Logical Agents that Plan, Execute, and Monitor Communication∗
Martin Magnusson and David Landén and Patrick Doherty
Department of Computer and Information Science, Linköping University, Sweden{marma,davla,patdo}@ida.liu.se

Abstract
Real and simulated worlds that involve cooperation between
several autonomous agents create highly dynamic conditions.
An individual agent can not hope to rely on fixed behaviors,
but needs to plan both physical actions and communication
actions that enlist other agents to help achieve the goal. We
present a logical agent that plans regular actions and speechacts, monitors their execution, and recovers from unexpected
failures. The architecture is based on automated reasoning in
a formal logic and is grounded in a physical robot platform in
the form of an autonomous helicopter. We apply the system
to a knowledge gathering goal and illustrate how it deals withthe complexities of the task.

Introduction
Imagine the chaotic aftermath of a natural disaster. Teams ofrescue workers search the afflicted area for people in needof help, but they are hopelessly understaffed and time isshort. Fortunately, they are aided by a small fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that can be requested to carryout tasks autonomously. The UAVs help quickly locate injured by scanning large parts of the area from above using
infrared cameras and communicating the information to thecommand and control center (CCC) in charge of the emergency relief operation.
Complex tasks like these occur frequently in real world
situations as well as in training simulations and computer
games. Achieving their goals requires the cooperation ofmany independent agents. Each agent faces an environmentthat can change in response to actions by other agents in addition to its own. It is unrealistic to assume that such anagent could be made autonomous by equipping it with fixed
behaviours for all possible situations that might arise. Instead, the agent must automatically construct plans of action
adapted to the situation at hand. These multi-agent plans
involve other agents’ mental states and communicative acts
to affect them. In addition, assumptions made during planning must be monitored during execution so that the agent
can autonomously recover from failures, which are prone tohappen in any dynamic environment. These are significant
challenges for any proposed planning formalism.
∗ This work is supported in part by the Swedish Foundationfor Strategic Research (SSF) Strategic Research Center MOVIII,
the Swedish Research Council Linnaeus Center CADICS, and
CENIIT, the Center for Industrial Information Technology.
Copyright c 2009, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.

We extend Temporal Action Logic (Doherty and Kvarnström 2007), a first-order language with a well-developed
methodology for representing actions that has previously
been used for planning (Magnusson 2007), with syntactic
operators that express the modalities of belief and commitment. This makes it possible to formalize inform and request speech acts, and to plan both physical and communicative actions in a multi-agent setting. Automation is provided
by a natural deduction theorem prover that integrates planning, execution, monitoring, and plan revision. The resulting physical actions are executed (in simulation) by a delegation framework (Doherty and Meyer 2007), built using
the Java agent development framework1 (JADE), and communicative actions are realized as standardized FIPA ACL(Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents 2002) speechacts. We describe this agent architecture and its use in solving the above scenario.

Related Work
Early planning research tended to ignore any processes that
occur before or after the planning phase, and many classicalplanning algorithms depended crucially on a global closed
world assumption. Agent programming languages provide
interesting alternatives that often incorporate execution andmonitoring, but move planning to a less prominent role oreliminate planning altogether, which might result in somesacrifice of flexibility in unforeseen situations.
Modern planning research tries to relax the classicalrestrictions while keeping the planning process in focus.
Shanahan’s agent architecture (Shanahan 2000) based on the
Event Calculus seamlessly integrates planning and plan revision. Though it has not been applied in multi-agent settings,
and its implementation as an abductive logic program is not
sufficiently expressive to represent communicative acts conveniently.
Searle’s speech acts (1969) characterize natural language
utterances as actions with conditions upon their execution
and effects on the mental states of others. Speech acts forma basis for expressing communicative acts as planning operators, as is done by Perrault, Allen, and Cohen (1978). They
generate plans that involve both regular actions and speechacts, but the implementation uses limited versions of speechacts in the form of STRIPS-like planning operators.
Speech acts have also been adopted by research on software agents (Genesereth and Ketchpel 1994). This body of
1 http://jade.tilab.com/

work depends fundamentally on agent communication languages (ACL), which are standardized sets of speech actsthat ensure interoperability in agent to agent communication. The widely used FIPA ACL is based on speech act theory and has a logical semantics defined using multi-modal
BDI logic. But there is no integration of speech acts withina more general framework of action and change that would
facilitate planning of speech acts together with other actions
to achieve goals. This is reflected by architectures that use
the FIPA ACL-based JADE framework in robotic applications. Their focus is not planning but rather the interoperability that is gained from using a standardized ACL and theease of developing agents using JADE.
In contrast, Morgenstern (1988) offers an integrated theory of both types of actions using a syntactic first-orderlogic that includes quotation. Davis and Morgenstern (2005)
provide an alternative integration using regular first-orderlogic. The two theories’ semantics cover both speech acts
and their content, however their use has so far been limited
to a STRIPS-like planner in the case of the former theory,
and as a specification for future implementations in the caseof the latter.

Temporal Action Logic
Reasoning about both physical and communicative actions
is only possible in a highly expressive formalism. We havechosen one such formalism as a foundation, the Temporal
Action Logic (TAL), and extended it with a representationof belief and commitment.
The origins of TAL are found in Sandewall’s modeltheoretic Features and Fluents framework (1994). Doherty(1994) selected important concepts, such as an explicit timeline and the use of occlusion (discussed below), to form TAL
and gave it a proof-theoretic first-order characterization. Doherty and Kvarnström (2007) provide a detailed account of
the logic, but the version presented below includes further
extensions that make TAL suitable for applications in multiagent planning and reasoning.
TAL uses fluents to model properties and relations that
may change over time. A fluent f is a function of time, andits value at a time point t is given by (value t f ). An agent
carrying out action a during time interval (t1 t2 ] is specified by a predicate (Occurs agent (t1 t2 ] a). But the mostimportant feature of TAL is its occlusion concept. A fluent that is persistent by default is permitted to change its
value when occluded, but must retain its value during timeintervals when not occluded. The following formula (withfree variables implicitly universally quantified and in prefix
form to make the representation of the quoted formulas introduced below more convenient) relates a fluent f ’s value
at the start and end time points of a time interval:(→ (¬ (Occlude (t1 t2 ] f )) (= (value t1 f ) (value t2 f )))By assuming that fluents are not occluded unless otherwise
specified, one is in effect making the frame assumption thatthings usually do not change. Exceptions are made explicit
by occluding affected fluents in action specifications and dependency constraints. E.g., if the UAV flies between two locations, its location fluent (location uav) would be occluded

during any interval with a non-empty intersection with the
movement interval. By exercising fine-grained control overocclusion one gains a flexible tool for dealing with important
aspects and generalizations of the frame problem.

Syntactic Belief
Previous accounts of TAL lack a representation of agents’mental states and beliefs. Introducing a syntactic belief operator that takes a quoted formula as one of its arguments
provides a simple and intuitive notion of beliefs. E.g., thefact that the UAV believes, at noon, that there are five survivors in grid cell 2,3 of the area map can be expressed by
the following formula (where 12:00 is syntactic sugar for a
Unix time integer):(Believes uav 12:00 ’(= (value 12:00 (survivors (cell 2 3))) 5))

We use the quotation notation from KIF (Genesereth and
Fikes 1992), which is a formal variant of Lisp’s. An expression preceded by a quote is a regular first-order term thatserves as a name of that expression. Alternatively one may
use a back quote, in which case sub-expressions can be unquoted by preceding them with a comma. This facilitates
quantifying-in by exposing chosen variables inside a backquoted expression for binding by quantifiers. E.g., we canuse quantifying-in to say that there is some number that theUAV believes to be the number of survivors:(∃ n (Believes uav 12:00‘(= (value 12:00 (survivors (cell 2 3))) ’,n)))(1)Note that it is not the existentially quantified number itself,
but the name of the number, that should occur as part of thequoted third argument of Believes. The quote preceding thecomma ensures that whatever value n is bound to is quoted
to produce that value’s name.
However, if expressed as above, Formula 1 would be satisfied if the UAV believes all tautologies of the form x = x.
To see this, simply replace n by the term (value 12:00 (survivors (cell 2 3))) and apply existential generalization. We
need to add the requirement that the UAV’s belief is not
merely a tautology, but that it really identifies the numberof survivors.
Moore (1980) suggests the use of rigid designators andMorgenstern (1987) modifies this suggestion slightly in her
requirement that standard identifiers are known. We follow
Morgenstern and use the syntactic predicate (Id x) to single out the name x as a standard identifier, adding the background knowledge that integers are standard identifiers. It isconvenient to introduce a two argument predicate assertingthat the second argument is a standard identifier for the first:(↔ (Id ‘’,x ‘’,y) (∧ (= x y) (Id ‘’,y)))Note the interaction between back quote and quote in ‘’,xand ‘’,y to make sure that the arguments of Id are namesof the expressions. The initial back quote turns the following quote into the name of a quote, leaving the variables x
and y free for binding. The resulting expression denotes thequoted version of whatever the variables are bound to rather
than quoted variables that can not be bound at all. The use

of quoted expressions as arguments to the Id predicate prevents substitution of identicals, as is required by opaque belief contexts.
If the UAV can identify the number of survivors we say:(∃ n (Believes uav 12:00‘(Id ’(value 12:00 (survivors (cell 2 3))) ’’,n)))Here, the occurrence of the Id predicate is nested in a belief
predicate, necessitating double quotes on the variable n.

Speech Acts
Speech acts can be used to communicate beliefs to, and toincur commitment in, other agents. The extensions introduced above make it possible to reformulate Allen’s speechacts (1988) in TAL using syntactic belief and commitment
predicates. The type of information we will be interested inis beliefs about what a particular value is. This is straightforwardly communicated by standard identifiers. E.g., if the
UAV wishes to inform the CCC that it is in the map’s gridcell 2,3 at noon, it may plan an action of the following form:(inform ccc ’(Id ’(value 12:00 (location uav)) ’(cell 2 3)))

(2)

However, this is complicated when the CCC wishes to ask
the UAV what its location is. Hintikka (1978), and manyothers, suggests viewing questions as requests for information. The CCC should thus request that the UAV performthe inform action in Formula 2. But since the CCC does
not know where the UAV is, which is presumably the reason
why it is asking, it can not know what action to request.
Again we follow Allen’s directions and introduce an informRef action designed to facilitate questions of this type.
The informRef action does not mention the value that is unknown to the CCC, which instead performs the following
request:(request uav ’(Occurs uav (b e](informRef ccc (value 12:00 (location uav)))))The informRef preconditions require that the informing
agent holds a belief about what the value that is being informed about is and the effects assert the existence of a standard name that the hearer believes the value has. Note thatan agent that commits to executing the action schedules aninform procedure call, plugging in the sought value. In contrast, an agent that only reasons about the effects of the informRef action, as in the question example above, knowsthat it will come to hold a belief about the value, but need
not yet have such a belief.

Automated Natural Deduction
The theory presented so far needs to be complemented with
an automated reasoner. Earlier work with TAL made deductive planning possible through a compilation of TAL formulas into Prolog programs (Magnusson 2007). But Prolog’s
limited expressivity makes it inadequate for our present purposes. Instead, our current work utilizes a theorem proverbased on natural deduction, inspired by similar systems by
Rips (1994) and Pollock (1999).
Natural deduction is an interesting alternative to thewidely used resolution method. A natural deduction proverworks with the formulas of an agent’s knowledge base in
their “natural form” directly, rather than first compiling theminto clause form. The set of proof rules is extensible and easily accommodates special purpose rules that make reasoning
more efficient. E.g., we incorporate specialized inference
rules for reasoning with quoted expressions and beliefs. This
works well, though the quoted expressions in our examples
are simple atomic formulas. Whether the approach will scale
to an effective method of reasoning with more general usesof quotation is an open question.
Rules are divided into forward and backward rules. Forward rules are triggered whenever possible and are designed
to converge on a stable set of conclusions so as not to continue generating new inferences forever. Backward rules,
in contrast, are used to search backwards from the current
proof goal and thus exhibits goal direction. Combined, theresult is a bi-directional search for proofs.
Nonmonotonic reasoning and planning is made possible
through an assumption-based argumentation system. The setof abducibles consists of negated occlusion, action occurrences, temporal constraints, and positive or negative holds
formulas, depending on the current reasoning task. These
are allowed to be assumed rather than proven, as long as
they are not counter-explained or inconsistent.
For some restrictions on the input theory we are able
to guarantee completeness of the nonmonotonic reasoning(Magnusson, Kvarnström, and Doherty 2009). But in thegeneral case, when one cannot guarantee completeness ofthe consistency checking, we might conceivably fail to discover that one of the assumptions is unreasonable. However,this would still not be a cause of unsoundness, since we areusing the sound system of natural deduction that keeps trackof all assumptions and the formulas that follow from them.
But it might result in plans and conclusions that rest on impossible assumptions. A conclusion Φ depending on an inconsistent assumption would in effect have the logical form⊥→ Φ, and thus be tautological and void. This is to be expected though, due to the uncomputability of consistency
checking. The most one can hope for is for the agent tocontinually evaluate the consistency of its assumptions, improving the chances of them being correct over time, while
regarding conclusions as tentative (Pollock 1995).

Agent Architecture
Solving the scenario in the introduction requires a systemwith a tight coupling between planning, execution, and monitoring. Our architecture achieves this through logic-basedplanning that results in abductive frame assumptions (about
the persistence of certain parts of the world) that are monitored during plan execution, as described below.

Planning
Planning is the result of proving a goal while abductively
assuming action occurrences that satisfy three kinds of preconditions. The action must be physically executable by anagent during some time interval, the agent must have a belief
that identifies the action, and the agent must be committed tothe action occurring, at the start of the time interval:

(→ (∧ (Executable agent (b e] action)(Believes agent b ‘(ActionId ’’,action ’,actionid))(Committed agent b ‘(Occurs ’,agent ( ’,b ’,e] ’,action)))(Occurs agent (b e] action))

Executability preconditions are different for each action andare therefore part of the specifications of an action.
The belief precondition is expressed by a single axiom:(→ (∧ (Primitive name) (Id arg1 id1 ) · · · (Id argn idn ))(ActionId ‘(,name ,arg1 · · · ,argn ) ‘(,name ,id1 · · · ,idn )))This captures Moore’s (1980) insight that knowing identifiers for the arguments of a primitive action is knowing that
action. This condition prevents e.g. a stock market agent
from planning to get rich by buying “the stock that will increase in value.” While theoretically correct, the plan is of
no practical value unless the agent can identify some particular stock that will increase in value.
The time point at which an action is executed is also critically important. One would not want the agent to generate a plan to buy a particular stock “when it is lowest” andsell it “when it is highest.” Without additional information
about when these events occur this plan is equally useless.
However, it seems overly restrictive to require that the agent
holds beliefs that identify the action occurrence time points.
Actions that do not depend on external circumstances can be
executed whenever the agent so chooses, without deciding
upon an identifiable clock time in advance. Actions that dodepend on external circumstances can also be successfully
executed as long as the agent is sure to know the correcttime point when it comes to pass. This is precisely what theconcept of dynamic controllability captures. Following Vidal and Fargier (1999) we denote time points controlled by
the agent by b and time points over which the agent has nocontrol by e. The temporal dependencies between actions
form a simple temporal network with uncertainty (STNU)
that can be checked for dynamic controllability to ensure an
executable plan.
Finally, the commitment precondition can be satisfied in
one of two ways. Either the agent adds the action to its own
planned execution schedule (described below), or it uses therequest speech act to delegate the action to another agent,
thereby ensuring commitment.

(→ (∧ (ActionId ‘ ’,action ‘ ’,id)(ProcedureCall self (b e] id))
(Dispatch self (b e] action))

The ProcedureCall predicate is the link between the automated reasoner and the execution sub-system in that thepredicate is proved by looking up the procedure associatedwith the given action and calling it. Note that it is the action’s identifier that is used in the procedure call. This guarantees that only integers, strings, and other standard identifiers are passed as arguments to procedures, and is necessary since the action’s arguments might depend on information gathering actions whose results were not available atthe time of planning. Invoking automated reasoning on theabove axiom, rather than simply performing the procedure
call, allows the full power of theorem proving to be appliedin finding standard identifiers for the procedure call arguments. This could be necessary in order to apply backgroundknowledge to convert the arguments into the standard format, or if the arguments are only implicitly represented as adeductive consequence of explicit knowledge.

Monitoring
Executing the plan will satisfy the goal as long as fluent persistence assumptions hold up. But the real world is an unpredictable place and unexpected events are sure to conspire tointerfere with any non-trivial plan. To detect problems early
we continually evaluate all assumptions that are possible tomonitor.
When a persistence assumption (in the form of a nonocclusion formula) fails it produces an occlusion perceptthat is added to the agent’s knowledge base. A truth maintenance system removes assumptions that are contradictedby observations and unchecks goals that were previously
checked off as completed but that include a failed assumptions among their dependencies. This immediately gives rise
to a plan revision and failure recovery process as the theorem
prover tries to reestablish those goals.
If the proof of the unchecked goals succeeds, the revision
will have had minimal effect on the original plan. A failed
proof means that the current sub-goal is not viable in thecontext of the execution failure, and the revision is extended
by dropping the sub-goals one at a time. This process continues until a revision has been found, or the main goal isdropped and the mission fails.

UASTech Delegation Framework
Execution
Scheduled actions are tied to the STNU through the explicit
time points in TAL’s Occurs predicate. An STNU execution
algorithm propagates time windows during which these time
points need to occur (Morris and Muscettola 2000). Timepoints that are live and enabled with respect to the time windows are executed, i.e. they are bound to the current clock
time and action occurrences scheduled at those time points
are proved dispatched using the following axiom:

Procedure calls are carried out by the UASTech Delegation
Framework (Doherty and Meyer 2007). But the actions areoften still too high-level to be passed directly to the low-levelsystem. An example is the action of scanning a grid cell using the infrared camera. This involves using a scan patterngenerator, flying the generated trajectory, and applying theimage processing service to identify humans in the video
footage (as described in (Doherty and Rudol 2007)). The
assumption is that, while not a primitive action in the lowlevel system, the scanning of a grid cell will always proceed
in the manner just described so there is no need to plan its

sub-actions. Such macro-actions are coordinated by specialized modules, in this case the scan coordinator.
The Delegation Framework implementation uses the Javaagent development framework (JADE) and encapsulates theagent so that all communication is channeled through a standardized interface as FIPA ACL speech acts. Human operators, like those in the CCC, communicate through an interface like any other agent but use a graphical user interface that displays a map subdivided into grid cells throughwhich they can ask questions, position no-fly zones or otherconstraints, and delegate requests to other agents. The resulting multi-agent system can consist of widely differing
agents that are able to interact through standardized speechacts to help each other achieve complex goals.

Scenario Solution
We have implemented this theorem proving based agent architecture and applied it to the scenario described in the introduction. If the UAV’s knowledge base was initialized at
12:00 and the CCC requests having information of the survivor count in map grid cell 2,3 at 13:00 the UAV produces
the following plan (in addition to an STNU that relates qualitative time points):(Schedule uav (b1 e1 ] (fly (cell 2 3)))
(Schedule uav (b2 e2 ] (scan (cell 2 3)))
(Schedule uav (b3 e3 ](informRef ccc ’(value 13:00 (survivors (cell 2 3)))))The success of the plan depends on two abductive assumptions that were made during planning and that can be monitored during execution:(¬ (Occlude (12:00 b3 ] (radio uav ccc)))(¬ (Occlude (e1 b2 ] (location uav)))

There is also an assumption of the persistence of the survivor count, though this is impossible for our UAV to monitor since it can not see the relevant area all at once. If one of
the survivors runs off, then the plan will be modified to takethe resulting body count discrepancy into account when it is
discovered.
Suppose however that the large distance and mountainous
terrain causes a radio communication break down while the
UAV is scanning the area. The UAV perceives that the fluent (radio uav ccc) was occluded and the truth maintenancesystem successively removes incompatible assumptions andsub-goals until a revised plan suffix is found:(Schedule uav (b4 e4 ]
(informRef mob ’(value 13:00 (survivors (cell 2 3)))))(Schedule uav (b5 e5 ](request mob’(Occurs mob (b6 e6 ]
(informRef ccc ’(value 13:00 (survivors (cell 2 3)))))))The new plan involves requesting help from another mobile
agent (mob). By communicating the survivor count to this“middle man,” and requesting it to pass on the information to
the CCC, the UAV ensures that the CCC gets the requested
information.

Another set of assumptions now require monitoring:(¬ (Occlude (oc 12:00 b6 ) (radio mob ccc)))(¬ (Occlude (oc 12:00 b4 ) (radio uav mob)))

While the UAV is incapable of monitoring the other agent’s
radio communication, it will be monitored if that agent isalso running our agent architecture. Unless further failures
ensue, this concludes the successful completion of the givenknowledge gathering assignment.

Conclusions
We have described a scenario that involves planning communication between agents, plan execution with monitoring,and plan revision to recover from an unexpected communication failure. Our solution uses speech acts formalized in
an extension of Temporal Action Logic that includes syntactic belief and commitment operators, which are made possible through the use of a quotation mechanism. Plan generation and revision is carried out using an automated natural
deduction theorem prover. The subsequent execution uses
an STNU execution algorithm to dispatch actions in accordance with the plan’s temporal constraints. Finally, an action
dispatch mechanism links the automated reasoning system
and a delegation framework that coordinates the executionof primitive actions on the physical robot platform.
Our framework makes extensive use of logic to meet thechallenges of dynamic environments. While the use of logic
as a theoretical foundation is relatively commonplace, wehave constructed a practical logical agent architecture thatuses theorem proving technology to plan and execute actions
in a multi-agent setting.
Much work remains before the technology is sufficiently
efficient and robust for larger scale applications. But there
is great potential for using logical agents in both real andsimulated worlds. This paper has explored a robotic searchand rescue scenario. Another paper uses the same technology in intelligent computer game characters (Magnusson
and Doherty 2008). We believe these and similar opportunities make continued effort worthwhile.

References
Allen, J. 1988. Natural Language Understanding. Redwood City, CA, USA: Benjamin-Cummings PublishingCo., Inc.
Davis, E., and Morgenstern, L. 2005. A first-order theoryof communication and multi-agent plans. Journal of Logic
and Computation 15(5):701–749.
Doherty, P., and Kvarnström, J. 2007. Temporal action
logics. In Lifschitz, V.; van Harmelen, F.; and Porter, B.,
eds., Handbook of Knowledge Representation. Elsevier.
Doherty, P., and Meyer, J.-J. C. 2007. Towards a delegation framework for aerial robotic mission scenarios. In
Cooperative Information Agents XI, 5–26.
Doherty, P., and Rudol, P. 2007. A UAV search and rescue scenario with human body detection and geolocalization. In Australian Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
volume 4830 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1–13.
Springer.

Doherty, P. 1994. Reasoning about action and change using occlusion. In Proceedings of the 11th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 401–405.
Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents. 2002. FIPA
communicative act library specification. http://www.
fipa.org/specs/fipa00037/.
Genesereth, M. R., and Fikes, R. E. 1992. Knowledge interchange format, version 3.0 reference manual. Technical
Report Logic-92-1, Computer Science Department, Stanford University.
Genesereth, M. R., and Ketchpel, S. P. 1994. Software
agents. Communications of the ACM 37(7):48–53.
Hintikka, J. 1978. Answers to questions. In Hiz, H., ed.,Questions. D. Reidel Publishing Company. 279–300.
Magnusson, M., and Doherty, P. 2008. Logical agents forlanguage and action. In Proceedings of the 4th Artificial
Intelligence and Interactive Digital Entertainment Conference.
Magnusson, M.; Kvarnström, J.; and Doherty, P. 2009.
Abductive reasoning with filtered circumscription. In Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning,
Action and Change NRAC 2009. UTSePress. Forthcoming.
Magnusson, M.
2007.
Deductive Planning andComposite Actions in Temporal Action Logic.
Licentiate thesis, Linköping University.
http://www.martinmagnusson.com/publications/magnusson-2007-lic.pdf.
Moore, R. 1980. Reasoning about knowledge and action.
Technical Report 191, AI Center, SRI International, Menlo
Park, CA.
Morgenstern, L. 1987. Knowledge preconditions for actions and plans. In Proceedings of the 10th International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 867–874.
Morgenstern, L. 1988. Foundations of a logic of knowledge, action, and communication. Ph.D. Dissertation, New
York, NY, USA. Advisor: Ernest Davis.
Morris, P. H., and Muscettola, N. 2000. Execution of temporal plans with uncertainty. In Proceedings of the 17th
National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and 12th
Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, 491–496.
Perrault, C. R.; Allen, J. F.; and Cohen, P. R. 1978. Speechacts as a basis for understanding dialogue coherence. In
Proceedings of the 1978 workshop on Theoretical issues innatural language processing, 125–132.
Pollock, J. L. 1995. Cognitive Carpentry: A Blueprint for
how to Build a Person. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Pollock, J. 1999. Natural deduction. Technical report, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona. http://
www.sambabike.org/ftp/OSCAR-web-page/
PAPERS/Natural-Deduction.pdf.
Rips, L. J. 1994. The psychology of proof: deductive reasoning in human thinking. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT
Press.

Sandewall, E. 1994. Features and Fluents: The Representation of Knowledge about Dynamical Systems, volume 1.
Oxford University Press.
Searle, J. R. 1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press.
Shanahan, M. 2000. Reinventing Shakey. In Logic-Based
Artificial Intelligence. Norwell, MA, USA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 233–253.
Vidal, T., and Fargier, H. 1999. Handling contingency
in temporal constraint networks: From consistency to controllabilities. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 11(1):23–45.