BTI 2022 Country Report

Slovakia

This report is part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2022. It covers
the period from February 1, 2019 to January 31, 2021. The BTI assesses the transformation
toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of governance in 137 countries.
More on the BTI at https://www.bti-project.org.
Please cite as follows: Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2022 Country Report — Slovakia. Gütersloh:
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2022.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Contact
Bertelsmann StiftungCarl-Bertelsmann-Strasse 25633111 Gütersloh
Germany
Sabine DonnerPhone+49 5241 81 81501
sabine.donner@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Hauke Hartmann
Phone+49 5241 81 81389
hauke.hartmann@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Claudia HärterichPhone+49 5241 81 81263
claudia.haerterich@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Sabine Steinkamp
Phone+49 5241 81 81507
sabine.steinkamp@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

3

Key Indicators
Population

M

5.5

HDI

Pop. growth1% p.a.

0.1

HDI rank of 189

Life expectancy

years

77.5

UN Education Index

0.826

Poverty3

%

1.0

53.8

Gender inequality2

0.191

Aid per capita $-Urban population %

0.860
39

GDP p.c., PPP $Gini Index

31832
25.0

Sources (as of December 2021): The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2021 | UNDP, Human Development
Report 2020. Footnotes: (1) Average annual growth rate. (2) Gender Inequality Index (GII). (3) Percentage of
population living on less than $3.20 a day at 2011 international prices.

Executive Summary
The economic and political developments in Slovakia at the beginning of the review period werehighly dependent on the Smer-SD party and its leaders Robert Fico and Peter Pellegrini, whowere attempting to strike a balance between meeting the demands of Western partners and thedomestic electorate, between fiscal consolidation and fiscal populism, and between large
multinationals and domestic oligarchs. In the post-EU accession era, Smer-SD had won threeconsecutive electoral terms. However, the February 2018 murders of journalist Ján Kuciak andhis fiancée ultimately led to the end of Smer-SD rule. Kuciak had investigated corruption in highpolitics and Italian mafia activities in Slovakia, disclosing the penetration of state structures bycorruption. At the same time, allegations of office abuse and bribes continued to be inadequately
investigated and prosecuted, which created further public frustration and distrust. Mobilizationof citizens angry with Smer-SD’s corrupt governance resulted in a change in government
through the February 2020 elections and the 2019 presidential elections. The government underPrime Minister Peter Pellegrini (then Smer-SD) who replaced Fico in 2018 was ineffective indealing with corruption or the loss of integrity.
The political consequences of the murder continued to influence politics, including municipal,
presidential, European and parliamentary elections that took place during the review period.
Public dissatisfaction with pervasive corruption led to Zuzana Čaputová’s victory in thepresidential elections in March 2019. She was the candidate of the newly founded (2017) social
liberal and pro-European party, Progressive Slovakia. Several other parties supported her to be
the first female president in Slovakia. Čaputová previously worked as a lawyer and activist for
the NGO-watchdog VIA IURIS.
Mobilization of citizens angry with Smer-SD’s corrupt governance resulted in the change ofgovernment through the elections in February 2020. Igor Matovič, the founder and leader ofOrdinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO), won elections on an anti-corruption
stance. Since 2010 he has established himself as an outstanding and convincing critic of

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

corruption, and he seized the opportunity created by broad anti-corruption protests andsentiments, winning 25% of the popular vote. OĽaNO rejects traditional, “establishment” parties
on the left and right and strongly favors populist rhetoric over a programmatic approach. Its
rhetoric is flexible, responding to shifts in public moods and following social media drives.
Matovič formed a governing coalition with three other parties: We are Family (Sme Rodina), a
socially conservative Eurosceptic party; Freedom and Solidarity (SaS), an economically liberaland libertarian party; and For the People (Za ľudí), a center-right, liberal-conservative party
founded by the former president Andrej Kiska.
The record of the new Matovič government is mixed. On the one hand, the government prepared
a comprehensive program with clear priorities and the impressive National Reform Program
2020. Its main goals reflect the EC and OECD recommendations and Slovakia’s international
commitments. The most visible progress occurred in justice and anti-corruption policies.
Moreover, an ongoing investigation and prosecution of organized crime, which encompasses top
corrupt judges and police officers, former politicians, and oligarchs, is underway. On the other
hand, the new prime minister has damaged the image of democratic and responsible government
through his unpredictable political communication, repeatedly insulting not only the opposition
but also his coalition partners, experts, media, NGOs and citizens. More importantly, because of
pandemic-related measures, Slovakia’s firmly established image as a fiscally responsible country
has been damaged, as the 2020 and 2021 budgets are not in line with EU recommendations. The
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the global crisis pushed the country into a recession in2020 due to a contraction in investments, low foreign demand and a sharp drop in private
consumption. According to Slovak National Bank, the economy is unlikely to return to its precrisis level before 2022. The pandemic exacerbated the deficit, due to weak tax revenues andsocial contributions, and fiscal measures taken to cushion the effects of the crisis.
While in spring 2020 Slovakia successfully minimized the number of cases of COVID-19, byautumn the country faced one of the highest increases of COVID-19-related deaths in the world.
Support for Prime Minister Matovič and his OĽaNO party dramatically declined because of alack of a stable electorate, and because of Matovič’s political style, way of communication andchaotic performance. In sum, Slovakia has gained a very different image over the review period,
highlighting the poor state of the health care, lack of medical staff, controversies between thenational government and municipalities, and the neglect of democracy (encompassing humanrights and the rule of law) by the executive in particular, including steps to strengthen theexecutive at the expense of parliament.

4

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

History and Characteristics of Transformation
After the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (Czechoslovakia) in 1993, theindependent Slovak Republic deviated from the liberal path of democratic consolidation. From1992 to 1998, with a brief pause in 1994, the country’s prime minister was Vladimír Mečiar,whose semi-autocratic rule led to the exclusion of Slovakia from the first negotiation round with
the European Union in December 1997. Slovakia was accepted into NATO only in 2004, unlike
the three neighboring Visegrád countries which entered NATO in 1999. The Mečiar government(1994 - 1998) was embroiled in a sharp conflict with opposition parties, the president,
independent media, NGOs, ethnic minority representatives and churches. Norms of rule of law
were openly violated. Some constitutional principles and decisions by the Constitutional Court
were disregarded. Slovak society suffered from extreme polarization between advocates andopponents of liberal democracy.
In the 1998 parliamentary elections, previously highly fragmented political opposition and civilsociety initiatives mobilized democratically oriented citizens and created a broad-based antiMečiar alliance to stop the continuation of the semi-authoritarian regime. The resulting victoryfor democratic forces underscored Slovaks’ commitment to constitutional liberal democracy andinternational recognition, and the country again embarked on a path toward integration,
democratic consolidation and pro-market reforms. The first post-Mečiar government (1998 –2002), led by Mikuláš Dzurinda, launched a renewed pro-Western foreign policy agenda
focusing on membership in NATO, the European Union and the OECD, as well as on gaining
broader international credibility. After the 2002 elections, the second Dzurinda’s government
introduced major structural reforms closely linked to ideas derived from the so-called
Washington Consensus, such as introducing a flat tax system, reforming the pension and healthcare systems, creating incentives for foreign investors, and welfare state retrenchment. The
reformist political and societal forces (political parties, NGOs, think tanks, independent experts
and public intellectuals) maintained dominating positions over the anti-reformist veto players.
Due to these reforms and a massive inflow of foreign investment, Slovakia has experienced
unprecedented economic growth since 2006. However, public dissatisfaction with the state ofhealth care, with some aspects of social policy and the implemented labor code reform, led to acomplete change of party composition in the government following the 2006 elections. The
ideologically heterogeneous coalition government composed of the left-wing Smer-SD andnational-populist authoritarian parties, the Slovak National Party (SNS) and the People’s Party –Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (ĽS-HZDS) raised doubts about the course of thecountry’s development. Nevertheless, the first Fico government maintained the previous
government’s main economic priority (i.e., meeting the economic criteria for adopting the euro
on January 1, 2009). Given this goal, the government pursued sound fiscal and monetary policies
during the first half of its term. However, since the 2009 global crisis, Fico has increased the roleof the state in the economy through minor changes, and as a result, the budget deficit has
increased. Meanwhile, the government failed to properly address the major social challenge,

5

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

increasing unemployment. Welfare policies were not systematic and mostly included one-time
direct payments. Fico showed less respect for media freedom, civil society, and democratic
institutions in general, neglecting to pursue anti-discrimination and anti-corruption measures.
The 2010 elections brought the center-right parties back into government as the public reacted tocorruption, party cronyism and the poor performance of the previous government. A center-rightcoalition government headed by Iveta Radičová (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union –Democratic Party) included the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) and two new parties,
the liberal Freedom and Solidarity (SaS), and a newly formed Slovak-Hungarian Most-Híd.
Radičová’s government, however, collapsed due to an intra-coalition disagreement over theEuropean Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which was strongly opposed by SaS. The
government lost a parliamentary vote of confidence in October 2011. The performance ofRadičová’s government left a rather ambiguous impression. In its short time in office, it passed
several important legislative changes, including the requirement that all contracts involving
public funds be published on the internet (making the validity of these contracts conditional on
publication), a new system for the selection of judges, changes to the Press Act, and amendments
to the Labor Code to make it easier to hire and fire employees. The quality of democracy
improved under Radičová’s government due to the involvement of dynamic civil society actors,
watchdog organizations and the media.
A corruption scandal between 2005 and 2006, the details of which were disclosed in 2011, led to“Gorilla protests” in 2012. Center-right voters became alienated and were demotivated. Smer-SD
won a sweeping victory in the early 2012 parliamentary elections, winning 83 seats in the 150seat parliament. The second Fico government lacked transparency and had done little to improveanti-corruption measures and economic development. After the 2016 parliamentary elections,Fico was reappointed prime minister. However, this time, the elections produced a fragmented
parliament with eight parties, and forming a stable government based on programmatic andideological compatibility that would last until the next scheduled elections looked almost
impossible. Fico had to accept three other parties as new coalition partners. Two of thembelonged to the center-right (Most-Híd and Sieť). The third partner, SNS, stemmed from theradical nationalist wing, but had moderated its program before the elections and excluded someof its discredited leaders (e.g., former chairman Ján Slota). The ruling coalition of “strange
bedfellows” included Smer-SD (national populists with left-leaning rhetoric), radical nationalists
and center-right politicians. The coalition included parties representing the two sides of the
Slovak-Hungarian ethnic cleavage, who shared complicated historic relations. This left thecoalition very fragile. However, it was only after the murder of investigative journalist andsubsequent large-scale protests that the controversial long-standing Prime Minister Robert Ficostood down. Peter Pellegrini (Smer-SD) replaced Fico but failed to strengthen democracy andthe rule of law.

6

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7

The BTI combines text analysis and numerical assessments. The score for eachquestion is provided below its respective title. The scale ranges from 1 (worst) to10 (best).

Transformation Status

I. Political Transformation
1 | Stateness

The Slovak Republic has an unchallenged monopoly on the use of force throughout
the country.

Question
Score

Monopoly on theuse of force

10

All citizens enjoy the same human rights and civil liberties, and the majority of the
population acknowledges the legitimacy of the state. The loyalty of ethnic
Hungarians living in Slovakia has been a sensitive political issue, as nationalist
groups on both sides perceive the history of their coexistence as loaded with unjust
and acculturation policies. The volatility of borders between the former
Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the 20th century has enhanced such a perception.
However, Slovak-Hungarian relations have calmed in recent years, even if thesubsequent Orbán governments occasionally exploit the Hungarian “nationalquestion,” and adopt policies which interfere in the politics of neighboring countries(e.g., granting citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living abroad). This fragile situation
did not substantially change after the 2020 elections, even though no ethnic
Hungarian parties entered the parliament. At the local level, there were no
ethnically motivated political conflicts; these had occurred in the past.

State identity

10

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

8

According to the constitution, the “state is not linked to any religion.” However, thechurch has not been fully separated from the state, as it receives funding from thestate budget. The state fully finances the salaries of priests and subsidizes central
church offices, building maintenance and church schools. After the 2020 elections,the role of the church may increase as many Catholic activists entered parliament onOĽaNO, Sme rodina (We are Family) and Kotlebovci-ĽSNS party lists. Thanks to
NGOs resistance, media criticism and Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) initiative, anamendment of the abortion law was not passed, but member of parliament Anna
Záborská from Christian Union (faction inside OĽaNO), who proposed theamendment, promised to submit it again in six months.

No interference ofreligious dogmas

The state’s administrative structure functions throughout the entire territory, and thestate extracts and allocates state resources on a broad basis. Administrative tasks are
conducted in part by local state administrative institutions, and in part by theregional and local municipalities. They have separated and shared competencies,
which also determine principles of coordination on specific matters such as
territorial planning and emergency situations. The situation in the self-built
segregated Roma settlements, where the state administration is failing to provide
full access to basic infrastructure (e.g., water, sewerage and electricity), is not
optimal, and only a few municipalities have implemented effective policies (e.g.,loans and subsidies to help Roma citizens build their own new homes with fullaccess to basic infrastructure). Despite these persistent shortcomings, the COVID19 pandemic did not worsen access to basic services in Roma settlements for an
extended period. No services in basic infrastructure were disrupted during the
pandemic.

Basic
administration

910

2 | Political Participation

Elections are free and fair and are held without any significant restrictions.
Slovakia’s unicameral parliament is elected under a proportional electoral system ina single nationwide constituency with a 5% threshold. However, while the single
nationwide district does not violate the free and fair character of elections, it lowers
the degree of regional representativeness.
General elections took place as planned on February 29, 2020, just a few days
before the first COVID-19 case was diagnosed. According to an OSCE report, theelections were free and fair and were administered in an orderly way. However, theElectoral Act provides a two week ban on pre-election opinion polls.
Due to the state of emergency, local by-elections were rescheduled from April 4 to
October 3, 2020. However, as the law allows for such postponement, this did not
violate the norms of free, fair and regular elections.

Free and fairelections

10

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

9

The democratically elected president and parliament, as well as the government andother constitutional institutions, have the effective power to govern. They are notconstrained by any non-democratic veto powers. Asset-stripping oligarchs andpolitically connected business tycoons exist and attempt to influence the politicalprocess using their political connections. However, they do not exercise a vetopower.

Effective power togovernAssociation and assembly rights are constitutionally guaranteed and upheld byauthorities. Article 29 of the constitution provides political rights and the freedom
to join political and civic groups. The freedom of association and assembly can belimited only in accordance with the law.

Association /assembly rights

When the first case of COVID-19 was diagnosed in early March 2020, Pellegrini’s
government introduced a set of measures that limited the freedom of movement andassembly. In October 2020 the government reintroduced a state of emergency,
including new restrictive measures.
While in spring 2020 the restrictions on personal lives were accepted without much
resistance, the government’s decision to reintroduce the state of emergency in
October 2020 was much contested. First, opposition MPs petitioned theConstitutional Court, arguing that there was no immediate threat to the lives andhealth of people, but the court upheld the constitutionality of the state of
emergency. Second, several hundred people, mostly supporters of the far-right
Kotlebovci (People’s Party Our Slovakia) and so-called ultras, protested in
Bratislava on October 17 (the official Day of Freedom and Democracy tocommemorate the Velvet Revolution). The protesters criticized the government’s
measures, including the ban on assemblies of over six people. The unauthorized
protest turned violent, and some police officers were attacked; consequently, police
used tear gas and water cannons to disperse the crowds. The government extended
the state of emergency twice and tightened some measures restricting freemovement and assembly until January 24, 2021.
The restricted measures imposed by the government were not motivated by thedesire to restrict the constitutional rights of citizens or abuse them in favor of thedominant political forces.

1010

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

Freedom of expression is guaranteed in Slovakia by law. There are viableindependent media outlets. However, several structural and cultural factors limit the
freedom of expression.

10

Freedom of
expression

9

Media outlets previously owned by foreign media companies have been acquired by
local oligarchs. In 2019, Petr Kellner, one of the wealthiest Czech businessmen,bought Central European Media Enterprises, which includes the largest Slovak TV
channel, Markíza. Other private channels include TV JOJ, which belongs to thesame people behind the J&T company. The TA3 news channel is owned bybusinessman Ivan Kmotrík, who has close ties to the nationalist SNS party. In
September 2019, the previous ruling coalition (Smer-SD, SNS, Most-Híd)reintroduced a right-to-reply for politicians. The amendment of the Press Code is alittle less restrictive compared to the legislation of 2008 - 2011, but it still enables
courts – for “privacy protection” – to limit the freedom of speech in favor ofpoliticians, oligarchs and judges. In the past, many independent newspapers wereforced to pay very high fines. The law has granted politicians the right of reply or to
demand the publication of a correction. If a media outlet fails to do so, it could facea fine of up to €5,000. This amendment was passed just 18 months after the murderof investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and sent the worst possible signal to theinternational democratic community. However, since the late 1990s, the media has
played an important role in the democratic accountability mechanism in Slovakia.
The tense relationship between the government and media has improved after the
February 2020 elections.

3 | Rule of Law

Generally, the system of checks and balances has functioned well within theframework of the parliamentary system. During the review period, some important
improvements were made to checks and balances related to the judiciary. On theother hand, the pandemic somehow led to the centralization of power in the handsof the government at the expense of parliament. Although the Slovak president has
weak constitutional powers and is mostly a moral voice or political authority,Čaputová managed to use her constitutional prerogatives to be a balancing force.
The composition of the Constitutional Court (after a lengthy conflict) was finallycompleted in 2019 under the Pellegrini government, following the end of thejudges’ term in February 2019. The Constitutional Court ruled in October 2020 that
the Matovič government had declared a national emergency in compliance with the
Slovak constitution. However, during the autumn wave of the pandemic, parliament
decided to allow the government to repeatedly extend the 90-day national
emergency by 40 days, subject to confirmation by the parliament within 20 days
after the extension came into force. This legislation definitely limits the powers ofparliament, and at the end of December 2020 even members of parliament who had

Separation of
powers8

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

11

just tested positive for COVID-19 were summoned to vote for the extension of thestate of emergency. Moreover, the Matovič government passed many laws
following a fast-track procedure that is at odds with the constitution, given that thelegislation was not related to the pandemic. Excessive use of fast-track procedure
may undermine the separation of powers, as it allows the parliament to pass a billon the day of approval by the government, and hence reduces the role of parliamentin scrutinizing legislation.
Slovak courts generally operated independently from executive power during thereview period. However, the courts suffer from widespread nepotism and cronyism.
This, linked with a weak accountability mechanism and perceived corruption, led toa constant decline of trust in the courts. The Pellegrini government abandoned
reforms prepared and partly implemented by the former justice minister, whichsought to foster transparency and tackle corruption in the judicial system. After the
February 2020 elections, new Justice Minister Mária Kolíková (Za Ľudí - For the
People) prepared a systemic, long-anticipated judicial reform that was passed at theend of 2020. It included reform of the Judicial Council, property checks of judges,
reform of the Constitutional Court (CC), an age cap for judges, and theestablishment of a new, Supreme Administrative Court. The Justice Ministry also
prepared to reduce the current 54 district courts to 30 and the number of regional
appeal courts from eight to three. This territorial administrative change may help toweaken the long-established corrupt ties between judges, politicians, oligarchs, andorganized crime.

Independent
judiciary

8

The public and expert community strongly support these reforms as an important
step toward strengthening justice. However, it also provoked a strong opposition
from “the old guard,” that is, those judges and prosecutors who were allegedly
involved in bribery and abuse of power. Several of them had already been formallyaccused and detained during 2020. They included the former state secretary of theJustice Ministry, the vice-chairwoman of the Supreme Court, heads of local courts
and ordinary judges, former main special prosecutor, former prosecutor general, andordinary prosecutors. These developments represent one of the most important steps
in the cleansing of the justice system. However, restoring trust in the judiciary (andthe entire political class) will take time.
Office abuse and corruption is the most sensitive sociopolitical problem
undermining stability and quality of democracy in Slovakia because the majority ofallegations continued to be inadequately investigated. This creates further
frustration and distrust amongst citizens already angry with Smer-SD corrupt
governance. Only after the 2018 murder of the investigative journalist have someSmer-SD leaders faced some accountability. Some pending cases involving
corruption from the first Fico government were finally decided in court under thePellegrini government, but the situation dramatically changed after the 2020
elections. Up to the end of January 2021, a number of high-profile judges, police

Prosecution of
office abuse

8

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

12

officers, ministers, top-administrative officials, and oligarchs were arrested andcharged with serious crimes. These steps in fighting corruption are significant, andmoreover, they are complemented by the judiciary reform (see 3.2) and changes tohigh-ranking personnel in police, courts, and the prosecutor. However, increasing
trust in the political class will require even further systemic and long-term efforts.
Civil rights are largely respected in Slovakia. As an EU member state, the country
has institutions to supervise the observance of civil rights such as the Constitutional
Court, the Supreme Court, general courts, prosecutor offices, the Office of the
Ombudsman (Public Defender of Rights), a special committee of parliament and the
National Center for Human Rights. These independent authorities play an importantrole in safeguarding civil rights but would benefit from clearer mandates, amended
legal status, and sufficient resources to exercise their roles more effectively. In
association with EU accession, Slovakia strengthened the non-discrimination
against illegal interference by public administrative bodies.
The Roma remain the most vulnerable segment of society; they are frequently
subject to mistreatment by the state authorities (including the police) anddiscrimination on racial grounds (especially in the labor market). Human rights
NGOs, including advocacy groups and watchdogs, have a key role in enforcing theequal treatment of Roma, while negative social attitudes still prevail. Some NGOs
have criticized the government for using army and police forces to prevent COVID19 from spreading in marginalized Roma settlements (mostly in east Slovakia).
NGOs (e.g., CVEK, Center for the Research of Ethnicity and Culture) argue thatsuch steps risk further stigmatization of an already stigmatized community. They
argued that the Roma people who test positive should be transferred out of theircommunity to state-sponsored quarantine.
The LGBTQ+ community is another stigmatized segment of the population whoserights are not sufficiently protected. Their substantiated demands are neglected orsimply ignored. Single mothers, pensioners, and patients with specific diseases canalso be classified as belonging to vulnerable groups.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, some fundamental civil rights (e.g., the freedomof movement and assembly, the right to privacy) were repeatedly restricted. Someof these measures were passed using a fast-track procedure. At the end of March
2020, the cabinet proposed to use location and other metadata produced throughelectronic communication. After the proposal was labeled “a spying law,” causing
fear and widespread opposition, it was withdrawn, with the reason cited as weak IT
capacities.
When the first case of COVID-19 in Slovakia was diagnosed in early March 2020,
the Pellegrini government introduced a set of measures that limited the freedom of
movement and assembly, as well as imposing a 14-day quarantine on all arrivals
from abroad. People had to stay in state-owned facilities until testing negative for

Civil rights

9

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

13

COVID-19. Conditions in some of these facilities were very poor and initial reports
about the treatment of citizens were rather disturbing. Only gradually, in the wakeof media reports, were these Draconian measures modified. According to somelegal experts, the constitutionality and proportionality of many restrictions werequestionable.
4 | Stability of Democratic Institutions

The ensemble of democratic institutions is effective and efficient. As a rule,
political decisions are prepared, taken, implemented and reviewed throughlegitimate procedures by the appropriate authorities. Democratic institutions operate
within a parliamentary democracy framework. After the 2020 elections there was acomplete makeover of the composition of the government. The polarization
between the government and opposition has increased as the dividing line has
shifted from policies to politics since 2016, when the far-right ultra-nationalist party
Kotleba – ĽSNS gained seats in the parliament. The pandemic, and disagreements
over measures implemented, have increased tensions between national, regional andlocal governments over competences and effectiveness. However, all issues were,
ultimately, democratically settled.

Performance of
democratic
institutions

The majority of political parties in Slovakia are committed to democratic
institutions or at least rhetorically support democratic norms and institutions.
According to representative opinion polls, the vast majority of the population
express support for democratic norms and values. Influential business actors, theclergy, and the military also accept most democratic institutions as legitimate.
However, a recent investigation has disclosed substantial corrupt ties between highranking representatives of the Smer-SD party, police officers, judges, prosecutors,
and rogue businessmen, who de facto ignored the legitimate power of institutions inwhich they operate.

Commitment todemocratic
institutions

8

8

5 | Political and Social Integration

Slovakia has a relatively low degree of party system institutionalization but withstable patterns of party competition, characterized by a dominant party in one camp(often using nationalist or left-wing appeals) and a group of fragmented center-rightparties in the other. These two voting blocs have been stable in size and ideologicalpreferences. Yet, after 30 years of free party competition, high fluidity persists,
expressed in the emergence of new parties and the collapse of established ones. The
high degree of party instability and ongoing fragmentation is further complicated byincreasing crosscutting polarization. The first dimension of party competition runs
between the far-right and the left, the second between liberals and conservatives,and finally, between ethnicities. After the 2020 elections, the previously establishedpatterns of party competition weakened as several major parties used mixed
appeals. The winner of the 2020 elections, Prime Minister Matovič’s party, OĽaNO

Party system

6

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

14(Ordinary People and Independent Personalities), is a clear example of such mixed
appeals. His party does not have a proper institutionalized membership or territorialorganization. In fact, it is a coalition of minor parties and “personalities.” Thepreviously dominant Smer-SD party, the self-declared “social democratic” politicalforce, until recently faced no real competition on the left. Smer-SD gradually lost
support and ultimately split after its former vice-chair, Peter Pellegrini (who in 2018
replaced Robert Fico as prime minister), founded a new left-wing party named
Hlas-SD (Voice-Social Democracy) in September 2020. The center-right of theparty system became even more fragmented after the 2020 elections and lacks solid
representation in parliament. The libertarian Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) has
gradually shifted toward the economic center-right. Most-Híd, an ethnically mixed(Hungarian-Slovak) party did not enter the parliament in 2020. The Slovak National
Party (SNS) lost support and did not pass the threshold either. In February 2021 a
split occurred in right-wing extremist ĽSNS due to the efforts of the convicted party
leader, Marián Kotleba, to concentrate powers in his hands.
After the 2020 elections, the main parties present in parliament constitute rather
loose groups of individuals selected by the respective party leader and are split
between center-right conservatives, self-declared social democrats, economic andpartly social liberals, and right-wing extremists. In general, all parties are elitecentered and very weak in aggregating societal interests. Support for parties remains
personalized and depends mostly on the leader’s appeal. Consequently, volatility
and polarization depend on party leaders’ ability to attract support and articulate
current pressing political issues.
While parties remain elitist and rather weakly rooted in society, civil society is wellanchored in diverse interest groups, which are well-differentiated and organized.
The interaction between labor and business follows the continental European
model. There are umbrella organizations in all special interest and professional
sectors that represent and mediate the demands of interest groups vis-à-vis thegovernment and its institutions. The main social interest groups have access to thepolicymaking process through the tripartite social dialogue and various advisory
bodies (e.g., councils at the government and ministerial levels). The social dialogue
includes not only business and professional organizations, but also civil society
organizations (e.g., trade unions, consumer groups, NGOs and churches).
Most organized interest groups enjoy some access to policymaking. While businessassociations are in a better position to provide policy proposals, as they have moreresources and some of them operate or support think tanks, trade unions are lesswell equipped and have suffered from fragmentation. However, in the past the mainumbrella trade union organization KOZ (Confederation of Trade Unions),
representing almost 30 sectoral unions, has benefited from close ties to Smer-SD
and was able to push for its interests. KOZ focused primarily on increasing theminimum wage and an assortment of less controversial issues such as workplacesecurity.

Interest groups

9

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

In Slovakia, democracy has been firmly anchored thanks to EU membership, andvibrant and influential pro-democratic civil society actors. These actors, together
with the media and democratic parties, have successfully countered and prevented
the rise of non-democratic politicians to power. In this sense, Slovakia benefits fromthe legacy of fighting the authoritarian regime of Vladimír Mečiar, including
sensitivity to restrictions on opposition rights and aversion to the concentration of
executive power. The sudden political crisis after the murder of Ján Kuciak and his
fiancée in 2018 fostered broad popular protests and movements in support ofdemocratic values.

15

Approval of
democracy

9

In terms of political values, Slovakia remains split into two camps. Dissatisfaction
with the working of democracy has declined slightly during the reviewed period.
According to Eurobarometer Summer 2020, 54% of people in Slovakia weredissatisfied with democracy in the country, a drop from 58% in 2018, but still
higher than the EU average (41%). Trust in the parliament and government remains
low and is decreasing (28% and 29%, respectively). It is below the EU average.
These attitudes were confirmed during the COVID-19 pandemic, as concerns overthe state of democracy increased (FOCUS 2021).
Only one relevant parliamentary party explicitly questions democratic values – theKotlebovci-ĽSNS, supported by 10.4% of the electorate in the 2020 elections. In
October 2020, the Specialized Criminal Court sentenced the party’s leader Marián
Kotleba to four years and four months in prison (Kotleba appealed the verdict andremained free at the end of the review period). He was found guilty of using neoNazi symbols by donating the exact sum of €1,488 to three poor families – a figurethat carries symbolic meaning for neo-Nazis and white supremacists.
Slovakian civil society is relatively well-differentiated and organized. Interest
groups have a direct influence on policymaking. According to the Government
Council for Non-Governmental Non-Profit Organization, over 64,000 organizations
exist in Slovakia (see Q2.3). Specific historical legacies (e.g., mistrust of strangers,a parochial political culture, social pessimism, and passivity) have for decades
influenced social capital and created strong social networks between relatives andclose friends. According to the European Quality of Life Survey 2016 and“Citizenship Empowerment” report in 2017, Slovakia has somewhat lower levels ofinterpersonal trust than neighboring Central European countries. Recentsociological findings show higher levels of general trust among people with postmaterial orientations and those with higher job security/satisfaction. Given the highlevels of unemployment in the country until relatively recently, this partly explains
lower levels of trust in Slovakia compared to the Czech Republic.

Social capital

8

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

16

II. Economic Transformation
6 | Level of Socioeconomic Development

Slovakia continues to enjoy a very high level of human development (39 out of 189
countries in the 2019 Human Development Index). Income inequality remains
relatively low – the Gini coefficient was 25.2 in 2016 – and poverty rates are
decreasing. The pre-pandemic high economic growth rate significantly improved
labor markets, which contributed to a decline in the risk of poverty. However, thetime of fast economic growth is over: since 2012 GDP per capita has stagnatedaround 76–77% of the EU–27, primarily because of lower FDI (OECD 2019: 125).
Slovakia has been falling behind in all rankings measuring economic freedom,
competitiveness, business environment, and corruption (Mikloš 2018). The
COVID-19 pandemic has affected most industries and services, meaning poverty islikely to increase, despite government efforts.
Overall, the intensity of poverty in Slovakia remains relatively high. When
compared to EU and OECD countries, segments of the population (e.g., the Roma)
still have limited access to labor, social housing, and education. The pandemic had anegative impact on marginalized communities, and its long-term consequences(especially the worsened access to education during the pandemic-related
lockdowns) are difficult to assess. The increase in employment prior to thepandemic came to a halt, although unemployment increased only marginally (7.4%
in November, according to Slovakia’s Labor Office, a 2.5 percentage point increaseyear-on-year).
Large ethnic and gender disparities in the labor market persist. Large regional
disparities amplify the levels of unemployment among low-skilled workers andlong-term unemployed people (e.g., the Roma). Young people and women continue
to be disadvantaged in terms of access to the labor market. Active labor market
policies to improve the integration of the long-term unemployed using personalized
services are badly needed. Women’s employment opportunities conflict with care
responsibilities, as high-quality and affordable care services, in particular forchildren under the age of three, are still lacking. These issues remain insufficiently
addressed by social inclusion policies. While the Gender Inequality Index has not
significantly deteriorated in the past two years, it remains considerably higher in
Slovakia than in many neighboring countries (0.191 in 2019).

Question
Score

Socioeconomic
barriers

9

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17

Economic indicators

2017

2018

2019

2020

95209.5

105474.7

105119.2

104574.1

GDP$M

GDP growth

%

3.0

3.7

2.5

-4.8

Inflation (CPI)

%

1.3

2.5

2.7

1.9

Unemployment

%

8.1

6.5

5.8

6.8

Foreign direct investment% of GDP

4.4

2.1

2.2

-

Export growth

%

3.6

5.2

0.8

-7.5

Import growth

%

3.9

5.0

2.1

-8.3

Current account balance$M-1853.5-2293.0-2842.0-294.4

Public debt

% of GDP

51.6

49.7

48.2

60.3

External debt

$M

-

-

-

-

Total debt service

$M

-

-

-

-

Net lending/borrowing% of GDP

-0.9

-1.1

-1.5

-

Tax revenue% of GDP

18.6

18.6

18.7

-

Government consumption% of GDP

19.0

18.7

19.7

21.5

Public education spending% of GDP

3.9

4.0

-

-

Public health spending% of GDP

5.4

5.3

-

-

R&D expenditure% of GDP

0.9

0.8

-

-

Military expenditure% of GDP

1.1

1.2

1.7

1.8

Sources (as of December 2021): The World Bank, World Development Indicators | International
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI), Military Expenditure Database.

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

18

7 | Organization of the Market and Competition

Market competition is consistently defined and implemented. Entry and exit barriers
in product, factor, and capital markets are low or do not exist. Slovakia fullycomplies with international rules for the equal treatment of companies. Prices are
fully liberalized, and the shadow economy is in decline. According to the Kaufmann
and Kaliberda electricity consumption method, the shadow economy declined bymore than half between 1993 and 2016, from 16.2% to 7.52% of GDP (Hošová
2019). According to a different methodology, it averaged 16.9% of GDP between
2003 and 2018 (Enste 2018).

Marketorganization

9

Despite some improvements during the review period, it still takes a significant
amount of time and resources to establish a business in Slovakia, due to thecomplex legal framework for businesses. In the World Bank’s Doing Business 2020
report, the country slipped from 42 to 45 out of 190 countries in terms of the overall
ease of doing business, although the situation varies by field of business. The 2020
Doing Business report acknowledges that some conditions for establishing abusiness have marginally improved because of measures implemented by theprevious government of Peter Pellegrini (Smer-SD) which included, for example,
abolishing the requirement to obtain and submit information on tax arrears. While
costs for establishing a business are rather low (1.0% of GNI per capita), it takes on
average seven procedures and 21.5 days.
Slovakia is subject to EU antitrust and competition laws and has previously
implemented laws protecting the market from monopolies and a concentration of
dominant actors. The country has also established antitrust institutions; while
adequately configured, they sometimes react slowly. The Anti-Monopoly Office(Protimonopolný úrad, PMÚ) regularly fines companies for participating in cartels
or for abuse of dominant positions (e.g., in electricity or telecommunications).
Many of these companies, which are co-owned by multinationals, have successfully
contested PMÚ decisions in Slovak courts. It then becomes the European
Commission’s responsibility to apply a coherent anti-monopoly policy, but evenwhen this occurs, this constitutes a lengthy procedure.
Since the new government took power, there are widespread hopes that the PMÚwill face fewer barriers in terms of implementation of its decisions.

Competition policy

9

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

Foreign trade is fully liberalized, and the country is integrated within the European
Single Market. There are few non-tariff barriers. Entry and exit barriers within the
product, factor, and capital markets are low or do not exist. There is no stateintervention in free trade. Slovakia has one of the most open economies in theworld.

19

Liberalization offoreign trade10

According to the Slovak Statistical Office, in 2019 84.3% of exports went to EU
countries – 22% to Germany, followed by the Czech Republic, Poland, France, and
Hungary. Outside of the EU, the United States remains the largest trading partner.
The share of foreign trade in GDP remains very high at 185% (World Bank, 2019),
making Slovakia the third most open country in the EU. Slovakia has an overall
positive trade balance, which amounted to 0.4% of GDP in 2019.
A two-tier banking system exists in Slovakia, which includes the National Bank of
Slovakia (NBS) and various private commercial banks. The banking system isstable and has consolidated over time. In the review period, the banking sector
operated in two different periods marked by domestic economic growth andcontinued improvement in the labor market situation, and then the COVID-19
pandemic. During both, the banking system remained stable and healthy because of
the NBS’s intensive monitoring of risk management practices. Slovakia has a wellcapitalized and liquid banking system, as confirmed by the European Central Bank
assessment. The non-performing loans ratio is at the EU average. It has decreased
significantly from 5% in 2016 to 3.1% in 2019, below the euro area average of
3.6%. According to the World Bank, Slovakia’s bank capital to assets ratio and nonperforming loans is 10.4%. During the review period, Slovakia’s banks were notaffected by a credit crisis due to non-performing loans because of government
intervention that allowed for a short-term deferral of payment installments.
Following the EU directives, NBS enjoys important supervision powers over banks.
It can demand specific reports or scrutinize banks’ plans and must create a scheduleof bank inspections based on their stress tests. NBS also holds supervisory powers
regarding banks’ customer protection. NBS efficiently uses its powers, especially inthe field of housing loans, as the level of household debt has been increasing. To
reduce the risks of a housing bubble and strengthen financial stability, the NBS
introduced some stricter measures, including a decrease in mortgage amounts to 8090% of the real value of the property, and introduced a strict debt to income
criterion (DTI) so that clients cannot obtain a mortgage worth more than eight times
their net income.
However, there are some concerns that NBS supervision suffered during the
pandemic as it struggled to receive data from banks regarding the ability of clientsto repay their installments, failed loans, or the banks’ need for money to coverrising losses.

Banking system

10

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20

8 | Monetary and fiscal stability

Since Slovakia’s accession to the eurozone, anti-inflation and forex policy has beenin the hands of the European Central Bank. Inflation remained rather low (2.7% in
CPI in 2019).

Monetary stability

Fiscal consolidation used to be one of the few areas of solid consensus among allpolitical actors. This was confirmed by the establishment of the Council for
Budgetary Responsibility in December 2011, an independent fiscal council charged
with monitoring and evaluating fiscal policy and its effects on fiscal development.
Slovakia reduced its fiscal deficit from 8% in 2009 to 1.3% in 2019. For 2019, thePellegrini government prepared a balanced budget, and the budget was set to
produce a moderate surplus over the following two years. However, this was notreached, given the economic slowdown in Germany and uncertainty produced by
Brexit, which affected Slovakia’s export-oriented economy. Moreover, excessive
government spending prior to the February 2020 elections also increased the deficit.

Fiscal stability

The COVID-19 pandemic also affected previously sound budgetary policies, as
exports of goods - a strong pillar of the Slovak economy - declined and publicfinances were hit by extraordinary spending on health care, economy, and social
initiatives.
Both governments during the review period continued a “Value for Money” (VfM)
project, although the Sme-Rodina ministers (transport and labor) frequently ignored
the reports. The project operated in the Finance Ministry and since its launch in2016 has saved hundreds of millions of euros, contributing to sound fiscal policies.
In 2020, the VfM office prepared new material for program budgeting which, if
implemented, could improve public finance management further.
While Slovakia has a relatively high public debt (48.0% of GDP in 2019), risks tothe public finances are largely long-term, related to population aging and theabsence of pension and health care reform. The budgeting framework still reveals
certain gaps in terms of coverage, time horizons, and reliance on cash accounting.

10

9BTI 2022 | Slovakia

21

9 | Private Property

Private property rights in Slovakia are respected, and authorities regulate theacquisition, use, and sale of property. Property rights are sometimes restricted by
the overriding rights of the constitutionally defined public interest, for instance, by
highway construction projects, protection of cultural heritage, and environmental
protection. In such cases, owners receive financial compensation at market value.
Neither the Fico/Pellegrini nor the Matovič governments passed any relevant
legislation to enhance protection for private property rights. Slovakia’s International
Property Rights Index 2020 score decreased slightly: by -0.022 points to 6.365;
Slovakia still ranks fourth in the Central Eastern Europe and Central Asia region,and 39 in the world.

Property rights

Since the 1998 elections, the privatization of state companies in Slovakia has
followed market principles. Private enterprise is the central pillar of the Slovak
economy; most state-owned utilities and companies were privatized by 2006 andthere is a considerable flow of foreign direct investments and multinational
corporations into the country. The pandemic primarily affected small privatecompanies, and therefore the government was not forced to take equity stakes or
nationalize affected companies to prevent bankruptcy.

Private enterprise

9

10

10 | Welfare Regime

Since Slovakia joined the European Union, its social security system has covered all
the standard social risks associated with a developed market economy. The statesocial support system is regulated by law and financed primarily throughemployee/employer contributions. The system guarantees basic benefits to theentire population and its institutional and organizational structure is fairly
satisfactory. The social policy includes financial and non-financial benefits, direct
and indirect payments, and tax base deductions and subsidies.
Thanks to vigorous economic growth, the unemployment rate has gradually fallen
below 5.8% (OECD Report, 2019) - the lowest since Slovakia’s independence. In
the review period further labor market improvements were expected in the medium
term; however, instead of improving active labor market policy, the Pellegrini
government focused on increasing the minimum wage (from €520 to €580 shortly
before the 2020 elections) and one-off bonuses. Because of this populist approach
to social policy and the negative effects of the pandemic, unemployment is likely toincrease in the next few years. The risk of poverty is low due to the country’s
relatively uniform income distribution. However, the pandemic has the potential tohave a negative impact on marginalized communities, as labor market mobility
within Slovakia is low, regional differences in unemployment remain high.

Social safety nets

9

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

22

Due to the pandemic, the Matovič government did not introduce any medium or
long-term labor reforms. Instead, several measures to offset the socioeconomic
effects of the pandemic were implemented: sick leave benefits granted from the firstday including for those in quarantine; a special paid family leave for those caring
for children; employment could be terminated due to pandemic-related absence; thedeadline for tax returns postponed by three months; a temporary abolition of social
insurance and health insurance contributions for self-employed entrepreneurs overthree months; the government paid 80% of salary costs to companies affected by the
pandemic).
There is a lack of financial resources and of a clear and integrated approach tohealth care. Health care is provided based on public (obligatory) health insurance
and free necessary treatment is accessible to holders of the European Health
Insurance Card (EHIC); non-citizens receive treatment on the same terms and at thesame price as the locals. Access to quality health care, in particular primary care,remains relatively poor and uneven. Slovakia spent 5.6% on health care in 2019
(OECD report 2019) and there is significant room to increase cost-effectiveness invarious areas. Poor working conditions in the Slovak health sector and mass
emigration of doctors and nurses to other EU member states have led to a shortageof staff: the Slovak Medical Chamber estimates a shortage of 3,000 doctors andmore than 10,000 nurses.
The legal system in Slovakia guarantees equality of access to work, education, andsocial services. There is no official discrimination based on gender, race, religion,or social origin. Literacy rates in the country are very high. Both men and women
have the same degree of opportunity in the education system. Education at stateschools is free of charge at all levels. Women account for a larger percentage ofstudents within the tertiary education system. Women comprise 45.4% of the labor
force, but they continue to be underrepresented in leading positions across various
sectors of society.
However, a structured support system intended to enable marginalized groups toovercome their initial disadvantages has been insufficient. This problem has been
greatest for the Roma community, who still struggle to access education andemployment. The issue of special schools is a long-term weakness within
Slovakia’s education system, which insufficiently addresses the special needs ofRoma children. Slovak law prohibits discrimination and segregation in education,
but many Roma children are still placed in special schools and classes for children
with intellectual disabilities. Moreover, the European Commission has initiatedproceedings against Slovakia for breaching the Racial Equality Directive. In
October 2019, the Commission sent a reasoned opinion to Slovakia urging thecountry to comply with EU rules on the equal treatment of Roma schoolchildren.
The European Commission conceded that Slovakia had taken measures in recent
years but argued that the measures had not been sufficient to resolve the segregationof Roma in schools. So far, the EC has not taken the case to the Court of Justice.

Equal opportunity

8

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

23

The December 2020 report of the European Commission against Racism andIntolerance (ECRI) of the Council of Europe noted some progress, such as asignificant increase in the budget of the National Center for Human Rights, theadoption of an action plan against racism, and the imposition of several penalties forhate speech on specific politicians and media. However, the government needs toimprove the education of Roma by adequately preparing children for compulsory
schools.
The ECRI report also recommends that Slovakia develops an action plan for
LGBTQ+ people to protect them against discrimination, hate crimes, and hatespeech. The far-right extremist political party (ĽSNS) opposes the broad
implementation of LGBTQ+ rights and has refused to legalize same-sex
partnerships. The principle of equality of opportunity has also been violated bysuccessive increases in the official registration threshold for new religious
communities, evidently motivated by widespread distrust of Muslims.
11 | Economic Performance

Between 2016 and 2019 Slovakia was one of the fastest-growing economies in theEurozone and managed to maintain a high rate of economic growth. However, theeconomic boom has slowed down unexpectedly since – real GDP growth fell from
4.0% in 2018 to 2.3% in 2019 as slower economic growth in Germany and theuncertainty of Brexit affected Slovakia’s export-oriented economy. Since the startof the pandemic, exports of goods – a strong pillar of the Slovak economy – hasdeclined.
According to Eurostat, inflation reached 2.7% in 2019. Economic growth brought adecline in the unemployment rate (according to the World Bank it was 5.1% in2020) and helped the government to reduce its fiscal deficit to a record low, mainly
due to the robust performance of domestic demand. In 2019 the current accountdeficit reached $2,842 million and public debt increased to 48%. However, due tothe COVID-19 pandemic, the European Commission 2020 spring forecast projected
Slovakia’s GDP to decline by 6.7% and the current account balance to 3.7%,
reflecting the disruption in economic activity caused by the pandemic-related
lockdown measures and an unprecedented fall in external demand.
Slovakia continues to be the world’s largest producer of cars per capita, although
this further increases the country’s already-high dependence on a single sector andon export performance. The slowing of growth has exposed the risks and limits ofeconomic development which relies heavily on the car industry and export
performance. Moreover, long-term economic growth prospects still suffer fromweak infrastructure, shortages of skilled labor, low R&D spending, and mixed
public governance performance. Future growth requires
investment in education, innovation, infrastructure, and energy technology.

Output strength

8

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

24

12 | Sustainability

Slovakia has considerable natural resources, primarily water and wood.
Industrialization and general economic development are still higher priorities thanenvironmental protection. As an EU member state, Slovakia adheres to strict
environmental standards; however, its historical legacy still influences thepolicymaking process and administrative approach to the environmental agenda.

Environmental
policy8

Public awareness of environmental issues has been gradually increasing and thegovernment responded to this by amending some legislation and strategic
documents. In February 2019, the Pellegrini government approved a new strategy
for environmental policy, Greener Slovakia. It sets clear and measurable goals
which should be met by 2030. The document identifies environmental challenges
and priorities, including waste management, air quality, and habitat and species
conservation, especially in forest, meadow, and wetland ecosystems. Some of thesepolicies have already been implemented (e.g., an environmental protection law,which prohibits logging in national parks and protected areas).
Many environmental experts agree that Slovakia should cut financial support for themining and burning of coal. However, automotive and supporting industries are ofsuch a size that Slovakia is among the most intensive energy-consuming countries
in the European Union. The EC stresses that environmental taxes need to bereformed, as the implicit tax rate on energy in Slovakia is among the lowest in the
EU. Slovakia should focus on increasing taxation in transport (0.3% in 2018; EUaverage is 0.5%) and pollution resources (0.03% in 2018; EU 0.08%).
Differentiating tax rates according to the carbon content of the energy source could
also encourage more environmentally responsible behavior.
The new government formed in 2020 includes representatives of environmental
initiatives with a high level of commitment to solutions to ecological problems. It isvery likely that the impact of environmentalist ideas will begin to effectively
counterbalance the dominance of the technocratic approach.
Slovakia has a developed and functional system of educational institutions offering
all levels of education from preschool to tertiary education, as well as life-longlearning programs. The UN Education Index score for Slovakia (0.826) is similar toneighboring countries in the region. However, its quality is declining compared tomore developed countries due to the state’s low level of spending on education andinsufficient implementation of innovative teaching and learning methods. Spending
on education fell from 4.1% of GDP in 2014 to 3.9% in 2017. Moreover, while
R&D spending reached a historic peak of 1.2% of GDP in 2015, it declined to 0.8%
in 2018.
Progress in this area is very slow, with reforms often poorly prepared andineffective, due to a lack of political consensus and administrative chaos. Previously

Education policy /R&D

7

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

announced education reforms have been delayed or managed in an erratic manner.
The teaching profession is unattractive to jobseekers and graduates tend to choose
better-paid jobs. In 2019 the Pellegrini government increased teacher salaries by
10% and updated its education strategy. However, the latter overlooks a number ofareas. Vocational education and training have been neglected for decades (since thetransformation) and universities focus exclusively on non-technical education.
Therefore, Slovakia faces a shortage of skilled workers, who are needed in its
industry-oriented economy. Tertiary educational attainment has improved but
remains below the EU average and quality control in higher education does notmeet international standards.
In the period under review, little progress has been made in improving the quality ofeducation. Despite continued economic growth, investment in education, researchand innovation remains below OECD and EU averages. Both organizations haverepeatedly emphasized the importance of improving several educational parameters(e.g., increasing the attractiveness of teaching, tertiary educational attainment,
tackling the segregation of Roma students), as the education system is insufficiently
geared toward increasing Slovakia’s economic potential.
Slovakia has a weak and underdeveloped research and innovation policy. R&D
intensity, the number of patent applications, and levels of employment inknowledge-intensive activities are below the EU average. Private sector investment
in R&D has not been sufficient to compensate for state failures in managing R&D.
In this sector, Slovakia is highly dependent on EU funds and, according to the
Slovak Organization for Research and Development Activities, corporate funds
account for only a quarter of total Slovak funding. Almost 90% of all foreign
resources are EU money, accounting for 39.4% of total government spending.
Corrupt and clientelist practices by the previous government (e.g., public funds
specified for R&D allocated to unskilled loyalists of the Smer-SD party rather thanto qualified and experienced experts) demotivated real professionals fromsystematic work for the public good and had a devastating impact on the morale ofprominent researchers in areas of scientific innovations.
During the pandemic, many research organizations developed new, innovative
products and technologies, yet the main barrier to getting these to market is anadministrative and bureaucratic environment which hinders successful and fastindustrial production. The new government focuses on improving the drawing ofEU funds supporting innovation and research, and some progress has been made inthis regard.

25

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

26

GovernanceI. Level of Difficulty
Structural socioeconomic constraints on governance in Slovakia are relatively low,
although none of the post-1989 administrations have addressed the existing
constraints efficiently or sustainably.
1) Substantial regional disparities exist between the relatively developed westernpart of the country (the Bratislava region, where there is export-oriented
manufacturing FDI) and the central, southern and eastern parts of the country.
These regions are still lagging behind, and their infrastructure remains
underdeveloped despite long-running EU-sponsored investment programs in theeast of the country. Improvements have been slow, and investments stopped entirely
due to the pandemic.
2) Long-term unemployment is falling, but it remains high, in particular for young
people and those living in disadvantaged regions. At the same time, there is a lackof high-skilled labor in some areas in which projects receiving foreign investment
are located.
3) Poverty, low educational attainment, poor health outcomes and discrimination
faced by the Roma population remain long-term, serious challenges to good
governance.
4) High-tech industry representatives consistently point out that Slovakia’s
education system does not provide high-skilled labor in the required (usuallytechnical) fields. Although the government has undertaken some reforms (e.g., adual education system), so far these have only had a small effect.
5) The gap between the demand and supply of highly skilled personnel remains
large in several sectors. The COVID-19 pandemic revealed a shortage of medical
personnel due to brain drain. Health care services in Slovakia are set to experience afurther shortfall of professionals due to aging health sector professionals.
6) By January 30, 2021, Slovakia had recorded 45,500 confirmed cases of COVID19 and 836 deaths per million.

Structural
constraints

1

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

Slovakia has a long and vibrant civil society tradition, and committed civil society
actors, including numerous citizen associations, civil society initiatives andplatforms, and large interest-based organizations participating in the social
dialogue. There are around 64,000 non-governmental organizations, including
foundations and civil associations.

27

Civil society
traditions

2

During the review period, Slovak NGOs were effective in organizing campaigns
and protests against several contentious issues, especially in response to the murderof Ján Kuciak and his fiancée. These protests were the largest since the Velvet
Revolution in 1989 and demonstrated the ability of civil society to influence society
and even decision-making. The movement “For a Decent Slovakia” emerged fromthese protests and continued to rally during 2019, demanding progress in theinvestigation of the murders and more appropriate law enforcement.
The three elections since (regional, presidential and European Parliament) showedthat civil society is capable of producing fresh leadership if the electoral system andpolitical parties allow for such candidates.
However, civil society has been subject to significant rhetorical attacks. On theother hand, the new law on the register of NGOs - which came into force in January
2019 - was welcomed by civil society actors, as it offered a unified system ofregistration.
One of the NGO sector’s important sources of funding is tax assignation (corporate
and individual taxpayers can assign up to 3% of their tax to selected NGOs). For
example, in 2018 around 800,000 taxpayers assigned a total of €64 million, €2million more than the previous year.
Specific historical legacies (e.g., mistrust in strangers, a parochial political culture,social pessimism and passivity) have for decades influenced social capital in
Slovakia. This resulted in the creation of strong social networks among relatives
and close friends. Slovakia has somewhat lower levels of interpersonal trust than
the neighboring Czech Republic. Society is still not particularly open to social
relationships that promote cohesion and the inclusion of strangers, but there is astrong tendency toward social bonding that promotes mutual support.
Slovakia’s politics is highly confrontational and conflictual; however all conflicts
are solved through authorized institutions: in the parliament between parties, in theConstitutional Court between institutions.
In the past, the most salient division in Slovak society was the split along ethniclines that manifested itself in party politics. During the last few years this potential
line of confrontation has become less salient at the national and local levels.
Moreover, Slovakia’s ethnic Hungarian minority has shown a tendency toward
political moderation. However, due to ideological differences and personalanimosity among ethnic Hungarian leaders and parties, since the February 2020

Conflict intensity

3

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

28

elections the Hungarian minority is not represented by any ethnic party inparliament, the first time this has occurred in Slovakia’s history (the potential voteshare is estimated around 10%). Slovakia’s population remains prone to ethnic
nationalism and racist sentiments, especially in areas with a significant Roma
population living in segregated, socially excluded settlements.
The dividing line between conservatives and liberals on cultural-ethical issues (e.g.,
reproductive behavior, family models, LGBTQ+ rights, abortion and gender issues)
is increasingly prominent and shapes public discourse. Polarization along this
dividing line has recently intensified but has not escalated into open conflict. In
2019 the nationalist conservative SNS party frequently attacked the Istanbul
Convention based on the Catholic Church’s objection that the agreement promotes“gender ideology.” These moves by conservative and nationalist actors werewelcomed by far-right extremists linked with the party Kotlebovci-ĽSNS and now
the self-declared “social democrats” from Smer-SD. The result of this was theremoval of Slovakia’s signature from the Istanbul Convention. This cleavage
between conservatives and liberals over cultural-ethical issues has potential towiden, and the extremists were able to mobilize a few, small scale protests during
the state of emergency. However, none of the old or new cleavages so far have
escalated into incidents of mass violence.

II. Governance Performance
14 | Steering Capability

Slovakia’s capacity for strategic planning is rather weak in terms of institutions andpersonnel, as there is no central coordination unit in the Government Office orparliamentary committee that coordinates strategic planning. However, a number ofstrategic documents exist, primarily due to EU post-accession conditionality, as theEC requires them for structural funding and coordination. There are also many otherdocuments that have been elaborated at municipal, regional and sectoral levels overthe past two decades.
The key strategic document “Vision and Development Strategy of Slovakia by2030” was prepared in 2019 defines its main objectives as sustainability, the qualityof life, effectiveness and policy integration. These general priorities were also
reflected in the manifesto of the Matovič government. The central position of the
Finance Ministry has been strengthened and it has drafted major reform documents,
including “Modern and Successful Slovakia,” the reform plan related to the EU new
recovery fund, and the National Reform Plan 2020, to address the impact of thepandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic has upset the balance of economic, social,

Question
Score

Prioritization

8

BTI 2022 | Slovakia

29

environmental and good governance, and the government was frequently forced
into correcting its plans, documents and measures due to erratic decision-making.
Despite the publicized shift in focus from economic growth to the quality of life, themain policy reform units at the ministry level (“Values for Money”) play a central
strategic role and focus on economic - and often short-term political - goals.
The fragmented nature and the rigid departmentalism of the public administration
complicated strategic planning before the pandemic and no additional mechanisms
which might enhance the strategic capacities of the government were established.
The strategic capacities of the public administration are also weakened by the highdegree of staff turnover which, driven as it is by a politicization of appointments,
limits the continuity of institutional expertise.
Previous democratic and economic reforms introduced by Slovak governments
were generally driven by the European Union and the country’s obligations as amember of the European Union. The implementation of these reforms and policy
measures has been largely effective. Since Slovakia’s accession to the European
Union, frequent amendments to basic legal regulations, and the adoption of new
regulatory measures have combined with poor coordination to create numerous
implementation problems and increased transaction costs for society. Further
development requires a more sustainable and higher value-added economy toovercome regional disparities and current educational deficiencies in human capital.
The ongoing EC reports continue to recognize Slovakia’s strategies and reforms,
but emphasize that their implementation often remains poor, erratic, and slow. For
example, the long-awaited health care reform was stopped by the Pellegrini
government, while education reform has failed to consider areas such as vocational
training. Little progress has been made with the promised improvements to public
transport infrastructure. Under the Matovič coalition, some reforms (e.g., anticorruption, rule of law, law enforcement) were prepared, but their implementation
has been slow, primarily due to the pandemic. The government’s focus has been on
implementing measures to combat the pandemic. In spring 2020 the government
restricted public movement to protect public health in the midst of the pandemic.
Economic measures focused primarily on cash assistance and governmentguaranteed loans to businesses as well as citizens. This has the potential to increasedependency on the state and eventually undermine the economic recovery.

Implementation

In the lead-up to Slovakia’s accession to the European Union, policy learning wasmore efficient due to EU legislation and different schemes of cooperation. Before
the COVID-19 pandemic, the impact of the European Union was strong, especiallythrough its fiscal consolidation requirements. Since March 2020, domestic reforms
appear to be driven by political interests and the expertise of individual ministers.
While Pellegrini’s government clearly knew how to follow EU requirements, aswell as pursue its own ideological and pragmatic priorities, the Matovič
government’s policy learning, performance and flexibility appear to be limited by

Policy learning

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individual coalition parties and party leaders. A good example is Matovič personal
support for nationwide antigen testing, despite criticism from experts and scientificorganizations, who pointed to countries finding success in using a large number of
PCR tests to track and contain the spread of COVID-19. For example, Martin
Smatana, the former head of the Institute of Health Policy Public, claimed that
Slovakia performed a million tests per week, but that the tests were not accurate andresearchers had no possibility of tracing that number of people. The result was thatmany infected people met with dozens of others before they realized they werepositive. The preference for mass antigen testing against the expert
recommendations, and the limited access to PCR tests, combined to produce chaos.
Matovič personally insisted on this unprecedented move despite a huge wave ofcriticism expressed by epidemiologists. In January 2021 he even questioned theeffectiveness of vaccination while supporting nationwide testing, which led tosarcastic media headlines such as: “A swab instead of a jab.” This chaos resulted in
an enormous increase in the number of deaths linked to COVID-19: in January
2021 Slovakia had one of the highest increases in COVID-19-related deaths per
million in the world (Our World in Data).

15 | Resource Efficiency

Public service performance improved slightly during the EU accession process
when EU conditions stimulated civil service, regionalization, and decentralization
reforms. Since then, professionalism and efficiency, especially under the three Ficogovernments, have suffered from an increase in the central state apparatus, a lack ofqualified staff (particularly at the local level), corruption scandals, nepotism, andfrequent ministerial changes. Professionalism and efficiency of the public
administration have suffered from the growth in the size of central state apparatus
and a lack of qualified staff in the civil service. Clientelist and politicizedappointment practices in public administration have also increased the risk ofcorruption.
In July 2020 Igor Matovič, who in the past had frequently criticized Smer and SNS
for their clientelist approach to civil service nominations, decided to replace allheads of district offices without even consulting his coalition partners. The partyOĽaNO introduced a quasi-transparent and semi-democratic procedure: a special
website was launched where citizens could report the “moral failures” of the preselected candidates. This unusual “public screening” caused concerns among the
opposition as well as coalition partners, who said they preferred clear qualification
criteria to avoid nominations of underqualified people who lacked previous
management experience.
Under the previous Smer-SD led coalition, the bodies responsible for controlling the
distribution of EU structural funds were integrated into the Government Office in

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order to improve coordination and centralize control over strategic public
investments. The Matovič government created a new Ministry for Investments,
Regional Development and Informatization of the Slovak Republic; it aims toconcentrate this agenda in one central body to improve Slovakia’s performance indrawing EU funds. A balanced state budget has been a clear priority in Slovakia.
However, only months before the 2020 elections, the Smer-SD and SNS, in aclearly populist manoeuvre, passed several amendments (using fast-track legislative
procedures with one instead of three readings) that threatened fiscal stability in an
attempt to attract more voters (e.g., an increase in family benefits, the 13th pension
and the cancelation of highway tolls).
Since the economic crisis, Slovakia has managed to reduce its government deficit
from 8% in 2009 to 1.3% in 2019 (Eurostat), but the consolidation efforts have
weakened over time, and the COVID-19 pandemic-related measures led to an
unprecedented growth in expenditure. The pandemic disrupted the consolidation of
the state budget and Finance Minister Eduard Heger (OĽaNO) admitted that
achieving a balanced budget is not expected in the next three years. Besides thedevastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, risks to the public finances remain
predominantly long-term in nature (e.g., population aging, and a lack of pension andhealth care reform). Public debt is relatively high and in 2021 will pass 60% of
GDP. The state budget for 2021 is projected to be 65%. According to INEKO
experts, the budget lacks a plan for recovering public finances backed by specificmeasures. It also lacks a long-term vision for the end of the government’s current
term in office. This approach deviates from what appeared to be the previous
consensus over fiscal responsibility.
The Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak Republic (NKÚ) is an independent
authority accountable exclusively to the National Council. During the period underreview, NKÚ’s performance improved. Some of the most sensitive cases of Fico’sera (e.g., the suspicious allocation of EU funds to farmers) ended in police
investigation and in criminal charges. According to its chair, NKÚ closelycooperated with the General Prosecutor and the police.
After the February 2020 elections, the new government established a coalition
council as an informal forum to coordinate political priorities, legislative activities,
and communication. Most importantly, the council negotiates solutions to potential
disputes between the coalition parties. The preparation of the government manifesto
took even longer than in 2016 and increased from 70 to 120 pages and included
more goals. However, immediate tensions within the coalition emerged and havecontinued to the present. The main protagonists are Prime Minister Matovič andEconomy Minister Richard Sulík (SaS, Freedom and Solidarity). Matovič’s style ofcommunication has raised questions over his personality and ability to maintain thecoalition. Matovič tends to announce certain measures (e.g., COVID-19
restrictions) one day and then change them significantly the next. He even called

Policycoordination

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Sulík an “idiot,” though despite the prime minister’s right to remove Sulík from theoffice, he refrained from doing so (as of January 2021). Sulík insisted that SaS will
stay in the coalition under any circumstances but called on Matovič to respect thecoalition agreement that partners do not criticize each other.
The leaders of smaller coalition parties have called on Matovič to improve his
communication, but his style has not altered. Policy coordination between thecoalition partners is complicated and as a result, the government returned to
Slovakia’s traditional pattern of departmentalism, with ministries divided between
the coalition partners and following the particular party’s priorities. The
government is rather fragmented and the best glue for the coalition appears to be thethreat that Fico and Pellegrini, eventually with the help of the far-right, may replaceit.
Corruption is the most sensitive political problem undermining political stability,
good governance, and the quality of democracy in Slovakia. In the wake of anticorruption protests (2018 - 2019), a new initiative Chceme Veriť (We Want toBelieve) was launched by leading NGOs. The strong pre-election anti-corruption
agenda brought a change of government in 2020 which improved the conditions forthe fight against corruption and appointed new leaders to the police and theprosecution, strengthening the independence of the police from political influence,and opening the Prosecutor’s Office to public control. The enforcement of measuresagainst legal persons is on the rise, but only 24% of businesses surveyed in Slovakia
believe in its effectiveness. 53% believe that corruption is a problem when doing
business in Slovakia (Business Eurobarometer Survey, 2019).
In its 2021 report, the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption(GRECO) indicated the slow progress of Slovakia in implementing measures toprevent corruption of members of parliament, judges, and prosecutors. Eight out of
its 16 recommendations were not fully implemented more than five years after the
publication of the previous evaluation report. The amendments to the Law on theProtection of General Interest have come into force – obliging members ofparliament to declare gifts or other benefits and their movable or immovable
property - but there has been no significant progress on asset declarations. GRECO
has encouraged Slovak authorities to finalize a code of ethics for parliamentarians.

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16 | Consensus-Building

The majority of the main political parties agree on the desirability of fostering
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. During the review period, support forliberal democratic values varied among parliamentary parties and political actors
but there is a general consensus over democracy. Since the February 2020 elections,
there is only one extremist political party (the far-right Kotlebovci-ĽSNS) in
parliament that casts doubt on democratic political values and institutions. Before
the 2020 elections, populism flourished, and extreme political positions were part ofelection campaigning. However, after the elections, the new coalition government
found a solid programmatic consensus on democratic values and a pro-Westernforeign policy. Despite different ideological emphasis on cultural values, allcoalition parties agreed and supported liberal democracy. The main political leaders
also support the rule of law, anti-corruption policies, and reform of the judiciary, allof which have been the weakest part of Slovakia’s democratic institutions under theprevious Smer-SD governments. The leaders also expressed clear reservations overthe state of rule of law in Hungary and Poland; therefore, it is unlikely that Slovakia
will experience a turn toward illiberalism in the short term.

Consensus on goals

9

The main political parties agree on the desirability of fostering a market economy
but there are differences of opinion when it comes to the precise nature of themarket economy. The incumbent center-right parties prefer “pure” market economic
principles. The former left-leaning governing coalition insist on a socially-oriented
market model, without providing detailed characteristics, and have slowly interferedin the free market. The current consensus is focused on a few issues usually related
to EU priorities, such as the need for fiscal consolidation and a balanced budget.
However, a number of independent institutions could still prevent any attempts toerode basic market principles. These institutions include the debt-brake law, theCouncil for Budgetary Responsibility, the Slovak National Bank, and Slovakia’s
membership of the eurozone.
For a long period, there were no anti-democratic veto players in Slovakia. During
the review period, the influence of extremist political forces persisted in public
discourse, and the right-wing populist and extremist party Kotleba-ĽSNS again
gained seats in parliament with 8% of the vote (20,000 more votes than in 2016).
However, support for anti-democratic actors may decline given the internal split of
the party leadership (January 2021) and a court verdict on Kotleba, who was foundguilty of supporting and propagating movements which oppress fundamental humanrights. His party remains rather isolated in the parliament.

Anti-democratic
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Slovakia is marked by several cultural cleavages (e.g., ethnic, political, regional andreligious) and social cleavages (e.g., social status and rural-urban residence). Ethnic
nationalism still plays an important role in politics, and radical nationalists(Kotleba-ĽSNS) are present in the parliament (10.39% of the vote). However,nationalists SNS received 3% of the vote and did not pass the 5% threshold for
attaining seats in parliament. Overall, however, Slovak-Hungarian tensions havebecome less politically salient over the last couple of years. The Roma populationand Slovakia’s few Muslim immigrants have replaced ethnic Hungarians as populist
politicians’ main target for hostility. The Matovič government has not made any
serious attempt to prevent the escalation of cleavage-based conflicts. Traditionally
Slovak cleavages are cross-cutting, rather than of a cumulative character, meaning
deep conflicts along ethnic, class, regional or religious divides are very rare. Even if
the political leadership has not intentionally focused on depolarizing structural
conflicts, political parties tend to focus on immediate electoral challenges and not
on long-term mobilization along cleavages.

Cleavage /conflict
management

The involvement of civil society actors in the political process depends to a highdegree on the government’s composition and policies. Previous cabinets led byRobert Fico and Peter Pellegrini preferred a paternalist and etatist model ofinteraction with civil society and opted for trade unions and employers’organizations, churches, academic institutions, and state universities as partners.
Center-right parties tend to cooperate more with NGOs, advocacy, watchdog andhuman rights groups, and think tanks. The new government installed after the 2020
elections promised in its manifesto to strengthen the systemic financing of nongovernmental organizations and eventually consider increasing the allocation of theshare of income tax to NGOs. Civil society is mentioned in the government’s
manifesto several times in relation to goals in fighting corruption, supporting
democracy, and increasing transparency.

Civil society
participation

7

9

Slovak civil society proved to be sufficiently mature to gain widespread public
respect and to influence public discourse to determine government policies. On theother hand, trade unions expressed their dissatisfaction with the inclusive social
dialogue and in October 2020 left the social dialogue mechanism (tripartite
negotiations). They blamed the labor minister (Sme-Rodina, We are Family) for
constantly bypassing laws, and began a series of small peaceful protests, launchinga petition to improve conditions and rights of working people.
Slovakia remains split over the legacies of two authoritarian regimes (fascist andcommunist). The process of reconciliation has been more complicated than inneighboring countries, and it has taken longer to establish institutions able to copewith the country’s totalitarian past.
The Nation’s Memory Institute (ÚPN) was established in 2002; its main
responsibility is to provide access to records of the secret police (STB). Allegedly,
some top figures of the former ruling party HZDS, including Vladimír Mečiar, were

Reconciliation

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collaborators of the STB. Allegedly, there have been instances in which the archives
were manipulated and utilized against public and political figures, including Ján
Budaj (now the minister of environment), one of the leaders of the 1989 anticommunist revolution. The ÚPN is responsible for documenting totalitarian regimesin Slovakia and its recent role in fighting right-wing extremism has been positive,
although inconsistent, as some leading figures clearly favored a clerical-fascist
state. During the review period, ÚPN became more active in analyzing thecommunist regime and this is likely to increase.
17 | International Cooperation

Slovakia is fully integrated into the international community, including the United
Nations, the OECD, and the European Union. Leaders and diplomats use EU
membership and alliances to advance the country’s priorities. In recent years,
Slovakian governments (including the incumbent government) have placed
particular emphasis on the direct material benefits of EU membership; since the2019 European elections the public discourse has been slowly changing and postmaterialist values (e.g., EU climate policies) have increasingly gained support mostly among the young generation - and subsequent relevance in policymaking.
Slovakia is a voluntary party to the UN’s High-Level Political Forum on
Sustainable Development and has prepared a medium-term strategy fordevelopment cooperation. The national priorities for Agenda 2030 include (1)education, (2) an environmentally sustainable and knowledge-based economy, (3)poverty reduction and social inclusion, (4) the sustainability of settlements, regions,and the countryside in the context of climate change, (5) rule of law, democracy andsecurity, and (6) good health.
According to the EC, the country has made progress toward achieving the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). For example, Slovakia performs better
than the EU average on a number of SDGs such as reducing poverty andinequalities; some progress has been made in good health and well-being, and thequality of education, but Slovakia still lags behind the EU average on someindicators in these areas. However, environmental pressures, energy consumption
from sources with low emissions, and resource productivity, all require moreprogress. Slovakia needs to reinforce climate action, affordable and clean energy,
and more responsible consumption and production. The country has become
increasingly dependent on EU structural funds to meet its developmental goals andlacks alternative means of development. Despite several attempts at reform, the rateof absorption of EU funds has remained low, although under the Matovič
government it has improved slightly.
The Matovič government endorses many of the EC and OECD recommendations
and is aware that growth opportunities lie in a more sustainable and higher valueadded economy. The most visible progress occurred in the field of justice and anti-

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corruption policies. However, Slovakia’s main economic goals, namely reinstating
sound public finances by 2024 (including reducing the tax burden for low-income
persons, compensating the subsequent tax revenue gap by increasing indirect,
property, and environmental taxes) is rather uncertain given the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic on Slovakia’s small and open economy, and the empty statetreasury left by the previous governments.
Since 1998, all Slovak governments have been trustworthy and reliable partners intheir relations with the international community. An underlying state priority is tobe recognized as a credible partner by the international community, especially by
the United Nations, the OECD, OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO, the European
Union, the Eurozone and in bilateral relations with individual states.

Credibility

9However, this image was damaged slightly during the Greek debt crisis and more
importantly by the previous government’s negative position toward the refugee
crisis in Europe (although Prime Minister Peter Pellegrini, who replaced RobertFico, showed a more accommodating stance toward EU migration policy). During
the COVID-19 pandemic, the Matovič government acted responsibly andcoordinated its engagement in international and multilateral efforts with theinternational community and its closest neighbors (Czech Republic, Austria,
Hungary, Poland). Sometimes however, information on the response (e.g., closureof borders and mobility for commuters) was communicated at the last possible
moment.
Slovakia’s compliance with existing international agreements is relatively high;however, some compliance problems occur when economic costs are too high, forexample regarding ILO core labor standards, climate change agreements, andhuman rights conventions.
The third Smer-SD-led government officially positioned Slovakia as a core
supporter of EU reform together with France and Germany. The former prime
ministers (Robert Fico, and his successor Peter Pellegrini) made EU relations agovernment priority, before the Visegrád-4. Since the change of the government,
Slovakia’s foreign policy and international cooperation is back on its Euro-Atlanticorientation. Slovakia’s efforts to act as a credible and reliable partner within theEuropean Union and pursue cooperative regional and international relations havebeen improved after the change of government and the departure of controversial
SNS leader, Andrej Danko.
The new Slovak government demonstrated firm support for EU values even if that
may complicate Slovak-Hungarian relations. For example, Slovak foreign andjustice ministers rejected the Hungarian justice minister’s initiative to implement a
special deal on the “Professional Network, a Junior Program” within the VisegrádGroup as an attempt “to bring an alternative understanding of the rule of law.” The
Slovakian delegation stressed that they did not see any sense in creating

Regional
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BTI 2022 | Slovakia“alternative” views of the rule of law principle that contradict the understanding of
the principle across the EU.
Both Slovak governments during the period under review have supported EU
foreign policy (e.g., supported sanctions against Russia and supported the EU’s
short and long-term policy goals in the Western Balkan and Ukraine, whichconstitute traditional territorial priorities of Slovakia’s developmental programs).

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Strategic Outlook
Significant room remains for further political, economic, and social improvement in Slovakia as
the country faces many important challenges. In foreign policy, a proactive EU policy,
multilateral regional coalitions, and strengthening NATO ties are vital to reaffirm the country’s
international standing, which was weakened due to its lack of solidarity with EU policy during
the 2015 migration crisis.
Zuzana Čaputová’s victory in the presidential elections in March 2019 was followed by a change
in government. The February 2020 elections brought victory for parties critical of the pervasive
culture of corruption and the erosion of democratic quality. However, the tense coalition
relations of the new government, COVID-19 pandemic-related violation of legislative rules, andfrequently chaotic decision-making were features of the new regime and are not conducive to
successfully advanced democratic transformation.
Therefore, domestically, there is an urgent need to build a political consensus on basic goals
beyond anti-corruption policy. A broad political agreement on the desired level of stateintervention in the economy, the systematic scope of social welfare policies and wealthredistribution needs to be reinvented after ten years of self-declared social democrats in power.
Social policy should go beyond immediate political concerns and one-time contributions. The
ambitious reform plan of the new coalition correctly defines key policy aims (such as ensuring
the independence of the judiciary, improving the system of public procurement, as well as public
integrity and anti-corruption policies); however, it also needs to strengthen the capacity,
accountability, strategic competence and efficiency of the public administration, as
implementation is the weakest point in Slovakia’s governance. It is also important that social
partners, academics, and civil society are included in these reforms.
The COVID-19 pandemic revealed weak points in governance. Prime Minister Igor Matovič, hisparty, and the government, all faced a monumental erosion of trust due to chaotic politicaldecision-making and poor coalition communication during the pandemic. To restore trust in
democratic institutions and the political class will require more than just a few changes inpersonnel, it needs time and strategic progress.
The pandemic and consequent slowing of economic growth have revealed the risks and limits of
Slovakia’s strategy of economic development, with its strong reliance on the car industry, export
and EU funds. The country needs well-designed, strategic policies to maintain its economic
competitiveness and ensure sustainable economic growth. Tackling corruption, reforming the
judiciary, and improving the quality of public administration will be of assistance in this respect
as well, but are not sufficient in themselves. Slovakia needs to invest in fields such as education,
R&D, and ICT, which have been neglected in the past. Mobilizing the support and necessary
human resources will not be easy, as some of the key pillars of effective governance are failing.
In general, to prevent democratic backsliding, the current trials of corrupt politicians and38

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oligarchs are not sufficient by themselves. The legal framework for tackling corruption andexisting integrity mechanisms requires reform, as stressed in the GRECO report from January
2021. The COVID-19 pandemic complicated the overall performance of parliamentarydemocracy, which has particularly suffered due to the lack of executive coordination and clear
communication. In sum, under the Matovič government, the role of the legislature has remained
limited, partly due to the constitutional majority enjoyed by the coalition, and possibly becauseof the absence of justification and coherent communication of executive policies. These concerns
are likely to remain in the future (such as efforts to curtail the competencies of the Constitutional
Court). The future trend depends on the performance of the most relevant democratic anchors(EU institutions, civil society, and the media) and their capacity to subject the government toeffective scrutiny.

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