Global
TobaccoIndustry
InterferenceIndex 2019Acknowledgements
Author: Mary Assunta
Editors: E. Ulysses Dorotheo, Christina Hipolito
Additional editorial input: Bloomberg
Philanthropies, Global Center for Good Governancein Tobacco Control, Vital Strategies
Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index, aglobal survey of how public health policies areprotected from the industry’s subversive efforts, andhow governments have pushed back against thisinfluence. The Tobacco Industry Interference Index
was initiated by the South-East Asia Tobacco Control
Alliance (SEATCA) as a regional report and withsupport from Bloomberg Philanthropies’ Stopping
Tobacco Organizations and Products (STOP), is partof a global publication of the Global Centre for Good
Governance in Tobacco Control (GGTC) at the Schoolof Global Studies in Thammasat University.

Mexico: Salud Justa México
Myanmar: People’s Health Foundation
Nepal: Health Rights & Tobacco Control Network
Pakistan: Society for Alternative Media and ResearchPhilippines: HealthJustice Philippines
South Africa: Consultant - Dhamaravelli Moodley
Sri Lanka: Alcohol & Drug Information Centre
Tanzania: Tanzania Tobacco Control Forum
Thailand: Action on Smoking & Health Foundation
Turkey: Turkish National Coalition on
Tobacco or Health
Uganda: Consultant - Hellen Neima
Ukraine: Advocacy Center LIFE
United Kingdom: Tobacco Control Research Group,
University of BathUnited States of America: Action on Smoking& Health
Uruguay: Tobacco Epidemic ResearchCenter of Uruguay
Vietnam: HealthBridge Vietnam

Main country collaborators

Design: sophieeverett.com.au

Bangladesh: PROGGA Knowledge for Progress
Brazil: Tobacco for Control AllianceCambodia: Cambodia Movement for Health
Canada: Action on Smoking & Health
China: Consultants - Wang Chunhui, Jiang Xuewen,
Chao Ren, Sun Jiani, Kelvin Khow
Egypt: Cairo Association Against Smoking,
Tuberculosis and Lung Diseases
France: National Committee Against Smoking
India: HRIDAY
Indonesia: Indonesia Public Health Association
Iran (Islamic Republic): Tobacco Prevention &Control Research Center
Japan: Japan Society for Tobacco Control
Jordan: Lina and Green Hands Society
Kenya: Consumer Information Network
Korea (Republic of): National Cancer Center
Lao PDR: Consultant - Maniphanh Vongphosy
Lebanon: Rima Nakkash, American Universityof Beirut
Malaysia: Women’s Action for Tobacco Control
and HealthThis publication is funded by Bloomberg
Philanthropies.
Suggested Citation: Mary Assunta. Global Tobacco
Industry Interference Index 2019. Global Center
for Good Governance in Tobacco Control (GGTC).
Bangkok, Thailand. Sept 2019.

Disclaimer
This Index is based solely on publicly available
information obtained by researchers in theirrespective countries. If you have information thatcan strengthen this report, contact us at:
info@ggtc.world
For more information visit:www.exposetobacco.org
www.globaltobaccoindex.org

Contents
05

06

09

Introduction

Key Findings

1. The tobacco industry
interferes in policy
development

14

16

19

2. The tobacco industry
ensnares senior officials
through its so called socially
responsible activities

3. Benefits enjoyed by
the tobacco industry

4. Governments
unnecessarily interact withthe tobacco industry

22

26

29

5. Lack of transparency
facilitates industry
interference

6. Senior government officials
working for the industry present
a conflict of interest problem

7. Preventive
measures to protect
the government

33

36

42

Conclusion andrecommendations

Summary table

End Notes

“We are deeply concernedby the fact that the tobacco
epidemic is shifting to thedeveloping world, where lesswell-resourced countries findthemselves unable to counter
tobacco industry exploitationof new markets often throughblatant interference with publichealth policy-making.”1– Dr Vera Luiza da Costa e Silva,
Head of the WHO FCTC Secretariat

4

STOP

Introduction
Tobacco use claims more than eight
million lives worldwide every year.2
According to the World HealthOrganization, about 80% of the 1.1
billion smokers worldwide live in
low- and middle-income countries,
where the burden of tobacco-related
illness and death is heaviest.
The poor bear the brunt of the problem as theexpenditure of their limited household income isdiverted from basic needs to tobacco. The cost to
the economy of a country is also substantial as
governments spend significant amounts on healthcare costs for treating the disease caused by tobacco
use as well as loss of productivity.
The tobacco industry is responsible for perpetuating
this global health problem. The industry works
strategically to delay and defeat tobacco control
measures across the globe in order to promote andprotect the profitability of the tobacco business. The
tobacco industry does this through various tactics
that interfere in a government’s effort to protect publichealth. In fact, governments have identified tobacco
industry interference as the most serious barrier tothe success of their efforts in passing strong tobacco
control measures.3 The key to tackle tobacco industry
interference however lies in the hands of governments.
The World Health Organisation Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC)4 under generalobligations in Article 5.3 requires that: “In setting andimplementing their public health policies with respect
to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect thesepolicies from commercial and other vested interests ofthe tobacco industry in accordance with national law.”

Guidelines were adopted to empower governmentswith a set of recommendations to protect themselvesfrom industry interference.5 Article 5.3 is regarded as
the backbone of the Convention and its importancecannot be over-emphasised.
This first Global Tobacco Industry InterferenceIndex (Index) shows that governments’ efforts totackle tobacco industry interference have been
progressing slowly and are far from satisfactory.
Major improvement is needed across the countries.
There is a lack of transparency in many countries
when dealing with the tobacco industry. Non-healthgovernment departments remain vulnerable toindustry interference. The tobacco industry continues
to obtain incentives to conduct its business. Countries
that scored well on the Index have prevailed against
tobacco industry interference by implementing
measures to protect themselves. These same countries
are noted for their strong tobacco control achievement.
To ensure global representation, a total of 33 countries
from Africa, Eastern Mediterranean region, Latin
America, North America, Europe, South Asia, South
East Asia and Western Pacific region were selected forthis review. This Index used the same questionnaireand scoring method as the ASEAN Tobacco Industry
Interference Index originally developed by theSoutheast Asia Tobacco Control Alliance (SEATCA)6 to
assess how well governments have implemented WHO
FCTC Article 5.3.
This Index is based only on publicly available
information on tobacco industry interference in the
countries and their respective governments’ responses
to these interferences for the period of January 2017
to December 2018 to support choice of scores. The 33
countries are ranked (Figure 1) according to total scoresprovided by civil society groups who prepared theirrespective country indices. The lower the score, thelower the over-all level of interference, which augurs
well for the country. Disaggregated scores for eachcountry are provided in Table 1.

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 2019

5
03

Key
findings
with it are a problem in many countries, andthese have facilitated industry interference toinfluence policy. Many countries allow politicalcontributions from the tobacco industry.

1. At least one country in each region
successfully resisted tobacco
industry interference while others
have succumbed.
→→

Successfully resisted industry interference:
The U.K., Iran, Kenya, Brazil and Uruguay
fared well in resisting industry interference
by adopting preventive measures provided in
Article 5.3 guidelines to facilitate transparency
and avoid conflict of interest. These countries
did not collaborate with nor endorse the tobacco
industry’s activities.

→→

Succumbed to industry interference: Of the
33 countries, Japan faced the highest levels
of industry interference and fared poorly in
implementing Article 5.3 guidelines to protect
its public health measures. Jordan, Bangladesh
and Lebanon are also lagging far behind in
implementing measures to protect themselves.

2. Lack of transparency facilitatedindustry interference.
→→

04
6

STOP

Lack of transparency: The lack of transparency
in dealing with the tobacco industry and theabsence of procedures to record interactions→→

Banning political contribution: Politicalcontributions and gifts from the tobacco
industry are banned in Brazil, Canada,
France, Iran, Myanmar, Turkey, U.K., Uganda
and Uruguay. Transparency on politicalcontributions is required in Kenya and the U.S.

3. The tobacco industry targeted nonhealth departments.
→→

Tobacco companies have used corporate social
responsibility (CSR) activities and presentation
ceremonies for frivolous awards to gain accessand obtain endorsement from senior officials
especially from the non-health departments.

→→

Departments of Finance, Commerce, and Tradeacross countries are targeted by the tobacco
industry and remain the most vulnerable totobacco industry interference, particularly on
decisions pertaining to taxation of tobacco.

“Over the last decade tobacco
control measures have saved
nearly 35 million lives, but
as more cities and countries
take action, the tobacco
industry is pushing to find
new users, particularly
among young people.

”

Kelly Henning, Director of Public Health
Programs at Bloomberg Philanthropies

4. Tax breaks benefit the industry anddelayed legislation results in more
tobacco sales.
→→

Incentives to the industry: Incentives, suchas tax exemptions and duty free tobacco,
have benefited the tobacco industry. Duty
free cigarettes for international travellers areallowed by all countries except Sri Lanka. The
tobacco industry sought endorsement from top
officials to manufacture new tobacco products
in Lebanon and Turkey.

5. A whole government commitment(commitment by every department)
is needed to withstand industry
interference and better protect tobacco
control measures.
→→

Avoid conflict of interest: Retiring senior
government officials must avoid conflict ofinterest situations with the tobacco industry.
Former senior officials joining tobaccocompanies has been a problem in Bangladesh,Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In China, Japan,
Lebanon and Vietnam, the trade and commercearms of the government are inadvertently

conflicted in developing tobacco control
measures according to the WHO FCTC becauseof their role in promoting the tobacco business.
→→Enduring legal challenges: Uganda and Kenya
have endured protracted court challenges fromthe tobacco industry against their tobacco
control legislation which have strong elementsof Article 5.3. The challenges are used to delay
or derail their implementation of the legislation.
Court cases have also been used to challenge
other effective tobacco control measures in
Brazil and India. These governments did notback down from the legal challenges.

→→

Partial measures are ineffective leaving
loopholes that the industry can exploit: Partial
measures such as a code of conduct only
for the health department is limited in its
effectiveness. The findings of the Index shows
adopting a Code of Conduct that applies to all
government officials is more effective as thiswill provide a firewall and enable officials
to conduct tobacco control efforts without
interference from the tobacco industry.

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201905
7

The lower the score, the better the ranking

Figure 1: Tobacco Industry
Interference overall country ranking

Japan 88
Jordan 79
Bangladesh 77
Lebanon 75
Indonesia 75
Egypt 73
China 73
United States of America 72
South Africa 72
Tanzania 70
India 69
Lao PDR 68
Pakistan 66
Malaysia 62
Ukraine 61
Mexico 59
Vietnam 58
Turkey 58
Sri Lanka 58
Philippines 54
Myanmar 53
Korea (Republic of) 50
Cambodia 48
Canada 47
Thailand 43
Nepal 41
Uruguay 34
France 34
Brazil 34
Kenya 33
Iran 30
Uganda 29
United Kingdom 26

06
8

STOP

0-9

10-19

20-29

30-39

40-49

50-59

60-69

70-79

80-89

90-1001. The tobacco
industry interferesin policy development

The tobacco industry undermines,
blocks or delays government efforts
to develop tobacco control policies,
such as enacting comprehensive
legislation, or strengthen measures,such as adopting more prominentgraphic warnings on packs orincreasing tobacco tax. Korea,
Nepal, U.K. and Uruguay (Figure 2)
show low level of tobacco industry
interference in policy development,
while Japan, China and Philippines
experienced the most interference.
Several countries entirely reject tobacco industry
participation in policy development. For example,
the governments of Iran, Korea, Nepal, Kenya,
UK, Uganda and Uruguay do not accept, support
or endorse any offers for assistance from orcollaboration with the tobacco industry in setting
or implementing public health policies in relation
to tobacco control. These governments do notallow or invite the tobacco industry to sit in any

government interagency/multi-sectoral committee/
advisory group/body that sets public health policy.
The Kenya Tobacco Control Regulations 20147 has
this component enshrined in the law. Similarly,
Iran’s National Tobacco Control law8 and its bylaws
ban any support of tobacco manufacturers to its
programs. None of the representatives of the Iranian
Tobacco Company, a state monopoly, are allowed toattend tobacco control policy making sessions.
Once every two years, 181 countries who are Parties
to the WHO FCTC, come together to negotiate more
effective implementation of the treaty througha process called the Conference of the Parties(COP). Article 5.3 guidelines recommends that
Parties to the WHO FCTC not include tobacco
industry representatives to the COP and otherrelated meetings. The Index found about 90% of thecountries surveyed do not include representativesof the tobacco industry in their delegations to the
COP or its related meetings. However, China andJapan continue to include industry representatives.
In 2018, at the eighth session of the COP, Japan
included four representatives from the Tobaccoand Salt Industries Office, more than in previous
years.9 China’s delegation included industry
representatives from the Center for Tobacco
Safety and Control, Academy of Inspection andQuarantine.10

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201907
9

In several countries, including Japan and China,
governments own some share of the country’s
largest tobacco companies. Japan’s Tobacco
Business Act, enacted to protect the tobacco
business, establishes a direct link between Japan
Tobacco (JT) and the Government (through 33%
ownership of JT) and policy makers, and enables
JT to interfere in policy development and weaken
or derail tobacco control policies. For example a
proposal for pictorial health warnings on packs
was dismissed by a pro-industry committee under
the Ministry of Finance, which recommended a
50% text-only warning instead, announced by
the Government in late 2018.11 Draft legislation
proposing 100% smoke-free public places was
defeated in 2017;12 however, in 2018, Tokyo Governor
Yuriko Koike, in consultation with experts fromthe public health community, successfully
implemented a Passive Smoking Prevention
Ordinance in Tokyo. The federal government has
since followed through with a 100% smoke-freeindoor law.
Similarly, in China, through the influence of theState Tobacco Monopoly Administration and General
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection

and Quarantine there are no pictorial warnings
on cigarette packs. Instead the tobacco industry
applies the 2015 legislation requiring the minimum
35% text-only warning at the bottom surface of thecigarette pack.13
In the Philippines, the government has madestrides towards limiting tobacco industry
involvement in decision-making. The Tobacco
Regulation Act 2003 (RA9211) has given tobacco
industry representatives a seat in the Inter-Agency
Committee -Tobacco (IAC-T) tasked to implement
the tobacco control law. In 2018, the Committee on
Health of the House of Representatives discussed
seven bills to amend the Act. One of the key
amendments is to restructure the IAC-T, including
removal of the Philippine Tobacco Institute (PTI)
from the Committee and assigning the Department
of Health as chair of the Committee. The PTI, anumbrella organization of tobacco companies in
the Philippines, Philip Morris Fortune Tobacco
Corporation, and Japan Tobacco International (JTI)
attended the hearings as resource persons andprovided their comments on the proposed measures.
The bills are still under consideration.

INEFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION WHEN TOBACCO INDUSTRYIS INVOLVED IN ENFORCEMENT
When industry is involved in enforcement, tobacco control implementation is ineffective: Thisis the case in the Philippines and in Jordan. In the Philippines, the Philippine Tobacco Institutesits in the Inter-Agency Committee - Tobacco, the implementing body of the Tobacco Control Act.
With the tobacco industry represented in this Committee, there has not been any instance since
its inception in 2003, when a complaint brought against the tobacco industry has resulted inaction taken against it.
In Jordan, a well-known pro-industry group, the Jordan Restaurant Association (JRA), successfully lobbied
to be part of the committee that oversees public health law implementation through the joint committee of
Ministry of Tourism.14 JRA is included in the National Joint Committee that decides on tobacco control and
WHO FCTC implementation across the government.15 As a member of the Committee the JRA intervened andlobbied for amendment to a tourism law for the adoption of an inspection law which restricts inspections of
tourist establishments to the joint committee.16
Since the adoption of the public health law, the JRA has been vocal In calling for extensions several times,
and successfully lobbied to give new licenses for shisha places on multiple occasions. As a result, more than
700 shisha places (touristic and non-touristic) have been licensed in the country.17

10

STOP

The lower the score, the better the ranking

Figure 2: Tobacco industry
interferes in policy development

0-2

3-4

5-6

7-8

9-10

11-12

13-14

15-16

17-18

19-20

Japan 19
Philippines 18
China 18
Lebanon 15
Jordan 15
Indonesia 15
Vietnam 14
Tanzania 14
Bangladesh 14
United States of America 13
Ukraine 12
Mexico 12
Pakistan 11
South Africa 10
Lao PDR 10
Malaysia 9
Turkey 7
Sri Lanka 6
India 6
Myanmar 5
France 5
Egypt 5
Canada 5
Thailand 4
Iran 4
Cambodia 4
Kenya 4
Uganda 3
Brazil 3
Uruguay 2
United Kingdom 2
Nepal 2
Korea (Republic of) 2

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201911

Non-health departments in national governments
such as departments of finance, commerce and trade,
as well as parliamentarians, remain particularly
vulnerable to interference to block or undermine
tobacco control policies, especially on tobacco tax
increases. Tax increase is among the most effective
measures to reduce tobacco use, especially among
the poor and the young.18 Several countries have
faced this type of interference. For example:→→

In the Philippines in 2018, the Committee onWays and Means of the House of Representatives
held several hearings on increasing tobacco
taxes. Among the Committee’s resource persons
invited for the hearings on the proposed bills
included representatives of tobacco companies,
the PTI, retailers’ associations, and farmers
groups, who repeated often used pro-industry
arguments that tax increase will exacerbate
illicit tobacco trade and cause farmers and small
retailers to lose their livelihood.

→→

The bidi industry in Bangladesh and India
interfered in government attempts to apply tax on
bidis. The Bangladesh Bidi Owners Association
met the Finance and Commerce Ministers andsubmitted their proposals for the budget for
Financial Year 2018-19 that included tax reduction
and a request for cottage industry status for bidi
industry. As a result, the bidi price (non-filter)remained unchanged in the FY 2018-19 budget.19 In
India, the decision to impose additional cess (tax)on Bidi was postponed in 201720 after the Goods
and Services Tax Council considered appeals fromthe tobacco lobby21 and questioned the proposal forhigh taxes on tobacco products, especially bidi.

→→

In Kenya, the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA)
adopted a flat rate tax system in 2015, taxing at
KSh 2.50 per cigarette, which led to a 17% drop in
consumption of cigarettes and a revenue increaseof KSh 7.3 billion.22 Manufacturers reportedly
lobbied against the flat rate, and in 2017 the
National Treasury Cabinet Secretary ordered
the KRA to revert to the old tiered system. In his
budget speech, the treasury’s cabinet secretarystated that the needs of the tobacco industry
were taken into account for the taxation, and thecurrent single tax structure had been “inequitable
and has adversely affected demand for locally
produced low value cigarette.”23

While the tobacco industry may not be a member of
an inter-departmental committee on tobacco control,
it may be consulted on policies that affect it.
→→

12

STOP

In Egypt, for example, intensive closed
meetings were held in 2017 at the Ministry of“

The governments of Iran,
Korea, Nepal, Kenya, UK,
Uganda and Uruguay do not
accept, support or endorse
any offers for assistance fromor collaboration with thetobacco industry in setting or
implementing public healthpolicies in relation to tobacco
control. These governments
do not allow or invite thetobacco industry to sit in any
government interagency/
multi-sectoral committee/
advisory group/body thatsets public health policy.

”

Supply between the ministry’s officials and thehead of Eastern Tobacco Company to determine
the final prices for the three segments of local
and foreign cigarettes.24→→

In Ukraine, members of Parliament have been
lobbied by the tobacco industry resulting in the
delayed passage of an effective tobacco control
law. In March 2017 the Cabinet of Ministers
approved a draft bill on ratification of the WHO
FCTC Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco
Products25 and the Ministry of Health submitted
the draft bill to the Presidential Administration(now called Office of the President of Ukraine) for
ratification; however, the Administration returned
the draft bill twice citing “some technicalissues”26 and it still remains unratified. In 2018,
the State Fiscal Service signed a memorandumof understanding with “Ukrtiutiun” (Ukrainian
Association of Tobacco Producers, which
represents Philip Morris International (PMI),
British American Tobacco (BAT), JTI, and Imperial
Tobacco), showing the Government accepted thetobacco industry’s assistance to tackle illicit trade
in tobacco.27

A NEW THREAT: LOBBYING FOR LESS REGULATION
OF NEW PRODUCTS
Controlling electronic nicotine delivery system (ENDS), more commonly referred to as
e-cigarettes, is a new arena where the tobacco industry and ENDS industry lobbied governments
for leniency in regulation. In 2018, Philippines, Mexico, Turkey and Lebanon experienced
interference so that companies would be allowed to promote these products or be treated lessrestrictively than combustible tobacco products.
→→

In the Philippines, in 2018, nine bills involving ENDS were proposed and deliberated by the Joint
Committees of Health and Trade at the House of Representatives. Organizations representing thee-cigarette industry and tobacco industry attended the hearings as resource persons. A report publishedby health non-governmental organization, HealthJustice Philippines, showed that the tobacco
industry and the ENDS industry played a large role in influencing policy formulation for ENDS in thePhilippines.28 The study shows that from the nine bills proposing ENDS regulation in Congress, six wereoriented to adopting ENDS industry positions. Three bills, two in the House of Representatives and one
in the Senate, showed the involvement of PMI. The Philippine E-Cigarette Industry Association (PECIA)
and Vapers Philippines were vocal during the meetings, arguing that regulation should be assigned
to the Department of Trade and Industry, promoting the harm reduction argument, and claiming thate-cigarettes are an effective smoking cessation tool.

→→

In Mexico, in 2019 two initiatives to reform the General Law on Tobacco Control to regulate ENDS were
presented in the Senate. There was no open or public discussion. Within a few days after the second
reading was presented, the Health Committee had a resolution which was supportive of the industry
position, and far removed from the original content of the initiatives. In 2018 the lower chamber held
a forum on new products to discuss the legislative proposal presented by a congressman who sought
to eliminate the regulations on ENDS. In March 2018, Philip Morris México was invited as a principal
speaker to this discussion.29→→

In November 2017, Lebanon’s state-owned enterprise (SOE), La Regie Libanaise Des Tabacs Et Tombacs(Regie) signed a memorandum of understanding with PMI to begin manufacturing its cigarette brands
in Lebanon.30 The agreement also includes manufacturing e-cigarettes in the future.

→→

In Turkey, the President announced in 2018 that the tobacco and ENDS industry had approached thegovernment to promote their new products promising high investment as beneficial for the nation’s
economy. The industry claimed that they are promoting non-nicotine products.31

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201913

2. The tobacco industry
ensnares senior
officials through its
so called socially
responsible activities
The tobacco industry spends millionsof dollars on so-called corporatesocial responsibility (CSR) activities
each year, ranging from handingout scholarships to poor students, tofunding poverty alleviation projects,
to giving aid during natural disasters.
The tobacco industry must be denormalized and
its CSR activities banned, because the industry
uses these activities to clean its image, buy public
goodwill and win political mileage.

→→

South Africa’s Minister of Water and Sanitation
visited and commended the British American
Tobacco (BAT) factory for “best water saving
initiative.” BAT Bangladesh (BATB) deposited
BDT 8.82 crore (about USD $1 million) to
the Bangladesh Labour Welfare Foundation(BLWF) fund under the Ministry of Labour and
Employment. When BATB representatives
handed over the check to the State Ministerfor Labour and Employment,32 the ministry
promoted this news of the donation on its official
Facebook page,33 while BLWF acknowledged
BATB as its partner organization.34→→

In India, to spread awareness about waste
segregation among school children, the Indian
Tobacco Co Ltd (ITC) launched a CSR program inschools, which was supported by the Ministryof Urban Development and Greater Hyderabad
Municipal Corporation.35→→

In Jordan, the Ministry of Education andNaour municipality (region of Amman)
accepted sponsorship from Philip Morris to
fix the buildings of ten schools and provide
school bags students in 25 schools. The
sponsorship was celebrated to award graduatesand beneficiaries from its capacity-building
program under the patronage of the Minister ofLabor, attended by the deputy mayor of Nauor,
Parliament members, and the police force.36

Several countries have banned CSR activities
entirely including: Brazil, France, Iran, Kenya,
Myanmar, Nepal, Thailand, Uganda and Uruguay.
The tobacco industry’s CSR activities remain aproblem in about a quarter of the countries in thisreport, especially in Bangladesh, China, Egypt,
India, Japan, Jordan, Philippines and South
Africa. In those countries, the industry focused onpoverty alleviation, student aid, disaster relief, andenvironmental protection, all of which facilitatecontact with senior government officials. In several
countries, non-health ministers were involved inendorsing tobacco-related CSR activities.

14

STOP

ENDORSEMENT FOR
TOBACCO FROM SEVERALMINISTERSIn 2018, four ministers of non-healthdepartments fostered relationships
with and endorsed events sponsoredby tobacco companies. The Minister ofSocial Affairs granted the “Padmamitra
Award 2018” to PMI’s local subsidiary,
PT HM Sampoerna, for its CSR programson disaster alert systems.

→→

In Egypt, JTI sponsored “Be happy, Bride”
for orphans and disadvantaged girls, thelargest charity project for brides in Qalioubia
governorate, endorsed by the Minister of
Investment and International Cooperation.37

In both China and Japan the tobacco industry takes
CSR activities to a different level by conducting
public education on how smokers can exercise“good manners” in smoking to reconcile withpublic health.38 In Japan, Japan Tobacco (JT) has
established “smoking spaces” giving the impressionthat this is how to satisfy both smokers andnon-smokers. Currently, JT has implemented thisinitiative at 943 locations in collaboration with 212
municipalities around the country. As in Japan,
the Chinese National Bureau issued guidance on
the creation of a “civilized smoking environment”
to help develop “beautiful China” over five years, tofulfill both governmental requirements and satisfy
public health needs.39 This initiative is run at bothnational and sub-national levels.40,41
In some countries, the tobacco industry’s CSR
activities are even rewarded with awards. In China
for example, the Shanghai Tobacco Company,
which donated RMB 10 million (USD 1.5 million)
to the Shanghai Charity Foundation for educationin 2017, was awarded China’s Charity Award foroutstanding corporate social responsibility by
China Charity Foundation.42

The Minister of Industry and the Ministerof Labor attended Sampoerna’s CSR program
for tobacco retailers,43 ”SRC National Retail
Festival” and were photographed with
the President of Sampoerna while they
were wearing SRC jackets with a logothat said “Let’s go SRC” The Minister ofLabor promoted the tobacco industry as animportant employer and source of finance.
The Minister of Cooperatives and Smalland Medium Scale Enterprises attended
a Sampoerna Entrepreneurship Training
Center in Bali, endorsing its contribution
to small entrepreneurs.44
Two of these ministries come under the
Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs,
which made important decisions in 2018that undermined tobacco control. The
Coordinating Ministry appointed a thinktank, Independent Research and Advisory
Indonesia, headed by the former CEO of
Sampoerna Foundation,45 to develop a new
Tobacco Roadmap to promote the growthof the tobacco industry through 2045. Fourmonths after the Tobacco Roadmap was
released, the government announced there
would be no tobacco tax increase in 2019and revoked a tobacco excise simplification
policy.46 The cancellation of the tax increase
and annulment of the tobacco excise
simplification plan illustrate the extent ofinfluence of the industry on the government.

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201915

3. Benefits
enjoyed by the
tobacco industry

Benefits to the tobacco industry
can be in various forms. Direct
benefits include privileges,
incentives, tax exemptions oreven endorsement to encourage
the business. Accommodating
requests from the tobacco industry
for longer implementation timeor postponement of tobacco
control measures also benefit
the tobacco business.
→→

16

STOP

Lao PDR’s joint venture agreement with
Imperial Brands gives preferential treatment
to the tobacco industry. This lopsided 25-year
agreement grants a tax rate of 15% if production
cost is less than LAK 1,500 per pack of 20
units and 30% if production cost is more than
LAK 1,500 per pack of 20 units causing thegovernment to forego about USD 144 million
in tax revenues between 2002-2017. The close
relationship between the business and thegovernment through the contract works tothe advantage of the company, such that noaction is taken against the company for noncompliance of pictorial health warnings on
its packs.47→→

The Pakistan Tobacco Board conducts export
promotion of tobacco, sending trade delegations
abroad and participating in domestic andforeign exhibitions.48 In 2018, the Pakistan
government secured a preferential trade
agreement with Indonesia to export tobaccowith duty-free access.49→→

In November 2017, Lebanon’s state owned
enterprise, Regie, signed an agreement with
PMI to begin manufacturing PMI’s cigarettebrands50 and also, a similar agreement with
BAT to produce Kent and Viceroy in Lebanon.51
High-ranking government officials were
present at the signing ceremonies indicating
their endorsement of increasing the tobacco
business in Lebanon.

→→

In Bangladesh, the government is committed toreduce tobacco use on one hand, but they also
endorsed the tobacco industry’s expansion of its
business. In 2018 the government endorsed JTI

“International travellers
purchasing tobacco products
at lower prices throughduty-free is an incentive topurchase more tobacco, hence
a benefit enjoyed by the
tobacco industry.

”

to expand its business in Bangladesh throughforeign direct investment (FDI) when it acquired
local company Akij Group for USD1.47 billion. In
August, the executive chairman of Bangladesh
Investment Development Authority (BIDA), thegovernment agency responsible for encouraging
and facilitating private investment, waspresent at the deal signing ceremony.52→→

In a bilateral agreement, Cambodia has waived
duties on tobacco leaves exported to Vietnam
for registered farmers producing more than
3,000 tons of tobacco.53 This incentive has beenin place for several years.

International travelers purchasing tobacco products
at lower prices through duty-free is an incentive topurchase more tobacco, hence a benefit enjoyed by
the tobacco industry.
→→→→

Currently Sri Lanka is the only country
surveyed that does not provide duty-free status
for tobacco to international travellers arrivingin Sri Lanka (Table 2).
India limits the allowance to 100 sticks while
the bulk of the countries allow 200 sticks.

Table 2: Duty-free cigarette allowance
for international travellers
No duty-freeallowance

Sri Lanka

Maximum
100 sticks

India

MAX

Maximum
200 sticks

Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia,
Canada, Egypt, France (nonEU members), Indonesia,
Iran, Japan, Jordan, Lao
PDR, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan,Thailand, South Africa,
Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda,
Ukraine, U.K., U.S., Vietnam

MAX

Maximum
400 sticks

China, Myanmar,
Philippines, Uruguay

MAX

Maximum
800 sticks

EU, Lebanon, Turkey(600 max)

MAX

100

200

400
800

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201917

the procedure for all interactions between
government officials and the tobacco industry
and requiring any industry affiliation by amember of the tobacco control board to be
declared for potential conflict of interest.
Implementation of the law was given six
months but was delayed due to a court casebrought by British American Tobacco (BAT).
On Feb 17, 2017, the Court of Appeal in Nairobi
upheld the Kenya High Court 2016 dismissalof BAT’s challenge.59 The industry’s continuous
appeals on the case through the court
ranks is a clear delay tactic for postponing
implementation of the regulations.

European Union travelers have a high allowanceof 800 cigarettes, 400 cigarillos (cigars weighing
maximum 3 grams each), 200 cigars and 1 kg of
tobacco.54 This high level promotes cross borderpurchases and an oversupply by the tobacco
industry which undermines health policies toreduce tobacco consumption through higher
taxation. In the past, France attempted to limit thisquantity to a lower level but failed.

Delay in implementation
In Bangladesh, with interference from the
Bangladesh Cigarette Manufacturers’ Association(BCMA), the law ministry gave the tobacco industry
temporary permission on March 16, 2016 to print
pictorial health warnings (PHW) on the lower partof packs until 2017. On July 4, 2017, the healthministry then ordered tobacco companies to print
PHW on the more prominent upper half of tobacco
packs from 19 September 2017, revoking the earlier
order.55 However, following a petition by the BCMA,
the High Court postponed the order to May 2018.
More prominent PHWs on the upper part of packs
were therefore delayed by two years.

→→

Uganda’s Tobacco Control Act 201560 includes
a component on Article 5.3, regarded to becomprehensive and compliant with the WHO
FCTC. However, in 2016, BAT Uganda filed apetition against the Government challenging
the constitutionality of 22 clauses in the
Act.61 The court also heard another petition by
BAT seeking a temporary injunction on theimplementation of tobacco control activities,
pending disposal of the petition. Three years
later in May 2019, the Constitutional Court
rejected BAT’s challenge and upheld the Act
as being constitutional.62 In the ruling theJudge said that just like many other tobaccocompanies around the world, BAT Uganda hadbrought the petition as one of its strategies tofrustrate laws against tobacco smoking, andordered the company to pay for legal costs.

→→

In India in 2015, the Ministry of Health, Family
and Welfare announced implementation of
85% pictorial health warnings (PHWs) on bothsides of tobacco packs;63 however, big tobaccocompanies and their allied organizations
lobbied against the implementation of these
new warnings and filed 27 cases against thefederal rule across various state jurisdictions.
The tobacco industry challenged thewarnings as untruthful, unsubstantiatedand unconstitutional. Consequently, theimplementation of larger PHWs was delayed
and not effectively implemented in manystates.64 The supreme court transferred all thesepetitions to the Karnataka High Court,65 which
struck down the 85% PHW amendment rulesin December 2017. However, in January 2018,
the Supreme Court stayed the order passed by
the Karnataka High Court thereby enabling thegovernment to, finally, proceed to implement
85% PHWs on tobacco products.66

In Canada, due to opposition from the tobacco
industry, the implementation of slide-and-shell
packaging was postponed in favour of pop-top
packaging which dissect the health warnings
when opened.56 Following vigorous opposition fromthe tobacco industry, a ban on menthol flavored
tobacco products was delayed for several years.57

Lawsuits by the tobacco
industry delay legislation
In several countries, the tobacco industry has sued
the government to derail laws entirely or delay
their implementation.

18→→

The implementation of Brazil’s ban on flavours
and additives in tobacco products, passed in2012, was delayed for about six years througha judicial claim brought by the tobacco
industry which argued that the National
Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) lacked
legal authority to regulate tobacco products.
In February 2018, the Supreme Court upheld
ANVISA’s authority to enact regulatory
measures and rejected the tobacco industry
request to strike down the ban on additives intobacco products.58→→

Kenya’s 2014 Tobacco Control Regulations
include elements of Article 5.3, setting out

STOP4. Governments
unnecessarily
interact with thetobacco industry

Unnecessary interactions occur
when, for example, top levelgovernment officials attend social
functions hosted by tobaccocompanies or when the government
accepts offers of assistance orenters into partnership with thetobacco industry. Figure 3 shows
how countries fared in unnecessaryinteractions with the tobacco
industry. Jordan, Lao PDR, U.S. andSouth Africa have faced high levelsof unnecessary interactions, while
Uruguay has done exceptionallywell to curb this problem.
In Uruguay, senior government officials do notmeet with tobacco companies. The government
only contacts the tobacco industry when strictly
necessary and in the presence of representativesof civil society. The government does not enter
into partnerships or agreements with the tobacco
industry nor accept any assistance from the tobacco
industry on enforcement activities including
monetary contribution for these activities.
Increasingly, tobacco companies have beenreported to receive frivolous awards, such as“Dream Company”, “Highest Income Taxpayer”,“Export champion” and other similar awards (Table3). The awarding ceremonies are attended by top
level officials who provide endorsement and photoopportunities for tobacco companies.
→→

In Bangladesh, most of the unnecessaryinteractions of government officials with BAT
revolved around award ceremonies, such as
the “Most Female-Friendly Organization” atthe Women Leadership Summit, where theInternational Affairs Adviser to the Prime
Minister handed over the awards; “Bangladesh
Supply Chain Excellence Award” involving
the Executive Chairman of the Bangladesh
Investment Development Authority (BIDA)
and the Institute of Chartered Accountantsof Bangladesh “Best presented annual report”
award handed over by the Finance Minister.67

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201919

The lower the score, the better the ranking

Figure 3: Governments engage
in unnecessary interaction withthe tobacco industry
Lao PDR 15
Jordan 15
United States of America 14
South Africa 14
Egypt 13
India 12
Bangladesh 12
Lebanon 11
Vietnam 10
Japan 10
Brazil 10
Ukraine 9
Philippines 9
Indonesia 8
China 8Canada 8
Pakistan 7
Sri Lanka 6
Tanzania 5
Turkey 5
Malaysia 5
Mexico 5
France 4
Uganda 3
United Kingdom 2
Thailand 2
Nepal 2
Korea (Republic of) 2
Kenya 2
Iran 2
Cambodia 2
Myanmar 1
Uruguay 0

20

STOP

0-2

3-4

5-6

7-8

9-10

11-12

13-14

15-16

17-18

19-20

Table 3: Frivolous awards to tobacco industry 2017-2018
Country

Officials who attended

AwardsExecutive Chairman of the Bangladesh
Investment Development Authority

BAT: Supply Chain Excellence Award

Finance Minister

BAT: Best presented annual report

ICT State Minister

BAT: Dream Company to Work for

Minister of Commerce

BAT: Corporate Governance Excellence Award 2017

State Minister for Finance and Planning

BAT: Highest income tax payer

International Affairs Advisor to thePrime Minister

BAT: Most Female-Friendly Organization

Nepal

Finance Minister

SNPL - subsidiary of ITC Ltd, India: Highest Tax
Payers award

Kenya

Cabinet Secretary for Youth & Gender

BAT: Best Employer of the Year Award

Korea

Minister of Industry and Commerce

BAT: USD $300 million Export Tower

TurkeyPrime Minister

Philip Morris: 2018 export champion award

BangladeshInteraction with the tobacco industry is inevitablein countries with state-owned enterprises such as
in China, Egypt, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Thailand
and Vietnam.
→→

In Lebanon top-level government officials attend
tobacco-related functions organized by their stateowned tobacco enterprise, Regie. In December
2018, the Finance Minister attended a ceremony
where the Association of Tobacco Farmers inSouth Lebanon honored farmers’ children for theiracademic achievement for 2017-2018 in Sidon andTyr. The ceremony was co-organized by Regie
and the Confederation of Unions of Tobacco.68 In
October 2018, the Minister of Defense received
Regie executives at his office where the Minister
presented an honorary shield to Regie for its
contribution. In turn, Regie presented the Ministerwith a photograph of tobacco plants.69

Tobacco companies may still gain access to senior
government officials through a third-party platform70
such as chambers of commerce or other institutions.
→→

BAT Myanmar for example co-chairs theAmerican Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM)

Myanmar’s Government Affairs Committee,
whose objective is to “strengthen relationships
between American companies and the Myanmar
Government and its related Ministries.”71
EUROCHAM Myanmar has an Anti-illicit
Trade Group, which has BAT as a member andwhose stated objective is to “coordinate regularconsultation meetings between the group andthe authorized government officials to develop ashared understanding of challenges and issues.”72→→

In Malaysia, Philip Morris International (PMI)
which is a board member of AMCHAM, routinely
meets with government officials throughactivities of the chamber. In October 2018,
officials from the Malaysian Ministry of Financeand Inland Revenue Board briefed AMCHAM’s
Investment and Taxation Committee.73 Alsopresent at this briefing were officials from the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry
and the Malaysian Investment Development
Authority. This presents challenges forgovernment officials to avoid meeting with PMI
executives at these AMCHAM events.

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201921

5. Lack oftransparency
facilitates industry
interference

Lack of transparency in interactions
with the tobacco industry is aproblem across most countries. Twothirds of the countries have notput in place rules or proceduresfor disclosure or registration of
tobacco industry entities, affiliatedorganizations, and individuals
acting on their behalf.
Non-health departments, such as departmentsof commerce, customs and trade remained mostvulnerable to influence from the tobacco industry.
Often, the interaction comes to light after the fact.
Closed door meetings with the Finance Ministryon taxation issues, without health officials present
and without disclosure of the agenda, occurredin Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and South
Africa. Several governments have bought into theindustry’s arguments that any tax increase willlead to worsening of tobacco smuggling. This has
encouraged governments to enter into collaboration
with the industry in a non-transparent manner.

22

STOP

In 2017, Bangladesh Customs Intelligence andInvestigation Directorate received funds from the
Bangladesh Cigarette Manufacturers Association
to observe a ”Cigarette Smuggling Prevention
Week,”74 which was halted after exposure in thepress. However, it was replaced with BAT providing
information to the National Bureau of Revenue toreduce illegal cigarette trade.75
Several governments have signed a memorandumof understanding with or accepted technicalassistance from the tobacco industry to addressillicit trade (Table 4) but they are not parties to
the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco
Products. The Protocol’s General Obligations,76 in
Article 4 requires that “Parties shall ensure themaximum possible transparency with respect toany interactions they may have with the tobacco
industry.” The Protocol also states under “tracking
and tracing” that obligations assigned to a party
shall not be performed by or delegated to thetobacco industry.
In India, an industry-related body, Committee
Against Smuggling and Counterfeiting Activities
Destroying the Economy (CASCADE) was formed
to counter illicit trade and smuggling of tobacco.
CASCADE is currently headed by Indian Tobacco
Company’s senior vice president for corporate
affairs. The government through a closed-door
agreement has collaborated with CASCADE tofight against illicit trade, endorsed by the Union
Commerce and Industry Minister.77

“Non-health sectors, such as
Departments of Commerce,
Customs and Trade remained
most vulnerable to influence
from the tobacco industry.
Often, the interaction comesto light after the fact.

”

Table 4: Governments in non-transparent collaboration with the tobacco industry
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)/
Technical assistanceParty to Protocol to Eliminate Illicit
Trade in Tobacco Products78

BangladeshTechnical assistanceBrazil2017 – Technical assistanceJune 14, 2018 (Accession)

China (state enterprise)

MOU

Signatory - 10 Jan 2013

India

Technical assistance

5 June 2018 (Accession)

JordanTechnical assistanceNot a Party

Lao PDR

Technical assistanceNot a Party

LebanonAnti-Smuggling Conference

Not a Party

South Africa

Technical assistanceNot a Party

UkraineMOU

Not a Party

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201923

Although governments may have a policy of nonengagement with the tobacco industry, tobaccocompanies can still gain access to senior level
officials as experienced by the European Union.
In 2018 in Brussels, Tobacco Watch Blog reported
that commissioners, members of the European
Parliament and directors of administration took
part in a symposium funded by PMI, which could
put pressure on Brussels. The symposium entitled“smuggling, counterfeiting and financing ofterrorism” was organized by the Robert SchumanFoundation. Among the speakers were Pierre
Moscovici, Commissioner for Economic andFinancial Affairs, Taxation and Customs, and JulianKing, Union Security Commissioner. According to
Tobacco Watch, Moscovici later reported, “We were
not aware of this funding, .... Information taken,
it is preferable that the Commissioner does notparticipate in this conference. We sincerely takethis opportunity to thank you for this informationthat we had missed.”79

There are countries with good practice in applying
a procedure to record interactions with the tobacco
industry. In Kenya, the Tobacco Control Regulations
set out the mechanism for all interactions between
government officials and the tobacco industry.80 The
procedure requires:
1.

Any interactions between public authorities or
public officers and the tobacco industry shallbe limited to the extent strictly necessary for
effective tobacco control and enforcement ofrelevant laws.

2.

A minimum of two public officers shall bepresent in any interactions with the tobacco
industry.

3.

Before commencing any interaction with thetobacco industry, the public officers shall state,in writing, that the interaction does not imply
an endorsement of tobacco industry practices
and that no relationship, collaboration or
partnership shall be construed whatsoever
from the interaction.

DISCLOSURE OF MEETINGS WITH THE INDUSTRY
Health Canada discloses meetings with the tobacco industry in providing the date, subject
matter, attendees and outcome.81 The Department has launched a website that contains detailsof meetings with representatives from the tobacco and the electronic nicotine delivery system(ENDS) industry.
In France, Article 26 of the 2016 health law has established a principle of transparency of relations ofinfluence by the tobacco industry. Application of this article requires that tobacco manufacturers, importers
and distributors, as well as businesses, professional organizations or associations representing them, reportannually to the Ministry of Solidarity and Health all expenditures related to activities of influence orrepresentation of interests.82 These include:

24→→

Remunerations of personnel employed full time or partly to exercise influence or represent interests;→→

Purchase of services from consulting companies in influencing or representation activities;→→

Benefits in kind or in cash, worth more than €10 (USD $11.15), provided to:

STOP

++

members of the government;++

members of ministerial offices or collaborators of the President of the Republic;++

collaborators of the President of the National Assembly or the President of the Senate;++parliamentarians;++

persons entrusted with a public service mission which their mission or the nature of theirfunction calls for taking or preparing the decisions and opinions of the public authorities relating
to tobacco products.

A register of lobbyists would identify those
speaking on behalf of the tobacco industry. In the
U.S., lobbyists are required to register according
to the Lobbying Disclosure Act.83 Lobbying firms
and organizations employing in-house lobbyists
must register when they meet income/expense
minimums, have an employee who meets thedefinition of a lobbyist, and/or when they makemore than one lobbying contact with a government
official. All 50 states have similar registration
requirements and provide public access toregistration information for lobbyists and/or entities
who contract for lobbying services (Table 5).

Table 5: U.S. lobbying totals
for 2017 and 2018
2017

2018

Total for Tobacco$21,825,111$23,361,000

Total Number ofClients Reported

28

28

Total Numberof Lobbyists
Reported

218

232

84

85

Access to information on the number of lobbyists
and lobbying expenditure will be helpful inseveral ways. For example, comparing the numberof lobbyists promoting the tobacco industry’s
interest against the number of full-time staffs
working in tobacco control, and a comparison on
the differences in the expenditure, would be an
exposé and a reality check on what the governmentis up against. For example, in 2017, Altria and RJ
Reynolds paid lobbyist to stop a tobacco tax bill in
Montana.86 About USD 26 million was spent on thedefeated tobacco tax measure.87“

Health Canada discloses
meetings with the tobacco
industry in providing
the date, subject matter,attendees and outcome.
The Department haslaunched a website that
contains details of meetings
with representatives fromthe tobacco and the ENDS
industry.

”

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201925

6. Senior government
officials working
for the industry
present a conflictof interest problem.
The Index reviewed whether current
or retired officials joined the tobacco
industry and whether governments
had a policy rejecting contributions,
including political contributions,from the tobacco industry (Figure 4).
Retired senior government officials joining tobaccocompanies is a problem in several countries. Tobaccocompanies appoint former senior officials to benefit
from their previous senior position which can facilitate
lobbying the bureaucracy and influence policy.

26→→

In Japan, when senior finance officials retire
from government service, they move to top
leadership positions in Japan Tobacco (JT). For
example, the current Chairman of JT started
his career in the Ministry of Finance, rising to
the position of Administrative Vice Minister in
2009, was promoted as Special Advisor to the
Cabinet (2012 – April 2014), and then appointed
as Chair of JT in June 2014.88→→

In Pakistan, a senior government official who
previously was the Finance Secretary andSecretary General, Finance and Economic
Affairs, upon his retirement, became the
Chairman of the Board of Pakistan Tobacco

STOP

Co (PTC) the local affiliate of BAT.89 Anotherofficial who served the government for 38
years in policy formation and implementation
joined PTC as its Non-Executive Director andChairman of Audit Committee.90→→

In Bangladesh, the former Senior Secretaryof the Ministry of Agriculture (2016) and theformer Secretary of the Ministry of Industries(since 2012) are both Independent Directors of
BATB.91 In Cambodia, the owner of a cigarettebusiness was appointed a Senator in 2018.92→→

France has legislation to prevent former ministers,
former presidents of local councils as well as
former members of independent administrativeor public authorities entering the private sector.93
The High Authority checks if these officials
enter the private sector at the end of their public
functions or mandates. For a period of three years,
anyone who has held one of these positions must
submit a request to the High Authority to examine
whether the new private activities that theyplan to pursue are compatible with their former
functions; however, the legislation applies only
to some public authorities94 which provides aloophole where former officials can still join the
tobacco industry. For example, a past Intelligence
Director of the General Directorate for External
Security (DGES) of the French Ministry of Defense,
who was also senior official in charge of economic
intelligence to the Prime Minister’s office, wasrecruited to the expert council of PMI’s IMPACT
program on illicit trade.95

The lower the score, the better the ranking

Figure 4: Conflict of interest
problem persists

0-3

4-6

7-9

10-12

13-15

16-18

19-21

22-24

25-27

28-30

Japan 15
Pakistan 14
Thailand 13
Bangladesh 13
Jordan 12
India 12Egypt 12Indonesia 11
United States of America 10
Mexico 10
South Africa 9
Malaysia 9
Lao PDR 9
China 9Cambodia 9
Sri Lanka 8Philippines 8
Lebanon 7
Kenya 7
Vietnam 6
Myanmar 6
Uruguay 5
United Kingdom 5
Turkey 5
Tanzania 5
Nepal 5
Korea (Republic of) 5
Iran 4
France 4
Canada 4
Brazil 4
Ukraine 3
Uganda 2

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201927

Political contributions andgifts from the tobacco industry
Two thirds of the 33 countries allow politicalcontributions from the tobacco industry. In the
U.S., the law requires that direct contributions topolitical campaigns must be declared and madepublic, although money spent on electioneering
without donating to campaigns is not subject toreporting. In the 2018 (non-presidential) election
cycle, the tobacco industry contributed USD$5,447,028 in total campaign donations according
to public records.97 The Kenya Tobacco Control
Regulations require full disclosure of politicalcontributions from the tobacco industry. A reportmust be submitted to the Board, responsible
for monitoring and reporting, any lobbying,philanthropy, political contributions and all otheractivities by the tobacco industry. The U.K. also has
general rules (not specific to tobacco) regulating
political contributions and the disclosure of suchcontributions. Donations over £7,500 (USD $9,130) tonational political parties must be declared.98

tobacco control law.99 In Canada donations topolitical campaigns for electoral purposes arebanned. This ban applies to all corporations, tradeunions and non-governmental organizations,
not just the tobacco industry. Other measures toreduce conflicts of interest between government
and any commercial interest include the federal
Conflict of Interest Act, Treasury Board policies on
Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment, and theDepartmental Code of Conduct which significantly
limits the acceptance of gifts, hospitality or any
benefits. These apply a high standard of protection
against conflicts of interest.
The French government disallows the acceptanceof all forms of contributions/ gifts from the tobacco
industry including offers of assistance, policy
drafts, or study visit invitations given or offeredto the government, its agencies, officials and theirrelatives.100 Similarly, the Ugandan Tobacco Control
Act prohibits contributions/gifts from the tobacco
industry including offers of assistance, policy drafts,
or study visit invitations.101

Contributions from the tobacco industry are bannedin 10 countries. In Turkey, activities including
lobbying, philanthropy, political contributions
and all other activities are prohibited by the

STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Governments with state owned enterprises (SOEs) or joint ventures such as China, Egypt, Japan,
Lao PDR, Lebanon, Thailand and Vietnam, protect their tobacco business interests; so government
officials find themselves inadvertently conflicted in adopting stringent tobacco control
measures.96 Some of these countries have been found at the lower end of the Index scale.
SOEs allow the tobacco industry to be viewed positively as a stakeholder, pressure government officials
to give preference to its business interests over tobacco control and create revolving door situations withsenior officials moving from government to the industry. Both foreign and local tobacco companies in thesecountries tend to approach departments responsible for trade and investment with their business concerns.
Decisions that accommodate the tobacco industry’s requests often result in delays and watering down of
tobacco control policies to the detriment of public health.
Hence Article 5.3 guidelines call on parties to the WHO FCTC to treat state-owned tobacco industry in thesame way as any other tobacco industry and to ensure that the setting and implementing of tobacco control
policy are separated from overseeing or managing the tobacco industry.

28

STOP

7. Preventive
measures to protect
the government

Governments can proactively takeseveral preventive measures toprotect their officials from being
exposed to interference suchas adopting a code of conduct
for officials when dealing withthe tobacco industry, applying
transparency and accountability
procedures for interactions, andprohibiting acceptance of any formof contributions including technicalassistance from the tobacco industry.
Unfortunately, Tanzania, Lebanon, Korea, South
Africa, Japan, Egypt, and several other countries
have done little to protect their officials fromindustry interference (Figure 5).
Most countries have taken some form of preventive
action, but these are insufficient to provide aneffective firewall. Some countries have instituted
partial action by just one agency, usually the healthdepartment, which is insufficient, as it leaves thedoor wide open for the industry to seek support
from the non-health departments.

A basic activity for governments to undertakeis to implement a program to consistently raiseawareness across the departments on policies
relating to WHO FCTC Article 5.3 Guidelines. Many
countries, including China, Egypt, Japan, Korea,
Tanzania, South Africa and Turkey, do not havesuch a specific policy awareness program in place.
Countries such as Brazil, Kenya and the U.K. haveadopted programs to raise awareness on protecting
their tobacco control measures from industry
interference. Brazil used an information sheet,(“How much it costs to receive donations from thetobacco industry”) to conduct awareness programswith various ministries of the National Commission
for WHO FCTC implementation and other bodies,including parliamentarians.102
The U.K.’s Department of Health and Social Care(DHSC) has committed to issuing active reminders
in the officials and delivery groups to limit contact
with the tobacco industry.103 In February 2019, theAll Party Parliamentary Group on Smoking and
Health recommended that the DHSC ”should provide
all parts of Government […] with advice on their
responsibilities to protect public health policy
from the commercial and vested interests of thetobacco industry based on the WHO FCTC Article
5.3 guidelines.’104

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201929

The lower the score, the better the ranking

Figure 5: Governments thathave acted to protect themselveswith preventive measures
Tanzania 25
Lebanon 24
Korea (Republic of) 24
South Africa 23
Japan 23
Egypt 23
Turkey 22
Mexico 21
Myanmar 21
India 21
Ukraine 20
Sri Lanka 20
Malaysia 20
Uruguay 19
United States of America 19
Lao PDR 19
China 18
Cambodia 18
Vietnam 17
Nepal 17
Jordan 16
Indonesia 16
Canada 16
Bangladesh 16
France 13
Uganda 12
Pakistan 12
Kenya 11
United Kingdom 11
Thailand 10
Brazil 10
Iran 8
Philippines 7

30

STOP

0-2

3-4

5-6

7-8

9-10

11-12

13-14

15-16

17-18

19-20

While Kenya’s tobacco control legislation105
requires the authorities to adopt mechanisms toraise awareness about the interference and vested
interests of tobacco industry and enforcementof tobacco control legislations and policies, theimplementation was delayed due to the court
challenge brought by BAT.

Code of conduct as a firewall
Indonesia and Lao PDR have issued a Code of
Conduct for their health ministries. In 2018, theMinistry of Health Lao PDR issued a Code of
Conduct for the Health Sector to provide guidanceon interacting with the tobacco industry.106 The
Code includes the following clauses:
1.

Should not accept legislation, policy, work plan,
action plan and any document offer by tobacco
industry or tobacco industry front groups
including ex-government officials and retirees.

2.

Should not accept direct and indirect support
from tobacco industry such as cash, loan,
present, gifts, in-kind, monetary, survey fund,study fund, equipment-technology including
Corporate Social Responsibility, except payment
made to the government according to the
obligations under the law and regulations.107

Jordan has a code of conduct for ministers andpublic officials however, the Parliament and theHouse of Representative are not required to disclose
any relationship with the tobacco industry.108,109

Record interactions
with industry
Uganda, U.K., Uruguay and France have instituteda policy and/or a procedure for disclosing records
of interactions with the tobacco industry and its
representatives. Uganda’s legislation requires
all nominated members of the Tobacco Control
Committee to sign a declaration of interest form
before being appointed. This committee is guided
by an internal code of conduct on its dealings withthe tobacco industry.110 Uruguay has a procedure fordisclosing the records of the interaction (such as
agenda, attendees, minutes and outcome) with thetobacco industry.

PHILIPPINES: A CODE OF
CONDUCT ACROSS ALL
CIVIL SERVANTSIn 2010, the Philippines Department
of Health and the Civil Service
Commission issued a Joint
Memorandum Circular (JMC)111 whichapplies to all officials and employeesof the government.
The JMC prohibits interaction with thetobacco industry unless strictly necessary
for its effective regulation. Where a strictly
necessary interaction with the tobacco
industry is warranted, the JMC requires
transparency in interactions with theindustry through submission of reports
or minutes of meetings that can be madepublicly accessible.
The JMC prohibits the following:→→

unnecessary interaction with thetobacco industry→→

preferential treatment to thetobacco industry→→

accepting gifts, donations,and sponsorship→→

financial interest in the
tobacco industry→→

accepting other analogous favors→→

conflict of interest with thetobacco industry

The circular specifies that any violation
covered under the JMC is a ground foradministrative disciplinary action. Constantraising awareness of the JMC to government
agencies and effective monitoring of thetobacco industry is needed to ensure its
successful implementation.

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201931

Requiring the tobacco
industry to be transparent
and accountable
According to recommendations of the guidelines,
the tobacco industry should be required toperiodically submit information on tobacco
production, manufacture, market share, marketing
expenditures, revenues and other activities,
including lobbying and philanthropy. Thailand, theU.K. and the EU provide good examples of how to
obtain industry information.
→→

In 2017, Thailand passed the Tobacco ProductControl Act117 which requires the tobacco
industry to submit information on volume of
manufacturing, imports, marketing expenses
and earnings. It is the first country in Asia torequire this level of detailed reporting from thetobacco industry.

→→

The U.K. Revenue & Customs and theDepartment of Health and Social Care collectinformation from tobacco manufacturers on
profits, taxes paid, product prices, marketing
and research spending, and local data on salesof all products;118 however, the government is
not allowed to publish the sales and marketingdata.119 Civil society organizations haveurged for greater transparency requiring theinformation to be made public.120→→

The EU Tobacco Products Directive of 2016
has imposed reporting requirements on the
tobacco industry.121

DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS SHOULD NOT PROMOTE TOBACCO
Parties to the WHO FCTC at the sixth session of the COP (COP6) agreed to “raise awareness andadopt measures to implement Article 5.3 and its implementing Guidelines among all parts ofgovernment including diplomatic missions.”112 The Philippines,113 U.K.114 and U.S115 have measures
to ensure their diplomatic missions do not promote tobacco.
The U.K.’s specific guidelines on tobacco for their diplomatic missions prohibits the following:→→

involvement in activities with the specific purpose of promoting the sale of tobacco or tobacco-related
products;→→

encouraging investment in the tobacco industry, or providing any assistance in helping tobaccocompanies influence non-discriminatory local business policies to their advantage (e.g.: taxation, plain/standardized packaging, etc.);→→

attendance or otherwise supporting receptions or high-profile events, especially those where a tobaccocompany is the sole or main sponsor and/or which are overtly to promote tobacco products or the tobacco
industry (such as the official opening of a United Kingdom tobacco factory overseas); and→→lobbying against any local administration’s policies that are aimed at improving public health.

In Pakistan, the importance of these guidelines was demonstrated when British American Tobacco (BAT)
was exposed in using the British High Commission in Pakistan to lobby the Finance Minister and theMinister of State for National Health to drop the government’s plan to apply 85% pictorial health warnings
on cigarette packs.116

32

STOP

Conclusion andrecommendations

This report has revealed thatcountries that scored well on
the Index have prevailed against
tobacco industry interference byimplementing measures to protect
themselves. These are the same
countries noted for their strong
tobacco control achievement.
Article 5.3 appears under General Obligations of
the WHO FCTC, however its implementation isprogressing slowly and is far from satisfactory.
Major improvement is needed across most countries.
Non-health sectors remain vulnerable to tobacco
industry interference. The tobacco industry
continues to receive incentives to do its business inseveral countries.

“

Article 5.3 appears under
General Obligations of
the WHO FCTC, however
its implementation isprogressing slowly andis far from satisfactory.

”

Actions outlined in sub-recommendations ofArticle 5.3 guidelines can put a firewall aroundthe government and enable officials to protect
and advance public health policies. It is vitalthat Article 5.3 is implemented in its entirety toplug loop holes the tobacco industry can exploit.
Examples of good country practices122 havebeen recorded and provide a menu of actions
governments can adopt.

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201933

Recommendations

Governments have the tools in theirhands to short-circuit the tobacco
industry’s interference. They needto act fast and do the following:
1. Create awareness on Article 5.3: A
whole-of-government approach isvital to effectively counter tobacco
industry interference. More needs tobe done to increase awareness on the
obligation to protect tobacco control
among the non-health sector to stop
industry influence in thwarting anddelaying policy development. Efforts
to increase awareness should also
include parliamentarians and all local
government officials.

2. Stop unnecessary interactions:Interactions must be limited to only
when strictly necessary for the
purposes of controlling, regulating and

34

STOP

supervising the tobacco industry. This
will halt unnecessary interactions
through awards ceremonies.

3. Firewall government officials:
Adopting a Code of Conduct or
guidelines for all government officials
will firewall the bureaucracy so thatpublic health policy is developed
free from interference. To be more
effective, the code must apply to thewhole government rather than just the
Department/Ministry of Health.

4. Ensure transparency: Greatertransparency when dealing withthe tobacco industry will reduce
opportunities for interference. All
meetings with the tobacco industry
and their outcomes must be recorded
and made publicly available.

“The tobacco industry should be required toprovide information in a transparent andaccurate manner regularly, about production,market share, marketing expenditures,
revenues and any other activity, including
expenditure on research and philanthropy.”

5. Denormalize so called “socially
responsible” activities by the tobacco
industry: A ban on tobacco related CSR
activities can reduce opportunities for
top level officials to participate andendorse industry activities.

6. Remove benefits to the tobacco
industry: Departments/ministries ofhealth must work more closely with
non-health departments.

7. Treat state-owned tobacco
enterprises like any other tobacco
business: As stated explicitly in therecommendations of the guidelines,
SOE should be treated like any othertobacco business and not be given any
incentives or privileges to conduct
their business.

8. Require information on production,marketing and revenue from thetobacco industry: The tobacco
industry should be required to provide
information in a transparent andaccurate manner regularly, about
production, market share, marketing
expenditures, revenues and anyother activity, including expenditure
on research and philanthropy.
Best practice would be to ban the
tobacco industry from providing any
contributions including politicalcontributions, gifts, technical advice,scholarships or study visits.

9. Require disclosure: Require a registryof lobbyists and the tobacco industry’s
lobbying expenditure. The registry
should also have a record of therepresentatives of the tobacco industry.

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201935

Summary table
BD

BR

KH

CA

CN

EG

FR

IN

ID

IR

JP

JO

KE

Level of Participation in Policy-Development

14

3

4

5

18

5

5

6

15

4

19

15

4

The government accepts, supports or endorses
offer for assistance by or in collaboration withthe tobacco industry in implementing tobacco
control policies (Rec 3.1)

5

1

1

2

5

2

2

2

5

1

4

5

1

The government accepts, supports or endorses
legislation drafted by/ collaboration with thetobacco industry (Rec 3.4)

3

0

1

1

3

1

1

0

5

1

5

4

1

The government allows the tobacco industry
to sit in multi-sectoral committee/ advisorygroup that sets public health policy (Rec 4.8)

5

1

1

1

5

1

1

3

5

1

5

5

1

The government allows representatives fromthe tobacco industry (including State-owned)in the delegation to the COP or subsidiarybodies or accepts their sponsorship fordelegates. (Rec 4.9 & 8.3)

1

1

1

1

5

1

1

1

0

1

5

1

1

5

0

3

3

5

5

1

4

5

1

5

5

0

The government accommodates requests fromthe industry for longer implementation time or
postponement of tobacco control law (Rec 7.1)

4

0

1

4

4

1

1

0

5

1

3

5

2

The government gives privileges, incentives,
exemptions or benefits to the tobacco industry(Rec 7.3)

5

2

4

3

3

4

3

5

5

3

5

4

3

Tobacco related CSR activities
The government receives contributions fromthe tobacco industry (including so-called
CSR contributions) (Rec 6.4) The government
agencies/officials endorses, forms partnerships
with/ participates in tobacco industry CSR
activities (Rec 6.2)
Benefits to the tobacco industry

36

STOP

KR

LA

LB

MY

MX

MM

NP

PK

PH

ZA

LK

TZ

TH

TR

UG

UA

UK

US

UY

VN

2

9

15

9

12

5

2

11

18

10

6

14

4

7

3

12

2

13

2

14

0

4

5

0

1

1

0

3

5

3

3

3

1

5

1

2

1

5

0

4

0

3

5

3

5

2

0

2

5

1

2

5

1

0

0

4

0

5

0

4

1

1

4

5

5

1

1

5

5

5

0

1

1

1

1

5

0

3

1

5

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

3

1

1

5

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

4

0

2

3

2

4

2

4

4

5

1

4

2

0

3

3

1

0

0

4

0

3

5

5

0

4

2

4

0

0

4

5

3

4

0

3

0

4

2

0

3

5

1

3

1

3

3

4

5

4

4

4

2

5

1

3

1

5

1

1

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201937

Summary table cont.
BD

BR

KH

CA

CN

EG

FR

IN

ID

IR

JP

JO

KE

Forms of unnecessary interaction

12

10

2

8

8

13

4

12

8

2

10

15

2

Top-level government officials meet with/
foster relations with the tobacco companies
such as attending social functions andevents sponsored or organized by the tobaccocompanies. (Rec 2.1)

5

4

1

3

0

3

2

3

5

1

3

5

2

The government accepts assistance/ offersof assistance from the tobacco industry on
enforcement (Rec 3.1 & 4.3)

4

3

0

3

5

5

0

5

1

1

3

5

0

The government accepts, supports, endorses, orenters into partnerships or agreements withthe tobacco industry (Rec 3.1)

3

3

1

2

3

5

2

4

2

0

4

5

0

The government does not publicly disclosemeetings/ interactions with the tobacco
industry where such interactions are strictly
necessary for regulation. (Rec 2.2)

3

2

2

2

5

5

2

5

5

4

3

5

1

The government requires rules for thedisclosure or registration of tobacco
industry entities, affiliate organizations, andindividuals acting on their behalf including
lobbyists.

5

3

5

2

3

5

1

4

5

3

5

2

3

Conflict of Interest

13

4

9

4

9

12

4

12

11

4

15

12

7

The government does not have a policy(whether or not written) to prohibit
contributions from the tobacco industry or
any entity working to further its interests topolitical parties, candidates, or campaigns or
to require full disclosure of such contributions(Rec 4.11)

5

1

5

1

1

5

1

4

5

1

5

5

1

Retired senior officials work for the tobacco
industry (Rec 4.4)

4

3

0

2

3

5

2

4

5

2

5

2

3

Current government officials and theirrelatives hold positions in the tobacco
business including consultancy positions (Rec4.5, 4.8 & 4.10)

4

0

4

1

5

2

1

4

1

1

5

5

3

Transparency

38

STOP

KR

LA

LB

MY

MX

MM

NP

PK

PH

ZA

LK

TZ

TH

TR

UG

UA

UK

US

UY

VN

2

15

11

5

5

1

2

7

9

14

6

5

2

5

3

9

2

14

0

10

2

5

4

3

3

0

2

3

4

4

4

5

0

5

2

0

1

5

0

5

0

5

4

2

2

0

0

4

0

5

2

0

2

0

0

5

1

4

0

5

0

5

3

0

0

1

0

0

5

5

0

0

0

0

1

4

0

5

0

0

5

4

5

3

3

4

5

5

0

4

5

5

3

5

2

4

0

5

0

1

5

4

5

5

5

5

3

5

3

3

4

3

4

5

3

4

4

2

5

5

5

9

7

9

10

6

5

14

8

9

8

5

13

5

2

3

5

10

5

6

5

1

5

5

5

1

5

5

5

4

5

5

4

5

1

0

4

5

5

1

0

3

1

4

3

3

0

5

3

1

0

0

5

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

5

1

0

2

2

0

4

0

4

3

0

4

0

0

3

0

4

0

5

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201939

Summary table cont.

40

BD

BR

KH

CA

CN

EG

FR

IN

ID

IR

JP

JO

KE

Preventive measures

16

10

18

16

18

23

13

21

16

8

23

16

11

The government has a procedure fordisclosing records of the interaction withtobacco industry and its representatives. (Rec
5.1)

4

2

5

3

4

5

2

4

5

1

5

4

4

The government has formulated, adopted
or implemented a code of conduct for public
officials, prescribing the standards they should
comply when dealings with the tobacco
industry (Rec 4.2)

3

2

3

4

4

5

3

4

2

1

5

3

4

The government requires the tobacco
industry to periodically submit information
on tobacco production, manufacture, market
share, marketing expenditures, revenues
and any other activity, including lobbying,philanthropy, and political contributions. (Rec
5.2)

2

2

5

3

2

3

2

5

2

2

3

3

1

The government has a program / system/
plan to consistently raise awareness within
its departments on policies relating to FCTC
Article 5.3 Guidelines. (Rec 1.1, 1.2)

3

2

3

4

5

5

4

3

5

3

5

4

1

The government has a policy prohibiting theacceptance of all forms of contributions fromthe tobacco industry (monetary or otherwise)
including offers of assistance, policy drafts,
or study visit invitations to the government,
officials and their relatives. (Rec 3.4)

4

2

2

2

3

5

2

5

2

1

5

2

1

77

34

48

47

73

73

34

69

75

30

88

79

33

STOP

KR

LA

LB

MY

MX

MM

NP

PK

PH

ZA

LK

TZ

TH

TR

UG

UA

UK

US

UY

VN

24

19

24

20

21

21

17

12

7

23

20

25

10

22

12

20

11

19

19

17

5

5

5

5

4

5

5

4

1

5

4

5

2

5

4

5

2

2

2

5

4

2

5

5

5

2

4

2

1

5

4

5

2

5

2

5

3

5

5

4

5

4

4

5

2

5

5

2

2

4

4

5

2

2

1

4

2

2

2

2

5

3

5

2

5

5

2

2

2

5

5

5

2

5

4

4

2

5

5

4

5

5

5

3

5

4

1

2

1

4

3

5

2

5

1

2

2

5

5

2

50

68

75

62

59

53

41

66

54

72

58

70

43

58

29

61

26

72

34

58

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201941

End notes

42

com/s/qqkp4dvjgdtrt16/IMG-20181125-WA0020.
jpg?dl=0World Health Organization. WHO Report on the
Global Tobacco Epidemic, 2019. Geneva. Licence:
CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO. Available from: https://apps.
who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/326043/9789241516204-eng.pdf

16

Inspection of Economic Activities Law 33/2017(2017). Petra Governmental News. Available from:https://bit.ly/2LMONmF

2

World Health Organization. Tobacco. 26 Jul 2019.
Available from https://bit.ly/2SHbAjm

17

3

World Health Organization. 2018 Global progress
report on implementation of the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control. Geneva: World
Health Organization; 2018. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA
3.0 IGO.

Jordan Restaurant Association. Touristic
Restaurants and Public Health Law 47/2008. 2017.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2JZV9gC

18World Health Organization. WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (adopted 21 May
2003, entered into force 27 February 2005). Geneva

19

Bonikbarta.net. NBR pressures foreign brands to
put higher price on cigarettes. The Daily
Bonikbarta. 2017 Jun 7. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2SPLThL

20

GST Announces Cess Rates on Tobacco Products
and Pan Masala. Clear tax. 2017 Jun 14. Available
from: https://bit.ly/2MtSSN8

21

The Hindu. Willing to hear out issues on GST.
Business Line: The Hindu. 2017 Jul 30. Available
from: https://bit.ly/2LLjclu

22

Tobacco Reporter. Taxing questions in Kenya.
2018 Mar 1. Available from: https://bit.ly/2LNe1BB

23

The Treasury. Republic of Kenya: Budget
Statement for Fiscal year 2017/2018. Available
from: https://bit.ly/2LN71Vj (Page 40, para 163)

24

Mahmoud Al Jamal. Urgent meetings between
Eastern Tobacco and Supply to determine
cigarette prices ELWATANNEWS. 2017 Nov 22.
Available from: https://www.elwatannews.com/
news/details/2739178

25

Ukraine is ready to accede to the Protocol toeliminate illicit trade in tobacco products. Cabinetof Ministers. 2019 Apr 25. Available from: https://www.kmu.gov.ua/ua/news/249781408

26

The Round Table was held at the Committee on
Foreign Affairs: “Ratification of the Protocol to
Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products Strengthening International Cooperation
between Ukraine and the EU in the Area of
Combating Illicit Manufacturing and Traffickingof Tobacco Products”. Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine. 2019 Apr 25. Available from: https://rada.
gov.ua/fsview/154054.html

27

The Ukrainian State Fiscal Service and the
Ukrtiutin Ukrainian Association of Tobacco
Producers Memorandum of Cooperation to Combat
the Illegal Trade and Movement of Tobacco
Products in Ukraine. SFS. 2019 Apr 14. http://sfs.
gov.ua/media-tsentr/novini/331434.html.

28

Health Justice. Tobacco and E-cigarette Industry:
Interference in Public Health Policy in the

1

4

World Health Organization. WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control. 2003. Geneva.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2YAa9tu

5World Health Organization. Guidelines for
Implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2YqfzU1

6

Assunta M., Dorotheo E. U. SEATCA Tobacco
Industry Interference Index: a tool for measuring
implementation of WHO Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control Article 5.3, Tob Control.
2014. Available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/
tobaccocontrol-2014-051934

7

Kenya Tobacco Control Act 2014. Available from:https://bit.ly/2YwG4uT

8

National Tobacco Control Law 2007. Available from:https://bit.ly/2KG8T0f

9

FCTC COP. List of participants, 2018 Oct. Available
from: https://bit.ly/2jONirO

10

FCTC COP. List of Participants. 2018 Oct. Available
from: https://bit.ly/2lFMt57

11

Jiji. Japan to use larger health warning labelson packs of cigarettes; Japan Times; 2018 Dec 28.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2SNvavA

12

Elaine Lies. Japan Health Ministry to water down
proposal on restaurant smoking: media; Reuters.
2017 Nov 17. Available from: https://reut.rs/2Y6AjEO

13

Rules on cigarette package labelling in thejurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China(2015 version). Available from: https://bit.
ly/2KMdRZy

14

Ministry of Tourism. Procedural Guide: Joint
Inspection, Awareness and Guidance Unit on
Touristic Establishments. Amman, Jordan:
Ministry of Tourism. 2015. Available from: https://bit.ly/2LOnx7i

15

Ministry of Health. Ministry of Health Letter TO/
Tobacco/672136/117. (2018b). Amman,
Jordan. Available from https://www.dropbox.

STOP

Philippines. 2019. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2SMV8zb

43

29

Open Democracy. Tobacco lobby and smuggling
in Mexico. 2018 Nov 21. Available from: https://bit.ly/2KPWQfM

JPNN.com. Permerintah Apresiasi Aplikasi
Ayo SRC Karya Sampoerna. 2018 Nov 26.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2H9DAIT

44

30

Regie Libanaise de Tabacs et Tombacs. Regie
signs agreement with “Philip Morris” tomanufacture its products in Lebanon. 2017 Nov
14. Available from: https://bit.ly/2SMtAtO

Sampoerna holds SETC Expo 2018
Preparing SMEs to Face Challenges in the New
Era of Entrepreneurship. 2018 Dec 15. Available
from: https://bit.ly/2YZNisn

45

31

Cumhuriyet video. Erdogan’s electronic cigarette
response. 2018 Nov 26. Available from: http://
www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/video/video/1151858/
Erdogan_dan_elektronik_sigara_tepkisi.html

Lin CW. Available from: Linkedin https://www.
linkedin.com/in/lin-che-wei-1098299

46

Mouhamad Bigwanto. Tobacco industry
interference undermined tobacco tax policyin Indonesia. Southeast Asia Tobacco Control
Alliance (SEATCA), Bangkok. Thailand. 2019.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2MpHL7a

47

SEATCA. Tobacco Industry Interference Index:
Asian Report on Implementation of WHO
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
Article 5.3. Available from: https://bit.ly/2KlidF948

Pakistan Tobacco Board. Available from: http://
www.ptb.gov.pk/?q=node/949

Yusufzai A. Indonesia grants duty free access to
20 Pakistani products; ProPakistani. 2018.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2MrjE7U

50

Regie Libanaise de Tabacs et Tombacs. Regie
signs agreement with Philip Morris to
manufacture its products in Lebanon. 2017 Nov
14. Available from: https://bit.ly/2SMtAtO

51

Regie Libanaise de Tabacs et Tombacs. The
Regie signs an agreement with British American
Tobacco to produce Kent and Viceroy in Lebanon.
2019 Apr 23. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2Zhxygp

52

The Daily New Age. Japan Tobacco to buy Akij
tobacco in Bangladesh for $1.48b. 2018 Aug 6.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2ZGimgu

53

Tobacco Reporter. Prices ‘not much different’, 2018
Sep 11. Available from: https://bit.ly/2Za6O4D

54

European Union. Alcohol, tobacco, cash andexcise duties. 2019 Jan 24. Available from: https://bit.ly/2HuBGBz

55

bdnews24.com. Bangladesh changes graphic
health warning rules in tobacco packs, 2017 Jul
6. Available from: https://bit.ly/2IesUYG

56

Varma D. Plain packaging and the world’s ugliest
colour. Graphicartsmag.com. 2019 Aug 2.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2Z98EPn

57

Public Health Law Centre. Leading from up
north. 2017 May. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2H7ANAb

58

Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids. Brazil’s highest

32

Daily-Sun.com. BAT donates Tk 8.82 cr to BLWF.
2018 May 21. Available from: https://bit.
ly/30csUAQ

33

Facebook photos. Ministry of Labour and
Employment. 2018 May 21. Available from: https://bit.ly/2K3GrVX

34Bangladesh Labour Welfare Foundation Website.
Partner List. Available from: http://blwf.gov.bd/
partners

35

The Hindu. ITC takes recycling, waste
management education to schools. Business
Line: The Hindu. 2017 Jul 18. Available from:https://bit.ly/2KeNWIb

36

37

Petra Governmental News. Graduating 200 young
men and women from the Youth Skills
Development Program. Petra Governmental
Newspaper. 2017. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2LMONmF
Almalnews. GTE sponsors the largest charity
event for bride processing in Qalyubiya. 2018
Nov 24. Available from: https://www.almalnews.
com/Story/399912

38

Japan Tobacco. Efforts to separate smoke.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2K39EQM

39Tobacco Market. National Bureau issued
guidelines: Creating a civilized smoking
environment to help beautiful China’s
construction. 2018 Jul 24. Available from: https://bit.ly/2ym3YdX

40

Eastobacco.com. Beijing 2018. Available
from: http://www.eastobacco.com/sypd/
sydtxw/201807/t20180712_494275.html

41

National Tobacco Monopoly Bureau. Hainan
Provincial Bureau (company) researchand deployment of civilized smoking
environment construction work, 2018 Jul 17.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2K1MIl2

42

Eastobacco.com. Shanghai Tobacco Company.
2017 Dec 24. Available from: Http://www.

eastobacco.com/shgy/201712/t20171228_471312.html

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201943

court upholds ban on flavoured tobacco products.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2z7MxhJ

59

Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids. Kenya: British
American Tobacco Ltd vs Ministry of Health.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2ZjdASr

Minutes of NBR meeting held on 2018 Sep 2018.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2ympkb9

76World Health Organization. Protocol to Eliminate
Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. Geneva. 2013.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2Yy4Afk

60

The Republic of Uganda. The Tobacco Control Act
2015. Available from: https://bit.ly/30fE1Jh

77

61

The Republic of Uganda in the Constitutional
Court of Uganda at Kampala Constitutional
Petition No.46 of 2016. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2OqbdfQ

The Tribune. Industry, govt. join hands to countermenace of counterfeit and illicit trade. The
Tribune. 2017 Oct 12. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2GBXDzu

78

62

Kazibwe K. Court blasts BAT Uganda as petition
against tobacco control is thrown out. NilePost.
2019 May. https://bit.ly/2LklJAt

United Nations Treaty Collection. Chapter 9.
Health. 4.a Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Tradein Tobacco Products. Seoul. 2012 Nov 12. Available
from: https://bit.ly/1cguOSU

63

Shrivastava R. PM Narendra Modi Backs Larger
Health Warnings on Cigarette Packets: NDTV
April 4, 2015. Accessed on 24 July 2019. https://bit.ly/2Y8G44Z

79Mediaport. In Brussels Commissioners and MEPs
meet the tobacco industry. Tobacco Watch. 2018
Mar 30. Available from: https://bit.ly/2SQo0qh

8064

Kalra A. Tobacco industry trumps as India courtcancels stringent health labelling rules. Reuters.
2017 Dec 15. Available from: https://reut.
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Kenya Tobacco Control Act 2014. Available from:https://bit.ly/2YwG4uT

81

Government of Canada. Lobbyist Registration Act.
Available from: https://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/
acts/L-12.4/

65

Krishnaprasad. Karnataka HC strikes down ruleon stringent tobacco pack warnings. The Hindu.
2017 Dec 15. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2KcnyyF

82

Ministry of Solidarity and Health. Transparency
of influence relationships of the tobacco industry.
2018 Jul 2. Available from: Article R. 3512-1-1 of
the Public Health Code66

Arora M., Bhaumik S. Trade versus health: an oldargument with new hope for tobacco control in
India. BMJ Global Blog. 2018 Feb. Available from:https://bit.ly/2Yvbuh4

83

Legal Information Institute. 2 U.S. Code Chapter
26–Disclosure of Lobbying Activities. Available
from: https://bit.ly/30Z9HCA

84

OpenSecrets.org. Tobacco: Lobbying, 2017.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2YultY1

85

OpenSecrets.org. Tobacco: Lobbying, 2018.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2SK4fRa

86“Tobacco Industry Interference with State Policy.”
TI Political Interference in State Policy. Available
from: https://bit.ly/2TfU4n7

87Volz M. “Record $26M Spent on Defeated Tobacco
Tax Measure in Montana.” AP NEWS. 2018 Nov
28. Available from: https://bit.ly/2PC0sYj

88

Japan Tobacco Inc. Annual Report [Pages 50-55]
2016. Available from: https://bit.ly/2NdmWfn

89

Pakistan Tobacco Co. Annual Report [Page 40]
2017. Available from: https://bit.ly/317hnTI

90

PTC Annual Report [Page 38] 2018. Available
from: https://bit.ly/2LNPkF6

91

BAT Bangladesh Website. Profile of the Directors.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2Ybv9Yg

92

Thmeythmey.com. 62 Senators for the newlegislature. 2018 Apr 23. Available from: https://bit.ly/2YekwE4

93Hatvp.fr. France: Summary table of public
officials subject to the control of the High
Authority. Available from: https://bit.ly/2K62CJO

94

Hatvp.fr. France: Summary table of public
officials subject to the High Authority for theirreporting obligations. https://bit.ly/2K62CJO

67
Arthosuchak.com. BATBC received ICAB NationalAward. 2018 Dec 26. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2YeX2yH

68

44

crime-news/223817

75

Regie Libanaise de Tabacs et Tombacs. Finance
Minister while honoring children of tobacco
farmers: Now is the right time to come up withsolutions. 2018 Dec 13. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2Yz1urj

69

Regie Libanaise de Tabacs et Tombacs. Defense
Minister Honors Engineer Seklaoui. 2018 Oct 18.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2KaI1UN

70

TobaccoTactics. Third Party techniques.
University of Bath. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2yo7uoa

71

AMCHAM Myanmar. Government Affairs
Committee. Available form: https://bit.
ly/2GwwBJS

72

EUROCHAM Myanmar. Anti-Illicit Trade.
Available from: https://bit.ly/2Yo8UxJ

73

American Malaysian Chamber of Commerce.
Investment and Tax Committee – Roundtablewith MOF and IRB. 2018 Oct 25. Available from:https://bit.ly/2LLYguK74

Risingbd.com. ‘Targeting Smuggled Cigarette’
campaign to protect cigarette smuggling. 2017
Apr 28. Available from: http://risingbd.com/law-

STOP

95

Philip Morris International. PMI-IMPACT: Expert
Council Members. Available from: https://bit.
ly/32Y6rJF

112

Sixth Session of the Conference of the Parties
to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control. FCTC/COP6(14): Protection of publichealth policies with respect to tobacco control
from commercial and other vested interests of thetobacco industry. 2014 Oct 18. Available from:https://bit.ly/31bM8qB

96

SEATCA. Asian State-Owned Tobacco Enterprises:
Challenges & Opportunities in Implementing
WHO FCTC. 2019. Southeast Asia Tobacco Control
Alliance. Bangkok, Thailand. Available from:https://bit.ly/2WrqLic

97

OpenSecrets.org. Tobacco: Long-Term Contribution
Trends. Available from: https://bit.ly/2yoxkIy.

113

Civil Service Commission. DOH-CSC JMC2010-01
Protection of the Bureaucracy Against Tobacco
Industry Interference, Republic of thePhilippines. 2010. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2SSBBxl

98

The Electoral Commission. Donations and loans
to political parties. United Kingdom. Available
from: https://bit.ly/2YtVkVl

114

UK Tobacco industry: Guidance for UK overseas
posts. 2014 Mar 6. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2Ks6GV5

115“Doggett Amendment” Omnibus Appropriations
Act Public Law 113-76. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2GBYQaf

116

The Express tribune. UK High Commissioner
accused of lobbying for cigarette companies
in Pakistan. 2015 Apr 20. Available from: https://bit.ly/2OscKBX

117

Thailand: Tobacco Products Control Act B.E. 2560
(2017). Available from: https://bit.ly/2Zn6UTE

118

Legislation.gov.uk. The Tobacco and Related
Products Regulations 2016. Available from:https://bit.ly/1VM9JIE

119

All-Party Parliamentary Group on Smoking and
Health, Delivering the vision of a ‘Smokefree
Generation’, ASH website. 2019 Feb. Available
from: https://bit.ly/2Zf6t0O

Action on Smoking and Health. Tobacco
Companies Transparency Bill. Available from:https://bit.ly/2XJzm0w

120

105

Kenya. The Tobacco Control Act 2014. Available
from: https://bit.ly/2YwG4uT

www.parliament.uk. Tobacco Companies(Transparency) Bill 2017-19. Available from:https://bit.ly/2YffAPl

121

106

Ministry of Health. Tobacco Control Code of
Conduct between Health Sector and Tobacco
Industry. 2018 Dec 6. Available from: https://bit.
ly/30Yfokr

Directive 2014/40/EU of the European Parliamentand of the Council of 3 April 2014. Available from:https://bit.ly/2pLW6P9

122

Assunta M. Good country practices in theimplementation of WHO FCTC Article 5.3 andits guidelines. 2018 Jan 15. World HealthOrganization. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2YeWh8H

99

Turkey. Law on Prevention and Control ofHazards of Tobacco Products, Law No. 4207

100

Priorite Prevention: Reste en bonne sante tout aulong de sa vie. 2018. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2ZbEwTA

101

The Tobacco Control Act 2015: Section 21, 22 andParagraphs 7,8,9,16,17 and 18 of the Third
schedule.

102

Government of Brazil. Report to the eighth
session of the COP [Page 53] 2018. Available from:https://bit.ly/2YuT6sW

103

Department of Health & Social Care, Tobacco
Control Plan Delivery Plan 2017-2022, UK
Government website. 2018 Jun. Available from:https://bit.ly/2Nfws1F

104

107

Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Health
Minister Tobacco Control Code of Conduct
between Health Sector and Tobacco Industry.
No: 3217/MOH, 2018 Dec 14. Available from: https://bit.ly/30Yfokr

108

Prime Ministry of Jordan. A Code of Conduct
for Conduct and Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest
to the Council of Ministers. 2018. Available from:http://www.pm.gov.jo/upload/code-of-conduct.pdf

109

Ministry of Public Sector Development. The Codeof Conduct in the Public Sector and the ethics ofthe public service. 2013. Available from: http://
www.cdd.gov.jo/pdf/modawana1_en.pdf

110Communication with Dr. Hafsa Lukwata, Tobacco
Control Focal Person, Ministry of Health/ TCC
secretariat. Uganda

111

Civil Service Commission. DOH-CSC JMC2010-01
Protection of the Bureaucracy Against Tobacco
Industry Interference. Republic of thePhilippines. 2010. Available from: https://bit.
ly/2SSBBxl

Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 201945

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