Beijing and the Paper Tiger: The Impact of the Korean War on
Sino-American Relations
James I. Matray
California State University, Chico
ABSTRACT
Mutual hostility and confrontation characterized the first two decades ofrelations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.
This article examines the impact of the Korean War on creating andperpetuating this mutual enmity. The first half describes how the U.S.
reaction to the outbreak of the Korean War and especially Chinese
military intervention in the conflict removed any chance for an earlyreconciliation, discussing Washington’s specific policies from June 1950
until the armistice in July 1953 aimed at achieving diplomatic isolationand economic punishment of China’s new regime. The second half
defines China’s five primary postwar foreign policy goals and explains
how Beijing faced strident opposition from the United States in its
attempts to achieve each objective. While Washington’s efforts largely
failed, U.S. actions ensured that Sino-American relations would remain
poisoned for fifteen more years.

Keywords: Korean War; Neutralization of Taiwan; Chinese militaryintervention; United Nations; Mao Zedong; Harry S. Truman; Korean
Armistice Negotiations; Korean Demilitarized Zone; voluntary
repatriation; Dwight Eisenhower; U.S.-Republic of China Mutual
Security Pact; Geneva Conference; Taiwan Strait Crisis; Bandung
Conference; Geneva Ambassadorial Talks.

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Introduction: The Origins of Mistrust
On January 5, 1950, President Harry S Truman declared publicly that
the United States “will not pursue a course which will lead to
involvement in the civil war in China.” Moreover, it would not “provide
military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa.”1 His statement
came just a few weeks after Communist forces had compelled theremnants of Guomindang armies to evacuate China’s mainland and seek
refuge for Jiang Jieshi’s government on Taiwan. American officials ofcourse were very distressed when Mao Zedong had proclaimed
establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on October 1,
1949, but Truman and his advisors had decided to accept this outcome
because they saw no easy way to reverse it. China scholar Qing Simei
recently has written that Truman’s announcement signaled his adoptionof a new grand strategy that “included two parts: First, the [UnitedStates would create] a limited economic relationship with Beijing, todrive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union, to break up the SinoSoviet alliance. Second, [it] would not intervene in Beijing’s [seizure of]
Taiwan campaign, which U.S. intelligence reports indicated would
happen in the summer of 1950.”2 Secretary of State Dean Acheson,
speaking at the National Press Club seven days later, repeated theelements of this new policy when he not only placed Taiwan beyond the
U.S. “defensive perimeter” in the Pacific, but also blamed Jiang’s defeat
on his failure to meet the economic needs of China’s people. 3 Then, in
March, Acheson informed UN General Secretary Trygve Lie that theUnited States would not use its veto to block a majority decision to seat
the PRC in the international organization. 4
Less than six months later, North Korea launched a massive
offensive across the 38th parallel to reunite its country, igniting the
Korean War. Among the most significant legacies of this conflict was its
initiation of a sequence of events that would poison Sino-American
relations for two decades. Many historians have blamed the Korean War
for a missed opportunity for Washington to establish normal relations
with Beijing. Chen Jian, however, has made a powerful case that anticolonial and Communist ideology ensured that Mao and his associates
would spurn U.S. offers of friendship and align with the Soviet Union. 5
Indeed, on February 14, 1950, Mao, after weeks of contentious
discussions with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in Moscow, signed the SinoSoviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. In response, the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) began to reconsider its position regarding Taiwan,
lobbying Truman and Acheson to adopt a policy of defending Taiwan
and providing military and economic aid to Jiang’s Republic of China(ROC). Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
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Affairs, and other State Department officials began advocating privately
replacement of Jiang with a more competent leader. Finally, U.S.
Occupation Commander General Douglas gave Defense Secretary Louis
Johnson during his visit to Tokyo in June 1950 a memorandum urging
transformation of Taiwan into a U.S. bastion to block further Communist
expansion in East Asia.6
Unaware of the policy shift underway in Washington, Mao alreadyhad reason to distrust the United States because Truman’s earlier efforts
to end the civil war had not been even-handed. In late 1945, thepresident, as is well-known, had sent U.S. Army Chief of Staff General
George C. Marshall to mediate a settlement, but neither he nor Trumanwere willing to act on threats to halt support for Jiang to force him tocompromise—and the Guomindang leader knew this.7 It therefore was
highly unlikely that Washington and Beijing would have been able todevelop the mutual trust necessary for an early cordial relationship. It
was the Korean War, however, that would transform this suspicious andadversarial association between the United States and the PRC into ahostile and perilous confrontation. Neither nation wanted this outcome,
especially the PRC. China had suffered enormous human and economic
losses during its civil war, placing a priority on devoting its resources toeconomic recovery. Soviet documents reveal that Mao was even morereluctant than Stalin to approve Kim Il Sung’s invasion plan but did so
because he felt a deep debt to North Korea for providing troops that had
helped defeat the Guomindang.8 By contrast, Truman implemented
provocative policies during and after the Korean War that challenged the
PRC’s vital interests. Rather than being intimidated, Beijing, as thisarticle will show, emerged from Korea determined to expose the UnitedStates as a “paper tiger.”
Truman set the tone for rancor and hostility in future Sino-American
relations on June 27, 1950 when he ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet toprotect the island of Taiwan against an invasion from the PRC andsupposedly prevent Guomindang attacks against the mainland.
Determination of Taiwan’s future status, he said, would have to await
restoration of peace in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or a
resolution in the United Nations. Coming two days after the Korean War
started, this “neutralization” of Taiwan in essence permanently created
two Chinas. His action enraged Beijing, which saw the Guomindang
government on Taiwan as illegitimate and the last remaining obstacle to
China’s reunification. Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai branded it“an armed invasion of the Chinese territory and a complete infringementon the U.N. Charter.”9 Escalating the acrimony, MacArthur, after
appointment as head of the United Nations Command (UNC) in Korea,
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visited Taiwan in late July to survey its needs for U.S. military
assistance. He followed this with an unauthorized dispatch of a message
to the annual meeting of the American Veterans of Foreign Wars calling
publicly for action to make Taiwan a powerful U.S. military base in the
Pacific. These actions conflicted with Truman’s desire to limit the U.S.
commitment to Taiwan. Nevertheless, Beijing, knowing MacArthur’shatred of communism and the PRC, rightly judged U.S. behavior during
the early weeks of the Korean War as very threatening. 10
Truman’s “neutralization” of Taiwan came easily because U.S.
leaders favoring a tougher stand against the Soviets in East Asia had laid
the groundwork for the decision.
Significantly, in April 1950,
submission of National Security Council (NSC) Paper 68, calling for ahuge increase in defense spending, signaled an emerging consensus in
the U.S. government on the necessity to rely on military means to contain
Communist expansion. Exaggerating the significance of North Korea’s
attack, the Truman administration placed a premium on worldwide
military and strategic considerations, thus adding force to the argument
for action to demonstrate U.S. resolve.11 Of course, doing otherwise
would have left Truman and Acheson subject to virulent partisan attacks
from Republicans and Jiang’s adherents in Congress. Though entirely
logical from an American perspective, U.S. “neutralization” of Taiwan
probably surprised Beijing. By contrast, Chinese leaders anticipatedTruman’s decision to commit combat forces to prevent Communist
conquest of South Korea. As North Korean forces advanced, Mao began
to warn Kim Il Sung about the probability of a U.S. amphibious military
landing behind his armies on Korea’s northwest coast at Inchon.12 Shen
Zhihua explains in a recent article that Beijing in fact had offered tointervene shortly after the war began, but Stalin balked because he fearedthat this “would expand China’s status and influence in Korea.” The war
definitely strained a relationship between the Soviet Union, China, andNorth Korea that already was complex, fractious, and mistrustful. 13
Truman’s decision to send U.S. forces across the 38th parallel weeks
before the successful Inchon landing on September 15 was momentous.
Profoundly misunderstanding the nature and power of nationalism as aforce in world affairs, the president thought that the liberation of North
Korea would initiate a process leading to the collapse of the Soviet
empire. Instead, his reckless choice provoked Chinese intervention,
extending the war from a conflict lasting three months to more than three
years.14 Almost as important, Truman’s decision also dramaticallyaltered the Sino-American relationship from one that might haveremained rancorous coexistence to virulent and unrelenting
confrontation. China scholars continue to debate the details surrounding
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Mao’s ultimate decision to commit Chinese troops in Korea. Shenemphasizes, however, that Stalin did not request PRC intervention until
after South Korean forces entered the north, but then revoked a promise
to provide Soviet air support. Mao did not make a final decision, Qing
contends, until U.S. troops crossed the 38th parallel. At that moment,
she concludes, China’s leader chose “to enter the war” because Beijing
had reached “the delicate balance between the defense of China’s
national independence and revolutionary internationalism.” 15 Truman, ofcourse, was oblivious to this disharmony, confident that Stalin controlled
a monolithic Communist movement.
An Avoidable War
War between the United States and China in Korea was avoidable.
Zhou Enlai famously conveyed warnings to the U.S. government against
entering North Korea, but American leaders thought the threat was abluff. Their dismissive and patronizing attitude toward the Chinese had along history. That the Truman administration did nothing in response to
MacArthur’s violation of orders as head of the United Nations Command(UNC) when he initiated his brash “Home By Christmas Offensive”
provided evidence that ethnocentric hubris afflicted not just the general. 16
China’s counteroffensive that shattered the UNC’s push to the Yalu latein November 1950 had a dramatic impact on U.S. security policy. After
Truman declared a state of national emergency, Congress approved
expanding the defense budget from $13.5 billion in 1950 to $60.4 billion
for fiscal 1952. Thereafter, the U.S. government’s mobilization strategy
until the Cold War ended was perpetual military preparedness, enormous
military expenditures, and budget deficits.17 But in the short run, U.S.
officials identified the PRC as a villain that the United States had topunish and weaken, if not defeat and subdue. Lieutenant General
Matthew B. Ridgway provided the opportunity to achieve this goal firston the Korean battlefield. Restoring the fighting spirit of UNC forces
following a costly and disorganized retreat, he staged offensives such as
Operations Ripper and Killer that by March 1951 reestablished the front
mostly above the 38th parallel.18
Meanwhile, the United States had moved vigorously to accomplish
diplomatic isolation of Beijing. Washington had not recognized the
PRC, a decision that the Korean War etched in stone for two decades.
However, several other nations, most notably Britain, had establishednormal relations with the new Chinese government. The Soviet Union,
for its part, had begun a boycott at the United Nations in January 1950 toprotest the refusal to grant China’s seat on the Security Council to the
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pass resolutions calling for defense of South Korea.19 During earlyNovember 1950, the United Nations, in response to MacArthur’s reportof China’s intervention, invited Beijing to participate in discussions
about this allegation. Beijing sent Wu Xuiquan, who arrived at Lake
Success on November 24, the same day MacArthur staged his offensive
to the Yalu. His insistence that the United Nations seat the PRC as amember and act against U.S. aggression on Taiwan made clear thepriority Beijing placed on acknowledging China’s sovereignty as acondition for discussions. Unimpressed with Wu’s analogy to China
occupying Mexico or Hawaii, the United States was adamant in blocking
consideration of either demand. Instead, it pressed for the passage of a
UN resolution condemning the PRC for aggression in Korea.
Disingenuously, Washington agreed to support a final compromise as abasis for discussions, knowing that the Chinese would reject it. Beijing
obliged. On February 1, 1951, the United Nations approved a resolution
branding China as an aggressor in the Korean War in a hypocritical act
of intemperate spiteful revenge. 20
For Washington, international condemnation of the PRC was just afirst step in punishing the Beijing regime. The UN resolution alsoestablished the UN Additional Measures Committee (AMC) to “as amatter of urgency” consider further steps “to meet this aggression and toreport thereon to the General Assembly.” The AMC members wereAustralia, Belgium, Brazil, Britain, Canada, Egypt, France, Mexico, thePhilippines, Turkey, the United States, and Venezuela. The UnitedStates already had frozen China’s financial assets, imposed a total tradeembargo, forbade U.S. ships from calling at PRC ports, and barred visas
for Americans to travel to China. Now it urged international economic
and political sanctions, recommending five measures against the PRC,
among them non-recognition, its exclusion from all UN bodies, and an
embargo on export to it of strategic goods. Even though Beijing rebuffed
UN overtures for a negotiated settlement, Britain refused to approve
political sanctions, but it did agree to serve on a subcommittee thatdrafted a proposal for economic sanctions. Then in April and May 1951,
the Chinese launched two massive offensives to force the UNC out of
Korea, but without success. In response, the AMC recommended on
May 14 the adoption of a U.S. proposal for a selective embargo against
China that the UN General Assembly approved. Less comprehensive
than what the Truman administration preferred, it called upon UN
members not to export to the PRC or North Korea “arms, ammunition
and implements of war, atomic energy, materials, petroleum,transportation materials of strategic importance, and items useful in the
production of arms, ammunition and implements of war.”21 This only
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made China even more dependent on the Soviet Union.
The Long Road to a Truce
China’s failed spring offensives of 1951 severely weakened its
ground forces, as well as exposing its inadequacies in firepower,
mobility, and logistics. At the same time, the UNC had displayed asignificant military superiority in using airborne infantry, air support, andtanks that, Colin Jackson argues, “surprised the Chinese and led to panic
in some units.”22 Beijing now decided, as the Truman administration
already had in March, that it could not achieve complete victory andshould pursue a negotiated settlement. When the UNC suggested thepossibility of truce talks on June 30, China had reason to be suspicious,
having recently become the target of moral condemnation and economic
reprisals. Truman’s firing of MacArthur in April, however, did provide
some reassurance of a sincere U.S. desire for peace. As a result, Korean
War truce talks began at Kaesong on July 10, 1951, but lasted for two
years. Historians have devoted much attention to describing theacrimonious atmosphere that the Communists established at the firstnegotiating sessions after occupying the area around Kaesong,highlighting their obsession with scoring propaganda points as evidenceof their bad faith. These actions included greeting with photographers
the UNC delegation’s arrival in vehicles displaying white flags, giving
the UNC chief delegate a smaller chair than his counterpart, competing
to see who displayed the biggest flag, and refusing to allow UNC
newsmen at Kaesong.23 Communist critics also allege that they haggled
needlessly over the agenda. But in fact, the two sides formally adopted abilateral draft of a five-item agenda after meeting on just ten days for a
total of 22 hours of discussion.24
Setting aside the issue of prisoner of war (POW) repatriation, thenegotiators might have achieved an armistice agreement in four months
had the United States not chosen to advance a preposterous proposal toresolve agenda item two calling for establishing “a military demarcationline” and “demilitarized zone [DMZ] as a basic condition for a cessationof hostilities.” On July 26, after adoption of the agenda, General Nam Il,
the Communist chief delegate, asked the UNC to present its position, but
Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, his counterpart, refused to do so until thenext day. Eager to reach quick agreement, the Communist side called fora line at the 38th parallel. But the following day, Joy proposed ademarcation line well north of the current fighting, requiring the enemy
to agree to a hefty territorial retreat. Defining military activities as
separated into zones of ground, air, and sea operations, he claimed that
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UNC would sacrifice all three, requiring territorial compensation. Joy
then haughtily avowed that this justified a demarcation line at the narrowneck of Korea, but proposed instead a 40-mile wide demilitarized zone
(DMZ) with its northern border about 20 miles south of Wonsan in theeast and roughly 75 miles south of the capital at Pyongyang in the west.
Nam Il reacted with understandable anger at this affront, denouncing
Joy’s suggestion of “a line running through Pyongyang and Wonsan” asan act of intimidation, declaring that the UNC’s specific “lines drawn at
random were not worthy of attention [because] . . . the arguments you
raised in support of these lines . . . were naïve and illogical.”25
Joy’s opening proposal had made it impossible for the Communists
even to consider its honest proposal of the battlefront as a demarcationline because this would imply acceptance of military inferiority.
Moreover, numerous U.S. officials had named the 38th parallel publicly
as a suitable armistice line as recently as June during the U.S. Senate
hearings into MacArthur’s firing, rightly causing the Communists to seethemselves as victims of a classic bait and switch. Accusing the UNC ofarrogance, the Communist delegation adopted an inflexible standinsisting on the 38th parallel as the armistice line. On August 10, theUNC said it was willing to discuss a DMZ based on the existing line ofground contact, but Nam Il refused. There followed a “period of silence,lasting two hours and eleven minutes.” 26 Beijing, however, still wanted
an early truce agreement. Indeed, on August 20, Nam Il presented aqualification of his position on location of the DMZ, retreating from his
demand for a demarcation line at the 38th parallel. Two days later, hepressed for an agreement in principle that “adjustments could be made to
the line of contact by withdrawals and advances by both sides in such a
way as to fix a military demarcation line.”27 Unfortunately, China had
immediate misgivings over its decision to compromise, fearing that it
had shown weakness. Beijing decided to halt the talks unilaterally at themeeting on 23 August, charging that an alleged UNC air attack near
Kaesong based on fabricated evidence meant the conference site was not
safe. The swift progress in the talks suddenly troubled the Chinese, who
decided to reassess their strategy. Armistice negotiations would remainsuspended for more than six weeks because Ridgway, now UNC
commander, insisted on moving the conference site.28
Meanwhile, the UNC had intensified its ground and air attacks
against the enemy, which almost certainly helped to persuade theCommunists to return to the bargaining table.29 On October 7, theysuggested resuming the talks, as well as yielding to the UNC demand tomove the meeting place to Panmunjom, a village about six miles east of
Kaesong. After approving a more comprehensive security agreement,
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the Communists on October 25 formally abandoned the 38th parallel, but
proposed a demarcation line that required the UNC to surrender most of
its holdings above that line. Naturally, the UNC delegation flatly
rejected this proposal.30 But the Truman administration wanted to avoid
charges that it was slowing progress toward peace because it feared that
this would imperil continued support among its allies at the United
Nations and also for ratification of the recently negotiated Japanese
Peace Treaty. On November 13, the UNC received instructions to settle
the issue based on the line of contact, suggesting that it be effective forone month. On November 17, the UNC tabled this proposal, but theCommunist delegation insisted that the line’s location, once decided, notbe subject to revision, even after the specified period ended. The UNC
again sought compromise, proposing that in the absence of an armistice
within thirty days that the line should be subject to revision based on
subsequent combat.31
Reflecting a new spirit of compromise, the Communists accepted
and the two sides promptly agreed on the location of a specific line. On
November 27, resolution of agenda item two provided that thisprovisional demarcation line would be the final one if the belligerents
signed the armistice in thirty days. Neither side reopened the issue after
the grace period ended, resulting in the provisional line becoming the defacto demarcation line and the basis for the DMZ at the last stage of thefighting. 32 Meanwhile, the negotiators turned attention to resolving
agenda item three, calling for “arrangements for the realization of aceasefire and an armistice in Korea including composition, authority, andfunctions of a supervising organization.” During December, productive
bargaining led to agreement on the details for supervision of the ceasefire, but then deadlock occurred over the questions of airfieldrehabilitation and the Communist desire for the Soviet Union to serve on
the neutral supervisory commission. Early in 1952, discussions on
agenda item five began and experienced immediate progress. On
February 6, the Communists proposed a political conference after thearmistice to discuss withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea,
recommendations for peaceful settlement of the Korean question, andother problems relating to peace in Korea. The UNC delegation agreed
to these provisions, with a few minor changes, after less than two weeks
of discussion.33
Seven months after the Korean truce talks began negotiators might
have signed a truce agreement had they not reached a stalemate
regarding agenda item four, “arrangements relating to prisoners of war.”
This deadlock was the result of Truman’s decision, for political reasons,to guarantee asylum for any Communist prisoner of war who did not
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wish to return to the PRC or North Korea. When the UNC negotiators
first introduced the concept of voluntary repatriation at the truce talks on
January 2, 1952, the Communist delegation rejected it out of hand. But
when the UNC speculated later that as many as 116,000 out of 132,000
Communist POWs and 38,500 civilian internees probably would elect toreturn home, allowing the impression that voluntary repatriation would
not discredit Communist ideology, the Chinese agreed on April 2 toscreening of POWs to separate potential repatriates from non-repatriates.
After completing this process, the UNC delegation informed theCommunist side that of 170,000 prisoners, only 70,000 wished to returnhome. This news infuriated the Communists, who must have thoughtthat the UNC had swindled them with a bait and switch over the DMZ.
Charging the UNC with deception, the Communist delegation assumed
an inflexible position, demanding repatriation of all POWs as the Geneva
Convention required. In a wild stab at settling all remaining disputes, theUNC delegation on April 28 submitted a package proposal. Dropping its
demand for a ban on airfield rehabilitation, it called on the Communists
to concede on Soviet participation on the supervisory team and voluntary
repatriation—a trade of one for two. On May 2 the Communists
accepted a swap on the first two provisions, but would not budge indemanding return of all POWs.34
Thereafter, only the impasse over the POW question prevented anarmistice. Again, the UNC resorted to military escalation to placepressure on their opponents to compromise. With intensification of the
war and no progress at Panmunjom, prisoner repatriation became anissue at the United Nations, with several states putting forth proposals.
India’s plan gained the most support, providing for a neutral commission
to resolve the POW question. The United States preferred passing a
resolution endorsing the proposal that the UNC delegation had presented
to the Communists on October 8 as its final offer. Communist rejection
had prompted the chief UNC delegate to adjourn the negotiations
permanently. This deflating turn of events motivated the UN General
Assembly to pass a resolution on December 3 advocating
implementation of the Indian formula to end the impasse over POW
repatriation. Washington wanted to force the PRC to back down, but
approved this measure to avoid alienating its allies.35 This was because
the Truman administration, Charles Young perceptively writes, hadembraced voluntary repatriation as a substitute for victory in compelling
the Communists to submit to a U.S. grant of asylum for its soldiers.
Knowing the American people would not accept this reason, U.S.
officials blamed the lack of an armistice instead on the “wicked ways theCommunists prevented peace” through “a bewildering snarl of petty
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bickering, inscrutable ‘Oriental’ stubbornness, and senseless desire tokeep killing.”36 Only Truman’s decision to pursue forcible reunification
was more important than insistence on voluntary repatriation inguaranteeing two decades of Sino-American enmity.
Explaining the War’s End and Sino-American Enmity
How the Korean War ended remains contested terrain. Historians
acknowledge that Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the presidency inJanuary 1953 thinking seriously about using expanded conventionalbombing and the threat of nuclear attack to force concessions from theCommunist side. The truce agreement came on July 27, after anaccelerated bombing campaign in North Korea and bellicose rhetoric
about expanding the war. Most scholars, however, reject Eisenhower’s
claim that Beijing was reacting to his threat of an expanded war
employing atomic weapons because no documentary evidence has
surfaced to support his assertion. Instead, it was Stalin’s death on March
5 that was decisive because it brought to power leaders who wanted to
end the war. Soviet documents reveal that Stalin had opposed an earlyarmistice, using pledges of economic aid for recovery to compel the
Chinese to continue fighting. Ironically, his death created a sense ofpolitical vulnerability that helped persuade Beijing to have Zhou Enlai
signal a willingness to retreat on repatriation late in March before
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles conveyed his vague atomic threat
to India’s prime minister for delivery to Beijing. Furthermore, theindirect nuclear saber rattling of May 1953 was not much different fromthe implied threats that the Truman administration made in the fall of1951, when B-29 bombers carried out atomic bombing test runs over
North Korea.37 Finally, Mao’s famous statement that the atomic bomb
was a “paper tiger” makes U.S. success in intimidating the Chinese all
the more unlikely. 38
By January 1953, both sides in fact wanted an armistice.
Washington and Beijing had grown tired of the economic burdens,
military losses, political and military constraints, worries about an
expanded war, and pressure from allies and the world community to end
the stalemated war. Food shortages in North Korea coupled with anunderstanding that forcible reunification was no longer possible had
motivated Pyongyang to favor an armistice even earlier. Moscow’s newleaders had been concerned even before Stalin died about economic
problems in Eastern Europe. A more conciliatory approach in the Cold
War, they believed, not only would reduce the risk of general war, butalso might create tensions in the Western alliance if the United States
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using atomic weapons and the bombing of North Korea’s dams andirrigation system in May, Chinese negotiators signaled a change in policy
when they accepted the UNC’s proposal for an exchange of sick andwounded POWs and then recommended turning non-repatriates over to aneutral state. Also, in late May and early June 1953, Chinese forces
launched powerful attacks against positions that South Korean units were
defending along the front line and pushed U.S. forces off Pork Chop Hill
in July. 39 Far from being intimidated, Beijing thus showed its continuing
resolve, persuading the United States to compromise on the final terms of
the armistice. But there was no peace treaty in Korea, a warning signthat the wider battle between Washington and Beijing had just begun.
Chinese and Americans stopped trying to kill each other in Korea inthe summer of 1953, but the war had built unremitting hostility into the
Sino-American confrontation, which would fuel its continuation until theearly 1970s. This clash might have subsided more quickly had theUnited States not assumed a posture of irrevocable refusal to accept thelegitimacy of Beijing’s postwar foreign policy objectives and its right topursue them in the global arena. Instead, as Michael Yahuda writes, theUnited States became “the major obstacle to the attainment of [PRC]
long-term foreign policy goals.”40 Beijing’s actions during the five years
after the Korean truce reflected pursuit of five primary aims. First, the
PRC acted to defend its national security, as do all nation states. Second,
China’s leaders were determined to reestablish China’s position as thepreeminent nation in East Asia. Third, Beijing sought reunification ofChina through acquisition of Taiwan. Fourth, Mao and his associates
wanted to elevate the international status of China as a recognized andrespected world power. Finally, China’s new leaders were determined toforce the United States to treat it as a sovereign and equal nation. A
major legacy of the Korean War was that it motivated the United Statesin the 1950s to oppose every effort of the PRC to achieve theseobjectives.41 Accordingly, Beijing would spurn U.S. hints in the 1960s
about normalizing relations. As late as 1971, China expert A. DoakBarnett even speculated that if “Washington were simply to announce
that it had decided to recognize the [PRC] in a de jure sense, . . . theChinese Communists would almost certainly either ignore or reject theAmerican actions.”42
In 1953, Beijing accepted voluntary repatriation to end the Korean
War as part of a new effort aimed at building “a peaceful united front.”
Seeking to avoid conflict, this policy relied on diplomacy to promote
regional peace conducive to successful implementation of the PRC’s firstFive-Year Plan for internal economic development. 43 The Truman
administration, however, saw only malevolent intent, as it continued to
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create an alliance system to contain the perceived threat of Chinese
expansion in East Asia. Significantly, the Korean War ended division in
Washington regarding Japan’s future, as the Pentagon agreed to early
restoration of sovereignty and the State Department reciprocated withagreement to future Japanese rearmament. In September 1951, theJapanese Peace Treaty provided for independence the following May, but
only after Tokyo had promised neither to recognize nor trade with the
PRC. Simultaneously, Japan signed separately a bilateral security pactwith the United States allowing U.S. troops to remain in Japan
indefinitely. To assuage fears of a revived Japan, Washington achieved
its parallel objective of containing the PRC when it negotiated security
agreements with several nations in East Asia. In August 1951, it signed
a mutual defense pact with the Philippines pledging mutual protection
from aggression. The next month, the United States signed a similar
agreement with Australia and New Zealand known as the ANZUS
Treaty. In August 1953, Dulles negotiated the U.S.-South Korea Mutual
Security Treaty. Beijing could anticipate that a defense pact with Jiang’s
regime was next after Eisenhower, in his State of the Union address theprevious February, removed the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait,
stating that the United States no longer would shield the mainland. 44
Washington understood that the Korean War had established thepower and prestige of the PRC in world affairs, weakening its strategic
position in Asia and widening divisions with its allies. Along withnegotiating new defense pacts, U.S. leaders intensified the economic
warfare begun during the war. In September 1952, ten months before thearmistice, the United States joined with Britain, France, Canada, andJapan in forming the China Committee (CHINCOM), a working group to
maintain strict export controls against the PRC and other Communist
states in Asia. The CHINCOM’s creation was the result of differences
between Washington on one side and London, Paris, and Ottawa on theother concerning an appropriate export control committee for Asia. The
United States sought to establish a separate Far Eastern Group in Asia toimpose stiffer export controls on the PRC and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) than what the Coordinating Committee on
East-West Trade Policy (COCOM) then was maintaining towards theEuropean Soviet bloc. But Britain, France, and Canada opposed the U.S.
proposal because none saw any benefit in losing Asian trade. The
compromise was creation of a separate Far Eastern Committee within the
COCOM structure, which allowed U.S. officials to enforce more
restrictive trade lists on exports to Asian Communist countries than theEuropean Soviet bloc. Additionally, the United States pressured Japan
into signing a bilateral agreement that required it to embargo 400 moreInternational Journal of Korean Studies · Vol. XV, No. 1

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goods against the PRC than other CHINCOM members.45
For Beijing, persistence of the U.S. policy of military and economic
containment of the PRC after the Korean armistice not only threatened
its national security, but also its aspirations to reestablish China’s placeas the foremost nation in East Asia. World War II had shattered oldforms of political and economic organization throughout the region.
Mao and his associates had a powerful sense of mission to assert
leadership in guiding the course of change in neighboring states.46 John
K. Fairbank emphasized long ago that, whether consciously or not,China’s leaders were heirs of an imperial past. Mao, in particular, wassensitive to the historic place China held as the “middle kingdom” inEast Asia providing a political and cultural model for its neighbors. 47
Benjamin Schwartz has cautioned against exaggerating the impact ofChina’s imperial legacy in the making of early PRC foreign policy.
Certainly another major motive force was Communist ideology. 48 The
PRC was committed to promoting Marxism-Leninism as a blueprint fornational development and encouraging emulation of the Chinese
revolution. But this reinforced Beijing’s greater desire to recreate apolitical and economic sphere of influence in areas adjacent to China. Of
course, the PRC’s determination to purge the U.S. presence in the region
had deep historical roots. As Fairbank writes, understanding Beijing’s
actions requires first remembering that “the West had invaded China, notChina the West.” Beijing would not tolerate a resumption of the“gunboat diplomacy” that had inflicted humiliation and suffering on the
Chinese people. 49
Sino-U.S. Competition in East Asia
China had sustained enormous damage in World War II and its civil
war, but its strength still was very substantial relative to the power ofneighboring Asian countries. Taking advantage of its central geographic
location, large economy, and military prowess, Beijing acted quickly toreestablish regional hegemony. Pyongyang’s failed invasion, Shen
Zhihua points out, gave the PRC the chance to become “the main force”
in Korea after intervention. Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) occupied Tibet during the Korean War.50 Earlier in 1950, Beijing
had recognized Ho Chi Minh’s Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV),
declaring its intention to help its new Communist ally end Frenchcolonialism. China had even more incentive to provide assistance after
U.S. intervention in the Korean War. During July, a Chinese Military
Advisory Group (CMAG) began providing aid to Viet Minh
headquarters and opened an officer candidate school in southern China.
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Truman administration was supplying France with economic and military
aid to maintain its control over Indochina. By 1954, Washington was
financing eighty percent of the French war effort. China strived to match
this support, sending large amounts of U.S.-made heavy mortars,
machine guns, recoilless rifles, and howitzers captured from defeatedGuomindang forces. PLA troops provided logistical support and ran a
special artillery school for Viet Minh soldiers. In addition to othertraining camps, the PRC maintained three hospitals in China to treat
wounded Viet Minh fighters. “Chinese advisors,” John Garver reports,“played a key role in formulating Viet Minh strategy and in directing
Viet Minh forces in the execution of that strategy.”51
Chinese assistance allowed Ho’s forces to assume the offensive and,as is well known, lay siege to the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu earlyin 1954. In February, the Allied foreign ministers, during their meetingin Berlin, decided to hold a conference in Geneva to seek both aresolution of the Indochina crisis and a settlement in Korea. The Koreanarmistice had called for a political conference to convene three months
after the agreement became effective to achieve withdrawal of all foreign
troops and Korea’s reunification. There was a meeting at Panmunjom in
October 1953, but it adjourned after much bickering and total
disagreement in December.52 A final attempt to resolve the Korean
dispute came at the Geneva Conference, which convened on April 26,
1954. All members of the United Nations that sent troops to fight in the
Korean War, except South Africa, participated in discussions on Korea,
plus the ROK, the DPRK, the PRC, and the Soviet Union. Washington
endorsed a South Korean proposal assigning authority to the United
Nations to supervise elections to establish a united, independent, anddemocratic Korea, with the UN forces remaining in Korea until it had
accomplished this mission. The Communists understandably dismissed
as absurd the notion of UN neutrality. The Soviet Union presented a
counterproposal requiring as a prerequisite for any settlement first thewithdrawal of all foreign troops from Korean peninsula. Discussions
ended in deadlock. On June 15, the sixteen nations contributing forces tothe UNC issued a declaration clearly targeted at the PRC, warning thatcollective action would punish directly any nation that resumed
aggression in Korea.53
Geneva opened a new phase in the Sino-American confrontation,
shifting the contest to the diplomatic stage. Beijing was acutely awarethat this was its first opportunity to establish itself as a major actor inregional, as well as world politics. But the Eisenhower administration
was determined to prevent this outcome. Throughout the conference, theUnited States made every effort to maintain its hostile posture against theInternational Journal of Korean Studies · Vol. XV, No. 1

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PRC, denigrating Beijing’s position or refusing to recognize its status.
Most famously, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, upon a chanceencounter, extended his hand to U.S. Secretary of State Dulles, who,
instead of shaking it, turned and walked away in an astonishing displayof disrespect. 54 But these American actions proved futile because it was
clear to all the conference participants that the PRC was an essential
major player in addressing the issues.55 This was especially true when,on May 7, talks began on Indochina, the day that French forces
surrendered at Dien Bien Phu. This defeat came after the United Stateschose not to intervene after failing to gain support from its allies and its
people for air strikes to save the garrison. Progress toward a settlement
followed because France wanted to withdraw. In July, Moscow and
Beijing persuaded Ho Chi Minh to accept the Geneva Accords that
Britain played a central role in negotiating, which provided for separate
governments in Laos and Cambodia and temporary division of Vietnam
until elections for reunification in 1956. Not only did the United States
not participate in the discussions or sign the agreement, it acted quickly
to divide Vietnam permanently. As another barrier to contain Chinese
expansion, it organized the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization at Manila
in September 1954.56
Beijing had joined with Moscow in persuading a reluctant Ho Chi
Minh to accept the compromise of temporary division at Geneva to deter
U.S. military intervention. But it also had played a major role in
exposing the United States as a “paper tiger” in allowing the Viet Minhto defeat the French. Chinese leaders already were trumpeting theirmilitary success in the Korean War, rightfully taking credit for defending
North Korea against American imperialism. Mao and his associates, tobe sure, used such anti-colonial nationalist appeals to unify the populace
behind China’s new Communist government. Indeed, after the Korean
War began, they had initiated the “Resist America Aid Korea” campaign
to energize popular support behind mass mobilization for possible war.
Chinese leaders encouraged anti-Americanism as well because uniting
the people against a common enemy was a useful tool to build internal
political control. 57 Intense fear and hatred of the United States, however,
did not become a powerful weapon for Beijing in domestic politics until
the Korean War and neutralization of Taiwan. The PRC condemned the
U.S. policy reversal, denouncing defense of Jiang’s illegal regime asblatant interference in China’s internal affairs.58 U.S. protection of therival Guomindang government on Taiwan, a mere one hundred miles
from the southeast mainland, constituted not only a political challenge,
but also a military threat because of Jiang’s determination to regain
power. Guomindang retention of the offshore islands of Jinmen and170

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Mazu, just a few miles off the coast, was even more disturbing, since
they were indisputably Chinese territory and provided a base for military
operations.59
China’s entry into the Korean War, Robert Accinelli writes,
motivated the United States to adopt a “fixed defensive commitment” toJiang’s regime on Taiwan. Thereafter, increasing U.S. military support
for the ROC provided Beijing with abundant evidence to justify its
charges that Washington was determined to overthrow China’s new
government. By January 1951, the Truman administration had delivered
to Taiwan $29 million in military assistance when the Defense
Department advocated approval of a U.S. military survey group’s
recommendation to allocate $71.2 million more for fiscal 1951.
Thereafter, the State Department negotiated with Jiang’s government a
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement that gave legal foundation for theuse of U.S. military aid for Taiwan’s internal security and self-defense.
Joint support from State and Defense in March 1951 resulted in thecreation of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) on Taiwan,
with responsibilities that included receipt and distribution military aid
and advising the Guomindang on military training and organization. By
1952, MAAG personnel had risen to 770 Americans, who worked with
the ROC to reorganize its armed forces to twenty-one army divisions
from thirty-one divisions, as well as modernizing its small air force andnavy. 60 Truman’s policy, however, concentrated on creating just enoughmilitary strength on Taiwan to deter a Chinese Communist attack,thereby preventing a conflict that he did not want to expand beyond
Korea. By contrast, Eisenhower agreed with Dulles that the PRC was anaberration, but he was vague about whether the United States should
encourage Jiang’s return to the mainland.61
Eisenhower’s “unleashing” of Jiang Jieshi early in February 1953
signaled a change in the U.S. policy of provocation toward the PRC
regarding Taiwan not just in words but in deeds as well. On February 5,
the MAAG’s Chief General William Chase suggested to the ROC that it
draft a plan to blockade the mainland and increase the frequency of raids
against the PRC. But the Eisenhower administration asked the ROC not
to utilize aircraft in these forays and to consult with Washington
beforehand about military operations exceeding five hundred men. Afterthe PRC sent troops to Korea in October 1950, the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) started to train Jiang’s forces on how to
conduct guerrilla-style commando raids against the PRC from the ROCheld offshore islands and northern Burma. By the end of 1950, theGuomindang claimed it had staged 1.5 million anti-Communist guerrillaattacks on the mainland. After two more years, Nationalist hit-and-run
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raids had immobilized at least 200,000 PLA forces in Southeast China,
and killed or wounded 41,727 Communist troops. Jiang anticipated an
expansion of U.S. support for Guomindang military harassment of the
PRC when Eisenhower became president in January 1953, pressing
Washington to provide F-84 jet fighters. Like his predecessor, the newpresident, however, did not want the ROC to provoke a war andapproved the request only after Jiang, on April 23, pledged not to “alter
patterns and tempo of operations” against the mainland. 62
Beijing, unaware of Eisenhower’s private caution, paid attention tohis public bravado and prepared for the worst on the eve of the Koreanarmistice. ROC military attacks against the mainland during the war
elevated seizing the occupied offshore islands to a high priority, setting
the stage for the first Taiwan Strait crisis. “On July 16,” Cheng-yi Lin
reports, “the Guomindang launched a large-scale amphibious attack
against Tungsban Island in Fukien Province, and later made an air striketo cover withdrawal from the island.” Washington protested to the ROC
that it had staged the air raid without securing prior U.S. clearance as
required, receiving in response a promise against repetition. Shortly
thereafter, however, the Eisenhower administration extended its military
aid and training program to the offshore islands, including Jinmen andMazu, as well as transferring two more destroyers to the ROC. For
Beijing, the United States was determined that the Guomindang would
hold the offshore islands as a springboard for an attack on the PRC.
Indeed, Jiang insisted on holding Jinmen and Mazu as at least symbols of
his hope to return and regain power on the mainland. Eisenhower andDulles, however, thought the islands were more trouble than they were
worth and preferred evacuation, but never conveyed this belief explicitly
to Beijing. The president also was reluctant to sign a mutual defense
pact, refusing to submit to Guomindang pressure in 1953 that intensified
after the Geneva Conference and culminated in the submission in
December of a draft treaty. Washington thus continued a policy datingfrom the start of the Korean War to limit its commitment of support of
the ROC government.63
In September 1954, Beijing massed roughly 2.5 million soldiers in
Fujian Province and then commenced shelling offshore islands and air
strikes against the Dachen islands. 64 Beijing started to bombard Jinmen
in September 1954. Predictably, Eisenhower and his advisors saw this as
the opening gun of a military campaign aimed at seizing Taiwan.
Instead, Beijing’s intent was to warn the United States not to sign adefense treaty with the ROC and persuade it to cease its hostile policies
toward the PRC. Exaggerating the threat, the president adopted astrategy of ambiguity, making neither a public commitment to support or
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oppose the ROC’s defense of the offshore islands. Eisenhower sought toavoid direct U.S. involvement not least because the JCS advised thatholding them against a full-scale PRC assault would require using
nuclear weapons. To show U.S. resolve, he approved the U.S.-China
Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and Dulles persuaded Britain and New
Zealand to submit the issue to the United Nations. When Beijing
captured a small island two hundred miles north of Taiwan early in 1955,
Dulles prevailed on Jiang to evacuate the nearby Dachen islands in returnfor a pledge of U.S. protection for Jinmen and Mazu. Eisenhower also
rejected Jiang’s request for U.S. consent to stage attacks on PRC air
bases. Public provocation, however, continued, as administration
statements hinted at the use of tactical nuclear weapons if war broke out.
Then, in April, JCS Chair Admiral Arthur W. Radford traveled to
Taiwan to inform Jiang that Eisenhower had revoked his promise to
defend Jinmen and Mazu. In response to an offer of U.S. support for a
blockade of sea lanes along the China coast, Jiang angrily declared that
he would defend the islands with or without U.S. support.65
Meanwhile, on January 31, 1955, the UN Security Council had
placed the Taiwan issue on its agenda and invited the PRC to participate
in discussions. That Beijing rejected the offer was hardly surprising
given that two days earlier, the U.S. Congress had approved the Formosa
Resolution, authorizing U.S. military action to protect Taiwan and such
related territories as the president deemed necessary. Eisenhower
refused to issue a public commitment of U.S. support for defense of
Jinmen and Mazu and gave Jiang only a secret pledge of U.S. assistancein case of an attack “at this time.”66 But from Beijing’s viewpoint, theUnited States was committed firmly to Jiang’s retention of the offshoreislands as physical evidence of the ROC’s claim to be the legitimate
government of China. Reinforcing this judgment was the Eisenhoweradministration’s adamant opposition to admission of the PRC to theUnited Nations. In June 1951, Acheson had presented one reason for
exclusion, declaring that “a claimant for seating cannot shoot his way
into the UN and cannot get in by defying the UN and fighting its
forces.”67 Assistant Secretary Rusk, however, captured the visceralhostility that perpetuated this policy earlier in May when he stated thatthe Beijing “regime may be a colonial Russian government—a Slavic
Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the Government of China,” hemaintained. “It is not entitled to speak for China in the community ofnations.”68 Thereafter, annual Congressional resolutions threatened to
end U.S. participation in the United Nations if it voted to oust the
Guomindang government.

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China’s Revolutionary Diplomacy
In November 1951, the UN General Assembly approved Thailand’s
resolution not to consider any changes in Chinese representation. The
United States annually gained passage of a similar moratorium measure
until 1960.69 Despite U.S. efforts at diplomatic isolation, however, theKorean War had made it plain to the majority of Asian and African
leaders in particular that Mao’s government now was firmly in power
and Jiang’s regime never would change that reality. Beijing saw this defacto recognition as the first step toward the PRC achieving its fourthmajor objective of establishing a position of leadership in theinternational community outside of the United Nations. Two wars,
however, had weakened China’s economy, limiting its ability to act as abenefactor. Instead, Beijing worked to enhance its image as a championof anti-imperialism, identifying itself as a strong proponent of former
victims of colonial rule in efforts to assert their independence. 70
Grounding its claim to world leadership in becoming the foremost
supporter in helping liberate people worldwide from the American
imperialists had great appeal to Mao and his associates for both
ideological and security reasons. By assisting nations to free themselvesfrom imperialist domination, Beijing could win new allies who would
support its aims in world politics, as well as divert U.S. military,economic, and diplomatic resources away from policies directed at
weakening the PRC. Another factor was pressure from Moscow toreplicate its new “peaceful coexistence” strategy. After Beijing ended
shelling of the offshore islands in February 1955, the Soviets offered toprovide it with assistance to develop peaceful nuclear power and a largecommercial credit in return for a promise to postpone active attempts toseize Taiwan. 71
Beijing’s strategy to elevate China’s reputation as a leader in theanti-imperialist struggle had its roots in Maoist ideology. Shortly afterWorld War II ended, Mao explained to American journalist Anna Louise
Strong that before the United States could attack the Soviet Union andignite another world war, it first would have to subjugate the nations ofEurope, Asia, and Africa, an area he called the “vast intermediate zone”
between the imperialist and the socialist countries. To prevent a U.S.
imperialist attack on the socialist Soviet Union, he reasoned, was tointensify the struggle especially among former victims of colonialism
against the United States in this intermediate zone. After triumphing in
China’s civil war, Mao also concluded that ensuring the success ofrevolutionary movements in the developing countries would enhance thesecurity of the revolutionary state he had founded in China. 72 The PRC
had the first opportunity to become the leader of the intermediate zone in
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April 1955 when it attended the Bandung Conference in Indonesia. One
year earlier, at the conclusion of the gathering of the heads of thegovernments of Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, India, and Pakistan at
Colombo, Ceylon, participants had issued a joint statement that proposeda wider international meeting of post-colonial states to deal with
common problems. African and Asian leaders agreed that the issues
would include colonialism, racism, international economic and social
cooperation, human rights, and world peace.73
Under the sponsorship of the Colombo powers, representatives fromtwenty-nine Asian and African countries attended the Bandung
Conference from April 18 to 24. Although there were notable exclusions
from the conference, including the ROC and the two Koreas, the nations
present did represent a quarter of the world’s land area and two-thirds of
its population. Elected as president of the body was Prime Minister Ali
Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia, who was the prime mover behindorganization of the meeting. The nations in attendance included neutrals,
as well as bloc members, representing all political ideologies. The
delegates engaged in remarkably free and frank exchanges, as threecommittees brokered compromises that led to reaching agreement on
several key issues. First, there would be steps for national development,
including promotion of intra-regional trade, export diversification, andthe undertaking of collective action to stabilize demand for primary basic
commodities. Second, participants would sponsor cultural exchanges of
information and artists to acquire knowledge of each other’s countries.
Third, worldwide self-determination received overwhelming support.
Pledging to eradicate racism, the delegates also declared that colonialism
in all its manifestations was “an evil which should speedily be brought toan end.” Finally, the conferees urged liberation of French North Africa,
states in Arabia under British protection, and West Irian, a territory
Indonesia claimed, but still under Dutch rule. 74
Bandung initiated a new spirit of cooperation among non-Western
nations and provided encouragement for the non-aligned movement in abipolar world. The conferees also passed the Bandung Declaration of
Peace, calling for the destruction of all nuclear arsenals and universal
disarmament. They recommended greater Afro-Asian representation in
the United Nations and on its Security Council. Attempting to mitigate,
rather than inflame Cold War tensions, the final communiqué did notendorse a UN seat for the PRC. But Beijing fully exploited its
participation to project cooperation and cordiality, discrediting U.S.
characterizations of Communist China as evil and predatory. Zhou Enlai
represented the PRC and was a model of collaboration, winning respect,admiration, and gratitude from all the other delegates. His efforts wereInternational Journal of Korean Studies · Vol. XV, No. 1

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instrumental in formulation, advocacy, and approval of the “Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” calling for respect for territorial
integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference of nations in
the internal affairs of others, equality of economic treatment, andpeaceful coexistence.75 Zhou’s virtuoso performance was instrumental in
the rapid rise of Beijing’s prestige and influence in the developing world,
as the PRC’s display of moderation and conciliation contrasted sharply
with a U.S.-promoted image of Communist China as militant andsubversive. Beijing became an active proponent of the “Spirit ofBandung” that encouraged an extension of the non-aligned areas of peacearound the world to balance the major powers. 76 The PRC’s diplomatic
strategy sought to isolate the “paper tiger” and to create a bloc of neutral
nations under its leadership.
Beijing remained on the diplomatic offensive against the UnitedStates after Bandung. On April 23, 1955, even before the conference
ended, Zhou publicly proposed “to sit down and enter into negotiations
with the U.S. government to discuss . . . the question of relaxing tension
in the Taiwan area.”77 Beijing’s purpose was to compel the United States
to deal directly with the PRC as equal, thereby indirectly recognizing its
national dignity and world power status. On October 1, 1949, Mao had
declared on the establishment of the PRC that “we have stood up” andpromised that China would “never again be an insulted nation.” 78
Beijing’s fifth foreign policy objective after the Korean War was to force
the “paper tiger” to negotiate with the PRC, while at the same time
pursuing the contradictory and unproductive policy of formal diplomatic
isolation.
On July 25, 1955, Washington and Beijing announced thatambassadorial-level talks would occur to help resolve the repatriation ofcivilians and “to facilitate further discussions and settlement of certain
other practical matters now at issue between both sides.” On August 1,
the first of 138 meetings convened in Geneva—moved to Warsaw in
1958—that for fifteen years was the only regular channel of directcommunication between the United States and the PRC. The first issue
for discussion was mutual repatriation of detained citizens, an issue that
representatives from the two sides had discussed at the Geneva
Conference. Contrary to past diplomatic dealings, these Sino-American
negotiations in each instance proceeded on a basis of equality andreciprocity. While ritualized exchange of rhetoric was the norm, theywould provide an efficient means for communication of national interestsand limitation of the areas of mutual conflict.79
Fears of a Sino-American war after the Taiwan Strait crisis caused
several governments to offer mediation, but Dulles chose direct
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negotiations, apparently because he did not trust third parties to protect
U.S. interests. On September 10, talks at Geneva resulted in U.S.
Ambassador to Czechoslovakia U. Alexis Johnson and PRC Ambassador
to Poland Wang Bingnan issuing an “agreed announcement” declaringthat civilians of both countries who wished to return to their respective
nations could do so and repatriation would occur “expeditiously.” This
would be the only agreement that the negotiations would produce,
although it did not resolve the issue swiftly. Washington had lifted thelast restrictions on the departure of Chinese nationals before the talks
began, but Beijing argued that Americans in Chinese prisons were there
lawfully for espionage or other crimes. Nevertheless, the PRC began torelease the incarcerated slowly until only two CIA agents remained.
During October 1955, discussions shifted to a U.S. proposal for a mutual
renunciation of force in the Taiwan area, but the two sides remained far
apart. Wang demanded “mutual respect for territorial integrity”—
indicative of the PRC’s claim to Taiwan—and Johnson insisted on theright of “individual and collective self-defense”—an assertion of thelegal validity of the ROC and the U.S. defense treaty with it. While
Washington was inflexible in perpetuating China’s division, Beijing wasjust as adamant that Taiwan was an inalienable part of China. For the
PRC, U.S. defense of Taiwan prevented real peace in the area. “Any plot
to slice off Chinese territory and create ‘two Chinas’ will not betolerated,” Yu Chao-li stated defiantly in 1959. 80
Other issues were similarly stalemated. American insincerity
ensured this result, given that Dulles agreed to the ambassadorial talks
only to pacify U.S. allies and discourage the PRC from resuming attacks
on Jinmen and Mazu. Wang proposed the exchanges of newsmen, theopening of trade, and the exchange of diplomatic missions, but Johnson
predictably rejected the offer because Washington judged acceptance astantamount to de jure recognition. Beijing’s invitation in 1956 for thevisit of fifteen newsmen to China met rejection from the United States
through the denial of passports. In August 1957, Washington bowed topressure and validated a limited number of visas for travel to China, but
agreed only to “individual” entry of the Chinese newsmen after great
scrutiny. Beijing condemned the proposal as the equivalent of an“unequal treaty” and vetoed the proposed exchange of correspondents. 81
When Johnson left his post in Prague at the end of 1957, Dulles proposed
downgrading the Geneva talks, but Beijing objected. Washington’srefusal to name a replacement resulted in a lapse of meetings for several
months, causing Chinese leaders to feel deeply insulted. Beijing angrily
explained that “what the United States was aiming at . . . was by nomeans a peaceful settlement of the international dispute between China
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and the United States on the basis of equality and mutual respect for
territorial integrity and sovereignty. . . . This cannot but rouse theindignation of the Chinese people.”82 Collapse of the Geneva talks
culminated a series of events that persuaded the PRC by early 1958 that
the United States never would accept its legitimacy or bargain with it as
an equal.
Dealing with a Not-so-Paper Tiger
Beijing abandoned its reliance on what Xia labels “tension”
diplomacy to diminish the threat from the “paper tiger” almost five years
after the end of the Korean War, shifting instead to an emphasis on
developing the economic and military strength necessary to meet anddefeat any American challenge. As is well known, Mao now began toassert his preference for a more militant, revolutionary approach indomestic and foreign policy. To be sure, U.S. behavior was not the
primary factor in motivating this shift, but it was not irrelevant.
Washington’s decision to support South Vietnam in not holding elections
in July 1956 justified the PRC’s support for Ho Chi Minh in
implementing a more aggressive strategy in Indochina.
NikitaKhrushchev’s speech denouncing Stalin had created doubts for Mao
about whether the Soviet Union remained devoted to Marxism-Leninism.
In September 1957, the Soviet launching of Sputnik convinced Mao thatthe socialist camp now held the advantage and should exploit its superior
power to challenge and defeat U.S. imperialism. 83 But Khrushchev
opposed direct confrontation and preferred peaceful competition with theUnited States. He wanted to reduce Cold War tensions because he fearedthat an aggressive approach might ignite a nuclear war. Beijing andMoscow would split on this and other important issues. Chinese leaders
did not want war because they respected U.S. power. Certain that theUnited States was internally weak and destined to collapse, Beijing
nevertheless understood that “tactically, they are real tigers which candevour human beings.”84
Warren I. Cohen has written that the postwar confrontation between
Washington and Beijing constituted the “great aberration” in U.S. China
policy. Traditionally, the United States had supported the “existence of astrong, independent China,” but in early 1950 it “forgot the soundgeopolitical, economic, and ethical basis of their historic desire for
China’s well being” and embarked on “an unprecedented campaign of
opposition to the development of a strong, modern China.”85 In fact, thisdid not occur until the Korean War, replacing a united China with one
permanently divided and substituting economic sanctions for an open
door. Thereafter, the United States exerted immense effort to ensure that
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the PRC would not become the “policeman” of Asia, but in doing so
after the Korean armistice Washington actually moved Beijing closer toachieving most of its five major foreign policy objectives.86 By 1956,
China reached a plateau of early success, boasting a strong governmentthat was fostering economic growth. Beijing’s main tool for exerting
influence in world politics was application of political and diplomaticpressure, notwithstanding Mao’s oft-quoted statement that “power flows
out of the barrel of a gun.”87 But Chinese leaders soon concluded that
diplomacy no longer would be effective in ending persistent U.S. efforts
to weaken and destroy the PRC. American leaders were not prepared todeal with a revolutionary China, but it was the Korean War that instilledin them exaggerated fears leading to adoption of unrealistic andthreatening policies. Eventually, Beijing responded in kind.
Notes:
1“United States Policy Toward Formosa,” Department of State Bulletin [DSB],
vol. 22 (January 16, 1950), p. 79; Dean G. Acheson, Present at the Creation:
My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 351; Robert
Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy Toward Taiwan, 19501955 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 6-16.
2

Simei Qing, “From Grand China Strategy to US-China Confrontation in Korea:
Assessment of Intentions in Time of Crisis,” Symposium on “The Legacy ofHarry S. Truman in East Asia: Japan, China, and the Two Koreas,” Truman
Little White House, Key West, FL, May 15, 2010. Arnold Xiangze Jiang notes
the contradictions in U.S. policy, stressing how Washington was not willing torecognize China’s new government and treat it as an equal. Arnold Xiangze
Jiang, The United States and China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1988), pp. 134-37.
3

Dean G. Acheson, “Crisis in Asia: An Examination of United States Policy,”
DSB, vol. 22 (January 16, 1950), pp. 111-17.
4

China: U.S. Policy Since 1945 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly,1980), p. 89.
5William Whitney Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy
toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1981), p. 125; Warren I. Cohen, “Symposium: Rethinking theLost Chance in China?,” Diplomatic History, vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter, 1997), pp.
283-89; Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the SinoAmerican Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 6469; Jiang, The United States and China, pp. 137-38.
6Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and theSoviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990),
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179

pp. 63-65, 70-75; Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, pp. 20-23; Bruce Cumings,
The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 19501953 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 157-68.
7Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman (New York: Viking Press,
1987), pp. 43-154; Mark A. Stoler, George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of
the American Century (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989), pp. 145-51; Michael
Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1979), pp. 287-305.
8

Joseph Stalin to V.N. Roshchin with message for Mao Zedong, 16 May 1950,
in Kathryn Weathersby, “Should We Fear This?: Stalin and the Korean War,”
Conference on “Stalin and the Cold War,” Yale University, September 23-25,
1999, pp. 15-16.
9

Quoted in Jonathan D. Pollack, “The Korean War and Sino-American
Relations,” in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming (eds.), Sino-American Relations,
1945-1955 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989), pp. 213-37. Seealso, Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, pp. 29-30; Stueck, The Road to
Confrontation, pp. 178-81; Jiang, The United States and China, p. 138.
10

Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday, 1956), p. 354; William Stueck, The Korean War: An
International History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp.
67-69; John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean
War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1965), pp. 65-77.
11James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea,
1941-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), pp. 226-27, 253-58.
12

Roshchin to Stalin, September 3, 1950, in Evgeniy P. Bajanov and Natalia
Bajanov, The Korean Conflict, 1950-1953: The Most Mysterious War of the 20th
Century (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995), pp. 89-90.
13Zhihua Shen, “China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force: The
Formation of the Chinese–Soviet–Korean Alliance in the Early Stage of the
Korean War, The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 33, No. 2 (April, 2010), pp.
212-16.
14James I. Matray, “Truman’s Plan for Victory: National Self-Determinationand the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea,” Journal of American History,
vol. 66, No. 2 (September, 1979), pp. 312-33.
15

Shen, “China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force,” p. 222; Qing, “FromGrand China Strategy to US-China Confrontation in Korea,” p. 6; Chang,
Friends and Enemies, p. 77.
16

Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, pp. 98-99,
123-28; Jiang, The United States and China, pp. 141-43; Chang, Friends andEnemies, pp. 79-80.
180International Journal of Korean Studies · Spring 2011

17

Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr., Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early
Cold War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999), pp. 15, 44, 71.
18David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin’s, 1964), pp.
184-95.
19

Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, andCommand (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1986), pp. 30-32.
20

Stueck, The Korean War, pp. 138-39, 151-57; Jiang, The United States andChina, p. 144.
21

Acheson to U.S. UN Delegation, May 14, 1951, Negotiations Armistice,folder 4, Korean War Documents, box 9, Harry S. Truman Library,
Independence, MO; Jiang, The United States and China, p. 143; Callum A.
MacDonald, “UN Additional Measures Committee,” in James I. Matray (ed.),Historical Dictionary of the Korean War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1991),
pp. 479-80.
22Colin F. Jackson, “Lost Chance or Lost Horizon?: Strategic Opportunity andEscalation Risk in the Korean War, April–July 1951,” The Journal of Strategic
Studies, vol. 33, No. 2 (April, 2010), p. 264.
23

Warren Austin to Acheson, April 13, 1951 and State-JCS Meeting Summary,
April 18, 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. 7, pp. 345, 353-54; Stanley Sandler, The
Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished (Lexington: The University Press of
Kentucky, 1999), p. 240; Donald W. Boose, Jr., “The Korean War Truce Talks:
A Study in Conflict Termination,” Parameters, vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring, 2000), p.
106; Rosemary Foot, Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the
Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 4344; Stueck, The Korean War, pp. 222-25.
24

Yafeng Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks During the Cold
War, 1949-1972 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), pp. 58-59;
Foot, Substitute for Victory, p. 45.
25

Matthew B. Ridgway to Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), July 26 and 27, 1951,
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1951, Vol. 7: Korea and China(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), pp. 735-37, 739-45.
26

Ridgway to JCS, July 28, 1951 and August 10 and 11, 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol.
7, pp. 749-53, 799-810; James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, History of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1951-1953,
Vol. III: The Korean War (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,1988), pp. 594-95; Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 535-56; Foot,
Substitute for Victory, pp. 45-46; Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, p. 60.
27

Ridgway to JCS, August 20, 22, 1951, FRUS, 1951, pp. 844-45, 847-48;
Schnabel and Watson, The Korean War, pp. 598-600.

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181

28

Mao Zedong to Filippov (Joseph Stalin), August 27, 1951, in “The Cold War
in Asia,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin [CWIHPB], vols. 6-7(Winter, 1995/1996), pp. 68-69.
29

Schnabel and Watson, The Korean War, pp. 608-15; Boose, “The Korean
Armistice Talks,” p. 107; Foot, Substitute for Victory, pp. 62-65; Stueck, The
Korean War, p. 247.
30

Ridgway to JCS, October 25, 26, 27, and 28, and November 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8,
11, 12, and 13, November 1951 and JCS to Ridgway, 6 and 13 August 1951,
FRUS, 1951, 7, pp. 1061-62, 1065-72, pp. 1079-81, 1085-91, 1092-93, 10971102, 1120, 1125-31; Schnabel and Watson, The Korean War, pp. 616-20;
Stueck, The Korean War, pp. 236-37; Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, p. 64.
31

United Nations Command [UNC] Delegation to Ridgway, October 7, 1951,
Ridgway to JCS, October 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 24,
1951, and UNC Press Release, October 22, 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. 7, pp. 10041005, 1009-10, 1011-15, 1031-41, 1049-61.
32

Ridgway to JCS, November 26 and 27, 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. 7, pp. 118688.
33

Ridgway to JCS, January 25 and 29, and February 1, 1952 and JCS to
Ridgway, February 1, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 15: Korea, pt. 1(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 30-32;
Schnabel and Watson, The Korean War, pp. 711-18.
34

Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, pp. 64-65; Stueck, The Korean War, pp.
268-269; Foot, Substitute for Victory, pp. 98-99; Rees, Korea, pp. 319-20;
Kaufman, The Korean War, p. 269.
35

Elizabeth A. Stanley, Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War
Termination and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,2009), p. 200; Foot, A Substitute for Victory, pp. 154-57; Stueck, The Korean
War, pp. 298-306.
36Charles S. Young, “POWs: The Hidden Reason for Forgetting Korea,” The
Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 33, No. 2 (April, 2010), p. 328.
37

James I. Matray, “Revisiting Korea: Exposing Myths of the Forgotten War,”
Prologue, vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer, 2002), pp. 113-14; Chang, Friends andEnemies, pp. 88-89.
38

Quoted in Ralph L. Powell, “Great Powers and Atomic Bombs are ‘Paper
Tigers’,” China Quarterly, No. 23 (July-September, 1965), p. 62. See also,Mark Ryan, Chinese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons: China and the UnitedStates During the Korean War (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharp, 1989).
39

Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," International
Security, vol. 13 (Winter, 1988/1989), pp. 50-51; Ryan, Chinese Attitudes
Toward Nuclear Weapons, p. 156; Edward Keefer, "Eisenhower and the End of
182

International Journal of Korean Studies · Spring 2011

the Korean War," Diplomatic History, vol. 10, No. 3 (Summer, 1986), pp. 26768; Daniel Calingaert, "Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War," Journal ofStrategic Studies, vol. 11, No. 3 (June, 1988), pp. 177-202.
40

Michael Yahuda, “Chinese Foreign Policy After 1963: The Maoist Phases,”
China Quarterly, No. 26 (October-December, 1968), p. 94.
41

James I. Matray, “Peking and the Paper Tiger: The Sino American
Confrontation 1958-1968,” unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Virginia,
June 1973.
42

A. Doak Barnett, Our China Policy: The Need for Change (New York:
Foreign Policy Association, 1971), p. 43.
43

Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, p. 77; Jiang, The United States and China,
pp. 147-48; Chang, Friends and Enemies, p. 90.
44

Chang, Friends and Enemies, p. 80; Dwight D. Eisenhower, State of theUnion Message (extract), FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 14: China and Japan(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 140.
45

Simei Qing, “The Eisenhower Administration and Changes in Western
Embargo Policy Against China, 1954-1958,” in Warren I. Cohen and Akira
Iriye, eds., The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960 (New York: Columbia
University Press 1990), pp. 121-42; Yoko Yasuhara, “Japan, Communist China,
and Export Controls in Asia, 1948-52,” Diplomatic History, vol. 10, No. 1(Winter, 1986), pp. 75-89.
46

John W. Garver, “Polemics, Paradigms, Responsibilities, and the Origins of
the U.S.-PRC Confrontation in the 1950s,” The Journal of American-East Asian
Relations, vol. 3, No.1 (Spring, 1994), pp. 21, 24, 34.
47

John K. Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1967), p. 303; See also, Robert Blum, The United States andChina in World Affairs (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 62.
48

Benjamin I. Schwartz, “The Chinese Perception of World Word, Past andPresent,” in John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional
China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1968), p. 9; Robert Scalapino, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Hearings of 1966, in Akira Iriye, ed., U.S. Policy Toward China(Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), p. 116.
49

John K. Fairbank, “China’s Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective,” Foreign
Affairs, vol. 47 (April, 1969), pp. 461-62.
50

Shen, “China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force,” p. 229; Michael M.
Sheng, “Mao, Tibet, and the Korean War,” Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 8,
No. 3 (Summer, 2006), pp. 15-32.

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183

51

Garver, “Polemics, Paradigms, Responsibilities, and the Origins of the U.S.PRC Confrontation in the 1950s,” pp. 25-26; Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A
History (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 169-80.
52

Sidney D. Bailey, The Korean Armistice (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
1992), pp. 150-70; Callum MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (NewYork: The Free Press, 1986), p. 257.
53

U.S. Department of State, The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference,
April 26-June 15, 1954 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,October 1954).
54

Edgar Snow, Red China Today: The Other Side of the River (New York:
Random House, 1970), p. 122; Chang, Friends and Enemies, pp. 101, 318-21.
55

V.P. Dutt, China and the World: An Analysis of Communist China’s Foreign
Policy (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1966), p. 23; Chang, Friends andEnemies, pp. 102, 108.
56

George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam
1950-1975 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), pp. 33-51; Karnow, Vietnam, pp.
180-205.
57

Dutt, China and the World, p. 20.

58

Barnett, Our China Policy, p. 8.

59

O. Edmund Clubb, “Sino-American Relations and the Future of Formosa,”
Political Science Quarterly, vol. 80, No. 1 (March, 1965), p. 18.
60

Cheng-yi Lin, “The Legacy of the Korean War: Impact on U.S.-Taiwan
Relations,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 11, No. 4 (Winter, 1992),
pp. 4-5; Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, pp. 65-68, 95, 254; Jiang, The
United States and China, p. 140.
61

Earl C. Ravenal, “Approaching China, Defending Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs,
vol. 50, No. 1 (October, 1971), p. 55; Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, pp.
255-57.
62

Cheng-yi Lin, “The Legacy of the Korean War: Impact on U.S.-Taiwan
Relations,” pp. 5-6; Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, pp. 115-17, 125.
63

Lin, “The Legacy of the Korean War,” p. 6; Accinelli, Crisis andCommitment, pp. 144-46.
64

Tang Tsou, “Mao’s Limited War in the Taiwan Strait,” Orbis, vol. 3 (October,1959), p. 337.
65

Gordon H. Chang and He Di, “The Absence of War in the U.S.-China
Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck,
Deterrence?” American Historical Review, vol. 98, No. 5 (December, 1993), pp.

184

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1502-23; Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, pp. 152-53, 157-83; Xia,
Negotiating with Friends, pp. 81-82.
66
Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, pp. 185-228; Jiang, The United States andChina, pp. 146-47.
67

Quoted in Blum, The United States and China in World Affairs, p. 114.

68

Dean Rusk, “Chinese-American Friendship,” DSB, vol. 24 (May 28, 1951),
pp. 846-48. Naturally, these insulting comments infuriated Beijing. Walter P.
McConaughy to Acheson, 795.00/6-851, U.S. Department of State Records,
Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park, Md.
69

Kuo-chang Wang, U.N. Voting on Chinese Representation (Taipei: Instituteof American Culture of Academia Sinica, 1984), p. 26.
70Peter Van Ness, “Mao Tse-tung and Revolutionary ‘Self-Reliance,’”
Problems of Communism, vol. 20 (January-April, 1971), p. 74.
71

Harold C. Hinton, China’s Turbulent Quest (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p.
70.
72

Chang, Friends and Enemies, p. 45; Garver, “Polemics, Paradigms,
Responsibilities, and the Origins of the U.S.-PRC Confrontation in the 1950s,”
p. 19.
73

George McT. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia,
April 1955 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956).
74

Ibid; Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, pp. 228-31.

75

John W. Lewis, Communist China: Crisis and Change (New York: Foreign
Policy Association, 1966), p. 27.
76

Hsu Kai-yu, Chou En-Lai:
Doubleday, 1968), p. 197.

China’s Gray Eminence (Garden City, NY:

77

Quoted in New China News Agency (NCNA), “Jen-min Jih-pao on 100
Meetings of Sino-American Talks,” No. 2337 (September 8, 1960), p. 33.
78

Quoted in Lawrence H. Battisini, “The Sino-American Confrontation: A
Look at the Chinese Side,” Yale Review, vol. 58 (December, 1968), p. 162.
79

Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The UnitedStates Experience, 1953-1967 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 75; Xia,
Negotiating with the Enemy, pp. 78-81; Clubb, “Sino-American Relations andthe Future of Formosa,” p. 18.
80

Morton Abramowitz and Richard Moorsteen, Remaking China Policy(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 102; Yu Chao-li, “The
Chinese People’s Great Victory in the Fight Against Imperialism,” Peking
Review, No. 38 (September 22, 1959), p. 9; Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy,
pp. 83-84, 89-91; Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, pp. 241-43; Jiang, The
International Journal of Korean Studies · Vol. XV, No. 1

185

United States and China, pp. 148-49.
81

Chang, Friends and Enemies, pp. 155-57; Barnett, Our China Policy, p. 14;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Chinese Statement on the Question of Exchanging
Correspondents Between China and the U.S.,” Peking Review, No. 37(September 14, 1960), p. 29; Blum, The United States and China in World
Affairs, p. 126.
82

Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, p. 96; NCNA, “Statement of Chinese
Government on Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks,” No. 1805 (June 30,1958), p. 53.
83

Hinton, China’s Turbulent Quest, p. 79; John Gittings, “The Great-Power
Triangle,” China Quarterly, No. 27 (July-September, 1969), p. 52; “Behind the
U.S. Smokescreen of Peace,” Peking Review, No. 50 (December 15, 1959), p. 3.
84

Yu Chao-li, “The Chinese People’s Great Victory in the Fight Against
Imperialism,” p. 10.
85

Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American
Relation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 179-83.
86. Fairbank, The United States and China, p. 307; Jiang, The United States andChina, p. 145.
86

Fairbank, The United States and China, p. 307; Jiang, The United States andChina, p. 145.
87

Hinton, China’s Turbulent Quest, p. 70; Dutt, China and the World, p. 22;
Quoted in Allen S. “Logic of Communist China’s Policy: The First Decade,”
Yale Review, vol. 50 (Autumn, 1960), p. 16.

186

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