The second set of recommendations
from JHPS on Radiation Protection
Issues after Fukushima Accident
Takatoshi HATTORI*

Advisor for Fukushima issues
Japan Health Physics Society (JHPS)
47th JHPS Annual Meeting, Kamisaibara village culture center

June 19th, 2014
*Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry

JHPS Responses and Recommendations
 27(31 with overlapping 4) points at
issues were pointed out from 11
issues associated with RP after theaccident.
 5 Responses of JHPS were declared.
 12(16 with overlapping 4)
recommendations of JHPS weredrawn up taking into consideration

1) how to improve the current system of
RP by overlooking the various opinions
on RP in an emergency and2) direction towards future goals of the RP
system by exploiting the strength of
JHPS of having many experts in RP
among its members.

This report can be downloaded from the
JHPS HP at http://www.jhps.or.jp/en/
2

1st set of Recommendations from JHPS
1.
2.

Balance among other emergency criteria
Assumption of long-term emergency situation and maintenance of infrastructure including
electricity, water, and communications
3. Use of SPEEDI and simulations on the diffusion of radioactive materials in the ocean
4. Communication with residents to designate the deliberate evacuation zones
5. Review of emergency planning zones (EPZs)
6. Category of foods and scope of radioactive nuclides except for key nuclides in regulation offoods and drinks
7. Validity of screening levels for decontamination (100 and 13 kcpm) from the viewpoint of RP
8. Transition of dose limit for emergency workers to 250 mSv and how to control individual
dose after shifting back to a normal situation using a dose limit (50mSv/y & 100mSv/5y)
9. Post disaster investigation of thyroid equivalent dose of radioactive iodine by simulating theatmospheric diffusion using SPEEDI and surveys on residents’ behavior
10. Balance among provisional criteria for judging the safety of using school yards, forage,
cropping soil, fertilizers, bathing areas, etc.
11. Balance among RP measures, inconvenience and heat stroke in relation to systems for
temporary entry into restricted zones
12. Management of radioactive wastes such as cesium-containing rubble, sludge, anddecontaminated soil
3

Fundamental policy for the recommendations
 Indicate the direction of evolvement of theradiological protection system in the future
by overseeing various radiological protection measures inemergency situation.

 Share the recommendations with radiologicalprotection experts in the world;
they must be understood by experts in the world from eachstandpoint and be able to be utilized independently.
4

IRPA 13 in 2012

AOARP Regional Meeting(17th May, 2012)
5

IRPA Bulletin started on March 2014

http://www.irpa.net/page.asp?id=54592
6

AOCRP-4 in 2014
AOARP Special Session (12nd May, 2014)7

Toward the 2nd set of recommendations from JHPS
Picking-up of RP issues through overall reviews of 5 reports ofinvestigation committees on the Fukushima nuclear accident• Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear
Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report(Dec. 26, 2011) 【Governmental Interim Report】• Same as above, Final Report (Jul. 23, 2012) 【Governmental Finalreport】• National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent
Investigation Commission, Official report (Jul. 5, 2012) 【National Diet
Report】• Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear
Accident, Research Investigation Report (Feb. 27, 2012)【Nongovernmental Report】 (Only in Japanese)• Tokyo Electric Power Company, Fukushima Nuclear Accident Analysis
Report (Jun. 20, 2012) 【TEPCO Report】
8

Categorization for picking-up RP issues (1)1. Environmental radiation monitoringa. Radiation monitoring of landi. Monitoring car
ii. Aircraft monitoringiii. Tap water, agricultural and livestock products, andfoods
iv. Woods
v. Sand from the riverbed and bottom of the lakeb. Coastal sea area monitoringi. Sea waterii. Sand from bottom of the seaiii. Sea products
9Categorization for picking-up RP issues (2)2. Prediction of dilution of radioactive materials
a. System for Prediction of Environmental
Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI)
i. Utilization of SPEEDI information
ii. Disclosure of SPEEDI informationb. Simulation system on the diffusion of radioactive
materials in the ocean

10Categorization for picking-up RP issues (3)3. Evacuation of residents
a. Criteria and zone of evacuationand stay in-houseb. Communication of measures of
evacuation and stay in-housec. Implementation and cancelationof measures of evacuation andstay in-housed. Designation of deliberate
evacuation zone and specificspots recommended forevacuation
11

Categorization for picking-up RP issues (4)4. Radiation exposurea. Radiation protection criteria
i. Criterion for administration of stable iodide
ii. Screening level for decontaminationiii. Criteria for using school yards, bathing areas, andaggregate, and disaster waste disposal, sewage sludge
etc.
iv. Criteria for foods and drinks
v. Criteria for temporary entry into restricted zones
vi. Dose criteria for emergency workers

12Categorization for picking-up RP issues (5)4. Radiation exposureb. Radiation exposure of residentsi.

Thyroid equivalent dose assessment by simple
measurementii. Internal dose assessment using whole-body counters(WBC)iii. External dose assessment using personal dosimeters
iv. External dose estimation using residents’ behavior surveys

c. Radiation exposure of plant recovery workersi.
ii.

Reservation of dosimeters, WBCs and protective tools, andadministration of stable iodide in emergency
Measurement and assessment of individual dose inemergency
13

Categorization for picking-up RP issues (6)5. Risk communication to the public
a.
b.
c.
d.

Understanding of low dose radiation exposure
Mental health careCommunication through mass media and internet
Information delivery to oversea countries

6. Nuclear emergency preparedness
a. Nuclear emergency preparedness system andresponses of relevant organization after accident
b. Opportunity of revision of nuclear emergency
preparedness for complex disaster (earthquake, tsunami
and nuclear accident)

14

Categorization of post-accident radiologicalprotection measures
Timing to implement the radiological protection
measures: early stage (up to 1 week post-accident),
middle stage (up to 1 month post-accident),
later stage (up to 1 year post-accident) or
long-term stage (after 1 year post accident).
Residential area: surrounding area / far from the accidentsite (for public)
Target: public / workers
Workers: plant recovery or rescue/decontamination workers
around the accident site15

2nd set of Recommendations from JHPS (1)1.

Radiation monitoring on land – unexpected effects on means of transportation andcommunication
2. Radiation monitoring on land – monitoring posts washed away and communication lines
severed3. Tap water monitoring – communication method with public
4. Shipping restrictions and monitoring of agricultural and livestock products – expansion ofcontamination due to food chain
5. Shipping restrictions and monitoring of agricultural and livestock products – measurement
method for livestock products
6. Food monitoring – regional variations (6-1, 6-2)
7. Monitoring of forests and subsoils of rivers and lakes – lack of understanding of thenecessity
8. Monitoring of seawater, subsoils of ocean, and sea products – lack of understanding of thenecessity
9. Monitoring of seawater, subsoils of ocean, and sea products – lack of prediction tools (9-1,
9-2)
10. System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) –underutilization of prediction results (10-1, 10-2, 10-3)
11. Simulation system on the diffusion of radioactive materials in the ocean – lack of prediction
tools in the emergency preparedness system (11-1, 11-2, 11-3)
16

2nd set of Recommendations from JHPS (2)
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Evacuation of residents and its criterion – extension of order to stay indoors
Evacuation of residents and its criterion – instruction of deliberate evacuation
Evacuation of residents and its criterion – communication of evacuation instruction
Evacuation of residents and its criterion – evacuation beyond a designated zone for
emergency preparedness (15-1, 15-2)
Evacuation of residents and its criterion – evacuation of socially vulnerable individuals
Radiological protection criteria – criteria for administration of stable iodide – confusion
regarding administration criteria (17-1, 17-2)
Radiological protection criteria – screening level – validity of the level (18-1, 18-2, 18-3)
Radiological protection criteria – criteria for contamination of soil (schoolyards andeducational facilities, and bathing areas, utilization of crushed stones, and disposal ofdisaster waste and sewage sludge) – consistency of concepts for derivation of criteria (19-1,
19-2)
Radiological protection criteria – criteria for food and beverages – comprehensiveness offood categories
Radiological protection criteria – criteria for food and beverages – universal use for various
types of accident (21-1, 21-2)
Radiological protection criteria – criteria for food and beverages – approach to dose criteria
Radiological protection criteria – protective criteria for temporary entry into restrictedzones – balance among other risks17

2nd set of Recommendations from JHPS (3)24. Radiological protection criteria – dose criteria for emergency work – dose limit taking lifesaving work into account
25. Radiological protection criteria – dose criteria for emergency work – treatment of individual
doses received in an emergency situation
26. Radiation exposure of residents – estimation of thyroid equivalent dose of radioactive
iodine by simple measurement (26-1, 26-2, 26-3, 26-4)
27. Radiation exposure of residents – internal dose assessment using whole body counter(WBC) – investigation system (27-1, 27-2)
28. Radiation exposure of residents – internal dose assessment using whole body counter(WBC) – measurement method
29. Radiation exposure of residents – external dose assessment using personal dosimeters
30. Radiation exposure of residents – external dose estimation on the basis of behavior survey
31. Radiation exposure of plant recovery workers – network for urgently borrowing alarm
pocket dosimeters (APDs)
32. Radiation exposure of plant recovery workers – control of internal exposure in an
emergency
33. Radiation exposure of plant recovery workers – control of localized exposure in an
emergency
34. Radiation exposure of plant recovery workers – managing access to and from a controlledarea in an emergency
18

2nd set of Recommendations from JHPS (4)35. Risk communication to the public – spreading understanding of radiation effects (35-1, 35-2,
35-3, 35-4, 35-5)
36. Risk communication to the public – comprehensibility of radiological protection system
37. Risk communication to the public – utilization of mass media
38. Risk communication to the public – response to foreign residents and overseas countries
39. Nuclear emergency preparedness system – preparedness for complex disasters (39-1, 39-2)
40. Nuclear emergency preparedness system – opportunity of revision of nuclear emergency
preparedness for complex disasters (earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident)

Total 61 recommendations

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Concluding remarks
 JHPS has been reviewed how radiological protection measures afteran accident should be operated on the basis of concrete facts clearly
described in the five investigative reports and voices collected in the
JHPS symposia, and elaborated comprehensive reports on the second
set of recommendations including the first set of recommendations.
 JHPS hope that this will be of help in developing the scientific fieldsof health physics and radiological protection utilized by internationalradiation protection experts as well as those in the JHPS, residents inaffected areas and relevant staff in the government, in cooperation
with overseas associated societies such as the Asian and Oceanic
Association for Radiation Protection (AOARP), the International
Radiation Protection Association (IRPA) and the Health Physics
Society in the US.

20

The 2nd set of recommendations(draft)21

Recommendations for protection of
the public

22

Recommendation 1: Radiation monitoring on land
Radiation monitoring on land – unexpected effects on meansof transportation and communication
Recommendation 1: Alternative means or cooperative
system for land monitoring should be previously
prepared assuming that the Off-site Center fails tofunction, the monitoring car is unable to be utilized or
aircraft monitoring cannot be carried out as intended,and so forth.

Issue 1: Radiation monitoring on land could not proceed following
the previously determined emergency preparedness planowing to unexpected effects due to road damage, widespread
power failure, fuel shortages in monitoring cars, damage tocommunications networks, and delay in the preparation ofhelicopters.

23

Recommendation 2: Radiation monitoring on land
Radiation monitoring on land – monitoring posts
washed away and communication lines severed
Recommendation 2: Monitoring posts should be
upgraded so as to ensure high tolerance toearthquakes and tsunami.

Issue 2: Four of the 24 monitoring posts established by
Fukushima Prefecture were washed away by the tsunami
and another 19 were unable to transmit data owing tosevered communication lines, which resulted in 23
monitoring posts being inoperable.

24

Recommendation 3: Tap water monitoring
Tap water monitoring – communication method with public
Recommendation 3: Risk communication methods should be
prepared to inform the public of a restriction period for theintake of drinking water (tap water, river water and well
water, etc.) indispensable to keep our lives and the meaningof the regulatory value.

Issue 3: After notification on 23 March 2011 to refrain from providing
tap water to infants in the 23 wards of Tokyo and the Tama area, theradioactivity concentration in tap water on 24 March decreased to
below the regulation value. For this reason, it was announced thattap water may be used without any concern, including for infants.
However, since mineral water could not be obtained in many areas,
there were actually severe cases whereby people ultimately had todecide for themselves whether to drink tap water including
radioactive materials or to refrain from drinking water and whether
or not to continue breast feeding owing to concern of transferring
radioactive materials from mother to infant.
25

Recommendation 4: Shipping restrictions and monitoringof agricultural and livestock products

Shipping restrictions and monitoring of agricultural and livestock
products – expansion of contamination due to food chain
Recommendation 4: Methods to predict and restrict the
expansion of contamination due to the food chain should be
prepared for various agricultural and livestock products in
response to the characteristics of the accident.

Issue 4: The Notice on Farming Management was not communicated tograin farmers, who produce rice straw. Furthermore, theinformation and guidance provided to cattle farmers were
inadequate and it was discovered that cattle farmers had fed theircattle rice straw that had been stored outdoors and was most likely
contaminated with radioactive material. This led to the detection ofradioactive cesium exceeding the temporary regulation value in
beef.

26

Recommendation 5: Shipping restrictions and monitoringof agricultural and livestock products
Shipping restrictions and monitoring of agricultural and livestock
products – measurement method for livestock products
Recommendation 5: Methods to measure radioactivity inlivestock products in emergency situations should bestandardized in collaboration with expert committees andassociated societies while verifying their technologicalvalidity by comparison with previous findings andconventional technologies.

Issue 5: Beef fed by contaminated rice straw could not be identified byinspection after slaughter.

27

Recommendation 6: Food monitoring
Food monitoring – regional variations
Recommendation 6-1: Methods to measure radioactivity in foods inemergency situations should be standardized in collaboration withexpert committees and associated societies while verifying theirtechnological validity by comparison with previous findings andconventional technologies.
Recommendation 6-2: A cooperative system that will enable us totemporarily lend equipment for measuring radioactivity in foods
should be developed after nationwide investigation of the availabilityof such equipment.

Issue 6: Food monitoring was left to the test plans of the prefectures, so thelevel of the monitoring varied depending on the prefecture. The
monitoring equipment and other infrastructure in the various prefectures
were insufficient at the early stage after the disaster. Moreover, there werealso local governments that were unenthusiastic about performing
monitoring because of their concerns about the harm to their reputation,
so the level of monitoring varied depending on the local government.

28

Recommendation 7: Monitoring of forests and subsoils ofrivers and lakes

Monitoring of forests and subsoils of rivers and lakes –lack of understanding of the necessity
Recommendation 7: Monitoring methods should be
prepared taking into consideration the behavior
and transition of radioactivity in forests andsubsoils of rivers and lakes.
Issue 7: The necessity of monitoring forests and subsoils ofrivers and lakes was not sufficiently understood.

29

Recommendation 8: Monitoring of seawater, subsoils of
ocean, and sea products
Monitoring of seawater, subsoils of ocean, and sea products –lack of understanding of the necessity
Recommendation 8: Coastal sea area monitoring methods
should be prepared taking into consideration the
behavior and transition of radioactivity in sea water,
subsoils of the ocean and sea products.
Issue 8: Since the necessity of sea area monitoring was not fully
understood, the monitoring area was limited to the region
within 30km from Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS at the early stage
after the accident. Ocean currents formed around this local
area were not considered in the monitoring design, which led
to missing knowledge on the dynamics of the transition ofradioactive materials from the source.

30

Recommendation 9: Monitoring of seawater, subsoils of
ocean, and sea products
Monitoring of seawater, subsoils of ocean, and sea products – lack ofprediction tools
Recommendation 9-1: Methods to predict and restrict the expansion ofcontamination due to the food chain should be prepared for various
sea products in response to the characteristics of the accident.
Recommendation 9-2: A technique for simulating the transition ofradioactivity in the ocean should be prepared as a nuclear emergency
preparedness measure.

Issue 9: Since the seawater off Fukushima Prefecture travels down to thesouthern region of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS along the coast after the“Oyashio” current meets the “Kuroshio” current, radioactive materials inseawater traveled down to off the coast of Ibaraki Prefecture in the area
south of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, which led to the situation thatradioactive materials temporarily accumulated in sand eels, forcing
fishermen in Ibaraki Prefecture to refrain from fishing. In addition,
radioactive materials also accumulated in bottom-dwelling coastal fishes(e.g., flat fish, flounder, etc.). The timing of the accumulation of radioactive
materials in medium-sized fish owing to the food chain could not be
predicted since the monitoring target at the early stage postaccident was
not ocean subsoils but seawater.
31

Recommendation 10: SPEEDI
System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) –underutilization of prediction results
Recommendation 10-1: The calculation results obtained from SPEEDI should be promptly
disclosed together with their uncertainty in a clearly understandable form so thatmunicipalities and evacuees can actively use the data.
Recommendation 10-2: Usage of SPEEDI in the case that the Emergency Response Support
System (ERSS) is unable to be used and a detailed plan for the evacuation of residents
in the case that SPEEDI fails to be utilized should be clarified under the framework of
nuclear emergency preparedness.
Recommendation 10-3: When the entire range within concentric circles is established as
an evacuation area owing to the fast unfolding of events in the present accident,
methods to predict areas scarcely affected by the diffusion of radioactive materials
and to speedily inform the relevant parties of the predicted information should bedetermined in combination with monitoring information to continue disastermanagement, such as life saving activities in evacuation areas, as long as possible.
Issue 10-1: Since the external power supply was lost following the earthquake and the Government's
dedicated line for sending data became unavailable, the release of source information from theEmergency Response Support System (ERSS) on which SPEEDI calculations are based was not carriedout. For this reason, the Nuclear Safety Technology Center provided the predicted results of theirunit release rate calculation based on “the Environmental Radiation Monitoring Guidelines”, to the
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), the Emergency Response
Center (ERC), the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC), the Off-site Center, the Fukushima Prefectural
Office, and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) in response to the directive from MEXT on 11
March 2011. However, these predicted results were neither utilized to discuss practical evacuation
measures nor disclosed to the public, since the calculations based on an assumed unit release rate
did not show any actual radiation dose levels.
32

Recommendation 10: SPEEDI
System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information(SPEEDI) – underutilization of prediction results

Issue 10-2: On the night of 12 March, NSC made one request for a SPEEDI
calculation to the Nuclear Safety Technology Center. The NSC received thecalculation results and shared them with its members, members of its
technical advisory body in an emergency, and some staff members of the
NSC Secretariat. The NSC, however, believed that the calculation results
should only be utilized for internal discussion. As a result, the calculation
results were not shared with any other organizations.
Issue 10-3: Meanwhile between 11 and 15 March, the Nuclear and Industrial
Safety Agency (NISA) conducted SPEEDI calculations by entering various
assumptions of release source information in order to grasp the dispersion
trend of radioactive materials. The obtained predicted results were sharedwith various functional teams within the MEXT-ERC. A few results were
provided to the Prime Minister's Office and the Off-site Center. However,NISA sent the Prime Minister's Office the SPEEDI predictions with anaccompanying message that NISA believed the SPEEDI predictions to be of
low reliability because the calculations were based on assumed releasesource information. Cabinet Secretariat staff treated them as reference
information and did not report them to the Prime Minister33

Recommendation 11: Simulation system on the diffusionof radioactive materials in the ocean
Simulation system on the diffusion of radioactive materials in the ocean –lack of prediction tools in the emergency preparedness system
Recommendation 11-1: Methods to utilize simulation results of the
diffusion of radioactive materials in the ocean should be determined
under the framework of nuclear emergency preparedness.
Recommendation 11-2: The calculation results obtained from thesimulation system for diffusion in the ocean should be promptly
disclosed together with their uncertainty in a clearly understandable
form so that municipalities and evacuees can actively use the data.
Recommendation 11-3: A system to estimate the medium- to long-term
effects of ocean contamination on sea products should be established.
Issue 11: No simulation system for the diffusion of radioactive materials in theocean has been established in the nuclear emergency preparedness
system, since people do not live on sea area, unlike on land.

34

Recommendation 12: Evacuation of residents and its
criterion
Evacuation of residents and its criterion – extension of order tostay indoors
Recommendation 12: The adoption of both short-term and longterm criteria in a stepwise manner should be examined byconsidering the balance between emergency measures that
may be effective both temporarily and over the long term,
and the maintenance of infrastructure required to ensure thesecure everyday life of the general public.
Issue 12: The results of radiation monitoring and SPEEDI retrospective
estimation showed there were areas with high radiation doses evenmore than 20km from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. The distributionof essential items was disrupted in stay-indoors evacuation zones
and it was difficult for residents to conduct their daily lives. In the
Nuclear Emergency Guidelines, the enforcement of a stay-indoors
evacuation for a long period of time was not assumed.

35

Recommendation 13: Evacuation of residents and its
criterion
Evacuation of residents and its criterion – instruction of deliberate
evacuation
Recommendation 13: Since the deliberate evacuation zones,
which were proposed after the disaster for the first time,
were areas in which evacuation was recommended on thebasis of the annual individual dose rather than on the needfor emergency evacuation, thorough discussions should beheld with municipalities to determine suitable evacuation
zones and the period of evacuation.

Issue 13: On 11 April 2013, Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano announced afundamental concept of how deliberate evacuation zones should beestablished. Subsequently, the government issued early advice tothe affected municipalities and then, on 22 April, the Nuclear
Emergency Response Headquarters (NERHQ) established deliberate
evacuation zones and provided those municipalities with a directive
to inform residents in the zones to be prepared to evacuate after aperiod of approximately one month.
36

Recommendation 14: Evacuation of residents and its
criterion
Evacuation of residents and its criterion – communication ofevacuation instruction
Recommendation 14: Measures, such as an order of
evacuation, in the case that the Off-site Center, where
the Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters(NERHQ) is located, fails to function should be previously
established including, for instance, where the Local
Headquarters should be replaced to.
Issue 14: The Emergency Preparedness Guide prescribes that thehead of the local headquarters shall communicate anevacuation order to each municipality, including cities, towns,
and villages. Most of the municipalities actually learned of theevacuation instructions through the mass media including TV.
Some of them learned through verbal announcements frompolice vehicles, including police patrol cars.

37

Recommendation 15: Evacuation of residents and its
criterion
Evacuation of residents and its criterion – evacuation beyond a designated zone for
emergency preparedness
Recommendation 15-1: Emergency planning zones (EPZs) that are designated for
emergency preparedness within a radius of 8-10 km from nuclear power
plants and related disaster management measures should be reviewed
through full discussions with municipalities with consideration of the postdisaster spread of contamination to a large area, as observed in this disaster.
Recommendation 15-2: The evacuation route and the destination should be
previously identified together with a method for the supply of food anddrinks on the basis of the nuclear accident size considered.
Issue 15: Each of the municipalities located within a 10km radius (equivalent to theEmergency Planning Zone, or EPZ) of a power plant is expected to possess regional
disaster prevention plans and evacuation plans. Each municipality is, as a rule,primarily responsible for formulating evacuation plans and implementing theseplans, but in the event of evacuation over a wider area (across municipalities),
Fukushima Prefecture bears the responsibility of formulating an evacuation plan.
However, in reality, the only evacuation cases in which Fukushima Prefecture took
the lead in coordinating shelters across municipalities were for Futaba Town andOkuma Town, when an evacuation instruction was issued for areas lying within a
10km radius.
38

Recommendation 16: Evacuation of residents
Evacuation of residents and its criterion – evacuation of socially vulnerable
individuals
Recommendation 16: For the evacuation of socially vulnerable individuals
such as people in medical institutions, homes for the aged andwelfare facilities, and developmentally disabled individuals, anemergency evacuation strategy including methods of communication
by satellite phone should be provided in the nuclear emergency
preparedness plan that is independent of the endeavor of theindividuals or the facilities.
Issue 16: People who had difficulty evacuating, such as hospitalized patients,
were left behind in the area within a radius of 20km from the nuclear
plant, which had been designated as an evacuation zone. In the situation
where communication was limited and sufficient information could not be
obtained, the evacuation of hospitalized patients was extremely difficult,resulting in many cases of aggravated medical conditions or death.

39

Recommendation 17: Radiological protection criteria
Radiological protection criteria – criteria for administration of stable iodide– confusion regarding administration criteria
Recommendation 17-1: The emergency measures of evacuation and stayindoors, distribution of stable iodide, and regulation of the ingestionof foods and drinks should be comprehensively examined to ensure
consistency in their principles.
Recommendation 17-2: The concept of criteria for administration of stableiodine should be clarified, taking into consideration that there may
only be insufficient radiation monitoring data available in an
emergency without SPEEDI information.
Issue 17: Local governments were able to obtain a sufficient amount of stableiodine tablets, but instructions to take the stable iodine tablets were notgiven because there was no information on predicted radiation dose by
SPEEDI. On the other hand, new criteria for the administration of stableiodine were provided by the NSC on the basis of a screening level. This
advice, however, did not reach Fukushima Prefecture and the cities, towns,
and villages concerned. There was no opportunity to take iodine tablets
except for some residents who were given instructions at a local
government’s own discretion.

40

Recommendation 18 : Radiological protection criteria
Radiological protection criteria – screening level – validity of the level
Recommendation 18-1: The validity of the screening criteria for decontaminationin an emergency in terms of their effectiveness for radiation protection
should be verified in accordance with the principles of other emergency
measures by considering problems that may arise in relation to the radiation
measurement.
Recommendation 18-2: According to the stage postaccident (early, middle, laterand long-term), when the environmental contamination level reduces, alower value of the screening level for decontamination should be selected ina stepwise manner in accordance with the reduction of the surrounding
environmental contamination level. Also, the concrete process for selecting
the screening level should be previously determined.
Recommendation 18-3: Since there are many valuable items in broadly
contaminated areas, which could be recycled or reused in normal
circumstances, the screening level for recycling should be set in addition tothat for decontamination. Moreover, in the case that objects for reuse or
recycling are restricted, the process used for setting the screening levelshould be previously determined because the screening level in the
restricted areas can be relaxed in accordance with environmental
contamination level.
Issue 18: The screening level was raised in accordance with the present situation using
different levels from those that had been previously established.

41

Recommendation 19: Radiological protection criteria
Radiological protection criteria – criteria for contamination of soil (schoolyards andeducational facilities, and bathing areas, utilization of crushed stones, and disposal ofdisaster waste and sewage sludge) – consistency of concepts for derivation of criteria
Recommendation 19-1: Reference levels should be determined on the basis of the overall
policy by considering the radiation sensitivity of children and the balance amongreference levels, and, if necessary, stepwise reference levels should be adopted. Also,with the cooperation of experts who can support residents’ viewpoints, the active
cooperation and understanding of stakeholders including residents should beobtained to determine the reference levels, which should not be described aspermissible levels because they do not indicate a threshold between safe andhazardous levels.
Recommendation 19-2: The reference levels for radioactive waste should be set to below
those for broad contamination in the overall plan of environmental restoration withthe active cooperation and understanding of stakeholders including residents and thecooperation of experts who can support residents’ viewpoints. Also, radioactive
waste should be managed so that the assessed individual dose becomes lower thanthe determined reference levels and disposed of in a planned manner so that theassessed individual dose satisfies a target dose of 1 mSv/y or lower.
Issue 19: It has become difficult to explain the consistency among all the criteria since each criterion wasdetermined using a different concept.

42

Recommendation 20: Radiological protection criteria
Radiological protection criteria – criteria for food and beverages –comprehensiveness of food categories
Recommendation 20: Categories of foods and their restriction
values should be reviewed by considering statistical results on
their annual amount of ingestion and by monitoring ofradiation levels in foods and following an optimization
principle in which social and economic factors are taken into
account.
Issue 20: Since in the provisional regulatory values (by 31 March 2012)
for radioactive materials contained in foods, the restriction values
for radioactive iodine in fish and foods not to consumed directly,
e.g., tea leaves, were not specified, much confusion occurred.

43

Recommendation 21: Radiological protection criteria
Radiological protection criteria – criteria for food and beverages – universal
use for various types of accident
Recommendation 21-1: The emergency measures of evacuation and stayindoors, distribution of stable iodide, and regulation of the ingestionof foods and drinks should be comprehensively examined to ensure
consistency in their principles.
Recommendation 21-2: The adoption of both short-term and long-term
criteria in a stepwise manner should be examined by considering thebalance between emergency measures that may be effective both
temporarily and over the long term and the maintenance ofinfrastructure required to ensure the secure everyday life of thegeneral public.
Issue 21: Since the new regulatory value for food and beverages enforced on 1
April 2012 was derived for only radioactive cesium on the basis of 1mSy/y
as an internal exposure dose and can be applied to the current situation
after the present accident, it cannot be universally used as a criterion for
emergency preparedness where various types of accident should beconsidered.

44

Recommendation 22: Radiological protection criteria
Radiological protection criteria – criteria for food and beverages –approach to dose criteria
Recommendation 22: The individual dose criteria used as
references to derive the restriction values of radioactive
materials in foods should be determined after full discussion
with stakeholders associated with the production,
distribution, and consumption of foods.

Issue 22: In the derivation of the new regulatory value for food andbeverages enforced on 1 April 2012, 1mSv was adopted as a dosecriterion, strictly shifting from 5mSv; nevertheless, the estimateddose due to intake of contaminated foods was sufficiently low and
was determined without full discussion with stakeholders associatedwith the production, distribution, and consumption of foods.

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Recommendation 23: Radiological protection criteria
Radiological protection criteria – protective criteria for temporary
entry into restricted zones – balance among other risks
Recommendation 23: Flexible systems that will allow people ofdifferent ages including the elderly to temporarily enter
restricted zones for various purposes should be developed byconsidering the balance of radiation protection measureswith other risks and inconvenience, rather than uniformly
imposing the wearing of a protective suit and limiting theentry time.
Issue 23: Irrespective of the ambient dose level in the residence, themaximum time spent at home during temporary entry was limited
to 2 h, and the total time taken for the round trip from the relay
point to each home was limited to 5 h.

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Recommendation 26: Radiation exposure of residents
Radiation exposure of residents – estimation of thyroid equivalent dose of radioactive
iodine by simple measurement
Recommendation 26-1: The thyroid equivalent dose for the internal exposure toradioactive iodine should be calculated on the basis of the results of simulating
the atmospheric diffusion of the radioactive plume using SPEEDI, food inspections,and surveys on residents’ behavior. Also, the calculation results along with theiruncertainty should be disclosed..
Recommendation 26-2: The standardization of methods of evaluating the thyroid
equivalent dose of radioactive iodine by simple measurement should be examinedin collaboration with expert committees and associated societies while verifying
their technological validity by comparison with previous findings and conventional
technologies.
Recommendation 26-3: The thyroid equivalent dose assessment carried out by otherresearchers and methods to estimate the thyroid equivalent dose of 1,080
children using simple measurements should be investigated and the results should
be reflected in the discussion of the uncertainty of the thyroid equivalent dose ofresidents.
Recommendation 26-4: Emergency environmental monitoring guidelines should beverified including dose assessment postaccident. A system that can be operated
with good understanding of the guidelines should be established developing
human resources. Moreover, a mechanism to enable the system to be maintained
over a long time should also be established.
Issue 26: Screening tests for thyroid gland exposure levels on 1,080 infants and children were carriedout in Iwaki City, Kawamata-machi, and Iitate-mura from 26 March to 30 March 2011; however,this involved low-precision tests and no further tests of the thyroid gland exposure levels of the47
children were carried out.

Recommendation 27: Radiation exposure of residents
Radiation exposure of residents – internal dose assessment using whole bodycounter (WBC) – investigation system
Recommendation 27-1: A cooperative system that enables the temporary
lending of WBCs and dispatch staff for measurements to the affected area
should be developed after nationwide investigation of the availability ofsuch equipment and training of the staff. Also, a system that enables theinvestigation of internal exposure using WBCs should be established, led
by the national or prefectural government immediately after an accident.
Recommendation 27-2: It is necessary to consider methods of maintaining thelarge number of WBCs after the accident and to make a Q&A booklet or
manual instructions to enhance the understanding of how the monitoring
results of WBCs should be explained to the public.
Issue 27: As part of the Fukushima Prefecture Health Management Survey started inJune 2011, individual doses for external exposure were investigated as theExternal Dose Estimation based on the behavior records in the Basic Survey.
However, investigation of the dose for internal exposure using the WBC was not
carried out in the Basic Survey. For this reason, the WBC measurement results
are individually kept in each municipality or hospital since these data are a formof personal information that is unavailable for use for other objectives without
permission. The WBC measurement for internal exposure was not addressed in
the nuclear emergency preparedness plan, which was a main cause of the delay
in conducting the WBC measurement.
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Recommendation 28: Radiation exposure of residents
Radiation exposure of residents – internal dose assessment using wholebody counter (WBC) – measurement method
Recommendation 28: The standardization of radiation-related
emergency methods of evaluating the internal dose using WBCs
and the bioassay method should be examined in collaboration withexpert committees and associated societies while verifying theirtechnological validity by comparison with previous findings andconventional technologies.

Issue 28: Since individual dose assessment for internal exposure using the
WBC highly collected the needs of residents, the WBCs were individually
set up by municipalities, hospitals, and nongovernmental organizations,in addition to direct management by the Fukushima prefectural
government. Therefore, the dose assessment was carried out by nonunified methods without standardization. Although it is important,when using a great number of WBCs as a monitoring tool, to ensure thetraceability from the viewpoint of maintaining the reliability of themeasurements, there are no standards for WBCs. Also, there are no
manuals to effectively explain the WBC monitoring results to the public.

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Recommendation 29: Radiation exposure of residents
Radiation exposure of residents – external dose assessment
using personal dosimeters
Recommendation 29: A cooperative system that enables the
temporary lending of personal dosimeters to the affectedarea should be developed. Also, a system that enables theinvestigation of external exposure using personal
dosimeters should be established, led by the national orprefectural government immediately after an accident.

Issue 29: Since dose assessment was carried out by each municipality
by lending personal dosimeters in response to the needs ofresidents, individual dose data for external exposure are kept in
the respective municipality because these data are a form of
personal information that is unavailable for use for otherobjectives without permission.

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Recommendation 30: Radiation exposure of residents
Radiation exposure of residents – external dose estimation on the basisof behavior survey
Recommendation 30: Knowledge and skill regarding the external dose
assessment system developed in the implementation of the the
Basic Survey of the Fukushima Prefecture Health Management
Survey (the External Dose Estimation), the format of the inquiry
form and relevant activities for improving the recovery ratio should
be shared. Also, a system that enables us the survey to be started
immediately after an accident should be established.

Issue 30: As part of the Fukushima Prefecture Health Management Survey
started in June 2011, the individual dose for external exposure wasinvestigated as the External Dose Estimation, using the behavior records
obtained via sets of inquiry forms in the Basic Survey. However, therecovery ratio of inquiry forms was only 18% in December 2011. (As of
31 January 2013, the recovery ratio for the whole area of the prefecture
was 23.2% and that for the preceding investigation area, Yamakiya
district of Kawamata Town, Namie Town, and Iitate Village was 56.7%).

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Recommendation 35 : Risk communication to the public
Risk communication to the public – spreading understanding of radiation effects
Recommendation 35-1: Activities to improve nationwide knowledge of the long-term
effects of radiation should be started, taking into consideration not only areas
relevant to the nuclear emergency and education in schools but also all generationsof Japanese people. Moreover, by considering the risks and benefits of not only
radiation but also all other applications of science and technology, opportunities
should be provided to discuss and understand concepts without taking alternative
ways to whether they are safe or dangerous.
Recommendation 35-2: Human resources such as spokespersons for radiation protection
who can provide easy-to-understand explanations should be developed as part of along-term strategy. Also, the ability to explain radiation effects in a face-to-facemanner in an emergency should be ensured by developing the communication skillsof people in municipal government to explain the risk posed by radiation to local
residents.
Recommendation 35-3: Effective methods for communication with the public, for instance,
small-size dialogue meetings in the surrounding area and large-size dialogue
meetings in remote areas using large facilities in a major town, should be establishedtaking into consideration that there will be a large number of people to communicate
with in remote areas where the environmental contamination level is relatively low
and the size of the area is large, compared with the surrounding area near theaccident site where the environmental contamination level is relatively high.

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Recommendation 35 : Risk communication to the public
Risk communication to the public – spread of understanding of radiation effects
Recommendation 35-4: Systems to dispatch risk commnunication experts who fully
understand the newest data and changes in the values of criteria with time should be
prepared taking into consideration that in the early stage postaccident, there were a
lot of simple questions regarding radiation and its effects, and the themes of thequestions changed in various ways with the passing of the stages postaccident (early,
middle, later and long-term), such as suspicion about governmental announcements,
the implications of various standards or measurement results, greater understandingof measured results and suggestions for minimizing risk in daily life. In addition,systems to share both successful and unsuccessful experiences should be prepared.
Recommendation 35-5: As an appropriate public relations measure, unclear expressions
such as those in which the intended meaning is unclear should be avoided. In
particular, for the explanations of radiation exposure, risk communication systems
supported by experts should be established together with consistent explanations of
low-dose radiation effects in an easy-to-understand manner.
Issue 35: The Government often explained, "It does not have immediate effects on health", concerning
the influence of radiation on the human body. This expression may be interpreted by some people
as "it is unnecessary to be anxious about the impact of radiation on human health," while it may beinterpreted by other people as "it does not immediately affect human health, however, some effects
on human health will appear in the longer term." However, it was not necessarily clear what theintended meaning of the expression was, and there was no detailed explanation. Moreover, anxiety
regarding unknown nuclear disasters and dissatisfaction about the explanation from thegovernment were broadly shared. One of the reasons for this is that we have neglected to endeavor
to improve public understanding of radiation and have never trained radiological protection experts
for risk communication in the municipal government in the nuclear emergency preparedness plan.
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Recommendation 36 : Risk communication to the public
Risk communication to the public – comprehensibility of radiologicalprotection system
Recommendation 36: Discussions should be started towards thereestablishment of simple systems for protecting the public fromradiation exposure, which will require high accountability to the
public, both under normal conditions and in emergencies (including
emergency and existing exposure situations), reconsidering theconcept of radiation risk.

Issue 36: Residents who had to live in an environment contaminated byradioactive material after the accident sought information about the levelof radioactivity that would serve as a basis for making decisions. Mothers,
in particular, sought accurate information about the extent ofcontamination in the food and beverages they were giving their children,
and about the radiation dose from the environment and its potential
effects on their health. However, the information that was made available
to the residents was not satisfactory.

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Recommendation 37 : Risk communication to the public
Risk communication to the public – utilization of mass media
Recommendation 37: A system that enables the timely provisionof information obtained by accurately collecting information
required by people through the bidirectional interactive
exchanges of information using social media in an emergency
and utilizing both social media and mass media should beestablished.

Issue 37: The government rapidly responded to online risk
communication by consolidating the relevant information onto its
homepage and opening an official twitter account of the Cabinet.
However, it used only one way communication such as mass media
and could not provide appropriate timely information or gain the
public’s confidence, since the information was not obtained throughbidirectional exchanges utilizing the characteristics of social media.

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Recommendation 38 : Risk communication to the public
Risk communication to the public – response to foreign residents and overseas countries
Recommendation 38: Taking into consideration the effects on neighboring countries inan emergency and ensuring the safety of foreign residents, a system that enables
the timely provision of information to foreign countries and residents should be
developed while clarifying the decision-making process for the order to evacuateand discharge to the ocean. Moreover, the authorized discharge of watercontaminated with low-level radioactive materials to the ocean in a controlled
situation should be decided with sufficient involvement and understanding ofstakeholders concerned with the fishing industry, with the cooperation of experts
who can support the viewpoint of the industry.
Issue 38-1: Although the discharge of the less contaminated water into the sea conducted on 4 April
2011 did not fall within the scope requiring notification prescribed in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the notification stating that the discharge would begin was
sent the day of discharge after it had already started and countries around Japan were notinformed of the discharge in advance.
Issue 38-2: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had been seeking detailed information
regarding the status of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS from the Japanese government since 12
March 2011. However, the Japanese government was incapable of providing such information
to the U.S. in a manner satisfactory to the U.S. side, because Japanese government had notbeen able to acquire sufficient information on the nuclear power plant itself and officials of
NISA and other government staff familiar with the situation at the nuclear plant werepreoccupied with their work of dealing with the plant’s situation. For this reason, the NRC
decided to issue evacuation advice as a safety measure, and on 17 March (Japan time) advised
U.S. citizens in Japan to evacuate to outside of a 50-mile (about 80km) radius of the Fukushima
Dai-ichi NPS. This led to confusion because this radius for evacuation was significantly larger
than the 20km radius of the Japanese evacuation area.
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Recommendation 39 : Nuclear emergency preparedness
systemNuclear emergency preparedness system – preparedness for complex
disasters
Recommendation 39-1: Nuclear emergency preparedness should bereconsidered considering the voices of relevant municipalities
including countermeasures prepared for an accident scenario where
events unfold quickly and a complex disaster involving earthquakes
and tsunamis occurring simultaneously with a nuclear disaster.
Recommendation 39-2: Expert groups who can respond to unanticipated
accidental events should be developed by daily training incorporating
up-to-date technical knowledge.
Issue 39: Serious confusion occurred in the relevant organization owing to
insufficient preparedness for an accident scenario where events unfold
quickly and for facing a complex disaster involving earthquakes andtsunamis occurring simultaneously with a nuclear disaster..

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Recommendation 40: Nuclear emergency preparedness
Nuclear emergency preparedness system – opportunity ofrevision of nuclear emergency preparedness for complex
disasters (earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident)
Recommendation 40: Nuclear emergency preparedness
should involve a system that is regularly and rapidly
updated according to new knowledge, technology andsuggestions and so on. Also, natural features should beestablished to prevent the inflexibility andobsolescence of countermeasures.
Issue 40: Although problems of emergency preparedness
assuming the possible occurrence of a nuclear emergency
coupled with a complex disaster were pointed out, no
measures were taken against them.
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Recommendations for protection ofworkers59

Recommendation 18 : Radiological protection criteria
Radiological protection criteria – screening level – validity of
the level
Recommendation 18-1: The validity of the screening criteria
for decontamination in an emergency in terms of theireffectiveness for radiation protection should be verified
in accordance with the principles of other emergency
measures by considering problems that may arise inrelation to the radiation measurement.
Issue 18: The screening level was raised in accordance with thepresent situation using different levels from those that had
been previously established.

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Recommendation 24 : Radiological protection criteria
Radiological protection criteria – dose criteria for emergency work – dose limit
taking life-saving work into accountRecommendation 24: New dose limits for emergency workers to take into
account the need for emergency medical care should be examined whileclarifying the decision-making process and considering the fact that the
adopted dose limit for emergency workers is 250 mSv, which is lower than
the internationally recommended value, and that the current dose limit forradiation workers under normal situations is determined on the basis of alifetime individual dose of 1,000 mSv.
Issue 24: In the second interim report on the incorporation of the 2007
Recommendations of the ICRP into domestic systems, the Basic Committee of the
Radiation Council proposed to match the dose limits to internationally
recommended values, taking into consideration that opportunities to participate ininternational activities were increasing for domestic workers, because the current
restriction criteria in Japan (dose limit, 100 mSv) interfered with emergency
medical care and other essential operations. On the other hand, in response to thepresent accident, 250mSv was adopted as a dose limit for emergency workers. Thisvalue is lower than the internationally approved principles and the recommended
value of the 2007 Recommendations of ICRP (emergency medical care, norestriction; other emergency rescue operations, 1,000 or 500 mSv; other rescue
operations, 100 mSv).
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Recommendation 25 : Radiological protection criteria
Radiological protection criteria – dose criteria for emergency work –treatment of individual doses received in an emergency situation
Recommendation 25: The individual dose in an emergency should becontrolled independently of the compliance with the dose limits forradiation workers under normal conditions (50 mSv per year and 100
mSv over five years) to control radiation exposure.

Issue 25: In the second interim report on the incorporation of the 2007
Recommendations of the ICRP into domestic systems, it was indicated thatemergency work doses will be treated separately from normal work doses.
However, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) issued an
official notice stating that when managing dose limits during normal work,
if a worker has a history of engaging in emergency work, the doses
received during such work should be included and the limit of 100mSv/5
years should be applied.

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Recommendation 31 : Radiation exposure of plant
recovery workers
Radiation exposure of plant recovery workers – network forurgently borrowing alarm pocket dosimeters (APDs)
Recommendation 31: An emergency procedure for borrowing
APDs, whole body counters (WBCs) and protective tools forinternal exposure from other nuclear power stations should
be developed for plant recovery workers. Also, systems toensure the availability of sufficient numbers of personal
dosimeters and protective tools for internal exposure shouldbe established for rescue or decontamination workers.

Issue 31: Although many APDs were provided as aid supplies from other
NPSs, these APDs were simply stored and remained unused owing
to a lack of communication. There were not enough APDs and by 15
March, not every worker was able to wear an APD, which led to thedecision that only the leaders of each operational group would wear
APDs on behalf of the entire group.
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Recommendation 32 : Radiation exposure of plant
recovery workers
Radiation exposure of plant recovery workers – control of internal exposure in an
emergency
Recommendation 32: The performances and the methods of using protective
tools for internal exposure, appropriate methods for eating, drinking andexcretion in the case of a long-term emergency situation, protective
measures to prevent the reduction of airtightness of seismic isolationbuildings used in an emergency and a method for the administration of
stable iodine should be trained and practiced in a practical manner for boththe plant recovery and rescue/decontamination workers.
Issue 32-1: The individual doses of 6 workers exceeded 250mSv, which was the dose
limit for emergency workers temporarily prescribed after the accident.
Issue 32-2: The doses of two female employees significantly exceeded the 5mSv threemonth upper limit for female radiation workers, although they took appropriate
radiological protection measures such as wearing full-face masks with charcoal
filters whilst working in the field, since the double-entry doors to the Seismic
Isolation Building were not airtight and the doors to the Seismic Isolation Building
were bent and twisted by the hydrogen explosions in Units 1 and 3.
Issue 32-3: 178 workers showed thyroid gland equivalent doses of over 100mSv, and 25
workers under the age of 40 did not take iodine tablets.
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Recommendation 33 : Radiation exposure of plant
recovery workers
Radiation exposure of plant recovery workers – control of localized
exposure in an emergency
Recommendation 33: Protective measures against the localized exposureof radiation should be previously trained and practiced in a practicalmanner for plant recovery workers, assuming a sudden change in theworking environment such as an explosion and leakage ofcontaminated water in an emergency.

Issue 33: On 24 March, two of three workers who were installing electric cables
under the surface of the basement floor of the Unit 3 turbine building
were exposed to high radiation doses while working immersed incontaminated water, because they were wearing low quarter shoes.
Although it was made clear, after getting cleaned up and having a checkup
and getting tested to measure internal radiation doses, that neither worker
suffered radiation heat burns on their feet, there had been a possibility of
suffering from radiation heat burns due to continuous localized exposure.

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Recommendation 34 : Radiation exposure of plant
recovery workers
Radiation exposure of plant recovery workers – managing access to and from acontrolled area in an emergency
Recommendation 34: Practical methods regarding the management of individual
doses and education before registration as a radiation worker in the case ofan emergency situation postaccident, where it is difficult to precisely
implement protective measures for radiation control, should be established
for the plant recovery workers.
Issue 34-1: After the nuclear accident, access to and from the controlled area of the
management system was initially impossible for calculating the radiation dose ofindividual radiation workers. It was then decided to manually calculate theradiation dose of individual radiation workers using APDs. (On 14 April, five
simplified instruments were installed in the Seismic Isolation Building for gaining
access to and from the controlled area management system. At the same time, aradiation work permit with bar code patterns was introduced so that the names
and radiation doses of individual workers could be automatically recorded).
Issue 34-2: From the date of the nuclear accident to 10 May, radiation workers wereallowed to carry out their duties after receiving a brief 30-minute explanation
about how to protect themselves from radiation and how to wear protective
equipment.

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