JIIA Forum (2011-06-17）
YAMAUCHI Masayuki, Professor, The University of Tokyo Graduate Schoolof Arts and Sciences“The Present and Future of Middle Eastern Democratization”
To analyze the changing tides of the Middle East – known variously as “the Arab Spring” and“the dominoes of democratization” – one can look at the individual countries of the Middle
East or one can take a broader view.

Here I will look at the new Middle East still emerging

at the moment by utilizing analysis and observation methods of the latter approach.
changes in the Middle East can be considered from two perspectives.

TheThe first is to view

these changes in a Middle Eastern or Arab context, while the second is to regard them as
the particular impulses of citizens demanding the human desires of freedom, the rule of law,and abundance without resorting to specificity.

These are not the all-too-common clashes

between Arabs and Israelis, nor religious quarrels between Christians and Arabs.

Given

the extreme unlikelihood that anti-American populations would rise up against anti-American
regimes such as those in Syria and Libya, neither is this a development driven byanti-American sentiment.

A variety of dimensions can be discerned from the changes in the Middle East.

They canbe characterized as liberation from the long-lasting spell of pan-Arabism known asNasserism dating back to the 1950s.

At the same time, there have also been areas inwhich the military and the Muslim Brotherhood have reached rapprochement, essentially
producing a quiet coup d’état.

It could also be said to be the delayed arrival of the third

wave of democratization generated in Latin America and Eastern Europe 20 to 30 years ago.
Furthermore, a high unemployment rate among youth has drawn some of them to terrorist
organizations offering them the means to live and financial incentives, but they are being
pulled back into domestic politics by the push for democratization.

1) Templates for intervention and democratization movements
To the points of commonality in the changes seen in Egypt, Syria and elsewhere mentioned
above – freedom, the rule of law and prosperity – could be added the keyword“intervention.”

The first stage comprised intervention via soft power such as the foreign

media coverage in Tunisia and Egypt prior to March, the second stage hard-powerintervention by foreign countries such as the use of military force by NATO and the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) in Libya and Bahrain in April and May respectively, and the third
stage intervention in the name of reconciliation as seen in Syria and Yemen from April to1

June.

The Middle East peace efforts announced by President Obama in May were of three types.
The first was the grant of economic aid to Egypt and Tunisia, which were deemed faithful tothe “American model” of Middle Eastern democratization.

The second was criticism

specifically directed at the governments of Iran and Syria for their growing oppression of
their own citizens.

The third was reproach of the Bahraini government’s response todemonstrations. Obama made no comment regarding Saudi Arabia, however, although it
would seem in particular need of democratization given its close connection to the US. It isthus difficult to deduce one single reason for US and NATO intervention.

They have still

not intervened against Israel for its attacks on Gaza nor against Yemen, but they
immediately intervened against Libya, and not for humanitarian reasons alone.

Conditions

in each of these countries differ, making it problematic to analyze these interventions using
the methodology of international politics, so perhaps a country-by-country analysis from acomparative politics perspective is required.

2) Egypt
What was the protest movement in Egypt’s Tahrir Square?

According to one newspaper

commentary, a certain human rights organization has described it in terms of three important
political phenomena.

This first is that isolated and unaided Arab individuals joined together

as a group to make themselves heard.

The second is that citizens sought to give real

substance to the sovereignty they possessed.

The third is that expectations rose of “socialcontract” principles granting political and civil rights to citizens and of the development of anegalitarian society free of disparities. Naturally we must wait and see if these observations
hold true. Nevertheless, this is the manner in which a peaceful Arab people overcame a“wall of fear.”3) Syria
The situation in Syria is unlikely to follow the pattern in Egypt as the military and security
forces of the Assad regime, dominated by Alawis that constitute a 12% minority in Syria,
have maintained control of the majority Sunni population.

Acceptance of democratization

usually hastens the collapse of a minority dictatorship, and the “wall of fear” of revenge by
the majority confronted the public authorities in this instance.
the Assad regime will stay in power in Syria.

It is in fact Israel that hopes

Holding out the possibility of a conflict withIsrael as a shield, Syria has maintained its dictatorship under an “entrenched regime.”

TheMuslim Brotherhood that supports the present democratization movement in Syria was at
one time responsible for the massacre of 20,000-30,000 people, and Israel fears theBrotherhood.

The Assad regime did at one point attempt to push ahead with2

democratization in Syria, but this effort was opposed by supporters of the previous regime.
Assad also sought to advance economic liberalization but, as in Egypt, the gap between richand poor only widened.

4) Bahrain
Bahrain, too, was unfortunately characterized by a sectarian dispute in which the majority
Shi’ite population opposed the minority Sunni regime.

The regime has problematicallyencouraged immigration and political naturalization from Sunni countries such as Syria andPakistan to reduce the relative percentage of Shi’ites within the population as a whole, andpreferentially hired Sunnis into the military and the police; indeed, it is even said that thelower house electoral districts have been gerrymandered in a manner advantageous toSunnis.

In the election, however, the Shi’ite Al Wefaq became the dominant party.

Thiswould seem to have presented an opportunity for establishing a constitutional monarchy, butAl Wefaq went so far as to demand an end to the monarchy and radical reforms.

Inresponse to Al Wefaq’s demands, Crown Prince Salman proposed several compromises: (1)recognizing the complete authority held by the members of the lower house of the National
Assembly, 2) transitioning to a parliamentary cabinet system, 3) putting an end togerrymandering, and 4) reconsidering political naturalization.

The Crown Prince on theth13 cunningly demanded an immediate response from Al Wefaq and, having received noneon the 14th, ordered the deployment of a GCC joint military force comprising Saudi military
units and USE police units and declared a state of emergency.

5) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and other members of the GCC have adopted a variety ofapproaches.

First, the GCC criticized the crackdown in Libya and intervened alongside

NATO, earning the favor of NATO and the US and boosting the GCC’s image as a supporterof the democratization movements.

Second, it persuaded the US, whose Fifth Fleet isheadquartered in Bahrain, to maintain security. Third, it granted several billion dollars toBahrain and Oman to be distributed for the welfare of the people.
did not focus on the uprising as a Shi’ite-led movement.
monarchy in Bahrain led to the GCC’s intervention.

Finally, the Arab press

Calls for overthrowing theBeing all Sunni monarchies, the GCC

member countries reached a consensus driven by concerns about a domino effect topplingmonarchies.

The failure to transform Bahrain into a constitutional monarchy wasunfortunate in that it was unable to serve as a model for the other GCC Gulf monarchies,
demonstrating that freedom and the rule of law will not be traded for regime stability.
Finally, I would like to discuss Turkey and Iran, both countries neighboring the area in which
the democratization movement has been the most intense.

36) Turkey
Turkey is hoping that Syria will learn from Turkey’s democratization and security measures.
Having also recently conducted elections, Turkey is strategically implementing anomnidirectional “New Ottoman” foreign policy.

The country previously regarded as thegreatest danger – Iran – is now considered a friendly country in Turkey’s National Security
Policy Document (the “Red Book”), and Turkey has sought to maintain friendly ties with andto aid Israel as well as to mediate disputes between countries.

Given its 700km with Syria,

Turkey is particularly concerned about refugee issues, and it is pressuring the Assad regime
to undertake reforms even as it voices its support for Syria’s leadership.

7) IranIran had been supporting Syria’s regime.

For instance, Iran itself repressed citizens whorose up in protest against the outcome of the presidential election two years ago, providing
Syria with approaches for repressing its own citizens.

However, all of Iran’s friends arecaught up in democratization movements.

Will Syria, a stronghold of Arab nationalism and democratization, adopt the methods ofTurkey or of Iran?

Syria is a junction between East and West, a transit point for theCrusader armies, and it has elements of both East and West in terms of genetic biology as
well.

It is also a country representative of the Arabs who built the Ummayad dynasty and astronghold of the democratization movement.

If the democratization movement is brought

to a halt in Syria, there is a possibility that it will be stopped across the Arab world.
changes in the Middle East could have an impact on Japan.

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