Copyright © 2003
International House of Japan
5-11-16, Roppongi, Minato-ku,TokyoJapan 106-0032
Tel. 81-3-3470-3211
Fax. 81-3-3470-3170
www.i-house.or.jp
Printed and bound by Percetakan Strikeway Sdn Bhd
Selangor, Malaysia
Korean and Japanese names are written in the native mannersurnames followed by given names.

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC INTELLECTUALSIN CHANGING ASIA:
Asia Leadership Fellow Program 2002 Report

Published by:International House of Japan andJapan Foundation Asia Center
2003

Contents
Foreword

4

Editorial Note6

Summary of Events (2002)

8

PapersPains Of A Journey
Nguyen,Thi Hieu Thien

57

Refefining the Role of the Media: Challenges for the Freedom of Speech
Reiko Kinoshita

67

In And Out Of Japan: Public Intellectualism And Making Sense Of
Identity Politics, Global Strife And Injustice
Maznah Mohamad

70

Environmental And Trade Implications Of China’s WTO Analysis
Hu Tao88

The Public Intellectual
Vinod Raina

109

Transnational Civil Society In The Age Of Globalization
Sakamoto Yoshikazu

132

Endpiece

146

Profiles of the ALFP 2002 Fellows

151Foreword
The Asia Leadership Fellow Program has been running since 1996, and thispublication marks the seventh successful operation of this ambitious venture.
The ALFP has been evolving year by year, but the basic style of having theFellows spend two months together taking part in discussions and visits hasremained the same. Apparently, the experiences of the Fellows, as well as theimmediate visible outcomes, differ from group to group. How the chemistry
among the members of each group turns out is often quite a gamble.
Each year, a general theme is set in order to provide a certain degree of
coherence to the Fellows’ discussions. In 2002, however, this very theme - whichis also the title of this publication - was questioned and challenged from the
beginning. Who are ‘public intellectuals,’ and what is their role? There had beena loose consensus about whom the ALFP meant by ‘public intellectuals’ and theterm itself had never been openly questioned (though there were some who
were skeptical) in the past programs. In addition to definitions by the renowned
intellectuals (which are also reflected in some of the Fellows’ papers in thisbooklet), there can be different versions of ‘public intellectuals’ according to
one’s philosophical/historical background or the socio-political system fromwhich one originates. Although the discussions on this issue remainedunresolved during the two-month program in September-October, 2002, thediscourse has now moved on to this publication for further examination.
The ALFP was originally designed to locate and bring together Asian intellectual
leaders to “enhance collaborative work to identify common issues and to set
new value-orientations for the people in the region.” The Fellows have been
expected to move beyond their own fields of interest and contribute theirthoughts to a much wider spectrum in “searching out solutions for ourcommon agendas” and “developing new norms.” In order to achieve thesegoals, various seminars/workshops and field trips as well as retreat conferences
have been organized to accommodate uninhibited discussions on critical issues
pertinent to the region. But in the course of developing the programs over theyears, various questions have arisen: How can Fellows from diverse backgrounds
go beyond exchanging and challenging each other’s ideas? What is meant by‘collaborative work’? Is it really possible for them to work collaboratively intackling the numerous problems that people and society are facing? There havebeen several examples of successful experimental ventures in collaboration
among the Fellows, but they are of course not the same every year.
From the beginning, differences in each Fellow’s ways of thinking have been
apparent, and we sometimes witnessed moments of tension during the courseof the two-month Program in 2002. However, we are reminded that it is only
natural that we all think differently, and that the current global tensions occur
partly because there are people or regimes that cannot tolerate suchdifferences, resulting in hostility towards one another. This group of 2002
4

Fellows, however, respected each other’s views, and the heated debate that
continued even after official visits or seminars were over was not because one
wanted to overwhelm another but was out of the desire to be exposed toother points of view and also to be heard. Although it is not always easy to have
one’s opinion contested or to accept opposing views, the Fellows of 2002 wereable to acknowledge the diverse views each of them had, and all of us involved
appreciated the fact that “we are all different and that is good.”
The two sponsoring organizations, the International House of Japan and theJapan Foundation Asia Center, wish to express gratitude to all the people whohave supported the ALFP, past and present. We are very thankful to all who havecontributed their papers for this publication, especially to Professor Sakamoto
for sparing his busy time in revising the texts of his informative presentationfrom the seminar. Also, our words of gratitude go to Vinod Raina for his tirelesswork of editing, and to Ann Lee, ALFP 2001 Fellow, who has kindly agreed tohelp us with the coordination of printing/distributing the publication for two
consecutive years. It is particularly delightful that a collaboration between
Fellows from different years became possible through this publication work.
We sincerely hope that the intellectual network created through this Program
will be maintained and will prosper, and that the ALFP alumni in particular willcontinue to be committed to working and acting together with people fromvarious walks of life to bring about change towards the betterment of this fluid
world.
July 2003
Naoko Shimamura
Chief Program Officer
International House of Japan(ALFP Secretariat)

5

Editorial Note
(In lieu of an Introduction)
I have thought hard of a metaphor that may catch the essence of ALFP2002, orof ALFP in general.The easiest seems to be of five pebbles of different shapes ina tin box. But that doesn’t fit. Because on shaking, the pebbles would rattle andmake a cacophony, which is certainly not my experience of ALFP2002.Also, thetin box defines a definite boundary, but the best aspect of ALFP, as Maznah andReiko say in their articles is its flexibility; the boundaries are distant andextendable. The main theme of ALFP2002 –‘The Role of Public Intellectuals in(a) Changing Asia’ denotes such flexibility. Even the public symposium theme –‘Violence,Terror and Peace: Problems of Identity in a Fluid World’ suggests thatthe boundaries of intellectual discourse are somewhat ethereal. The keywords
and phrases that evoke the ALFP experience are perhaps: fluidity, intellectual
passion in serene surroundings (as provided by the I-House setting), plurality ofviews - sometimes merging, sometimes not, community feeling, experiencing
Japan in its myriad dimensions and so on.
The image and metaphor that would seem to fit such an experience is anevening in a rural area of large parts of Asia, when wood smoke rising from eachhouse seems to make a statement about the identity of the inhabitants of thehouse, and the various smoke trails sometimes merge, sometimes separate,
against the canvass of an evening sky, that looks definitive, but is actuallyextendable; just like the theme Public Intellectuals, or Identity Politics.ALFP2002
was a combination of such five definitive smoke trails - the Fellows,
supplemented by many more of subtly different hues - the Japanese resource
persons, and the ever-present pleasant breeze; the Secretariat.
The trouble is, how do you bind such a flexible intellectual memory between
two covers? My impulsive and voluntary offer to edit the subsequent volume
has been haunting me since. Everything done in these two months is so different
that merging it together is a bit of an editorial nightmare.Take the main theme
itself, which was originally given to us as ‘The Role of Public Intellectuals in
Changing Asia’. When I heard it the first time in one of our sessions, my ears
pricked up a bit, since I wasn’t sure Intellectuals had much role in changing Asia;
we would have had to invent one! During the course of the discussions, it
became clear that the Secretariat actually meant it to be ‘in a changing Asia’,
which made much better sense and restored one’s sense of involvement. But
these are the vagaries of an intercultural and inter-linguistic discourse, where
the particular use of the connecting language, English, can be a cause of major
misunderstandings.
Given that people from at least five distinct language backgrounds – Chinese,
Vietnamese, Malay, Hindi and Japanese spoke to each other, mostly orally, for
two months in differing English, reflected in the final transcripts made fromtapes, editing becomes a hazardous task, since there is danger that improving
6

language can completely change the intended meaning, as in the case of themissing ‘a’ in the main theme.That is only one of the problems.
The other is how to hang it together.The five Fellows and nearly another dozen
Japanese resource persons had an intense interaction during the course of
these two months. But the only thing common amongst them was that perhaps
each one of them could be called an intellectual of some kind – public,
functional, power or grassroots, as I have tried to categorise in my paper in thisvolume. What they spoke on is mind bogglingly diverse – Islam, American
Literature in Vietnam, Environment Protection and WTO in China, EcologicalDebt,American Medias’ depiction of Terrorism.As for the Japanese speakers, thetopics ranged from Leprosy, Intellectuals,‘Englishisation’, Informal Communities,
Peace Movements, Comfort Women, Pop Culture,Traditional Arts, Afghanistan,
School Education, to Election Expenditures of an MP!
There is no doubt that the volume is likely to interest the participants, since asa written record, it can remain with them as their cerebral memories diminish.
But they may also be furious if they find that editing has robbed their words oftheir intended meanings; for that the editor must take all the responsibility. But
will the volume be useful or of interest to those who were not participants?
That was my dilemma – how to make it interesting to a larger population. For
example, the Resource Person seminars were very informative and opened up
a whole lot of conceptual issues. But since they were not available as papers,
except the one by Prof. Sakamoto, they appear in a very truncated form, as
notes transcribed from recordings, with the danger that editing may havetampered with them somehow. Though the Fellows could find links in thesediverse seminars as they experienced Japan more and more, to bring out such
links in a volume like this is extremely difficult.
In the end, all one can hope is that this volume, in addition to satisfying theneeds of the Fellows and the Secretariat to have a written record of theproceedings, might interest others too, given that the issues dealt in it: of Public
intellectuals,Terror, Peace and the various dimensions of Japanese situation is ofimmense interest to many, particularly in the present turbulent times. More thanthat, one hopes that it will add to the meagre volume of interdisciplinary
intellectual efforts of Asians, in Asia.
Vinod Raina

7

Summary of Events (2002)
Introductory Session: September 2, 2002
The Introductory Session on September 2, 2002 at the International House ofJapan was attended by the Fellows (except Marian Pastor Roces, who couldn’t
join the program because of a family problem), Program Committee members
Ishizuka Masahiko, Lee Jong Won, and Takeda Isami; Former ALFP Fellows Ohashi
Masaaki and Huang Ping; Takemoto Chiharu and Machimura Akiko from theJapan Foundation Asia Center; Kato Mikio, Koide Izumi, Shimamura Naoko,
Sonoda Kimihiro, Higuchi Keiko and Kuroda Yuko from the International Houseof Japan. Following an introduction from Program Director Koide Izumi, Kato
Mikio, Executive Director, welcomed the Fellows and elaborated on theunderlying question of what exactly is a Public Intellectual and what role they
have to play in a changing Asia. He also voiced his expectation that the Fellows
would share not only their hopes and aspirations but also their anxieties andfears; of globalization, and the destination of humanity in general. He hoped thatthe interconnectedness and networking of the Fellows would become
important when after 15 or 20 years’ time, this fellowship period would
hopefully be one of the highlights of their career.
After the Fellows’ self-introduction, the rest of the party introduced themselveswith additional remarks about the program; Lee Jong Won stated the outline ofthe program and the importance of mutual understanding and formation ofclose personal networks amongst Fellows. Takeda Isami expressed his
expectations of the outcome of the program and Ishizuka Masahiko stressed thepositive impact and expansion of the intellectual network established amongst
the past Fellows. Huang Ping from China pitched in with his positive experiencesof his time as a Fellow, and Ohashi Masaaki, also an ex-Fellow, pointed out thetwo dimensions of the program, of having new encounters and creating a
network of Fellows.Takemoto Chiharu, Director, Intellectual Exchange Division,
Japan Foundation Asia Center explained the Foundation’s role and history ininternational cultural exchange. Koide Izumi explained how this year’s theme,‘The Role of Public Intellectuals in a Changing Asia,’ had been decided becauseof its broadness to accommodate a variety of possible topics of interest. She
also gave an explanation of the program schedule. Librarian Higuchi gave a brief
explanation of the International House Library and afterwards, a tour of the
Library. In the afternoon, the Fellows visited the Japan Foundation, where they
met with Mr.Yoshino, Executive Vice President of the Japan Foundation and Mr.
Junetsu Komatsu, Managing Director of The Japan Foundation Asia Center, whoelaborated on the importance of this program and interaction among Asian
countries. They moved on to The Japan Foundation Asia Center, where they
were briefed about the objectives of the Asia Center.With a quick introduction
to the Library, they later had an informal gathering with other staff members of
the Asia Center.

8

Workshop I: Presentation by the Fellows (1) September 4
Presenter: Maznah Binti Mohamad & Vinod Raina
Moderator: Reiko Kinoshita
In relation to her paper ‘The Role of Public Intellectuals in a Changing Asia’ andthe situation in Malaysia, Maznah Binti Mohamad first raised the question of
how to define a public intellectual against the backdrop of current times. No
clear answer could be given, which reflects the ambiguity of State development
particularly after the Cold War.At present, while capitalism is globalized and thestate increasingly moving towards the market, the Sept. 11 incident revealed thatthe only forces to challenge capitalism are coming from non-rational
movements, such as Islamic fundamentalism. As there are no other cohesivesocial movements, this is a worrying element for the civil society. Today, where
does social change come from? How can public intellectuals play a role?
Though different societies define public intellectuals differently, they can begenerally classified as those who provide ideas and actually participate in socialtransformation, to fight for justice, to be a critical voice, to provide alternative
views. Categorized into two groups, the ‘Functional intellectuals’ legitimize andgive credence to the working system and official policies of the regime.They also
have space and power to affect the thinking of the masses who enjoy the
economic boom and comfortable lifestyles; with no urgent need for political, civil
freedom, nor movements to challenge the State and the market. The media,
academia, and marketplace are all controlled by the political and economic
system, which gain legitimacy from these middle classes. On the contrary, the‘Critical or Oppositional intellectuals’ provide skeptic, anti-hegemonic viewpoints
to the ruling system. But they are increasingly losing public space and authority.
In conclusion, Maznah stated the importance of preserving a public space
where oppositional intellectualism and an intellectual public can be cultivated.
The public should be able to participate in the debate to carry forward theprocess of democratization.The present problem lies in the fact that the threeparallel systems of ‘global civil society’,‘nation-state’, and the ‘national public’ are
not interacting, therefore not able to assert or influence social movements.
Vinod Raina presented his discussion points for the ‘Role of PublicIntellectuals’ where he described the problems and hopes of public intellectuals
in India, which claims to be the largest democracy in the world with many
political parties and where public intellectuals seem to flourish. However, he
asked, is it true that there is a plurality of views in the Indian civil society?
According to Vinod, democracy does not truly exist within the Indian society.
One major obstacle of deepening democratic ethos within its civil society is therise in identity politics, based on religious and ethnic identity. Consequently,
conflict is rampant and tolerance has diminished. Such nationalistic politics, if
unhindered, will ultimately lead to fascism and violence.The other aspect is the
new imperialist globalisation, which has hooked the middle class toconsumerism. The middle class is now an endangered intellectual species. The
question to be asked is - Whether in a Marxist tradition or in a liberal
democratic tradition, where are public intellectuals produced?
9

Traditionally, it was in the universities or academia, in places of learning as was thecase in the 60s. Now the notion of the university is itself changing, where freeflow of knowledge is under strain and intellectualism is a commercial property.
Increasingly therefore, the location of public intellectuals seems to have moved
from academia to the practitioners; farmers, and housewife; the resistance class,of gender, women, ethnic, indigenous groups, community-based dam fighters etc.
In other words, the classical Marxist notion built on class has been overtaken bygender, environment, and movements based on other differentiating concepts andnotions. Gramsci captured this notion as ‘organic intellectuals’.Another source of
public intellectuals in India is within the deepening parliamentary system withthree more levels added in 1994 to the original State and National levelgovernment. One of them, the village level, is where Gandhi believed thatgovernance should be conducted, and where participative democracy can be
operated. In the last ten years, the result has been a rise of people who are truly
representatives as politicians and intellectuals. Deepening of democratic process
and rise of peoples’ movements which displaced university-based intellectuals arehopes for the future. A true resistance force to ugly nationalism or to neoliberalism is the ‘public’ and ‘intellectual’.
Clarifying the term ‘public intellectuals’ and ‘organic intellectuals’, Vinod
described the former as intellectuals who devote time for thinking and action
for social justice, equalities, and rights, but might come from the elite class,where as the latter come from the marginalized class. Also, difference in thenature of the State was mentioned, between India and other countries, such asSingapore and Malaysia, where the State is totalitarian and dominant. A criticalquestion was raised whether it isn’t the role of public intellectuals to ‘intervene’
rather than to ‘represent’. On the role of universities in India and the world,
Vinod feels that there has been a transformation of its liberal space into a
privatized, monopolized domain. What will happen to the production ofknowledge then? He concluded the session by stating that we need tostrengthen public responses by public intellectuals in the liberal fight against
terrorism or extreme nationalism.
Workshop II: Presentation by the Fellows (2) September 4
Presenter: Nguyen,Thi Hieu Thien & Kinoshita, Reiko
Moderator: Maznah Binti Mohamad
In her presentation titled ‘New Educational Strategies in Vietnam: Reflections on
the Reform of Teaching-Learning Methods’, Nguyen,Thi Hieu Thien explained
where public intellectuals now stand in the context of the Vietnamese society,and their challenges and opportunities; particularly in the field of education.
After the Vietnam-France War in 1945-54, intellectuals were divided into
liberal, pro-Ho Chi Minh government, pro-French and patriotic intellectuals who
were called ‘socialist intellectuals’ or ‘communist intellectuals’. The latter were
the source of inspiration to patriots during Vietnam War.
The implementation of the open-policy in 1985 subsidized socialist
intellectuals in Vietnam to a market-oriented structure. The one-party political
10system switched the economy to a market-oriented economy, whereas
education, politics, and art remained communist-oriented.
Socially,Vietnam has transformed from a feudal society to a half feudal, halfcolonized society, and is still in its transition. Its democratic tradition is different
from that of the West, and also has a different notion of freedom of voice,distribution of power, and the notion of democracy.
Vietnam is also facing challenges and opportunities towards radical
educational reform. Classrooms are transforming from low quality, traditional
teacher-centered monologue sites with passive and dependent learners, tolearner-oriented situations where students are more independent to demand
their individual needs. Recently, even state-run colleges and universities havebecome joint ventures with foreign investments, and overseas training is fundedby both the government and banks.
In the ensuing discussion, other Fellows shared the view that the situation of
public intellectuals and education in Vietnam could be related with othercountries as well, including the United States. The fact that marketization does
not bring liberation of the mind is evidence that the existence of public
intellectuals and educational system depends on the regime. But what can apublic intellectual do to change the situation?
Reiko Kinoshita presented her own analysis of Japanese public intellectuals
and their challenges, in ‘Clash of Educations: English-Speaking Asia and its Impact
on Societies’.
Japanese public intellectuals were challenged when social changes occurredin the 90s and the wave of globalization made people realize the gap between
national standards and internal standards. Often described as ‘bureaucrats rule,
politicians reign’, the monopolizing public policy-making in Japan dissolved in the
90s. Also, people lost faith and confidence in its failing economic policy, foreign
policy, and scandals involving government agencies.The ‘lost decade’, as the 90s
is described, led to the notion of the need for a public policy community.
Another challenge to the bureaucrats, 'lack of public policy' entrepreneurs,
and crony capitalism comes from the populist revolt. Until the 90s, quality media
was the vehicle of public discussion. Now, delicate issues of public policy aredisplayed on talk shows in a superficial manner in media, such as on TV andmanga.
But the core of the problem is that no one is willing to take risks. Here,public intellectuals can play their role to examine current policies and present
alternatives. Their role is to examine and analyze the national order from aninternational and global perspective, and shed light on the domestic situation.
The other task is to explain the challenges and express their experiences to theglobal audience.A drawback of public intellectuals in Japan is their lack in English
proficiency.
According to Reiko, the function of public intellectuals is to harness
globalization in order to make a difference, articulate their diversity and share
their experience with the world. In this definition, she sees a new form of public
intellectuals in Japan who are inspirational and spiritual leaders or role models.
11

As such, Ms. Sadako Ogata, NGO activists, activists from “Doctors without
Borders”, practitioner Carlos Gone, and major league baseball pitcher
Hasegawa can be defined as public intellectual figures.
Workshop III: Presentation by the Fellows (3) September 5
Presenter: Hu Tao
Moderator: Nguyen,Thi Hieu Thien
Hu Tao reflected on the definition of public intellectuals in ancient, present, andfuture China in his presentation on ‘The Role of Public Intellectuals in a Changing
Asia – Reflections from China’.
First,Tao noted that the term ‘public intellectual’ does not exist in Chinese, as
it does not in Vietnam and Japan. ‘Intellectuals’ already implies people who shouldtake social responsibilities. In ancient China, they were educated andknowledgeable people. Especially advisors, consultants, philosophers, monks,
Taoist, hermits were considered important public intellectuals.
At present, the social structure of China is changing dramatically. Politically, it ischanging from a centralized, authoritarian top-down policy to bottom-up
democracy. Tao’s personal view is that reforms should be gradual. Economic
development has brought in industrialization and urbanization, but in turn has
produced environmental problems. New technologies such as IT andtransportation have led to drastic changes in people’s lifestyles, particularly incommunications with such a huge country.
In current China, the notion of a public intellectual is broad, including civil
servants, officials, social scientists, engineers, and white collar brainworkers who
may not even be conscious of public interests.Their roles cover management workat government levels, NGOs as criticizers of the government, to white collar
brainwork involving social or non-social roles. The MPA (Master of Public
Administrations) education system to train civil servants on how to write publicbudgets and deal with natural resources and environmental issues is required forthe making of these public intellectuals. Prospective public intellectuals are in the
middle class, or middle-low class.
For the future of Asia, the role of a public intellectual is open for everyone, totake up a role and responsibility in every aspect of public life.
Weekend Retreat in Tateshina: September 27 - 29
During the weekend retreat at Tateshina Forum, Nagano Prefecture, the five
Fellows engaged in discussions with thirteen Japanese participants fromacademia and organizations. There were also two attendees from the JapanFoundation Asia Center and four from the International House of Japan.
Following greetings by Chiharu Takemoto, Director of Intellectual Exchange
Division of the Japan Foundation Asia Center, the Fellows gave a brief selfintroduction.

12

Session I: ‘Globalization and Environmental Security’
Moderator: Masahiko Ishizuka, Managing Director, Foreign Press
CenterVinod Raina's paper, ‘Debt, Development and Environment’ focused on thegrowing ecological debts that Northern industrial countries owe Third World
countries and emphasized the responsibilities of the Northern countries tostart calculating and paying their debts. He foregrounded this argument by first
explaining the historical origins of how such debt came about. He noted that in
the postwar period, ‘gender’ and ‘access to resources’ or ‘environment’ had
become visible categories, in addition to class, even as economic, social, political,
and cultural disparities have widened. Citing William Crosby’s ‘Ecological
Imperialism’ and Accion Ecologica’s definition of ‘Ecological Debt’, Vinod
explained how the expansion of biological species e.g. cereals and grain, thecorresponding monopolization of biological knowledge and resources byprivatization by European colonialism had led to a condition where the North
had basically expropriated from the ‘South’ many of its resources.This, according
to Vinod, is the basis for raising the issue of the North owing a historicalecological debt to the ‘Original’ Countries.
But how to categorize and determine the extent of Northern debt? Vinodsuggests that we should consider pointing to a starting point of the ‘clock’ andthen proceed to determine the appropriate method of calculation to be appliedfor quantifying debt. Vinod suggested the notion of ‘Ecological Footprints’
proposed about three years ago, which indicates the average per capita
consumption of food, forest products, and fuel given in a geographic area; and asa starting point, it shows how much land should be available per person so thata person subsists.
Vinod concluded by stating that the value of science and technology ischanging vis-à-vis political processes, and the notion of ‘nature’ as a backdrop ischanging.Although doubts existed for patenting intellectual property for over 500
years, and the legitimacy of the economic market as a vehicle for development,
rapid changes in these perspectives have had the impact of widening disparities.
The ecological debt inherent in this process has remained hidden.
Hu Tao’s paper was on ‘China’s Accession to WTO and Environmental
Implications for Agriculture.’ He explained that the Chinese leadership’s
supportive attitude towards globalization and China’s accession to World Trade
Organization (WTO) will affect her environment considerably, especially the
agricultural sector. In his brief introduction on the history of China’s inclusionin the WTO, Hu raised the question of whether this move will threaten China’s
environmental security. He noted that once China joins the WTO, her current
agricultural policy of prioritizing food self-sufficiency will be challenged bychanges in trade policy and production structure.The entry of cheaper imports
and the shift in agriculture from production for a domestic market to the world
market will surely affect the environmental condition of the rural areas.The shift
in trade policy to import more rural products from abroad and produce less athome will particularly affect the production structure. There will be a change
13

from land-intensive production to labor-intensive production withcorresponding expansion also in horticulture, livestock industry andcountryside industrialization.
All this, according to Hu, inevitably will lead to the questions raised by Lester
Brown:“Who will feed China?” and “Who will feed the United States and/or theEuropean Union and Japan?” Hu argues however that these are not two
mutually exclusive problems. In fact, the more China opens up to the WTO, thestronger the possibility that ecosystem degradation and biodiversity loss will beminimized. Moreover, he notes that the current Chinese leadership is well awareof the ecological consequences of China’s full involvement with the WTO andhas taken the necessary measures to prevent biodiversity loss. There may besome initial damage, but he argues, this will only be temporary and in the longrun, ecological balance will be restored.
Hu gave three policy suggestions by way of making sure that the environment
in rural areas is protected while opening Chinese agriculture to worldcompetition, and China to the world market. First, he recommends that theagricultural structure be adjusted to include measures that will ensuresustainable development even as the government pursues high growth rates.
Second, he recommends that the tarriff rate quota for grains not be limited to
80 percent so that China’s access to food products from abroad be unhampered.
Hu argues that one possible reason why Chinese agriculture remains
underdeveloped, is because too much government protection of local foodproducts via subsidies and high tariff rates had stifled initiative among farmers to
improve poductivity and the quality of their produce. Finally, Hu recommends
that the agricultural product tax be abolished so as to spur productivity. He
concluded by stating that WTO will not threaten China’s environmental security
because Chinese authorities have already begun to implement appropriate
policies to mitigate negative impact on the environment.
Responses to Hu’s paper were varied, and these included apprehensions ofpollution from industrial production and agricultural development affecting not
only China but also the rest of Asia. Hu responded to these concerns by citing
the need for China to overcome its poverty and deal with its growing
population. The ensuing discussion raised the question once more of how tobalance economic growth and ecological safety.
Session II: ‘Cultural Values in Globalizing Asia’
Moderator: Aiko Kurasawa, Professor, Department of Economics,
Keio University
Speaking on ‘Islamic Resurgence and Human Development in Malaysia’, Maznah
Mohamad proposed a way in which to understand the origin of Islam and its
global resurgence against a backdrop of the social and economic development ofCold War politics and September 11 terrorist attack.The September 11 incident
shocked the world and raised the question as to how capitalism can be challenged
by an ideological cultural system. While Islam was seen by many as a benign
alternative to Communism during the Cold War, it later on took on a more
14

critical stance as cultural and economic globalization spread, raising questions onsuch issues as the concept of a nation-state and the roles of state and citizens.
In Malaysia, the Islamic resurgence movement in the 70s came out of theprevalent identity politics, where Malays adopted and identified themselvesmore with Islam than Malay. Citing the anthropologist Ernest Gellner’sclassification of Islam into two categories – Low Islam which is rustic, ruralbased, spiritualistic, and mediated by saints and ritual specialists; and High Islam,which is Quran-based and follows traditions of the Prophet (pbuh), Maznah
traced how these processes emerged alongside the rapid economic
development that Malaysia underwent in the 1970s. Leaders and public
intellectuals were the first to try to analyse how to adjust rapid modernization
with these processes, which was followed up by attempts to explain to abroader public.As a result, debates on Islam’s role began to spread to personal,
public, and governance levels, and there were even calls to establish an ‘IslamicState’ as a political alternative. All this, Maznah argues, brings a controversial
question back to the public arena: why, despite economic, scientific andtechnological progress, does culture go against the grain of modernization andin fact become a challenge to capitalist development?
Session III: ‘America and Americanism in Asia’
Moderator: Lee Jong Wong, Professor, Faculty of Law, Rikkyo University
Nguyen Thi Hieu Thien titled her paper ‘Transition from War to Peace and from‘Socialist-Oriented’ to ‘Market-Oriented’ Society: Experiences of a VietnameseIntellectual’. Her initial goal was to rectify the distorted information and image ofVietnam as a socialist country and then to compare the values nurtured bysocialist society, with those of market-oriented society. She suggested suchcomparisons may help many to learn from the past, in order to move forward.
Looking back at the Vietnam War, she noted that the spiritual strength andunity of the Vietnamese people was an important factor in explaining its victory
over the materialistic but spiritually fragile United States military. With thecollapse of USSR and the end of the Cold War, Vietnam’s open-door policy
ignited changes that prompted debates as to the extent to which a devoted andunified socialist-oriented Vietnamese Communist party should allow marketoriented practices to ‘infiltrate’ the society.
The eventual decision of the Party to allow opening in order to speed up the
economy had led to drastic transformations in the country’s traditional values.
These changes include the loss of a sense of solidarity, the growing isolation ofindividuals from each other and the consequent impact on human relationships,
the commercialization of education, and so on. As an educator, Thien felt there
was less space for educators, as attitudes of children are also changing. Thien’scommentary on these changes led her to cite Donald Richie who has suggested
that the Japanese may be able to cope with their own changes by returning totheir traditional frugal ways.Thien was in effect suggesting that the two countries
can learn from each other as they confront globalization.
Reiko Kinoshita’s presentation, ‘War Memories and the History Issue in15

Japanese Politics,’ looked at the Smithsonian Institute’s Enola Gay exhibition
controversy over the description, interpretation, and display of the atomic
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Reiko first raised the question of how weshould remember, or even forget, history. What is the collective memory ofhistory and war? The Smithsonian incident was just one example of a conflict ofinterpretation between American and Japanese versions. This, however, is quite
common across borders as shown by the ongoing disputes between China andJapan over the Rape of Nanjing, comfort women, Okinawa, Pearl Harbor, theYasukuni Shrine issue, and official Japanese history textbooks. Addressing ofthese issues has been affected by policies of the Japanese State before and after
the Cold War. The debate within Japan has taken a different turn after thecollapse of ideology and the weakening of the ruling LDP. The new trend of
identity politics has gained momentum in Japan, thereby complicating further
how these historical issues are to be discussed and resolved.
It was not until the uprising and struggles in the 80s and 90s in China, therise of feminist and other social movements, that some members of Japanesesociety were inspired to uncover past injustices of the State, and grievances ofvictims. Globalization and diffusion of information and knowledge via theInternet have also empowered this movement. However, the fact that thesedisputes continue and their resolution seem to be difficult shows only how
separated and complicated the sentiments of the State and people are. Given
these circumstances, Reiko tried to figure out what her role as an international
female journalist in this debate should be.
Free Discussion: ‘Whither Asia? In Search of a New Paradigm’
Moderated by Vinod Raina
To jump-start the discussions,Vinod proposed three topics for consideration:1) Making sense of peace: Is peace absence of war? Are we making peace?
Are people peaceful?
2) Heroism and Patriotism
3) What do we tell our children?
The discussion, with a question mark on the role and responsibilities ofacademics, led to exchanges on the education of children in school, home, andsociety. Within Japan, some participants warily noted a growing sense ofhopelessness and lack of pride among children, based on a survey on high school
students.They said that such sentiments reflect a lack of national vision on thepart of adults, and their inability to impart any sense of national commitmentthat their children could reflect upon, and practice.
The discussions also looked at the growing importance of cross-border
networks of public intellectuals who could play an important part in thefacilitation of various interpretations of history, help conceptualize and provide
alternatives, thereby generate adequate space for public thinking and debate.The
discussants were unanimous in the view that a public intellectual is “one who isable to influence the public,” rather then one who merely pontificates in public.
16

The retreat closed with the participants reiterating the need to constantly
anticipate action in the public arena, and act accordingly.
Concluding Session: ‘The Role of Public Intellectuals in a Changing
Asia’
Moderator: Chiharu Takenaka, Professor, Faculty of International
Studies, Meiji Gakuin University
Professor Takenaka noted that the roles and functions of public intellectuals
change and differ according to changes in political, historical, economic andreligious contexts. Today, with democratization and the pervasiveness of openmarket economic reforms, a paternalistic kind of public intellectuals cannot
function anymore in regions like Asia. The following questions then arise: whatkind of a role should intellectuals play in the current changing democraticsociety? What kind of a society are we aiming for? What kind of ideas do wehave to make Asian societies, and even the World better? Can we come up withalternative ideas and commitments to go beyond national boundaries, otherthan multi-culturalism, right wing rhetoric, NGO networking, feminism, or
environmentalism? Finally, what kind of media will convey these messages?
The discussion that followed reiterated public intellectuals’ role to generate
new ideas by analysing the past, the need for them to be involved in concrete
activities aimed at the greater common good, seeking out new locations insociety and among communities to open up discussion and debate, and therecognition of new social and resistance movements. In Asia, however, public
intellectuals will also have to confront how to effectively communicate witheach other and with the communities they are involved in.The problem of ‘theEnglish divide’ was raised. Finally, concrete issues like how to organize a social
movement, and foster alternative and unconventional lifestyles suited for the
new generations were also raised.
Public Symposium: October 22‘Violence,Terror, & Peace: Problems of Identity in a Fluid World’
The Fellows’ symposium ‘Violence, Terror, & Peace: Problems of Identity in a
Fluid World’ was held on the 22nd of October. The moderator Ishizuka
Masahiko from the Foreign Press Center, initiated the program and invited thefirst speaker, Maznah Binti Mohamad.
On ‘The Challenge of Islam in Southeast Asia: Origins and Prospects,’ Maznah
explored the roots of recent terrorism and instability in Southeast Asia by goingback to the origin of a global political Islamic movement, and delineated its
problems and solutions. In a climate of fear, investor confidence will be affected
inviting the presence of the United States for security safeguards. Maznah
expressed her concern that movements for democracy and human rights willbe thwarted in the region. Following the nationalist phase of political Islam fromthe 16th century up until the 1950s, the transnational phase since the 70s
characterizes the global political Islamic movement of today. It is based on
17

fundamentalism, cross-border common identity, and aims to set up an Islamicstate within national borders and aspires to unite them later. However, why
resort to violence to achieve these purposes? The concept of jihad is a basicmodel for the terrorists, as a defence against the perceived enemies of Islam anda fight against the internal and global repression of Islamic movements. Half of
the Islamic society will practice moderate Islam and the other will become
hardened and militant. Nevertheless, Islam should be distinguished from
communism in seeking solutions. Unlike communism that was openly
demonised by capitalist western powers, Islam is not just a system of belief but
a deeply entrenched culture with long historical roots.The problem today is thesole emphasis on militaristic and coercive means by authoritarian governments.
The challenge is whether violence can be overcome by peaceful means andwhether democratic and human rights can be preserved when they are the firstto be sacrificed.
Nguyen,Thi Hieu Thien described the history of ‘Multicultural Literature in
the United States’ from the 60s, including descriptions of the Vietnam War by
American writers. Thien suggested that the sensitivity and empathy ofmulticultural literature, and movements for democracy and minorities might be
one of the solutions to the injustice and violence in society today.The 60s werea special period in history, when far reaching changes occurred in society. The
old canon was confronted by a new liberal canon insisting on social equality
amongst a plurality of class, race, and gender. In academic circles as well, themyth of white supremacy and Euro-centrism was overturned by progressive
movements, to rewrite history and to give a place to marginalized authors.The
publication of the Heath Anthology of American Literature was a tool tointroduce a new notion of American culture, ushering in a major battlefield.
Whereas the antithetical Norton Anthology remained the symbol of traditional
power and ideology, the Heath Anthology provided a counterpoint byrepresenting the rich diversity of American culture.Today, students in American
universities are exposed to diverse literatures written by writers whose namemay be ‘unpronounceable at first.’ Of course, another important aspect of thisdiversity is literature penned by Vietnam War veterans, reflecting an American
society in which Vietnam continues to haunt.
Kinoshita Reiko presented her paper, ‘Redefining the Role of Media:
Challenges for the Freedom of Speech’, in which she spoke about the role andbehaviour of US Media in its depiction of terrorism, and raised questions aboutsuch journalism.
The 9/11 terrorist attack revealed challenges that the media was facing in
multiple aspects. By describing it as a ‘war’ instead of ‘crime’, the media needs
to be held responsible and accountable for its choice of vocabulary andemphasis, since the use of such misleading and careless language can escalate
existing conflicts. The growing dominance of US media and the imbalance ofcoverage had resulted in a lack of stories about the terrorists, for example. It isapparent that an objective view and a sense of proportion and perspective toinclude the other side of the story has been completely ignored.
18

As an industry, deregulation of media ownership has triggered buyouts andconsolidations. Whereas news in the past was regarded as a public service andnews centres were tolerated as ‘loss leaders’ or ‘cost centers’ because of theirprestige and credibility, the giant conglomerates have now turned them into
‘profit centers’, concentrating on satisfying shareholder interests. Hence, thetrend is an increase in entertainment-driven soft news, violent crime, disasters
and personal tragedies, to attract the audience. Due to the pressure to maximize
profits and minimize costs, international news coverage is also on the decline.
Raising these unanswered questions, and dangers the US media poses today,
Reiko suggested the need for the media to redefine its role and pointed to thesignificance of Asian perspectives.
After the coffee break, the symposium resumed with Hu Tao with hisconcerns regarding the intense conflicts hiding behind the contemporary trade
regimes, and how we can deal with them peacefully, through his presentation
titled, ‘Trade War and Peace in a Globalizing World’.
Tao gave a basic review of the notion of trade from economic and social
perspectives in a global and industrial context; and explained why trade wars aretaking place. From an economic point of view, the problem of monopoly
imposed new challenges on existing economy, making the protection of infantindustries a major issue. From social considerations, protection of labour andemployment are major issues. The political considerations involve acquiring
votes and a dominance in international politics. Transcending these national
issues are problems stemming from the current fluid world that is propelling
economic, social, and political systems towards rapid change.Thus, identities ofthe economist, consumer, monopoly corporates, representatives of businesssector, politicians, and public intellectuals are fluid altogether. Can we prevent
trade wars and can there be peaceful trade at all? Tao concluded that there
might be a solution by emphasizing the efficiency of economic structures and byusing trade dispute settlement mechanisms as a judge, rather than as
instruments for imposing trade sanctions.
The final speaker,Vinod Raina’s presentation was titled,‘Violence by any Means;
Identity Politics and Neo-Liberalism in South Asia’. South Asia, he indicated, haslong been a spectre for violence. He examined ‘peace’ from a variety ofperspectives. Violence is tangible but peace is not. What does peace look like?
What does it mean? Is peace absence of violence? What constitutes peace? Why
does violence exist when military action is not a solution to problems?
He used the metaphor of electric conduction to describe the fluid Worldand the resistances within it. The ‘fluid world’ is like electricity in a wire.
Electricity ‘runs’ when the mobile electrons on the surface of the wire flow, but
electrons at the core of the wire do not conduct electricity; they instead
provide resistance. How is the ‘fluid world’ structured today? In the neo-liberal
world, may be about 25 percent of the world population is ‘fluid’, global, on themove, i.e., benefiting from the system; but the remaining 75 percent are at thecore – ‘immobile’ and adversely impacted. They form the resistance to theeconomic and social system, with violence always lingering nearby.They are notinherently violent, but are forced into it due to the violence of the fluid elites,19

who derive their sustenance from the labour and suffering of the marginalized.
What are the responses to this fragile system? Identity politics, once asource of resistance to colonialism, is turning into hardened nationalism basedon religion, ethnicity and other forms of identity. Terrorism is not inherent toIslam,which must be understood as a major cultural system with deep historicalroots. Hope is to be seen in World movements fighting for equality, fraternity,and peace. The World Social Forum is proving to be an important platform
where these movements are intersecting and renewing each other.We need tostrengthen these processes.
After the Fellows’ presentations, questions were collected from the floor
and the Q & A session provided stimulating exchanges between the audienceand the Fellows.
Questions for Maznah revealed that many of us hold one-sided and negative
perceptions of Islam. Mainstream Islam needs to be distinguished from its
recent extreme militaristic form. It is a plural religion and essentiallycontradictory to violence. Objective views of outsiders can help Muslims towake up and start reasoning with the outside world. Maznah stressed that weneed to understand Islam’s deep historical background and diversity, and clear
the mystification that surrounds it. Thien shared her experience of living bothin a socialist and a market-oriented Vietnam. Her observations conveyed
conflict of values toward the two systems and security/insecurity during war
and peace times. She stressed that we should be fair and not prejudiced in
judging which social system is more democratic or inhumane and contended
that the West had a distorted image of socialist countries. Reiko received
questions regarding media reform, its objectivity, regulations, and the role of thenational government as a watchdog. She gave concrete suggestions to promote
cross-border networking and interaction amongst journalists, and to introduce
different views and new dimensions to conventional media institutions.
Reacting to a question whether we can expect another Gandhi, Vinod statedthe need for systemic changes rather than putting hope on a single figure toshow us a way out. We should look at the main source of violence, which isheavily polarised economic, political and military power, and a deep feeling of
injustice, and not demonise one identity, such as Islam. When neo-liberalism
prevails and the secular nation is at stake,Vinod suggested the possibility of a‘softer’ State, one that is tolerant to diversity, and not afflicted deeply bynationalism.Widespread disparity, and not just poverty is the problem.To breakthe violence inherent to monopolisation and centralisation, we need to think
deeply about localized governance and production systems. Tao was asked
about the likely scenario for China to reconcile politics and a capitalistic
lifestyle.Tao argued that China embraces global values, market economy alongwith its political system, as it continues to progress. The image of China is
distorted and the media, with presumptions like ‘communism is bad’, simplifies
its political and economic logic.
Ishizuka Masahiko thanked the Fellows and audience for their wonderful20presentation, and discussions. One common agreement among us is that we live
in a violent world with extreme affluence and poverty. Ishizuka suggested
further sharing and serious intellectual and social solidarity with the Fellows on
issues of Asia and beyond.
In her closing remark, Koide Izumi mentioned that this year’s Fellows raised
many questions and had extensive discussions during this fellowship program.
They share common expectations for democracy and criticism towards various
forms of violence, despite their diversity and differences. This assumption was
the underlying theme of the symposium.
Study Visit: September 19
Matsui Yayori, Director of Asia-Japan Women’s Resource Center
Director Matsui Yayori explained about the history of women’s movement,
which started in Korea in the early 70’s when young Korean women protested
against sex tourism by Japanese men. It coincided with their human rights fightfor democracy in Korea. Many women from the Philippines and Thailand weretrafficked to Japan in the 80s as workers in the entertainment industry. In the90s, “comfort women” in Korea and other countries began to accuse theJapanese government for its involvement during the War. Ms. Matsui, an activist
even while working as a journalist for Asahi Shimbun, retired in 1995 andestablished the Asia-Japan Women’s Resource Center (AJWRC) which focuses
on issues related to migrant women in particular, and issues of development andwomen in general. They also publish quarterlies and organize study tours. The
role of the Center is:1) fact finding2) reparation, compensation, or remedies to the survivors and advocating
legislation3) punishment to the perpetrators of sexual crimes during the war. A
Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual
Slavery was held in Tokyo in December 2000, due to the tireless effortsof Ms. Matsui. It exhorted the Japanese government to take responsibility
for the past crimes, and to prosecute the accused responsible for sexual
violence during the war.The Tribunal was centered around: a) respect forindividual rights, b) gender justice, c) surpassing the state framework andadvocating global solidarity, d) continued support and action.
Following Ms Matsui, one of the staff explained about a women’s group in
Okinawa established in ’95, active in networking East Asia and US women’s
movement against militarism, including Korea and the Philippines, which has asimilar situation because of the US military base there.
Questions from the Fellows revealed that many of the government or
national women’s organizations are conservative and the AJWRC faces
opposition from right wing organizations as well. Fund raising is an especially an
difficult task for private organizations such as AJWRC. Gender issues being
mostly ‘invisible’, it is extremely difficult to find support.
21

Ms Matsui concluded that through transnational exchange of history, sharing
experiences and building international links on memory and history, we mightfind a more objective assessment of the past.
(A fortnight after this visit, Matsui Yayori cut short her trip to Afghanistan because ofpain that was diagnosed as liver cancer by doctors in Tokyo. She spent the last monthsof her life completing many tasks related to the War Tribunal and a Museum, and diedon Dec 27, 2002 at the age of 68; a tireless and inspirational human being.)
Meeting with Noda Seiko, Member, House of Representatives
October 21
Noda Seiko kindly joined the Fellows for an informal meeting at the Shugiin
Daiichi Kaikan, in spite of her busy schedule related to the 155th extraordinary
session of the Diet.After briefly introducing her background, she touched uponsome of the projects she is taking an initiative in, such as the child prostitution
prohibition law, and the project on the formation and promotion of a universal
society with equal rights for the healthy, and disabled people. But foremost is
the project on alternative surnames for married couples. Under the law, Japanrequires a married couple to register under one surname, and a majority ofwomen are customarily forced to change their maiden name to that of theirhusband’s.The traditional conservative female role is still supported by this law.
Ms Noda is facing resistance from conservative forces from within the media
and from Diet in her efforts to have this law changed. These never-ending
gender issues are becoming more and more emotional and, illogical, sheaverred.
Asked about her dilemma as a third generation member of a political family,
she clearly stated that, although she faced difficulties being a young female
politician, being a member of the ruling LDP is practical if you want toaccomplish something. She candidly gave specific data on her annual budget,
funding and expenditures, including her election budget and costs.
Amidst an atmosphere where there is little credibility of politicians, how can
we make the functioning of the democracy less corrupt? Ms Noda thinks
democracy is beautiful, but we make mistakes and give wrong interpretations.
She feels Japanese democracy is distorted and too dependent on the LDP.The
right and capability to judge must be in the hands of the people, and the LDP
needs to change its ideas and approaches.
Gifu-Nagoya Field trip: September 6 - 9
The Fellows visited public facilities and NGO organizations relevant to the main
theme of this trip,‘environment’.The first highlight was visiting the controversial
Nagara Estuary Dam.
The Fellows visited Aqua Plaza Nagara, an information and education
center located beside the barrage, where they were guided by Mr.Yoshinari
Kawai, a local NGO activist from Society Against the Nagara River
22

Estuary Dam Construction, accompanied by Professors Yoshiaki Kaoru,
Mikihiro Moriyama, and David Potter from Nanzan University. Mr Kawaigave an outline of the history of Estuary Dam construction. The plan was
originally initiated forty years ago for the stated purpose of flood control andwater utilization for heavy industry.At the time, Japan was reaching its economic
peak. However, as demand for industrial water declined and other flood control
measures were put into place, both the aims became redundant. Though theplan was once aborted, the Prefectural government and the Construction
Ministry insisted on resuming construction by inventing a new reason - toprevent salt damage of rice fields, without any proof that salt water can be so
harmful to the crop. In spite of disputes and opposition movements for decades,
the Construction Ministry started its operation in 1995. Damage to sweetfish
and other river creatures and plants was apparent, despite controversial
environmental assessments in support of the government’s construction plan.
The residents quickly lost their river culture and lifestyle.
The Fellows later joined Ms Megumi Omori, a member of Nagashima
Town Congress and the local residents group, all opposed to the dam. Fourmembers of the group shared their personal experiences related to natural
disasters in the past and their current state of life living near the river. Ms.
Omori revealed that while it took 150 billion yen for the estuary dam’s
construction, the local government is now planning another water supply routeto Yokkaichi City and Suzuka City located next to their town, at an estimatedcost of 100 billion yen. To justify its deeds, the government argues that natural
creatures can be found in the water just as before, that apparently salt damageon the rice fields has been contained, and water supply running short inindustries and households can be augmented by the dam. Ms. Omori and theresidents group are opposing these claims, and are demanding the opening of
the estuary barrage so that the river may live again.Vinod shared the common
experience of the anti-Narmada Dam movement in India.Though Ms. Omori isa Town Congress member, she stands alone in her opposition in the Congress.
Later in the day, everyone enjoyed dinner on a fishing boat and watched ademonstration of cormorant fishing in the Nagara River.
The second day started with a meeting with another local NGO, Gifu 2001 No
Kai.The concept of the group is described by keywords ‘life’ ‘nature’ ‘existence’ and‘future of children’, which signify the diversities of their activities and interest.The
group is funded by donations and membership fees from 250 members, and hosts
lectures, concerts, and film-shows on current topics. They also distributenewsletters. Some of the members who joined the Fellows were specialists on
biology, dam fighters, a lawyer, ecologist, medical doctor, high school teacher, andarchitect.Their latest event was an exhibit revealing materials and photo panels ofgerm warfare conducted in China by the Japanese Imperial army Unit 731 andother units during World War II. Some of the members of the group were involvedin preparing for a lawsuit against the Japanese government.The court was held only
ten days before in August of 2002, in which the facts were acknowledged but
compensations dismissed. In autumn, the group plans to hold a photo exhibition,lecture, and concert on ‘30 years of Okinawa and Vietnam’ commemorating 30
23years since the recovery of Okinawa to Japan and the end of the Vietnam War.
Other topics they worked on included reviewing public works, namely dam issuesof Nagara Estuary Dam, Mecong Dam, and the recent Nagano Dam.
After lunch, the group headed for Oak Village located in Kiyomi Village, up in
the mountain area of Gifu Prefecture. Founder and President, Tadashi
Inamoto first set his location in Nagano Prefecture in 1972 where he built asmall cottage house to pursue his philosophy to build a self-sufficient, selfsustainable community through farming and building their own houses. He
moved on to Kiyomi Village in 1976, where he was fascinated by the clear waterand treasure of high level, traditional industrial art. Since then he has nurtured
and expanded Oak Village with his brother Mr Hiroshi Inamoto, now head of
Nature School of the Forest. It is operated under three principles: to build 100year-lasting furniture so that the forest can maintain a sustainable cycle;
craftsmanship ‘from a bowl to a house’; and providing ‘an acorn for each child’,
an environmental education program to understand and appreciate the natureand environment. Guided by Mr Tadashi Inamoto, the Fellows toured theshowroom and museum, which display crafts, from children’s toys, tableware,
furniture, audio player, to house architecture. Mr Tadashi Inamoto shared someof his personal background; his primary professional field was in nuclear physics,
and he came to realize that energy is not sustainable. He started to think how
he could help people, which led him to set up Oak Village. Mr Inamoto also
introduced the concept of ‘community forest’, where a part of the forest area
between the hamlet and the wilderness is groomed and utilised for food, water,
and wood. It is unique Japanese culture based on co-existence with nature, bywhich Henry David Thoreau was influenced, and the renowned Japanese writerof the Meiji period Soseki Natsume had reverted to, after his philosophical andphysical journey to the West.
The next stop, Shirakawa-go is an isolated village in the deep mountains,designated as a world heritage site with its gassho-style straw-thatched roofs
and unique architecture, not found in any other part of Japan. Akio Yamada, a
local civil servant, explained the traditional rules, system, and function of thecommunity by which they maintain their lifestyle, including the essential task of
involving every villager to thatch the roof.
A wrap-up meeting was held in Nanzan University on the last day,facilitated by Professors Yoshiaki Kaoru, School of Business Administration,David Potter of the Department of Policy Sciences, Mikihiro Moriyama of the
Department of Asian Studies, and Kiichi Noritake, Head of the Office of the
President. Each Fellow shared her/his views and comments about the trip.
Maznah felt that the domestic civil group’s experience is not linked with that ofinternational counterparts. Through such networking, it could promote moredebate and discussion on issues like sustainable development, particularly since
it seems Japanese foreign aid is only exporting domestic problems for therecipient country to suffer in return. Although social development is complex
and particular to a country, there are yet commonalities which can be shared
for mutual benefit.Thien was impressed with the wisdom and flexibility of Japan24

to respect and live in harmony with nature and preserve its heritages. In thissense, a strong community seemed an essential part of Japanese culture.Vinod
had many questions from the visit - tension between academia and movement,
conflict regarding the right to use natural resources, preservation anddevelopment, class disparity, balance between economy and culture, quest forequality in development, all of them being relevant to global society. Taodiscerned that the disparity between the local and urban people in Japan wasmuch less compared to that in China, and noted the strong consciousness
regarding energy consumption in Japan. Giving an example from the US, Reikoemphasized the need for establishing independent think tanks in Japan to draw
successful policies. In response, Professor Kaoru agreed that class struggles anddifferent perceptions complicate the conflicts. Professor Potter explained theconventional structure and mentality of the Japanese state, government,
corporations, and citizen, which incubated the issues that the Fellows witnessed.
Professor Moriyama remarked that the group’s perceptions were of a tourist
nature, as the truth was veiled by a high degree of politeness! Professor Ohashi
concluded that the NGOs and NPOs in Japan should interact in a creative way,domestically and internationally.
Hiroshima-Okayama-Kagawa Field Trip: October 12 to 15
The Fellows visited Hiroshima, Okayama, and Kagawa Prefectures from October
12 to 15, with underlying theme of ‘peace movement and education’, ‘humanrights’, ‘gender’, ‘environmental security and citizen’s rights’.
Arriving at Hiroshima, the group first visited Hiroshima International
Conference Center where they met the former mayor of Hiroshima,
Takashi Hiraoka, for a briefing on “Asia and Hiroshima” and discussion about
the peace movement there. Mr Hiraoka explained his view that the 9/11
incident was a challenge to Hiroshima’s peace philosophy and movement. The
reaction to the challenge should not be retaliation, but should be based on
Hiroshima’s mission to stop the chain reaction of hatred and violence. The
ultimate goal for international society should be to overcome poverty, illness,
nuclear weapons, and other similar obstacles in order to establish a fair andequal society based on justice. Mr Hiraoka also mentioned opposition from the
US and China against the certification of the A-Bomb Dome in Hiroshima as aworld heritage site, reminding us that the ‘anti-Hiroshima’ sentiments in the
United States, China, and other parts of Asia are still existent. For example,
while the United States justifies the dropping of the A-bomb as necessary action
to terminate the war, the Hiroshima peace movement is viewed by the Chinese
as a means to absolve Japan of its war responsibilities. Regardless, inhuman use
of nuclear weapons should not be justified as a retaliation for Japan’s
wrongdoings.As the then mayor of Hiroshima, Mr Hiraoka offered apologies to
the Asian countries for the Japanese invasion in the peace declaration of 1991.
He is taking initiatives to narrow the gap between people of Hiroshima and Asia,with citizens’ exchange programs with e.g. Republic of Kazakhstan andCambodia, who have both suffered from the consequences of nuclear testing or
25

tragic domestic dictatorship. According to the UN Trade Development
Conference, held in June 2002, the worldwide figure of absolute poverty (thoseliving on less than a dollar a day) is 307 million. This is a result of the vicious
cycle of mass production, mass consumption, and disposal based on modern
technology. Though science and technology revolutionized modern
development, it has also produced negative results. Nuclear weapons are one
such example. How do we choose to live in such circumstances? Hiroshima’s
challenge and mission is to share its experience and woes of its people with thepeople of Asia, in order to build a common ground for peace.
Reiko asked about the ties between Hiroshima and Japanese-Americans
living in the US, as they have difficult times coming to terms with their identity
and need support. Mr. Hiraoka responded that one should distinguish between
a Japanese-American and Chinese or Vietnamese living in the US because they
have different historical backgrounds. It is difficult to fill the gap of perception of
the justification of the bombing, but Hiroshima has continuously tried to
exchange views through exhibitions, lectures, and other forms of programs tonurture understanding between the two countries.
Tao commented he had always wanted to visit Hiroshima; the rules ofinternational society should not be based on power but justice, fairness,richness, and peace. Use of the A-bomb is a tragedy for human beings andshould not be an excuse to kill.
Mr Hiraoka agreed with Maznah’s impression of Hiroshima peace movement
as ‘tame’ and not successful to get it’s message out to Asia and the world.
Leftists are making use of it for their own political campaigns, which makes
citizens turn away from such activities. How can we convey our spirit?
Hiroshima is trying through movies, theater, music, and exhibitions in and out ofJapan.The Japanese government should put more effort in such activities.
Vinod asked where do people get the zest and energy for a peace movement
and how are they convinced of non-violence, since their motives do not seemto come from ‘resistance’? As a citizen of Hiroshima and former journalist,
Mr Hiraoka could sympathize with the sentiments of the people and their peace
movement, motivated by their agony and pain, as victims of such a tragedy.
Thien suggested that their anti-nuke/anti-war movements could be elevatedmuch more with tie-ups with other peace movement groups in and out of Japan.
Kazuhiko Takano, Deputy Director of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial
Museum, guided the Fellows through the exhibits with thorough explanationsof their main displays showing damages to material and humans by radiation,
heat rays, and the blast of the Bomb. The group was educated by the
explanations, the overviews and guide of the city, historical and politicalbackground of the bombing, the current status of nuclear weapons, Hiroshima’s
peace activities and education, testimony of the survivors, and the models, films,
and photo panels. The photos of the city taken only three hours after thebombing, diorama of the victims, replica of the A-bomb ‘Little Boy’, victim’s
shadow printed on the stone stairs of a bank, the story of Sadako Sasaki and her
paper cranes, are shocking evidence of the devastation.
26

A more vivid encounter was the opportunity to meet an A-bomb survivor,
now the Director of World Friendship Center, Michiko Yamaoka. It has been
24 years after her mother’s death, since she started giving testimonies of her
experience. She feels her mission is to devote herself to talk to children about
the precious lives lost and the irrationality of war, on behalf of her mother andfriends who were killed. Even after almost 60 years, Ms Yamaoka could
remember vividly how, as a 15-year-old junior high school student, on her way
to work at the telephone office just 500 meters away from the epicenter, she
was blown away and trapped under the rubble, which actually saved her life.
Ms Yamaoka miraculously survived but suffered heavy burns and wounds on her
face, neck, and arms. Her mother and Ms. Yamaoka’s life became extremely
difficult with no jobs and discrimination towards the victims (hibakusha) and noproper health treatment. It was in 1952 that medical care was provided to her
in the US, to undergo 27 reconstructive surgeries. Coming back to Japan with abrighter outlook on life, she started working in a kindergarten to support her
life with her mother.While suffering from cancer and other health problems, she
is determined to continue her rigorous activities throughout her life.
The discussion meeting with members of The Women’s Association ofHiroshima Prefecture was held next morning on the theme ‘Women’s
Agenda: In Pursuit of Gender Equity and Non-violent Community’. In 1990, theAssociation established The Hiroshima Women’s University aiming to provide
education for women on such topics as politics, economics, sociology, andgender - other than conventional topics as ‘housekeeping’ - to enable them to
be involved in policymaking in their community. Nearly 600 women, housewives
as well as working women graduated, building networks and becoming leadersof the community. Six of the members explained their own activities ranging
from taking care of family disputes, counseling and international campaign
activities on DV (Domestic Violence), international peace activities, women’s
career building, and education.
Dr Eiichi Nakai, Director of Nagashima Aisei-en gave a briefing on‘Nagashima Aisei-en in History of Leprosy’.The national sanatorium wasestablished in 1930 on Nagashima, an isolated island located in the Seto Inland
Sea of southwest Japan, separated from the mainland with the beautiful sea,
which has been finally linked with the construction of a bridge in 1988.With acapacity of 400, the facility initially hospitalized 85 people from all over thecountry. Discriminated against and abandoned by families and society, they wereconfined to physical labor that worsened their physical condition with deformity
and paralysis. Some commited suicide, in pain and despair. The Leprosy
Prevention Law formulated in 1907 kept the patients quarantined, even after
1956 when international medical experts declared leprosy was “rarely
contagious” and called for an end to quarantine. It was not until 1996, whenafter a long battle to overturn the law, the Ministry of Health finally admitted its
mistake in maintaining the law and abolished it. Nagashima Aisei-en is presently
occupied by 510 residents, ranging from 50 to 96 years old, with an average ageof 76.They live in designated areas within the island, according to each of their
physical conditions.Asked about his personal motivation to devote his life there,27

Dr Nakai explained that ever since he was a medical student in Kyoto, heaspired to accomplish what others would rather not. Having volunteered to go
to India in 1966 for research and treatment on Hansen’s disease, his outlook onlife and human beings had been deeply affected by the experience, and hereturned to Japan with a fixed determination to devote himself, regardless of
opposition from his family. With accumulated years of experience, Dr Nakai
hopes to take in Hansen’s disease patients from abroad and those suffering withdifficult diseases such as AIDS, in the coming future.The Fellows also observed
its facilities, walked around the residential area and visited the hospital.
The next stop of the trip, Teshima Island, also located on the Seto InlandSea, is a controversial place where illegal toxic industrial waste had been
dumped for 15 years since 1975 after the Kagawa Prefecture had given
permission to a waste processing company, triggering toxic industrial waste to
be dumped from as far as Europe. The place is said to be the largest site forillegal dumping of industrial waste in Japan. Upon arriving on the island, thegroup visited Teshima Center for International Exchange where they
were greeted by members of Teshima Residents Conference for Waste
Materials and government officials from the Kagawa Prefectural
Government, and Toru Ishii, who is a Prefectural assembly member and acore member of the residents group. Mr Ishii presented a briefing of the Teshima
Incident in the context of historical, social, and economic development of Japan
since the Meiji era, when a free market economy was introduced that boosted
the expansion of production and consumerism. Reaching a peak in the 60s and
70s, Japan enjoyed its excessive economic prosperity while producing the worst
industrial pollution, which is exactly when the illegal dumping started. Teshimaresidents finally settled the Environmental Dispute Coordination with Kagawa
Prefecture in 2000. Treatment of the site is underway to prevent the polluted
water from flowing out to sea, and the wastes are being excavated and moved
to Naoshima Island next to Teshima, where a new furnace will melt the waste.
However, this is not a final solution since the process will not completely
dissolve the waste. Had the manufacturers and dischargers taken responsibility
for its treatment at the original site of production, all the disputes could havebeen prevented. The group walked on the dump-filled ground, occupied withdrums filled with toxic waste and labeled in other countries, while Mr Ishii
explained the system in place to prevent polluted water from flowing out.
During the question and answer session moderated by Professor Togo
Tsukahara. Mr Ishii emphasized that the Teshima incident highlights theoperations of unchecked industries and the markets over the past century inJapan and other countries. The case provides evidence that the present
economic and social system needs to be reviewed and replaced with a newparadigm. Lively discussions with the other residents also revealed that theresidents’ goal to settle the dispute was solely to recover their beautiful island
for the next generation, and not intended to make profit out of the waste
processing procedures. Their decision not to accept compensation was
motivated by this ideal. Along with the island-restructuring process, they aremaking the younger generation aware and involved in creating their own
28

community with a vision of Teshima as an ‘Island of Learning’. Tao pointed outthat deep-rooted economic and political issues must not be overlooked behindsuch an environmental catastrophe like the Teshima incident: Who is
responsible? What is wrong with the political system? What should bereformed? As the closing note to the session, Koide Izumi expressed how
deeply impressed we were to learn about the Teshima residents’ way ofconfronting the issue in a fundamental way, their awareness and understandingof civilization and history, compassion for human beings, and devotion of thepeople.The visit certainly proved Teshima to be, ‘an Island of Learning’.
On the last day, the group visited Okayama University for a wrap-up
session where they were joined by Professor Tsukahara and Professor Ayami
Nakatani, who acted as the moderator. Reflecting on the trip, the Fellows
acknowledged that the meetings and experiences raised a number of issues toreflect upon, with many links to similar issues in each of their own countries.
The Fellows shared many of these views. All agreed that this was an enrichingexperience, revealing different facets of Japan.
At the end of the trip, the fellows enjoyed an optional visit to the Ohara
Museum of Art and strolled the streets of Kurashiki, an artistic town with ataste of the Meiji period.
Resource Person Seminar 1, September 11
by Michihiro Ko, General Director of Zen Ryo Kyo
Presider: Dr. Hiroshi Yuasa, Sasagawa Memorial Health Foundation‘History of Leprosy and Human Rights’
Koide Izumi greeted the guests and explained that this seminar should also be
an introductory session for the Fellows as they plan to visit a sanatorium on
Nagashima Island during their second field trip in October.
The seminar began with introduction by Dr Hiroshi Yuasa, who as a
medical doctor has been active in Japan and overseas on leprosy to contributeto resolving the accompanying human rights issue from a medical point of view.
Dr Yuasa views that because leprosy represents a universal problem of humanrights, it will contribute to wider interests and other situations if we find an
answer to it. He explained that leprosy is similar to tuberculosis, but has
different manifestations in its attack on the internal organs. The disease had
been in existence for two to three thousand years until a Norwegian doctor
Dr Hansen discovered the bacteria in 1876. It is known to be the first bacteria
discovered that causes disease in human beings. Since leprosy bacteria lives onlyin human cells, no one succeeded in cultivating the bacteria, which delayed thedevelopment of a cure. After unsuccessful attempts, a miracle drug was
discovered in the 50s with a relapse rate of only three to four percent. Since
then, the WHO has been remarkably successful in eliminating the disease
worldwide. Still, countries such as India, Brazil, Myanmar, and Mozambiqueremain affected, one leprosy patient per ten thousand people.Though medicallya cure has been established, the problem lies in the social sphere of Japan where
the draconian law, Leprosy Prevention Law was formulated in 1907 to keep the29patients quarantined.As mentioned, long after medical experts declared leprosy
was rarely contagious and called for an end to quarantine in 1956, it was only
in 1996 that the Law was abolished!
Michihiro Ko, former patient and an advocate against the violation ofhuman rights of leprosy patients due to forcible quarantine, looked back at 50
years of his life, his experience of leprosy, and described how it had beenintertwined with the Japanese policy. After developing the disease as a highschool student, he had no choice and left voluntarily to be treated in thesanatorium under the Leprosy Prevention Law - a law which was said to havean ‘entry’ but no ‘exit’, or in other words, a forced isolation policy violating
human rights and dignity. Fear of the disease raised discrimination andmisunderstanding from the public, which also kept patients in isolation fromtheir families. Lightly affected patients were even forced to work on dailylaundry, food delivery, bathing, and cremation of the deceased, on a round-theclock basis. Although he was recommended by the doctor to retire from thesanatorium, Mr Ko decided that his well-being and happiness lay with his
suffering inmates, to devote his life in regaining the human dignity and happinessof the patients, and solving the problems in the sanatorium. One of his major
activities had been to seek revision of the discriminatory Leprosy Prevention
Law. (The uniqueness of the problem was that after years of segregation, thepatients became so invisible to the society, that the awareness of the issue wasgone, even from attorneys, lawyers, and experts of law. Now that 99% of thepatients are recovered and that the disease has proved to be zero contagious,
Mr Ko is working towards the elimination of the remaining sense of
discrimination in society to leprosy patients.)
Responding to questions on how patients were confined, Mr Ko explainedthat the Law exhorted people to inform the authorities about suspectedpatients in their neighbourhood.The Law found support through the sentimentsof people to segregate patients as symbols of ‘shame’ for the country, and tomaintain the ‘pure quality’ of Japanese ethnicity. The Japanese government has
now admitted to the illegal status of the Law, and agreed to compensate every
inmate, and provide medical care, housing, clothing, and food. He stressed thatthe deep-rooted fundamental problem of worldwide violation of human rights
is the common sense of discrimination against those who are different, in termsof ethnicity, gender, religion, and other categorizations. On the basis of
intolerance and indifference, true democracy will never take root. Speaking out
and sharing the history of leprosy with the public would contribute toacknowledging the basic existence of human beings.
A question was also raised for Dr Yuasa on the role of the scientificcommunity. Japanese doctors and scientists had been silent until 1958 when aleprosy congress was held in Tokyo.There, scientists strongly called for the Law
to be abolished and successfully gained acknowledgement and apologies fromthe health ministry.As a doctor, he still feels he has a role to play on the medicalside of the disease.

30

Resource Seminar 2, September 13
by Prof. Shunya Yoshimi, University of Tokyo‘Popular Culture and American Hegemony in Postwar Japan’Professor Yoshimi began by informing about his recent major research interestin Cultural Studies. Having its origin in the UK in the 70s and introduced to
Hong Kong, Korea, Southeast Asia, and Australia in the early 90s, it gained
popularity in Japan as well.Though the area of study has been around for twenty
years, it is yet to establish its position within the institutional framework inJapanese universities.
Professor Yoshimi spoke on the relationship between popular culture andpolitics of the modern urbanization process. He contends that the relation topolitical power and the hidden desires of people influences people’s mobility.
A gathering place also changes and is created in relation to urbanization politics,
which affects the construction of culture. His question is: how do people build
their identity in relation to the cultural power? He refers to the popularnational entertainment, expositions, and track and fields school events. The
study involves a broad range; from historical study of pop culture and politics,
culture, history, people, to politics of power.
He also talked on ‘war, media, and American hegemony in Asia’, with reference
to American hegemony in postwar Japan, Southeast Asia, Philippines, South
Korea, China, and Taiwan.There six viewpoints concerned with this theme are:
1) John W. Dower’s ‘Embracing Defeat’ and American Culture in Japan
series, where two aspects of American influence on Japan and Asia canbe seen, stemming from political science and the American culture. As aresult of collaboration of the Japanese ruling class and US military tomaintain occupation, cultural hegemony of the ruling class has continued
since wartime.
2) Observing Americanism in pre/post-War Japan, we can trace it backto the late 20s, when cultural globalization began after WWI.
3) The American military bases during the occupation from 1945-1952 andtheir influence on post-war urban culture. Pop singers and American
culture emerged from the bases and later spread throughout thecountry through TV. Desire for American culture was even stronger after
the US exit from Japan. Roppongi, Harajuku, Ginza, where the US military
was based, became gathering places for young people, negating harshmemories of occupation.
4) Stages of re-constructing the national subjectivity through the American
gaze. Up until the 50s, Japan was exposed to direct influence from the
US. From the 60s and beyond, indirect US influence remained and theJapanese proudly reconstructed its cultural identity with industrial
technology and economical upsurge. The Tokyo Olympics in 1964 andexpansion policy of the government also boosted the sentiment. The
31

advertising image in the 50s and 60s of Japanese technology andeconomy also played its part in reconstructing the national identity.All of
this would not have become invaluable without the American gaze as its
assessor.
5) From the 70s and beyond, the American gaze is internalized and turns
from symbol to system. Tokyo Disneyland is a typical example of theAmerican system to consume self-image and identity. In the 80s, Japanese
enjoyed ‘discovering’ and ‘mythologizing’ their exoticness from theAmerican gaze. With the end of Cold-war, neo-nationalism and identity
politics is expressed aggressively in the 90s media, closing the relation ofpolitics and culture.
6) The last question is how to deal with American cultural hegemony in
Asia.
During discussion, Professor Yoshimi explained that compared with
European elitist culture,American culture has attracted mass popularity becauseof its materialistic and easy lifestyle in contrast with the complex traditional
Japanese culture. American culture was a symbol of wealth, commodities,
convenience, richness, attraction of emancipation, free from traditional
restrictions and system, and captured the heart of the mass in post-WWII
Japan.
Widespread popularity of American culture in Japan is also linked with
American foreign policy of the time. During the Korean War in the 50s, Japan
was positioned as an ally of the US, as an example of an ‘open’ Asia, a modelof a ‘free country’ in Asia. In the 60s, the identity of young student radicals andthe middle and lower class people was formed with the influence of theAmerican model. Domestically, a sentimental divide was formed between
mainland Japan as an economic success model and Okinawa, Taiwan, as amilitary wall against communism. They showed mixed sentiments of antiAmerican, anti base, and anti Vietnam, but pro-American for the abovementioned cultural reasons. Pro/anti sentiments had disappeared in the late70s, and American culture was ‘Japanized’ (adopted and modified), implying the
weakness of anti-Americanism.
Resource Person Seminar 3, September 17
by Professor Takayoshi Igarashi, Hosei University; Lawyer‘Re-examining Public Work Projects in Japan’Professor Igarashi is a lawyer, active in city planning and a strong critic ofwasted public works in Japan, termed, ‘pollution by construction’, which hebelieves is the most crucial and fundamental basis for understanding Japanesepolitics.
Public works in Japan has long been operated in an established system whereonce the plan is laid out, it never fails to be executed. A closely-tied nexus
between bureaucrats, politicians, and the business sector has long supported
this ‘myth’ of public works. The budget involved amounts to approximately 40
32

trillion yen per fiscal year, which is far greater than the total of France, Italy, US,
and Germany for similar purposes.The Japanese annual budget is 80 trillion yen,of which 10 trillion is allocated for public works from the general account.
Another 30 trillion comes from other pockets.The Government spends10 outof the 40 trillion yen directly on bullet trains, airports, and roads; local
government public works consume 20 trillion.The remaining 10 trillion is used
to subsidize projects of the local government, and there are several principles
laid down to distribute such money. First, decision-making by bureaucrats isbelieved to be a ‘never overthrown myth’, with no mistakes and alterations
whatsoever once the plan is decided.The Nagara River Estuary Dam is a typicalexample. Then, there is the ‘iron triangle’, of bureaucrats providing information
to politicians in return for employment in corporations after retirement,
politicians giving contracts to constituency corporations for bribes and votes,
and private corporations gaining profit out of the business.Academics and mass
media also manipulate public opinion by making strong statements in favour ofthe plans. Initially, these public works were effective in building infrastructures,but have now become merely a temporary measure to boost the economy andsecure employment, not necessarily for the advantage of the community.This is
why local governments are dependent and unable to survive without
construction works. Because the conventional system involves every aspect ofJapanese society in this manner, Japanese politics can be clearly understood bywhether you are for or against public works.
Since Mr Junichiro Koizumi succeeded as Prime Minister and Mr Tanaka as
governor of Nagano prefecture, their top priority has been on reform of public
works.The collapse of the above mentioned ‘never overthrown myth’ was dueto the heavy debt of local and national governments, which has accumulated up
to 700 trillion or even 1000 trillion yen, implying a 200% of GDP in debt. Morethan half of the amount is related to public works. Even government bonds havelowered in value to the same level as in Italy, Hungary, Greece, and Argentina.
The last possible measures to dissolve debt are considered to be ‘hyper
inflation’ or ‘War’. Nagano prefecture, where roads and facilities wereconstructed for the Winter Olympics in 1998, will likely go bankrupt if its debt
continues to accumulate. Mr Tanaka’s ‘no dam’ announcement to stop thevicious circle of public works construction has raised a nationwide controversy.
The big cities of Tokyo and Osaka also carry huge debts that may lead to thesame scenario as in Nagano.
Another reason for the collapse of the ‘myth’ is the destruction of themountains, rivers, and sea. Of the 109 major rivers in Japan, 108 rivers, except
Kushiro River, have dams. Once the dams are completed, sand and sludge
accumulate at high speed, filling up the dam and preventing its function. Soon,they do not prevent floods nor do they improve water usage. The sea andmountains have died away, and 90% of Japanese nature is lost. Because thepoliticians murky’ involvement with public works has finally been uncovered, andsome even imprisoned, Japanese politics is seriously tainted by scandals.
Public work plans are written in relation to a comprehensive national landdevelopment plan to build bridges, airports, road extensions, and the recent
33main attraction is the relocation of capital functions from Tokyo. As a start toreform the mechanism of public works, Prime Minister Koizumi began by reexamining road construction. Furthermore, the overall public works system istargeted for reforms, including the long term development plan, tax revenue,
and organizational structure, to stop the perpetual vicious cycle. The major
obstacle for implementing reform is the confrontation between the LDP
interests and Koizumi’s policies. As a result, his policies weaken to acompromise. In the case of governor Tanaka, though he is strongly supported by
the citizens, he is isolated in the assembly where the majority is pro-dam.
Whether or not reforms will succeed is likely to be very significant forJapan’s future. One of the headaches of the reformer is the resistance fromlegislators, who cannot win the election without depending on public works.
Also, the citizens are not always happy with the reform because they remember
the happy days of economic prosperity and are filled with anxiety for supporting
their lives in the economic recession. Employees in the construction businessfear layoffs. To resolve the people’s dilemma between reform and security, one
solution is to have people decide by direct voting on public works. Japaneseconstitution and local laws need to be changed accordingly. People should also
live without depending on public works, by creating a new industry and finding,for example, alternative power generation, providing rich welfare services forthe community, and developing a unique local industry based on its history andtraditions; in other words, to replace public works with ‘civic works’ in theregion. Koizumi and Tanaka reforms depend on how well ‘civic works’ arecarried out.Tanaka may be first to do that.
Professor Igarashi concluded that the future of Japan relies on the speed ofreform by politicians to check the speed of public works.
Vinod raised a question whether Japanese economy will survive if public
works are reduced. If public works are exported overseas as Japanese ODA, will
it not be merely transferring the problem out of Japan, to other countries? Also,is there a need for major constitutional changes in order that local governments
may make their own decisions? Professor Igarashi agreed that the nationalversion of ODA is only transformed into an international version, where
corporations go out to make contracts in other countries.We need to control
this, but in reality, it is difficult to logically define relations between the economy
and public works. Citizens’ vote regarding nuclear power, dams, waste facilities,
military bases, is negative. Two barriers exist that overturn people’s wishes: a)
The Assembly does not accept direct reference to people, and referendum toordinances is rejected. b) The local government sees the result of referendum,
if undertaken, as only a reference and not binding. The Constitution stipulates
that the assembly decision is the only legal decision. Professor Igarashi’s opinion
is that the Constitution should be amended on these counts. But there are also
complex issues surrounding the Japanese Constitution…
Maznah asked whether the results of referendum would change the politicalsituation. The pattern of voting is confusing. Is there another force outside theassembly? Are voices heard through other channels? Professor Igarashi
informed that 60% - 70% people are not affiliated to any political forces, and34

their voting patterns are unpredictable. In ordinary elections, the results andpatterns remain more or less the same. We may expect a new civil society toemerge. Maznah further asked whether militarization is being promoted as ameans to counter the economic recession. Professor Igarashi explained that theJapanese Self Defense Force is a problem when viewed constitutionally.With astrong military association with the US, it is one of the biggest political issues,of how to question militarism. How Japan get involved with international
conflicts, and the direction to dispatch SDF overseas is highly controversial.The
government has made efforts to bridge the contradiction but it has been
impossible. Economic recession can easily turn society in favour of militarism.
On one hand, Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine is opposed by Asian
countries, and on the other, emergency law enforcement is leading the country
to militararism.
Thien inquired about the possibility of democracy. John Rock introduced
indirect democracy for two reasons: 1) on the assumption that the electedhave more insight than the voters, and 2) he believed that without a closed
assembly, nothing can proceed. However, both the hypotheses seem flawed.
Voters and the elected are of equal intellectual ability within the civil society,and the closed assembly has opened through the media and internet. The
Constitution also states that sovereignty lies in the civil society. People must beable to stop a fanatic mood of dictatorship with direct democracy. The courtof justice should also intervene by experimenting with various measures. In
Japan, this experiment is being implemented and is likely to provide someresults in the future. How mature the democracy is will determine thetendency to militarise.
Tao suggested that instead of public works, why not increase the budget on
R & D on the IT industry and education industry? Is it possible to reduce tax
or make the highway free? Professor Igarashi informed that IT and education
have been discussed repeatedly since 1995 but not much has materialized. If the
highway is toll free, 40 trillion yet debt will accumulate, but how do we repay it?
The solution is either for people to shoulder the tax, or impose a toll.
Reiko asked about the future of academia and the media. Her idea is to forma neutral independent think tank of academia. For example, young
Transportation Ministry officials are listed in websites discussing their hopes andplans for their future with the public. Such possibilities of civic works andofficials working together in the future may be one hope for Japan. Professor
Igarashi agreed three are hopes for the ministry’s young generation, but doubts
whether they can do it before reaching their forties. Independent think tanks
can be a solution.
The session concluded with an understanding that the issue of public works
projects in Japan involves essential problems regarding democracy, and not only
economy.

35

Resource Person Seminar 4, September 24
by Muto Ichiyo, People’s Plan Study Group‘Militarization and People’s Security in Asia’
Muto gave an overall view of what has been happening in Asia after WWII andJapan after 1868 in terms of militarization and people’s security. He stated theneed for unity and convergence of people to share a common view of reality;i.e., if people are sincere about themselves, there is a force that puts them
together. Emerging fears of militarization are emanating from economic
depression, and the ‘Bush Doctrine’ declaring that US has the right of military
action against their foes in favour of its national interests. The basic
configuration of this century has already been created in the 90s.
In this period of ‘Empire’ and ‘globalization’, what do we need? We needstrategy, to see beyond national frameworks, in a positive sense, approachedfrom Asian and historical viewpoints.
In most Asian countries that gained independence after WWII, there was aprocess of national liberation, to regain an identity and to become ‘Somebody’.
They attempted social development through the acquisition of a nation state,
and a national military to protect their borders, national culture, and national
strength. Though there are differences in China, Indonesia, the Philippines,
Korea,Thailand, Burma, India, and Pakistan, their histories show that whereas therole of the military was primarily to fight on behalf of the people, in reality it
was used overwhelmingly against their own people, to support regimes that did
not speak for the people. The militaries only exceptionally functioned against
external enemies.These distinctions between the myths and realities need to bestudied and demystified.
During the Cold war, realities were interpreted in a communist/anticommunist dichotomy. People were assumed to be potentially subversive tocommunism. The American military promoted this ideology for national
security, but people in Asia lived in contradiction. In post-cold war, the anticommunist context is gone and the ‘globalisation’ that has taken over now
seems like ‘world capitalism’. The single dominant power, the US, is today
creating the same realities as during the Cold War, only replaced by the context
of globalism.After 9/11, the complex realities have been greatly simplified, where-by the US military dominance is seen as a solution for the basic problems of
the world, and the rest of the world must kneel to the US. One of the responses
in Japan is the controversial legislation on emergency measures, which violates
the basic rights of the people. It seems like an uncontrollable situation.
Where is Japan now? Is militarism reviving? If so, what is its role? Muto statedthat we should avoid simplistic arguments. He explained the twisted post-war
Japanese statehood in relation to its contradictory formation under the built-in
factor of US hegemony. As a result of the Japanese ruling group’s decision to
strategically go along with US policy in order to gain economic growth, thecontradictory Military treaty and Peace Constitution generated threecompatible principles in a single state: 1) free world principle, with the US-Japansecurity treaty and the US as a built-in state factor, 2) pacifist principle with the36Constitution written in 1947, 3) imperial heritage of Emperor Hirohito being
well-preserved, incorporating issues on textbooks, etc. Under these principles,
Japan worked closely with the US to rule Asia politically, economically, andmilitarily.The outcome was opportunism with three faces, which is back to backwith the system of war: 1) facing Asia with peace nationalism, blind to what
Imperial Japan had done to Asian neighbours, 2) pledging allegiance to the US,3) formation of people’s mentality and a leftist political culture. The uproaragainst the turbulence in the 60s with regard to the Vietnam War and theChinese Cultural Revolution made the war mechanisms visible to the people.
The US military based in Okinawa was also a part of the Vietnam war, and thepeople of Okinawa have a totally different view from mainland Japan towards war
and the military. People’s movements and the women’s movement had great
impact on peace and democracy. What happened after the Cold War? Pacifism
supported by people was watered down by a process of economic growth andprosperity. In the 90s,the thrust was to become a full state with an ability tomake war without hesitation, to take pride in our history, but with loyalty to theUS; but how can we justify Pearl Harbour?
As stated earlier, Okinawa has a totally different view towards war and themilitary. Their experience can be described by their sense of betrayal by theJapanese military in the Battle of Okinawa during WWII, disillusionment about
the Peace Constitution, and their anti-US base struggle. Pacifism has its roots in
Okinawa. On this basis, we should overcome narrowness and various barriers
that have been built in our thinking. In conclusion, Muto suggested we need tofigure out ways to integrate state and nation with broader and sharedperspectives for people’s security in this era of ‘global war on terrorism’.
Perspectives from Okinawa and the new quality of women’s movements may be
key to a non-violent intervention.
Questions were raised about Article 9 of the Constitution and its
contradiction with the Japanese Self Defense Force, which holds the second
largest military budget worldwide next to the US. The discussion brought inissues related to the war; US intervention after Japanese defeat in WWII, theConstitution written by the US and jurisdicial judgment of its legitimacy, peace
movement, democratisation brought by McArthur, and the iconized Emperor.
Pearl Harbour was good propaganda to start the war. It marked the beginningof American hegemony. How do Japanese memorize the war? Young people havelittle memories, and textbooks do not have a good description. Some examplesof the different angles are; sympathizing with the suffering of people of othernations, depicting the war as a pacific war between democracy and communism,and sympathetically trying to identify with the young soldiers who lost theirlives. Muto was requested to give future predictions, and stated that we areheading towards a chaotic situation with no acceptable order and competition.
There is no sustainable human society. Military is used to keep order, and theterm ‘stability’ is a trap of the US; stating that in the name of stability, militarypresence is justified. Muto hopes that there is potential amongst the people andindividuals to raise a voice against all this.

37

Resource Person Seminar V, September 26
Terawaki Ken, Director, Cultural Affairs Department, Commissioner
for Cultural Affairs, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Scienceand Technology (MEXT)‘Educational Reform in Japan’
Terawaki gave a clear description of the visions of educational reform in Japan
from elementary to university level with perspectives from historical, economic,
and social backgrounds, in a global framework.
He explained that one focal point of reform is conversion from a
conventional ‘knowledge accumulation’ type of education to ‘knowledge
implementation’ type of education. Quoting from the Constitution, he pointed
out that after WWII, Japan denounced war and intended to achieve a culturaloriented nation; ‘culture’ denoting not only artistic but broad values which are
not linked with economic impacts on society. This original concept wasforgotten during the Cold War period and Japan enjoyed dramatic economic
growth, putting more priority on materialistic prosperity. Since the 80s,
however, a national survey shows that there has been an increase of Japanesepeople who put more value on the importance of spiritual health, rather thanmaterial health. In the 21st century, as we face serious economic downturn andglobalisation, Japanese educational reform is focusing again on its original
concept in achieving cultural individuality and prosperity.
On the basis that human capabilities are measured by knowledge, spiritualstrength, and physical capabilities, and that children grow in the school, home,
and the community, educational reform expects more engagement andresponsibility of the home and the community in nurturing children who aretreasures of their community. As a consequence, schools have been made to
adopt a 5-day week since April 2002, and have received positive feedback fromchildren and adults that they have more time for communication with eachother and contact with nature. Success of the new system also depends on theadult perception and attitude towards their own lifestyles.
Still, there are problems of large-scale dropouts, and children lacking in selfconfidence. A world survey of high school students showed a high percentage
of Japanese students lacking in pride. The problem here is the lack ofunderstanding of individuals as to how to play their role in society, and their lossof interest and motivation in studies. By eliminating excessive uniformity in
education and focusing on the individual personality, students may build
confidence and motivation. Schools will provide integrative, cross-disciplinary,comprehensive study to make use of acquired knowledge and experience.
Problem solving will be stressed in order to raise awareness and need of further
knowledge, and encourage children to study. The reform aims to shape thefoundation for children’s education in the 21st century.
Not only in elementary education, but higher education and even teachers
cannot be left out from this reform process. University reform will deal withbringing in a more student-oriented campus, abolishing uniform entrance
examinations, and in 2004 national funded universities will be abolished and they38

will be required to acquire funding based on evaluation.
Many questions and comments were raised in the following discussion.
Thien: Vietnam has the same issues where educators have no space forcreative teaching. While in need of reform, the teachers and parents who are
the implementers need to be oriented too.
Terawaki: There is a need to shape healthy public sentiment through openpolicy and accountability in international perspectives. It is imperative that the
public should be able to make their choice and decision.
Vinod: Is the nature of reform catered to the local community?
Terawaki:Yes, from nation to local municipal office to personal level, in both
software and hardware.
Vinod: How is teacher-training done?
Terawaki: There is optimism that teachers will also eventually change withrise of public opinion.
Vinod:What about the juku system?
Terawaki: The Ministry is also responsible for juku. The role and benefits ofjuku are valuable for acting on behalf of the parent or community.
Reiko: How do we promote change of adults? Where is the pride of parents?
Terawaki: The lifelong learning program aims to provide opportunities for
adult education.
Tao:Why is there pressure to enter universities in Japan?
Terawaki: Hierarchy of universities and fierce competition make it difficult toenter a prestigious one. The problem of universities is their lack of field ofexpertise and the fact that the name value of your alma mater is more
important than what you study.
Maznah:Will the cost of reform be paid by the state or citizens?
Terawaki:There are two possible scenarios; the private sector will enter themarket and drive up individual cost, which will also change the scholarshipsystem. Another scenario would be more voluntary involvement from thecommunity, which can be considered to be a ‘social’ cost rather than literally‘monetary’ cost.This change in the concept of ‘cost’ would be key to change.
Vinod: How do you view the textbook controversy?
Terawaki: Negative interpretations are the cause of the controversy. The
younger generation has potential to overcome barriers on common basic
assumptions and start accepting history.
Resource Person Seminar VI, October 1
by Prof. Kosaku Yoshino, Associate Professor of Sociology, Universityof Tokyo‘Globalisation as ‘Englishisation’: Asian Experiences’
Professor Yoshino first defined the term ‘Englishisation’ or ‘Englification’ todescribe “the process whereby English spreads”, which is a fairly new word, usedby linguists and scholars interested in the politics of English language. He
focused on globalisation in higher education and the issue of English language
39

today, by comparing the Japanese and Malaysian situations. He also raisedquestions: How can Japanese universities, with poor command of English,
compete with English speaking universities of other countries? What does itmean for non-Japanese students who come to Japan from abroad, to study in amonolingual country?
The debate on “English Imperialism” has long existed in Japanese society
among the globalists, critics against domination of the English language, andcultural nationalists. He introduced some of the arguments of linguistic
nationalists, who insisted that we should be liberated from the dominance ofEnglish, that is, unfair power games, call for the protection of the beautiful
language, and preserve Japan’s linguistic sovereignty.
On the contrary, Professor Yoshino views Japanese Universities as failures in
globalisation of higher education since English is not commonly used, andtherefore cannot accommodate migration of students from other parts of theworld. In contrast, Malaysia is successful in playing its role as a hub of higher
education and international students, with twin programs with universities of
the US, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. Japan is left out of this networkingof English-speaking universities. In reality, how can Japan cope in the global
competitive market without English?
Professor Yoshino raised three questions for discussion: 1) Issue of linguistic
imperialism, and the concept of ‘standard’ English in contrast to ‘Asian’ English,2) Internationalization or localization of English, 3) The meaning of conducting
business in English - does that mean we are no longer exploited by the power
holder?
Maznah explained the situation in Malaysia where there is a divide between
foreign and local private universities. Professor Yoshino’s interest in Malaysia lies
in its close linkage with the Chinese, Muslim, and Indian civilizations within one
national context. The fact that students from the Middle East are recruited to
Malaysia under the slogan ‘Malaysia, truly Asia’ after 9/11, shows this trend.
Vinod questioned whether cultural preservation must always imply narrow
nationalism. In India, they share no one language, and there is very little that could
be called ‘Indian’ – language, food, dress, music and so on. How can you preserve
linguistic diversity in a live form and exclude another language at the same time?
Professor Yoshino tried to explain the relationship of the use of English andpreservation of culture by giving an example of the Japanese culture, which isextremely difficult to generalize and define because of its regional, individual, andclass differences. If you cannot define a unique Japanese culture, there is diversity
enough not to define nationalism, which implies homogeneity. Speaking English
does not change your identity, but there are people who believe so.
In China,Tao explained that people have strong motives to learn the English
language, to have a different angle and exchange ideas. As they have a standard
Chinese dialect, the Chinese feel they need to learn the common language tocommunicate with the world. Professor Yoshino pointed out an interesting
distinction between Malaysia and Singapore where English is a community
language, and Japan, China, and Korea, which try to imitate the British or
American model.
40

Reiko stated that the uniqueness of English is that it absorbs different
cultures, history, and ideas. Vinod raised another question, how does higher
education play a role in getting a language integrated, in comparison with therole of, say, popular culture? He thinks rather than higher education, popular
culture plays a bigger role in the assimilation of a language.
Thien thought that in cultural terms, acquiring a new language supplements
knowledge and enables new interactions which lead to forming a hybrid culture.The
influence also depends on the person’s choice and consciousness towards learning.
Professor Yoshino also commented on the political and economic aspects ofEnglish language. The notion of ‘Standard English’ challenges autonomy of any
other English language that leads to domination and subordination.
Vinod’s question: Is the reluctance to open up to the English language in Japan
based on cultural nationalism, on the perception that it would destroy Japaneseculture, or for practical reasons where there are not many English teachers whoare capable enough? According to Professor Yoshino, opposition based onpolitical reasons is in a minority.The main obstacle to English education in Japanis lack of capabilities. Maznah also commented that Malaysia has a complex anddeep-rooted situation of tension between globalization and nationalization,
where English was banned by the state during the nationalization period in the70s, and now the same government is promoting the language.
Thien pointed out that in Vietnam, there are many private English centersother than schools, where people can learn the language. Professor Yoshino
informed that it is more or less the same in Japan, and the English educationindustries seem to be politically and globally linked with schools that do notteach practical English, for the prosperity of the industry.
Vinod shared the case in India, where the National Book Trust producestranslations into 14 languages for all books that are awarded by the state as
outstanding literature in each language. He also pointed out that economic
control is shifting from nation-states to corporations, where they are
dominating the global market. One symbolic example is that of the IT software
industry, based on the English language. It is also producing a division of laborand promoting the hegemony of English language.
Tao proposed that from an economic point of view, if Japan could adjust its
economic structure, reduce public works and increase new industry such as theeducation industry, there is big potential for Japan. If higher education isconducted in English, Japan can attract more students from other countries.
Resource Person Seminar VII, October 4, 2002
by Mushakoji Kinhide,‘HumanSecurity
andInformality: The
Commodification, and Criminalization ofCommunities’

Globalization,
the Informal

Professor Mushakoji first gave three reasons why he is interested in ‘informal
communities’: 1) To begin with, regardless of the idea that nations are composedof the state and civil society, it is difficult to define “civil society” in Japan.As an
41

individual, there is also an identity gap within ourselves where we hold bothformalities and informalities. 2) According to a report of the UN Conference in
Durban last August, the NGO forum was said to be a failure because their
behaviour was not in a diplomatic style, and the declaration by NGOs was too
repetitive and emotional. However, it reveals that those who can speak the UN
language are only a minority in civil society, and do not represent the true
people who are oppressed and angry. 3) The1995 Beijing conference, focusing
on double discrimination combining gender and racial discrimination, revealed
trafficking and sexual slavery accompanying sex industries in Japan.The industry
was formally run by the Japanese state, but there are many other informal
institutions that exploit human rights.
Professor Mushakoji has also been studying the issues in Europe and North
America.A report from Germany states that the global political economy is now
run by neo-liberalism, and describes that the State is reducing its contribution
to civil society, and people are falling into informal civil society. In Canada, Steven
Gill gives an analysis that the formal side of disciplinary neo-liberalism is not an
idea but a discipline, and promotes the notion of freedom in a controlled form
within the free market.There is surveillance and security in the capital market.
The formal practice is called ‘new-constitutionalism’ which is controlled by the
US through the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. The more the formal practice, themore informal people are getting involved in crime.
How did the formal and informal develop? The basic idea is that modern
history is developing from community to civil society and we need to learn how
to build civil society, peace, and democracy. However, there is the informal side
within us that is undemocratic. Our economy should not be selfishly directed
to rational behaviour.We have our own identities and culture.There is not only
one global economy of formal capitalist, but there are networks based oncommunities and other networks e.g., criminal networks. The problem is theassumption that this is not good. Globalisation has its informal communal side,which can be called the anti-social and anti-systematic side. It is important tolook at these aspects of reality closely.
In terms of human security, Professor Mushakoji referred to the
Scandinavian countries where they solve problems among the countries
through negotiations and not by military means. The Security Communities in
the North denote only the civil society, but exclude the informal communities.
Migrant insecurity is increasing in Japan, Europe, and North America. This is‘global fascism’, where everyone is under observation and surveillance of thesuperpower, and human rights is restricted for the sake of human security, in anegative sense. In terms of the issue of ‘multitude’, civil society does not likethe multitude, because it is not well organized. Terrorism is part of themultitude. It is important to develop a new theory that is based on the
networking of formal and informal Security Communities. The concept of‘Common Security’ which was used between the US and Soviet Union during
the Cold War, can also be adopted for people of Tokyo and trafficked womenin Shinjuku.We need to develop the ‘common human security’ between formal
and informal security communities.
42

Professor Mushakoji gave four conclusions to his argument: 1) Global
Fascism has to be opposed by an alliance of the citizens and the ‘multitude’.
He feels it is happening in situations such as the World Social Forum where thecivil society, grassroots activists, and NGOs are working together. 2) The citizens
must realize that the multitude sticks to its roots of identity. Professor
Mushakoji pointed out that identity politics resorting to violence is bad, but inreality, we cannot become an idealistic ‘world citizen’, and need to recognize themultitude is composed of people with their own identities. 3) A global dialogue
must involve the transformation of ‘global states’ with a clear political andeconomic agenda. He quoted an example from Antonio Gramsci, in which hestated the need to develop common projects between formal and informal
communities based on networking of communities, not run by the global stateor corporations.
This obviously led to a provocative and lively discussion:
Maznah questioned, how do you deal with multitudes that are more benign,
and those that are oppressive and threatening, trying to enlarge theirboundaries?
Mushakoji:To deal with the dangerous part of the multitude, a negative way
is to force the multitude to be a part of the civil society. On the other hand, bylooking at multitude as an overlapping phenomenon, we can try and figure out
how to develop common securities between different multitudes, which maylead to dialogue. Another way may be to have dovish leaders in communities,
with a non-violent approach, not to encourage the hawks. Gandhi’s message wasthat your identity would be served best if you can have a broader understandingof humankind and have a dovish approach.The multitude should be activated ina non-violent way.
Vinod: Multitude does not imply anarchy, and has a degree of organization,
though different from civil society. Shouldn’t we try to integrate them into
democratic systems?
Mushakoji: Globalization of the economy is breaking these systems in termsof locals and migrants.
Tao: The Chinese government issued a regulation on the mafia, but theunderground economy is conducting money exchanges.As a result of regulation,
the central bank is monopolized and people find it easier to exchange moneywith the underground organization.Therefore, the informal market is a productof the government.The “black banks” in southern China also fit in to the nichemarket for individuals to borrow money from, since the big banks do not lendmoney to small businesses. Tao quoted another example in Amsterdam, where
prostitution and drug is legal. It may be good economically, but socially, it may
not be good.What is your observation?
Mushakoji: Regarding Amsterdam, economically it is free but in the center
there are the Dutch girls and in the periphery, Indonesian girls, who are illegal
and cheaper.There is racial hierarchy here.Another example for the Chinese istheir tradition of salt criminals. In terms of criminality, trafficking should not beliberalized, but in reality, they prevail - a complex situation. I am interested indifferent kinds of ownership in production. In China, a capitalist system is on the43coastal area, but the workers own the village system. There, production is
owned not by the state but the community.
Tao: Reform of ownership will be a critical issue in China in the coming threeor four years. Economy at the macro level seems good but on the micro level,
it is not good because of the ownership system.There are big differences in theurban and rural areas. It is a difficult balance in such a big country.
Thien referred to media control and existence of the illegal black market in
Vietnam. Since people are lured to the more attractive black market, thegovernment and media need to adjust their system to meet demands ofpeasants and farmers and small business. Thien also referred to the oriental
concept of yin-yang. Every aspect of society has ‘yin’ activities.Yin and yang areinteracting and complementary.
Mushakoji: Western social science lacks yin-yang analysis. To understand theformal and informal, Germans are adopting this theory.
Thien: In literature, there are also the conventional and unconventional
literature, oral literature, and anecdotes. For example, carnivals are an illegalpart of life. In every field of human activity, there is the illegal and informal
aspect.We should have respect for the informal and multitude.
Mushakoji: Art and graffiti, counter-culture creativity belongs to the multitude.
In sophisticated civil society art, there is no spirit.Yin represents the multitude
and yang represents the technocrats.
Vinod asked about governance and law. Liberal democracy is pushed
predently because of the demonization of Islam. Islamic law is considered as aninhuman law. In India, there are community law systems. Indigenous groups haveindigenous legal systems to resolve conflicts. Second question: Philanthropy iskindness to the society, but is it good? Is it legal or illegal?
Mushakoji: Robbers contribute to the society. The stability of Japanesepolitics is based on the LDP. It links multinational interests with local interestand local bosses.
Reiko: How can we persuade the public regarding the need for common
human security? After 9/11, the Islamic community and the US community tried
to dialogue, but there have been no positive outcomes. Instead, there is afeeling of fatigue amongst people. Where is the solution for dialogue andcoexistence?
Mushakoji:We need to work on a different level, on a more legal and formal
level. For example, there are open-minded reformers of Islam law. Dialogue
between human rights and Islam.There are informal sides of Islam, such as theIslamic economics ethics. For example in Indonesia, Muslim and Christian
women are demonstrating together through a sharing of feminist concerns.The
role of women is transcending religion, common interests and ideal. Anotherexample is of artistic manifestations such as music, that is shared among people
transcending communities.

44

Resource Person Seminar VIII, October 8, 2002
by Christopher Yohmei Blasdel, Shakuhachi Performer, Lecturer onJapanese Music;Advisor to Arts Program,The International House of Japan‘Traditional Performing Arts in Japan; Preservation, Transmission, &Performance’
Blasdel gave an overview of Japanese traditional performing arts by providing
explanations about Gagaku, Shoumyou, Biwa, Noh, Koto, Shamisen, Shakuhachi,
and folk song and dance, with audio references from a CD and his live
performance on the Shakuhachi. At the beginning, he described Japanesetraditional art as an integrated form with extensive influences over the ages
from cultures of China, Korea, Southeast Asia, and India.
Gagaku, a banquet style orchestra performed and practiced in the Imperial
household, was imported from China and Korea and established itself in theearly half of the 9th century. The instruments used are relevant to those of
China, India, and Vietnam. The court dance (Bugaku) which is accompanied by
the gagaku ensemble, shows a formation of symmetrical style which later
developed an asymmetrical formation.The songs can be described as synthesisof Shintoism and Buddhism.
Shoumyou, which is a chanting of the Buddhist text conducted in religious
ceremonies, also came from China, Korea, and India, and transcribed to theJapanese context.This sutra chanting is believed to be the standard of Japanese
vocal music which later developed into songs accompanied by the stringed
instruments, shamisen and biwa. Because of its religious status, it is only recently
that its artistic aspect has become recognized. The gagaku and shoumyou are
the basis of Japanese traditional music.
The Biwa, a plucked lute, can also be traced to the Chinese pipa and Persianoud. It was originally used in gagaku and Buddhist chanting, and gradually used insecular forms. It is most famous for its use in the narrated performance of theTales of the Heike, a story of the rise and fall of a Japanese aristocratic family.The
purpose of narration was to let people know of the tragic historical stories, andalso for the salvation of dead souls of the warriors who perished in fierce battle.
The instrument and style of performance later developed several variations.
Noh theater was patronized by the Shogun in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries. They had no preference for gagaku and patronized sarugaku street
theater, which later developed into noh theater. It contains minimalistic
movement, dance, singing, and literature, requiring not only the performers but
also the audience to be trained in comprehending its contents. It is regarded as
an expression of the aesthetics of middle age Japan, of Zen and minimalism;
economic, formalized, dignified movements, highly artistic, with refined andexplicit elements. Popular topics were on the Heike family and demon plays.The
noh stage is a sacred space where the performers descend from the spiritual
world to the real world.The orchestra consists of six to eight chorus members
together with performers of the flute and drum. Its language is chanted in
middle age Japanese in unit structures. The mask is condensed into simplicity
and symbolized, yet encompassing rich expression.
45

Koto, a flat zither with thirteen strings, was originally used in gagaku, butbecame a popular home instrument in the 17th century, accompanied by singing.
The shamisen, a three-stringed lute, was imported via China and Okinawa in
the Edo period. It is used in kabuki theater and bunraku puppet theater, andbecame popular in performing folk music and among geisha entertainment.
Shakuhachi, a five-holed bamboo end-blown flute, also came from China aspart of the gagaku ensemble. It disappeared from gagaku in the 12th century but
was later used in the secular and religious world by monks and poets. A basic
shakuhachi repertoire is called the honkyoku, which is meditative and purely
instrumental in Japanese music. Mr Blasdel gave an impressive demonstration on
one traditional composition about a national bird, the crane.
Asked about himself, Mr Blasdel referred to his biography, ‘A Shakuhachi
Odyssey’ in which he writes about his personal experience of studying,developing, and traveling in Japan since living here as a student in the seventies.
He recalls his learning experience of shakuhachi and how it synthesized with theinner learning and changing of his own self.To play music, to be an artist, to makea difference in creativity, you need to enrich yourself through discipline and selfquestioning, learning the formal aspect of art, and developing the contents.
Shakuhachi, for him, is a tool for spiritual growth, and means of meditation.
Improvisation with traditional and contemporary music elements is not acompromise, but one needs to know the classic technique and history to beable to do that.The ambience, or the traditional lifestyle with which traditionalart was born is already lost, not to mention the restrictions of length of timethat we are able to put on a medium such as the compact disk.The Ministry of
Education mandated music education in junior high schools, to teach Japanesetraditional instruments, which only endanger Japanese music by being
popularised in a commercial form.
Resource Person Seminar IX, October 9, 2002
by Donald Richie,‘The Structure of Japanese Culture’
Richie gave a provisional, rough blueprint of the structure of Japanese culture
by indicating patterns and how they are portrayed, to offer ideas of how
Japanese culture is put together. He observed that the main feature of theculture is modularisation. One useful example for understanding is represented
by Tokyo city, which is an intricately structured city, that also serves as atemplate of interchangeable parts for every other place in Japan.Tokyo does nothave a center, but is comprised of various centers and a collection of small cities,
which have never integrated the way western cities did. These “nodes” areidentical. It is made of modules or patterns that are represented by convenience
stores, pachinko, hairdressing salon, shoe shop, etc., which are the sameelements which constitute the city or town or village. In the traditional homes,
the tatami (straw mattress), fusuma (Japanese cardboard door) and shoji(Japanese paper shade) are interchangeable construction parts formodularization. Similarly, the traditional costume kimono is another example.
46

Street fashions and language also retain their modular forms, but there is adesperation to try out new experiments, which become a fad.Another order ofmodular system, kata, is a breaking down into small units. For example,
traditional sports and music are learned and memorized in kata.The assumption
is that these modules proliferate. One of the ways to make a module is to
reduce things into small and efficient parts. The miniaturization is represented
by bonsai (miniature gardening), electronics, and transistor chips. For example,
the Japanese garden, like Disneyland, tries to miniaturize nature into small space,
and the ikebana attempts to make flowers look more natural and authentic thannature.The idea of smallness culturally represents convenience, practicality, andcivilization, but represents a strong national ethos. Impulse for miniature isculturally imperative. Modularizing also implies economic efficiency andstandardization. Public taste regarding products is also standardized. Brand
names are miniaturization of taste and easily accepted as standardized culture.
Why does Japan use modularization? Mr Richie analyses that it is purposely used
for ease of governance, control, regularization, controlled harmony, andstandardized guidance in various contexts. He concluded that the structure ofJapanese culture creates a means of both disciplining and producing, creates a
successful way of making and marketing, and efficient methods for developing
and profiting, but at a great cost.
Mr Richie then requested for feedback on his general thoughts, and the restof the session was devoted on questions and discussion with the Fellows.
Maznah: From outside, Japanese culture looks well managed.Are there crosscurrents and counter currents of Japanese culture coming from younger
generation?
Richie: Cannot see them coming.There was counter-culture during 1965 to1969 with students, which the government successfully toned down. The
Japanese psyche always have honne (real thoughts) and tatemae (social
appearance), giri ninjo (duty or obligation; what you owe to somebody). There
are two people in one person. Here, they have a social standard principle, andtheir individuality does not show, but the expense is spiritual.
Tao: Found similarities with Shanghai and Japan; garden and houses are small,small amount of food in restaurants, efficient and economic products, language
is indirect and diplomatic. Different from Beijing.
Richie: Shanghai is exposed to the outside world. Beijing looks inside. The
rulers of Japan would have been different if they were aware of the outside
world. For example, the city of Fukuoka in western Japan looks more to Asia.
Just like Shanghai, the Kyushu area (western Japan) is periphery from the centerand historically was never subjected to central politics.
Vinod: Japan looks more connected to the US and unconnected with Asia.The
modularization thinking is similar to the Descartes notion of reducing everything
to binaries.Why is Japan closer on this western “reduceability”? In contrast,Asia,
which Japan is a part of, is not so reductionist, and deals with the complex.
Richie: There is a third possibility that people may think differently, but feelthe same. People are moulded by civilization, economics, and politics.
Vinod: The diversities, plurality, creation of complexities accumulate and47

dissolve. Isn’t there creativity, diversity and plurality in Japanese culture?
Richie: The invisible wall on which the tree of Japanese culture grows iscreated by its history, agenda of political party in power, and control power.
There is the unofficial side and official side of Japan. The real Japan was shownwith outlets in the 60s, when Japan experienced outbreaks of youth fashion andculture.
Vinod:‘Rashomon’ depicted there is nothing like a truth or fact.The pluralityof viewing the fact is complex and cannot be reduced. It depicted Japan’s
philosophy.What you said seems contradictory.
Richie: Think of the maverick – Kurosawa - he doesn’t represent Japan, buthimself. Kurosawa wanted to say there is no one reality.We each perceive reality
in different ways.The maverick doesn’t reduce himself.
Mohamad Haji Salleh: I come from a country with poverty and political strife.
Malaysia is experimenting on the social system. It may come up with goodresults. Japan seems successful but needs to improve on individuality.
Richie: Bureaucrats trying to protect their turfs. Few people who want toprotect their common wheel!
Ann: In ‘Japanese homogeneity’, what do you see as demarcations of class andsexuality?
Richie: Changing rapidly with economic erosion. Class is about money.
Demarcations of class is not being addressed but gender is heavily questioned,
also especially in terms of sexual freedom. Now you see erosion of traditional
values and dynamic social change, and eruption of new culture and values.
Reiko:What do Americans expect from Ozu films? They seem to be enjoying
the kata education system.
Richie:Americans admire a land of order because they are badly trained andlive in a land of individuals.They need royalty.Too much freedom does not work.
Ozu films are popular because they have many rules with camera and narrative.
Ozu teaches us to be creative within these boundaries and shows us a different
kind of freedom by giving other options. Americans feel even nostalgic for thevalues.
Vinod agreed with Mr Richie’s observation that affluence seems to havebecome a disease in Japan and his wish to see more frugality and discovering
the earth, could be a solution to bring back some hope to the present social
situation. Another question: In spite of the modularity and kata in Japanesesociety, you were strongly influenced by Mr Suzuki who had just the opposite
values, and have since lived here. It seems contradictory?
Richie: True, but I don’t see it as a conflict. People are made of different
elements. In Japan, I find ways to satisfy my needs for order and anarchy. I founda country where both ends could be entertained. I could be a whole entity inthis country where as I could not be so in America.There are other countries
but only by being an outsider. If I were Japanese, I would not live here. I live here
because of my difference and freedom.
Maznah: It sounds a paradox, but modularization can lead to individualization.
Exceptions can be parts of a whole complexity of a culture. I like appreciationof complexities of cultures rather than reducing it.
48

Richie: We’re talking about variables and balance of back and forth. The
problem is that we do not have a counterpoint of real Japan.
Thien: I am interested in the concept of Ma.
Richie: It is an aesthetic term used by aestheticians to identity theindefinable. Ma is the way space is used. Emptiness has weight. Nothingness is
not empty. It has its positive qualities. A room where what is not there has thesame weight as one with what is there. In the West, there is the concept ofnegative space. Ma is not used.The concept of Ma indicates that nothingness has
substance, which makes it not negative, but positive. Difficult to comprehend.
Many such terms, for example, shibui, wabi sabi, hade, jimi… Concepts of values
which cannot be discussed. Ancient Greek had similar terms.
Vinod: In India, the notion of emptiness is full of meaning. What is absent is
powerful.
Richie: One reason Ozu movies are loved is because he refuses to be
pragmatic about existence. He will leave things out by stopping narratives or the
picture, and make the audience reflect on the absence.
Vinod: Silence in Indian music. It gives a different meaning.
Thien: What is your notion of smell, color and sound? (quoting from aninterview of Mr Richie)
Richie: Human beings make clutter and clean them up. For example, it must
be an extension of one’s property for them to take care of. If something belongs
to everybody, it belongs to nobody.This seems extreme and strong in Japan.
Resource Person Seminar X, October 10, 2002
by Professor Ryosei Kokubun, Director of Center for Area Studies,
Professor of Political Science Department, Keio University‘China’s WTO Entry and Sino-Japanese Relations’
The presentation by Professor Kokubun focused on 1) the assessment ofChinese entry into WTO, and 2) perspective of Sino-Japanese relations on the
30th anniversary year of diplomatic normalization. He quoted from aninteresting opinion poll conducted in major cities of Asian nations in the year
2000 by one of the largest public relations companies in Japan.Asked about the
impression of ‘globalization’, the Chinese and Japanese results were two
extremes. Japanese show pessimism on the surface but their action is often
optimistic. The Chinese are optimistic but their reaction is extremely realistic
and pessimistic. The difference derives from their historical and social
backgrounds.
Since the Meiji restoration, Japan has worked on economic modernization
for more than 130 years. The system has worked by distributing wealth andmost people are considered middle class. However, it brought serious stagnationin the system while unnecessary regulation escalated and political corruption
spread and regenerated. Due to the system’s hard foundation, it is difficult tocarry out reform. Meanwhile, it has only been some twenty years since theintroduction of open-door policy in China. The foundation of its economy andsociety is not yet certified. Its economic base is still fragile.That is why China is49

susceptive to globalization and considers it as a great challenge and opportunity.
With such differences in the two countries, it is necessary to make adjustments
in building a relationship.
In China, globalization has been a topic for discussion in the context of being
admitted to WTO. China must adjust the economic domestic system to meetthe requirements of the international market economy, to change into a
capitalistic economic system. It persisted for accession to WTO in order tomake fundamental changes, because it was too dependent on foreign capital.
40% of GDP is dependent on trade, of which 50% is exports by foreign
corporations. In terms of national tax revenue, 20% of tax revenue comes fromforeign companies. These facts show how Chinese economy had to adapt toforeign pressure and competition, whereas a thick wall protects Japan.
These days, Japanese are attracted to make investments in China.
Corporations and manufacturers from Japan and Southeast Asia are moving to
China. In the past, there were several ‘China booms’ in Japan. In 1972, after
diplomatic normalization of China-Japan relationship, China was in the midst of
the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, after signing the Peace and Friendship Treaty
and the official long-term agreement, Japan decided to export advanced
technology to China, and China decided to export oil to Japan. China started its
economic modernization process. Japan started to establish business in China.
However in 1981 after business agreements were cancelled, the boom wasgone. During 1984-85, China made rapid progress in economic reform where
coastal cities were opened up for foreign business. Durable consumer goods
were imported to China and consumers started buying Japanese goods. The
mood was again disturbed by the visit to Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister
Nakasone which fuelled Chinese anger. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping made thedeclaration of a socialist market economy and opened the country. Japanese andforeign corporations rushed into the market, resulting in annual growth rate ofover 10 percent. In the late 90s, the Asian financial crisis and other problems
influenced the economy. Economic stagnation accelerated and bad loans
accumulated.The fifth boom started in 2001, not because of great expectationsof entering the market, but because of the Japanese recession forcing companies
to move to China.
Behind the boom, there is a deep-rooted China economic threat theory inJapan and uneasiness that cheap Chinese goods will blow away Japanese goods
from the market. It is said that the move of the Japanese corporations is related
to China’s entry into WTO, but this statement should be studied carefully.
Rather, it is related to Japanese recession. Direct investment by Japanesemanufacturing companies has been increasing while it has decreased with otherforeign countries. Japan, Korea, Taiwan manufacturers are offering employment
and stabilization of Chinese economy and accelerating transfer of technology.
As a result, Japan is facing hollowing out of industries from the country.
How should we understand the current state of Sino-Japan relations? There
are no major conflicts, but the biggest problem is the image and people’s feelings
toward one another. As can be seen from the past, it is easily fluctuated bypolitical strategies and events between the countries. Noticeably, the 197250

framework changed the international structure and system. Generation change
and Japanese domestic policies also contributed to building a new relationship.
A similar situation can be seen in China and Taiwan. With political regimechanges, from Mao to Deng to Jiang Zeming, Chinese society is changing.
Within the new framework, what should we do towards rebuilding the
China/Japan relationship? 1) Search for ways to develop cooperative relations.
Because economic relations are interdependent and strong, we can monitor the
relationship. However, we need to deal with issues in a logical manner, lest
conflicts occur with slight emotional divergence. 2) We need to perceive theChina/Japan relationship within the framework of East Asia. Relatedly, free trade
agreements are also an important issue and necessary in the region, namely
ASEAN plus three.
Tao argued: It seems the China/Japan relationship is still based on Cold War
perceptions. Is China a threat, a potential enemy in economic and environmental
terms? The US, which defined China as a potential enemy, needs potential
enemies for military purposes and business. China is joining the international
community.What comes after joining WTO? It can be OECD. Cold War thinking
should be changed.
Thien: For Vietnamese and other small nations, it is true that China is an
unconscious threat. However, we need to be aware that there are biased views
regarding national interests.
Kokubun: I have never talked about the China threat. I am talking about therising China. We are watching carefully how China behaves. It should betransparent which will help reduce the unconscious fear towards China.
Vinod: The results of the Friendship survey, and the fact that when there isminimal interaction there is a good mutual impression, is interesting. It is an
important question.The perception that as we move towards liberalization andan open world, we will be friendlier, is in question. We are moving towards amore self-exploited, self-interested world order. There is an inherent
contradiction of terms. Increased business interaction is also an increase inthreat perceptions. Therefore, opening up economically does not necessarilymean a better world order. Can economic open-door policy be matched by apolitical system that can keep this distress down? The biggest problem with
China in this context is a slightly non-transparent political system.
Maznah: Can ASEAN be a solution? It’s creating a block.
Kokubun: Relations between ASEAN and China, Korea is sensitive andcompetitive. ASEAN and China have a gentleman’s agreement.
Reiko:What is the remedy to understand the real China?
Kokubun: Approach from the reality, history and culture.
Kokubun: In case of China, the challenge is lack of democracy. How theleaders are elected will be the key point. One good sign is they are raising goodinternational people. Japan is sustained by its system.

51

Resource Person Seminar XI, October 17, 2002
by Funabashi Yoichi,
Chief Diplomatic Correspondent & Columnist of The Asahi Shimbun;
Professor Takeda Isami, Dokkyo University as observer‘Japan’s Post-War History’Followed by a brief introduction from Professor Takeda, Dr. Funabashi gave aconcise description of more than 50 years of ‘Japan’s Post-War History’,with the underlying question as to the role its partners should play in policymaking.
After World War II, the United States and Japan played a ‘good winner’ and‘good loser’ role, respectively, in which Gen McArthur imposed an occupation
policy to democratize Japan, lasting until 1952. However in the 60s, the signingof the US-Japan Peace Treaty fueled sentiments against the US and Japanese
government. People’s sense of ownership for democracy was challenged andnationalistic sentiments against US were suppressed by McArthur and Prime
Minister Yoshida, which finally exploded. Economically, Japan enjoyed its golden
60s with a GDP growth rate of more than 10%. During the 60-70s the middle
class formed the solid basis of society. Events such as the Tokyo Olympics in1964 and joining the OECD and G7 has turned Japan from a ‘good loser’ to a‘good builder’. With economic upliftment, the ruling party was able to absorb
Japan’s ‘surging nationalism’.
Two die-hard issues in Japanese politics still remain. One is the Hiroshima
and Nagasaki issue with disputes over the legacy of nuclear weapons. Japan and
US have not come to terms with this sensitive issue, both holding different
views.Another unsettling issue is the presence of an American base in Okinawa.
Citizens’ movements, such as the women’s human rights movement,
environmental movements, and local grassroots activists, have opposed thecontinued operation of the base. They are becoming major players of thenationalist and protest movements.
From another perspective, we could ask the question: is Japan a ‘model
country’? Does it have a vision to explore beyond catching up with economic
growth; such as becoming a major player for human rights, environmental ethics,
or a cultural epicenter for a new civilization? It has no national consensus,
identity, nor leadership. People have become ambivalent to the role of thegovernment over the years. The occupation days and the following years havebeen a collusion between the ruling class and occupation forces, with no true
democracy. The epitaph, ‘Politicians reign, bureaucrats rule’ dominated the war
years and remains cemented since occupation.
The Cold War and Gulf War experience was traumatic. Japanese aid to theseconflicts was not appreciated. It challenged Japan’s economic success and provedthat economic power is not compatible with geo-political power. Japan was too
clumsy to adjust to new security dynamics.
It was in the year 1995 that people realized the ineffectiveness andincapability of the central and local governments in handling the earthquake
disaster and Aum Shinrikyo attacks. It revealed how irrelevant the Japanese52government was in ensuring human security.The following year, it was revealed
that the Ministry of Welfare had allowed the use of unheated blood plasma,
which resulted in transmitting HIV disease to 20,000 people. Fifty years after
WWII, the credibility of public services was shattered causing deep mistrust of
the government. Internationally, Japan was the target of serious accusations
from Asian countries over historical issues, strongly suggesting that the past will
not easily fade out. Issues like the comfort women, Japanese official textbooks,
POWs,Yasukuni Shrine and so on, are a source of continued unease in post-war
Japan.
Finally, Dr Funabashi attempted to grade Japanese post war history. In his
view, Japan, as ‘Good loser’ merits A minus, ‘Good builder’, A, ‘Good citizen’, B
plus, ‘Good neighbor’, B minus.
The question and answer session was as profound as the presentation itself.
Questioned about the reason for Japan’s reluctance to take on an internationalrole in Asia, Dr Funabashi gave explanations from several perspectives including
complex history issues and their constraints on diplomatic policies, domestic
bureaucratic system, Japan - US alliance system, reluctance of Asian countries to
accept Japanese leadership, and Japan’s inability to follow through an alignment.
Regarding the future of the Japan-US relationship, he predicted that ‘checkbook
diplomacy’ could not be afforded anymore. Japan’s economic peak has alreadypassed. Rather, it would be most affected by the underlying issue of the Korean
peninsula; specifically North Korea, and the US-China relationship. The Okinawa
issue, however, will still remain as the focal point. For Japan, China is unlikely to
become a direct fractious point. It is up to the political leadership and theirdecision of how to realign and revitalize the relationship with China. Professor
Takeda added that we should also carefully follow the effect of Free Trade
Agreements between Japan and ASEAN countries. Asked whether Japan had
strong oppositional tendencies within, that might destabilize the democratic,
peaceful, and economically equal society, Dr Funabashi explained that Japan isbasically a homogenous society with no serious dividing lines, although it is likely
to become more multi-ethnic. Citing from Dr Funabashi’s article in which healerts about US unilateralism, would the Japanese society support his view when
actually unilateral action might bring economic benefit to Japan? To this, he repliedthat the Japanese society stood in a vulnerable state, with no independent militaryforce to protect the metropolitan cities. Japan would rather see a more
multilaterally assured society. If the US is constantly targeted by terrorists orother forces, it would impose risks on allied countries as well. Imposing military
power would only upset the delicate balance, which has been established withneighboring countries.To keep the balance, we must develop Asian regionalism bystabilizing Southeast Asia and Central Asia, having India and China more involved,
and search for global civilian power. On the debate of revising the JapaneseConstitution and handling the emerging fervor for nationalism, Dr Funabashi
didn’t see the issue as politically developed, revolving around the ‘peace issue’
between the Socialist party and Liberal Democratic Party. Lastly, on how we canrevitalize mulilateralism in the world order and challenge unilateralism, he saw
ASEAN plus 3 at the core of this, rather than Japan.
53Core Seminar 1, September 18
by Prof. Fujiwara, Kiichi, University of Tokyo‘Heiwa-shugi;The Life and Times of Pacifist Intellectuals in Japan’Professor Fujiwara gave a thorough explanation of Intellectuals in Japan in achanging historical and social context before and after the Meiji restoration
period, after World War II, up to the present.
Until Meiji era, the criteria of a Chishikijin, or Intellectual in Japan included
his capability to read Chinese text, and the long tradition lived on until the
1960s. With the Meiji restoration, westernisation became another key factor.
According to Professor Fujiwara, Intellectuals are not professional scholars,
politician, nor activists. ‘Intellectuals’ and ‘Activists’ should also be clearly
distinguished. ‘Intellectuals’ can be defined as those putting value tomeaninglessness and uselessness, doing nothing but being absorbed in thinking
and observation.Then who are the Intellectuals? For example in China, they areoften those who have trailed out from the mainstream power, who failed
national examinations and became poets, or those who were not born as eldersons in Russia. In Japan, the ex-samurais who were ousted from government
offices became educators and journalists, and social advocates calling for action
against injustice.To this day, the term Chishikijin has a leftist implication. In short,the Intellectual’s role is to find meaning of spirit of the times and lives of people.
In the post WWII ‘enlightening period’, there was a sudden outburst ofpeople talking, and writing in journals. What were their accomplishments interms of historical context? How did their day begin and how did it end? What
did war mean to intellectuals? First of all, it meant a demise of any liberalargument.The Japanese Communist Party, which was an anarchy of social voices
and the only party that could confront militarism, was shut off after 1937.Witha Stalinist discipline, the party was repressive towards supporters of social andindependent voices. They also played their part of a secular religion among
intellectuals in the 30s, as the only political institution that could confront the
government. After the War, there were those who supported the party but
those who criticized it were interested in regaining their voices, and rather thanargue about war crimes, their focal point was to argue against hierarchy andhegemony of the party authority. Their first debate after the War was the‘politics and literature debate’, which stood against the Stalinist discipline
imposed on independent writers. The decline of party control of intellectuals
opened a liberal space for a new group of intellectuals in Japan.This was also thebeginning of a surge of real socialism that is neither Chinese nor Russian. Not
adhering to party leadership, they started to look for ‘real’ communism.This isa very important stream of thought in post-war Japan. Another group can beloosely called the ‘pacifist people’. For them, an outbreak of ‘peace’ and‘democracy’ became so important until it became meaningless.This trend has its
significant origin in the Japanese psyche. During the War, the State and people
were united under the Emperor symbol.After the war, the State lost credibilityof political power, breaking its relationship with society. Civic nationalism
emerged in return to put together ‘We’, which implies ‘the society’, against the54

‘State’. ‘Peace’ and ‘Democracy’ were popular symbols that were respected at
the social ‘we’ level but neglected at the political level. In this context, the roleof intellectuals was to make sure that the power holders were not neglecting
these symbols, in order to fight against authority.This liberal project was actuallya revival of early 1920s, during the movement of ‘Taisho Democracy’, when
there was open space in civil society to speak about various ideas. However, the
new generation who grew up in the 1940s held strong resentment toward these
elitist intellectuals who did nothing against the government but repeat thearguments of the 20s.As a means to reclaim independent thinking, therefore, theimmediate enemies of intellectuals were the communist party and the emperor.
Another implication of the War was its effect on Japan’s relationship with the
US. Westernized liberals in Japan adored Germany, England, France, but the US
was only popular in terms of pop culture, and not for intellectuals. However,pro-American liberals allied with the US to politically survive, and the US alsoneeded capable administrators in the region to stand against North Korea andChina.The liberals allied with social democrats and communists to fight against
the US.This was the origin of the post-war pacifist movement in Japan. On theother hand, the constitution could not have been made without the US.This is
one of the major basic traumas of post-war Japan. What is more ironic is thatwhen the US became interested in industrialized Japan, intellectuals defended
the country based on principles of the Constitution. The fact that this symbolof western liberal ideas was used against the US is a paradoxical tragedy forJapan and the US.
These post-war pacifist intellectuals had poor propaganda in terms ofwriting. They wrote in the first person singular ‘I’, caring less about democracy
or nationalist appeal. Rather than talking for the nation, they tried to reclaim‘me’ from the nation. In other words, the period when Japanese pacifism became
plastic was a period when no strong political advocacy was present.The mid 50s
was a transition period when liberal writing turned into political propaganda.
There were arguments and recurrence of iconized leading figures.
In conclusion, Professor Fujiwara stated that Public Intellectuals were a‘product’ of both talent and times.
The Fellows further shared their opinions about locating public intellectuals
in the context of art, culture, history, society, time, profession, and country; forexample, in the context of Asia, Japan, US, war, peace, Americanism, colonialism,
gender, environment, and being on the right, left, or being a politician. They
agreed that the role of intellectuals is to function as dissenters, providing
alternatives to the needs of civil society. In other words, to find what is ‘out
there’, having faith in ‘seeing the times’, and ‘make it going’.

55Core Seminar II, September 25
by Dr Sakamoto Yoshikazu, Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo‘Transnational Civil Society in the Age of Globalization’
Dr Sakamoto Yoshikazu first spelled out some of the intrinsic contradictionsof today’s extraordinary acceleration of globalization. The main engines ofglobalization are the marketization of economy and the global advancement ofscience and technology, especially dominated by the power of the US, leading todiminution of other countries. Contemporary world order can be outlined infour dimensions; 1) the unipolar state system, 2) the market, 3) civil society, and
4) international organization including regional organizations. The traditionalsovereign state system that persisted for the past four centuries is confronting
these new four dimensions.
(Full text of Prof. Sakamoto’s presentation included in this volume pg 132)

56

PAINS OF A JOURNEY
by Nguyen,Thi Hieu Thien
Dear friend, I'm telling you a fairy tale.
HOPE
To be transferred from Narita Airport to the International-House1 was likelanding on a new planet.The thing that impressed me most right at the momentof “landing” was the wonderful peacefulness of the place. I had a walk in the IHouse's old garden (the International-House boasts a beautiful traditional
Japanese garden) and its solitude brought me centuries back to a remoteancient era. Suffocated by dusty and smoky Hochiminh City's streets I hoped toescape to an island of peace.
LOST
My hope did not last long. On the following day, leaving the I-House for a walkaround Roppongi, I was astonished to find its striking resemblance toHochiminh City's streets. I could not believe my eyes! There were
advertisements everywhere. Red, purple, orange, yellow, green, blue, black orwhite. Large or small, running horizontally or vertically, flashing or not flashing,emitting sounds or not emitting sounds, they all joined the ever-lasting struggle
for survival common to every being on this earth. And people! There were somany people. Men and women looked important in business suits, all hurriedly
heading somewhere. And motor vehicles! There were cars in front of you,behind you, on your right, on your left, and above your head.All that noise, thatbustling, that rush…. How powerful the whole flow was. Can anyone stop it?
Stop it just for a moment, just symbolically, to let think of whither humanity?
Hardly. But that is what we, the fellows of the ALFP 20022, were supposed todo. I started to doubt the relevance of my being there where I was, lost in the
powerful flow of rushing people and machines. I felt pretty weak and lonesome.
HOTELEDWe, the fellows of the ALFP 2002, stayed in the I-House. Staying in a hotel isnever a blessing to me but never did I dread it as much as I did the first days of
my staying there in the I-House hotel. Living in a hotel you should behave
accordingly. You should not make noise, you should not mess things up, you
should not disturb the others, you should not stay out too late, and so on. A
hotel is a place of highly concentrated politeness. Yet a Vietnamese can barely
survive a day without company. He/she loves talking, laughing loudly, smilingbroadly and frequently (often for no definite reasons), exchanging eye contact(with whoever appearing in sight) and, hence, can be a pretty messy animal (toborrow an expression by Donald Richie3). In short, to me, a Vietnamese, warm57

and informal company is the air to breathe in.Therefore, I did not have to waitvery long to find all those little habits of mine tending to be at odds rather oftenwith the neatness and tidiness of the hotel for, in this regard, it was an
exemplary one. In brief, during the first days of living in the I-House I was
gasping for air like a fish cast on dry land.
UNVOICED
My instinct for survival urged me to make a few attempts to break out of thatblockade in quest for company. At the fellows' meeting before the firstworkshop I blurted out (producing a smile of apology lest my words mightsound silly), "Let’s select a leader for our group. I'd like to suggest Reiko as a
candidate.” The fellows did not smile at me back and one of them looked sternly
at me as a teacher at his little pupil and said, “I think we've already got thesecretariat to be the leader.” I withered.
Silly as my suggestion may sound to somebody I had profound reasons for it.
For ten years I worked as a teacher of Russian and was in charge of the groupsof student candidates to the USSR I was teaching Russian to. There will be noother time like that in my life. It was filled with so much holy joy. Consecrating
the whole of my youthful energy to teaching, I was awarded unbelievable love
and worship.The being true friends and working together as a team did produce
wonderfully edifying effects on us both, me and them.Those unforgettable days
have sown in me strong faith in the value of education and the sacred missionof the teacher.
I wanted to explain to the fellows my conviction. I wanted to say that thesuccess of the program depends very much on interaction among the fellows,that is on whether we can join efforts or not. I strongly believed that only
through working as a team, would we be able to learn a lot from each other andfulfill our part: to bring common experience and knowledge gained together tothe others. But, being discouraged by the rejection, I decided to keep silent. In
Confucian Asia the hierarchy "Emperor-Teacher-Father" sanctified the teacher's
position in society but nowadays in Japan (and Vietnam, as well) teachers shouldbe the last ones to be listened to.
Then, again, the question of my relevance reappeared. If I can not bring to thisprogram something distilled from the whole teaching experience so crucial to
my life, am I relevant to it and vice versa?
DECONTEXTUALIZEDAt the first workshop it became clear to everyone that there are no public
intellectuals in Vietnam and China. Because the political systems in these twocountries are totalitarian. Totalitarianism. That was the first time I encountered
this word.And it sounded so ugly and so threatening. Not much better than the58term terrorism, which has for some reason become so fashionable lately, I
thought.
We spent hours discussing the notion public intellectual and ended in a deadlock
unable to answer either of the two thorny questions: 1. Who is the public
intellectual? 2. What roles should public intellectuals play in modern world?
Then, suddenly, a naughty question came to my mind.What would happen if allthese discussions were carried out in, let’s say,Vietnamese, Japanese, Chinese or
Malay? An attractive idea! In these languages the terms public intellectual,democracy and totalitarianism, apparently "Made in West" products, I hoped, may
acquire new cultural meanings.
Can one say, for example, the concept democracy has been existing in the Westlonger than it has in the East? The concept NHAN (roughly "human", "forhuman"), one of Confucius’s key notions, is the core of his thought. But
nowadays in the West (and the East, also) Confucius is known to many as an
advocate of anti-democratic feudal ideology.And hardly does anyone of Western
scholars know about Nguyen Trai, a great Vietnamese politician and philosopher,
who has developed the Chinese Confucian concept NHAN to form aVietnamese notion NHAN, developing further Confucius's thought. In a
Vietnamese culture a ruler or leader is said to have NHAN if he/she has an ear
for his/her people's words and their wellfare is his/ her primary concern.
TAM is another notion that could shed light upon the understanding of theconcept public intellectual. TAM means litterally heartb. In Chinese and Vietnamese
cultures, where Confucianism is blended with Buddhism, this word has beendeveloped to form a whole notion central to understanding human's internal
worlda.An intellectual who is said to have TAM is the one whose heart and soul,in short TAM, is oriented toward common human wellfare and humanistic
ideals. He/she is the one who has great love for his/her human fellowsa.TAM andTRI (mind) are interrelated. If one's TAM is sang (lit or guided by a light) thenhis/her TRI should be sang, tooc. So, I believed the concepts NHAN and TAM
should be used to gain another approach to the understanding of the concept
public intelectual discussed so far purely in terms of mind rather than heart, notto say TAM.
Obviously, the same concept may vary from time to time and from culture toculture.Then, is it wise to simply apply the Western concepts democracy, public
intellectual and totalitarianism to particular contexts of Asian cultures without
thinking about how the former would interact with the latter? Should he/shetake into consideration the cultural elements that are sure to condition theapplication of these Western terms to the new environments? This is not easy
for one to lift him/herself up the ground on which he/she is standing by grasping
his/her own hair.Would we be able to lift ourselves up standing on the groundof a Western discourse which is still basically Euro-centered and Americancerntered?
59

Labor and language are the two essential elements in the process of converting
chimpanzee into human, says Engel. It seems without language man can not delve
into secrets of this world. But Buddha has warned us of the danger of language:
it may be turned into an obstacle to perceiving truth. I did not start reasoning
with counter-arguments, however, keeping to myself the fear that excessive
rationalizing would enslave us to what we believe to be the milieu for ourthought. I might attempt another approach, I thought.
CHOKEDWe had a field trip to Gifu and Nagoya.That was the first time I had a chance to
see Japan’s countryside. The wonderful landscape reminded me of Vietnam's
countryside: I saw many mountains and rivers.The mountains were all covered ingreen forests.The water in the rivers was crystal clear and the rivers themselves
looked graceful and peaceful. Like Vietnam, Japan is said to be a country of river.
We visited Nagara River Estuary Dam and the Society Against the Nagara River
Estuary Dam Construction. There, we met with gray-haired men and women
who have been fighting against the construction of the Dam since their hair was
still all black. Yet not much change has occurred since then. Later, from aresource seminar, titled Re-examining Public Works Projects in Japan, we learned
that to Japanese politicians and bureaucrats public works are an exceptionally
good channel for Big Dollar to flow into their secret pockets. For decades, atriangle of power "politicians - bureaucrats - corporations" has been cemented
to keep unshakable its umbrella of protection over thousands of dams built inJapan in the name of the Japanese people’s well being. No matter how much
local people, environmentalists and social activists may outcry, these dams
remain intact. On leaving the Nagara River I looked again at the dam. It loomed
large and imposing at the horizon. Poor Nagara River! She looked so gentle andgraceful.Too fragile under that threatening giant block of concrete.
In Asian cultures mountains and rivers are sacred sources of life. The mountain isyan – the masculine, the Father; and the river is yin – the feminine, the Mother. For
millions of years, the River has been Mother to Man.The Nile gave birth to ancient
Egypt and Ganga nurtured India in very much the same way as the Hong River
Delta was the first cradle to Vietnamese culture. Vinod, in his paper Why People
Oppose Dams4, gives a startling figure.The world’s rivers are now choked by morethan 40,000 large dams, an incredible number of them having been built since 1950.
How has it come that the child has learned to exploit his mother in such a way?
The Nam Bo Delta, the largest rice basket in Vietnam, is watered and fertilizedby nine branches of the Mekong River and for this reason the Mekong River in
Vietnam5 receives a beautiful name: Cuu Long (Nine Dragons). However, it has
been recently decided that one of the river’s branches should be blocked by a
dam as a huge tourist and commercial center is to be built in that place. So, theCuu Long River is probably going to be renamed as Bat Long (Eight Dragons). In
60

Vietnamese culture, 9 is a sacred number – the symbol of maturity andperfection. What new connotations may the number 8 have now? Flaw andimmaturity? I recalled a remark by a friend of mine who has traveled extensively
around the world," Black, white or yellow - people are the same everywhere."Japan and Vietnam share striking similarities. I thought and did not knowwhether to feel happy or sad about it.
BEFRIENDED
A few days after I came to Tokyo a group of journalists from ASEAN countries
arrived bringing the kind of noise I was starving for. I thrived in the warmcompany with those young boys and girls like a Vietnamese idiom goes, “fish isbrought back to the water”. Through them I learned about some more painful
truths. For instance, I learned about Roppongi’s nightlife. Roppongi is a famous
residential and commercial area in Tokyo. The story of its becoming as it is
nowadays can not be told without the story of American troops occupying
Japan during the post-war time. Americans brought prosperity to this area
through different ways, one among them being the development of prostitution-- a tradition to be continued up to these days.
The journalists showed me heaps of small ads they found stuck to lampposts
along Roppongi Street. In those ads (with photos attached), females of a varietyof occupation, ranging from housewives (not necessarily widows) to university
students, offered sex with price varying according the kind of sexual pleasuresavailable. Basically, prostitution is not something exotic. In Saigon during
American occupation brothels mushroomed fabulously, too.Yet the way sex isadvertised in Roppongi was really special.
Needless to say, as soon as they arrived, the journalists became unpopular in the
hotel because of the noise they made talking, eating, laughing, and running. This
reminded me of my first days in the USSR as a student. In a class in Russian
language, my Russian tutor explained to us, the foreign students, the Russian word
mugik. Before the October Revolution this word was used to refer to ingenious
Russian peasants who loved doing everything with loud noise: eating, talking,walking, snoring and the like. The word is now used as a derogatory expression
for those Russians who fail to acquire gentle manners to look Western ladies orgentlemen.Then the tutor turned to me and said,“You may learn something from
this, my darling.Your steps are making awful noise for you always drag them on
the floor.” I should confess that the remark produced a miraculous effect on myappearance in general and my manners in particular; just like the way the Fairy
Lady's stick did on Cinderella. I was desperately determined to stop dragging myboots. Most importantly, I learned to be a perfect Western lady. Unfortunately,
however, the self-training has left an awful scar on my poor unconscious: I havedeveloped a deep fear of polite places. In vain should I try, I do miss those weird
habits of mine.And I miss them so much that nowadays, whenever I have to keep
an eye on my manners for too long, I begin to feel sick.And I did fall sick around61the time the journalists were to be gone. My consolation then was Mazna's
spending hours listening patiently to me talking nonsense.
FORSAKEN
Unlike Japan or any other Western country, Vietnam is a country of peasants:
nearly 80% of the population is engaged in agriculture. So, being a Vietnamese, I
have inclinations close to those typical of peasants rather than intellectuals. I
prefer communicating through informal chats to highly formal and highly
academic exchange of thought in the form of scholarly meetings, seminars,
workshops, symposiums or the like. Nevertheless, preparing for important talks
with Japanese and international intellectuals all of whom are incredibly erudite,
I had no choice but to read like mad articles, papers, essays, book chapters andbooks. Sick and exhausted I found my flow of thought choked like a dammed
river.To worsen my sickness my dreams were haunted by two formal talks I wasto present in front of large and diverse audiences.
It is a shame to confess my command of English was the lowest among thefellows. Not only because my English was bad at the basic levels such as
pronunciation, grammar, vocabulary etc. but also because, I soon discovered, I
was ignorant of many key concepts, notions, terms, styles, discourses etc. usedeveryday in the Western world by intellectuals and non-intellectuals. To findconsolation and to feel less marginalized I told myself that one of my ALFP
colleagues, who came from a totalitarian society like me, might be facing thesame difficulty of culture shock. Unluckily, he possessed the kind of confidence
and optimism that none of us could compete with. In other words, I had nochoice but to accept the fact that I, alone, was lagging utterly behind.
Another torturing horror was the search for a topic that sounded serious,
informative, scholarly but still able to keep the audience all awake throughout
the talk (otherwise, what sense may it have?). What would I be talking about?
Mazna would probably be talking about Islam -- a topic that suddenly became
incredibly thrilling after 9/11. Hu Tao would be talking about rising China’s“American Dream”, the kind of talk which is sure to be breathtaking toeveryone today. Vinod is a wizard who always knows what to say to scare his
audience most. Since Reiko is a person of and by the Media exercising powerover people's mind is the air she breathes in. What about my usual topics -literature and education? How can they intrigue any keen interests in modern
audience? I thought with much self-consciousness.
SHARED
To my rescue came Vinod. He said the thing he and, he believed, everyone would
like to listen to from me is the Vietnam War. I was moved by his kind words.
Vinod is the type of intellectual with bright TAM -- I learned about that pretty
62

soon after my unfortunate suggestion about selecting a leader was dismissed.
He reminded me of an American friend of mine: Gary Okihiro6. At theinternational conference American Studies Today held in Hanoi on 12nd-13th ofOctober, 1998, the first conference at which Vietnamese and American scholars
working in the fields of social sciences and humanities met, he started his paperon the 1960s movements against the Vietnam War in the United States with thefollowing words: Vietnam is central to my life.
He is not the only American scholar to whom Vietnam has such significance.The
War of Resistance Against American Imperialism by Vietnamese people has
produced a Vietnam War generation to whose life orientation Vietnam is central.
Vinod Raina and Gary Okihiro are remarkable representatives of thisgeneration that I have had a chance to meet. Similarly, the War is central to mylife orientation and that of many other Vietnamese of my generation, who werein their prime in the 1960s and 1970s.To us that was a romantic time -- a feelingthat generations succeeding ours may find hard to understand.
I felt encouraged and inspired by Vinod's understanding and sharing when we,he and I, spent hours discussing how to approach the topic I had chosen:
Transition from War to Peace -- Experiences of a Vietnamese Intellectual. The thingthat struck me most was that we had so much in common in terms of valueorientation. So I decided finally to take value as the key concept which thewhole talk of mine would revolve around. The Vietnam War! What topic onearth could I love more? Yet, I recalled, when I started my study on Vietnam War
Literature in the United States some of my Vietnamese colleagues were surprised,"Are American still writing about it?" Is the Vietnam War still relevant here wheneven in Vietnam, to someone, it has fallen into oblivion?
TATESHINA
Tateshina is the name of a beautiful place. It was in the mountain, far away fromthe flashy and dusty Tokyo. We went there for weekend retreat. A Japanesecolleague explained to me that although outwardly Japan looks oriented toward
the materialistic West, inwardly love for Zen has not died yet in their hearts.
Therefore, retreat can perhaps be understood as a modern version of
meditation. As September was approaching the end, the air in Tateshina wascooling, fragrantly damp and youthfully fresh.The sky had a moody gray hue.The
leaves on the trees had all turned red or yellow. I wondered if Tateshina was an
ideal place for retreat or for love. Being in front of such a beauty one would feel
inclined to think of the latter.
We had a wonderful dinner with tables covered with dishes reminding me ofJapanese autumn forests.The ALFP 2002 fellows and secretariat were joined byinvited guests, who were mainly Japanese, Korean and American academics,
scientists and social activists. During the dinner, a young man came over to me
and introduced himself as a Korean research fellow and social activist working
63for Japan International Volunteer Center. Then he started asking me about theVietnam War, learning that I was from Vietnam. I was moved by his kind words
and shared his feelings.We,Vietnamese, had a long and horribly devastative war
but our nation was united in the end.They, Koreans, had a war, too; and bloody,horrible and devastative.Yet, their country remains divided.And those American
military bases in Korea! Could any Korean think about them without pain andshame? Kim Kyung-Mook -- I later learned about his name -- told me he valued
patriotism but did not like nationalism and then asked me how to distinguishbetween patriotism and nationalism. I could not at once appreciate the depth of
his concern but did feel the significance of the question he raised. To him, andnot to him only.
LIT
When I was thinking about how to develop the talk at Tateshina the words ofRonald Richie's echoed in my mind, " Japan is not relevant if relevance consistsof making wads of money and calling that life … To be Japanese is to be poor.To
be decently poor. Japanese, traditionally, did not have anything beside mud sothey made the best pottery going.They did not have any furniture because they
were so poor so they developed the whole science of space called "ma" toaccount for emptiness.This is what the world needs from Japan.The country has
shown how much can be made of little. The materialistic philistine world canlearn something from Japan…."7.These words reminded me of my own country
that has shown the world "how much can be made of little," too. Entering the
War of Resistance Against American Imperialism8, Vietnam was very poor, like
Japan before the "bubble economy"9 period. How could such a poor country
fight with the United States, one of the world's economic and military
superpowers? Logically, the war should belong to the mighty, not to the weak.
How could Vietnam win the war? The answer lies in the concept strength. In thematerialistic world of today the word strength tends to evoke the images ofdollars and guns. However, this is only one side of the problem. The other sideoften seems to be hidden from sight.This is spiritual strength.The war mobilized
all the hidden strength potential in every human being in Vietnam that fought for
their country. And we, Vietnamese people, were inspired by the noble fight sostrongly that each of us was raised spiritually to a level closer to that of saints
and gods. At that level one is capable of doing things normally beyond humancapacity.Today, like Japan at the beginning of the bubble economy period,Vietnam
has become significantly wealthier over a decade of market economy. And like
Japan, I believe, it is time for Vietnam to look back to where it was and reflect
over the hidden strength which was so miraculously mobilized at some time in
the past.To reflect over the values of that struggle. And to learn its lessons.
***
It was like a dream. I mean, these days when I recall the morning I presented mytalk about the Vietnam War and my teaching experience -- about their values -64

at Tateshina Forum it appears like a dream to me. A dream full of light.
When I finished my talk Reiko looked at me and I saw so much light in her eyes
and in her smile. I looked around and saw I was submerged in light. Dazzlinglight. I did not know where it came from.Then, suddenly, it dawned on me that
it was from us. All of us. I have found it! I thought and a rush of holy joy filled
my heart. At last, I have found what I have been painfully seeking for.
I was brought 20 years back in time.Yes, over 20 years ago, when I was teaching
Russian to student candidates to the Soviet Union's universities, I used to haveclasses when I found myself covered in light like I was in that morning in Tateshina.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union I happened a couple of times to have darkagonizing days. Still, those happy hours kept shedding their light on me to dissolve
even the worst darkness, out of which I already lost hope to break away.
HOME
After Tateshina days flew very fast.To bring my journey to a happy ending as it
usually happens in a fairy tale. I have found home in Japan.There I have loved andbeen loved back. There I have found what I have been searching for. Throughturbulence. How can it be obtained otherwise? Also, it, the journey, has openedin front of me new roads. I will embark on them with more faith in my TAM(roughly my heart).
May light from Tateshina and from those days follow me.
H.T.
Notes
1. International House of Japan is a non-governmental organization in Japan
founded for the promotion of cooperation, mutual contact andunderstanding between intellectuals and people of Japan and other nationsin the world.
2. Asian Leadership Fellow Program, created jointly by the International Houseof Japan and the Japan Foundation Asia Center in 1966, aims promoting
mutual understanding and cooperation, the creation of a close personal
networks among the "public intellectuals" who:
_ undestand and have deep faith in the values of democracy and equality_ are commited to create a public sphere of intellectual discussions byinteracting with people, and to empower civil society_ can articulate critical voices/discourse against the status quo and takeaction to propose alternative solutions and meaningfully intervene inpublic life and culture_ are able to utilize their professions beyond their diciplinary boundaries
and to motivate people for the common public good
65

The fellows of the ALFP 2002 are Hugo Tao (China), Vinod Raina(India), Maznah Binti Mohamad (Malaysia), Nguyen Thi Hieu Thien (Vietnam),Reiko Kinoshita (Japan).
3. The expression is borrowed from Films, Zen, Japan, an interview of Donald
Richie, regarded as the leading Western authority on Japanese film, carriedout by the Japan Times of September, 1st, 2002. Answering the question,"
What are the impressions - in terms of smell, coloor, sound - that you missfrom the Japan of 1947?", he answered, " … clutter. Tokyo now has thecleanest streets of any city in the world.The genetal, glorious, natural waste
of clutter -- visually, I miss it very much because it was so human. Humans
are really messy animals. "4. This paper is published in Inter-Asia Cultural studies, Vol. 1, No 1, 2000;
Rouletdge.
5. The part of the Mekong River that flows in Vietnam is called the Cuu Long
River.
6. He is the current Director of the Center for Race and Ethnicity, Columbia
University, the USA.
7. See Films, Zen, Japan in Japan Times of September, 1st 2002.
8. The war between Vietnam and the United States is called "Vietnam War" in
the Western countries but Vietnamese people call it "War of Resistance
Against American Imperialism."
9. This expression is borrowed from Films, Zen, Japan.
References(in Vietnamese)a. Ha Thuc Minh, Dao Nho va Van hoa Phuong Dong, Giao Duc Publishing
House, Hochiminh City,Vietnam, 2002.
b. Buu Ke, Tu Dien Han Viet Tu Nguyen, Thuan Hoa Publishing House, Thuan
Hoa,Vietnam, 1999.
c. Nguyen Duy Can, Phat Hoc Tinh hoa, Hochiminh city Publishing House,
Hochiminh City,Vietnam, 1996.

66

Redefining the Role of the Media: Challenges for theFreedom of Speech.
by Reiko Kinoshita
Let me begin by telling you about my personal experience of September 11th,
2001. By coincidence, I happened to be in Washington on that day. In theimmediate wake of the Pentagon incident, I heard that the Red Cross were
urgently calling for blood donations, and like many others decided to do mypart. I arrived at the Washington DC blood donation center to find long lines ofpeople, perhaps two or three hundred, all waiting to give blood.
By a further chance, I bumped into a limousine driver I knew. He wasan Arab-American, and at pains to express how bad he was feeling about theattacks as a Muslim.These emotions had prompted him to come to the donor
center and give blood.
As we waited, he described to me how Islamic society also suffers. Just
behind us was seated a federal government worker who, overhearing ourconversation, felt obliged to tell him how impressed she was by his words. She
actually seemed almost moved to tears, and emotionally asserted that she must
make an effort to better understand the Islamic community.
As a gesture of solidarity, she stretched out her hand to him to shakehands, but he could not take it. All three of us were stunned. He apologized,
explaining that he was not permitted under his religion to make physical contact
with a woman other than his own family members.
This incident dramatically confirmed for me how, despite people's
efforts to show understanding in a multi-religious society, barriers still exist.
That is very hard to digest. Most of America shakes hands as a matter of course,
however what for most Americans is a straightforward act was utterly
incompatible with the driver's beliefs. Despite a shared motivation (wanting to
express solidarity at that critical time) the driver and the government worker
could not find a shared cultural medium within which to do so. The chanceencounter illustrated, in other words, how the desire to unite under the same
flag can be obstructed by religious differences.
Immediately after 9-11, the headlines started to ring with words of war, and I
began to feel uneasy. Was not what occurred on 9-11 a terrorist attack, I
wondered, and therefore a criminal matter as opposed to an act of war? Oncethe linguistic framework of war is brought into play, however, people generally
fall into line.
The message that 9-11 and Pearl Harbor were essentially the same wasbeing broadcast over the airwaves as a matter of course, and the surprise
attacks were even labeled "a second Pearl Harbor".The assumption behind thiswas obviously that surprise attacks and terrorism are one and the same thing. I
started to feel very uncomfortable. Since the media is not just a world unto
itself, but can have powerful influences on society, it has a responsibility to pay
much closer consideration to its choice of vocabulary. As British propaganda
67

posters put it in the Second Word War, "Careless talk costs lives" -- or at thevery least, can risk escalating conflicts unnecessarily.
US-centered discourses increasingly dominate our globalized world,owing to the extended reach of the US media. September 11th has made this all
the more obvious. It goes without saying that I feel unreserved sympathy for thecasualties of 9-11. However, at the same time it seems to me that the media's
response has lacked all sense of proportion and broader perspective. Perhaps
we need reminding that of the number of casualties in Kashmir,Algeria, or East
Timor are far in excess of the albeit awful toll taken on 9-11. In contrast to theapparently never-ending story telling surrounding that one American day lastyear, however, we never hear heroic deeds from these "far-flung" places. It seems
that the American media is given to valuing "American life" more highly thanother forms, and has lost all sense of balance.
What is more, we have heard innumerable human documents revolving
around the victims of September 11th, but where are the terrorists stories being
told? We are not sufficiently well informed about their personalities, their
histories or their motivations. The US media needs to dwell on these aspects
more deeply in order to present a fuller picture. In showing us only one side of
the coin, it has failed its obligations to objectivity. Although more has emergedin recent months concerning the terrorists' own tales, analysis of the reasons
why they felt that they had to turn to terror has still been left largely to Mr
Matsumoto and his team at the Asahi Shimbun Newspaper in Tokyo, in theirbook 'Terorisuto no gunzou' ('A Portrait of Terrorists', printed by Soshisha).
It seems fair to say, therefore, that the US media, fixated by the imagesof what occurred a year ago, has not focussed sufficiently on concrete analysisof the destabilizing effects. Important questions have been left unaddressed.
How far is it true, for example, that American politics has significantly changed
since the events of 9-11? We know President Bush's reaction, but what of amore fundamental analysis? There has, similarly, been talk of World War III, butwhere is the analysis or proof? Without an intellectual engagement with theissues behind the issues, we are left with just opinions -- and potentially very
dangerous opinions at that. The way to unravel terrorism is through a nonmilitary, non-reactive response. Culturing such an environment is a life-or-deathchallenge for journalists.
Terrorism's wide-ranging impact on society, politics and economics
seems likely to find a further tragic illustration in Bali. The effects of the Bali
bombing may be extremely widespread. It seems likely that foreign tourists willassociate Bali with the bombing, and that the tourist trade will be hit hard as aresult.This has potentially very worrying implications for the entire Indonesiancommunity.The whole of Indonesia has depended on the income derived fromvisitors to Bali, which has been a symbolic cash dispenser providing 50% of the
tourist income in the Indonesian economy.
Pressures let loose in the wake of the Asian financial crisis led to thedownfall of Suharto. A collapse in the Bali economy could similarly enflame
ethnic conflict in this fractured country. Could it be possible that theoverwhelmingly Hindu island of Bali might now be persuaded to seek separation68

from the larger Muslim-dominated entity that is Indonesia? One attack, in otherwords, has threatened to alter a whole country in its social, economic andpolitical aspects. Furthermore, we cannot expect that the effects will be limited
to just Indonesia: the side effects could impact on every one of us in Asia.
Whereas I felt a hot anger about 9-11, I was filled with a kind of cold
anger as it became obvious how the five Japanese kidnapping victims who havereturned to Japan had been deprived of their mental freedom -- mentally
damaged, indeed. It was obvious that this was itself a crime of state terrorism.
On the one hand, President Bush's opinion regarding regime change is clearly
over-simplistic -- it is after all not as simple as changing a hat or changing
clothes. Although Bush is not normally overly concerned about more subtle
considerations, there is clearly a complex political and social history underlying
today's North Korea. Watching the five abductees on television, however, I
agreed that the regime has to change.
All I have are questions, with few answers.What is the real meaning of
the anti-terror war? Can it actually be waged successfully? What is the best
approach toward solving the problem of international terrorism?

69

IN AND OUT OF JAPAN:
PUBLIC INTELLECTUALISM AND MAKING SENSE
OF IDENTITY POLITICS, GLOBAL STRIFE AND
INJUSTICE
by Maznah Mohamad
PrologueI imagine that most ALFP fellows who came before me would be lamenting thesame way as I do -- that this is a really tricky final report to produce.After sucha memorable and unique two-month stint what sort of report would do justiceto the aims of the programme, to the efforts of the people behind the project
and to the integrity of one’s own personal development out of this experience?
The guidelines supplied were wonderfully flexible; we were told that we could
either submit a report that presents the findings of the “collaborative” researchamong us fellows, or, it could also be on any aspect of one’s own experience inJapan. Needless to say such openness of requirement was the source of thisdifficulty in writing. How do I combine in this one report my expression of
thanks, my proof of attentiveness towards the richness of the seminars given,
my evidence of a learning-curve responsive to the stimuli of stirring field visits
and my honest thoughts on how we fellows maintain a cautious but healthy
respect for our mutual attempt at enlarging one another’s personal horizons?
And all at the same time making sure that the report is worth reading about
and even gripping in its coherence of ideas, prose and substance?
It is a tall order. I can only try my best, if not my worst at producing this difficult
paper. My account is a hotchpotch of thoughts and musings, and will not pretend
to lay down problems and answers but will nevertheless attempt to frame a setof pertinent questions. It will try to deconstruct the concept of the PublicIntellectual, probing questions such as -- is there any such entity, or category ofpeople, and if so how does it make sense of identity politics, global strife andinjustice? Can Japan, via the ALFP serve as a cultural template, or a base for theflow of knotty, subversive and hopefully all at once, fresh ideas to stream in andout of its political walls?
To simplify my task I have arranged this report into three parts, at first glancechronologically, although substantially, the themes may criss-cross and diverge
from one another. This paper should thus be seen as a collage of my thoughts
on public intellectualism, identity politics, global strife and injustice; thoughts
interwoven while I move in and out of Japan. Really, this report should be readas three separate papers.
Outside Japan:
My Thoughts on The Unbearable Heaviness of Being a Public Intellectual in Malaysia

70

As I prepared to leave for Japan in the month of August, 2002 I reflected on themeaning of the public intellectual by describing my own experience as a scholar
and social activist. However, I first made the point that many thoughts on theengaged intellectual have already been traversed by various scholars such as
Antonio Gramsci (1971), Paolo Freire (1974), Noam Chomsky (1989) and
Edward Said (1994). They all tried to address the problem and meaning of theintellectual in their own way, but they were driven by a common intent -- tooverturn a world increasingly shaped by concentrated power. Having said that I
am not sure that I myself can categorically be called a public intellectual. Such a
distinction can surely only be conferred by the knowing public and not
something that is self-assumed.
Back in the late 1970s when I returned from my university education abroad,everything in Malaysia was either about to be changed or was in need of change.
That was the mood that scholars of my generation found themselves caught in.
The academic tradition was new in the country. Only a few state universities
were being built and as academicians in such fresh settings, we were proud tobe given the opportunity to shape young minds.
At the same time the state was strengthening itself. The modern nation-state
was about to be overwhelmed with new notions of identity. Nationalism was
not as unproblematic as most people had thought it to be. The simplicity of it
all ended after people finished agreeing that the land must be rid of outsiders.
Beyond that everything had to be fought for, and against one another – fromlanguage, to education, to who should live where, to what jobs which people
should have, and when. People in the new post-colonial entity were either
forced to, or wanted to live differently from before.They had to construct newmeanings and ideas about their existence. Malays, Chinese, Indians and otherindigenous communities found that they had to invent a formula for ‘national
unity’, where as under colonial patronage they had existed relatively peacefully,
in separate parallel worlds, albeit in an unequal way. In Malaysia, one aspect of
this post-colonial rebuilding culminated in a rude, sharp shock in the form of the1969 racial clashes. Although much questioning remains about the real motive,
extent and spread of the conflict, the episode provided a defining moment for
those who succeeded in seizing the power to affect change. The nationalists
ultimately accepted the new terms of nationhood with the New Economic
Policy (NEP) in place to structurally favour the advancement of the indigenous
population. For some left-leaning intellectuals the NEP at least spelled out somerecognizable goals of equity notwithstanding its racial nature.The switch of theschooling system to the national language was also accepted because people feltthat the prerequisite of unity might lie in the use of a common language, acommon curriculum and a centralized bureaucracy.The affirmative-action thrustof the NEP was ultimately accepted as the price for stability and nationalcohesion.The other price was the emasculation of democracy.Throughout the
1970s when the NEP was being put in place, numerous legislations to curb civil
freedoms were passed. For many this was not even a heavy price to pay.
71

As scholars we were prepared to play a leading and strategic role in challenging
the above process. We wanted to be the voice of critique and conscience forthe system, we wanted to provide the checks and balances in society, we wanted
to build new consciousness about class, gender and ethnicity. We wanted tobuild a more just society, with equality and welfare as the prime goals.We werewary of capitalism, aggressively seeking its prey at every turn of our lives. We
denounced wily politicians and fawning bureaucrats.
In coming to terms with the above, a variety of choices existed for us. We could
take the conventional road of academic scholarship and be content withpontificating sophisticated but obscure theories and debates within the cloisteredworld of teaching, research and publication. Or we could create two worlds forourselves. There was to be one world where standards of academic merit would
be exercised. The other would be the world of social activism. We felt we could
draw clear boundaries between the two and didn’t need to sacrifice our
professional integrity in favour of partisan engagement. Of course this was not easy.
The other solution was to try to reconcile the two worlds, and in the process
extract the mutual advantage of academia and activism, and enhance ourpersonal stature within both the realms. However, there was danger that theconflation of popular inquiry with scholarship could be detrimental to both..
Still, the intellectual in the Third World somehow feels that s/he has to play adouble role, as an activist and an academician.There is always a real or imagined
perception that the social and intellectual capital in a developing society ishopelessly deficient. Hence the persistence of the push and pull factors forcritical intellectuals to be involved in social activism. Changes in these societies
are occuring so fast that the ones who reflect upon the repercussions of suchchanges will inevitably find themselves intertwined within its praxis. One sectorof the intellectual class will readily yield to their cooptation by the state andfunction as the legitimizers of national policies. The other group will findthemselves on the adversarial side of the state and mainstream scholars. They
provide the other discourse and find themselves building new discursive outlets
through which alternative consciousness, agendas and perspectives can be
pragmatically applied.These scholars, rightfully called the public intellectuals, arethe ones who would inevitably be drawn to civic organizations, like feminist,
human rights, democratic, non-mainstream and radical religious movements.
But of late, with the entrenchment of neo-liberal economic agenda throughprivatisation and liberalization, the expansion of university education has been
phenomenal in the country, accompanied however, by a drop in standards andquality of education.With more faith instilled in the fundamentalism of the freemarket, social activism of the left has since been on the wane. Idealism of any
persuasion has made way for crude economic pragmatism. In 1995, Malaysians
voted overwhelmingly for their government (even with its extensive record ofcorruption and bad governance) to continue in power, signalling the72pointlessness of dissent.The credibility of the government was so assured in thewake of spectacular economic success in the 1980s and 1990s that buoyancy
about ‘the end of history’ or the end of class politics became infectious. Public
intellectuals worried about their source of support. With the economic boom
and the growth of the new middle-class, empowerment through the sovereignty
of consumerist rights was much easier to achieve than through civic
engagement.There were simply more things to do for most people than to be
involved in politics or to fight against an enemy which had by then becomerather vague. The logic of this new system goes this way. While unscrupulous
developers may have usurped the land-based lifeline of squatter communities
they also compensated them with low-cost abode in high-rises with property
titles to their names. While government may be corrupt, it was also creating
more jobs for the erstwhile poor. While democracy was being battered, people
were still granted the technical right of ‘voting-out’ the government, if they sodesired, every four or five years.
As the authoritarian-developmental state basked in its ‘performance-legitimacy’
the role of university intellectuals gradually became limited to becoming agentsfor producing employable human resource. Many intellectuals within civicorganizations and NGOs, despite carrying an inherent mission to check andbalance state excesses and oversights, also began to craft their roles aroundacceptable conduct that could fit well into the rhetorical goals of nationbuilding, national unity and other agendas propounded by the national
leadership. My unkind view is that Malaysia is either still a long way inestablishing its sound intellectual, democratic and good governance tradition orthat it has even degenerated from its heyday of a once nascent democratic
revolution. The contribution of public intellectuals in this country is either
ambiguous in nature or shunned as a voice on the fringe. Amidst rising middleclass affluence, political and social reforms are the elusive goals of an increasingly
demoralized civil society.
The Limit of the Intellectual
Coming back to the topic of a changing Asia of the last three decades, I observethat in this region the role of the intellectual is seldom debated. It isambivalently accredited, and it is implicitly recognized as a necessary but not themost valuable form of human capital in a market-driven economy. In manystates, not just the authoritarian ones, intellectuals are easily enticed to endorse
populist national ideologies and provide the unity to ideas that further entrench
the concentration of power, involving the nexus of state, bureaucracy andcorporation. However, there are also others who resist this domination. But
they have to do so at the margins of public space, that is beyond the grasp ofstate cooptation, and sometimes have to pay a heavy price for such exclusion.
They risk their voices remaining unheard, and if they do succeed in overcoming
control to permeate popular consciousness, they risk being violently shut out.
Within our remembered and lived history what has been gained out of a73

collective critical consciousness of the public intellectual? It’s true that greatsocial movements of Asia, beginning with anti-colonialism to economic
development have depended on critical intellectuals to power their realisation.
But the struggle to establish genuine democracies and truly sustainable national
economies have also seen critical intellectuals falling by the wayside, unable toaffect the tide of consensus or ‘necessary illusions’ as Noam Chomsky calls
them, which sustains a public mood that shuns any confrontation withhegemonic power and domination. Either people are tacitly grateful for thesystem they inhabit, or they have ceased to find it worthwhile to oppose apotent but undefined enemy, or even, they would rather be part of the systemic
ensemble that wins and profits from the perpetuation of unjust orders rather
than be partisan to anything that upsets it.Which is why the role of the public
intellectual is getting harder to fulfil.
Intellectuals provide an alternative imagination, but this may be dismissed ascontemplative indulgence. Intellectuals may carry their conviction for justicebased on compassion and moral faith, but this may be dismissed as naive
romanticism. Intellectuals may engage in reflexive action, but this may bedismissed as destructive activism, a distraction from national interests. A
rendition of failed encounters against the hegemony can go on endlessly.Thereis nevertheless the presence of will.We are confronted with a long list of global
ills and shortcomings.A few examples below show that we need more than justintellect to take on every problem by its bullhorns.We need an enormous will
to overcome enormous global woes such as:• The worsening disparity between the richest nations and the poorest
nations.
• The extreme conditions of deprivation from basic needs experienced by alarge section of humanity.
• The existence of slavery everywhere in new guises—especially the conditionof waged labour with no power nor rights nor even a sense of organization.
• The extensive ecological damage that is making way for more and more
wealth-creating activities.
• The rise of non-rational challenges waged against a western-centric, secularand liberal order in the form of struggles for the rights of distinct andreligious cultures, rather than merely rights of minority cultures.
• The shrinking room for values that fall outside the sphere of market-rational
choices—concern for equity and equality giving way to prerogatives for
efficiency and productivity.
• The increasing elusiveness of democracy and human rights as goals of themodern nation-state.
• The persistence of unabated death from disease, war, terror and destruction
in almost every corner of the world.
That is not to say that only through the emergence of the critical intellectual,
armed with an iron will, can we change and improve these conditions. But
74

without the critical input of the engaged intellectual through her eloquence andaction, the malevolence that lurks behind the global process cannot even begin
to be unravelled. Hence the role of the public intellectual must continue to beconceptualised and actualised, if a grim global reality is to be confronted andultimately overturned.
Inside Japan:
A Haven of Tranquility, A Promise of Intellectual Lucidity
Having written the stream of sketchy ideas and providing my own raw take on
the meaning of the Public Intellectual, I journeyed to Tokyo on 1 September
2002. I landed to a balmy late summer weather. The humidity still hung in theatmosphere but the air was refreshing and the sun was gloriously blazing.
Funnily, and happily I even felt a sudden sense of being carefree and liberated(after the mad rush of preparing for the trip, and dragged before this by thefeeling of apprehension over the worth of the programme). But from day one,the two-month stint was not only extremely stimulating, it might even have been
one of the best times of my life, given the sense of tranquility, and the lucidity inthoughts and movements that I experienced.
But technically I cannot decide whether the ALFP was akin to a lavish allexpense-paid intellectual study tour or an enriching, even if “forced”,
collaborative research encounter among five disparate individuals. It was bothactually, and I am thankful to the sponsors for enabling me to indulge in such an
exceptional sojourn. It’s the luxury of space, time and abandon that affords one
to make sense of one’s own intellectual journey (replete with its incessantcrossroads and dead-ends) -- especially when given the opportunity to confront
with that of others. In that way, the two-month period was indeed an intellectual
discovery of many sorts for me. On the surface it was about absorbing
information and insights about Japan, India, Vietnam and China, laced with theperennial discourse on identity, power, historicism and purpose. But beneaththis, it was also about differentiating the nuances, ambivalences and discomforts
in national experiences. It was about how best, and how worst to move forward
or not at all --- with a hurried, stumbling pace catching up with what’s in front,
or with a slow, guarded shuffle fearful of leaving anything, something behind, orwith a cold, impassioned forward strut, looking neither left nor right? But as we
all discover, so much of the national experience is about moving forward thateven the issue of memory and past haunting must be framed within the logic of
its currency for the future.
On reflecting the two-month experience I start by trying to make sense of ourthree sets of activities. The first activity was the series of seminars given byscholars based in Japan, on various aspects of Japan’s contemporary
development.The second was our series of field trips during which we met withsocially-engaged members of local communities. The third was the series of75

informal and personal encounters and conversations we had with fellow
members and staff of the ALFP secretariat.All three activities must be judged ashaving equal worth in shaping our impressions of Japan as well as enriching ourown intellectual perspective in our fields of study and activism.The seminars on
Japan were highly informative as well as stimulating.As a scholar and teacher indevelopment studies I naturally found the seminars most beneficial in enlarging
my scope of knowledge about another country in Asia. I discovered that Japan’s
post-war experience is still a minefield of untapped national outpourings andsentiments.2 The field trips were a sobering eye-opener as we got to know of
the less advertised ‘underside’ of Japan. It was one of the most valuable
experiences that the fellowship has afforded me. In knowing the struggles ofcommunities undergoing the travails and excesses of development we got toknow the much richer and in many ways the stronger (not of the technologicalpowerhouse) face of Japan. Our personal meetings and conversations also
allowed us to bounce off our own particularistic experience with that of Japan’s.
In Japan we met with many organic as well as public intellectuals who are
specialists, who provided depth, meaning and credibility to social movements.
They use their specialist knowledge in a way that allows for it to be translated
into generalist concerns. The issue that pervaded global concerns while wewere in Japan revolved around the subject of violence, terror and peace.The U.S
and the United Nations were in the throes of debating and deciding on possible
military action in Iraq. There have been views expressed in our seminars that
resurgent nationalism and the economic downturn in Japan may augur for theopportunistic revision of Japan’s “Peace Constitution’ and lead it down theslippery slope of re-militarization. In Kashmir, the state election held in
September went on albeit the almost daily incidents of killings. And all of thiswas happening amidst the never-ending use of violence and counter-violence
between the Palestinian freedom fighters and the Israeli state. On October 12th
the world was rocked by the Bali Bombing incident. This was followed soonafter by the hostage-taking incident in a Moscow theatre staged by Chechen
rebels.This list of terror, ad nauseum and ad infinitum seems to mock us that theprecursor to peace can only be violence.The tools of conflict-resolution in theform of diplomacy, democracy and decency all seemed to have broken down.
But Japan, throughout our two-month stay, appeared as an oasis of calm, orderand almost perfect political-neutrality in the midst of global military alignments
and re-alignments that were being worked out by the major powers in theworld. However, this does not mean that the Japanese were unconcerned about
events and issues around them, even if the issues that touch Japanese people themost are the ones affecting the future of their local economy, environment,
education, and political and cultural purpose. For the record I would like tothank all the esteemed speakers of the seminars for giving me a valuable andinsightful introduction to the many facets of Japan.And what I got was the imageof a Japan that is very proud of its ability to ride the horrors and mistakes ofthe past, complacent in its present state of economic “comatose” and extremely76ambivalent of its role in the future. The field trips were the most memorable
because of the opportunity to meet with a variety of people who were either
the practitioners of development or themselves victims of it. I learned a lot
about how social activism was practiced within the context of Japanese politics
and cultural sensibilities.There is still a healthy though patchy search for the true
meaning of pacifism, liberalism and freedom within the Japanese psyche, as
described from an outsider’s point of view.3 Our informal gatherings andconversations with one another (fellows and staff of I-House and the JapanFoundation) were also most inspiring, both in an intellectual sense and in ahuman way. It was possible to connect and empathize with one another’scultural and political dilemmas.
If I may go back to theme of the fellowship programme,“The Roles of the PublicIntellectual”, I would like to say that the theme is as trite, as it is murky, as it is
intriguing, all at the same time. But inherent in each concept, from ‘roles’ to‘changing Asia’ and ‘public intellectual’ is the idea of ‘moving out’ and ‘stepping
ahead’. Needless to say, to have to think in those terms is somewhat of apersonal burden. I think that all of us felt we were already involved in making
our own especial, even if unnoticed, intellectual contribution to the well-beingof our bounded nation, if not to the global, borderless community. Hence, I think
we did not spend much of the two months mulling over this theme. However, I
am quite sure that we were all touched by it in different ways. For me, I felt the
obligation to sort out the difference between the straightforward meaning of
the scholar-intelligentsia or the functional intellectual in service of thehegemonic state from that of the autonomous, critical, and reflective intellectualthat is nurtured by the tradition of social activism. I am quite sure that it isthrough the cultivation of the latter, even if only conceptually rather thanrealistically, that this programme can be distinguished from all other similar
fellowships in its uniqueness. Hence, I am grateful to have been a beneficiary ofsuch a special endeavour, so meticulously organized and sponsored by theInternational Centre of Japan and the Japan Foundation.
Rethinking the Pubic Intellectual
Why was the theme of the public intellectual chosen as the recurrent theme of
the ALFP project? By looking at the previous years’ reports, the issues ofglobalization, alternatives, local strategies and emancipation were tagged on as
related concerns. I think that underneath this concern is the fact that people allover the world are looking for something new to replace or deal with thediscomfort of contemporary developments. One of the reasons for this is thepervasiveness of capitalism as a globalizing and homogenizing force.We are also
confronted by a situation wherein the state has become beholden to the market
and assuming more and more of a corporatist function.The state used to be asite where citizens could hope to mount their challenge against the privateinterests of the dominant class. Today we have civil societies in many places
unable to affect the tide of change in their favour.
77Why the necessity to deconstruct, dissect, even decry the concept of the public
intellectual then? I can only conjecture that first of all most people are in thedark as to where the impetus for social change will henceforth spring from.
There are no large-scale social movements taking over the stage since thedemise of the Left after the end of the Cold War.At the same time this vacuumof counter-hegemony is being filled by the rise of various non-rational
movements, galvanizing around ethnic and religious identities. Secondly, there isthe convergence and conflation of the market and the state. Civil society isineffective in influencing the state, and worst in affecting the market. But market
forces are also often undefined and ambiguous, making them even harder todeal with. So where are the social movements and their public intellectuals
behind all of these emergent trends?
Grouping pubic intellectuals into two categories helps in clarifying the issue.The
first group is what we might call the functional intellectual and the second is thecategory of critical and oppositional public intellectual.4 On the first, the role ofthe functional public intellectual is mainly to legitimate the role of the state.
These intellectuals may comprise academic scholars and scientific specialists.
They maintain a façade of being apolitical, but in actual fact are the apologists,publicists and propagandists of government and market-favourable policies. The
kind of civil society they cultivate would be a consensual one, devoted to‘problem-solving’ within a circumscribed political framework. On the other hand,critical public intellectuals can be distinguished by their attempt at disseminatingideas that are counter-hegemonic, the ones that or go-against-the-grain andultimately threatening to the status quo.They see themselves as representing themasses, interpreting popular demands into credible social needs and as a force
capable of de-legitimizing the power of the dominant classes.
However, this ideal dichotomy or existence of points and counterpoints in the
dynamics of social transformation is even usurped by current closing in of the
public space. The public space whereby public intellectuals can even hope toassert their public authority is being narrowed.The media is either fettered bystate powers or even if it exists in a democracy, it is getting increasingly
concentrated in the hands of only a few, powerful owners. The other public
space, the academy is also being transformed to restrict the voices of the critical
public intellectual.As more and more public institutions such as universities arebeing put under centralized control or being privatized, the traditional
intelligentsia will have little incentive in assuming its role as a critical public
intellectual. What we are seeing instead, out of the above conditions ofhegemony is the proliferation of more and more functional intellectuals insociety. As the media evolves by the day to become a most powerfulmanufacturer of public tastes and opinions it needs to be propped up by pundits
and intellectuals who bandy about crisp analysis and uncomplicated answers tothorny social problems. These are the intellectuals who give credence to apresupposed governmental or ruling clique’s position. If the subject of national
politics and global politics is to be avoided they can always provide the basis of78

discernment for lifestyle choices. In Malaysia for example, as middle-classaffluence and mass consumer power spreads, the media has become the great
outlet and guide for the “good life” ideologues and followers. They include themedley of cultural critics, film reviewers and feel-good gurus. On an insidiousside, intellectual debates involving critical public policies will also have theiragenda set by the media.Any oppositional voice or voices that fall outside of theagenda are considered partisan in a sense of being in league with an oppositional
party line, and hence subjective and illegitimate. In the end the Pubic Intellectual
can no longer function in a milieu where there is a decline of public intellectual
life and space. Speaking from perhaps an elitist or vanguard point of view I
believe that the urgent need in responding to the above closures would be torestore the vibrancy of the public intellectual space first even before any poolof new public intellectuals can ever be hoped to be created. Unfortunately,
speaking as a Malaysian, I feel that this much-needed space for the Public
intellectual has become scarce, deserted by the intelligentsia and feared by themasses due to the spreading tentacles of coercive politics.
Leaving Japan:
Reflecting on the Challenge of Islam in Southeast Asia
Towards the end of October I began on another reflection. An issue most
pertinent to my field of study and closest to my personal life is the issue of Islam.
The theme of the symposium was decided by the fellows after much debate anddeliberations.The selection of the theme was prescient. On October 12, ten days
before the symposium, the bombings in Bali occurred.This simply drove home thepoint that the theme of the symposium which we decided upon, exactly a monthearlier could not be more apt, unfortunate though the circumstance might be. I
had already titled my talk, “Reflections on the Challenge of Islam in Southeast
Asia” and used the Public Symposium as an opportunity to share my diagnosis of
the root of political Islam in Southeast Asia with the audience. Below is the text
of my presentation at the Public Symposium:
Introduction to the Talk
The October 12th bombing incident which killed some 200 people in Bali as well as thesmaller ones which occurred in Zamboanga and Manila a few days later have shed apall of gloom over the region. People were jolted into realizing that terrorism had
actually arrived at their doorstep. Last year’s September 11 was still considered afaraway event since at the back of people’s minds the target of the terrorists would be
the West, rather than the Rest. People often forget that with globalization the presenceof the East and the West can be anywhere and everywhere all at the same time. Hence,
while the bombing may have occurred in the East last week the targets, it seemed were
the West.The other irony is that while the perpetrators of September 11 were from theEast, they resided in the West, were schooled in the West and hatched their plots in theWest. Perhaps people’s fears are not exaggerated when they find themselves vulnerable
to violence and terror no matter where they are, who they are and even what they79

stand for (even if they stood for the cause of the perpetrators). Such is the peril of living
in a fractured world that is at the same time magnificently fluid and porous.
Regional Security Arrangement and US PresenceThis climate of fear and uncertainty is providing the seeds for instability in Southeast
Asia.And what is worrying about this is that it will have a direct repercussion upon theeconomy. It follows that what really worries Southeast Asian governments is thepossibility of declining investor confidence. Already with the economic crisis of 1997,
investments have been on the decrease in the region.This worry about the state of theeconomy will further invite another development, and that is changes to the future
security arrangements of the region. Already in the Philippines, U.S. military presence
has returned under the pretext of training the Philippine military to fight against the
Abu Sayyaf rebels. Earlier during the year, the American government had alreadysucceeded in getting Southeast Asian governments to agree to an anti-terror pactspelling out cooperation in the areas of information and intelligence sharing.There has
also been tacit, if not open pressure to get governments to enact tougher, and by
nature, more draconian legislations to deal with the issue of their homegrown militants.
It was only about ten years ago the U.S dismantled its military bases in the Philippines
and withdrew from the region, as soon as the Cold War ended and the Indo-China
Peace settlement was achieved. Presently, there is much anticipation and speculationthat the regional security arrangement will once again see active military influence if
not intrusion of the U.S. into the region.
Democracy and Human Rights Jeopardized
Yet another development that is worrying is that all of these measures to prevent
terrorism will in all reality hamper, thwart and jeopardize the movement for democracy
and human rights in the region.The case of Indonesia is worth noting in this respect.
Soon after the fall of Suharto, Indonesian civil society was hopeful that they could
finally work at establishing the rule of law, democracy and human rights in the country.
Malaysian and Singaporean civil society was also embarking on an active campaign torepeal their four-decade old repressive law, the Internal Security Act (ISA) but since
September 11 this campaign is falling more and more on to deaf ears. A law like the
ISA is euphemistically referred to as a preventive law. But preventive in actual practice
implies detaining anyone, suspected of going against national interests, indefinitely;
without access to legal counsel, often incommunicado, without charges and without
trial. Just a few days ago Indonesia was forced to enact a similar legislation. All theselaws are open to abuse and have been used so to arrest all kinds of dissidents, eventhe legitimate ones who operate within the bounds of the constitution.
Source and Origins
Since the source of these new developments is linked to the rise of political and radical
Islam it is thus important to understand the origin of this new movement or ‘threat’ as somefactions would like to see it. For me, on reflecting upon this phenomenon it is important to80

make a distinction in the two phases of the evolution of political Islam.The first phase inwhich a politicized or distinctive Islam emerged is what I would call its parochial- nationalist
phase.The second phase is the phase of transnational and globalized Islam.
Nationalist-Parochial Phase
This phase is characterized by Islamic communities fighting to retain their autonomy
and colonization against foreign powers. The cases of Acheh and Mindanao are its
examples.The Moros of Mindanao had struggled against Spanish rule since the 16th
century and they continue till today to resist what they see as the domination of theChristian north against them. Similarly, the Achenese in Sumatra also have a long
history of fighting against the Dutch colonizers and were in fact successful in remaining
an autonomous region while the rest of Indonesia succumbed to Dutch colonization.
Hence, when the independent Republic of Indonesia was conceived,Achehnese resisted
the move to include their autonomous region as part of the newly created nation-state.
Islam during this nationalist phase also rallied a sector of the indigenous population thatwas marginalized by the colonial ruling elite. In Malaysia, rural Malays and those who
were educated in the Middle-East saw themselves as another class opposed to those who
were favoured by the colonialists and had their education in English schools and wereeducated in the West. Those who were not part of the ruling and colonial circle foundthemselves gravitating to Islamic movements. In many Muslim societies the earliest
mobilization of people against colonialism was led by Islamic scholars and clerics.
During this nationalist-parochial phase there was little contact among Muslims fromdifferent regions in the world.The form of Islam that was practiced had a very local
character. In fact there was a lot of infusion of local customary traditions into Islam,as well as those found within Hinduism and Buddhism. So at this period Islam wasdistinct from one region to the other, and from one continent to the other.
Transnational-Global Phase
It was much later that the second phase evolved and this is what I would call thetransnational or global phase of Islam.This began from around the 1970s and continues
to the present time.The developments precipitating this phase of Islam were many.
First, it is tied to the politics of the Cold War itself. During this period the greater enemy
that was pitted against the so-called Free World was Communism. The ideologicalpropaganda waged during this time was to use all kinds of cultural systems todemonize communism. Islam was conveniently employed to oppose communism,projected as being atheistic, anti-god and anti-religion. The 1965 massacre inIndonesia, wherein an estimated one to two million members and sympathizers of theCommunist Party of Indonesia (PKI) were eliminated was not only waged by the
military but also by the members of the Islamic mass movement the Nadhlatul Ulama(NU) (Zurbuchen, 2002; 572).When the CIA used this familiar strategy in Afghanistan
to fight the Soviets it was very successful. Not only that, it succeeded in building an
81

international network and brotherhood of Islamic fighters. Muslims from all over theworld were recruited by the CIA to be trained in Afghanistan and to fight alongside theAfghans against the Soviets.When these fighters returned to their individual countries
they were fired up and set up their own movements.
The second development which fed into the resurgence movement was the oil boomin the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia.The wealth which was created overnight in thesestates allowed some of the money to be channeled to other Muslim countries aroundthe world. It so happened that the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia were also practicing
the most conservative and fundamentalist Islam. So with the money they also exported
this particular tradition of Islam. One cannot underestimate the power of such
overflowing funds in contributing to the resurgence of fundamentalist, or to be more
precise, the literalist Islam.The authentic model of Islam which the leaders preached
was one based on the 7th century model of Islam, the period during which Prophet
Muhammad lived.This was the period when the Prophet established his first city-statein Medina. Literalist Islam essentially meant following the words (revelations) of the
Quran as closely as possible and to emulate the ways and traditions of the Prophet(Sunnah) as closely as possible too.
The third important development which further provided impetus to this resurgence
was the Iranian revolution in the late 1970s.When the Islamic clerics were successful
in overthrowing the secular regime of the Shah and established the first Islamic Stateby popular revolution in the world it had the effect of radicalizing many Islamic
movements, especially the ones led by youths.
Yet another reason which led to the ‘overnight’ revivalism of fundamentalist Islam was
the question of identity itself. Islam had become a new basis for reinventing or
strengthening ethnic identities. In Malaysia the identity of Malay quickly became
indivisible from Islam as the resurgence picked up momentum. In Malaysia, a sense of
economic inferiority experienced by Malays living in the midst of other more
successful communities forced many to adopt a more universalized identity which wasconsidered to be more powerful. In Malaysia, because of the multi-ethnic structure ofsociety, Malays who are the indigenous community experienced a new sense of
empowerment when they took on a clearly-defined Islamic identity. Islam wasconsidered more global and universal. Old Islamic practices that had been meshedwith local customs and other religions were abandoned for this so-called more pristineauthentic Islam.
This second, transnational phase of Islam leads to its present dominant character, viz.,• Fundamentalist-literalist• Islamic movements have widespread networking and cross-border contacts• Aim of these movements would be to work at setting up an Islamic state within
the national borders first.
• Eventually to realize the institution of the Islamic Caliphate that would govern theinternational Islamic community or Ummah.
82

Violence
Now I come to the question of violence. Is violence then the necessary method inachieving all of the above aims? I argue strongly that violence is not an inherent value
in Islam but it may be used as an instrumental value when the believers feel that they
are being threatened.The perception is that violence will be used to defend Islam against
its perceived enemies, especially those that are perceived to hinder and obstruct Islam.
As far as the concept of Jihad or holy war is concerned some of the radical Islamicgroup may have wanted to emulate the prophet. In the 7th century the Prophet waspersecuted in Mecca when he started to preach Islam (Doran, 2002; 177-190). He
escaped to another city called Medina and successfully set up a model city-state using
Islamic principles of governance. Subsequently when he had built his own independent
power base he waged war against the unbelievers in Mecca and successfully converted
the population to Islam.
I am not trying to make any assertions here or to try to explain the motives of theterrorists but the obsession to emulate the ways of the Prophet may have driven someto invoke violence justified by the concept of jihad. But as far as my personal
experience in Malaysia goes, I haven’t seen the necessity of Islamic groups to use force
or violence to carry out their mission of deepening and spreading Islam. They haveactually been very successful at Islamizing society or influencing more people into theirfold through the tactics of cultural coercion, intimidation and invocation of divinesanctioned authority.
Tactically, the use of violence by some Islamic groups would only serve to discredit
fundamentalist Islam.The end result would be of two kinds. First, one-half of professed
Muslims today will veer towards more moderation and become less dogmatic in theirbeliefs. However, the other half will feel even more threatened due to the increase ofnegative propaganda against Islam today. Furthermore, the Palestinian-Israeli violence
has not abated and the threatened military action against Iraq by the US will likely
come into effect – all these will potentially drive the other-half of the Islamic believers
to become more hardened and militant.
Solution and Prospects
It is dangerous to apply the Cold War model to frame the analysis and solution to thethreat of terrorism associated with extremist Islam. It was easier to demonize
Communism because it was essentially a modern ideological movement focused upon
relations based on production and economic structures.Although it may be considereda sacred doctrine among its many followers its essence is devoid of the’ sacred’.With
Islam it is different. Islam is not just an ideological system born in this century, but it isalso a deeply entrenched culture with roots that go very far back in history.
The challenge in creating an Islam that would co-exist, even integrate peacefully withmodern realities is to distinguish the repressive, literalist Islam from its compassionate,83tolerant and liberating variant. It is definitely not easy today given that there is this thinline between an Islam that is pristine and one that is extremist, just as well as thereis this thin line between an Islam that is liberal and an Islam that is considered too
open-ended. The problem is that the only solution that is being used today is of thecoercive, militaristic and repressive. In this way, there could be success in obliterating
the messenger but not the message. No apparent and concerted ideologicalprogramme or cultural instrument is being used today to undo the source and origins
of political Islam which I described earlier.
What we are witnessing is that democracy and human rights are being sacrificed, as
more and more ineffectual governments try to enact draconian legislations and measures
to legitimize their own politically unstable positions. This is victory for the extremists
because they are succeeding in chipping away the very foundations of the democratic,
and secular order. The challenge is, can violence, in both its palpable and culturally
insidious form be overcome by peaceful means? And finally, can we promote democracy
and human rights relentlessly when these are the very institutions that will be the easiest
and the first to be sacrificed in our desperation to protect ourselves against fear?
Celebrating the Positive
As a follow-up to the above questions which formed the closing lines of myspeech at the Public Symposium I would also like to ask if there is any role forthe public intellectual to play in mitigating humanity’s slide down the slippery
slope of mass destruction? I believe that issues explicated in my presentation
above will dominate current concerns of activists and academics. But we mustat the same time be wary about this outlook. The global focus has been too
narrowly framed to view the misdeeds of evildoers as simply emanating from asystem of beliefs involving religion and culture. This narrowness of perspective
and prejudice can serve as a trap – to close off minds and the development of
thinking about the various sources of injustices and inequality in the world. HereI would like to reiterate my earlier points that the list of global woes is anextensive one. It ranges from pervasive and worsening poverty among a large
section of humanity to pervasive and worsening state of disparity between therichest nations and the poorest nations. An unequal world order could well be
the greatest source of our problems today. But how many people dare to upset
the current orthodoxy about the urgency of allowing a few benevolent
superpowers to deploy their extraordinary military prowess to supposedly
restore safety, security and stability for all of humanity?
But I must also affirm that the role of the public intellectual is not only to
expose the gloom and doom that has befallen the world, it is also to makeknown the other, brighter side of human existence. Just as it is important for
intellectuals to unravel misdeeds it is also crucial that they help in highlighting
the interstices and spaces within which society has found hope and sustenance.
The optimism shared by a cross-national civil society in being able to networkand organize on a global level is something that should be celebrated. The
84

ingenuity of resistance movements to appropriate tools such as the Internet for
their own advantage is also something to cheer about. It is also a comforting
thought to know that the will of belligerent national governments is nevernecessarily the will of their people. One other hope for those harmed by theunequal global order today is the fact that the strength of such an order, built
on the backs of finance capital and corporate greed has shown its numerous
cracks, here and there, no matter how resilient it is made out to be. Of course
the contest is still one-sided and hegemony is not easy to smash but it helps toknow that through a strong global civil society and communication avenues likethe Internet, intellectual exchange programmes and international people’s fora,
there is still room for dissent and addressing disquiet over the insufferable stateof things and beings. This is the space that is in need of defence by the public
intellectual who must depend on it all at the time to articulate, write, propoundand act on behalf of the other half of humanity-- the embattled half, thedispossessed half and the un-mesmerized half.
Despite the pessimistic diagnosis of a deteriorating state of identity politics,
global strife and injustice, I would like to end this rambling piece of “intellectual
ranting and raving” by believing that the future holds many possibilities, and I
look forward towards making this world a more equitable, if not enjoyably
bearable place to be. Every little attempt, the ALFP included, must have leftsomething of a legacy for all of us to work upon towards achieving this end.
References:
Chomsky, Noam (1989) Necessary Illusions:Thought Control in Democratic Societies,(London: Pluto Press).
Doran, Michael (2002) “The Prgamatic Fanaticism of al Qaeda: An Anatomy ofExtremism in Middle Eastern Politics”, in Political Science Quarterly, vol. 117, no.
2; pp. 177-190.
Friere, Paolo (1974) Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York:The Seabury Press)
Gramsci,A. (1971) Prison Notebooks: Selections From, ed. Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith(New York: International Publishers)
Kellner, Douglas (1997) Intellectuals, the New Public Spheres, and Techno-Politics,
Online Course Materials for 253A, Education, Technology and Society,http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/newDK/intell.htm
Kersten, Rikki (1996) Democracy in Postwar Japan: Maruyama Masao and the
Search for Autonomy, London and New York:The Nissan Institute/Routledge Japan
Studies Series.

85

Said, Edward (1994) Representations of the Intellectual (The 1993 Reith Lectures)(London:Vintage).
Yoneyama, Lisa (1999) Hiroshima Traces:Time, Space and the Dialectics of Memory,
Berkeley: University of Calaifornia Press.
Zurbuchen, Mary S. (2002) “History, Memory, and the “1965 Incident” inIndonesia”, in Asian Survey, vol. 42, no. 4; pp. 564- 581.
1The first part, titled “Outside Japan” is an extract of my notes, “The Roles of PublicIntellectuals in Changing Asia” submitted in late August to the International House ofJapan before I left for the two-month stint.The second part “Inside Japan” is the real“meat” of this report, in the sense that it captures my own cogitation of ideas during
the ALFP period. Thematically it is partly a rethinking of the concept of the PublicIntellectual and partly a stream of ruminations of the actual two-month experience.
Finally, the third part, titled,“Leaving Japan” contains a write-up of my presentation for
the Public Symposium, “Violence, Terror and Peace: Problems of Identity in a Fluid
World” held on October 22, 2002 at the I-House.
2Aftervisiting Hiroshima and listening to the accounts of one of the survivors(hibakusha) I sense that Japan still straddles a dual identity of between wanting tohave everything out in the open and approaching history (and memory) with great
caution still. Lisa Yoneyama’s idea of “innocence” strikes me as appropriate in capturing
this syndrome. She asserts that, “the memories of Hiroshma’s destruction, secured
within the global narrative of the universal history of humanity, has thus sustained, atleast in the dominant historical discourse, a national victimology and phantasm of
innocence throughout most of the postwar years.” (Yoneyama, 1999; 13).

3One of the more fascinating figures in propounding

liberalism in Japan was Masao
Maruyama. In a way he was describing an “Asian” malaise of having to function withina “closed” worldview which is also at the same time manipulated by official ideology.
Even if Japan were to function within a democratic structure weaknesses of such anature would still be, “… an invitation to abuse by an unscrupulous authority…”.
(Kersten, 1996; 125).

4I

would like to borrow the two terms from David Kellner who distinguishes,“…functional intellectuals who serve to reproduce and legitimate the values of existingsocieties” from, “…critical-oppositional intellectuals who oppose the existing order.To
quote him further, “..oppositional intellectuals voice their criticisms in the name ofexisting values which they claim are being violated (i.e. truth, rights, rule by law, justice,etc.) and sometimes in the name of values or ideas which are said to be higher
potentialities of the existing order (i.e. participatory democracy, socialism, genuine
equality for women and blacks, ecological restoration, etc.). Functional intellectuals
were earlier the classical ideologues, whereas today they tend to be functionaries ofparties or interest groups, or mere technicians who devise more efficient means to86

obtain certain ends, or who apply their skills to increase technical knowledge in various
specialized domains (medicine, physics, history, etc.) without questioning the ends,
goals, or values that they are serving, or the social utility or disutility of their activities.
Functional intellectuals are thus servants of existing societies who are specialists inlegitimation and technical knowledge, while oppositional intellectuals are critics who
struggle to create a better society.” (Kellner, 1997)

87

ENVIRONMENTAL AND TRADE IMPLICATIONS OFCHINA’S WTO ACCESSION-- A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
by Hu Tao
Policy Research Centre for Environment and Economy of State Environmental
Protection Administration
Beijing 100035, China
1. Introduction
1.1 Summary of impacts of China WTO accession on the economy
structure
China has become a member of WTO in Doha Ministerial conference in 2001.
China's accession to the WTO will have great influence on China’s foreign tradein terms of volume and structure. Under the agreement between China and theUnited States, China’s policy will have the following changes after it becomes a
WTO member: average tariff reduction for agricultural products from 22.1% to17%; average industrial tariffs on U.S. products will fall from 24.6% in 1997 to
9.4% by 2005; elimination of all export subsidies; further opening of the market
for agricultural products; implementation of a “tariff-rate quota” system forwheat, maize, rice and cotton; phase-out state control over trade in soybean oil;increasing textile exports; opening of the retail market and service sectors
including legal, accounting and medical services; 100% foreign ownership forhotels; opening of tourism and the video and audio product markets; andimporting more foreign films, at least 20 each year to double the present
number.The auto industry will be expanded, reducing car tariffs each year fromthe present 80-100% to 25% by the year 2006 and allowing loans for car
purchasing. The telecommunication industry will also be open, allowing foreign
investors to own 49% of shares in communication services and increasing to
50% after two years. Foreign investors are allowed to invest in the Internet
market and banking business will also be open, allowing foreign banks to handle
Chinese currency for Chinese companies two years after China’s accession to
the WTO.The banking sector will be completely open after five years of beinga WTO member and sectors such as brokerage, security, bond and insurance
will also be open.
According to the quantitative estimates by a CGE model by Li Shantong of
the Development Research Centre of the State Council1, when China fully
fulfills its WTO commitments by 2005, its GDP will have increased to 195.5
billion yuan RMB (1995 price, in contrast to non-accession), which equals US$
23.55 billion. These would account for approximately 1.5 per cent and 1.2 percent of China’s GDP that year (China’s Tenth Five-Year Plan estimates that
China’s GDP growth rate in the 2001-2005 period will be 7%). The income
increase of the WTO membership is mainly due to high efficiency resulting from88

global resource re-allocation according to comparative advantage. This means
China will participate in the division of labour internationally and shareefficiency benefits of the integration into the world economy. For sectors thatare capital intensive and under high protection of the state, such as auto,
equipment and instruments, as well as cotton, wheat and those under highprotection by agricultural departments, their output value will decrease greatly.
However, sectors that are labour-intensive, like textile and clothing, will be thebeneficiaries.The world exporting market for labour-intensive products and theimporting market for primary agriculture commodities would be greatly
affected.The share of China’s clothing exports in the international market would
meanwhile increase by 10 per cent and the import of land intensive agriculturalcommodities would also greatly increase. In the year 2010, China will probably
become the most important agro-product importing country after Japan. In
general, the tertiary industry in China will develop greatly after China’s WTO
accession.The proportion of the secondary industry in the economic structure
would further grow, while the primary sector would shrink. According to thecalculation by Huang Jikun of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science, grain
production within the agricultural structure would decrease substantially while
livestock production increasing greatly.2
2. Potential Environmental Impacts of China’s WTO Accession
After China joins the WTO, the opening of the market and changes in the trade
structure and volume will lead to tremendous changes in China’s economic
structure. Changes in the economic structure will have great potential
environmental impacts in China. These include impacts on industrial pollution,
the state of the ecological environment environmental management andenvironmental industries.This section discusses these possible impacts.
2.1 Impacts on pollution in industrial sectors
With WTO membership, China is likely to substantially increase its exports.This
may lead to rapid production expansion in certain sectors, which would
undoubtedly add new pressures to the environment. However, one of the mostimportant changes in China’s WTO accession will be China’s participation in
global re-allocation of productivity elements such as land, labour, capital andnatural resources. It will help China restructure its overall economic
configuration. If this takes places properly, the pollution elasticity of per unit ofchange will be presumably higher than the pollution elasticity of the volume
change. With overall changes in the industrial structure, the pollution level
would probably decrease gradually over a long-term period compared to nonaccession. This is because environmental pressure would likely stick to thefollowing trend: low value-added and labour-intensive industries which usually
perform poorly in financial and environmental terms will, along with theinvestment direction, be transferred from developed countries in Europe, theUnited States and Japan to China, and then from eastern China to central and89

western China, and from China to other even poorer regions like Indochina
countries,Africa etc. Industrial restructuring induced by trade expansion will be
conducive to tackling industrial pollution at its sources and also to addressing
non-point source pollution problems of chemical fertilizers and pesticides in the
agriculture sector, if proper policies are put in place.
After China accesses to the WTO, productivity elements such as land, labour,
capital and natural resources will be re-allocated internationally, which may help
China reorganize its industrial structure. A general perception based on
qualitative analysis could be:• Labour-intensive industries such as manufacturing, livestock and handcraft
would further expand;• Intelligence/intellectuality-intensive and knowledge-intensive industries
including information, telecommunication, consulting, community services,education and culture, etc. would grow further;• Land-intensive industries such as plantation, grain production and traditional
husbandry would decrease;• Capital-intensive industries would largely increase, including banking,security, insurance, brokerage, tourism, real estate, education and culture;• Pollution-intensive industries will vary from the east to the west of China.
Generally speaking, environmental pressure would increase in central andwestern regions but decrease in eastern regions.
Quantitative estimates by the CGE model of the Development Research Centre of
the State Council predict that the proportion of the tertiary industry in the national
economy structure would greatly increase in the future while the proportion of the
primary and secondary industries including traditional manufacturing, processing,grain production and husbandry would substantially shrink.
With the increase in the proportion of the tertiary industry and thedecrease in the proportion of the primary and secondary industries after China
joins the WTO, the overall pollution in China will most likely drop gradually incomparison with the baseline pollution level before China becomes a WTO
member. WTO accession will be an historic opportunity for China to
restructure its economic structure.
International experiences have proved that rational economic restructuring
would help eliminate industrial pollution emissions at their source as well as
non-point source pollution caused by the use of fertilizers and pesticides. It is a
far more effective measure than direct pollution control. Japan underwent
economic restructuring in the 1970s; it transferred its low value-added andlabour-intensive polluting industries to other southeast Asian countries whiledeveloping its electronic industry at home. In doing this, it gained both
economic growth and environmental benefits. Restructuring is also one of themeasures now highly recommended by the World Bank in addressing
environmental problems.
The Chinese government can take the opportunity of WTO accession to
restructure its economic and industrial structures rationally, eliminating old
industries that have low efficiency, high pollution and high energy consumption
90and replacing them with high technologies, high efficiency, low pollution and low
energy consumption. Enterprises that intend to expand and develop in theinternational market will have to undertake technology innovation on one handand on the other hand undergo systematic reform, establish a modern industrial
system, strengthen their development forces and establish incentive or
disincentive mechanisms. They will also have to learn advanced and modern
management experience from abroad.
Rational restructuring can help eliminate industrial pollution emissions attheir sources. In a long-term period, overall environmental pollution will be
reduced and environmental quality improved. This is a more effective way tocontrol pollution than the end-of-pipeline control used in the past and evencleaner production practiced at present.
It should be also noted that although restructuring through trade liberalization
is likely to reduce pollution per unit of output, there is a concurrent risk ofincreased output volumes negating the gains per unit. To prevent this fromhappening, appropriate policy measures are needed. Most developed countries
have found it necessary to utilize multiple standards to deal with environmental
problems created by economic growth; these include emissions standards,
environmental quality standards, product and process standards, use standards
and disposal standards. China also needs to adopt such a structure to control
scale effects of pollution after WTO accession.
2.2 Impacts on the state of the environment
After China's WTO accession, if appropriate policy measures are taken to
facilitate rational industrial restructuring and effectively address environmental
problems, the volume of wastewater discharges to the environment willprobably be reduced due to more and better treatment being enforced.
Although environmental pressure on air quality will also be reduced in general,
air quality in urban areas will likely worsen.There is a possibility that the importand export of wastes will grow and the trend in ecosystem degradation
probably slow down and even be reversed.
2.2.1 Water
Wastewater discharges in different sectors will vary along with the changes inindustrial structure after China’s WTO accession. The preliminary qualitative
estimate of overall impacts on water is that total contaminated water into theenvironment would slightly decrease. This would mainly because pollution
caused by non-point source from grain production accounting for a fairly large
proportion of the total contaminated water into the environment. Take Taihu
Lake as an example, 40% of wastewater containing nitrogen and phosphorus
come from agriculture production.
As the partial equilibrium modelling by Chinese Academy of Agricultural
Science predicts, although China’s accession to the WTO will have adverse91

impacts on China’s agricultural production (Huang, 1999), the export of livestock
products is likely to expand. The textile industry will see tremendous
development. Other traditional industries such as iron and steel are likely to slow
down. Both the tertiary industry and residential water consumption will grow.
How the water environment will be affected depends on the following sectors:• The grain production sector: this sector will see reduction in use of chemicalfertilizers and pesticides and therefore a reduction of non-point source
pollution (presumably, substantial domestic production of rice, wheat, maizeand bean, etc. will be replaced by foreign exports due to pricedisadvantages);• The livestock industry: there is likely to be an increase of point-source
pollution in this sector with increase of livestock manure;• The textile industry: this sector will see an increase of wastewater discharges;• The iron and steel industry: there will be a decrease of wastewater discharges
as this sector is likely to slow down; and• The tertiary industry and residential consumption: there will be an increase inwastewater discharges from the tertiary industry and residential
consumption.
2.2.2 Air
After accessing to the WTO, China is likely to increase the import of clean
energy such as petroleum and natural gas, which would enlarge the proportionof such clean energy and reduce the proportion of coal in China’s energy
structure. Therefore, environmental pressure resulting from energy
consumption on air quality is likely to reduce.
However, the situation in urban areas could be quite different. Given thetariff reduction for automobiles, the import of cars will greatly increase as aresult of price reduction. Therefore, the automobile purchasing rate by
consumers in urban areas is likely to increase at an estimated rate of 5 per centto 10 per cent annually. Meanwhile, existing old cars will continue to emit
presumably much more air pollutants than newer cars. Moreover, there areother major sources that are likely to cause urban air pollution including
domestic heating and industrial emission from existing sources. Compared tothe baseline level before WTO accession, the increase of car consumption willbring greater pressure to urban air. Without taking adequate measures toenhance pollution control, particularly pollution caused by the increase of
automobiles in urban areas, serious air pollution is likely to take place.
2.2.3 Solid wastes
Given the probable shrinking of the secondary industry and the growth in thetertiary industry after China becomes a WTO member, industrial solid wastes
are likely to decrease with appropriate control measures. However, municipal
wastes are likely to increase with urban expansion.
Meanwhile, with the increase of trade volumes and opportunities, there is a92

possibility of increasing the import of wastes from developed countries if noadequate controls are in place.There is also the likelihood that wastes would beexported from China to poorer countries.
2.2.4 Impacts on ecosystem
Since 1996, China has paid as much attention to ecological conservation as topollution control. Nevertheless, ecological conservation and reconstruction
projects are very difficult to carry through because of China’s self-sufficient
agricultural policy.
After accession to the WTO, China could greatly increase its import oftimber and timber products to protect its forest resources, and to use bothinternational and domestic markets to maintain food security for its 1.2 billion
people.With WTO membership, average tariffs for agricultural products will be
reduced from 31.5% to 14.5-15% within five years and a tariff-rate quota system
will be applied for products such as wheat, rice and cotton, the import of theseproducts (mainly land-intensive products) will greatly increase as they losecompetitive advantages. Labour-intensive products like fruit, vegetables andlivestock products could be developed faster given the comparative advantagesof such products.
From the environmental protection perspective, the increased import ofland intensive agricultural products such as grain means reduction of land
utilization, reduction of chemical fertilizers and pesticides use, reduction ofagriculture plastic film pollution and reduction of straw pollution caused byagricultural production. In this sense, after China's WTO accession, moreagricultural products will rely on the international market. It will be conducive
to addressing agricultural non-point source pollution, which is a daunting task atpresent. It could also make it possible to carry out reforestation andafforestation projects in remote and mountainous areas.This would apparently
help China greatly reduce environmental pressure in rural areas andfundamentally halt the trend of ecological degradation resulting from economic
development. Meanwhile, appropriately guided use of foreign investment would
help carry out ecological reconstruction projects, if the Chinese government
formulates appropriate incentive policies to encourage the investments.
At the same time, China’s trade establishment should be cautious not toadopt trade policies that encourage exporting of products having detrimental
environmental impacts simply for the purpose of keeping trade balance between
import and export after China becomes a WTO member. Exporting of suchproducts will cause significant environmental impact. For example, excessive
expansion of tin exports is likely to result in serious environmental problems in
the tin mining process, unless sufficient investment is put in environmental
protection, which will permit increased production with lower pollution.
2.3 Impacts on environmental management
From the perspective of environmental management, China's accession to the93

WTO will provide China with good opportunities to improve its environmental
management and make China’s environmental management system andstandards gradually conform with those of the international levels.
First, the complete market opening would make China’s environmental
management authorities face many new issues. To better manage its
environmental regime, the authorities need to learn from the advanced
experiences from abroad, standardizing its management system and making it
gradually conform to the internationally practiced system.
Second, China’s environmental management standards need to be revised inorder to meet the requirements of the importing countries. The WTO
encourages free trade while at the same time allowing governments to takeappropriate measures to protect human health, animal and plant health, natural
resources and the environment. Therefore, environmental measures are
sometimes used as a non-tariff barrier.With WTO membership, China will haveto re-consider its environmental standards and make efforts to coordinate with
developed countries to reduce transaction costs for its exports.
Third, trading under the WTO rules requires a market-oriented system, andthe separation of enterprises from the government is inevitable. Such a
separation makes it easier for the government to regulate enterprises in termsof environmental management without considering too many social, economic
and political issues.
2.4 Impacts on the environmental industry
After China’s WTO accession, the environmental industry in China as a wholewill develop rapidly, not only in scale but also in terms of the technology level; itwill become a sector with a substantial scale. Presently, China continues toincrease investment in environmental protection, and the market for theenvironmental industry is prospectively promising.After China becomes a WTO
member, more and more foreign environmental companies are likely to enter
China’s market. Given fewer barriers for foreign investors to invest in China,
foreign companies, with their advantages in capital, management skills, technology
and human resources, can establish joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned
enterprises and even form entities by ways of acquisition or recombination ofChina’s environmental enterprises, according to the rule of the market economy.
This means major upgrading of this industry not only in scale but also in termsof the technology level, if proper policy measures are taken.
However, China’s environmental industry, which is now mainly comprised ofTVEs, would not be able to compete with foreign companies in terms oftechnology, management and scale. This would substantially affect China’s
environmental industry and “force” it to increase its competitiveness. Without
appropriate adjustment, China’s environmental enterprises are likely to go
bankrupt and come under the control of international capitals. Facing such agreat challenge, China’s national environmental industry needs to be reformed
or it would go bankrupt.
Under WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services, the environmental
94

services sector is one of the sectors encouraged to liberalize. In facilitating
China’s WTO accession negotiations, the Ministry of Foreign Trade andEconomic Cooperation worked out a schedule of specific commitments forliberalizing trade in environmental services in China in 1995. After China’s
accession to the WTO, this sector will be gradually opened. Importing foreign
advanced environmental management skills, coupled with their advanced
technology, will help China meet its environmental protection needs andpromote sustainable development. On the other hand, opening this sector toforeign environmental service suppliers may impede the development of the
newly developed domestic environmental services sector. The challenge for
China will be how to maximize the benefits of liberalizing this sector, while atthe same time providing necessary protection to the development of its own
sector. It is important for China to meet such a challenge under the WTO rules
and obligations.
3. Environment-related Trade Implications and Other Trade-related
Environmental Implications
In addition to domestic environmental impacts, China’s WTO accession would
also have some environment-related trade implications and other trade-related
environmental implications. These include the impact of green consumer
challenges in the international market on Chinese exports, environmental
challenges of increased foreign investment inflows and the impact of increased
imports of resource-based products on the global environment. WTO
membership will also require China to adjust its trade and environment policies
to ensure consistency with rules of the world trading system in support ofenvironmental protection and sustainable development.
3.1 Impacts of green consumerism in the international market on
Chinese exports
WTO membership will provide China with tremendous opportunities toexpand exports, as China will enjoy stable multilateral preferential trade policies
under a rule-based system and its trading partners will have to reduce arbitrary
tariff-rates and measures imposed on China’s exports. As mentioned earlier,
China’s WTO membership will mostly benefit China’s labour-intensive products
like textiles, toys, leathers and other light industry products. Taking the textile
and garment industries as an example, their products are expected to benefit
considerably from WTO membership.At present, about 25 per cent of Chinese
textile exports, worth $US10 billion value, are under the restriction of quotas
imposed by European countries and the United States.With WTO membership,
China will greatly benefit from the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles andClothing. China’s textile exports are expected to grow substantially by 20053,
while garment exports will double.The toy industry is another sector that will
benefit from WTO membership.
In the agriculture sector, although exports of Chinese primary products such95

as wheat, corn, rice, edible oil, cotton and sugar are likely to shrink (due to pricedisadvantages), fruits, vegetable and husbandry products are likely to obtaincompetitive advantages in the international market.
However, there will be some potential environmental challenges for these
Chinese exports in the international market. The current international market ischanging rapidly in response to consumer’s preference for environmentally friendly
products, and stringent environmental regulations in other countries. There is anincreasing public perception in developed countries that trade liberalization needs
to consider environmental and other social values. Chinese exports are likely to
encounter green challenges due to more stringent environmental regulations andother voluntary environmental measures in response to green consumers’ choicein these countries. Textiles, toys, and food products are most likely to encounterenvironmental measures in foreign countries.
Studies undertaken by the Working Group on Trade and Environment of the
China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Developmenton impacts of environmental standards and other voluntary environmental
measures in other countries clearly indicate that measures taken by othercountries for the purpose of the environment, health and plant and animal
protection will cause impacts on China’s exports, such as the German ban of
108 Azo dye stuff and the ban imposed by the U.S., Canada and EU on untreatedwooden packaging materials.4
An APEC study indicates that environmental regulations and standards in the
U.S., Japan and European countries have mainly impacted 24 categories of
products in APEC developing countries among 10 surveyed environmental
measures. Of the 24 categories of products surveyed, 21 are affected byenvironmental measures.5 Environmental measures range from provisions ofmultilateral environmental agreements, national laws and regulations andenvironmental standards and requirements, to voluntary environmental measures
such as ecolabelling and ISO14000 environmental management system standards.
These measures are sometimes referred to as “green barriers.” Strictly speaking,
only those measures that are used under the green cloak but for the purpose fortrade protection are called “green barriers” in a real sense. Nevertheless, somecommentators refer all environmental measures as “green barriers.”
Although these “green” measures caused some difficulties for Chinese
enterprises, they also brought about opportunities.They prompted the industry
to seek alternatives and undertake technology innovation. As a result, they
promoted the integration of environmental considerations into industrial
restructuring and strengthening the environmental management systems ofexporting firms. These efforts eventually brought competitive advantages toChinese exporting firms.
The most recent trend is developing countries tightening theirenvironmental regulations. Trade conflicts could arise from environmental
measures taken by a developing country as well. Recently, the European Union
requested consultation with Chile, within the WTO, concerning Chile’s ban onaccess to its ports for foreign fishing vessels catching swordfish inside andoutside the 200-mile coastal economic zone of Chile. Chile has tightened its
96domestic rules regarding the capture of swordfish because the species is now
threatened.This could be a precedent-setting trade and environmental conflict
triggered by environmental measures from a developing country, if it goes to the
WTO dispute settlement.
To compete successfully and ensure the expected greater access of Chinese
exports to the international market after China joins the WTO, Chinese
exporting enterprises need to be aware of the green consumerism trend andthe rapid change in international markets in response to environment
protection. It is not economically beneficial to rally against the prevailing windsof consumer preference. The government of China needs to strengthen andadjust its domestic environmental regulations and standards, help exporting
enterprises obtain necessary information on changes and overcome “green
barriers” adopted in foreign countries to meet the environmental challenge ininternational markets. Enterprises need to strengthen their environmental
management, practice cleaner production, and make these efforts known by
obtaining ecolabels or ISO 14000 certification.
3.2 Implications of Foreign Investment for Environment andSustainable Development
Since the economic reform in late 1970s until July 2000 there have been morethan 350,000 foreign-invested enterprises established in China with acontractual investment totalling US$ 641.7 billion and an actual investment ofover US$ 327.7 billion. According to a newly released World Development
Report by the World Bank, China has attracted 6% of the world foreign direct
investment (FDI), and has become the largest recipient of FDI among developing
countries6 since 1993. Foreign investment now accounts for more then 20
percent of the fixed assets of the entire nation.
Table 1 FDI Ranking for Developing Countries
Country
China
BrazilMexicoSingapore
Indonesia
Malaysia
Saudi Arabia
Argentina
Other developing countries
Industrial countries

Percentage of total FDI (%)
6
4
3
2
2
1
1
1
10
70

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Source: Entering the 21st Century:World Development Report 1999/2000,World Bank
97

Most of FDI comes from Hong Kong,Taiwan and Macao, Japan, the U.S. and EU
as well as Singapore. Most FDI inflows to the industry sector, particularly
manufacturing, and to eastern coastal areas such as Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu
and large Chinese cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. These regions attracting
most foreign investment have been very successful in its development. FDI has
played a very important role in China’s fast-growing economy over the past two
decades. In 1999, the growth rate of the industrial output of foreign-invested
enterprises was higher than the national average. Their tax revenues increased
by 33.78 per cent, 16% of the total tax revenues of the national industrial andcommerce tax revenues. The import and export value of these enterprises
reached US$ 174.5 billion, accounting for 48.38 per cent of the nation’s total.7
China’s WTO membership would further boost FDI inflows. Elimination of
restrictive measures, access to more sectors, and lifts of tariff would allcontribute to bring more foreign capital to China.The rule-based environment
would also boost foreign investors’ confidence and trust in investing in China. It
is estimated that FDI inflows will increase from US$ 45.6 billion in 1998 to US$
70 billion by 2003.
As mentioned above, the CGE model prediction by the Development ResearchCentre of the State Council indicates that after China joins the WTO thegeneral development trend will be: the primary and secondary industries will
generally shrink while the tertiary industry is likely to greatly increase. Morespecifically, land-intensive sectors such as plantation, grain production andtraditional husbandry will decrease, while labour-intensive sectors (such as
textile, toy and handcraft, etc), capital-intensive service industries (such as
banking, security, insurance, brokerage, tourism, real estate, etc.) andintelligency-/intellecually-intensive and knowledge-intensive industries (including
information, telecommunication, consulting, community services, education andculture) would largely increase.
Accordingly, the investment direction will most likely follow this trend. The
increase of the tertiary industry and the decrease of the primary and thesecond industries will be conducive to China’s industrial restructuring and help
address environmental problems and promote sustainable development.
Nevertheless, it is still important to integrate environment and sustainable
concerns in guiding FDI inflows to China. Because investment is the mostimportant force in fostering more sustainable forms of production, theintroduction of foreign capital, advanced technology and management expertise
will give impetus to technical innovation and structure adjustment in Chinese
enterprises. However, these benefits associated with investment do not accrue
automatically and need adequate policy guidance. Investment today will largely
decide the future economic structure of the country in the long run.
There are lessons that can be drawn from China’s own experience in utilizing
foreign investment in the past. Foreign investment has made obvious
98contributions to China’s rapid economic growth. Many foreign-invested firms,
particularly large multinationals, are more environmentally responsible. They
introduced advanced technology and pollution control facilities and practiceadvanced environmental management systems in their operation. However, insome cases, environmental and national long-term goals of sustainable
development have been compromised for short-term economic profits. Studies
done by the University of International Business and Economics pointed outthat some small and medium sized foreign-funded firms have moved to China’s
southern provinces to take advantage of lower environmental standards and lax
enforcement.8 Certain foreign-invested enterprises are engaged in pollutionintensive industrial activities.There is a race among different regions to attract
foreign investment, sometimes at the cost of environment and long-term
development.
The Chinese government has begun to attach importance to integrating
environmental concerns into its investment policy. In its guiding industry
priorities for foreign investment implemented in 1998, foreign investment isencouraged in sectors and projects that are energy efficient and environmental
friendly; and discouraged or prohibited in projects that may cause
environmental pollution. Most recently, measures have been taken to encourage
foreign investors to undertake R&D and establish R&D centres, including
environmental technology R&D. Those who do so will be exempted fromimport tariff and other import fees for equipment and technology needed for
R&D. Those who invest in encouraged projects and technology will be
exempted from certain business and other taxes. In response to China’s new
development emphasis in the western provinces, various measure have beentaken to attract foreign investment. Those who invest in projects that areencouraged will be exempted from import tariffs and procedure fees. Moresectors are open for investment, and requirements for investment and theapproval procedures for encouraged projects have been relaxed.
When it becomes a member of the World Trade Organization, China needs tocontinue to adjust its national investment policies to include environmental andsustainable development concerns in its investment policy-making process.
China must ensure that new investments do not lead to environmental
deterioration but rather support its goals of environmental protection andlong-term sustainable development and ensure that short-term economic
interests do not compromise long-term sustainability. In this regard, there are
two aspects that need attention. First, to provide detailed guidance forinvestment projects and technology and to enhance the ability to identify thetechnology desirable for supporting China’s environmental and sustainable
development goals. Second, to strengthen environmental management offoreign investment such as encouraging foreign investors to implement higher
environmental standards, develop environmentally friendly products andpractice cleaner production, etc.

99

3.3 Impacts of increased imports of resource-based products
After accession to the WTO, China is likely to substantially increase imports ofresource-based products for various reasons. These include grain products,
forest products, oil and natural gas.
China’s annual timber consumption reaches 150 million cubic meters, which
exceeds the world total annual timber trade volume. The demand for timber
products in the future will continue to grow in a rapid growing economy.
Ironically, the country’s forest resource base has been very fragile. Deforestation
over the past few decades for economic development has caused devastatingconsequences. Floods in 1998 demonstrated the serious consequences ofdeforestation and China’s fragile ecological environment. In order to reverse thedeterioration of the ecological environment, the Chinese government has
decided to ban logging in the upper and middle ranges of the country’s two
major rivers and initiate programs for afforestation and restoration of claimed
land for grain production. Under these circumstances, China expects to increasetimber imports and reduce exports. Statistics shows that China’s timber
imports rose sharply in 1999 since the logging ban was imposed. In the first halfof 1999, China imported 10 million cubic meter of timber, more than doubled
the 4.8 million cubic meters imported in 1998.
China’s WTO accession will likely foster China’s timber imports.Tariff rates forimports of processed forest products could be further reduced and non-tariffmeasures such as trading rights can be phased out. Increased imports of forest
products would benefit the country greatly, helping to address the domestic
timber shortage and support domestic forest conservation efforts.
In the agriculture sector, marked reduction of tariff and elimination of quota
could likely lead to increased imports of agricultural products such as wheat,corn, rice, cotton, oil and sugar. From the environment and sustainable
development perspective, it would be conducive to the country’s landconservation leading to less land exploitation, less application of fertilizers andpesticides, and reduction of non-point source pollution.
In the energy sectors, increased imports of natural gas could help ease its heavy
dependency on coal and increased imports of petroleum products may help
ease oil exploitation.The importation of other natural mineral resources could
prevent environmental impacts associated with mining.
Although these changes in trade in the forest, agricultural and energy sectors
would be environmentally beneficial to China in terms of land conservation,
forest conservation and promoting the use of clean energy; China’s likely
increased imports of natural resource-based products may raise issues ofenvironmental impacts on the global environment. China would be soon in thesituation where it plays a role in deforestation in tropical countries and in100

unsustainable exploitation of natural resources in other poor exporting
countries. China needs to pay attention to the environmental challenges inresource exploration beyond its border and become a responsible natural
resources consumer in the international market. The government could takenecessary measures to encourage the sustainable form of production anddiscourage the unsustainable form of production in exporting countries.These
measures may include the requirement of the Forest Stewardship label toencourage sustainable forest management systems and environmental impact
assessment on projects that Chinese firms invest in, etc.
3.4 Implications for trade and environmental policies
After China becomes a member of the WTO, it will have to strictly follow therules of the multilateral trading system. Some current trade related economic
laws and regulations in China are not quite consistent with rules of themultilateral system and need to be adjusted.
From an environment and sustainable development perspective, WTO
membership also requires necessary changes in environment-related trade
policies and trade-related environmental policies. Integrated policies andmeasures are needed to ensure mutual support of trade development andenvironmental protection and to promote long-term sustainable development.
The overall effect of China’s WTO accession will be to place increased demandson the quality and technical appropriateness of China’s environmental
management system.
China needs to make efforts in integrating environmental concerns in national
investment, import and export policies for goods and services, andstrengthening its environmental legislation and enforcement. In addition,
attention should also be paid to the following aspects:
Technical barriers to trade and sanitary/phytosanitary measures
The WTO aims to promote free and fair trade. But it also allows its Member
States to maintain their sovereign rights to protect human health, plant andanimal health, natural resources and the environment as exceptions to its
general rules. There are two binding WTO agreements that intend to limit
abusive uses of standards for protection purposes. They are the WTO
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (the SPS
Agreement) and the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the TBTAgreement). The SPS Agreement covers the use of sanitary and phytosanitary
measures that ensure food safety and animal and plant health. The TBTAgreement governs all mandatory technical regulations and standards as well as
voluntary standards for products. TBT standards may involve product content,
packaging and labelling measures.Although WTO member states are allowed tomaintain sovereign rights of governments to provide the level of protection of101

human health, plant and animal health, natural resources and the environment,
as they deem appropriate, the basic aim of these two agreements is to ensurethat such measures are not distorting trade.These two agreements regulate theuse of protection measures.
The TBT and SPS issues China may face are twofold. On one hand, China’s likely
increase in imports of timber and food products may pose challenges to China’s
sanitary and phytosanitary regulatory regime. The increased imports of theseproducts will likely increase the chances of bringing invasive species to China.
Currently, China’s sanitary and phytosanitary measures are generally lax and therisk of bringing in invasive species doesn’t seem to receive adequate attention.
In order to protect human health, plant and animal protection and ecologicalenvironment conservation, China needs to strengthen its sanitary andphytosanitary regulatory regime to provide adequate protection of humanhealth, plant and animal health, natural resources and the environment.
On the other hand, with greater access to the international market, Chinese
products may also encounter more stringent TBT and SPS measures, and other“green barriers.” China needs to carefully undertake studies on TBT and SPS
measures and other “green barriers” in foreign countries, and formulate its
counter measures so as to minimize barriers to trade and maximize its exportsof goods and services.
Upgrading environmental regulations and standards
After China becomes a WTO member, China’s environmental regulations andstandards will have to gradually conform with international ones. These may
include environmental standards for products, environmental management
standards and environmental quality standards.While allowing Member States totake necessary measures to protect human health, plant and animal health, theenvironment and natural resources, the WTO rules also impose some
restrictions on protection measures to ensure that measures taken by
governments are not misused for protectionist purposes and do not result in
unnecessary barriers to international trade. The WTO rules require standard
setting bodies of governments to follow certain rules. On the other hand, boththe SPS and TBT Agreements encourage Member States to use international
standards.They also encourage standards harmonization and mutual recognition.
This implies that WTO membership requires China to upgrade its
environmental regulations and standards by incorporating international
standards as well as regulations and standards in other countries. Strengthening
environmental regulations and upgrading its environmental standards will
promote environmental management in the country, encourage efficient
production practices while raising the competitiveness of Chinese firms in theinternational market.

102

Transparency of trade and environmental policies and regulations
Another important policy implication is the issue of transparency.Transparency
is one of the most important principles of the WTO. It requires member
governments to follow a transparent procedure in the rule-making process andmake any rules related to trade easily accessible. WTO membership requires
China to publish domestic laws and regulations that may affect international
trade, including measures governing import, export, sale of goods and technicalregulation, as well as sanitary, etc. These requirements also apply toenvironmental regulations and standards.
This means that China needs to establish a transparent registration andpublication system for governmental regulations that may affect international
trade ensuring the compliance of the WTO publication requirements. Traderelated environmental regulations and measures as well as environment-relatedtrade regulation and measures will become one of the important componentsof the system.
4.WTO and China: a perspective of trade and environment
China’s entry into the WTO will not only allow China to enjoy stable
multilateral preferential trade policies of its trade partners and expand its
exports, China will also enjoy a full membership in exercising its power toinfluence this organization and present its views. In addition, China will be able
to participate in the rule-making process of the world trading system. It will also
participate in a new round of trade negotiations, if there are any, and influence
the rule-making process of the trading system. China will be also able toparticipate in the continuing negotiations on the “build-in agenda” and on issues
concerning the implementation of existing commitments.
It will also allow China to use the WTO dispute settlement system to resolve
any dispute it may have with other trading partners. From an environment andsustainable development viewpoint, China will be able to use the disputesettlement system to resolve trade and environment-related disputes and playa role in the trade and environment debate.
4.1 Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System
Over the past few years, there were a number of trade conflicts between China
and other countries related to environmental measures. Non-WTO
membership prevented China from bringing its disputes to the WTO disputesettlement system. China’s WTO membership will provide China with a channel
for bringing its trade conflicts with other trading partners to the WTO for a fairsettlement. To resort to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism could
safeguard its trade and environment interests.

103

Studies undertaken by the Working Group on Trade and Environment of the
CCICED found that although environmental measures taken by foreign
governments are sometimes legitimate, the procedures used to adopt themeasures are inconsistent with WTO rules. Take for example the azo ban inGermany or the packaging requirements by the U.S. and Canada. Although themeasures themselves are legitimate in protecting human health and forests, thesemeasures did not pay proper attention to the impact on China’s trade and are notconsistent with the procedure requirements like consultation and transparency.9
WTO membership will allow China to bring these disputes to the WTO disputesettlement system for a fair settlement.
4.2 The role of China in the trade and environmental debate in the WTO
WTO membership will allow China to participate in a new round of tradenegotiations, if there are any, and in making international trading rules. With its
size of economy, its dimensions of trade, its status as the principal recipient ofinvestment among developing countries, China is likely to become one of themost important key players in the WTO regime, and in discussions on all theimportant issues. Developed countries and developing countries are greatly
divided in the debate about trade, environment and development. Developing
countries reject any inclusion of environmental or labour issues and call for full
implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements, while a growing number ofdeveloped countries in Europe and North America call for strong environmental
measures and support environmental review of trade agreements.
China, as the world’s largest developing country, shares the concerns of thedeveloping countries. On the other hand, it also recognizes the importance ofenvironmental protection and sustainable development. It is crucial that China
develops a forward-looking position and plays a major role in discussions on theissue of trade, environment and sustainable development.
5. Preliminary Conclusions and Recommendations
Generally speaking, WTO membership will have long-term historic impacts on
China’s environmental quality, environmental management and environmental
industry at large. It will become a major milestone in China’s environmental
history. Some of these impacts are short-term direct impacts, while most ofothers are long-term and indirect. It is not only a historic opportunity toredistribute its industrial structure, but it also adds more pressure on theenvironment in some aspects. It challenges the environmental industry andraises new requirements for environmental management.
Environmental impacts of China’s WTO accession can be summarized as follows:• With fundamental changes in industrial structure, the overall pollution level
will gradually reduce year after year compared to pre- WTO accession, if proper104policy measures are taken.There is a likely tendency in terms of environmentalpressure: low value-added and labour-intensive industries which usually perform
poorly in environmental terms transferred from advanced countries in Europe,
the United States and Japan to China, and then from east to central and west
regions, and from China to poorer countries (such as India, Africa, etc.).
Industrial restructuring is conducive to addressing industrial pollution emission
at its source, and non-point source pollution caused by chemical fertilizer andpesticide from agriculture.
• The quantity of wastewater discharges in China will probably be reducedwith appropriate measures. Although environmental pressure on air will belessened in general, air quality in urban areas will probably worsen. Industrial
solid wastes will be cut down, but municipal wastes would likely increase.Thereis a probability that the import and export of wastes would increase.The trend
in ecological degradation would be reversed.
• China’s WTO accession may bring excellent opportunities for China to
improve its environmental management and to gradually upgrade its
environmental management system and environmental standards to be moreconsistent with international practice.
• China’s environmental industry will develop rapidly, not only in scale but also
in terms of the technology level, and it may form an industry in substantial scale.
WTO membership may also greatly affect China’s environmental industry, which
is mainly made up from township and village enterprises. This sector will befacing great challenges and needs to be reformed or else go bankrupt.
In addition to domestic environmental impacts, China’s WTO membership will
also have some environment-related trade implications and other trade-related
environmental implications.These include:• Chinese exports that may have great competitive advantages, such as
textiles, toys and leather, are most likely to encounter green consumer
challenges in the international market. Efforts need to be made to address theseenvironmental challenges;• China’s WTO membership will attract more foreign direct investment toChina. New investments need to be guided and rationally used in support ofChina’s long-term national goals of environment and sustainable development;• With WTO membership, China is likely to substantially increase imports ofnatural resource-based products. China needs to pay attention to environmental
challenges in natural resources exporting countries and avoid playing a role indeforestation and unsustainable exploitation of natural resource in these countries;• China’s WTO membership requires adjusting its relevant trade andenvironmental policies, including integrating environmental concerns into
national investment, import and export policies. It would also require China toestablish a sound regulatory system for protection of human health, plant andanimal health, natural resources and the environment. Efforts should also bemade to upgrade its environmental laws and regulations in lines with those inother countries, and to make its laws and regulations transparent; and• China would be able to use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to105

protect its trade and environmental interests and play an active role in the tradeand environmental debate in the WTO.
WTO membership will bring China opportunities as well as challenges; it will
have positive and negative impacts on China’s environment. Therefore, theChinese government needs to pay sufficient attention to trade andenvironmental implications of China’s WTO accession. In order to make gooduse of the opportunities of WTO membership and minimize adverse impacts on
China’s trade and the environment and to maximize its trade opportunities, thefollowing preliminary recommendations are put forward for relevant
departments to consider as actions to be taken to address trade andenvironmental issues of China’s WTO accession:
1.There is a need to undertake a more thorough assessment on environmental
impacts of the WTO agreements in China in order to be clear about the actual
impacts of China’s WTO accession on the environment and environmental
related trade implications. Adequate policies and measures to address theseissues must be formulated
2. There is a need to set up an integrated program to address environmental
challenges brought about by China’s accession to the WTO.The opportunity of
China’s WTO accession to address environmental problems through thestructure adjustment must be taken in hand. A detailed plan needs to be
formulated that integrates eco-environment protection into economic system
as soon as possible to take part in economic actions and minimize negativeenvironmental impacts. Efforts should be made to strengthen its environmental
legislation, enforcement and management
3.There is a strong need to integrate environmental concerns in relevant trade
policies to address environmental challenges both at home and abroad. These
include adjusting China’s national investment policies, import and export policies
for goods and services to strengthen its sanitary and phytosanitory measuresand other technical standards and regulations and to establish a transparent
publication system for trade laws and regulations. This also requires close
cooperation among relevant departments responsible for trade, environmental,
technical standards and others. It is desirable to establish an advisory committee,
under the auspice of MOFTEC, comprised of representatives from all relevant
departments. This committee should meet regularly to advise on appropriate
policies for China to address issues related to trade and environment. There isalso a need to study “green” measures in foreign countries, to help enterprises
meet the green challenge in international markets.
4.There is also a need for China to develop a forwarding and positive position andplay an active role in the trade and environment debate in the WTO. China may
wish to bring relevant governmental officials and academic professionals together
to develop a set of principles to help address trade and environmental issues.
106Reference
SETC (1999) “Sino-American Agreement on China’s WTO Accessing”, China
Agricultural Press.
Li Shantong, et al., (1999) WTO Impact on China’s Economic Structure, a reportby Development Research Centre of the State Council.
Huang Jikun, et al., (1998) WTO Impact on China’s Agriculture, a report by the
China Agricultural Policy Research Centre of the Chinese Academy ofAgriculture Sciences.
Mo Tong (1999) 22 Aspects of WTO’s Impacts on China, China Press.
Hu Tao (2000) WTO’s Impacts on China’s Environment, “The Trends inEnvironmental Sciences” 2000(1): 1-7.
Zhang Yi, “The principles, benefits and drawbacks of China’s accession to the
WTO”, China Economic Review, August, 2000
Ni Yueju, “Opportunities and challenges of China’s WTO accession”, China
Economic Review, June 2000.
Changjin Sun, “WTO and Chinese forestry: an outline of knowledge andknowledge gaps”, Sinoshpere (an electronic publication by PACE atwww.chinaenvironment.net\sino), vol. 3, no. 3, Summer 2000.
1Li Shantong, et al., (1999) WTO Impact on China’s Economic Structure, a report by

Development Research Centre of the State Council.
2Huang Jikun, et al., (1998) WTO Impact on China’s Agriculture, a report by the

Agricultural Policy Research Centre of the Chinese Academy of Agriculture Science.
3According to a commentary by Ni Yueju in China Economic Review of June 2000,

Chinese textile exports would increase by 63.8 percent by 2005.
4Policy

Research Centre for Environment and Economy, Impact of environmental
standards/requirements in EU countries on China’s textile industry, a report submitted
by the WGTE to CCICED in October 1999; Chinese Academy of International Tradeand Economic Cooperation. Improving outer packaging of export goods for sustainablegrowth of China’s foreign trade, a report submitted by the WGTE to CCICED in
October 2000.

5APEC Economic committee, Survey on trade-related environmental measures andenvironment-related trade measures in APEC, p64-65, 1998.
107

6World Bank, Entering the 21st Century:World Development Report 1999/2000.
7The

role of foreign direct investment in China’s economic development, China
Economic News (www.cei.gov.cn) September 8, 2000.

8University of International Business and Economics (UIBE), Pollution Heavens andODS control in China, a report submitted to CCICED by the WGTE in 1998; UIBE,International investment rules and sustainable development: China’s perspective, areport submitted to CCICED by the WGTE in 1999.
9See Note 4.

108

THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUALFROM ACADEMIA TO GRASSROOTS

by Vinod Raina
Having ‘Embraced Defeat’ (title of John Dower’s fascinating book) in the Second
World War, Japan is often accused of being a surrogate of the US, mostly
mimicking and echoing the US sentiment and interest in world politics. The
presence of US bases in Okinawa, the somewhat unabashed aping of the US pop
and media culture and the fierce technological and economic competitivenessbetween the two nations are visible manifestations for such accusations.
Personal encounters often deviate from such broad generalities. That in many
ways was my experience on landing at Tokyo on August 31, 2002. Nearly a year
back, on that infamous day of September 11, 2001, I was in the United States on
a lecture tour.With my South Asian appearance, compounded by a beard, I was
mostly a ‘Bad Fellow’ on the roads and airports of the US, provoking instantsuspicion, body searches and disapproving glances.The final exit from that nation
was quite a relief. But beginning September 2, 2002, the opening day of the Asian
Fellowship Leadership Program (AFLP) in Tokyo, it was so different andrefreshing to be treated as a ‘Good Fellow’ in Japan, even though my appearance
remained unchanged and the echoes of the debatable War on Terrorism werereverberating with vigour throughout Japan. Obviously, the difference was notdue to any major transformation in the relations between the Governments of
US and Japan on the question of terrorism, but clearly due to the difference inthe public perception of ordinary people of the two countries; whichrefreshingly points out to the fact that even though Japan belongs to the G8
block, it remains in many ways an Asian country, and not just geographically.The
complexity involved in such a perception would of course require a separate
treatment.
Quite apart from the fact that one did not feel like an alien walking on thestreets and hurrying through Tokyo trains, that five people drawn fromcountries like China (Hu Tao), Vietnam (Nguyen Thien), Malaysia (Maznah
Mohamad), India (Vinod Raina) and Japan (Reiko Kinoshita) would be spending
over two months together exploring the nuances of the “Role of PublicIntellectuals in a changing Asia” sounded just the kind of tonic a field-worker likeme would have wished for. It was also gratifying on two counts. One, that it wasan Asian initiative for Asians, jointly promoted and implemented by the JapanFoundation and the International House of Japan and not by some Westernconsortium, and the second, that even though I no longer worked at a
University, that did not go against I being selected to be part of such a group.
The latter would seem important, since people fitting these credentials would
normally be sought from academic institutions.Without stating it precisely, the
ALFP program has therefore made a very important statement through its
109choice of Fellows, that the site of Public Intellectuals is wider than thecustomary University. But how wide could it be – could it be a proestablishment researcher, bureaucrat or academic, a baseball or football player,
a social activist, are questions we were destined to grapple with for the twomonths, obviously with a great deal of heat and passion.
Who is a Public Intellectual?
Far from defining a public intellectual, getting even a sense of who is a public
intellectual is obviously a very elusive proposition. I doubt that the ALFP faculty
was aware that the issue had become a topic of intense discussion in thepreceding year through the publication of a very ‘authoritative’ book on public
intellectuals in the US by the conservative judge, Richard Posner, that prompted
them to make this as the theme for ALFP2002.
Much controversy has been generated by the “Top 100 Public Intellectuals” list
he created based upon these individuals’ number of media mentions, Web
search engine hits, and scholarly citations. Posner is quick to point out that“‘prominent’ is not a synonym for ‘best,’ or even for ‘good.’” He also employs
complicated tables filled with coefficients, constants, and t-statistics todemonstrate the deterioration of the public intellectual sphere.
Once the data and magic formulas have been inserted, Posner pulls the lever toreveal a top 100 list crowned by Henry Kissinger. Kurt Vonnegut edges out
Milton Friedman 21 to 34, and Toni Morrison handily tops Jean-Paul Sartre 12
to 69. Posner ranks himself in at number 75, a bit ahead of W.E.B Du Bois at 83.
Since the list is founded upon media mentions, his own presence is not
surprising, as he has published 33 books and hundreds of articles and lecturesat the University of Chicago, all while serving on the U.S. Seventh Circuit Courtof Appeals.
A review of this provocative book by Denis Dutton, would seem to match thepassion of our group discussions during ALFP2002 very well, and help explore
the question – who is a public intellectual?
Writes Dutton, “It’s not often that a book by a public intellectual has received
as much media attention—mostly vilification and scorn—as Richard A. Posner’s
Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline (Harvard University Press). Threereasons for this stand out. First, there’s the sheer audacity of including a list of
the top hundred public intellectuals, drawn from a larger list of 546 names.This
invites endless dispute over how the list was generated, who is on it, who is leftoff, where each one stands, and why. Second, there is the fact that Posner has
managed in the book to offend half of the public intellectuals you’d expect to becalled on to review it—almost as though he made a list of potential reviewers
and worked in a swipe at each. Finally, he has tapped into the deep antipathy
humanist intellectuals have to seeing a beloved topic treated quantitatively, with110

statistics and applications of social and economic theory, replete with graphs
and algebraic formulae. And after all, what topic is more beloved by theintellectuals than they themselves? That Posner would actually treat suchimportant people as a demographic type, sorting them in terms of race, age,field, politics, sex—why, he even asks why so many are Jews. It’s outrageous . . .
and delicious.”
Echoing Russell Jacoby's argument in The Last Intellectuals, which appeared in
1987 and lamented "the eclipse of public intellectuals," Posner places much of
the blame on the mania for specialization that's become de rigueur throughout
the modern university in recent decades.The idea of an intellectual, Posner says,
should not be identified merely with having highbrow, cultivated tastes, being
especially creative, or having high intelligence. All of these things are possible
without being an intellectual, which Posner thinks ought to denote theapplication of the mind to “political matters in the broadest sense of that word,a sense that includes cultural matters when they are viewed under the aspectof ideology, ethics, or politics (which may all be the same thing).” There is
therefore a vague redundancy in the term “public intellectual,” since the placingof ideas in a larger public context, acting as social critic, is what the intellectual
most essentially does. In our age of vast communication media, it is also done
conspicuously in public, through op-eds, public radio interviews, and on TV clips
with the regulation public-intellectual bookcase as a backdrop. This concern
with larger moral issues means that for the Posner paradigm individuals would
therefore include the likes of John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Hannah Arendt,
Arthur Koestler, Edmund Wilson, Susan Sontag, and most powerfully in Posner’smind, George Orwell: people who write about literature, art, science, and soforth from a broadly political or ideological perspective. For example, when
Allan Bloom writes about rock and roll, he is not doing so as a music critic but
as a philosopher who sees it as a symptom and source of social degradation.
That’s public intellectual work (and rather bad work in this particular case,Posner believes). That it is done for a broader public is also a crux for Posner,
who leaves John Rawls off his list, because as influential as Rawls is as aphilosopher, he does not address a larger public in the way that Richard Rorty
and Martha Nussbaum do.
The decline referred to in Posner’s title is a decline in the actual worth of public
intellectuals’ work, not in their media celebrity, which has grown roughly
inversely to the value of what they do. This invidious situation has followed, in
Posner’s view, the proliferation of academics in the ranks of public intellectuals.
From the nineteenth century, with such names as Thoreau, J.S. Mill, Herbert
Spencer, Matthew Arnold, and Tocqueville, to well into the twentieth, with the
likes of Max Eastman, Edmund Wilson, H.G. Wells, and Dwight Macdonald, thegreat tradition of public intellectuals had its life outside of universities.Although
there remain nonacademic public intellectuals today—Susan Sontag, Roger
Kimball, Tom Wolfe, Gore Vidal—they are a severely diminished species.
Universities, which have expanded so enormously in the twentieth century, offer111

“to anyone who wants to embark on a career as a public intellectual” therequirements for the job: “leisure, credentials, and financial security.” For
academics who otherwise keep their noses to the scholarly grindstone, andeven for those who don’t, there is but small cost for entering into the market
as a public intellectual, small cost for doing bad work there, and small cost forwithdrawing from the market.The media for their part have column space andair time to fill, and they are all too willing to give a platform to public
intellectuals to pontificate, predict, warn, scold, handwring, entertain, andoccasionally inform their audience.
Posner’s discussion is wide-ranging and digressive, animated by a skepticism thatnever quite falls into cynicism: dour amusement is more his style than bittercondemnation (besides, since Posner is himself the preeminent public
intellectual in the American judiciary, he can ill-afford to dismiss everyone else
who is doing what he does).The public intellectual is selling credence good, ideas
and arguments that solicit agreement, and therefore demand some kind of
authority in order to be accepted. This authority is attained through having
academic credentials indicting a high degree of specialized knowledge: being an
academic expert in astrophysics, aboriginal peoples of Tierra del Fuego,
copyright law, or Latin poets. Since this is accompanied by being “professor” soand-so at a university, and since the specialty is beyond the grasp of the lay
audience, it helps to have one or two further warrants: celebrity andcommitment. Celebrity is understood here as an intrinsic value: being familiar
face on the television screen or regular name on the op-ed page is a value in its
own right. Commitment is perhaps more substantial, and can contribute to bothcelebrity and authority: it means that the public intellectual has stood behind acause or position in a way that requires a sacrifice or risk of some kind. Posnermentions eco-catastrophist Paul Ehrlich’s decision to be sterilized after
fathering a single child, therefore putting the fight against overpopulation, as hethen saw it (about 1970), into his personal life.This commitment seems at leasta real, if not major, sacrifice (many people choose anyway to have one child, ornone at all, without worrying about world population). On the other hand,
Posner treats as fatuous the well-known photograph of Edward Said throwing astone, risk free, at Israeli soldiers, who were not responding. As risk-takers,
public intellectuals like Ehrlich and Said, Posner remarks, “are our Havels andSolzhenitsyns, writ small.”Commitment and sacrifice are issues Posner alludes to more than once in PublicIntellectuals: for the individuals who partake in public-intellectual work in the
media today, the performances have the quality of a risk-free lark.The self-imageof many an academic is of a brave battler who “speaks truth to power.” In fact,
far from being marginalized outsiders academics are, in Russell Jacoby’s phrase,“consummate insiders.” They are the very ones with the power—and the
security of having well-paid jobs from which they can be fired only with thegreatest difficulty.Yet they often flatter themselves that they are lonely Socratestypes, independent seekers of truth, living at the edge. An American example
112Posner gives is that of Cornel West, who in self-pity calls himself “isolated,”caught between “an insolent American society and an insouciant black
community.” Of course, Posner remarks, it doesn’t help his recognition in theblack community that this wealthy Ivy-League professor seems more at hometalking about Hegel, Gramsci, Lyotard, and Jameson than formulating practicalsocial policy (Posner’s book predates West’s recent rap CD). In any event, mostacademic intellectuals take no risks whatsoever in expressing conventional leftleaning (or politically correct) views in the public arena, which is undoubtedly
part of the reason their pronouncements are not regarded with muchseriousness by the public.
There is another point Posner makes in connection with public indifference topublic intellectuals.The image of the independent outsider calls on the academic
to display overt originality-academics are expected to avoid spouting“conventional wisdom.” At the same time, the media find more entertainment
value in talking heads that express unusual or jarring ideas of any stripe. The
result of these two factors is to drive the opinions of public intellectuals to
extremes, or at least to present mostly the extremes, in order to up the dramaof public debate. Posner observes:“Because there is no correlation between theoriginality and the political and social utility of an idea, the academic emphasison originality, and the superior marketability of extreme positions in the market
for public-intellectual work, are frequently at war with the accuracy, utility, andpracticality of the academic public intellectual’s predictions andrecommendations.” After all, the best sense that might be expressed on a public
issue might well turn out to be boring, and boring is not what the media want.
This is not a dumbing down that can be laid at the feet the media. As Popper
and Kuhn understood, bold, risky hypotheses are, infotainment demands aside,at the heart of great advances in the sciences and scholarship generally. Posnerpoints out, however, that bold and risky propositions are not something thatusually have much merit in the realm of the social and political. In fact, it’s themore frequently the reverse: the best public-intellectual work in the past “hasconsisted in seeing through the big new economic and political nostrums.Typicalacademics, on the other hand, are not oriented toward political reality: “Theytend to be unworldly. They are, most of them anyway, the people who havenever left school. Their milieu is postadolescent.” They often work alone,
without developing the social skills and sensibilities that would give them
political insight. Here is how Posner summarizes the academic public
intellectual:“A proclivity for taking extreme positions, a taste for universals andabstraction, a desire for moral purity, a lack of worldliness, and intellectual
arrogance work together to induce in many academic public intellectuals
selective empathy, a selective sense of justice, insensitivity to context, alack of perspective, a denigration of predecessors as lacking moral insight,
an impatience with prudence and sobriety, a lack of realism, and excessive
self-confidence. The “on the one hand, on the other hand” approach to113politically or ideologically charged issues—the kind of approach that canunderstand slavery in its historical context, that sees the bad along withthe good abolitionists, that seeks a functional explanation to (for us)
bizarre practices such as clitoridectomy and infibulation, that
acknowledges that Nazis were fervent environmentalists and publichealth fanatics, and that Bill Clinton was the consolidator of the Reagan
Revolution—this approach is uncongenial to the academic temperament.
The typical academic is a Platonist, not an Aristotelian.”
Functional and Critical Intellectuals
An area of intense debate during our ALFP2002 discussions was the distinction
between intellectuals in countries with multi party democracy, uncontrolledpress and constitutional guarantee for freedom of expression, with those insocialist countries, like China and Vietnam, operating within a variety of state
controls. Our visits to sites such as an anti-dam movement at Nagara river,Teshina island anti-dumping movement also raised difficult questions regarding
the roles of intellectuals in new social movements, as contrasted with their
engagement with more universal questions like democracy, rights and so on.
In relation to such debates, it may be worthwhile to note that sociologist
Zygmunt Bauman (author of the engaging book ‘Liquid Modernity’) contrasts
intellectuals as legislators who wish to legislate universal values, usually in theservice of state institutions, with intellectuals as interpreters, who merelyinterpret texts, public events, and other artifacts, deploying their specialized
knowledge to explain or interpret things for publics. He thus claims that there
is a shift from modern intellectuals as legislators of universal values who
legitimated the new modern social order to postmodern intellectuals asinterpreters of social meanings, and thus theorizes a depoliticalization of therole of intellectuals in social life.
David Kellner has persuasively argued that ‘there can however, be anotherdistinction between functional intellectuals who serve to reproduce andlegitimate the values of existing societies contrasted to critical-oppositional
intellectuals who oppose the existing order. Sometimes oppositional
intellectuals voice their criticisms in the name of existing values which theyclaim are being violated (i.e. truth, rights, rule by law, justice, etc.) and sometimes
in the name of values or ideas which are said to be higher potentialities of theexisting order (i.e. participatory democracy, socialism, genuine equality for
women and blacks, ecological restoration, etc.). Functional intellectuals were
earlier the classical ideologues, whereas today they tend to be functionaries ofparties or interest groups, or mere technicians who devise more efficient means
to obtain certain ends, or who apply their skills to increase technical knowledge
in various specialized domains (medicine, physics, history, environmental impact
analysis etc.) without questioning the ends, goals, or values that they are serving,or the social utility or disutility of their activities’.

114

Functional intellectuals are thus servants of existing societies who are specialists
in legitimation and technical knowledge, while oppositional intellectuals are
critics who struggle to create a better society. Critical intellectuals weretraditionally those who utilized their skills of speaking and writing to denounce
injustices and abuses of power, and to fight for truth, justice, progress, and otheruniversal values. In the words of Jean-Paul Sartre, "the duty of the intellectual is
to denounce injustice wherever it occurs." For Sartre, the domain of the criticalintellectual is to write and speak within the public sphere, denouncing
oppression and fighting for human freedom and emancipation. On this model, acritical intellectual's task is to bear witness, to analyze, to expose, and tocriticize a wide range of social evils. The sphere and arena of thecritical/oppositional intellectual is the word, and his or her function is todescribe and denounce injustice wherever it may occur.
The modern critical intellectual's field of action was what Habermas called the
public sphere of democratic debate, political dialogue, and the writing anddiscussion of newspapers, journals, pamphlets, and books. Of course, not all
intellectuals were critical or by any means progressive.With the rise of modern
societies, there was a division between physical and mental labor, andintellectuals became those who specialized in mental labor, producing anddistributing ideas and culture, with some opposing and some legitimating theestablished forms of society.
Thus, intellectuals were split into those critical and oppositional individuals who
opposed injustice and oppression, as contrasted to functional intellectuals who
produced technical knowledge that served the existing society and those
producers of ideology who legitimated the forms of class, race, and gender
domination and inequality in modern societies.
We therefore need to locate the Intellectual within the domain of Public
Sphere. Democracy involves a separation of powers and popular participationin governmental affairs. During the era of the Enlightenment and 18th century
democratic revolutions, public spheres emerged where individuals could discussand debate issues of common concern. The public was also a site where
criticism of the state and existing society could circulate. The institutions andspaces of the 18th century democratic public sphere included newspapers,
journals, and a press independent from state ownership and control, coffee
houses where individuals read newspapers and engaged in political discussion,
literary salons where ideas and criticism were produced, and public assemblies
which were the sites of public oratory and debate.
Bourgeois societies split, of course, across class lines and different class factions
produced different political parties, organizations, and ideologies with eachparty attracting specialists in words and writing known as intellectuals.
Oppressed groups also developed their own insurgent intellectuals, ranging
from representatives of working class organizations, to women like Mary115

Wollstonecraft fighting for women's rights, to leaders of oppressed groups ofcolor, ethnicity, sexual preference, and so on. Insurgent intellectuals attacked
oppression and promoted action that would address the causes of oppression,
linking thought to action, theory to practice.Thus, during the 19th century, theworking class developed its own oppositional public spheres in union halls, party
cells and meeting places, saloons, and institutions of working class culture.With
the rise of Social Democracy and other working class movements in Europe andthe United States, an alternative press, radical cultural organizations, and thespaces of the strike, sit-in, and political insurrection emerged as sites of an
oppositional public sphere.
Intellectuals in modern societies were thus conflicted beings with contradictorysocial functions. The classical critical intellectual -- represented by figures likethe French Enlightenment ideologues, Thomas Paine, Mary Wollstonecraft, andlater figures like Heine, Marx, Hugo, Dreyfus, Du Bois, Sartre, and Marcuse -- wasto speak out against injustice and oppression and to fight for justice, equality,
and the other values of the Enlightenment. Indeed, the Enlightenment itself
represents one of the most successful discourses of the critical individual, adiscourse and movement that assigns intellectuals key social functions. And yet
conservative intellectuals attacked the Enlightenment and its prodigy the French
Revolution and produced discourses that legitimated every conceivable form of
oppression from class to race, gender, and ethnic domination.
Against the Enlightenment and Sartre's model of the committed intellectual
who is engaged for freedom, Michel Foucault complained that Sartre
represented an ideal of the universal intellectual who fought for universal values
such as truth and freedom, and assumed the task of speaking for humanity.
Against such an exalted and in his view, exaggerated conception, Foucault
militated for a conception of the specific intellectual who intervened on the sideof the oppressed in specific issues, not claiming to speak for the oppressed, but
to intervene as an intellectual in specific issues and debates, say on the questionof a dam, a local environmental problem, abuse of human rights in a specificlocation etc.
Foucault's conception of the specific intellectual has been accompanied within a
new postmodern politics with a turn toward new social movements as thedomain of contemporary politics, replacing the state and the national realm ofparty politics. For a postmodern politics, power is diffuse and local and not
merely to be found in macroinstitutions like the workplace, the state, or
patriarchy. Macropolitics that goes after big institutions like the state or capital
is to be replaced by micropolitics, with specific intellectuals intervening in
spheres like the university, the prison, the hospital, or for the rights of specificoppressed groups like sexual or ethnic minorities. Global and national politics
and theories are rejected in favor of more local micro politics, and the discourseand function of the intellectuals is seen as more specific, provisional, and modest
than in modern theory and politics, subordinate to local struggles rather than116

more ambitious projects of emancipation and social transformation.
Such a binary distinction between macro and micro theory and politics is ofcourse problematical, as are absolutist commitments to either modern or
postmodern theory. Using the example of the events of 1989 that saw thecollapse of communism, for instance, it is clear that the popular offensives
against communist power combined micro and macropolitics, moving from local
and specific struggles rooted in union halls, universities, churches, and small
groups to mass demonstrations forcing democratic reforms and even classicalmass insurrection aiming at an overthrow of the existing order, as in Romania.
In these struggles, intellectuals played a variety of roles and deployed a diversityof discourses, ranging from the local and specific to the national and general.
Thus, whereas one may argue that postmodern theory contains importantcriticism of some of the illusions and ideologies of the traditional modern
intellectual, it goes too far in rejecting the classical role of the criticalintellectual. Moreover, it may be suggested that some of the modern conceptionof the critical and oppositional intellectual remains useful. One may fight forrights, freedom, and democracy à la Sartre's committed intellectual. But a
democratic public intellectual does not speak for others, does not abrogate ormonopolize the function of speaking the truth, but simply participates in
discussion and debate, defending specific ideas, values, or norms or principlethat may be particular or universal. But if universal, like human rights, they arecontextual, provisional, normative and general and not valid for all time. Indeed,rights are products of social struggles and are thus social constructs and not
innate or natural entities -- as the classical natural rights theorists would haveit. But rights can be generalized, extended, and can take universal forms -- aswith, for instance, a UN charter of human rights that holds that certain rights,
in fact, reject the particular/universal intellectual dichotomy in favor ofdeveloping a normative concept of the critical public intellectual. The public
intellectual -- on this conception -- intervenes in the public sphere, fights against
lies, oppression, and injustice and are valid for all individuals -- at least in thisworld at this point in time.
Consequently, one does not need all of the baggage of the universal intellectual
to maintain a conception of a public or democratic intellectual in the present
era. Intellectuals may well seek to occupy a higher ground than particularistic
interests, a common ground seeking public interests and goods. But intellectuals
need not abrogate the right to speak for all and should be aware that they are
speaking from a determinate position with its own biases and limitations.
Moreover, intellectuals need to learn to get out of their particular frame ofreference for more general ones, as well as to be able to take the position of
the other, to empathize with more marginal and oppressed groups, to learn
from them, and to support their struggles. To perpetually criticize oneself, todevelop the capacity for self-reflection and critique -- as well as self-expression-- is thus part of the duty of the democratic intellectual.
117

Intellectuals in Contemporary China
Because of the presence of Hu Tao from China and Nguyen Thien from Vietnam
in the ALFP2002 group, there were many formal and informal sessions, debates
and arguments regarding the location, function and impact of intellectuals insocialist states.The moot point was - apart from functional intellectuals, is therea significant presence of critical intellectuals in these countries, and if so, how
do they function. However, to my mind the discussions couldn’t go forward
significantly because of lack of authentic information about the existing situationin these countries regarding the issue, as also an understandable reluctance of
persons from these countries to be publicly forthright on such sensitive
matters.Any discussion about Public Intellectuals in Asia would however be very
limited if it totally ignored the situation in the billion plus country of China,
particularly as it is on the threshold of a great economic leap based, curiously
for many persons, on its vigorous attempts to integrate with the neo-liberal
economic processes, without opening itself to multi-party democracy. Since theissue is important, a hunt for secondary sources has thrown up a long anddetailed article on the intellectuals of China written by Wenfang Tang.The article
is based on data collected through eight surveys conducted by the Economic
System Institute of China, including the 1992 China Urban Survey, and the sevensemiannual surveys on Social Reaction to Reform from 1987 to 1991. Spreadover twenty-three provinces, about forty cities are covered in most of thesesurveys. The 1992 Urban Survey includes 2,395 respondents, and the seven
Social Reaction to Reform Surveys have a total number of 16,450 respondents.
The 1992 survey asks many detailed questions about the respondent's socialand political values. The seven semiannual surveys include questions on
satisfaction with and support for urban reforms and are useful to comparereform satisfaction among different intellectual groups. The purpose of thesestate-sponsored surveys was to provide the government with informationneeded to shape policy. Summaries of these surveys were circulated within thegovernment but never published. In 1992, Teng not only gained access to thesurvey data but also was able to check them against the original questionnaires.
Teng says,“so far as I know, this was the first time such data were made available
to researchers outside China.”
He also goes on to add that the “hope often expressed by Western leaders isthat China will democratize and so come to fit more smoothly into the worldorder. Seeing how few and disunited are the Chinese dissidents today calling for
democratization, observers are at a loss to specify any coherent Chinesepolitical force pressing for democratization. In fact, however, there is significant
evidence that there is a politically vigorous Chinese stratum with an increasingly
strong interest in reform if not democratization--broadly speaking, party
intellectuals.” The effort of his research is to establish such a reformist agenda
as the main occupation of the Chinese intellectuals at present. He explains thatthe modern term intellectual (zhishi fenzi) has been used to denote those who
118

in imperial times passed the official examination. Xiucai were those who passed
the examination at the prefectural level, juren, at the provincial level, and jinshi,
at the national level. Other labels have also been used, such as xuezhe (scholars).
Under socialism, intellectuals were similar to the intelligentsia in the Soviet
Union: people with higher educational degrees holding non-manual jobs. These
included not only professionals and government officials with higher education
but also enterprise managers and directors. Intellectuals are obviously an
extremely important part of Chinese society, but they are also an extremely tiny
part. In the 1990 population census, there were only 12 million persons withhigher-education degrees, about 2 percent of the total employed population.
That 2 percent in turn was made up of two groups of rather different status:
regular four-year college degree holders, who now get into universities throughnational competition, and two-year junior college graduates with degrees fromtechnical colleges, local night schools, or continuing education programs. Most
intellectuals belong to the latter, less-educated group. About 35 percent of the
12 million had regular college degrees, and about 65 percent had junior college
degrees.
Our focus here however is on the differences between establishment
intellectuals and nonestablishment intellectuals, or within system and outside ofsystem intellectuals. True, given the nature of the communist state, thisboundary is partly blurred.Virtually all intellectuals are involved in the system tosome degree. Nevertheless, some intellectuals are more involved than others.
Thus one can distinguish government and party officials (guojia jiguan, dangqun
zuzhi fuze ren) with higher education from other professionals not directly
working for the state and the party, a group that includes teachers at primary,middle school, and university levels; health care staff; engineers and technicians;
accountants, statisticians, and economic planning staff; cultural professionals(reporters, editors, writers, actors, athletes); legal workers; priests and monks;
science management professionals; researchers; and enterprise directors andmanagers. Most establishment intellectuals are party members (party
intellectuals), whereas other intellectuals are not. Party intellectuals andestablishment intellectuals are however synonymous, as are nonparty intellectuals
and nonestablishment intellectuals.
This bifurcation is a highly institutionalized one that begins early in the
education system. Even in elementary school, those who will follow the path
into the establishment are recruited into the organization of Young Pioneers(shaoxiandui) and appointed as class leaders. In high school, they are recruited
into the Communist Youth League (gongqingtuan) and given various political andadministrative responsibilities. In a study of Tianjin elites, it was found that
recruitment into administrative positions was based on both political andeducational credentials. Party membership contributed much more thaneducation to gaining administrative positions. In contrast, political credentials
were not important for obtaining professional positions; only education
119

mattered.
Before 1978, Mao limited the quantity of party intellectuals and their role in thedecision-making processes of the state. After 1978, however, intellectuals cameto play an important though not dominant role in middle- and high-level
administration.According to the 1992 Urban Social Survey, intellectuals filled 32
percent of the positions in the government administrative apparatus and 21
percent in the administrative apparatus of factories. These intellectuals in thepolitical center, however, are only a small percentage of the intellectual stratum
as a whole, are mostly party intellectuals, and are mostly junior college
graduates. In other words, the vast majority of the intellectuals are nonparty
intellectuals outside the political center. Moreover, the better-educatedintellectuals are mostly part of this stratum outside the center.
Various statistics can be used to describe this situation. According to the 1992
Urban Social Survey, for example, although 32 percent of the middle- and highlevel positions in the government administrative apparatus were filled byintellectuals, 87 percent of those were party intellectuals.As for the 21 percentof the factory administrative positions filled by intellectuals, 86 percent wereparty intellectuals. Similarly, according to the 1990 population census, only 7
percent of the intellectuals were government and party administrators, andthese were mostly party intellectuals. Of intellectuals as a whole, 11 percent
were managers, 62 percent were other kinds of professionals (mostly teachers
and technical personnel), and 20 percent were in still other occupations.
The 1992 Urban Social Survey further revealed social and economic differences
between party intellectuals and nonparty intellectuals. For example, nonparty
intellectuals fill 35 percent of the positions in clerical work and 36 percent of
those in teaching, medical, and other kinds of professional work, as comparedwith 25 percent and 22 percent, respectively, for party intellectuals. In addition,
party intellectuals are also slightly better paid (518 yuan per capita), significantly
older (forty-four years), and more male dominated (70 percent) than the
nonparty intellectuals (512 yuan, thirty-six years, and 58 percent). Thus, ingeneral, party intellectuals were in a better bargaining position and enjoyedmore privileges than nonparty ones.
All in all, nonparty intellectuals were more numerous and often better educatedthan party intellectuals, while being largely excluded from the political centerand suffering from a slightly lower rate of compensation. These facts bythemselves would indicate a xiao ren dang dao (the road to leadership is blocked
by mediocrities) syndrome, that is, resentment directed by a large stratum of
nonparty intellectuals toward a privileged minority of party intellectuals and soa great demand for reform on the part of the nonparty stratum. In fact, however,
the extent of any such syndrome is in doubt, and the demand for reform seems
to come as much from this minority of party intellectuals as it does from thebulk of the intellectual stratum.
120

Finally, one should distinguish between the handful of influential intellectuals andthe much larger number lacking fame. Studying a few of the most prominent
intellectual leaders is a powerful tool for understanding the intellectual climate
in China because they have considerable influence on other members of theirgroup and on Chinese society. Just how much influence, however, is a different
question. Particularly worth studying would be the extent to which the Western
ideology of liberalism has now become part of the political culture shared byparty and nonparty intellectuals.
History of Intellectuals and the Party-StateTo assess the extent to which intellectuals tend to demand reform, it isnecessary to remember the traditional normative role of Confucian scholars,each of whom was "resolutely to take responsibility for the well-being of theworld" (yi tian xia wei ji ren). This traditional concept became intertwined with
the implicit Marxist belief that society's true physical, psychological, and social
needs can be "discovered" by those who are wise and informed, who thenshould guide society.This originally foreign Marxist approach further convinced
many Chinese intellectuals that they had a mission to rule.
This Marxist role for intellectuals is diametrically opposed to the way "good"decisions are made in liberal democratic societies, which emphasize that society
is complex and humans, fallible. No elite can discover universal truths bymastering this complexity and overcoming this fallibility.The preferences of themass of individuals are the best indicators of society's true needs and wants.This
alternative model, which downplays the role of intellectuals, has had little appeal
in China. Chinese intellectuals in the twentieth century have typically believedthat they are capable of understanding the "laws of history" and that they havethe "moral mission" to lead China's modernization.
This elitist attitude in turn led to an uneasy relationship between intellectuals
and the party. After all, intellectuals had traditionally oscillated between cooptation and protest. On the one hand, the "vanguard" party needed
intellectuals both to articulate its claim to leadership in Chinese society and toprovide technical expertise in economic construction. On the other hand, theCommunist Party was always worried that intellectuals would challenge its
authority. Given this ambivalence, the relation between the state andintellectuals has gone through two stages since 1949.
The first stage subordinated intellectuals to the state more than the second.
Officially, intellectuals were considered petite bourgeoisie. Many had been
educated in the old system that the Communists sought to overthrow. Mao
suspected that they were "fellow travelers," not fully committed to therevolution. Unlike peasants, workers, and soldiers, intellectuals were neverelevated in status by being designated as a main force of the revolution. True,
121

Mao Zedong stressed the importance of intellectuals in winning the Chinese
revolution and the need to recruit large numbers of them into the party,
military, and government organs.Yet he felt secure enough to do so only when
the party's organization and leadership were sufficiently consolidated andimmune to potential intellectual erosion. As he saw it, the party should use
bourgeois intellectuals to produce its own revolutionary intellectuals, while
reeducating the former to serve the revolution.
Under Mao, one of the most frequently attacked characteristics of Chinese
intellectuals was not their political outlook but their anti -empirical and elitist
academic style. Mao criticized many intellectuals for being "antique collectors"(only accumulating knowledge and not knowing how to use it), and of "shooting
the wrong target with their arrows" (trying to apply their knowledge to China
without any understanding of Chinese society). He ordered intellectuals to
associate themselves with manual workers. He argued that, without doing so,
intellectuals would accomplish nothing.
These policies established a social contract between the party and intellectuals
after 1949.The party-state would provide opportunities for intellectuals to use
their talent and would reward their efforts with social prestige and material
benefits if they obeyed the leadership of the Communist Party; accepted
Marxism-Leninism and Maoism as the guiding ideology; derived their knowledge
from and applied it to concrete conditions in China; performed adequately; andgave up their political autonomy as a social group and their elitist values.
Repeatedly, however, Mao felt the intellectuals were failing to honor thiscontract.
The first major test of this relationship was in 1956, after the Communists took
power, when the party invited intellectuals to give their advice on how to
improve its leadership. The intellectuals responded by not only giving theiradvice on how to improve it but also challenging the very basis of the regime:socialist economic planning, the idea of "the people's democratic dictatorship,"and the monopoly of political power by the Communist Party.The party felt thatthe contract had been broken and instigated the antirightist movement in 1957,
during which intellectuals suffered terribly.
Whereas the antirightist movement was a political campaign against intellectuals,
the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was a social and academic campaign
punctuated with violence, aimed at forcing intellectuals to change their elitist
attitudes, lower their social status, and make their lives more closely related tothose of peasants and workers. Educated urban youths (both high school andcollege graduates) were sent to the countryside. Professionals andadministrators were sent to reeducation schools, where they had to learn to be
self-sufficient by doing manual work to meet their own material needs.
Education was to serve production directly. For example, physics was about themechanics of tractors; chemistry, the nature of chemical fertilizers. Theoretical122research was suspended. For many intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution was thedarkest decade of their lives.
In the post-Mao era, the party developed a basically new contract with theintellectuals, seeking to elicit their support by allowing them a kind of qualified
autonomy. In the third plenum of its eleventh congress in 1978, the party
decided to abandon the longtime policy of keeping China on the socialist roadof class struggle and political correctness. Instead, its most important task
became economic modernization. Deng Xiaoping realized that the party could
not modernize China by means of political campaigns and that it had to rely on
intellectuals to achieve this goal. Thus he was less concerned with ideologicalresistance and the arrogance of intellectuals. Reeducating them was not his mainconcern. His pragmatism was epitomized by his well-known saying: "No matter
black or white, it's a good cat if it catches mice." The party should concentrateon how to keep power, the intellectuals, on contributing to economic
modernization. Thus a new, major differentiation between intellectual andpolitical life was institutionalized.
The new relationship with the intellectuals had a variety of aspects:
1. Publicly praising intellectuals. Almost overnight, the officiallyrecognized status of intellectuals was transformed. Instead of forming thebottom of society ("the stinky ninth category," choulaojiu), they were
defined as the most important force in China's drive to achieve economic
modernization, surpassing workers and peasants.They were described inglowing terms: creative, driven to excel, filled with a strong sense of
responsibility, upholding the truth, animated by the spirit of exploration,and so on.
2. Redefining political loyalty.The prereform contract had required theintellectuals actively and explicitly to accept the official ideology of
Marxism-Leninism and support the Communist Party. This requirement
was loosened. Political loyalty was defined in much less demanding terms.
Intellectuals could demonstrate political loyalty by just being patriotic,
working hard, contributing their specialized knowledge, and avoiding
public acts embarrassing the party.
3. Reducing time for political study. The prereform policy required
intellectuals to devote significant amounts of time to political study andto understanding the party's policies. Deng Xiaoping wanted them todevote as much time to their work as possible.When China had a work
week of six days, he required intellectuals to spend at least five days atwork and only one day on policy study and meetings. "It is fine if theywant to spend seven days a week at work [and no time on political
study]," Deng said in 1983.
4. Rehabilitating intellectuals victimized in political campaigns. Those
who were labeled rightists in the antirightist campaign in 1957 and as the"bourgeois counterrevolutionary academic authority" during the Cultural
Revolution were delabeled. Many intellectuals who had been sent to the123countryside were called back and allowed to return to their old
positions. Re-education schools were closed.
5. Deemphasizing the unity between intellectuals and the working class.
College graduates no longer had to work with workers and peasants.
They were assigned jobs directly related to their training immediately
after their graduation. Conversely, the promotion of workers andpeasants to professional and administrative positions was discontinued.
Those already promoted were either sent back or retrained on the job.
6. Recruiting nonparty intellectuals to fill high positions. Before reform,
almost all of the high-level positions in the government (vice minister andabove) were filled by party members. Under reform, nonparty
intellectuals and even former rightists were given high positions. One
example was Wang Meng, an intellectual who was labeled a rightist during
the antirightist campaign in 1957 and promoted to the post of ministerof culture in the post-Mao era.
7. Professionalizing the party. Before 1978, among the more than 40
million party members, only 4 percent had a college education.The newpolicy is to recruit intellectuals into the party.
8. Dividing labor between the party and the expert. Along with theseparation of power between the party and the state under reform,
intellectuals were encouraged to take charge of technical matters in awork unit. The party secretary should not be the same person as the
director of the enterprise, and the party secretary should not interferewith the work of the director.
9. Improving material benefits. Along with raising their political andsocial status, intellectuals were to be rewarded with more material
benefits. These included higher wages, more subsidies, bonuses, bettermedical benefits, more job mobility, improved housing, better vacation
benefits, and more retirement protection. This policy to some extent
raised the intellectuals' income during reform.
10. Granting more intellectual freedom. Reform has seen a relaxation ofmedia and communication control. Intellectuals have been invited toexpress their opinions in many talk shows on TV and radio. There has
been a proliferation of printed materials under reform (newspapers,
books, and magazines). Academic freedom has been enhanced as many
academic disciplines banned before 1978, such as political science,sociology, and anthropology, were revived. Most basically, intellectuals, nolonger required explicitly to adopt Marxism-Leninism, became much freer
to develop their own political and intellectual views. In late 1998, forinstance, without creating any significant stir, a Beijing University
professor published a survey study of Western liberalism eruditely putting
the liberalism of J. S. Mill and F. A. Hayek in an entirely favorable light.
11. Intellectuals acting as advisers. Intellectuals were also promised theopportunity to contribute to "scientific decision making". Intellectuals andscholars with specialized knowledge were to be consulted before an
important decision was made. One example of this was the Economic
124System Reform Institute of China, a think tank chaired by the then prime
minister Zhao Ziyang and staffed by the best and the brightest young
scholars. Although such a paternalistic and patron-client relationshipbetween scholars and the state was common during imperial China, it
was less visible under Mao.What is new under reform is the Western andscientific flavor of the return to this traditional practice.
Yet although the conditions in the old social contract have been adjusted andprofessional performance is much more important than during the Cultural
Revolution, the bottom-line political requirement remains important.The stateseeks a qualified intellectual autonomy, balancing intellectuals' desire for
freedom with the state's demand for loyalty. It is true that intellectuals do nothave to be actively involved in party politics, but neither are they supposed tochallenge its power.The message seems to be that they should mind their own
business.There have been a few times since 1978 when intellectuals crossed theline and challenged the political monopoly of the party, as they did in 1957.The
party responded with the 1987 antibourgeois spiritual pollution campaign andthe purges of many intellectuals after the 1989 crackdown on antigovernment
protests.
Controversies about the Role of Intellectuals in Communist Societies
With the emergence of this new contract between the state and theintellectuals, the distinction between establishment and nonestablishment
intellectuals became important. After all, under Mao's contract, if the idea of anestablishment intellectual was not an oxymoron, at the very least party
members with higher education (i.e., establishment intellectuals) were rare.The
new contract thus created new questions: How do establishment andnonestablishment intellectuals differ in their political attitudes? More specifically,
how do they differ in terms of general satisfaction with the status quo, withpromarket values, and with activism. The literature offers very different
perspectives on this question.
One can reason that intellectuals outside the establishment enjoy fewer
centrally allocated benefits, see themselves as educationally superior to party
intellectuals, and so exhibit the bitterness syndrome (xiao ren dang dao) adduced
above. Thus they would be more likely to support a fast transition away from
central planning and the party's monopoly of power. Such a transition would
provide them with those increases in authority and material benefits that they
feel they deserve. Conversely, establishment intellectuals should be moresatisfied with their life conditions and with the party-state.They should also be
likely to support the status quo since any rapid change would weaken theirprivileged position. In Russia, for example, state subsidies for literary journals,
writers, artists, filmmakers, and researchers were dramatically reduced during
reform, which led to increasing frustration among Russian intelligentsia.
This theory should be correct; after all, those with vested interests in the status125

quo and thus resisting reform should be those in the political center. It isstriking, therefore, that, in China today, this logic runs into difficulties, especiallybecause the advantages enjoyed in post-Mao China by establishment
intellectuals are small in comparison with those of most of nonestablishment
intellectuals, and this small gap is likely to disappear altogether. Economic reform
has provided more opportunities for improving one's livelihood outside theplanning system and has reduced the ability of the center to maintain its relativeadvantage and keep up with the pace of income growth in society. If this is true,
party intellectuals should be more dissatisfied with the status quo than nonparty
intellectuals.
If, then, there is doubt about which group of intellectuals exhibits less generalsatisfaction with the status quo, it is also not clear which group is more in favorof the rise of the market. Establishment intellectuals may favor it as much, oralmost as much, as nonestablishment intellectuals. Direct and indirect evidence
suggests both kinds of intellectuals favor it more than nonintellectual membersof the establishment. For instance, according to a 1991 survey carried out in thepostsocialist societies of Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Russia,
Slovenia, Czechoslovakia, and Estonia, education reduced support for suchsocialist principles as egalitarianism, distribution of wealth based on need, andbelief in the state as the prime vehicle of welfare benefits for everyone. Thisfinding was stronger in postsocialist societies than in advanced capitalist states.
If intellectuals in postsocialist societies in general favor the market more than
nonintellectuals, many factors affect differences in this regard between
establishment and nonestablishment intellectuals. The latter are more likely tobe the beneficiaries of free market reform because they are more competitivein the labor market, more likely to earn higher incomes, and have more job
mobility under free competition.Therefore, they are expected to favor equalityof opportunity and market competition. Whether establishment intellectuals
favor promarket reform is less clear. On the one hand, they may share anunderstanding of the problems of central planning and have a competitive edge
once put under the control of the "invisible hand." On the other hand, if they
depend on the old system both politically and economically, any change will hurt
their vested interests. In this case, party intellectuals, many of them party
bureaucrats, are likely to hold a critical view of the market, similar to that heldby bureaucrats.
At the same time, however, the promarket values of both kinds of intellectuals
may be attenuated by a shift to postmaterialism. In the long run, with moreeducation and (in most cases) better jobs and incomes, intellectuals may
develop new, postmaterialist concerns with individual development andfreedom of expression, thus becoming less interested in material advantages
than nonintellectuals.
Apart from the questions of general satisfaction with the status quo and126attitudes toward the market, there is the issue of political activism.According to
the modernization school, intellectuals in general throughout the developingworld are expected to be politically more active than others in the society.
Education leads to a stronger sense of political efficacy and a stronger desire toparticipate politically. Intellectuals also have more contact with the West andthus more understanding of the basic elements of a democratic system, such as
free elections and checks and balances. They are also more likely to challenge
the monopoly of power by the Communist Party.
Others, however, describe Chinese intellectuals as generally elitist andantidemocratic, as indicated by students' feeling of superiority and their refusal
to associate themselves with workers and peasants in political movements.
Another aspect of elitism is the desire of many Chinese intellectuals to beadvisers or consultants for the establishment. Whether in imperial times orduring the 1989 urban protests, they eagerly sought patrons among top leaders.
Moreover, the remaining virtuocratic standards in bureaucratic recruitment
should promote political loyalty and obedience among party intellectuals. Thistendency ensures the continuity of the "incestuous relationship" between thestate and intellectuals.
A third view is that Chinese intellectuals in general are unenthusiastic about
democratization but that a small minority of Chinese party intellectuals areprodemocratic. Ding Xueliang, for instance, argues that the majority of Chinese
intellectuals are not the driving force for democracy because most of themwere trained by the old socialist system, which led to the current spread ofneoauthoritarianism in intellectual circles and perhaps especially among
intellectuals wanting to be advisers working for the establishment.The real hopefor democracy, Ding holds, lies with "independent-minded official intellectuals"
who have the institutional resources and quasi-autonomy needed to exert theirinfluence and challenge the authority of the state. According to this view, then,
one should expect establishment intellectuals to be more likely thannonestablishment intellectuals to challenge the power and authority of the state
and the party. Ding implies that even a tiny minority can be extremely influential.
Three hypotheses can be derived from the above discussion. Hypothesis 1 isthat during the current stage of relations between the state and intellectuals,
establishment intellectuals have become increasingly similar tononestablishment intellectuals. With increasing educational credentials,
technocratic orientations, and rising expectations similar to those ofnonestablishment intellectuals, establishment intellectuals are now likely to be
more dissatisfied with the status quo, to be more supportive of rapid reform,
and to have more promarket and prodemocratic values. This hypothesis
emphasizes the convergence of different intellectual groups undermodernization, regardless of the institutional impact.
The remaining two hypotheses focus on the institutional impact on intellectual
attitude. Hypothesis 2 is that establishment intellectuals, having been "bought127

off" or co-opted by more benefits, feel threatened by the prospect of decreasing
status under reform and thus will remain more satisfied with the old system andthe status quo, less supportive of rapid reform, and less supportive of promarket
and prodemocratic values than nonestablishment intellectuals. Conversely,
nonestablishment intellectuals will be more critical of the status quo and morecommitted to reform, especially because their superior education and inferior
compensation provoke in them a traditional complaint that "mediocrities areblocking the road," keeping the higher positions out of the hands of the mosttalented and qualified. Hypothesis 3 is about the unintended positive impact ofsocialist institutions on establishment intellectuals. With an elitist outlook,
control of resources, and experience in decision making, establishment
intellectuals are expected to show more political activism thannonestablishment intellectuals.
We conclude this informative section with the observation that quite clearly, thecomplexity involved in defining and exploring the role of public intellectuals ina socialist state is staggering compared to the rather simplistic analysis that
Posner uses while making his questionable 100 list sitting in a country like the
US.There is similar complexity, for different reasons though, for other countries
in Asia like, India, Japan, Philippines and Thailand, where the prominence of public
intellectuals needs to be contrasted from the number of TV appearances totheir degree of involvement with grassroots activism.
The Power Intellectuals
If state control acts as a barrier for critical public intellectuals to flourish insocialist states, is it obvious that access to public is readily available tointellectuals in liberal democracies? In different ways, this question was a sourceof constant informal debate between Hu Tao and myself at the ALFP2002. For
example, how many intellectuals opposed to the imminent Iraq war have accessto public in the United States today? In a Znet commentary of May 2001,
Edward Herman and David Peterson are candid about this issue when they state“we can agree that the term public intellectual has become problematic, but notbecause intellectuals have disappeared as a result of being locked in theuniversity. Rather, those we would call public intellectuals are simply not being
given the chance to appear on the public stage. We believe that the source ofthe confusion lies in the failure to distinguish between intellectuals who have
ACCESS to the public and those who SERVE the public.There is a strong inverse
correlation between the two, which rests on the biased choices of thecommercialized and concentrated mainstream media. This in turn reflects thepreferences of the corporate community and political establishment.”
An intellectual who has generous media access is often funded by the American
Enterprise or Manhattan Institutes, Heritage Foundation, or the Hoover
Institution, as in cases of neo-liberal and market propagators Dinesh D'Souza,
the Thernstroms, Christina Hoff Sommers, Shelby Steele and Heather Mac
128

Donald. More generally, those who enjoy access can be relied on to say what
the establishment wants said on the topics of the day--"civility," "politicalcorrectness," race, free trade, and "humanitarian intervention" and the civilizing
mission of the United States and West. This characterizes the work ofintellectuals such as Alan Wolfe, Charles Murray, Paul Krugman, Robert Kaplan,
David Rieff and Michael Ignatieff, who have been relatively ubiquitous figures
over the past decade, enjoying bylines, radio and television appearances, andfavourable book reviews. Given their service to the powerful we categorize
these preferred intellectuals as "power" rather than "public" intellectuals. It is adistinction that captures a crucial feature of the U.S. system of selective
promotion or marginalization of intellectuals and their ideas throughout the
public sphere.As Noam Chomsky once noted, "It is a system of no small degreeof elegance, and effectiveness."
The term "public intellectuals" should therefore be reserved for those strong
thinkers who lack access to the public precisely because they are independent
and would speak effectively to that public's concerns. Their access is blocked,
and their work and ideas are rendered invisible, by vested interests who control
the flow of information to the public and are able to exclude from the print
media and airwaves those who challenge their interests and preferred policies.
That is, effective freedom of expression-- freedom of expression combined withoutreach to large numbers--is limited to the "power intellectuals."
Public intellectuals are recognizable not only by their marginalization, they arealso frequently subjected to harsh denigration and attack by the establishment's
power intellectuals.As Voltaire noted back in the 18th century, with odes to themonarch "you will be well received. Enlighten men, and you will be crushed."Thus, when Rachel Carson published her Silent Spring in an extremely
propitious environment for criticism of the chemical industry back in 1962--theecological consequences of DDT were becoming hard to hide, and thethalidomide disaster had recently struck--and succeeded in reaching not only
the New Yorker but a CBS News program that featured her message, she was
furiously assailed by the industry and its academic appendages for"emotionalism" and alleged inaccuracy. Noam Chomsky affords the finest
illustration of the public intellectual subjected to incessant and long-term
derogation in an attempt to discredit and justify a refusal to allow him toparticipate in public debates. Power intellectuals can make the most egregious
errors of fact and interpretation, their forecasts may be wildly off the mark, andthey may be first class war criminals claiming status as intellectuals (and rank
number one on Posner’s list, as Henry Kissinger does), but this does not impair
their ability to reach the public, as establishment good taste prevents mentionof their failings. But in Chomsky's case, criticisms based on literal fabrications
and misrepresentations about his work are repeated as a matter of course--andusually without any chance of rebuttal--when it is felt necessary to explain why
such an "extremist" is denied access.

129

It is possible to move between the categories of public and power intellectual
by a shift in viewpoint and funding source. David Horowitz, master of the"political correctness" and "left fascists" scares, moved from invisibility as aleftist to relative prominence as a Reagan-Gingrich Republican by such a shift.
The role of power intellectuals fits nicely into the propaganda model, where thethreat of independent experts as sources conflicting with official and corporate
perspectives is shown to be alleviated by pushing forward dependent andfriendly experts--i.e., power intellectuals--who preempt space that otherwise
might be taken by genuinely independent analysts, i.e., public intellectuals.
Nurturing and giving credentials to these power intellectuals, who will serve as
front-line fighters against the public interest, is a main function of corporate
thinktanks. And one of the beauties of the system is the willingness of thecorporate media to accept the experts from the corporate thinktanks as
genuinely independent and presumably serving the public interest.This has been
dramatically illustrated during the past several decades in the provision ofexperts on "terrorism" by the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Heritage Foundation, Rand Corporation, and other hugely biased, government
linked institutions. The result has been a flow of experts into the media thatprovide an almost uniform echo of the official view on terrorism, with two
thirds of the leading experts having been in government service and virtually all
focusing on leftwing and insurgent terrorism (see Herman and O'Sullivan, The"Terrorism" Industry). The prominence of the New World Order power
intellectuals in the last several decades fits the same pattern, and they haveplayed an important role in putting contemporary imperialism in a friendly lightwhile focusing on the crimes of its opponents and victims. Thus we have theoptimists like Francis Fukuyama, featuring the triumph and spread of "liberal
democracy" under the leadership of the United States.We have the pessimists
like Robert Kaplan, focusing on a "coming anarchy" that is traced to a numberof sources, but not corporate globalization, IMF-World Bank policy, or theeffects of a colonial heritage and wars traceable in large measure to thatheritage.
With newspapers, TV and other media agencies increasingly falling under thecontrol of neo-liberal conservatives not only in the US but in other parts of theWorld too, including Asia, freedom to speech and expression are highly
contested areas in the link between the public and the intellectual.
The Organic Grassroots Intellectual
Largely because of this, we must go beyond the Academia and the Metro city tolocate the more invisible intellectuals, who are not necessarily looking for media
links to reach their public, but are physically going out to meet the public. In Asia
particularly, they are an increasing component of resistance movements,
alternate developmental practices, and rural professional support services.They
are dreamers, practitioners and writers of a new politics, more in the Gandhianmode.They are not necessarily city elites who have opted to work directly with130

people; an increasing number of them are the Gramscian Organic Intellectuals,
coming from local areas but preferring to work in their own communities after
receiving good education from best institutions. This is a strong component ofpublic intellectuals, particularly in Asia.
It may not be a mere coincidence that institutions like the Nippon Foundation
with its Asian Public Intellectual Program, the Japan Foundation and I-House
with their Asia Leadership Program or a network like the Asian Regional
Exchange for New Alternatives (ARENA) are active today in providing links andplatforms for a resurgent Asian Public Intellectual fraternity.The strength of thegrassroots movements in Asia is perhaps propelling such initiatives, just as theWorld Social Forum platform is getting the World’s public and their intellectuals
on a common platform. That Noam Chomsky is heard by a wildly cheering
20,000 crowd in the small city of Porto Alegre in Brazil, whereas he is shunnedin his home country is an indication that people are there for the intellectuals
to link up with, provided they are ready to adopt different methods of reachingout, beyond the book, the article and the TV appearance.
Just when everyone thought that the era of street level resistance ended withthe anti-Vietnam war rallies, the anti-globalisation rallies, most dramaticallyvisible at Seattle, Genoa, Nice and other places, where millions of people havedemonstrated against the ill-effects of imperialist globalisation have instilled a
new hope about the politics of dissent and resistance. The massive anti-war
rallies that were held just before and during the morally and legally unjustified
Iraq war has shown that the resistance movement is unlikely to be a flash in thepan.
But it is easy to resist, what are the alternatives people ask. The World Social
Forum, a non-organisational platform of diversity and plurality with the slogan –‘Another World is Possible’, has in recent years emerged as a serious meeting
point of World’s intellectuals and movements to carve out the alternatives.With
three editions in the city of Porto Alegre in Brazil, and the fourth slated forJanuary 2004 in Mumbai in India, and with a participation that crossed the
100,000 mark in WSF2003, the WSF has raised hopes regarding the globalisationof people, rather than of market economy and military.The ‘new politics’, basedon diversity and plurality that is associated with the WSF is bound to change thenotion of intellectual and political discourse, and one can feel hopeful today thatthe grass root and academic intellectual might find a common space to combine
their efforts against an increasingly violent and repressive World order.

131

TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION
by Sakamoto Yoshikazu
Post-Cold War globalization
Today we are witnessing the extraordinarily accelerated dynamics ofglobalization unprecedented in history. Many people demonstrate an ambivalent
response to globalization because it has intrinsic contradictions as I shall spellout below.
The main engines of globalization are the global marketization of theeconomy and the global advancement of science/technology. Unlike in the daysof the Cold War when science and technology were put under the control ofthe states, particularly “the Superpowers”, science/technology in the post-Cold
War world has been increasingly relegated to the logic of the globalizedcompetitive market economy coupled with the globally dominant power of theUnited States, and this has led to a diminution in the power of other individual
nation-states to exercise control over the forces of globalization.
Thus we can shed light on contemporary world order in terms of four
dimensions— (1) the unipolar state system, (2) the market, (3) civil society, and(4) international organizations, including regional organizations. The traditionalsovereign state system that has persisted for the last four centuries as thedominant and primary actor constituting world order (or world disorder) is
now confronting these four competing systems, all of which go beyond theframework of individual nation-states.
Of the four, international organizations, such as the UN system or the EU,
consist of so-called “sovereign states” and are constrained by the legacy of statesovereignty much more than the other three – that is, the US-centered unipolarsystem, the market and civil society that are undergoing globalization in theirrespective ways.
So, let me examine, first, the basic problems of global concern that are
confronting us in the process of contemporary global transformation, and thenthe role assumed by these four categories of actors in relation to these global
problems.
You may recall that most of us welcomed the end of the Cold War, because, asa consequence, the danger of global genocide, which was one form ofglobalization in those days – namely, war and annihilation on a global scale –receded. It was expected by the people of the West, particularly the Americans,that the end of the Cold War would bring about a unitary “New World Order”,
which would treat the world as a single unit without fundamental global
cleavages – the view illustrated by the “End of History” idea of Francis
Fukuyama. But the very dynamics that has worked to build “one world” in that132

sense has given birth to divisions and fragmentation globally, cutting acrossnational borders. Further, the issue of global war/peace issue that had appeared
to have diminished in importance as a result of the end of the Cold War
resurged in a new form after 9/11.
Underlying these divisions and fragmentation are the problems of global
concern which include, among others, (1) the problems of the globalized market
economy, (2) global environmental degradation, and (3) the global effects of theadvancement of science and technology.
Each of these problems involves (a) disparity and inequity that affect thedisadvantaged, and (b) dehumanization and alienation that affect not only thedisadvantaged people but also the advantaged. But I do not think I need to go
into the detail of the problematic of globalization here.
The Agents of Democratic Control
The next question we must address is “Who are the agents who can exercise
control over these global problems to make the world more humane anddemocratic?”
In the age of modernity in the 19th and 20th centuries, it was primarily theindividual nation-states that were expected to fulfill the task of overseeing thedevelopment of the national economy and science/technology; and for thenation-state to meet the legitimate human needs of the people, democracy ona national scale was called for. But, today, the nation-state, which has been the
primary political framework of modernity, is being surpassed by the economic
and scientific/technological power which in itself is the driving force andproducts of modernity.
Furthermore, it is not only the global development of the market economy andscience/technology that has surpassed the nation-state system. It is also thestate-system itself that is transforming the system of sovereign states into a
unipolar global power structure headed by the world empire, the USA. Unlike
the modern world history characterized by the plurality of imperialist big
powers, we see today the emergence of a literally world empire unprecedented
in history. The power of the US is of global reach, which is a form ofglobalization, especially in terms of military power projection. The military
expenditure of the US takes 40% of the total world military expenditure. Its
military power can reach anywhere in the world, with an unparalleled degree ofdestructive power and high tech precision, though far from perfect, as illustrated
by “collateral damage”, which is nothing but dolus eventualis, i.e. advertent
negligence.
This military power of global reach is a product of the combination of its
global superiority in the market economy and its global superiority in militaryscience and technology. These two strands of superior power have given riseto the superior politico-military power of the US; and the dominance of thissingle global empire has transformed the traditional pluralist state-system based133

on the principle of legally equal sovereignty.
On the other hand, the global political legitimacy of the American world empire
is questioned in varying degrees by most nations in the world (except Tony
Blair’s Britain), because, contrary to the professed principle of this empire basedon the universal validity of democracy, the people of non-American states haveno democratic right to participate in the decision-making of the world empire.
If the US is to be a democratic power of global reach, it must be inclusive interms of the democratic rights of the people of the world. But it is precisely due
to its imperial character that the US takes an exclusionary policy toward othernations and peoples of the world.
This is the problem of “unilateralism”, which tends to disregard the crucial
importance of multilateral consultation and participation. The crux of thematter is that the global power of the US is not exercised for the global interestof humankind, but for the “national” interest of the American empire, giving
priority to “homeland security”.Thus, the global unipolarity is not consolidating
the unity of the world; on the contrary, its exclusionary unilateralism isdeepening the division between the US and the rest of the world and thefragmentation of the non-US world.
The unilateralist global dominance of the US, therefore, has not provided apolitical framework that is adequate to cope with the global economic disparity
and inequity, global environmental degradation, and the global dehumanizing
effects of science and technology. In fact, it tends to aggravate these problems.
The question is, “where can we find the source of power that will counter the
overwhelming negative impact of the market, science/technology, and theAmerican dominance?”
Here we can direct our attention to another agent in modern history which
has been struggling for the creation of a democratic, humane society of equality,
dignity and freedom— namely, civil society.
Historical Background
The modern idea of civil society was formulated in the latter half of the 18th
century by the Scottish Enlightenment school (Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, etal.) and was taken over by Hegel in his Philosophy of Right. By Hegel, civil society
was systematically coupled with the market economy, and was virtually equatedwith what Marxists later called the “bourgeois society.”
It was an age when the market and civil society were seeking to establish theirautonomy from the mercantilist state; and the underlying idea was that, while
the state embodied a closed system of violence and domination, civil society andthe market represented an open system of free speech, free competition andfree trade. The contradiction between the state, on the one hand, and civilsociety and the market, on the other, was emphasized. This was a reflection of134

the emergence of “bourgeois civil society” as a new bearer of the liberation of“man and citizen” of the time, as illustrated in most rational terms by theoriginal spirit of the French Revolution (though characterized by maledominance, as aptly pointed out by Mary Wollstonecraft). But that was as far as
the commonalities between the principles of market and civil society went.
The fundamental contradiction between the market and civil society became
unmistakably clear in the latter half of the 19th century, when a twofold divisionof society came to the fore; that is, (1) the division of capitalist society in termsof class conflict and (2) the division of the world in terms of imperialist powers
vs. colonized peoples. This uncivil, often violent, conflict at home and abroad
contributed to the demise of the concept of “civil society” in the mainstream ofWestern social and political thoughts.
Thus it was made abundantly clear by that time that the idea of civil society(which had been equated with “bourgeois civil society”) contains within itself asharp contradiction, and having lost the inspiring power as a liberating vision ofsociety, the idea went into oblivion.
In the course of the ending of the Cold War, however, the idea of civil society
was unexpectedly revived by the dissident citizens in Eastern Europe in theredefined sense of the term, i.e. the agent of political democratization withpractically no intrinsic association with the capitalist market economy.
But in the West, the collapse of state socialism through citizens’ struggle forpolitical democracy was congratulated as the triumph of liberal democracy andmarket economy combined. (“market democracy”) Hence the well-known selfcongratulatory conceptualization of the end of the Cold War as the “End of
History”. As a critique of this thesis, I wrote in 1993 that this was not the End
of History but the beginning of the history of open contradiction between thetwo ideological forces that had survived the Cold War -- that is, capitalist
market economy, on the one hand, and democracy based on civil society, on theother.
To spell out what I mean, let me make further clarification of the two concepts
and their relationship. I would summarize the commonalities and contradictions
as follows:
Common features
The capitalist market economy seeks autonomy from the state, limiting the roleof the state to the maintenance of order necessary for keeping the market
autonomous. Hence the liberalization and deregulation of the economy.
Civil society also seeks autonomy from the state, limiting the role of thestate to the maintenance of order necessary for keeping civil society
autonomous. Hence the democratization of the state and society.
To the extent both the market and civil society seek to create and consolidate
135the space autonomous from the state, they are oriented to de(trans)nationalization and demilitarization. To the extent free trade, reciprocal
investment, horizontal division of labor, and economic interdependence (notdependency) are enhanced, and to the extent civil society and politicaldemocracy are strengthened as the basis of diplomatic interactions, theincidence of inter-state armed conflict will decrease. This much is thecommonality of the two, beyond which the two part company.
Contradictions
The fundamental contradiction between the two lies in the fact that, while themarket refers to the commodification of social relations, civil society is oriented
to the humanization of social relations.
Incidentally, we can say in a similar vein that the state is based on thenationalization (including militarization) of social relations.
The market determines the value of human beings in functional terms (e.g. skill,
merits, achievement, etc.) and treats human beings as instruments andcommodities, that is, labor and consumers whose values are measurable or evenquantifiable in terms of productivity and efficiency which, in turn, are measurable
in monetary terms.What counts is what you have and you can do, not who you
are. In the market, although not all saleable goods are good, goods that are notsaleable are no good.
In other words, productivity, efficiency, and money, all refer to instrumental values
based on the system of the exchange of private interests, which Hegel called“the system of wants.” The power of the capitalist market, however compelling
it may be, is rooted in the egotistic motive for profit-making, treating humanbeings and nature essentially as means.
The market, being the system of instrumental values, it is small wonder that,
despite the presentation in today’s world, especially in the United States, of thefree competitive market as if it were a good in itself, very few people will bewilling to die for the defense of the market economy!
Put conversely, it is natural that the market of overriding power ofcommodification should aggravate the problem of dehumanization, alienationand the identity crisis of human beings in every society and also the degradationof the environment which is an aspect of dehumainzation. The market as asystemic force that undermines human identity cannot be the focus of ultimate
human self-fulfillment or self-realization.
In contrast, civil society refers to democratic social relations based on themutual recognition of the dignity and equal rights of human beings as ends inthemselves. It is grounded in the commitment to humanized end values such as
dignity, equality, equity, freedom, and social justice.

136

Further, two points may be noted. (1) civil society refers to public space, not thesystem of private interests; and (2) while the market is conceived as anahistorical “natural order” guided by the “invisible hand” which is also anahistorical entity, civil society constitutes the historical process through which
the meaning of civil society is constantly redefined by civil society itself inaccordance with the changing context of human conditions – i.e. historicalreflexivity.
This definition is not a product of an a priori, ahistorical, or arm-chair exercise.
It corresponds to the historic re-emergence and re-definition of the idea of civilsociety achieved in the course of the citizens’ struggle for democratization in
the former “Eastern Europe” such as Poland (and also in some Latin Americanand Asian countries) in the 1980s.
It was essentially a rejection by leading intellectuals and active citizens of thelegitimacy of the oppressive authoritarian political system.
It is a ”civil (citizens’) revolution” aimed at the creation and reinforcement of apolitical civil society, -- a democratic revolution that has three characteristics:(1) A crystallization of people’s power resulting from the autonomous
decisions and actions of an innumerable number of seemingly powerless
citizens.
(2) An unpredictability in the sense that no one, not even the citizens
themselves who become the agents of change, can predict when and in what
way the apparently inconsequential dissenting opinion and actions of citizens
will reach a critical mass to generate an enormous power for change.
(3) Once the avalanche of change begins, a new civil leadership secures a“transformational hegemony” through non-violence, “hegemony” meaning
political leadership that stems from the moral credibility of the agent of change.
This non-violent change takes place where dissidents have already formed
under the old regime the nucleus of a nascent civil society.
This is the form a democratic revolution through the democratization
movement from below took in the late 20th century and will take in the 21st
century. This is in sharp contrast to the Marxist-Leninist revolution thatprovided the model of global social change since the Bolshevik Revolution in1917 – a revolution without civil society as its foundation or nucleus.
Present Czech President, Vaclav Havel, wrote in an underground article inl979 when the Communists were still in power that the source of “the powerof the powerless” lies in “living within the truth” by rejecting the official lies andhypocrisy of the State. Havel’s remark brings to mind Mahatma Gandhi’s word,“the power of truth (satyagraha).” These are the manifestation of the fact that,in the final analysis, civil society centers on end values, not instrumental values
as is the case of the market.
So far I have argued that there are, in principle, fundamental contradictions (1)between the state and civil society, and (2) between the market and civil society.
137This is true of the conflict within a state. But these contradictions have become
all the more conspicuous and profound when the dominance of the US and thatof the capitalist market economy are globalized, exercising enormous powerover individual states, particularly the developing countries, as well as civilsociety in today’s world.
If the present structural trend toward widening disparity and deepening
marginalization continues, in terms of both political and economic power, it
would not be surprising if the marginalized people, feeling indignation at theincreasing inequity and inequality and driven by a deep despair toward thefuture, were to one day erupt into violent action which would spread acrossnational boundaries.
This kind of revolt would not be limited to democratic popular resistance;
violent exclusionist actions directed to other races, ethnic and religious groups,
together with fascist direct action or fundamentalist terrorism, are also there. I
wrote in 1998 that these violent revolts would lead to a “new form of World
War” in the 21st century, cutting across national boundaries. The terrorist
attacks on 9/11 turned out to be a case in point.
Structural roots of terrorism
Many have singled out poverty as the main cause of terrorism. In my view,
however, terrorism is the product of a combination of oppressive political andsocial structures, of which poverty is a component, and the corresponding
political and social consciousness of being oppressed. These oppressive
structures in today’s world have three dimensions.
Firstly, the global political and military dominance of the United States and its
allies and the dominance of global capital have given rise to global disparity andoppression. Secondly, and related to this, there are national/internal structuresof disparity and oppression, most notably in many developing countries.Thirdly,
there is the transnational structure of inequity and discrimination faced by anenormous number of people (legal and illegal immigrants, migrant workers,
refugees) who move to relatively more “advanced” countries in an effort toescape from the dual pressures of global and internal domination.
The world we live in today constitutes a huge pyramid characterized byinhumane disparity and oppression. As information dissemination is globalized
and the disadvantaged people become increasingly aware of the global inequities
and inequalities, it is natural that a growing number of the marginalized should
harbor anger and resentment.
Although I envisaged a new form of World War of the 21st century, theinhumanity of the 9/11 terrorist attacks went beyond anything I had everimagined. At the same time, I felt quite uncomfortable when I heard someone
characterize the terror as a “challenge against civilization” or a “war against138

civilized society.” Of course, it is antithetical to civilization.
But we must ask simultaneously: What do we mean by “civilization”? Does
our “civilization” not rest upon the global structure of inequity and oppression
which we ignore so long as it does not harm our vested interests?
Of the many observers and media people in Japan, and particularly in the US,
who have commented on terrorism, few people (that I know of) have tackled it
as part of our own problem, i.e. as intrinsic to our way of life called “civilization”.
Rather, they have treated terrorism as the subject of analysis and policy making,or as the object of military campaign. I have yet to see an account of the causesof terrorism that refers to our own mindset and the modality of our“civilization”.This is what has made me deeply uncomfortable.
President Bush said in his Congressional address,“Americans are asking, why
do they hate us? …They hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion, ourfreedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with eachother.”I was astounded by this remark, and wondered if he truly believed that his
statement would prove convincing to the other peoples of the world.
There are a number of people, particularly in the developing countries, who do
not accept the means used by terrorists but find their objective and intent
understandable.These people are critical of America because, while the US may
firmly protect freedom, human rights, and democracy for itself, America has
collaborated in the murder and the silencing of those in the developing
countries who fought against their oppressive, corrupt regimes in pursuit of
freedom, human rights, and democracy. Further, America’s “global standard” isseen as having widened the gap between rich and poor and eroded the“freedom to disagree” with America in defense of one’s own cultural values.
I must admit that, as far as its continued emulation of American “civilization”
is concerned, the Japanese mindset is equally problematic.
The backlash from South to North
It is often said that the terrorists have taken advantage of the democratic
freedom of the North for their anti-democratic purposes. Although that is notwrong, terrorism should be considered a manifestation of the much deeper
structural backlash underway on four dimensions.
Firstly, there has been the counter-flow of large numbers of immigrants andrefugees from South to North, reversing the historical trend of ruling officials
and labor force moving from the metropoles to the colonies. By settling in the
countries in the North these people, while confronting discriminatory,
repressive practices, are altering the character of the national identity andnational culture of the recipient countries.
Secondly, a backlash can be seen in the development of nuclear weapons by thenations in the South. Twenty years ago, I invited an African friend, for whom I
have great respect, to a conference held in Japan. He argued,“It is only when we139

have developed nuclear weapons that we can get the First World to takeseriously the poverty in the Third World and the enormous North-Southdisparity.” When I criticized him for making this kind of inhumane remark at aconference where A-bomb survivors were present, he refused to retract his
statement. I also pointed out, “It is unrealistic to assume that the nuclear
weapons of the South will be targeted only on the North, and it will amount tothe self-denial of the justice of the South if these weapons are directed against
other nations in the South.” Yet, the point he made has continued to stick in mymind.
Thirdly, the backlash can take the form of terrorism using biological, chemical or
nuclear weapons, which would involve a large number of civilian casualties in the
North – undeniably the worst and most dreaded type of protest. Naturally, I
loathe the idea of such inhumane, demonic slaughter of innocents. At the sametime, I cannot help but also remember the words of despair my African friend
uttered.
Finally, the world information and communication order dominated by the mass
media of the North, such as CNN, BBC,AP, and Reuters, has been challenged by
the recent moves in the South intended to disseminate internationallyinformation compiled from the perspective of global peripheries, mostly using
internet networks. The most dramatic example of this kind of backlash was aseries of interviews with Osama bin Laden disseminated by the Qatari satellite
television,Al Jazeera.The fact that the Bush administration attempted in vain to
suppress the telecast, in violation of the very principle of the “freedom ofspeech and press” it professedly espouses, illustrates the backlash of the free
information flow, now from South to North.
The backlash on these four dimensions all speak of actions meant to rendervisible to the society and civilization of the North the very existence of thepeoples of the South who have tended to be forgotten by the North. In thissense, the world is entering a phase of South-North backlash. Do the societies
in the North respond to this challenge by closing themselves off or by making
themselves open to it? This is one of the fundamental questions raised by the“roots of terrorism”.
Agents of Democratic Global Transformation
Given the legitimacy of action to redress the inequality and injustice inherent in
the present world political and economic pyramid, and given the illegitimacy ofterrorism as a means to achieve this end, we must address the following twoquestions: (1) What should be done to mitigate global disparity and maximize
equality and equity on a global scale? (2) Who should be the agents of thischange by non-violent means?
(1)

Measures to be taken globally to regulate global capital will include: an140appropriate global capital tax to check the inordinate growth in global economic
disparity and inequity – a tax on massive foreign exchange currency speculation(the so-called “Tobin tax”); taxation and legal restrictions to halt and reverse
environmental degradation; and international restrictions for abolishing childlabor and other forms of excessively low waged labor exploitation. It must be
noted that the right to taxation has been the integral part of the sovereignty ofthe state.
Given the fact that present day capital acts globally, regional (Asian) regulatory
response will have certain limits. Yet, a number of measures are feasible. They
will include: the establishment of a regional Asian monetary fund for responding
without delay to a currency crisis and preventing a currency speculation
spillover from one country to other countries in East Asia; the adoption of acurrency basket system in line with the conditions of respective countries thatwill include not only the US dollar, but also the Euro and the yen and othercurrencies in the region to reduce the adverse effects of foreign exchange
fluctuations linked solely to the US dollar; the monitoring and regulation ofshort-term speculative foreign capital (the “Chile formula”); and mutual
humanitarian aid, particularly aid from Japan, for the protection of the socioeconomically marginalized people who suffer from the shortage of food andmedical supplies, economic hardship due to structural unemployment, and soforth.
In this connection, I should like to make one point clear. In my view, one of thereasons why the global market and global capital are able to exert such a strong
influence on our lives concerns the fact that they possess the means to create
wealth with a high degree of efficiency through the rationalization of the
exploration and utilization of the world’s resources.
It would, therefore, be a mistake to reject this entirely and fall back into
“state capitalism” or “state socialism”. The issue here is not the outright
rejection of the globalization of the market, but how to regulate it to minimize
its negative effects from the perspective of civil society-based public values.And
since such regulation solely at the national level is not effective, the issue of how
to establish international public regulation needs to be considered.
Similarly, to counter American unilateralist political/military dominance, it isnecessary to strengthen regional organizations in various parts of the world,
particularly in Asia, to make the world more pluralist. Regionalization has been
underway in Europe, in North America, and a large part of South America.
Except for ASEAN, East Asia and South Asia remain virtually unorganized interms of multilateral regional frameworks.
At the same time, it must be noted that inter-state cooperation as such is
not the most essential issue because regional organizations may be another way
of preserving and protecting the common interests of the privileged elitegroups in the region. More generally, the privileged people in a country have theresources and know-how to act beyond national boundaries under the banner141

of “internationalism” much ahead of the disadvantaged and marginalized people
who often tend to stick to nationalist protectionism.
We must, therefore, bear in mind whose cooperation for whose interest isreferred to when we talk about the promotion of “international cooperation,”whether regional or global.
The task of the citizens in (East) Asia in terms of regional cooperation,
therefore, is to promote such interstate cooperation that is based on
democratic accountability to civil society – namely, cooperative relations thatare based on the recognition of the following six conditions of thecontemporary world.
(1) Restraint of the American empire and the regulation of global capitalcannot be achieved by any single “sovereign state”. Interstate cooperation isindispensable.
(2) Interstate cooperation will not ensure the protection and promotion of
the rights and interests of the people, particularly the disadvantaged, unless thestates are under the effective democratic control of civil society which is
sufficiently powerful to counteract the impact of the privileged global andnational power structure.
(3) For civil society to counter the global power structure, civil society has
to, and in fact does, transnationalize itself, providing the state with atransnational foundation for a democratic inter-state cooperation.
(4) Civil society, including transnational civil society has no formal
institutional mechanism of its own to exert effective and authoritative influence
over the global political and economic power structure. Therefore, it must
exercise democratic popular control mainly through the instrumentality of thestate machinery.
(5) It is on the basis of an association or a union of democratic states thatpublic values such as equity, justice, social welfare and human rights can be put
into effect to counter the global power structure.
(6) At the same time, it must be emphasized that transnational civil society
is gaining power at a remarkable pace in the rapidly interconnected
contemporary world, as illustrated by the innumerable networks of NGOs.
They represent in various ways “the power of the powerless”, raising a voice tomake the world more democratic and humane. In fact, they reflect the significant
post-modern reality of the 21st century that, while the mobilizing power ofmodern organizations such as political parties and labor unions is declining, thenumber of NGOs and the active citizen participation in their activities isdramatically increasing worldwide, dealing with global issues, such as poverty,
ecological decay, peace, and human rights, fro the perspective of “antiglobalization”.
Toward a “Regional Union”
Of course, in advocating the building of a regional community in Asia, I am awarethat the experience of the more advanced case, i.e. the European Union, cannot
142be mechanically replicated in East Asia. But no one can deny that we live in aworld where the myth of “national self-determination” based on the principleof “one nation, one state” is no longer tenable and every state is bound to be
multi-ethnic and multi-cultural.The failure to recognize this reality leads to thehorror of ethnic cleansing and genocide.
Against this background, two points may be noted. First, it is likely that one of
the major actors in the world politics of the 21st century will be what I would
call a “regional union.”
Although some of the existing states will continue to disintegrate into
smaller “ethno-national states,” these smaller “ethno-national states” will bebound either to join or form a larger “regional union” once they have attaineda degree of formal “independence”.
Second, in terms of the internal structure, it is civil society which istransnationalizing itself that lays the solid foundation of the regional union –transnationalizing itself internally, across the boundaries of ethnic groups within
the nation-state, and transnationalzing itself externally, across the boundaries ofnation-states – as in the case of the EU.
By saying so, I am not romanticizing Western Europe. But it must be noted that
the West European democracies, although they are obviously far from ideal,
recognize the legitimacy of the principle of civil society and provide institutional
guarantees to the self-transformative activities of concerned citizens.
The Future of (East) Asia
The question for us concerns what regional union, or its embryonic framework“regional association,” we can envisage in (East) Asia based on transnational civilsociety.
In reality,Asia is a region of enormous diversity or even heterogeneity, in termsof civilizational backgrounds, the colonial experience and the legacies andwounds it left on the state and society of Asia, which include even the modern
imperialist rule of an Asian state, Japan – a fact which does not apply to Africa
or Latin America.The structure of developmental disparities is also diverse.
This heterogeneity can give rise to two opposite scenarios. On the one hand,
Asia in the 21st century may be in the state of Balkanization.What happened in
Sri Lanka, Indonesia,Afghanistan, etc. may be an indication of this danger. Further,
the emerging belt of actual and potential military nuclearization, extending fromthe Korean peninsula, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, to Israel, coupled with thescramble of the major powers and multinationals for the oil deposit in the
Caspian region in Central Asia, testifies to the danger of the Balkanization ofAsia.
On the other hand, if Asian people succeed in achieving the coexistence andcooperation of the states and nations characterized by diversity andheterogeneity,Asia may serve as a promoter of the dialogue among the diverse
143civilizations of the world. As far as East Asia is concerned, the civilizationalcleavage may not be unmanageable and the economic interdependence basedon horizontal division of labor and intra-regional trade has been growing.
But, again, we must ask, “Whose community, for whom?”In the light of what I have emphasized above, it should be clear that an East Asian
regional framework will be democratically accountable to the people only when
it is an association of democratic states founded on a civil society which istransnationalizing itself across the boundaries of nations and ethnic groups, athome and abroad.
Obviously, this is not an easy task. But to counteract the two major dangers,
i.e. the dominance of global marketization and the Balkanized politicalfragmentation of the region, it is essential to create an association of democratic
states based on the empowerment of transnational civil society.
Multi-layer and Hybrid Identity
We live at the historic moment when, in order to tackle pressing global
problems, it is imperative to go beyond the system of national loyalty andnational identity. This by no means will dismiss the importance of national andsubnational ethnic and local communities and cultures. In fact, we are entering
the world of “overlapping communities of fate”, namely, a system of multi-layer
identities.
But to cope with the problems of global concern, we must be willing to givepriority to the identification with an international and supra-national communityof fate, whether global or regional.
This would imply that there are two channels for transcending nationalsovereignty to tackle global problems from a supra-national point of view.
One is to build an inter-state consensus through governmental coordinationof national interests with a view to creating a supra-national world or regionalorganization based on multilateral consultation and coordination.
The other is to activate civil society in support of transnational cooperationand solidarity.This is to foster a new human identity which dictates, for instance,
as NGOs such as M_decins sans Fronti_re espouse, that citizens have not only
the right but also the duty to go across national borders for extending
humanitarian assistance, interfering in a non-military, non-violent manner withthe domestic affairs of a state that commits massive violation of the humanrights of its own people.This would also apply to the poverty and hunger thatare localized but call for the universal, principled concern of those whose
interests and lives are not directly affected by these problems.
In short, one way is to transcend the national loyalty and identity at the top ofsovereign states, and the other is to transcend the national identity at thebottom of sovereign states through the transnationalization of civil society. To
144resolve global problems through the reinforcement of democratic governance, it
is imperative to transform the system of identity from below.
It is no wonder that, in the last decade, the United Nations, which used tobe jealous of its character as an “intergovernmental organization”, has been
increasingly emphasizing and relying on the role played by civil society andNGOs.
Finally, to promote this process of a regional or transnational community
building, it is necessary to make an inward re-examination and make ourselvesaware of the fact that there is no pure national identity (no pure Chinese, Indian,
Vietnamese, Japanese).What we all have is “hybrid identity”.
I think you have heard of Japan’s history textbook issue.The Japanese rightwing nationalists have been compiling history textbooks with a view towhitewashing all wrongdoings committed by the Japanese in terms of colonial
domination and wars of aggression, and to making school kids deceptively proudof the sanctity of Japanese traditional values. The fundamental intellectual
deficiency of this rightist interpretation of history stems from their assertion as
if there were pure Japanese and things purely Japanese.
In reality, what is called “the Japaneseness and the Japanese national traditionand values” are a hybrid of Korean culture, Chinese culture, Indian culture,
Persian culture, and even Hellenistic cultures which came to Japan via the silkroad across the Eurasian continent, in addition to some pre-existing local
cultures that were also hybrid.
To acknowledge the hybrid character of Japanese national-cultural identity
is an important step for the Japanese toward treating Koreans, Chinese, Indians,
and so forth, not as the “other” but as a cultural component which is alsopresent inside Japan and inside the Japanese mind as an integral part of “Japanese
identity”.
This point, in my view, has a crucial bearing on the role of “public intellectuals”.
Intellectuals are those people who are characterized by intellectual hybrid
identity. You have absorbed Western scholarship, values of other Asian cultures,
as well as what you consider your indigenous traditions. This refers to theformative process through which an intellectual acquires and deepens selfreflexivity to be intrinsic to oneself and to transcend oneself at the same time.
This gives birth to an intellectual perspective antithetical to exclusionary
fundamentalism and ethnocentrism.
It is on these grounds that I trust that public intellectuals like you do foster
the capacity and assume the responsibility to play a leading role in creating andstrengthening a civil society transnationally, both at the regional and global
levels.

145

ENDPIECE
Violence,Terror and Public Intellectuals
by Reiko Kinoshita
In November of 2002, my two-month intensive experience of great interest, asa Japan fellow for the "Asia Leadership Fellowship Program", chosen by theInternational House of Japan and the Japan Foundation Asia Center came to anend, sadly. I and four other fellows from the Asian region were given lectures
especially prepared for us by intellectuals of Japan on a wide variety of issues.
We went on stimulating and exciting field trips to meet activists and thinkers
working on a variety of issues, and were provided opportunities to freely
exchange our thoughts on anything under the earth, on a twenty-four hours
basis.What more could one ask for?
Of course, it was an opportune occasion for me to think about Japan. By
listening to the other fellows' remarks intently and delving into the meaning ofthese remarks, my mind was trying to fathom the kind of role many expect
Japan to play in a diverse Asia.Without the constraints of professional duties, it
was a refreshing experience to ponder over such enormous issues so freely, andstate my opinions in the midst of so many counter opinions. I have never spent
my time amidst such a luxury of free opinions. Every day I would remind myself
how grateful I was for all this.
To be true, I was initially skeptical about this program, since what it was seeking
was not very clear. No, actually more than that! It might be that I had notforeseen such a benevolent opportunity, promoted by a set of Japaneseinstitutions, of providing a person with space to grow intellectually.As days went
by, I became engrossed in the program. It was so much fun that I couldn't wait
for the next day.
However, not everything went smoothly.
It was when the first discussion amongst the fellows began. From the start, there
was a premonition, akin to a sense of wonder among the five of us that thediscussion might end up on a rocky surface.The theme for ALFP2002 was "TheRole of public Intellectuals".To begin with, the definition of "Public Intellectuals"
led to some discordant notes. Each of us had to acknowledge "differences" inour respective understandings. Our discussion on the definition kept goingaround in circles and was unable to move forward - it went on and on.
In the session's few remaining moments, we finally reached a "compromise".
By accepting all the differing definitions, each of us would make our own
arguments. It was a simple conclusion. However, we learned a lesson that evenseasoned and confident people from various countries need mutual146

understanding and earnest cooperation from one another in order to move a
discussion on, and to reach a satisfactory conclusion, based on a respect forplurality for views.
That is to say, we were reminded of the importance of "a way with words".
The World after September 11, 2001
How could a group of intellectuals meeting in September 2002 remain immune
from the earth shattering events of September 2001?
Has the world changed since September 11th?
Such a hypothesis sprang up in our debates repeatedly. I think it "did change".To
be sure, a definitive statement like that may contain some exaggeration. It is
impossible for everything in the world to change in one day. But such a shocking
event sometimes possesses a potential to change the context of everything, ina flash.
The multiple terrorist’ attacks of September 11, 2001, were certainly events ofsuch magnitude. For better or worse, the biggest concern for nations since 9/11
has been to position themselves in ‘war against terror’.
And in 2003, we as active members of the international community have beenmostly coerced into cooperating for the "Operation Iraqi Freedom (the Iraq
War)", led by the United States government, without understanding its real
intentions.
What needed clarity, I think, was whether we should have defined thedevastating events on September 11, 2001, as acts of "war" or something else?
In the world of international politics, the threshold of "war" is defined as "amilitary personnel death toll exceeding 1,000". In the case of the multiple
terrorist attacks on America, the victims were civilians and not combatants.
Nevertheless, the death toll exceeded 3,000.
And, the perpetrators seemed to have thought out the strategies meticulously.
It could be argued that they were like military strategies.Thus, if to administer
force as a means to compel someone to do what we exactly desire is adefinition of ‘war’ as some political scientists call it, them the incidents of
September 11 were undoubtedly acts of ‘war’.
By defining those incidents as acts of ‘war’, more than a few countries expressed
their willingness to cooperate in the ‘international community's war against
terror’". Britain, Spain, the Philippines and Japan were among them. To view
America with its overwhelming military might as an ‘imperialist state’ has been
gaining ground. Indeed, it is unrealistic to discuss today's world politics without
147

reference to where America is going. However, it would be extreme to say thatthe world is controlled by America or America rules the world.That would not
be very different from the views of American ‘neo-conservatives’, whose
arguments are similarly simplistic and extreme.
The ‘neo-conservatives" believe that all the problems of the world can be solved
with America's overwhelmingly strong military might. They say one should nothesitate to use military force in fighting against terrorism. They think that therest of the world will have to follow, as long as America takes the lead. The
intensity of ‘criticism of America’, which has greatly surfaced after September 11
may stem from a reaction to such views.
The critics have argued, "The September 11 terror sprang from America's world
strategy. Terrorists were born because the U.S. has become a powerful andarrogant nation. It has attempted to impose the American way on the rest of
the world as the right way, and acted unilaterally. Besides,America itself had longsupported terrorist-like activities. Don't make a great fuss just because terror
has now started coming your way".
I think that the international community's will is definitely the most important
aspect in this discussion. In the November of 2002, the United Nations Security
Council voted on ‘Resolution 1441’, and resumed the inspections in order todisarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. However, when the United States
said that it was dissatisfied with the inspections and would move towards useof military force, France, Germany and Russia objected. In other words, both the
US and the World were reminded of the reality that the otherwise traditional
supporters of the US differed with it, and they were not simply North Korea or
Iran!
Thus the post 9/11 community of nations has become more complex.
The Role of Public Intellectuals
One Japanese man said during the 2003 Iraq War:‘Bush and Saddam Hussein should have a one-to-one match, as leaders of the
O.K. Corral. No one else should be involved.The one that falls first shall retreat
upon defeat’. Certainly, it would have been easier if today's international
community’s rules were like the Old West's ‘rules of justice’. But, the real global
community’s rules are diverse, complicated and confusing.
Can the Public Intellectuals play a role that can clarify the fuzz? Because, I think,such a role is imperative.
In the case of Japan, the concept of ‘Public Intellectual’ has not progressedsufficiently so far. Even the conception and definition of the ‘elite’ has been used148

in a limited sense, especially after World War II.
What kind of "Public Intellectual" would be expected of Japan in the post 9/11
world?
1. A public intellectual as an individual who can exist in all kinds ofcommunities, understands the meaning of democracy properly, can act
independently in accordance with information and knowledge about
domestic and international issues, and is generous and enthusiastic about
efforts to speak and act to the limits of his/her capacities.
2. A public intellectual as an individual who makes a living out of what s/heloves to do, engages without comparing oneself to others, and is willing tocontribute positively to communities based on his/her level of confidence.
3. A public intellectual as an individual who has the intellectual curiosity tounderstand the Japanese history accurately, is able to discuss a variety ofpolitical, economic and social issues in a composed manner with people
inside and outside Japan, by means of the person's mother tongue or acommon language (foreign languages including English), and possesses the "away with words" in its true meaning.
For example, in terms of making a career out of what one loves to do, let's
remember the Japanese professional baseball players active in the U.S. Major
League and those who went to participate in the European soccer clubs to test
their abilities.As role models who realized their dreams, they are likely to appeal
to the future generations in Japan more than anything else. Just by choosing
something we love most, or are best at, as our career, our devotion, we can giveback a lot to the society. Utilizing the "a way with words", we can reciprocate
our society by sharing our experiences, answering questions and expressing
how one may act as a member of that society.
Democracy and Us
In an attempt to foster public intellectuals, we must build a structure to deepen
the understanding of democracy in Japan once again.
Such efforts have been made in the past. In particular, the two volumes oftextbook material titled "Democracy" were produced in 1948. It was something
the Ministry of Education asked Japanese intellectuals to write, following
discussions with American officials at the GHQ. While the writers and thecontents were creations of Japanese thoughts by residents in Japan, the material
had global points of views.
But why ‘Democracy’ now, one might wonder. This is because the ‘idea of
democracy to stabilize the society by valuing individuals’ is necessary today,
more than ever.

149Let us take a look at countries around the world.
Roughly, they can be put in to three groups:*Nations where democracy and the market economy has matured(Most of the U.S. allies belong here).
*Nations in which the democratization and modernization are developing, andthe market economy is still evolving (China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Indonesia andso on belong here).
*Nations in which democratization and modernization has failed for the time
being, and the social order is less than stable (The likes of Afghanistan belonghere).
A condition in which countries from these three groups can go beyond theirboundaries and form "alliances" has emerged.The fact that Pakistan and the U.S.
cooperated in the "war against terror" is a case in point.At that time, did eitherof them put democratic ideas to work? Did they think of such ideas by asking,‘Would taking this action value individuals?’, or ‘For what purpose should wetake this action?’
The basis of democracy is the respect for a human being as an individual. An
individual is a unit for all social activities, abilities are better used by valuing
individuals. Even when the market economy functions well, people might fallvictim to self-indulgence, whereby they feel that nothing matters as long as
they're all right. We learned this sufficiently from the attitudes of various
countries in suppressing the number of people infected with SARS, which swept
the Asian region in 2003 like a dashing tiger.
I do not mean to say that anyone can be a public intellectual. However,possibilities will grow infinitely in that direction if an active model of democracy
becomes pervasive. Japan seems stagnant.
But, it is not a bad idea to remember that the Japanese public intellectuals overhalf a century ago did try to leave "democracy" in a written form to the future
generations, like us.
If we improve on the ‘way with words’, we may not have such a long way to go.
Yes, I did understand a bit about ‘way of words’ at the ALFP2002.

150

Profiles of the ALFP 2002 Fellows
Hu,Tao (China)
Director of Environmental Economics Program, Policy Research Center
for Environment & Economy, State Environmental Protection
Administration (SEPA) of China
Proposed Research Topic: Trade and Environment: Toward Sustainable
Development
Dr. Hu is one of the pioneers in China in environmental economics as amethodology of environmental policy. As a senior research fellow of the
Policy Research Center for Environment & Economy of China’s State Environmental
Protection Administration, he often works as policy advisor or project consultant forinternational organizations and bilateral cooperation organizations, as well as national
ministries. He is an expert in analyzing trade and environmental issues and rural
environmental policy, and is experienced in Europe and America as well as in ASEAN
countries. He has also been active in writing environmental reports and essays andexpressing his views on hot environmental topics through appearances on TV and radio
programs.

Vinod Raina (India)
Vice President, All India People’s Science Network;
National Secretary, Bharat Gyan Vigyan Samiti (BGVS)
Proposed Research Topic: Environmental Security & Debt in a Globalised World
Dr. Raina received a PhD in Physics from Delhi University. He has been
one of the key leaders of the NGO literacy movement in India and cofounded one of the most extensive networks of school education, nonformal education, and literacy, Eklavya / BGVS. Although he retains his
interest in science, he has also made in-depth studies of the environment, education anddevelopment, being the chief editor of a book based on a study of ten Asian countries,
The Dispossessed:Victims of Development in Asia, published by ARENA, Hong Kong. He
is highly esteemed not only among NGOs but also among government leaders.

Maznah Binti Mohamad (Malaysia)
Associate Professor in Development Studies, School of Social Sciences,
Universiti Sains Malaysia
Proposed Research Topic: The Human Rights Question: Nation-States andCultural Communities
Dr. Maznah specializes in Development Studies, with a focus on social
development policies and political change. Her recent studies have beenon Islam, human rights and democracy. She writes regularly for a publicinterest newsletter, The Aliran Monthly, and tries to provide an unencumbered, if notalternative analysis of the current Malaysian political situation. She has also been active
in women’s organizations that promote the causes of gender equality, feminism andwomen’s rights against physical and structural violence. She once held the 2001 Visiting
Chair in ASEAN Studies at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University ofToronto, Canada.
151

Nguyen,Thi Hieu Thien (Vietnam)
Vice-Dean, English Department, Ho Chi Minh City University of
Education
Proposed Research Topic: Education in Viet Nam: New Strategies
After receiving her BA in electroning engineering from the Odessa
University of Technology in the former USSR, Ms. Nguyen was involvedin Russian language education in the 1980s. She later earned an MA in
TESOL at the University of Canberra and has become a noted expert inAmerican literature in Vietnam, with her broad knowledge of American culture andextensive reading of American literary works as well as research on U.S. multiculturalliterature. As vice-dean of the English Department and Head of the American Studies
Program of the Ho Chi Minh City University of Education, one of the three major
universities of education in Vietnam, she has contributed to the introduction of anumber of important reforms in administration, in curriculum development, and incooperation with other educational institutions both at home and abroad.
Kinoshita, Reiko (Japan)
Journalist; Member of Board of Directors, International Women’s MediaFoundation (IWMF)
Proposed Research Topic: Responsibility and Challenges of the JapaneseElectronic Media, Promoting Theater Democracy
Since the 1990s, Ms. Kinoshita has been conducting research andreporting under the theme of “Power Missing in Japan,” resulting in the
publication of 4 books: Influential, The Prize, The Club, and American
Bubble. As Visiting Fellow of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at
the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins
University, in Washington, D.C., she focused her research on the reconstruction of U.S.Japan relations and contributed to analysis and discourse among American university
students on the subject. At IWMF in Washington, D.C., she plays a unique role as thesole Board member representing the Asia/Pacific region, working on the developmentof a network of women journalists active in that region, Africa, the Americas, andEurope.

152