Name: Jyoti Panday

Submission ID: 89

Hi,Request you to please accept my comments to the ICG consolidated proposal on the IANA
Stewardship Transition.

Regards,

Jyoti Panday

IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal - Public Comment Form
Disclaimer: The ICG will not use the information collected for any purpose other than analyzing publiccomments. Submitters’ names, affiliations, and comments will be public.
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First Name *Jyoti

Last Name *PandayEmail Address *REDACTEDCountry/Economy
Organization

India

Independent Researcher

I commend the progress and congratulate the IANA Coordination Group (ICG) and the Cross Community
Working Group (CCWG) for their tireless efforts to produce proposals for community review andcomment and for raising and seeking resolution of issues that impact the stability, security and trust in
the operations of the global DNS. My comments are restricted to the Combined ICG Proposal, however
there are two critical aspects of the transition related to the role of the Root Zone Maintainer and the roleof VeriSign as a TLD operator that must be addressed if this transition is to be of any consequence to theglobal Internet community. I have elaborated on my concerns below.
Questions Concerning the Proposal as a Whole
Names and the Accountability WS1 track
While the names proposal1 is the most detailed yet there remain many significant gaps. In part this isbecause the proposal is dependent on accountability changes to ICANN that are yet to be finalized orapproved by the CCWG-Accountability2. One possible outcome of the transition is that ICANN may end

1 2nd Draft Proposal of the Cross Community Working Group to Develop an IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal on Naming

Related Functions, See: https://www.icann.org/public-comments/cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-2015-04-22-en
2 CCWG on Enhancing ICANN Accountability, See:

https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/CCWG+on+Enhancing+ICANN+Accountability1

up maintaining the IANA function for two operational communities and is envisioned as taking on a
stewardship role for the IFO for the names community. Therefore, it is imperative that the discussion of
the IANA transition be closely tied to the discussion on ICANN accountability.
Presently, there is a lag in the proposal development timeline for the IANA Stewardship transition andaccountability track largely due to accountability being included much further into the transition timeline.
I recommend that this gap be addressed by the ICG by allowing the combined proposal to be reviewed by
the operational communities while the public comments from accountability are assimilated by the
CCWG-Accountability. Further, both revised proposals should be put out for comments so that the global
multistakeholder community can comprehensively decide the impact of the accountability track on therole of the future IFO for names. Further this would allow the names, numbers and protocols community
to take into account recent developments in the transition process such as the VeriSign/ICANN Proposal
in Response to NTIA Request Root Zone Administrator (RZA) Proposal.3
Accountability Proposal Relies Heavily on Names Community
Linked to the issue of the accountability track being developed behind the operational communities
proposals is that the accountability proposal heavily relies on one community-names community. Whilesome of this is circumstantial, it is important that the numbers and protocols communities reflect on
proposed changes and how it may impact how the IFO can perform all of the functions related to all threecommunities in a reliable and predictable way. Of particular relevance of this skewered symmetry aredecisions regarding the budget, bylaws changes, strategic and operational plans. It is to reasonably
expected and within the right of individual operational communities to ensure that the transition meettheir needs of funding. Further, it is of consequence for the stability and security of the global DNS
operations that the balance between the communities and stakeholder groups is not upset and that power
to control management and operations does not remain with any single body, stakeholder group or
institution. An interrelated issue the principle of separability and accountability. In the event of a common
IFO being subcontracted through ICANN for all numbers and protocols communities and ICANN as a
steward for the names community renders possibility of future separation of the IFO weak for all threecommunities.
This arrangement places ICANN in an asymmetric relationship with the other two communities, aposition it may misuse to block future separation. ICANN’s hold over the future IFO (currently proposed
3 Verisign/ICANN Proposal in Response to NTIA Request Root Zone Administrator Proposal Related to the IANA Functions

Stewardship Transition See: http://www ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/root zone administrator proposalrelatedtoiana functionsste-final.pdf

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as Post-Transition IANA or PTI) would mean that it has more control of this DNS management aspect
than IETF or the RIRs which do not retain this exclusive control over the IANA operator. Finally, in viewof this asymmetric relationship, I would also reiterate that the ICG should seek that any accountability
structure of any future IFO for all three communities places a higher dependence on external
accountability measures. This is of particular relevance to maintain the possibility of numbers or
protocols communities changing the IANA operator to a third party in the future. With ICANN as the solesteward of PTI this internal mechanism will be ineffective and a potential roadblock if IETF or the RIRs
chose to move to an arrangement outside of ICANN.
Names Proposal - Community Mechanisms
The names proposal submits the creation of PTI and calls for associated oversight mechanisms that are
subject to community review. These mechanisms have been developed within a short time frame andhaving been developed through participation from the community have evolved as complex structures. I
would request the ICG to address the issues of complexity, lack of consensus and seek more details on
implementation. I would like to reiterate that while I am fully supportive of the accountability efforts
being undertaken in the transition process, the success of a transition is dependent on ensuring thatexisting arrangements that do not serve the sustainability the DNS ecosystem as a whole are rooted out by
introducing alternatives to existing arrangements. Any alternative must be developed through carefulconsideration and understanding of its implication on long term stability of DNS management. Neither ameasured approach nor the rushed implementation of underdeveloped measures should lead tomaintaining the status quo of existing stakeholders or institutions in DNS management.
Of particular importance is that the ICG should seek to ensure that the implementation of any new
mechanism going forward should be not be closed to the Internet community. Therefore, it is importantthat the ICG ensure that proposal being shared with NTIA maintains that implementation of new
mechanisms are subject to early and frequent reviews by operational communities and the broader
multistakeholder community of Internet users. This would ensure that complexity alternatives are madeclearer through the interactions and may be simplified if needed by community review and are accepted in
the future.
Linked to the point above is that participation in ICANN processes is burdensome and costly and comesat a high threshold of engagement. It is imperative that the ICG and the NTIA take note that firstly there
should be a distinction between policy development and policy implementation stages. Further the ICG
should also address the requirement that the overhead for participation at any stage of the transition
process be kept low including minimizing physical meetings and teleconferences. Further progress on the3transition should be maintained and developed through publicly auditable mechanisms such as mailinglists and meetings in far flung places should not be built in to the process nor essential or serve as abarrier for participation. I would like to commend the transition process which albeit being voluminoushas been successful in initiating discussions over mailing lists which are publicly archived.
Compatibility of the IFO for Operational Communities
I posit that the role of the ICG as a mere facilitator and its decision to purposefully and steadfastly
suggesting alternatives or mandating necessary steps for the development of the proposal need to berevisited. In particular I believe that the ICG should seek clarification from the operational communities
on an arrangement for the IFO that is compatible with all three community transition plans. A
consideration of the role of the ICG becomes even more relevant as the transition moves from phase ofdeveloping a plan to working out the implications, testing proposed mechanisms and initiating andimplementing reforms necessary before a successful transition.
Further, the ICG should expand its scope as a neutral body that coordinates the transition efforts of thethree communities. This is a necessary and important step as each community is uniquely placed in thetransition process. The numbers and protocols communities have superior accountability mechanisms
than the names community. Further, it is not possible for the names community to organise outside of
ICANN in the same manner as the other two communities. These differences will give rise to proposals of
structural changes or workable settlements that will have to be negotiated between the communities
working towards their individual expectations and objectives of a successful transition. For example,
currently there are no incentives for the numbers and protocols communities to agree to additional
mechanisms designed specifically to address names’ issues.
Complicated institutional arrangements could lead to the perception that the protocols and numbers
communities are being ‘held hostage’ by the names communities and could also affect the principle ofinstitutional and functional separation. As a negotiated outcome is harder to achieve there is a need for aneutral body created from within the communities to oversee these arrangements and the ICG fills the role
perfectly and should step up to ensure that this transition is neither risky nor a failure.
In addition there are details of the consolidated proposal that need resolution and clarification from thecommunities. For example, the names proposal suggests that the numbers and protocols should
subcontract IFO responsibilities to the body created by the names community to take over the IFO role.
Presently working out the details of development and implementation of such a subcontracting
arrangement is outside the scope of all three operational communities and I believe the ICG should not4only take it up as within its scope of work and should also ensure that this arrangement are worked andwhere necessary in force before the transition proposal is sent for approval to the NTIA.
The ICG’s role is critical in ensuring that the three proposals are interoperable. As of today, both theregistry operations and policy functions reside in ICANN and any possibility of disentangling them needs
to be see immense coordination between the three communities. For example, one way forward could betransferring all the staff and operations related to IANA functions to a new entity that has no policy
capabilities nor discretion to take decisions outside of this technical role of implementing the IANA
functions for the other two communities. However, in the absence of an implementation plan it is difficult
to evaluate potential risks or unintentional consequences of such an arrangement and the ICG should seek
the development of such a plan and factor it in its recommendation to the NTIA.
One way to move forward on this would be for the ICG to include the proposal of a common IFO for all
three communities in the combined proposal if. Any such arrangement should be sent back to operational
communities for review providing an opportunity for the communities to assess implementationnecessities for such a proposal. Further, any such proposed arrangements should address the issue of
ICANN’s dual role as a steward for names community and as the IFO contracting party for the numbers
and protocols community. This is also necessary to ensure logistical coherence in the performance of all
three services. In the event that the IFO ends up being the same entity the IFO contract should only
include references to the entities such as the IETF, the RIRs and ccTLD operators but should not include
any reference to the policies that these entities should develop, neither the instructions that the contractor
should follow these policies.
The ICG should also urgently address the issue of developing the subcontracting arrangements fornumbers and protocols between ICANN and PTI. While the IANA Functions Contract between ICANN
and PTI for the names function has been annexed to the CWG proposal a similar contract is missing forother two communities. This makes the ICG proposal incomplete as it stands and has an impact on theinteroperability of the IFO operations post transition. The ICG should expand the scope of its work if
necessary to ensure the compatibility of high level details of a consolidated IFO arrangement including
ensuring that checks and balances for external accountability, functional and institutional separation are
included. All three operational communities represented by the CWG, CRISP and IANAPLAN should
finalise and develop a framework for such subcontracting arrangement including MoU between ICANN
and IETF, and the SLA between ICANN and the RIRs. Any planned changes to the MoU or the RIRs
contracts must be placed in the public domain prior to finalising the proposal.
Institutional Separation of IANA

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I believe a key measurement of the success of the IANA transition will be the functional and institutional
separation of the IANA functions related to the three communities. In my opinion this is a combined
responsibility of the ICG and the operational communities to ensure that the power of separation remains
in the hands of respective steward. I also believe that it is within the ICG’s scope of work to ensure thatany future IFO arrangement should be premised on achieving such an institutional and functional
separation in the future and dependent on the needs of the operational communities. Therefore, the ICG
should seek that in addition to developing subcontracting IFO role to one body with IETF and RIRs, thesubcontracting body should also be asked to produce a document explaining how such institutional andfunctional separation can be achieved within a time period agreed by each community.
Further the ICG should also seek clarity on the required arrangements that must be implemented for each
community at the time of separation if only one of the communities decides to move IANA, before thetransition process is finalized. All three IANA functions are currently performed together using sharedhuman and material resources, complicating the practical implementation of the separability envisionedby the three communities. Addressing such questions prior to the proposal approval shall ensure thatworkable arrangements are devised as a result of the transition.
ccTLDs delegation and redelegation
As the ccNSO have submitted4, that ICANN’s Board of Directors adopted and endorsed the Frameworkof Interpretation without reservation. The Board directed that “the CEO & President or his designee todevelop an implementation plan for the recommendations for community consideration through a publiccomment, and to implement the plan when finalized.”.
In the context of delegation and re-delegations of ccTLDs, it is also important that the ICG develop atransition proposal that reflects the evolving state-of affairs with respect to the adoption of thisframework. I support the ccNSO submission that the ICG should seek that there be a defined and current
baseline documentation available before it submits its final transition proposal to the Board. The ICG
should further note the amendments to inclusion of a reference to ICP-1 and keep abreast of thedevelopments around the issues of redelegation of ccTLDs.
This is a particular issue may also have overlaps with some aspects of the Accountability work in
particular reference the requests to transfer control of the country code domain from one party to another.
The ICG proposal notes that the Names proposal should state that RFC 1591 and GAC Principles 2005
4 Country Code Names Supporting Organisation Council (ccNSO Council) Comments on the IANA

Stewardship Transition Proposal, See:https://comments.ianacg.org/pdf/submission/submission49.pdf

6are the two policies the ICANN should use for delegations and re-delegations of ccTLDs. The ICG also
noted that a dispute resolution mechanism body was required under Section 3.4 of RFC1591 however, it
does not exist presently. The NTIA IANA Functions Contract clearly establishes the importance of the
GAC Principles 2005 in the delegation and redelegation of ccTLDs. Further as most ccTLDs do not
specify a dispute resolution mechanism with ICANN through contracts therefore, GAC and ICANN(Ombudsman and ByLaws) become the dispute related bodies.
The ICG should seek more clarity on the issue of redelegation of ccTLDs bearing in mind the need forclarity on jurisdiction and avenues of dispute resolution for stakeholders. I refer to the recent case where
Plaintiffs have requested the US District Court for the district of Columbia to turn to ICANN in order toseize whatever money, property, credit IRAN and Syria have at ICANN as a possible scenario which
could remain unresolved under the current transition arrangements. It is important for a successfultransition that the ICG seek clarity on whether the future IFO should operate on the belief that ccTLDs arebeing delegated to country registries and IFO asserts changes into the authoritative root zone file
following direction from country registry rather than a particular community.
I also refer to the Tunis Agenda5 which states that no country should have authority over anothercountry's ccTLD. The ICG and the global multistakeholder community including but not limited to theoperational communities should consider the changes envisioned in ICANN’ relationship with ccTLDs.
Further this raises the question of how does the resolution of such issues fit within the US jurisdiction
being proposed in the current transition proposal. The ICG should seek clarity on whether under proposed
California law for the IFO, whether the USG will take a lead from Tunis Agenda point to state that they
have no jurisdiction to intervene. Currently it is not clear that as long as the ICANN authorizes root zone
entries is it that ccTLDs are considered as being delegated or does national sovereignty take precedence.
ICG should also ensure that there is agreement on whether the IANA contract between US and ICANN
legally bind ccTLDs or if it is possible to for the RIRs to potentially shift the allocation function to NRO
not which is not under US jurisdiction. The ICG should consider any unresolved or ambiguities around
ccTLDs and the process for redelegation in developing a final proposal. It should seek clarity from thecommunities through the multistakeholder process convened in gathering consensus on an acceptable andagreed way forward.
Continuity and Contingency Document

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Tunis Agenda for the Information Society See: http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html

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With reference to the “Continuity and Contingency Plan” developed by ICANN under clause C.7.3 of thepresent IANA Functions Contract, the names community has highlighted the deficiencies in the
document. Some of these issues relate to operationalising separability and ensuring continuity in case
IANA functions are transferred from ICANN to another operator. The ICG should note that, thisdocument is extremely relevant to the numbers and protocol communities as well, and has presently not
been reviewed by them at all. I urge the ICG to address this incompatibility to ensure the transition plans
remains interoperable and there are no serious implications for the security and the stability of theInternet. The ICG is requested to take serious note of the need to revise this document to ensure
continuity, if the IANA is to be split for each community and in the event if only one community wants toenforce separation. It is imperative that a revised document derived through community development
process is included in any finalised proposal.
IANA Related IPR
The numbers section of the proposal expects that the ownership of various intellectual property, including
the domain name iana.org and the trademarks in IANA be moved to some independent third party. I
believe this is an important future safeguard and must be agreed upon and completed before the transition
enters an implementation phase. I therefore, urge the ICG to initiate gathering consensus from all threeoperational communities and overseeing the development of a plan for the transfer of the property within
the scope of their work. While all three communities have considered future separability from the IFO, anactual separation of the IANA Functions Operator (IFO) role is dependent on the appropriate transfer ofthe intellectual property rights (IPR) associated with the IANA function (IANA trademark and “iana.org”
domain name) to a neutral and trusted body.
I would also like to stress that even if one community holds the IPR on behalf of the other two
communities, that community should be accountable to the other two communities. Under nocircumstances should the independence or choice of the IFO for any community should be held ransom tothe leverage of the community holding the IPR. I would also stress that given the possibility of expansion
of ICANN’s role either as a contracting party for the IFO or as steward for the names community and as acontracting party for the RZA function, under no circumstances should ICANN be allowed to hold the
IPR related to IANA. Any arrangements for the IPR must be framed as a non-exclusive license that may
be granted to any IFO in the future based on the operational community’s choice and decision. This isnecessary in order to ensure that these assets are used in a non-discriminatory, stable and predictablemanner for the benefit of all communities, users and the Internet.
Protocol Parameters Data Should be Affirmed to be in the Public Domain

8Linked to the issue of IPR, it should be affirmed that the protocol parameters data is in the publicdomain.6 I urge the ICG to gather consensus on the issue from the IETF and protocols and parameters
community. If a third body is created to hold the IPR related to IANA, that body should also affirm this.
Numbers Community SLA
I urge the ICG to seek the development of an agreement between the various RIRs and the incumbent IFO
to ensure the independence of the policy bodies associated with the numbers community. One example ofcontinuing ambiguity in the proposal submitted by the community is in reference to dispute resolution andarbitration. The numbers community proposal states that "Disputes between the parties related to the SLA
will be resolved through arbitration".
While developing the community was limited by the lack of available legal experts to address this issue.
While this is a legitimate limitation, I urge that the ICG seeks that legal counsels appointed for thetransition process or an external counsel appointed by the numbers community should consider the
specifics of dispute resolution avenues for the RIRs and the IFO as part of the work necessary for
implementation. Further, if the RIR legal team considers these questions then a proposal should be open
to public inputs before it can be submitted as a final proposal to the ICG and subsequently the NTIA. The
global multistakeholder community and is limited in its ability to assess the numbers proposal in theabsence of the proposed SLA between the IFO and the RIRs and the ICG should seek further clarificationon this.
Questions Concerning the Process as a Whole
Precluding Multistakeholder Consultation on RZA and RZM functions
A key aspect of the ICG assessment is to ensure the sustainability of DNS management when the NTIA
pulls out of this oversight role of the IFO. In parallel to the transition of the NTIA oversight, thecommunity has also been developing mechanisms to strengthen the accountability of ICANN and has
devised two workstreams that consider both long term and short term issues. While under the present
arrangements, the root of the Internet's name and address spaces is managed by ICANN as the IFO in
coordination with Verisign Inc. acting as the Root Zone Maintainer (RZM). Both entities fulfill theirrespective operational and policy making roles under separate contracts with the US government, a legacyof the U.S. Defense Department and National Science Foundation foundational role in the Internet's
6 Data in the protocol parameters registries is in the public domain. See: http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01149.html

9origins. As it stands the root zone management process is limited to the performance of two specificfunctions with respect to a root zone change request:●

NTIA verifies that ICANN (IFO) has followed established policies and procedures in processing
the request; and●NTIA (RZA) gives the final authorization to the Verisign (RZM) to update the contents of theroot zone to implement the change request.

The NTIA transition criteria and subsequently the ICG consolidated proposal and accountability
mechanisms are limited, in that, they only address the concerns of NTIA oversight with respect tochartering organizations involved with the IFO aspect of root zone management. Further, theaccountability recommendations stemming from workstream one are narrowly tailored to the names
community while long term stability related issues around DNS management have been relegated toworkstream two with no defined timeline for resolution of issues. The security, stability, and resiliency of
the Internet DNS rests on uncertain foundations with two critical aspects of the DNS Management—the
Root Zone Administrator (RZA) and RZM having been precluded from the scope of the transition
proposal being developed by the global community through the multistakeholder process.
VeriSign Conflict of Interest
The transition announcement does not state a deadline for termination of the existing cooperative
agreement between NTIA and Verisign nor is it evident whether ICANN will be the contracting party or
if Verisign will wield the contract over the IFO. Further, as Milton Mueller has pointed out, it is the
Verisign Cooperative Agreement, not the IANA functions contract, that gives the US government
authority over all root zone file changes.7 Since Verisign has operational control of the root zone, if the
Cooperative Agreement with NTIA is not modified the US control of the DNS root remains unchanged.
In the RZA transition proposal circulated by NTIA, the reasons for the continuation of the agreement isunclear for example, it does not clarify if the continuation is linked to Verisign being shielded fromliability of making root zone changes by the USG.
Critically, the proposal limits the scope of the RZA oversight transition by continuing with VeriSign in its
role in the maintenance and publication of the Root Zone. It ignores the important structural separationthat is needed between the DNS-related RZM functions performed by VeriSign and its duties as the
exclusive registry for the dot-com registry which it has been managing since 2000. As of 31 December,
7 Oops. The Fly in the IANA Transition Ointment, Internet Governance Project

See:http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/03/22/oops-the-fly-in-the-iana-transition-ointment102014, there were 115.6 million registered dot-com names and the dot-com TLD remains the largest
domain based on the number of registered domains. The first mover advantage that VeriSign gives it not
only a head start in the domain name business, it also limits its competition as dot-com TLD branding andlongevity make it the most trusted and dominant TLD on the Internet. There are several problems with thetransition arrangements as they stand and I have listed them elsewhere.8 However, as the scope of the ICG
is limited to evaluating the IFO transition I shall not elaborate them here.
I do posit that it is imperative that there be effective arrangements among the root zone management
partners, if the post-transition RZM process involves more than one organization. It is also important that
there be an accountability framework for the resolution of disagreements, ambiguities, and disputes that
does not depend on the NTIA or the RZA function as the names community has suggested automating
this role. VeriSign may be supportive of the NTIA's goals to “introduce more transparency andmeasurement to the execution of the IANA functions”9 but it also needs to extend the same consideration
to its role in root zone management.
Conclusion
I remain strongly supportive of the stewardship of the IANA functions moving away from the NTIA
oversight so that the Internet community continues to ensure the stability needed for the growth of theInternet. The importance of the Internet as a critical global public resource must not be negated by any
one body retaining a special role. The ICG proposal and the work undertaken by the global
multistakeholder community is the way to ensure this.
This peculiar arrangement in the efforts to internationalize the DNS neither meets the needs andexpectations of the global customers and partners of the IANA services nor lends credibility or support toa viable multistakeholder model. In view of the recent developments, I urge the ICG to seek that theoperational communities deliberate and reflect on ensuring that the IFO transition process should becoordinated and aligned with the transition of the RZA and RZM Functions within DNS Management.

8 Jyoti Panday, Transitioning the NTIA Oversight of the DNS Root – Evaluating Progress Made andProblems See: http://www.orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/html/cyber/Cyber-Monitor09.pdf
9 Verisign Inc. Response to National Telecommunications and Information Administration Further Notice of Inquiry

on the Internet Assigned Names and Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions [Docket No. 110207099-1319-0] See:
http://www ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/verisign fnoi response.pdf

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I believe that all the issues that I have raised are resolvable and the transition should not be blocked.
Nevertheless, it is important that the absence of clarity on these issues would result in a transition that is
incomplete and fails to address some of the most critical factors related to the DNS management.
In addition, it is also necessary to confirm both from the NTIA and the operational communities that it ispossible to implement the transition plans for communities at different paces so that different pieces of
IANA may transition at discrete stages of the overall implementation plan. Not only is this necessary tomaintain the stability of DNS operations but is also critical for ensuring that potential problems and issues
are recognised and addressed as they arise. Establishing consensus amongst the operational communities
on whether the transition should move forward in a 'staged' manner or as a combined interlinked effort
would serve as a useful complement to the implementation efforts under the extended IANA Functions
contract time period.
Preserving the interest of a stable and secure DNS operations, ICG should ensure the development ofspecific implementation actions and resolution of underlying issues that may be contentious but will
maximise the synergies across the names, numbers and protocols communities. This approach will avoid
a lock-in on unresolved issues such as jurisdictional resilience of the domain name system, sovereignty
and external accountability.

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