Name: Matthew Shears
Organization: Center for Democraacy & Technology (CDT)
Submission ID: 107

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IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal - Public Comment Form
Disclaimer: The ICG will not use the information collected for any purpose other than analyzing publiccomments. Submitters’ names, affiliations, and comments will be public.

Identifying Information* Indicates required fieldFirst Name * Matthew
Last Name * Shears
Email Address * REDACTEDCountry/Economy USA
Organization Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT)

General comment

The Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) welcomes the ICG's proposaland applauds the operating communities (OCs) for their considerable efforts indelivering their respective proposals.
CDT has been a participant in the work of the CWG Stewardship for the names
community and has seen first-hand the open, inclusive and transparent way inwhich the work has been undertaken, across stakeholders, in order to facilitate
this important transition.
CDT supports the transition and believes that the transition proposal offers areasonable approach to ensuring evolution while maintaining the imperatives ofstability, security and resiliency of the DNS. Overall, we believe that thistransition proposal meets the NTIA's criteria.
We do note however that there are still some areas that require attention before
the proposal can be considered complete, as we outline below.

Questions Concerning the Proposal as a Whole1)

Completeness and clarity: Is the combined proposal complete? Each of the operational
community proposals contains aspects to be completed in the future when the proposal
is implemented. Is the combined proposal specified in sufficient detail such that it can beevaluated against the NTIA criteria?

Accountability related dependencies
CDT believes that the proposal is only complete once the identified accountability
related dependencies in the CWG transition proposal have been fully met by theproposals and mechanisms in the final and agreed CCWG accountability
proposal. While CDT is comfortable with the current CCWG proposal, andbelieves that as it stands it would satisfy those dependencies, it is currently out
for public comment so changes are still possible. Further, we also note that inparallel to the consultation there are discussions underway between the CCWG
and the ICANN Board which have highlighted significant areas of disagreement,
particularly as they relate to operationalizing the community powers. Therefore
the completeness of the CWG's proposal – and therefore the overall ICG
proposal – is still very much in question.
It bears repeating that the CCWG Accountability proposal will have to beendorsed by the chartering organizations and then forwarded to the Board forreview. It is only once the Board agrees to accept the CCWG'srecommendations that the community can state that the accountability-related
dependencies have been met. If the CCWG Accountability proposal does notsatisfy the dependencies it is far from clear what revisions the CWG would be
able to put in place that would be adequate to mitigate the consequences ofmoving the IANA functions to ICANN, when ICANN would effectively be steward,
contracting party and operator.

2)

Compatibility and interoperability: Do the operational community proposals work together
in a single proposal? Do they suggest any incompatible arrangements wherecompatibility appears to be required? Is the handling of any conflicting overlaps between
the functions resolved in a workable manner?

IPRWe support the conclusion that has been reached that a trust (unspecified at thispoint in time) would be an appropriate vehicle to hold the trademarks and domainname associated with the IANA services.
IFO change/separation
One of the important characteristics of the overall CWG proposal is that of thepossibility of replacing the IANA Functions Operator (IFO), including thepossibility of an independent (non ICANN-affiliated) IFO. In the OC proposals
there are mechanisms to review and assess the performance of the IFO;
however there appears to be no process or mechanism for coordination among
the OCs when considering a change of IFO. While CDT appreciates that each
OC has its own approach to such a possibility, we wonder, as have otherrespondents, whether there should be a process whereby the OCs coordinate inthe event of a proposed change in IFO, etc., so as to mitigate any potential
procedural or operational disruptions or conflicts that might arise.

3)

Accountability: Do the operational community proposals together include appropriate andproperly supported independent accountability mechanisms for running the IANA
functions? Are there any gaps in overall accountability under the single proposal?

See our response to point 1 above.

4)

Workability: Do the results of any tests or evaluations of workability that were included in
the operational community proposals conflict with each other or raise possible concerns
when considered in combination?

PTI and related structures/processes
As a participant in the development of the names community proposal, CDT
found that the CWG's work was rigorous and complete, resulting in a workablemodel that while not perfect manages to accommodate stakeholder needs whilesatisfying various criteria.
The PTI model and the related structures such as the CSC, IFR and SIFR are
new but we do not see these as raising concerns – they will however requiremeasured implementation and monitoring. The choice of representatives on thevarious committees will be important as will the participation of “non-members” in
the IFR. Similarly, the appointment of the independent directors to the PTI Board
will be central to its all-important neutrality as the home for the IANA functions.
The careful implementation of these new structures and bodies and the selectionof appropriate expertise will be key to the success of the IFO as a whole and toits workability.
We would like to better understand from the ICG and the OCs as to whether or
not there are any implications of the numbers and protocols communities
contracting with ICANN as opposed to contracting with PTI? While there is
general level of comfort with the existing and relatively informal relationships
between the OCs, will these contracting differences have any bearing on theselection of a new IFO, for example, or any other decisions related to the IFO?

Questions Concerning NTIA Criteria

5)

Do you believe the proposal supports and enhances the multistakeholder model? If yes,please explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications youbelieve are necessary.

Yes, in a number of ways. Among others, it enables the USG to step back fromits role in the IANA functions – thereby addressing the perception that one
government had a special role in critical internet resources – and in so doing
enhances the multistakeholder model of Internet governance. The linkages
between the IANA transition and ICANN accountability will also hopefully result inan ICANN that is more accountable to a more empowered multistakeholder
community in the future. And with open, inclusive and transparent proposal
development processes we have seen multistakeholder approaches togovernance and policy in action.

6)

Do you believe the proposal maintains the security, stability, and resiliency of the DNS?
If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications
you believe are necessary.

Yes. With the exception of the creation of PTI and associated entities theexisting IFO and related mechanisms will remain largely the same post-transition
as pre-transition.

7)

Do you believe the proposal meets the needs and expectations of the global customers
and partners of the IANA services? If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why
and what proposal modifications you believe are necessary. Please indicate if you are acustomer or partner of the IANA services.

Yes. For example, in the work of the CWG there was a conscious effort toensure that the interests of direct customers/partners and the global community
more broadly were taken into account and reflected in the models that wereconsidered and the final model that was agreed upon.

8)

Do you believe the proposal maintains the openness of the Internet? If yes, please
explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe arenecessary.

Yes.

9)

Do you have any concerns that the proposal is replacing NTIA's role with a governmentled or inter-governmental organization solution? If yes, please explain why and what
proposal modifications you believe are necessary. If not, please explain why.

No.

10)

Do you believe that the implementation of the proposal will continue to uphold the NTIA
criteria in the future? If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why and what
proposal modifications you believe are necessary.

Hopefully. The transition is dependent upon the accountability enhancements
within the CCWG accountability proposal. Without those accountability
enhancements – those all-important powers and checks and balances – it isentirely possible that the IANA functions could be subject to capture or undue
influence which would undermine the NTIA's criteria.

Questions Concerning ICG Report and Executive Summary
11)

Do you believe the ICG report and executive summary accurately reflect all necessary
aspects of the overall proposal? If not, please explain what modifications you believe arenecessary.

Largely, but we refer you to our comments above.

General Questions12)

Do you have any general comments for the ICG about the proposal?

See opening comment.