant rural laborers, leading to a large increase in wages. Taiwanese producers thentransferred production to more cost effective locations (see Yoshitomi, 2003).
Taiwanese FDI was also stimulated when the government deregulated FDI for notebook
PC companies. These companies transferred production to the Yangtze River Delta close to10

Shanghai. A value chain developed in this area that produces many of the world’s laptop
computers.
Figure 2 also shows that Korean FDI has increased steadily over the years. Lee, Kim,
and Kwak (2012) discussed how Korean FDI up until 1994 largely involved small-sized Korean
firms in labor-intensive industries looking for cheaper labor abroad. Between 1994 and 1998
FDI involved large Korean firms (Chaebols) investing in capital intensive industries andtargeting markets abroad. Then between 1999 and 2010 Korean FDI largely revolved around
SMEs concentrated in higher value-added, technology-intensive industries. Some were involved
in regional production networks and others targeted consumer markets abroad.
Figure 2 also shows that Chinese outward FDI began increasing, especially after 2000.
Huang (2012) sheds light on Chinese outward direct investment (ODI). Chinese FDI focuses on
three areas: 1) investing in companies that can provide advanced technology or brand names, 2)
obtaining commodities that can be used for Chinese production, and 3) linking with service
companies that can facilitate Chinese exports. Some of it is controversial because it is done bystate-owned enterprises whose motives may be state-directed rather than commercially-oriented.
Huang (2012) also noted that one of China’s locational advantages is productivityadjusted costs. Thus, China has tended not to transfer factories overseas. Recently, though, as
costs in China have increased, some companies have shifted the production of garments, toys andfootwear to ASEAN. Li (2012) similarly discussed how producers of low value-added products
such as textiles are shifting production to Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries because
labor costs are rising in China.
China has become the fifth leading foreign investor in ASEAN. Between 2008 and 2010
FDI flows from China to ASEAN equaled USD 9 billion. Within Asia, this was surpassed only11

by Japan with USD 16 billion and ASEAN itself with USD 27 billion.iii Intra-ASEAN flows
often involve more advanced countries investing in less advanced countries. For instance,
Singapore invests a lot in its ASEAN neighbors and Vietnam is a leading investor in Laos.
India is not shown in Figure 2. Its outward FDI was minuscule until 2000, but it thenclimbed to 1.6 percent of GDP in 2007. As Kumar (2007) discussed, much of this is efficiencyseeking FDI driven by regional trade agreements. For instance, when India and South Korea
began negotiating an Economic Partnership Agreement, Tata Motors acquired Daewoo Motorsof Korea. Tata then used this connection to establish a more efficient way of producing cars andtrucks (see Nag et al. 2012).

4. East Asian Networked FDI
Japanese FDI after the Plaza Accord was initially designed to take advantage oflower production costs and to produce final goods for developed economies. However,as discussed above, this pattern has been changing. Baldwin and Okubo (2012), in a
detailed analysis of Japanese data, have tried to characterize these changes. They coined
the term “networked FDI” to describe East Asian FDI at present.

They regarded

networked FDI as a concept that transcends conventional classifications such as
horizontal FDI or vertical FDI. It is instead a complex form of FDI in which horizontal,
vertical and export platform types of FDI take place in differing degrees at the same time.
They argued that unlike the case of U.S. MNCs, most Japanese affiliates buy some of
their intermediates from abroad and sell some of their output abroad. Their concept of
networked FDI implies that affiliates are operating as nodes in regional production networks.

12

They found that this particular pattern became much stronger between 1996 and 2005. Theysuggested that the nature of FDI is influenced by regional comparative advantage (i.e., theproximity of markets and suppliers).
Theoretically, the authors argued that it is useful to organize thinking about the classic
substitutes-or- compliments view of trade and FDI by considering the share of an affiliate’s
output that is sold locally and the share of its intermediates that are sourced locally. Using thesevariables, they classify:•

Pure horizontal FDI as the case where affiliates sell all output locally and source allintermediates locally.

•

Pure vertical FDI as the case where all intermediates are sourced locally but some of the
final good output is exported back to the home nation.

•

Pure export platform FDI as the case where all intermediates are imported and all output
is exported.

•

Tariff-jumping assembly FDI as the case where all intermediates are imported and all
output is sold locally.

•

Pure resource extraction (cash-crop agriculture, mining, fishing, etc.) as the case whereintermediate inputs are sourced locally and all output is exported. Sometimes, though,some intermediates may be imported (e.g. oil drilling).

FDI that is marked by low levels of both local sales and local sourcing may be labeled‘networked FDI’ since these facilities are most naturally viewed as part of international supply
chains, or links in global value chains. One interesting aspect of this FDI is its intimate

13

connection with trade. Indeed, trade and investment are simple two observable facets of asingle economic activity.
The substitutability of FDI and trade increases as both the share of imtermediates sourced
locally and the share of output sold locally increases. At one extreme, pure horizontal FDI
extinguishes all trade. At the other extreme, outward processing FDI maximizes trade inboth intermediates and final goods. The extent to which FDI is market-seeking (as opposed
to efficiency-seeking) increases as the share of output sold locally increases.
The traditional import-substitution strategy, for example, involves starting with local
assembly and pushing multinationals to produce more intermediates locally; the eventual
goal is to export. This would show up as a decrease in the share of output sold locally and anincrease in the share of intermediates sourced locally.
The 21st century version of this – pursued by China and other East Asian nations – starts
with export platform FDI and then seeks to induce multinationals to source moreintermediates locally. Sometimes, these countries also seek to develop local markets for the
final good.
Based on this analytical framework, Baldwin and Okubo (2012) analyzed the behavior ofJapanese affiliates. The data for their study came from the yearly survey called the “Survey
on Overseas Business Activities” conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Tradeand Industry (METI). This survey covers all Japanese affiliates in all sectors and in all
nations. The survey provides firm-level data on the sales and sourcing patterns of Japaneseaffiliates. The data cover the number of employees, assets, purchases, intellectual property
indicators, and many other items.

14

Looking at Japanese data from 1996 and 2005, the authors noted that progress in informationand communication technology made it increasingly economical to spatially unbundle
production and disperse the production stages to locations with attractive production costs. A few
sectors remain as classic horizontal sectors but very few correspond to classic vertical sectors.
Many sectors can be classified as ‘networked FDI’, where affiliates import substantial shares of
their intermediates and export substantial shares of their output.
Focusing on individual sectors, primary sectors tend to have extreme patterns. Forestry andmetal mining, for instance, have low local sales but high local sourcing of intermediates. In themachinery sector, sales and sourcing tend to rise and fall together. For motor vehicles, both local
sourcing and local sales are high. On the other hand, other transportation equipment have both
low sales and low sourcing.
Baldwin and Okubo (2012) also found that production fragmentation seems to have occurred
mostly in the machinery sector, reflecting the internationalization of supply chains. This isespecially true for the mechanical machine and electronics sectors. For the electronics sector,
and in particular for phones and computers, Baldwin and Okubo concluded that the production
networking patterns are regional rather than global. They also found that Japanese MNCs tend toview Asia and the European Union in similar fashion. Their FDI to these regions are networked
rather than being purely horizontal or purely vertical. On the other hand, they reported thatJapanese MNC’s behavior in North America is different, especially for manufacturing. Most of
the sales in this case were made in the local market. Japanese affiliates thus do not seem to beengaged in production chains in the U.S.

5.

Understanding Fragmentation in East Asia

5.1 East Asian Electronics Exports
15

Baldwin and Okubo (2012) noted that for the electronics sector and especially for phones
and computers, production networks are regional rather than global. In 2010, 16.4 percent of all
intra-East Asian exports were in the category ‘electronic components’. iv For every year after
1993, the category electronic components was the largest category of intra-East Asian exports
out of the 70 categories tracked by the CEPII-CHELEM database. v In 2010, 10 percent ofexports from East Asia to the rest of the world were computer equipment and 8.5 percent were
telephone equipment. For every year after 1993, computer equipment was the largest category ofexports from East Asia to the world. The electronics industry, with parts and components
flowing between countries in the region and final assembled electronics goods such as computers
flowing outside of the region, is thus far and away the most important industry within East Asian
production networks.
The flow of parts and components in this industry is closely related to the flow of FDI. It
is thus instructive to examine the flow of electronic parts and components. Figure 3 shows theflow of parts and components from East Asia to individual East Asian economies and regions.
In 2010 USD100 billion went to China and almost USD 60 billion went to ASEAN. The large
value of parts and components flowing to China and ASEAN is what one would expect since
they are downstream in the value chain. About USD 20 billion each in electronic parts andcomponents went to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The amount flowing to India wasminiscule. Within ASEAN, almost all of the parts and components went to Singapore, Malaysia,
Thailand, and the Philippines. Indonesia and Vietnam received less than 5 percent of the valueof parts and components going to ASEAN in every year since 1993.

5.2Modeling Fragmentation in East Asia

16

Modeling the fragmentation decisions behind these trade flows has required new
analytical tools. Trade theories have traditionally focused on exchanges of final goods driven bydifferences in technology and factor endowment. However, production fragmentation involves
trade in parts and components. Firms allocate production blocks across economies based on
differences in factor endowments and other locational advantages.
Kimura and Ando (2005) have proposed a theoretical framework for understanding thesedecisions. In their model firms decide to slice up the value chain when the cost saving fromsegmenting production exceeds the service cost of linking fragmented production blocks (theservice link cost). There are two primary types of costs associated with linking geographicallyseparated production blocks, distance and managerial controllability. Costs along the distancedimension can be lowered by strengthening physical and ICT infrastructure, increasing theknowledge base, enforcing high standards of corporate governance, and providing legal remedies
when firms within a network relationship violate intellectual property rights agreements (Yusuf
et al., 2003). Costs along the controllability dimension include the costs of ineffective disputesettlement mechanisms, incomplete contracts, and asymmetric information.
Kimura and Ando (2005) have represented this framework geometrically with the graphshown in Figure 4. For production at a single location, the total cost of production increases with
output. For fragmented production, the total cost also increases with production but the slope ofthe line is smaller.

However, there is a fixed cost (the service link cost) associated withfragmentation that is represented by the distance OA on the y axis.

Therefore, whetherfragmentation reduces the total cost of production depends on the service link cost, OA, and themarginal cost of production as represented by the slope of total cost curve.

17

Thorbecke and Salike (2011) have argued that some ways to lower service link costs and thus
to increase fragmentation include strengthening physical infrastructure such as 1) the network of
highways, ports, and airports, 2) the ICT infrastructure, 3) container yards, and also marketsupportive institutional infrastructure such as 1) enforcement of the legal system, 2) information
on vendors, 3) enforcement of the stability of private contracts, 4) corporate governance, and 5)
legal remedies when firms violate intellectual property rights agreements.
This framework can help explain the patterns observed in Figure 3. The largest share of partsand components flows to China and the smallest share flows to India.

China has superb

networks of highways, ports, and airports in the Pearl and Yangtze River Deltas. This highquality infrastructure has attracted many firms. The resulting agglomeration makes it easier forfirms to interact with upstream and downstream partners. There are also a plethora of skills andtechnologies within the industrial cluster.

This has lowered service link costs and madebusinesses much more willing to establish production blocks in these areas. By contrast, theinfrastructure in India is much poorer. In a JBIC (2010) survey of Japanese firms, the quality of
infrastructure was the number one concern of firms considering investment in India. Someone
observed that even if labor costs were zero in India, it would be more economical to produce in
China because the infrastructure is so much better there. Also, as Nag et al. (2012) noted, unlikein the case of China, agglomeration has not acted as a magnet for Japanese FDI into India.
The quality of infrastructure is also correlated with the extent to which ASEAN countries
have become part of regional production networks.

As discussed above, only minusculeamounts of electronic parts and components go to Indonesia and Vietnam. By contrast, large
quantities go to Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia. In the JBIC (2010) survey, 17 percent offoreign investors singled out poor infrastructure as a concern for Indonesia and 30 percent

18

mentioned this as a concern for Vietnam. By contrast, only 7 percent of firms mentions poor
infrastructure in the context of Thailand and only 4 percent mentioned this concerning Malaysia.
Similarly, infrastructure is not a concern for Singapore.
So, for economies to take part in regional production networks and receive the attendant
technology spillovers, it is essential that they improve the quality of their infrastructure. Kimura
and Ando (2005) have noted that it is hard to implement the necessary changes in infrastructure
for a whole country. It might thus be easier for countries to begin with a city or a province.
These improvements in infrastructure can then lead to a virtuous cycle. As they lower theservice link cost, they will attract production blocks. Local small and medium sized enterprises
will then have opportunities to get involved in the production networks. This will lead to
productivity spillovers and changes for host country firms to develop. This in turn will increase
government tax revenue, giving them more money to spend on infrastructure.

6. Conclusion
FDI in East Asia has unique features. While it is influenced by factors such as theownership, location and internalization advantages highlighted by Dunning (1988), it also
follows Kojima’s (1973) complementarity model. In Kojima’s model, FDI flows from the capital
exporting country’s disadvantaged industry into the host country’s advantaged industry. MNCs
in the investing country then export sophisticated parts and components and technology to theassembly country, so that there is a complementary relationship between exports and FDI. The
outward FDI from Asia began in earnest when Japanese MNCs shifted production bases to other
Asian economies after the yen began appreciating in 1985. Initially, the major destinations forJapanese FDI were NIEs, especially South Korea and Taiwan.

19However, as wages and exchange rates in the NIEs increased, Japanese MNCs transferred
their production bases to ASEAN countries. After the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, Japanese
MNCs channeled new investments to China. However, they did not withdraw their existing
investments from ASEAN countries but instead continued to export large quantities ofintermediate goods to affiliates in ASEAN. The investments in China primarily focused on final
assembly operations and China became the key export platform for regional production anddistribution networks. It imported parts and components from East Asia and exported the final
assembled products throughout the world. Japanese trade and FDI have thus been
complementary.
Japanese FDI has also had a positive impact on the economies of East Asia. Empiricalevidence indicates that Japanese FDI, more than FDI from other countries, has contributed to
growth in the host countries. Further, emerging economies in the region have also benefitted
from industrial agglomeration and the resulting technology spillovers.
MNCs from South Korea and Taiwan began investing in other Asian economies
especially beginning in the late 1980s. The locational advantage of producing in Taiwan fell as
the US Treasury named Taiwan as a currency manipulator and as its currency appreciated. As
labor cost went up, Taiwanese MNCs also benefitted from governments deregulation on
computer related business which prompted for investments in China. Korean FDI also followed
this pattern of using cheaper labor abroad when wage rates in Korea increased. Korea’s FDI
largely involved SMEs that were focused on in higher value-added, technology intensive
industries, some of which were linked to regional production networks. China recently has
increased its outward FDI. These investments were often in lower end products like garments,
toys and footwear and in lesser developed members of ASEAN.

20

FDI in East Asia has recently been characterized as “networked FDI” by Baldwin andOkubo (2012). It is a complex form of FDI in which horizontal, vertical and export platform FDI
take place in differing degrees at the same time. FDI that is marked by low levels of both local
sales and local sourcing may be labeled as networked FDI since these facilities are mostnaturally viewed as part of international production chains or links in global value chains. The
fragmentation strategy adopted especially by Japanese MNCs involves allocating production
blocks across countries based on differences in factor endowments and other locational
advantages. This fragmentation is accompanied by more trade in parts and components than in
final goods.
Kimura and Ando (2005) provided a theoretical foundation for understanding thisfragmentation of the value chain. Firms slice up the value chain when the cost saving arisingfrom fragmentation exceeds the service link costs. Therefore the total cost of production depends
on the service link cost and the marginal cost of production. Key steps to lower the service linkcosts include improving the quality of both the physical and the market-supportive institutional
infrastructure.
Much of the fragmentation of production is seen in the electronics sector. Intermediate
products in these industries are relatively easy to ship between production blocks and toassemble into final products.
Regional production network have followed a stable pattern, with Japan, Taiwan, South
Korea, and MNCs in ASEAN shipping parts and components to the coastal regions of China andto ASEAN for final assembly and re-export to developed economies. There is pressure though
for this pattern to change. Rising labor costs in Eastern China have given impetus to MNCs torelocate their bases to inland regions of China and to other Asian destinations, especially the new21

member countries of ASEAN. India may also become a promising place to invest, although thisdepends on India increasing its locational advantage by improving the quality of its infrastructure.
Finally, if the U.S. and Europe continue to stagnate, more of the final output of production
networks could flow to Asia. This would allow Asian workers to enjoy more of the fruits of
their labor.

22

References
Baldwin, Richard and Toshihiro Okubo. “Networked FDI: Sales and Sourcing Patterns ofJapanese Foreign Affiliates.” NBER Working Paper No. 18083 (2012).
Dunning, John H. “The Eclectic Paradigm of International Production: A Restatement and Some
Possible Extensions.” Journal of International Business Studies 19- 1 (1988): 1-31.
Huang, Yiping. “The Changing Face of Chinese Investment.” East Asia Forum Quarterly 4- 2
(2012): 13-15.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). “2012 Spillover Report.” Washington: International
Monetary Fund. (2012).
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). “Survey Report on Overseas Business
Operations by Japanese Manufacturing Companies.” Tokyo: JBIC. (2010).
http://www.jbic.go.jp/en/about/press/2010/1203-01/eibunn_120224.pdf
Kimura, Fukunari and Mitsuyo Ando. “Two-dimensional fragmentation in East Asia: Conceptual
framework and empirics.” International Review of Economics and Finance 14- 3 (2005): 317348.
Kimura, Fukunari and Ayako Obashi. “Production Networks in East Asia: What We Know So
Far.” Paper presented at the Comparative Analysis of Production Networks in Asia and Europe
Conference, Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Vienna, 15–16 July. (2010).
Kojima, Kiyoshi. “A Macroeconomic Approach to Foreign Direct Investment.” Hitotsubashi
Journal of Economics 14- 1 (1973): 1-21.
Kumar, N. “Regional Economic Integration, Foreign Direct Investment and Efficiency-Seeking
Industrial Restructuring in Asia: The Case of India.” RIS Discussion Paper No. 123. New Delhi:
Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS). (2007).
Krugman, Paul. “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle.” Foreign Affairs 73-6 (1994): 62–-78.
Lee, Jong-Wha and Kwanho Shin. “Welfare Implications of International Financial Integration.”
Japan and the World Economy 24- 4 (2012): 235-245.
Lee, Keun Mihnsoo Kim & Jooyoung Kwak. “Places for Korean firms in China: looking for a
viable international division of labor in 1990–2010.” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 17-1
(2012): 4-21.
Li, Xiaolu. “Questions over China’s International Investment Position.” Caixin. October 18.
(2012).
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Lim, Hank and Fukunari Kimura. “The Internationalization of SMEs in Regional and Global
Value Chains.” Paper presented at the Latin America/Caribbean and Asia/Pacific Economics andBusiness Association (LAEBA) Fifth Annual Conference, Singapore, 15 July. (2009).
Mundell, Robert A. “International Trade and Factor Mobility.” American Economic
Review 47- 3 (1957): 321-335.
Nag, Biswajit, Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, and Debdeep Dey. “Integrating India to International
Production Network: Prospects and Challenges.” ADBI Working Paper, forthcoming (2012).
Thorbecke, Willem and Nimesh Salike. “Understanding FDI in East Asia.” ADBI Working
Paper 290. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute (2011).
Urata, Shujiro, and Hiroki Kawai. “The Determinants of the Location of Japanese Foreign Direct
Investment by Japanese Small and Medium- sized Enterprises.” Small Business Economics 15(2000): 79-103.
Yoshitomi, Masaru. “Post-Crisis Development Paradigms in Asia.” Tokyo: ADBI. (2003).
Yusuf, Shahid, M. Anjum Altaf, Barry Eichengreen, Sudarshan Gooptu, Kaoru Nabeshima,
Charles Kenny, Dwight H. Perkins, and Marc Shotten. “Redrawing the International Boundary of
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Asia: The Future of Growth edited by ShahidYusuf. World Bank, Washington DC. (2003).

24

FDI
4
3
30

2
Capital Goods
Exports

25

1

20
0

15

Intermediate
Goods Exports

10

Value of FDI (billions of US dollars)

Value of Exports (billions of US dollars)

5

5
0
82

84

86

88

90

92

94

96

98

00

02

04

Figure 1a: Japanese Capital and Intermediate Goods Exports and FDI to South Korea andTaiwan.
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance and CEPII-CHELEM Database.

25

FDI
6

4

30
25

2

20
0

15
10

Intermediate
Goods Exports

5

Capital Goods
Exports

Value of FDI (billions of US dollars)

Value of Exports (billions of US dollars)

8

0
82

84

86

88

90

92

94

96

98

00

02

04

Figure 1b: Japanese Capital and Intermediate Goods Exports and FDI to Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance and CEPII-CHELEM Database.

26

4
40

FDI

3

30

2
1

20
Intermediate
Goods Exports
100Capital Goods
Esports

Value of FDI (billions of US dollars)

Value of Exports (billions of US dollars)

5

0
82

84

86

88

90

92

94

96

98

00

02

04

Figure 1c: Japanese Capital and Intermediate Goods Exports and FDI to China.
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance and CEPII-CHELEM Database.

27

Percent of Home Country GDP

54

Taiwan32South Korea

1

China
0
1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Figure 2. Outward FDI of China, South Korea, and Taiwan.
Source: www.unctad.org.

28

Value of Exports (billions of US dollars)

120

100
China
80

60
ASEAN-640
Taiwan Korea

20

Japan
0
1980

India
1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Figure 3. Exports of Electronic Parts and Components from East Asia to Asian economies andregions.
Notes: East Asia includes China, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan, and Thailand. ASEAN-6 includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, and Vietnam. Electronic components come from the Harmonized System Codes 85408542.
Source: CEPII-CHELEM Database.

29

Figure 4. Total Cost with and without Fragmentation.
Source: Kimura and Ando (2005).

30

Notesi

The website for the OECD is www.oecd.org.
Krugman (1994) argued that growth in East Asia was driven by capital accumulation and that total factor
productivity (TFP) growth played only a small role. However, traditional measures of TFP are biased for several
reasons. For instance, technological progress was often embodied in imported capital goods. Yoshitomi (2003)
discussed this and other issues and documents the important role that learning and technological transfer played in
East Asian development.
iii
These data are from www.asean.org.
iv
Electronic components come from the Harmonized System Codes 8540-8542.
v
East Asia here includes China, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.
ii31