Contents Page: NZJER, 2019, 44(1)
Name

Title

Page
Numbers

Gail Pacheco, Chao Li
and Bill CochraneAn empirical examination of the gender
pay gap in New ZealandDavid Brougham,
Jarrod M. Haar andBeth Tootell

Service Sector Employee Insights into
the Future of Work and Technological 21-36
Disruption

1-20

Amy Pei Chuin Yong,
Maree Roche and Anna Psychological autonomy and well-being 37-58
of employees in low-skilled occupations
SuttonPeter Skilling

Another swing of the pendulum: rhetoricand argument around the Employment 59-78
Relations Amendment Act (2018)

Deirdre Farr, Ian Laird,
Felicity Lamm and Jo Talking, listening and acting:
Bensemann
Developing a conceptual framework79-100New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20

An empirical examination of the gender pay gap in New Zealand
GAIL PACHECO*, CHAO LI** and BILL COCHRANE***
Abstract
New Zealand has often been described as a leader in the field of gender equality. Yet, while women haveachieved substantial gains in a range of outcomes (education and labour force participation for example),the gender pay gap has changed very little. This study uses confidentialised microdata from Statistics New
Zealand to examine the gap in a multitude of ways. We begin by applying the traditional Oaxaca
decomposition technique, before accounting for selection, distributional differences and matching. We
find that the gap is largely unexplained (83 per cent). Importantly, we correct for selection bias for both
men and women – which produces counterbalancing effects such that the net result is broadly similar tothat prior to the correction. We also employ propensity score matching, as a further check of robustnessof results, and find only minor movements in the unexplained gap. Finally, distributional analysis
illustrates evidence in favour of the glass-ceiling hypothesis.
Keywords: Gender, wage gap, selection, quantile, matching
JEL classification: J16; J3

1.

Introduction

New Zealand led the world as the first country where women achieved the right to vote, and there havebeen substantial gains in recent years for women in a range of outcomes, such as education; labour force
participation; and health. However, the gender pay gap has not diminished in the last decade – particularly
if we compare the gap between the last time there was substantive analysis in this space for the New
Zealand labour market (Dixon, 2003) and the end of the sample timeframe of this study 2015. Over thisperiod of 12 years, the gender pay gap has hovered at the 12 per cent mark. The main aim of this research*

Director, New Zealand Work Research Institute, Auckland University of Technology. Corresponding author:
gail.pacheco@aut.ac.nz**
Research Fellow, University of Waikato***
Senior Lecturer, School of Social Sciences, University of Waikato
Acknowledgements:
We would like to thank Sylvia Dixon for her peer review feedback and suggestions that she provided on an earlier version ofthis study. We are also grateful to a number of others for providing us with helpful comments at various conferences andforums – including the team at the Ministry for Women; Statistics New Zealand’s microdata team; and the New Zealand
Association of Economists. We also wish to acknowledge and thank the Ministry for Women for sponsoring this research.
Any errors or omissions remain the responsibility of the authors.
Disclaimer:
Access to the data used in this study was provided by Statistics New Zealand under conditions designed to give effect to thesecurity and confidentiality provisions of the Statistics Act 1975. The results presented in this study are the work of theauthors, not Statistics New Zealand.

1New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20
is, therefore, to explore whether the factors that contribute/explain the gap have changed over time (given
the transformation in other aspects of the labour market by gender), and what proportion of the gap can
now be explained by observable information about the individual and their job. While the raw gender pay
gap is regularly reported in the mainstream media (based on average or median earnings for males andfemales), it is meaningless without controlling for differences in characteristics. These include individual,
household, occupation, industry and other job characteristics of the person. Of particular note is that there
has been no gender pay gap analysis, controlling for relevant observable information post-2003.
This study relies on the use of unit record Income Survey data from Statistics New Zealand to estimate
the gender pay gap while controlling for a wide range of observable characteristics. We employ thestandard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition technique which apportions to the gap into two components –explained and unexplained. The explained component reflects differences in the observed characteristics
of males and females; while the unexplained reflects differences in returns. The latter is more problematic
to interpret as these differences may be due to unobserved variables, discrimination, and/or different
preferences for non-wage components by gender.
As the Oaxaca-Blinder approach may suffer from sample selection bias (wages can only be observed forthe employed), we also apply the Heckman procedure to correct for this bias. This provides a predicted
pay gap under the scenario that both males and females not in the labour force select into the labour market.
We, then, switch to the semi-parametric approach of propensity score matching (PSM), which offers analternative approach to test the reliability of our decomposition results. The PSM approach matches males
and females based on their observed characteristics – this includes all personal, educational, household,region, occupation, industry and other job characteristics used in the earlier Oaxaca decompositions. The
wages of the matched male observations provide the counterfactual wage for females, based on the returns
to the characteristics that males are receiving.
We end our empirical endeavours with an assessment of how the gender pay gap changes across the wage
distribution. In particular, we employ quantile regression to investigate how the gender pay gap (alongwith the proportion that is explained/unexplained) varies across various wage quantiles.
The format for the rest of the paper is as follows: A background on the New Zealand literature in thisspace is provided in Section two; Data and variable selection is described in Section three; The
decomposition analysis, along with results corrected for sample selection bias are shown in Sections fourand five; The PSM findings (as a test of robustness of our findings) are illustrated in Section six; while
Section seven covers the quantile regressions; and the final section concludes.

2.

New Zealand literature

There has been limited empirical work on understanding the gender wage ratio in New Zealand. Kirkwood
and Wigbout (1999) made use of the first wave (1997) of the Income Survey (IS) via ‘tree analysis’ andfound that about half of the earnings gap between men and women in full time employment could be
explained by observed characteristics (such as education, occupation, ethnicity, marital status, etc.). The
IS was added in 1997 as an annual supplement to the June quarter of the Household Labour Force Survey(a quarterly survey of around 15,000 households that began in March 1986).

2

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20
The most substantial contributor to the New Zealand literature has been Sylvia Dixon. Her earliest work
(1996ab; 1998) used the Household Economic Survey (HES) to investigate the distribution of earnings in
New Zealand. She estimated Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions with log of real hourly earnings
as the dependent variable and generally found a significant gender wage differential. For instance, Dixon(1996b) found that, in 1995, the predicted earnings of females was 9.6 per cent lower than males, after
controlling for other factors – which included age, age squared, educational characteristics, ethnicity, andpart-time status.
In Dixon (2000), more covariates were added to the gender pay gap analysis (such as occupation andindustry), analysis was extended to include the 1997 IS (in addition to the 1997 and 1998 HES), and wage
regressions were replaced with decomposition frameworks. Such techniques (first developed by Oaxaca(1973) and Blinder (1973)) are now a standard method employed in the pay inequality literature; andapportion the pay gap either into endowments, characteristics, and residuals (a three-fold decomposition)
or explained and unexplained (a two-fold approach).
In Dixon (2000), the total log hourly earnings gap equated to 15.3 per cent when using the HES (19971998), and 17.1 per cent when using the IS (1997). Initially, it was found that between 30 and 60 per centof the gender wage differential could be attributed (explained) to differences in education and experience;
and after information on occupation and industry was added to the model – the explained component rose
to between 40 to 80 per cent. Dixon (2000) expected the pay gap to narrow in future years due toimprovements in relative educational attainment of females, as well as the long-run expectation that maleand female paid work patterns would gradually become more alike. Indeed, in a follow up paper, Dixon(2003) did find that the total gender pay gap had narrowed to 12.8 per cent. She argued that the decline in
the pay gap was primarily driven by increases in the human capital of females (relative to males) andchanges in the employment distribution of the two groups.
A final study worth mentioning is that by Alexander, Genç and Jaforullah (2004). They also made use of
IS data, from both its inaugural year in 1997 and 2003. They estimated wage regressions via OLS, Heckit
and Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) – the latter two taking into account sample selection bias.
Dixon (2000) did trial correcting for sample selection bias in her study as well, but found that the selection
effect estimates were often insignificant, and very sensitive to the exclusion or inclusion of alternative‘identifying’ variables. Alexander et al., (2004) found that, regardless of the estimation technique (i.e.
whether correcting for selection or not), similar gender wage differentials were found – withapproximately a 13 per cent gap in 1997 and 12 per cent gap in 2003.
To sum up the literature on examining the gender pay gap in New Zealand, while there appears to havebeen a flurry of estimations of the gap when the IS was first introduced in 1997, there has been no
substantive analysis of the gender wage differential using data post-2003. We, therefore, provide a muchneeded update using the latest available data in 2015.

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20

3.

Data and descriptives

Data
This study continues the tradition of using IS data in New Zealand when analysing pay inequality. Thisdata source provides earnings information for a representative sample of approximately 15,000 New
Zealand households (corresponding to roughly 30,000 individuals). The survey asks for details on, among
other things, the respondent’s pay and working hours. Where necessary, responses are imputed from arandom donor of similar characteristics, with an 11.1 per cent imputation rate in the 2015 iteration1.
Information from the accompanying Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) provides a detailed pictureof the labour force in terms of geographic, demographic, occupational, industry, and other job
characteristics.
We limit our 2015 sample to the working age population (i.e. those aged 16-64) and drop a small numberof wage earners with very low or high values for earnings and/or hours2 to minimise the potential formeasurement error influencing our estimates. We also exclude the self-employed – leaving us with a final
sample of 13,737 (6834 males and 6903 females3).
Descriptives
Figures 1 and 2 show kernel density curves for the distribution by gender of log hourly wages and weekly
hours worked, respectively. In Figure 1 the curve for the female wage distribution is steeper and higher
than that for males, meaning that it is more clustered around the point of maximum density than the male
distribution, which is more uniform. This indicates that male wages are more distributed over a range ofvalues, relative to their female counterparts in the workforce. The point of maximum density is also further
to the left for the female distribution, relative to the male distribution. This finding is reinforced by thelower value for the median usual hourly wage for women compared to men ($21 versus $24.21).

1

See http://archive.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/income-andwork/Income/NZIncomeSurvey_HOTPJun15qtr/%20Data%20Quality.aspx
2

Specifically, we follow Dixon’s (2003) thresholds of excluding hourly wage <$1 and >$500, and inflate these figures to2015$. This mostly removes employed individuals who report zero wages, which may indicate a misclassification of theiremployment status. We also drop individuals reporting weekly hours in excess of 100.
3
All sample sizes are random rounded to base three, due to Statistics New Zealand requirements regarding confidentiality
assurance. Also, included in our sample are all imputed records.

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20
Figure 1: Usual hourly wage distribution, by gender (2015)

Source: 2015 IS. Author’s compilation.

For usual weekly hours worked (Figure 2), the male curve is considerably steeper and higher than thefemale curve, suggesting more clustering in our male series. The density for females is flatter relative tothat for males, indicating that weekly hours worked by females are more distributed in comparison to theclustering of male hours around the 40-hour mark. The female distribution also lies to the left of the
distribution for males; median weekly hours worked are 37.5 for females and 40 for males.
Figure2:

Usualweeklydistribution,bygender(2015)

Male
Female.05.1Female Median.15↑ Part-time.2↑ Full-time
Male Median0

kdensity

hours

0

20

30

40
60
Weekly Hours Work80

Source: 2015 IS. Author’s compilation.

5

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20
A comprehensive descriptive portrait of the individuals in our sample is provided in Table 1. The 13,737
sample is fairly evenly split between the genders and the means and standard deviations for all variables
used in the forthcoming analysis are provided for both the full sample, as well as separately for males andfemales. The final column in the table reflects whether the differences in characteristics between thegender sub-groups are statistically significant.
As Table 1 indicates, female employees, on average, receive a lower wage than their male counterparts –$25 per hour compared to $29 per hour. In terms of personal characteristics, females in our sample are
marginally older, and there are minor differences in the ethnic makeup across the genders (with a little
more Māori females than males; and a little less Asian females than males in the workforce). There are
more marked differences across the genders with respect to household characteristics – with females close
to three times as likely to be a sole parent and twice as likely to be widowed or separated/divorced, relative
to males. It also appears that males in 2015 were more likely to be living in a household with children
under the age of 6 (26.1 per cent of males compared to 18.1 per cent of females).
In previous studies, differences in educational attainment between males and females have often beenfound to be a contributing factor in explaining pay gaps – past evidence has usually found higher levelsof educational attainment for males. However, based on Table 1, and as Dixon (2000) predicted, theeducational divide in New Zealand has narrowed considerably – with females overtaking males in all
qualification levels (barring post-school – which encompasses many vocational certificates and diplomas).
Males are more likely to have no qualifications (16.3 per cent versus 14.2 per cent), and less likely to havea Bachelor’s and postgraduate qualification. We can compare the figures in Table 1 to those reported by
Dixon (2000) which used the 1997 wave of the IS. This comparison shows that in the 1997 sample, 14.3
per cent of males held a Bachelor’s or postgraduate degree as their highest level of educational attainment(and 12.4 per cent of females); while in the 2015 sample, the comparable proportions were 22.5 per centand 30.5 per cent, respectively.
In terms of occupational structure, males are more likely to be managers, trades workers, machinery
operators or labourers; and women are more likely to be professionals, community and personal service
workers, or in administration roles. There are also significant differences in gender distribution for the
majority of the industry categories. Manufacturing and Construction, for example, appear to be maledominated; while Retail Trade and Education and Training appear to be female dominated sectors. Besides
occupation and industry, one other job related characteristic provided in Table 1 is a dummy variable forworking part-time. Females appear to be more than three times more likely to work part-time comparedto males, 30.4 per cent versus 8.8 per cent.

6New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20
Table 1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics
Variable

Definition

Mean (Standard Deviation)
Full Sample
Male

FemaleSignificant
difference

Hourly wage
Ln hourly wage
Weekly hours

Usual hourly total earnings ($)
Natural logarithm of hourly usual total earnings
Weekly usual total hours work

27.0 (15.7)
3.18 (0.45)
36.7 (12.5)

29.0 (16.8)
3.25 (0.47)
40.9 (11.1)

25.0 (14.1)
3.12 (0.42)
32.5 (12.5)

***
***
***

Personal characteristics
Age
PakehaMāori
Pacific
Asian
MELAA
Other ethnicity
Non-immigrant
Immigrant - Pasifika
Immigrant – Asia, Middle East,
AfricaImmigrant - Other

Age in years
Dummy variable: 1 = Pakeha; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 = Māori; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 = Pacific; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 = Asian; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 = MELAA; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 = Other ethnicity; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 = Born in NZ; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 = Born in Pacific Island countries; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 = Born in Asian, Middle East or African countries; 0
otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 = Born in other countries (not listed above); 0 otherwise

41.2 (13.0)
0.743 (0.437)
0.117 (0.321)
0.067 (0.251)
0.115 (0.319)
0.009 (0.092)
0.020 (0.141)
0.726 (0.446)
0.055 (0.227)
0.098 (0.298)

40.7 (13.0)
0.739 (0.439)
0.111 (0.314)
0.069 (0.254)
0.120 (0.326)
0.008 (0.092)
0.018 (0.135)
0.719 (0.449)
0.057 (0.231)
0.104 (0.306)

41.7 (12.9)
0.746 (0.436)
0.123 (0.328)
0.065 (0.247)
0.109 (0.312)
0.009 (0.093)
0.022 (0.147)
0.732 (0.443)
0.052 (0.223)
0.092 (0.290)***

0.121 (0.326)

0.120 (0.324)

0.123 (0.328)

Dummy variable: 1 = Couple with one or more dependent children; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 = One parent with one or more dependent children; 0
otherwise
Number of children aged under 6 in the family
Number of children aged 6-14 in the family
Number of children aged 15-18 (and not in full-time employment) in the family
Dummy variable: 1 = Married/living as married; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 = Widowed/separated/divorced; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 = Never married; 0 otherwise

0.345 (0.475)
0.059 (0.236)

0.382 (0.486)
0.030 (0.172)

0.307 (0.461)
0.087 (0.283)

***
***

0.221 (0.549)
0.364 (0.744)
0.102 (0.342)
0.649 (0.477)
0.069 (0.254)
0.281 (0.449)

0.261 (0.600)
0.362 (0.749)
0.092 (0.328)
0.675 (0.468)
0.043 (0.203)
0.282 (0.450)

0.181 (0.491)
0.365 (0.738)
0.111 (0.355)
0.624 (0.484)
0.095 (0.294)
0.280 (0.449)***

0.152 (0.359)
0.243 (0.429)
0.339 (0.474)

0.163 (0.369)
0.230 (0.421)
0.381 (0.486)

0.142 (0.349)
0.255 (0.436)
0.298 (0.457)

***
***
***

0.180 (0.385)
0.085 (0.279)

0.153 (0.360)
0.072 (0.259)

0.207 (0.405)
0.098 (0.298)

***
***

0.130 (0.336)
0.238 (0.426)
0.124 (0.329)
0.098 (0.297)

0.170 (0.376)
0.195 (0.396)
0.199 (0.400)
0.054 (0.225)

0.090 (0.285)
0.280 (0.449)
0.049 (0.215)
0.141 (0.348)

***
***
***
***

**
**

*
**

Household characteristics
Joint parent
Sole parent
Children under 6Children 6 - 14
Children 15 - 18
Married/partnered
Widowed/separated/Divorced
Never married

***
***
***

Educational attainment (highest qualification)
No qualification
SchoolPost school
Bachelor’s
Postgraduate

Dummy variable: 1 = No qualification; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 = Lower/upper secondary school qualification; 0 otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 = Post school qualification (level 1-7 certificate or
diploma); 0 otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 = Bachelor’s degree (including Honours); 0 otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 = Postgraduate qualification; 0 otherwise

Occupational Characteristics (ANZSCO Level 1)
Dummy variables (8)1 = Manager; 0 otherwise
1 = Professional; 0 otherwise
1 = Technician and Trades Worker; 0 otherwise
1 = Community and Personal Service Worker; 0 otherwise

7

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20
1 = Clerical and Administrative Worker; 0 otherwise
1 = Sales Worker; 0 otherwise
1 = Machinery Operator or Driver; 0 otherwise
1 = Labourer; 0 otherwise

0.132 (0.339)
0.098 (0.298)
0.065 (0.247)
0.115 (0.319)

0.063 (0.243)
0.073 (0.261)
0.112 (0.315)
0.134 (0.341)

0.201 (0.401)
0.123 (0.328)
0.020 (0.138)
0.097 (0.295)

***
***
***
***

1 = Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; 0 otherwise
1 = Mining; 0 otherwise
1 = Manufacturing; 0 otherwise
1 = Electricity, Gas, Water and Waste Services; 0 otherwise
1 = Construction; 0 otherwise
1 = Wholesale Trade; 0 otherwise
1 = Retail Trade; 0 otherwise
1= Accommodation and Food Services; 0 otherwise
1= Transport, Postal and Warehousing; 0 otherwise
1 = Information Media and Telecommunications; 0 otherwise
1 = Financial and Insurance Services; 0 otherwise
1 = Rental, Hiring and Real Estate Services; 0 otherwise
1 = Professional, Scientific and Technical Services; 0 otherwise
1 = Administrative and Support Services; 0 otherwise
1 = Public Administration and Safety; 0 otherwise
1 = Education and Training; 0 otherwise
1 = Health Care and Social Assistance; 0 otherwise
1 = Arts and Recreation Services; 0 otherwise
1 = Other services; 0 otherwise

0.045 (0.206)
0.004 (0.061)
0.131 (0.337)
0.012 (0.108)
0.073 (0.260)
0.041 (0.199)
0.103 (0.304)
0.053 (0.224)
0.045 (0.207)
0.019 (0.137)
0.022 (0.147)
0.013 (0.115)
0.056 (0.230)
0.038 (0.190)
0.054 (0.227)
0.109 (0.311)
0.109 (0.312)
0.039 (0.193)
0.034 (0.182)

0.060 (0.238)
0.006 (0.080)
0.187 (0.390)
0.018 (0.131)
0.126 (0.332)
0.056 (0.230)
0.088 (0.283)
0.040 (0.196)
0.062 (0.241)
0.020 (0.140)
0.018 (0.132)
0.013 (0.112)
0.050 (0.218)
0.042 (0.200)
0.047 (0.212)
0.069 (0.254)
0.037 (0.190)
0.021 (0.143)
0.040 (0.196)

0.029 (0.168)
0.001 (0.034)
0.075 (0.264)
0.006 (0.079)
0.020 (0.141)
0.027 (0.161)
0.118 (0.322)
0.065 (0.247)
0.028 (0.166)
0.018 (0.133)
0.026 (0.160)
0.014 (0.117)
0.062 (0.241)
0.034 (0.181)
0.062 (0.240)
0.148 (0.355)
0.180 (0.384)
0.057 (0.231)
0.029 (0.167)

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

1 = Northland Regional Council; 0 otherwise
1 = Auckland Regional Council; 0 otherwise
1 = Waikato Regional Council; 0 otherwise
1 = Bay of Plenty Regional Council; 0 otherwise
1 = Gisborne/Hawke’s Bay Regional Council; 0 otherwise
1 = Taranaki Regional Council; 0 otherwise
1 = Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council; 0 otherwise
1 = Wellington Regional Council; 0 otherwise
1 = Nelson/Tasman/Marlborough/West Coast Regional Council; 0 otherwise
1 = Canterbury Regional Council; 0 otherwise
1 = Otago Regional Council; 0 otherwise
1 = Southland Regional Council; 0 otherwise

0.037 (0.189)
0.278 (0.448)
0.082 (0.274)
0.059 (0.236)
0.056 (0.230)
0.037 (0.189)
0.059 (0.235)
0.103 (0.304)
0.052 (0.223)
0.132 (0.339)
0.065 (0.247)
0.038 (0.191)

0.035 (0.183)
0.282 (0.450)
0.083 (0.277)
0.058 (0.234)
0.056 (0.229)
0.037 (0.188)
0.056 (0.231)
0.102 (0.303)
0.051 (0.220)
0.137 (0.344)
0.065 (0.247)
0.038 (0.191)

0.039 (0.195)
0.275 (0.446)
0.080 (0.272)
0.061 (0.239)
0.057 (0.231)
0.038 (0.190)
0.061 (0.240)
0.105 (0.306)
0.054 (0.226)
0.127 (0.333)
0.065 (0.247)
0.038 (0.191)

Dummy variable: 1= Part-time (working less than 30 hours a week); 0
otherwise

0.197 (0.398)

0.088 (0.284)

0.304 (0.460)

Industry Classifications (ANZSIC Level 1)
Dummy variables (19)

***
***
**
***
***
***
***
***

RegionDummy variables (12)Othercharacteristics
Part-time*

job-related***

13,737
6,834
6,903
Sample size
Notes: ***, ** and * reflect the significance of the differences between the male and female subgroups, at the one per cent, five per cent, and ten per cent level, respectively.

8New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20

4.

Decomposition

Given the observable characteristics detailed in the previous section, the next step of our empiricalendeavour is to investigate which variables (or more accurately put – gender differences in variables) can
explain the gender pay gap, and how much of the gap is left unexplained.
We use the common decomposition approach in the literature on gender pay disparities introduced by
Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). The process is to, first, separately estimate the wage equations (using
the natural logarithm of usual hourly wages) for males in (1) and females in (2) as4:ln(𝑤𝑖𝑚 ) = 𝛽 𝑚 𝑋𝑖𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑓ln(𝑤𝑖 ) = 𝛽 𝑓 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

(1)
(2)

where m and f superscripts denote males and females, the i subscript denotes the ith wage earner, and w
stands for hourly wages. X represents vectors of explanatory variables, shown in Table 1 above, which
includes information on personal, educational, regional and household characteristics, as well as
occupation, industry, and other job-related characteristics.
The gender pay gap is calculated in (3) and decomposed in (4):𝑚 ) − ln(𝑤̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑓) = 𝛽𝑚 ̅̅̅̅
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
̂ln(𝑤𝑋 𝑚 − 𝛽̂𝑓 ̅̅̅̅𝑋𝑓𝑚 ) − ln(𝑤̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑓) = 𝛽𝑚 (𝑋𝑚−𝑋
̅̅̅̅𝑓 ) + (𝛽̂
𝑚−𝛽
̂𝑓 )𝑋
̅̅̅̅𝑓
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
̂
̅̅̅̅
ln(𝑤

(3)
(4)

where ̂𝛽 stands for the vector of coefficients estimated in the wage equations. The first term on the righthand side of (4) is the part of the gender pay gap that can be explained by male-female differences inaverage characteristics (based on the explanatory variables outlined in Table 1). This ‘explained’
component can also be further broken down to show the contribution of different groupings ofcharacteristics to the overall gap (as shown in Table 2).
The second component on the right hand side of (4) is the part of the gender pay gap left unexplained.
This reflects differences in the returns to characteristics in the labour market and is more problematic tointerpret. The unexplained component may indicate there are unobservable differences in the quality ofcharacteristics between males and females, or differences in preference for non-wage components of jobs
across gender, or discrimination against females in the labour market. For instance, Weichselbaumer andWinter-Ebmer (2005) argue that lower investment in on the job training, or more flexible and lower
occupation levels of women could be voluntary choices made by some women, and these will not be
observed in the data at hand, but could be responsible for part of the unexplained component.

4

There are two weighting schemes that are possible with such a decomposition. The first uses the male wage structure whenvaluing the characteristics of men and women, and the opposite is true for the second. We use the first, which is the morecommonly reported one in the gender pay gap literature.

9New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20
Table 2: Oaxaca decomposition (pooled), dependent variable = ln hourly wage
Explained
Unexplained
Model (A): With only personal characteristics
Overall pay penalty = 12.71% ***-1.13%***

13.84%***

Model (B): Model (A) + educational attainment
Overall pay penalty = 12.71% ***-3.88%***

16.59%***

Model (C): Model (B) + occupation and industry sector
controls
+
other
job
relatedcharacteristics
Overall pay penalty = 12.71% ***1.81%**

10.90%***

Model (D): Model (C) + regional characteristics
Overall pay penalty = 12.71% ***1.97%**

10.74%***

Model (E): Model (D) + household characteristics
Overall pay penalty = 12.71% ***2.15%**

10.56%***

Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. N = 13,737

Five specifications are presented in Table 2 (labelled Models A through to E), each of which includes
additional explanatory variables in an iterative fashion. Our decomposition analysis begins with Model A
which includes only the personal characteristics listed in Table 1, i.e. age, ethnicity and migrant status(and we also include age squared to allow age to play a non-linear role in our specification). Model B thenreplicates this analysis with the addition of educational attainment variables. Model C includes thecovariates from Model B and adds occupation and industry sector controls, as well as other job related
information on part-time status of the individual. Model D then controls for regional characteristics in an
additive manner. Finally, the decomposition analysis culminates with Model E which includes all theaforementioned variables and household characteristics regarding sole/joint parenthood; marital status;
and information on the number and ages of dependent children in the household (again details of all thesevariables are listed in Table 1).
From Table 2, it can be seen that, regardless of the model used, the pay gap equates to a penalty of 12.71
per cent for females. With the exception of Model B, incorporating additional controls in to thespecification results in a decline in the unexplained component of the gender pay gap from 13.84 per centto 10.56 per cent, a drop of 3.28 percentage points or 23.7 per cent.
With respect to Model B, which contains controls for personal characteristics and educational attainment,
female characteristics appear to be better than males, as shown by the negative explained component.
However, this model yields the largest unexplained component of 16.59 per cent. The main driver of theunexplained component appears to stem from age, which is also a proxy for experience in this analysis.
More specifically, the unexplained total of 16.59 per cent is made up the following elements: 30.53 per
10New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20
cent age, and age squared; -0.74 per cent other personal characteristics; -0.004 per cent education; and aconstant of -13.20 per cent. Hence, it appears that males are receiving a much higher rate of return for age,
relative to their female counterparts. It is also worth noting that adding job specific information to the mix(via inclusion of occupation, industry dummies, and an indicator for part time status) in Model C does
little to quell the role of age in terms of the unexplained component.
Adding regional controls (shown by Model D) has a negligible effect on both the overall results for the
explained and unexplained, as well as their sub-components. Finally, when household characteristics areadded (i.e. moving from model D to E) the explained component rises marginally from 15.5 per cent to
16.9 per cent of the total gap (1.97 and 2.15 percentage points out of 12.71 per cent, respectively). To
delve further into the drivers of the unexplained figure, we breakdown this component of the pay gap into
the following sub-parts: 7.41 per cent age; -0.83 per cent other personal characteristics; 1.02 per centeducation; -2.94 percent occupation, industry and part-time status; -0.38 per cent region; 5.62 per centhousehold characteristics; and a constant of 0.66 per cent. There is one result shown in these figures thatis worth highlighting. The role of age appears to have diminished with the addition of household
characteristics, i.e. controlling for differences in marital status and childcare responsibility has helped
reduce the magnitude of the large unexplained positive returns for age/experience found for males (relative
to females) in Models A through to D.
It is important to note that, even for the fullest specification (model E), characteristics and endowments
still only account for 16.9 per cent of the gap, leaving just over 83 per cent unexplained.
How does this compare with the international literature? Such comparisons are fraught with difficulty (seefor example, Blau and Kahn, 2001; 2016). However, Christofides, Polycarpou, & Vrachimis (2013)
consider the pay gap across 26 European countries using the Oaxaca decomposition and data from the2007 European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions. They find considerable heterogeneity
in the size of the raw gender pay gap and also in the unexplained component of the gap. The percentageof the gap unexplained varies from values similar to what we find here for Denmark (74.2 per cent),
Germany (75.8 per cent) and Norway (87.2 per cent) to those that are considerably higher (Poland – morethan 100 per cent 5) or lower (United Kingdom, 45.3 per cent).
Similarly, the OECD in its report “Closing the Gender Gap” (OECD, 2012) find considerable variation in
the unexplained component of the gender pay gap, with the unexplained component varying from 15 percent in Australia to 137 per cent in Slovenia.
As detailed earlier, the unexplained residual can encompass any unobserved differences in characteristics
or preferences between males and females as well as discrimination against females in the labour market.
Therefore, the “unexplained” cannot be unproblematically equated with the extent of labour market
discrimination against females. Such unobservables include personality, attitudes, motivation, andambition for example. While many of these will be difficult to quantify, one set of unobservables that
could be included in future research is the subject studied by those that undertook bachelor’s qualifications
or higher. For instance, recent research by Frölich (2007) finds that the subject of degree was an importantvariable in explaining gender wage differences in the United Kingdom. Future research could use theIncome Survey linked with Ministry of Education data in the Integrated Data Infrastructure provided by
Statistics New Zealand to include this explanatory variable.

5

In this case, the explained portion is negative, indicating that female characteristics are better than male characteristics.

11

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20

5.

Correcting for selection bias

The Oaxaca-Blinder approach may suffer from sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979) as wages can only
be observed for individuals that are employed. The decision to enter the labour force may be systematicallycorrelated with potential wages, meaning that limiting our analysis to only the employed may result inbiased estimates. For example, one of the traditional explanations for a gender pay gap is different levelsof experience between the genders; therefore, to understand the potential drivers of this difference, wehave to better understand the factors associated with the decision to participate in the labour market andaccumulate experience. Additionally, females are more likely to change their participation decision duringchild bearing and rearing years, and it is important to take this into account. Another aspect of theparticipation decision that is also relevant here are education levels. Given that there are rising levels of
education for both males and females in New Zealand (and at a faster rate for the latter), and knowing that
education and wages are positively correlated, changing levels of educational attainment will likely affectthe participation decision, and thus influence the pay gap.
To correct our estimates for sample selection bias, we apply the Heckman procedure and do this for both
females and males6. The procedure requires one additional step before (1)-(4) above. This is to separately
estimate probit models for males in (5) and females in (6) as:
𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑚 = 𝜗 𝑚 𝑍 𝑚
𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑓 = 𝜗 𝑓 𝑍𝑓

(5)
(6)

where m and f superscripts denote males and females, respectively and the full HLFS sample is utilised,
i.e. not restricting analysis to the waged employees, as was done in Section 4. In equations (5) and (6)LFP stands for labour force participation (with =1 for wage earners, unpaid workers or volunteer job
takers, self-employed and unemployed, and =0 for those not in the labour force). Z represents vectors of
explanatory variables shown in Table 1, except for occupation, industry and other job relatedcharacteristics. Then for each male in (7) and female in (8), the probability of participating in the labour
force is predicted as:
𝑚 𝑚
𝑚 𝑚
𝑚 𝑚
𝑚
̂
̂
̂
̂
𝐿𝐹𝑃
𝑗 = 𝜗1 𝑍1𝑗 + 𝜗2 𝑍2𝑗 + ⋯ + 𝜗𝑘 𝑍𝑘𝑗
̂𝑓 ̂𝑓 𝑓
̂𝑓 𝑓
̂𝑓 𝑓
𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑗 = 𝜗1 𝑍1𝑗 + 𝜗2 𝑍2𝑗 + ⋯ + 𝜗𝑘 𝑍𝑘𝑗

(7)
(8)

where k and j subscripts denote the kth explanatory variable and the jth male or female in the sample,
respectively.
A selection-correction parameter for each male in (9) and female in (10) is generated as:𝑚 ))̂(𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑛(−𝐿𝐹𝑃

𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑚 = 1−(𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(−𝐿𝐹𝑃
𝑚 ))
̂
𝑗

𝑓

𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑗 =̂𝑓 ))(𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑛(−𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑗̂𝑓
1−(𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(−𝐿𝐹𝑃 ))

(9)
(10)

𝑗

6

Most prior literature has only corrected for selection bias for females. There are a few exceptions of recent studies that
control for sample selection for both genders. See Perugini and Selezneva (2015), and Christofides, Li, Liu and Min (2003).

12

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20
where normalden and normal denote the standard normal density function and the cumulative normal
distribution function, respectively. The selection-correction indices (inverse mills ratios) millsm for males
and millsf for females are added as additional variables into the decomposition process shown in (1)-(4),giving the decomposition results corrected for selection bias. These results are provided in Table 3, andincluded in this table are the uncorrected estimates for the full specification from Table 2, for comparison
purposes.
Table 3: Oaxaca decomposition of full specification – with and without adjustment for sample
selection bias
Not corrected
Explained
Unexplained
Total gap
Inverse mills ratio(std error)

2.15%**
10.56%***
12.71%***
N/A

Correction
females
2.15%**
18.00%***
20.14%***
0.205**(0.106)for Correction for males
2.46%**
2.10%*
4.56%**
0.373***(0.085)

Correctionforfemales and males
2.46%*
9.54%***
12.00%***
Females: 0.205**(0.106)
Males:
0.373***(0.085)

Note: Full specification = Model E. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. N = 13,737.

Table 3 presents three new specification results, the decomposition corrected for sample selection bias forfemales only, males only and, in the last column, for both genders. A useful way to conceptualise theseresults is as follows. The working age population (All) for each gender is made up of those in the labour
force (Employed (E) and Unemployed (U)) and those not in the labour force (NILF). The first column
which provides the uncorrected results of the decomposition compares the pay gap between Ef and Em,
where f and m superscripts denote females and males, respectively7. The second column compares thesame pay gap under the scenario where the females that are NILF now join the labour force; the thirdcolumn repeats this exercise but changes the scenario to that of NILF males joining the labour force; andthen the final column provides the predicted pay gap if both genders that are NILF join the labour force.
For both males and females in Table 3 we find that the inverse mills ratio is positive and significant. Thismeans that there is positive selection into the labour market - those participating in the labour force havefavourable unobservable characteristics (relative to those not in labour force) that positively affect theirwages8.
When correcting for selection bias for only females (column 2), the predicted pay gap rises to 20.14 percent This is the scenario where all NILF females join the labour force. This result is expected as including
females not in the labour force (who have less favourable unobservable characteristics) in the comparison
reduces the average predicted wage of this group, relative to employed males. In a similar fashion incolumn 3, correcting for selection bias for only males reduces the predicted pay gap to 4.56 per cent.
Again, this means that males not in the labour force have less favourable unobservable characteristics
compared to males in the labour force, as the unobservables that would increase the likelihood of

7

Noting that we exclude employed individuals with zero wages.
Note that while we cannot show that the NILF group have poorer unobservables relative to those in the labour force, we cancheck the observable characteristics as a potential proxy. For instance, we find that 29.4 per cent of the NILF group have noschool qualifications, compared to the 15.2 per cent of the group in the labour force. Additionally, 11.73 per cent of the NILF
group have a bachelor’s qualification or higher, compared to 23.29 per cent of the group in the labour force.
8

13

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20
participating in the labour force simultaneously increase the likelihood of higher predicted wages.
Including these males in the comparison substantially reduces the predicted gender pay gap.
Finally, as the last column in Table 3 shows, correcting for sample selection bias for both females andmales reduces the gap marginally from 12.71 per cent (when uncorrected for both genders) to 12.00 per
cent This decrease indicates that the males out of the labour force have slightly less favourable
unobservables compared to the females out of the labour force. Once the selection adjustment has beentaken into account, the explained proportion of the pay gap rises a little to 20.50 per cent (whichcorresponds to 2.46 percentage points out of 12.00 per cent).

6.

Matching

Another way of assessing the gender pay gap in New Zealand is to apply the semi-parametric techniqueof propensity score matching (PSM). We follow Frölich (2007), who argues that the functional form
assumptions inherent in the parametric Oaxaca decomposition may potentially give misleading results(see Barsky, Bound, Charles, & Lupton (2002); Mora (2008), and Ñopo (2008) for further discussion ofthis). In contrast, PSM does not specify linear regression functions and only simulates the adjusted mean
wages for the common support subpopulation (Frölich, 2007). This distinguishes PSM from Oaxaca andallows PSM to serve as an alternative approach to test the reliability of our initial results from the Oaxaca
decomposition. The process is to first estimate a probit model for males and females together:𝑓𝑖 = 𝜗𝑋𝑖

(11)

where 𝑓𝑖 is the gender dummy equal to 1 for female observations and 0 for males, and 𝜗 is a vector of
coefficients. 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of control variables that are the same ones as those in Oaxaca equations (1) and(2). The probability of being female, namely the propensity score, for each observation of males andfemales is predicted as:𝑝̂𝑖 = 𝜗̂𝑋𝑖

(12)

where 𝜗̂ is a vector of the estimated coefficients from equation (11). Male observations are then matchedto the female observations who have exactly the same (or the closest) propensity scores. Then, the wages(or average of those wages) of those matched male observations are assigned to those female observations.
This provides a counterfactual for females’ observations of the potential wage they would receive if theyexperienced the same wage returns to their characteristics that males are receiving.
The pay gap can then be broken down into explained and unexplained components. The unexplained partencompasses the difference between the females’ mean counterfactual wages and the females’ mean actual
𝑚−𝛽
̂𝑓 )𝑋
̅̅̅̅𝑓 in the Oaxaca decomposition from equation (4). The explained
wages. This corresponds to (𝛽̂component reflects the difference between the males’ mean actual wages and the females’ mean𝑚 (𝑋𝑚−𝑋
̅̅̅̅𝑓 ) from the Oaxaca decomposition in equation (4).
̅̅̅̅
counterfactual wages and corresponds to 𝛽̂
It is useful to point out that by applying PSM to the decomposition of the gender pay gap, the females’
counterfactual wage is not estimated (unlike Oaxaca), but assigned using the matched males’ actual wages.
The results are provided in Table 4.
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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20
Table 4: PSM decomposition of full specification – with and without adjustment for sample selectionbias
Not corrected
Explained
Unexplained
Total gap

3.54%***
9.17%***
12.71%***

Correction
females
3.54%***
16.60%***
20.14%***

for Correction for males
4.26%***
0.30%
4.56%**

Correctionforfemales and males
4.27%***
7.73%***
12.00%***

Note: Variables used in PSM stem from the full specification of Model E. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. N = 13,737

As shown in Table 4, the gender pay gap is unchanged from Table 3 – as it is based on mean wage
outcomes for each gender. What has changed a little is the proportion of the gap accounted for by ourobservable characteristics for the individual, household, region, industry, occupation and part-time status.
Focussing on just the final column (which are the results after the adjustment for sample selection bias forboth males and females), we can see that 4.27 percentage points out of 12 per cent is now explained by
the explanatory variables, compared to Table 3 where the comparable proportion was 2.46 percentage
points out of 12 per cent. This is a jump from 20.50 per cent to 35.58 per cent of the total gap. Nevertheless,the pay gap still remains dominated primarily by the unexplained component.

7.

Quantile regression

The purpose of this section is to explore gender wage disparities at different points in the wage distribution.
More specifically to investigate the existence of both “sticky floors” (where the disparity is greater at thelower end of the distribution) and “glass ceilings”. The latter refers to “a greater earnings gap at the top
end of the distribution” (Chi & Li, 2008, p.244).
In this final section, we undertake an unconditional quantile decomposition and follow the approach by
Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009), which is an improved version of the approach detailed in DiNardo,
Fortin and Lemieux (1996)9. Other relevant literature utilising this approach includes Chi and Li (2008),
Ahmed and Maitra (2015), and Barón and Cobb‐Clark (2010).
The first step is to calculate the re-centred influence function (RIF) for each male observation and eachfemale observation, for each quantile of their respective distributions:
𝑅𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑚,𝜏 = 𝑤 𝑚,𝜏 +
𝑓,𝜏

𝑅𝐼𝐹𝑖

(𝜏−1{𝑤𝑖𝑚 ≤𝑤 𝑚,𝜏 })𝐷𝐸𝑁(𝑤 𝑚,𝜏 )

(13)

𝑓

= 𝑤 𝑓,𝜏 +(𝜏−1{𝑤𝑖 ≤𝑤 𝑓,𝜏 })𝐷𝐸𝑁(𝑤 𝑓,𝜏 )(14)

where, i is the ith observation, 𝜏 is the 𝜏th quantile of the log wage distribution (males’ or females’), 𝑤 𝑚,𝜏
is the log wage at the 𝜏th quantile of the males’ log wage distribution, 1{ } is an indicator function, whichis equal to 1 if 𝑤𝑖𝑚 ≤ 𝑤 𝑚,𝜏 is true, otherwise 0. 𝑤𝑖𝑚 is the ith male’s log wage, and 𝐷𝐸𝑁(𝑤 𝑚,𝜏 ) is thedensity at the 𝜏th quantile of the males’ log wage distribution.
9

An alternative method is the conditional quantile decomposition (see Machado and Mata (2005); and Melly (2005));
however it is generally recognised as problematic to implement as it is computationally intensive (Chi & Li, 2008).

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20
As shown in Firpo et al. (2009), we then follow the Oaxaca steps detailed in (1) to (4), and replace thedependent variable of log wage with the calculated RIF obtained from equations (13) and (14). Equations(15) and (16) are then run for each quantile:
𝑅𝐼𝐹𝑖𝑚,𝜏 = 𝛽 𝑚 𝑋𝑖𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑓,𝜏𝑓𝑓
𝑅𝐼𝐹𝑖 = 𝛽 𝑓 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

(15)
(16)

where m and f subscripts denote male and female wage earners, respectively, w stands for wages, and X
represents vectors of explanatory variables shown in Table 1 above.
The gender pay gap at the 𝜏th quantile of the log wage distribution (males’ or females’) is calculated in(17) and decomposed in (18) as:̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑓,𝜏 = 𝛽𝑚 ̅̅̅̅
̂̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑅𝐼𝐹 𝑚,𝜏 − 𝑅𝐼𝐹
𝑋 𝑚 − 𝛽̂𝑓 ̅̅̅̅𝑋𝑓̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑓,𝜏 = 𝛽𝑚 (𝑋𝑚−𝑋
̅̅̅̅𝑓 ) + (𝛽̂
𝑚−𝛽
̂𝑓 )𝑋
̅̅̅̅𝑓
̂
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
̅̅̅̅
𝑅𝐼𝐹 𝑚,𝜏 − 𝑅𝐼𝐹

(17)
(18)

where ̂𝛽 stands for the coefficients estimated in the RIF equations ((15)-(16)). The first term on the righthand side of (18) is the part of the calculated gender pay gap in (17) at the 𝜏th quantile of the log wage
distribution (males’ or females’) that can be explained by male-female differences in means of those
explanatory variables. The second term in (18) is the part of the gap left unexplained (reflecting differencesin returns)10.
Figure 3: Gender pay gaps across wage distribution

Note: Hollow markers indicate insignificant gaps at 10 per cent significance level. Source: 2015 IS. Author’s compilation.

10

The specific stata command is rifreg which is available for download as an RIF-regression STATA ado file from Firpo,
Fortin and Lemieux (2009): http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/nfortin/datahead.html.

16

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20

Figure 4: Gender pay gaps across wage distribution, with adjustment for sample selection bias

Note: Hollow markers indicate insignificant gaps at 10 per cent significance level. Source: 2015 IS. Author’s compilation.

Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the total gender pay gap at the following wage cut-offs: 10th, 20th, 30th, 40th, 50th, 60th, 70th,
80th, and 90th quantiles. These graphs also show the proportion of the gap that is explained and unexplained. Figure
3 provides the uncorrected results, while Figure 4 shows the results corrected for selection bias.

Regardless of which figure is viewed, there are a couple of noteworthy trends. First, the gender pay gap
appears to increase as we move up the wage distribution – from zero per cent to 21.15 per cent in Figure
3 (when moving from the 10th to 90th quantile), and from zero per cent to 18.69 per cent in Figure 4. Thisis evidence in favour of the glass ceiling hypothesis. Other studies that also find strong evidence of only
the glass ceiling and not the sticky floor include Kee (2006) for Australia; and Booth, Francesconi andFrank (2003) for the United Kingdom.
In a similar fashion to Kee (2006), we also find that the proportion of the gap that is unexplained rises as
we move up the wage distribution. In particular, it is clear in both Figures 3 and 4 that the explained
component tends to be statistically significant at the lower quantiles, and insignificant at the higher
quantiles; while the reverse is true for the unexplained component. For instance, viewing the selection
corrected results in Figure 4, we can see that the unexplained component is statistically insignificant for
the first four quantiles; while the explained component then becomes statistically insignificant for the last
five quantiles.
Why is there no evidence of a sticky floor? This is potentially due to the high relative minimum wage ratio
in New Zealand. Most recent data from the OECD11 (from 2013) shows that the minimum wage in New
Zealand is 60 per cent of the median wage of full time employees. This high minimum wage ratio provides
minimal room at the bottom of the wage distribution for sizable wage disparities by gender.
11

See https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=RMW#

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 1-20

8.

Conclusions

This research presents empirical evidence of the gender pay gap in New Zealand, based on Income Survey
data from Statistics New Zealand. It is the first rigorous empirical look at the drivers of the pay gap since2003. We find that the pay gap (based on 2015 data) is approximately 12 per cent and unchanged since
this topic was last analysed in 2003. Additionally, regardless of the approach undertaken, the majority of
the gap appears to be unexplained. This result persists even after correcting for selection bias.
While the unexplained portion dominates the pay gap, it is not a simple concept to tackle. The unexplained
could relate to unobservables (such as subject of qualification), or differences in preferences for nonpecuniary aspects of the job by gender, or unconscious bias, or discrimination, or all of the above.
Additionally, our methodology cannot deal with differences between men and women in terms of accessto endowments, such as training and promotion opportunities, and this could mean that our decomposition
approach is underestimating the size of the gender pay gap in general.
This research also illustrates that the size of the gender pay gap depends heavily on the location in thewage distribution. There is strong evidence pointing to a glass ceiling effect in New Zealand. Future work
could delve further into the drivers of this outcome. For instance, it may be related to the differential
impacts (by gender) of parenthood on labour market outcomes, and it would be useful to follow theevolution of life-course earnings by gender in New Zealand to assess the point at which the gender pay
gap emerges.

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 21-36

Service Sector Employee Insights into the Future of Work andTechnological Disruption
DAVID BROUGHAM*, JARROD M. HAAR** and BETH TOOTELL***
Abstract
Recently there has been significant attention given to the fourth industrial revolution and its
impact on employment. The present study aims to provide employee insights into theirperceptions of the future of work, specifically around their job and career. These insights areimportant, as the respondents show how they plan to adapt (or more importantly, not plan or
not adapt) to new jobs and careers in a rapidly changing world. Based on insights from 60
employees, which were collected online, the key findings suggest that people in the same lineof work have varying degrees of knowledge and opinions about automation and how it may
impact on their jobs. In addition, many employees are generally optimistic about the future ofwork and their long-term careers, with them acknowledging potential job changes aroundautomation, but with a strong belief their type of work will remain. These are important
findings when we consider how people plan their careers in the face of automation.
Key Words: Future of Work, Career Planning, Robotics, Artificial-Intelligence, Technology.

Introduction
Uber, the world’s largest taxi company, owns no vehicles. Facebook, theworld’s most popular media owner, creates no content. Alibaba, the mostvaluable retailer, has no inventory. And Airbnb, the world’s largest
accommodation provider, owns no real estate. Something interesting ishappening (Goodwin, 2015, n.p)
The pace of change in business and employment is increasing, the average life expectancy ofa Fortune 500 company has fallen from an average of 67 years in the 1920s to 33 years in 1965
and is expected to be less than 15 years in 2026 (Ioannou, 2014; Mochari, 2016). Thisdisruption of business as usual will ultimately impact on employees, as traditional businesses
are likely to need to make changes to existing processes and cut costs to remain competitive.
The automation of human labour can be a cost-effective way of bringing down overheads
within an organisation. Automation does not need to do the entire job of one person; it simply
needs to do part/s of the job. Examples of automation can be robotics, driverless technology,
algorithms, artificial intelligence etc., as well as the use of smart phone applications and acomplete redesign of existing labour practices. Brougham and Haar (2018) refer to this as
STAARA: smart technology, artificial intelligence, automation, robotics, and algorithms.

*

Senior Lecturer, School of Management, Massey University, Palmerston North, New ZealandProfessor of Human Resource Management, Department of Management, AUT University, Auckland, New
Zealand***
Senior Lecturer, School of Management, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand**21

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 21-36
The employment landscape has changed significantly over the decades. Employees can nolonger expect lifetime employment, and careers have become more transient (Inkson, Gunz,
Ganesh, & Roper, 2012). It has been predicted that 57 per cent of OECD jobs could be affectedby technology worldwide over the coming decades (Citigroup, 2016). Within New Zealand, it
has been estimated that 46 per cent of jobs could be automated between now and 2035
(Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand, 2015). Some experts have suggested thatthe level of disruption to jobs could be as low as 9 per cent (Arntz, Gregory & Zierahn, 2017).
However, even at the lower estimate, 9 per cent of jobs being disrupted within a short amountof time would pose a substantial challenge to many countries. Overall, very little is known
about how employees view the future of work in relation to their own job and career. This isimportant, given the potentially rapid changes to the workplace as a result of technology,
automation and general disruption.
While new jobs will always be created (Deloitte, 2015; Scarpetta, 2016), it is clear that thenature of traditional work and career paths is changing dramatically as people move away fromlinear careers (Baruch, 2004). However, similar dire predictions have been made before.
During the 1930s, John Maynard Keynes prophesied that technological unemployment would
become a familiar part of language. The phrase described “our discovery of means of
economising the use of labour outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labour”(Keynes, 1930, n.p). A job for life is a term that disappeared decades ago, and such aphenomenon of work is even less likely today, given the disruption companies potentially face.
For example, the casualisation of labour is more common around the world (De Stefano, 2016),
and within New Zealand, we have seen the impacts of zero-hour contracts, and other variationsof temporary work (Wilson, 2014) such as the ‘gig economy’ (i.e., highly casual and projectbased labour). It is difficult to know what the future will look like, it may be a “difficulttransition” rather than a “sharp break with history” (The Economist, 2016, n.p)
The present study will not try to predict the future. Our main objective is to gain an insight into
what employees think the future of their job and career will look like as a result of technology(i.e., STAARA). This is an important area to investigate – especially for employees, employers
and Government – so we can gain an insight into how employees currently perceive STAARA
and its influence on jobs and career planning. The following literature review outlines sometechnological advancements that are currently in flux – career planning, perceptions of control
and predicting the future. We then highlight the study we conducted to answer our research
objective, and detail the insights collected.

Literature Review
According to many futurists, we are entering a fourth industrial revolution (e.g., Schwab,2017). We have already seen major advancements in technology and the way we do business.
Future advancements will see the refinements of multipurpose robots, 3D printing in
production and construction, driverless vehicles (Bellamy & Pravica, 2011; Solon, 2016),
automated ports (Ports of Auckland, 2016), automated food production, and automatedcommercial pilots (Frey & Osborne, 2013). Other changes include virtual employees poweredby AI (EtTec, 2016), automated accounting, legal research and teaching services to name thosecurrently existing. In addition, the makers of smart phones and tablets – Foxconn – are using
more robots, while Amazon refines its automated delivery service. In our supermarkets, selfserve checkouts have existed for a number of years already, supplanting the original ‘checkout
person’. The future suggests that even the mainstream adoption of synthetic meats and milks
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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 21-36
could have a significant impact on New Zealand’s agribusiness sector. These last examples
represent only a handful of exemplars that are currently being refined by tech companies. It isalso expected that the cost of each technology will continue to fall (Nolan, 2015) while theperformance outcomes will increase.
Technology could be a key driver within some industries to reduce worker control (Cohen,2015), and it has the ability to polarise the labour market, meaning we have the bulk of theworkforce in low skilled/low paid work – or high skill/high pay work, but with fewer middleclass jobs in between (Acemoglu & Autor, 2011). However, we cannot discount the positives
that technology has and will provide in the future (Holland & Bardoel, 2017; Deloitte, 2015),
and this includes potentially expanding work sectors. Ultimately, it is contested whether fewer
or more jobs will be created as a result of technology. For example, a study of futurists reported
that:
Nearly half of the respondents (48%) predicted that robots and AI will displace
more jobs than they create over the coming decade…Many experts told Pew they
expect the jobs created by the rise of the machines will be lower paying and lesssecure than the ones displaced, widening the gap between rich and poor, whileothers said they simply don’t think the major effects of robots and AI, for betteror worse, will be in evidence yet by 2025 (Bercovici, 2014, p.12).
In summary, the effects of technology on employment are widely debated, and a balanced
argument might suggest that:
AI will not cause mass unemployment, but it will speed up the existing trend ofcomputer-related automation, disrupting labour markets just as technological change
has done before, and requiring workers to learn new skills more quickly than in thepast” (The Economist, 2016, n.p).
If this is the case, employees still need to plan accordingly. Significant changes to the labour
market have been seen over the previous decades due to “a combination of fast developments
in multiple areas – economy, technology, and society in general” (Baruch, 2004, p.54). Baruch(2004) discussed the importance for employees of being their own ‘free agent’, accepting theexternal changes that are likely to impact on them. This aligns with the work of Orpen (1994),
who noted the importance of individual career planning in relation to career success.
Recent research into employee perceptions on technological disruption causing redundancy
found that over 91.4 per cent of participants out of a sample of 190 New Zealand employees
were not concerned about their job being automated (Brougham & Haar, 2016). This is despiteover 40 per cent of New Zealand businesses looking into technology solutions to create
efficiency (Smylie, 2016). Thus, while employees feel there is likely little change forthcoming,
their employers appear to be considering the potential cost benefits of STAARA more readily.
The present study aims to give an insight into how employees view the future of their job,career and work, in general, in relation to technology.
The present study focusses on employees’ perceptions of the role of technology on their jobs
and careers. However, uncertainty is a very important construct to consider. Hatch (1997)
suggested that, within uncertainty, one needs to consider complexity and the expected rate ofchange. Complexity considers the number of elements in a given environment, whereas therate of change takes into account how rapidly things change at (Duncan 1972 as cited in Hatch,
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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 21-36
1997). However, Hatch (1997) stated that “the problem with the environmental uncertainty
perspective was that it assumed that conditions in the environment were experienced in thesame way by everyone” (p. 89). Thus, environmental conditions might be seen as certain tooccur by one group of people but not by another, possibly leading to radically different
perceptions when one industry workforce is threatened by automation while another is not.
That said, some employees will be able to identify the role that technology might play ininfluencing their job and career. Research has found that experts predict the impact oftechnological unemployment will take much longer compared to non-experts (Walsh, 2017).
Thus, while some changes are occurring – such as Foxconn with robot production lines, andthe automated shipping ports within New Zealand – the widespread influence of technology on
employees may take decades to be fully realised. In addition, the Gartner Hype Cycle also
illustrates how “hyped” something is in the media and public perception compared to how far
away commercial viability is (Gartner, 2018)
We expect to see a wide range of opinions regarding the future of work and what the future ofwork may look like from the employee perspective. This might also reflect employees’ views
regarding how much control they have over their lives. Locus of control is defined as “theextent to which people believe that they have control over their own fate” (Ng, Sorensen, &Eby, 2006, p.1057), whether internally (one’s own actions) or externally (by other forces, suchas STAARA). These opinions can influence factors including promotions, salary increases andcareer advancement (Spector, 1988).
Given the media attention given to such potentially radical changes to the workplace, thepresent study explores the generic research question of What do employees think their job andcareer might look like in the future, due to STAARA? We acknowledge that such perceptions
are likely to vary across employees, including those in similar jobs. However, we note that
Bercovici (2014), in his research of futurists, found almost an even split between these ‘experts’on the future of work. Thus, the opinions and perceptions of workers provides, at least, a voice
which is currently limited in the literature. Thus, the present study is exploratory and provides
an opportunity for the voice of employees around STAARA to be captured.

MethodQuestionnaires were distributed by research assistants in New Zealand’s main centres via an
online survey, as part of a wider study of STAARA. The present study focusses on open-ended
questions (outlined below). The research assistants used purposeful sampling to attract
respondents from a wide range of industries and job titles, specifically from the service sector(Coyne, 2008). We targeted many responses to give depth to our sample, to ensure we were
not gathering data from a narrow sample of workers in specific occupations. Hence, our sample
size target was in excess of 50, which is quite high for qualitative comments, but we wanted toensure that we gained enough voices across a broad range of occupations. Research assistants
initially targeted employees in retail, sales, food preparation and administration roles, as theseoccupations make up a large pool of employees that could be impacted significantly byautomation. We also sought multiple respondents from the same organisation and position toprovide better comparisons. Once enough sample was attained in this area, the research
assistants were then required to target people in lower risk professions, such as executive
management, law and nursing etc. Overall, the list of professions offers a well distributed
representation of the jobs that could be automated as per the list offered by Frey and Osborne(2013). The service sector was targeted as a lot of automation has already been used in the24New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 21-36
primary and secondary sectors. Many of these workers, over the decades, have transitioned into
the service sector. However, now, many of the tertiary sector jobs are set to be affected by these
disruptions. The present study focusses on responses from 60 employees. The sample had an
average age of 35 years (SD=11) and 71 per cent of the respondents were female. Private sector
workers made up 65.9 per cent of the sample, with 26.1 per cent public sector workers and 8.0
per cent worked in the not-for-profit sector. The education level was roughly half with auniversity degree, with the majority being non-union members (90 per cent).
Study Questions
The present study used two open-ended questions in an online form to give an insight into how
employees view the future of their job and career, and we included a definition/explanation of
STAARA. Respondents could write as much as they wanted within the fields provided.
Questions were: (1) Describe what you think your work will look like in 10 years as a result of
STAARA. This question was designed for employees to think about their current job/work; (2)Describe how STAARA might affect your future career prospects, and this question focussed
on their future career. The 10-year timeframe was used in previous research regarding future
perceptions (Bercovici, 2014).
Procedure
The present study used thematic analysis to look for trends amongst responses (Braun &Clarke, 2006). This enables identifying and presenting the perceptions of the respondents inthe contextual setting. The goal of this research was to understand how the respondents from awide range of settings perceived the threat of technology in relation to their employment.
Qualitative research enables the researcher in understanding “how people understand concepts”(Barbour, 2008, p.12) and enables researchers in “seeing through the eyes of the people” (p.
402). Aligned with our focus on work and careers, this approach provides meaning as attributedby respondents within their context (Bryman & Bell, 2011), specifically work.
This study does not claim to meet the criteria of generalisability. Indeed, Stebbins (2001)
argues against the usage of generalisations in exploratory research. Each author coded
responses and then they were triangulated, to help minimise bias in the analysis. Ultimately,
we used thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), which enabled us to identify and present
the perception of STAARA as seen by the respondents in the contextual setting. This allowed
us to identify common themes amongst the respondents.

Results
The results from this study offered an insight into how employees view the future of their job
and career while considering the role of technological changes. These perspectives were wide
ranging. However, general themes have been outlined below.
Theme 1: The importance of soft skills
A clear trend from respondents was that face-to-face interactions or complex interactions(between humans) would become more important, while paper work and administration would
be more automated. Two respondents in the banking sector said that STAARA would “take25New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 21-36
away all the manual tasks, leaving only the social/relationship side of things which could bedone by my manager,” and:My role will become more reliant on relationship building, supported byautomation of the banking industry. This will give me the ability to respondto clients faster. It would affect my prospects if I did not adapt to it. My role
uses systems and automation, but is heavily reliant on relationships withcustomers, so it is not likely to affect my role, or future job prospects (#2829).
Someone in the IT sector stated:
The basic help desk job will still exist. A lot of standard tasks are already automated(a/c reset/unlocks, changes to access rights/permissions, software installations, etc.),
but human interaction will still be needed when issues are being reported (#38).
Thus, there is strong support that employees see soft skills as something that STAARA cannot
replace.
Within this theme, the following quotes provide a useful comparison: both are within the sales
and automotive sector but see the potential of STAARA disrupting their job and career.
Respondent #54 stated that:
Online ordering of cars will become part of the future. Traditionally 90 per
cent of people had to physically see and drive a vehicle before they could buy
it. However, recently Tesla sold 100,000 cars without a single test drive sothat is definitely possible.
Another employee in this sector said, “not much change to be fair, new computer software andmaybe some newer tech but basically the same” (#55). This individual also noted that “It would
make some areas of work better but ultimately you can’t do this job with just technology alone;a human presence has to be there”. An administrator in retail stated:
I suppose the customer service aspect of my job could be replaced but I am
not confident this would work. I think people today still appreciate greatcustomer service... for me it is often the difference between buying one
similar product over another (#56).
Hence, there is this perception (rightly or wrongly) that humans have certain skills and abilities
that cannot be replicated by STAARA.
Theme 2: STAARA will enhance my job, the future is bright!
In addition, respondents saw automation as providing new opportunities, perhaps evenenhancing their current jobs. For example, a teacher in the education sector said, “I thinktechnology is enhancing education and careers but don’t know the specifics” (#5), with anotherteacher in education noting
As an educator it is highly important that we keep up-to-date with the latest
technology. The students we have need to be taught skills to be able to use the26New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 21-36
current technology available and have the skills to draw on when facing newtechnology (#5).
Towards specific benefits from STAARA, common thoughts included “I think it could be areally powerful tool for augmenting my skill set in my current role” (#18) The following
comment offers a balanced approach towards STAARA:
For the most part I do not believe my role in construction could be replaced by
STAARA. The amount [of] problem solving, and public liaison required in myrole makes the idea unrealistic in the next 10 years. I do, however, believecertain parts of my role could be replaced which would allow me to focus onother aspects, reducing potential issues in other areas that may have occurred
due to lack of attention. I also believe that some roles within the industry could
be replaced by STAARA, just not the management on the projects. Definitely
not in the next 10 years anyhow (#33).
This retail manager suggested STAARA would provide “More updates in future to streamline
things...already use technology on a daily basis – would just improve in the future” (#43).
Within the accounting sector, this respondent noted that STAARA would make things “Moreefficient in terms of getting the information presented to you and allowing for more time indecision making” (#60). Many of the respondents could identify specific types of technologythat could be used to augment, enhance or replace parts of their job. For example, an architect
provided a number of suggestions that would enhance their work:
Robotic PA for meetings, emails, scheduling. Transport PODs to meetings, or
automatic video conference setup. Algorithms are currently used to help us find datarequired for technical consultants to design a solution to provide to the customer (#28).
Someone in customer service suggested: “A virtual assistant that will help with basic enquiries
to ease the workload on the digital customer service” (#37), while another respondent inconstruction noted
I think the possibility of STAARA affecting the communications industry is very
exciting – it poses huge potential, but it does mean that, as a consultant in thisfield, I need to be open-minded and constantly adaptable to new technologies.
As far as the construction industry is concerned, I think STAARA will have
HUGE changes, but due to there being BIG shortages of sub-contractors andgood people to manage projects I believe it would be hugely beneficial if we
could rely on more Automation and Robotics (#40).
Finally, some suggested that the repetitive and routine parts of their job would be removed,
enabling more creativity. Someone in product manufacturing, for example, suggested their job“would become more creative and would push towards more ‘thinking outside thebox’/disruptive strategies.” Many of the respondents see their jobs and careers as being muchof the same with respondent #35 (surveyor) stating that it will be “much the same” and “I don’t
think it can affect my current career as my work involves a lot of people interaction.”“Automation and better data collection through algorithms or AI would allow the time to create
more experimental, unique, and potentially more advanced marketing campaigns” (#30 –manager in manufacturing). A consultant also noted positives, stating
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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 21-36

It could replace the more routine parts of my role, leaving more space for me tofocus on the real ‘value add’ aspects. It could also create opportunities for us topackage and sell new service products which were previously labour intensive(#31).
Theme 3: Unsure… But job and career change is coming…
Jobs and careers have been in a state of flux or change over the decades. This was outlined byrespondent #15, a construction sector project manager, who stated “My role is forever changing
so haven’t considered this but know that it will not be the same as I do now.” Many of the
respondents were simply not sure about what the future would hold, with respondent #9 stating“I am not sure whether it will affect my particular role at all!?” and a financial analyst stating“I will need to understand in more detail what the impact of STAARA is on my role, but I
believe I will need a greater knowledge of what STAARA is and how it affects society andfinancial institutions” (#25). Another respondent stated, “I think it will impact on my future
career prospects, however, am unsure how it would benefit myself or the organisation I workfor” (#57). Overall, it appears that part of the issue for some employees is that there is a lackof understanding of just how STAARA might influence their work. One respondent in retailstated, “The technology would improve but the selling aspect would still be the same” and “[I]don’t think it will affect my career. Already use technology on a daily basis – would just
improve in the future” (#42-43), highlighting how some see the entwined nature of work-jobcareer-life. On the flip side, one respondent (retail sales) was defiant around the potential threatof STAARA to their job and career, stating “Retail is based on customer
interaction…[regarding a potential career change] no mate, not going to happen!” (#51).
Theme 4: Age and Career Stage
We identified a significant theme around age, career stage and STAARA. Several respondents
had career stage related comments with respect to automation. For example, a manager (aged58 years) stated that “My age might hold me back from learning new technology type skills”(#8), while a lawyer (aged 68 years) stated “Not applicable [to me] - near retirement!” (#10).
A communications analyst (53 years) similarly noted “Nearing the end of my career. I don’t
believe it will affect my future career prospects” (#22), while a younger (32 years) manager inmanufacturing noted that STAARA might have a major influence on the future of their career.
They stated:
Due to the creative and social engagement required by my role, it is not as ‘atrisk’ as others. However, as you are asking about future career prospects, I am
prepared for and do realise that ‘retirement’ for me will be very different toretirement for the current generation of elderly. Specifically, simple, structured
employment, often taken up by retirees wanting to remain active will be mostly
replaced by automation – meaning that any type of employment in the later
years will be very difficult. For example, bus drivers, will be replaced by selfdriving vehicles and/or ride sharing. Check out assistants – automatedcounters/online ordering (#30).
This highlights that young employees are aware of STAARA but do not necessarily see thefuture as being ‘paved’ with opportunities. There appears to be real worry around future
careers. Two younger respondents (both 22-years-old) stated that: “When I graduate I will be
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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 21-36
seeking employment with business in the marketing/e-business sectors and I’m aware that thelatter will be heavily impacted by this” (#48), and similarly “I will have to finish my degree
because most of the jobs I could apply for now could be replaced with STAARA” (#58).
Related to these concerns, several respondents were worried about unemployment as a resultof automation. A 34-year-old in manufacturing noted “It might be more difficult to find a job
and upskilling will be critical to keep competitive” (#41), while another respondent (21-yearsold) stated STAARA would lead to an “increase in unemployment” (#46). There was clear
concern around potential job losses although this was somewhat limited to a smaller group ofparticipants. Another highlighted that, while STAARA was a threat, other factors – like young
new entrants to the sector – were likely to be more of a threat, stating…given my greatest strengths are human focussed (networks established) andconfined to the industry I work in my career prospects are grim – very few jobs.
[my] ability to go outside my area of speciality is limited and young people
pose more of a threat than technology to myself personally – tech generally(#39).
Theme 5: Low risk jobs still see changes coming
Employees have a wide range of perceptions regarding STAARA replacement of their job,irrespective of their roles. According to Frey and Osborne (2013), lawyers occupy a very low
risk position, and thus are unlikely to be widely replaced. Our sample included six lawyers who
were generally in agreement with this rating, with one suggesting that things will be “the same”(respondent #9). Some thought that change would occur but is unlikely to change their job in
the majority. One stated: “More automated documents but advice still tailored to individuals”(#10) and “similar to now, but more focus on customer relationships and getting the work rather
than doing the work” (#12). One suggested the change would be beneficial, stating “I consider
we will still have a role in the personal dealings with those clients and representing them, butwill be significantly assisted by STAARA in the formulation of our advice to our clients”.
Some respondents saw the potential for change from STAARA being dramatic, but positive,
for example “I believe our research databases will be expanded to enable them to more
effectively trawl through large volumes of legislation and case law precedents to identify
patterns and suggest possible outcomes for our clients” (#14). A theme around technology
simply enhancing the job, with no real impact on their career, was a key theme, with one
respondent stating: “I consider that there will remain a need for lawyers and the Court process,but we will be assisted in part by the tools that will come from STAARA” (#14).
Theme 6: High risk jobs have contrasting views about the impact of automation
Respondents in higher risk professions (e.g., retail sales) gave contrasting views. Some
indicated uncertainty “Unsure if my workplace would change but with technology nowadays
anything is possible” (#45), while others highlighted modest change “More jobs being donetech wise and robotically rather than face to face communication” and “Maybe quicker systems
in point of sale system and EFTPOS advancements, but not any STAARA advancements withcustomer service/interactions” (#46-47). Some did acknowledge a strong threat, stating “Aplethora of simple tasks will become automated and therefore humans will have to concern
themselves with the more complicated decision-based aspects of their jobs. In certain sectors,
STAARA will likely cause worker redundancies” and “Less staff, less customer service” (#4849). Despite these acknowledgements, others thought there was little threat, such as: “The29

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same, apart from till service” and “Retail is based on customer interaction” (#50-51). Overall,retail staff showed the broadest range of variation and appear consistently to differ in the way
they perceive changes that STAARA may evoke.

Discussion
Previous research from Brougham and Haar (2017) found that the public was generally notconcerned about automation to their job. The present study uncovers a range of themes as towhy this might be – while also discussing a range of insights into what employees think the
future of work may look like. The insights from our respondents suggest many think they will
be working alongside technology to enhance their current job. They saw that technology could
also free up time from the monotonous and repetitive tasks that their current work entails. Thisway of looking at automation aligns with Gale (2017), who suggested that we should not aim
to replicate human work with machines, but to see the benefit that humans and technology canprovide in combination. We see our respondents’ willingness to use technology to change theirjob and drive productivity to be an important theme from this research. Because of this, many
respondents do not see technology as a ‘threat’, but something that can ultimately benefit theirjob, career and organisation.
Employees see personal interaction at work and soft skills to be more important moving
forward. This aligns with Frey and Osborne (2013) who suggested that social intelligence suchas negotiation, persuasion, social perceptiveness and caring for others would be harder toautomate than things like automatic data entry. This was also highlighted by the World
Economic Forum which stated that “social skills—such as persuasion, emotional intelligenceand teaching others—will be in higher demand across industries than narrow technical skills,
such as programming or equipment operation and control” (Berlin, 2017, p.8). So, our
respondents do seem to understand the potential value in their soft skills. Several othercommentators in the area have also discussed the importance of creativity, critical thinking andjobs with more purpose (e.g., Erb, 2017). In addition, many of the respondents within this study
felt that parts of their job could be automated, but not the entire job. This is because jobs tend
to be made up of a wide range of tasks. For example, one administration job in one organisation
firm may have a different set of tasks when compared to another administration job within
another organisation. Because of these varying tasks within jobs, the likelihood of an
administrator being made redundant because of technology needs to include what kinds of work
they do on a day-to-day basis. Because of this, the impacts of automation may be overstated(Arntz, Gregory & Zierahn, 2017).
While many respondents were unsure of what the future may look like, they knew that it would
look different to what we experience now. Respondent #15 offers a great insight into this bysimply stating that “My role is forever changing so haven’t considered this but know that it
will not be the same as I do now”. Indeed, jobs and careers have been in a state of change for
hundreds of years. New and different jobs have been created, and more will be created in the
coming decades (Deloitte, 2015). This statement from Kirchner (2017) highlights how we canthink about the future of jobs: “Let us not be lulled into the misconception that industrial
employment is a zero-sum game; that a finite number of jobs exist in industry and for everyone
job replaced by a robot an industrial job disappears” (n.p).
Age and career stage also influenced how people felt about the future of work in relation totechnology. This paper found that older workers do not feel threatened by STAARA as they
could exit the workplace in the coming decade. On the flipside, it is known that younger people
30

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 21-36
who are digital natives have a greater awareness of the capability of current technology. As aresult, younger people can foresee how competitive STAARA will be. Similar findings werereported by Brougham and Haar (2018) in an empirical study of New Zealand employees;
finding that age was a predictor of STAARA awareness around potential job loss throughtechnology. Age also appeared to align with how people felt they could use technology to theiradvantage, with older participants suggesting that they would struggle to adopt new technology
to remain competitive in the workplace. This has serious implications for training, and we see
increased demand for rapid training systems for people of all skill levels and age. This will beneeded in order to redeploy and repurpose staff where their job, or parts of their job can be
automated rather than making them redundant (Gale, 2017).
An interesting finding was that many respondents had varying differences in how they see thefuture of their job and also the future of their career, regardless of a respondent’s job being ina low risk or high-risk category of automation. This sits in line with the expert futurists who
have varying views on what the future of work will look like, and how it will impact on human
workers (Bercovici, 2014). For example, our sample of lawyers discussed how some parts of
the job could be automated or enhanced, but relationships with clients would be more important
moving forward. We also noted several respondents with low risk jobs (according tocalculations by Frey & Osborne, 2013) who reported that they were concerned about
automation. On the flip side, we also noted many cases where respondents in high risk jobs
were mixed – with some being highly concerned and others not being concerned at all about
automation impacting on their job. For example, our sales and retail respondents largely felt
their jobs would be unchanged. This is despite a retail landscape that has been disrupted overthe decades by online sales, with many more disruptions expected to come. While New Zealandhas faced more online sales, we have not (yet) faced the Amazon effect to the same extent as
the USA or Europe. Overall, the results from this study provide useful insights into how
employees view the future of work. It shows that New Zealand respondents appear to have abroad understanding of STAARA although the different viewpoints on whether jobs will be
replaced is understandably mixed because the future is uncertain. Overall, the themes provided
new depth and insights to existing employee studies STAARA and provide greater depth
towards understanding employee perceptions. Perhaps the most intriguing perception is that
employees do see job changes coming through STAARA, but perhaps more positive change –whereby repetitive parts of roles are automated only.
Limitations and Future Research
Research into the future of work is in its infancy. It is important that we know about how
employees perceive the potential threat or benefit of STAARA and how employees plan toadapt (or not) for the future of work. For example, are truck, taxi- and bus-drivers looking for
new careers as the likelihood of driver-less vehicles become a reality? What does this do forthe supply of truck drivers that are needed while the driverless technology is not on-board yet?
Future research should also look at which businesses are looking to use STAARA within theiroperations and how, and what their intentions are behind this? Is it to replace workers? Or is it
to increase efficiency? What are firms planning to do with employees that no longer fit within
their old job? Do they simply make them redundant? Do they provide training to them so they
can find work in another field? Or do they try and retain these workers for new roles within
their organisation? These are important questions that researchers need to explore. Overall, thisarea of research is limited, and we encourage researchers to undertake more exploration.

31

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 21-36
A limitation for the present study was that the responses were collected online. They were notin-depth interviews, meaning follow-up questions were not asked to the respondents involved.
Furthermore, some respondents provided limited dialogue in their response. It is, however,important to mention that the purpose of this study was to provide a broad insight into what awide range of employees think about STAARA at that point in time. A benefit of using thismethod to attract respondents was that a wide range of industries and occupations were able to
be included in the research. We also achieved a sizeable sample (60 employees), providing awider range of insights from our respondents to look at our research questions.
It is also important to note that not all futurists predict STAARA will have detrimental effects
on employment. This potential for job loss through technology is not a foregone conclusion,
but a prediction about that future that has not happened (yet). While it is likely that parts of ajob may or will be automated, it might be that the result will be a change a job or role, rather
than the strict removal of that job (i.e., redundancy). Some researchers are very critical of any
detrimental STAARA future. Miller and Atkinson (2013) stated that “robots, automation,
machines, productivity: these are key enablers of human progress and absolutely no threat tooverall employment” (p.2). Furthermore, research from Deloitte (2015) suggested thattechnology has created more jobs in the last 140 years. This could be a limitation because we
may not be on the cusp of a new industrial revolution. We must also consider the fact that newjobs will be created in the coming years, ones that we cannot begin to imagine. In addition,
Frey and Osborne (2013) suggested that there will be a multitude of external considerations
that could play a role in shaping the future of work, such as wages, labour shortages andpolitical pressure. In addition, current issues, such as the temporary and casual labour, are in astate of change. These constant changes mean that the future is difficult to predict.
Furthermore, respondents may be looking to transition into new work because they want a
career change, more meaningful work, higher wages or more flexibility. So even though we
asked about technology, their ideas around their future job and career may be based in a
profession they are not currently working in.

Conclusion
Much of the research on the future of work has been presented from the position of ‘theexperts’. This paper sought to highlight the current employee outlook into the future of work.
We suggest that employees offer a different and meaningful insight into the complexity of theirown work, and how hard it might be to automate the entire process. This is not to say they havea greater or lesser insight into the future of work, but it is an insight that is missing from theliterature. Knowledge of these perceptions is very important for organisations and policy
makers. It is a useful part of the puzzle for assessment moving forward. We encourage further
research to develop the understanding and influence of STAARA on workforces from a rangeof different perspectives. This will enable better planning insights for all affected.

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 21-36

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Psychological autonomy and well-being of employees in low-skilledoccupations
AMY PEI CHUIN YONG *, MAREE ROCHE** and ANNA SUTTON***
Abstract
Psychological autonomy and the impact it has on employees’ well-being has seldom been
examined for those employed in low-skilled occupations. Using self-determination theory(SDT) as the theoretical grounding, this study aimed to investigate the relationship between
supervisors’ support for psychological autonomy and employee outcomes such as well-being,stress, and job performance, for those in low-skilled occupations. SDT proposes that the effectof supervisors’ autonomy support is mediated through the satisfaction and frustration of
employees’ needs. Survey data were collected from 171 employees at four different
organisations in New Zealand. Regression analysis indicated that supervisors’ autonomy
support was positively related to the satisfaction of employees’ autonomy, competence andrelatedness needs, and negatively related to frustration of employees’ autonomy andrelatedness needs. In addition, supervisors’ autonomy support was related to job performancethrough competence and relatedness satisfaction and to well-being through autonomy
satisfaction. Findings highlight the importance of supervisors’ autonomy support for
employees’ well-being and job performance, giving organisations ways to improve well-being
and job performance.
Keywords: low-skilled occupations, well-being, supervisors’ autonomy support, autonomy

Introduction
Autonomy at work has been shown to have positive effects on employees’ well-being. For
example, job autonomy, where an employee has control over the nature and type of task, has apositive relationship with employees’ well-being (Boxall & Macky, 2014). Autonomy inscheduling or timing, where employees control the start and end of their working hours, is also
positively related to well-being (Nijp, Beckers, Geurts, Tucker, & Kompier, 2012). While bothjob and time autonomy contribute to the well-being of employees, neither of these forms of
autonomy are widespread in low-skilled occupations (Wheatley, 2017). Low-skilledoccupations can be defined as occupations where work experience of up to a year is requiredwith little or no formal education required to perform the tasks (Australian Bureau of Statistics,
2006). The nature of work in these occupations is typically characterised as highly routinisedwith fixed production or service hours, and therefore limited in job and time autonomy. These
occupations can also be physically and psychologically demanding. Karasek and Theorell(1990) suggest that occupations such as assemblers and machine operators, where job-holders
tend to work in isolated work stations, are found to have low control and social support, but*

PhD candidate, Waikato Management School, University of Waikato.
Dr Maree Roche, Senior Lecturer, Waikato Management School, University of Waikato.
***
Dr Anna Sutton, Senior Lecturer, School of Psychology, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University ofWaikato.
**37

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58
are high in physical and psychological demands. Similarly, front-line hospitality occupations
are also low in autonomy and high in demands (Walters & Raybould, 2007). According toMarmot (2005), those holding low-skilled jobs with less control tend to experience an increased
level of alienation and boredom and a reduced level of social contact. Individuals working inthese occupations are more prone to experience adverse outcomes, such as health and mental
health complaints, fatigue and low job satisfaction (de Jonge, Bosma, Peter, & Siegrist, 2000;
Pelfrene et al., 2002).
This research generally supports the notion that high job demands and psychological strain
generate negative well-being outcomes for both organisations and employees. The well-beingof employees in low-skilled occupations is commonly investigated from the work system anddesign perspective, such as lean manufacturing practices (e.g., Cullinane, Bosak, Flood, &Demerouti, 2014) and has often neglected the individual psychological aspect within wellbeing. This study provides an understanding of the individual psychological process byinvestigating the role of psychological autonomy in the well-being of employees in low-skilledoccupations, hence providing organisations with another means to improve their well-being.
Using self-determination theory (SDT) as a framework, we discuss psychological autonomy,
the autonomy-supportive environment and basic psychological needs.

Self-Determination Theory (SDT)The core concept of SDT concerns the facilitation or hindering of human flourishing (Ryan &Deci, 2000a). The basic assumption of SDT is that humans are innately curious, active anddesire social connection, and much of SDT research focusses on the social conditions thatenhance or undermine an individual’s capacity for psychological growth, wellness andengagement (Ryan & Deci, 2017). An individual’s capacity for growth is grounded in two
fundamental principles: firstly, the need for an environment that supports psychologicalautonomy and, secondly, the satisfaction of basic psychological needs. These are discussed
below.
Autonomy
Autonomy is commonly seen as being synonymous with independence, having the ability to
behave and think outside the bounds of societal conformity, and making decision based on
personal judgement (Ryff & Keyes, 1995). This view of autonomy is consistent with a great
deal of the organisational research on job and time autonomy, which suggests that autonomy
is having the independence to decide how tasks can be completed and the flexibility to decide
when to start and end work. In contrast, SDT defines autonomy as interdependence. Deci and
Ryan (2000) suggest that autonomy, in essence, is self-organisation and self-regulation, where
one endorses one’s own action while finding coherence between the inner self in association
with the external environment or conditions. Drawing on SDT research in the workplace, Nie,Chua, Yeung, Ryan and Chan (2015) and Williams et al., (2014) found the experience ofinterdependent autonomy, measured as autonomous motivation, was facilitated by anautonomy-supportive environment.
Interdependent autonomy has a broader application to work than the view of independent
autonomy, because employees are not independent of the organisation and its policies, but arecommonly subjected to organisational standards which employees may not fully endorse.
Moreover, employees in low-skilled occupations often follow a routine and are required to38

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58
strictly adhere to procedure. Thus, they may find work less interesting (Morgeson &Humphrey, 2006) and, consequently, more challenging to engage autonomously at work.
Therefore, interdependent autonomy, where employees willingly engage in an activity at workwithout having their values and goals undermined, while also being aware of the expectations
and standards of the organisation, may be more relevant to low-skilled occupations which lackjob and time autonomy. The key to this willing engagement with organisational standards andactivity at work is supervisors’ autonomy support for the employees (Ryan & Deci, 2000a).

Supervisors’ autonomy support (SAS)
Employees’ autonomy can be supported by the supervisors who act as their first line of report.
An autonomy-supportive supervisor tends to provide an explanation for a given task, be open
to employees’ points of view, encourage initiative-taking and minimise the use of punishment
or external rewards to motivate or change behaviour (Slemp, Kern, Patrick, & Ryan, 2018). In
summary, SAS is a supervisory style aimed at fostering a supportive and understanding climate
within the supervisor–employee relationship.
However, SAS is also commonly associated with being permissive and providing minimal
guidelines (Reeve, 2009), which may lead supervisors in highly routinised occupations todiscount the practicality of SAS. Nevertheless, studies have shown that SAS is a supervisory
style that promotes well-being (Deci et al., 2001) without neglecting order and guidelines(Jang, Reeve, & Deci, 2010). Therefore, in a routinised work environment, SAS can bedemonstrated through providing the rationale for seemingly repetitive and meaningless tasks,
acknowledging and accepting employees’ views when issues arise, avoiding controlling
language (e.g., should, must) when outlining guidelines and expectations, and providing
personal development opportunities. Through SAS, employees’ basic psychological needs are
satisfied, leading to better well-being and benefitting the organisation through improved
performance (Deci, Olafsen, & Ryan, 2017).
Autonomy support and needs satisfaction
SDT posits that the optimal functioning and well-being of an individual is dependent on thesatisfaction of the three fundamental psychological needs – autonomy (self-regulating one’s
behaviour; achieving inner coherence with external demands and goals), competence(engaging in optimal challenges and mastery in the physical and social world) and relatedness(seeking attachment and desiring the feelings of security, belongingness and intimacy withothers) (Deci & Vansteenkiste, 2004). Similarly, the satisfaction of employees’ basic
psychological needs is key to their well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). As such, SAS aims toprovide an environment allowing employees to make choices and take action to satisfy the needfor autonomy, competence and relatedness (Ryan & Deci, 2017). While such relationships havebeen widely studied in various occupational groups (Gillet, Fouquereau, Huyghebaert, &Colombat, 2015), the effect of SAS specifically on employees in low-skilled occupations is notknown. Based on previous findings that SAS is positively related to needs satisfaction, thefollowing hypotheses are proposed for employees in low-skilled occupations:
H1a: SAS is positively related to autonomy need satisfaction.
H1b: SAS is positively related to competence need satisfaction.
H1c: SAS is positively related to relatedness need satisfaction.

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58
Autonomy support and needs frustration
Needs, if frustrated or thwarted, will have a negative outcome on the person’s well-being,
which is likely to diminish the person’s ability to function optimally (Deci & Vansteenkiste,2004). Deci and Ryan (2000) suggested the lack of satisfaction of needs may reflect a lower
state of well-being, but the active or constant frustration of needs may lead to a more negative
outcome such as anxiety, depressive symptoms and other maladaptive coping strategies. Needs
satisfaction and frustration are negatively related to each other (Chen et al., 2015). However,they are not antithetical, as the antecedent and outcome of needs satisfaction and needs
frustration tend to correlate, but they do so in the opposite direction (Vansteenkiste & Ryan,
2013). The effect of SAS on needs satisfaction has been widely studied, but the same could not
be said about the effect of SAS on needs frustration. Although Vansteenkiste and Ryan (2013)
suggest that SAS could prevent needs frustration, not many organisational studies have chosen
to confirm this path, except for a few, such as those by Gillet, Fouquereau, Forest, Brunault
and Colombat (2012), Gillet, Forest, Benabou and Bentein (2015) and Schultz, Ryan, Niemiec,
Legate and Williams (2015). These studies found a negative relationship between SAS andneeds frustration at work. However, needs frustration was analysed as a composite unit. Hence,
how SAS is related to the frustration of each need is not known, and to our knowledge, no otherprior research has informed about this relationship. Nevertheless, based on the findings that
SAS is negatively related to needs frustration, the following hypotheses for employees in lowskilled occupations are proposed:
H2a: SAS is negatively related to autonomy need frustration.
H2b: SAS is negatively related to competence need frustration.
H2c: SAS is negatively related to relatedness need frustration.
Needs satisfaction and frustration as mediators
SAS has been found to have a significant positive relationship with the following: employees’
tendencies to self-initiate and regulate (Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 2004); acceptance oforganisational change (Gagné, Koestner, & Zuckerman, 2000); organisational identification,
work satisfaction and job performance (Gillet, Colombat, Michinov, Pronost, & Fouquereau,2013); well-being and task engagement (Deci et al., 2001); and decreased burnout (Fernet,
Guay, Senécal, & Austin, 2012). A meta-analysis by Slemp et al., (2018) found a similar effectof SAS on well-being and needs satisfaction across individualistic and collectivistic cultures.
Thus, they concluded that SAS universally supports employees’ well-being. As SAS iscommonly known to contribute to employees’ well-being and a positive organisational
outcome, we hypothesised the following specific outcomes for employees in low-skilledoccupations:
H3a: SAS is positively related to job performance.
H3b: SAS is positively related to well-being.
H3c: SAS is negatively related to stress.
While SAS is related to positive organisational outcomes, it is often mediated by thesatisfaction of needs (Baard et al., 2004; Deci et al., 2001). Employees whose needs are
satisfied showed increased work performance in a banking firm (Baard et al., 2004), greater
well-being and job satisfaction in a shoe factory (Ilardi, Leone, Kasser, & Ryan, 1993), reduced
symptoms of anxiety and depression in Bulgaria where employees are dominated by a “topdown” management approach (Deci et al., 2001) and a higher level of organisational citizenshipbehaviour in New Zealand organisations (Roche & Haar, 2013). Other studies with Dutchspeaking employees also found needs satisfaction leads to better well-being (Van den Broeck,
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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58
Vansteenkiste, De Witte, Soenens, & Lens, 2010) and lower stress (Van den Broeck,
Vansteenkiste, De Witte, & Lens, 2008). SAS provides the environment in which needs may
be satisfied, which leads to positive outcomes.
On the other hand, research suggests that when employees’ needs are frustrated, this can leadto negative outcomes such as employees engaging in counterproductive behaviours: taking
long breaks and turning up late to work (Van Den Broeck et al., 2014); experiencing burnout,high turnover intent, absenteeism (Schultz et al., 2015); psychological distress, psychosomatic
complaints (Gillet et al., 2015; Trépanier, Forest, Fernet, & Austin, 2015); and higher levelsof stress (Olafsen, Niemiec, Halvari, Deci, & Williams, 2017). Needs frustration also mediates
between SAS and employee well-being and job satisfaction (Gillet et al., 2012). Although
research examining needs frustration is growing, to our knowledge, no research has been
conducted with low-skilled occupations.
Based on studies which found needs satisfaction and frustration as mediators between SAS andoutcome variables, we hypothesise the following relationships:
H4a: The relationship between SAS and job performance, well-being and stress will be
mediated by satisfaction of the need for autonomy.
H4b: The relationship between SAS and job performance, well-being and stress will be
mediated by satisfaction of the need for competence.
H4c: The relationship between SAS and job performance, well-being and stress will be
mediated by satisfaction of the need for relatedness.
H4d: The relationship between SAS and job performance, well-being and stress will be
mediated by frustration of the need for autonomy.
H4e: The relationship between SAS and job performance, well-being and stress will be
mediated by frustration of the need for competence.
H4f: The relationship between SAS and job performance, well-being and stress will be
mediated by frustration of the need for relatedness.
High performance and well-being as well as lower levels of stress are not only good for theemployees, but they are also indicators of a healthy organisational culture (Cooper &Cartwright, 1994; Grabovac & Mustajbegovic, 2015). This study aims to understand how needs
satisfaction and frustration may mediate the relationship between supervisors’ autonomy
support and employees’ well-being, job performance and stress, hence providing informationon the antecedent and psychological process leading to positive outcomes.

MethodParticipants and procedure
The data for this study were collected from employees in low-skilled occupations in New
Zealand. Employees from three factories and one hotel participated in the study. The survey
was distributed to the participants during a pre-arranged meeting. Arrangements were also
made for the employees to return the completed survey forms via survey boxes placed indifferent locations (i.e., cafés and the clock-out machine area). The survey boxes were thencollected by the lead researcher a week after the survey forms were distributed.

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58
A total of 171 employees (out of 229) completed the survey with a response rate of 74.7 percent. Of the 171 employees, 39 were from Organisation 1, 61 from Organisation 2, 28 from
Organisation 3 and 43 were from Organisation 4. The majority of the participants were male
(66.7 per cent), 28.7 per cent were female, and the remainder did not specify their gender. The
mean age of the participants were 39.6 years (SD = 13.2). Most of the participants were factory
operators (74.9 per cent) while 25.1 per cent were from various services in the hotel industry(i.e., housekeeping, food and beverage, receptionist, etc.).
Measures
The questionnaire administered to the employees consisted of five different scales and all themeasures were administered in English.
Supervisors’ support for autonomy
Employee perceptions of supervisors’ autonomy support (SAS) were assessed using the Work
Climate Questionnaire (WCQ). The WCQ uses 15 items (e.g., My manager listens to how I
would like to do things) and a 7-point response scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
Baard et al. (2004) adapted the scale to the work context by changing the reference person to
manager from Williams, Grow, Freedman, Ryan and Deci (1996) who used the survey withpatients to assess the autonomy-supportiveness of their healthcare provider (α = .92) andWilliams and Deci (1996) who used the survey with students to assess autonomysupportiveness of their instructor (α = .96).
Basic psychological needs satisfaction and frustration
The needs satisfaction and frustration 24-item scale (BPNSF-W) was designed to measure thesatisfaction and frustration of competence, relatedness and autonomy needs at work. The scale
was initially developed by Chen et al. (2015) and was adapted to a work context by Schultz etal. (2015), with Cronbach’s alpha of 0.90 for needs satisfaction and Cronbach’s alpha of 0.88
for needs frustration. Participants responded to a series of items such as “At work, I feel a senseof choice and freedom in the things I undertake” for needs satisfaction and “I feel insecure
about my abilities on my job” for needs frustration, using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 totallydisagree to 7 totally agree.
Employees’ well-being
The well-being of employees was measured using the WHO-5 Well-being Scale (WHO-5) and
the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-4). The WHO-5 scale was developed by the World HealthOrganization (WHO) from the WHO-10 and has been phrased to reflect subjective positivewell-being. The scale consists of five items, where the participants rated their well-being withitems such as “I have felt cheerful and in good spirits at work” on a scale of 0 at no time to 5
all of the time (Topp, Østergaard, Søndergaard, & Bech, 2015).
The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-4) scale was used to measure the perceived stress of
employees. The PSS-4 scale was a short version of the 14-item scale originally developed by
Cohen, Kamarck and Mermelstein (1983). The Cronbach’s alpha for the 4-item scale was 0.72.
The items in the scale asked the participants to rate the items such as “In the last month, howoften have you felt that you were unable to control the important things in your life?” from 0
never to 4 very often. In general, the greater the score, the higher the level of stress reported.

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58
Job performance
The job performance scale was adapted from Abramis (1994), which characterised job
performance into technical (α = 0.83) and social performance (α = 0.76), absenteeism andlateness. In this study, technical and social performance are used as a measure of job
performance. The items in the scale included, “In the past four weeks you worked, how well
did you perform without mistakes?” and participants rate it from 1 very poorly, to 5
exceptionally well. Self-rated job performance was chosen in consideration of the pressure theemployees might feel about their prospects in the organisation if supervisor- or organisationalrated job performance was used.

Results
Reliability and validity
Most scales demonstrated high reliability, ranging from .70 to .96. The reliability value for the
scale measuring stress was relatively low (α = .57) and the inter-item correlations wereconsiderably weak (range from r = .11 to r = .39). Hence, the PSS-4 scale has been removed
from further analysis.
Preliminary analysis
Correlations between the variables are presented in Table 1. From the correlation analysis,needs satisfaction (i.e., autonomy satisfaction) showed stronger correlations with well-being (r= .58, p < .01), while needs frustration (i.e., autonomy frustration) showed weaker correlations
with well-being (r = -.26, p < .01).

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58
Table 1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Employees
M
SD 1
2
3
4

5

6

7

8

1. SAS

5.1

1.2

(.96)

2. Autonomy satisfaction

4.6

1.1

.48**

(.75)

3. Competence satisfaction

5.8

.9

.29**

.46**

(.70)

4. Relatedness satisfaction

5.0

1.1

.35**

.47**

.36**

(.76)

5. Autonomy frustration

3.8

1.4

-.23** -.19*

-.09

-.19*

(.76)

6. Competence frustration

2.6

1.2

-.07

-.34** -.16*

.51**

(.78)

7. Relatedness frustration

3.2

1.2

-.26** -.16-.26** -.35** .51**.58**

8. Job performance

4.0

.5

.16*

.24**

.40**

.41**

-.14

-.40** -.32** (.82)

9. Well-being

3.2

1.1

.37**

.58**

.24**

.36**

-.26** -.16*

-.14

9

(.77)

-.08

.35**

(.84)

**

p < .01, *p < .05; n = 154.
Note: Alpha reliabilities presented in italics on the diagonal

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58
Regression analysis
SAS and needs satisfaction and frustration
A series of hierarchical regression analyses were run using SPSS version 24, to test the hypothesesof SAS as a predictor of autonomy, competence and relatedness needs satisfaction and frustrationindividually. The organisations, types of contract, and tenure of employment were first entered in
the regression analysis as controls. In the second step, SAS was entered. Results of the regression
analysis showed a significant positive relationship between SAS and the satisfaction of autonomy,
relatedness, and competence needs, as shown in Table 2.

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58
Table 2 Hierarchical regression analysis for SAS and autonomy, competence and relatedness needs satisfaction and frustration
Autonomy satisfactionβ
SE B R2
ΔR2

Competence satisfactionΒ
SE B R2
ΔR2

Step 1 (Control variables)
Employment term
-.02
.08
.03
.06
a
Org 1
-.15
.25
-.02
.18
b
*
Org 2
-.14
.25
-.23
.18
c
Org 3
-.12
.28
-.02
.20
Fulltime & Part-time
-.18
.23
-.11
.17
Fulltime & Fixed term
-.24
.27
-.18
.20
Fulltime & Others
.02
.32
-.03
.23
Model summary.08.05
Step 2
Employment term
-.03
.07
.06
.06
a
Org 1
-.14
.23
.00
.18
b
Org 2
-.08
.23
-.20
.17
c
Org 3
-.08
.25
.01
.19
Fulltime & Part-time
-.15
.21
-.06
.16
Fulltime & Fixed term
-.17
.25
-.12
.19
Fulltime & Others
.01
.29
-.04
.22
**
**
SAS
.44
.07
.31
.05
**
**
Model summary
.26
.18
.14**
Note: N = 162; **p < .01, *p < .05. aOrg 4 vs Org 1; bOrg 4 vs Org 2; cOrg 4 vs Org 3

Relatedness satisfactionβ
SE B R2ΔR2.02-.29**-.39**
-.16
-.14
-.21*
-.08

.08
.24
.24
.27
.22
.26
.31
.11*

.05
-.26**-.36**
-.13
-.07
-.14
-.09
.36**
.09**

.07
.23
.23
.25
.21
.24
.29
.07
.23**

.12**

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58
Table 2 continued
Autonomy frustrationβ
SE B R2ΔR

2Competence frustration
Β
SE B R2
ΔR2

Step 1 (Control variables)
Employment term
.07
.10
-.02
.09
a
Org 1
-.12
.30
-.23
.29
b
Org 2
.01
.30
-.04
.29
c
Org 3
-.07
.33
-.17
.31
*
Fulltime & Part-time
.22
.28
.12
.26
Fulltime & Fixed term
-.01
.32
-.03
.31
Fulltime & Others
.14
.38
.06
.37
Model summary.06.07
Step 2
Employment term
.06
.10
-.02
.09
a
*
Org 1
-.14
.30
-.23
.29
b
Org 2
-.01
.30
-.05
.29
c
Org 3
-.08
.33
-.17
.32
Fulltime & Part-time
.18
.27
.12
.27
Fulltime & Fixed term
-.05
.32
-.03
.31
Fulltime & Others
.14
.38
.06
.37
*
SAS
-.17
.09
-.03
.09
*
*
Model summary
.09
.03
.07
**
*
a
b
c
Note: N = 162; p < .01, p < .05. Org 4 vs Org 1; Org 4 vs Org 2; Org 4 vs Org 3

Relatedness frustrationβ
SE B R2ΔR2.07-.30**
-.05
-.21*
.05
-.01
.06

.09
.29
.29
.31
.26
.30
.36
.10*

.05
-.31**
-.07
-.23*
.01
-.05
.07
-.23**
.00

.09
.28
.28
.30
.26
.30
.35
.08
.15**

.05**

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58
Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c are supported. SAS also predicted reduced frustration of relatedness andautonomy needs, but not competence need. Hypotheses 2a and 2c are supported, but not 2b.
Generally, SAS accounted for greater variance in needs satisfaction (R2 of .09 to .18) than in needs
frustration (R2 of .03 to .05).
Multiple mediation analysis
According to Preacher and Hayes (2008), a multiple mediation analysis is an appropriate analysis
for multiple potential mediators, which, in this study, are autonomy, competence and relatedness
needs satisfaction and frustration. Based on the recommendation by Van den Broeck, Ferris, Chang
and Rosen (2016), individual needs should be analysed separately to test the unique effect of eachneed on the outcome variables. Therefore, the relationship between SAS and the outcome variables
were first tested. Following this, autonomy, competence and relatedness satisfaction andfrustration were tested as mediators of the relationship between outcome variables and SAS.
Analyses were conducted using SPSS version 24, Process version 3.0. The coefficients andconfidence intervals for the outcome variables based on 10,000 bootstrap samples are presented inTable 3 and 4.

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58
Table 3 Summary of mediation analysis with SAS as predictor, needs satisfaction as mediators and outcome variables
OutcomeJob performance a
Predictors
SAS
Autonomy satisfaction
Competence satisfaction
Relatedness satisfaction
Model R2
SAS
Total effectDirect effectTotal indirect effectIndirect effect via(A) Autonomy satisfaction(B) Competence satisfaction(C) Relatedness satisfaction

Well-being b

Coeff
.08*
-.02
.26**
.15**
.30**

SE B
.03
.04
.05
.04

95% CI
LL
.01
-.10
.16
.08

UL
.05
.06
.36
.23

95%
CoeffCI
.35**
.46**
-.04
.10
.36**

SE B
.06
.08
.10
.10

95% CI
LL
UL
.22
.47
.31
.61
-.23
.15
-.05
.24

.08*
-.02
.10*

.03
.03
.03

.01
-.08
.05

.15
.05
.15

.35**
.12
.23*

.06
.07
.05

.22
-.01
.15

.47
.25
.33

-.01
.06*
.05*

.02
.02
.02

-.04
.02
.02

.03
.10
.09

.21*
-.01
.03

.05
.03
.03

.13
-.06
-.03

.31
.04
.10

Note: a N = 165; b N = 165. **p < .01, *p < .05. CI = Confidence intervals based on bias-corrected k = 10,000 bootstrap samples, LL lower
limit, UL upper limit.

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58
Table 4 Summary of mediation analysis with SAS as predictor, needs frustration as mediators, and outcome variables
OutcomeJob performance a

Well-being b
95% CI
LL
UL
.01
.15
.01
.15
-.25
-.09
-.13
.03

95%
CoeffCI. 35**
-.16*
-.13
.18*
.21**

95% CI
LL
UL
.22
.47
-.30
-.02
-.29
.04
.02
.34

Predictors
Coeff
SE B
SE B
*
SAS
.08
.03
.06
*
Autonomy frustration
.08
.04
.07
**
Competence frustration
-.17
.04
.08
Relatedness frustration
-.05
.04
.08
2
**
Model R
.19
SAS
Total effect
.08*
.03
.01
.15
.35**
.06
.22
.47
*
**
Direct effect
.08
.03
.01
.14
.35
.07
.23
.48
Total indirect effect
.00
.02
-.03
.04
.22
-.01
.03
-.06
Indirect effect via(A) Autonomy frustration
-.01
.01
-.04
.00
.03
.02
-.00
.08
(B) Competence frustration
.00
.01
-.02
.04
.01
.01
-.01
.04
*
(C) Relatedness frustration
.01
.01
-.01
.04
-.04
.03
-.11
-.00
a
b
**
*
Note: N = 165; N = 165. p < .01, p < .05. CI = Confidence intervals based on bias-corrected k = 10,000 bootstrap samples, LL lower
limit, UL upper limit.

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58
SAS and outcome variables
The main effect analyses showed SAS was significantly related to job performance (β = .08, p < .05) andwell-being (β = .35, p < .01). Therefore, hypotheses 3a and 3b are supported. Following the significant
main effect results, mediation analyses were conducted.
Needs satisfaction as mediators
The mediation analysis showed a significant relationship between SAS and job performance throughcompetence and relatedness satisfaction only. Hence, hypotheses 4b and 4c are supported for job
performance only. Autonomy satisfaction mediates the relationship between SAS and well-being, with aneffect size of .21. Therefore, hypothesis 4a is supported only for well-being.
Competence and relatedness satisfaction mediate SAS and job performance while autonomy satisfaction
mediates SAS and well-being. The mediation model provides a better explanation of the relationshipbetween SAS and job performance and well-being than the direct relationship between SAS and job
performance and well-being.
Needs frustration as mediators
The total direct effects between SAS and job performance and well-being were significant, while theindirect effect through needs frustration were not significant. Therefore, the mediation hypotheses between
SAS and the outcome variables through needs frustration were not supported. This relationship canpossibly be influenced by SAS contributing to less variance in needs frustration, as demonstrated in thesecond set of hypotheses and the mixed results between needs frustration and outcome variables.

Discussion
This study investigated (1) the relationship between supervisors’ autonomy support and the satisfaction
or frustration of employees’ autonomy, competence, and relatedness needs, and (2) the relationshipbetween supervisors’ autonomy support and organisational outcomes mediated through needs satisfaction
and frustration. The results showed that autonomy support is uniquely related to satisfaction andfrustration of each of the three needs satisfaction, as demonstrated by different effect sizes. Although SAS
predicts autonomy and relatedness frustration, it does so to a lesser degree than needs satisfaction. Thesefindings are consistent with Bartholomew, Ntoumanis, Ryan, Bosch and Thøgersen-Ntoumani (2011) and
Gillet et al. (2012), who found autonomy support relates to needs satisfaction to a greater degree thanneeds frustration. The findings suggest SAS functions to increase positive resources rather than preventing
needs frustration of employees in low-skilled occupations. Therefore, if employees continuously operate
under a controlling management style that is rigid, prescriptive and frequently uses punishment as acorrective method (Ryan & Deci, 2017), SAS may not be able to prevent employees’ needs from being
frustrated.
It was hypothesised that the satisfaction of needs through SAS would lead to better job performance andwell-being. Competence and relatedness satisfaction mediate job performance, while only autonomy
satisfaction mediates well-being. Mixed results were found, suggesting that each need uniquely mediates
the relationship between SAS and the outcome variables, hence reinforcing the requirement to examine
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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58
each need individually (Van den Broeck et al., 2016). On the other hand, the results do not imply thatneeds that did not mediate the relationship between SAS and job performance and well-being should be
ignored, as needs satisfaction varies daily and with different activities (Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, &Ryan, 2000). Future studies focussing on activities and daily variation might be able to provide insight
into the role of each need in employees’ well-being. However, what we can infer through this study isthat, despite limitation in job and time autonomy, psychological autonomy plays an important role in thewell-being of employees in low-skilled occupations.
On the other hand, needs frustration does not mediate SAS and job performance and well-being. This
result contrasts with that of Gillet et al. (2012), who found that needs frustration mediates SAS andorganisational outcomes such as job satisfaction, happiness and self-realisation. In their study, needs
frustration was investigated as an overall index while, in this study, needs frustration was analysed
separately as three mediators. This difference in the analysis might influence the mediation effect. In
addition, the evidence of needs frustration as a mediator between controlling and negative outcomes isstronger than needs frustration as a mediator between autonomy-support and positive outcomes. For
example, Vander Elst, Van Den Broeck, De Witte and De Cuyper (2012) found that needs frustration
mediates the relationship between job insecurity and emotional exhaustion and vigour. Needs frustration
also mediates the relationship between workplace bullying and burnout (Trépanier, Fernet, & Austin,2015). Our study suggests that, although SAS can prevent autonomy and relatedness frustration to a certain
degree, it is not sufficient to impact job performance and well-being of employees in low-skilledoccupations.
Finally, the PSS-4 scale demonstrated low reliability and was removed from further analysis. The scalechosen for this study, consisting of two positively and two negatively worded items, might appear
confusing to the participants in low-skilled occupations who might not be used to filling in surveys. Since
the scale has not been used extensively with people in low-skilled occupations, it may be that a brief stressscale for our participants might not be the best measure, especially when the scale has both positive andnegative items. Therefore, studies with low-skilled occupations in the future should consider using the 10item stress scale, which is a two-factor model, instead of the more popular single-factor model (Taylor,2015).

Limitations and future research
There are a few limitations in this study to take note of when interpreting the results and considering
directions for future research. First of all, the data collected was cross-sectional. Though no single factor
emerged after performing Harman’s one-factor test, we do not deny that cross-sectional data is still subject
to other common method biases (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Moreover, crosssectional data cannot conclude causality. Future organisational studies can consider using longitudinal orexperimental methods to establish the relationship between SAS and employees’ well-being through needs
satisfaction and needs frustration.
Secondly, the relatively weak effect sizes of SAS on job performance through needs satisfaction suggestthat future studies should include types of motivation as potential mediators (Deci et al., 2017). Moreover,since only SAS was investigated as a predictor, researchers might also want to include supervisors’
controlling behaviour in relation to needs frustration and organisational outcomes. Bartholomew et al.
(2011) suggested needs frustration has different antecedents and predicted outcomes. Therefore, future52

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58
studies could measure controlling behaviours that might lead to needs frustration and negative outcomesto gain better understanding of the predictors as well as the outcomes of needs frustration.
Finally, research with low-skilled occupations posed some unique challenges, such as lower literacy skills,
leading to the possibility of participants misunderstanding certain items in the questionnaire. Moreover,as employees in low-skilled occupations work with machines or in service areas that run continuously andunder tight schedules, it can be challenging to motivate them to participate in the study as they are unable
to move away from their work station, and they might not see the benefit of participating in a study.
Because of this, the sample size of this study, although sufficient, is limited.
However, these limitations should encourage rather than discourage researchers to study low-skilledoccupations, as they present unique contexts for the application of SDT. Future studies could pay closer
attention to simplifying the items in the questionnaire and providing literacy support to the participants.
In addition, researchers could attempt to gain support from management prior to the study so employees
are able to take time away from their work station to participate in the study. This could both increase theparticipation rate and also convey organisational commitment to improving employee well-being.

Practical implication and conclusion
Following the results of this study, we offer a practical suggestion that might improve well-being and job
performance of employees in low-skilled jobs. Our findings suggest that for employees in low-skilledoccupations where job and time autonomy are limited, supervisors’ support for psychological autonomy
plays an important role in the satisfaction of autonomy, competence and relatedness needs, which, in turn,leads to better job performance and employee well-being. Organisations should consider encouraging
supervisors to practise an autonomy-supportive interaction style with employees. One of the ways toincrease autonomy supporting interaction is through training supervisors in autonomy-supportive
behaviours. Autonomy-supportive skills training includes providing a meaningful rationale whenassigning a task, accepting rather than correcting employees’ views when assigning tasks that are not of
employees’ interest, using informational rather than punitive language in correcting behaviour, andproviding opportunities for development, learning and interactions at work. Studies have shown that
autonomy-supportive training with managers, coaches, health practitioners and teachers resulted in moreautonomy-supportive interactions with their employees, athletes, patients and students (Su & Reeve,2011). Therefore, investing in such training could provide great benefit to the employees and organisation.
In conclusion, this study has provided insight into the relationship between supervisors’ autonomy support
and organisational outcomes (job performance, well-being and stress). While the relationship between
supervisors’ autonomy support and job performance and well-being was mediated by needs satisfaction,
there is no evidence that needs frustration mediates the same relationships. In conclusion, supervisors’
autonomy support plays an important role in the satisfaction of needs and improvement of job performanceand well-being.

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 37-58

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Another swing of the pendulum: rhetoric and argument around the
Employment Relations Amendment Act (2018)
PETER SKILLING*
Abstract2018’s Employment Relations Amendment Act (ERAA) reversed many of the employment relations(ER) regulatory changes introduced by the preceding National-led administration. It, thus, continued
the pattern of yo-yo policy-making that has held in New Zealand since 1991, where significant changes
to the ER system have been made with each change of government. Regular pendulum swings in policy
settings (where each government begins by reversing policy changes made by the previous
administration) generate negative outcomes, including uncertainty and, most likely, a sub-optimal
policy equilibrium. In order to understand and (hopefully) move past this impasse, this paper analyses
the arguments made for and against this new Act. Texts drawn from parliamentary debates, the SelectCommittee process, and media coverage are analysed to show the linguistic and rhetorical means usedby actors on either side of the debate to make their competing arguments appear legitimate andcompelling.
The article notes the moments where the parties to this dispute failed or engage meaningfully with thearguments and evidence presented by the other side, and suggests that the “talking past each other”
nature of the debate is related to the institutional forms and structures within which the debate took
place. It concludes with suggestions for an institutional setting able to facilitate more constructive
dialogue.
Keywords: discourse analysis, rhetorical analysis, unions, flexibility

Introduction
Within its first 100 days in office, the new Labour-led coalition government introduced employment
relations (ER) legislation that addressed issues of minimum protections for workers, and the role ofunions and collective bargaining. To anyone with more than a passing interest in ER legislation in New
Zealand, there was nothing especially surprising in any of the changes proposed. To a large extent,
they simply reversed many of the changes introduced by the preceding National-led administration:changes that Labour, the Greens and (to a lesser extent) New Zealand First had strongly opposed(Skilling & Molineaux, 2017). The provisions of the Employment Relations Amendment Act, 2018
(ERAA) had been prefigured in speeches and documents released during the election campaign(Labour Party of New Zealand, 2017a; 2017b) and in the new government’s statements of intent(Ardern, 2017). The ERAA does not represent the sum total of the government’s ER ambition: further
policy work will address issues of equal pay and of the “future of work”. This Act, however, had been
signalled and (being, in large part, a reversal of recent changes) had the advantage of being able to be
introduced relatively quickly.
The 2018 Act can be read as the latest move in a pattern of yo-yo policy-making that has held since1991, when the Employment Contracts Act (ECA) disrupted a long-established policy equilibrium(Rasmussen, 2009). In their turn, National MPs have stated their intention to reverse the provisions of
this Act as soon as they are able to do so (Simpson, 2018; McKelvie, 2018). These pendulum swings*

Department of Management, AUT, Auckland. Contact: peter.skilling@aut.ac.nz

59New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 59-78
with each change of government – reflecting what Foster, Rasmussen and Coetzee (2013, p.52)
describe as “the on-going lack of a broadly-based consensus over employment relations” – areunsurprising in that they express historically, materially and ideologically entrenched differences.
More than perhaps any other policy field, ER is an area in which the positions of the various parties
are well-established and thoroughly institutionalised. These polarised positions, moreover, arereinforced and further entrenched by the institutional forms and structures within which the relevant
policy debates take place.
In New Zealand’s Westminster-derived political system, a bill goes through three parliamentary
readings and a select committee process that allows for public submissions on the bill and scrutiny of
its clauses. While, on the face of things, this process appears designed to facilitate debate andengagement between competing perspectives, the analysis in this paper demonstrates that it does notcompel competing parties to engage meaningfully with the arguments and evidence presented by theother side. In many cases, actors may choose to ignore those competing claims and continue to simply
make claims that they believe will be resonant and convincing to a targeted public constituency. New
Zealand’s unicameral legislature (its absence of an upper house) means that any bill simply requires aparliamentary majority at each stage to pass into law. Actors opposed to a bill may find more value inseeking to rally public and media opposition, in order to put pressure on the parties supporting the bill.
In a proportional representation environment, where the government is typically comprised of two or
more parties, this may amount putting pressure on one of the smaller parties to withdraw their support,
or to demand changes.
The progress of any bill through the legislative process can be read as a situation of public dispute, inwhich a wide range of actors seek to have their perspectives heard and accepted. The logic of thissituation dictates that all parties must present reasons for their position, and align those reasons with
an appropriate conception of the common good (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Thévenot, Moody &Lafaye, 2000). Indeed, both sides in this debate claimed that their proposals promoted a mutuallybeneficial collective good, while describing their opponents’ prescriptions as merely the expression of
narrow self-interest.
If we accept that regular pendulum swings in policy settings generate negative outcomes (uncertainty,
but also, most likely, a sub-optimal regulatory equilibrium), we need to understand the rhetoricalfoundations of the arguments made on either side of the debate, and the way in which the nature of thedebate reflects its institutional setting. This article briefly summarises the major changes contained in
the ERAA (2018) before turning to an analysis of the arguments made on either side as the Bill
progressed through parliament. The data for analysis is drawn from public texts (including
parliamentary debates, submissions to and reports from Select Committee, and media coverage)
associated with actors on either side of the debate. These data are subjected to discourse analyticaltechniques drawn from pragmatic sociology and rhetorical analysis (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006;
Gottweis, 2007). The analysis is critical in the sense that it seeks to show the presence and operationof power that makes certain partial and interested positions appear natural, neutral and necessary(Fairclough, 1992). Its attention to the ways in which the various actors exercise power within thedebates foregrounds the various forms of capital available to the different actors, and the nature of thepolitical-cultural context within which the dispute took place.
In the next section, methods of data generation and analysis are described. Following that, the article
establishes the necessary context for its analysis: the main provisions of the ERAA (2018) aresummarised and situated within a brief history of ER legislation in New Zealand and a brief outline of
New Zealand’s political system. The subsequent Findings section identifies the linguistic andrhetorical means used by actors on either side of the debate to make their competing arguments appear
legitimate and compelling. The most important findings are developed further in the Discussion
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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 59-78
section, which focusses on the contestation in the debate over the key discursive node of “flexibility”.
This section also considers how different institutional structures could better arrange these competinginterests within a system that encourages and constrains them to seek shared ground. The Conclusion
brings the main threads of the article together and suggests avenues for further exploration.

Theory and Methods
The yo-yo pattern of policy change seen in ER regulation demonstrates the limitations of the rationalcomprehensive model of policy-making (Simon, 1976), and its assumption that policy-makers can (orattempt to) provide ‘unequivocal, value-free answers’ to policy questions (Gottweis, 2007, p.237). It
shifts our attention to the competing ideological bases of policy-making and the importance of“language and the process of utilizing, mobilizing and weighing arguments” (ibid.). This article
addresses the question of the linguistic and rhetorical means used by competing political actors tomake their competing arguments compelling to decision-makers and the public. It draws on Boltanski
and Thévenot’s (2006) pragmatic sociology as a way of analysing the various arguments made during
this policy debate, and of showing how different arguments offer different accounts of what is
important, how it should be measured, and how human actors should be understood.
Pragmatic sociology offers a useful typology for analysing how arguments are made in the publicsphere. It offers, more specifically, a framework to analyse “the struggles over legitimacy” (Cloutier& Langley, 2013, p. 360; see also Patriotta, Gond, & Schultz, 2011) that arise in situations of public
dispute. According to Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), social life is regulated by multiple (but not
infinite) “orders of worth”. Boltanski and Thévenot identify and outline six orders of worth (themarket, industrial, civic, domestic, opinion, and the inspired), where each order of worth has its own
standards for assessing the worthiness of actors, objects and arrangements.1 These orders are explicitly
moral: each grounds its claims by appealing to a conception of the common good that is widely
understood and acknowledged. Boltanski and Thévenot (2006, p. 66) describe these orders of worth
as “systematic expressions of the forms of the common good … commonly invoked in today’ssociety”. The three orders of worth most relevant in this instance (market, industrial and civic) aresummarised in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Summary of the six orders of worth
Modeofevaluation
Test

MarketPrice, costIndustrial
Technical efficiency

Civic
Collective welfare

Market competitiveness

Equality, solidarity

Form of proof

Monetary

Qualifiedobjects
Qualified
human beingTimeformation

Freely circulating market
good or service
Consumer, seller

Competence,
reliability,
planning
Measurable:
criteria,
statistics
Technical object, method,
plan
Professional, expert

Short-term, flexible

Long-term planned future

Formal, official
Ruleandregulations,
welfare policies
Equal citizens, solidarity
unionsPerennial

Source: adapted from Thévenot et al., (2000, p. 241).

Worthiness within the market order, for example, is established by the market competitiveness of afreely circulating good or service, with market participants (the buyers and sellers of those goods andservices) designated as the qualified evaluators of worth. This can be seen as the expression of a moral
1

Subsequent work in pragmatic sociology has proposed additional orders of worth (Thévenot, Moody, & Lafaye, 2000)
but these are not relevant here.

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 59-78
vision since the market’s “invisible hand” is held to align the individual interests of market participants
with the collective good by promoting economic efficiency and innovation. Meanwhile, worthiness isdetermined in the civic world not by the buyers and sellers of the market order, but by the collective
will of equal citizens. The common good is assured here not through the pursuit of individual interests,
but through the conscious pursuit of the “general interest” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 187). And
in the industrial world, worthiness is based not on the short-term calculations of market actors, but on
considerations of long-term productive efficiency. This order privileges strategy, data and the statusof technical experts.
In practice, many situations are stabilised and legitimated through a compromise between two or moreorders. Boltanski and Thévenot (2006, p. 325) refer often to workers’ associations and workers’ rights,
observing that the figure of the worker, “supported by the arrangements of unionism and by theequipment of labor laws” originated in a compromise between industrial and civic worths. Historically,
they argue, workers have been treated both as market commodities assessed according to theircontribution to firm performance and also as citizens: members of a political society and possessed(therefore) of certain basic rights. More broadly, they also argue (2006, p. 332, and see also p. 194)that “the need to work out a compromise between an order governed by the market and an order basedon efficiency [i.e. the industrial order] lies at the very heart of a business enterprise”.
This typology of orders of worth is useful here because it foregrounds how different arguments basethemselves on different understandings of the common good. As a result, they support different
understandings of what and who is important and (therefore) different regimes of measurement (should
we focus on the metrics of profits, economic growth and GDP, or should we measure the distributionof wealth and job satisfaction?) and different understandings of human actors (are workers mostfundamentally units of labour power, human beings with specific physical and social needs, or politicalcitizens possessed of inalienable rights and dignity?)
The data for analysis in this article are texts in which policy actors stated and offered justifications fortheir position on the proposed changes to a public audience. The specific texts for analysis include thetranscripts of the parliamentary debates at the first, second and final readings of the Bill; selectedsubmissions to the Select Committee process, and media coverage of the Bill. The Select Committee
submissions included in the analysis were those associated by the most prominent voices on either sideof the debate (on the one side, the Employers and Manufacturers’ Association (Northern) (hereafter
EMA); Business New Zealand (BNZ), Canterbury Employers Chamber of Commerce (CECC), theAuckland Chamber of Commerce (ACC] and the National Party; on the other side, the New ZealandCouncil of Trade Unions (NZCTU), FIRST Union, Unite! Union, E Tu, and the Labour, Green and
New Zealand First Parties.
The data was coded based on the explicit arguments that were made in support of, or in opposition to
the proposed changes. The arguments were analysed in terms of the different orders of worth that they
appealed to, and the linguistic and rhetorical means by which actors attempted to make their partial,
interested prescriptions appear natural, neutral and necessary.

Context and BackgroundAs we saw above, ER has been built historically on a compromise between the market order of worth(that positions labour as a market commodity whose value is determined by the price a willing buyer
is willing to pay for it) and the civic order (that posts certain basic rights that workers possess due totheir underlying status as equal citizens.) These compromises can be seen in the history of ER
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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 59-78
legislation in New Zealand. The provisions of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act (ICAA
1894) established a “state-imposed system of conciliation and arbitration” in place of the informal
approaches and laissez-faire policies that had led to widespread exploitation of labour (Rasmussen,
2009, p. 43). These provisions enacted a relatively stable equilibrium that shaped New Zealand’s ER
system for almost a hundred years, “up to the passage of the Employment Contracts Act in 1991”(Rasmussen, 2009, p. 55). This equilibrium supplemented the compromise between the market and the
civic orders of worth with the industrial order’s insistence on the importance of long-term planningand efficiency (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006).
The principles and provisions of the ECA (1991) marked a sudden and marked shift to the terms ofthis compromise, with a great deal of additional weight given to the market order and its assessmentof labour as a commodity whose value is determined not by collective institutions but by market actors(see Foster, Murrie, & Laird, 2009; Rasmussen, 2009). Employment relations were imagined as arealm of legal contracts between consenting and (formally) equal parties (Rasmussen, Foster, & Farr,
2016). Since workers were seen as rational agents capable of looking after their own interests innegotiation with prospective employers, the provisions of the ECA denied unions any privileged
position. Rather, unions were positioned as self-interested vested interests. Ignoring problems ofcollective action, free-riding and the presence of public goods, unions, like all other parties, werereturned to the market. Their fortunes under the ECA would be based on the market order’s criterionof their capacity to persuade willing buyers to purchase their services. As Foster et al. (2009) note,
union density was reduced by a half within five years.
The changes contained in the ECA responded to calls by international organisations (notably the IMF
and the OECD) and business lobby groups for more flexibility within the labour market (Rasmussen
et al., 2016). The calls made in New Zealand were situated within a broader global movement in the
1980s (ibid.). The ECA was based on the objective of promoting “an efficient labour market”, andefficiency was held to arise from labour market flexibility (Brosnan & Walsh, 1996, p. 158). Thesechanges marked a “radical departure” from the civic and industrial orders of worth embedded in thecollectivist nature of earlier legislation and the “blanket coverage” of the award system (ibid., p. 158)
towards a much heavier reliance on market signals and disciplines. Crucially, proponents of the ECA
presented labour market flexibility as beneficial for all. In 1990, for example, the National Party (ascited in Brosnan & Walsh, 1996, p. 158) argued that flexibility would generate economic growth,“improved productivity, income and employment”.
The principles underpinning the ERA (2000) were diametrically opposed to this reading of thesituation. The Act was explicitly designed to “acknowledge… and address… the inherent inequalityof power in employment relationships” (New Zealand Legislation, n.d.) and its principles re-asserted
the civic order’s core belief that human beings are marked by their fundamental equality qua citizens,
not their inevitable inequality qua market actors (Brown, 2015). Fundamentally, they understood thelabour market not as a realm of free and fair exchange between rational actors, but as a realm of powerand domination. The provisions of the ERA, thus, offered protections to workers, restored certain
powers to unions, and “sought explicitly to bolster collective bargaining and more ‘productive
employment relationships’” (Foster et al., 2013, p. 52; see also Rasmussen et al., 2016). These
provisions re-balanced the compromise between the market, civic and industrial orders of worth, butthey did not amount to a return to the pre-ECA era of state-imposed arbitration and conciliation, or tripartite bargaining.
In the years since the introduction of the ERA, a series of amendments to its basic architecture havecontinued a pattern of yo-yo policy-making. Successive amendments under National-led governmentsfrom 2008 – 2017, while not as radical or as (obviously) ideological as the ECA, had the cumulative
effect of weakening collective bargaining mechanisms and enhancing the flexibility available to63New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 59-78
employers (Foster et al., 2013; Rasmussen et al., 2016). Discursively, these changes were legitimatedthrough appeal to the market order’s construction of the common good: that the invisible hand would
ensure that each actor’s pursuit of their own interest would promote the benefit of all; that workers,
even (and especially) vulnerable and marginalised workers would benefit from laws that allow for firm
flexibility.
The parties that comprise the current government (the Labour, Green and New Zealand First Parties)
were united in their opposition to almost all of the changes introduced under National (Skilling &Molineaux, 2017). Further, Labour’s ER policy going into the election (Labour, 2017a;b) included
promises to reverse many of National’s changes, including the 90-day ‘fire at will’ law, provisions
around rest and meal breaks, remedies in cases of unfair dismissal, and union powers and access. The
ERAA, signed into law in December 2018, contained 16 main provisions (summarised in Table 2,
below) designed to enhance protection of workers’ rights and to encourage collective bargaining andenhance union rights (Lees-Galloway, in NZPD, 1 February 2018).
Table 2: Major provisions of the ERAA (2018)
Changes in effect from 12 December 2018
Union representatives can now enter workplaces
without consent, provided the employees arecovered under, or bargaining towards, acollective agreement
Pay deductions can no longer be made for partial
strikes
Businesses must now enter into bargaining for
multi-employer collective agreements, if asked
to join by a union

Changes in effect from 6 May 2019
The right to set the number and duration of restand meal breaks will be restored

90-day trial periods will be restricted tobusinesses with less than 20 employees
Employees in specified ‘vulnerable industries’
will be able to transfer on their current terms andconditions in their employment agreement if
their work is restructured, regardless of the sizeof their employer
Employees will have extended protections The duty to conclude bargaining will be restored
against discrimination on the basis of their union for single-employer collective bargaining
membership status
If requested by the employee, reinstatement will For the first 30 days of their employment, newbe the first course of action considered by the employees must be employed under terms
Employment Relations Authority
consistent with the collective agreement
Earlier initiation timeframes have been restored Pay rates will need to be included in collective
for unions in collective bargaining
agreements
New categories of employees may apply to Employers will need to provide new employees
receive the protections afforded to ‘vulnerable with an approved active choice form within theemployees’
first ten days of employment and return forms to
the applicable union
Employers will need to allow for reasonable paid
time for union delegates to undertake their union
activities
Employees will need to pass on information
about the role and function of unions toprospective employees(Employment New Zealand, 2018).

As noted above, there is nothing particularly surprising in this list. Most of these changes are instancesof the new government reversing changes made by the previous administration. For their part, National
MPs have promised to reverse its provisions as soon as they can (Simpson, 2018; McKelvie, 2018).
What has been more interesting is the way in which the progress of the Bill through the legislative
process has revealed some of the tensions within the coalition government. In the period 2011-2017,
New Zealand First consistently voted against National’s proposed ER amendments and its position on
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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 59-78
ER aligned more logically with the centre-left than with the centre-right (Skilling & Molineaux, 2017).
Specifically, New Zealand First had supported higher minimum wages, longer paid parental leave,
more protections for casual workers, and the abolition of ‘starting out’ wages. During the progress of
the Employment Relations Amendment Bill (ERAB) 2018 through parliament, however, it was New
Zealand First who argued for retaining 90-day trials for workplaces with less than 20 employees, forallowing some businesses to not opt in to mult-employer collective agreements (MECA), and for
placing some restrictions on union access to workplaces (Mitchell, 2018).

Findings
The brief historical overview presented above demonstrates the constant pendulum swings that havemarked ER legislation in New Zealand since 1991. In order to move beyond the impasse created bythese regular changes, it is necessary to understand the logic of the arguments associated with the two
established sides in these policy disputes.
Arguments against the Bill
Arguments against the ERAB were built around five major themes. These arguments, associatedprimarily with the opposition parties, business lobby groups and some industry associations, presented,
firstly, a positive assessment of the status quo. Arguing that the changes made by the previous Nationalled administrations had led to positive labour market outcomes, these groups held that the Bill’s
proposed changes were at best unnecessary, at worst willfully destructive. Secondly, the proposedchanges were held to be bad because they reduced the flexibility that firms need to remain competitive.
Thirdly, the previously existing flexible ER system was seen not as a zero-sum game of conflicting
interests, but as affording mutual benefit, where gains accrued not just to firms but also to workers(including, and especially those workers most weakly attached to the labour market). The obverse
argument claimed, fourthly, that the Bill was designed to benefit some groups (unions and – especially– union officials) at the expense of firms and, ultimately, the collective good. At its most extreme, thiscritique extended to impute corrupt motivations for the Bill, describing it as pay-back for unions’financial and political support of the Labour Party. Fifthly, arguments against the Bill described it as areturn to the past (and specifically the “bad old days” of the 1970s), at odds with the needs of a fastchanging labour market.
A positive assessment of the status quo
Unsurprisingly, this theme was most commonly associated with National Party MPs, who took it as achance to promote their sound political and economic management. Steven Joyce claimed (in NZPD,
1 February 2018) that “we have the highest rate of employment, … the highest rate of job creation, …
the highest rate of wage growth, [and] some of the best-performing statistics of our labour market in
the developed world”. These positive aspects of the status quo, he concluded, set “a very high bar forchange”. This argument was repeated with minor variations by several National MPs, including Sarah
Dowie and Paul Goldsmith (in NZPD, 1 February 2018). Seeming to argue causation from correlation,
the National Party (2018, p. 1) held that low unemployment figures and increasing wages showed that“the system is working as intended”. Phrasing things a little more cautiously, the CECC (2018, p. 1)
stated their belief that the “incremental changes to the [ERA] introduced by former governments” have“generally helped to create conditions in which business can grow and provided the flexibility needed
to respond to changes in market demands” (see also Campbell,2018; Nicholls, 2018; McKelvie, 2018;
Business NZ, 2018a.

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 59-78
The importance of flexibility in the ER system
Opponents of the Bill agreed that ‘flexibility’ is an unalloyed good in the ER system. The EMA (2018,p. 4) emphasised “the need to be highly flexible, responsive and nimble in a very competitive market
place”, while the CECC (2018, p. 1) endorsed existing policy as providing “a flexible and easy
structure that encourages employment”. These groups opposed the Bill precisely because they heldthat it would reduce flexibility. According to the National Party (2018, p. 1), the Bill would “return
our framework to a rigid, overly prescriptive requirement”; the EMA (2018, p. 3) held that the Bill
entails “more compulsion … more regulation [and] less flexibility” (see also Mackenzie, 2018).
Meanwhile, the CECC (2018, pp. 1, 3) argued that the Bill would unhelpfully re-introduce “rigidities”
and “an unacceptable level of bureaucracy” into the employment environment’.
The widely-shared benefits of the existing ER system
An important thread that runs through the first two themes is the insistence that the flexibility
established by the status quo is good not just for firms but also, more broadly, for workers and for
economic growth. Flexibility, said National (2018, p. 4) allows employers to “boost productivity” andthis leads “to greater rewards to employees”. The proposed changes, by contrast, would put thesewidely shared rewards at risk. Nikki Kaye (in NZPD, 1 February 2018) held that these changes “willlead to a loss of jobs” and to additional “costs for businesses”, meaning that “some of our mostvulnerable workers [will not get] the opportunities that they deserve”. As such, the existing ER system,
according to National MPs was not just good for workers generally (giving them, as Goldsmith (inNZPD, 1 February 2018) said, the “dignity and respect” that comes with “getting a job”) but especiallygood for workers who find themselves marginalised in the labour market (see also Campbell, 2018).
Underlying this theme is the more fundamental assumption that the employment relationship is amutually beneficial arrangement between more-or-less equal parties. This denial of any inherent
inequality of power in the employment relation is seen in National’s (2018, p. 2) claim that the Bill’s
proposals are “patronising to employees by pretending they cannot negotiate with their employers fora fair outcome”, and in Amy Adams’ (in NZPD, 1 February 2018) insistence that workers “are grownup, so deserve the right to decide for themselves whether they want to join the union”. In the same
speech, Adams contrasted National’s treatment of workers as “adults who can actually work out forthemselves what makes sense”, with Labour’s approach of “infantilising the workforce”. In an opinion
piece, Mike Hosking (2019) characterised the ECA as giving workers a choice whether to “backyourself, or stick with collective deals negotiated on your behalf by unions” and concluded that “mostchose to back themselves”.
A critique of the Bill as promoting the sectoral interests of unions
If arguments against the Bill held that the existing ER system worked to the shared benefit of all, theyalso claimed that the Bill represented a zero-sum game: imposing additional costs on firms while
offering enhanced powers and protections to unions and – especially – union officials. Joyce (in NZPD,
1 February 2018) argued that the Bill will “shift the balance in favour of union officials”, before
pointedly adding “not workers—nothing to do with workers”. Business NZ (2018b, p. 2), meanwhile,held that the Bill would “create extra work and compliance costs for employers where the primary
beneficiary of the extra work is unions”. This theme developed, at times, into the stronger claim thatthe Bill was designed as “Labour Party payback for the great union support that they got at the election”(MacIndoe in NZPD, 1 February 2018, see also Joyce, in ibid.; MacKelvie, 2018; Hosking, 2019).
Kaye (in NZPD, 1 February 2018) also noted union involvement in selecting Labour Party leaders,
implying that any prospective or existing Labour leader is constrained to respond to union interests.
These and similar accusations prompted warnings from the Speaker (based on page 49 of Speakers’66New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 59-78
Rulings) that MPs “cannot imply that a Government is funded from an organisation that is influencing
what they're doing” (NZPD, 1 February 2018. See also, however, the second reading (NZPD, 27
November 2018) where the ruling was applied less consistently).
A critique of the Bill as an (undesirable) return to the past
In stressing the external pressures of a rapidly changing global market, opponents of the Bill claimed
that it was not fit for the challenges of the future. Rather, according to Amy Adams, the Bill “will take
New Zealand backwards” and result in “more strike action, the likes of which we haven't seen in thiscountry for many years”. More specifically, it was claimed that the proposed changes would take New
Zealand back to the “the regular industrial disruptions of the 1970s” (MacIndoe, in NZPD, 1 February2018). This reference to the 1970s was echoed in Joyce’s accusation (in ibid.) that the Bill was “harking
back to 1970s-style trade unionism”, and Dowie’s claim (in ibid.) that it was based on “the bad olddays” of “the 1970s”. By the second reading, Scott Simpson (in NZPD, 27 November 2018) expandedon this theme to refer to the militant trade unions who “used to bring this country to its economic
knees” in the 1970s. The twin scare-phrases “militant” and “1970s” subsequently became a regularfeature of media and online opposition to the Bill, especially (but not only) by National MPs (see
MacKelvie, 2018; Nicholls, 2018; Hosking, 2018; Mackenzie, 2018).
Arguments for the BillOn the other side of the debate, arguments in support of the ERAB (2018) were built around five
diametrically opposed themes. They presented firstly, a negative assessment of the current situation.
While acknowledging positive outcomes in terms of economic activity and employment, these groups
stressed that these headline numbers hid serious inequalities in terms of how the benefits of economic
growth were shared, and the conditions faced by many workers. These negative outcomes were held,
secondly, to flow from the unequal nature of the employment relationship. As a consequence, changes
to the ER system were required in order to level the playing field and ensure that the benefits of work
are fairly shared. Thirdly, the trope of “flexibility” was critically assessed in the argument that it often
refers to flexibility for employers, often at the expense of security and stability for workers. It wasclaimed, fourthly, that the proposed changes would benefit not just workers but also firms and thebroader economy, since workers who feel themselves to be secure and well-rewarded are likely to be
more motivated, productive and innovative. Fifthly, arguments for changes to the ER system held thatthe Bill provided the necessary framework for the future, as opposed to the backwards-looking andregressive changes made by the preceding National-led government.
A negative assessment of the current situation
While it was acknowledged that recent years had seen “economic growth” (Lees-Galloway, in NZPD,
1 February 2018) and record “labour force participation rates” (NZCTU, 2018a, p. 59), the governing
parties and unions insisted that the system had not distributed the benefits of growth and jobs fairly.
During the election campaign, Labour (2017b) argued that “after nine years of National, working
people’s share of the economy is falling (see also FIRST Union, 2018). Less than 40 per cent of
economic growth under National has gone into working people’s wages”, and (Labour, 2017b) that“low wages, little say on rosters or hours of work, and an erosion of conditions” mean that “for too
many Kiwis, the current employment relations system is failing” (see also Lees-Galloway and Logie
in NZPD, 1 February 2018). The NZCTU submission (2018a, pp. 3, 7, 59) added that the changes
introduced by National had resulted in “poor wage growth”, in poor quality jobs, and in a situation
where “all the increase in income in the economy … has gone to the highest income 10 percent ofhouseholds”. National’s positive assessment of the status quo, it was claimed, was simply a result of
selecting metrics that hid the important issues of under-employment and the distribution of incomes67

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 59-78(Mitchell, in NZPD, 1 February 2018; Lubeck, in ibid.; NZCTU, 2018a, pp. 30, 59. See also MBIE,
2017, p. 6).
Negative outcomes for workers reflect the unequal nature of the employment relationshipThose arguing in support of the Bill held that these negative results were predictable: that the ER
landscape is not a level playing field populated by rational actors with roughly equal amounts ofpower, but a realm of asymmetric power relationships. As Jan Logie (in NZPD, 1 February 2018)
put it, “an employee can't fire their boss, they can't cut or change their hours, and they can't send
their employer into an unsafe situation”. Specific changes enacted by National, such as the 90
day ‘fire at will’ law, had the effect not of enabling employers and workers to negotiate towards
mutually-beneficial outcomes, but of shifting “cost and risk from employers onto a group ofvulnerable workers” (NZCTU, 2018a, p. 41). The 2018 Bill was presented as a recognition of“the imbalance in the employment relationship” (Lubeck, in NZPD, 1 February 2018) and the“start of fixing [the current unbalanced system] to make sure that the people who are actuallycreating the wealth get a … fair share” (Logie, in ibid.) Mutual benefit, in other words, ispossible, but it does not occur automatically. Rather, it requires policy settings that counteract
inherent inequalities of power.
Contestation over the trope of flexibility
While opponents of the Bill represented flexibility in ER as good for everyone, proponents of the Bill
contested this, insisting that it is always necessary to ask “flexibility for who?” Unions and thegoverning parties argued that flexibility in the ER system often means increased freedoms for
employers at the expense of worse conditions and less security for workers. The NZCTU (2018a, p.
57) quoted an OECD (2017) report to argue that thedownside of flexible labour market regulations is that the costs of economic restructuring
largely fall onto individual workers’ and that ‘in the absence of sound bargaining andrepresentational arrangements, all forms of “flexibility” will be imposed and can be used torepress wages, working conditions and job security.
Clayton Mitchell (in NZPD, 1 February 2018; see also Lees-Galloway, in ibid.) agreed that the goalof an ER system should be to balance employers’ need for flexibility with employees’ need for ‘job
stability, safe working conditions, and good remuneration packages.’
The widely shared benefits of the proposed changes.
As we have seen above, business groups and the National Party argued that their preferred ER system(a system providing maximum flexibility for employers) promised widely-shared benefits to all, since
successful firms would provide more and better-paying jobs. Arguments in support of the Bill(arguments, in a sense, for a “less flexible” ER system) reversed the direction of the causal arrows.
Unions and the parties of government argued that workers who feel secure and well-compensated arelikely to perform better for their employers: to be more engaged, productive and innovative. Sucharguments were put most clearly in the NZCTU (2018a, p. 20) submission, where collective bargaining
was said to “improve the quality of the employment relationship between workers and firms, leading
to more efficient allocation of resources, greater motivation and ultimately productivity” (see also
FIRST Union, 2018, pp. 5-6). Further, the NZCTU (2018a, pp. 18, 20, 65) claimed that “collective
bargaining”, “workers’ voice” and “rising wages” tended to “make labour markets function more
efficiently”, to “reduce conflict” and to enhance “engagement, co-operation and innovation fromworkers”. Indeed, “excessively flexible labour laws” carried perverse outcomes: workers who feel68New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 59-78
themselves to have low job security will likely “see little point in gaining sufficient firm-specificknowledge to develop and improve processes” (NZCTU, 2018a, p. 68).
Arguments for the mutual benefits promised by the Bill often looked to Scandinavian models (and,most often, the Danish model) for inspiration and to provide evidence of the link between fair wages
and conditions and increased productivity. A report (Salmon, 2015) published by Labour’s Future ofWork Commission praised Denmark’s active approach to the labour market and advised that New
Zealand seek to replicate it. Finance Minister, Grant Robertson (2017), endorsed the report and argued
for the benefits of ‘Active Labour Market policies’. While the NZCTU (2016, p. 17) welcomed “theinterest the Commission is showing in the Danish model of flexicurity and industry development”,
they also sounded a note of caution. Replicating the Danish model in New Zealand, they argued, would
require attention to the underlying factors that allowed it to work in Denmark: a much stronger rolefor unions and collective bargaining, a greater acceptance of co-ordination of the market, and a genuine
sense of a social partnership between business, labour and the state.
The proposed changes are the best fit for the labour market of the present and the futureThis theme was essentially a direct riposte to the critique that the Bill represented a return to 1970sstyle industrial disruptions. Marja Lubeck (in NZPD, 1 February 2018) described such claims as“scaremongering” and characterised the proposed changes, instead, as “a sign of us being a very
modern Government, because they will give us an opportunity to improve, modernise, and innovate
the workplace” (see also Logie, in ibid., Tinetti, in ibid.) Indeed, it was said that it was National’schanges to the ER system that had been “a backwards leap ... towards the failed paradigm of the 1990s”(NZCTU, 2018a, p. 3; see also Willie Jackson, in NZPD, 1 February 2018).
The core assumption of these arguments was that National’s changes (2008-2017) had swung thebalance of power in favour of employers (Logie, in NZPD, 1 February 2018; NZCTU, 2018a; NZ
Police Association, 2018). For proponents of the Bill, the status quo gave undue weight to the market
order of worth, positioning workers as market actors responsible for maximising their own value
proposition within a competitive labour market, and firms as market actors responsible primarily for
maximising their own competitiveness. The Bill, committed also to the civic order’s insistence on thefundamental equality of citizens, held that workers needed further protections, and unions further
powers in order to allow employers and workers to interact fairly. And, in keeping with the industrial
order’s emphasis on long-term productivity and efficiency, it held that economic activity required
intervention and planning rather than the laissez-faire approach of leaving things to the short-term
decisions of self-interested market actors.

Discussion
Most of the key findings presented above can be understood as dimensions of a fundamental dispute
over the meaning and relative importance of the key discursive node of flexibility. This contestation
offers a particularly clear expression of the underlying ideological disagreement: business groups andthe National Party construct flexibility in terms of the central importance of negative freedom (Berlin,2017): freedom from state coercion. In keeping with the market order of worth, the common good is
supposed here to be generated through the operation of Smith’s “invisible hand” (Boltanski &Thévenot, 2006), whereby market actors’ pursuit “of their own advantage naturally, or rather
necessarily, leads [them] to prefer that employment [of their capital] which is most advantageous tosociety” (Smith, 1999, p. 30). On the other side of the debate, unions and the government understoodflexibility in ER as a zero-sum game where employers’ freedom from regulation comes at the expenseof workers’ positive freedom to determine the conditions of their work. As Bourdieu (2003, p. 58) puts
69

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 59-78
it, the label “flexibility” is often used in neoliberal contexts to hide the reality of “the inflexible
demands of one-sided employment contracts”.
This section considers how, in their constructions of the meaning and role of flexibility, the competing
parties (a) consciously invoked and leveraged emotional language, (b) elided or inserted human actors,and (c) were able to ignore the arguments and evidence presented by the other side.
The tradition of rhetorical analysis (Gottweis, 2007) reminds us that arguments become persuasive
through multiple means: not just through the rational coherence of their claims but also through theforce of their emotional appeal and through the status or character of the speaker. Business groups andthe National Party did not typically construct their arguments for flexibility in a rational (logos)
register. They seldom explained explicitly why more flexibility was desirable, beyond simply statingthat it “encourages employment”, productivity and so on. They certainly never acknowledged thearguments and evidence presented by unions as to the potential long-term benefits of certain“rigidities” within the system (NZCTU, 2018a; Acharya, Baghai, & Subramanian, 2010), or that New
Zealand’s ER system is already considered one of the most flexible in the world (NZCTU, 2018a;
Vamvakidis et al., 2010; OECD, 2008). Their arguments reflect research by Foster et al., (2013, p. 62)
showing that New Zealand employers “are still of the opinion that the legislation is fairly evenly
balanced or may even be in favour of employees”. Despite their success in advocating for more
flexibility, New Zealand employers “still regard their flexibility as being [unduly] constrained”(Rasmussen et al., 2016, p. 901).
Arguments against the Bill operated more in the emotional (pathos) mode, relying on the intuitive
interpretation of flexibility, agility and dynamism as good; rigidity, prescription and compulsion as
bad. In everyday usage, the term flexibility carries a set of positive connotations: it is widely acceptedthat it is better to be flexible than tight, rigid or sclerotic. Critics of the Bill evoked these positive
connotations: business groups and the National Party articulated a set of positively-coded synonyms(dynamic, innovative, agile, responsive) set in explicit opposition to a set of negatively-codedantonyms (rigidity, compulsion, prescriptive, bureaucratic.) These opposing lists mirror the broader
neo-liberal narrative of individual rights and freedoms threatened by an over-bearing and oppressive
state (see Kelsey, 1997). Given the cultural dominance of the neo-liberal insistence on the immutabilityof the market (Skilling, 2018) it was rhetorically effective for these groups to state that “we support
flexibility” and “they (i.e. the government) favour compulsion and bureaucracy”, even in the absenceof any demonstration that a flexible ER system really did offer widely-shared benefits.
The other key move in these groups’ construction of flexibility was their refusal to specify the relevant
actors, let alone the different ways in which different actors are impacted by flexibility. There wasonly one instance within the data where it was stated who flexibility is for, and in this case it was“flexibility of employees and employers” (National Party, 2018, p. 2.) In other instances, flexibility
was decidedly agent-less. Existing policy settings, it was said, provide “a flexible and easy structure”
and “the flexibility needed to respond to changes in market demands” (CECC, 2018, p. 1), and the Billwill mean “reducing this flexibility” (National Party, 2018, p. 4).
While it is possible to infer from some of these quotes that flexibility is primarily necessary for firmcompetitiveness, the absence of agents implies that flexibility is good for all. This reflects the Party’s
position of almost 30 years previously, which held flexibility to lead to “improved productivity,
income and employment” (National Party, 1980, cited in Brosnan &Walsh, 1996, p. 158). Bill Birch,
Finance Minister at the time, argued that “[w]orkers and employers alike are being inhibited by laws,
regulations and restrictions” (cited in ibid.). When we hear that flexibility is “needed to respond tochanges in market demands” (CECC, 2018, p. 1), it is constructed as necessary, and as neutral between
actors. The linguistic act of removing human actors from this construction of flexibility is an act of de70

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 59-78
problematisation (Stone, 1989) in that it moves ER out of the realm of human actions (whereproblematic outcomes are caused by the decisions of actors who can, thus, be held responsible) andinto the realm of “accident, nature and fate” (p.281).
Proponents of the Bill responded by consistently re-inserting actors into their construction offlexibility, and noting the asymmetric power of those actors. Flexibility, they maintained, granted
privileges to some (employers) in a way that imposed burdens and liabilities on others (workers), as in
the argument that the “downside of flexible labour market regulations is that the costs of economic
restructuring largely fall onto individual workers” (OECD, 2017, cited in NZCTU, 2018a, p. 37).
Returning actors to the equation was an insistence that ER regulation is fundamentally about balancing
the conflicting interests and needs of the two parties. Employers naturally desire “to have flexibility in
how they run their businesses”, but that flexibility needs to balanced in “an effective ER system” withthe valid desires of workers for security, stability, safety, dignity, and decent terms and conditions(Lees-Galloway, in NZPD, 1 February 2018). It was not – as National (2018) and business groups
claimed – the case that flexibility for firms would automatically and necessarily lead “to greater
rewards to employees” (p.4).
The fundamental point of contention here was the way in which workers were understood. Groups
opposing the Bill drew on the market order of worth to construct labour as ‘just another’ factor of
production and (therefore) primarily as a cost to be minimised (Sikka, 2015) in firms’ pursuit ofcompetitiveness. On the other side of the debate, the government and unions drew on the civic anddomestic orders to stress that workers were, more fundamentally, citizens and human beings. What
was important here was the insistence on workers as socially embedded (New Zealanders “should havethe job security they need to live a decent life, buy a house and raise a family if that is what they want
to do” [NZCTU, 2018a, p. 3]) and as irreducibly biological beings (rest breaks should be scheduled
based on workers’ “rest, nutrition and psychosocial needs” (NZCTU, 2018a, p. 43; FIRST Union,2018). Stressing the obvious but crucial point that workers are human beings stands against the market
order’s assessment of workers as units of labour within a market. While other factors of production
can be traded within a market, workers have civic rights, biological needs, emotional attachments andpsychological make-ups that mean that they must be treated differently. The human nature of workers
means that they cannot be endlessly flexible.
Where opponents of the Bill based most of their arguments on the positive emotional resonance ofterms related to flexibility, union groups (most notably the NZCTU) grounded their construction of“flexibility” through empirical argument. They presented evidence, firstly, to show that New Zealand’s
ER system is already among the most flexible in the world (OECD, 2017; NZCTU, 2018a). They alsopresented evidence to show that this degree of flexibility carries certain negative effects for workers.
Data and examples showed that, even in the presence of high levels of employment, many workers
currently remained under-employed, and many workers (NZCTU, 2018b; FIRST Union, 2018) wereexperiencing low wages, and a lack of security, stability and dignity in their workplaces. The
previously existing flexible system, moreover, was held to be differentially bad for workers. In contrast
to National’s assertion of strong wage growth, the NZCTU (2018a) showed that almost all of the gains
had been captured by those near the top of the distribution, while wages nearer the bottom werestagnating.
Developing this theme, the NZCTU (2018a) argued that an overly flexible system can, paradoxically,lead to greater rigidities within that system. In an ER system where workers do not have security andcertainty (a system where taking a new job would leave a worker vulnerable to dismissal without
explanation during the first 90 days, for example) there is an incentive to remain in an existing job,even if that job is not the best match for a worker’s skills. In a system where workers feeldisempowered and insecure, they are less likely to experiment, to take risks, to innovate, or to raise71

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 59-78
important concerns. In a system where wages are suppressed, workers are less likely to be fully
engaged, motivated and productive. At the firm level, FIRST Union (2018) argued that introducing
certain rigidities such as the “establishment of base terms and conditions” would benefit firms and theoverall economy, since employers would be “incentivised to compete by increasing productivity”
rather than simply by “driving down wage costs” (pp.5-6).
Such arguments draw on the industrial order of worth, with its preference for long-term planning,rather than the short-term time horizon of the market order. Within the industrial order, wages andconditions are not seen primarily as costs to be minimised, but as a long-term investment in enhancing
productive efficiency. Just as business groups presented their prescriptions as promoting the bestinterests of workers, here, union groups presented their prescriptions as promoting the best long-term
interests of New Zealand firms and the overall economy.
Pragmatic sociology holds that public disputes cannot be reduced to a play of deception and coercion.
Participants in public disputes, it assumes, are constrained by the public nature of the process, toengage in good faith. Such participants are held to be motivated not by a desire to “win” the debate(Annisette & Richardson, 2011) but by the desire to arrive at a mutually acceptable outcome (Boltanski& Thévenot, 2006). While these assumptions have been severely criticised for their weak analysis ofpower (Wagner, 1999), they seem to be aligned with the institutional structure for this particular
dispute. The processes of formal parliamentary debates and select committee hearings are intended toprovide a setting in which disputants can put forward their respective perspectives, presenting anddemanding reasons and evidence in the pursuit of the best outcomes. In the findings presented above,
however, we see many instances where actors did not engage with the arguments or evidence presented
by the opposing side. Opponents of the Bill, for example, never responded to the NZCTU’spresentation of evidence on the downsides of excessively flexible ER systems. Rather, they continued
their initial insistence that flexibility was necessary for the productivity of firms, and for job
opportunities for workers.
We might argue, then, that the primary audience for many of the arguments analysed here was not
those on the other side of the debate, or the other members of parliament, but rather a targeted publicaudience of stakeholders (business owners, workers, employer groups, and unions) and prospective
voters. Contrary to the assumption of pragmatic sociology that parties to a dispute will engage in goodfaith, in the findings above we see many imputations of bad faith: the Labour Party, for example, wasaccused of designing the Bill not in the interests of New Zealand firms and workers, but as “pay-back”
for their paymasters in the union movement (MacIndoe in NZPD, 1 February 2018): a morally
questionable ‘quid pro quo’ made by a ‘conflicted’ Labour Party (Joyce in ibid.; Kaye in ibid.). One
problem here is that the legislative process has no institutional mechanism to force the parties into a
constructive dialogue with each other. The political incentive structure of the process encourages
actors to make the most extreme argument that a certain segment of the population will find persuasive,
and to disparage (rather than engaging with) the arguments and evidence presented by the other side.
It is salient here that the business groups and the National Party both started advertising and online
campaigns that deliberately by-passed the parliamentary process, and directly addressed the public inseeking to rally opposition to the Bill. The four “members of the Business NZ family” joined forces in
the #fixthebill campaign: “an advertising campaign using outdoor billboards, press and digitaladvertising [that asked] Government MPs to “Please Fix the Bill”, at the same time encouraging its
members to ask the same of the coalition Government”2 The National Party, meanwhile, launched the‘Protect NZ Jobs’ campaign, using a wide variety of video-based and other online content to ‘explain’
how the “proposed changes will have far reaching effects on business and employees”, leading to
2

The fixthebill.co.nz website has since been deleted72

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 59-78“increased cost to business and reduced job opportunities and wage growth” (Upston, 2018). Rather
than engaging with evidence that the existing ER system was not working for all New Zealanders, thiscampaign, repeated to a public audience the claim that “all the evidence shows New Zealand's
employment settings are some of the best and most successful in the world”, before asking rhetorically“what exactly is the Labour-led Government trying to fix?” (English, 2018).3
The ERAA (2018) continues an established pattern of significant changes being made to ER policy
settings with each new government. This pendulum pattern of policy making generates negative
outcomes, including uncertainty and, most likely, a sub-optimal policy equilibrium. It makes it difficult
for the various parties to work together towards a mutually beneficial system that allows for New
Zealand firms and workers to create a high-value, high-productivity situation that could deliver
benefits to everyone. One way to move beyond this current impasse would be to develop institutional
forms and structures that would require and incentivise parties to the debate to genuinely engage withthe arguments presented by the other side. This could potentially involve creating a deliberative forum
such as a citizens’ assembly (Warren & Pearse, 2008; Farrell, O’Malley, & Suiter, 2013; Fischer, 2009)or a citizens’ jury (Smith & Wales, 2018), where the various sides would present their arguments notto each other, or to their political supporters, but to a panel of representative citizens. These citizens
would then be given the time, the impetus and the information to make a comprehensive evaluation of
the competing arguments. An institutional setting like this (where its recommendations, whether
binding or simply advisory, were well publicised) would give the parties to the dispute a strong
incentive to prepare persuasive arguments, and to respond substantively to the arguments and evidence
presented by the opposing side.

Conclusion
This article has presented the changes contained in the ERAA (2018) as the latest swing of the ER
policy pendulum. Suggesting that regular and substantial changes to the ER system are less than ideal,
it has analysed the arguments that have been presented on either side of the political dispute that
attended the progress of this legislation through parliament. This analysis has shown a fundamental
contention over the meaning of the key discursive node of “flexibility”. Arguments for the Bill insisted
that flexibility in the ER system typically means flexibility for employers at the expense of the security
and stability sought by workers. Arguments against the Bill almost always elided the presence ofhuman actors: a flexible ER system was simply presented as self-evidently good and as offering
benefits to everyone. Critics of the Bill were thus driven to ignore any evidence that suggested thatflexibility is damaging to workers and (potentially) to the long-term interests of business.
Both sides in this policy dispute presented data, statistics and other forms of evidence that, they said,
grounded their arguments. There was, however, no engaged process by which competing arguments
and competing forms of evidence were tested and evaluated. At the end of the debate, none of the key
actors had changed their position due to the presentation of evidence that challenged their starting
position. As noted above, this is unsurprising. The key actors in the debate represent well-establishedblocs of ideology and interest. This policy dispute problematises any belief that public policy isdeveloped in a “rational comprehensive” way that provides (or that can provide) “unequivocal, valuefree answers” to policy questions (Gottweis, 2007, p. 237; Simon, 1976).
It is unlikely that policy disputes in the ER field will ever be determined on the basis of which side has
the strongest evidence on their side. There is the more fundamental question of what it is that a given
society decides to value and promote. What would constitute success in ER policy? What are “we”
3

The protectNZjobs.co.nz website has since been deleted, though many of the image- and video-based content remains
online.

73

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 59-78
trying to achieve, and how is “we” to be defined? Answers to these question will determine whichforms of evidence (and, therefore, what measures and metrics) are seen as important. The analysis
presented here demonstrates that the two sides disagree fundamentally about the appropriate measures
for success. Opponents of the Bill privileged measures of firm competitiveness and economic activity,
arguing that success on these measures would generate benefits for all, including (and especially)
workers. Supporters of the Bill privileged measures that focussed on the experience of workers (wagegrowth across the distribution, and job satisfaction, for example) arguing that success on thesemeasures would enhance the long-term performance of firms and the overall economy.
These differences derive from a fundamental disagreement over power asymmetries in theemployment relationship, and over the figure of the worker. Are workers to be seen as commodities in
the labour market whose value is to be determined by the price that willing buyers are prepared to pay;as citizens possessed of a fundamental equality and certain fundamental rights; or as partners in thelong-term productive efficiency of firms? It is argued that the existing process by which ER policy ismade (a process where competing actors, seeking to persuade a time-poor public, are incentivised touse emotive language and already-existing tropes, and to ignore evidence that challenges theirposition) is ill-suited to the task of resolving these difficult questions. Given the entrenched andpolarised positions that mark this policy field, the article suggests that ER policy could benefit from asystem where these fundamental differences could be surfaced and addressed in a deliberative process.

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Talking, listening and acting: Developing a conceptual framework to
explore ‘worker voice’ in decisions affecting health and safety outcomes
DEIRDRE FARR*, IAN LAIRD**, FELICITY LAMM***, and JO BENSEMANN****
Abstract
The aim of this article is to identify a conceptual framework for exploring how new statutory provisions
for worker engagement, participation and representation (EP&R) in workplace health and safety(WHS) are contributing to ‘worker voice’ in the high-risk construction industry. Literature from
employment relations, health and safety, human resource management and organisational behaviour
debates are reviewed. Drawing on lessons from the past and contemporary perspectives, the favourable
conjunctures theory is integrated with deconstructed concepts of ‘employee/worker voice’ and the key
factors for effective voice in WHS. The authors conclude that this research has the potential to help
clarify ambiguity and misunderstanding of terms that influence the interpretation and enactment of
EP&R duties in the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (HSWA). By investigating ‘worker voice’ in
WHS through an expanded conceptual framework, this study captures the link between ‘worker voice’in WHS and the employment relations context.
Keywords: Worker voice, employment, engagement, participation, representation, WHS outcomes,
construction

Introduction
There is a substantial body of research exploring the concept of ‘employee voice’ in decisions that
directly affect workers’ work security, health, safety and wellbeing. The plethora of work spanning
decades and multiple disciplines reflects the importance of ‘worker voice’ for all of the key parties in
employment relationships, governments, employers, and workers and their representatives. Several
authors have mapped waves of interest reflecting responses to critical political and economic events
that stimulate employer interest in participatory schemes. In addition, recent incidents in high risk
industry sectors have highlighted the lack of ‘worker voice’ in the systematic management of hazards
and risks as a contributing factor to these incidents. This paper explores different perceptions of‘employee/worker voice’ across academic debates and the context within which employee/worker
voice occurs in New Zealand. Then engagement, participation and representation (EP&R) in theworkplace and in the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (HSWA) are defined. This is followed by
the development of a conceptual framework and theory for exploring the research question: How are
the new statutory provisions for EP&R in workplace WHS contributing to ‘employee voice’ in thehigh-risk construction industry in New Zealand?

*

PhD Candidate; Assistant Lecturer, School of Management, Massey University, New Zealand
Associate Professor, School of Health Sciences; Director of Research of the College of Health, Massey University,
New Zealand***
Associate Professor of Employment Relations; Co-Director of the Occupational Health and Safety Research Centre,
AUT University, Auckland, New Zealand****
Associate Professor, Head of School of Management, Massey University, New Zealand**

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 79-100

Understanding Different Perceptions of ‘Employee and Worker Voice’
Overall, interest in employee/worker voice has fluctuated over the years. Interest has generally beenstimulated by a desire to increase employee productivity and organisational profitability (Morrison,
2011; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998), and/or an interest in improving social and economic outcomes(Anderson & Nuttall, 2014; Barry & Wilkinson, 2016; Lamm, 2010; Marchington, 2015; Rasmussen,
2009a). The latest ‘wave’ of academic interest in ‘worker voice’ has been stimulated by the universal
decline in unions (Barry & Wilkinson, 2016; Gollan & Patmore, 2013; Walters, Quinlan, Johnstone,& Wadsworth, 2016; Wilkinson, Donaghey, Dundon, & Freeman, 2014), new technology with theassociated drive for more flexible work arrangements and an increase in vulnerable work (Lamare,Lamm, McDonnell, & White, 2015; Lamm, 2010; 2012; Weil, 2014). High-performance work systems(HPWS) became popular in the New Millennium, with the associated concepts of ‘employee/worker
voice’ (Johnstone & Ackers, 2015; Kwon, Farndale, & Park, 2016; Mowbray, Wilkinson, & Tse, 2015;
Wilkinson, Gollan, Kalfa, & Xu, 2018), ‘employee/worker involvement’ (Budd, 2014; Gollan,
Kaufman, Taras, & Wilkinson, 2015; Marchington, 2015), ‘employee/worker engagement’(Arrowsmith & Parker, 2013; Barton, 2018; Foster & Farr, 2016; Houghton & Lovelock, 2016;
WorkSafe, 2016), and ‘worker EP&R’ (Anderson & Nuttall, 2014; Lamare et al., 2015; PashorinaNichols, 2016; Sissons, 2016).
These fluctuations are reflected in distinct bodies of literature spanning multiple academic disciplines.
The literature review revealed that ‘employee/worker voice’, ‘involvement’, ‘engagement andparticipation’, ‘empowerment and control’ are explored within multiple disciplines including, but notlimited to; employment law (Anderson & Nuttall, 2014; Bogg & Novitz, 2014), employment relations(ER) (Barry & Wilkinson, 2016; Markey, Harris, Ravenswood, Simpkin, & Williamson, 2015;
Wilkinson et al., 2014), human resource management (HRM) (Marchington, 2015), organisational
behaviour (OB) (Van Dyne & LePine, 1998), and occupational/workplace health and safety (Burton,
2010; Lamm, 2010; Walters & Nichols, 2009; Walters et al., 2016). However, terms defining‘employee voice’, have been used interchangeably with variable objectives and meanings (Wilkinson
et al., 2014; Wilkinson, Gollan, Marchington, & Lewin, 2010; Wilkinson, Townsend, & Burgess,2013).
Practices vary at the industry and workplace levels and may include a range of direct and indirect‘employee voice’ mechanisms. Direct informal mechanisms include: ad hoc individual and groupinteractions, meetings and complaints to line managers. Direct formal mechanisms include: planned
meetings and grievance procedures. Indirect formal representation may occur through union
representation and collective bargaining and/or employee/worker representation (NER) such as joint
consultation committees (Barry & Wilkinson, 2016; Marchington, 2015; Markey et al., 2013;
Wilkinson et al., 2014; Wilkinson et al., 2010).
Clearly, the difference in objective and meaning of ‘employee voice’ highlights how macro-level
contextual factors, such as the social, political and economic environment, have influenced the formsof ‘employee voice’ that have emerged and co-existed in organisations (Wilkinson et al., 2010).
Ideologically driven attitudinal differences shape decisions about the intended purpose, form, scopeand outcome of worker voice initiatives selected at national, industry and organisational levels. This
complexity is compounded by different research paradigms used to explore this concept acrossmultiple disciplines. Theoretical assumptions inform expectations and choices about how muchinfluence employees should have and what forms of ‘employee voice’ are used. Pluralist perspectives
developed from political science scholars’ interest in industrial democracy. The industrial
relation/employment relations and employment law disciplines predominantly focus on indirect
representative participation, i.e. union collective bargaining and social partnership practices. Union
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representation was the recognised form of employee participation until the decline of unions in the
1980s (Gollan & Xu, 2015). The HRM and OB disciplines reflect unitarist assumptions (Kaufman,2014). ‘Employee involvement and engagement’ is popular in HRM which essentially utilises‘employee voice’ as a motivational tool to enhance employee commitment and raise organisational
performance (Gollan & Patmore, 2013). OB scholars explain ‘employee voice’ as a “… discretionary,pro-social, largely, informal behaviour” (Van Dyne & LePine, 1998, p.262)
Although the occupational health and safety (OHS) voice occurs as an independent debate, it is similar
to the HRM and OB disciplines in that it has adopted a functionalist unitarist management led approach
focussing ‘employee voice’ at the task level. The ‘Safety Pays’ unitarist approach to improving OHS
risk management is based on the assumption that “… there is no inherent conflict between the goalsof WHS and profitability” (Brown & Butcher, 2005, p.2). However, OHS scholars in New Zealand(Lamm, 1989; Lamm, Massey, & Perry, 2007) and internationally (James, Johnstone, Quinlan, &Walters, 2007; Markey & Patmore, 2011; Quinlan & Johnstone, 2009; Walters & Nichols, 2007; 2009;
Walters, Nichols, Connor, Tasiran, & Cam, 2005) were challenging this approach even before thecatastrophic Pike River event. There is, nevertheless, agreement on the importance of employees
having an independent voice in WHS matters (Barton, 2018; Lamm, 2014; Markey et al., 2015;
Walters et al., 2016).
The health and safety literature includes critiques of proposed institutional reforms and reflections on
the effectiveness of established reforms. Browne (1973) and Robens (1972) focus on the shift towards
deregulatory institutions that follow the Robens’ model established in the UK. Others explore the shift
towards de-collectivist employment relations in New Zealand (Anderson & Nuttall, 2014; Jeffrey,
1995; Lamm, 2010; Pashorina-Nichols, Lamm, & Anderson, 2017; Wren, 1997) and Australia(Quinlan & Johnstone, 2009). As New Zealand laws and institutions have been influenced by thesystems in the UK and Australia, it is worth noting the changing focus to health and wellbeing. The
early legislative minimum standards in the UK and New Zealand were also concerned with theconditions of workers’ health, rather than safety, especially the conditions of females and children.
Furthermore, Campbell (1995) found that lobbying for regulatory safety interventions follows
catastrophic industry events, largely in the mining industry. And although statutory frameworks are
essential, other key factors are required to achieve effective worker EP&R in health and safety (Lamm,
2010; Walters & Nichols, 2009).
Walters and Nichols (2009) and Lamm (2010) have identified key factors for effective worker
EP&R in WHS. These were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

the influence of a broader co-operative approach to employment relations
longstanding social partnerships
statutory requirements
supported by rigorous enforcement and inspection of health and safety regulations
adequate, available and accessible training programmes for managers and workers, andmandatory for health and safety representatives (HSRs)
6. an organisational climate conducive for participation and collaboration
7. employer and worker agreement on the function of health and safety committees(HSCs) and worker representatives
8. sufficient resources, including time allocated to HSRs, and proper support.
Another stream of research explores the meaning and purpose of ‘worker silence’. In this discourse,
power is central to ER concepts of ‘worker voice’ as power and control are perceived to stem fromlabour institutions and power structures that prevent employees from exercising voice (Barry &Wilkinson, 2016; Donaghey, Cullinane, Dundon, & Wilkinson, 2011). Whereas, OB concepts focus
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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 79-100
on ‘why’ employees choose to remain silent (Morrison, 2011; Van Dyne, Soon, & Botero, 2003).
Worker ‘silence’ emerges in health and safety literature as workers’ fear of retribution and HSRs’
reactive ‘resistance’ to management decisions, when management imposed decisions failed to preventor control hazards in the high-risk mining industry (Walters et al., 2016). This suggests that there may
be some ideological tension between the traditional HRM/OB approaches and the new WHS approach,regardless of the apparent convergence in efforts to consider both direct and indirect ‘worker voice’across all the disciplines mentioned. It is within this national, industry, and organisational context thatworker involvement in WHS occurs. Yet, Quinlan and Johnstone (2009) and Quinlan (2018) highlighta persistent dearth of literature exploring the link between WHS and ER.
There have been numerous attempts to assist cross-disciplinary debates by deconstructing concepts tofacilitate in-depth analysis of the nature and extent of participatory initiatives and systems. Typologies,
analytical models and theories of employee participation, influence and control in decision-making
have been developed and tested in some key industries. The initial focus of the application of these
theories was primarily in the manufacturing and public sector, and then extended to capture the service
sector and smaller sized organisations. While there is some empirical research in the construction andmining industries, few studies adopt management models and theories to explore employee EP&R in
WHS in high-risk industries. There are also concerns about the relevance of current theoreticalframeworks in the contemporary global environment defined by the gig economy (project work, IT
platforms and precarious work) (Barry & Wilkinson, 2016; Budd, Bray, & Macneil, 2015; Heery,2016a). These concerns are supported by calls to learn from the past (Barry & Wilkinson, 2016; Budd
et al., 2015; Heery, 2016b) and a need for more in-depth research on how health and safety systems
function and the role of HSRs (Hasle, Seim, & Refslund, 2016; Lamm, 2014; Markey et al., 2015;
Walters et al., 2016).

The Context Within Which Worker EP&R Occurs in New Zealand
There have been a number of institutional mechanisms and voluntary schemes, to allow employees
and their representatives to have influence in workplace decision-making in New Zealand since 1894.
Rasmussen and Tedestedt (2017) refer to the waves of interest in a commentary of employee
participation in New Zealand. The Arbitration System that operated for nearly 100 years gave
employees some form of collective influence in decision-making through collective bargaining. There
was also financial participation and profit sharing, for example, the Companies Empowering Act 1924,
providing for employees to have shares in the company. In 1927, the New Zealand Railways
introduced workshop committees, but there was little interest. Interest in establishing regulatedindustry level consultation committees emerged during World War II (Rasmussen, 2009a).
Another wave of interest in worker participation schemes occurred in 1960s and 1970s in attempts tostabilise the effects of industrial disruption. But these were largely management driven (Smith, 1978).
In New Zealand during the 1980s, attempts were made to improve joint consultation in WHS througha voluntary Code of Practice for HSRs 1987. In 1989, a Commission of Enquiry into industrial
democracy in New Zealand recommended formal representative councils for all businesses with morethan 40 employees. However the recommendations were never implemented, partly because of
employer resistance (Haynes, Boxall, & Macky, 2005). In the 1990s, the concept of workplace reform
was taken up by a number of organisations with the aim of creating a stable, productive workforce.
Worker participation was part of this workplace reform mix, but again, there was little interest frommost employers and unions (Foster & Mackie, 2002).
In 2000, the fifth Labour government introduced a more collaborative approach to workplace change.
A Partnership Resource Centre was established to promote employer and union collaboration in the82

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 79-100
public and private sectors. The National government disestablished the Centre in 2011 (Lamm, 2010).
Overall, the bipartite (government and employer) and tripartite (government, employer and union)
initiatives have not achieved sustainable worker participation and influence in workplace decisionmaking (Anderson & Nuttall, 2014).
Consequently, the ER environment experienced a shift away from indirect voice, under the Arbitration
System, to one of individual or direct voice (Anderson & Nuttall, 2014; Foster, Rasmussen, Murrie, &Laird, 2011). This came about with the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act (ECA) in 1991,
the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 (HSEA) and a raft of other institutional reforms that
led to a predominantly individualist climate in ER and WHS management decision-making. The
HSEA was the first attempt at adopting the self-regulatory Robens’ model in New Zealand. One of theobjectives of this model was to enhance flexibility within which employers and workers could
collaboratively develop, implement and continuously improve WHS risk management systems to
reduce or eliminate workplace risks. The model requires action at both industry and workplace levels,and included statutory duties for employers to consult and engage workers (Browne, 1973). However,
New Zealand did not originally adopt these duties (Pashorina-Nichols, 2016). According to theliterature, this lack of representation and an inactive health and safety regulator, key objectives of the
Robens model, were contributing factors in the Pike River Mining disaster (Adams, Armstrong, &Cosman, 2014; ITWHS, 2013; Lamare et al., 2015; Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine
Tragedy, 2012).
Following a Royal Commission inquiry into the disaster, a new regulator was established – WorkSafe
New Zealand. The Royal Commission stated that worker participation is essential for the effective
management of workplace hazards. Furthermore, noting that the previous government in 2007 had
ratified the ILO Occupational Safety and Health Convention 1981 (C155), requiring worker
participation (Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012). Moreover, themembers of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety (ITWHS) concluded that theprovisions for worker participation under the HSEA were not being fully implemented and that levelsof worker engagement in WHS issues were inconsistent (ITWHS, 2013). The forestry (Adams et al.,2014) and construction (Construction Safety Council, 2012) industries also carried out reviews of their
WHS systems. There was unanimous agreement that it is essential to create a safe workplaceenvironment where workers feel confident to raise issues. Further, employers must involve workers inmatters that affect their health and safety, listen to and consider workers issues before making
decisions.

A New Health and Safety System in New Zealand
Both the reports of the Royal Commission and the ITWHS recommended strengthening the provisions
over worker participation and greater union representation in WHS. The Commissioners referred tostaff members and contractors having ‘voiced concerns’, but used employee and worker participation
throughout the report (Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012). The
importance of respecting ‘worker voice’ and fear of reprisal emerge in the taskforce report (ITWHS,
2013). However, concerns have been raised about New Zealand consistently blocking attempts toadopt statutory requirements for HSRs and HSCs. This is not the first attempt to establish formal
employee participation systems in WHS. Neither is tension between recognising the importance of
joint management and worker participation in the effective management of WHS and employer
resistance to mandatory standards novel. This tension is evident in employer submissions on the recent
reforms proposed in the Health and Safety Reform Bill (Sissons, 2016) and preceding the enactmentof the Code of Practice for HSRs and HSCs, 1987 (Mullen, 1990; 1991). Refer to Anderson andNuttall (2014), Pashorina-Nichols et al. (2017) and Sissons (2016) for further reflection of the changes.
83New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 79-100

Comparing the two Acts, the HSWA 2015 is more explicit than the HSEA 1992, both in its entirety
and specifically concerning worker EP&R in health and safety matters. There are a number of changes
that impact on worker EP&R, such as the primary duty of care. The primary health and safety duty ofcare resides with the person conducting a business or undertaking (PCBU) who has to ensure the healthand safety of workers and others affected by the work it carries out. Therefore, the PCBU must consult,co-operate and co-ordinate with other PCBUs where there is a shared worksite or is part of acontracting supply chain. ‘Officers’ of PCBUs have a positive duty of ‘due diligence’; this includes
directors and others who make decisions at the governance level.
The intention to establish a system to facilitate tripartite collaborative relationships to achieve
continuous improvement in WHS outcomes is captured in both Acts. But, whereas duties to ‘involve
employees’ in WHS matters were outlined in general duties in the HSEA and required providing
reasonable opportunities for employees to participate effectively in the management of health andsafety in the employees’ places of work. There is a significant focus on tripartite worker voice in themain purpose of the HSWA. More detailed duties and provisions follow.
There are also new regulations prescribing how the minimum standards are to be implemented andmaintained (Health and Safety at Work (Worker Engagement, Participation, and Representation)
Regulations 2016). Whereas the HSEA only provided for third party worker representation throughHSRs, HSCs and unions; the HSWA interpretation extends the scope of a worker representative toinclude “any other [appropriate] person the worker authorises to represent the worker” (S16).
However, “if the workers are represented by a health and safety representative, the engagement must
involve that representative” (S59 (2)). More detail clarifies expectations necessary to manage WHS incomplex contracting and supply chain situations. The use of the term ‘worker’ reflects a wider scopeaccommodating the changing nature of work. The repealed HSE Act provided for employees. Finally,
the new Act and regulations allow considerable flexibility, as intended by the Robens model. But, there
are concerns about exclusions of PCBUs employing less than 20 workers and some high-risk industries
from duties to establish formal worker EP&R systems (Pashorina-Nichols et al., 2017; Sissons, 2016).

Conceptualising EP&R in the Workplace and in the WHSA
Even though terms are used interchangeably and the meanings of terms vary, some disciplinary
distinctions emerge (Budd, 2014; Budd, Gollan, & Wilkinson, 2010; Gollan & Xu, 2015; Wilkinson
et al., 2018; Wilkinson et al., 2010). This section explores broad definitions of employee and worker
engagement, participation and representation (EP&R). Each definition is supported with reflection on
how this has been interpreted in the New Zealand context.
At the international level, employee rights to have a say are recognised by the World HealthOrganisation (WHO) (Burton, 2010) and in the principles of the International Labour Organisation(ILO) Convention 87 (Freedom of Association) and Convention 98 (Right to Organise and Bargain
Collectively). In defining engagement, the WHO refers to involvement, influence and representation.
Leadership engagement is critical for providing permission, resources and support, and is the first stepand key feature of the continuous improvement process in WHS (Burton, 2010). Therefore, the scopeof leadership includes all stakeholders; owners, senior managers, union leaders or informal leaders.
The second key feature ‘worker involvement and influence’ in work and decisions is also crucial for
effective sustainable WHS initiatives. Burton reported that few change initiatives have succeeded
when a strong collective voice is absent. In fact, as two of the WHO core principles, leadershipengagement and worker involvement are more than just steps in a process. Therefore, how workers
must be involved is also clarified as:84

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 79-100…the workers affected by the programme and their representatives must be involved in ameaningful way in every step of the process, from planning to implementation and evaluation.
Workers and their representatives must not simply be ‘consulted’ or ‘informed’ of what ishappening, but must be actively involved, their opinions and ideas sought out, listened to, andimplemented (Burton, 2010, p.62).
While New Zealand laws, policies and practices, to a large extent, reflect the principles outlined inConvention 98 (ratified in 2003) and Convention 155 (ratified in 2007), there are still some concerns
regarding the limitations of the statutory provisions, duties and regulations for worker EP&R
(Anderson & Nuttall, 2014; Foster & Rasmussen, 2017; Pashorina-Nichols et al., 2017; Rasmussen,
Foster, & Farr, 2016). In the following sections, we endeavour to unpack the concept of ‘employee
voice’ in order to see and understand its practical application in New Zealand.

Engagement‘Employee engagement’ (Kwon et al., 2016) and ‘employee involvement’ (Marchington, 2015;
Markey et al., 2015; Pateman, 1970) are management driven direct forms of involvement aimed atincreasing positive organisational outcomes. Pateman (1970) proposed that, although management
may consult employees, the aim is for them to accept management decisions. Pateman called this‘pseudo’ participation as influence is purely an unintended consequence of the organisational gains.
Employees and workers would only be involved in operational and task level decisions on a narrow
range of issues (Blyton & Turnbull, 2004; Markey et al., 2015; Pateman, 1970). Thus, worker
engagement is mainly concerned about the purpose, intent and outcome of the employee/worker voice
initiatives.
However, the HSWA duties on management and workers to agree to procedures for engaging andinvolving workers in WHS matters and decisions that are likely to affect health and safety appears to
be based on the assumption of equal power in decision-making(Health and Safety at Work Act, No.70.,
2015). The regulator, WorkSafe, expects management in PCBUs to provide reasonable opportunities
for workers to be involved in two-way conversations about WHS. “Everyone involved in health andsafety must be able to contribute and have their opinion considered when decisions are made”(WorkSafe New Zealand, 2017a, p.1). Citing Safe Work Australia, 2017 advice to employers, Barton(2018, p.9) interprets engagement as “part of employer attitudes towards worker involvement”.
Participation refers to the physical activity of worker involvement in making a workplace safer. Thus,
engagement is more of a mental state, whereas participation is a description of practices related to thatmental state, and representation is a sub-set of participation practices. Although the Australianstatutory duties to consult workers are stronger than engagement (Pashorina-Nichols, 2016), thismental state is shaped by moral and ideological beliefs about why and how workers need to be involved
in workplace decisions that affect their work, health, safety and wellbeing.

Participation
Some define ‘employee/worker participation’ as encompassing all the direct and indirect forms ofvoice that involve workers in decisions about their work (Gollan & Xu, 2015; Marchington, 2015),
These forms of participation processes make up worker involvement systems, and impact on the degreeof influence employees/workers will have in management decisions. Others require participation to be
between groups of employees and their manager (Budd et al., 2010). Markey et al. (2015) confine
employee participation to collective indirect representation by unions, HSRs or other employee
representatives. Pateman (1970, p.68) argues that:85

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 79-100
The whole point about industrial participation is that it involves a modification, to a greater or
lesser degree, of the orthodox authority structure; namely one where decision making is the‘prerogative’ of management, in which workers play a part.
Situations where employees have some influence over some tactical and strategic level decisions
within a context of unequal power are classified as, ‘partial’ participation. ‘Full’ participation isfounded on equal power between management and employees/workers. The level of leadership
openness to share decision-making and the amount of participation will be influenced by a range ofindividual and organisational factors (Tannenbaum & Schmidt, 1958). The stakeholders will need toagree on how employees/workers will participate, at what level of the organisation will they
participate, the range of subject matter they will talk about, and what degree of influence they will
have in management decisions.
Even though management and workers must agree on engagement and participation procedures, the
HSWA allows PCBUs management to determine the best way to meet their duties to provide
reasonable opportunities for workers to participate effectively in improving WHS on an ongoing basis(WorkSafe New Zealand, n.d.). This flexibility accommodates workers’ views and needs,organisational size and nature of WHS risks. Moreover, PCBUs are allowed to keep existingengagement and participation practices if they are effective and comply with the HSWA (WorkSafe
New Zealand, 2017a).

Representation‘Employee/worker representation’ includes traditional forms of indirect union bargaining, andworkplace HSRs and HRCs. These may be replaced or complimented by non-union employee
representation (NER). NER are useful for short-term task focussed working groups, but the HSWA
requires that elected HSRs must be involved. Moreover, the practice of combining union representative
voice with individual voice is not a new phenomenon, (Arrowsmith & Parker, 2013; Gollan & Xu,
2015; Kaufman & Taras, 2010; Wilkinson et al., 2010). Complimentary practices first occurred in
Anglo-American countries in the 1970s as traditional ways of conducting industrial relations andmanagerial decision-making were expanded to capture individual employee rights (Marchington,
Goodman, Wilkinson, & Ackers, 1992; Ramsay, 1977; Rasmussen, 2009a).
The effectiveness of traditional forms of representation in WHS is well established (Quinlan, 2008;
Sissons, 2016; Walters et al., 2005; Walters et al., 2016). Elected HSRs and HSCs facilitate
employee/worker participation in the continuous improvement of WHS outcomes. Independent
regional roving HSRs (Burton, 2010; Frick & Walters, 1998; New Zealand Council of Trade Unions,2012; Walters, 2010) and industry HRS (Walters et al., 2016) are also valuable in supporting worker
voice and participation in high-risk industries and small and medium-sized enterprises (SME).
Kaufman and Taras (2010) note that employer-led voluntary NER systems, such as joint consultationcommittees (JCCs), aim to enhance organisational flexibility and efficiency in identifying andresolving workplace matters. However, effectiveness depends on the purpose and extent it is used tointegrate employee involvement or bargaining (Kaufman & Taras, 2010; McGraw & Palmer, 1995).
In fact, Markey (2007) found that the Australian regulatory environment constrained the formation ofa genuine independent non-union works council style employee participation initiative, andencouraged union substitution. These findings suggest that even when the legal aim is to enhance
worker participation NERs may be used to undermine unions.
Research on motivation for establishing voluntary NER joint consultation committees (JCCs) to meetstatutory duties in Australia, shows these forms require similar conditions as those for compulsory
86New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 79-100
HSCs including: management commitment and responsive to issues raised by the JCC members;
provision of adequate resourcing and training; effective interpersonal communication between JCC
members, JCC representatives and employees; inter-JCC links within an organisation; ensuring
employee representation and participation is genuine; and gaining union support (McGraw & Palmer,
1995). The JCCs tended to deal with relatively trivial organisational issues and either complemented
union collective bargaining or competed with unions’ efforts to improve productivity. Kaufman andTaras (2010) concur with McGraw and Palmer (1995) that NERs are challenging to manage
successfully, require considerable employer commitment, attention and investment. They found NERs
can quickly atrophy. Both articles develop analytical models, the latter, based on a comprehensive
review of the NER literature, includes consideration of the degree of power and permanence.
However, research suggests that NERs are relatively ineffective as a forum for distributive bargaining
and employee interest representation because they lack power, independent resources and autonomy
to exert leverage on a company (Haynes, 2005; Haynes et al., 2005; Kaufman & Taras, 2010; McGraw& Palmer, 1995)
There are detailed provisions for HSRs and HSCs in the HSWA and new regulations (Health and
Safety at Work (Worker Engagement, Participation, and Representation) Regulations 2016), yet
representation is only one form of participation. Furthermore, PCBUs who employ fewer than 20
workers or do not operate in specified high-risk industries do not have to use traditional indirect formsof participation.
While there is evidence that the new statutory duties are encouraging employers to improve themanagement of WHS, weaknesses and areas for improvement are apparent. The most recent resultsfrom annual surveys, started in 2012, show 49 per cent of businesses making significant changes totheir WHS policies and systems (Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment (MBIE), 2013;2014; 2016; 2018). This is a statistically significant increase compared to previous years (34 per centin 2015/16, 24 per cent in 2014/15, 20 per cent in 2013/14 and 24 per cent in 2012/13). How thebusiness involved their workers in WHS was only the fourth most common change made by these
employers (49 per cent). Employers appeared to be more concerned about developing policies orsystems (75 per cent), the training of workers, including inductions (63 per cent) and risk management(53 per cent) (MBIE, 2018). Foster and Farr (2016) also found some employer willingness to engage
workers in SMEs, and Rasmussen and Tedestedt (2017) argue that employee participation has been
embedded in the statutory provisions. In addition, annual reports suggest there have been some recent
improvements in EP&R within some state sector organisations that are modelling good practice(Department of Conservation, 2018; Department of Corrections, 2018; New Zealand Police, 2018).
Another annual survey nevertheless highlights significant differences between employer and worker
perceptions of how the statutory WHS duties are implemented in practice (Nielsen, 2015; 2017;
WorkSafe New Zealand, 2017b). Weaknesses in complex PCBU EP&R systems are also starting toemerge in Enforceable Undertakings accepted by the regulator (WorkSafe New Zealand, 2018). The
annual MBIE surveys from 2012-2017 show decreasing numbers of informal HSRs, trained HSRs andHSCs in New Zealand. And there are concerns about the Labour Party not delivering on their election
promise to extend the right for workers to elect a HSR to all workplaces (Rudman, 2019).

Occupational and Workplace Health and Safety
The terms ‘occupational health and safety’ and ‘workplace (worker) health and safety’ have varied
over time. The terms defining the employment relationships are also used interchangeably with someresearchers referring to ‘worker’ (Lamm, 2010; Ramsay, 1977; Smith, 1978; Wall & Lischeron, 1977;
Walters & Nichols, 2007), while others to ‘employee’ (Arrowsmith & Parker, 2013; Blyton &87New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 79-100
Turnbull, 2004; Marchington, 2015; Marchington et al., 1992; Pateman, 1970; Rasmussen &Tedestedt, 2017).
Finally, Wilkinson et al. (2018, p.711) recently concluded that ‘employee voice’ is weaker than terms
such as participation “because it does not denote influence or power-sharing and may thus be at times
no more than a trickle up voice”. Furthermore, proposing that ‘voice’ is a prerequisite for participation
practices. However, the Worksafe interpretation of worker EP&R duties of PCBUs (presented in
Figure 1.a.) does not appear to encompass the broader WHO conceptualisation of leadershipengagement or the context of continuous improvement common in WHS management systems(presented in Figure 1.b.). Although Barton (2018) agrees engagement is a precursor and element ofcontinuous improvement participation processes, his suggestion of the distinction between engagement
and participation being insignificant appears to deviate from this body of reviewed literature.
Figure 1.a. WHO Healthy Workplace Model: Avenues of Influence, Process, and Core Principles(Burton, 2010, p.13), and Figure 1.b WorkSafe Worker EP&R Duties of a PCBU (WorkSafe, 2016,
p.12)
Figure 1.a.

Figure 1.b.

The literature suggests it is the intent, purpose, depth, breadth and intersection of worker EP&R
policies and processes at the national, industry and organisational levels that will impact on theeffectiveness and sustainability of WHS initiatives. This research adopts the term ‘worker EP&R’ to
explore all forms of ‘psuedo’, ‘partial’ and ‘full’ worker engagement, participant and representation
between management and employees, contracted workers, and PCBU and worker representatives.
There is agreement that all disciplines need to broaden their scope when exploring ‘employee voice’.
For example, ER scholars recognise the need to complement collective voice with individual voice inthe contemporary work environment (Barry & Wilkinson, 2016; Wilkinson et al., 2014; Wilkinson etal., 2013). This research will also contribute to the academic debate concerning the relevance ofstatutory ‘worker voice and participation’ protections in neo-liberal context that lean towards unitarist
employment relations systems (Bogg & Novitz, 2014; Quinlan & Johnstone, 2009; Walters et al., 2016;
Weil, 2014).
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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 79-100

Discussion and Development of a Conceptual Model for Exploring Worker EP&R
The reviewed literature draws on a growing body of multi-disciplinary research exploring the conceptof ‘worker voice’ in the contemporary environment. Of central importance is enhancing outcomes of‘worker voice’ for the organisation and workers. Nevertheless, the literature shows that implementing
sustainable ‘worker voice’ systems has been challenging in Anglo-Saxon countries. The waves andcycles theories have helped researchers analyse the macro level external socio-political and economic
factors that influence the forms of ‘worker voice’ implemented in organisations and the level ofinfluence workers have in decision-making affecting their work (Blyton & Turnbull, 2004;
Marchington et al., 1992; Ramsay, 1977; Rasmussen & Tedestedt, 2017). The ‘waves’ model is usefulfor understanding the socio-political background of ‘worker voice’ and the implementation of the
Robens model in New Zealand (Anderson & Nuttall, 2014; Campbell, 1995; Rasmussen & Tedestedt,2017). But it also focusses attention on the vulnerability of voluntary and compliance-based ‘worker
voice’ schemes and systems.
The literature shows that neither employer willingness (Kaufman & Taras, 2010; Marchington, 2015),
nor statutory provisions are sufficient (Lamare et al., 2015; Pashorina-Nichols et al., 2017; Walters &Nichols, 2009; Walters et al., 2016). The importance of EP&R in the effective management of WHS
suggests that the government, employers and workers have to collaborate to ensure the system
functions as one of continuous improvement, rather than just fading away as another ineffective fad(McGraw & Palmer, 1995; Ramsay, 1977). However, concerns about implementing the Robens modelin a largely individualist context in New Zealand indicate that it may be challenging to establish
sustainable tripartite systems at the organisational and enterprise levels (Anderson & Nuttall, 2014;
Pashorina-Nichols et al., 2017). Blyton and Turnbull’s (2004) interpretation of cycles as having little
impact in progressing objectives and outcomes (in relation to what?) may help distinguish between
strategic level organisational choices of forms of ‘worker voice’, and understand challenges to thesustainable implementation of strategic choices at the tactical and operational levels, in complex supply
chains.
The multi-disciplinary research debates have also highlighted the interchangeable use of a wide rangeof terms defining and deconstructing ‘worker voice’ and the need for the development of analytical
tools to help comparative researchers talk to each other, rather than over or around each other. In
summary, the reviewed empirical research demonstrates efforts to explore the depth and breadth of
direct and indirect, formal and informal forms of ‘worker voice’. Marchington’s (2015) amended
model explicitly highlights the socio-political factors that shape decisions about the objectives andmeaning, whereas, ideological frames may get limited consideration in some industry andorganisational level empirical studies (Markey, Harris, Knudsen, Lind, & Williamson, 2014; Walters,
2010; Wilkinson et al., 2013). Some researchers have applied Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) theory incomparative analysis (Marchington, 2015; Markey et al., 2014). However, Poole, Lansbury, andWailes (2001) propose the favourable conjuncture model to overcome the limitations of VoC, and help
account for the complexity and diversity of forms of participation within a country. The latter model
also captures a related factor as it allows for consideration of the relative power governments,
employers and workers and their representatives have in decision-making. However, integrating themodel with Marchington’s (2015) internal and external factors shaping depth and breadth of ‘worker
voice’ (degree, level, range and form) and including the prerequisites for effective EP&R (Lamm,
2010; Walters & Nichols, 2009) will facilitate deconstruction of the meso-organisational levelstructures and process to gain in-depth insights at the firm level.
Typologies, frameworks and models of ‘worker voice’ have emerged from conceptual and empiricalresearch, alongside concerns about the relevance of classical theories in the contemporary
89

New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 79-100
environment. Some seminal work is still prominent in contemporary debates, such as (Marchington etal., 1992; Pateman, 1970; Ramsay, 1977) and new perspectives have also emerged across these debates(Budd, 2014; Kaufman & Taras, 2010; Lamm, 2010; Rasmussen et al., 2016; Walters & Nichols, 2009;
Weil, 2011; Wilkinson et al., 2014). But, whereas different typologies and frameworks emerge fromempirical studies, the ideological frames of reference are widely used across disciplines (Arrowsmith& Parker, 2013; Gollan & Xu, 2015; Ramsay, 1977; Smith, 1978; Walters, 2010).
There are numerous continuums classifying ‘worker voice’ and influence. Although Pateman’s (1970)
distinctions between the pseudo, partial and full involvement and power in decision-making that may
occur at different levels in an organisational hierarchy, this applied to exploring participation andindustrial democracy. In addition, Marchington, et al.’s (1992) escalator captures a wider range ofvoice and influence, therefore, it may be helpful for exploring and developing a tool to help understandthe level of worker influence in health and safety. Contemporary terms may need to be added to reflectcurrent understanding and practice. The prominence of continuums suggests that these would befamiliar to academics; managers, workers and their representatives; and practitioners. Empiricallydeveloped tools and measures that have the potential to enhance the understanding of the duties andregulatory requirements for EP&R should be useful for policy and decision makers.
Reflecting on Rasmussen’s (2009b) discussion of the three major theories used in ER, systems theory,
conflict theory (ideological frames of reference) and social action theory. Poole, et al.’s (2001)
analytical framework encompasses basic systems theory (inputs, conversion processes and outputs)
applicable and at the meso-organisational level. Systems theory is a useful foundation for interpretingtheory into practical models. Dunlop’s (1958) industrial relations system expands to external level
contextual factors influencing industrial relations matters, including ideology (unitarism, pluralism andradicalism). As the outcomes also expand to include the government, this can be applied at the macrolevel. Rasmussen’s observation that Dunlop’s ideological frames of reference are widely used in theliterature, despite criticism, is supported in this review. Social action theory focusses on the ‘actors’
and individual differences in understanding, goals and expectations, thus narrowing to the individuallevel. However, the model does not allow consideration of external factors nor does it address theimbalance of power in the employer-worker relationship. Poole et al.’s (2001) favourable conjuncturesmodel for comparative analysis of industrial democracy has the potential to be adapted to analyse the
new legislative changes. It develops on a systems theory structure and reflects some concepts
emanating from the ‘worker voice’ literature. As such, it may be useful for academic analysis that
could be adapted for policy makers and practitioners. The current contextual factors have toaccommodate the gig economy (platforms and projects) with the related increases in precarious work
arrangements (contract, casual, part-time).
In summary, having defined the scope of the forms of ‘worker voice’ to be included in the study, aconceptual model is developed drawing on lessons from the past and contemporary perspectives(presented in Figure 2). In order to explore the research question, ‘worker voice’ will be deconstructedusing Marchington’s (2015) forces shaping employee involvement and participation (EIP) and the four
dimensions to measure EIP (degree of influence in management decisions, levels of participation,
range of subject matter, and form of participation). This framework is expanded to capture the key
factors for ‘worker voice’ in WHS (Lamm, 2010; Walters & Nichols, 2009). These deconstructedfactors are integrated with Marchington, et al.’s (1992) escalator of employee participation andinfluence, and Poole et al.’s (2001) favourable conjectures model. The latter model will help
distinguish between differences and similarities in the case studies, thus overcoming a limitation in
VoC theory.

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New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 79-100

Conclusions
As academic debates have explored management trends and the relevance of theories over the
centuries, the plethora of ‘worker voice’ research provides opportunities to identify lessons from thepast that shape expectations and decisions in the contemporary workplace environment. Firstly, theimportance of ‘worker voice’ in the effective management of matters affecting worker health andsafety is well documented. Yet, the catastrophic Pike River mining tragedy highlighted the limitationsof Robens’ light national health and safety system that had been operating in New Zealand for almost
two decades. Secondly, the reviewed historical accounts suggest that it will be challenging to
implement sustainable effective ‘worker voice’ systems and initiatives. The literature has demonstrated
the need to explore the complex socio-political and economic context shaping strategic decisions.
Furthermore, diversity in the purpose and forms of ‘worker voice’ implemented in workplaces showsthat in-depth analysis is required to determine similarities and differences in practices in the casestudies. And although there are numerous attempts to classify the degree to which the ‘worker voice’empowers workers to influence organisational decisions and imping on managers’ prerogative, there
is little empirical research exploring the link between WHS and ER. Finally, empirical researchers
define and deconstruct the characteristics of ‘worker voice’ in different ways, depending of theresearch discipline and aim of the study. Therefore, the analysis and integration of the models isappropriate for exploring EP&R in health and safety in the contemporary New Zealand context.

91New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations, 44(1): 79-100
An Interpretivist multiple-case study methodology will be adopted, with purposive samplingtechniques applied to recruit key stakeholders for the Phase 1 interviews and the PCBUs explored in
the case studies in the construction industry. The revised and adapted model will be used to explore
the following research question: How are the new statutory provisions for EP&R in WHS, contributing
to ‘worker voice’, particularly in high-risk industry sectors in New Zealand?
This empirical research has the potential to clarify ambiguity and misunderstanding of terms that influence
the interpretation and enactment of duties in the WHSA. It will also provide new insight and an in-depth
understanding of what effect this legislation has on ‘worker voice’ in the high-risk constructionindustry. The empirical findings will contribute to the debates informing policy, processes andpractices aimed at enhancing worker EP&R in matters that affect their health and safety. By
investigating ‘worker voice’ in WHS through an expanded conceptual framework, this exploratory
study captures the link between ‘worker voice’ in WHS and the ER context. Thus adding toconversations about the relevance of statutory ‘worker voice’ provisions and participation protections
in neo-liberal social, political and economic environments that lean towards unitarist employment
relations systems (Bogg & Novitz, 2014; Quinlan & Johnstone, 2009; Walters et al., 2016; Weil, 2014).

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