JIIA Forum Presentation Summary
January 12, 2012
Venue: The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Timothy Colton
Dean, Department of Political Science, Harvard University“A Fracture in Putin’s Political System?”

The State Duma elections in Russia in December 2011 resulted in a substantial drop in thenumber of seats held by the ruling Unified Russia Party. Following the announcement ofthe election results, a series of demonstrations protesting election irregularities broke out inMoscow, Saint Petersburg and other major cities. The “near-certain” return of Putin to thepresidency has suddenly taken a doubtful turn; the Putin “system” previously regarded as
rock-solid could even be said to be exhibiting a “fracture.” Why did this “fracture” occur?
How serious is it? Could this “fracture” widen in future? I would like to address thesequestions today.
The direct cause for the ruling party’s recent loss of seats and the subsequent
demonstrations is likely Putin’s plan to return to the presidency announced at the Unified
Russia Party Conference last September. This plan entails President Medvedev stepping
down as a candidate in the next presidential election in favor of Prime Minister Putin, inexchange for which Putin would appoint Medvedev as prime minister if United Russia wereto win the State Duma elections and Putin were to be elected president. What’s more, it
was added in explanation that this plan to exchange places between president and prime
minister was a decision made “behind closed doors” between Putin and Medvedev,
disappointing not only Medvedev’s elite supporters but the general populace as well.
Why did the Putin-Medvedev tandem administration, particularly adept at image strategy, so
ineptly announce Putin’s re-appearance? Medvedev’s explanation of Putin’s comeback
plan was clearly inadequate, giving one the sense that a minute “fracture” has appeared inthe tandem administration.
A “fracture” has also emerged within the ranks of the elite supporting this tandem
administration. A good example of this is provided perhaps by the fuss surrounding the1

dismissal of the previous finance minister Alexei Kudrin. Putin’s return to the presidency
itself had been anticipated by many Russians, but people’s reactions would likely have beendifferent had the announcement been the outcome of a more formal approach, e.g., hadparty members had been asked for their approval at the party conference.
The recent demonstrations clearly illustrated the existence of a “fracture” between theadministration and the general public that cannot be overlooked.

An unwritten social

contract has been in place in Russia since the inauguration of the Putin administration.
The government is to guarantee people economic freedom, in return for the people abiding
by the government’s oppressive policies.

The recent demonstrations suggest that a“fracture” has occurred in this unwritten promise.
The lives of the Russian people changed greatly after the turn of the millennium. Manypeople saw their livelihoods improve by leaps and bounds as the economy boomed. Good
indicators of this include the explosive spread of the Internet and cell phone usage and thesubstantial increase in the number of Russians traveling abroad. Political freedom, on theother hand, has suffered.

The Putin administration has implemented one policy after

another to strengthen the authority of the central government. Putin himself justifies this bydeclaring that conditions in Russia immediately after he became president required apolitical crackdown for the sake of social stability, as ongoing political turmoil since thebreakup of the Soviet Union was moving the country towards collapse.
However, the administration’s explanation met with an increasingly skeptical reception by apublic whose political awareness had risen as it enjoyed the benefits of economic freedom.
Dissatisfaction with the government has been particularly conspicuous since 2010 among
highly educated urban youth engaged in vigorous discussions on the Internet. Criticism
has risen of Putin, who did not describe the image in which he would like to remake Russia
once “stability” had been achieved through political crackdowns. As you know, the latest
demonstrations grew via use of the Internet.

This change in political awareness has

become the driving power behind the public’s assertive “no!” to the long-time rulingestablishment.
The administration has been fretting over how to respond to the dissatisfaction clearly
indicated in these demonstrations. Even while rejecting a redo or a recount of the State
Duma elections, President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin have laid out revisions totheir earlier policies, promising to reform the law on political parties, resurrect direct election2

of governors, and establish public broadcast organizations.

They are also exploring

possible dialogue with demonstration leaders and non-ruling parties as well as establishinga coalition government.
Nevertheless, there remain doubts about just how well these approaches will work. The
administration may seek out dialogue with the leaders of the demonstrations, but who isleading these demonstrations is by no means clear. A coalition government with opposition
parties also presents problems as Putin’s efforts to eliminate opposition have been sothorough that there is no opposition party within the Duma capable of taking up the people’s
dissatisfaction and thus no partners with whom to form a collation. The administrationmust keep the demonstrators in check even while carefully allaying their dissatisfaction, andit faces some difficult maneuvering in this regard.
Over the past ten years Putin has sought to build a full-blown ruling structure thatconcentrates authority in his own hands, all the while closing his eyes to the corruption
arising around him in the course of this power grab. This is now coming back to haunt
Putin. Putin will likely be re-elected in the March presidential election but his previous
approaches will no longer work; Putin himself will have to change. The key questions to be
asked are whether Putin can move away from a micromanaging style and delegate moreauthority, and whether he can take resolute action against the corruption surrounding him.

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