HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATS AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

HOUSE COMMITTEE ONOVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
DEMOCRATS

DENIAL, DISINFORMATION, AND DOUBLESPEAK:
BIG OIL'S EVOLVING EFFORTS TO AVOIDACCOUNTABILITY FOR CLIMATE CHANGEJOINT STAFF REPORT
April 2024
April 30, 2024

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This joint staff report on Big Oil’s decades-long deception campaign is theculmination of a nearly three year-long investigation by the Democratic staff of theHouse Committee on Oversight and Accountability (House Oversight), which has
worked with Democratic staff of the Senate Budget Committee staff during the 118th
Congress. The investigation, focused on ExxonMobil Corporation (Exxon), Chevron
Corporation (Chevron), Shell USA Inc. (Shell), BP America Inc. (BP), the American
Petroleum Institute (AI), and the Chamber of Commerce (the Chamber), provides arare glimpse into the extensive efforts undertaken by fossil fuel companies to deceive
the public and investors about their knowledge of the effects of their products on
climate change and to undermine efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions.
This final joint staff report builds on the House Oversight Committee’s earlier
hearings, public memoranda, and document releases, and it presents new findings
from the investigation. The key findings include:
Documents demonstrate for the first time that fossil fuel companies internally
do not dispute that they have understood since at least the 1960s that burning
fossil fuels causes climate change and then worked for decades to undermine
public understanding of this fact and to deny the underlying science. In fall2015, blockbuster reporting by Inside Climate News and the Los Angeles Times
revealed that Big Oil companies such as Exxon knew that burning fossil fuels wasa major contributor to climate change. Companies publicly rejected the reportingat the time, but new documents corroborate the reporting and show that fossil
fuel companies internally did not dispute the findings but tried to dismiss them as“hyperbolic” and “journalistic malpractice.”
Big Oil’s deception campaign evolved from explicit denial of the basic science
underlying climate change to deception, disinformation, and doublespeak. The
fossil fuel industry evolved from denying climate science to spreading
disinformation and perpetuating doublespeak about the safety of natural gas andits commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. New documents
demonstrate that Big Oil companies:
seek to position natural gas as a “bridge fuel” between coal and cleaner,renewable energy, while enmeshing natural gas in the U.S. energy economy
for the long-term;
seek to portray natural gas as a green, climate-friendly fuel, whileinternally acknowledging that there is significant scientific evidence thatthe lifecycle emissions from gas are as bad as coal and are incompatible
with scientific emissions reduction targets;make public pledges to support the Paris Agreement and to achieve net
A p r i zerol 3 0emissions, 2 0 2 4 while internally recognizing that they could not achieve
those goals or referring to them as outside of their business plans;

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
privately lobby—either directly or through their trade associations—against pro-climate legislation and regulations that they publicly
claimed to support;
publicly celebrate carbon capture technologies to help reduce
harmful emissions while privately acknowledging that the technology
is expensive and claiming that it cannot be scaled without federal
government investment; andpublicly promoted algae-based biofuels as an innovative low-carbon
technology while investing little in its research and development andthen cancelling the programs entirely.
The fossil fuel industry relies on trade associations to spread confusing andmisleading narratives and to lobby against climate action. Fossil fuel companies
use trade associations, think tanks, and other nonprofits to influence public policy
proposals and messaging, including API and the Chamber, as well as the Oil and
Gas Climate Initiative, Natural Gas Supply Association, and Western States
Petroleum Association. New emails between fossil fuel executives and thesegroups demonstrate how the companies influenced and leveraged theassociations and other organizations to control their messaging and use them tolobby for unpopular proposals that they do not want to be associated with.
The fossil fuel industry strategically partners with universities to lend an auraof credibility to its deception campaigns while also silencing opposition voices.
Fossil fuel companies establish funded partnerships with academic institutions toenhance their credibility, shape academic research programs to provide studies
supportive of a prolonged life for oil and gas, leverage the resulting research totheir advantage, and bolster access to policymakers. New documents reveal
previously unknown funding levels and show how companies condition theirfunding on academics’ cooperation and alignment with companies’ businessneeds. Additional documents demonstrate that companies actively tracked
individuals and organizations critical of the industry and monitored their social
media.
All six entities—Exxon, Chevron, Shell, BP, API, and the Chamber—obstructed
and delayed the Committees’ investigation. Despite valid subpoenas, the entities
refused to fully comply with the investigation, making baseless legal arguments
and flouting longstanding congressional practices and norms for investigations.
The companies further obstructed the investigation by significantly redacting or
entirely withholding more than 4,000 documents without any valid basis.

April 30, 2024

Chapter 1: Introduction and Investigation Background ................................................................. 1
I. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
II. The House Oversight Committee’s Investigation ......................................................... 2
Chapter 2: History of Climate Denialism ...................................................................................... 6
Chapter 3: Modern Climate Denialism and Doublespeak ........................................................... 11
I. Doublespeak: Emissions Reduction Targets.............................................................. 11
II. Doublespeak: Paris Agreement .................................................................................. 16
III. Doublespeak: Role of Natural Gas as a Clean Fuel ................................................... 21
IV. Doublespeak: Emissions Reduction Measures .......................................................... 24
A. Methane Regulations........................................................................................ 24
B. Emissions Reductions Policies......................................................................... 27
V. Doublespeak: Low-Carbon Technologies.................................................................. 29
A. Companies Are Not Making Substantial Investments in CCS......................... 30
B. Companies Touted Low-Carbon Algae Biofuels That Were NeverCommercially Viable ....................................................................................... 34
Chapter 4: Fossil Fuel Industry Collaboration ............................................................................. 36
I. Fossil Fuel Industry Trade Associations and Other Organizations ............................ 36
A. American Petroleum Institute .......................................................................... 37
B. United States Chamber of Commerce .............................................................. 38
C. Oil and Gas Climate Initiative.......................................................................... 39
D. Natural Gas Supply Association ...................................................................... 41
E. Western States Petroleum Association ............................................................ 42
II. Abuse of the National Petroleum Council .................................................................. 43
Chapter 5: Targeting Universities, the Press, and Critics ............................................................ 44
I. Cultivating Relationships with Academic Institutions ............................................... 44
A. Funding and Shaping Academic Research Programs ...................................... 45
B. Conditioning Grants on Cooperation from Researchers .................................. 47
C. Studying the Disruption of Climate Change to Core Business ........................ 48
D. Using Academic Programs to Bolster Access to Policymakers ....................... 48
II. Tracking Critics and Pressuring News Outlets ........................................................... 49
Chapter 6: Obstruction of the Congressional Investigation ......................................................... 51
I. Attempting to Undermine Congressional Investigation Legal Frameworks and Norms
51
A. Power and Scope of Congressional Investigative Authority ........................... 51iii

B. Baseless First Amendment and Privilege Arguments ...................................... 52
C. Disregard for Longstanding Congressional Practice and Norms ..................... 52
II. Significantly Redacting or Withholding Documents .................................................. 53
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 60

iv

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND INVESTIGATION BACKGROUNDI.

INTRODUCTION

Decades of climate denial and legislative obstruction by the fossil fuel industry haveforestalled meaningful government action to avert climate change, “the defining crisis of ourtime.” 1 The effects on people around the world are already significant and will only worsen overtime absent urgent action. Syntheses of the work of thousands of climate scientists demonstratethat 1.5°C of warming above preindustrial levels will cause extreme heat waves, flooding,drought, food scarcity, and sea level rise. 2 The world is on track to hit 1.5°C of warming in thenext decade, and with each additional increment of warming, the effects worsen. 3 With global
warming now on course to breach 1.5°C compared to preindustrial levels, at least five tipping
points—rapid and irreversible transformations of Earth systems—are likely to be triggered.
These physical tipping points could also lead to “social tipping [points] such as financial
destabilization, disruption of social cohesion, and violent conflict that would further amplify
impacts on people” as well as risk “catastrophic, global-scale loss of capacity to grow staple
crops” that could result in food system collapse across the world. 4
Scientific evidence makes clear that any new fossil fuel development is incompatible
with the Paris Agreement, a treaty signed by 195 countries including the United States, whichsets a long-term goal of keeping global temperature rise below 2°C with an additional ambition
to keep it below 1.5°C. The International Energy Agency (IEA) is unequivocal that, in order toachieve that goal, there must be no new or expanded greenhouse gas-emitting fossil fuel—including natural gas—projects approved for development, “beyond projects alreadycommitted.” 5 Similarly, the United Nations’ (UN) 2020 Production Gap Report found that,“[b]etween 2020 and 2030, global coal, oil, and gas production would have to decline annuallyby 11%, 4%, and 3%, respectively, to be consistent with a 1.5°C pathway.” 6 There is a “‘large
consensus’ across all published studies that developing new oil and gas fields is ‘incompatible’

United Nations, The Climate Crisis—A Race We Can Win (online at www.un.org/en/un75/climate-crisisrace-we-can-win) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
1

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report (2023) (online atwww.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf).
2

When Will Global Warming Actually Hit the Landmark 1.5℃ Limit, Nature (May 19, 2023) (online atwww.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-01702-w); 10 Big Findings from the 2023 IPCC Report on Climate Change,
World Resources Institute (Mar. 20, 2023) (online at www.wri.org/insights/2023-ipcc-ar6-synthesis-report-climatechange-findings).
3

New Report: Tipping Point Threats and Opportunities Accelerate, Stockholm Resilience Center (Dec. 6,2023) (online at www.stockholmresilience.org/research/research-news/2023-12-06-new-report-tipping-point-threatsand-opportunities-accelerate.html).
45International Energy Agency, Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector (Oct. 2021)(online at https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/deebef5d-0c34-4539-9d0c-10b13d840027/NetZeroby2050ARoadmapfortheGlobalEnergySector_CORR.pdf).
6

United Nations, The Production Gap (2020) (online at https://productiongap.org/2020report/).

with the 1.5°C target.” 7 In all scenarios holding warming below 1.5°C, the International Institutefor Sustainable Development found that “[g]lobal oil and gas production and consumption must
decrease by at least 65% by 2050.” 8
As set out in this joint staff report, as well as two prior memoranda, documents obtainedby the then-House Committee on Oversight and Reform (House Oversight Committee) during
the 117th Congress demonstrate that, contrary to public statements supportive of the Paris
Agreement, major oil and gas companies’ and their trade associations’ business models andpolitical influencing activities are inconsistent with any credible pathway to a safe climate. 9
II.

THE HOUSE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE’S INVESTIGATIONOn October 23, 2019, in view of the risks posed by climate change and public reporting
about the role the fossil fuel industry has played in suppressing scientific evidence, theSubcommittee on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the House Oversight Committee held thefirst congressional hearing about climate denialism, “Examining the Oil Industry’s Efforts to
Suppress the Truth About Climate Change.” At this hearing, former Exxon scientists confirmedthat Exxon knew the reality of climate change as early as the 1970s but concealed that reality
from the public. Dr. Martin Hoffert, a former Exxon consultant, testified that Exxon’s actions
were “immoral” and “greatly set back efforts to address climate change.” 10
Two years later, on September 16, 2021, the House Oversight Committee launched aninvestigation into the fossil fuel industry’s decades-long deception campaign. 11 The House
Oversight Committee sent investigative letters to ExxonMobil (Exxon), BP America Inc. (BP),Shell Oil Company (Shell), Chevron Corporation (Chevron), the American Petroleum Institute(API), and the Chamber of Commerce (the Chamber). None of the entities met the deadline forresponding to the Committee’s requests for information and documents, and each eventually
New Fossil Fuels ‘Incompatible’ with 1.5C Goal, Comprehensive Analysis Finds, Carbon Brief (Oct. 23,2022) (online at www.carbonbrief.org/new-fossil-fuels-incompatible-with-1-5c-goal-comprehensive-analysisfinds/).
7

International Institute for Sustainable Development, Navigating Energy Transitions: IISD Report (Oct.
2022) (online at www.iisd.org/system/files/2022-10/navigating-energy-transitions-mapping-road-to-1.5.pdf).
89Memorandum from Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney and Chairman Ro Khanna to Members of theCommittee on Oversight and Reform, Investigation of Fossil Fuel Industry Disinformation (Sept. 14, 2022) (online
at https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/democratsoversight.house.gov/files/2022.09.14%20FINAL%20COR%20Supplemental%20Memo.pdf); Memorandum from
Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney and Chairman Ro Khanna to Members of the Committee on Oversight andReform, Investigation of Fossil Fuel Industry Disinformation (Dec. 9, 2022) (online athttps://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/democrats-oversight.house.gov/files/2022-1209.COR_Supplemental_Memo-Fossil_Fuel_Industry_Disinformation.pdf).

Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Hearing on
Examining the Oil Industry’s Efforts to Suppress the Truth About Climate Change, 116th Cong. (Oct. 23, 2019)(online at https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/legislation/hearings/examining-the-oil-industry-s-efforts-tosuppress-the-truth-about-climate-change).
10

Committee on Oversight and Reform, Press Release: Oversight Committee Launches Investigation of
Fossil Fuel Industry Disinformation on Climate Crisis (Sept. 16, 2021) (online athttps://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/press-releases/oversight-committee-launches-investigation-of-fossilfuel-industry).
11

2

made only a limited production primarily containing non-substantive, trivial and publicly
available materials such as press clippings, regulatory filings, and pages from the entities’ own
websites. On October 21, 2021, the House Oversight Committee sent additional letters to all six
entities, extending the production due date to October 25, 2021. Still, none of the entities madesubstantial productions of the key documents the House Oversight Committee requested. 12
As a result of their initial obstruction, on November 2, 2021, the House OversightCommittee subpoenaed all six entities. 13 The subpoenas required the six entities to produce all
documents dating from November 30, 2015, that (1) were sent, received, or created by board
members and executives and related to climate change and clean energy, including documents
addressing industry marketing and advertising on those topics; (2) were sufficient to demonstrate
the amount and itemization of all direct or indirect funding to employees and external contractors
related to climate change and clean energy; and (3) related to the entities’ plans to reducegreenhouse gases. 14 Even after receiving these subpoenas, the entities failed to comply fully—or, in some cases, at all—as discussed in Chapter 6 of this staff report.
As part of its investigation, the House Oversight Committee also held hearings
demonstrating the ways that Big Oil was fueling the climate crisis. At the first hearing, titled“Fueling the Climate Crisis: Exposing Big Oil’s Disinformation Campaign to Prevent Climate
Action,” CEOs from Exxon, BP, Chevron, Shell, API, and the Chamber testified. House
Oversight Committee Members questioned the CEOs about their organizations’ roles in the fossil
fuel industry’s “long-running, industry-wide campaign to spread disinformation about the role offossil fuels in causing global warming.” 15
At the second hearing, titled “Fueling the Climate Crisis: Examining Big Oil’s Climate
Pledges,” climate and environmental experts testified about “the urgent need for fossil fuelcompanies to fundamentally alter their operations and reduce emissions, and assess[ed] whether
the companies’ climate pledges will meet that goal, or are instead just the latest example ofclimate disinformation.” 16
At the final hearing, titled “Fueling the Climate Crisis: Examining Big Oil’s Prices,
Profits, and Pledges,” individuals directly affected by the climate crisis offered firsthandaccounts about surviving climate change-induced severe weather events. In a second panel,Committee on Oversight and Reform, Press Release: Chairwoman Maloney Subpoenas Top Fossil Fuel
Entities for Key Documents (Nov. 2, 2021) (online at https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/pressreleases/chairwoman-maloney-subpoenas-top-fossil-fuel-entities-for-key-documents).
12

13

Id.

14

Id.

Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on Fueling the Climate Crisis: Exposing Big Oil’s
Disinformation Campaign to Prevent Climate Action, 117th Cong. (Oct. 28, 2021) (online athttps://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/legislation/hearings/fueling-the-climate-crisis-exposing-big-oil-sdisinformation-campaign-to).
15

Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on Fueling the Climate Crisis: Examining Big Oil’s
Climate Pledges, 117th Cong. (Feb. 8, 2022) (online athttps://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/legislation/hearings/fueling-the-climate-crisis-examining-big-oils-climatepledges).
16

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experts on economic, environmental, and energy policy examined Exxon’s, Chevron’s, BP’s, andShell’s record-breaking profits and the inadequacy of their climate pledges. 17
In September 2022, in connection with that third hearing, and again in December 2022,
the House Oversight Committee released memoranda and documents obtained by theCommittee. These memoranda and documents showed that fossil fuel companies had misled the
public and investors about their supposed commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions andhad continued to obstruct the House Oversight Committee’s investigation despite being
subpoenaed. 18
Alongside this joint staff report, the House Oversight Committee’s Democratic staff, atthe direction of Ranking Member Jamie Raskin, is releasing additional documents obtained
through the investigation commenced during the 117th Congress. These documents further
demonstrate that fossil fuel companies—directly and through their trade associations—worked inconcert to deceive the public and investors and to undermine efforts to curb greenhouse gas
emissions.

17
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Hearing on Fueling the Climate Crisis: Examining Big Oil’s
Prices, Profits, and Pledges, 117th Cong. (Sept. 15, 2022) (online athttps://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/legislation/hearings/fueling-the-climate-crisis-examining-big-oil-s-pricesprofits-and-pledges).
18
Memorandum from Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney and Chairman Ro Khanna to Members of theCommittee on Oversight and Reform, Investigation of Fossil Fuel Industry Disinformation (Sept. 14, 2022) (online
at https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/democratsoversight.house.gov/files/2022.09.14%20FINAL%20COR%20Supplemental%20Memo.pdf); Memorandum from
Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney and Chairman Ro Khanna to Members of the Committee on Oversight andReform, Investigation of Fossil Fuel Industry Disinformation (Dec. 9, 2022) (online athttps://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/democrats-oversight.house.gov/files/2022-1209.COR_Supplemental_Memo-Fossil_Fuel_Industry_Disinformation.pdf).

4Documents obtained by theHouse Oversight Committee demonstrate that:
Although fossil fuelcompanies claim to support
the Paris Agreement, theclimate plans that they havepledged to adopt—even if
fully implemented—are notsufficient to achieve thegreenhouse gas reductions
necessary to meet the Paris
Agreement’s goals. Moreover,at least some companies’
internal communications callinto question their putative
support of the Paris
Agreement.
Despite fossil fuel companies
pledging to meet various
emissions reduction targets,internal communications
show that they continue topromote a future dominatedby oil and gas and routinely
take actions that are directly
at odds with their pledges.
Fossil fuel companies publicly
tout investments in lowcarbon technologies such asalgae-based biofuels, while
privately asserting theimpracticability of thesetechnologies in light ofserious questions about theirreadiness, cost, andscalability.

Fossil fuel companies publicly
tout carbon capture andsequestration (CCS) as asolution for reducing
emissions from fossil fuelcombustion but fail to invest
sufficient resources in
deploying it and then blame
the federal government for
not providing taxpayer money
to help them do so.
Fossil fuel companies areaware of scientific evidence
that the lifecycle emissions
from natural gas may be equal
to those from coal, yet
continue to market natural
gas as a safe, clean fuel thatwill help achieve climate
goals.
Fossil fuel companies publicly
support climate policies suchas carbon pricing andmethane regulations while
privately opposing them orpaying trade associations tooppose and block them on
their behalf.
Fossil fuel companies
collaborate with one anotherand industry groups todevelop pro-fossil fueldisinformation, downplay theindustry’s responsibility forclimate change, and obstructmeaningful climate action.

Together, these documents demonstrate how the strategy behind the fossil fuel industry’s
campaign of climate denialism and obstruction has shifted over time. As the effects of climatechange have worsened—and, in turn, become more apparent—over the past three decades, thefossil fuel industry’s outright denial has become more difficult to sustain. As a result, theindustry shifted gears to focus on a campaign of deception about its true intentions with respect
to the Paris Agreement, emissions reduction targets, low carbon technologies, the alleged safetyof natural gas, and climate policies. This campaign sold to the public and investors a false storyof progress while lobbying to protect and even expand the role of oil and gas in the U.S. energy
mix.
Finally, despite being legally required to produce responsive documents pursuant to avalid congressional subpoena, the fossil fuel companies and their trade associations failed to
fully comply with these subpoenas and obstructed the congressional investigation in many ways,
including by failing to provide certain responsive documents and concealing key information
through baseless and extensive redactions. Perhaps most egregiously, the Chamber furnishedonly 24 documents responsive to the subpoena.

CHAPTER 2: HISTORY OF CLIMATE DENIALISM
In fall 2015, investigations by
Inside Climate News and the Los Angeles
Times revealed that, as early as the
1960s, oil giants like Exxon knew thatthe burning of fossil fuels was a major
contributor to climate change. 19
Subsequently released public informationsuggests the industry actually knew as
early as 1959, when nuclear scientist
Edward Teller explained to a symposium
hosted by API that carbon dioxide emissions from burning oil would melt ice caps and raise sea
levels. 20 In 1963, the burning of fossil fuels was already being linked to rising carbon dioxidelevels and a rising global average temperature. 21 At the 1965 annual meeting of API, thenpresident Frank Izard said that “carbon dioxide is being added to the earth’s atmosphere by theburning of coal, oil, and natural gas at such a rate that by the year 2000 the heat balance will be
so modified as possibly to cause marked changes in climate beyond local or even national

19
Exxon’s Own Research Confirmed Fossil Fuels’ Role in Global Warming Decades Ago, Inside Climate
News (Sept. 16, 2015) (online at https://insideclimatenews.org/news/16092015/exxons-own-research-confirmedfossil-fuels-role-in-global-warming/); How Exxon Went from Leader to Skeptic on Climate Change Research, Los
Angeles Times (Oct. 23, 2015) (online at https://graphics.latimes.com/exxon-research/).
20
On Its 100th Birthday in 1959, Edward Teller Warned the Oil Industry About Global Warming, The
Guardian (Jan. 1, 2018) (online at www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-percent/2018/jan/01/on-its-hundredth-birthday-in-1959-edward-teller-warned-the-oil-industry-about-global-warming).

Implications of Rising Carbon Dioxide Content of the Atmosphere, The Conservation Foundation (1963)(online at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015004619030&view=1up&seq=4).
21

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efforts.” He went on to say that “[o]ur industry must give its fullest cooperation in this national
effort to improve our air and water resources.” 22
By the late 1970s, the question was not if fossil fuels were contributing to climate change,
but “how soon and how fast and how bad” climate change would be. 23 Exxon itself recognizedin 1979 that the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere had been increasing since thestart of the industrial revolution due to fossil fuel combustion, that it would lead to global
warming, and that “[t]he present trend of fossil fuel consumption will cause dramatic
environmental effects before the year 2050.” 24
Despite recognition by the fossil fuel industry that its products contributed substantiallyto climate change, including by Exxon’s subsidiary tasked with conducting scientific researchand engineering for the company, Exxon devised a campaign of climate change denial
orchestrated to delay the enactment of greenhouse gas-reducing policies in the United States andglobally. 25 In 1988, instead of communicating the findings of its scientific research, thecompany embarked on a calculated strategy to “emphasize the uncertainty in scientificconclusions regarding the potential enhanced Greenhouse Effect.” 26
Other industry advocacy groups engaged in similar tactics. Exxon was a member of the
Global Climate Coalition, a now-defunct industry lobbying group that opposed the United Statessigning the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. 27 In 1998, as the world continued to grapple with the needto cut carbon emissions, API sent a memorandum to its Global Climate Science Communications
Team, later leaked to the New York Times, that stated: “Victory will be achieved when average
citizens ‘understand’ (recognize) uncertainties in climate science. ... Unless ‘climate change’
becomes a non-issue ... there may be no moment when we can declare victory.” 28 This nowinfamous “Victory Memo” laid out the industry’s campaign to deceive the public by raising

22
Frank N. Ikard, Meeting the Challenges of 1966, American Petroleum Institute (1965) (online atwww.climatefiles.com/trade-group/american-petroleum-institute/1965-api-president-meeting-the-challenges-of1966/).

Drilled: The Bell Labs of Energy, Critical Frequency (Nov. 13, 2018) (online atwww.dropbox.com/sh/fi4n4g13nqt2f7m/AADPpB8CXzw3Q7aEN_hts3J2a/S1%20Transcripts?dl=0&preview=Drill
ed_Ep03.docx&subfolder_nav_tracking=1).
23

Exxon, Controlling the CO2 Concentration in the Atmosphere (Oct. 1979) (online atwww.climatefiles.com/exxonmobil/1979-exxon-memo-on-potential-impact-of-fossil-fuel-combustion/).
24

How Exxon Went from Leader to Skeptic on Climate Change Research, Los Angeles Times (Oct. 23,
2015) (online at https://graphics.latimes.com/exxon-research/).
25

26

Exxon, The Greenhouse Effect (Aug. 1988) (online at www.climatefiles.com/exxonmobil/566/).

Global Climate Coalition: Fighting Global Climate Action in Favor of Fossil Fuels’ Survival, Climate
Liability News (Apr. 25, 2019) (online at www.climateliabilitynews.org/2019/04/25/gcc-global-climate-coalitionun-fossil-fuels/).
27

1998 American Petroleum Institute Global Climate Science Communications Team Action Plan,
American Petroleum Institute (online at www.documentcloud.org/documents/2840903-1998-API-Global-ClimateScience-Communications) (accessed Apr. 26, 2024).
28

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“serious question on the science” by emphasizing “both sides” of the debate, and by depicting
those promoting emissions reductions as “out of touch with reality.” 29

New documents obtained by the House Oversight Committee confirm the reporting by
Inside Climate News and the Los Angeles Times in 2015: the fossil fuel industry has been awareof the reality of climate change (and the substantial role that fossil fuels play in temperature rise)for nearly 60 years. Yet the industry consistently conducted deception campaigns to blunt thepolitical peril of such evidence and undermine proposed legislation and regulations governing
greenhouse gas emissions. 30
The documents demonstrate that despite its public statements at the time, Exxon did notdispute the reporting internally. Publicly, Exxon stated in a press release and in a letter that thestories were, “inaccurate and deliberately misleading.” 31 A December 2015 email from an
Exxon communications advisor indicated that the company conceded the journalists’ findings. 32
In discussing a potential public response, the advisor wrote that Exxon didn’t “actually ... dispute
much of what these stories report.” Instead, the advisor expressed frustration that journalists
interpreted “the facts so negatively.” 33 The advisor wrote:

29

Id.

Exxon’s Own Research Confirmed Fossil Fuels’ Role in Global Warming Decades Ago, Inside Climate
News (Sept. 16, 2015) (online at https://insideclimatenews.org/news/16092015/exxons-own-research-confirmedfossil-fuels-role-in-global-warming/); How Exxon Went from Leader to Skeptic on Climate Change Research, Los
Angeles Times (Oct. 23, 2015) (online at https://graphics.latimes.com/exxon-research/).
30

Exxon, ExxonMobil Says Climate Research Stories Inaccurate and Deliberately Misleading (Oct. 2015)(online at https://ir.exxonmobil.com/news-releases/news-release-details/exxonmobil-says-climate-research-storiesinaccurate-and) (accessed Apr. 16, 2024); Letter from ExxonMobil Corporation to Mr. Lee Bollinger, President
Columbia University (Nov. 20, 2015) (online at www.politico.com/f/?id=00000151-5a8a-d6a2-a155dbca213c0000).
3132

EM-HCOR3-00073317.

33

Id.

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Other documents acknowledge previous systematic efforts companies took to conceal
their internal understanding of fossil fuel-induced climate change, including questioning
journalists’ integrity and motivations. In the December 2015 Exxon email, the communications
advisor labeled them as “advocacy-funded journalists” rather than “traditional journalists,”
notwithstanding the reality that the company did not dispute the facts presented in the stories. 34
A March 2016 internal email between BP government affairs leadership members reveals that
BP agreed with Exxon’s dismissal of the reporting, deeming it “silliness,” and expressing
admiration for Exxon’s response. 35
Documents also demonstrate that the fossil fuel industry’s duplicity continued at least
into the last decade. In the 2010s, companies not only recognized their previous efforts to denyclimate change but also continued to deny it anew. For example, although Chevron largely
failed to comply with the Committee’s subpoena, one 2016 spreadsheet produced by BP
reflected it’s view that Chevron had not yet “acknowledge[d] man made climate change
exists.” 36
In February 2016, Exxon released a blog in response to the allegations regarding its
deliberate undermining of climate change evidence. 37 While the final published piece asserted
that the company “believes the risk of climate change is clear and warrants action,” earlier drafts
obtained by the House Oversight Committee do not discuss climate change as a threat or
advocate for environmental protection. 38 Instead, initial language vigorously defends the role offossil fuels, labeling the accusations against Exxon as “way off the mark” and the reporting as“journalistic malpractice.” 39 Moreover, the drafts accuse the journalists of “misrepresent[ing]what we believe and what we have told the public,” later amended to accuse them of being“deliberately inaccurate and misrepresent[ing] the basic facts.” 40

34

Id.

35

BPA_HCOR_00117818.

36

BPA_HCOR_00283274.

Significant Differences of Opinion, ExxonMobil (Feb. 24, 2016) (online athttps://exxonmobilperspectives.com/2016/02/24/significant-differences-of-opinion/#print).
37

38

Id.

39

EM-HCOR3-00216152; EM-HCOR3-00216157.

Id.; Significant Differences of Opinion, ExxonMobil (Feb. 24, 2016) (online athttps://exxonmobilperspectives.com/2016/02/24/significant-differences-of-opinion/#print).
40

9

The contrast between the draft and final language provides an almost real-time glimpse
into the evolution of climate denial strategies as fossil fuel companies pivoted from outrightclimate denial to a new strategy of deception. Instead of misrepresenting the science and theconsequences of climate change, they pivoted to misrepresenting their business plans, theirinvestments in low carbon technologies, the alleged safety of natural gas, and their support forvarious climate policies and emission reduction targets. 41
The documents obtained by the Committee show the fossil fuel industry’s adoption ofthis new approach. Today’s climate denialism centers on greenwashing industry commitmentsthat purport to address climate change, such as adopting industry pledges to move away fromfossil fuels while funneling millions of dollars—often through a web of trade associations andthink tanks supported by the fossil fuel industry—into campaigns that push anti-climate action
agendas. 42

41
Additional documents detailing references to historical deception include: BPA_HCOR_00041460;
CHEV-117HCOR-0046737; CHEV-117HCOR-0047108; CHEV-117HCOR-0045529; EM-HCOR3-00247952.
Emails from an Exxon advisor dated January 2016 similarly appear to affirm Exxon’s awareness of its historical
deception. Discussing a draft opinion piece, a communications advisor suggests replacing “working against climate
policies” with “working against climate science.” A media relations manager responded, “It’s true that Inside
Climate News originally accused us of working against the science but ultimately modified their accusation to
working against policies meant to stop climate change, such as Kyoto. I’m ok either way since they were both true
at one time or another.” EM-HCOR3-00071758; EM-HCOR3-00071760.

The United Nations defines greenwashing as “misleading the public to believe that a company or otherentity is doing more to protect the environment than it is.” United Nations, Greenwashing—The Deceptive Tactics
Behind Environmental Claims (online at www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/climate-issues/greenwashing)(accessed Apr. 19, 2024).
41

10

CHAPTER 3: MODERN CLIMATE DENIALISM AND DOUBLESPEAK
Industry documents obtained by the House Oversight Committee reveal that fossil fuelcompanies routinely mislead the public and investors about their emission reduction targets, theirplans to comply with the Paris Agreement, the viability of low-carbon technologies they tout, thealleged safety of natural gas, and their commitments to support various climate policies.
I.

DOUBLESPEAK: EMISSIONS REDUCTION TARGETS

Shell, Exxon, and Chevron have each made climate pledges, including emission
reduction targets, albeit with varying degrees of ambition and different approaches for achievingcarbon neutrality. Despite their differences, a common theme is the pledges’ reliance on
ambiguous language and long-term targets to avoid more aggressive, necessary action. All four
fossil fuel companies claim that their pledges will allow them to meet the Paris Agreement goalof net zero emissions by 2050, using clever marketing and green-sounding language to convince
the public that they are taking climate change seriously.
In 2020, BP pledged to reach net zero in its oil and gas production on an absolute basis
and to cut by 50% from 2019 levels the carbon intensity of the products it sells by 2050 orsooner. 43 It also promised to install methane measurement at all of its major oil and gas
processing sites between 2019 and 2023 and to reduce methane intensity in its operations by
50% in that time period (one goal BP successfully accomplished). BP also pledged to increase
the proportion of investment into non-oil and gas businesses over time. 44 And it has set somenear-term climate goals across operations, production, and sales, and it appears to be on track tomeet some of those goals. 45
But recent public statements as well as internal documents produced to the House
Oversight Committee demonstrate that BP’s external pledges were inconsistent with its internal
positions. Just two months ago, in February 2024, BP interim CEO Murray Auchincloss madeclear that BP would pursue a profit-oriented “demand strategy” that would require increasing its
oil output: “[W]e see growing demand for energy right now across the globe … [We are] going
to invest in today’s energy system … So that’s investing into oil and gas.” 46 Documents

43
BP, Press Release: BP Sets Ambition for Net Zero by 2050, Fundamentally Changing Organisation to
Deliver (Feb. 12, 2020) (online at www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/press-releases/bernardlooney-announces-new-ambition-for-bp.html). Carbon intensity is “the ratio of carbon dioxide per unit of energy, or
the amount of carbon dioxide emitted as a result of using one unit of energy in production.” World Bank,
Databank: Metadata Glossary (online at https://databank.worldbank.org/metadataglossary/world-developmentindicators/series/EN.ATM.CO2E.EG.ZS) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).

BP, Press Release: BP Sets Ambition for Net Zero by 2050, Fundamentally Changing Organisation to
Deliver (Feb. 12, 2020) (online at www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/press-releases/bernardlooney-announces-new-ambition-for-bp.html).
44

45
BP’s Path to Emission Reduction: Analyzing Targets and Achievements, Offshore Technology (Jan. 18,2024) (online at www.offshore-technology.com/data-insights/bp-net-zero-targets/?cf-view).

BP to Increase Oil Output, New Chief Says, New York Times (Feb. 6, 2024) (online atwww.nytimes.com/2024/02/06/business/bp-oil-gas-profits.html).
46

11

obtained during the House Oversight Committee’s investigation suggest this has always been
true.
Other 2019 internal emails demonstrate a lack of support at the highest levels of BP
leadership for emissions cuts consistent with the Paris Agreement targets. The Climate
Leadership Council (CLC) is a non-profit, bipartisan organization founded to advocate for a
carbon dividends policy funded through a carbon tax, which would gradually increase until
emissions reduction goals are achieved. In 2019, CLC pushed for a climate roadmap to cut U.S.
carbon emissions in half by 2035. BP—through another third-party group, OGCI declined toparticipate in the campaign to promote the initiative. 47 An internal email chain at the time shows
BP executives internally flagging CLC’s outreach to OGCI, asking it to support a potential
announcement from CLC oil and gas member companies, including Exxon, BP, and Shell,
during a UN meeting. BP’s Vice President of Strategic Planning wrote: “just wanted you to beaware as reducing emissions in half by 2035 sounds pretty out there!” 48 Of course, reducing
emissions by half by 2035, as CLC’s plan called for, would be roughly consistent with Paris
Agreement targets, which BP claimed to support.
Private emails just before BP’s February 2020 net zero pledge demonstrate that BP’s
global lead for Sustainability and Climate Policy and Partnerships did not believe that BP had
any ability to meet its net zero target by 2050. In a June 2019 email thread showing BP’sinternal discussion on how to respond to a press request for comment, the BP official said, “itgoes a bit too far to state or imply support for net zero by 2050, because that would requirepolicy likely to put some existing assets at risk, and we haven’t discussed that internally.” Hesuggested BP respond by claiming to be “supportive of ambitious targets and timetables,
including net zero targets,” emphasizing that “we need to stand by our public support for theParis goals and the achievement of net zero ‘in the coming decades.’” 49
Another document shows BP in damage control mode after it opposed a shareholder
resolution seeking to establish robust emissions targets on BP products. A 2019 email from a
Communications and External Affairs official on the day after BP’s Annual General Meetingstrongly encouraged shareholders to oppose the resolution. The email, highlighting both aFinancial Times op-ed and a note to “key climate stakeholders,” illustrates BP’s public support
for the Paris Agreement to justify its refusal to commit to specific emissions reduction plans:[O]ur strategy is consistent with the Paris Agreement and we welcome steps that support
a faster transition to a low carbon energy system. That said, the pace and nature of theenergy transition remains[sic] uncertain. Therefore, we could not support a second
resolution proposed by a group called Follow This that called for emissions targets on BP
47
Climate Leadership Council, The Baker Shultz Carbon Dividends Plan: Bipartisan Climate Roadmap(Aug. 2021) (online at https://clcouncil.org/reports/Bipartisan-Climate-Roadmap.pdf).

BPA_HCOR_00170209; BPA_HCOR_00170216; BPA_HCOR_00170225. The document also showsinternal debate between CLC member companies over a proposed policy provision granting fossil fuel companies
relief from liability for climate harms. “CLC delivered to me late Friday (in hard copy) their revised Pillar
document and a comms plan for rollout of this (including esp [sic] removal of the liability relief provision)…
Bottom line, XOM has apparently agreed to this plan at least for now and so crisis averted in terms of XOM on one
side or Microsoft on the other making a noisy withdrawal over the liability issue.”
48

49

BPA_HCOR_00105125 (emphasis added).

12

products. We have no control over these emissions and to support such a resolution
would not provide the necessary flexibility to transform in response to whatever form thetransition will take. 50
BP’s own public relations consultants advised the company that, after testing proposed
messages with relevant audiences, respondents felt BP was greenwashing its image withincremental examples of emissions reductions, while not demonstrating sustained action to
become a cleaner company. 51 Purple Strategies, a political communications firm, assisted BP in
refining its narrative as a “transitioning” or “greening” company. BP and Purple Strategies
organized focus groups with “multi-issue activists and armchair pundits” and “ESG-oriented
financial elites.” 52 A 2021 document titled “Transitioning Companies Narrative Refinement &Exploration: Engaged & Influential Segments” sets out findings aimed at helping BP appear
greener. 53 Purple Strategies concluded that the tested narrative “prove[d] that bp is thinking in
the right direction but falls short of providing that we are acting in the right way.” 54 Purple
Strategies suggested ways BP could change its behavior to appear more committed to the green
transition:
A single or discrete example of an investment in cleaner energy does not a greening
company make. As we found with ESG investors, segments need to see sustained efforts
and investments over time to believe in bp’s commitment. Clear benchmarking andreporting on goals, along with focused leadership and accountability are crucial tobelieving in change. 55
In other words, in order to be perceived as a truly green company by investors, BP had toactually become a low-carbon company, something it was not actually doing.
An undated draft document that appears to be from 2021 entitled “Greening companies
narrative – DISCUSSION DRAFT” shows how BP executives worked to downplay the climate
crisis. 56 For example, one comment on the draft appears to show a BP official suggesting thephrase “[t]o meet a tough challenge” rather than “[i]n a crisis,” adding that “[b]y using [crisis]
language we risk putting pressure on ourselves (‘so why then aren’t you doing more?’) but by
not using it we risk counting ourselves out of the conversation before we’ve got started.” 57 BP50

BPA_HCOR_00073042.

The United Nations defines greenwashing as “misleading the public to believe that a company or otherentity is doing more to protect the environment than it is.” United Nations, Greenwashing—The Deceptive Tactics
Behind Environmental Claims (online at www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/climate-issues/greenwashing)(accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
51

52

See, e.g., BPA_HCOR_00106758; BPA_HCOR_00326467; BPA_HCOR_00326638.

53

BPA_HCOR_00326640.

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

BPA_HCOR_00193837.

57

Id.

13

officials also suggested using the term “lower carbon” practices in lieu of “greener” to avoid
potential “inclusion of other sustainability issues.” 58
Shell pledged “net-zero carbon emissions from our operations” by 2050 and “net-zerocarbon emissions from the energy products we sell, ... which currently account for over 90% of
the total emissions we report.” 59 Shell also pledged to reduce its absolute emissions by 50% by2030, compared to 2016 levels on a net basis. Shell plans to eliminate routine flaring of natural
gas from its upstream operations, maintain methane emissions intensity below 0.2% by 2025,
and achieve near-zero methane emissions by 2030. 60
The evidence that Shell is on track to meet these targets is scant. 61 In 2018, a Shell
External Relations Manager expressed doubt that net zero emissions were possible by 2050,
suggesting it might take until 2070. The Shell manager also expressed concern that a think tankwhose research Shell was considering amplifying “is pushing harder & faster for net-zero carbon
emissions than Shell finds plausible at this time (e.g. 2050/60 vs 2070).” 62 Other Shell
documents demonstrate that the company planned to extract oil and gas for as long as possible.
In conversations between Shell executives at an event with reporters in 2020, Shell’s chief
economist stated that the company was “going to get as much out of [oil and gas] for as long as
we can.” A Shell deepwater strategy employee said, “In terms of emissions, [deepwater] is oneof the cleanest ways to go. Of course, when you put it in your car and burn it, it’s oil...” After anews outlet published these statements, in internal documents, Shell’s communication teamdismissed the outlet that published as a “local rag” and stated that they hoped that no one would
read it. One official, however, conceded the article made for “uncomfortable reading.” 63
Exxon has pledged an “ambition to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions for
operated assets by 2050, backed by a comprehensive approach to develop detailed emissionreduction roadmaps for major facilities and assets” and “supported by 2030 emission-reductionplans, including net-zero plans for Permian Basin operations.” 64 In a December 2021 press
release, Exxon also pledged to eliminate routine flaring, a type of operational emission, in the

58

Id.

Shell, Our Climate Target (online at www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/the-energy-future/ourclimate-target.html) (accessed Apr. 17, 2024).
59

Shell Plans to Increase Fossil Fuel Production Despite its Net-Zero Pledge, National Public Radio (June14, 2023) (online at www.npr.org/2023/06/14/1182102392/shell-plans-to-increase-fossil-fuel-production-despite-itsnet-zero-pledge).
60

Environmental Defense Fund, Flaring Flatline: Commitments on Natural Gas Flaring Outpace
Progress (June 2022) (online at https://business.edf.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/90/files/Flaring-Flatline.pdf;) Shell
Cuts Scope 1, 2, and Methane Emissions, Energy Digital (Apr. 20, 2022) (online at https://energydigital.com/oiland-gas/shell-cuts-scope-1-2-and-methane-emissions).
61

62

SOC-HCOR-045422.

63

SOC-HCOR-391063.

ExxonMobil, Press Release: ExxonMobil Announces Ambition for Net-Zero Greenhouse Gas Emissions
by 2050 (Jan. 18, 2022) (online at https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/news/news-releases/2022/0118_exxonmobilannounces-ambition-for-net-zero-greenhouse-gas-emissions-by-2050).
64

14Permian Basin. 65 The company also pledged to decrease operational methane emissions
intensity by 70% to 80% of 2016 levels by 2030. 66 However, none of the pledges address
emissions released from Exxon’s products when they are burned for energy, which account foraround 85% of Exxon’s total emissions. 67
Internal Exxon documents demonstrate that the company touts one-off, insubstantial
emissions reductions, rather than setting ambitious climate targets and holding the entire
company accountable for meeting them. In its 2017 Chairman’s Annual Meeting Book, Exxon
explained its refusal to set an ambitious, company-wide climate plan aligned with the Paris
Agreement. 68
As the document explains:[O]ur processes include, where appropriate, setting tailored objectives at the business,site, and equipment levels, and then stewarding progress toward meeting those objectives... ExxonMobil believes this rigorous bottom-up approach is a more effective andmeaningful way to drive efficiency improvement and GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions
reduction than simply setting high-level corporate targets. 69
Another document shows that Exxon would not strive to comply with rigorous voluntary
third-party climate disclosure standards from respected nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
like the Carbon Disclosure Project and the Task Force on Climate-Related Disclosure. The
Exxon Chairman’s Annual Meeting book from 2017 stated: “we do not believe striving for a[Carbon Disclosure Project] ‘A’ grade, as some of our competitors have indicated (Shell & BP)
is in the best interest of the company.” 70
A 2018 spreadsheet obtained by the Committee shows that Exxon and fellow oil major
ConocoPhillips collaborated to discuss whether disclosure standards set by the International
Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA), an oil-industry tradegroup, should incorporate stronger climate risk disclosures, in particular, “a description of theirrisks and opportunities by sector and/or geography.” 71 The spreadsheet shows that
ExxonMobil, Press Release: ExxonMobil Plans for Net-Zero Emissions in Permian Basin Operations by
2030 (Dec. 6, 2021) (online at https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/news/news-releases/2021/1206_exxonmobil-plansfor-net-zero-emissions-in-permian-basin-operations-by-2030); Exxon Halts Routine Gas Flaring in the Permian,
Wants Others to Follow, Reuters (Jan. 25, 2023) (online at www.reuters.com/business/energy/exxon-halts-routinegas-flaring-permian-wants-others-follow-2023-01-24/).
65

ExxonMobil, Advancing Climate Solutions Report: Methane (Jan. 2024) (online athttps://corporate.exxonmobil.com/sustainability-and-reports/advancing-climate-solutions/methane).
66

67
ExxonMobil, Scope 3 Emissions (2022) (online at https://corporate.exxonmobil.com//media/global/files/advancing-climate-solutions-progress-report/2022-july-update/scope-3-emissions.pdf); Securities
and Exchange Commission, Notice of Exempt Solicitation (2023) (online atwww.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/34088/000183988223012483/xom_px14a6g-051023.htm).
68

EM-HCOR3-00942441.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

EM-HCOR3-00876629.

15

ConocoPhillips argued that IPIECA disclosures did “not need to get more granular than adescription of potential future risk.” 72 ConocoPhillips also balked at reporting Scope 3
emissions, disagreeing that they were an “important metric to judge a company by.” 73
Chevron released a report detailing its intention to reach net zero by 2050, but its actual
actions have been the least substantial of any company. The pledge only addresses operationalemissions, which constitute less than 10% of Chevron’s overall climate pollution. 74 One study
calculated that the company’s total projected emissions from 2022 to 2025 are larger than theemissions of ten European countries combined. 75 And despite this net zero pledge, Chevron
expects to spend between $18.5 billion and $19.5 billion in 2024 on new oil and gas projects—an
11% increase year over year. 76
II.

DOUBLESPEAK: PARIS AGREEMENT

Publicly available information and documents produced to the House OversightCommittee demonstrate that fossil fuel companies have no intention of aligning corporate
emissions reductions with the Paris Agreement despite public statements supporting theAgreement. Rather than developing plans that recognize the fossil fuel industry’s responsibility
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the companies (1) de-emphasize or ignore responsibility for
reducing emissions from the burning of their oil and gas products for energy, transferring blameand responsibility to consumers for the vast majority of their emissions; and (2) overemphasize
minimal investments in clean or renewable energy projects that are insufficient to achieve thegoals of the Paris Agreement.
Fossil fuel production must decrease annually for the world to meet international climate
goals. However, fossil fuel companies implement business plans to expand their oil and gas
production and extraction activities, in turn generating enormous profits. These enormous profits
are a result of industry-wide business models that are inconsistent with the Paris Agreement.

Id.; Other documents show that the companies closely track their competitors’ climate pledges andprojections: EM-HCOR3-00005564; EM-HCOR3-00040924; EM-HCOR3-00876410; BPA_HCOR_00283274,
BPA_HCOR_00037840, BPA_HCOR_00049634, BPA_HCOR_00050382, BPA_HCOR_00155874; EM-HCOR300876629.
72

73

Id.

Worthless: Chevron’s Carbon Offsets Are Mostly Junk and Some May Harm, Research Says, The
Guardian (May 24, 2023) (online at www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/may/24/chevron-carbon-offsetclimate-crisis).
74

75

Id.

Chevron Increases Project Spending by 11% for 2024, Reuters (Dec. 7, 2023) (online atwww.reuters.com/business/energy/chevron-forecasts-16-bln-capex-2024-2023-12-06).
76

16

17

Exxon first announced its support for the Paris Agreement in 2015. 77 In a 2021 blog
post, Exxon’s Director of Greenhouse Gas and Climate Change reiterated that the company “hassupported [the Paris Agreement] since its adoption in 2015.” 78 Yet, a document obtained by theHouse Oversight Committee shows that in a 2019 memo, the very same Exxon official
recommended to Exxon’s CEO that the company urge the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative(OGCI), a CEO-level group that claims to support greenhouse emissions in the fossil fuelindustry, to remove any references to the Paris Agreement from its documents, including publicstatements and an annual report. He sought to avoid any language that “potentially commits[OGCI] members to enhanced climate-related governance, strategy, risk management, andperformance metrics and targets.” 79 The document, which catalogued “critical edits” Exxon
provided to OGCI, noted that Chevron was “generally aligned” with the approach.
Exxon clearly understood that its investment strategy was inconsistent with the Paris
Agreement. However, the company absolved itself from responsibility because it had alreadywritten off the possibility of the world reaching 2°C ; that is, it did not believe that the global
energy system was on track to meet the Paris Agreement. In a 2018 email, the same Exxon
official who edited the OGCI documents wrote: “I don’t think hypothetical 1.5 deg C scenarios(vs hypothetical 2 deg C scenarios) should really change our thinking vis a vis upstream
strategy…we don’t yet see the world even approaching a 2 deg C pathway (via Paris NDCs,
signpost monitoring, etc.), let alone a 1.5 deg C pathway.” He continues, “[b]oth 2 deg C and
1.5 deg C would require unprecedented changes to the global energy system and economy, at a
rate and scale never before demonstrated.” 80
In 2024, Exxon confirmed that it would continue to increase oil and gas production, by
about 10% over the next four years, from a projected 3.8 million barrels of oil equivalent a dayby 2024 to 4.2 million barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2027. With the recent acquisition of
Pioneer Natural Resources, the company will double its Permian shale oil and gas output toabout 1.3 million barrels per day. 81 Exxon and partners plan to spend $12.9 billion to develop
their sixth offshore oil project in Guyana, which would start operations in 2027 and bring
Exxon’s oil output in Guyana to over 1.2 million barrels per day. 82

Inside Exxon’s Strategy to Downplay Climate Change, Wall Street Journal (Sept. 14, 2023) (online atwww.wsj.com/business/energy-oil/exxon-climate-change-documents-e2e9e6af).
77

78
ExxonMobil, Reaffirming Our Commitment to the Paris Agreement (Jan. 20, 2021) (online athttps://corporate.exxonmobil.com/news/viewpoints/commitment-paris-agreement).
79

EM-HCOR3-00064980.

80

EM-HCOR3-00022185; EM-HCOR3-00611488.

81
Exxon Mobil Forecasts Increases in Project Spending, Oil Output, Reuters (Dec. 6, 2023) (online atwww.reuters.com/markets/commodities/exxon-mobil-forecasts-higher-production-2024-2023-12-06/).

Exxon Proposes Sixth Oil Project in Guyana for $12.9 Billion, Reuters (Aug. 21, 2023) (online atwww.reuters.com/business/energy/exxon-proposes-sixth-oil-project-guyana-129-billion-2023-08-21/).
82

18

According to investment firm MSCI, Exxon’s current activities would result in 3.2°C of
global temperature rise when extrapolated over the entire economy—well above the Paris
Agreement targets. 83
Chevron first announced its support for the Paris Agreement in 2016, calling it a “goodfirst step.” 84 But internal documents suggest that Chevron was either not assumed to be truly
committed to the Paris Agreement or quickly changed its position to curry favor with the Trump
Administration. In early 2017, a Trump Administration official emailed a Chevron official,among others, to offer talking points on President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement, urging recipients to “use and share as you see fit and please do flood the zone withpublic communications of support—TV, radio, social media, statements, op-eds, etc. The
climate-change supporters will be out there trashing this move, so we’d love as much back-up for
the President as possible.” 85
Chevron’s oil and gas activities have also increased. In 2023, Chevron produced a record
3.1 million oil-equivalent barrels per day, and it projects a rise in production between 4% and 7%
in 2024. 86 Last year, Chevron’s production in the Permian Basin reached a record 860,000
barrels per day and is on a path to reach 1 million barrels per day in 2025. Like Exxon, Chevrondoes not see any need to act since it does not believe that the world is on track to meet climate
goals. 87 Chevron officials followed countries’ public pledges under the Paris Agreement via aninternal coordinating body called the “Chevron Flexibility Mechanisms Evaluation Network,”
which noted in 2021 that “nationally determined contributions are falling short of the needed
MSCI, ESG Ratings & Climate Search Tool (online at www.msci.com/our-solutions/esg-investing/esgratings-climate-search-tool/issuer/exxon-mobil-corporation/IID000000002127471) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
83

These Oil and Coal Companies Have the Worst Climate Change Records, Vice (Oct. 6, 2016) (online atwww.vice.com/en/article/8q8k34/these-oil-and-coal-companies-have-the-worst-climate-change-records).
84

CHEV-117HCOR-0047194. Other documents that show fossil fuel industry internal positions or
influence on federal policy include: BPA_HCOR_00033564; API_00015121 (payment to Republican Legislative
Campaign Committee); BPA_HCOR_00255778 (payment to the historic Ford’s Theatre, in part because “Membersof Congress, the Administration and more regularly attend Ford’s Theatre.”); BPA_HCOR_00052952 (“the reallybig climate command & control regulation would be a future Refinery GHG rule (similar to the CPP) and we could
avoid that rule with a carbon tax. Of course, [the Trump] Administration will not promulgate a Refinery GHG ruleso the benefit of a carbon tax to BP is diminished for the time-being.”); BPA _HCOR_00326061 (lobbying in
support of National Environmental Policy Act rollbacks); SOC-HCOR-340463; BPA_HCOR_00177553 (“if the US
goes overboard [on climate policy] compared to other places in the world, it could greatly disadvantage the US
business.”). Other relevant documents include: BPA_HCOR_00032843; BPA_HCOR_00035421;
BPA_HCOR_00050804; BPA_HCOR_00050382; BPA_HCOR_00076592; BPA_HCOR_00052136;
BPA_HCOR_00113157; BPA_HCOR_00110495; BPA_HCOR_00351971; BPA_HCOR_00038733,
BPA_HCOR_00038791; BPA_HCOR_00341624; BPA_HCOR_00333437; BPA_HCOR_00110808;
BPA_HCOR_00112636; BPA_HCOR_00112638; BPA_HCOR_00052946; BPA_HCOR_00174512;
BPA_HCOR_00174515; BPA_HCOR_00283161; BPA_HCOR_00288824; BPA_HCOR_00325882;
BPA_HCOR_00325889.
85

Chevron Earnings Fall but Shareholders See Record Windfall in 2023, Company Raises Dividend 8%,
CNBC (Feb. 2, 2024) (online at www.cnbc.com/2024/02/02/chevron-cvx-q4-earnings-report-2023.html); Chevron,
Chevron Supports Well-Designed Climate Policy (online at www.chevron.com/sustainability/environment/climatepolicy) (accessed Apr. 19, 2024).
86

CHEV-117HCOR-0066712; CHEV-117HCOR-0038538; CHEV-117HCOR-0066758; CHEV117HCOR-0108369.
87

19pathway to the well below 2°C goal.” 88 According to MSCI, Chevron’s current activities would
result in 3.2°C of global temperate rise when extrapolated over the entire economy—well above
the Paris Agreement targets. 89
BP expressed support for the Paris Agreement beginning in 2015, and its website
currently claims that its operations are “consistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement” andthat the company “support[s] the goals of the 2015 Paris Agreement,” including to “pursu[e]efforts to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°C.” 90 However, in one 2017 email thread,BP’s global head of Sustainability and Climate Policy, Partnerships, and Stakeholder Relations
opined that the U.S. remaining in the Paris Agreement was “the most obvious course of action to
take. All the benefits and few of the risks. That was really why the Paris Agreement was
designed the way it was - to enable flexible transition from one political regime to the next. No
one is committed to anything, other than to stay in the game.” 91
BP sought to take advantage of the Trump Administration’s pro-fossil fuel extraction
agenda despite BP’s stated support for the Paris Agreement. One email thread discussed
submitting a Washington Post op-ed, a draft of which praised the Trump Administration’s “calls
for increasing domestic energy production and reforming the federal regulatory system.” 92 A BP
Communications and External Affairs executive explained the need for the op-ed to “strik[e] theright balance between supporting the administration’s energy agenda and gently pushing it tostay in Paris”—a curious approach given that the Trump Administration’s agenda included
withdrawing from the Paris Agreement altogether. 93
Perhaps most telling, despite its previous statements supportive of the Paris Agreement,
BP’s CEO announced earlier this year that the company would increase oil and gas production
from 2024 through 2027, citing increased global demand for energy. 94 The increase inproduction is inconsistent with the Paris Agreement. Scientists are clear that to meet the goals of
the Paris Agreement, new and expanded oil and gas exploration must stop immediately. 95 MSCI
found in its “Implied Temperature Rise” ratings that, if BP’s business plan was extrapolated to
88

Id.

89
MSCI, ESG Ratings & Climate Search Tool (online at www.msci.com/our-solutions/esg-investing/esgratings-climate-search-tool/issuer/chevron-corporation/IID000000002161679) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).

BP, Getting to Net Zero (2022) (online at www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/sustainability/getting-to-netzero.html) (accessed Apr. 19, 2024); BP, BP High Level Climate Policy Positions (May 2023) (online atwww.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/sustainability/group-reports/bp-climate-policypositions.pdf) (accessed Apr. 19, 2024).
90

91

BPA_HCOR_00068113 (emphasis added).

92

BPA_HCOR_00029988; BPA_HCOR_00029214; BPA_HCOR_00029217; BPA_HCOR_00039194.

93
Other officials shared comments on the draft, suggesting that the op-ed should make sure to highlightgas’s potential role in modulating intermittent renewables and to make “the overall role of gas more prominent in
our narrative.” See BPA_HCOR_00029996.
94
BP to Increase Oil Output, New Chief Says, New York Times (Feb. 6, 2024) (online atwww.nytimes.com/2024/02/06/business/bp-oil-gas-profits.html).

International Energy Agency, Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector (Oct. 2021)(online at https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/deebef5d-0c34-4539-9d0c-10b13d840027/NetZeroby2050ARoadmapfortheGlobalEnergySector_CORR.pdf).
95

20

the global economy, the world would warm 3.1°C—similar to Exxon’s and Chevron’s ratings
and well above Paris Agreement targets. 96 The documents, actions, and analyses suggest that
BP’s stated commitment to the Paris Agreement is not credible.
Like its peer companies, Shell also first expressed support for the Paris Agreement in2015 and now claims that it “supports the more ambitious goal of the Paris Agreement, which is
to limit the rise in global average temperature this century to 1.5° Celsius.” 97 However, MSCI
still estimates that, if extrapolated across the economy, Shell’s activities would be consistent
with 2.3°C of warming. 98 In 2021, Shell promised to undertake a gradual decline of about 1–2 %a year in total oil production through 2030, including divestments. 99 Then, last summer, Shellannounced plans to boost fossil fuel production. 100 It now states that oil and gas production willremain stable until 2030 and that it will invest $40 billion in fossil fuel production between 2023
and 2035. 101 Shell’s current oil and gas expansion plans are inconsistent with the Paris
Agreement. Despite originally pledging to reach net zero by 2050 for its total emissions
consistent with the Paris Agreement, Shell now concedes that the “2050 target is ‘currently
outside our planning period.’” 102
III.

DOUBLESPEAK: ROLE OF NATURAL GAS AS A CLEAN FUEL

Fossil fuel companies greenwash the risks surrounding natural gas, promoting it as aclean energy alternative to fossil fuels and misleading the public regarding well-established andaccepted scientific facts. Natural gas—also sometimes referred to as fossil gas—is a “fossil fuelenergy source” of which the “largest component is methane.” 103 Methane, in turn, is a “powerfulgreenhouse gas, about 84 times more potent than carbon dioxide measured over a 20-year

96
MSCI, ESG Ratings & Climate Search Tool (online at www.msci.com/our-solutions/esg-investing/esgratings-climate-search-tool/issuer/bp-plc/IID000000002140371) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).

Id.; Shell, Our Journey to Achieving Net Zero (2022) (online at https://reports.shell.com/sustainabilityreport/2022/achieving-net-zero-emissions/energy-transition/our-journey-to-achieving-net-zero.html).
97

MSCI, ESG Ratings & Climate Search Tool (online at www.msci.com/our-solutions/esg-investing/esgratings-climate-search-tool/issuer/shell-plc/IID000000002137074) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
98

Shell, Shell Energy Transition Strategy (2021) (online at www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/theenergy-future/shell-energy-transitionstrategy/_jcr_content/root/main/section_1679944581/simple/promo/links/item0.stream/1651509559757/7c3d5b3173
51891d2383b3e9f1e511997e516639/shell-energy-transition-strategy-2021.pdf).
99

Shell Plans to Increase Fossil Fuel Production Despite Its Net Zero Pledge, NPR (June 14, 2023)(online at www.npr.org/2023/06/14/1182102392/shell-plans-to-increase-fossil-fuel-production-despite-its-net-zeropledge).
100

101Shell Joins BP and Total in U-Turning on Climate Pledges to Reward Shareholders, Euronews (June 15,2023) (online at www.euronews.com/green/2023/06/15/shell-joins-bp-and-total-in-u-turning-on-climate-pledges-toreward-shareholders).
102
Shell Plans to Increase Fossil Fuel Production Despite Its Net Zero Pledge, NPR (June 14, 2023)(online at www.npr.org/2023/06/14/1182102392/shell-plans-to-increase-fossil-fuel-production-despite-its-net-zeropledge).

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas Explained, (online atwww.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas) (accessed Apr. 3, 2024).
103

21

period.” 104 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has recently estimated that “methane
emissions from natural gas and petroleum systems and from abandoned oil and natural gas wells
were the source of about 33% of total U.S. methane emissions and about 4% of total U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions.” 105 Recent studies have shown that global methane emissions are
significantly higher than estimated previously. 106 Methane leaks “undermine [natural gas’]
credentials as a better fossil fuel.” 107 Notably, although the fossil fuel industry did not coin theterm “natural gas,” it has leaned into its positive connotations and adopted it as its own; a 2020
Yale Program on Climate Change Communication study demonstrated that attaching the term
“natural” to terms “gas” and “methane gas” made each significantly more favorable in the eyesof the public. 108
Despite the risks of methane emissions, fossil fuel companies advocated for natural gas
expansion and promoted natural gas as a “bridge fuel,” and eventually even a safe “destination
fuel.” Behind the scenes, industry leaders recognize the methane-related risks of natural gas
while acting to lock in dangerous emissions for decades to come.
Documents show that fossil fuel companies and their trade associations promote natural
gas as “clean” without acknowledging the environmental effect of methane. API developed a2016 draft print ad showing people engaging in outdoor activities like skydiving, soaring on aplayground swing, and playing basketball that states: “Natural gas doesn’t just cook dinner.
Thanks to natural gas the air up here is cleaner than it’s been in 25 years.” 109Company and trade association documents demonstrate that the fossil fuel industry (1)knew that natural gas was no cleaner than other fossil fuels absent wide-scale deployment ofcarbon capture technologies; and (2) actively undermined methane emissions regulations, despite
recognizing that regulation was necessary to control harmful greenhouse gases.
A March 2018 draft presentation marked “Confidential” identifies the “challenge” facing
BP as extensive press pieces reporting that natural gas is a fossil fuel that contributes to climatechange, including 15 articles from late 2016 to late 2017 that describe the risks of methane
emissions associated with natural gas. The slides are titled “Gas doesn’t support climate goals
when you take methane emissions into account.” The presentation describes a forthcoming BP
communications campaign to “advance and protect the role of gas – and BP – in the energy
104
United Nations Environment Programme, Is Natural Gas Really the Bridge Fuel the World Needs? (Jan.
12, 2023) (online at www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/natural-gas-really-bridge-fuel-world-needs).

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas Explained (online atwww.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/natural-gas-and-the-environment.php) (accessed Apr. 17, 2024).
105

United Nations Environment Programme, International Methane Emissions Observatory (IMEO)(online at www.unep.org/topics/energy/methane/international-methane-emissions-observatory-imeo) (accessed Apr.
29, 2024).
106

United Nations Environment Programme, Is Natural Gas Really the Bridge Fuel the World Needs? (Jan.
12, 2023) (online at www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/natural-gas-really-bridge-fuel-world-needs).
107

108
Should It Be Called “Natural Gas” or “Methane”?, Yale Program on Climate Change Communication(Dec. 1, 2020) (online at https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/should-it-be-called-natural-gas-ormethane/).
109

API_00073103. It is unclear whether this ad ever ran.

22

transition.” 110 One key pillar of the campaign strategy was to “‘Harness excitement’ aroundrenewables by positioning gas as the perfect partner,” even though methane and carbon dioxide
emissions from producing, transporting, and burning natural gas present significant risks. The
document recommends funding white papers by research institutions like Princeton University
and Imperial College “highlighting [the] role of gas as a friend to renewables;” hosting global
stakeholder events with influential leaders; and highlighting “hero projects” to demonstrate thebenefits of gas and offer anecdotal evidence of methane management. BP estimated spending$1.1 million in the first year of the campaign alone. 111
A 2017 BP email asserted that “promoting and protecting the role of gas as an increasing
part of our energy mix is a paramount priority. We need to be ready to speak to this wherever
there is a credible effort to dis-incentivize gas.” 112 BP asserted that natural gas “play[s] a keyrole in meeting the dual challenge of providing more energy with fewer emissions. It is cleaner
than other fossil fuels when burnt in power generation or used in industrial processes and offers
numerous health, climate and economic benefits.” 113
API viewed natural gas as part of a broader “license to operate” for the fossil fuelindustry. A 2020 document prepared by API for BP shows the industry’s viewpoint that “oil &gas will be part of the long-term energy mix by facilitating technological innovation to lower
carbon emissions from the production and use of oil & gas.” 114 API further suggests multiple
greenwashing actions, such as “[s]howcas[ing] [b]reakthrough [t]echnologies,” and“[e]stablish[ing], [e]xpand[ing], or [p]artner[ing] with an oil and gas information sharing
network.” 115
The industry publicly promoted natural gas while acknowledging internally that the risksof methane were problematic. Comments on a draft outline for a 2017 speech by BP’s then-CEO
Robert Dudley acknowledged explicitly that internal modeling suggested that widespread carbon
capture technologies would be necessary to even come close to aligning natural gas emissions
with the Paris Agreement goals: “You don’t say anything about concerns about ... the idea that,once built, gas locks in future emissions above a level consistent with 2 degrees, at least without
CCUS. All the models with a continuing role for gas see wide CCUS deployment.” 116
In December 2019, a lobbyist sent BP’s then-VP and Head of U.S. Policy and Regulatory
Affairs an article highlighting that methane emissions from natural gas offset the climate
benefits, adding “This is an issue that will not go away.” 117 The BP executive forwarded thearticle to colleagues, noting: “Curious whether any [of] you are familiar with or have insight
110

BPA_HCOR_00306762.

111

Id.

112

BPA_HCOR_00072717.

113

BPA_HCOR_00142497.

114

BPA_HCOR_00337704.

115

Id.

116

BPA_HCOR_00116893.

117

BPA_HCOR_00264915.

23into this study. It is quite concerning to us as another blow against natural gas, and in thiscase associated with MIT.” 118
IV.

DOUBLESPEAK: EMISSIONS REDUCTION MEASURES

Documents obtained by the House Oversight Committee demonstrate that fossil fuelcompanies often expressed public support for emissions reduction measures while internally
opposing and funding efforts to undermine relevant legislation and regulations that would haveestablished meaningful emissions reductions requirements.
A.

Methane Regulations

Scientists have discovered that the production and transportation of natural gas causes
leaks of large volumes of methane into the atmosphere; and that, accounting for methane leaks,
natural gas may be just as harmful to the climate as coal. 119 According to the IEA, despite
readily available methane abatement technologies, “[t]he challenge is to incentivize thedeployment of these abatement technologies via voluntary or regulatory means.” 120 The IEA
acknowledges that some abatement can be economical for fossil fuel companies, but policy andregulatory interventions may be needed to incentivize companies to reduce their emissions. 121
Fossil fuel companies publicly advocate for methane management as a way to promote
continued fossil fuel exploration and extraction.
In 2017, API convened a program to coordinate voluntary efforts to reduce the industry’s
methane emissions, known as the Environmental Partnership. 122 In 2021, after supporting
Trump Administration rollbacks of methane emissions from the oil and gas industry, APIreversed itself and announced that it “support[ed] the direct regulation of methane from new andexisting sources.” 123

118

Id. (emphasis added).

Deborah Gordon et al., Evaluating Net Life-Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Intensities from Gas andCoal at Varying Methane Leakage Rates, Environmental Research Letters (July 17, 2023) (online athttps://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ace3db); Rocky Mountain Institute, Coal vs. Natural Gas(online at https://coalvsnaturalgas.org/) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
119International Energy Agency, Methane Abatement Options (online at www.iea.org/reports/methanetracker-2020/methane-abatement-options) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
120

121

Id.

American Petroleum Institute, Natural Gas, Oil Industry Launch Environmental Partnership to
Accelerate Reductions in Methane, VOCs (Dec. 5, 2017) (online at www.api.org/news-policy-andissues/news/2017/12/04/natural-gas-oil-environmental-partnership-accelerate-reductions-methane-vocs).
122

American Petroleum Institute, Positioned for Climate Action (Mar. 25, 2021) (online atwww.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/blog/2021/03/25/positioned-for-climate-action); American Petroleum Institute,
Why EPA’s Modified Methane Rule is Good for the U.S. (Aug. 14, 2020) (online at www.api.org/news-policy-andissues/blog/2020/08/14/why-epas-modified-methane-rule-is-good-for-the-us).
12324

BP claims to support direct, federal regulation of methane, stating, “we want a strong rulethat brings everybody in our industry on board to tackle this potent greenhouse gas.” 124 Exxon
similarly states that it “has long advocated for federal methane regulations as the most effective
way to reduce methane emissions at scale.” 125 Shell not only stated its support for methane
regulations but publicly opposed the Trump Administration’s rollback of methane regulations. 126
Notwithstanding the companies’ putative public support for federal regulation of methane
emissions, their internal communications demonstrate that companies only made voluntarycommitments to avoid mandatory methane regulations, which they viewed as potentially
unfavorable to their business.
Internal BP documents directly
undermine BP’s public support formethane regulations. In a 2019 emailthat references then-EPA Administrator
Andrew Wheeler’s proposed plan toroll back methane emissions
regulations, a BP executive stated:“Wheeler outlined the legal theory tofor [sic] rolling back direct regulationof methane. This is aligned with ourthinking but probably the first time it
was said in public?” 127 Two years before, BP representatives had lobbied Congress on themethane emissions regulations and submitted public comments to Trump Administration
agencies requesting they be reconsidered or revoked. 128
However, when EPA’s methane rollback was finalized the following year, BP, along withother fossil fuel companies, including Shell and Exxon, claimed to oppose the rollback, stating it“respectfully disagree[d]” with the Trump Administration’s decision. 129
BP, Methane Emissions and Natural Gas (online at www.bp.com/en_us/united-states/home/who-weare/advocating-for-net-zero-in-the-us/methane-emissions.html) (accessed Apr. 19, 2024).
124

ExxonMobil, ExxonMobil Urges Action on Methane Emissions Regulation (Jan. 28, 2021) (online athttps://corporate.exxonmobil.com/news/viewpoints/action-on-methane-regulations) (accessed Apr. 19, 2024).
125

126
Gretchen Watkins, Methane Rollback Puts U.S. on Wrong Track (Oct. 2, 2020) (online atwww.linkedin.com/pulse/methane-rollback-puts-us-wrong-track-gretchen-watkins/) (accessed Apr. 19, 2024).

BPA_HCOR_00341864 (emphasis added). Other documents released today demonstrating that thecompanies under investigation engaged in greenwashing by promoting natural gas despite its climate risks include:
BPA_HCOR_00037138; BPA_HCOR_00041460; BPA_HCOR_00066438; BPA_HCOR_00033285;
BPA_HCOR_00046941; BPA_HCOR_00047004; BPA_HCOR_00049579; BPA_HCOR_00142491;
BPA_HCOR_00156022; BPA_HCOR_00218612; BPA_HCOR_00263376; BPA_HCOR_00277809;
BPA_HCOR_00278701; BPA_HCOR_00282067; BPA_HCOR_00280577; EM-HCOR3-00002391; EM-HCOR300005936; EM-HCOR3-00007129; EM-HCOR3-00151405.
127

128
Unearthed, BP Lobbied Trump Administration to Roll Back Key U.S. Climate Rules (Dec. 3, 2019)(online at https://unearthed.greenpeace.org/2019/03/12/bp-lobbied-trump-climate-methane-obama/).

Major Oil Companies Oppose EPA Methane Rollback, The Hill (Aug. 14, 2020) (online athttps://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/512097-oil-majors-oppose-epa-methane-rollback/).
129

25

A 2017 API document shows that the voluntary methane program noted above was
explicitly formed to ensure that efforts the industry was already making were “captured in a waythat effectively explains what is being accomplished to the public and benefits the oil and gas
industry” in an effort to “stave off future regulation.” 130
Shell documents demonstrate that days after President Trump was elected, a Shell media
manager worked to “soften [methane reduction] language and still be true to ourselves” in aneffort not to upset the Trump Administration, which sought to roll back methane standards.
Shell ultimately stated that it “favor[s] a pragmatic approach — one that takes into account a
combination of incentives, technology and best practices.” 131
Currently, most fossil fuel companies do not comprehensively measure or disclose theirmethane emissions, instead submitting estimates to EPA based on an EPA mandated
methodology that “vastly understate[s] the problem.” 132 None of the oil companies investigatedhave publicly disclosed annual methane emissions except estimates made using EPA’s
inaccurate methodologies. Despite actual direct measurements of methane through tools such as
ground, aerial, or satellite surveys, the companies that are working to reduce their methane
emissions are still “years away from being able to make comprehensive calculations.” 133 A
2022 House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology investigation examined ten oil andgas companies operating in the Permian Basin. It found that companies were still inconsistently
deploying updated technologies to quantify and continuously monitor methane leaks and only inlimited pilot projects. All ten companies claimed they did not have internal annualized methane
calculations. 134
Even where there are regulatory measures in place to reduce such emissions, without
accurate data it is impossible to determine if the methane measures are implemented
effectively. 135 A spreadsheet obtained by the House Oversight Committee shows previously
unreleased internal estimates of BP’s U.S. methane emissions in 2016. The spreadsheet
acknowledges significant gaps in the company’s monitoring and raises questions about how
130

BPA_HCOR_00039279 (emphasis added); BPA_HCOR_00107932.

131

SOC-HCOR-106138.

Difficulty Measuring Methane Slows Plan to Slash Emissions, Associated Press (Jan. 31, 2021) (online
at https://apnews.com/article/drones-business-climate-and-environment-0a1ab9be3427818cfe5f33521b9b05c2). Oiland gas companies are required to submit emissions-factor calculations of methane to EPA, which do not involve
actual direct measurements of methane, such as through ground, aerial, or satellite surveys. Rather, they estimate
methane emissions based on type of equipment in a facility and then add up the total number of pieces of equipment
for each category type to arrive at an aggregate methane estimate. For this reason, they are considered imprecise.
132

133
Methane Emissions from Oil and Gas Exceed EPA Estimates, Study Finds, Yale Environment 360 (June29, 2021) (online at https://e360.yale.edu/digest/methane-emissions-from-oil-and-gas-exceed-epa-estimates-studyfinds).

Majority Staff, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Seeing CH4 Clearly: ScienceBased Approaches to Methane Monitoring in the Oil and Gas Sector, at 3–9 (June 2022) (online athttps://democratsscience.house.gov/imo/media/doc/science_committee_majority_staff_report_seeing_ch4_clearly.pdf).
134

Difficulty Measuring Methane Slows Plan to Slash Emissions, Associated Press (Jan. 31, 2021) (online
at https://apnews.com/article/drones-business-climate-and-environment-0a1ab9be3427818cfe5f33521b9b05c2).
13526

much BP has known about its methane emissions compared to the official estimates it submits tothe EPA. 136
B.

Emissions Reductions Policies

Beyond methane, companies contradicted their public positions supporting emissions
reduction by directly lobbying against climate legislation and regulations or by funding
candidates who opposed them. One series of documents highlights BP’s strategy to oppose
climate policies. A document from 2016 states that its Communications and External Affairs(C&EA) “team exists entirely to protect BP’s license to operate in the U.S., help BP businesses
achieve their objectives in the United States and protect the company’s reputation.” Thedocument instructs that those goals can be achieved by “develop[ing] and wag[ing] strategic
campaigns that favorably influence legislative, regulatory and public opinion outcomes,”
mitigating “the potentially harmful impact of ... detrimental policy and political developments,”
and expanding “the company’s capacity to influence regulators on key climate-related
initiatives.” 137 A similar 2016 document emphasizes that BP’s primary goal was to remain “atrusted voice for those who can influence BP’s ability to operate in the U.S.,” including by“preventing harmful legislation or regulation (examples include climate, ozone, RFS, Dodd
Frank, exports, and taxes.)” 138 In Alaska, BP’s C&EA team aimed to “support passage of LNG[liquid natural gas—or methane gas] project enabling legislation in 2016 and voter approval of aconstitutional amendment on the November 2016 ballot.” 139
A 2020 draft email shows BP mobilized its employees and retirees to elect preferredcandidates in Texas who would oppose climate regulations. BP encouraged employees tocontribute to BP’s employee PAC (BPEPAC). The email states that “BPEPAC is used toadvance the interests of BP in America by making political contributions to candidates ororganizations who share our philosophy on energy advancement and climate. Contributions areapproved by the BPEPAC Board to candidates based on recommendations from several
stakeholders, including our government and public affairs team.” 140 The draft email argues that
“Texas [was] shifting politically,” meaning that:

136
BPA_HCOR_00346826. Additional documents that discuss methane management and public
communications include: SOC-HCOR-414139; SOC-HCOR-407252; SOC-HCOR-390975;
BPA_HCOR_00028921; BPA_HCOR_00028931; SOC-HCOR-127255; SOC-HCOR-017912; SOC-HCOR112216; SOC-HCOR-051302; CHEV-117HCOR-0124097; EM-HCOR3-00636619; EM-HCOR3-00041055; SOCHCOR-437485; SOC-HCOR-437482; SOC-HCOR-437010; SOC-HCOR-116264; SOC-HCOR-414015; SOCHCOR-413710; SOC-HCOR-413383; SOC-HCOR-404410; SOC-HCOR-014504; SOC-HCOR-268679.

BP also hoped to play “an influential role in shaping the tax policy debate ahead of any 2017 reform
initiatives.” BPA_HCOR_00304402.
137

138
BPA_HCOR_00172240. In the same document, BP aimed to expand its influence by “leverage[ing]existing elected, regulatory, media and third-party relationships,” and “building and nurturing new relationships withcandidates in key federal, state and local political races.”
139

Id.

BPA_HCOR_00256706. For example, a 2018 email describes contributions from the BPEPAC to
Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX), including $2,500 in 2018. BPA_HCOR_00102525. Another document further
elaborates BP’s strategy for the BPEPAC. Through the BPEPAC, BP aimed to “educate and empower the BP
140

27

BPEPAC will be equally if not more important to our future in Texas. This is an election
year, and the BPEPAC will help us support a candidate for Texas Railroad
Commissioner, and legislative candidates who will help us resolve eminent domain,
water recycling, and tax issues during the 2021 Texas legislative session, among othercritical issues. 141
Public records suggest that BP’s strategy was effective. In 2020, BPEPAC donated$5,000 to James Wright, the Republican candidate for Texas Railroad Commissioner. The Texas
Oil & Gas Association (TXOGA), a trade association of which BP is a member, gave $76,000 to
Wright. TXOGA gave more to Wright than any donor except the Texas Republican Party. BP
and its trade associations contributed 6.7% of the campaign contributions made to Wright—the
most by any non-party donor. 142 The Texas Railroad Commission has jurisdiction over oil- andgas-industry regulations, including those related to drilling, gas utilities, LNG, and pipeline
safety. Since his election, Mr. Wright and the Commission have been lenient with oilcompanies’ pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from methane leaks and flaring, the practiceof burning off excess gas. The Commission even allowed the industry to help draft oilfield
waste regulations two years before the public was allowed a one-month comment period, and it
approved 95% of companies’ applications for flaring in 2022. 143
Internal emails also demonstrate that Shell contributed to a campaign against a state-level
carbon tax—and then sought to mitigate bad press after its opposition became public. In a 2018
email, a Shell media manager explained that the company had wished to maintain “ Shell’s status
as a global champion for a carbon price while appearing neutral on the voter referendum in
Washington state — despite the widespread industry (and internal) belief the initiative was,essentially, flawed.” 144 But “when it was made public that money Shell contributed to WSPA[Western States Petroleum Association] was going directly to the campaign to defeat theinitiative,” the media manager admitted they could no longer rely on the “‘way out’ that existed
prior (answer: Shell is on record supporting carbon pricing - we will let the voters decide — weare not contributing to the VOTE NO campaign).” 145 When caught, Shell was forced to prepare a
grassroots—employees, retirees and vendors—so they clearly understand issues of importance to the company andcan be mobilized to advocate on BP’s behalf.” This engagement took the form of newsletters, “lunch & learns,
Congressional visits,” and “get out the vote efforts” for political campaigns, including “data on how to volunteer for
Presidential campaigns.” BPA_HCOR_00304402.
BPA_HCOR_00256706. Documents show that in 2017, BP hosted the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce Chairman at its Texas headquarters. BPA_HCOR_00183626; BPA_HCOR_00183614.
141

Follow the Money, James (Jim) Wright (online at www.followthemoney.org/entitydetails?eid=48644913); BP, Our Participation in Trade Associations: 2023 Progress Update (Apr. 2023) (online atwww.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/sustainability/our-participation-in-tradeassociations-2023-progress-update.pdf); Ballotpedia, Texas Railroad Commissioner Election 2020 (online athttps://ballotpedia.org/Texas_Railroad_Commissioner_election,_2020) (accessed Apr. 19, 2024).
142

Meet the Texas Commissioners Who Could Stymie Biden’s Climate Agenda, Politico (June 20, 2023)(online at www.politico.com/news/2023/06/20/texas-biden-climate-methane-00098572); Oilfield Companies Helped
to Craft Texas’ New Waste Rules for 2 Years Before the Public Got to See Them, Texas Tribune (Oct.4, 2023)(online at www.texastribune.org/2023/10/04/texas-oilfield-waste-disposal-rules-railroad-commission/).
143

144

SOC-HCOR-376287.

145

Id.

28

public statement that acknowledged Shell’s previous opposition, but promised not to further
contribute to the WSPA campaign.
V.

DOUBLESPEAK: LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGIESFossil fuel companies publicly promote low-carbon technologies such as carbon capture
and algae-based biofuels while investing little in commercial deployment. None of thecompanies has invested significant portions of its overall capital expenditures on developing
low-carbon technologies. Nonetheless, companies have heavily promoted these not-yet scaled
technologies. Documents obtained by the House Oversight Committee reveal that the companies
are aware that such technologies are either difficult to scale (algae) or costly to scale (carbon
capture) yet mislead the public and investors about the technologies’ importance for reducing
carbon pollution and meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement.
Publicly available information shows that companies have made few investments inlower-carbon technologies relative to their overall capital expenditures. For example, Chevron
spent $1.5 billion in 2023 on lower-carbon technologies, representing only 4% of its total capital
expenditures plus distributions. 146 It has only pledged $10 billion of capital allocation toward“lower carbon” projects by 2028. 147
In 2023, Exxon spent $3.5
billion on low-carbon
investments—just 6% of its total
capital expenditures plus
distributions to investors andshareholders. 148 In the next five
years, Exxon claims it will invest
up to $17 billion to reduce carbon
emissions—even if it does so, thatwould account for only 14–17% of
its total capital expenditures. 149
Shell, similarly, spent just $5
billion on low-carbon investments
in 2023, which represented just
11% of its total capital

Big Distributions Threaten Majors’ Low-Carbon Spend, Energy Intelligence (Aug. 10, 2023) (online atwww.energyintel.com/00000189-ddce-d433-a5ad-fdff7f2f0000).
146

Chevron, Press Release: Chevron CEO: Company is Working to Lower Carbon Intensity of Business,(Nov. 8, 2023) (online at www.chevron.com/newsroom/2023/q4/chevron-ceo-company-is-working-to-lower-carbonintensity-of-business).
147

148
Big Distributions Threaten Majors’ Low-Carbon Spend, Energy Intelligence (Aug. 10, 2023) (online atwww.energyintel.com/00000189-ddce-d433-a5ad-fdff7f2f0000).

ExxonMobil Plus Pioneer Are Shaping the Energy Transition, Forbes (Oct. 24, 2023) (online atwww.forbes.com/sites/ianpalmer/2023/10/24/exxonmobil-plus-pioneer-are-shaping-the-energy-transition).
149

29

expenditures plus distributions. 150 BP reduced investments in lower-carbon technologies in both2022 and 2023 compared with 2021, even after counting investments in convenience stores at
gas stations as low-carbon investments. 151
Shell generated just 0.02% of energy from renewable sources in 2022, while 91% of
Shell’s investments went toward fossil fuels. 152 Shell misleadingly reported that it had arenewable generation capacity of 6.4 gigawatts—the unit for renewable generation capacity—when the actual number was closer to 2.2 gigawatts if plants still under construction orcommitted for sale were omitted. 153 In 2022, BP generated just 0.17% of its total energy fromrenewable sources, reporting a renewables capacity of 2.2 gigawatts in 2022. 154
As set out more fully in the two sections that follow, companies have focused on funding
extensive and long-lasting media campaigns touting low-carbon technologies—carbon captureand storage (CCS) and algae-based biofuels—while admitting internally that algae-based
biofuels were not yet viable at scale (before cancelling algae research altogether) and refusing
internally to commit adequate investments in deploying carbon capture.
A.

Companies Are Not Making Substantial Investments in CCS

CCS is the process of capturing CO2 emissions at the source and injecting them into
deep underground geologic formations for safe, secure, and permanent storage. At scale, CCS
could facilitate the transition to net‐zero CO2 emissions by: tackling emissions from existing
assets; providing a way to address emissions from some of the most challenging sectors;
providing a cost‐effective pathway to scale up low carbon hydrogen production rapidly; andallowing for CO2 removal from the atmosphere. 155 On its face, the promotion of CCS by thefossil fuel industry seems like a positive step on the path to net zero, allowing fossil fuelcompanies to employ the method during an energy transition to renewables.

Big Distributions Threaten Majors’ Low-Carbon Spend, Energy Intelligence (Aug. 10, 2023) (online atwww.energyintel.com/00000189-ddce-d433-a5ad-fdff7f2f0000).
150

151
Shell and BP Among Oil Firms Accused of Greenwashing over Renewable Energy, Independent (Aug.
23, 2023) (online at www.independent.co.uk/climate-change/news/shell-bp-oil-greenwashing-greanpeace-climateb2397689.html); Weekly Data: BP and Shell’s Spending on Renewables Flatlines in 2023, Energy Monitor (Feb. 7,2024) (online at www.energymonitor.ai/finance/corporate-strategy/weekly-data-oil-majors-bp-and-shells-spendingon-renewables-flatlines-in-2023/?cf-view).
152
Shell and BP Among Oil Firms Accused of Greenwashing over Renewable Energy, Independent (Aug.
23, 2023) (online at www.independent.co.uk/climate-change/news/shell-bp-oil-greenwashing-greanpeace-climateb2397689.html).
153
Id.; Other documents that address companies’ climate pledges include: BPA_HCOR_00038395;
BPA_HCOR_00120091; BPA_HCOR_00120650.

Shell and BP Among Oil Firms Accused of Greenwashing over Renewable Energy, Independent (Aug.
23, 2023) (online at www.independent.co.uk/climate-change/news/shell-bp-oil-greenwashing-greanpeace-climateb2397689.html); EnergyComment and Greenpeace, The Dirty Dozen: The Climate Greenwashing of 12 European
Oil Companies (June 2023) (online at https://greenpeace.at/uploads/2023/08/report-the-dirty-dozen-climategreenwashing-of-12-european-oil-companies.pdf).
154

International Energy Agency, Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector (Oct. 2021)(online at www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-12/IEA%2C%20Net%20Zero%20by%202050.pdf).
155

30

The rosy story that the fossil fuel industry depicts through news and social media
campaigns targeting consumers, however, is inconsistent with statements the companies make ininternal documents, which show: (1) a coordinated campaign to use CCS to prolong the use ofnatural gas, perhaps indefinitely; (2) natural gas plant projects do not economically capture CO2compared to a free-to-pollute business model; (3) fossil fuel companies refuse to adequately fundtheir CCS projects (despite billions in profits) and advocate instead for increased subsidies fromthe federal government; and (4) at present levels of industry investment, the current pace of the
CCS buildout is too slow to achieve needed reductions in CO2.
In particular, fossil fuel companies have funded extensive and long-lasting media
campaigns that tout carbon capture technology and their investments in its development. Theyuse misleading tag lines such as “It’s one way ExxonMobil is helping industrial plants ... bemore like plants.” The advertisements juxtapose natural gas smoke stacks with images of plantmatter such as seedlings, leaves, and curling vines. 156 Advertising firm BBDO stated explicitly
in that their strategy in the CCS ad campaign was to “use third party validation to add credibility
to the importance of our work on CCS technology” in order to convince “people who see
ExxonMobil as part of the problem of rising emissions, rather than part of the solution” toinstead “believe ExxonMobil is actively working on effective ways to reduce the world’s CO2
levels.” 157
Exxon has also developed CCS ads thatboth feature and target youth through a “Kidsseries,” aimed at Gen Z as well as “Young
Professionals and Skeptical Independents.” 158
A 2019 email chain with members of Exxon’s
Public and Government Affairs groupdemonstrates how Exxon is actively attempting
to convince younger generations that Exxon
cares about the environment and their future. The Digital and Social Media Manager wrote:“Kids is an over-performer in terms of our content. It humanizes ExxonMobil and is in an
unexpected format.” 159 The rhetorical reliance on carbon capture is not matched by capital
investments necessary for it to be deployed at scale. The same email chain suggested “[d]eemphasiz[ing] concept that catching carbon is difficult or hard. […] We changed the messaging
at the end to not focus on how catching carbon is hard,” instead substituting, ‘Carbon capture andstorage: making a difference for future generations.’” 160

156

EM-HCOR3-00524824; EM-HCOR3-00519383; EM-HCOR3-00519355.

157

EM-HCOR3-00298426.

158

EM-HCOR3-00758838.

159

Id.

160

Id.

31

Exxon has conducted greenwashing campaigns across various platforms that target
specific reporters, media outlets, demographics, and audiences. 161 One advertising campaign on
CCS was intended to be “targeted to our three key segments — Enthusiasts, Professionals andIndependents” and “run on programs such as Meet the Press, and on cable news channels.” 162
Another CCS advertising campaign was scripted to reach a “gen-pop” and “opinion leaders”
audience and to be read on National Public Radio broadcasts. The script read:Support for NPR and the following message comes from ExxonMobil. The company that
believes that Carbon Capture technologies are critical for lowering global CO2 emissions.
And more and more scientists agree. As a leader in capturing emissions in its own
operations, ExxonMobil is working on ways to make this technology more efficient andaffordable for other industries as well. That's the Unexpected Energy of ExxonMobil. 163
Internal documents show Exxon hired a reputation management company, Polecat, toexamine the effectiveness of the CCS campaigns in counteracting statements made by climatefocused NGOs. 164 Shell hired the same company to analyze a potential engagement with Exxon
on CCS but ultimately decided against engaging due to potential negative blowback. Their
emails show that Shell was concerned that “NGO’s and media are picking up on ‘shadow’players.” 165
The companies’ massive public-facing campaigns portray CCS as a viable and available
solution to increasing greenhouse gas emissions, but the companies acknowledge internally thatthey are not planning to deploy the technology at the scale needed to solve the warming crisis.
By Exxon’s own admission, CCS technology would need to be deployed at 185 times its current
rate of deployment to reach net zero by 2050. 166 A June 15, 2016, internal presentation by BP’s
Carbon Solutions division titled “CO2 Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS): Overview of
the technology components, policy and value proposition”, contains no fewer than eightstatements contradicting BP’s own public ad campaigns. 167 The presentation reveals that CCS atscale is not economically viable against a free-to-pollute business model and that a “robust
carbon price [would be] needed to stimulate CCUS deployment.” 168 In sum, “[d]espite its
importance and ambition to meet decarbonization goals, CCUS has stalled and commercial

161
EM-HCOR3-00591761; EM-HCOR3-00615278; EM-HCOR3-00615685; EM-HCOR3-00615681; EMHCOR3-00521304; EM-HCOR3-00521296; EM-HCOR3-00519730; EM-HCOR3-00519728; EM-HCOR300519824; EM-HCOR3-00519410.
162

EM-HCOR3-00591761.

163

EM-HCOR3-00519410.

164

SOC-HCOR-118087.

165

SOC-HCOR-116861.

ExxonMobil, Emissions (online at https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/what-we-do/energy-supply/globaloutlook/emissions) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
166

167

BPA_HCOR_00037840; BPA_HCOR_00049634.

Id. BP noted that at least 4,810 miles of “new CO2 pipeline infrastructure will be required” in the U.S.
and Europe to link fossil fuel combustion with storage sites.
168

32

deployment is very limited.” 169 The fossil fuel industry recognizes that the rollout of CCS atscale is moving too slowly to reach net zero emissions by 2050 and that the reason is their own
extremely modest investment, but their public claims conceal this reality.

Fossil fuel companies stall the development of CCS technology at scale, seeking taxpayer
dollars even though each earned tens of billions in profits in 2023. A July 2019 Shell slideshow
says that “CCS requires more than 45Q [tax incentives] to incentivize” and that to make CCS“profitable and competitive” Shell would need to obtain 45Q tax incentives, a reference toexisting tax credits for CCS, and maximize government support. 170 In short, the companies havedecided not to invest adequately until the government provides them with even larger subsidies
than those already available. As recently as February 2024, Exxon’s CEO argued that the “dirty
secret” underpinning the climate crisis is that customers are not willing to pay to put carbon
capture on existing fossil fuel plants—an admission that Exxon is unwilling to spend its own
billions to scale CCS projects. 171
Fossil fuel companies elide the difference between investing in emissions reductions they
can afford and investing in emissions reductions that pay for themselves. Fossil fuel industry
profits have always been significant, but since Q1 2021 they have shot up to the highest levels onrecord; raising significant questions about companies claims that they need taxpayer dollars to
pursue low-carbon technologies:

169

Id.

170

SOC-HCOR-056632.

Exxon CEO Blames Public for Failure to Fix Climate Change, The Hill (Feb. 28, 2024) (online athttps://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/4494543-exxon-ceo-blames-public-for-failure-to-fix-climate-change).
171

33

Source: Analysis conducted by Committee staff based on companies’ annual reports from 2015 through2023.

The industry’s true goal is to prolong, perhaps indefinitely, the unabated use of fossil
fuels. BP stated that “CCUS could help sustain gas demand growth for longer, supporting gas
markets, the value of gas and potentially liquid fuels.” 172 A July 2018 briefing for Bernard
Looney, then-Chief Executive of BP’s Upstream Business (and later BP’s CEO) stated that
“CCUS … enables 21 years … of continued current consumption level of coal, 59 years … forgas, and 29 years … for oil.” 173 A 2021 document titled “Campaign … Gas, CCS, andHydrogen” identifies BP’s business objective of ensuring that gas has “an enduring role over the
next decades.” 174 BP and other fossil fuel giants view publicizing CCS without actuallydeploying it at scale as a method to ensure that fossil fuels like natural gas are used for as long as
possible.
B.

Companies Touted Low-Carbon Algae Biofuels That Were NeverCommercially Viable

In 2008, BP, Chevron, Exxon, and Shell all announced programs to research and develop
algae as a biofuel. Their public statements heavily promoted their research and development
funding for algae-based biofuels, giving the impression that they were embracing a transition to172

BPA_HCOR_00037840; BPA_HCOR_00049634.

173

BPA_HCOR_00058113.

174

BPA_HCOR_00029063, BPA_HCOR_00029157.

34

low-carbon energy even though the technology was unproven and difficult to scale. As of 2023,
all companies ended their algae biofuels programs.
Exxon was the last of the oil companies to end its algae biofuels program, in 2023. Until
it terminated its algae program, however, Exxon ran costly advertisements focusing on algae as aclimate solution. From 2009 to 2023, public information suggests that Exxon spent nearly $175
million to advertise its algae program, while only spending $350 million on the research anddevelopment of algae technology. 175 Put differently, Exxon spent nearly half as much on
advertising algae as a climate solution as it did on actually researching it. Algae experts havesaid billions of dollars of research and development were necessary to commercialize thetechnology—an amount to which Exxon never got close despite its fantastical advertisements. 176

Internally, Exxon scientists and other officials questioned the practicality of algae
biofuels. The House Oversight Committee previously revealed that, in 2018, Exxon stated thatalgae biofuel technology was “[s]till decades away from the scale we need.” 177 An email from2017 acknowledged, “[a]s you know, [the Senior Vice President of Exxon] has made comments
about us getting too far out there on the original algae ads.” 178 Exxon employees said that they
“will replace any lines that imply the technology is live today.” 179 One employee cautioned thatthe images in the advertisement “could suggest the work is in scale-up mode.” 180 Another
employee responded, “the images have to be visually stimulating to get the audience engaged”
Big Oil Firms Touted Algae as Climate Solution. Now All Have Pulled Funding, The Guardian (Mar.
17, 2023) (online at www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/mar/17/big-oil-algae-biofuel-funding-cutexxonmobil).
175

176

Id.

Memorandum from Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney and Chairman Ro Khanna to Members of theCommittee on Oversight and Reform, Investigation of Fossil Fuel Industry Disinformation (Sept. 14, 2022) (online
at https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/democratsoversight.house.gov/files/2022.09.14%20FINAL%20COR%20Supplemental%20Memo.pdf); Memorandum from
Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney and Chairman Ro Khanna to Members of the Committee on Oversight andReform, Investigation of Fossil Fuel Industry Disinformation (Dec. 9, 2022) (online athttps://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/democrats-oversight.house.gov/files/2022-1209.COR_Supplemental_Memo-Fossil_Fuel_Industry_Disinformation.pdf).
177

178

EM-HCOR3-00084836.

179

EM-HCOR3-00133998.

180

EM-HCOR3-00084836.

35

and that the images “tested very well.” 181 Other emails stressed that the ads should “keep thefacts high-level and tout the innovative work in research, science, and engineering.” 182
An internal Exxon document titled “Algae Biofuels Program Talking Points” explicitly
states that the investment in algae biofuels was potentially prohibitive: “ExxonMobil’s analysis
has concluded that final development and broad deployment of algae based biofuels by thecompany would require future investments of billions of dollars.” 183
Despite these known limitations, Exxon’s highest-ranking officials used the algae
program to greenwash its public image. Internal emails show Exxon’s CEO Darren Woods
requested that his staff add to a speech “more relevant climate related technology” (i.e.,
explicitly requesting references to Exxon’s algae biofuels program) in lieu of references to priorcollaboration with a university. 184 An Exxon public and government affairs official responded toMr. Woods that “the reason we did not initially include [the algae program] was because it did
not directly address the speech’s original core argument: oil and gas production (specifically)and environmental progress (include climate change risk management) are not incompatible.” 185

CHAPTER 4: FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY COLLABORATION
Fossil fuel companies rely on trade associations, think tanks, and other nonprofits to
spread misleading narratives to the public, without having to put their names directly on
advertisements, lobbying, or PR campaigns. 186 They work together to ensure that theirmessaging and financial contributions to these third-party groups are consistent. Several
documents uncovered in the course of the House Oversight Committee’s investigation showcase
the collaboration between fossil fuel companies and their trade associations and other industry
groups.
I.

FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND OTHER
ORGANIZATIONS

An armada of trade associations, organizations, and coalitions works with and for fossil
fuel companies to perpetuate deceptive and misleading industry narratives; API and the Chamber
181

Id.

182

EM-HCOR3-00000219.

183

EM-HCOR3-00604560.

184

EM-HCOR3-00075997.

Id. Other documents released today demonstrate that the companies under investigation engaged ingreenwashing by articulating vague climate pledges while taking limited actions to address the climate crisis,
including: API_00011422, BPA_HCOR_00106758, BPA_HCOR_00110850, BPA_HCOR_00051046,
BPA_HCOR_00068514, BPA_HCOR_00119095, BPA_HCOR_00119138, BPA_HCOR_00119116,
BPA_HCOR_00119159, BPA_HCOR_00142017, CHEV-117HCOR-0021954, EM-HCOR3-00168834, EMHCOR3-00029549, EM-HCOR3-00047501, EM-HCOR3-00213182, EM-HCOR3-00247946, EM-HCOR300216215, EM-HCOR3-00238134, and EM-HCOR3-00238304.
185

Fossil Fuel Giants Are Pumping Out Greenwashing—Their Tricks Won’t Work, Union of Concerned
Scientists (Nov. 13, 2023) (online at https://blog.ucsusa.org/kathy-mulvey/fossil-fuel-giants-are-pumping-outgreenwashing-their-tricks-wont-work/).
186

36

were direct subjects of the House Oversight Committee’s investigation. Documents also shedlight on other organizations the fossil fuel companies coordinate with—or take advantage of—to
obstruct climate progress.
A.

American Petroleum Institute

API is the nation’s leading oil and gas trade organization. Its membership includes 600
oil and gas companies, including major corporations in upstream, midstream, and downstream
operations such as BP, Chevron, Exxon, and Shell. 187
Through initiatives like API Energy Excellence and the Climate Committee, API portrays
itself as engaging in environmental and safety progress by encouraging the development of newtechnologies and transparent reporting. 188 However, API’s Climate Action Framework,
purportedly aimed at accelerating low-carbon technologies and innovation, mitigating emissions,and advocating for government carbon pricing policies, has been criticized for a “lack of
specifics.” 189 Its focus on carbon pricing was belied by an Exxon lobbyist “caught on camera ...
saying that a carbon tax will never happen and that support for the measure was a public
relations ploy intended to stall more serious measures.” 190
API serves as a hub for industry coordination against climate progress. In 2018, Exxon
CEO Darren Woods assumed the role of chairman of API’s board of directors. He emailed otherboard members, including representatives from Shell, BP, Chevron, Enbridge, Anadarko, Noble,
Marathon, Phillips66, and Conoco, and noted that API’s upcoming Executive Committee
meeting would include a “strategic alignment” segment to focus on “WHAT gaps we have vs.
WHY we have them (i.e. no finger pointing/blame games).” He described that the meeting’s
objective was to “put together an assessment of API’s strengths, opportunities and ideas forpotential improvements,” including “above and beyond advocacy priorities,” based on “anExxonMobil view.” 191 This email illustrates that fossil fuel companies directly determine API’s
strategy to undermine and oppose climate legislation and regulations.
1872024).

American Petroleum Institute, Membership (online at https://api.org/membership) (accessed Apr. 29,

American Petroleum Institute, API Energy Excellence (online at https://api.org/oil-and-natural-gas/apienergy-excellence) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024); American Petroleum Institute, Organization (online athttps://api.org/about/organization) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
188

American Petroleum Institute, Climate Action Framework (online at https://api.org/climate) (accessed
Apr. 29, 2024); How a Powerful US Lobby Group Helps Big Oil to Block Climate Action, The Guardian (July 19,2023) (online at www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/jul/19/big-oil-climate-crisis-lobby-group-api).
189

How a Powerful US Lobby Group Helps Big Oil to Block Climate Action, The Guardian (July 19, 2023)(online at www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/jul/19/big-oil-climate-crisis-lobby-group-api).
190

191
SOC-HCOR-123718. Additional documents detailing API’s role in influence campaigns and industry
coordination include: API_00015262; API_00015296; API_00015308; API_00016127; API_00016130;
API_00016189; API_00016162; API_00016167; API_00016170; API_00016178; API_00016182; API_00016187;
API_00016289; API_00016291; API_00016184; BPA_HCOR_00028668 (RFS); BPA_HCOR_00030447 (APIClimate Policy Task Force); BPA_HCOR_00035868 (hearing on fossil fuel subsidies); BPA_HCOR_00039279(methane); BPA_HCOR_00076532; BPA_HCOR_00076537; BPA_HCOR_00111189; BPA_HCOR_00150971(fracking harms); BPA_HCOR_00156229; BPA_HCOR_00222362; BPA_HCOR_00326338;

37

B.

United States Chamber of Commerce

The Chamber has long played an organizing and convening role for the fossil fuelindustry, opposing climate action and preserving business as usual. In 2007, for example, theChamber ran television advertisements against climate legislation claiming that it would prevent
people from heating their homes and driving to work. The Chamber publicly opposed significant
climate legislation including the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill that died in the Senate in2010. 192 In 2014, the Chamber convened “about 30 corporate lawyers, coal lobbyists andRepublican political strategists” to devise “a legal strategy for dismantling the climate change
regulations” they expected to be promulgated by the Obama Administration. 193
The Chamber has repeatedly been labeled one of the most powerful political opponents toclimate progress in the United States. 194 Last year, independent researchers at InfluenceMap
released renewed evidence of the Chamber’s persistent lobbying against climate policies.
According to InfluenceMap, the Chamber has “continued opposition to meaningful legislation
and regulation introduced by the federal government” while simultaneously issuing “positive PR[…] to create the impression of reform for climate-conscious investors and corporate
members.” 195 As Politico explained, the InfluenceMap analysis demonstrated that the
Chamber’s “positions on climate policies mostly reflect the views of its fossil fuel members.” 196
Notably, the Chamber has refused to disclose, even to its members, the extent of its funding fromfossil fuel interests.

BPA_HCOR_00326503; BPA_HCOR_00326504; BPA_HCOR_00326553; BPA_HCOR_00339690; EM-HCOR300377606; EM-HCOR3-00377436; EM-HCOR3-00381270; EM-HCOR3-00426393; API_00011007;
API_00011011; API_00015105; Chamber-HCOR-00041610; BPA_HCOR_00156229; BPA_HCOR_00156242;
BPA_HCOR_00298443; BPA_HCOR_00326338; SOC-HCOR-354103; EM-HCOR3-00604560
BPA_HCOR_00054162.
Chamber of Commerce Details Opposition to Waxman-Markey Bill, Wall Street Journal (May 14, 2009)(online at https://blogs.wsj.com/environmentalcapital/2009/05/14/chamber-of-commerce-details-opposition-towaxman-markey-bill/); Chamber Ad Urges Senate to Reject Lieberman-Warner Bill, E&E News (Nov. 30, 2007)(online at https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/eenews/2007/11/30/chamber-ad-urges-senate-to-rejectlieberman-warner-bill-206112).
192

193
Move to Fight Obama’s Climate Plan Started Early, New York Times (Aug. 3, 2015) (online atwww.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/us/obama-unveils-plan-to-sharply-limit-greenhouse-gas-emissions.html).

See, e.g., InfluenceMap, The U.S. Chamber’s Climate Policy Engagement (Feb. 2023) (online athttps://influencemap.org/briefing/The-U-S-Chamber-of-Commerce-and-Climate-Policy-21084); InfluenceMap, The
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Climate Policy (Mar. 2022) (online at https://influencemap.org/report/The-USChamber-of-Commerce-and-its-Corporate-Members-on-Climate-17631); InfluenceMap, Industry Groups and their
Carbon Footprints (Sept. 2019) (online at https://influencemap.org/report/Trade-Groups-and-their-CarbonFootprints-f48157cf8df3526078541070f067f6e6).
194

195
InfluenceMap, The U.S. Chamber’s Climate Policy Engagement (Feb. 2023) (online athttps://influencemap.org/briefing/The-U-S-Chamber-of-Commerce-and-Climate-Policy-21084).

Dissecting the Chamber’s Stance on Climate Policies, Politico (Feb. 16, 2023) (online atwww.politico.com/newsletters/the-long-game/2023/02/16/dissecting-the-chambers-stance-on-climate-policies00083181).
196

38

The Chamber has opposed various legislative climate efforts. 197 In 2022, the Chambersought to block the Inflation Reduction Act, the most significant climate bill Congress has everpassed. It funded ads specifically aimed at pressuring the U.S. senators from Arizona to voteagainst the bill. 198 On the regulatory side, the Chamber opposes the EPA’s recent “Power Plant
Rule,” a proposed rule that would protect public health and reduce harmful pollutants while
delivering up to $85 billion in climate and health benefits over the next two decades. 199 The
Chamber opposes EPA’s recent proposed rules for vehicle greenhouse gas emissions standards
for light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles. 200 The Chamber opposed the Securities andExchange Commission’s (SEC) proposed climate disclosure rules, writing that they “exceed the
SEC’s lawful authority and are vast and unprecedented in their scope, complexity, rigidity andprescriptive particularity.” 201 In courtrooms, as a litigant and as an amicus curiae, the Chamber
has a long history of opposing climate rules and laws, and supporting deregulatory theories
propounded by polluting industries to fetter people’s ability to protect themselves from pollution
and climate harms. 202
C.

Oil and Gas Climate Initiative

OGCI is a CEO-led effort that claims to assist the oil and gas industry in curtailing its
greenhouse gas emissions, primarily by advocating for CCUS and methane emissions reduction
initiatives.
Comprised of 12 of the world’s largest energy companies, OGCI members collectively
account for approximately one-third of the global oil and gas supply. 203 While OGCI attempts to
197

Chamber-HCOR-00001188.

U.S. Arizona Chambers Run Ads Targeting Sinema, Kelly over Reconciliation Bill, The Hill (Aug. 2,2023) (online at https://thehill.com/lobbying/3584204-us-arizona-chambers-run-ads-targeting-sinema-kelly-overreconciliation-bill/).
198

Environmental Protection Agency, Press Release: EPA Proposes New Carbon Pollution Standards for
Fossil Fuel-Fired Power Plants to Tackle the Climate Crisis and Protect Public Health (May 11, 2023) (online atwww.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-proposes-new-carbon-pollution-standards-fossil-fuel-fired-power-plants-tackle);
Chamber of Commerce Finds Significant Flaws in EPA’s Power Plant Rule, Institute for Energy Research (July 5,2023) (online at www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/regulation/chamber-of-commerce-finds-significant-flaws-inepas-power-plant-rule/).
199

Environmental Protection Agency, Proposed Rule: Multi-Pollutant Emissions Standards for Model
Years 2027 and Later Light-Duty and Medium-Duty Vehicles, 88 Fed. Reg. 29185 (May 5, 2023) (proposed rule)(online at www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/proposed-rule-multi-pollutant-emissionsstandards-model); Letter from U.S. Chamber of Commerce et al. to President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (July 11, 2023)(online at https://growthenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Multi-Stakeholder-Letter.pdf).
200

201
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Comments on SEC’s Proposed Rule on Mandatory Climate
Disclosures (June 16, 2023) (online at www.uschamber.com/finance/u-s-chamber-comments-on-secs-proposed-ruleon-mandatory-climate-disclosures).

See, e.g., The US Chamber of Commerce Has Helped Downplay the Climate Threat, a New Report
Concludes, Inside Climate News (June 29, 2021) (online at https://insideclimatenews.org/news/29062021/uschamber-of-commerce-downplay-climate-threat-new-report-concludes/); Union of Concerned Scientists, Who’s
Fighting the Clean Power Plan and EPA Action on Climate Change (Apr. 13, 2016) (online atwww.ucsusa.org/resources/whos-fighting-clean-power-plan#toc-us-chamber-of-commerce).
202

203

Oil and Gas Climate Initiative, About OGCI (online at https://ogci.com/about) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).

39

“promote a climate-friendly image,” its stated goal to reach net zero emissions omits Scope 3
emissions,—i.e., the emissions produced by the burning of fossil fuels for energy—which “makeup the vast majority of an oil company’s total carbon footprint.” 204 Members include BP,
Chevron, Exxon, and Shell.

Exxon and Chevron were initially hesitant about joining OGCI at its outset but ultimately
became members in 2018. 205 Documents demonstrate that Exxon hesitated because of concernsthat the group was “very disorganized, its overarching propose [sic] / objective was generally
unclear and that the governance was basically undefined.” 206 Exxon revisited the matter in 2015
after Shell and BP had joined but still believed that the initiative was “more about ‘window
dressing’ in preparation for COP21 [the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference] than trying toachieve lasting results.” 207
Once Exxon did join the group, it provided “critical edits” for OGCI announcements,
statements, and its annual report, with which Chevron was “generally aligned.” Some of theseedits included removing references to the Paris Agreement and language that “potentiallycommits members to enhanced climate-related governance, strategy, risk management, andperformance metrics and targets.” 208 These memoranda demonstrate the collaboration among
Oil and Gas Climate Initiative, DeSmog (online at www.desmog.com/oil-and-gas-climate-initiative/)(accessed Apr. 29, 2024); Oil Group’s Net-Zero Goal Shuns Emissions Cuts That Would Threaten Core Assets, S&P
Global (Sept. 29, 2021) (online at www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/oilgroup-s-net-zero-goal-shuns-emissions-cuts-that-would-threaten-core-assets-66773327); Yale Experts Explain Scope
3 Emissions, Yale Sustainability (Nov. 14, 2023) (online at https://sustainability.yale.edu/explainers/yale-expertsexplain-scope-3-emissions).
204

Oil and Gas Climate Initiative, Who We Are (online at https://ogci.com/who-we-are) (accessed Apr. 29,2024); ExxonMobil Agrees to Join Oil and Gas Climate Change Alliance, The Guardian (Sept. 20, 2018) (online athttps://theguardian.com/business/2018/sep/20/exxonmobil-joins-oil-gas-climate-change-alliance-global-warming).
205

206

EM-HCOR3-00942272.

207
Id. Other documents relating to OGCI include: BPA_HCOR_00037358; BPA_HCOR_00126551;
BPA_HCOR_00151042; BPA_HCOR_00158509; BPA_HCOR_00268188; EM-HCOR3-00064996; EM-HCOR300559732; EM-HCOR3-00783916; EM-HCOR3-00919501; EM-HCOR3-00919678; EM-HCOR3-00919695; SOCHCOR-123622; SOC-HCOR-144016; BPA_HCOR_00128024; BPA_HCOR_00126554; BPA_HCOR_00127273.
208

EM-HCOR3-00064980.

40

fossil fuel companies to control messaging of organizations of which they are members to avoid
additional commitments regarding climate.
D.

Natural Gas Supply Association

The Natural Gas Supply Association (NGSA) is the sole domestic trade association
focusing on producer-marketer issues within the natural gas industry. 209 NGSA’s membership
includes nine of the largest natural gas suppliers in the country, including BP, Chevron, Exxon,
and Shell. 210 The association is a partner organization of the Center for Liquefied Natural Gas,
which advocates for the interests of the LNG industry. 211

Publicly, NGSA expresses support for achieving economy-wide net-zero greenhouse gas
emissions by 2050, in alignment with the Paris Agreement goals. 212 But NGSA opposes certain“inappropriate” regulations that hinder its members’ ability to provide “affordable and reliable”
natural gas—an objective that often conflicts with reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 213
In June 2021, NGSA emailed its “Business Leadership Committee” asking for feedback
from its members in crafting a response to Department of Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm,
who was quoted as saying that natural gas should only be considered clean in a Clean EnergyStandard if combined with CCS. BP internally expressed concern that the “Administration [was]moving towards squeezing out gas” and asked, “what we need to be doing with Administration(besides pushing for strong Methane regulation) to preserve the role for gas in power
generation.” 214

Natural Gas and Supply Association, Who We Are (online at https://ngsa.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/3/2023/09/NGSA-Who-We-Are-9.23.pdf) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
209

210

Id.

211

Id.

Natural Gas and Supply Association, Environment and Climate (online athttps://ngsa.org/issues/environment-and-climate/) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
212

Natural Gas and Supply Association, About Us: Chairman’s Greeting (online at https://ngsa.org/aboutus/) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
213

214

BPA_HCOR_00063504; BPA_HCOR_00244435.

41

E.

Western States Petroleum Association

The Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA) is one of the oldest oil and gas tradeassociations in the United States. BP, Chevron, Exxon, and Shell are members, among others.
InfluenceMap describes the organization as “actively engaged on climate policy with strongly
negative positions, particularly on state-level policy in California, Washington, and Oregon.” 215
WSPA has lobbied against bills designed to reduce emissions, including by working to establish
a network of “citizen activist” groups in western states. 216
Two key documents obtained by the House Oversight Committee reveal BP’scomprehensive campaign in Washington, in collaboration with WSPA, to oppose state and local
policies that would have cut climate-warming emissions. After a Washington county proposed
an ordinance that would require one of BP’s refineries to reduce its carbon emissions and make it
more difficult to obtain permits to expand or upgrade refineries, BP launched a statewide
campaign to oppose it. In an internal memorandum, BP outlined a planned “$300,000 advocacy
campaign to build opposition to the proposal in its current form and persuade local officials toamend, postpone or give up on the plan.” 217 The document noted that WSPA would “also run acoordinated $200,000 grassroots voter activation campaign on behalf of its membership.” 218 In
the memorandum, BP explained that, “given the opposition to our industry in this area of theUnited States[,] ... we are also developing a comprehensive Washington State strategy” for“managing business and reputational risk from our West Coast operations” in the long-term. 219
A document from a few months after the memorandum shows how BP’s statewide
strategy evolved. 220 In the document, BP identified a handful of key actions and investments toexert its influence in the region. BP planned to enhance “external education, community
engagement, political influence and advocacy [that] can change the narrative, stem the flow of
bad policy and create opportunities for business growth.” 221 The team asked for a “significant
increase in C&EA funding” as well as $2.5 million to construct a salmon hatchery that, officials
InfluenceMap, Western States Petroleum Association (online athttps://lobbymap.org/influencer/Western-States-Petroleum-Association-WSPA) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
215

Leaked: The Oil Lobby’s Conspiracy to Kill Off California’s Climate Law (Nov. 25, 2014) (online atwww.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-25/leaked-the-oil-lobbys-conspiracy-to-kill-off-californias-climatelaw).
216

217

BPA_HCOR_00224135.

218
Id. The memo warns, “there is a risk that those who support the proposal will argue that this is a climate
issue and criticize BP for opposing it.” However, they predict that “any negative stories are likely to be much more
muted than the criticism from the Washington State ballot initiative in 2018, as we do not expect major e-NGOs(TNC, EDF) will get involved” and that “BP plans to mitigate this risk with advertising, as well as earned media anddirect advocacy.”
219

Id.

BPA_HCOR_00278794. In the document, titled, “Creating a Better Environment to help BP deliver its
Operational and Strategic Priorities in Washington State,” BP admitted it had previously spent $13 million to
successfully defeat a 2018 carbon pricing proposal in Washington State, because BP claimed, “it would not haveeffectively reduced carbon emissions.” However, BP admitted that if the measure had passed the company would
have lost $38 million in profits by 2020, worsening to $137 million by 2035.
220

221

Id.

42

believed, “would change the dynamic of how the public and elected officials view the refinery.”
The team requested between $2.5 and $4.5 million for “hard persuasion” tactics, such as
television advertising, and $300,000 for “soft persuasion” to be invested in the community andgrow support that “will be helpful with elected officials.” 222
BP believed that its Washington strategy was necessary because they feared that theirreputation would “only get worse unless we change the public's perception of us and the elected
official’s lack of respect for our business.” 223
II.

ABUSE OF THE NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL

The National Petroleum Council (NPC) serves as a domestic advisory committee
representing oil and gas industry views to the Secretary of Energy. Housed within the
Department of Energy’s Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, NPC consists ofapproximately 200 individuals appointed by the Secretary. According to the agency, thesemembers serve without compensation as representatives of industry or associated interests
collectively, not as delegates of specific companies or affiliations. 224
NPC members currently include David Lawler, Chairman and President of BP America
Inc.; Michael Wirth, Chairman of the Board and CEO of Chevron Corporation; Darren Woods,
Chairman, President, and CEO of ExxonMobil Corporation; and Gretchen Watkins, President of
Shell USA Inc. 225 Despite the agency’s assertion that members act independently, it is clear thatthe direct involvement of top fossil fuel executives has allowed them to influence NPC’s work ina way that benefits their companies’ interests.
For example, Exxon produced NPC’s Topic Paper #1, Role of Natural Gas in a LowCarbon Economy. In one of the later versions of this document, edits sent around bySouthwestern Energy, a fossil fuel company, removed all references to natural gas’s “potential
greater use to displace higher carbon intensive fossil fuels,” such as coal and oil, despite industry
claims that natural gas is a bridge fuel between these more carbon intensive fossil fuels and aclean energy future. 226
NPC’s most recent report, released in 2019, focused on the expansion of carbon capture
deployment domestically. 227 Meeting minutes show that the report was led by BP America andincluded ExxonMobil, Total, and Occidental Oil and Gas Corporation among others, as part of
the Coordinating Subcommittee (CSC) for the study. The meeting minutes show that McKinsey
222

Id.

223

Id.

National Petroleum Council, Mission (online at https://energy.gov/fecm/national-petroleum-councilnpc) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
224

National Petroleum Council, NPC Members (Dec. 7, 2023) (online athttps://energy.gov/fecm/articles/npc-members) (accessed Apr. 19, 2024).
225

226

EM-HCOR3-00246947.

National Petroleum Council, Meeting the Dual Challenge: A Roadmap to At-Scale Deployment of
Carbon Capture, Use, and Storage (Dec. 12, 2019) (online at https://energy.gov/sites/default/files/202210/CCUS_V1-FINAL.pdf).
227

43

& Company would provide support to the study, including interviews with companies on the
NPC study. 228 CSC “agreed to work language to reduce reputation risk” for the fossil fuelcompanies involved. 229
NPC’s report sought to describe a “roadmap” to scaling up carbon capture deployment in
the energy and industrial sectors as a fossil fuel-friendly climate “solution.” The report did not
mention that industry investment was inadequate to employ carbon capture technology at a scale
necessary to meet ambitious climate targets. However, the cost should not have been any
surprise to the companies. As far back as 2007, then-CEO of ExxonMobil and Chairman of NPC
Lee Raymond acknowledged that carbon capture is “a huge, huge undertaking ... and the cost isgoing to be very, very significant.” 230 Companies did not invest sufficiently in the technology,
leading the IEA to characterize the fossil fuel industry’s reliance on carbon capture to reduce
emissions as “an illusion.” 231
Fossil fuel companies not only fail to invest in carbon capture technologies at scale but
also then use the mere existence of the technologies to justify new oil and gas projects.

CHAPTER 5: TARGETING UNIVERSITIES, THE PRESS, AND CRITICSI.

CULTIVATING RELATIONSHIPS WITH ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS

The oil and gas industry cultivates partnerships with academic institutions as a way to
influence climate research toward an energy transition that favors maintaining fossil fuels for as
long as possible; bolster its ability to claim expertise on climate science; and gain access tothought leaders. 232 In the words of one BP official, the academics’ research was to be “informedby the business challenges we need solved.” 233 Although the existence of relationships between
industry and academia has long been known, documents released by the House OversightCommittee (1) reveal for the first time previously unknown funding amounts and (2) shed lighton how companies condition grants on cooperation from academics and their perception of therelationship’s business value.

228

SOC-HCOR-123228.

229

BPA_HCOR_00156030.

230

Id.

Id. Other documents discussing the work of the NPC include: BPA_HCOR_00135544;
BPA_HCOR_00089421; BPA_HCOR_00089557; BPA_HCOR_00091900; EM-HCOR3-00246788; EM-HCOR300246789; EM-HCOR3-00246789; EM-HCOR3-00246790; EM-HCOR3-00246791; EM-HCOR3-00246796; EMHCOR3-00246797; EM-HCOR3-00246798; EM-HCOR3-00246807; EM-HCOR3-00246934; EM-HCOR300246926; EM-HCOR3-00246940; EM-HCOR3-00246942; EM-HCOR3-00246947; SOC-HCOR-123223; SOCHCOR-123228; BPA_HCOR_00135813. Other documents showing collaboration between companies throughthird-party organizations include: BPA_HCOR_00114332.
231

232
Princeton’s Climate Research: In the Service of BP,Daily Princetonian (Feb. 6, 2023) (online atwww.dailyprincetonian.com/article/2023/02/princeton-bp-carbon-mitigation-initiative-greenwashing-climatechange-reputation).
233

BPA_HCOR_00141678.

44

A.

Funding and Shaping Academic Research Programs

Six fossil fuel companies, including BP, Chevron, Exxon, and Shell, spent an estimated$700 million on academic research programs between 2010 and 2020, though exact figures are
unknown because disclosure requirements for university funding are limited. 234 The funding thecompanies have provided has filled a research-shaping role the companies’ funding facilitated.
As one study found, research centers funded by fossil fuel interests are more “favourable in theirreports towards natural gas than towards renewable energy,” especially in communications thatspecifically mention fossil fuel companies. Programs less dependent on fossil fuel industry
funding show the reverse, with a more neutral sentiment towards gas, and more favorability
towards renewable energy. 235

BP’s sponsorship of Princeton University’s Carbon Mitigation Initiative (CMI) spansover 20 years and is the longest among the industry-university relationships. CMI seeks “todesign safe, effective and affordable carbon mitigation strategies.” 236 One spreadsheet reveals
that, between 2012 and 2017, BP funded CMI at levels between $2.1 and $2.6 million
annually. 237 BP also provides funding to climate policy academic programs at Harvard andTufts, including the Harvard Kennedy School and the Climate Policy Lab at the Fletcher Schoolat Tufts University. 238 BP gave “$416k to Harvard and $250k to Tufts, per year” between 2019and 2021, for programs focusing on “policy themes including but not limited to: carbon pricing,land use and carbon offsets, transportation, and technology innovation.” 239
One BP email memorialized a conversation with a Princeton University climate systems
modeler about research BP requested on the use of carbon capture technologies from Princeton’s
234
Fossil Fuel Companies Donated $700 Million to US Universities over 10 Years, The Guardian (Mar. 1,2023) (online at www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/mar/01/fossil-fuel-companies-donate-millions-usuniversities); Data for Progress and Fossil Free Research, Accountable Allies: The Undue Influence of Fossil Fuel
Money in Academia (Mar. 2023) (online at www.dataforprogress.org/memos/accountable-allies-the-undueinfluence-of-fossil-fuel-money-in-academia).

Douglas Almond, Xinming Du & Anna Papp, Favourability Towards Natural Gas Relates to Funding
Source of University Energy Centres (Nov. 10, 2022) (online at www.nature.com/articles/s41558-022-01521-3).
235

236
Princeton University, High Meadows Environmental Institute, Carbon Mitigation Initiative (online athttps://cmi.princeton.edu/about/) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
237

BPA_HCOR_00038639.

238

BPA_HCOR_00115928.

239

Id.

45

Net Zero America academic project. That project claims to “quantif[y] five distinct
technological pathways, all using technologies known today, by which the United States could
decarbonize its entire economy.” 240 The BP email notes that the researcher “will recommend[an] infrastructure program to advance net zero policies with emphasis on CCUS – building‘backbone’ of pipelines to transport carbon from emitters to the Permian and Gulf Coast.” Theemail demonstrates how BP’s relationship with Princeton allowed it to advocate directly forenergy and emissions policies like carbon capture without accountability for refusing to invest at
scale. 241
One spreadsheet rates how strongly Princeton, Harvard University, and Tufts University
research plans fit BP’s strategic priorities of “advantaged” oil, or oil that has incrementally fewer
emissions per barrel than other barrels on the market, supporting a “shift to gas” from coal, and“market-led downstream growth,” referring to increasing BP’s petroleum refining business—allof which emphasize a continued reliance on fossil fuel. 242
Shell’s Global Methane Communications Plan describes an academic-industry
partnership at the Imperial College London as providing “thought leadership and research into
technology that could underpin role for gas.” 243 A 2017 email notes that the program is“focused on supporting fundamental research and develop [sic] innovative technology solutions
to support the ongoing energy transition,” including on renewables, energy storage, and “newend-uses for natural gas.” 244 In the same email, an official described Shell’s plan to “‘embed’
Shell scientists” at the University of California (UC), Berkeley. 245 Shell funds the Energy
Biosciences Institute at UC Berkley and spent $25 million over five years on the program. 246
In recent years, Exxon partnered with at least 80 universities, including the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT), the University of Texas, Stanford University, National Universityof Singapore, and National Technical University of Singapore. 247 From 2016 to 2017, Exxon
planned to fund dozens of projects at academic institutions, including $600,000 to MIT;
$325,000 to George Washington University’s Regulatory Studies Center; $175,000 to Indiana

Princeton University, Net-Zero America: Potential Pathways, Infrastructure, and Impacts (online athttps://netzeroamerica.princeton.edu/) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
240

241

BPA_HCOR_00339744.

242

BPA_HCOR_00038639.

243

SOC-HCOR-112216 (emphasis added).

244

SOC-HCOR-155807.

245
Id.; Accountable Allies: The Undue Influence of Fossil Fuel Money in Academia, Data for Progress(Mar. 1, 2023) (online at www.dataforprogress.org/memos/accountable-allies-the-undue-influence-of-fossil-fuelmoney-in-academia).
246
EBI, Shell Sign $25 Million Partnership to Fund New Energy Tech Research, Berkeley News (Mar. 15,2017) (online at https://news.berkeley.edu/2017/03/15/energy-biosciences-institute-shell-partnership).

ExxonMobil, University and National Labs Partnerships (online athttps://corporate.exxonmobil.com/who-we-are/technology-and-collaborations/university-and-national-labspartnerships) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
247

46University’s School of Public and Environmental Affairs; $140,000 to Stanford University; and$50,000 to the University of Massachusetts Amherst. 248

Similarly, Chevron has partnered with major universities for workforce development andfacility upgrades, including the Colorado School of Mines; Louisiana State University; MIT;
Stanford University; Texas A&M University; UC Berkeley; UC Davis; the University of Texas,
Austin; Tuskegee University; North Carolina A&T State University; Prairie View A&M
University; and Florida International University. 249 It does not appear that Chevron produced
relevant documents on this subject, even though the scope of the House Oversight Committee’s
subpoena covered these documents.
B.

Conditioning Grants on Cooperation from Researchers

Fossil fuel companies conditioned their funding to academic institutions on the extent of
their cooperation and sensitivity to industry business needs. A 2016 internal document marked“confidential” reveals that BP officials recommended cutting the budget for Harvard and Tufts
research partnerships because it was finding it difficult to “obtain more value” as compared tothe perceived success of BP’s partnership with Princeton, explaining that the “CMI discussions
are directly relevant to BP whereas the Harvard/Tufts discussions” were not. Accordingly, theofficial recommended cutting funding to Harvard in favor of “a tighter focus limited to climate
policy and geopolitics,” which “should enable a more integrated approach between the policy
work at Harvard/Tufts and the scientific work at CMI.” The official recommended
marginalizing researchers with whom BP worked less well and propping up those who weremore favorable to BP. His final recommendation was to renew the Harvard grant at a“[m]aximum of $400k,” preferring “zero for geopolitics but understand[ing] it may need to be$50–$100k if necessary to manage the relationship.” 250

248

EM-HCOR3-00726663.

249
Chevron, University Partnerships and Association Relations (online atwww.chevron.com/sustainability/social/university-partnership) (accessed Apr. 29, 2024); Accountable Allies: The
Undue Influence of Fossil Fuel Money in Academia, Data for Progress (Mar. 1, 2023) (online atwww.dataforprogress.org/memos/accountable-allies-the-undue-influence-of-fossil-fuel-money-in-academia).
250

BPA_HCOR_00308117.

47

BP reduced funding for the Harvard and Tufts programs by around 40%. Harvard’s
grant decreased from $700,000 annually to $400,000, and Tufts grant decreased from $215,000
to $200,000. 251
C.

Studying the Disruption of Climate Change to Core Business

Other documents show that, through their academic partnerships, the companies had clear
knowledge of the effect of climate change on their business. A slide presentation prepared by a
Princeton researcher funded through BP’s CMI titled “The Challenge of Climate Change”
reveals BP’s understanding of the threats to BP’s core business posed by a shift from fossil fuelconsumption to lower carbon alternatives: “the climate problem has the potential to disrupt BP’score business” because “effective climate policies can emerge that discourage fossil fuelconsumption ... and that subsidize or otherwise promote efficiency and low carbon energy.” The
presentation identifies incremental changes for BP to address climate change, such as reining inflaring and methane leaks, and supplanting coal usage in Asia with natural gas. 252 In a separate
email, a BP official applauded the Princeton researcher’s perspective that shifting toward naturalgas, in part through increased LNG exports, would cut overall global emissions. 253 The email
described the CMI-funded researcher as a “big advocate of this as part of our case for gas.” 254
D.

Using Academic Programs to Bolster Access to Policymakers

Fossil fuel companies sought to gain access to policymakers and influential thought
leaders by funding academic research programs. One internal BP email describes the Tufts
program as “the policy complement to our longstanding Carbon Mitigation Initiative (CMI)
climate science program with Princeton,” noting that it benefits BP because “many of theirfaculty are former senior government officials with deep insight, credibility and influence with
US and global policymakers.” 255 Similarly, a “confidential” document from around 2018
describes the benefit of the BP partnership with Harvard and Tufts as “access to unparalleledexpertise at the forefront of research in the areas of climate change science, technology andpolicy,” which helps BP “provide a business perspective to help shape international policy.” 256
In a 2020 email, BP coordinated with Princeton officials on the Net Zero America study,
which maps different pathways by which the United States could decarbonize its economy. 257
BPA_HCOR_00028087; In a 2014 internal document noting both Tufts’ and Harvard’s Energy Policy
and Geopolitics Programs, BP’s budget allocation for universities included a combined $700 thousand distributed
amongst several researchers at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. An additional $215
thousand was allocated to Tuft’s Fletcher School. BPA_HCOR_00117652.
251

252

BPA_HCOR_00043055.

253

BPA_HCOR_00029996.

254

BPA_HCOR_00029996.

255

BPA_HCOR_00115928.

256

BPA_HCOR_00028087.

Princeton University, Net-Zero America, Net-Zero America: Potential Pathways, Infrastructure, andImpacts (online at https://netzeroamerica.princeton.edu/?explorer=year&state=national&table=2020&limit=200)(accessed Apr. 29, 2024).
257

48

BP provided “just under $2 m[illion]” to fund the Net Zero America study, which the company
viewed as important because the study had some alignment with the Biden-Harris
Administration’s climate policy agenda. Specifically, the BP official noted that the study“clearly plays to Biden’s green agenda” and that principal researchers were “already advising
Biden’s transition team.” As a result, BP could “leverage the study with the USG [United States
government].” 258
As the 2020 presidential elections
approached and it appeared that President
Biden would win, BP’s Vice President of U.S.
Policy and Regulatory Affairs pointed out that
BP’s relationship with Princeton was“becoming increasingly synergistic.” BPadmitted that, “[i]f the Presidential elections go
the way it looks now, I would not be surprised
to see some of our friends in senior government
policymaking roles, as well!” 259
II.

TRACKING CRITICS AND PRESSURING NEWS OUTLETS

Documents obtained by the House Oversight Committee reveal that the fossil fuelindustry actively tracks individuals, organizations, and news outlets critical of the industry.
One particularly disturbing email demonstrates that Exxon’s chief security officer was
tasked with tracking a specific activist, noting that he “has been very active in his
communications of late. We are monitoring his location (now living in Vermont) and his social
media.” 260 The activist in question, a retired petroleum and industrial engineer who used to workfor Exxon, provided testimony to the Vermont state legislature on fossil fuel infrastructure andhad written op-eds concerning presidential climate plans, among other advocacy activities. A
Shell email similarly demonstrated that climate activist activity is shared internally. The email,from May 2020, acknowledges that the coronavirus pandemic limited the ability of activist
groups to protest, but that there was, in turn, a “sharp spike—43% more than average in social
media ad spending.” This caused concern that the activists “are not sitting on their hands—they
are adapting and we expect that they will raise more than $1 billion this year to build their armyof boots-on-the-ground supporters with the goal of killing off the fossil fuel industry.” 261
Other documents show that fossil fuel companies tracked outside advocacy efforts related
to emissions reductions and environmental accountability. A BP official expressed concern
about an “uptick in citizen suits” due to the “wide availability of high-tech monitoring devices”
that citizens can use to measure pollution from hazardous chemicals in their local environments.

258

BPA_HCOR_00064996.

259

BPA_HCOR_00115928.

260

EM-HCOR3-00196006.

261

SOC-HCOR-357654.

49

He worried that “NGOs will have more info” than what industry is required to report to the
EPA. 262
Documents produced by BP include numerous “Weekly Activist Report[s]” that track
global critics and protest activity focused on the fossil fuel industry’s role in climate change.
One Weekly Activist Report identified specific activism, such as “Protests in Washington as partof ‘Green New Deal’” and “Sunrise Movement occupies office of US Representative in
Washington, DC.” 263 API also tracked activities of climate activist groups via an email from an
outside consulting group, which promised to contact API “if there is any concerning or
threatening content related to API.” 264
The fossil fuel industry tracks critical social media content. One email from API to its
internal Communications email list, titled “API Media Monitoring,” appears to be part of aregular mass email blast that tracks critics of the industry. A 2017 email describes social media
conversations on climate change following damaging snowstorms and wildfires throughout thecountry. 265 Another shows Exxon tracking social media content, including public posts on
Facebook and Twitter discussing ExxonMobil and climate change, including “a review of tweetsthat use the hashtags #ExxonKnew and #EnergyLiesHere.” 266Internal documents show companies pressuring news outlets pursuing stories that thecompanies believed were instigated by activists. In a 2016 email, an Exxon Media Relations
Manager reacted angrily to questions from a Reuters journalist on Exxon’s relationship with theAmerican Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a nonprofit organization that has frequently
undertaken political advocacy activities that appear to violate Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
rules governing its tax-exempt status. 267 Providing a statement that could be used “if Reuters istaking this crap seriously,” the official responded“how tone deaf are these guys for asking the IRS toinvestigate ALEC – an organization made up of
more than 2000 conservative state lawmakers –after the IRS scandal last year? Of course anything
passes for news when you slap the ‘climate denier’label on it.” When the journalist responded, “I hear
262

BPA_HCOR_00073250; BPA_HCOR_00325882; BPA_HCOR_00288824.

263

BPA_HCOR_00315600; BPA_HCOR_00315608.

API_00106928. BP also mentions utilizing a consulting firm to help the company monitor
environmental group activity. Referencing an article about the legal strategy of the environmental group Union ofConcerned Scientists, a BP official wrote, “This story confirms the UCS strategy for state AG actions. I will have
Brunswick pull the UCS emails.” BPA_HCOR_00037904. Another email reveals that a few months into the Trump
Administration, a Chevron official and an employee at the lobbying firm HBW Resources discussed theenvironmental movement’s strategy to respond to push back on President Trump’s pro-oil-and-gas agenda “forseveral months.” CHEV-117HCOR-0020323.
264

265

API_00015598.

266

EM-HCOR3-00167190.

State Legislatures and ALEC, Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (Nov. 2, 2014) (online athttps://genius.com/Last-week-tonight-with-john-oliver-state-legislatures-and-alec-annotated).
267

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you,” the Exxon media relations manager replied, “Don’t hear me. Kill the story.” 268

CHAPTER 6: OBSTRUCTION OF THE CONGRESSIONALINVESTIGATIONAs documented in the House Oversight Committee’s memorandum dated December 9,2022, Exxon, Chevron, Shell, BP, API, and the Chamber refused to fully cooperate with theHouse Oversight Committee’s investigation, even after then-Chairwoman Maloney issued
subpoenas to each company. Their obstruction is evident in many of the documents reviewed by
the House Oversight Committee and released today.
I.

ATTEMPTING TO UNDERMINE CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONLEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND NORMS
A.

Power and Scope of Congressional Investigative Authority

There is a clear legal framework supporting Congress’s broad latitude to conduct
investigations and requiring private sector entities to comply fully with congressional subpoenas.
The Supreme Court has long recognized Congress’s power conduct investigations, a power
inherent in the legislative process, holding as early as 1927 that “[t]he power of inquiry—withprocess to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function .... A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information.” 269 The
Supreme Court has also made clear that such power is broad: “[The] power of the Congress to
conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. It
encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or
possibly needed statutes.” 270 Indeed, the “scope of the power of inquiry ... is as penetrating andfar-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.” 271 Courts
defer to Congress’s “broad power” to seek information “when the purpose asserted is supported
by references to specific problems which in the past have been or which in the future could be
the subjects of appropriate legislation.” 272

EM-HCOR3-00143706. Other documents discussing Exxon’s relationship with ALEC include: EMHCOR3-00765993; EM-HCOR3-00766014; EM-HCOR3-00567563; EM-HCOR3-00143706. Other documents
tracking critics include: BPA_HCOR_00104837 (“Bloomberg will spend $500 million not just to close coalplants—it will be used to cap the use of natural gas.”); SOC-HCOR-395123; “Monitoring and reactive engagementof low-priority NGOs is critical to the effective management of proximate risks presented by NGO interventions or
campaigns to BP businesses’ or projects’ permission to operate.” BPA_HCOR_00050200; BPA_HCOR_00073918.
Shell contracted SIGWATCH, which describes itself as “the leading consultancy and data provider on activism” toproduce a quarterly review of NGO criticism of Shell, as well as provide other analyses. SOC-HCOR-443104;
SOC-HCOR-442772; SOC-HCOR-414119; SOC-HCOR-036102; SOC-HCOR-350105; SOC-HCOR-116047.
268

269

McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (emphasis added).

270

Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).

271

Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959).

272

Shelton v. United States, 404 F.2d 1292, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

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Congress also has a long history of investigating the activities of companies andcorporations. 273 The fact that such entities are not governmental is irrelevant, as “[i]t isunquestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate with the Congress in its efforts to obtain thefacts needed for intelligent legislative action. It is their unremitting obligation to respond to
subpoenas, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its committees, and to testify fully withrespect to matters within the province of proper investigations.” 274
The companies here have failed to respect these well-established judicial interpretations
and resulting practices.
B.

Baseless First Amendment and Privilege Arguments

Some companies claimed that the First Amendment or undefined “privilege” protected
them from the House Oversight Committee’s subpoena. Exxon argued that the subpoena
appeared “designed to intrude on ExxonMobil’s First Amendment activities, including its
constitutionally protected right to petition the government. 275
Neither the First Amendment nor the petitioning clause permits the categoricalwithholding of documents from Congress. 276 Indeed, recent case law has affirmed Congress’s
right to conduct investigations into activities and subpoena documents that have been claimed to
be protected by the First Amendment. 277 In effect, the fossil fuel industry proposes a novel
theory of “privilege” in which the people’s power of investigation through their Congressevaporates whenever the subject is a matter of public debate or legislative lobbying, and withouteven the customary requirements in courts of a privilege log identifying the documents withheld
and the specific privilege asserted.
C.

Disregard for Longstanding Congressional Practice and Norms

The companies’ positions would upend longstanding House Oversight Committee andcongressional practice. In 2006, the then-House Committee on Government Reform soughtrecords and communications relating to Jack Abramoff’s lobbying of White House officials via
his lobbying firm Greenberg Traurig LLP. After issuing a subpoena to the firm, the House
Oversight Committee obtained more than 14,000 pages of responsive documents. 278 More
273

See, e.g., see also Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U.S. __ (2020).

274

Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187–88 (emphases added).

Letter from ExxonMobil Corporation to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight andReform (Nov. 16, 2021).
275

276
See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961) (rejecting the notion “thatfreedom of speech and association, as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are ‘absolutes,’ not onlyin the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail, but also in the sense that thescope of that protection must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment.”).
277

See Senate Permanent Subcom. on Investigations v. Ferrer, 199 F. Supp. 3d 125, 139 (D.D.C. 2016).

Abramoff Put White House Contacts at 400, Washington Post (Sept. 28, 2006) (online atwww.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2006/09/29/abramoff-put-white-house-contacts-at-400/e9ecb97f-b689477b-b2c2-d46605d49d2f/); Majority and Minority Staff, Committee on Government Reform (Sept. 29, 2006)(online at http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2006/images/09/29/final.abramoff.report.pdf).
278

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recently, as part of a long-running investigation into the pharmaceutical industry, the House
Oversight Committee requested—and received through voluntary compliance—internal
communications and documents from several pharmaceutical companies related to lobbying
activities, including through their trade association. 279
II.

SIGNIFICANTLY REDACTING OR WITHHOLDING DOCUMENTS

Despite the clear legal framework upholding Congress’s broad latitude to conduct
investigations and requiring private sector entities to comply with congressional subpoenas,
companies heavily redacted or entirely withheld documents despite repeated objections by House
Oversight Committee staff.
Of the six recipients of subpoenas, the Chamber obstructed the investigation mostsignificantly. The Chamber produced only 5,503 documents in total—less than 9% of theaverage number of documents provided by the other companies under investigation. Of those
5,503 documents, only 24 were within scope. The Chamber was also the only entity that failed
to produce any internal communications. Given the significant public information available
about the Chamber’s lobbying efforts on climate policies, the Chamber’s failure to produce
documents is not because the documents do not exist, but because the Chamber willfully failed tocomply with the subpoena.
More broadly, the investigation identified 4,180 documents that were significantly
redacted. 280 These documents include board minutes, communication plans, and emails andcontracts about advertising. BP’s production made up the vast majority of the redacted
documents, with at least 3,733 documents with significant redactions—90% of the total numberof significantly redacted documents and nearly 8% of the total documents produced by BP.
In one example, BP redacted all content from an email except “Sent from my iPhone”
and the sender’s email signature from an email thread between senior officials in BP’s C&EA
team with the subject “Conference: Climate Change Implementation.” 281

279
See Committee on Oversight and Reform, Drug Pricing Investigation: Majority Staff Report, 117th
Cong. (Dec. 2021) (online athttps://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/DRUG%20PRICING%20REPORT%20WITH%20APPENDIX%20v3.pdf).
280“Significantly redacted” in this context refers to documents that were redacted in their entirety, in which
all of their substance was redacted (i.e. emails where only the greeting and signature were unredacted), or where key
information such as the names of public relation firms or contract prices were redacted.
281

BPA_HCOR_00344230.

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BP also provided email threads where only one email within the thread was redacted,
demonstrating that the company intentionally redacted key information, despite providing therest of the thread: 282

282

BPA_HCOR_00104753.

54

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In another example, Exxon withheld multiple documents “for privilege” without
specifying the privilege it was claiming and notwithstanding that Congress is not required torecognize common law privilege claims: 283

API also produced several contracts between it and various third-party marketing andadvocacy firms but redacted key information, including the monetary value of the contract andthe subject of the engagement. One example follows: 284

283

EM-HCOR3-00082889.

284

API_00011242.

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In addition to withholding and redacting documents, companies also employed a “paper
blizzard” tactic, providing the House Oversight Committee with hundreds of thousands ofgeneric documents not responsive to any of the categories set forth in the subpoena. Of the morethan 280,000 documents produced to the House Oversight Committee by all parties, more than
125,000 documents were mass emails, newsletters, flyers, and generally meaningless documents.
57

The number of generally meaningless documents that each company provided, expressed as apercentage of the total number of documents produced, are: Chamber—99.5%, Chevron—
73.2%, API—63.4%, Exxon—58.3%, and Shell—40.6%. BP provided very few generally
meaningless documents. Examples of such documents include daily “news” blasts to the entire
company providing links to publicly available articles with nothing more, such as thefollowing: 285

The review also identified a striking number of documents, especially emails, to which
individuals from several companies under investigation were party, but that only one of the fossil
fuel companies under investigation actually produced. This further demonstrates the companies’
lack of full compliance with the House Oversight Committee’s investigation, as such documents
285

EM-HCOR3-00413434.

58

should have been produced by every company that had the document in its possession, custody,
or control. For example, Shell provided the following relevant email, discussed in Chapter 4,
Section I.A above, concerning “API Opportunities.” Although Exxon CEO Darren Woods sent
the email to a number of energy companies, including Chevron, BP, and Shell, only Shell
produced it: 286

286

SOC-HCOR-123718.

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CONCLUSION
The investigation and this report have set out new evidence about the extent of the fossil
fuel industry’s evolving efforts to avoid accountability for climate change. As previously
understood, fossil fuel companies first approached climate change by branding it a “hoax” anddenying outright that the burning of fossil fuels contributed to a warming planet. But as thescience about climate change became too overwhelming to continue to deny its existence, Big
Oil needed to pivot. Accordingly, as new documents set out in this report demonstrate, the fossil
fuel industry engaged in an elaborate campaign of deception and doublespeak—supported by its
armada of trade associations—marked by public claims to support climate action and significant
private steps to avoid it as well as disinformation about the climate safety of natural gas and its
role as a bridge fuel to a fossil-free future. For more than half a century, Big Oil has misled theAmerican public about its role in the climate crisis, doing everything in its power to keep theUnited States and the world dependent on its polluting products. It is long past time to hold Big
Oil accountable for its deception campaign and to take action to undo the harms it hasperpetrated.

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