February 2011
Vol. 3 No. 1

Diversification and Beyond:
The Comparative Benefits of Multi-Strategy
InvestingS

OME OF THE WORLD’S BEST risk-bearing

In this Market Insights, we focus on multi-strategy funds

firms and elite producers of alpha, execute a

and managers, comparing them with their single-strategy

broad range of investment strategies.

In thecousins. We won’t delve into the relative merits of fund-universe of alternative investment products, aof-funds products because they present a different set ofmajority of funds invests in a single investment strategy andtrade-offs.

a smaller proportion allocates capital across multiple

advantages of the multi-strategy approach and thenstrategies.

addresses some common criticisms.

We strongly believe that managers of multi-

strategy funds offer investors advantages they could not
obtain from managers of single-strategy investments—
including a better value proposition, better alignment of
incentives, more efficient capital allocation, and better risk
management—and we manage multi-strategy funds inkeeping with that view.

Those advantages, we believe,

stem in large part from a broader and more nuanced
perspective on global financial markets that comes withallocating risk capital across a range of investment
disciplines.

The paper first considers the structural

Diversification and Beyond
But let’s step back for a moment. A multi-strategy
approach to investing rests on claims about the benefits ofdiversification. The core premise of modern portfolio
theory, associated with the work of Harry Markowitz andothers, is that risk-adjusted returns can be improved at theportfolio level by allocating to multiple investment
strategies and asset classes that are imperfectly correlated.
Some have questioned whether diversification is possible
through all market cycles. It’s commonly thought that incrisis periods, all correlations go to 1.0, eliminating the key
benefits of diversification. We’ve found, however, that in
the universe of hedge-fund strategies that’s not been thecase. Over the past three years—most of which surely
qualifies as a crisis period—the average pairwise correlation
among hedge-fund strategies, as defined by thecomponents of the Dow Jones Credit Suisse Hedge Fund
Index, was 0.36. While positive, this level of correlation
clearly indicates the ability to benefit from diversification.
One drawback of using the Dow Jones Credit Suisse Hedge
Fund Index as a metric is that those returns are available
only on a monthly basis. In the depths of financial distress,
the correlation of daily returns is arguably more relevant
than monthly correlations. (We emphasize daily
correlations because a particularly large loss on a given day
could trigger provisions in contracts with leverage providers
that materially reduce—or even cut off—access tofinancing, forcing a fund to liquidate positions andpotentially exposing it to catastrophic losses.) In our
experience, pairwise correlations between investment
strategies are lower when measured on a daily basis thanwhen measured using monthly data. For example, from
July 2007 through December 2010, the average pairwise
correlation of the more than 20 alternative investment
strategies and sub-strategies managed by the D. E. Shawgroup was never higher than 0.1 when measured daily (and0.15 when measured monthly).
Diversification, it is often remarked, is the only free lunch.
But how should it be served? Both single- and multi-strategy
approaches can benefit from the diversifying effects ofallocations to multiple asset classes. While many people
believe that a portfolio of single-strategy funds offers an
optimal solution to the diversification problem, we believethat multi-strategy funds, and the firms managing them,
exhibit ten distinct advantages relative to managers focusing
on one or a few strategies.

MARKET INSIGHTS

1. Quantifying Netting Risk

Multi-strategy funds charge fees on the net
performance of the strategies in the fund, andsingle-strategy funds charge fees on overall
performance. For investors in a collection of single-strategy
funds, this introduces so-called “netting risk,” as illustrated
by the following scenario. Imagine an investor has aportfolio of two single-strategy funds. If Fund A has a
profitable year, the investor pays a performance charge.
Let’s assume, however, that Fund B experiences a negative
return. Although the investor pays no performance fee to,but likely earns a loss carryforward from, Fund B, theperformance charge paid to Fund A places a drag on
aggregate performance on a net basis. However, if theindividual strategies deployed by each of the single-strategy
funds were managed within a multi-strategy fund andexperienced the same aggregate performance, the investor
would pay a smaller performance fee (or no performance fee
if that aggregate performance were flat or negative) andthus would be spared the drag on return.
It’s possible for investors to avoid this netting cost by adding
value through manager selection. But how much managerselection alpha would the investor need to add to overcome
the netting risk? We ran a Monte Carlo simulation to shedsome light on the question. Here are the key assumptions: 10 uncorrelated investment strategies;
 15% annual gross return for each strategy within the
single- and multi-strategy funds;
 25% annual volatility of return for each strategy within
the single- and multi-strategy funds;
 1% risk-free rate;
 fees of 2% and 20% (subject to a highwater mark) for
the single- and multi-strategy funds;
 performance is measured monthly, and fees on
performance are charged annually;
 the multi-strategy fund rebalances monthly, andinvestments in the single-strategy funds are rebalanced
annually on terms favorable to the investor; and a fund shuts down and returns capital if performance
declines by 40%.

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Diversification and Beyond
When the 10 strategies are simulated inside a multistrategy fund, the fund produces a net Sharpe ratio of 1.44,
or approximately three times the Sharpe ratios of theindividual underlying strategies. We then simulated amulti-manager portfolio by running each strategy as astandalone fund (but otherwise identically) to compare theaggregate performance of ten separate funds to that of themulti-strategy fund. We found that the independent
manager portfolio generates a net Sharpe ratio of 1.26,
14% lower than the multi-strategy fund. In order for themulti-manager program of single-strategy investments tomatch the risk-adjusted performance of the multi-strategy
fund, each strategy needs to generate an additional 157
basis points of gross return per year to compensate for the
netting effect.
Some investors may be confident they can add that muchadditional value in manager selection over the long run tooffset netting risk. Others may be less sanguine. Manager
selection and netting risk do not take place in a vacuum,and other factors must be considered as well.

2. Generating More, and More
Diverse, AlphaO

ne of the things we have learned over a numberof years is how much collaboration acrossinvestment disciplines can enhance returns indifferent but related investment activities. A firm’s
expertise in credit markets, for example, can inform its
asset-backed securities strategy. The portfolio construction
technology supporting a systematically traded equity or
futures strategy can help size positions for macro trades.
Insights into the Asian convertible bond market can
improve the structuring of private equity deals in theregion. In short, a firm with a multi-strategy platform canbuild upon its success in one investment area to foster
achievement in others.

The intrinsic benefits of generating alpha across multiple
investment disciplines are self-evident. In addition, thisdynamic can result in firms that, relative to single-strategy
shops, are large, loaded with talent, well-capitalized, andhighly profitable. And as we’ll see below, those attributes
have an affinity with other potential advantages forinvestors allocating capital to firms that manage multistrategy funds.

MARKET INSIGHTS

3. Managing Risk ExposuresAn important factor in determining an optimal
allocation across multiple investment strategies is
the relationship between strategies and inparticular correlations among strategies to similar extreme
events. Understanding changing relationships acrossstrategies is highly dependent on the specific securities heldby each strategy. Are energy and macro strategies both
exposed to a simultaneous short-term commodity priceshock? Could that shock take the form of a hurricane in
the Gulf of Mexico to which a reinsurance strategy mightalso be exposed? How would such a hurricane affectequity positions in the homebuilding industry?
Managers that exclusively operate one or even a few
single-strategy funds are likely less aware of such varying
common exposures. Moreover, investors in such funds areless apt to obtain insights on such risks in the absence ofdaily risk reporting. Even if aware of those exposures,investors may be unable to take timely action given eachunderlying fund may not provide access to capital with thesame frequency. Those challenges intensify when markets
enter crisis periods and funds may restrict the access toinvestor capital. A manager of a multi-strategy fund, on
the other hand, can have a comprehensive view of theportfolio and its instruments. That manager is thus better
positioned to identify problematic correlations or exposuresand to take corrective action by reallocating capital in atimely fashion. The usual caveats apply: just because amanager has a clearer view of the portfolio’s risk exposures
doesn’t mean she will act in a timely or prudent way, and,as with single-strategy funds, transparency on risk
exposures and portfolio characteristics is necessary for theinvestor to verify, if only after the fact, that this job is being
done well.

4. Allocating Capital and Estimating
CapacityIn our experience as a multi-strategy manager, we
believe that the range of our investment activities andthe depth of our alpha research and development
programs have aided us in our capital allocation efforts.
Not only do we often have forecasts on the relative
attractiveness of our strategies, but the direct market
intelligence obtained from dialogue across multiple asset
classes with numerous dealers, money managers, andFebruary 2011 | Vol. 3 No. 1 | Page 3 of 8

Diversification and Beyond
policymakers also sometimes gives us an indication ofwhere there may be changes in opportunity and risk.
On a related note, achieving a desired level ofdiversification on an ongoing basis requires that capital beperiodically reallocated across asset classes. Advocates ofsingle-strategy funds often argue that their approach,which is not beholden to a multi-strategy manager’s
allocation decisions, allows for more opportunistic investingin different asset classes. But investors in a portfolio of
single-strategy funds would seemingly find it more difficult
to reallocate capital across strategies than a manager
operating on a multi-strategy platform. As discussed
above, firms that manage assets across a large number ofstrategies are likely to have more and better information
regarding the cross-cutting currents of global capital
markets. Moreover, most funds require notice periods forwithdrawals, liquidity frequency generally runs frommonths to years, and many funds have lock-ups or otherwithdrawal restrictions.
Capacity management comes into play here as well. Alphais scarce. If a manager exceeds capacity constraints,
investment returns will deteriorate. And yet, even withequivalent facts, every business operator has an incentive tobe optimistic about the prospects for his business and thus
may fall prey to distorted perceptions. We believe thatmulti-strategy managers may view the world a bit moreobjectively than those focused on single strategies. Because
their business models are not tied to a specific strategy,
multi-strategy managers may be more disciplined inassessing capacity than managers relying on one source ofalpha. As the saying goes, “If all you have is a hammer,
everything looks like a nail.”

5. Holding “Best Ideas” in SizeW

hen sizing their best investment ideas,
managers often face a trade-off between
expected return and risks associated withconcentrated portfolios. We believe that multi-strategy
funds offer greater flexibility with respect to position sizing
because their managers spread risk exposures over a muchbroader portfolio.
Given their prevalence in the alternatives space, long/shortequity strategies are perhaps the paradigmatic case. It’s
generally accepted that a fund dedicated to long/shortequities would be ill-advised to allocate more than 10% to

MARKET INSIGHTS

20% of investor capital to a single stock position, even ifthat stock represented the manager’s best idea. However,in a multi-strategy fund in which a long/short equities
strategy constitutes, say, 10% of the total fund—making a
10% position in the long/short strategy a mere 1% positionin the fund as a whole—the portfolio manager has greater
latitude to hold more concentrated positions in such best
ideas that are expected to contribute the most attractiverisk-adjusted return to the fund. Marketing considerations
also apply here. Single-strategy managers may have an
incentive to diversify into lower quality ideas more than is
optimal for the investor to avoid the higher volatility, or
simply the scarier-looking risk report sent to investors, that
results from additional concentration.

6. Attracting and Retaining
Investment TalentWe believe that firms that have invested in a
multi-strategy platform have the potential torecruit superior investment talent given thepositive and mutually reinforcing effects of multiple core
investment competencies, an attractive firm culture, andscale. Elite investment professionals often prefer working
with other extremely talented practitioners, and those
professionals may initially develop their exceptional abilities
in part through such collaboration. Peer interaction allows
them to exchange information and ideas, improve theirskills, and ultimately advance their careers. Although someaccomplished investors ultimately want to “run their own
shop,” many prefer the advantages of a firm that is
involved in multiple disciplines. Warren Buffett, forexample, has written extensively on why a rational businessowner or manager may prefer the Berkshire Hathawayenvironment and structure to operating independently. If a
firm develops effective communication and sets appropriate
economic incentives, it can foster an environment
characterized by a high degree of collaboration and attract
highly talented individuals who are likely to thrive in such aworking environment.
Performance is also a factor in retaining talent. In stable
markets, the scale and breadth of alpha generation noted
above can reinforce the firm’s culture and help it retain top
investment professionals and attract new talent. Periods ofmarket stress, on the other hand, can jeopardize thebusiness models of firms that are dependent on a single
source of alpha and undermine efforts to retain talent. In a
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Diversification and Beyond
crisis, managers that have one core competency may beforced to liquidate positions that could be winners in thelong run. This can erode franchise value and may prompt
the departure of key professionals. By contrast, large firms
with multi-strategy mandates afford greater stability in amarket disruption. Even if single-strategy funds falter in acrisis, firms that run the same or similar strategies in a multistrategy complex are less vulnerable to existential threats,and such relative stability is often an important factor inretaining key personnel.

7. Aligning IncentivesW

hen evaluating various funds, investors in thealternatives space generally seek structuresthat align their interests with those of the
manager. One way to achieve interest alignment is for
portfolio managers to make a sizable investment in theirown fund. Individual managers who have achieved acertain measure of economic success may prefer to retain asignificant fraction of their net worth in a fund they
manage in the expectation that they can manage theirmoney more profitably than others (and avoid paying feesin the bargain). Yet, at some point, this idea flies in theface of prudent financial wealth management if it results in
an irrational concentration of a manager’s assets in one
strategy. We believe that a manager may rationally invest
a higher fraction of net worth in a multi-strategy fund thana single-strategy fund given the higher degree ofdiversification, thus better aligning the incentives ofmanager and investor.
The alignment of incentives encouraged by multi-strategy
funds is not limited to investor and manager interests; italso applies across a management firm’s personnel. As
noted, we believe that talent attracts talent in multistrategy shops. The interests of key investment personnel
will be more closely aligned to the extent that those
professionals are confident they will benefit from theircolleagues’ investment acumen when putting their own
capital at risk in their firm’s funds.

8. Managing Unencumbered CashThe management of unencumbered cash is anotherarea in which multi-strategy funds have a distinctedge over multi-manager portfolios. An efficient
cash-management function can provide the multi-strategy
fund with efficiencies not available to single-strategy funds.

MARKET INSIGHTS

All funds must keep cash in reserve to protect against avariety of periodic short term stresses. In principle, liquidity
management involves reserving cash to meet the following
five distinct purposes:
 cushion normal earnings volatility (“PnL buffer”);
 accommodate increases in prime-broker or counterparty
margin (“financing buffer”);
 adjust for changes in the size of a portfolio’s positions(“ramp buffer”);
 compensate for the movement of positions among various
prime brokers, which can tie up cash transiting between
entities for several days (“cash-flow buffer”); and provide some measure of insurance against unexpectedvolatility if markets enter a period of crisis (“stressbuffer”).
Sizing these buffers involves estimating the volatility of theassets in a portfolio, individually and in the aggregate, inboth normal and abnormal market environments. We
believe the scale and diversification of multi-strategy funds
allow for more robust buffers than single-strategy funds ineach case. Those benefits are perhaps most striking in theareas of stress buffers, which have obviously taken on
increased salience in recent years. In a market crisis, themanager of a multi-strategy fund can move cash between
strategies to where it’s needed most and thereby optimize
stress buffers across those strategies. This means that a
multi-strategy fund generally can afford to reserve a smaller
proportional cash buffer than a portfolio of single-strategy
funds would in the aggregate. The lower threshold on theamount of uninvested capital held in reserve can have apositive impact on the risk-adjusted return of a multistrategy fund, and also generate more free cash per unit ofreturn, relative to a multi-manager structure.

9. Benefiting from Dealer
Relationships

A

manager’s ability to negotiate strong financing
contracts depends in part on the number, scale,and breadth of the dealer relationships that it
maintains. The forces of competition in the dealer
financing community suggest that the quality of financing
increases with the number of dealers with which a manager
can negotiate and the more business that it can dole out.
We believe that firms managing multi-strategy platforms
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Diversification and Beyond
have an edge in this regard because they tend to havelarger asset bases than firm managing only one or a few
strategies.
One of the key lessons of the past three years is that thequality of a firm’s financing arrangements is crucial. We
use the term “quality” in this context to denote four
primary attributes: the degree to which specific businessterms in financing contracts favor the manager,
diversification of the supply of leverage, the duration of thefinancing, and pricing. Managers with large asset bases areadvantaged when negotiating specific leverage provisions,such as circumscribing or avoiding altogether certain“triggers” permitting dealers to pull credit lines. They candiversify by sourcing leverage from multiple providers given
the possibility of establishing a sizable relationship witheach provider. They can bargain effectively for longer
financing terms. And they can obtain better pricing given
the volume of their business. Volume also means that amanager can secure some or all of these benefits for smaller(often single-strategy) funds as well as larger flagship (often
multi-strategy) funds.
A second, related advantage to a broad set of dealer
relationships is better deal flow. The bigger the dealer
relationship, the more likely a manager will be at the headof the line when a dealer is looking for reliablecounterparties for interesting deals. Furthermore, a multistrategy manager can act more quickly on such deals—
often a key determinant of success—by having a range ofexperts on hand to assess such opportunities and thefreedom to proceed on that evaluation without first
determining whether a particular deal fits within the (morenarrow) investment mandate of a single-strategy fund.

10. Building Operational
Infrastructure and Internal
Control Systems

T

he breadth and scale of a multi-strategy manager’s
operations also allow it to build a sizable back-officeand operational infrastructure to support its
investment activities. Touting this as an advantage might
be construed as making a virtue out of necessity. After all,greater complexity on the investment side necessarilymeans a bigger and better equipped back office and a morerobust compliance regime. Firms dedicated to single
strategies generally don’t invest significant resources to

MARKET INSIGHTS

build such infrastructure because they don’t need to. But
this argument is shortsighted. All firms in the alternatives
space are exposed to operational risk, and this has only
intensified in recent years with elevated regulatory scrutiny
and numerous changes in the rules that govern trading invarious capital markets.
Furthermore, there’s a feedback loop between a firm’s
infrastructure and asset scale and the talent
recruitment/retention factor already discussed. Investors
increasingly demand institutional quality infrastructure frommanagers in the alternatives space, which means thatmarginal dollars are more likely to flow to larger firms withmore robust infrastructures. And because a strong backoffice and support organization provides investment
professionals with more freedom to practice their craft,
multi-strategy firms may attract a disproportionate share of
the best talent.

Anticipating CounterargumentsWe acknowledge a number of rejoinders to thecase favoring a multi-strategy approach overmultiple investments in single-strategy funds.
We believe that several of these counterarguments are
justified, but a number of others apply equally to multi- andsingle-strategy funds. Let’s start with the latter.
One charge often leveled against multi-strategy funds isthat the breadth of their investment universe inevitably
results in excessive beta exposure. On this view, multistrategy funds package their alpha along with returns thatare heavily correlated to various forms of beta. And even ifthat beta is relatively “exotic,” it might even be replicatedby various combinations of options or long or shortpositions in exchange-traded funds.
Although this critique might apply to certain multi-strategy
funds, it doesn’t appear to characterize multi-strategy funds
on average—actually, quite the opposite. Leaving aside thetopic of exotic beta (which might require a separate paper),the Dow Jones Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index had acorrelation of 0.65 to the S&P 500 over the last sevenyears. Over that same period, the Dow Jones Credit Suisse
Multi-Strategy Hedge Fund Index had a correlation of
approximately 0.55 to that equity index, and, we know it’s
possible to improve upon that. (Our largest multi-strategy
fund had a correlation of approximately 0.15 to the
S&P 500 over that same period.) The more general point
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Diversification and Beyond
here is that portfolio construction (whether at the strategy
and/or aggregate level), not the number of strategies
deployed, determines whether a fund delivers uncorrelated
returns.
A second critique centers on asset/liability matching. Someobservers contend that multi-strategy funds tend to
manage less liquid strategies alongside more liquid ones,
and consequently a mismatch can arise between theliquidity of underlying instruments and the terms governinginvestor access to capital. Multi-strategy funds may
aggregate instruments that are subject to higher or lower
levels of market liquidity. But the potential for an assetliability mismatch is not limited to the multi-strategy space.
Managers of funds dedicated to strategies as disparate as
long/short equities, fixed-income relative value, eventdriven opportunities, and credit investing have fallen afoul
of such mismatches, either by structuring a fund at theoutset with overly “friendly” access to investor capital(relative to the liquidity of the fund’s investments) or by
failing to track the evolving liquidity of a fund’s investments
over time.
We support the notion that fund liquidity terms must be set
appropriately given the liquidity of underlying instruments,
taking into account how the liquidity of those instruments
might change in times of market stress, but this isn’t anissue unique to multi-strategy funds. Indeed, because
managers of multi-strategy funds often combine strategies
and asset classes with varying degrees of liquidity, thosemanagers may be more likely than single-strategy
managers to get asset-liability matching right.
Two other counterarguments strike closer to the core ofwhat it means to be multi-strategy. One holds that multistrategy funds are subject to a “tie-in” sales model that
exposes investors to substandard businesses as part of theoverall package. Because investors in multi-strategy funds
purchase a fixed menu of strategies, rather than choosing à
la carte, investors may find it difficult to assess a manager’s
strengths and weaknesses in any one particular area. As aresult, the investor may end up buying relatively lesser
performing strategies that the manager bundles with better
performers. By contrast, investors that build customized
multi-manager portfolios can select only those strategies
they desire and can choose only those managers in which
they have conviction. This is a valid argument; it is, we
believe, simply outweighed by the advantages of multistrategy funds cited above.

MARKET INSIGHTS

A second credible rejoinder centers on complexity andsuggests that the sheer number of strategies “under thehood” may result in a portfolio that is highly complex andconsequently too difficult for the investor to comprehend.
As a result, some investors prefer single-strategy models on“stick-to-your knitting” grounds and the straightforward
analysis of the investment proposition and ongoing
monitoring.
It’s true by definition that multi-strategy funds have moremoving parts than any single single-strategy fund, although
in fairness, the level of complexity may be no greater than amulti-manager program of single-strategy investments.
Still, given that these moving parts fall into a single fundand that the dynamics of the whole portfolio may be harderfor investors to grasp than the individual strategy parts, we
believe that managers of multi-strategy funds can andshould design transparency regimes that illuminate a fund’s
exposures at both levels. Providing useful information
about the strategies included in a multi-strategy fund andtheir aggregate performance requires significant thought
and effort. Though not an easy task, we believe that it’s
possible to create informative and insightful investor reports
in that regard.

ConclusionM

any firms, including our own, focus less on
categorization and nomenclature and more on
producing alpha; the more of it, and the morediversified it is, the better. But for good or ill, our firm andmany of its products have been placed in a multi-strategy
bucket. We began managing multi-strategy investment
funds on the premise that allocating capital across different
strategies could enhance the risk-adjusted return of thetotal portfolio. This paper has attempted to catalog someof the structural advantages that accrue to multi-strategy
funds or single-strategy funds managed by multi-strategy
managers relative to a portfolio of separate allocations tosingle-strategy funds or firms that manage only one or a
few strategies.
We believe the advantages conferred by managers ofmulti-strategy funds cut across a wide swath of hedge-fundprocesses and activities, including alpha generation, risk
management, financing, and back-office operations. In ourview, to quote perhaps an unlikely source in V.I. Lenin,
there’s a point at which “quantity turns into quality”: afirm or fund that manages ten or fifteen alternative
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Diversification and Beyond
investment strategies can offer investors a range of benefits
that, when taken as a whole, are not available from singlestrategy managers or funds that invest in just a handful ofstrategies.
That said, trade-offs certainly apply when an investor
chooses, say, between an investment in a multi-strategy
fund and a portfolio of single-strategy funds. The degree
to which a given investor gains comfort with one or theother approach will of course vary. But we strongly believethat a multi-strategy approach to investing not only
enhances portfolio diversification and risk-adjusted returns
but also bolsters operational infrastructure and thealignment of manager and investor interests. Our firm
packages its strategies in a variety of funds that straddle
both sides of the multi-strategy/single-strategy divide.
However, as a matter of firm culture, we believe all of ourinvestment activities are characterized by, and benefit from,a multi-strategy perspective on global financial markets.

The views expressed in this commentary are solely those of the D. E. Shaw group as of the date of this commentary. The
views expressed in this commentary are subject to change without notice, and may not reflect the criteria employed by any
company in the D. E. Shaw group to evaluate investments or investment strategies. This commentary is provided to you for
informational purposes only. This commentary does not and is not intended to constitute investment advice, nor does it
constitute an offer to sell or provide or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security, investment product, or service. This
commentary does not take into account any particular investor’s investment objectives or tolerance for risk. The
information contained in this commentary is presented solely with respect to the date of the preparation of thiscommentary, or as of such earlier date specified in this commentary, and may be changed or updated at any time without
notice to any of the recipients of this commentary (whether or not some other recipients receive changes or updates to theinformation in this commentary).
No assurances can be made that any aims, assumptions, expectations, and/or objectives described in this commentary
would be realized or that the investment strategies described in this commentary would meet their objectives. None of thecompanies in the D. E. Shaw group; nor their affiliates; nor any shareholders, partners, members, managers, directors,
principals, personnel, trustees, or agents of any of the foregoing shall be liable for any errors (to the fullest extent permitted
by law and in the absence of willful misconduct) in the information, beliefs, and/or opinions included in this commentary,or for the consequences of relying on such information, beliefs, or opinions. Past performance should not be considered

indicative of future performance.

MARKET INSIGHTS

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