Preface

This report summarizes the research findings of a research project conducted by the Japan
Institute of International Affairs in fiscal 2010 titled “The World and Japan’s Foreign Policy in
the Future: Prospects in 20 Years.”
The guarantee of security through the Japan-US Security Treaty enabled Japan to achievereconstruction and economic growth in the aftermath of the Second World War. As a major
economic power, Japan has maintained its influence in international politics. In 2010, however,Japan lost its status as the world’s second largest economic power, as China overtook Japan interms of gross domestic product. In addition, the Japan-US alliance, which forms thefoundation of Japan’s security, carries with it daunting challenges, as evidenced by controversy
over the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa.
Moving forward, with what identity and diplomatic strategy should Japan face theinternational community? This research project aims to make recommendations regarding thepath and policies Japan should take in the future by looking back on Japan’s postwar
diplomacy and planning the scenarios of the international situation in 20 years or so.
The expected challenges Japan must tackle when considering the international situation
surrounding the nation in 20 years’ time can largely be separated into the following two groups.
The first group of challenges is characterized by changes in the balance of power. The rise of
emerging nations such as China is expected to diminish the influence of the world’s only
superpower, the United States, in relative terms. Such shift in power is expected tosignificantly change the framework of today’s international order. In particular, the rise of
China will bring about more major changes in the military and economic power balance in
East Asia to which Japan belongs. Under such a situation, it will become essential to consider
how to build a stable regional order and guarantee the security of Japan. Additionally, theJapan-US alliance that forms the foundation of Japan’s security will also need to be revisited inorder to develop a more effective framework that addresses this large shift in power.
Compared to this first group of challenges focused predominantly on geopolitical or
traditional security issues, the second group of challenges is rooted in environmental andenergy issues, which to date have yet to be considered categories of diplomacy or international
politics. Climate change as well as changes in the flow of natural resources will of course havea great impact on the Japanese economy and people’s lives in Japan. Yet, these are global
issues that Japan cannot address by itself, meaning that it will be essential for Japan tonegotiate and cooperate with other nations. In order to respond to such global issues, Japan
will need to strike a balance between securing its national interests and contributing to global
initiatives aimed at resolving these issues. In this regard, it will be important for Japan toeffectively leverage its technological development prowess and assistance to developing
countries, where it has achieved a certain degree of success to date, as diplomatic tools.
Japan will need to address both groups of challenges at the same time from an internationaland geopolitical standpoint. This research project comprehensively discusses the two groups ofchallenges by transcending the narrow sense of diplomacy and security as well as examines
and makes recommendations for planning scenarios of the international situation in the near
future and on the strategies Japan should take given these scenarios going forward.
The views expressed in this report characterize the views of each author and do not
represent the opinions or views of the Japan Institute of International Affairs. However, I fully
believe that the results of this research will greatly contribute to improving foreign policy researchin Japan.

In closing, I would like to again express my sincerest gratitude to the authors of this report,
who exerted their best efforts from beginning to end in the research and compiling this report,
as well as other related parties whose cooperation made this report possible.

Yoshiji Nogami
President
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

March 2011

*This research project was supported by a government financial subsidy under the 2010 Ministry ofForeign Affairs Policy Recommendation Research Project on International Affairs.

Project Members

Head：

Dr. Masayuki Yamauchi

Professor, University of Tokyo

Members (alphabetical order based on last names)：
Dr. Yuichi Hosoya

Associate Professor, Keio University

Dr. Yasuko Kameyama

Senior Researcher,
National Institute for Environmental Studies

Mr. Tadashi Maeda

Head of Corporate Planning Department,
Japan Bank for International Cooperation /Special Advisor to the Cabinet

Dr. Narushige Michishita

Associate Professor,
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

Dr. Taizo Miyagi

Associate Professor, Sophia University

Dr. Toshihiro Nakayama

Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University /Adjunct Fellow, Japan Institute of International
Affairs

Prof. Izumi Ohno

Professor,
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

Dr. Kazuto Suzuki

Associate Professor,
Hokkaido University Public Policy School

Members and Organizers：
Ms. Naoko Saiki

Deputy Director-General, Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

Dr. Teruaki Moriyama

Research Fellow, Japan Institute of International
Affairs

Dr. Masaru Nishikawa

Research Fellow, Japan Institute of International
Affairs

Ms. Nao Shimoyachi

Research Fellow, Japan Institute of International
Affairs

Assistant：

Ms. Ryoko Suzuki

Research Assistant, Japan Institute of International
Affairs

Contents
Part 1: The Future International Situation: Prospects in 20 Years (Overview)
Why Do We Need to Possess a Vision of the World of 20 Years from Now?:
Awareness Supported by “The World and Japan’s Foreign Policy in the Future”
Research Group
Masayuki Yamauchi / Toshihiro Nakayama···················· 1Part 2: The Future International Situation: Prospects in 20 Years (Specific Issues)
Chapter 1
A Vision of the Future International Order: Are Common Interests and Values
Achievable?
Yuichi Hosoya ························· 9
Chapter 2
Japan’s Regional Order Initiatives
Taizo Miyagi ························· 29
Chapter 3
The United States and Japan-US Relations 20 Years Later: Ensuring That the
Alliance Is Not Cast Adrift
Toshihiro Nakayama·············· 45
Chapter 4
Traditional Security
Narushige Michishita············· 61
Chapter 5
Japan and the Environment
Yasuko Kameyama ················ 73

Chapter 6
The Strategic Environment Surrounding the Developing Countries and Japan’s
Development Cooperation: To Be a Global Civilian Power
Izumi Ohno ··························· 85
Chapter 7
Strategic Japanese Diplomacy in View of Natural Resources and Energy
Tadashi Maeda······················111
Chapter 8
Japan’s Science and Technology Policy
Kazuto Suzuki ····················· 123
Part 3: Proposal for Japan’s Diplomacy
The Future International Situation and Japan’s Diplomacy: Prospects and Proposals
Masayuki Yamauchi ············ 141

Part 1: The Future International Situation:
Prospects in 20 Years(Overview)

Why Do We Need to Possess a Vision of the World of
20 Years from Now?:
Awareness Supported by“The World and Japan’s Foreign Policy in the Future”
Research Group
Masayuki Yamauchi and Toshihiro Nakayama

On March 11, 2011, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) was holding a symposium
to report on the results of its research project “The World and Japan’s Foreign Policy in the Future.”
At precisely the same time as this symposium was taking place, the Great Tohoku-Kanto
Earthquake struck. Just after 2:46 pm, while the project head, Masayuki Yamauchi, was delivering
his keynote lecture, a strong earthquake rocked the hotel where the participants were assembled
and the shaking continued for quite some time. Following that, aftershocks continued to be felt
intermittently, so finally the organizers decided to close the symposium after only two of the sevengroup members who were scheduled to speak that day had given their reports. The impressions of
Yoshiji Nogami, the President of the JIIA, informing the assembly of the symposium’s cancellation
after several strong tremors had shaken the building, and of Naoko Saiki, the Deputy
Director-General of the JIIA, running here and there to contact other people, are clearly and deeply
burnt into my memory. At the time, I had a premonition that something huge had occurred. But
even when I talked with the other members of the research group after we went back to the waiting
room, I had no idea that the situation would prove as serious as turned out to be the case.
On 3/11, however, something certainly changed. Perhaps the “postwar era,” which had not yet
actually come to an end although it seemed like it had already done so, was finally over at last, andJapan has now moved into an era that can best be termed “post-disaster.” Now we must try to build
a new Japan. This is the first time in a long while that such a consciousness has been so widely
shared among the Japanese people. The generation that grew up with the “lost 20 years” and “theGreat Tohoku-Kanto Earthquake” as their archetypal mental images will scan the future with totallydifferent eyes to those of us who experienced living in “postwar Japan.” Although its ending has
been declared several times in the past, in many respects the era known as “postwar” has served as
Japan’s starting point until very recently. What significance shall we give this earthquake disaster?

1

This is an issue that bears a direct relation to the future of Japan as a nation. When an earthquake
causes disaster on such a vast scale, it will clearly leave psychological traces in its wake. Although
as a matter of course, the changes it causes cannot be measured quantitatively.
Not surprisingly, back in May 2010 when we begun working on the present project and named it“The World and Japan’s Foreign Policy in the Future,” we did not anticipate the current situation.
Although Japan has been undergoing a relative decline in its position within the international
community, its potential remains high, and so it should be searching for the role it must play as astable and democratic nation. That was the stating point of the present project. Moreover, regarding
the international environment surrounding Japan, the project members shared, roughly speaking,the following common understanding. Firstly, the world is moving in the direction of multi-polarity
and a global power transition is under way. Secondly, the diversification of the actors involved in
diplomacy is qualitatively transforming international politics itself. And thirdly, as a result of theworld having become more closely connected through globalization, there has been an
intensification of global-scale problems that spread virtually instantaneously beyond borders. In aworld that has been significantly transformed in this way, how can Japan establish its position andmake its presence felt? Cynicism is spreading rapidly concerning Japan’s future, but still Japan has
a huge potential. This was the gist of the common understanding that was shared tacitly by theparticipants in the present project.
However, as a result of the Great Tohoku-Kanto Earthquake, Japan now finds itself in a situationin which it has no alternative than to concentrate on the issue of “how to recover” rather than on“moving forward” across various sectors, at least over the short and medium term. But how muchtime will Japan take to do this and in what form will it recover? Or what does it actually mean to“recover” in the first place? Nobody is in a position to give any clear and definite answer to thisquestion at the present stage. However, tentatively, we must pour all the power at our disposal intoa united effort toward recovery and reconstruction with an attitude of general mobilization.
Naturally, this will inevitably place constraints on Japan’s international behavior.
Originally, the present project was supported by an awareness that we need to reconsider Japan’s
diplomacy from its very foundations. As a point of departure in the search for a new Japanesediplomacy for the new era, the participants shared the following understanding. Until now, Japan’s
diplomacy has been focused on seeking a landing site, or more specifically, on how to accurately
read the international situation and react to it, rather than on actively forming the situation. Of
course, many diplomatic issues come down to how to respond appropriately to unexpected2contingencies, and in that respect there has been no change in the fact that a certain kind of “reflex
action” remains the essence of diplomacy. Moreover, to say that Japan up to now has been doing
nothing but “reacting” and has not been involved in actively forming the situation at all would not
be correct either. Because by the 1970s, Japan’s Asian diplomacy had already developed a scopethat went far beyond the postwar reparations, and when Japanese hesitation to talk about the state
declined in the 1980s, people began to positively seek a new image of the state. Then, after theCold War ended, Japan made an intellectual contribution in providing a concrete guiding principle
and giving form to the new issues the world was facing by promptly highlighting the importance of“human security.” While restricted by certain constitutional constraints that do not bind othernations, Japan in the postwar era consistently expanded the scope of its activities in keeping withthe spirit of its new postwar constitution. These activities may have moved at a snail’s pace at times.
However, they were works involving broad-ranging intellectual endeavors too, and in them wasreflected the Japanese people’s wish for their nation, which had been on the losing side in theSecond World War, to once again regain its place as an honorable member of the international
community.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that, after all, Japan’s international status during that period
was guaranteed by its economic capabilities, and that its political status was also proportional to its
economic evaluation. Even today, ten years on from the end of the so-called “lost decade” that
followed the bursting of the bubble economy, Japan remains unable to recover the economic
strength that it formerly wielded. In proportion to this economic decline, Japan’s political presencein the international community has likewise declined, and among the Japanese people today (andwhat is particularly troubling is that this is shared by young people), there is a tendency to accept
this decline as an inevitable fact. The situation has not yet reached the point of desperation, but can
the nation be permitted to sink into a form of fatalism similar to a malaise of sorts? And is thislethargy, which can seem comfortable at times, going to persist over the long term? Without goingas far as to borrow the words of the Indian American journalist Fareed Zakaria, in a time like this“as the rest of the world rises,” can we allow Japan alone to just stagger along until it comes to a
stop?
Japan has already become too large a country to be able to stand up to the challenges it faces
merely by using its reflexes alone. Japan’s presence in the world is far larger than the Japaneserealize, to the extent that other nations cannot avoid being influenced by the moves Japan makes.
Accordingly, we can even say that from now on Japan will not aim at diplomacy focused on3

seeking a landing site, but that while securing its national interest, Japan has the responsibility tobuild a stable and free regional order as a contribution to the development of the region, andultimately to build the international order. If, however, Japan is to avoid reacting immediately to thecurrent situation and instead make active efforts aimed at encouraging the situation to develop, it
will require a compass of sorts to confirm the direction in which it should be moving. This can also
serve as a standard of value when Japan chooses a specific policy among the various available
diplomatic options.
Needless to say, this should not be taken to mean that the direction of the state is fixed. So it isnecessary for us to set a certain time span and then think about how the world is likely to progress
during that time and what kind of role Japan should play in that world. The time span set tentatively
under the present project is 20 years. This was because we considered that if we were to set toolong a time, such as a century, then the story would become too ethereal, while, on the other hand,
10 years would be too short a period and too close to the present to allow the imagination to flower.
However, although we set out a time span of 20 years, we have to admit that there are marked
differences in how the individual members look at this 20-year period. It should be understood that
it is only a standard to help us think about things, and by no means an attempt to forecast “theworld in 2030” in any strict sense. Rather, the reason we chose this particular time span was simply
because we thought that 20 years was the most appropriate period for ensuring a sufficient degreeof freedom to allow researchers in their own specialized fields to imagine what the state of theworld might be and also what Japan’s standing might be in that world.
As a more concrete model, let us take a look at the US National Intelligence Council’s 2025
project “Global Trends 2025” (http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html). The main purposeof this project is to present policymakers with hints on how international politics will betransformed, as well as to show that this transformation will present opportunities for the UnitedStates as well as negative situations that might require a political response. It is also aimed at
stimulating broad-ranging discussions not limited to the usual narrow circle of policymakers
concerning what kind of future image the US will build. The NIC has already published reports onfour occasions based on long-term trends in international politics.
It goes without saying that the present research project does not cover the entire range of issues.
At the project’s planning stage, we specified a number of issues that we considered would probably
be important for Japan and we narrowed our focus down to just these issues. In so doing, we may
have overlooked several important issues, and we have to beg your pardon on that point. Also,

4

during the course of the project, we handled themes that do not correspond with specific diplomatic
objectives. This was because we considered that we would need to cover certain problem areas thatcannot be substantiated, such as “international order” and “values.” Modern international politics is
not merely a “power system” but also a “value system.” How we attribute meaning to our own
behavior by placing reliance on what sort of values will become increasingly important in future.
Of course, we are fully aware of the existence of the idea that politics should not be involved with
abstract values, but should limit itself to dealing with specific means of realizing limited objectives.
But if we were to restrict diplomacy to limited action only, then talking about the state of the worldin 20 years from now would be a waste of effort in the first place. Can we not look forward anddiscuss Japan in the new era once again using the “value range” terms that Japanese diplomacy has
not necessarily been good at? This has become the consistent theme that runs through the projectand its report.
Specifically, the project has taken up international order, regional order, traditional security,
Japan-US relations, development cooperation, environment, natural resources and energy, andscience and technology, with each of the members taking responsibility for their own field ofinterest and the project head, Masayuki Yamauchi, carrying out macroscopic analysis andproducing a summary based on analyses of these individual fields. Although the various members
produced reports on their respective fields of responsibility and commented on each other’s work,
this does not mean there is any consistency between the various chapters, as each chapter was
freely composed by a different individual based on their own ideas. But even so, essentially, eachchapter represents an attempt to discuss positively and concretely about Japan’s future potential.
However, as was explained at the beginning, it cannot be denied that the Great Tohoku-Kanto
Earthquake has effectively demolished the basic premise on which this project was conceived. To
repeat what was stated earlier, the self-understanding that “although Japan has been undergoing a
relative decline in its position within the international community, its potential remains high, and so
it should be searching for the role it must play as a stable and democratic nation” was the project’s
basic premise. But as a result of the huge earthquake, which was on a scale that is expected tooccur only once in a thousand years, issues have emerged that we were not able to consider within
the scope of the premise. For example, when we consider the scale of the budget that will be
required for reconstruction, we must presume that the financial constraints against Japan’s
development cooperation with the outside will become greater. Inevitably, opinions will be voiced
questioning why Japan should continue to provide large amounts of support to foreign countries

5while there are people in need right here in this disaster-affected county. Besides that, can we go on
thinking of the reliability of Japanese science and technology as a universal truth? The Fukushima I
Nuclear Power Plant has already become a symbol that is being circulated internationally. Whatsort of implications will the present nuclear accident have on Japan’s energy strategy? This is amatter that has spilled over onto the approach to environmental issues as well. The Japanese people
have also been deeply impressed by the active images of the US military personnel who areoperating in the disaster area. How are they going to regard the presence of US forces in Japan in
future? Moreover, in the first place, we have to consider the possibility that Japan’s presence in theinternational community might significantly decline while devoting a great deal of time and effort
to the reconstruction process.
In ways such as these, we cannot deny that several important points on which the present project
was based have crumbled following this huge earthquake. The project did not envision thepossibility that Japanese society itself would be greatly transformed under the impact of an event
such as a large earthquake. In that sense, we feel overwhelmed by the reality that has beendeveloping in front of our eyes since experiencing the earthquake that struck at the symposium site
during the announcement of our research results. Furthermore, we have come to the somber
realization that diplomacy is also an activity that cannot be conducted while ignoring nature andhistory.
But in the first place, the purpose of this project was nothing other than to try to think about theworld in 20 years’ time in combination with how Japanese diplomacy should be. One could say thatprecisely because in the present situation Japan is facing a national crisis, the importance offocusing on what is to come by making use of one’s imagination is increasing apace. Although theadequacy of the individual issues may have decreased slightly, the importance of the awareness thathas supported the project has, if anything, been further intensified. To our way of thinking, the factthat the consequences of the great earthquake are putting the disaster victims and the entire nation
through such an immeasurably painful ordeal is all the more reason why sincere discussions about
the future shape of Japan’s diplomacy should be developed actively. Our hope is that the present
report will be of modest help in beginning that process.
As we stated above, Japan is in a situation in which the nation must inevitably concentrate its
power and consciousness on “how to recover” rather than on “moving forward,” at least over the
short term. But the future “recovered” Japan cannot be the same nation as the Japan that existed up
until March 10, 2011. That is why the necessity and the significance of thinking about the future6

image of Japan’s diplomacy while looking at the kind of Japan that could have existed as of the
March 10 time point has not diminished at all.
At present, a huge amount of both psychological and material support is being gathered in Japan
from all over the world. In fact, Japan is even receiving support from poorer nations that have no
scope to provide support under normal circumstances. This can be regarded in some sense as aform of repayment for the support and friendship that Japan has been providing up to now, and itcomes as a blessing. We could also call it a positive outcome and result of Japan’s accumulated
diplomacy over the past 20 or 30 years.
How should we visualize Japan 20 years on from the great earthquake and how should we
envisage the shape of the Japanese state? For the Japanese people, the issues we need to think about
are too numerous and their weight is immense. To paraphrase the example of the Greek historianThucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War (Book 1, Paragraph 21), if one considers not
only the impression but also looks at the weight of the consequential facts themselves, one will seethat this was the greatest earthquake of all, without precedent in history. To those of us who haveencountered such an unprecedented serious disaster, now is the time for us to study even more
boldly about how Japan’s diplomacy should be by making as much use as possible of theimagination and the intellectual ability we possess. The Chinese philosopher Mencius wrote, “Thecase of one of the present princes wishing to become sovereign is like the having to seek for
mugwort three years old, to cure a seven years’ sickness. If it has not been kept in store, the patient
may all his life not get it” (The Works of Mencius, Book4, Li Lau). This ancient teaching can beapplied to the world of diplomacy in the sense that one should take care to consider the future wellin advance and make preparations accordingly.

Explanatory note: This text was originally written by Dr. Nakayama and partially revised and added
to by Dr. Yamauchi. As such, the responsibility for the wording of this text lies with both authors.

7

Part 2: The Future International Situation:
Prospects in 20 Years(Specific Issues)

Chapter 1
A Vision of the Future International Order:
Are Common Interests and Values Achievable?
Yuichi Hosoya

Introduction
How will the international order of the 21st century take shape? How will it differ from the one
we are used to? How will it transform itself? The future development of Japan’s diplomacy can nolonger be disconnected from changes occurring in today’s international order.
First, let us define the term international order. Noted scholar of international politics from theso-called English School and professor at the University of Oxford Hedley Bull definedinternational order as, “A society of sovereign states or a pattern of activities that maintains theprimary and essential goals of international society.” i Bull also argued, “A group of nations
conscious of certain common values and common interests—in the sense of assuming that in theirmutual relationships each of these countries are bound by a common system of rules andregulations and carry a responsibility to one another to make the various common institutions
function—form a single society.” ii The key point from this statement is that Bull points out thetwo elements of “common interests” and “common values.” In order for the international order tofunction in a stable manner it is imperative for these “common interests” and “common values” tobe widely recognized among nations. Is it then possible for the future international order to broadly
share such “common interests” and “common values”?
Bull states, “The one common trait of international society throughout history has been that it
always was founded on a common culture and civilization.” iii In other words, what would aninternational order not founded on a “common culture or civilization” look like? As new emerging
nations such as China and India rise to prominence, to what extent have the conventional ideas of“common interests” and “common values” penetrated in today’s international order? To what
extent are common interests and common values shared in the pressing international issues of theinternational trade system, the environment, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
democracy and human rights? What will the international order of the 21st century look like if these9

“common interests” and “common values” have yet to deeply penetrate emerging nations resulting
in a deeper clash between differing interests and values?
This chapter will look back from a macro point of view to the development of today’s
international order and will discuss how this international order is undergoing a transformation. iv
Additionally, by also incorporating discussions on the rise of emerging nations such as China, thischapter will also present a recommended path for Japan’s diplomacy to follow in the future.

1. Evolution of Today’s International Order(1) The Balance of Power System
The balance of power system present in modern international society is considered to have been
formed as a result of the Treaty of Utrecht signed at the start of the 18th century after the War of the
Spanish Succession. The treaty showed that countries made a concerted effort to join forces incombating the emergence of a powerful hegemony in order to prevent the control of internationalsociety by a single empire. Using the words of Vattel, this indicated an international situation
where “neither country occupied a dominant position over another nor dogmatically pressed what
they thought to be correct upon other countries.”v Conversely, if the power of balance collapses,
one country will then occupy the dominant position and can dogmatically order other countries tofollow what it assumes to be correct.
In 19th century Europe, a power balance was formed among the five major powers of Britain,
France, Prussia, Austria and Russia.vi For example, by signing the League of the Three Emperors
Treaty with the two powers of the Russian Empire and Austrian Empire in October 1873, Prime
Minister of Germany Otto von Bismark was able to isolate France. On the other hand, prior to theGerman Empire expanding its military strength under Emperor Wilhelm II, Britain signed the
Entente Cordiale with France in 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Entente with Russia in 1907 in an
attempt to achieve a balance of power that boxed in Germany.
Around World War I, however, three of Europe’s five major imperial powers collapsed
including the German Empire, Austrian Empire and Russian Empire. As a result, the international
order in the aftermath of World War I needed to be stabilized by the two remaining powers ofBritain and France. Yet, instead the United States rose to the ranks of world power since Britain
and France had been so utterly battered by the Great War, while at the same time the Soviet Union,
which advocated the ideology of communism, and Japan, which championed the ideology of
Pan-Asianism, emerged as new powers. By asserting these differing interests and values, the new10powers made it difficult to build a stable international order with “common interests” and“common values.” With the outbreak of World War II, the search for a new international orderbegan.
The world in the aftermath of World War II saw the fall of the Nazi German Empire and theJapanese Empire as well as Britain and France losing their colonies. As a result, the newinternational order headed for stability based on the balance of power among the new super powersof the United States and Soviet Union. This stability turned out to be a “balance of fear” resulting
from huge arsenals of nuclear weapons and the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).
One of America’s foremost historians John Lewis Gaddis called this period the “Long Peace.”vii
Following the end of the Cold War, the balance of power changed significantly with the fall of
the Soviet Union. Would unipolarity ensue under the single super power of the United States? Or
would another country rise to create multipolarity? At the time, American scholars of international
politics were largely divided over the issue of polarity in decentralizing the international powerbase.viii Most of these scholars began to analyze a new empire-like international system headed by
the dominating power of the United States.ix However, even the power of the United States, which
was thought to be so dominant, began to wane due to setbacks in the War in Iraq and financial
crisis after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Instead of a future dominated by theUnited States, we have begun to hear more and more about the rise of China and India.
For example, a 2008 report released by the National Intelligence Council of the United Statesstates, “A global multipolar system is emerging with the rise of China, India and others,” andargues that, “The unprecedented shift in relative wealth and economic power roughly from West to
East now under way will continue.” x In addition, the first-ever permanent president of theEuropean Council, or quote-unquote President of the EU, Herman Van Rompuy stated, “Thebalance of power has shifted, and Europe is more on the defensive now that it was a few years
ago,” after taking office on January 8, 2010. xi With the rise of China, the general view now is thatthe world is multipolar. As a result, the world is also in the process of recognizing that the balanceof power is migrating to a multipolar format.
In other words, a new balance of power is unfolding in today’s international order among the
major powers of the United States, China, the EU, India and Russia, as we are witnessing the birthof a new order globally.

11

(2) The Concert System
The international order is not always defined by the clash or equilibrium of opposing powers.
Until now we have seen major powers seek cooperation from among one another to resolve issues
and avoid conflict through diplomacy, with this process now institutionalized. This can be traced
back to the ever-important Vienna Congress held at the start of the 19th century after the
Napoleonic Wars.
The term “concert” in Concert of Europe is derived from the Italian word “concerto,” andindicates a situation where countries act based on consensus and harmony.xii In their search forpeace and stability after the Napoleonic Wars, the five major powers of Europe convened at a
diplomatic conference in Vienna where they deliberated on future peace.xiii Congresses were also
held among the five major powers on four other occasions, including the Congress of
Aix-la-Chapelle (1820), Congress of Troppau (1820), Congress of Laibach (1821) and Congress of
Verona (1822). These congresses were diplomatic conferences on a political level where thestatesmen of each country and diplomatic leaders gathered. Then, in 1830, the Concert of Europe
was revived under Britain’s Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston. This resulted in Britain taking thelead as balancer, ushering in a new type of “conference diplomacy” where the resident
ambassadors of Europe’s other four major powers in London met to discuss diplomatic issues.xiv
Diplomacy came to play a major role at these conferences. In addition, other major powers
would also hold congresses to ensure stability and peace in the international order. The spirit of theConcert of Europe was later inherited by the Locarno Conference of 1925, where Britain’s Foreign
Secretary Austen Chamberlain aspired to realize a “new Concert of Europe.”xv As a result, thistradition of the Concert of Europe can be found today in the convention where a major power after
having become a member nation of an organization, such as the now defunct League of Nations orUnited Nations, leads diplomatic conferences to preserve peace and stability with a special sense of
responsibility. In other words, “as a means to realizing collaborative management within the realmof possibility in a multipolar international system, even when considering times of failure orambiguity, we can say that this system was more of a success than its predecessors.”xvi As such,the tradition of resolving problems through diplomatic means found in the Concert System has
certainly been passed down to today’s international order.

As evidenced by the permanent council members (P5) of the United Nations Security
Council on a global level and the Six-Party Talks regarding the nuclear crisis on the Korean
Peninsula on a regional level, we can say that the spirit of the Concert System has been passed

12

down to the modern era. Yet, this does not mean that all problems can be resolved throughdiplomatic conferences. There are occasions when a nation must resort to the use of militaryforce and there are many more times when diplomatic conferences have been stopped due to aclash of national interests. Although diplomatic conferences continue to be used in the modern
international order as a type of Concert System, diplomatic negotiations in most instances do notnecessarily lead to a desirable consensus, as symbolized by the Six-Party talks concerning thesituation on the Korean Peninsula.
In particular, in the modern era it has become more difficult for countries that do not necessarily
have the same “common interests” and “common values” to form a consensus based on diplomaticnegotiations, as has been seen in the multilateral diplomacy of the United States, China, Russia,
Japan, South Korea and North Korea in the Six-Party Talks. This is the same in the case of theQuartet on the Middle East that includes the United States, European Union, Russia and the United
Nations. Although the EU has cultivated a shared diplomatic policy as an international organization,
the UN is a general international organization that encompasses the entire world, indicating thatnegotiations involving asymmetrical diplomatic actors have brought about a new set of challenges
and difficulties.

(3) The Community System
When looking back at the history of 20th century international politics it can be understood thatinternational society has created a certain form of community. An important contributor to thepromulgation of this concept was the diplomacy of United States President Woodrow Wilson.
Wilson was enthusiastic about establishing a league of nations like “The Parliament of Man”
(Alfred Tennyson), or an organization similar to a domestic legislature, and dreamed that thisorganization would help build an international community. Himself a political scientist and former
President of Princeton University, Wilson aspired to create a community of nations in internationalsociety, and as a means to accomplishing this he exerted diplomatic efforts aimed at establishing aleague of nations at the Paris Peace Conference following the end of World War I. As a product of
his enthusiasm, the League of Nations established its headquarters in Geneva in January 1920.
However, the United States did not participate in the League of Nations, while the Soviet Union,
which advocated the ideology of communism, did not join as a member until 1934 when the threatof Nazi Germany had emerged. In other words, the “common interests” and “common values”
essential to realizing “a community of nations” were not necessarily promulgated widely around13the world in the 20th century. As such, the foundation was not in place for the development of suchan international community.
After the end of the Cold War, once again the world attempted to build a community ininternational society in much the same way as before. In a world where colonialism was out andopposing ideologies became a thing of the past after the Cold War, another attempt was made tobuild an “international community” in order to realize peace and prosperity. For example, in his
book written after the Cold War historian and Harvard University Professor Akira Irie argued, “Theexistence of a fundamentally global society or a global community is a prerequisite for world
peace.” xvii The problem therein lies with whether we have actually achieved mutual “common
interests” and “common values” that can be called a global community.
A political leader who most boldly advocated the logic of this type of international community
was former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. In a speech given in Chicago in April 1999, Blair
outlined his “doctrine of the international community” and argued that, “…you cannot build acommunity on opportunity or rights alone. They need to be matched by responsibility and duty.”
xviii

With this, Blair advocated the need for military intervention in Kosovo where a humanitariandisaster was unfolding. Afterwards, although Blair would experience a major setback in the War in
Iraq, he focused his efforts on environmental issues and eliminating poverty in Africa and also wasdevoted to peace in the Middle East. Regardless of Blair’s efforts, however, it proved rather
difficult to reach a consensus internationally regarding these issues. As before, international society
found itself in a situation where “common interests” and “common values” could not be easily
produced.

2. Vision of the Future(1) The Direction of the Liberal International Order
As illustrated in the aforementioned overview, the three aspects of balance of power, concert andcommunity existed in the historical development of the international order, with the complex
interaction of these three aspects helping to maintain a stable order. At the same time, an importantfactor determining stability in the international order was also to what extent “common interests”
and “common values” were shared in international society. If international society did not shareinterests and values, differing interests would repeatedly and intensely clash, which would lead to asystem of opposing values.
Of particular importance is that international society shares values and rules. With that being said,

14

what type of values has international society shared to date? Princeton University Professor John
Ikenberry argued that the stability of the post-war international order has been supported by theUnited States displaying leadership as a leading major power and the fact that international society,which is based on rules and policies, has been supported by liberal values such as liberalism anddemocracy.xix Much like the Western European countries of Britain, France and West Germany,
Japan secured its own security through an alliance with the United States and achieved economic
development under a liberal and open international order. The fact that not just the balance ofpower between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the Concert System seen in thepermanent member nations of the UN Security Council, but also this liberal international order thatshares values and rules has been maintained carries with it great significance.
This liberal international order is today largely destabilizing. It is essential to consider the rapid
rise of China’s power from the perspective of the balance of power as well as from a perspectivethat it will challenge the post-war liberal international order. Here again Ikenberry argued not fromthe perspective of the power balance relationship between the United States and China, but rather
that, “If the defining struggle is between China and a revived Western system, the West will
triumph.xx” As such, it will be important for Japan and the United States to invite China into theliberal international order and avoid a system where the two countries oppose China.
The Atlantic alliance and US-Japan alliance formed during the Cold War were not establishedsimply with the purpose to combat the threat of communism posed by the Soviet Union withmilitary force. The advocating of liberal values in the Atlantic Charter signed in August 1941 andthe United Nations Charter signed in June 1945 was again an important mission for the Westernalliance. Liberal values also form the foundation of today’s international order. For example, thepreamble of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in April 1949 states, “The Parties to this Treaty…are
determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, foundedon the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”xxi Today, NATO has
strengthened its global partnership to include other nations with shared values such as Australia,
New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. Also, the preamble of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between the United States and Japan signed in January 1960 proclaims, “The signatories
desire to strengthen the relationship of peace and friendship that traditionally existed between thetwo countries as well advocate the principles of democracy, individual freedoms and rule of thelaw.”xxii The Western alliance formed during the Cold War continues to shoulder an importantmission as an organization to advocate the values of freedom and democracy in the post-Cold War

15

world.
The importance of advocating liberal values has not weakened in the post-Cold War world.
Rather, it has often been debated that there is a need to spread liberal values to the entire world
even after the end of the ideological opposition seen during the Cold War. For example,
humanitarian issues became a significant international concern during the Kosovo Crisis of 1999,
while demands for democratization within China have become a big issue in international politics
once again. Also, demonstrations for democracy in North Africa and the Middle East that begun in
Tunisia in January 2011 are in the process of largely transforming the situation in the region.
The rise of China will inevitably cast new problems on the post-war liberal international order.
Will China accept “the principles of democracy, individual freedoms and rule of the law,” andshare the “common interests” and “common values” of the United States, Western European
nations and Japan? Or will China’s national power sharply grow to produce a serious clash ofinterests and values between the United States and Japan and in the process destabilize theinternational order? Following the end of the Cold War, liberal values were spread to Central andEastern Europe, with these nations coming to share these values in the process of joining the EU
and NATO. This was the process of slightly revising the liberal international order and expanding it
outwards. However, since China has the world’s largest population, possesses nuclear weapons, isa major power that has not thrown away the ideology of communism and is a permanent memberof the UN Security Council, as before it remains unclear as to which path the country will take inthe future.
In developing a long-term view of the future, consideration must be placed on the fact that mostmajor powers with large populations will no longer be Western nations, while the center of
economic growth will also shift away from Western Europe and the United States. As a result, itremains to be seen whether these countries will advocate the same post-war liberal values. If not, it
will become even more difficult than before for international society to possess “common values.”(2) The International Order of East Asia
When considering the future of international order, it becomes necessary to think separately interms of the global order and the regional order. The current world trend is to put efforts into
reaching the goals of peace, prosperity, and stability on a global level as well as on a regional level.
The most urgent issue for Japan is to achieve the peace, stability, and national interests that it seeks
from within the surrounding region of East Asia. Considerable changes in the international order of16

East Asia can be expected when looking into the mid- and long-term future. These changes will be
examined below from the perspective of the balance of power, concert, and community.
China’s increase in power should be considered the most prominent when reviewing the trendsof the power balance. In 2010, China surpassed Japan to become the second largest economy in theworld after the United States. In addition, if China continues to forge ahead its strategy of naval
dominance, significant changes in the power balance can be expected in the South and East China
Sea. It is evident that there are a number of new movements intended to address this strategy. The
first movement is the development of alliances between countries that share common values. With
the Japan-US alliance which is expected to be redefined in 2011 being the core of this movement,in addition to the strategic dialogue that has been held between Japan, the US, and Australia since
2002, a foreign ministerial conference was held between Japan, US, and South Korea in December
2010 in discussing the possibility of security cooperation. Furthermore, bilateral collaboration
between Japan and India is being developed at a steady pace, which in addition to the existing
India-US partnership, shows that India is constantly strengthening its collaborative relationshipwith the United States and its allied countries. The strengthening of collaborative relationships
between the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and India will likely
contribute to the development of a new order in this region, and promote the sharing of values,
rules, and systems. The participation by the United States in the East Asia Summit from 2011, as
well as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which centers on these Asian countries in heightening
the economic collaboration among countries of the Pacific Rim, may suggest such directional
movement.
When considering the potential decrease in China’s population and the various concerns China
has, including the possible slowing down of its economic growth, environmental pollution,
unemployment and employment difficulties, as well as corruption, the overturn of East Asia’s
existing international order or the large scale withdrawal of the American presence from the region
would be hard to fathom. Even Jisi Wang, a leading Chinese scholar on international politics,
argues that, “not many experts expect the power of China to rise to the same level as the UnitedStates.” xxiii American military power still maintains its dominance in the world, while American
influence over the world also remains strong. The possibility of overtaking the US for its leadershipin international society is not that high. If that is the case, even when under the assumption that theregion will become more diverse, the strengthening of a collaborative relationship with the US and
its friends and allies shall keep the existing stable international order intact. What is more of an

17

important question right now, rather, is where China should be ranked in international society as it
rises to power.
While concert is the next topic of discussion, basically, this region does not have a wellestablished Concert System. The mechanism for the major powers in the region to gather in
discussing territorial disputes, collaborating in relief efforts in the time of a natural disaster, or
conducting diplomatic conferences to ease tension remains in its infancy. Meanwhile, theframework of Japan-US-China dialogue that was mentioned often times when the Obama
Administration first took office has not yet been developed. Moreover, the Six-Party Talks have yet
to be restarted. Historically speaking, such a Concert System involving the main powers in theregion has never been developed. Professor of International Relations at American University
Amitav Acharya contends that it is necessary to develop a collaborative relationship between themain actors in the ASEAN region, and calls this a “Concert of Asia.”xxiv However, since thedirection in which the power balance flows remains uncertain, while the mutual sharing of“common values” and “mutual benefits” is insufficient, it is apparent that the establishment of sucha Concert System will be challenging even in a mid- to long-term perspective.
On the other hand, an opposite and different vector can be seen in the development of acommunity in this region. Professor Takashi Shiraishi, an expert on Southeast Asia, notes the factthat a “common cultural circle” is being formed through popular culture and subculture, and points
out the process of developing a certain community as a result of the formation of middle classfamilies and development of a consumer culture.xxv At the same time, a lot of difficulties can still
be found in the development of an East Asian Community that is based on ASEAN Plus Three. The
East Asia Summit, which first began in December 2005, has continued to serve as an importantframework for dialogue in the region. However, the amplification of emotional opposition due toissues in the perception of history, territorial disputes, and extreme nationalism has made it difficult
to build a sense of community in the region. The rapid growth of China’s national power likely has
made the formation of a community from a level perspective even more difficult.

(3) The United Nations and Global GovernanceIn light of the above, how is the international order transforming itself on a global level? Here,several new trends can be pointed out. After the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has
shown a new movement where greater involvement in international issues has been required.
Japan has also supported this new movement in the United Nations in several aspects. For18

example, in a speech given in Hanoi, Vietnam in December 1998, Japan’s Prime Minister at thetime Keizo Obuchi positioned “human security” as a clear part of Japan’s diplomacy andannounced the new establishment of the Trust Fund for Human Security at the United Nations. In
addition, at the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000, Japan’s then Prime
Minister Yoshiro Mori announced in a speech that “human security” would form a new pillar ofJapan’s diplomacy and requested the United Nations to establish an international commission onhuman security as well as compile a report.xxvi The Commission on Human Security chaired by
Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen submitted a final report to former UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan on May 1, 2003 in New York City. The report calls for exhaustive new measures regarding
problems relating to both conflict prevention and development based on the reality that there havebeen cases where nations have been unable to sufficiently guarantee human security in today’s
world where globalization has moved forward.xxvii
Meanwhile, around the same time international society, which experienced the Kosovo Crisis in
1999, was searching for a new way to safeguard human security. Later in 2001, the Government of
Canada established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Ina report released by the commission a new concept called “responsibility to protect” wasintroduced.xxviii While the Commission on Human Security which had been devised primarily by
the Government of Japan had placed its main emphasis on development and humanitarianassistance, ICISS considered the conditions for humanitarian intervention using military force.
ICISS strongly urged the need for international society to respond to humanitarian crises using bothmilitary and non-military means.
Given this, a proactive movement spread in the aftermath of the Rwanda Genocide in 1994 andthe Bosnia Srebrenica Genocide in 1995 that demanded humanitarianism and morality ininternational society. Tony Blair’s Labor Party Administration that came to power in the UK in
1997 resonated this trend, as it became a leader in humanitarian and moral action under the
principles of “ethical foreign policy” and “a force of good.”xxix When considering the international
order as well, the elements of morals and ethics have become even more important than before,
indicating the need to build a stable order atop a foundation of shared values and rules.
This is not the only major change. Today, a global civic society is on the verge of being born,while global governance is being gradually developed through transnational NGOs, the dramaticdevelopment of transportation and telecommunications methods and the sharing of informationfrom the spread of the Internet.xxx Certainly the balance of power among major powers, concert

19and community formation are important when considering the international order, but at the sametime, we must also train our eye to the fact that in reality transnational and borderless trends are
creating an order all in itself. This can be said to be an awareness that translates into the above
concepts of “human security” and “responsibility to protect.”
When forming a medium- and long-term view of the future, however, it remains hard to forecast
a strengthening of global governance through dramatic United Nations reforms. First, from theexperience of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it should be pointed out that the tide ofhumanitarianism has stagnated under the interventionism that has developed starting from the latter
half of the 1990s. This is because it is difficult to establish standards for international society totackle broad reaching humanitarian assistance or the end of civil strife since the financial
restrictions of major countries and individual interests make intervention arbitrary and selective.
This can also be seen from the hesitant stance of the Obama Administration to use militaryintervention to fend off government forces attacking the opposition forces in Libya based on the“excessive involvement” of the stationing troops overseas. The fiscal difficulties of Europe and theUnited States will make these countries more cautious than ever before when it comes to militaryintervention for humanitarian reasons. On the other hand, a major struggle will ensue since theUnited Nations, which advocates the principles of “human security” and “responsibility to protect,”will find it more difficult than ever before to neglect humanitarian crises. As such, there is a need tosearch for an appropriate balance between fiscal as well as military limitations and the need forhumanitarian intervention.
Second, unlike the United Nations led by Europe and the United Sates soon after the end ofWorld War II, today’s United Nations includes more than 190 nations as members, with most ofthese members emerging nations in Africa and Asia that gained their independence in the 1960s orlater. As it is made up of countries from differing regions, religions and cultures, the United
Nations will find it more difficult than ever to unify thoughts and find “common interests” and“common values.” This can be understood to mean that the United Nations, which should
proactively tackle poverty elimination, environmental issues and humanitarian assistance, faces
growing opposition within its own ranks regarding these very same issues.
However, the authority of the universal United Nations was recognized by all of internationalsociety through the war in Iraq, as symbolized by the fact that granting legitimacy by the UN
Security Council carries with it a significant meaning more than ever before. As such, it will
become harder to exercise military force without a resolution of the UN Security Council, which

20will link up with the formation of international opinion through the United Nations. This being so,international society should make greater efforts to reform the UN over the medium to long term,
which may also result in major countries making similar efforts to make the United Nations a more
effective international organization.

3. Proposals for Japan’s Foreign Policy(1) The New Power Balance and Redefining the Japan-US Alliance
Given the above discussion, what course of action should Japan take in its international
diplomacy? How should Japan change the way it sees the outside world? Or how should Japanchange its approach?
First, in order to address the need for a new power balance as China’s power rises rapidly, theneed for Japan to strengthen its alliance with the United States should be pointed out. In 2011,
China’s proposed budget for national defense has increased by 12.7% compared to its actual
spending in the previous yearxxxi. While it did reduce its national defense budget increase to asingle percentage point for the first time in 22 years following criticism from international society
in 2010, in 2011 China has indicated it will largely increase its national defense budget. As it ismoving to improve its capacity to defy the American approach, if the Chinese navy expands its
sphere of influence in the South and East China Sea, this change will greatly impact the power
balance of East Asia. A constant balance of power is crucial to maintaining a stable international
order. If this is the case, for it to address the rise in Chinese power, Japan will have to improve its
own defense capabilities, strengthen its alliance with the United States as well as enhance its
collaboration with other countries such as Australia, South Korea, and India.
Japan’s National Defense Program Outline first released under the Democratic Party
Administration on December 17, 2010 clearly states that a new defense policy in addressing such a
power balance shift is necessary.xxxii The outline also mentions changes in the security assurance
environment, including the “change in the global power balance is prominently reflected in thisregion”. Furthermore, it contends that “it is important to act proactively in addressing global
security challenges through collaboration with allied countries, friendly countries and other related
countries (hereafter collectively referred to as the “allies”).” For the same reason, the new National
Defense Program Outline indicates a new concept of “mobile defense capability” shedding the
traditional concept of a static, “basic defense capability” in aiming to address the Chinese maritime
advance through a more flexible allocation and utilization of its defense power and shifting the21power in the southeast direction. In this sense, the change in Japanese national defense strategy isin no question a way to address the gradual transformation of the power balance in the region.xxxiii
However, even if the Japanese government adopted a proactive defense strategy through the new
National Defense Program Outline, as long as the Japan-US alliance is adrift and weakening due tothe issue of the Futenma Base relocation, such a defense strategy will not serve much of a purpose.
The purpose of Japan’s own efforts to enhance its defense capabilities is after all to match theeffective operation of the Japan-US alliance. In 2010, as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between Japan and the United States of America reached its 50th anniversary since signing,
the announcement of a joint statement between Japan and the US as well as confirmation on acommon strategy between Japan and the US that was scheduled to be held within this anniversary
year were not executed. The Democratic Party Administration went through a change of its party
leader in June 2010 with Naoto Kan taking over as Prime Minister from former Prime Minister
Yukio Hatoyama. As the power struggle escalates within the Democratic Party, policy adjustments
concerning Japan’s diplomatic policy remain a challenge. As a result, the outlook for theenhancement of the Japan-US alliance remains a question, while the fact that the plan to relocate
Futenma Base to the surrounding area of Henoko remains unclear being a major obstacle. Given
this situation, the future power balance in East Asia is perhaps looking even more favorable for
China. For Japan, this is a type of situation that is undesirable in considering its position in theworld.

(2) Value Oriented Diplomacy and Strategic Partnerships
As Professor Masataka Kosaka once described, international politics is a “system of power” aswell as a “system of interests,” and at the same time a “system of values.”xxxiv Consequently, notonly should attention be paid to the shift in the global power balance, the factor of value behindsuch change should also be examined. As already mentioned earlier, the rise of China, which
promotes an ideology of communism and does not necessarily share the same values such as
democracy and freedom, may relatively downgrade the values upheld by its American and Western
European counterparts. In such case, what adjustments should Japan make in accordance with thechange in the “system of values”?
On November 30, 2006, Foreign Minister Taro Aso of the Shinzo Abe administration gave aspeech under the title “Creating an ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’” at Hotel Okura in Tokyo. In
the speech, Aso proposed “What I would like to tell you today is that beyond that, we are aiming to22

add a new pillar upon which our policy will revolve,” and advocated for “value oriented
diplomacy” as the main focus of Japan’s foreign policy.xxxv Furthermore, he stated that, as anextension of the above policy, “With that in mind, I firmly believe that Japan must make its ties
even firmer with friendly nations that share the common views and interests, namely of course theUnited States as well as Australia, India, and the member states of the EU and NATO, and at thesame time work with these friends towards the expansion of this ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’.”In fact, Aso had paid a visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels on May 4, 2006, and delivered aspeech on the necessity for NATO and Japan to strengthen their relations at the North Atlantic
Council.xxxvi Moreover, on January 12th of the following year, Prime Minister Abe made anothercourtesy visit to Brussels, and presented a speech for strengthening collaboration between Japan
and NATO to the North Atlantic Council once more.xxxvii What Prime Minister Abe and Aso hadenvisaged was to strengthen security collaboration with NATO, which shares the same values withJapan, in response to the rise in China’s power. However, following the resignation of Prime
Minister Abe in September 2007, and assumption of office by Yasuo Fukuda, Japan’s foreign
policy started to shift its focus on its relationship with China, leading to the fall of “value oriented
diplomacy” and a halt for measures aimed at strengthening the relationship between Japan andNATO.
Meanwhile, despite the political situation within the Liberal Democratic Party, or the transitionof power from the Liberal Democratic Party to the Democratic Party in September 2009, theenhancement of a collaborative relationship between Japan and its “friendly allies who share thesame thoughts and interests” was steadily implemented. Also stated in the new National Defense
Program Outline as of December 2010, Japan will continue to implement the same foreign
diplomacy policies in the future. At the same time, as seen in the aftermath of the fishing boat
collision off the Senkaku Islands that took place in September 2010, the development of apolitically collaborative relationship with China was clearly not as easy as the Democratic Party
Administration had first envisioned. As a result, both the Democratic Party and the public opinionof Japan have gradually turned to countries such as the US that share the same values.
Japan is not the only country to experience difficulties and friction with the rise of China.
Countries such as the United States, Australia, Korea, and ASEAN all have a number of frictions
with China which is in the middle of expanding its influence. As these countries share the same
fundamental values as Japan, further improvements on a mutual collaborative relationship between
Japan and these countries based on such common values can be expected in the future. While23

serious friction still exists between Japan and Korea in regard to the two countries’ different
historical perception, a new relationship of trust is being developed as Japan has provided strong
support to South Korean citizens following the incident of the sinking of a South Korean patrol
boat in 2010 and the shelling incident by North Korea. While there are still concerns in Japan’s
expansion of its security guarantee efforts, the collaboration between South Korea and Japan will
likely continue to be enhanced in multiple directions. On the other hand, despite its strong
economic connection, the South Korean government continues to find limits in its collaboration
with North Korea and China, with whom it does not share fundamental values.
While it protects a liberal international order and implements a foreign policy which strengthenssuch an order, the improvement of Japan’s alliance with the United States, and further deepening of
its collaborative relationship with allies of the same values will become even more important for
the Japanese government in the future. Such measures should not necessarily be a policy to isolate
China from the perspective of the power balance. Instead, it would be more important to invite
China into and hence further improve on the existing international order. Such an international
order will be one that is open, civilized, and different from both the one created mainly by theUnited States after World War II and the one developed under Western values of the United Statesand European countries, and one that can be followed by a wide range of players in internationalsociety as well as one that Japan can actively benefit from.

Conclusion
Above, an overview of the historical development of the international order to date was provided
along with a discussion on the path Japan’s diplomacy should follow in light of the newinternational order of the 21st century. The key for this will be for Japan to build a desirable
international order for itself based on Japan’s diplomacy developing a thorough understanding of
the gradually changing international order.
Here, the need for a diplomacy that has an eye on the creation of international order has also
been talked about in a speech given by Japan’s Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara in the Naoto Kan
Administration. In a speech given at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on
January 6, 2011 during a trip to Washington D.C., Maehara stated the following regarding the need
for Japan and the United Sates to cooperate to build a new order for the Asia-Pacific region. “The
top-priority task today for Japan and the United States, I believe, is to invest our all-out andall-round effort to shape a new order in the Asia-Pacific region, which finds itself in the middle of a24period of change. The roles of our two countries will not diminish in anyway in the days ahead. In
fact, in view of the urgent need to develop "institutional foundations" in the region today,
expectations are only rising that we play even greater roles, and I feel the responsibilities on ourshoulders are very great.” What did Maehara mean by “new order?” Maehara presented threepoints about this in his speech. First, “promote various regional cooperation,” second, “create acommon platform for the liberalization of trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region,” andthird, “establish closer partnerships among countries that are mature democracies with market
economies, with a view to building a system of cooperation encompassing both security and theeconomy.”These three elements are each indivisibly united. The direction Japan’s diplomacy should take isthe development of an Asia-Pacific order with mutual dependence, stability and prosperity that
aspires to achieve free trade and liberalization founded on collaboration with countries that sharecommon values. That is the issue of problem awareness found in the speech advocating an “EastAsian Community” given in Singapore by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi as well as the
speech by Foreign Minister Taro Asao on “The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.” It goes without
saying that the US-Japan alliance stands at the heart of this issue. The only way to build this neworder in the Asia-Pacific region is atop a foundation that includes a stable balance of power.
The challenge to this new order will be how the rising power of China fits in. There, the key
issue will be nationalism. To date, a militant and exclusive form of nationalism has become abarrier to the development of regional cooperation in Asia.xxxviii Governments have been unable tocontrol this problem due to the spread of the Internet; while the possibility exists that nationalism
will grow even more intense in the future. xxxix If intense nationalism makes it difficult tocompromise in the search for government led cooperation and mediation, then diplomaticnegotiations will become more difficult than ever before. If this becomes the case, the sharing of
popular culture or subculture among citizens, as mentioned earlier, will carry with it an importantmeaning to building community awareness. The future of Japan’s diplomacy must expand its
viewpoint further than ever before, and by moving forward with multilateral and multilayered
initiatives, build and respond to the new international order.

i

Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics. Trans. Eiichi Usuki. Iwanami
Shoten, Sept. 2000. Print.
ii
Bull 14.
iii
Bull 17.

25

iv

There are quite a few valuable reference materials in Japan that give an overview of the shift ininternational order after the Cold War. This paper has also made reference to some of these materials
including, Tadokoro, Masayuki. "Globalization and international order: Chapter 1." Course oninternational politics 4: Change in international order. [In Japanese.] Ed. Kiichi Fujihara, Jong Wong
Lee, Yoshiko Kojo, and Atsushi Ishida. Tokyo UP, 2004. Print., and Yamamoto, Yoshinobu. "Will theinternational system reach another balance?" [In Japanese.] ΑΣΤΕΙΟΝ 70 (2009): 27-45. Print.
v
Bull, The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics: 127.
vi
Kosaka, Masataka. Maturation and Collapse of Classical Diplomacy. [In Japanese.] Central Review.,
1978 has more detail on the development of the power balance concept in Europe.
vii
John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989), Japanese translation: The Long Peace – Inquiries into the History of the Cold
War: Nuclear, Tension, Peace. Trans. Toshiki Gomi et al. Ashi Shobo, 2002. Print.
viii
G. John Ikenberry, “Introduction”, in Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivalled: the Future or the Balanceof Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002) pp.1-28. In addition, for more information on thecontroversies included in foreign affairs on the same topic, refer to the articles published in
Neo-conservative vision and American empire? [In Japanese.] by Asahi Shimbun Publications Inc, 2003.
ix
Refer to the leading reference material in Japanese by Yamamoto, Yoshinobu. International Politics ofEmpire : The Post-Cold War International System and the United States. [In Japanese.] Yushindo, 2006.
x
National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (Washington D.C., 2008).
xi
Financial Times, January 12, 2010.
xii
Hosoya, Yuichi. Diplomacy: the Dialogue and Negotiations across Civilizations. [In Japanese.]
Yuhikaku, 2007. 73. Print.
xiii
For the establishment of the Concert System in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars, refer to chapter 4of the publication by Kosaka previously mentioned, Kissinger, Henry A. A World Restored. Trans.
Yukio Ito. Hara Shobo, 2009. and chapter 10 of F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory
and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1963).
xiv
For more on Palmerston diplomacy and European collaboration, refer to Kimizuka, Naotaka. British
Foreign Policy in the Age of Pax Britannica: Lord Palmerston and Conference Diplomacy. [InJapanese.] Yuhikaku, 2006.
xv
In reference to Hosoya, Yuichi; "From the new European collaboration to the Schuman Plan 1919-50:
England and Europe of the World War age." Ed. Yuichi Hosoya. England and Europe: 200 years of
isolation and integration. [In Japanese.] Keiso Shobo, 2009. 62-65. Print.
xvi
Michael Graham Fry, Erik Goldstein and Richard Langhorne (eds.), Guide to International Relations
and Diplomacy (London: Continuum, 2002) p.113.
xvii
Irie, Akira. Toward a peaceful globalization. [In Japanese.] Nihon Hosou Shuppan Kyokai, 2001. 35.
Print.
xviii
Hosoya, Yuichi. Ethical Wars: the Rise and Fall of Tony Blair. [In Japanese.] Keio UP, 2009. 89.
Print.
xix
G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Order & Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power and World
Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 2006) pp.1-3.
xx
G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West”, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2008,
vol.87, issue 1, pp.23-37.
xxi
For example, refer to Rebecca R. Moore, “Partnership Goes Global: the Role of Nonmember,
Non-European Union States in the Evolution of NATO”, in Gulnur Aybet and Rebecca R. Moore (eds.),
NATO in Search of a Vision (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010) pp.219-242.
xxii
Article quoted from International treaties 2006. [In Japanese.] Eds. Yasuaki Onuma et al.Yuhikaku,
2006.
xxiii
Wang, Jisi. "The China-Japan-United States Triangle: A Power Balance Analysis" Getting the
Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-US Relations. Eds. Jisi Wang, Gerald Curtis, and Ryosei
Kokubun. Iwanami Shoten, 2010. 3. Print.
xxiv
Amitav Acharya, “A Concert of Asia?”, Survival, vol.41, no.3 (1999).
xxv
In reference to Shiraishi, Takashi. “Regional formation of East Asia and ‘common cultural circle’.”26

Japan’s concept of East Asia. [In Japanese.] Eds. Yoshihide Soeya and Masayuki Tadokoro. Keio UP,
2004. 11-30. Print. as well as Takashi Shiraishi, “The Third Wave: Southeast Asia and Middle-Class
Formation in the Making of a Region.” Beyond Japan: the Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism. Eds.
Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2006. 237-271. Print.
xxvi
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. The Trust Fund for Human Security - For the"Human-centered" 21st Century. [In Japanese.] 2007. 4.
xxvii
Commission on Human Security. Summary of the Final Report of the Commission on Human
Security. Japanese Version. May 1, 2003.
xxviii
Also in reference to International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The
Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty(Ottawa: International Development and Research Centre, 2001). Ramesh Thakur, The United Nation,
Peace and Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), chapter 11.
xxix
Hosoya; Ethical Wars: 12-4.
xxx
For excellent international political analysis on this topic see Kaldor, Mary. Global Civil Society: An
Answer to War. Trans. Takehiko Yamamoto, et al. Hosei UP, 2007. Chapter 2, Endo, Ken. “Prologue.”
The Frontiers of Global Governance: Between the Present and the Past. [In Japanese.] Toshindo, 2008,
and chapter 8 of Nakamura, Kenichi, The politics of global issues. [In Japanese.] Iwanami Shoten, 2010.
xxxi
The Mainichi Daily News. The Mainichi Newspapers, 4 Mar. 2011. Web.
xxxii
The National Defense Program Outline From Year 2011. 17 Dec. 2010.
xxxiiiExample of references include, Nagashima, Akihisa. “This is the reality to survival.” [In Japanese.]
Interviewer. Tomohiko Taniguchi. Central Review.. March (2011): 154-59. Print., Kitaoka, Shinichi.
“Overcoming Japan’s Crisis with Political Reform,” [In Japanese.] Central Review.. February (2011):
94-101. Print., and Jimbo, Ken. “The New Defense Program Outline and the concept of new defense
capability.” [In Japanese.] International Diplomacy vol.05. (2011): 109-17. Print.
xxxiv
Kosaka, Masataka. International politics: Fears and hopes. [In Japanese.] Chuokoron Shinsha, 1966.
19. Print.
xxxv
Aso, Taro. “Creating an arc of freedom and prosperity.” November 30, 2006., mentions in Aso, Taro.
Arc of Freedom and Prosperity. [In Japanese.] Gentosha, 2007. 24-41. Print. For background of thedevelopment of this “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” strategy, refer to Visions of diplomacy andstrategy. [In Japanese.] narrated by Shotaro Yachi, and recorded by Masayuki Takahashi. Sankei
Shimbun Shuppan, 2009. 142-6.
xxxvi
Aso, Taro. “Japan and NATO in a New Security Environment.” [In Japanese.] Speech. North
Atlantic Council Meeting. Brussels, Belgium. May 4, 2006.
xxxviiAbe, Shinzo. “Japan and NATO: Toward Further Collaboration.” [In Japanese.] Speech. North
Atlantic Council Meeting. Brussels, Belgium. January 12, 2007.
xxxviii
In reference to materials including Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism:
Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)
p.356.
xxxix
Hosoya, Yuichi. “Internet public opinion and nationalism.” [In Japanese.] Central Review.
November (2010): 18-9. Print.

27

Chapter 2
Japan’s Regional Order Initiatives
Taizo Miyagi

Foreword―Asia as a Regional System
This paper discusses the issue of Japan’s “regional order initiatives,” with a regional focus on
Asia to which Japan belongs.
First, it is important to consider what is meant by a “regional order initiative.” It would beunreasonable to call a cluster of bilateral relations such as Japan-China relations or Japan-Republicof Korea (ROK) relations a regional order initiative. A regional order initiative refers to the act ofattempting to establish a type of order by combining relations with various countries such as China,
the ROK, Southeast Asian countries and the United States. In other words, it is an attempt tounderstand Asia as a whole.
The efforts to deal with the issue of Asia as a region are always accompanied by the question of
the scope of Asia. From a geographical perspective, Asia refers to a vast area that stretches from the
Asian part of Turkey to all the areas east of the Ural Mountains. The generally-accepted idea of“Asia” as it is referred to in Japan, however, means the area including East Asia and Southeast Asia,
or South Asia at the farthest. On the contrary, the existence of the United States is indispensable
when discussing the regional situation surrounding Japan, and this aspect is emphasized by theregional concept called “Asia-Pacific.”
In fact, “region” is quite a vague concept. Today the term Southeast Asia refers to the countriesof the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but countries that belong to the region
called South Asia today such as India and Pakistan were also included in the concept of “Southeast
Asia” in Japan during the 1950s. The concept of an “East Asia Community” is at the focus of
discussion on regional order initiatives in Japan. The phenomenon of calling Northeast Asia
including Japan, China and the ROK, and Southeast Asia collectively “East Asia”—often with thephrase “in a broad sense”—was started during the 1980s. This trend officially began with the East
Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), a concept proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohamad. In the background was the fact that economic ties between Northeast Asia centering on
Japan and Southeast Asia were deepened to an inseparable degree.
This paper considers “region” not as a fixed geographical concept but as a changing regional

29

system. There are countries such as India that come to be included in Japan’s version of “Asia” asthe economic ties between the countries deepen, while the United States occupies a central position
when considering security in “Asia.” These examples both reflect the characteristics of the regional
system of the respective times.
This paper first looks at Japan’s regional order initiatives during the period following the Second
World War. Japan’s diplomacy in the postwar period is often summarized as “one-country
pacifism” under the Cold War, but an unbroken line of regional initiatives of the respective times
exists in the history of its diplomacy. It is considered that only after understanding such a historicalcontext can we analyze the characteristics of the current situation and the outlook for the future.
Then, based on the current situation at the beginning of the 21st century, the paper presents theoutlook for and the consideration of the regional situation in Asia in 20 years’ time according to the“future international situation: prospects in 20 years,” which is the issue to be addressed in thisresearch project.
The paper then considers and examines the challenges that Japan should tackle in 20 years or
toward the establishment of a regional order in 20 years.
History—Regional Order Initiatives in Postwar Japan・“Independent” Asia and Japan
This chapter looks at the regional order initiatives in postwar Japan, beginning with the 1950s.
When Japan regained its independence and diplomacy by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Asia wascaught in the maelstrom of war and confusion. With the movement to emerge from colonial rule (orto refuse the return to colonial rule) and the Cold War that began in Europe rippling through Asia,
situations of conflict spread throughout Asia, such as the Chinese Civil War, Korean War,
Indochina War, and the separation and independence of India and Pakistan that was accompaniedby confusion.
It was not until the mid-1950s that a certain form of order began to appear in Asia. Ceasefire
agreements were reached in both the Korean War and the Indochina War in 1954, and the countries
that newly gained independence gathered at the Bandung Conference (Asia-Africa Conference) in
1955. The conference was led by the two largest emerging nations in postwar Asia, China and India
that had established a partnership through the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The
Bandung Conference stressed anti-colonialism as well as the “peaceful coexistence” with thecommunist regime and aspired to an international order within Asia, which would mark a clear
departure from the Cold War regime led by the United States.
The Bandung Conference was the first international conference that Japan attended after theSecond World War. The challenge for Japan was how to strike a balance between the neutralism in30

Asia as represented by the Bandung Conference and the Cold War policies pursued by the UnitedStates. In the end, then Japanese Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama’s Administration chose the pathof uniting Asia by putting great emphasis on economic partnership without touching on politicalissues to the extent possible. At that time, however, conditions for uniting Asia through theeconomy did not exist and, being a poor defeated nation, Japan did not have the economic strength
to support its leadership.
・Various Initiatives under the Asian Cold War
In the 1950s, the Japanese government began to propose many regionalism-oriented initiatives
for Asia.i One representative example is the Southeast Asia Development Fund proposed by the
Nobusuke Kishi Administration. The majority of the initiatives shared the idea of utilizing thefunds from the United States for the development of Southeast Asia through Japan. Under the
Asian Cold War, Southeast Asia became the largest arena of offense and defense surrounding thepenetration of communism.
Japan was of the opinion that poverty would be an invitation to the penetration of communism inSoutheast Asia and attached importance to the “development of Southeast Asia,” but it lacked theeconomic strength to promote this idea by itself. The idea behind these initiatives was a rather
convenient one for Japan to simultaneously reconstruct the country and enter Southeast Asia byexpecting funding from the United States for Southeast Asia to go through Japan.
The Southeast Asia development initiative using funding from the United States was once called
the “Asian Marshall Plan” and there were high expectations for its realization, but this was neverrealized and the Japanese initiative never attracted attention.
・Establishment of ASEAN
In the 1970s, Asia faced a big turning point both with respect to the Cold War and independence
from colonialism, with such developments as the closer relations between the United States andChina that were the major players in the Cold War conflicts in Asia, the end of the Vietnam War
and the retreat of the United Kingdom from Southeast Asia. When the large political challenges
such as the selection of the regime and the achievement of independence were tentatively settled,
the “development regime” spread throughout Asia as a form of politics centering on economic
growth, replacing the former “independence” or “revolution.” In Southeast Asia, this development
regime was politically underpinned by ASEAN, which was established in 1967. ASEAN thus cameto provide a stable framework of coexistence among the countries of Southeast Asia which had
often been trapped in tense relations.

31

It is true that in the beginning there were some uncoordinated aspects in Japan as to what kind of
relations it would pursue with ASEAN, but it can be said that subsequently Japan has quiteconsistently taken the stance of providing support and assistance for the enhancement of ASEAN.
As the volume of trade with and investment in Southeast Asia grew rapidly, the maintenance ofstability in Southeast Asia became an extremely important challenge for Japan. The Fukuda
Doctrine announced in 1977 which is well-known as an active initiative in Japan’s diplomacy
toward Asia was also an attempt to establish a stable regional order in Southeast Asia after theretreat of the United States and United Kingdom.
・Appearance of China
Following the visit to China by US President Richard Nixon and the achievement of the historicreconciliation between the United States and China in 1972, Japan immediately decided, ahead of
the United States, to normalize the relations with China.
Until then under the US-China Cold War, in a sense, there had been no need for Japan toconsider China as a realistic target of diplomacy. This is because it had been extremely difficult toovercome the walls of the US-China Cold War. When the walls broke down, however, Japan began
to face and is still facing to this day the challenge of how to treat its huge neighbor, China, and withwhat sense of distance.
The Japanese politician Kakuei Tanaka who decided to normalize the relations with China andthe politicians belonging to his faction maintained the position to attach importance to China. On
the other hand, Takeo Fukuda, who was Tanaka’s chief rival, and those belonging to his faction
tended to aspire to a more balanced approach not focusing on China alone. The “omnidirectional
peace diplomacy” advocated by Fukuda during his administration had an implication of
establishing good relations with the Soviet Union and other actors in order for Japan to avoid
becoming exclusively focused on China.ii
The competitive relations between the two politicians would remain as a continuous underlying
factor in Japan’s future diplomacy.
・Pacific Rim Initiative
A representative example of a regional order initiative that extends beyond Asia proposed by
Japan in the postwar period is the Pacific Rim or the Asia-Pacific initiative. The Pacific Basin
Cooperation Concept was beginning to be envisaged in the 1960s, inspired by the movement
toward European integration. In the 1970s, Australia began to turn its attention to Asia, partially led
by the fact that the United Kingdom, a former colonial power, joined the European Economic

32

Community (EEC). Linked with this movement of Australia, the Pacific Basin Cooperation
Concept became more concrete.
The main idea behind the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept proposed by the Masayoshi Ohira
Administration was for Japan to lead the establishment of order in this region by uniting with theUnited States and Australia, but it can be said that there was also the intention of bringing in Chinathat had begun to push forward with its reform and opening up. The Pacific Basin Cooperation
Concept later came to fruition as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).
・Appearance of “East Asia”
International politics in Asia in the 1950s was led by the political partnership between China andIndia. The Cold War tensions were intensified and eased in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s,
Northeast Asian countries such as Japan, China and the ROK, and Southeast Asian countries
centering on ASEAN deepened their economic ties with Japan playing a central role. This led tothe establishment of a concept called “East Asia” (in a broad sense) that incorporates both
Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. The first example of official use of this concept was the East
Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. The
EAEC faced strong protest from the United States which maintained that this initiative would draw
a dividing line in the Pacific, and failed.
The situation was changed by the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997. The invitation extended to theleaders of Japan, China and the ROK to join the ASEAN Summit Meeting to discuss the responseto the crisis led to the establishment of a framework called ASEAN Plus Three. One consideration
would be to say that the dissatisfaction with the control measures implemented by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) led by the United States and Europe sharply increased the momentum forregional cooperation.
The situation was later followed by the leadership struggle between Japan and China. While
China insisted that regional integration of Asia be pushed forward centering on ASEAN Plus Three,Japan maintained that regional integration should be promoted through ASEAN Plus Six, which
includes Australia, New Zealand and India added to ASEAN Plus Three, partially with the aim of
weakening China’s influence.
The Yukio Hatoyama Administration of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) that was started in2009 after a change of government put forth an “East Asian community” in its diplomatic policy.
Coupled with the other focus of the administration of “Japan-US relations on an equal footing,” thecommunity initiative was further tinged with the impression of “drawing away from the UnitedStates.” It cannot be denied that this aroused unnecessary suspicion from Japan and abroad. The
initiative never came to fruition under the Hatoyama Administration.

33

Current Situation
How can we explain the current status within the flow of regional cooperation mentioned above?
It has been decided that from 2011, the United States and Russia will also join the East Asia
Summit (EAS) which embodied the idea of ASEAN Plus Six that Japan advocated. On the other
hand, the Naoto Kan Administration considers the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
Agreement (TPP) with the United States and Australia being the key member states the largest
diplomatic challenge. It can be said that the pattern of tug-of-war between Japan and China
regarding whether the scope of the “East Asian community” should be ASEAN Plus Three or Six
has now entered a new stage.
The largest factor behind the change in the situation is the further rise of China. It is true that
China itself has achieved significant growth in the past 10 years or so, but it can be said that what isfurther emphasizing China becoming a major power is the fact that ASEAN has suffered greatdamage from the Asian Currency Crisis and been politically weakened, along with the fact that theeconomic strength of the United States has been weakened as a result of the Lehman Crisis.
As China has become an immense nation both in absolute and relative terms, it seems that themove to find a balance against China is becoming apparent today in “East Asia” which comprises
Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. For one thing, there is a growing move in Japan and Southeast
Asian countries to pull the United States into this region mainly in terms of security. It can be said
that Japan’s enthusiasm for the TPP is part of its move to take the lead in regional integration by
deepening its ties with the United States and Australia to achieve a balance against China, which isconstantly increasing its presence both politically and economically.
There is also the move to deepen the relations between India that is making a significant
economic leap and “East Asia.” If “East Asia” as a region was formed by ties among the countries
centering on the economy, it is in a sense not surprising that there is a tendency for the border
between India and “East Asia” to disappear as their relations become closer due to the increasingly
vigorous economic activities.
Either way, this author believes that the concept of “East Asia” comprising ASEAN Plus Threewhich was formed by ties among the countries centering on the economy seems to be gradually
becoming more fluid toward the establishment of a subsequent regional order or regionalframework, in the face of China becoming an enormous country within the region.
Outlook―Regional Order in 20 Years
This chapter looks at the regional situation in Asia in 20 years. First, it is necessary to confirm
the data that serve as the basis for forecasting the situation in 20 years. It can be said that the34

economic field is relatively easier to forecast in comparison with the field of politics or security.
Economic forecasts based on the demographic situation that serves as the foundation for economic
growth have been released by research institutions and companies.
The first index to examine is the gross domestic product (GDP) of each country in 2030. The
following picture can be envisaged by putting together the reports of the research institutions. In
2030, China’s GDP will reach a level nearly matching that of the United States. India will come inthird, and the size of its economy will reach a level that exceeds 30% of the GDP of the UnitedStates. Japan’s economy will come in fourth in the world in size, but its GDP per capita will be at alevel of 2.5 times and eight times that of China and India, respectively.iii The report of anotherresearch company also provides a similar forecast.iv
Although it exceeds the scope of this paper, research institutions have different forecasts
regarding the period beyond 2030. While there is a forecast that China’s economic development
will continue even more steadily and the country will become the largest economic superpower inthe world overtaking the United States by 2041v (some institutions forecast that China’s GDP willbe the largest in the world in 2020),vi according to other forecasts China’s economic growth rate
will decline to 1% in 2040 due to the declining birthrate and a growing proportion of elderly
people.vii
In any case, it seems possible to envisage a picture where Japan’s economy will become thefourth largest in the world after the United States, China and India, but Japan’s per capita income
will remain at a relatively high level at the time of 2030, which is the point of focus of this paper.
Next, the situation of Asia in 20 years will be examined by considering political factors in
addition to the above picture. By dividing Asia into the three regions of Northeast Asia, Southeast
Asia, and South Asia, the key points in considering the projected situation in each region will bementioned.
・Northeast Asia
According to the majority of the forecasts, China’s steady economic growth of recent years will
be maintained at least until around 2030 as can be projected from its demographic situation andother factors. There are, however, quite a few challenges in order for China to maintain a stableeconomic growth. These challenges will be divided into the following three groups of issues forconsideration.
The first group of issues is related to the question of how to resolve the factors that restrict theeconomic growth, such as the issue of supply of energy and water resources, and the burden on theenvironment. It is widely known that China has been vigorously working in recent years to acquireinterests in resources such as oil in a seemingly rather aggressive manner in various regions

35

including Africa. There are positive and negative factors, such as the consequence of the aftermathof the collapse of longtime administrations in the Middle East that started in Tunisia, and thepossibility of development of oil resources including oil sand and oil shale to replace the traditionaloil, but the possibility of an increasingly tight supply situation of oil cannot be denied in the longterm. The tight supply of water resources is also a serious issue in China.
The key points in considering China’s trend will be whether the country will rush toward theacquisition of interests in a unilateralism-oriented fashion, or whether the country will attach
importance to the establishment of some form of international or regional regime in order toconquer the situation of tight supply of resources.
The second group of issues is related to the domestic governance system of China. This author
believes that the largest issue is the gap between the rich and the poor (which nearly overlaps withthe gap between urban residents and farmers) and relations between the government and themilitary. The issue of the gap between the rich and the poor (gap between urban residents andfarmers) exists in contrast to the issue that the members of the communist party overlap with theexecutives of powerful companies and are forming a group with vested interests. The
democratization of the governance system will be an unavoidable hurdle to clear in order tofundamentally solve this issue.
The other issue related to the governance system are the relations between the government(party) and the military. Till this day, the People's Liberation Army remains a military that belongs
to the Communist Party of China, and not the nation. During the times when charismatic leaders
such as Mao Tse-tung and Deng Xiaoping promoted nation building, the issue of whether they
could take control of the military did not grow into a serious problem. As time progressed to thetimes of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, however, the issue of whether the leader can take control ofthe military seems to have become more likely to surface. When China’s tendency of seeking
resources for the country’s growth in a unilateralism-oriented fashion is linked to the military’s
aspiration for maintaining and expanding its vested interests, it may become a factor that allows
China to seek hard-line measures externally. The establishment of stable government-military
relations constitutes a large hurdle along with democratization in understanding the future directionof China’s governance system.
The third group of issues relates to the international environment. The current Chinese leadership
advocates the “peaceful rise” of the country, based on a cooperative approach with the existing
international order including the United States (behind China’s basic approach, there is probably
the idea that it does not want to bear any burdens that exceed its fair share). There are two risks,
however, that may destroy its cooperative approach: the issue of North Korea and the issue of
Taiwan. In the event of a sudden collapse of North Korea or the country entering into a state of36

turmoil and conflict, or a clear declaration of independence made by Taiwan, China would have no
choice but to intervene. In either case, it would not be easy for China to maintain cooperative
relations with countries such as Japan and the United States.
China’s economic growth as a natural course of event, which was mentioned at the beginning of
this chapter, will be influenced to no small degree by how well the country will be able to settle
these challenges. This paper envisages a scenario in which the above three groups of issues will
become more serious in 20 years without any fundamental solution of the issues. Conversely, theimportant point in considering the regional order or the measures to be taken by Japan will be how
to prevent these three groups of issues from exploding in an irreversible manner.
Regarding the future of divided nations in Asia as seen in the Korean Peninsula or the
China-Taiwan issue, this paper only points out that these issues have the risk of becoming an“explosion point” that could influence the actions of China as mentioned above.
・Southeast Asia
ASEAN, with its centripetal force and presence weakened by the Asian Currency Crisis, ismaking efforts to recover its centripetal force by promoting the realization of an ASEAN
Community by 2020. In other words, this seems to partially reflect its current situation in which it
can only maintain its centripetal force by promoting a “deeper integration.”
Although ASEAN has become a cornerstone for regional integration in Asia, it is losing groundto the presence of other actors outside of ASEAN such as Japan, China, the ROK and India. In
countries such as Indonesia, which has overcome the confusion following the Asian Currency
Crisis and gotten back on the track of economic recovery with democratization taking root, there
are voices that insist that the focus of the diplomatic activity should be placed on becoming a“member of the G20” instead of the previous “leader of ASEAN.”
Former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew predicts that ASEAN will eventually be
divided between an archipelago and a mainland part. The difference between the two is seen in the
response to China that is increasing its presence; namely, countries such as Thailand, Laos andCambodia, that find it difficult to escape from the influence of China as they are connected to thecontinent of China, will have no choice but to respect China’s intent; on the other hand, countries
such as Indonesia and the Philippines that belong to the archipelago part with a distance from
China will move into a direction to maintain a balance against China.viii
This phenomenon in which there is a difference in the approach to China between the mainlandpart and the archipelago part of Southeast Asia was also seen when the international relations
surrounding China became fluid (when the “fetters” of containment of China were lifted) after theUnited States and China advanced toward each other in the early 1970s.ix

37

In the recent case of the TPP as well, it seems that the countries are failing to reach an agreement,with Singapore already joining the TPP while many other countries maintain a cautious stance.
In short, it will not be easy to maintain the centripetal force of ASEAN between the directional
movement that does not deny being taken into the scope of influence of China and the directional
movement that advances toward the United States (and Japan) to seek balance against China as
China increases its presence. This paper predicts that the tendency will increase for ASEAN togradually break apart under these different directional movements.
・South India
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it is predicted that India’s economy will become
the second largest in Asia after China by 2030, but there naturally exist issues.
India shares the same situation as China with factors that restrict the growth, such as the issue ofsupply of energy and water, and the burden on the environment, as mentioned above as the firstpoint. Regarding the second point of domestic governance system such as the democratization of
the governance system and the government-military relations, however, it can be said that India hasvery few unstable factors such as the need for a fundamental reform as seen in China. On the other
hand, there is a big difference between the literacy rate in India and China, with that in India beingaround 65%x as opposed to 90% in China. This fact shows that India faces the challenges ofimproving its educational standard and disseminating education.
Regarding the third point, the international environment, the issue of North Korea and the issueof Taiwan for China are equivalent to the relations with Pakistan for India. India and Pakistan
originally sought to gain independence as one country, but they became separate and independent
states amidst religious turmoil, followed by three wars between the two countries. Furthermore,both countries are nuclear powers today. It is fair to say that this situation is one of the potential“powder kegs” in the international situation. It is also a matter of concern that Pakistan’s
governance system has been increasingly weakened during the recent years, torn between the
United States strongly calling for cooperation for the “fight against terrorism” and the domestic
public opinion that opposes it.
When seen from such a perspective, it can be said that the challenge for India that will influence
its future is how to establish more stable relations with Pakistan while resolving the factors that
restrain growth.
It can be considered that the rise of India is relatively peaceful in comparison with that of China
in terms of the sense of tension it brings to its neighboring countries and the international order. In
India, the issue of the government-military relations that is observed in China is relatively minor.
India is also a democratic country. From such factors, it can be determined that the risk of India

38

taking unilateral military action in an expansionist-oriented fashion is relatively low in comparison
with China. The matter of the greatest concern is India’s relations with Pakistan.
This paper envisages a scenario in 20 years in which India’s economy will continue to grow,bringing a relatively moderate sense of tension to the regional and international order, although thecountry will have such issues as described above; however, the situation could change greatly
depending on the development of the situation in Pakistan.
Recommendations
This chapter considers the measures and the direction to be taken by Japan based on the issues
regarding the regional order in 20 years that have become clear from the analysis thus made.
China and India will be the leading players in Asia in 20 years unless a substantiallydestabilizing factor appears on the scene. Therefore, it is meaningless to lament Japan falling to“number three in Asia.” What is important is to draw Asia’s dynamism into Japan. It is very
fortunate for Japan to have growing markets such as China and India close by. This point isobvious when compared with the situation of European Union countries with neighboring regions
such as Eastern Europe where high growth of the level seen in Asia cannot be expected, and North
Africa with the risk of destabilization.
The issues faced by China and India have been summarized into three points: (1) the factors that
constrain growth such as the supply of energy and water, and the burden on the environment; (2)the issues surrounding the domestic governance system such as the democratization of thegovernance system and the government-military relations; and (3) the regional and international
environment that is necessary for stable growth. This paper has also summarized that while China
faces serious issues regarding all of the above three points, India has very few issues regarding thesecond point.
・Response to the Three Groups of Issues
In order to contribute to the stability and prosperity of Asia in 20 years and draw its dynamism
into the country, Japan needs to hammer out measures to respond to the three groups of issues.
Regarding the first point, namely the factors that restrict growth, the measures that can be taken
by Japan can be divided into the two categories of technical cooperation and the establishment of aregime.
The two possible directions for the solution of the energy issue are the securing of more abundantresources and the improvement of energy efficiency. Technical cooperation obviously contributes
to the latter direction, and this is Japan’s forte. In addition, technical cooperation has a positive
meaning for two reasons. For one thing, it can contribute to the challenge of responding to the issue39

of global warming. Second, there is a possibility that the provision of environmental technology
can become a business opportunity.
The other measure, or the establishment of the regime, is about how to establish a mechanism forstable energy supply in Asia, including countries with tremendous energy demand such as China
and India. Naturally, the establishment of this type of regime within the regional unit of Asia is not
the only option, but a variety of other options are possible. If this type of regime can be establishedwithin the regional unit of Asia, however, it will be a huge step towards the establishment of an
actual “community.”
In 2009, the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) proposed the introduction of a“common Asian currency” on par with the dollar and the euro with a view to the 2030s.xi The
energy regime mentioned above can sufficiently serve as the basis of a regional framework alongwith the currency. It cannot be denied that Japan has been relatively weak in establishing this typeof international and regional regime, compared with technical cooperation, among others.
If the Japanese economy were extremely strong as it was in the 1980s, the establishment of aregime led by Japan would bring a sense of caution that this regime would unilaterally offer
benefits to Japan. Around 2030, however, the Japanese economy will maintain a certain level ofpresence with an increasing degree of maturity (meaning momentum lost in terms of growth rate),
while the two major growth nations of China and India will come into existence. This will put
Japan in quite a reasonable position to exercise moderate leadership toward the establishment of aframework for the coexistence and co-prosperity of Asia. The challenge will be how to attainconceptual power and exercise diplomatic power to realize the concept. This issue will be touched
upon at the end of this chapter.
The second point, or the governance system of each country, will probably become an issue
especially with regard to China, but there will not be much that Japan will be able to achieve in thiscontext. China is so enormous that only its internal factors will be able to bring any fundamental
change to the country. As for measures that Japan should take, two points will be mentioned in thispaper. The first measure is to prevent a militaristic vacuum from being created, and the second is toextend practical cooperation for democratization in a broad sense.
As mentioned above, this author believes that one of the focal points surrounding the future
movement of China will be the government-military relations. The emergence of a militaristic
vacuum around China may trigger bold actions by the military. There are lessons to be learned
from Japan’s prewar experience; the Japanese army gradually advancing into the Chinese continent
without any approval of the government in Tokyo finally led to the collapse of the domestic
governance system. Especially, the de facto militaristic vacuum that was present in Manchuria,
which triggered the course of this event, became the main reason for the Kanto Army to take bold

40

actions.
The prevention of a militaristic vacuum in 2030 will require the adherence to and the appropriateenhancement of the Japan-US alliance. It will also be important to continue to make efforts for theappropriate capacity building of the Self-Defense Forces themselves.
Regarding the cooperation for “democratization,” it is not necessarily effective to repeat
high-handed lectures. The provision of technical cooperation at the time of elections or theprovision of aid over broad areas, such as providing practical know-how to activities conducted bylabor unions or civil groups that call for the rule of law and guarantee of human rights, will be oftrue significance and importance. It is oftentimes more effective if activities conducted at theselevels are carried out by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as non-profit organizations(NPOs) and labor unions, and not necessarily led by the government. It will be vital for Japanesesociety as a whole, not limited to the government, to make efforts to carry out such initiatives andincrease the awareness of people, which will serve as a foundation for such initiatives.
As for the third group of issues, there are three regions that hold the key to stability in Asia:
North Korea, Taiwan and Pakistan. The stability in the first two regions is indispensable for China
and in the last region for India to achieve sustainable growth. What can Japan do about these three
regions?
Japan has a “bargaining chip” against North Korea; namely, the normalization of diplomatic
relations and the subsequent economic assistance. The question is when to use it. Whether Japan
can show a certain level of leadership and presence or it will be given the unwelcome nickname of“automatic teller machine” during the period of reorganization of order in the Korean Peninsula
will depend on when Japan will use this bargaining chip.
Regarding Pakistan, Japan does not have the means of exerting influence through military aid
like the United States. Economic cooperation would again be of certain significance in this context.
Japan is currently promoting the Industrial Corridor Project with a focus on the development ofrailway infrastructure, among others, in the northwestern part of India. It can be said that Pakistan’s
fundamental stabilization depends on the degree to which the economic prosperity of India canreach Pakistan. It seems that Japan will have not a small role to play in this context.
Of the three countries, Japan will most likely be an interested party in the case of Taiwan. For
the United States, Taiwan may be an issue that can be “dealt with” within the large volume oftransactions between the United States and China in case of necessity. During the era of the
US-China Cold War, strong ideological support for Taiwan was seen in the United States, but sucha trend no longer exists, and will probably become even weaker in the future.
In Japan, however, it seems that there is, at least in potential terms, a tendency to oppose theunilateral inclusion of Taiwan in China both on geopolitical grounds and for reasons related to41

domestic politics, and that this tendency will not change. The stable transition of the Taiwan issue
will continue to be a critical factor for Japan-China relations.
・Spreading Its Wings
The discussion in this chapter has been focused on China and India, which are likely to become
major players in Asia in the 2030s. It is very important, however, for Japan to establish evenstronger relations with other Asian countries.
If China and India become enormous, there will be an increasing number of situations that will
be difficult for Japan to handle alone. Strategic cooperation with countries other than China orIndia that have a strong presence will be more important. The ROK and Australia are both US
allies, and Japan recently concluded an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with
Australia, with another one scheduled to be concluded with the ROK. There is also recognition of
the ties with those countries.
This paper mentions Indonesia and Turkey as the other important countries. These are bothregional major powers that have achieved steady economic growth in recent years and havebecome G20 member states. These are also countries that have successfully achieved a balance
between Islam and a stable democratic regime. Cooperation with countries with suchcharacteristics will greatly broaden the scope and possibility of Japan’s diplomacy.
・Stabilization of Domestic Politics
Finally, the challenge that must be mentioned is the stabilization of Japan’s domestic policy. In
order for Japan to maintain its presence in a situation where Japan’s economic status will belowered toward 2030 in relative terms, it will be vital to have a certain level of presence as an actor
in international politics. The current situation in which prime ministers change every year would by
no means make it possible to hold hope for such an achievement. It can be said that there have been
two administrations in the recent years that helped Japan achieve a certain level of presence in thearena of international politics: the Yasuhiro Nakasone Administration and the Junichiro Koizumi
Administration. It is of no coincidence that the two prime ministers were in office for around five
years, which is an exceptionally long period in Japanese politics, although it would only be anormal length from an international perspective.
Under the so-called 1955 regime seen in Japan previously, the completely different foreign
policies pursued by each party, with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) focusing on the Japan-US
Security Arrangements and cooperation with the United States, and the Socialist Party of Japanfocusing on unarmed neutrality, did not bring about much trouble. This is because under the42

“domestic Cold-War,” a change of government was not realistic.
As we have entered the 21st century, however, a change of government is and will be no
extraordinary matter. The Yukio Hatoyama Administration came into office with the complete
disapproval of the LDP, and especially the diplomatic policy of Prime Minister Koizumi, andreached a deadlock. Nevertheless, the change of government would be meaningless if it had
absolutely no influence on the country’s diplomatic policy. The question is how to strike a balance
between the change of government and the continuity of diplomatic policy. The establishment of afoundation for domestic policy with a view to such diplomacy will be the largest unavoidable
challenge in order for Japan to maintain its position in the international community toward 2030.
i

Hiroyuki Hoshiro, The fate of the Asian diplomacy of regionalism,1952-1966. [In Japanese.](Bokutakusha, 2008).
ii
Hidekazu Wakatsuki, The age of omnidirectional diplomacy: Japan and Asia during thetransformational period of the Cold War, 1971-1980. [In Japanese.] (Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 2006).
iii
Dai-ichi Life Research Institute Report, December 2010.
iv
Goldman Sachs, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050, 2003.
v
Ibid.
vi
Japan Center for Economic Research, Demographic Change and the Asian Economy, 2007.
vii
Ibid.
viii
Yoichi Funabashi, The new world: rise and fall of countries. [In Japanese.] (Asahi Shinsho, 2010).
ix
Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War After the War (Mekong,1999).
x
The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/india/data.html.
xi
The Institute for International Policy Studies, Prospects for the Global Economic and Financial
System in the 2030s, 2009.

43

Chapter 3
The United States and Japan-US Relations 20 Years Later:
Ensuring That the Alliance Is Not Cast Adrift
Toshihiro Nakayama

1. The Importance of Japan-US Relations and the Primary Factors Transforming Them
Assuming that the rise of China were to continue at its present brisk pace, and that the other
BRIC countries and NEXT11 were to continue growing stably, then the fact remains that Japan-US
relations will serve as the most important bilateral relationship for Japan 20 years down the road.
Its relative importance will likely diminish following the structural changes in world politics. Outof the set of problems newly confronting the international community, the number that can be dealt
with by the bilateral alliance’s ability for resolving and handling problems is on a downward
trajectory. For this reason, we have already entered the era where simply establishing this bilateralalliance as the “cornerstone” of peace and safety for the region will not adequately produce them.
Yet in spite of this, tightly knit Japan-US relations will serve as a major advantage to both parties infacing up to this new set of problems. This is because both Japan and the United States share deep
ties on the economic and security front, democratic values that underpin the political systems ofboth countries, and a fundamental image of how a desirable international order should be structured.
They also share a vision of a liberal international order with regard to how a desirable regional
order should be structured in the Asia-Pacific region.i
Needless to say, Japan and the United States are not composed in such a way that they
completely share every value. Rather, their self-images vary greatly. In Japan, collectives are
fostered and grow up as if out of thin air, while the United States has been erected as a collection ofprinciples. The United States regards itself as a missionary democracy, while Japan currently feels
little reality despite hanging out its values as the cornerstone of its diplomacy. The United States
proactively tries to shape international situations on its own, while Japan concentrates its attention
on accurately responding to international situations and in searching for where it will touch down.
These two countries vary considerably in how their respective national self-consciousness isordered. Yet it is because they share fundamental political and social values and comprehend one

45

another’s presence in a mutually complementary fashion that the bilateral relations of Japan-US
relations are being put on a unique and sound footing.
When the first Armitage Report was issued about ten years ago, it ignited debate about Japan
becoming a “mature partner” to the United States like the United Kingdom was, which was touched
off by the passage in this report stating that the Japan-US alliance in Asia should be upgraded to thestatus of the US-UK alliance.ii This was primarily a concrete proposal concerning how the allianceshould operate, but this has come to take on a scope that exceeds the intentions of the report. It was
precisely around this time that the Koizumi Administration set out a clear pro-American line, andafter the 9/11 terrorist attacks it embarked upon cooperation with the United States to a greater
extent than ever before. Because of this, the synopsis of “upgrading the Japan-US alliance to thestatus of another US-UK alliance in Asia” raised hopes on the US side as well that this was not justa figurative expression.
However, the alliance is underpinned by the special relationship between the United Kingdom,which was once a hegemony, and the United States, which has inherited this position. The twocountries are also connected via a deep-seated awareness including their language and sharenumerous values in common. The debate of overlapping this alliance with the Japan-US allianceconceals the special characteristics of the latter; that is to say, in the fact that the Japan-US allianceis an alliance that binds together two states which belong to different cultural spheres. What ismore, both countries long occupied the number one and two positions in terms of their economic
scale, which is also a unique characteristic. Whereas the US-UK alliance was an alliance between aformer empire whose influence continues to decline dramatically and a new hegemon, theJapan-US alliance was one between a hegemon and a latent competitor (of course this did notsolely occupy an economic dimension).
When you get right down to it, the subconscious mind on the Japanese side could be said to haveundergone a revision in 1960, and the alliance has continued to be one between a victor nation anda defeated nation. This would bubble up to the surface at random, like ancient geological strata, andfrom time to time upward thrusts like impulses trying to rise to the surface would issue forth fromboth camps on the left and right. This is something that we have only experienced recently. For thisreason, discussions concerning the alliance in some cases took the form of discussions concernedwith national dignity rather than as discussions about security. Or to put this in somewhat simpler
terms, it contained the latent risk that this would unfold in the form of postwar Japan’s
self-discovery. For Japan, determining its relationship with the United States was a search for46

identity, whereas to the United States, Japan rarely ever appeared in these sorts of contexts. A
number of contortions and asymmetries were structurally internalized within the Japan-US alliance,
and in some cases differences in how these contortions were handled have shaken the alliance itself
to its very core.
It has been 50 years since the basic framework of today’s alliance was laid. Though theJapan-US alliance has time and again undergone constant corrections and upgrades according to
the current state of affairs, it has played a significant role in maintaining regional order as analliance that is without precedent. It consists of a type of alliance that can only be described interms of the Japan-US alliance. Especially in the post-Cold War period, despite being a bilateralalliance its nature as a regional public good has grown stronger and stronger, and it grew everclearer that it was composed in such a way that its destabilization would be unwelcomed by theother countries in the region. Despite facing a number of problems, over the past half century it has
not yielded anti-American and anti-base conflicts that have embroiled the entire nation, and it
enjoys a domestic base of support which is relatively stable. Of course, this assertion does not in
any way negate the fact that there is discontent with the bases that is rooted in local regions. But
such discontent has not necessarily been directed solely towards the United States; it has also been
directed towards the Government of Japan and, especially in Okinawa’s case, toward the“mainland.”The world has literally grown smaller due to the fact that the cost of transport has fallen andinformation technology has developed rapidly centered primarily around the Internet. Despite this,and the fact that the speed at which the international situation is changing is increasing at anaccelerated pace, it is difficult to imagine the basic structure comprising the Japan-US alliancecollapsing in 20 years’ time. If this were to collapse, then it would likely be in a world where themajority of the presuppositions for thinking about contemporary world politics have collapsed.
Even if such presuppositions were to collapse and world politics were to enter into a major periodof change, it would be hard to imagine Japan-US relations, which serve as a stabilizer, being
allowed to decline, especially if the Japan-US alliance has grown in importance. This is because theJapan-US alliance is one that attempts to uphold the status quo rather than shake it up, and because
it is an alliance that quintessentially strives to incorporate new factors for change into the current
system.
One scenario in which this alliance would be on the brink of crisis would be a potential case inwhich Japan as one of the partners in the alliance were to choose a course of shaking up the status47

quo. In The Next 100 Years (2009), George Friedman points to the possibility that Japan and theUnited States might fall into adversarial relations around the year 2040. Russia will once again
retreat and China will be unable to affect a skillful takeoff, which will usher in a period of
instability. Friedman posits that the 21st century rather than the 20th century will be the “Americanage,” and that it will be Japan that will initiate the regional resistance to American“super-hegemony.” In the 2020s there will be growing friction between a Japan that has grownassertive as a seafaring country (within a Friedmanesque worldview, this is a Japan that has
reverted back to its true form) and the United States. Then in the 2040s, Japan’s sphere of influenceand US interests will collide, and a coalition against Japan will take shape which will involve aSouth Korea and China that are concerned about the reemergence of Japan. “Japan will be
profoundly isolated,” and therefore Japan will once more walk down the path it has trodden before.
This is the scenario.iii
While this author is unaware of what sort of assessment Friedman’s predictions have been met
with, they do not feel all that realistic. This is because Friedman’s argument tries to apply
geopolitics in an overly mechanical manner to such an extent that an analysis of the collective
conscious wherein nations constitute the agents is given short shrift. What is more, Friedman’s
argument is founded upon the premise that postwar Japan’s diplomacy is nothing more than an“adaptive tool,” and that as long as it were to decide to change course it would not be all thatdifficult for it to do so. Rather, his argument is that there is no alternative for it but to do so whenpressed by geopolitical necessity. But is that really true? While the claim could be made thatstability was achieved in postwar Japan on account of its depersonalized political adhesion, this issimultaneously the main culprit that makes it extremely difficult for contemporary Japan to change
course. Nowadays this is often summed up as being “bureaucrat-driven politics,” and it is often
argued that just so long as this could be put to rest then “individuality (=politician-driven politics)”
could be restored. But when it is taken into consideration that this was the very system ofgovernment in Japan, then today’s political circumstances keenly denote that doing so will not bethat simple. If that were the case, then at present it would at the very least be considerably difficult
to envision a bold change of course in terms of security. In other words, assuming that some sort ofsignificant qualitative transformation could arise in Japan-US relations and the Japan-US alliance,then it would be appropriate to consider this as being due to some other factor rather than to any
clear intention on the Japanese side—or in other words, rather than Japan serving as the force forshaking up the status quo.

48

Specifically, what sort of latent factors are there? Naturally of course, issues like what bothcountries respectively perceive to be qualitative threats and of what sort, the manner in which they
consider ways of handling these, and how they conceptualize of one another’s roles within theprocess of handling these are all decisive factors. Frankly put, this comes down to what sort ofpresence these two countries go about acknowledging and accepting on the part of an emerging
China. Of course, that is not to imply that the structural changes in world politics are being caused
solely by the emergence of China. Nevertheless, it is hard to deny that the relative importance of
the China factor to the United States and Japan stands out. Of course, it is unavoidable that Japanand the United States will have different impressions when it comes to China, that is only natural.
Yet the greater the degree of divergence grows, the more difficult it will be to manage Japan-US
relations. This holds true regardless of whether it is the Japanese side that perceives of China as thegreater threat, or conversely whether it is the US side that adopts this perception. Furthermore,
China drawing excessively close to either Japan or the United States could also potentially serve asa destabilizing factor. In other words, in thinking about the prospects for Japan-US relations, it isessential to accurately determine where the two countries’ impressions of China overlap and where
they are out of alignment.
Another factor is the issue of both countries’ self-perceptions and the manner in which thesehave an effect on their respective external behavior. In terms of the United States, if the country
were to regard itself as a declining power (though the United States is not likely to acknowledge
this directly), then in what manner will the isolationism found at the base layer of its external
behavior manifest itself within this? This will also act as the foundation that shapes the UnitedStates’ impression of China. In the case of Japan, situations can be envisioned in which problems
like cross-purposes surrounding the base issue and accidents involving residents in the vicinity ofthe bases will trigger a sense of discomfort regarding the US presence. It is beyond dispute that
there is little in the way of strong politically determined anti-American sentiment in Japan. Yet
sentiments which could be described as an “anti-Americanism Lite” or “mild anti-Americanism”
rooted in a latent feeling of discomfort toward the US military presence have deeply taken root in
the postwar mental makeup of the Japanese people. This is because Japan has been resting on its
laurels when it comes to its postwar pacifism, and because it has sealed off debates concerning
security. Though these have been sealed deep down within its unconscious, they tend to rear theirhead at unexpected occasions when Japan is directly confronted with a clear crisis. To the UnitedStates, the Japan-US alliance is important as a security policy that extends out in a far-reaching49

manner, but it is nothing more than one extremity. To Japan, it serves as an entrance into and exitout of security issues. This asymmetry makes handling the Japan-US alliance difficult. Frankly put,the US side has an environment in which the Armitage Report, which is grounded in bipartisanconsensus, can be created, whereas Japan has not necessarily set in place an environment in which
this could be done. In actuality, it has already been about ten years since the first Armitage Reportand about four years since the second Armitage Report, but there has yet to be a genuine reply fromJapan that responds to these consensus reports on the US side. To be sure, debates and work on
initiatives for updating the alliance are somberly being advanced by experts at venues for managing
the alliance, but it would have to be said that national debate is absent concerning new
configurations for the Japan-US alliance for a new era.
Latent factors that have the potential to transform the Japan-US alliance will be inspected below,
and the paper will look toward the future of Japan-US relations. This will be done from theperspectives of the United States’ self-consciousness, its impressions of China, as well as Japan’s
self-consciousness. We will begin by taking a look from the US side.

2. Effects That a Transformation of the United States’ Self-Consciousness Would Have on
Japan-US Relations
The United States frequently describes the Japan-US alliance as the “cornerstone” of its East
Asian policy.iv In Washington politics, where everything is tinged with partisanship, the Japan-US
alliance is a policy issue that is underwritten by bipartisan consensus and serves as a constant(unchanging entity) in the United States’ East Asian policy. There are truly grounds for calling it a“cornerstone.” It is only by virtue of the fact that the United States has such a policy environmentthat the Armitage Report mentioned above is possible. But there are perceptible signs that thethinking concerning this alliance is changing in the United States, however incrementally. This is
not necessarily a shift in attitude that is specific to the Japan-US alliance. Rather, it is a change inattitude that is a response to international structural transformations. More specifically, signs ofthese changes are manifesting themselves in the policies set forth by the Obama Administration,
but they also represent bipartisan changes in the sense that they are a response to structuralchanges.
This is a change in attitude that has inevitably arisen as part of the United States’ process oftrying to affirm its position in the world that is newly manifesting itself at present. But what sort ofworld is this one that is newly manifesting itself? This is a world that is awash in problems that the50

United States cannot handle solely on its own, despite its ongoing predominance in a large numberof fields. Moreover, despite the fact that the United States has not suffered a downfall like theformer British Empire, the world of today is one in which other countries are rising to prominence.
So in this sense the world has seen a relative lowering of the United States’ status. This is the worldthat Fareed Zakaria termed the “post-American world.”v In such a world, discovering footings forjoint action will be conducive to the United States being able to fulfill its potential in the mostefficient and effective manner.
Such a worldview deviates drastically from the United States’ self-image as reigning supreme at
the peak of a network of alliances, which had been prominent during the first term of the G.W.
Bush Administration. Within the world that is newly emerging, coalitions for resolving issues on an
individual basis will be flexibly created. Secretary of State Clinton terms such a world thatcomprises combinations of numerous partners a “multi-partner world” (foreign policy speech at theCouncil on Foreign Relations on July 15, 2009).vi At the root of this recognition lies a problem
consciousness which states that the ability to respond to problems found in traditional
alliances—which are rigid, static, and dependent on bilateral relations—is unable to adequately
cope with these problems.
The concept of coalitions suited to problems is not dissimilar from the concept of the “coalitionof the willing” from the Bush era, but it has a facet which carries strong overtones as a values
coalition, and the significance of the coalition of the willing came into being in relations with thoseon the outside that did not join the coalition. However, in a multi-partner world, precedence isgiven to resolving problems instead. This change does not necessarily herald the United States’
sudden transformation into a multilateralist. It was explicitly chosen as a policy designed tomaximize the United States’ national interests in this new world amidst the ongoing change of theUnited States’ standing from what it once was. If this point is overlooked, then this change may
become fixed in place as a distinctive characteristic of the foreign policy of Obama’s Democratic
Party, but it is a change that has a much broader reach. Naturally, the nuances vary depending on
the Democratic Party or the Republican Party. Furthermore, it is apparent that the United States
would not venture to make claims to the effect that the role of alliances have declined in a relative
sense, as an example. In this sense, Japan-US relations will persistently continue to act as acornerstone. But as was pointed out at the outset of this paper, out of the set of problems newly
confronting the international community, the number that can be dealt with by the bilateralalliance’s ability for resolving and handling problems is on a downward trajectory. For this reason,51

we have already entered the era where simply establishing this bilateral alliance as the cornerstoneof peace and safety for the region will not adequately produce these.
In response to such changes, it is vital that instead of concluding alliances as bilateral alliances,these should take on notions of “alliance plus.” This would entail opening these up to andembedding them within a variety of multilateral initiatives. What is more, within the hub andspokes structure that is the architecture for bilateral alliances centered around the United States,
this calls for creating collaboration between the spokes, which have fallen behind in terms of
relationship building. In addition to conventional alliances, a diverse array of new security
frameworks is being constructed in a multi-tiered manner. These include the formation of alliancenetworks (Japan-US-Korea, Japan-US-Australia, Japan-US-India, etc.), regional frameworks
designed to resolve specific problems and prevent conflicts (Six-Party Talks and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation), ad hoc cooperation (cooperation for each problem area, including
anti-terrorism measures and anti-piracy measures), and so on. In the midst of all this, there will
come to be an ever greater need in the future to quickly discover optimal nodes that link thesevarying levels together, and for ideas that use these various different tools flexibly and seamlessly,
which are grounded in Japan-US relations.vii
But this United States is still the United States that we are well acquainted with. While its
self-image is being retouched in line with the realities of this “post-American world,” it is still
sufficiently ambitious, and still the United States that tries to resolve new security problems andproblems at the global scale by specifying regional partners and partners for each point ofcontention. The United States of 20 years down the road, however, may not necessarily continue toretain this self-image. Here we will consider two patterns. The first is the image of the “frugal
superpower” depicted by Michael Mandelbaum.viii This is a self-image drawn from a reality inwhich the United States will be forced to cut its national defense budget and curtail its external
commitments under a scenario in which the country has scant prospects of rectifying its financial
conditions. The National Security Strategy issued in 2010 also expressed the viewpoint that
economic conditions and financial conditions would restrict the United States’ security strategy toan appreciable degree.ix This does not necessarily imply that a superpower greater than the UnitedStates will emerge, but it does mean that the United States will be forced to act under significant
restraints and will out of necessity have to be more selective than it has been previously in its
diplomatic actions.
Mandelbaum himself suggests that, faced with such circumstances, the United States should act

52

in a counterintuitive way. His assertion is that post-Cold War America should rescind its focus on
the new security problems that it has been emphasizing and return to its “old commitments” basedon its alliances from the Cold War era.x Simply put, this is because Mandelbaum believes that thisconventional set of security problems has a direct bearing on the United States’ vital interests. As
an extra-regional superpower, the United States engages in “offshore balancing” of a sort that
ensures that each region does not fill with distrust over a power vacuum, with the exceptions of theemergence of China in Asia and Russia in Europe. This does not imply that the United States willcompletely back away from this, but it implies the formation of a new order, or rather thinking thatis responsive to circumstances and which bears regional stability in mind. What is being envisioned
here is not an order where precedence is given to values, but one which gives precedence tostability above all else; one where containing full-scale challenges to the United States is the issueof overriding concern. Furthermore, the United States will reach the conclusion that it ought toabandon the nation-building operations that the Clinton Administration explicitly pursued andwhich the G.W. Bush Administration involuntarily committed itself to. This posits that this will bebecause the United States will no longer be able to retain its staying power both in a financial sense,and later on in terms of its will. This thinking says that if this is the case, then the United Statesshould honor its old commitments and not engage in any unusual commitments amidst cries forthings like new security guarantees.
But in terms of the fact that this scenario highlights old commitments, its composition is not one
in which isolationist impulses nakedly rise to the forefront. It does preserve a limited
internationalism of sorts, though this is constrained. The United States would withdraw from tasks
such as developing collective organizations in East Asia, but it would also preserve minimum
security commitments. In this sense, the Japan-US alliance could conversely rise in relative
importance. The envisioned threat that would have to be contained here is the threat emanatingfrom China, but this alliance would not be one that is capable of responding to the new era, and its
functional roles would remain limited.
However, we must remain vigilant against the encroachment of the libertarian impulses
unleashed during the 2010 midterm elections into diplomatic and security areas. The Tea Party
movement houses a fairly simplistic form of isolationist impulses, while at the same time it also has
a dimension that stirs up extremely strong national sentiments. The power relationship between
these two vectors is such that while the first one is more powerful in terms of visceral feeling, thesecond is something that could easily be channeled into interventionist aggression if there was a53

clear threat to the United States. If such an impulse to return back into its cocoon is unleashed, thenthis would not at all be good news for the Japan-US alliance. American demands on Japan would
likely increase in the form of a more equitable bearing of responsibility. This would likely extend
to both financial commitments and military commitments. Furthermore, as part of this process,confidence in the Japan-US security alliance would be shaken on the Japanese side, which would
result in a power vacuum arising in East Asia at a psychological level and the destabilization of theregion. It would certainly not be all that difficult to throw such a state of affairs further into arrears.
It is not hard to envision that if certain countries were to continue acting in a manner that Japan
perceived to be a threat, but which the United States perceived to be just below the threshold of athreat, then this could potentially set Japan-US relations on a downward spiral.
There currently do not appear to be any circumstances in which new isolationist impulses would
sweep through US foreign policy. The new congress members elected with the backing of theenergy from the Tea Party movement have not attempted to incorporate any nakedly libertarian
impulses into the field of foreign policy. They have not done so out of a conceptual distinction
between domestic and foreign policy, but only because diplomatic and security issues have been
completely outside the scope of their interest thus far.xi Admittedly, proclaiming one’s isolationfrom the world is impossible in a pragmatic sense in this connected world, and for that reason thiswould amount to nothing more than empty rhetoric, but this impulse itself is a real thing. Perhaps
this is not unrelated to the fact that the United States has a latent premonition of its own relative
downfall for possibly the first time in history.

3. How Should China Be Objectified?
This premonition that the United States is declining can be regarded as something akin to aperiodic fever. To be sure, the United States is periodically gripped by this fever. This is because
the United States is a nation that was constructed artificially, and because quintessentially it is anation that is characterized by instability. Similarly, theories about its downfall were widespread
about 20 years ago at the exact moment when the US economy was faltering. It had taken on the
aspect of what could almost be called a downfall boom, as exemplified by works such as Allan
Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind (1987), Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the GreatPowers (1987) and Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s The Disuniting of America (1991). Later on, thecommunist bloc collapsed and Japan’s bubble economy burst, but the United States revived its own
economy by harnessing information technology (IT). By the middle of the 1990s it had grown54

increasingly self-confident in the advent of a unipolar era and began to exult in its superpower
status. Yet when viewed from a macroscopic perspective, this unipolar era only lasted for whatamounted to a brief flicker. The Iraq War entered a difficult phase and the way out of the war in
Afghanistan disappeared from view, while a relative sense of collapse crept deep within thenational psyche following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Zakaria’s
Post-American World and Mandelbaum’s The Frugal Superpower mentioned in this paper areemblematic of the atmosphere of this age. Other works such as Paul Starobin’s After America(2009) could also be included in addition to these.xii What is characteristic upon reading these istheir attempt to matter-of-factly accept the limitations imposed upon the United States. They
perceive this as a structural change, accept it in a fatalistic manner of sorts, and rather than resisting
it place the emphasis on how to maneuver skillfully within these circumstances. On this point they
diverge considerably from authors like the pessimistic Bloom and Schlesinger, who lament themental and civilizational decline of the United States.
Have the American people accepted their decline? No, that is certainly not the case. However,this current decline is not being regarded as an abstract thing, but rather as something that isextremely tangible. It is the rise of China that is imparting the United States’ relative decline withthis sense of tangibility. This is found in the following figures. According to a survey conducted by
the Pew Research Center in January 2011, 31% of people responded that they viewed the UnitedStates as the world’s greatest economic superpower, yet up to 47% of the people responded that it
was China.xiii While this response is far removed from the reality of the situation, if it is viewed as
an indicator expressing the sort of view that Americans take of the world, then such figures cannot
be ignored. Additionally, the latest report of Global Views, which is periodically released by the
Chicago Council on Global Affairs, was titled “Constrained Internationalism.” This clearly seems
to imply a state of affairs wherein the United States is attempting to adapt to the new reality, rather
than resisting its decline.xiv
The United States emerged on the stage of world history as a country that did nothing but rise to
greater prominence over the roughly 160 years since its founding, and experienced overwhelming
strength that no one else could rival for about 70 to 80 years after that. Just a little while ago theAmericans themselves were convinced of the durability of this unipolar world in which the UnitedStates sat at the top, but this conviction has already deserted the United States of today. This
American sense of decline is probably a subjective thing, but it is real at an intuitive level and has
the potential to powerfully constrain American action.

55

Thus far, America’s China policy has oftentimes been portrayed as vacillating between the twopoles of hedge or engage (or both). The United States has essentially selected its China policy
against this backdrop, and its basic thinking has been about how it can manage the course of
China’s rise. Recently, however, such thinking has taken a step backward in favor of ascertaining
the true China. There has come to be a clear awareness of the fact that the true China is an
emerging superpower already, no matter what actions the United States takes, and that thissuperpower is not as the United States portrays it. This is a standpoint that has already gone beyond
hedge or engage and which can accept a stance of “ascertain the true China and watch its
emergence (accept but prepare).” The two sides are by no means friendly nations, but they are notenemy nations either. The United States is fairly presenting matters that are of concern to itself
before China, and in this context its allies could be said to have grown in importance. On the other
hand, there is a situational awareness which sees this becoming a variable in what sort ofrelationship will be concluded between the United States, whose inclinations toward world politics
continues to decline in a relative sense, and China, which harbors uncertainties yet is neverthelessrising with overwhelming force.xv
Assuming for argument’s sake that the basic configuration of US-China relations were to takethis shape in the post-American world, then scrupulous attention will have to be paid to ensure that
this perception gap with Japan, where there is an intensifying crisis consciousness regarding
China’s rise, does not result in the destabilization of the Japan-US alliance. Though the American
public currently views China as an economic competitor, it does not necessarily see it as a military
threat. Conversely, Japan has a strong tendency to consider China’s rise as coming tied together
with a military threat. Over the coming 20 years the balance of power between the three countries
of Japan, the United States, and China will change significantly. This change will not necessarily
lead in a straight line to the destabilization of Japan-US relations, but due consideration should begiven to the fact that it has the latent potential to do so.

4. Can the Disjunction between Esoteric Canons and Open Knowledge Be Surmounted inJapan?xvi
Finally, Japan itself must naturally be discussed. Japan-US relations have been shaky since theinauguration of the administration of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in September 2009. The
cross-purposes between Japan and the United States surrounding the relocation of Marine Corps
Air Station Futenma was an indication of this turmoil. But nailing down the contours of the56

significance of this turmoil is extremely important in terms of thinking about future Japan-US
relations. The majority of this problem can certainly be blamed on the confused response of the
Hatoyama Administration (or rather on Prime Minister Hatoyama himself). There is no doubt thatthe mixed messages sent out by Prime Minister Hatoyama conveyed the wrong message to both
Japan and the United States, and especially to Okinawa. But was this “drift in the alliance” reallynothing more than “Hatoyama adrift”? While Prime Minister Hatoyama’s confused response wasdeliberately highlighted, the fact is that a certain coherence could be glimpsed behind it all. This isthat, while casting the Japan-US alliance as the cornerstone, he apparently regarded this as a hurdle
that Japan had to surmount. At the meeting of DPJ members of the two Houses of the Diet on June2, 2010, which served as his de facto resignation address, Prime Minister Hatoyama clearly stated,“At some point we must strive for the day when the Japanese people forge peace on their own, as I
do not think that we should continue to rely on the United States.”
The concept of “Japan’s unhealthy overdependence on the United States” was also apparent
within his Voice essay (from the September 2009 edition) which was published before theinauguration of his administration.xvii A summary version of this essay was uploaded to the New
York Times’ web edition, and it is famous for provoking anxiety in the United States over whether
Yukio Hatoyama was an anti-American politician. In the end, was Prime Minister Hatoyama ananti-American politician? Did the drift in Japan-US relations that occurred under his administration
originate solely from Prime Minister Hatoyama’s singular thinking toward the United States? Orrather, was Prime Minister Hatoyama’s view of the United States the latest manifestation of theinstability inherent to postwar Japan-US relations?
There is a public opinion poll that is frequently referenced any time that views are exchanged onJapan-US relations. This is a public opinion poll that has been carried out by the Cabinet Officesince 1978 which has asked a fixed question on respondents’ affinity toward the United States.xviii
This has at times slumped down to the 60% range as an exception, but it holds largely consistent in
the 70% range. Looking at this, there is certainly no mistake to the view that Japan-US relations are
considerably favorable and stable. However, these figures fail to capture a subtle nuance that isconcealed within Japan-US relations. To be sure, there is little in the way of politically determinedanti-American sentiment in Japan. Nationwide anti-base struggles rooted in anti-American
sentiment are likewise absent. However, this public opinion poll overlooks the “anti-Americanism
Lite” (or anti-American mood) that is surprisingly widespread.
In postwar Japan there have been severely strained ties between an idealistic pacifism and the57government’s realistic choice in the form of the Japan-US security alliance. Postwar Japan sealed
off the Japan-US security alliance as an esoteric canon without having adequately verbalized thelogic underwriting it. On the other hand, there is the fiction that claims that it was an aspiration forpeace alone that sustained postwar Japan’s peaceful reconstruction. There was an inherent
contortion in the uneasy coexistence of these two schools, which found its expression in“anti-Americanism Lite.” In other words, when this latter notion, which has been elevated to thestatus of a civil gospel in postwar Japan, and the realities of the esoteric canons of the Japan-US
security alliance came into conflict with one another, it manifested itself as a simplistic yet real
sense of discomfort. It was enough to make one blurt out, “Why does the sovereign nation of Japan
have bases of foreign troops? It must be because Japan still has not yet freed itself from its
occupation.” Nevertheless, it could be concluded that these esoteric canons have the potential tointrinsically repudiate the view of peace found in this civil gospel, which is akin to apre-established harmony.
The protagonist in this popular gospel of peace driven by this aspiration is not the “state,” butrather it must be the “people.” There is little wonder then that Prime Minister Hatoyama kicked off
a debate about the Japan-US security alliance from the grief of the residents of Okinawa Prefecture.
Ordinarily, it is rare for this “anti-Americanism Lite” to manifest itself as political sentiment, andso it tends not to reach those who manage the alliance. Yet it is also true that such sentiments lie inthe undercurrent beneath postwar Japan-US relations, and it was this that Prime Minister Hatoyama
unleashed unknowingly (or irresponsibly), so to speak. But when faced with the overwhelming
reality of the Japan-US alliance, this notion once again crawled back inside its cocoon.
When considered in this light, Prime Minister Hatoyama symbolized the inherent contortion in
postwar Japan that has not verbalized. This “anti-Americanism Lite” will by no means simply
vanish along with Prime Minister Hatoyama’s resignation. Since the Liberal Democratic Party(LDP) has fairly consistently been the ruling party since the end of the war, they have sealed off
debate concerning security as esoteric canons. Leaving aside whether this was the correct thing to
do or not, this potential state of affairs has persisted for a long time. But assuming that changes ofpolitical administrations will become part of the everyday landscape in Japan in the future, it will
be necessary to overcome this disjunction between esoteric canons and open knowledge. It will
also be essential to actualize the Japan-US security alliance through the term security, and to forge
a “security consensus” that does not waver with the change of political administrations. Of course,
this security consensus must not be something that precludes policy modifications and revisions

58

due to the change of political administrations. Moreover, it is not realistic to consign the concrete
management of security policy to sophisticated, expert knowledge, while also conducting national
debates over its every last detail. Therefore, it will be essential to create some sort of intellectually
elite circle. If the term “elite” is inappropriate, then perhaps this should be replaced with the phrase“foreign affairs and security establishment.” But this elite circle must be open and must not consistof wardens who guard over esoteric canons like those seen thus far. They must also discuss thisconsensus in a language that the general public can understand. This establishment should comprisesecurity-conscious politicians and experts across political party lines. Unless such a “security
culture” is established, the sustainability of the alliance could be jeopardized. When viewed in thislight, the greatest challenges to the alliance are actually internal factors, more so than the rise of
China and the United States’ changing self-consciousness. It will become apparent that the greatest
question for Japan is how it should go about facing up to this alliance.

i

The Tokyo Foundation and the Center for a New American Security, Renewing Old Promises
and Exploring New Frontiers: The Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Liberal International Order(October 27, 2010).
ii
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, INSS Special Report: The
United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership (October 11, 2010), pp. 3-4.
iii
George Friedman, The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century (New York: Doubleday,
2009), pp. 139-144.
iv
Gerald Curtis, Future Directions in US-Japan Relations, Background Paper Prepared for New
Shimoda Conference organized by Japan Center for International Exchange, February 2011.
<http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/newshimoda/CurtisFinalE.pdf>. February 20, 2011.
v
Fareed Zakaria, Post-American World (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008).
vi
Hillary Clinton, Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations, July 15, 2009.
< http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm>. February 14, 2011.
vii
See The Tokyo Foundation, Asia-Pacific Security Architecture: Tiered Structure of Regional
Security (August 2010) with regard to the multi-tiered development of security frameworks.
viii
Michael Mandelbaum, The Frugal Superpower: America's Global Leadership in a
Cash-Strapped Era (New York: Public Affairs, 2010).
ix
The White House, National Security Strategy, (May 2010).
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf>.
February15, 2011.
x
Michael Mandelbaum, “In an Era of Tightening Budgets, can America Remain a Superpower on
the Cheap?,” The Washington Post, (February, 17, 2011).
xi
See Walter Russell Mead, “The Tea Party and American Foreign Policy: What Populism Meansfor Globalism,” Foreign Affairs (March/April, 2011) with regard to the diplomatic implications of
the rise of the Tea Party movement.
xii
Paul Starobin, After America: Narratives for Next Global Age (New York: Viking, 2009).
xiii
Conversely, 67% of the people still view the United States as superior militarily, which vastly
outstrips the 16% who view China as superior in this regard. Pew Research Center, Strengthen Ties
with China, but Get Tough on Trade, (January 21, 2011). < http://people-press.org/report/692/>.

59

February 15, 2011.
xiv
Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Global Views – 2010 Constrained Internationalism:
Adapting to New Realities, 2010.
<http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/POS%202010/Global%20Views%202010.pdf>. February 15, 2011.
xv
Toshihiro Nakayama, “US-China relations in the ‘post-American world,” [In Japanese.] Dong-a
Ilbo No. 525 (March 2011), pages 2-3.
xvi
This passage is a revision and reworking of Postwar Japan and ‘Anti-Americanism Lite,’ which
was uploaded to the homepage of the English-Speaking Union of Japan<http://www.esuj.gr.jp/jitow/eng/contents/0296.htm >. February 20, 2011.
xvii
Yukio Hatoyama, “My Political Philosophy,” Voice (September 2009).
xviii
Public Relations Office, Minister for the Cabinet Office, Public opinion poll on foreign affairs.
[In Japanese.] (Poll from October 2009) <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h21/h21-gaiko/index.html>. February 20, 2011.

60

Chapter 4
Traditional Security
Narushige Michishita

1. Developments in The Past
(1) The Role and Comparative Advantage of Japan during the Cold War Period
Regarding the security of Japan during the Cold War period, we often hear arguments thatJapan had been under the wing of the United States and played all but no security role. In fact,
however, Japan within the Western camp had played a part in its world strategy to contain thecommunist bloc. More specifically, as the Soviet Union reinforced its “sea denial capabilities”
during the Cold War period, Japan, based on the joint strategy with the United States, had therole of blockade of the three straits (Soya Straits, Tsugaru Straits and Tsushima Straits) and sea
lane defense in times of emergency to deal with the Soviet capabilities, and strengthened andconducted exercises in its antisubmarine warfare (ASW), sea-based air defense and mine warfare
capabilities.

(2) The Role and Comparative Advantage of Japan after the Cold War Period
After the anti-Soviet maritime strategy came to a close after the Cold War, the United Statescame to expect Japan to assume a new security role. In response, Japan enacted the Act on
Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other Operations in 1991 anddispatched a minesweeping mission to the Persian Gulf after the Gulf War, and also sent
Ground-Self Defense Force (GSDF) units to Cambodia, East Timor, Mozambique, Rwanda, theGolan Heights and other areas by actively administering the Act Concerning the Dispatch ofJapan Disaster Relief Teams in order to contribute to solving low-intensity problems theinternational community was confronted with after the Cold War, such as civil war andhumanitarian crises. Further, in order to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan
following the synchronized terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Japan’s
Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) conducted refueling activities for US-led coalition vessels
in the Indian Ocean for about eight years until January 2010, and Japan also dispatched GSDF

61

and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) units to Iraq from 2004 to engage in operations to support
the country’s reconstruction (until July 2006 for the GSDF and until December 2008 for theASDF).
Since the contents of operations in these global activities are limited under constitutional
constraints, the comparative advantage of Japan’s military capabilities still lies in the maritime
strategy as undertaken during the Cold War period. As the concept of the so-called“anti-access/area denial capabilities” that China is currently boosting is almost identical to thesea denial capabilities of the Soviet Union during the Cold War period, the likelihood that thestrategy Japan and the United States adopted in the Cold War period will become useful again is
growing. In that case, Japan is highly likely to have the role of deterring the Chinese Navy’s
advances on the ocean, such as blocking the Chinese Navy’s activities around Taiwan and theSouthwest Islands.

2. Security Threats in the International Community through 2030
(1) Characteristics of the New International Order from the Security Perspective
Pluralistic International Order: In the international society up through 2030, as the strength of
the United States is expected to decline relatively and such countries as China, India, Brazil andIndonesia are expected to rise as big powers, a multipolar, pluralistic order will likely develop to
replace the US-led world order centering on Western civilization. Under the likely new order, theUnited States and China will be the central players, but that will not lead to the bipolar systemseen during the Cold War period. The United States and China may have conflicts but still haverelations to enable their cooperation, and depending on problems, Russia, Brazil, India,
Indonesia and the European Union (EU) will likely enter the scene to oppose or cooperate withthem to drive the international society. While the extent of the presence and influence Japan may
have under such a new order remains to be seen at the moment, Japan’s international presence
will at least likely continue to decline as long as the present trends of the falling birthrate andaging population and the decline of the Japanese economy (industry) amid the globalization of
the world economy continue and its defense capabilities remain under the budgetary constraints
of no more than 1% of gross domestic product (GDP). Under the new multipolar, pluralistic
order, unlike the post-Cold War international society where the United States, the only
superpower, assumed the role of the world’s police, major powers including emerging countries
mentioned above will likely act collectively as the police by forming a loose alignment

62

depending on problems such as terrorism, narcotics and piracy.
Further Emergence of Diverse Actors: States were main actors in the international society until
the 20th century. Going forward, however, multinational corporations, non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) and crime syndicates including terrorist groups that operate across borders
are expected to have increasingly significant influences over the international society as a whole.
State monopoly over military power or police power is also beginning to crumble amid thegrowth of private-sector military companies or security contractors. The tendency will likely
grow stronger to make use of the strength of these private-sector companies in order to maintainthe peace and stability of the international society.
Progress in the Interdependence Relationship: Already in the present international society,countries have a relationship of mutual military and economic interdependence, and thisrelationship is expected to grow even stronger in the international society up through 2030. Thus,
domestic troubles in a single country will likely have a greater-than-ever impact on the security
and economic conditions of the international society as a whole.

(2) Security Threats to the International Society under the New International Order(a) Ever More Active Global Crime Organizations (Including Terrorist Groups) andExistence of Failed States
In the world that is being globalized rapidly, cheaper costs of moving around andtransportation and cheaper means of information transmission as well as freer flows of funds
have occasionally generated new employment opportunities and improved people’s lives but at
the same time caused the poverty of people who do not benefit from them to become entrenched
to expand income gaps and created an environment prone to spawn terrorists, and also mademovements of and communication between terrorists easier. Going forward, the likelihood ofacts of terrorism being committed by minority extremist groups demanding secession and/or
self-governing rights or forces seeking to accomplish religious objectives through terrorism is
expected to increase. On the other hand, the advancement of science and technology(communication technology in particular) is the two-edged blade for globally active terroristgroups, because the enhancement of investigative techniques to detect terrorist groups has madeit difficult to keep communications within terrorist organizations secret. The bigger the size of aterrorist group, the more difficult it becomes to maintain the secrecy of communications.
In addition, the prospect of actors becoming more diverse in the international society going63

forward does not necessarily mean the role of the state in security will diminish. As majorcountries in the international society cooperate to maintain peace or crack down on criminalorganizations that operate across borders, it will become very important for these countries tostrive more than ever for responsible governance in their respective areas and strengthen theirsurveillance over globally active criminal organizations. Nevertheless, in the internationalsociety today, the number of failed states without such capabilities is increasing and is likely toincrease further going forward. Failed states are states where, as seen in Afghanistan under
Taliban rule, criminal organizations with global threats are provided support within theboundaries of the state, organizations not represented in the government have effective control
over part of the boundaries of the state, or popular anti-government demonstrations cause
protracted confusion in domestic affairs, all of which pose threats to the international society as awhole. Such threats are real particularly in the globalized world. In these cases, it becomes
necessary for major countries to help stabilize the security situation by occasionally resorting tomilitary force or to build up a system of international support for failed states. The kind of
support that is important in doing so is state-building, not simple development assistance. If
failed states do not acknowledge that they are such states or the UN Security Council cannot
recognize the influence of the “threat to international peace and security” that such failed statespose over neighboring countries and the international society as a whole, concerned countries
may have no choice but to form a coalition of the willing to intervene for state-building support.
In that case, under the future pluralistic international order, major countries are likely to havedeep rifts over the interpretation of such intervention. Unless an adequate international legal
framework is put in place (for example, reducing the veto power by modifying the role ofpermanent members of the UN Security Council), the international society will likely find itself
in greater confusion than before.

(b) Traditional Conflicts and Power Struggles among States
While some people see the reduced probability of conflicts between states as states reinforce
relationships of interdependence under the future international order in the globalized world, it
may not necessarily be the case. If we assume the following cases, conflicts between states may
instead increase.
Firstly, even between two countries that are mutually interdependent, if one country’s politicaland economic dependence on the other country can be replaced with dependence on a third64

country (for example, if Country A is not put to any disadvantage by establishing the same
economic relations with Country C as those with Country B), the interdependent relationshipbetween the first two countries does not deter conflicts between them.
Under the pluralistic international order, it is also conceivable that conflict deterrence does not
function as a result of multiple major countries mutually obtruding the role of mediator or police
for deterring conflicts that has been played thus far by the United States.
Furthermore, with the progress in globalization and informatization in the international society,it will become easier than ever for people to access information or transmit information. As theirconsequence, as seen in recent anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, public dissatisfaction andnationalist sentiment are likely to intensify and these pressures may make it difficult forgovernments to implement policies in a reasonable and calm manner. It is also likely that
religious forces and extremist groups of ethnic minorities clamoring for self-determination can
incite people more easily than before using the Internet.
At the same time, risks still exist of conflicts occurring over the demarcation of national
borders or economic interests as before. For example, despite the lapse of some 30 years since
the adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 (which took effect in 1994),
there exist no clear rules about the demarcation of exclusive economic zones, and the possibility
cannot be entirely excluded that there may be clashes over resources and other conflicts
occurring frequently over the management of biological resources discovered on the deep seabedsince then or management of rare earth and other new scarce resources that exist only in certain
locations in the world.

(c) Increase in Invisible Wars/Conflicts with Command of Science and Technology
In addition to the traditional threat of hardware (military power and acts of terrorism), thethreat of software such as cyber attacks and electronic warfare is also likely to increase. Many
countries have already established specialized sections to deal with these threats, and Japan’s
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is no exception. To date, while there have been apparent cases of theinvolvement of some countries or the military in cyber attacks and similar actions, nogovernments of implicated countries have ever acknowledged their involvement. But it would be
no exaggeration to say that the possibility of cyber attacks and electronic warfare occurring
between states is only a matter of time. What countermeasures are authorized under internationallaw are not clear at present when a country hit by a cyber attack with state involvement invokes

65the right of self-defense, and this state of uncertainty will likely continue for some time to come.
More specifically, it has been generally believed that the exercise of the right of self-defense
needs to satisfy the following three requirements: (1) there is an imminent and unjust invasion;(2) there is no other means available; and (3) an act of self-defense is kept to a necessary limit(equal in intensity to the damage caused by the initial attack). In the case of a threat of software
as mentioned above, it is extremely difficult to make a judgment over whether the use of militaryforce can be authorized as a countermeasure and even when the use of military force isauthorized, how to determine the limit set under (3).
Moreover, even in times of peace, the trend of using cyber warfare and psychological warfare
through information manipulation as well as using the influence or coercion/compulsion basedon the strength of military power as a means to conduct negotiations among countries at anadvantage or win in global economic competition is expected to intensify internationally.

(d) Proliferation (Including Proliferation to Terrorist Groups and Other Non-State Entities)of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Related Materials and Technologies (Including
Missiles)Weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, are expected to further spreadhorizontally in the international society over the coming 20 years as the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) system for the prevention of nuclear proliferation has effectively
collapsed while traditional nuclear-weapon states are continuing to move toward nuclear
disarmament. In particular, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and othercountries in the Middle East may commence the development of nuclear weapons, raising the
likelihood of a nuclear “domino” and making nuclear war in the Middle East a real possibility.
The possibility is also rising very high of vertical nuclear proliferation, meaning the acquisitionof nuclear weapons by terrorist groups and other non-state entities. In particular, prospects for theconcomitant existence of nuclear-weapon states in an unstable region from the Middle East to
India and for the further international spread of commercial utilization of nuclear energy,
including nuclear power generation, are expected to make it increasingly easier for non-state
entities to obtain nuclear weapons and nuclear-related materials. Under these circumstances,some expect that terrorist attacks using nuclear weapons are only a matter of time.

66

(e) Alteration in the International Order with the Rise of China (Shift in the Power
Balance)
Since the 1990s, China has been modernizing its military force rapidly. China’s defense
spending, based on announced amounts alone, has been continuing its two-digit growth, and the
US Defense Department estimates that China’s actual defense budgets are two or three times
bigger than the announced amounts. Looking more specifically, China has already deployed
operational new intercontinental ballistic missiles (Dong Feng (DF)-31A) and road-mobile
solid-fuel missiles that bring within range any location in the continental United States, and has
also been making repeated tests for the operational deployment of submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (JL-2 with a range of 8,000 km) to be mounted on the latest Strategic Submarine
Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN) Jin-class nuclear-powered submarines. These weapons are expected tofurther enhance China’s strategic offensive capabilities. In particular, the operational deployment
of Jin-class nuclear submarines carrying JL-2 missiles will have the extremely important
implication in China’s nuclear strategy that China does have strategic nuclear submarines for the
first time and has enhanced its nuclear deterrent by being capable of enduring the first nuclear
attack by an enemy and by securing the highly residual second strike capability. Through further
efforts going forward to enhance the quietness to make enemy surveillance more difficult and torealize warhead reduction, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) andlonger ranges, it is believed that will acquire a powerful deterrent against the United States in thenear future, regardless of whether or not China’s strategic offensive capabilities will match thoseof the United States.
China is also reinforcing its anti-access/area denial capabilities through construction of aircraft
carriers, development of antiship ballistic missiles, reinforcement of short-range ballistic missiles,
preparations to mount high-performance cruise missiles that are hard to detect by enemy radars
and are capable of pinpoint assaults on submarines, and the deployment of destroyers andsubmarines. The immediate objective of these efforts is to deter US intervention in times of
emergency in the Taiwan Strait, but over the longer term, it is believed that China will aim at
preventing US interference in the formation of a regional order that will buttress China’s interests.
While the concept is similar to the sea denial capabilities the Soviet Union tried to reinforce
during the Cold War period, China is seen to be expanding its anti-access/area denial capabilities
beyond land, sea and air defense to cover outer space and cyber space as well.
Furthermore, if China proceeds with the military modernization at the current pace, the67

military balance in the Taiwan Strait is expected to continue to shift in China’s favor, raising thepossibility of the annexation of Taiwan by China with military force actually happening in thelong term through 2030.
As seen above, the military power balance between the United States and China will inevitably
shift in the international situation through 2030. Already, China is actively engaged insaber-rattling on the back of its military might in the South China Sea and the East China Sea,and this will likely add to already increasing destabilizing factors in Asia. In particular, it isconceivable that China will take advantage of its growing naval power to take action to try toalter international practices built up to date under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

(f) The North Korea Situation and the Possibility of Unification of the Korean Peninsula
Regarding North Korea’s nuclear development program, we should assume that Pyongyang
already has enough plutonium to enable it to build 4 to 8 nuclear bombs and that it is all but
impossible to achieve the country’s complete denuclearization as long as the current regime
remains in power. If North Korea continues with its nuclear missile development over the next
20 years or so, it is highly likely that it will become able to mount nuclear weapons not only on
Rodong missiles that bring almost the whole of Japan within range but also on long-range
missiles currently under development with a range of 8,000 km or more to reach the continental
United States. While the possibility of the collapse of the North Korean regime is certainly notnil, at a time when the strategic importance of North Korea located at the exit to the Sea of Japanis increasing through China’s efforts to strengthen its anti-access/area denial capabilities, China
is expected to continue providing support to prevent North Korea’s collapse. Thus, it would be
realistic to expect the North Korean regime to continue under Kim Jong Un even after the demiseof Kim Jong Il barring unforeseeable disturbing elements. However, in preparation for an
emergency, Japan needs as before to have plans in place for emergency responses, includingtransportation of Japanese nationals residing in the Korean Peninsula and management of nuclear
weapons and related materials and facilities.
While South Korea, under President Lee Myung-bak, is currently considering a plan forpeaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula, the recent opinion poll results indicate that South
Koreans do not want to see the reunification in the next 20 to 30 years. Thus, we can probably
say at the moment it is not highly likely that the reunification will be realized in the future up
through 2030.

68

The above comments are based entirely on the trends in the international situation currently
observed, and it cannot be entirely ruled out that a totally unexpected situation may emerge as aresult of an unpredictable turn of events or the present trends evolve much faster than the presently
foreseeable pace. For instance, in the 1980s, nobody could predict with high accuracy that China
would become the world’s second largest economy in 2010. Similarly, a currently middle-standing
development country (Iran, for example) may by 2030 become one of the military powers to
confront the United States and China. Having said that, given that any country has to decide on
future policies on the basis of future prospects at the present time, putting such future prospects
into shape is still of great significance.

3. Specific Measures Japan Should Take
(1) Consolidation of the Japan-US Alliance and Strengthening of Japan’s Defense
Capabilities
In Asia that has so far relied on the overwhelming military strength of the United States, therelative waning of US military power could spawn a power vacuum. It is also possible that theUnited States can no longer remain committed to the security of Japan. If Japan continues todepend on the United States for its security under such circumstances, not only would Japan not
be able to maintain its security but also East Asia as a whole might become unstable and a neworder in Asia might be formed rapidly with China making use of its hegemony. Thus, in order tofill such a power vacuum, it is a matter of urgency to strengthen the Japan-US alliance withJapan expanding its role in that alliance.
To that end, Japan needs first to strengthen its own defense capabilities to build a more
self-sustaining defense system. More specifically, it is necessary to strengthen the Self-Defense
Forces (SDF) to hold its various functions in a well-balanced manner. At the same time, it isnecessary to conduct comprehensive discussions over the short and medium term of the next 10
years or so to examine a variety of constraints developed in the postwar period, including Article
9 of the Japanese Constitution (including the non-use of the right of collective self-defense) andthe three non-nuclear principles. Japan also needs to develop general law to allow the rapid
deployment of SDF units overseas in times of crisis.
After taking these steps, it is necessary for Japan to assume several conceivable scenarios for
emergency situations in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait crisis and adequately
confirm the cooperation and division of roles among Japan, the United States and South Korea in69

each of such events. From the perspective of Japan and the United States jointly dealing with athreat from China, it is necessary at the same time to maintain and strengthen the antisubmarine
warfare (ASW), sea-based air defense and mine warfare capabilities, as discussed at the outset of
this paper.

(2) Cooperation with Regional Partners and Development of the Security Architecture
In order to deal with the threat from China and destabilization of Asia in the wake of the shift
in the power balance between the United States and China, the strengthening of the Japan-US
security alliance described above is not enough. Therefore, it is important for key countries in
Asia, led by the United States, to develop and institutionalize a hedging network against China to
contain its intentions to seek hegemony in Asia. Candidates for such key countries in Asia
include Japan, Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Korea. For example, Vietnam has
already expressed its strong interest in boosting cooperation with US forces, while India andIndonesia can be expected to strengthen their naval and air powers as a strategic counterbalanceagainst China. Russia already has capabilities to serve as a deterrent against China, and South
Korea is currently building a base for US forces stationed in South Korea in an area facing the
Yellow Sea and this, if developed so as to plug in the Japan-US alliance, can be expected toprovide part of potent hedging network against China.
It is desirable for this sort of the hedging network against China to be transformed in the futureand serve as the foundation of the regional security architecture as the de facto collective security
system by component countries, creating a situation wherein China has no choice but toparticipate. If such a collective security system is realized, the stabilization of Asia, borne to dateby the Japan-US alliance backed by the overwhelming military power of the United States, is tobe taken over by the regional architecture, opening the possibility of US military bases being
dispersed throughout the region to a certain extent.

(3) Strengthening of Sea-Lane Defense
In the international society with progressing globalization through 2030, it is absolutely
imperative to continue to secure the freedom of navigation through the defense of sea lanes fromthe perspectives of global economic stability and stable supply of resources. While the sea-lane
defense has been given importance until now mainly from the perspective of stable supply of
crude oil, amid the expected spread of environmental energy going forward, the defense of sea

70

lanes is to be designed for the stable transportation of a broader scope of goods and theimportance of sea-lane defense will likely be recognized more than ever in an internationalsociety that becomes increasingly interdependent.
While the United States is currently exerting various efforts to raise its self-sufficiency ratio
for energy in the face of abnormally high prices of crude oil in recent years and is officiallyarguing that the freedom of navigation is a common global interest, it may still actually weakenits commitment to guaranteeing the freedom of navigation in a global commons. It is importantfor Japan on its part to strengthen support for groups that advocate the importance of the freedomof navigation in the United States and at the same time to make more active contributions to thedefense of sea lanes together with other countries in the region.

(4) Response to Military and Diplomatic Competition (Including Cyber Warfare) in
Peacetime
In the international society going forward, diplomatic pressures that do not involve the use of
military power but still draw on the strength of that military power may be used frequently ingray zones between times of emergency and peace. This is nothing illegal as the military powerin the first place is the means of conducting diplomacy advantageously. However, if Japan resorts
to countermeasures on the strength of the SDF, it could give rise to a controversy over the “threatof force” banned by Article 9 of the Constitution. Under such circumstances, it is necessary forJapan to clarify the legal interpretation, including the confirmation that such countermeasures do
not constitute a threat of force, and to develop a manual for responses and conduct simulations,training and exercises on a routine basis in order to possess military and diplomatic capabilities
to take such countermeasures with agility. The “National Defense Program Guidelines for
FY2011 and beyond,” announced in December 2010, states that “…To this end, the Government
will examine the functions and systems related to its decision-making and response, throughinitiatives such as regular simulation exercises of various contingencies and comprehensive
training and exercises, and consider necessary policies, including legal measures,” (IV. 1(2)),
making it necessary to conduct comprehensive and exhaustive examinations with theparticipation of experts in a wide range of fields, including military, diplomacy, law andeconomics.
In particular, it is important to have consultations promptly with other major countries overwhat countermeasures will be authorized under international law to respond to new sorts of71

threats such as acts of terrorism and cyber attacks by non-state entities under the instructions of acertain state (for example, a highly probable case where a certain state disguised as a hacker
launches an attack to paralyze Japan’s economic infrastructure).

(5) Strengthening of Crackdown on Terrorist Organizations (Criminal Organizations)
The possibility cannot be excluded of Japan, one of the advanced democracies, becoming thetarget of attacks by terrorist groups. It is necessary to continue to bolster security to block theentry of terrorists into the territory of Japan and prevent nuclear-related materials in Japan fromfalling into the hands of terrorist organizations. It is also very important for Japan to actively
contribute to the crackdown on and eradication of terrorism by the international community sincesuch efforts are ultimately conducive to the security of Japan. Specifically, as the use of militaryforce against leaders of terrorist organizations remains a necessity, it is necessary for Japan todevise legal measures to enable the participation of SDF units in related operations. Japan is also
required to strengthen the intelligence system for the collection of information overseas on
activities of terrorist organizations, share with other countries its knowledge about andexperiences in the management of nuclear-related materials in developing countries (for example,
radioactive waste generated in association with the commercial use of nuclear energy) andreinforce support for state-building of failed states where terrorist organizations are operating.

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Chapter 5
Japan and the Environment
Yasuko Kameyama

Introduction
Since the beginning of its existence, humankind has built up a sophisticated civilization at a
rapid speed not seen among other living things. Our everyday life today is underpinned by thissophisticated civilization. And we have consumed a massive quantity of diverse resources on theearth in order to build and maintain this sophisticated civilization. The simultaneous increase in the
population and per capita consumption of resources have led to a visible transformation of theplanet. The degradation that can be clearly seen make it obvious that it is no longer possible torestore the planet to its original state.
Several decades have already lapsed since we came to recognize the environmental problem as
an international issue, and its importance has been increasing more than ever. This paper isintended to consider Japan’s diplomatic strategy to address the environmental problem as one
international issue. First, we discuss how Japan has responded to the environmental problem aswell as environment-related developments in other countries. Next, we focus on climate change(global warming), which is recognized as being of particular importance among global
environmental problems, and we project how things will develop in light of the situation in recent
years. Lastly, we propose a strategy that Japan should follow in the global environment.

1. History of Japan’s Environmental Administration and International Trends(1) Japan’s Environmental Administration Began with Dealing with Pollution
The history of Japan’s environmental administration dates back to the period of high economic
growth immediately after the Second World War.i While rapid industrialization in the 1950s to
1960s contributed to the postwar reconstruction, it gave rise to pollution problems in many areas.
Air pollution and water contamination themselves were not seen as problems, but rather tolerated
as inevitable for economic growth. However, as health hazards such as the Minamata disease andthe Yokkaichi asthma became highly visible, affected areas began to call for measures to deal with73

them.ii
With movements finally being seen at the state level on antipollution measures, the Basic Act forEnvironmental Pollution Control, which can be described as the launching platform of Japan’senvironmental administration, was enacted in 1967, followed by the enactment or revisions of 14
laws related to antipollution measures in 1970. Then, the Environmental Agency was inaugurated
in 1971, and the Nature Conservation Act was enacted in 1972.
In Japan, as seen above, the environmental administration has developed from measures to copewith pollution, but other countries have not necessarily followed a similar course ofdevelopments.iii In the United Kingdom, for example, the National Trust movement to preserve
nature from environmental destruction caused by industrialization was the origin of the country’s
environmental administration.iv Predecessors of government ministries and agencies responsible
for environmental administration and the perception of people who have witnessed thedevelopment of environmental administration can influence national governments’ decision making
on current environmental problems.
In Japan, environmental measures made progress with the enforcement of relevant laws in the
1970s. The oil crises in 1973 and 1979 resulted in sharp rises in oil prices, which provided
momentum for energy-saving measures. As a consequence, most of the antipollution measuresturned a corner by the 1980s.
In the latter half of the 1980s, when domestic antipollution measures all but ran their course inJapan, we began to see a glimpse of the next challenges. One of them was the global environmental
problem as an international issue. Problems that cannot be solved with domestic measures alonecame to the fore, including ozone layer depletion and acid rain. The 1980s happened to coincidewith Japan’s assumption of the position as a global economic power, and deforestation by Japanesecompanies in developing countries became the target of criticisms by environmental protectiongroups. As an economic power, Japan was called upon to take on a pioneering role in dealing withinternational issues. Domestically, environmental problems in dimensions different from pollution
came to the fore. They include waste disposal and conservation of satoyama (undeveloped natural
woodland) near populated areas, which are problems that may not pose health hazards as serious as
those caused by pollution but could still have negative effects on some of life’s basic comforts. In
order to deal with these new challenges, the Environmental Basic Act was enacted in 1993 as a
successor law to the Basic Act for Environmental Pollution Control. In 2000, the Basic Act for
Establishing a Sound Material-Cycle Society was enacted to deal with waste disposal.

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(2) International Developments concerning the Environmental Problem
Japan was not the only country that needed to develop antipollution measures in the 1950s and1960s. Immediate action was also required in Europe and the United States as a result of harmful
air pollution from coal burning and health effects of soil contamination. Meanwhile, many
developing countries experienced a rapid growth of population after the Second World War. The
combination of pollution and massive consumption of natural resources in industrial nations andthe population growth in developing countries has brought about the exorbitant load of humanactivities on the earth.v The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm
in 1972 was driven by the sense of crisis mainly of industrial nations. But developing countries
were mostly reluctant to take part in discussions that could prove to be a constraint on theireconomic growth in the future.
The term “sustainable development” began to be used in the 1980s as the concept designed forthe simultaneous pursuit of environmental preservation and economic growth vi . Sustainable
development, which seeks ways to preserve nature and utilize it over the long term with therecognition that destruction of the environment would ultimately hamper economic development,
was used as the keyword at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) heldin Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Since then, the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) has
been meeting at the pace of once a year. Treaties and other official documents related to the global
environment came into being in 1992, including the Framework Convention on Climate Change,
the Biodiversity Treaty and the Statement of Forest Principles. We can say that since 1992, theenvironmental problem has been officially positioned as an international issue. Not only in Japanbut also in many other countries, government ministries and agencies responsible for foreign affairs
have become actively involved in environmental problems, and they have come to regard responses
to environmental problems as part of their foreign policies.
In 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg Earth Summit) was heldin commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro to review the progresssince the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. But the degradation of the global
environment still continues unabated, requiring redoubled efforts going forward.vii(3) The Environmental Problem as Part of Foreign Policy
While domestic environmental problems in Japan began with pollution more closely related toindustry and the economy; internationally, environmental policy has developed with conservation75

of the ecosystem running in parallel with antipollution measures. Under the concept of sustainable
development, not a few developing countries participate in the discussions for the purpose of
seeking financial or technical assistance under the pretext of environmental preservation. From theperspective of economic problems or support for developing countries, the adjustment of relativebalances with counterparties is important in negotiations. From the perspective of conservation of
the ecosystem, on the other hand, an important point of consideration is the total amount of impact
we and counterparties could together bring about on the ecosystem, rather than the adjustment ofrelative balances with counterparties.
There is little room for diplomatic elements in environmental problems that can be solved
technologically. In cases where the relative power relationship with other countries is an importantfactor, however, the perspective of foreign policy becomes necessary. What does the other party
want? What should we do to persuade the other party? The global environment issue moves toward
resolution only when both parties are convinced.viii

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Table Trends in the International Community Regarding the Future Environmental Policy and Global
Environment
Year

Japan

1967
1970
1971
1972

Enactment of the Basic Act forEnvironmental Pollution Control
Pollution Diet
Inauguration of the Environment Agency
Enactment of the Nature Conservation Act

1973

Impact of the oil crisis

1979
1985

Plaza Accord

1987
1988
1992

1993
1994

2002
2005
2007
2008
2009

2010

2011

Adoption of the Ramsar Convention
UN Conference on the Human Environment(Stockholm Conference)
Adoption of the Washington Convention; the first oilcrisisAdoption of the Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution
Adoption of the Vienna Convention for the Protectionof the Ozone Layer
Adoption of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer
Inauguration of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC)
Adoption of the Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Biodiversity Treaty; UN Conference
on Environment and Development (Rio Earth
Summit)

The Environmental Basic Act
Adoption of the UN Convention to Combat
Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in
Africa (UNCCD)
1st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (COP1); start ofnegotiations on the protocol
Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol

1995

1997
2000

International Developments concerning the Global
Environmental Problem

The Basic Act for Establishing a Sound
Material-Cycle Society
Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol

Then Prime Minister Abe: Beautiful Planet
2050 (“Cool Earth 50”)
G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit
2020 target for CO2 emissions reduction:
15% reduction from 2005 (to be achieved
only by reductions in Japan) (Liberal
Democratic Party); reduction by 25% from1990 (also use credits obtained overseas)(Democratic Party of Japan)
The Bill of the Basic Act for Global
Warming
Countermeasuressetforcontinuous deliberation

World Summit on Sustainable Development (Rio +10)
Effectuation of the Kyoto Protocol
G8 Heiligendamm Summit;
COP13/CMP3 Adoption of the Bali Action Plan
COP15/CMP5 Copenhagen Agreement

COP16/CMP6 Cancun Agreement

COP17/CMP7 Set for Durban, South Africa

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2. Japan’s Reponses to the Climate Change Issue(1) International Negotiations on the Climate Change Issue
We cannot but use energy in our economic activities and/or daily lives. At present, much of theenergy we use is provided by the combustion of fossil fuels such as oil and coal. But the burning offossil fuels increases carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and pushes up the average temperature.
Global warming causes changes in meteorological phenomena in various regions. Increasing
instances of concentrated heavy rain and scorching heat in Japan in recent years are showing trends
similar to effects said to stem from climate change.ix
As climate change alters the climate of the earth as a whole over the long term, ecosystems
currently existing on the earth are headed toward conditions they have never experienced before.
Given the magnitude of effects and the magnitude of expected damage, the climate change issue isperceived to be a problem of more urgency than any other economic environmental problems.
On the other hand, as constraints on the use of energy are seen as constraints on economic
activities, CO2 emissions cannot be reduced so easily, however important the climate change issue
is. Discussions on the countries and their respective CO2 emissions reduction requirements havebeen going on to date since the 1980s.
There are two multilateral conventions under the United Nations framework aimed atinternational efforts to address the climate change issue. One is the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted in 1992. The convention sets out the immediate target for
Annex I countries (developed countries, etc.) to reduce emissions to the 1990 levels by 2000.
However, the target was presented only as a non-binding target and few countries took it seriously.
Reflecting upon this mistake, the Kyoto Protocol adopted in 1997 sets out quantified greenhousegas emissions reduction targets for the same Annex I countries for the five-year commitment period
from 2008 to 2012 as well as non-compliance measures to be taken in cases when these targets are
not achieved.
During the years when the two international agreements mentioned above were being negotiated,countries now called emerging economies, including China and India, still fell under the categoryof developing countries and their national emissions were substantially lower than the current
levels. At the time, developed countries did not vocally oppose the idea of setting emissions
reduction targets only for developed countries because of the then-prevailing absolute gap inemissions levels between developed and developing countries. However, after the United States
under the George W. Bush Administration announced in 2001 that it would not be a party to the78

Kyoto Convention and by 2005 when the Kyoto Protocol took effect, it became known thatcombined emissions by countries for which emissions reduction targets have been set under the
Kyoto Protocol account for only about 30% of total global emissions.
Since the Kyoto Protocol sets emissions reduction targets only until 2012, negotiations havebeen under way since 2007 on international efforts to reduce emissions from 2013 onward.
However, prospects are not so good for these negotiations to be concluded within the next several
years.

(2) Japan’s Stance in Climate Change Negotiations
Japan’s position in climate change negotiations is complex. From the viewpoint of the magnitudeof efforts put into energy-saving, Japan is close to the European level. Thus, Japan is in a position
to argue strongly that the United States and Canada have much room to reduce emissions in thesense of wasteful use of energy. In multilateral negotiations, however, from the perspective of
foreign policy, Japan becomes strongly aware of its position as a close ally of the United States.
This means that Japan is not in a position to simply criticize and pressure the United States easily.
The United States is the second largest CO2 emitter in the world, and any international
convention in which the United States does not participate would be meaningless. However, given
the American people’s strong reaction to constraints on energy consumption, it is necessary toconsiderably ease the terms of the agreement in order to draw the United States into it. It is difficult
to gain the understanding of other countries for the Japanese stance of calling for relaxed terms of
the agreement citing the importance of participation by the United States while at the same timerefraining from criticizing the United States. Simple logic has it that if Japan recognizes climatechange as an important issue, Japan should criticize the United States which among developed
countries has the most desired potential in terms of energy saving. Japan’s stance of seeking todilute the terms of the agreement by emphasizing the importance of the US participation is open to
misunderstanding in that Japan is trying to “escape necessary measures under the shadow of theUnited States.”
In Japan, with the business community’s opposition to the Kyoto Protocol rising, objections to
the Kyoto Protocol persist in discussions on an international framework in 2013 and onward.
However, we have yet to thoroughly examine and discuss which part of the Kyoto Protocolpresents real problems to Japan and what revisions to the Kyoto Protocol would resolve those
problems and are also likely to obtain international consensus. For example, which is the real79

problem with the Kyoto Protocol—the emissions reduction target level of 6%, the non-participationof the United States and China, or the approach itself of setting the emissions caps and introducing
the emissions trading system? The future framework truly desirable for Japan depends on whichpart of the Kyoto Protocol Japan will seek to change.
In Japan, in 2007 then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his “Cool Earth 50” initiative proposed tohalve total global CO2 emissions by 2050. At the Davos Forum in January 2008, then Prime
Minister Yasuo Fukuda representing the Japanese government officially accepted the approach of
setting emissions caps and in June 2008 came up with the Fukuda Vision that included Japan’semissions reduction target of 60-80% by 2050. The initiatives of Prime Ministers Abe and Fukuda
were also designed as preparations to host the summit meeting of the Group of Eight major
economies to be held in Toyako, Hokkaido, in July 2008, but Prime Minister Fukuda resigned
immediately after the G8 summit. His successor, Prime Minister Taro Aso, set up a committee toconsider a medium-term emissions reduction target in October 2008, and after the committee’s
discussions on Japan’s 2020 reduction target, the government decided in June 2009 to cut Japan’s
greenhouse gas emissions by 15% from 2005 levels by 2020 (8% reduction from 1990 levels). Thistarget did not assume the purchase of emissions credits from other countries. However, theDemocratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took over the reins of government in a general election
immediately after that decision, and newly elected Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama in September
2009 announced the new target of reducing emissions by 25% from 1990 levels by 2020. The newtarget includes the purchase of emissions credits and other offsetting measures acquired overseas.
The previous Aso Government emphasized the high cost of emission reduction, including “thenational burden of ¥360,000 per capita required for the 25% reduction from 1990 levels,” but it was
found later that the cost estimate resulted from the misuse of the model result by the Cabinet Office(while the cost of ¥220,000 in the model result included the heating and lighting cost of ¥140,000,
the two costs were simply added up. And the positive factor of the increase of ¥760,000 in
per-household disposable income over 2005 due to economic growth was not countedx). In 2010,
the Bill of the Basic Act for Global Warming Countermeasures was submitted to the Diet for
deliberation, but the bill was shelved for continuous deliberation amid the continued lack ofpolitical leadership, including another change of government to the one headed by new Prime
Minister Naoto Kan.
As voices grew stronger in opposition of a simple extension of the Kyoto Protocol without
considerations guided by the political leadership, Japan argued that it would “not support the80second commitment period under any conditions” at the 16th Conference of the Parties to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change in Cancun, Mexico, in late 2010.

3. Future Prospects of Global Environmental Problems
What course will the climate change issue and other major global environmental problems
follow going forward? It is likely to be influenced largely by developments in the internationalsituation. Particular heed needs to be paid to the following points in the international community
going forward.
The first point is the rise of emerging economies and the relative decline of the United States. As
a result of the end to the Cold War structure in the 1980s, the United States, as the only superpowerin the world, has had considerable influence over international negotiations on global
environmental problems. But that US influence is beginning to wane. The economic scale of China
is expanding rapidly and its consumption of energy resources is also increasing. China has become
the world’s largest CO2 emitter by overtaking the United States in recent years. Chinese delegations
to international negotiations on climate change have been increasing in numbers each year, andwith it, what China says is beginning to carry a lot of weight. In the United States, on the other
hand, the American people are turning increasingly inward. As indicated by the strength shown by
the Tea Party in midterm elections in the autumn of 2010, the Americans’ immediate concerns arean economic recovery and homeland security, not showing off a strong America in the international
arena.
Emerging countries blame the cumulative emissions by developed countries for the current
climate change, and even after they have achieved a decent level of economic development, theyargue that emerging countries are not responsible for reducing emissions until after developed
countries take full responsibility and put sufficient measures in place. On the other hand, the UnitedStates believes that considering international competitiveness vis-à-vis China that benefits fromcheap labor costs, it cannot take part in an international system where only developed countries are
required to take necessary measures. It may fall upon China, not the international community, to
get the United States to change its posture.
Secondly, the scarcity of resources and commodities will likely become evident more than ever.
The scarcity of mineral resources, as exemplified by the term rare earth, is drawing keen attention,
let alone energy resources such as crude oil and natural gas. Some metals used in technologies
necessary for measures to cope with climate change are concentrated in a few limited countries,

81and these producing countries may increase their monopoly power over such metals. The scarcity
of water and grains is also increasing more than ever. Part of that scarcity can be traced to the factthat the increase in abnormal weather conditions around the world, regardless of whether or notthey are caused by climate change, is destabilizing the supply of food and making food the objectof speculation. In particular, prices of corn and other gains that are being used as materials forbiofuels have been rising sharply, making them less accessible as food for the poor. As food prices
continue to shoot up while the global population remains on the uptrend, the polarization between
the “winners” who gain on speculation and the “losers” who slip deeper into poverty is highly
likely to intensify going forward.
The third point is the likelihood that non-state actors will gain in importance in the international
community. It has been long since cross-border, or transnational, corporate activities have captured
our attention, and this trend will grow further conspicuous going forward. International movementsof capital and labor will increase, the spread of the Internet will create an environment where we
can obtain the same information wherever we are in the world. Such an environment is likely tomake it more difficult to reach any effective agreement in multilateral treaty negotiations under the
auspices of the United Nations as the number of participants and relevant parties grows too large.
On the other hand, it is also likely that the international networking at various levels, including at
the regional, private sector and local government levels, will make progress outside the frameworkof international conventions. Rather, the networking of the latter type is highly likely to lead topractical relationships of cooperation. The situation in which transnational activities are being
promoted at the regional level like in Asia-Pacific, at the level of similar industries or at the level ofenvironmental protection groups is termed “multilayered environmental governance.”

4. Japan’s Strategy toward Global Environmental Problems
At a time when we are witnessing phenomena in the international community not seen before ininternational relations, how should Japan deal with global environmental problems?
(1) Japan should reinforce the alliance with the United States in responding to the rise of
emerging countries and the relative decline of the United States. But this does not necessarily meanthat Japan should concur with the position that “the United States does not need to reducegreenhouse gas emissions.” In order to change the inward-looking attitudes of the American people
and Congress, it is necessary to have the United States recognize diverse risks outside the country.
If a certain country poses a military threat to Japan, Japan-US cooperation has been crucial to date.

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Similarly, if a certain country monopolizes energy and scarce resources and their supply to Japan issuspended, it is necessary for Japan to build a relationship with the United States that allows
Japan-US cooperation to respond to such an event.
Improvement of relations between Japan and Asian countries is as important as Japan-US
relations. Sino-Japanese relations have been tense in recent years, but the continuation of the tense
relationship is not desirable, particularly for Japan. It is necessary to develop relationships andsystems under which Japan’s energy-saving technologies will contribute to emissions reductions in
China and, in turn, Japan will be rewarded with economic benefits.
(2) As a resources-poor country, Japan would inevitably have to continue to manufacture
products with comparative advantage and export them to other countries. Japan cannot competewith other countries based on the price of its products because labor and other costs are highrelative to developing countries. Thus, it is important for Japan to continue to manufacture productsthat are of high quality as well as acceptable under policies of other countries. Though international
negotiations on a future framework for climate change are making little headway at present, it iscertain that the international community has clearly steered toward a low-carbon society. In China,
production of photovoltaic panels is increasing sharply. In Japan, while the debate is going on
about emissions reductions, fierce competition is being waged over technology development of avariety of storage batteries and next-generation automobiles. Instead of sticking to the rigid stancethat “Japan cannot reduce emissions further,” Japan should mull over a strategy to aggressively
promote investment in technologies conducive to emissions reductions as the driver of Japanese
economy.
(3) In Japan, where domestic political leadership for tackling climate change is weak, it isdifficult to take procedures to enact legislation for implementing commitments provided for under
an international treaty that needs to be ratified at the international level. One good example of thatis the fact that while the 6% emissions reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in
1997, actual measures for the achievement of that target were not introduced until the Kyoto
Protocol went into effect in 2005. In recent years, with no agreement in negotiations on a future
framework for climate change in sight, domestic discussions on measures to cope with climatechange have been left in limbo.
That is not necessarily the case in other countries, however. In Europe, for instance, theEuropean Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) was considered and implemented
even before the Kyoto Protocol took effect. In the United States, while the federal government has

83

decided to stay out of the Kyoto Protocol, some states have been exerting pathbreaking efforts. For
example, the State of California and some other regions are actively promoting renewable energy.
State-level initiatives are important in the United States, as the State of California alone has
emissions equivalent to the emissions level of a major country of the world.
Japan will be required to show that it is moving in the direction it believes to be right on its own
without waiting for agreement on an international treaty. Some moves are already emerging invarious areas in the country. The Metropolitan Tokyo Government, for example, has joined theInternational Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), xi deepening international cooperation bytranscending the national borders of Japan.
Global environmental problems cannot be solved overnight. In line with a long-term global trend,
the Japanese society and economy as a whole is being called upon to proceed in the direction ofsustainable development.

iMichio Hashimoto, Private Memoirs on Environmental Administration. [In Japanese.] (The Asahi
Shimbun Company, 1988).
ii
Masazumi Harada, Minamata Disease. [In Japanese.] (Iwanami Shoten, 1972).
iii
Makoto Numata, The idea of nature conservation. [In Japanese.] (Iwanami Shoten, 1994).
iv
Keikichi Kihara, National Trust (New Edition). [In Japanese.] (Sanseido Publishing Co., 1998).
v
Donella H. Meadows, The Limits to Growth – The Club of Rome Report on the Human Crisis(Diamond, Inc., 1972).
vi
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), “Our Common Future” in Saburo
Okita, ed., For the protection of the Earth’s future. [In Japanese.] (Fukutake Shoten, 1987).
vii
Yasuko Kameyama, The new global environment policy. [In Japanese.] (Showado, 2010).
viii
Paul Harris, ed., Climate Change and Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2009), esp. chap.1.
ix
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, (theFourth Assessment Report of the IPCC) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
x
Kyodo News, October 18, 2009.
xi
About International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) , ICAP,
http://www.icapcarbonaction.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52&Itemid=2&lan
g=ja, accessed on February 15, 2011.

84

Chapter 6
The Strategic Environment Surrounding the Developing Countries
and Japan’s Development Cooperation:
To Be a Global Civilian Power
Izumi Ohno

Introduction
When we look toward the future world, we need to take note of three movements that have risen
to the surface during the post-Cold War period. Firstly, the world’s political structure has become
multipolarized, as emerging countries such as China and India have gained power (change in the
global power balance). Secondly, the diplomatic actors have diversified and private actors such ascivil society and corporations have also come more to the forefront. And thirdly, due to theaccelerating pace of globalization, there has been an escalation of global-scale problems including
infectious diseases, climate change, financial crises, etc., which can be transmitted instantaneously
beyond national borders. In this multipolar world, the search for a new world order will continue,
but in the course of that process, tensions could occur between the traditionally advanced countries
and the emerging countries in the context of “global rule-making.” How can we construct a newworld order in a stable fashion and cultivate values that can be shared, and what kind of country
will Japan become as it builds its position in the world? These are among the important issues thatJapanese diplomacy is facing. Coupled with the diffusion of information communication tools, thediversification of actors has activated not only traditional official diplomacy, but also private
diplomacy (so-called “second track”) and network-type diplomacy. Furthermore, as the barriers
between overseas and domestic issues are being lowered as a consequence of the deepening unityof the world, policy coherence and rapid problem-solving capabilities are becoming essential
requirements for all national governments.
In the future world where tension and destabilization could be triggered as a result ofmultipolarization, development cooperation itself will be a major and active tool for contributing to
the peace, stability and prosperity of the world by supporting nation building, poverty reduction
and sustainable growth in those regions that tend to be left behind. This in turn will lead to an85

increase in friendly countries and will contribute both directly and indirectly to protecting theJapanese people through such things as ensuring stable supplies of food and resources, promoting
trade and investment, preventing infectious diseases, etc. When development cooperation is
promoted under a comprehensive cooperation strategy, it can become an important element of soft
power.
As the first non-Western nation to join the ranks of the advanced countries, Japan has
experienced being both an aid-receiving country and an aid-providing country. It has also made acontribution to the development of other East Asian countries through aid, trade and investment. As
a donor, cooperating with newly emerging countries that have achieved dynamic growth toward thedevelopment of regions and countries that have been left behind is also a way of sharing andpromoting East Asian perspectives of development. Particularly in Africa and the Middle East
region, Japan has the advantage of being able to contribute to development from a neutral position
free from historical constraints, while its partner countries also have great expectations of Japanesecooperation. In the sense of building a new world order that involves the emerging countries and ofstrengthening its partnerships with other developing countries, Japan should make efforts toprovide cooperation through development by positioning this as an important element in its soft
power and incorporating it into the entire country’s external strategy. Under the current situation of
fiscal austerity, official development assistance (ODA) is continuing to decline on a generalaccount budget basis since reaching a peak in 1997. Compared with the 1990s when Japan was theworld’s top donor, the situation surrounding the nation has changed greatly. In order to maximize
the impact of its aid in light of the strategic targets at which Japan is aiming, we must consider
concretely which issues to devote official funding, and how to mobilize resources from outside
Japan by obtaining the sympathy of international organizations and other partner countries. Japan isincreasingly required to be engaged in global rule-making and to make effective use ofdevelopment cooperation, by focusing on selected strategic issues and working beyond the concept
and framework of ODA.
Based on this fundamental recognition, the present paper will analyze the following issues. The
first section explains the strategic environment surrounding the developing countries, which haschanged noticeably during the post-Cold War period and is currently following a trend that is
expected to continue for the next 20 years. The second section reviews how Japan’s aid policy haschanged over time and indicates the issues that this policy is encountering. The third section
focuses on the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), two countries that are influential86

in the international community and are major donors, and also on the Republic of Korea as an
emerging donor, and analyzes the relationships between the national strategy and the development
cooperation policy of each of these three countries. Lastly, the fourth section considers how Japan
should approach development cooperation with the goal of becoming a global civilian power, and anumber of recommendations are put forward.

1. The Situation Surrounding the Developing Countries — Changes in the Strategic
Environment
The world situation in the post-Cold War period has triggered several important changes in thestrategic environment for the developing countries. Firstly, there has been diversification andexpansion of the development agenda. Development assistance just after the Second World War
was centered on capital transfers by governments for purposes such as for economic development
and building large-scale infrastructure, but emphasis was also placed on structural adjustment
programs that stressed market mechanisms as well as on social development that gave
consideration to the poorest segment of the population, and on governance, etc. Since the end of theCold War, on the one hand the amount of private financial flows toward the developing countries
has increased due to globalization, while on the other hand there has been an increase inglobal-scale issues that extend beyond national borders. Ironically, the easing of East-West tensions
has caused civil wars and regional conflicts rooted in differences of race, religion, etc., to flare up
in many parts of the world. The synchronized terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) further
raised the importance of supporting fragile states and peace-building in the sense of carrying onwith “the fight against terrorism” in alliance with the US.
As a result, the development issues have become inseparable from the domestic issues of theadvanced countries and have begun to be linked closely with economic, diplomatic and national
security issues. The agendas of the G7/G8 Summits, which began in 1975 and are attended by theleaders of the major advanced countries, were initially centered on the world economy, but from the
1990s in particular, the focus of interest shifted to the development issues, such as Africa,
environmental and climate change, global health and others. Taking global health issues forexample, we have witnessed an expansion of their geographical scope, together with anacceleration of their expansion speed (e.g. new influenza viruses) and an expansion of the policy
object areas (e.g. intellectual property rights issues associated with pharmacological products). In
accordance with this trend, health issues have now become diplomatic issues. In the US and the UK,87not only organizations specializing in healthcare issues, but also think tanks addressing diplomatic
issues are tackling global health as an important issue.i
Secondly, there has been a diversification of the actors involved in development as well as anincrease in the complexity and a further diversification of the development aid system. By making
use of the opportunities provided by globalization, emerging countries such as South Korea, China,
India and Brazil have achieved sustainable growth and made the leap from being aid-recipients tobecoming donors. According to a forecast made by the Japanese Cabinet Office, China would
overtake Japan to become the world’s second largest economy in gross domestic product (GDP)terms in 2010, and would then go on to overtake the US to become the world’s largest economy in2030. When we take in the rise of India too, it is estimated that Asia’s share of total world GDP will
increase from approximately 25% in 2009 to approximately 40% in 2030, while the US share will
decrease from 25% to 17% over the same periodii. Reflecting these changes in the balance ofeconomic power, moves have begun toward adjusting and restructuring the traditional development
aid system that the advanced donor countries of Europe and the US built up after the Second World
War and the rules that control it. The growing presence of the G20 and the voting rights reforms
and capital increases in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (where China
and India’s voices carry increasing weight) are symbolic of this trend.
Moreover, a variety of private actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civilsociety, private foundations and corporations are now among the leading providers of support forthe developing countries, and they are increasingly influential with a presence exceeding that ofgovernment ODA in terms of scale of funding (Chart 1). Taking the example of global health once
again, apart from the international organizations and government organizations, as represented by
the World Health Organization (WHO), other actors have appeared, such as the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation, that exercise an important influence on aspects of policy backed by their huge
capital power.

88

Chart 1. Trends in Capital Transfers from the Advanced Countries to the Developing Countries

In terms of bilateral ODA, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) serves as a watchdog for improving theefficiency and effectiveness of aid by, for example, periodically carrying out peer reviews
concerning the quantity and quality of the aid provided by its member countries. But in reality, the“advanced countries club” is strongly colored by being centered on European donorsiii. Until South
Korea became a member in January 2010, Japan had been the only non-Western nation among the
22 DAC member countries. Accordingly, South Korea’s participation in the DAC provides an
excellent opportunity to bring Asia’s development experience and view of nation building into themainstream within the organization, and the South Korean government itself is aiming to make anactive contribution as an emerging donor (as will be discussed in 3.(3) below). In line with theincreasing complexity of the development assistance system including the diversification of the
DAC membership structure, there is a strong possibility that we will enter an era when thelegitimacy of the values and rules made by the traditional donors will be questioned.
Thirdly, while the remarkable rise of the emerging countries is drawing wide-ranging attention,
the reality remains that the disparities between different developing countries are widening. In the
African countries and in the fragile states generally, there is a danger that the UN’s Millennium
Development Goals (MDGsiv), which are aimed at reducing poverty worldwide by 2015, will not
be achieved. Chart 2 shows the status of MDG achievement by region. The target of halving thenumber of people living on less than US$1 a day has already been achieved in East Asia, but
progress on this goal is lagging a long way behind schedule in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.

89

A further widening of the disparities between developing countries could be a destabilizing factor
for the world. It is very important to support nation building in the least developed countries inorder to forestall destabilization and increase the number of friendly countries in future.

Chart 2. The Status of MDG Achievement by Region
Goal 1: Halve the proportion of people living on less than $1 a day between 1990 and 2015
Ratio of people living on US$1.25 or less per day, comparison between
1990 and 2005 (Unit： %)Sub-Saharan Africa

South Asia

1990
2005

South Asia except India

2015 Target
Asian Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries

Southeast Asia

East Asia

Latin America/CaribbeanWest Asia

North Africa

Southeast European transitional economies

European CIS countries

Developing regions

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
UN Millennium Development Goals Report, June 201090

2. Changes in Japan’s Aid Policy
After the end of the Second World War, Japan tackled the task of economic and social
reconstruction with the help of assistance among others from the World Bank, UN agencies and the
US government. But within a short period, from the 1950s, Japan was able to provide ODA to other
East Asian countries as a part of its postwar reparations payments. In the 1960s, the aidorganizations that later served as the foundation for today’s Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA) were established, such as the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF)(1961) and the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA) (1962), and Japan also became amember of the OECD in 1961. On the other hand, Japan did not complete the repayments of its
outstanding loans to the World Bank until 1990.
As shown in Chart 3, the ODA provided by Japan shortly after the end of the war was positioned
in the nation’s basic policy of Asian diplomacy based on the postwar reparations and the Japan-US
alliance. Later, in the 1970s, such assistance was linked to the nation’s industrial policy including
export promotion and to Japan’s economic security policy at the time of the oil crises. From thestart of the 1980s, based on the Japan-US trade friction, which became severe because Japanese
exports to the US increased rapidly, the expansion of ODA was promoted as a means of recycling
the trade surplus and as a part of Japan’s international cooperation policy. From the end of the
1970s and through the 1990s came the so-called “period of planned expansion” of ODA, during
which the Japanese government set out successive medium-term targets and increased the amountof ODA it provided. As a result, by the beginning of the 1990s when the Cold War came to an end,
Japan had become the world’s top donor.
Following the changes in the post-Cold War strategic environment, Japan diversified the priority
regions and countries to which it provided assistance. What became a particularly major turning
point was the Persian Gulf War of 1991, waged by US-led UN-authorized multinational forces in
response to Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The Japanese government at that time madea pledge to contribute US$13 billion to the cost of the war, but because the government took time
to reach that decision, the assistance was not necessarily highly evaluated by the international
community. Japan was subsequently faced with the need to cooperate to preserve world peace andtackle tasks shared by the international community not only by providing capital support but by
contributing personnel as well. Reflection on this issue led to the establishment of the International
Peace Cooperation Law and the start of dispatching of Self-Defense Forces personnel on
peacekeeping operations (PKO) in 1992. From about this time, Japan also reformed its aid policy,

91

making an explicit effort to improve its domestic system and to contribute toward achieving “theinternational interest” beginning with, for example, the establishment of the ODA Charter and theholding of the first Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 1993
(which has been held at five-year intervals subsequently).
Chart 3. Changes in Japan’s Aid Policy

４(US$millions)（百万ドル）

16 000Top donor period(1989-2000)
トップ・ドナー期(1989～2000年)

Planned expansion period(1977-88)
計画的拡充期(1977～88年)

14 000
12 000

日米貿易摩擦Japan-US trade
friction（資金環流計画）(surplus recyclingplan)

10 000Aid expansion
period (1964-76)
援助伸張期(1964～76年)

16 0008 000
14 000Discussionof defense
防衛予算のbudget GDP 1%
ＧＤＰ比１％枠の議論
framework

12 000

6 000
10 000
8 000

4 000
6 000

Postwar
reparation
戦後賠償期
period (1954-63)(1954～63年)

4 000

1964:
Japan ＯＥＣＤ加盟
joins the OECD
１９６４年

2 000
2 000

1950-55
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

-

1950-55
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

-

5th interim target

3rd interim target

4th interim target

2nd interim

1st interim

第 ５次中 期目 標

第 ４次 中 期目 標

出所：外務省・財務省資料をもとに筆者作成

第 ３次 中 期目 標

Source: Produced by the author from MOFA and MOF materials

第 ２次 中 期目 標

第 １次 中 期目 標

１９５４年
日本がコロンボ計画加盟
1954:
Japan
joins the Colombo Plan

ビジョンの模索
VisionEndingof the Cold War (1990s - )冷戦終結（90s～）（トップドナーÎ第5位へ）(Top partner
to 5th place)
Asian
戦後賠償、
diplomatic
日米同盟に基づくand industrial
policy based
アジア外交・
on postwar
compensation
産業政策& Japan-US

経済安全保障（石油危機等）
Economic
security(oil crisis, etc.)

International

黒字還流、
Surplus
国際協調
circulation,

contribution, mutual
国際貢献、相互依存
existence, enlightened「開かれた国益」
self-interest (support

international
harmonybuilding &（アフリカ支援、平和構築・
reconstruction aid,
復興支援、地球規模課題
tackling global-scaletasks)）
への取組み

alliance

for Africa, peace* 1992: Law Concerning Japan's Cooperation in the UN Peacekeeping
z 1992年
国際平和協力法（PKO法）Î98年、2001年に改定
Activity
and Other Activities (PKO Law) > revised 1998, 2001
カンボジア復興支援、カンボジア復興閣僚会議
Cambodiareconstruction support, Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation andReconstruction
z 1993年
ODA大綱 of Cambodia (MCRRC)* 1993: ODA アフリカ開発会議（TICAD）Î以降5年毎に開催（98、03、08年）
CharterTokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) > held every fivez 2000年 九州・沖縄G8サミット 「沖縄感染症イニシャティブ」
years subsequently (1998, 2003, 2008)
z 2002年 アフガニスタン支援国際会議* 2000: Kyushu/Okinawa G8 Summit/"Okinawa Infectious Diseases Initiative"z
2003年
新ODA大綱（人間の安全保障、平和構築への取組みを追加）* 2002: International
Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan
2004年
イラク復興信託基金東京会合*z2003:
New ODA
Charter (additional efforts toward human security & peace building)*z2004:Tokyo
Meetingof the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI)
2006年 海外経済協力会議の設置、参議院にODA等特別委員会の設置*z2006:
Establishmentof the Overseas Economic Cooperation Council, Upper House;
2008年
外務省の機構改革（国際協力局設置、国際協力企画立案本部）、新JICA
establishmentof the Special
Committee of the House of Councillors on Official
G8洞爺湖サミット「国際保健に関する洞爺湖行動指針」、TICADIV
Development Assistance and Related Matters (ODA Committee)
z 2010年 外務省「ODAのあり方に関する検討」、内閣官房にアフガニスタン支援室* 2008: Reform of MOFA (establishment of International Cooperation Bureau, International
Cooperation Planning Headquarters), new JICA
G8 Toyako Summit, Toyako Framework for Action on Global Health, TICAD IV* 2010: MOFA "ODA Review", Afghanistan Support Division in the Cabinet Office

Source: Author

92

seeking

In this way, since the 1990s, in addition to the assistance centered on economic infrastructure andhuman resource development and the prioritization in Asia that was provided up to that time, Japan
has begun to tackle the issues of African development and global issues such as implementing
infectious disease countermeasures, as well as providing support for peace building andreconstruction. In the new ODA Charter revised in 2003, efforts to achieve “human security” andpeace building are clearly specified. Looking back at Japan’s bilateral ODA over the past 20 to 30
years, the regional share for Africa and the Middle East regions have been expanded (Chart 4).
Although the proportion devoted to economic infrastructure remains large, the amounts spent onsocial infrastructure services and humanitarian support are increasing.

Chart 4. Distribution of Japanese Bilateral ODA by Region
二国間ODAの地域別配分
暦年
Year

11.9

1980
1990

Middle East
中東

10.1

2000
2004

Africa
アフリカ

10.9

Latin

中南米

10.9

2005

-20%

アジア
Asia

12.0

2006

34.1

2007

29.1

2008

20.1
0%

20%

40%

60%

Europe欧州
Aid straddling
multiple regions,
複数地域に
etc.
またがる援助など

80%

100%

Source: MOFA, ODA White Papers 1997, 2008, 2009 (Regional distributions are on a net
expenditure basis.)

To tackle diversifying development issues and to make an active contribution toward achieving“the global interest,” the objects of Japanese aid widened. On the other hand, the ODA generalaccount budget has been continuously decreasing for 13 consecutive years since its peak year of
1997 due to Japan’s severe financial situation. As a result, Japan was the world’s largest ODA
donor up until 2000, but since 2007 it has been in fifth place (on a net expenditure basis). Pressure
on Japan to increase its ODA budget to accomplish the MDGs and to respond to various needs
within the international community grows constantly, but unlike in the top donor era, Japan can no93

longer afford to provide aid with a please-everybody attitude. It has become vitally important firstand foremost to select and concentrate the limited available resources, and then, based on thesecriteria, to indicate the Japanese government’s thinking of what are the priority issues and regions.
At the same time, in order to stem the decline in the ODA budget, it is necessary to obtain theunderstanding of politicians and of the general public by domestically communicating thesignificance of achieving “the global interest.”
Under a situation in which the ODA budget has been continuously declining, Japan has pushedahead with systemic reforms since 2002/03. The Japanese government installed ODA Task Forcesin aid-recipient countries (an approach aimed at better planning Japan’s aid policy andimplementation system, and at strengthening cooperation with other donors and relatedorganizations in developing countries, with Japanese embassies, JICA, the Japan Bank forInternational Cooperation (JBIC) and the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) as its major
members),v formulated country assistance plans and issue-specific policies, and expanded thescope of its ODA evaluations, etc. Since 2006, a reorganization of the ODA implementation system
has been carried out. In April 2006, the Japanese government established the Overseas Economic
Cooperation Council, which is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes the Chief Cabinet
Secretary, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economy,
Trade and Industry among its members. In August of the same year, the International Cooperation
Bureau (ICB) was established by uniting several departments concerned with development
assistance with the aim of strengthening the planning capabilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MOFA). Then, in October 2008, the yen loan operations of JBIC and the bulk of the grantassistance handled by MOFA were transferred to JICA, and the new system for providing yen loans,grant assistance and technological cooperation in an integrated fashion was established.
However, it is necessary to make a careful study concerning whether the changes in Japan’s aid
policy since the 1990s were clearly positioned within the national strategy and whether theirsignificance has permeated widely within the political and economic worlds or among the generalpublic. Questions have been raised as to whether the Overseas Economic Cooperation Council has
carried out its expected “control tower” function or notvi. Moreover, it has been pointed out thatwhile ODA system reform since 2006 has certainly made comprehensive use of the existing aid
instruments easier, it remains inadequate from the standpoint of creating a system that responds tothe strategic environment of the 21st centuryvii. The ODA Review Final Report compiled by MOFA
under the new Democratic Party of Japan administration in June 2010 proclaims “the promotion of94

enlightened self-interest” and sets out a policy for Japan of making an international contribution ina world of interdependenceviii. This report is commendable in that it lays out specific measures suchas expanding support for NGOs, collaboration with private companies (in relation to growthstrategies), giving consideration to foreign currency-denominated loans, etc. However, concerning
the promotion of cooperation across the government and between the public/private actors and thenarrowing of priority issues (poverty reduction, investment in peace building and backing
sustainable economic growth), a more in-depth approach will probably be required in the future.
It seems appropriate that the report upholds “the promotion of enlightened self-interest” as a
post-Cold War vision, but it is also essential that we think about “Japan in a global context,” raise
discussion within Japan concerning what the international contribution is really for, andcommunicate this message clearly. While on the one hand the barriers between external anddomestic policies have been lowered by globalization, on the other hand the nation’s
inward-looking tendency has strengthened due to the influence of economic stagnation, tightbudgets and others, and public awareness toward external policy has dimmed as a result. The
question is being raised as to what the nature is of Japan’s core national strategy and vision in thecontext of the development cooperation Japan provides that corresponds to the US National
Security Strategy or the UK’s International Development Act (which aims at the MDG
achievement), which I will talk about in the next section.

3. Responses of Major Donor Countries
How are the major donor countries responding to the changes in the post-Cold War strategic
environment? In this section, I will focus on the US and the UK, two countries that provide aid on alarge scale and have major influence, and on South Korea, which is actively expanding its ODA interms of both quality and quantity as an emerging donorix. As is shown below, we can see that all
three countries—the US, the UK, and South Korea—are positioning development cooperation as amajor pillar of soft power in their national strategies, although with different strategic implications
in each case.

(1) The United States
Historically, US external policy has been centered on its National Security Strategy, and its
foreign aid policy has been discussed within the framework for this strategy set out by eachsuccessive administration. In the National Security Strategy (September 2002, March 2006) of the95

previous administration of President George W. Bush, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, development
was positioned as one of the 3Ds (Defense, Diplomacy, Development) as a means toward solving
the problem of poverty, which was considered to be “a breeding ground for terrorism.” But inreality, development held a position subordinate to that of national defense. Although the foreign
aid budget was increased significantly, the increased amounts were used for newly establishedorganizations and programs such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and thePresident’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and also for aid provided through the
Department of Defense. This has tended to weaken the position of the US Agency for International
Development (USAID), which has been the core US government aid-implementing organization
since 1961. In the latter half of the Bush Administration, there was a rising concern over the
fragmentation and militarization of aid, leading to active discussions about aid reform andproposals put forward by bipartisan Congress members and think tanks.
In a departure from the Bush Administration’s stress on hard power for “the fight against
terrorism,” the new National Security Strategy announced by the administration of Barack Obama
in May 2010 was based on a vision with the emphasis on smart power, which combines hard andsoft power. This strategy also positions development as an important element of soft power. In
order to materialize the new vision in a development context, President Obama called for a WhiteHouse-led survey in September 2009, and the completion of the survey was followed by anapproximately one-year process of analysis, consultation and drafting, which resulted in theformulation of the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) on Global Developmentx. President Obamahimself announced the new directive in September 2010 on the occasion of the UN’s 2010 MDG
Summit.
As the first ever US presidential directive concerning development, this PPD showcases the
Obama Administration’s global development policy vision and principles. It places the central
focus on development, not on aid, and it has the following features: (1) making “broad-based
economic growth” its top target; (2) employing a whole of the government approach; (3) “selection
and concentration” for setting out strategic issues (food security, global health, climate change); (4)cooperating with diverse partners and consideration toward principles for improving aid
effectiveness; and (5) mobilizing private funds to solve development problems and making use ofinnovative technology. The reason why this directive makes “broad-based economic growth” its toppriority is based on the idea that increasing the number of capable partners over the medium andlong term will be desirable in light of sustainability. This will help prevent the creation of fragile

96

states and lead to a more peaceful, stable and prosperous world, and eventually to the spread ofmarket economies and democracy, which are the stated aims of the US. It can be said that the
PPD’s positioning of development as a future investment for preventing the creation of fragile
states represents a major turnaround from the confrontational approaches promoted by the previous
administration such as “the fight against terrorism.” Moreover, the clear intention to position
development from a national strategy standpoint that takes in trade, investment and national
defense is evident from, for example, the fact that the head of USAID is permitted to participate inmeetings of the National Security Council (NSC) according to necessity. In order to take a whole of
the government approach, an Interagency Policy Committee on Global Development wasestablished at the end of September 2010 with the NSC’s senior director for development andsenior advisor to President Obama as its chair. The committee began its studies from the standpointof how to reflect the goals of the PPD in the policies and practices of different organizations and to
institutionalize them. Meetings are held weekly with the participation of 16 government-affiliatedorganizationsxi.
In parallel, from July 2009, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDRxii)
was started up under Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and issued its final report, entitled “Leading
Through Civilian Power,” in December 2010. This was the first QDDR produced by the US State
Department. Based on the Obama Administration’s National Security Strategy, the QDDR positions
development as an important element of civilian power and sets out the policy under which theState Department and USAID will work together to promote “development diplomacy.” This isintended to stem the amount of aid provided via the Defense Department and thereby to elevate theposition of USAID that was weakened under the previous administration.
However, many involved parties doubt the feasibility of this approach, even though they highly
value the Global Development Policy of the Obama Administrationxiii. The biggest reason for this isthat the Republican Party’s gaining of a majority in the House of Representatives in the midterm
elections that took place in November of last year has made it increasingly difficult for the Obama
Administration to control Congress. In a situation in which it is highly probable that the aid budget
will be reduced due to the Republican Party’s skeptical attitude toward foreign aid, it will not beeasy to approach strategic issues based on “selection and concentration” as was set out in the PPD.
There remains a great deal of uncertainty as to how much of the aid budget, which tends to be rigid
due to Congressional earmarking, can be reallocated from a “selection and concentration”
viewpoint.

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(2) The United Kingdom
It is a characteristic of the UK that, unlike the US, it separates diplomacy from commercial
interests and development and brings “the global interest” to the fore. In particular, the Labour
Party administration that came into office in 1997 newly established the Department forInternational Development (DFID), which is charged with policy planning and implementation
concerning international development in an integrated fashion. The DFID’s overarching goals are
reducing poverty and achieving the MDGs, as specified in the International Development Act,
which came into force in 2002.
Based on the UK government’s new public management initiative, all departments including the
DFID conclude 3-year public service agreements with the Treasury. For the DFID, a performance
evaluation is carried out based on the progress made toward achieving the MDGs, and this exerts
an influence on the DFID’s budget allocation, among others. Accordingly, the DFID allocates 90%
of its bilateral aid to the poorest countries, while addressing the issues of poverty in middle-income
countries and global issues, etc., through multilateral aid. At the same time, the UK aims topromote collective and effective activities by all donors as a catalyst, not by taking independentaction but by appealing to the international community. This is the reason why the DFID takes alead in promoting in-country policy dialogues and aid partnership, and involves itself actively in
the international aid system and the priority strategies of international organizations.
Since the 1960s, the UK, which has two main political parties, has followed a repeated historicalpattern in which aid-administering ministries independent of the Foreign Office are set up underLabour administrations while the Foreign and Commonwealth Office organizations are placed incharge of aid implementation under Conservative administrations. However, the present
Conservative-LDP coalition, which came into office in May, 2010, has decided to keep the UK’s
international development policy independent of its diplomacy. This is a new departure for an
administration with Conservative involvement. The Coalition Agreement advocates support forachieving the MDGs and for the observance of the UK’s pledge to the international community (toincrease its ODA budget to 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) by 2013), as well as for the firm
maintenance of untied aid and the continuance of the DFID. At the same time, regarding the detailsof the UK’s international development policy, the coalition has consciously set out its differencesfrom the previous administration by, for example, placing stress on the transparency andperformance of aid, strengthening accountability to taxpayers and promotion of development in thedeveloping countries not only through aid but also through trade, etc.

98

It is noteworthy that the Conservative Party, which has traditionally taken a skeptical stancetoward aid, is maintaining the DFID and has set out a policy of protecting the ODA budget evenduring a period of tight fiscal restraint. Since its establishment, the DFID has built up a good
reputation within the international aid community for being consistent in terms of policy andimplementation as well as for the strength of its international communication powerxiv. So, I expectthat the coalition government has also recognized that the DFID’s performance in leading the
global rule-making effort in this field has enhanced the presence for the UK in the international
community. Moreover, it appears that because there are large numbers of immigrants from Africa
and South Asia residing in the UK, the environment of the country makes it relatively easy for thegovernment to obtain public support by displaying British leadership in the international
community in the shape of highlighting the “global interests” of poverty reduction and theachievement of the MDGs.
With what kind of system, then, has the UK established in order to respond to global issues? In
the UK, the DFID takes the lead in adjusting the response of other government departments as acontrol tower that directs international development policy. Concerning inter-departmental andcross-cutting development issues, there is a system centered on the DFID under which cooperation
units are established with other government departments for specific issues. For example, in thefield of trade policy, the DFID cooperates with the Department for Business Enterprise &Regulatory Reform through a Joint Trade Policy Unit, while in support of peace-building efforts, a
Post-Conflict and Reconstruction Unit is established in cooperation with the Foreign andCommonwealth Office and the Department of Defence. In addition to making political appeals tointernational organizations concerning its themes of interest, the DFID also launches initiatives
around which it builds multi-donor frameworks and urges the other approving donors to commit tofunding them (examples include global health, privately financed infrastructure, BOP (Base of the
Economic Pyramid) business support). In this way, although its philosophy and domestic systemdiffer from those of the US, the UK uses development as a pillar for promoting soft power
diplomacy.

(3) South Korea
South Korea joined the OECD’s DAC in January 2010 and hosted the G20 Summit in Seoul in
November of the same year. Plans are currently under way to hold the DAC-sponsored FourthHigh-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) in Busan in November 2011. South Korea is99

working hard to quantitatively expand its ODA budget, but over and above that, as an emerging
donor it is aiming to function as a “bridge” between the developing countries and the traditional
donor countries by proceeding to systematize its own development experience and sharing this withthe developing countries.
At present, South Korea’s annual ODA outlay including both bilateral and multilateral aid totals
approximately US$800 million (as of 2008, net expenditure amount base) and its ODA/GNI ratio is0.09%. The South Korean government is aiming to triple the size of its ODA budget from the 2008base by 2015 and raise the ODA/GNI ratio to 0.25% (in 2009, Japan’s ODA/GNI ratio was 0.22%).
President Lee Myung-bak himself has announced that through international cooperation, South
Korea will become a “guiding light” for the developing countries in the 21st century. The present
administration is positioning ODA as its main tool for raising South Korea’s soft power and brandpower, and at the G20 Summit, it achieved leadership in getting development included on the
G20’s discussion agenda, which has traditionally been centered on finance. As a result of the South
Korean effort, the participating countries achieved agreement on the G20 Seoul Development
Consensus for Shared Growth and the G20 Multi-Year Action Plan on Development.
South Korea’s development “miracle” is gathering strong interest and respect from many
developing countries. Making use of its advantage in having had a comparatively recent
development experience, the South Korean government has in recent years launched theKnowledge Sharing Program (KSP) and set forth a policy of systematizing its development
experience and actively using this in policy dialogues with developing countries. Even if it can
succeed in tripling its ODA budget, South Korea will remain a small donor in terms of total aid
amount, but through the KSP this strategy will raise its national brand power and appeal thecountry’s intellectual contribution to the international community. Japan too has carried out
intellectual cooperation in a variety of forms (including policy dialogues, formalization of sector
and regional development plans, joint research, seminars, lectures, training visits and others) withmany developing countries. However, these activities have tended to be centered on efforts madeby the individual departments of various organizations and JICA, and have not involved an
approach by the entire nation acting in concert as in the case of South Korea.
Efforts are beginning to be made toward strengthening the ODA policy decision mechanism, In
January 2010, South Korea enacted the International Development Cooperation Basic Law, which
specified the philosophy, purpose and principles of development cooperation. (This law enteredinto force in June of the same year.) South Korea’s aid system is modeled on the Japanese system.

100

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) and the Korea International Cooperation
Agency (KOICA) are in charge of grant assistance cooperation and technological cooperation,
while the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) and the Economic Development Cooperation
Fund (EDCF) of the Export-Import Bank of Korea are in charge of loan assistance cooperation. In
order to conduct policy coordination between multiple government agencies and organizations, theInternational Development Cooperation Committee was established in 2006 as a forum fordiscussing ODA policy under the chairpersonship of the Prime Minister. This committee has 25
members (in addition to 6 or 7 private committee members, the ministers of related agencies
participate) and meets twice each year to engage in deliberations on the main directions of ODA
policy such as the countries and fields of focus, the ratio of concessional loans against grants and soon.

4. Future Prospects and Proposals for Japan’s Development Cooperation
Finally, I would like to consider how Japan should approach development cooperation in light of
its aim to become a global civilian power. Given the current severe financial situation, an effort toachieve maximum impact with limited resources is required. It is essential for Japan to consider
engaging in development cooperation not by separating it off from national strategy but by relating
it to other measures, and there is also a need to study how Japan can best provide bilateral aid bydeciding what sort of strategic issues, regions and countries to emphasize and how best to make useof international organizations.
Based on this awareness, I would like to make a set of proposals encompassing the four points
described below.xv The basic idea is that in the 21st century, a time in which globalization isaccelerating, in order to allow Japan to grow out of the idea called “ODA,” it is necessary to createa system for enhanced cooperation within the government and between public-private actors so that
not only the government but also various private actors such as corporations, NGOs, universities
and others can approach “development cooperation” using their own strengths.xvi In order todisplay Japan’s presence within a limited budget, it is essential to mobilize the nation’s
accumulated knowledge effectively and to engage in global rule-making. Moreover, it is importantto form new “next-generation” cooperative relationships with the emerging Asian countries, going
beyond aid relationships.

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(1) Proposals
Firstly, Japan should install a powerful control tower at the core of its government, formulate an
external cooperation strategy from a national strategic perspective and position development
cooperation from a cross-sectional standpoint. In this context, the external cooperation strategy
refers to a comprehensive one that encompasses a growth strategy, PKO, economic partnerships,
science and technology policy, cultural exchanges, etc., and should also include development
cooperation. Regarding the mechanism for formulating the external cooperation strategy, there area variety of choices such as to newly establish the National Security Council (mentioned in the
New Basic Defense Program of December 2010) or to make use of the present National Policy Unit.
This strategy should be supported by the empathy and trust of the various actors and a process
should be created of calling on knowledge from a broad range of sources by establishing anadvisory council made up of private members. On this basis, it will be important to decide on asmall number of strategic issues and the regions and countries on which Japan should place aparticularly strong focus as well as indicate its policy of cooperation with internationalorganizations by introducing a strong basic policy for development cooperation that iswell-matched to the international environment and to development issues and others. Based on that,the government agencies and implementation organizations responsible for development will
formulate budgets and project plans. The proposed model can be said to be close to the US modelthat was introduced in 3.(1) above.
In addition, I would like to propose that Japan select issues that generate large synergy effects
when determining the small number of strategic issues and the regions and countries it wishes toemphasize by taking the following items into consideration: (1) the needs of developing countries
and the international community (or in other words, “the global interest”), (2) the comparativeadvantage to Japan, and (3) the benefit to the Japanese people (or in other words, “the national
interest” (Chart 5).

102

Chart 5. Specification of Strategic Issues
Needs ofdeveloping nations& the international
community

Benefit to
the JapanesepeopleFocus on the small numberof strategic issues in Japan’s
development cooperation

Japan’scomparativeadvantage

Secondly, Japan should strengthen its global policy power by establishing organizations andfunctions that can serve as intellectual hubs for each of this small number of strategic issues, andallocate human resources for policy making who have the relevant knowledge from government
agencies in a cross-sectional manner, and from the private sector. The government should provide
funding for the necessary budget and secretariat to achieve this. If Japan is to display leadership inmaking a contribution to addressing the global issues facing the international community in the
21st century and solving the development issues of the developing countries, it will not be possible
to leave the handling of these issues to a single organization. On the contrary, it will be necessary tocreate network functions centered on intellectual hub organizations. The ability to take a lead inglobal rule-making is also required in order to respond to the multi-layering of diplomacy that has
taken place due to the existence of various frameworks at the private-sector diplomacy, regional
and world levels. In addition, there is a need to promote exchanges of policy-specialist humanresources beyond the boundaries of vertically structured organizations, as well as for cooperation
within the government and between public-private actors, and to become involved in the global
rule-making on each issue.
Thirdly, Japan should deepen its cooperative relationships with emerging donor countries in Asia
by establishing the Asia Development Cooperation Forum. Japan was the first non-Western nation
to move from being an aid-recipient to a donor, and its sense of values and approach todevelopment aid based on its catching-up experience (efforts to achieve self reliance, placing valueon the independence of developing countries, providing aid in consideration of each country’s
individuality, aid for self-reliance, etc.) are widely shared by other Asian countries that have risen
in a similar way from being developing countries to becoming emerging donors such as South103

Korea, China, and the leading ASEAN member countries. This is a different view of development
assistance from that held by Western donor countries, which tend to discuss development in termsof what it ought to be and to set out universal and uniform reform policies. Moreover, since there
are a great many human resources in the Asian countries who have been nurtured by the ODA
carried out by Japan over the past half-century, Japan should lead the evolution toward the next
generation of development cooperation with the emerging countries as its supporters by making useof the assets it has accumulated up to now through ODA.xvii A factor that will become important inJapanese soft power is building a cooperation mechanism to support the least developed ASEAN
countries and the developing regions and countries, including in Africa, by taking the emerging
Asian countries that have recent aid-recipient experience as Japan’s partners and by sharing andtransmitting a sense of values concerning development cooperation. Can the Asia Development
Cooperation Forum not be made into a place where the vitality of the emerging donors and Japan’s
experience can be shared in the course of loose and flexible information exchanges and policy
collaboration? Furthermore, can we not make use of this forum as an intelligent network or acooperation mechanism for mobilizing the human resources and organizations of the Asianemerging countries mentioned above? This mechanism should extend beyond the present
frameworks of South-South cooperation, training in third countries and such.
Another purpose of the Asia Development Cooperation Forum is to promote to China the ideathat it can make a contribution commensurate with its economic power and conduct its activities inharmony with international rules. On top of its positive aspects such as providing a place forsharing experiences of Asian development aid and Asian values, if the forum can be used toencourage China to behave responsibly in the international community including with regard tosuch issues as human rights and environmental consideration, then Japan can link the advanced(Western) countries with the emerging countries and exert its presence in the international
community as a leading coordinator of the emerging Asian donors.
Fourthly, Japan should attempt both a quantitative and a qualitative expansion of its support fordevelopment education. It is essential to expand the opportunities for each and every Japanesecitizen to grasp the essential unity and mutual independence of the world, to think about “Japan in
the world,” and to consider the situation of Japan in the world and the need for development
cooperation. Since there are NGOs and local government authorities that are undertaking a
grassroots level approach, it is important to arrange financial cooperation and a support system toback up the existing approach. But more radically, it is necessary to change the present situation in104which the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), the Ministryof the Environment (MOE), MOFA and JICA are each carrying out their own brand of international
understanding education, environmental education and sustainable development education under
different concepts and to formulate a comprehensive development education policy.xviii(2) Toward the Materialization of the Proposal – Global Health Policy as a Pioneering
Approach
At this point, I would like to introduce the ongoing effort in the area of global health as apioneering example of a strategic approach involving the formation of policy functions and huborganizations based on cooperation across the government and between public-private actors as
referred to in the second proposal above. This began as a private initiative and then put down roots
by obtaining the support of governments and implementing organizations. (Although I will not go
into detail in this paper, BOP business support and package-type infrastructure development
overseas tend to generate new “seeds,” which often attract attention.)
Global health is a 21st century-type global issue, but it is also an issue in which a rapid response
is essential in order to protect the health of citizens. Moreover, it is an issue in which Japan canmake good use of its past experience such as in strengthening the health system that links thecommunity and government, providing maternal and child care and so on. In this field, Japan
initiated policy in a united public-private effort aimed at 2008, when Japan hosted TICAD IV andthe G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit. Specifically, this included the following: (1) the then Foreign
Minister Masahiko Komura delivered a policy speech at an international symposium (November2007), (2) the G8 Health Experts’ Meeting was held (at government level) and this developed into a
partnership between related people in the public and private sectors in Japan and in other countries,(3) at the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit, the Toyako Framework for Action on Global Health wascompiled and announced (July 2008), and (4) MOFA co-hosted the International Conference on
Global Action for Health System Strengthening as a follow-up event to the G8 Hokkaido Toyako
Summit, together with the World Bank, the WHO, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation,
among others (November 2008), and following this conference, a policy proposal document
entitled “Global Action for Health System Strengthening: Policy Recommendations to the G8” wascompiled and presented to the Japanese government (January 2009). The final version of this
proposal document was handed over by the Japanese government to the Italian government andwas further taken up on the agenda for the G8 L’Aquila Summit in 2009. In addition, “Japan’s New

105

Global Health Policy (2011-15),” announced in September 2010 by Japan’s then Foreign Minister
Katsuya Okada, is based on this kind of intellectual activity.
In addition to the concerned ministries and agencies, a variety of stakeholders who have differing
points of view, including those in the private sector, NGOs, researchers and others, participated in aseries of processes in order to put the proposal together for the G8 Summit. What was of particularimportance was the intellectual communication effort that took place at the private level. The
Working Group on Challenges in Global Health and Japan’s Contribution (headed by former Upper
House Member Keizo Takemi and hereinafter referred to as “the Takemi Study Group”) supported
the setting up of the agenda for the international conference and helped realize the transmission of
the policy by providing intellectual backing.xix
Since a number of ministries and agencies, research institutes and NGOs are involved in the
global health issue, it is not an easy thing for the Japanese government, which has a verticallydivided organizational structure, to start up the political process. The Takemi Study Group’s
important contribution relates to the point that a private foundation, the Japan Center forInternational Exchange (JCIE), performed the role of the secretariat, and that an “all-Japan,” fullparticipation-type approach was employed under a private-sector general manager possessing both
political power and professional knowledge. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW),
MOFA, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), JICA, JBIC (at that time), the National Center for Global
Health and Medicine (NCGM), NGOs, researchers and others, all participated in the Takemi Study
Group and provided intellectual input for the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit in 2008, and they were
ultimately successful in setting the summit’s agenda and transmitting the Government of Japan’s
Toyako Framework for Action on Global Health. On this occasion, JCIE served as the secretariat,
launched research and dialogue projects, and provided an environment in which people could carryout unrestricted discussion beyond the boundaries of vertically divided organizational structures.
This had a very significant impact.. A forum was born in which people could discuss policy details
outside of an organizational framework, and government-related organizations also began torecognize its value. In Chart 6, I have organized the factors that made such an approach possible bypaying attention to the role of the Takemi Study Group.

106Chart 6. The Role of the Takemi Study Group in “Challenges in Global Health andJapan’s Contribution”
Coordination
betweendomestic
ministries & agencies

Constructed an “all-Japan” system by coordinating between domestic
ministries and agencies and a forum for participation by various
stakeholders including intellectuals and the private sector.

International network

Built up an international network including Japanese and overseas
foundations, research institutes, corporations and civic society, and tried tomake use of professional knowledge from a global perspective.

Internationaltransmission power

Carried out information transmission to the international community by
publishing an article in the internationally respected authoritative journal,
The Lancet, and by participating in international conferences.

Source:Japanese Organization for International Cooperation in Family Planning (JOICFP), NPO HANDS,
A Study on Japan's Global Health Aid Policy – Toward the Formulation of a New Policy, March 2010

Conclusion
Looking ahead 20 years into the future, the rise of the emerging countries including China looks
set to have an impact in changing the global power balance. However, economic power is noteverything. There are a variety of other means of raising Japan’s presence such as by making a
positive contribution to solving the problems of the international community or becoming involved
in global rule making. Also, even in 2030, there will be no change in Japan’s status as a major
economic power holding the world’s third largest share in terms of GDP (following China and the
US).
Japan, which is bound by a certain amount of restriction on the exercise of defense power, should
involve itself positively in the process of constructing a new world order as a global civilian power.
In particular, development cooperation is one of the few categories of projects that Japan canundertake with its own hands in support of the international community.xx My expectation is thatJapan will stand on a policy of enlightened self-interest that contributes to the activation of the
global economy through the development cooperation and the simultaneous strengthening of thefriendship with partner countries that receive this assistance. I also hope that Japan will play a rolein bridging the traditional donor countries with the emerging countries and the developing countries.
In order to realize this prospect, consensus building within Japan concerning the values Japanwishes to popularize will be essential. Moreover, sharing and communicating a view ondevelopment assistance with the emerging countries of Asia will be of particular importance. We
need to put in place a mechanism for positioning and discussing development cooperation in across-sectional manner within the context of Japan’s national strategy including with respect to107

diplomacy and security. And in order to realize this, it will also be important to raise awarenessamong politicians and the general public about the unity of the world, the relationships between thedeveloping countries and Japan, and the approaches of other foreign countries to international
development. Needless to say, the promotion of development education will be necessary over thelong term.

iAmong others, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the Center for Strategic and International
Studies and the Brookings Institution in the US and the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham
House) in the UK are also working on global health.
ii
Report of the Japanese Cabinet Office, Trends in the world economy 2010: I—Economic recovery led
by Asia and the contagion of the Greek financial crisis. [In Japanese.] May 18, 2010.
iii
Originally set up as the Development Assistance Group (DAG) in response to a proposal by the US in
January 1960, it was given committee status as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at thetime of the establishment of the OECD in September 1961. The original member countries of the DAC
were the US, the UK, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Canada and the European
Commission. Japan was also invited to become a member at the outset, and it joined the DAG before
joining the OECD.
iv
The MDGs form a common framework formed by uniting the UN Millennium Declaration adopted at
the UN Millennium Summit, which was held in September 2000, with the international development
targets that were adopted at major international conferences and summits held in the 1990s. They consistof eight goals that should be achieved by 2015 and are aimed at the eradication of extreme poverty andhunger, the achievement of universal primary education, etc., together with specific figures.
v
Japan’s ODA Task Force was established in 2003 and as of September 2010, local Task Force teams
had been set up in 80 recipient countries.
vi
The Overseas Economic Cooperation Council met 23 times between May 2006 and July 2009 under
the LDP administration, but during the DPJ administration it has only held one meeting so far, in
December 2009.
vii
Refer to “The 3rd Meeting for the Reform of Japanese ODA” (April 22, 2010), presentation by Keizo
Takemi, Professor, Tokai University.
http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/pdf10/ODAMT/3rd/ODAminutesfinal.pdf
viii
At the end of this summary, it is stated that, “Based on the present review, in order to reflect newideas and basic policies, the government would like to start internal discussions for revising the ODA
guidelines.”
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/kaikaku/arikata.html
ix
In terms of total ODA amount spent in 2009 (on a net expenditure basis), the US came in first place,the UK in fourth place, and Japan in fifth place.
x
An abbreviation for “Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development.” For an outline of thispolicy, please refer to the following URL at the website of the White House.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/fact-sheet-us-global-development-policyxi
An interview with the NSC Director in Charge of Development conducted by the author in December
2010.
xii
An abbreviation for “Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review.” For the report and related
information, please refer to the following URL: http://www.usaid.gov/qddr/
xiii
An interview with a person associated with a Washington, DC, think tank conducted by the author in
December 2010.
xiv
The DAC periodically carries out peer review studies of aid by its member countries. The review of
the UK conducted in 2010 gave the country a high evaluation, noting that “the UK is a recognizedinternational leader in development.”

108

xv

While referring to ODA Reform: Five Recommendations (by the Multi-sectoral Task Force for the
Reform of Japanese ODA, June 2010), which the author helped to draw up as one of the founding
members, the author wished to raise this point with a special emphasis on the idea of the present writing.
xvi
MOFA’s ODA Review Final Report (June 2010) also highlighted the concept of “Development
Cooperation,” including activities separate from ODA funded by both the public and private sector(including by corporations, NGOs and ordinary citizens). However, this document positioned ODA as
something that forms the core of development cooperation.
xvii
JICA, International Development Center of Japan and International Development Journal Co., Ltd.,
Data Collection Survey on Strategy Formulation on Human Resources Development in Southeast Asia,
Final Report. [In Japanese.] February 2010.
xviii
Refer to the Minutes of the 4th Meeting for the Reform of Japanese ODA (May 12, 2010), remark
by Eno Nakamura, Executive Director, Development Education Association and Resource Center(DEAR).
http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/pdf10/ODAMT/4th/minutesrevised.pdf
xix
For the details of this approach, refer to “21st century type power politics and health diplomacy inJapan” [In Japanese] by Keizo Takemi, published in Diplomacy, Vol. 5, January 2011. Incidentally, theWorking Group on Challenges in Global Health and Japan’s contribution (June 2007 to July 2009) has
been reformed into the Global Health and Human Security program (Chair: Keizo Takemi; members
comprise 20 actors from government, research organizations, NGOs and corporations including Tadashi
Yamamoto, Manager of JCIE).
xx
Report of the Prime Minister’s Commission on Japan’s Goals in the 21st Century (January 2000),
Section 6. Japan’s Place in the World. This report was commissioned by the late Prime Minister Keizo
Obuchi and produced by an advisory panel of well-informed independent personalities with Hayao
Kawai as Chairperson.
References
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Enhancing Enlightened National Interest – Living in harmony withthe world and promoting peace and prosperity, ODA Review Final Report, June 2010.
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), International Development Center of Japan andInternational Development Journal Co., Ltd., Data Collection Survey on Strategy Formulation on
Human Resources Development in Southeast Asia, Final Report. [In Japanese.] February 2010.
United Nations Secretariat, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), The Millennium
Development Goals Report 2010, June 2010.
Japanese Organization for International Cooperation in Family Planning (JOICFP), NPO HANDS, A
Study on Japan’s Global Health Aid Policy – Toward the Formulation of a New Policy, FY2009
survey commissioned by MOFA, March 2010.
Keizo Takemi, “21st century type power politics and health diplomacy,” Diplomacy, Vol. 5. [InJapanese.] Jiji Press, p. 36–47, January 2011.
Cabinet Office, Trends in the world economy 2010: I—Economic recovery led by Asia and the contagionof the Greek financial crisis. [In Japanese.] May 2010.
Prime Minister’s Commission on Goals for Japan in the 21st Century, Japan’s frontier is in Japan –Building a new century with self reliance and co-governance. [In Japanese.] Report of theCommission on Goals for Japan in the 21st Century, January 2000.
Multi-sectoral Task Force for the Reform of Japanese ODA, ODA Reform: Five Recommendations –Moving into the 21st Century – “Development Cooperation (DC)”, June 2010.
Global Action Task Force on Health System Strengthening, Global Action for Health System
Strengthening: Policy Recommendations to the G8, translation/editing: Japan Center forInternational Exchange, January 2009.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The United Kingdom: Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review, 2010.

109

Chapter 7
Strategic Japanese Diplomacy in View of Natural Resources andEnergyTadashi Maeda

Introduction
Triggered by and ever since the two oil crises, Japan's natural resources and energy policy
appear to have been devised so far based solely on the question of how resource-poor Japan cansecure a stable supply of natural resources and energy. Soaring crude oil prices since 2000 led torevisions of the natural resources and energy policy, mainly by the Ministry of Economy, Tradeand Industry (METI), but no changes were made to the basic position. Even the New National
Energy Strategy prepared by METI in May 2006 grants that promoting energy conservation has
limited effects, despite advocating efforts to further increase energy efficiency in an Energy
Conservation Frontrunner Plan, and acknowledges that the structural vulnerability of Japaneseindustry, which is dependant on imports from overseas for nearly all of its energy resources,
remains unchanged. In view of this, there is no doubt that the strategy in the New National
Energy Strategy makes the primary goal the securing of a stable supply of natural resources andenergy for Japan.
For that reason, the strategy sets as specific efforts regarding oil, for example, the goals ofcomprehensively strengthening relations with resource-rich nations and diversifying supply
sources. The policy objective here is to reduce dependence on the Middle East, which is a high90%. The strategy clearly specifies Russia and the region surrounding the Caspian Sea and thenlater African nations including Libya and Nigeria, and South American countries as the concretetargets for this initiative. However, with the focus, as always, on stable supplies for Japan, thestrategy is structured with the emphasis laid on securing upstream interests. This typical strategy
objective is plainly apparent in the fact that the weight is placed on the classic target of raising
the percentage of oil developed by Japanese companies.
However, in light of the fact that natural resources and energy are strategic materials that form
the backbone of economic activity, they should rightfully be perceived as strategic assets for111

Japanese diplomacy in relations with resource producing countries. Further, it should also be
possible for them to become strategic assets on the higher order of influence in international
markets.
This paper analyzes possibilities for the development of Japan's strategic diplomacy frommultiple angles, centering on natural resources and energy. Specifically, an attempt is made to
analyze the issue from the following perspectives:•

A view of the global markets for specific natural resources and energy, rather than a narrowfocus on the stable supply of natural resources and energy to Japan, and consideration of
their effectiveness as strategic tools for Japanese diplomacy.

•

Clear differentiation of market characteristics for natural resources and energy by category.
For instance, the spot market is well developed in the oil market, making it a commodity
market in which anyone can participate freely. The development of a futures market andarbitrage transactions has turned it into a market into which speculative money flows. In
contrast, the spot market for natural gas, which is a fossil fuel the same as oil, isundeveloped, since in many cases supplies go directly from the supplying country to theconsuming country via gas pipelines. As a result, without interregional arbitrage taking place,natural gas has not become a commodity market.

•

Consideration of supply-side problems—that is, not only supply disruption risks but also
consuming country collaborations and control over markets on the demand side.

•

Adoption of a view that considers pipelines and other means of transport and related
infrastructure as well as inter-industry linkage on downstream sectors.

1.

Viewpoints on the Oil Market and Japanese Diplomacy(1) Characteristics of the Oil Market
The oil market is the most commoditized of the natural resources and energy markets. It has a
deep spot market. Basically, anyone can participate in the market and can receive a supply as
long as the price is paid. In 2010, the worldwide supply and demand on an actual demand basis
hovered at a little less than 90 million barrels per day (B/D). Soaring crude oil prices in 2008
raised concerns, but that spike was not due to short-term supply and demand balance. Rather, it
resulted from the influx of speculative money into the oil market, mainly the futures market, on
the assumption that the upward-sloping growth curve for emerging markets would increase overthe long-term. In this way, the volume of trade in the futures market far outstrips actual demand.

112

Presupposing these kinds of market characteristics for oil, it is rational to establish strategic
objectives through the international oil market. It also makes the strategic objectives ofdecreasing dependence on the Middle East and raising the percentage of oil developed by
Japanese companies, as if the premise were bilateral trade, open to question. Instead, there is theoption of setting the strategic goal as securing a stable supply to the international market andactively contributing to the construction of pipelines and other relevant infrastructure that
contributes to the stability of supplies to the market, even if not brought directly to Japan.
In 2008 the crude oil price in the WTI futures market rose to a level topping $100 per barrel.
In this situation speculative money in the oil futures market was pointed to as the primary causeof the high price. Pension funds (which mainly go long in investments such as commodity funds)
and sovereign wealth funds (SWF) are a bigger presence in this speculative money than hedge
funds, which repeatedly engage in arbitrage transactions combining long and short positions.
Behind this investment of speculative money in long positions in the oil futures market is thenationalization of the oil industry by Saudi Arabia and other oil producing nations despite thefact that production from undeveloped fields, which carries a high initial investment cost, andproduction from secondary recovery or other means will have to be expanded, since oil
production from existing oil producing fields is declining significantly from 2010. The lack ofheadway in reducing the bottleneck of supply to the market, since investment of foreign capitalin upstream interests is being refused, stands as a fundamental challenge. Were Japan tostrategically employ measures to expand investment upstream in order to stabilize the long-term
oil market, this would lead to further stability in the international oil markets.
(2) Strengthening Relations with Middle Eastern Nations
The strategic objective of reducing dependence on the Middle East is not only ineffective interms of macroeconomics; it may well lead to policy induced projects with upstream interests indisregard of economic rationality, in Africa and other locations with relatively high risks andcosts. At the same time, it may possibly restrain investment in Middle Eastern nations bycomparison, which would likely turn out to be inappropriate as a strategy. Instead, Japan should
assume that dependence on the Middle East will remain high and concentrate its efforts oncreating stronger multi-dimensional relations with Middle Eastern nations and on supporting alower dependence on oil in the economies of Middle Eastern oil producing nations andsophistication of their industrial structures. For example, when then Prime Minister Abe made aseries of visits to countries in the Middle East in May 2007, Saudi Arabia strongly pressed for the113promotion of direct investment from Japan, based on the Industrial Cluster Concept. In response
to such a request from Saudi Arabia, Japan set up the framework for a public-private Japan-Saudi
Joint Investment Promotion Committee and is endeavoring to promote investment by the private
sector. However, in the face of issues including problems in the investment environment in Saudi
Arabia (in particular Saudization, which obligates the hiring of Saudi nationals) and the problemof the size of Saudi Arabia's domestic consumer market, a big gap has opened between Saudi
expectations and Japan's investment preferences.
The Petro Rabigh Project, a joint venture between Sumitomo Chemical Co., Ltd., and Saudi
Aramco, is an example of investment from Japan in Saudi Arabia since 2002. The biggest factor
in the investment decision was the offer of inexpensive raw materials by Saudi Aramco, andinvestment in the downstream petroleum sector based on a low-cost supply of crude oil can be
expected in the future. In addition, private sector investment has also been made in Independent
Water and Power Projects (IWPP). In this way, investment in fields that are economicallyrational for Japanese investors seems sufficiently probable. Nevertheless, by itself investment inthese areas has little impact as resources diplomacy, since it is uncertain whether it is the"investment in strategic fields" sought by Saudi Arabia. For instance, strategic investment by thestate is desired in fields that are difficult to tackle with private investment alone. One example isstrategic investment in strategic projects such as the Abdullah Gas City Project sponsored by
King Abdullah.
(3) Expansion of Oil Pipelines and Transportation Routes
Taking a panoramic view of the overall international market for oil, in the interest of reducing
oil supply disruption risks, the diversification of safe oil transportation routes is important in thesense of stabilizing oil transit. For importing countries, ensuring safe navigation for tankers
through transportation bottlenecks from the Middle East comes foremost. In that sense, theeffectiveness of maritime interdiction operations, conducted with the cooperation with thecoastal nations of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, in the Strait of Malacca, through which
numerous ships pass and where damages are caused by acts of piracy, needs to be increased.
Additionally cooperating with China and South Korea is the key, since ensuring safety in theStrait of Malacca is a common proposition for Northeast Asian nations that consume energy
resources. The United States National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the State Department's
Policy Planning Staff have, since 2005, considered creating a new multilateral security
framework in Northeast Asia. In this case as well, it is positioned as a concrete step for114

cooperation among the coastal nations along the Strait of Malacca, Japan, China, South Korea,
and the US under a multinational framework in order to ensure safety in the straight.i
Japan has brought up the question of maritime security at ASEAN+6 and the East Asia
Summit (EAS), in which the US and Russia participate. Putting maritime security in the South
China Sea and East China Sea on the agenda is effective for multilaterally creating a system ofchecks against China. For its part China is opposed to taking this issue up, and so, from thespecific standpoint of energy security it is important for Japan to get the coastal nations involved.
In this way, there is a need to roll out strategic diplomacy that strategically broadens discussions,beginning with the raising of more specific issues, in order to achieve the true policy objective.
In the Middle East's Persian Gulf, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is in a geopoliticallyimportant position between the Persian Gulf and the open sea. Participation in construction of anoil pipeline linking Abu Dhabi, the largest oil producing emirate in the UAE, and Fujairah, theemirate in the east of the country beyond the Strait of Hormuz, is an important point for energy
security, in preparation for the possibility of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran. Oman,
which borders the UAE, is another oil producing country in a geopolitically important position,
located outside the Strait of Hormuz, which is a bottleneck for maritime transit of oil andliquefied natural gas. The level of Oman's recoverable reserves is no more than five billion
barrels, or 0.5% of worldwide reserves, and the country provides no more than 3% of Japan's
imports. With a reserves to production ratio (R/P) of 20 years the Omani government recognizes
that oil production in the country will decline significantly, relatively sooner than other Persian
Gulf states. Accordingly, it is advancing policies to shift from crude oil production to thedownstream petrochemical industry. In the interest of energy security for Japan, Oman ispositioned as an alternative gateway outside the Strait of Hormuz. Japan should encourage
investment by its petrochemical sector in Oman's Sohar Industrial Estate and consider strategic
investment aimed at securing an oil transportation route that bypasses the Strait of Hormuz
through development of the Port of Sohar and Duqm Port.
Another place where the securing of oil transportation routes is a pressing geopolitical issue isin Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan along the Caspian Sea. Thus far, pipelinetransportation routes for oil and gas around the Caspian Sea had been monopolized almost
entirely by Russia. With the rise of Russian resource nationalism there is no doubt that Russia
places strategic importance on Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and other parts of Central Asia as
being in its backyard.ii With strong backing from the US Congress, the BTC pipeline wasconstructed by BP and an international consortium.iii The BTC pipeline transports crude oil from115

the ACG oil field, from Baku through Georgia to Ceyhan in Turkey. The intention was totransport oil directly to Ceyhan, Turkey on the Mediterranean Sea, whereas previously the onlytransportation route was to the Black Sea through Russian territory. The pipeline was built
successfully and oil transportation has begun, but the transportation route from the Kashagan
Fieldiv in the northern part of the Caspian Sea is still undetermined. For its part Japan should
cooperate with the West and work ultimately toward the transportation of crude oil from the
Kashagan Field via an extension of the BTC pipeline. As an alternative route, a plan also exists
for an extension to the CPC pipeline, which transports oil through the city of Atyrau on the northshore of the Caspian Sea to Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. However, this route would beheavily influenced by Russian resources strategy and is also compromised by the fact that transit
from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea has to go through the bottleneck of the Bosporus.
Thus far Japan has focused on raising the acquisition of upstream interests by Japanesecompanies and increasing the percentage of oil developed by Japanese companies. However, therise of the kind of resource nationalism seen in Russia begs the question of whether a safe routefor transportation to Japan can be secured merely by securing upstream interests; and if atransportation route to supply international markets is not secured, vulnerability remains in termsof energy security, demonstrating the one-sidedness of this option. In order to transport oil fromthe Kashagan Field through the BTC pipeline, an overland pipeline would first have to be built toport facilities on the Caspian coast, from which the oil would need to be transported by tankers to
Baku. As an option, a Trans Caspian Pipeline running under the Caspian Sea has been proposed,
but its feasibility is uncertain due to border problems in the Caspian Sea and technical challenges.
For its part Japan should probably consider, through public-private cooperation, financial
assistance from Japanese companies aimed at construction of the necessary infrastructure, on thecondition of a greater off-take of oil, instead of stopping at Inpex Corporation's 7.56% stake.
2.

Natural Gas as a Strategic Material(1) Japan Specialized in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
As a clean energy source with low greenhouse gas emissions, natural gas is responsible,
alongside nuclear power generation, for meeting Japan's base load for power and heat. Japan
does not have a system for receiving supplies of natural gas via pipelines as in Europe; it relies
on imports for nearly its entire volume, all of which comes in the form of liquefied natural gas(LNG). In 2008 the global LNG trading volume was 203 million tons, of which Japan imported
about 67 million tons, or a little less than 40%, giving it the world's largest volume handled. In

116terms of the makeup of countries of origin, dependence is greater in the Asian and Oceanianregion including Indonesia (20%), Malaysia (19%), and Australia (17%), in stark contrast to thesituation with oil; dependence on the Middle East is less than 30% in total, mainly on the three
countries of Qatar, the UAE, and Oman. In that sense, geopolitical supply disruption risks likethose for oil are relatively low. But, with no spot market developed as in the case for oil, if
supplies were disrupted even temporarily, or if production from gas fields was significantly
delayed, finding alternative suppliers would be difficult and the fact that there are difficulties instorage would be a bottleneck.
Japan's share of global trade in LNG has been decreasing from over 70% in the 1980s to 50%
in 2002 to less than 40% as of 2006. This decline is anticipated to continue over the long-term, in
response to mounting global demand for LNG as demand rises in the US and in emerging
markets such as South Korea, China, and India, and Japan's share is forecast to be less than 20%
in 2020. The drop in the share accounted for by the Japanese market may well bring Japan's
bargaining power down, and so there is a need to establish strategic responses for when it
maintains its bargaining power through tactics such as price formation mechanisms.
(2) Natural Gas in Diplomacy Strategy with Russia
In light of the above, mention should be made of Japan's strategic viewpoint on natural gas
development in regards to Russia, which is geographically close to Japan. Russia is the world's
largest producer of natural gas, but up to now development of gas fields from the Yamal
Peninsula westward has taken priority in order to supply the European market, while gas fielddevelopment in Siberia and Sakhalin lagged behind. Offshore gas fields off the northeast coast of
Sakhalin have been in development since the 1990s and the Sakhalin-I and Sakhalin-II projects
were developed. Of particular note, Sakhalin-II involved the laying of gas pipelines cutting
across the island and the construction of two LNG trains in Aniva Bay at the southern end of theisland. Initially the Sakhalin-II project got underway as a joint venture among Anglo-Dutch oil
major Shell and Japan's Mitsui and Mitsubishi. But, along the way Russia's state-owned
company Gazprom ended up owning over 50% of the shares. Until now Russia mainly supplied
natural gas via pipeline to the European market, and this project signifies the first time Gazprom
has owned an LNG facility. The Russian government under the Putin/Medvedev Administration
views natural gas in particular as a strategic material among the country's natural resources.
Under the Eastern Gas Program announced in September 2007, Russia is trying to connect gas
fields in four locationsv in Eastern Siberia and the Far East with gas pipelines and build a system117

to supply 50 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year to East Asia. For that reason grossinvestment in the program is expected to reach $81 billion by 2030.
Russia's supply of natural gas in Europe is supplied via pipelines. When conflict broke out
between Russia and Ukraine, European states including Poland and Germany that had been
importing natural gas from Russia through Ukraine became strongly aware of the supply
disruption risks for natural gas caused by a temporary halt of supplies by Russia. For that reason,
European states stepped up their moves in search of alternative suppliers, including the planningof a proposal to import natural gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan via a pipeline that does
not go through Russia (the Nabucco Pipeline). In light of this, Russia developed the strategy ofliquefying natural gas produced from the Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea and exporting it
to North America. However, an event occurred that forced Russia to abandon this plan: the gainin momentum in the US of development of shale gas, which is natural gas stored in geologicallayers of shale. This resulted in a sudden drop in the Henry Hub price, which is the price fornatural gas in the US. Because the market for natural gas is not commoditized, price arbitrage by
region does not work, and so the Henry Hub price hovers about 50% below the price in Asia.
Consequently, in terms of cost, Russia's initial plan to export LNG to North America no longer
held up economically. This unexpected development then limited the plausible buyers for
Russian natural gas as a strategic material to East Asia. In other words, the Eastern Gas Program
increased in strategic importance.
Development of natural gas, which is a strategic material for Russia, the construction of gas
pipeline infrastructure, and the development of downstream sectors such as the petrochemicalindustry require investment of an enormous sum of money. Considering the fact that
implementation of shale gas development removed export of LNG to North America as arealistic option for Russia, which wants to diversify its outlets for natural gas, Japan has leverage
it can use against Russia in multiple regards: (1) the financing of gas field development; (2) the
financing of infrastructure construction, including gas pipelines; and (3) long-term off-take of
LNG, which is the product. Previously, items (1) and (2) were often perceived as "economic
cooperation" and regarded as a form of assistance. For that reason, the dominant understanding
was that the primary beneficiary would be Russia—the side receiving funding. The dominantview regarding item (3) was that private-sector businesses such as electric companies, gas
companies, and trading firms would take volumes they need according to the demand of eachindividual company. Hence, the viewpoint that item (3) is an asset in diplomacy strategy had
been almost completely overlooked. Still more, no thought was given to strategically combining

118

these items, nor to amplifying leverage against Russia by taking a greater off-take than neededby Japan (from the viewpoint of item 3), nor to the strategic option as a consuming country ofcooperating with South Korea (consuming country collaboration). In the case of South Korea,
off-take agreements are monopolized by the semi-public Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS). In
regards to LNG produced by the Sakhalin-II project, the two countries agreed that Japan would
take two-thirds and KOGAS would take one-third. In the case of Japan, because multiple electricand gas companies participate, from a strategic perspective it is difficult for individualcompanies to take more than their own demand or respond strategically in other ways.
Accordingly, there is a need for a scheme such as creating a buffer by establishing in a joint
venture between the government and trading firms a corporation that would handle strategic
off-take.
3.

Uranium and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Natural uranium ore, which is the raw material for low-enriched uranium that is used as fuel innuclear power generation, is an area in which huge demand can be expected over the long-term,
given that the nuclear power renaissance motivated by mounting awareness of the climatechange problem has led to planned construction of a total of 202 new nuclear power plants
worldwide by 2030. Uranium is buried broadly across the globe, including in the developed
nations of the US, Canada, and Australia, and in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia and otherformer Soviet Union states, Mongolia, South Africa, and Namibia. Due to the fact that there is noestablished spot market and given the problem of high development costs resulting from the factthat many ore deposits exist in remote areas with insufficient infrastructure, the price for uranium
has been unstable in recent years and had even jumped more than 15 fold in a short period. At thesame time, given the need to go through the process of conversion → enrichment →reconversion → fuel fabrication, and since uranium enrichment technologies are immediately
applicable to nuclear weapons development, a strict international control structure has been
imposed over the entire nuclear fuel cycle by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.
Additionally, the problem of how to arrange the storage of spent nuclear fuel and the process fornuclear reprocessing (what is called the back end), is a major issue. The question of where to
perform this back end processing is expected to be a bottleneck in the development of nuclear
power plants outside Japan as well. Since there is a limit to Japan's domestic processing capacity,
it will become necessary to perform this processing in a third country. However, obtaining theunderstanding of a third country would be difficult if bringing only the back end portion to that119

country, and this, it is feared, would allow a monopoly by Russia and France, which alreadyposses back end technologies and have spare processing capacity. In view of this, Japan needs topropose a comprehensive partnership to a country like Mongolia, for example, that is very likely
to accept back end processing in return for financial cooperation for the development of
undeveloped uranium mines and construction of transportation infrastructure (railroads,
terminals, etc.).
4.

Rare Metals and Rare Earths
Ore deposits of rare metals and rare earths, which are of vital importance for Japan's

manufacturing industry, are unevenly distributed in certain countries and regions. Also,
depending on the type of ore, they are divided into ones that are developed as the main productand ones that are produced as a byproduct of copper, gold, and other metals and minerals.
Consequently, the fact that development of rare metals and rare earths entails additional costs is abottleneck. What is more, the supply chain is complicated, since the industries that require eachtype of ore are wide-ranging. Furthermore, entrusting initiative to the private sector isunreasonable due to political and other risks associated with the producing countries. In a field
like this, the national government needs to actively create a National Strategy Fundvi and takeactions like the following:•

M&A-based capital participation in existing near mine development majors, etc.

•

Investment in new mine development.

•

Cooperation for downstream sectors and infrastructure construction.

•

R&D investment for alternative technology development.

5.

Conclusion
Natural resources and energy are strongly colored by their position as strategic materials, moreso than their commodities factor. But, the degree of that shading varies depending on the specificnatural resource and energy. Nevertheless, focusing on strategic directions while accurately
grasping Japan's place in the overall value chain will lead to a clear awareness that these are“assets in Japanese diplomacy.” It is hoped they will serve as a guide in strategic diplomacy inthe future.

120

i

In its China Military Power Report the US Department of Defense sounds a note of warning about
the buildup of the Chinese Navy's high seas deployment capabilities. But, in the interest of evading
potential friction with China, there is also the view that promoting cooperation on common
multilateral issues, not only between the US and China, will check the excessive caution inside the
US government and Congress taken toward China.
ii
The "NATO and Energy Security, August 15, 2007" report by the US Congressional ResearchService points out the perception, particularly on the part of European nations, of the agreement
among Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan to build a new gas pipeline as a threat, and mentions
the need to expand NATO's role in energy security.
iii Even in “Energy and US Foreign Policy, March 9, 2007,” Daniel S. Sullivan, Assistant Secretary ofState for Economy, Energy and Business Affairs, mentions that the US government and Congress
backed construction of the BTC pipeline.
iv
The largest oil field discovered since 1980. It has reserves of 11.2 billion barrels and a peak
production volume of 1.2 million B/D. Japanese oil company Inpex Corporation owns an 8.33%
upstream interest in the field alongside Western majors Exxon Mobil, Shell, Total, and Agip.
KazMunayGas, Kazakhstan's state-owned oil and gas company, also owns an interest. There isconcern about resource nationalistic behavior by the Kazakh government.
v
A program to build a unified gas production, transportation, and supply system in Eastern Siberia
and the Far East through the creation of a network of gas pipelines linking gas fields in Sakhalin,
Yakutia, Irkutsk, and Krasnoyarsk with Khabarovsk and Vladivostok.
vi"National Strategy Fund" refers not to a fund for making portfolio investments but to agovernment-driven fund for investing from the perspective of long-term national strategy, beyond
consideration for short-term profitability. For example, Abu Dhabi's Mubadala Development
Company corresponds to this. Conceivable funds in the case of Japan include the general accountbudget, the foreign exchange funds special account, the GPIF, and combinations of these.

121Chapter 8
Japan’s Science and Technology Policy
Kazuto Suzuki

Introduction
If we consider international conditions and Japan’s position in the world 20 years from now,science and technology will, without a doubt, be playing a vital role. As a country that maintained astrong focus on “monozukuri” (manufacturing products) to sustain its economic growth, Japan in
the 1970s began to transfer its production overseas, which signaled the progressive “hollowing out”
of its manufacturing industry at home. In recent years, however, Japan has been gradually losing its
price competitiveness in general-purpose products with the rise of the emerging nations ofSoutheast Asia and China, and it is clear that the country is reaching the stage where it can nolonger successfully compete with emerging nations that operate on low wage systems andadvantageous exchange rate arrangements simply by “manufacturing products” as it has done in thepast. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Japan has been entirely usurped of its prominent positionin the manufacturing industry. Its sound competitiveness in manufacturing products comes from its
ability to attract buyers even when the prices are higher. Japan’s ability to attract customers comesfrom the superior quality and functions of Japanese products. To be more specific, it comes fromJapan’s technological capabilities.
In this regard, however, will promoting a science and technology policy result in raising Japan’s
technological capabilities, which to date have been the source of its competitiveness? Has Japan’sscience and technology policy been a policy that has provided the support necessary for Japan tosurvive in international society 20 years from now and to continue to maintain a noteworthy
presence in that society? This paper will briefly review Japan’s science and technology policies todate and will present a vision for Japan’s global competitiveness in science and technology in lightof conditions in other countries, and in doing so, will make recommendations regarding the scienceand technology policy that Japan should adopt.

1231. The Uniqueness of Japan’s Science and Technology Policy(1) Science and Technology Policy as Latent Deterrence
Japan’s science and technology policy up until now can be described as having had three main
characteristics. First, while Japan has focused on peacetime uses of science and technology without
overtly pursuing the development of military technology, it has promoted the development oftechnology which may have latent military and strategic uses. During the postwar occupation, theresearch of science and technology directly related to military technology was strictly controlled.
Following the restoration of Japan’s sovereignty in 1952, however, research in dual use technology
for both military and civilian purposes was gradually allowed, but by this time the Cold War had
already begun. With the understanding that science and technology would play a pivotal role intheir future military capabilities, both the United States and the Soviet Union began to invest hugesums of money not only to promote technology for military applications but also to raise the levelof science and technology in their countries by raising the standard of science education in theirschool systems and investing military funds in basic research in universities and other institutions. i
Up until this time, Japan’s science and technology was limited to basic and theoretical researchcarried out for the most part in universities. What changed this situation significantly was theinternational technology transfer program for nuclear energy technology known as “Atoms for
Peace,” which was promoted by the Eisenhower administration. As a result, nuclear energy
research was publicly encouraged even for Japan, and with the establishment of the Science andTechnology Agency in 1956, so-called “big science” was promoted by Japan’s science andtechnology policies at the government’s initiative. ii However, with the establishment of adomestic legal system and legal imperatives, including those relating to Article 9 of the newConstitution and the Atomic Energy Fundamental Act, which restricted the transfer of technology
for military use, it was extremely difficult for Japan to implement a military-oriented science andtechnology policy like the policies promoted by the United States or the Soviet Union. On the other
hand, in terms of military balance with the Soviet Union and China, Japan was the only power inthe region without strategic weapons, either nuclear weapons or even missiles, and this created asense of anxiety within the government. iii
As a result, while Japan engaged in scientific and technological research at a purely academic
level overtly claiming that its pursuit of so-called “dual use technology” in areas such as nuclear
technology, space technology, biotechnology and material research, which could in the future beconverted to military purposes, was for peaceful purposes, it began to develop a science and124technology policy based on the underlying assumption that the ability to convert this know-how
into military technology in the future by enhancing the country’s basic technological capabilities
would become a form of “ latent deterrence.”iv(2) Science and Technology Policy Aimed at “Catching up”
In this science and technology policy based on the underlying assumption of latent deterrence,
catching up to the level of technology of Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States became a
specific policy goal. To acquire latent deterrence, it was necessary to indicate that reaching thestandards of technology of Europe, Russia and the United States would enable Japan to have thestandard of technology that at any time could be converted to military technology within a shortperiod of time.
By setting “catching up” as a goal, Japan’s science and technology policy made it possible tosimply introduce the development of technology of a nature that is generally undertaken by various
countries as a matter of course without further justification. In other words, this policy goal “tocatch up with other countries” provided an automatic, concrete response to the question, “Why isthis research project necessary?” and created the grounds for justification of the policy. As a result,the “policies” implemented by the Science and Technology Agency and Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology have been able to focus largely on investigating trends inresearch in various countries and within the constraints of limited budgets coordinate activities sothat resources can be allocated to various projects and engineers and companies responsible for thedevelopment of technology can continue their activities. These “policies” also focus on examining
the project technology and the status of progress of such projects. v In this way a “sweeping”
policy could be developed where the process of selection and concentration of technology could be
avoided and resources could be widely distributed across broad areas to make “catching up”
possible.

(3) Science and Technology Policy Isolated from Use and Industry
The fact that Japanese “technological expertise” is highly regarded and has been associated withinternational competitiveness is due largely to the fact that Japan’s science and technology policy
and industrial policy, which make use of technology in the private sector, diverged significantly.
Even in space technology, where the government plays the leading role in research anddevelopment, assigning top priority to the development of technology has resulted in the failure of125satellite manufacturers such as Mitsubishi Electric Corporation and NEC to achieve international
competitiveness and their inability to sell their products to most users overseas. In fact, except forthe purchase of one satellite, even Sky Perfect JSAT procures foreign-made satellites. vi
The reason Japanese industries have international competitiveness and are recognized for their“technological expertise” is not due to the success of Japan’s science and technology policies.
While there are various reasons why Japanese industries have competitiveness, the overwhelming
reason why Japanese technological expertise is highly regarded is because Japanese industries
promoted research and development independently on their own and promoted the development of
their respective technologies taking into consideration the needs of the market. In this regard, there
was a strong recognition of the need to differentiate products through technology in order tobecome competitive and manufacturers aimed to enhance the attractiveness of their products by
shortening the new product cycle and continually promoting technical innovation. While theincorporation of excessive technology in some products drew criticism as products that went too far(particularly some cell phones which were said to have the “Galapagos syndrome”), these too wereindicative of the significant divergence of progress in the development of products and technology
in the private sector from the science and technology policy of the government.

2. Increasing Competition in the Global Market(1) Rise of Emerging Nations
Bearing in mind the unpredictability of new developments in technology, we can begin toperceive a number of directions the development of technology might take when we consider theworld of the next 20 years. First of all, there will be improvement in the standard of science andtechnology in emerging nations. Although there are significant differences in China and India,
which we refer to as emerging countries, they are both countries with extremely high levels oftechnological capabilities. It can be assumed that the high economic growth these countries haveachieved since the beginning of the 21st century is largely due to the inflow of foreign capital thatwas first attracted to these countries mainly because of low wages. There is no doubt that this factor
was a driving force propelling economic growth but if we focus on simple labor at cheap wages
alone, we will most likely fail to understand the process of the future development of theseemerging nations.
Prior to changes in domestic policy and the opening up of China, its technological capabilities in
the areas of nuclear energy, aerospace, and IT were extremely high by international standards, due

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largely to investment in military technology. In 1986, starting with the so-called “863 Plan,” which
was triggered by the United States’ Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or better known as the “StarWars Plan,” China aggressively promoted investment in research and development in hi-techareas. vii

At present China ranks fifth in the world viii in the number of patent applications,surpassing Japan, and at the same time it has been promoting human resource development throughoverseas study, particularly in the United States, and the government appropriates an enormous
amount of investment to domestic universities and research institutes and, again surpassing Japan,
currently ranks second in the world in investment in research and development. ix
However, these initiatives have yet to result in raising the international competitiveness ofChina’s corporations and brands. Even though its technological capabilities may be improving,
China’s industries are comprised of a very large ratio of OEM and other subcontractors that supply
parts for Japan and Korea and it has yet to establish many unique brands of its own. Furthermore,
although China possesses a high standard of technology, from the perspective of innovation, thisknow-how has not translated into new products nor has China reached the stage where it is creating
new business models. The reason for this may be traced to the fact that China, like Japan in the past,is at a stage where it is concentrating its energies on “catching up” and, rather than the provision of
new products is giving priority to acquiring the know-how that other countries already have.
Another reason may be that industrial policies in China have a tendency to favor models thatdeliver higher returns on short-term earnings. The socioeconomic structure also makes it difficult tostart up new businesses with a long-term perspective. Both of these may be considered problems.
Moreover, continuous intervention of the Communist Party in a system of one-party dominance aswell as market competition that continues to be undermined by corruption and corrupt practices arelikely to inhibit China’s creation of its own new value. However, if in the next 20 years a newframework for creating new business through innovation emerges in China, on the basis of its
existing strong technological capabilities, which will serve as the foundation; it is not hard to
imagine that China will achieve sustainable economic growth.x
In India, on the other hand, rather than manufacturing, the service industry centered on the IT
industry and the subcontracting of call centers, referred to as back offices, has been the driving
force of economic growth. Until the 1990s, however, India had adopted a system of self-sufficiency
through a closed economic system, and therefore had a sizable industrial base for supplying manyof its own products. Furthermore, because India already has technological capabilities of a world
standard in the chemical industry, steel industry, and aerospace development, it can be assumed that127

these will be the driving force of future economic growth. xi These technologies are alreadycontributing to India’s international competitiveness in areas such as pharmaceutical products and,like China, India has researchers who are actively engaged at the frontline of research inuniversities in the United States and Europe and its technological capabilities can be expected toincrease.xii
Unlike China, however, because India has a democratic system which, on the one hand, makes it
difficult to promote a government-led industrial policy, on the other hand, it still has various
inhibiting regulations left over from the era when its economy was closed. Consequently, theefficiency of the market is poor, so it is difficult to expect robust investment and innovation.xiii
Development of new and improvement of existing infrastructure are lagging and although recently
there has been a noticeable acceleration in improvement, it is unlikely that obstructions toeconomic activities such as power outages and poor roads and railways will be rectified in theforeseeable future. Moreover, education infrastructures that can cope with a population that is set togrow further are inadequate, limiting the country’s capacity to provide a high-quality workforce.
On the other hand, the skills of one segment of the elite in India are high and that segment is alsoquite sizable. Therefore so long as this segment continues to actively participate inknowledge-intensive industries, growth in the software and services industries will continue andIndia will probably continue to maintain its superiority in certain industries.

(2) Can the United States Maintain Its Hegemony?
The country that until now has been in a hegemonistic position in the area of science andtechnology is the United States. It has received more Nobel prizes than any other country in theworld and in the areas of science and technology it has maintained an overwhelming position thatno other country can come close to. For many countries, the United States serves as a model that
other countries feel they should aspire to and that they can learn from. This is why many overseas
students go to the United States to study and why studying in the United States was believed to be
the easiest and most expedient way of raising a country’s standard of science and technology.
It cannot be denied that the scientific and technological capabilities of the United States were
initially promoted to some extent as a military imperative. During the Cold War era scientific andtechnological capabilities were indicators of military superiority and having a higher technologicalstandard than the Communist bloc was an absolute condition for the leader of the West.xiv Even
today Americans are reminded of the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik, which occurred in 1957, as

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a warning when they fall behind in the areas of science and technology. In his State of the Union
Address in 2011, President Obama even mentioned the rise of the emerging nations as a “Sputnik
moment” as he emphasized the United States’ need to further increase its scientific andtechnological capabilities.”xv It was in an environment of international competition that the UnitedStates developed its scientific and technological capabilities and, as stated earlier in section 2.(1), if
we assume that the emerging nations will rise to prominence in the next 20 years, it is also likelythat the United States will promote even more ambitious initiatives than ever before to further
enhance its scientific and technological capabilities.
At the same time, however, in many cases the government of the United States does notintervene in the development of that country’s scientific and technological capabilities. The UnitedStates’ IT industry based in Silicon Valley developed at the initiative of universities and venturecorporations, and not through the direct intervention of the government. Furthermore, even though
the Internet was developed for military purposes, it was not the government that fostered its growth
as an industry.xvi As these examples illustrate, the roles of the government and the market inscientific and technological capabilities in the United States are clearly separated, and thegovernment even makes available to the private sector technology it develops for military purposes.
In this respect, creating an environment where the industry will grow on the basis of market
principles, establishing the infrastructure to encourage this, and assisting in education are importantroles of the government. At the same time, primary and secondary high school education in the
United States are in a state of crisis, and as the fiscal conditions of the individual states deteriorate,
government policies are becoming fragmented and education and other budgets are being cut. Even
though support is provided for tertiary education, a large ratio of this support comes from overseas
students, and the foundation of the country’s scientific and technological capabilities is weakening.
Fiscal reconstruction at the federal level is also having an impact on the areas of science andtechnology, with budget cuts in technological development accompanying military budget cuts andthe suspension by the Obama administration of the Constellation Program, a plan for exploration of
the moon and Mars launched by the preceding Bush administration. These measures are symbolicof the United States as a whole at present, as government projects in key areas such as spacedevelopment that form the bedrock of science and technological capabilities lose momentum.
Much the same can be said about Green Innovation, which was to be a flagship project of the
Obama administration, involving the construction of high speed railways and the development ofsmart grids. Due to fiscal restraints, however, this program is stagnating and the long-term

129prospects cannot be predicted. The series of accidents at the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Plant
triggered by the Great Tohoku Earthquake are also casting shadows of doubt over the future of thenuclear policy the Obama Administration has been promoting. Furthermore, there is little
expectation that the situation will change much in the long term and the greater the impact offactions such as the Tea Party, which is calling for cuts to fiscal spending, the more it can beassumed that government-initiated projects in science and technology will decrease.
If we consider the long-term outlook for the United States 20 years from now, the bedrock forsustaining its hegemonistic position will be shaking. Nevertheless, as a country it will not easily let
go of the scientific and technological capabilities it has accumulated, and even if the role of thegovernment should diminish, it can be assumed that initiatives of the private sector in the market tofill this gap and the public sector’s participation in government projects will result in the UnitedStates’ continuing to maintain its scientific and technological capabilities. In short, even 20 years
from now the United States will probably maintain its position as the world’s leader in innovation.

(3) The EU’s Ability to Establish Standards
Two strengths of the EU countries which cannot go unnoticed in the area of science andtechnology are their capabilities in innovation and their ability to set international standards in
Europe. From the perspective of capabilities in pure science, technology, and research anddevelopment, the standards do not quite measure up to those of the United States and Japan.
However, the strength of the EU lies in its ability to set and share technical standards across anumber of countries, and to transform these into global standards. For example, the EU established
GSM (Global Standard for Mobile Communications), a second-generation mobile telephone
communications system, as the integrated standard within the region in 1983. The use of thisstandard made roaming across national borders possible. Gradually this standard was adopted byvarious countries outside the region and eventually this GSM became the global standard.
Furthermore, because EU countries send their respective national representatives to internationalorganizations which set standards, such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and because the EU alone has a total of 27
votes, it has an overwhelming impact on international negotiations.xvii Because of this, the EU has
the ability to play a leading role in making decisions on technical standards. Since the 1980s the
EU has had a framework for cooperating at the EU level in research and development projects
which individual countries had previously done separately on their own. At present the EU

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countries are currently planning to launch their eighth fiscal Framework Programme in 2012 andare actively involved in research and development projects. This Framework Programme operates
on the premise of forming a research consortium with a number of countries. There are special
coordination costs associated with cross-border projects involving a number of countries and at
first glance this approach may seem inefficient.

On the other hand, the cooperation of different

institutions of different countries can be expected to result in new ideas and innovations.xviii
However, if standards of research and development the EU do not improve, the EU will not beable to demonstrate adequate effectiveness for setting such standards. Since the Lehman Shock, theindividual EU countries have strongly felt fiscal constraints and it is possible that this will also
have an impact on research and development projects. At present the order of priority of scienceand technology policies and research and development projects in every country is high and thesehave not been targeted as areas for budget cuts. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that these will feelthe impact indirectly. Great Britain, for example, has cut its defense spending by 20%.
Furthermore, if we consider the long-term outlook of 20 years from now, we can assume that thescience and technology policy cannot avoid such fiscal effects and there will be a need to adopt an
approach of selection and concentration. At that time, it can be assumed that in the case of the EU,
countries will opt for competitiveness in the market as the standard, but it is not possible to say
how effective this will be.

(4) Global Outlook for Science and Technological Capabilities 20 years from Now
If we look at prospects for science and technology policies of such countries, we can see a
relationship where emerging countries on the one hand aim for further economic growth using
science and technology as a lever, despite the various challenges they face, and various countries of
the EU and the United States, which already have a certain degree of research and development
capability and a significant level of scientific and technological capabilities but which lose
momentum through fiscal constraints. As stated earlier, there is also a strong possibility thatcountries, despite being referred to as developing countries, will pursue research and development,
and countries such as Vietnam, Mexico and South Africa, whose growth in scientific andtechnological capabilities is evident, will direct the riches they have gained through economic
growth to their science and technology policies.
What can be said at this point in time is, first of all, the international balance of scientific andtechnological capabilities that had a hierarchical order with the United States at the top will have131

disintegrated, and while the United States may still maintain a degree of superiority, many
countries of equal rank will stand alongside the United States. Second, the scientific andtechnological policies of the developed countries of the EU, the United States and Japan will havepeaked due to financial constraints but conditions in these countries can change depending on how
well they are able to cover their shortfall in funds. In other words, the key point is how they will beable to attract funds from other countries or from the private sector to finance major projects forbasic research and projects with significant risk that previously depended on public funding. Third,
emerging countries and developing countries will have a strong interest in research anddevelopment and will be seeking to introduce and transfer technology from developed countries.
How developed countries which already have a certain degree of scientific and technologicalcapabilities will respond to this demand will probably become an important issue. For example, it
can be assumed that China and Russia in particular will see the transfer of technology as part oftheir diplomatic policies and they will be seeking to secure resources, develop new markets, andgain political influence in return for the transfer of technology. As the United States and the EU
countries as well as Japan hesitate to transfer their technology, if the emerging nations are in aposition to comply with the requests of China and Russia, the likelihood that the balance ininternational society will be upset will probably increase.

3. Recommendations for a Science and Technology Policy for JapanThe question then is what Japan should do in view of such prospects 20 years from now. The
policy issues relating to a science and technology policy cover extremely broad areas, from fiscal
policy to educational policy for fostering the development of scientists and engineers. At this point
I would like to focus on the subject of international conditions 20 years from now in line with thecentral theme of this paper.

(1) Integration of Military and Civilian Technology in an Era of RMA
Unlike policies of the United States, Japan’s science and technology policy had rejected military
use and developed through specialization in research and development of technology as purely
civilian technology. In so doing, Japan succeeded in developing its technological capabilities to aworld standard. Although there is an underlying concept of “latent deterrence” in this policy, thedirect transfer of civilian technology to defense technology is difficult and has been strictly limited.
However, the status of military technology at present varies significantly from that immediately

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after the Second World War or during the Cold War. Like nuclear energy or rocket technology ofthe past, there was a time when certain technology was referred to as “dual use technology” buttoday it is possible for almost every kind of technology developed in the civilian sector to be
applied to military uses – from robotics to IT, materials, chemicals and electronic technology. Thereis also an increasing trend to promote advances in military technology by introducing technology
developed in the civilian sector. This is particularly the case with RMA (Revolution in Military
Affairs) underway in the United States. Centered on IT technology, research and development
carried out under the military budget is being integrated with research at the forefront of research inthe civilian sector. xix Spurred on by RMA in the United States, China is promoting themodernization of its military, and EU countries, which fear losing their competitiveness as a resultof the United States’ investment in RMA, are also promoting investment in hi-tech technology
through their defense budgets, albeit not on a scale with that of the United States.
Even in Japan, the development of military technology is proceeding in a form of RMA
cooperation with the United States in areas such as the development of unmanned aerial vehicles(UAV) and the development of missile defense systems, but this is being promoted in a manner thatis unrelated to the civilian sector and it is not a project aimed at integration with the civilian sector
as seen in the EU, the United States and China. This trend toward integration means that in the
future if Japan is to continue to pursue as it has in the past research and development where suchdevelopment is clearly separated into military and civilian sectors, it is likely to be left behind inboth the area of military technology and civilian technology. Integration of the high level oftechnology Japan has in the civilian sector with military technology will enable more efficientinvestment. It will also probably result in more efficient troop operations and the implementation ofa more efficient defense budget. At a time when fiscal constraints are severe, pursuit of such
efficiency will be an essential policy response for promoting the growth of both defense andcivilian technology.

(2) Review of the Three Principles of Arms Export
Like promoting the integration of defense and civilian technologies, reviewing the threeprinciples of arms export will be an important issue in responding to international conditions. The
three principles of arms export are based on pronouncements by the Diet of the Eisaku Satogovernment in 1967 of prohibiting the export of arms to (1) the Communist Bloc, (2) countries
where arms embargoes have been imposed by UN resolution, and (3) countries which are parties in133

an international dispute or are likely to be parties. However, under the Takeo Miki government in1976 the Diet stated that (1) it would not permit export of arms to areas of the three principles, (2)it would also refrain from the export of arms to regions other than the aforementioned, and (3) itwould treat the export of equipment related to the manufacture of arms the same as for arms. At
present, the three Miki principles, which are generally referred to as the “arms export principles”
and what is of particular interest about these principles is the difference in the way they are
regarded and understood in Japan and overseas.
In Japan these principles are regarded as policy principles that realize Japan’s peace constitution
and at the same time avoid international criticism of Japan as “a merchant of death.” In Japan thesethree Miki principles are also highly regarded. Abroad these principles also serve as a message forinternational peace and recognition of Japan’s “soft power.”xx
However, outside of Japan almost nobody is aware that Japan voluntarily prohibits the export ofarms. In fact, it may be safe to say that this fact is not known at all. Therefore, for Japan to openly
proclaim that it prohibits the export of arms may have the opposite effect and arouse suspicions thatas a country it has a hidden agenda, or it may be viewed as some form of conspiracy theory. Evenamong people who may be familiar with the three principles, they may not necessarily fully
understand the ideals behind them and there would be few who would see Japan’s loss ofopportunity to export weapons as a diplomatic strength for Japan. xxi
The fact is that with the exception of Japan almost all countries not only consider the export ofarms as an important method in their foreign strategies but also as necessary in their industrial
strategies. The countries to which they export arms are usually allies or friendly countries, andexporting arms that are technologically advanced to those countries is meaningful in terms offoreign policy, because these arms will strengthen the military capability of their allies andmutually reinforce their security. Furthermore, when a country provides arms to another country is
also meaningful in the sense that it makes its own military capabilities known to the other country.
This means that if, for example, an ally or friendly country poses a threat to the exporting country
or the exporting country becomes the target of an attack of that country, it will be difficult to defend
itself. In other words, the export of arms is also an act indicating trust in an ally. xxii
In the economies of developed countries where high economic growth cannot be expected, theexport of arms can be considered a way of strategically developing export destinations andmaintaining employment at home. Furthermore, by exporting arms, production increases and drives
down the cost per production unit. Cutting production costs will also alleviate the expenditure on

134arms in the defense budget of the exporting country. This is why the export of arms is encouraged
by many developed countries. Even Germany, which like Japan was defeated in the Second World
War and which has stringent restrictions on the deployment of its troops outside the NATO region,
is a major exporter of arms even from an international perspective. Interestingly, one rarely hears
discussion of any moral issue regarding this country’s export of arms. However, the export of arms
to dictator regimes or military regimes is seen as both a moral issue and a strategic problem in
diplomacy. Therefore, the export of arms to countries in the Middle East and Africa such as
Bahrain and Libya, where government troops have opened fire on popular demonstrations is aserious social problem. In this regard, however, the problem here is the export destination, not theexport of arms per se. This in itself suggests that there is a popular consensus concerning the exportof arms.xxiii
If we consider Japan’s position in light of the above, perhaps there is a need to reconsider thecountry’s stance on the export of arms. The proactive export of arms as an industrial policy is hard
to imagine at this point in time. Because of the implementation of the three principles on the exportof arms, Japan’s defense industry undertakes the development of technology on the premise that it
is solely for supply to the Japanese government. Furthermore, because the production volume islimited, the unit price is extremely high and cannot be said to have international competitiveness.
Furthermore, in light of cases where arms exported to countries of the Middle East and North
Africa were supposedly used in government crackdowns on ordinary citizens, it is advisable forJapan to refrain from the simple export of arms. On the other hand, more flexible arrangements
should be worthy of careful consideration when it comes to an ally such as the United States,
countries with whom Japan engages in security talks like Australia and India, as well as Korea withwhom Japan is building security relations, and countries which are Japan’s global partners like inthe EU. This is particularly so for management of the three principles on the export of arms thatwould enable the joint development of technology for missile defense and RMA-related
technology.
If we consider that export of arms to allies or friendly countries and the joint development oftechnology will strengthen relations among allies, contribute to the stability of international order,and strengthen Japan’s security, a flexible application of the three principles on arms exports will
not necessarily erode the reputation of Japan’s soft power. Furthermore, promoting the joint
development of technology will enable Japan to acquire technology that it would not have beenable to develop on its own, and the application of this technology to the private sector will probably

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contribute to Japan’s ability to maintain its technological capabilities more effectively. In this sense,
if the export of arms is sufficiently controlled by steering away from unrestricted flexibility in theapplication of the principles, such export should contribute to Japan’s diplomatic security and also
contribute to the science and technology policy.

(3) Promotion of a Double Standard
One policy Japan has been promoting in its foreign diplomacy is economic diplomacy, and in
this regard the tendering and receipt of orders for overseas infrastructure is a core issue. Whether it
be in nuclear power plants or railways, Japan’s high technological capabilities place it in good stead
for receiving tenders. The government has also given support through efforts to establish anenvironment that facilitates the receipt of orders. In the areas of nuclear power generation andrailway development the government’s science and technology policy has to some extent beensuccessful. However, it cannot be said that the technology promoted through government projects
is always competitive. For example, in the case of nuclear power generation, while one electric
power company introduced fundamental technology based on development promoted by thegovernment, the company developed its own proprietary technology based on technology it learned
from practical nuclear reactors in operation in the United States and Europe. In Toshiba’s case, thecompany acquired the technology it sought by purchasing Westinghouse in the United States. In thecase of railway development, although the development of the high-speed Shinkansen was a projectof the government, the development of technology for the Shinkansen following its privatization
raised the awareness of the private sector in improving services, and this resulted in developing
new types of passenger cars. This development too cannot be considered an outcome of thegovernment’s science and technology policy.
On the other hand, promoting tendering for infrastructure orders in emerging countries as Japan’s
economic diplomacy would act as an incentive for improving technological capabilities at home.
Japan’s positioning of its science and technology policy as a means of maintaining international
competitiveness would also become clear. Such a policy, however, must never be divorced fromindustry and application as in the past. The ruling Democratic Party has introduced the concepts of“green innovation” and “life innovation” in the policy for new growth that it is currently promoting
and it has indicated an integrated package as a part of its domestic policy for the environment, as anindustrial policy for encouraging economic growth, and as a science and technology policy thatwill make these possible. As a national strategy, it has also drawn up a strategy that incorporates the136science and technology policy as one approach. This will overcome problem areas in Japan’sscience and technology policy already stated and will create a new strategic direction. While thisconcept is just at the inception stage, it will also make a difference in the orientation of the scienceand technology policy. Key to this initiative is whether the Council for Science and Technology
Policy of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, which has been in
charge of the science and technology policy, will adopt a policy that coincides with this new growthpolicy. Unfortunately, at this stage it is not possible to discern a move in this direction.
What will be important in terms of diplomacy in the promotion of an innovation strategy as a
package of this nature is the “setting of de jure standards.” In standards relating to technology, “defacto” standards have been the center of interest. A de facto standard means a product standard thathas overwhelming superiority technologically and which, as the market for it grows, creates a“network externality” where the more the users increase, the greater the value of the standard
becomes. For example, there are many cases where a number of technologies are eliminated in aculling process in the competitive market until ultimately a single standard emerges, as in the caseof VHS and Blu-ray Discs. Japanese products have many de facto standards and this has been asignificant resource in the world market where they have been able to maintain a presence.
Therefore, in discussions in Japan, strategies considering how a de facto standard can be secured
have been at the center of discussions.
However, little interest has been shown in the standard known as “de jure standard” as a standard
for playing an important role in the world markets. This is a standard that is set following
discussions of standards and specifications of new technology in international organizations andmeetings. Countries then proceed to undertake the development of technology based on thisstandard. As already discussed, the EU is skilled at setting de jure standards and has covered
subordination in technological capabilities through its capabilities in political negotiation. In Japan
too, there is increasing interest in the need for a de jure standard and the government is alreadydevoting efforts to introducing de jure standards through discussion. Included in these discussions
is the issue as to whether the digital terrestrial television (DTT) system used in South Americancountries should be introduced as Japan’s system. In this respect, however, one major problem isefforts to set de jure standards do not coincide with the package strategy, and cases can be seen
where such standards are not viable. Even if the South American DTT system is introduced as
Japan’s system, it is Korean manufacturers which have the overwhelming share of this system inthe market, so there is not significant merit for Japan in its adoption.

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Japan’s superiority in the global market where competition is set to escalate will become possible
only when its package concept, science and technology policy and the de jure standard become
integrated. The cooperative promotion of such a foreign strategy by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications is an essential elementin Japan’s science and technology policy.

i

There is an enormous amount of research concerning science technology during the Cold War. As
studies which give a general summary, see Shigeru Nakagawa, “International competitiveness in scienceand technology: United States and Japan – Half a century of rivalry,” Asahi Shimbun [In Japanese], 2006,
and Hiroshi Ichikawa, The Cold War, Science and Technology : in the Case of Soviet Union, 1945-1955.
[In Japanese.] Minerva Shobo, 2007.
ii
Nozomi Sagara, Changes in Japan’s Atomic Energy Policy and Historical Considerations for
Cooperation in International Policy: Implications for the Introduction of Nuclear Power Generation in
the East Asia Region. [In Japanese.] RIETI Discussion Paper Series 09-P-002, September 2009.
iii
An outline of “Japan’s Foreign Policies” by the Foreign Affairs Policy Committee, the Ministry ofForeign Affairs is perhaps a typical example of this discussion. (This report is available for reading at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokoku/pdfs/kaku_hokoku02.pdf accessed February 13,
2011.) This report indicates that “Japan will continue to maintain a policy of not possessing nuclear
weapons for the foreseeable future but will always maintain economical and technological capabilities
for the production of nuclear weapons and at the same time will make arrangements to ensure that thispolicy is not bound by restrictions.”iv
For example, the Soranokai, which claims to be an online think tank for space development discusses
the global role of Japan’s space technologies based on a concept it refers to as the “quiet deterrent.” See
Fujio Nakano, “Making a Show of Science and Technology: A Quiet Deterrent, Part 1 (An Opinion of
Soranokai),” http://www.soranokai.jp/pages/yokushi_kagakugijutsu.html (accessed February 13, 2011).
v
For further discussion on catching up in the development of space technology, see Kazuto Suzuki,“Policy logic as an analysis of the decision-making process in constructivist policies,” in Koji Ono (ed.),Constructivist political logic and comparative politics. [In Japanese.] Minerva Shobo, December 2009.
vi
At the background of this tendering by the Japanese government for the procurement of satellites,
which came under pressure due to invocation of “Article Super 301” of the US Trade Act due to trade
friction between Japan and the United States during the 1980s. Therefore, it cannot be denied that
US-made satellites with greater competitiveness were in a more advantageous position. However, it wasalso clear that the Japanese manufacturers had no competitive edge.
vii
Evan A. Feigenbaum, China’s Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition fromthe Nuclear to the Information Age, Stanford University Press, 2003.
viii“China, 5th in the World in Patent Applications,” People’s Daily Online [In Chinese], March 30,
2010. http://j.peopledaily.com.cn/95952/6935218.html (accessed February 15, 2011).
ix“China’s research and development expenditure to be the world’s 2nd highest, expected to overtake
Japan’s next year,” Asahi Shimbun [In Japanese], December 30, 2010.
http://www.asahi.com/international/update/1228/TKY201012280129.html (accessed February 15,2011).
x
Shinichi Isa, Major power in science and technology - The truth about China. [In Japanese.]
Kodansha Gendai Shinsho, 2010.
xi
Science & Technology Foresight Center, “ Remarkable Development and Science & Technology
Policy in India.: a seminar report,” National Institute of Science and Technology Policy, Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, August 2006.
http://www.nistep.go.jp/achiev/ftx/jpn/mat127j/idx127j.html (accessed February 21, 2011).

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xii

Center for Research and Development Strategy, Report on trends in science technology andinnovation – India. [In Japanese.] Japan Science and Technology Agency, March 2008. This report gives
a detailed overview of India’s general science and technology policies.
http://crds.jst.go.jp/kaigai/report/TR/AS/Asia20080331.pdf (accessed February 21, 2011).
xiii
Mark A. Dutz (ed.), Unleashing India’s Innovation: Toward Sustainable and Inclusive Growth,World Bank, 2007. (Translation by Michiko Murakami, Ittosha, 2008.)
xiv
Eugene B. Skolnikoff, The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution ofInternational Politics, Japanese translation and editorial supervision by Taizo Yakushiji and Kiyofuku
Chuma, NTT Publishing Co., Ltd., 1995.
xv
The White House, Remarks by the President in State of Union Address, January 25, 2011.
xvi
Remarks by T.J. Rodgers, CEO of Cypress Semiconductor Corporation who testified before
Congress in 1993 representing Silicon Valley. His remarks express a typical view on this point. T.J.
Rodgers, “High Technology Innovation: Free Markets or Government Subsidies?: An Entrepreneur
Endorses the Invisible Hand,” Testimony to House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation, March 25, 1993.
xvii
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry Study Group on Economic Efficiency of Standardization(ed.), International Competition and Global Standards. [In Japanese.] Japanese Standards Association,
2006.
xviii
Kazuto Suzuki, “Political economics of European industrial policies: Expansion of integrated areas
in policies for the development of advanced technology” in Kaoru Ishiguro, Hiroharu Seki and Minoru
Sekishita (eds.), Contemporary international politics and the economy: Experiment in interdisciplinary
knowledge. [In Japanese.] Houritsu Bunka Sha, April 1998, Pages 155-170.
xix
There have been numerous studies on RMA. However, at this time see Emily O. Goldman,
Information and Revolutions in Military Affairs, Routledge, 2005.
xx
For example, the editorial “Three Principles on Arms Exports – Unconvincing argument for areview,” Asahi Shimbun [In Japanese], November 20, 2010.
xxi
For example, Michael Chinworth, “The Technology Factor in U.S.-Japan Security Relations," inMichael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin (eds.), US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future, Council
on Foreign Relations, 1999, pp.286-310, etc.
xxii
Richard A. Bitzinger (ed.), The Modern Defense Industry: Political, Economic, and Technological
Issues, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009.
xxiii
Stefan Nicola, “Expert: German Arms Industry Not Innocent,” UPI, January 14, 2009.
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Expert_German_arms_industry_not_innocent_999.html (accessed
March 1, 2011).

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Part 3: Proposals for Japan’s Diplomacy

The Future International Situation and Japan’s Diplomacy:
Prospects and Proposals
Masayuki Yamauchi

I. Diplomacy, Democratization, and “Common Values”/ “Common Interests”——Results andProspects
The Middle East and the Arab world have been ushered into a new historical phase by the
momentum of the recent “wave of democratization” and the “Islamic domino” that have swept
away the walls of fear and hesitancy in the region. This wave of Middle East democratization ishighly suggestive from the standpoint of considering the “common interests” and “common values”
that are vitally important elements in the forming of diplomacy and the establishment of theinternational order. In general, for the international order to be able to function in a stable manner,
it is essential that these “common interests” and “common values” are shared widely among thenations concerned.
Japan and the United States share a basic image of what a desirable international order shouldlook like. The “arc of freedom and prosperity” concept, which Japanese diplomacy has set out inrecent years, is linked to Japanese diplomacy’s task of building a peaceful and stable regional orderin the Asia-Pacific region. This is because the idea of a liberal internationalist order, which Dr.
Nakayama, a member of this research group, has mentioned, has much in common with the “arc of
freedom and prosperity” concept. So, today, I would like to discuss the movements that are seeking
freedom and democratization in the Middle East in relation to this “arc of freedom and prosperity”.
Now, with regard to Middle East democratization, there are three hidden keywords. These are“freedom,” “the rule of law,” and “development”. In Tunisia and Egypt, the obtaining of freedom
was an important result that released the citizens from bondage under a long-term dictatorship that
had imposed individual and public constraints. The people of these nations will henceforth have thefreedom to choose by election the administrations they judge to be most desirable in place of theousted regimes headed by former Presidents Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, who had
been in power for 23 and 30 years respectively. But in addition, they will also acquire the freedom
to make law, including through the revision or establishment of their nations’ constitutions.
Moreover, the rule of law is nothing less than a cornerstone in safeguarding the ordinary citizens’

141freedom of speech and association and liberation from fear. Then again, the people have theresponsibility to investigate the corruption and depravity of the former regimes based on law andevidence, not based on rumor and hearsay.
As Dr. Hosoya of this research group has emphasized, if world peace is to be based on theexistence of a global community, then people everywhere need to share certain “common interests”
and “common values” appropriate to such a global community. Of course, there have been efforts
to seek such common interests and common values even in the quite recent past. For example, theformer British Prime Minister Tony Blair spoke of the necessity for military intervention in Kosovo,
where the humanitarian situation had become disastrous, although this approach was seen to havesuffered a major setback with the Iraq War, showing that it is no easy thing to bring in “common
interests” and “common values” from the outside to realize Middle East peace and democratization
in a world which has unique theories of civilization in terms of the Islamic faith and Arabnationalism. However, the outside expectations being placed on the present Arab democratization
movements are founded on the fact that Middle Eastern Arab citizens have also publicallydemanded freedom and the rule of law, which have become the basis of “common interests” and“common values”, from the inside as well.
The nameless young people (citizens) who gathered together in Cairo’s Tahir Square weredirectly connected horizontally using the so-called “new media” of Twitter and Facebook, which
linked members of the general public both inside and outside of the country. This coincided withthe appearance of a new generation of young people who believe unreservedly in global historicaluniversal values such as freedom, human rights and democracy and who are not intoxicated byideologies such as Arab nationalism or Islamic extremism. A portion of the younger officers andsoldiers on active service also participated in this horizontal solidarity through mobile phone or
joining social media as if playing an online game.
A third issue is that of development. The way development takes place is closely related to anation’s affluence. One thing we should take note of is the reality that since 1980, GDP growth per
capita in the Arab nations including Egypt and Saudi Arabia has remained at an annual average of
only 0.6%, while the industrialization level has also dropped back since the 1970s. All the Arabnations have fallen behind those nations that have ridden the wave of globalization such as Brazil,
Turkey, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, China and India. I suppose that the Middle East nations
where pro-democracy movements are happening at the moment are lagging behind not only interms of economic growth but also in respect of their governments’ efforts to tackle issues that Dr.

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Kameyama of this research group has referred to as “multi-layered environmental governance,”
which encompasses the promotion of transnational global environmental maintenance at the
Middle East regional level and at the trade organizational and environmental protection grouplevels.
However, democratization in the Middle East should not be viewed as an attempt at smoothnation building that takes liberal democracy as its ideal. The United States in particular must
understand this point. Certainly, different Middle Eastern nations have different systems ofgovernment such as monarchies and republics, and there are disparities between those nations thatpossess oil resources and those that do not. But even more than this, the relationships between
various human populations and networks of interests such as the social structure, historical andgeographic characteristics, tribal and religious differences, and differences between nomadic andsedentary communities, etc., vary greatly from one nation to another in the Middle East andthroughout the Arab region. These differences in turn are bound to lead to differences in the timing
and strength of any waves of democratization that may propagate through the region. Bearing in
mind the distinctive character of the Middle East, it may be wiser to consider the present
phenomenon as representing the fourth wave of democratization in world history rather than as anextension of the third wave that occurred from the 1970s to 1990s.
A characteristic of this fourth wave is that the ways in which it produces changes are extremely
diverse. On the one hand there are nations such as Egypt and Tunisia that have set out along a pathfrom change within the regime to fully-fledged regime change, while in other nations the
movement towards democracy is kept in the form of change within the regime, as in the case of
Bahrain, where a moderate path is being pursued in an effort to make a compromise with the Shia,
who comprise over 60% of the citizens. If Bahrain can enact reforms that reduce unemployment
among the Shia and allow their political participation, then it may become a model case fordemocratization and internal regime change among the monarchies of the Arab region. However,there may be nations that are experiencing political reform at present but which, like Libya, will
suddenly close the door on the possibility of peaceful regime change, let alone change within theregime, and enter into a civil war situation in which there will be no limit to the number of civilian
casualties. In Libya, there are regional and tribal differences between Cyrenaica (Benghazi) in theeast and Tripolitania (Tripoli) in the west, and there is also a movement in Fezzan in the central partof the country. Given the present situation, a number of unwelcome scenarios cannot be ruled out
including civil war, anarchy, or even the break up of the country.

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In addition, the case of Libya shares something in common with that of Yemen, where there is anorth-south confrontation. Were Yemen to break up, the possibility that this would produce asituation of anarchy not unlike that existing in the failed state of Somalia cannot be dismissed.
Unless President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has been in power for over 20 years, and the citizens of
the capital Suna’a, proceed rationally along a path to democratization, the world might witness anightmare in which Yemen faces an even more acute situation and becomes a Somalia-like failed
state, which could then serve as a base for terrorism and piracy.
Not only in the Middle East but within the present international community as a whole, thenumber of failed states that have lost their responsible government functions is on the increase, andthere is a possibility that more such states will appear in the Arab Middle East after the manner ofSomalia. According to the definition given by Dr. Michishita, a member of this research group, afailed state is a state in which criminal organizations that represent a global threat receive support
within the state’s territory, as was the case in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime, or in whichorganizations not representing the government are in control of part of the national territory, or inwhich anti-government demonstrations by the populace stoke political turmoil over a protracted
period. The reversal of democratization and the ongoing turmoil in Libya and Yemen could lead tothe rise of failed states that pose a threat to the entire international community.
When I look at the present situation in Libya in which civilian casualties are being produced
almost daily among the anti-Gaddafi forces, I can’t help but recall the slaughter in Rwanda in 1994
and the massacre at Srebrenica, Bosnia in 1995. This once again raises issues relating to themeaning of seeking humanity and morality in the international community, and to the inability of
the international community to do anything other than keeping silent when the governments ofsovereign states openly attack their own citizens. In this case, can we not at least say that the
Libyan people who have risen up against their nation’s dictator in seeking freedom for all citizens,religions and sects, the application of the rule of law without any exception, and balanced
development, are in fact calling for a standard that shares underlying global “common interests”
and “common values”?

II. Prospects for Middle East Democratization —Conditions and Experience
The democratization processes in the Middle East, which call for contents that share theseunderlying global “common interests” and “common values”, must experience roughly thefollowing four elements.

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Firstly, it will be necessary for authority over policy-making power to be transferred to atransitional administration immediately after the former authority has broken down. Especially incases where a long-term dictatorship has lost power, a base for transferring power can be formed
provided that a stable middle class that can take over the reins of power has been nurtured. But if
this is not the case, then the situation will become unstable. In Egypt and Tunisia, the reason why
the present transitional period has been stable and violence has been limited is because of theexistence of a middle class in these nations. Conversely, in nations where tribes conspicuously
stake out their own territory and religious figures and legal scholars legitimize the government, thepeople should initially make efforts to entrust power over the transitional period to tribal leaders or
religious figures who have at least a tentative understanding of global “common values”, and theseprovisional leaders can later be exchanged for leaders who value freedom and the rule of law.
Secondly, whether a nation tries to review or amend its existing constitution or to establish abrand new constitution, regardless of the nature of the task at hand it is important that all theconcerned people participate without discrimination in the process of reaching agreement. In thecase of Bahrain, of course, the will of the majority of citizens must be reflected in the constitutional
revision by including representatives of the Shia among the participants. Such operations in nations
such as Libya, that have no constitution, will be extremely difficult. But even so, getting theestablishment or revision of a constitution accepted by a majority of the people is a basic condition
for successfully making the transfer to a democratic system.
Thirdly, after a revolution or an uprising prompted by a wave of democratization comes to its
end, it is necessary to indicate for how long a period the operation to establish a new constitution
will continue, how and under what framework the operation will proceed, and by what sort of steps
and procedure the new constitution will be established by classifying the arrangements andschedule. It should be understood that the atmosphere of euphoria and excitement that characterizes
revolutions generally lasts for only half a year or a full year at the longest.
Fourthly, any hostility toward the ancient regime or thoughts of revenge against the old systemthat are hiding within society should be eliminated. It will be difficult to erase the memories ofrepressive control from the minds of those who were on the receiving end of dictatorships such asthat of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, and many people will continue to have uncomfortable
memories of the dictatorial Mubarak regime, which was in power in Egypt for over 30 years.
However, those who are newly advocating the people’s freedom and proudly holding up the rule oflaw need to have sufficient tolerance to forgive those servants of the old regime who were not at the145core but only on the periphery of the system, without necessarily forgetting their bitter memories ofthe past. What is required in a new state are bureaucrats and technocrats who have an overall graspof statecraft and are capable of guiding their organizations. The human resources of the new stateneed to work in the spirit of Isei Seimei (literally: “statesmen must be clean”) as advocated by
Japanese Meiji-era politician Toshimichi Okubo. What he meant is that when statesmen appoint or
promote personnel, they must select people who have a clean conscience and under a system of
meritocracy, regardless of whether these people were yesterday’s allies or enemies.
When we think about the support Japan provides for democratization in the Middle East, strong
doubts remain regarding its strategic target for diplomacy, which was designed as if based on
bilateral deals, as apparent in its stance of downsizing the relationship with the Middle East by
seeking to reduce its 90% dependence on the region for crude oil and raising its crude oil
self-development ratio. As Mr. Maeda, a member of this research group, has emphasized, astrategic target such as to reduce the nation’s dependence on Middle East is not only likely to proveineffective in macroeconomic terms, it also carries with it the danger that policy will be guided
towards matters that fly in the face of economic rationality and that hold interest for the elites ofanother region, that of Africa, which has relatively high risks and costs. Moreover, there is apossibility that such a policy would serve to comparatively hold down investment in Middle East
countries, thereby raising the concern that the policy lacks validity in strategic terms as well. So
rather than that, in order to support the ongoing flow of democratization in the Middle East,
whether or not Japan should try to strengthen its multilayered relationships with Middle East
nations based on the assumption that Japan’s dependence on Middle East oil will continue to hoverat a high level, while at the same time supporting a lowering of oil dependence on the economies of
those Middle East oil producing nations that exhibit pronounced disparities and income gaps
between rich and poor while also supporting the upgrading of industrial structure is a question
being asked of Japan’s resource energy diplomacy.

III. The “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” Revisited and Building a Sea Power
Network——A Proposal
Nevertheless, and this is not limited to the Middle East, it is not necessarily the case that theinternational community is positive about such ideas as that of an “ethical foreign policy” or “aforce for good” that were put forward by the Labour administration of Tony Blair in Britain, whichcame into office in 1997. It is not without reason that the international community is standing idly146

by and watching the present situation unfold in Libya. Concerning this point, Dr. Hosoya
emphasized that the flow of humanitarian intervention that had been progressing since the 1990s
has become stagnant following the experiences of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. The financial
constraints and individual interests of the major nations and the “excess involvement” of militaryforces stationed abroad, etc., have become the basis for turning international opinion cautious evenwith regard to the setting up of no-fly zones, while the Obama administration is hesitant to give
support to Libya’s internal opposition forces by intervening militarily in the conflict. While themajor nations are cautious about mounting military intervention on humanitarian grounds, the UN,
which proclaims “human security” and the “responsibility to provide protection”, finds it difficult
to neglect a humanitarian crisis. Japan in particular, as a positive advocate of “human security”, issuffering a serious dilemma caught between the need for humanitarian intervention in conflict areas
and the significance of rescue on the one hand and the constraints on its ability to provide a militarycontribution on the other. In spite of this, when we think about the new international order, andparticularly about the recovery of peace in the Middle East, we have to search for a way to build on
a foundation that encompasses a greater sharing of values and standards than has been the caseconventionally.
In this connection, the abovementioned view has something in common with the argument put
forward by Prof. Ohno that Japan, which is subject to constraints on “the exercise of defense
power”, should involve itself positively as a global civilian power in the process of constructing a
new world order. Prof. Ohno has emphasized that development cooperation is “one of the few
undertakings” in which Japan can make use of its own hands in support of the international
community.
In order to realize this, Japan’s diplomacy has been envisioned in terms of the strategy called the“arc of freedom and prosperity”, which is an attempt to share values and interests. It is regrettablethat this strategy has somewhat lost its luster with the change of administration. According to the“arc of freedom and prosperity” concept, there are nations that share the same values, namely,
Japan at the eastern end of the Eurasian continent and the European nations at the western edge.
And between these two there are nations that have experienced rapid liberalization in Eastern
Europe such as the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and nations in the Muslim
world such as Turkey, which has declared itself secularist and democratic and has maintained aseparation between religion and politics since the 1920s, proceeded with its own diplomacy, andbecome a model for democratization in the Middle East. Moving through India, the eastern part of147

the arc takes in the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, showing that anincreasing number of Asian nations have adopted freedom and prosperity as matters of “common
interest” and “common values” as well. The movements demanding freedom and the rule of law
that are happening now in the Arab region beginning with Egypt should have eventually led to aconnection with this “arc of freedom and prosperity”. This strategic concept had the purpose ofprompting the nations and regions belonging to the arc to make efforts in search of a future ofgreater freedom and prosperity, while at the same time Japan was to cooperate with them in the roleof a good escort runner.
For instance, as an aid to securing affluence within the “arc of freedom and prosperity”, Dr.
Suzuki pointed out that Japan should pay attention to the importance of so-called “de jure”
standards in its relationship with the global market. In this, with regard to the specifications andstandards of new technologies, standards are set up by means of discussions conducted byinternational organizations and at international conferences, after which all nations carry out
technological development based on those standards. This kind of joint undertaking is appropriate
to the “arc of freedom and prosperity”, given its orientation toward liberal democracy.
In this context, it is suggestive that Dr. Miyagi, a member of this research group, listed Indonesia
and Turkey as nations the future Japan of the 2030s should be focusing on. Both are regional
powers that have achieved favorable economic growth in recent years and become members of theG20. Moreover, he proclaims that both are successfully achieving a balance between Islam and astable democratic system of government. Partnerships with nations that possess such characteristics
will significantly expand the breadth and potential of Japan’s diplomacy, and they are also the kindof nations that can serve as organic components in the “arc of freedom and prosperity”.
One method of realizing this goal is by means of dialogue and consultation. Another is to makefull use of non-military means such as ODA, human resource cultivation, cultural exchanges, etc.
In order for Japan not to engage in leadership competition with China and Russia, but rather to givedue consideration to important value senses such as freedom and prosperity, and also to conduct
itself from the standpoint not of a destroyer of order but of a force for maintaining peace andstability in the international community, it should show freedom and prosperity to China andRussia as “common values” and “common interests”. For China, which recently surpassed Japan interms of GDP, to continue developing, it is important that it becomes a future-oriented state byadopting the same values to which Japan ascribes. If such a vision could have been brought to life,
and if the Japan-U.S. alliance had functioned properly, I am certain that the unnecessary frictionand expansion of tensions Japan experienced with China and Russia last autumn could have been148

avoided.
Moreover, the concept of a “sea power network” is also important. In the Pacific Ocean, in
addition to Japan and the United States, this network would involve other important nations
including the ASEAN members such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, as well as Australia
and India. The NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) member countries including the UK andFrance also have interests as sea powers. Through their joint efforts, these nations are protecting thefreedom of the sea-lanes along which energy resources such as oil and natural gas are transported
and conducting the necessary fight against piracy and terrorist activity in the seas adjacent to theMiddle East. In this sense too, governments have to share freedom and prosperity with their own
citizens by engaging in dialogue with ongoing democratization movements in order to prevent
Yemen from becoming a second Somalia and to avert the establishment of an authority in Bahrainthat refuses to engage in international cooperation. The sea route from the Strait of Hormuz via the
Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean to the Strait of Malacca is one of the world’s main marine
arteries, as is the route connecting the Strait of Hormuz with the Bab-el-Mandeb, Red Sea and Suez
Canal. Of course there is no need to stress the importance of preventing the transport andpurchasing of weapons of mass destruction by sea and of tackling the problem of marine pollution.
Lastly, I would like to express my wish that China will participate in the “sea power network” andrefrain from taking actions of the kind that have often encroached on Japan’s legitimate interestsand from making unjustified claims on territory which is under the sovereignty of other nations.

149