CROSS-BORDER ANALYSIS AND MAPPINGFINAL REPORT
Submitted on 22 September 2016
to the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing the
Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa (EUTF),
Horn of Africa Window

1

Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary ............................................................................................................... 3
2. Research Background ............................................................................................................ 6
2.1. Objectives ......................................................................................................................... 6
2.2. Research Team .................................................................................................................. 6
2.3. Research Methodology...................................................................................................... 7
2.3.1. Fieldwork.................................................................................................................... 7
2.3.2. Cluster areas ............................................................................................................... 8
2.4. Stakeholder Engagement................................................................................................... 8
2.5. Challenges faced................................................................................................................ 9
2.5.1. Project timeframe ....................................................................................................... 9
2.5.2. Government engagement ............................................................................................ 9
2.6.3. Security ...................................................................................................................... 9

3. Research Findings................................................................................................................ 11
3.1. Context ........................................................................................................................... 11
3.1.1. Population ................................................................................................................ 11
3.1.2. Infrastructure ............................................................................................................ 11
3.1.3. Resources ................................................................................................................. 13
3.1.4. Economic activities .................................................................................................... 16
3.1.5. Vulnerabilities ........................................................................................................... 19
3.2. Instability and migration, and their drivers....................................................................... 21
3.2.1. Instability and its drivers ............................................................................................ 22
3.2.2. Migration and its drivers ............................................................................................ 27
3.3. Cross border interventions............................................................................................... 34
3.3.1. Existing initiatives in the areas.................................................................................... 34
3.3.2. Best practice and lessons learned ............................................................................... 37

4. Recommendations on Potential Opportunities for the EU .............................................. 39
Annex 1: Terms of Reference (TOR) ....................................................................................... 44
Annex 2: Research Guide ........................................................................................................ 52
Annex 3: Cluster Area Maps.................................................................................................... 55

2

1. Executive Summary
The main purpose of this Cross Border Study is to provide a mapping and analysis exercise offour cross border areas linking Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea. The fieldresearch took place during July and August 2016, and involved eight researchers in fourcluster areas:xxxx

Cluster 1: Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya
Cluster 2: Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia
Cluster 3: Western Ethiopia-East Sudan
Cluster 4: Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea1

Methodology
The researchers collected the majority of the primary information on their respective
clusters through semi-structured interviews and discussions with key informants andstakeholders. This was complemented with a review of documents collected from the field
and researched online. The key research themes centred around migration and instability,
as well geographic and demographic information, socioeconomic and political context,
infrastructure and other key resources, sources of vulnerability, and existing interventions in
the area.
Cross border areas are, by their nature, challenging contexts in which to work, and theresearchers faced a number of obstacles in carrying out their work. Most notable amongst
these were issues of security and access, as well as difficulties around getting someauthorisations on time. The relatively short timeframe allocated to this project alsopresented a major challenge.
General findings
Common across all four border areas is low population density and limited infrastructure
capacity, both typical of peripheral border areas. Water, livestock and land for farming andgrazing are the main natural resources identified in the cross border clusters. Resource
scarcity is widespread and caused by a combination of man-made (state-sponsoreddevelopment projects) and natural (climate change and droughts) pressures. Most of thevulnerabilities identified in the study are also associated with resource scarcity. Livelihoods
across the study area tend to be undiversified and reliant on scarce natural resources, andare therefore vulnerable to shocks and pressures. These vulnerabilities could be alleviatedthrough better sharing of resources both across and within borders, and between local
communities and commercial entities, as well as by initiating targeted interventions to build
resilience, strengthen local infrastructure and improve access to basic services .

1 Due to challenges around access, it was not possible to include Eritrea in the research study or findings.

Consequently, the ‘Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea’ cluster focuses instead on Sudan and Ethiopia.

3Economic activities in the four clusters tend to provide low levels of income; they are
informal and dependent on natural resources. Pastoralism and agriculture are common to
all the clusters (in varying proportions), and other informal employment opportunities werealso identified in some areas. Trade in goods and animals, and relatively lucrative smuggling
and trafficking networks are also a feature. In nearly all areas, a lack of adequate investment
and targeted interventions undermines the productivity and profitability of these economic
activities.
Instability is common to all the study to varying degrees, and manifests itself in a number ofways. It can take the form of clan conflict, as rival groups compete and fight over scarce
resources (especially land and water), but also trade and political power. Instability is also
linked to protracted conflict between government and rebel forces, as in Blue Nile State in
the Western Ethiopia-East Sudan cluster. In the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster, instability isfrequently generated by violent attacks associated with Al-Shabaab. In this context, anumber of different groups and actors are involved in conflict, and instability is taking place
at local, regional, national and international levels.
Migration also occurs across the research areas, but in different ways, involving different
people and to differing extents. Generally speaking, migration is more prevalent in Clusters
2, 3 and 4 than in Cluster 1, which has ceased to be an important migratory corridor since2012. The research identified a wide range of migratory practices, including transhumance,labour migration, irregular migration, forced migration, displacement, mig ration for
education and health purposes, family reunification, politically motivated migration,
migration for flood retreat agriculture and community resettlement. In this context, thedrivers of migration are multiple and often overlapping. They include: resource scarcity,
development projects, conflict, natural disaster, coercion, unemployment, a lack of basic
services, culture of migration, political participation, and so on. While the demographic
profile of migrants (particularly in terms of their age, gender and access to resources) varies
across the study areas, the research found that labourers, young people and pastoralists
typically made up the majority of those moving.
A number of interventions are being carried out by NGOs, UN and governments in thecluster areas. Initiatives and activities that have achieved the best results have tended to be
those that: adopt a cross-border and conflict-sensitive approach; involve and build on
traditional institutions and practices; balance commercial interests and community needs;
integrate peacebuilding; take a market approach; and support already-existing mechanisms.
Based on this, a list of suggested project interventions has been provided for each cluster
area, full details of which can be found in Section 4.

4

Cluster
Cluster 1:
Southwest
EthiopiaNorthwest Kenya)

Cluster 2: KenyaSomalia-Ethiopia

Cluster 3: Western
Ethiopia-East
Sudan

Cluster 4: Eastern
Sudan-Northwest
Ethiopia-Eritrea

Suggested Interventions
1. Land and water resource mapping.
2. Integrated water management interventions at local, national andinternational levels.
3. Integration of peacebuilding into development works.
4. Rangelands rehabilitation.
5. Joint fishing zone.
6. Regional tourism sector.
7. Commercial agriculture and agro-pastoralism integration.
8. Peace building activities.
9. Cross border livestock disease control programme.
10. Resilience activities that target the impact of drought on livestock andpastoralist livelihoods.
11. Integrated water management interventions at both a localised andregional level.
12. Renewable energy projects.
13. Support to technical training institute and a teachers training college.
14. Irrigation schemes.
15. Surveillance of livestock diseases.
16. Communications campaigns, job creation, technical and vocational
training, and business loans to discourage irregular migration.
17. Community resilience programmes.
18. Support to victims of irregular migration.
19. Government capacity building and provision of equipment for better
migration management.
20. Cross border interventions linked to security and policing, but alsosocioeconomic activities, such as livestock, health and agriculture.
21. Peacebuilding activities between refugees and hosting communities, andbetter integration of refugee and local development projects.
22. Public awareness campaigns to raise awareness of the dangers of
irregular migration amongst migrants and especially the youth.
23. Interventions that foster employment opportunities and economic
empowerment, whilst also strengthening livelihoods and building
community resilience.
24. Support to state infrastructure and capacity to ensure the proper
implementation of policies and regulations designed to combat
trafficking, smuggling and irregular migration.
25. Promotion of national and transnational cooperation and joint, crossborder interventions to tackle issues of smuggling and trafficking.
26. Regularisation of the employment and movement of farm labourers inorder to better protect the rights of workers, reduce employer-employee
tensions, and capitalize on the benefits accrued by foreign employment
exchange services.
27. Protection and support services for intercepted or stranded migrants.
5

2. Research Background2.1. Objectives
The overall objective of the Cross Border Study is to undertake, at the request of the EU and
IGAD, as a preliminary step in pursuit of a comprehensive mapping of the Horn of Africaarea, a mapping and analysis exercise that will provide evidence for a possible €80 million
intervention in support of greater resilience in four cross-border areas, to be implemented
through the EUTF Horn of Africa window:xxxx

Cluster 1: Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya
Cluster 2: Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia
Cluster 3: Western Ethiopia-East Sudan
Cluster 4: Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea

It should be noted that Metema was subsequently included as a fifth cross border area,
although the findings from this site (still being collected at the time of writing) will beincorporated into the ‘Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea’ report. Furthermore, due
to challenges around access, it was not possible to include Eritrea in the research study or
findings. Consequently, the ‘Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea’ cluster focusesinstead on Sudan and Ethiopia.
The purpose of the Cross Border Study is to:x Gain a better understanding of the drivers of instability and irregular migration, andthe sources of resiliencex Catalogue the responses already provided by other donors, non-governmental andcivil society organisations, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),
and partner state governments to address the dynamics referenced above, andassess what is working wellx Map and assess potential partners
x Identify potential opportunities for engagement

2.2. Research TeamThe core research team included one Research Coordinator based in Nairobi, and another in
Addis Ababa. The roles of the Research Coordinators were to facilitate communications with
EU representatives (in Brussels and the Delegations), recruit and supervise the fieldresearchers, support logistics, engage with IGAD and other government representatives,
monitor costs and budgets, and write up the final report. The wider Research and Evidence
Facility (REF) management team were also involved in the project, including Team Leader
and Key Experts.

6This core team was supplemented by eight field researchers allocated to the different
research zones. The researchers were selected based on their academic and professional
background and experience, including first-hand knowledge of the relevant clusters.

2.3. Research Methodology
A group session was held with the researchers in Addis Ababa on Thursday 14th July, andNairobi on Friday 15th July in order to clarify the study objectives and approach, and answer
any questions or concerns. A research guide (see Annex 2) was developed from the terms ofreference (TOR) (see Annex 1) and used to guide the researchers’ work in the field. The
guide included questions around the key themes of migration and instability, as wellgeographic and demographic information, socioeconomic and political context,
infrastructure and other key resources, sources of vulnerability, and existing interventions in
the area. While this report provides a comparative analysis of the different clusters, eachcluster also developed its own individual report, as requested by the individual Delegations.
2.3.1. Fieldwork
The researchers collected the majority of the primary information on their respective
clusters through semi-structured interviews and discussions with key informants andstakeholders. Interviewees included:
x

x
x
x
x

Government officials from the following sectors: security, immigration, labour,
agriculture and natural resources (incl. livestock, fisheries, water, energy), youth,
finance and economic development
Community members
Migrants and refugees
UN organisations
NGO and civil society representatives

The information collected from these interviews was consolidated and supplemented
through a review of documents collected from the field and from other publicly available
sources. These included:xxxx

Government documents
UN and NGO reports
Statistics and censuses
Academic papers

Due to the short timeframe of this project, researchers were allocated 20 days to complete
their research. This included approximately 15 days in the field and 5 days’ write up,
although final allocations varied. Following submission of field reports by the groups ofresearchers, the core team spent approximately one week finalising the content, structure7

and analysis of this final report. Research was carried out at the clusters according to thetimetables below:
Cluster
Cluster 1: Southwest EthiopiaNorthwest Kenya
Cluster 2: Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia
Cluster 3: Western Ethiopia-East
Sudan
Cluster 4: Eastern Sudan-Northwest
Ethiopia-Eritrea
Cluster 4: Metema

Dates in the field
31st July – 17th August
25th July – 11th August
27th July – 6th August
4th August – 19th August
16th August – 27th August

2.3.2. Cluster areas
The cluster areas were determined by a series of maps provided by the EU in Brussels –these are presented in Annex 3. The sizes of each cluster varied and, due to the shorttimeframe of this project, it was not expected that researchers could visit every part of thecluster. Rather, the researchers focused their time in the area capitals in order to meet withand secure approvals from regional government, and then proceeded to key border areas.
More details on these movements are provided in the individual field reports.

2.4. Stakeholder Engagement
In order to secure the official approvals needed to carry out the research, it was necessary
to engage the governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan on each of thedifferent clusters. As a first step, a workshop was held in Nairobi on Thursday 7 th July withrepresentatives from IGAD, EU Delegations and the Research and Evidence Facility (REF).
This was followed up with correspondence and numerous meetings over approximately six
weeks. Once letters of authorisation had been secured from central governments, these had
to be approved and, in some cases, replicated by the regional authorities at the cluster level.
This required ongoing engagement with a number of different government institutions,
including IGAD, IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development (ICPALD), IGAD
Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC), and the National Drought Management
Agency (NDMA), as well as the various ministries dealing with security, agriculture andlivestock issues, at both the central and regional government level.
The EU Delegations were also involved in the research process, and were kept abreast of
project progress. Consultation sessions were held with the EU Delegation to Ethiopia in
Addis Ababa on Thursday 14th July, and with the EU Delegations to Kenya and Somalia on
Friday 15th July. During these sessions and in subsequent correspondence, the terms ofreference and research guide were shared and discussed. Feedback from the Delegations8was captured and, where possible, incorporated into the researchers’ workplans. Following
this, group debriefing sessions were held in Addis and Nairobi with Brussels, EU Delegations,individual researchers and representatives from the REF on Tuesday 23 rd and Thursday 25th
August.

2.5. Challenges faced
The research team faced a number of challenges in carrying out this research project. Theseare elaborated in detail below:
2.5.1. Project timeframe
Given the scope and scale of this research, the six weeks allocated (from the IGAD workshop
to submission of the field cluster reports) was not sufficient for carrying all of the various
steps associated with the project: government engagement, mobilisation, field work, desk
based research and write up. Given the complexity of conducting research in cross borderareas, in future it is recommended that additional time be made available.
2.5.2. Government engagement
The deadline for this project also did not allow sufficient time for government engagement.
Given the sensitive nature of border zones, government officials from a number of
departments had to be involved in this process. During the initial Nairobi workshop, IGAD
members highlighted that the planning of the project should be inclusive and on aparticipatory basis. Other government officials had concerns and questions around security,
access and inter-country tensions. These issues had to be resolved through ongoing
dialogue over time, before the necessary letters of authorisation were released. Even once
letters were secured from central government, a similar process of dialogue and negotiation
had to be held with government officials at the regional level.
Formal permission had not been granted by Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea, so fieldwork as of
31 August was not possible in those areas. Research teams covered these areas through a
combination of their own previous professional experience working in these places, as wellas interviews with others who are currently working in them. The team is continuing to try
to gain authorisation to conduct field research in Sudan and Eritrea in September 2016.
Should permission be granted, information gained from these field visits will be supplied as
supplementary to the current report.
2.6.3. Security
Cross-border areas are places of heightened security and inter-country tension. This madecrossing borders quite challenging and, in some cases, crossing s had to be delayed, orabandoned altogether. The researchers’ ability to access some of the clusters was also
9

hampered by security issues. Serious and violent clashes between protestors andgovernment forces in Oromia and Amhara regions of Ethiopia led to a heightened security
situation, in particular in the northern city of Bahir Dar. As the capital of the Amhara Region,
Bahir Dar was an essential part of our government engagement strategy for accessing theborder town of Metema. The unrest made it difficult for the researchers to government
officials who were dealing with the security situation. In Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest
Kenya cluster, a spike in cross border raids and killings led the Deputy Administrator in the
town of Omorate to advise against attempting the crossing into Kenya. In the KenyaSomalia-Ethiopia cluster, instability associated with Al-Shabaab and the presence oftrafficking networks made crossing into Somalia highly risky. Ongoing hostilities andtensions along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border were also a security issue.

103. Research Findings
3.1. Context
3.1.1. Population
Cluster 1: Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya
The cluster area is a pastoral zone, with the majority of people living in rural areas. It is likelythat population dynamics will be significantly affected by the anticipated influx of labour
migrants attracted to work on local mega-projects, such as large-scale sugar projects. Somegroups are settled, but many practice agro-pastoralism, with a reliance on rain-fed
agriculture.
Cluster 2: Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia
This cluster is made up of Gedo Region (Somalia), Doolow (Ethiopia), and Mandera country(Kenya), with the latter being by far the most densely populated. A number of different
clans inhabit the cluster, including: Marehan, Rahanweyn, Ogaden, Harti and Bantu in Gedo;
Degodia and Geremare in Doolow; and Garre, Murulle, and Degodia in Mandera.
Cluster 3: Western Ethiopia-East Sudan
This cluster is characterised by a diverse range of ethnic groups. On the Ethiopia side, theseinclude Berta, Amhara, Gumuz, Oromo, Shinasha and Agew Awi. On the Sudan side, there
more than a dozen ethnic groups, including the Ingessana, Berta, Burun, Gumuz, Hamaj,
Jumjum, Koma, Ragarig, and Uduk. Nomadic groups are much more numerous on the Sudanside than in Ethiopia. The majority of people on both sides of the border live in rural areas.
While population density is low, the number of people living in the area is predicted to growsignificantly due to an influx of labourers, irregular migrants and refugees from Sudan,South Sudan and Eritrea.
Cluster 4: Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea
This cluster is made up of a number of different groups, principally the Tigrayan andAmhara. Tigrigna is the working language in the Humera zone (Amharic is the working
language in Metema) and Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity is the dominant religion (although
there are a significant number of Muslims as well). In Sudan, the population is
predominantly Muslim. Arabic is the main language, but there are also sizeable Tigre, Beni
Amer and other ethnic groups.
3.1.2. Infrastructure
Infrastructure relating to roads, transport, communications, water, sanitation, electricity,
health, education, agriculture, banking and veterinary services, was limited across all fourcluster areas. This can be attributed to low population density, lack of government presence
and investment (in part due to the peripheral location of these areas), and conflict andinstability. In the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia and Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea
11clusters, for example, conflict and unrest have destroyed local infrastructure, delayed
construction projects, and reduced government resources and services in Gedo and Blue
Nile State. Furthermore, with the exception of some health and educational facilities,
infrastructure is rarely shared across borders, and there is little evidence that governments
are planning to improve cross border collaboration.
Cluster 1: Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya
Infrastructure in this cluster is very limited and, with the exception of some of the mainroutes that warrant state-sponsored upgrades, road networks tend to be under-utilised,basic and severely eroded by rainfall. Infrastructure is not planned with cross-border sharing
or collaboration in mind. The only exception to this are small-scale infrastructure, such as
churches, schools and health facilities which attract populations from both sides of theborder.
Cluster 2: Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia
Infrastructure in this cluster is also limited. On all three sides of the border, most road
networks and airstrips are yet to be tarmacked. Access to electricity is low, although thecluster is endowed with vast, untapped solar and wind energy potential. Conflict in Gedo
has been the main challenge to improving key infrastructure, such as airways and a dam
project. Educational infrastructure has also been impacted and only four secondary schools
are functional on the Somali side of the border. Mandera’s infrastructure is relatively moredeveloped with a greater number of educational, health, banking, communications andtransport facilities. These attract people to move to Mandera county from across thecluster, in order to access such services. It can therefore be argued that cross-bordersharing of infrastructure is occurring to a greater degree than in Southwest EthiopiaNorthwest Kenya cluster. Given the heightened security considerations across the KenyaSomalia-Ethiopia cluster, there have efforts to streamline security infrastructure andarrangements across borders.
Cluster 3: Western Ethiopia-East Sudan
As in the other clusters, infrastructure in Cluster 3 remains very limited. This relates toroads, transport, water, sanitation, electricity, veterinary services, agriculture, educationand health. The state of affairs in Blue Nile State on the Sudanese side of the border has
been severely undermined by the Second Sudanese Civil War, and renewed conflict since2013. This destroyed much of the local infrastructure and reduced government resources
and services. As a result, many areas remain without adequate health care and children in
the area have not been vaccinated since the renewal of conflict. It is important to note thatBlue Nile is home to the Roseires Dam, the main source of hydroelectric power in the Sudan
until the completion of the Merowe Dam in 2010. On the Ethiopian side of the border, theGrand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is under construction.
Steps have been taken to share infrastructure across the border. In Kurmuk, there is ashared bridge, and the contract to construct a new road was given to the same company on
both sides. Mobile telephone networks from both sides stretch tens of kilometres over theborder, enabling border communities to make use of two networks. Nevertheless, further
12

progress could still be made, and transport infrastructure (roads and bridges) remains
weaker on the Sudan side due to conflict in Blue Nile State.
Cluster 4: Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea
Infrastructure in the cluster is somewhat limited, however there is a well-built asphalt roadthat connects Humera to the Sudanese border town of Lugdi, and then on to Khartoum.
Humera and Khartoum are also connected by public transport networks. The KassalaGedaref-Gallabat-Metema-Gonder(Azezo) highway is also an important road network that isshared across the border. Electric power, landline and mobile telephone networks, andinternet service are available. However, the quality of these varies and is interrupted bypower shortages. Agricultural infrastructure linked to local farming practices is alsoavailable, such as sesame cleaning machinery and storehouses.

3.1.3. Resources
Water, livestock and land for farming and grazing are the main resources identified in the
cross border clusters. Fish stocks, flood retreat agricultural land, and minerals, marble, goldand quarry stone are other important resources found in some of the study areas. Local
livelihoods in all four areas were largely or completely dependent on the availability of theseresources. Resource scarcity, however, was widespread and caused by a combination ofman-made (state-sponsored development projects) and natural (climate change anddroughts) pressures. More than in any other cluster, water scarcity was a major resource
issue in the Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya cluster, where the Gibe III dam and largescale sugar projects in Ethiopia have severely limited water availability and displaced many
communities from their lands.
In this context, competition over resources can be great, leading to conflict and instability,
especially in areas characterised by inter-clan rivalries. Tensions are particularly prevalent inclusters 1 and 2 amongst communities living downstream from over-exploited river sources.
In contrast, the successful sharing of the River Tekeze/Atbara2 (in the Eastern SudanNorthwest Ethiopia-Eritrea) shows that, in some contexts and with the necessary measuresin place, river waters can be harnessed for irrigation and hydro power without undermining
local livelihoods and stability.
Another positive example was found in the Western Ethiopia-East Sudan cluster, which
demonstrated the most successful efforts at resource sharing. Rivers, forests, quarries,
parks and infrastructure are shared across the border, and communities on both sides
engage in gold mining, and the production of incense, gum arabic, charcoal and stones andsand for construction. Typically, however, the research found that resources are not being
adequately shared across borders, or even across social groups or gender lines. Women, forexample, often have less access to land, limited or no control over resources, fewer
economic opportunities, and are exposed to gender-based violence.
2 The river is known as the Tekeze in Ethiopia and the Atbara in Sudan.

13

Cluster 1: Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya
In this cluster, livestock, water, grazing land, flood retreat agricultural land and fish stocks
are the main resources for local communities on both sides of the border. Water, inparticular, is a major resource, and a key consideration when it comes to livelihoods. Agropastoralists’ decisions on engaging in both retreat agriculture and seasonal migration with
their herds are made to maximise access to river water. Likewise, major development
initiatives, such as the Government of Ethiopia’s villagisation programme, are made in a‘water-centred’ manner, with village locations chosen specifically due to their proximity towater sources.
Competition over resources is often fierce – within countries and across borders – andconflict over access to land, water and fishing rights is common. While there are a few
examples of cross-border collaboration (e.g. the Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience
Project), few resources are currently shared across national or local borders, or among
different groups.3 Alliances between groups are negotiated for the purpose of resource
sharing. However these tend to be short-term and to break down during times of resource
scarcity.
Resource scarcity in the Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya cluster has been severely
exacerbated by a number of state-sponsored development projects, mainly on the Ethiopianside of the border. The filling of the Gibe III dam and the absence of a simulated flood in2015 to allow for flood retreat agriculture has had serious repercussions on water
availability and fish stocks, and consequently on local livelihoods and food security. Sourcesindicate that in 2016 Gibe III officials are preparing to release the simulated floods by theend of August. Another pressure on natural resources is the transformation of communal
lands into large-scale irrigated cash-crop schemes for sugar cane and cotton. These
enterprises have displaced communities from their land and reduced the amount of water
available to the Dassenech, Erbore and Turkana, who are downstream from the Omo andWoyto rivers. It would seem that upstream and downstream interests are not aligned,
raising the risk of resource conflict. Indeed, full utilisation of the Woyto River has resulted in
the total drying up of Chew Bahir (Lake Stephanie), and has rendered impossible flood
retreat agriculture and dry season grazing by the Erbore and a section of the Hamer.
In general, management of resources in the Ethiopian and Kenyan sides of the border
generally rests with the local communities themselves. These pursue a number of
traditional coping strategies including: pastoralist migration, inter-tribe negotiations andinsurance mechanisms; and societal behavioural control built on norms and custom. NGOs
and other non-state actors also play a role in managing local resources. While degradationof resources, such as rangelands, through overuse does occur (particularly in the Turkanaarea), the research suggests that this is not as widespread as commonly assumed. When

3 The Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project a five-year project funded by the World Bank that isbeing implemented in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.

14degradation does occur, the establishment of enclosures is an effective strategy forrehabilitating rangelands.
Cluster 2: Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia
As in cluster 1, water scarcity is also common in many parts of the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia
cluster. Water from the rivers Dawa and Ganale is a shared resource, and is widely used for
irrigation by residents of the triangle, though particularly in Mandera county. According tolocal authorities, the potential for irrigation is believed to be between 10,500 to 15,000
hectares. Sources indicate that the Government of Kenya is developing a masterplan for theriver Dawa, which will involve various developmental projects including increased irrigation,
generation of hydro-electric power and revamping of the Malkamari National Park. A recent
tripartite consultative process under the auspices of IGAD that sought to bring together
government representatives from Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia seems to have stalled. It isalso important to note that Ethiopia has plans to dam the Shabelle River for irrigatedagriculture in Somali Regional State. If not properly managed, this could produce communal
tensions over the new farmland, pastoral clashes with farmers over access to the river, andpossible cross-border tensions due to reduced water flow into Somalia.
Livestock is another key resource for households inhabiting the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia
cluster. These include camels, goats, sheep and cattle. Cattle are no longer kept in large
numbers because of the harsh climatic conditions and lack of sufficient water resources
required to maintain large herds. Animals are used for food, as pack animals, or forploughing. Livestock and their products (milk, meat, and skins) are also sold to generatehousehold income. There have been reports of declining numbers of livestock in recent
years, due to a combination of recurrent droughts, livestock disease and the obligations to
pay religious or social contributions using animals as zakat or dowry payment.
Cluster 3: Western Ethiopia-East Sudan
There are a number of key natural resources found on both sides of the border, including
cultivatable land, water sources, fish, wild game and gum arabic. Marble, gold and quarrystone are also mined. Of all the study areas, Cluster 3 demonstrates the most successful
efforts at resource sharing. Rivers, forests, quarries and sands are shared across the border,
as indicated by the crossing of Sudanese pastoralists into Ethiopia for grazing cattle andgoats. Communities on both sides are engaged in gold mining, and the production of
incense, gum arabic, charcoal and stones and sand for construction.
Cluster 4: Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea
The River Tekeze/Atbara is the main water resource shared by Ethiopia and Sudan. In spiteof dam projects (already built in the case of Ethiopia and in the planning stage in Sudan),there seems to be sufficient water for both sides of the border. This is in contrast to otherareas, such as the Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya and Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia
clusters, where the construction of water dams has been a source of contention andconflict. Sudan seems to have made more progress, in comparison to Ethiopia, in using the
Atbara River for irrigation farming, and as a source for generating electric power.
15

3.1.4. Economic activities
Economic activities in the four clusters tend to provide small income opportunities and to
be informal and dependent on natural resources. Pastoralism and agriculture are common
to all the clusters. At the household level, the productivity and profitability of these
activities is undermined by a lack of skilled human resources and new technologies, poor
infrastructure, and crop and livestock disease. Agriculture is generally labour intensive anddependent on rain. Fishing techniques are also traditional, relying on hooks and traps. Moremodern, commercial agricultural projects have become increasingly common in clusters 1, 3
and 4. While these enterprises are modernising the production of significant quantities ofcash crops, they are also leading to significant land and water pressures for l ocal farmers.
Furthermore, local communities are not necessarily benefiting from the employment
opportunities created as, in the case of Western Ethiopia-East Sudan cluster, most of theworkers involved in these projects come from other parts of Ethiopia.
Trade in goods and animals is more common in clusters 2, 3 and 4 than in cluster 1, andrepresents a key economic activity that takes place across international borders. In the
Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster, this has been facilitated by the rise of small towns andsettlements on both sides of the border. In the Western Ethiopia-East Sudan cluster, aborder cooperation agreement between Ethiopia and Sudan has established joint market
days, with people from both sides of the border allowed to officially buy and sell to eachother. This represents the strongest example recorded in the research of state-sanctioned
support towards cross border trade and economic activities , and a positive step that could
be replicated in other cross border areas. In Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya, researchsuggested that the scale and profitability of trading and other service sectors in this cluster
will expand once development projects become increasingly functional.4
Smuggling networks also constitute a major cross border activity that generates large
economic gains. Products that cannot be produced locally, such as beverages, soap
powders, detergents, perfumes, electronics and vehicle parts tend to be imported, mainly
illegally by smuggling networks. Whilst the trade in commodities, foods and other goods
helps to boost livelihoods and resilience, the illicit trade in guns and people underminesstability and propagates local corruption. Furthermore, the circulation of counterfeit andineffective animal drugs is reportedly also a common issue, which leaves livestock
vulnerable to disease.
In nearly all cases, a lack of adequate investment and targeted interventions undermines
the productivity and profitability of economic activities. If these economic activities are toreach their full potential, greater support is needed to improve related infrastructure,
institutions, inputs, marketing, and the availability of credit and insurance mec hanisms. This
4 These projects include the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor, the discovery offossil fuel and planned infrastructure projects, such as an international airport in Lokichoggio a nd Resort Cityat Eliye Springs.

16

is especially the case for the fishing industry in Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya cluster,where in spite of large fish stocks and the economic potential of fishing, it is yet to function
as a significant or sustainable income earner for local populations.
Cluster 1: Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya
In this cluster, pastoralism and fishing, flood retreat agriculture and petty trading are themain economic activities practised by local communities. Due to poor access and a lack ofinvestment, these activities are not as productive as they could be. For example, in spite of
the economic potential of fishing, it is yet to function as a significant or sustainable income
earner for local populations. A combination of inadequate fishing equipment, absence ofmarket and marketing facilities, poor infrastructure and services (roads, storage, processing
or cold chain, and extension services) and lack of institutions (such as legally establishedfishing cooperatives) have undermined the economic potential of the fishing industry in thecluster. These economic activities do not formally cut across the Kenya-Ethiopia border,
although the research does point to the importance of cross border social connections insustaining these economic activities.
Cluster 2: Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia
In contrast, economic activities in this cluster seem to be much more prominent. Research
pointed to four main livelihood systems: pastoralism, agro-pastoralism, formal and informal
employment, and trading. Livestock rearing (pastoralism) is the main economic activity inthe cluster, and households rely heavily on camels, goats, sheep and, to a lesser extent,
cattle to meet their daily needs. Livestock marketing, mainly across the border with Somalia
and into the Gulf states, generates enormous revenues for livestock owners, traders andmarketing agents in the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster.
Cross-border trade (including lucrative smuggling) of consumer goods, foodstuffs, cattle,
camels, khat, cars and construction materials is also common, and is facilitated by the
porous nature of parts of the border. Gun smuggling and human trafficking and smuggling
are two of the most serious forms of illegal trade across the region’s borders. Major humantrafficking routes include Ethiopian trafficking into Somalia and Djibouti on towards Yemen
and the Gulf, and Somali human trafficking into Kenya on towards South Africa, Europe, orNorth America. Efforts to crack down on this business have been limited due to weak
government capacity and powerful interests profiting from it.
Economic activities across the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster have been facilitated by a ris eof small border towns and settlements on both sides of the border, most visible along theSomali-Kenyan border. In this light, the cluster constitutes an integrated cross-bordereconomy, with a critical set of corridors for commerce and livestock sales for the entire
region. Cross-border business partnerships exist and, while these can be a source ofcompetition, have, for the most part helped to build resilience to conflict as both sides havea vested interest in maintaining peaceful and secure trade arteries.
Cluster 3: Western Ethiopia-East Sudan
17

Crop and livestock production are the main economic activities and sources of livelihoods in
Cluster 3. Sorghum, maize, sesame, pulses, finger millet, niger seed and groundnut are themain crops grown. Women play a central role in all aspects of agriculture, including foodproduction, processing and marketing. The area is also known for its gold mining, fisheries
and wild food collection. The productivity and profitability of these economic activities is,however, undermined by a lack of skilled human resources and new technologies, poor
infrastructure, and crop and livestock disease. Agriculture is labour intensive and dependent
on rain. Fishing techniques are also traditional, relying on hooks and traps. Modern fishingusing motorized boats and gillnets has been introduced in some parts of Metekel Zone
(Ethiopia). However there remains a lack of technical skills and equipment needed tocapitalise on these investments.
The Ethiopian side of the cluster has attracted large-scale investments in commercial
agriculture, which are modernising the production of significant quantities of cash crops forexport, including sesame, cotton, soybeans, oil seed and rice. It should be noted, however,that local communities are not always targeted, and most of the workers involved in theseprojects are from other regions of Ethiopia.
Similarly to the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster, cross border trade in Western Ethiopia-East
Sudan is a bustling economic activity. The border cooperation agreement between Ethiopia
and Sudan has allowed for joint market days, with people from both sides of the borderofficially allowed to buy and sell to each other. Onions, soap, laundry materials, sugar andmats are some of the common merchandise that Ethiopians buy from Sudan. In turn,
Ethiopian sellers supply the Sudanese with vegetables, eggs, chicken, coffee, leather shoes
and cosmetics. There are restrictions, however, with a maximum limit of 2,000 Ethiopian
Birr on transactions and a marketing scope of 90km from the border. 5 Furthermore, illegal
trade and smuggling of livestock, bamboo, alcohol and coffee also occurs. Nevertheless, thiscooperation agreement represents one of the most decisive and legitimate steps towards
an official cross border economy recorded in the study.
Cluster 4: Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea
Agriculture is the main activity in this cluster, and is divided between local farmers thatcultivate approximately 42% of land, and large scale farming through investors, which takes
up 58% of cultivable land.6 Sesame, sorghum and cotton are the main crops. Local farmers
on the Ethiopian side no not generally practice irrigation farming from the River
Tekeze/Atbara, and this has tended to be better utilised by Sudanese farmers. Since thearea is rich in pastureland and water, livestock herding is an important household
investment, with significant contribution to the household economy.
Cross border trade is also a key economic activity for communities living along both sides ofthe border. Commodities, mainly agricultural products, including coffee, sesame, sorghum,
5 2,000 Ethiopian Birr is the equivalent of approxi mately US$ 90.
6 In 2010 there were over 400 investors engaged in large scale farming, cultivating an average of 600 hec ta r esof sesame.

18

red pepper, spices (especially ginger), chickpeas, beans, tomato, garlic, honey, hand-madeclothes and fish are traded across the borders between Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea, both
legally and illegally. Live animals such as goats, cattle, and camels are also bought and s old.
Products that cannot be produced locally, such as beverages , soap powders, detergents,
perfumes, electronics and vehicle parts tend to be imported, mainly illegally by smuggling
networks.
Cross border trade is particularly active in and around Metema Woreda, and has been
facilitated through a number of measures. Firstly, a cross border agreement allows trucks
and drivers from both sides of the border to pass through Gallabat and Metema without theneed for carrying passports or obtaining a visa. Secondly, the construction of the KassalaGedaref-Gallabat-Metema-Gonder(Azezo) highway is an invaluable shared infrastructure
across the border, widely used for the transportation of goods and merchandise. Thirdly,
weekly border markets have also been established as part of the cross -border collaboration
effort by Ethiopian and Sudanese authorities, with the purpose of encouraging informal
trade and social interactions.

3.1.5. Vulnerabilities
Across the study areas, vulnerabilities are generally associated with a reliance on
undiversified livelihoods and, linked to this, a lack of household resilience. As aconsequence, when natural and man-made shocks occur, and resources (such as water, land
and livestock) become scarce, households become increasingly vulnerable.
Climate change is key to understanding these vulnerabilities. In recent years, the frequency,
duration and intensity of droughts have increased. Consistent droughts and famine overyears have depleted the livestock herds of poorer pastoralists, and left them with noalternative but to migrate to peri-urban or urban areas in search of casual job opportunities
and/or humanitarian assistance. Conflict is another factor behind local vulnerabilities. For
example, inter-clan fighting in the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster has led to thedisplacement of tens of thousands of people, undermining their livelihoods and resilience.
Conversely, vulnerabilities also sometimes lead to conflict and instability, as resource
scarcity and livelihood pressures increase competition and tensions between groups andindividuals. This is a frequent occurrence in the Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenyacluster. (See section 3.2. below for further details.)
These vulnerabilities could be alleviated through better sharing of resources both acrossand within borders, and between local communities and commercial entities. Targeted
efforts to mitigate the impact of large-scale development projects would also help to
support livelihoods. Furthermore, programmes and interventions that strengthen
livelihoods and resilience would also benefit local communities; in particular, farming andlivestock schemes, such as irrigation, extension services, disease surveillance andvaccination campaigns.
19

Cluster 1: Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya
The main sources of vulnerability in this cluster are linked to resource scarcity caused byenvironmental and man-made factors. These include unpredictable weather patterns,
environmental degradation, recurrent disasters (drought and epizootics) and resourcepressure caused by population growth and large-scale development projects. The expansionof Prosopis juliflora, an invasive species, is also a concern. These have placed significant
pressure on livelihoods and food security, and generated conflict and instability between
groups competing for access to land, water and fishing rights. Resource scarcity is therefore
the key vulnerability underpinning a range of wider problems.
Cluster 2: Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia
Livestock dependence has created vulnerabilities given the susceptibility of livestock to
drought and disease. Livestock are typically unprotected against disease because of theabsence of veterinary services and vaccination campaigns and the widespread use ofcounterfeit and ineffective drugs. The absence of formal insurance mechanisms and disease
surveillance has also left livestock owners vulnerable to livestock losses. As a consequence,
the governments of Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya have been accused of neglecting
pastoralism as an economic developmental priority over the years.
Communities reliant on farming are also subject to a number of vulnerabilities, andsharecroppers and landless households are especially vulnerable. Farming is confined toriver banks and canals, and yields therefore tend to be low. Farmers have little or no accessto fertiliser, irrigation equipment, input credit or agricultural extension services, and there isa high risk of crop failure during drought years. While some farmers are successfully
exporting their produce and cash crops to Somalia, marketing opportunities are generally
limited. Food price seasonality is a particular risk for all farming households, and poorer
farmers with undiversified incomes are often forced to sell produce immediately after
harvest (when prices are at their lowest) to raise cash, and then buy food later in the year atmuch higher prices.
Cluster 3: Western Ethiopia-East Sudan
Residents of the cluster are affected by a number of vulnerabilities, typically associated witha lack of diversity of livelihood strategies and poor resilience to shocks and disasters when
they occur. This includes loss of crops and livestock to disease and drought. Environmental
issues such as land degradation, water pollution and deforestation are also prevalent. The
arrival of new users of land – whether investors, spontaneous settlers or migrant
agricultural workers – can also reduce the availability of land and water, and, whencommercial and intensive farming occurs, lead to further land degradation. These pressures
have created conflict over land, especially between indigenous and non-indigenous
communities. Large scale development projects, such as the construction of the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) can also exacerbate these vulnerabilities.
Conflict in Blue Nile State between government forces and the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement-North (SPLM-N) has also been a major factor in contributing to local
20

vulnerabilities. Due to its protracted nature, it has caused instability, undermined
livelihoods, and led to widespread displacement.
Cluster 4: Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea
As in the other areas studied, vulnerabilities in this cluster are linked to livelihoods lacking indiversity and are reliant on external factors, such as weather patterns. For example,
livelihoods in this cluster are dependent predominantly on agriculture and, particularly, on
rain-fed agriculture. This undermines people’s resilience to shocks, and inadequate or
irregular rainfall or, conversely, flooding, has left many farming families food insecure. Land
shortage is also a problem. While farmers generally do own their own plot, these tend to bevery small, which makes it difficult to build a surplus and improve economic resilience. It isestimated that the majority of Ethiopian smallholders cultivate plots of 1 hectare or less,and consequently face annual periods of prolonged hunger before the harvest is ready. This
shortage of land can be attributed to the expansion of commercial farming, which takes up
58% of cultivable land and the fact that plots must be divided between children when theycome of age. Consequently, the size of plots diminishes with each generation. Landdegradation through soil and land erosion and the unsustainable use of forest resources has
also undermined people’s resilience to vulnerabilities.
Commercial sex work is a relatively widespread activity in Metema town, and can beconsidered another vulnerability for young women and girls. The influx of transient
populations and economic potential has been echoed by a rise in the number of women,both local and from outside, engaging in transactional sex. In some cases, these women may
be stranded migrants who had originally intended to travel on to Sudan and beyond. Others
are tricked or trafficked into moving to Metema by brokers who promise them employment
opportunities that subsequently do not materialise.

3.2. Instability and migration, and their drivers
The research found that instability and migration are often closely connected. They sharemany of the same drivers. For example, unemployment, conflict, displacement, resource
scarcity, natural disasters, development projects and a lack of basic services have led toboth migration and instability across the four study areas.
Furthermore, instability can lead to migration, and migration can impact stability. For
instance, as noted above, in the East Sudan-Ethiopia cluster, instability caused by theongoing civil water in Blue Nile state has led to the displacement of between 115,000 and
165,000 people since the beginning of the conflict. In the same area, the large influx oflabour migrants, irregular migrants and refugees is fostering instability by increa sing the
population, changing local dynamics and placing a serious strain on local resources. This has
generated instability and conflict between competing groups.

21

The impacts of migration on stability are not always negative and, in many instances,
movement and mobility can improve resilience and relations amongst different groups, withpositive consequences for stability. For example, the seasonal migration of pastoralists andtheir livestock allows them to take advantage of water and grazing lands for their herds,
thereby increasing their resilience and promoting greater stability. Likewise, the spreadingof ethnic groups across borders through migration can help to build cross -border alliancesand stability.
In spite of the interrelatedness of migration and instability, the two themes are explored
under separate headings below. Due to the complex nature of migration and instability inthe region, as well as the wide geographical focus of this research project, it was felt that
this approach would help to convey the information and data collected more clearly andsuccinctly.

3.2.1. Instability and its drivers
Instability is a common characteristic across the clusters, which manifests itself in a numberof different ways and to differing extents. It takes the form of clan conflict in clusters 1 and
2, as rival groups compete and fight over scarce resources (especially land and water, butalso trade and political power). This is driven by a combination of factors, including
historical clan rivalries and dynamics, resource scarcity and livelihood pressures.
In the Blue Nile State of the Western Ethiopia-East Sudan cluster, instability is linked to
protracted conflict between the Sudanese government and rebel forces of the Sudanese
People Liberation Movement (SPLM)-North. Centre-periphery relations are at the root of
the conflict, manifested in the unequal distribution of economic, political and social
opportunities between them.
In the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster, instability is generated by terrorism associated with
Al-Shabaab. The group has carried out a number of violent attacks on government
installations and civilians. In addition to carrying out physical attacks, Al-Shabaab causes
instability by creating suspicion and divisions among communities. It has successfully
recruited unemployed youth with the promise of a paying job, and has exploited local clan
and other grievances to meet its own objectives.
In this context, a number of different groups are involved in conflict and instability in the
study areas. On a localised level, conflict occurs between neighbouring groups of indigenous
people, as in the case of clusters 1 and 2. It can also occur between indigenous and nonindigenous groups, as in the case of Western Ethiopia-East Sudan, where investors andsettlers have encroached on farming land. In Blue Nile State, conflict and instability occur ona national level between the centre and periphery. In the Eastern Sudan-Northwest
Ethiopia-Eritrea cluster, instability is characterised by international tensions between
countries (Ethiopia and Eritrea). Similarly, in the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster, instability is
taking place on an international level between the Government of Kenya and Somalia-based22

Al-Shabaab. In these international scenarios, governments move to strengthen theirborders. Ethiopia has been particularly effective in this regard, and movement across its
borders with Eritrea and Somalia has been heavily restricted. This is in marked contrast to
the borders with Sudan and Kenya, which are much more porous in comparison.
The Sudan-Ethiopia-Eritrea cluster demonstrates some positive examples in terms of
reducing and, or mitigating instability and conflict. For instance, in contrast to clusters 1 and
2, water resources are being successfully shared across the border, even in the context ofirrigation and hydro power generation. The successful exchange and adoption of social andcultural traits has contributed to the relatively peaceful co-existence of the twoneighbouring people. The governments of Ethiopia and Sudan have also taken on an activerole in dealing with questions of instability. For example, they intervene in localised conflict
between individuals and households, and set up a joint security taskforce to share
information and intelligence on potential terrorist activities . That said, instability is still afeature of the cluster, as indicated by the ongoing stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea,
and the unrest occurring in nearby Gonder and Bahir Dar.
This highlights the important role of national governments in generating peace and stability.
For example, limited delivery of public goods such as security in the Southwest EthiopiaNorthwest Kenya cluster has led to communities arming themselves for protection and thepersistence of a ‘gun culture’, which further undermines peace and stability. In the KenyaSomalia-Ethiopia cluster, security forces are present, but local communities demand greater
engagement and trust-building.
Cluster 1: Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya
Instability and conflict occur frequently across this cluster. Conflict can be seen between the
Nyangatom and Suri, Dassenech and Nyangatom, Dassenech and Hamer, Dassenech andTurkana, Nyangatom and Turkana, Hamer and Mursi, and Hamer and Erbore. The Hamer
also fight with the Gabra, even if only rarely. On the Kenyan side, conflict over rangeland
and water resources mainly arises between the Turkana and Pokot, Turkana and Samburu,
Turkana and Gabra, and Turkana and Murle.
The main drivers of instability and conflict are resource scarcity (in particular water andgrazing land) and increasing pressures placed on livelihoods and food security by
development projects and schemes. These pressures make traditional pastoralists more
likely to resort to violence to gain access to resources or to retaliate when resources aretaken. When conflict becomes protracted, the emphasis tends to shift from resource
scarcity to intercultural clan dynamics. At a macro level, the disputed Ilemi Triangle
represents another potential driver of instability and conflict between Ethiopia, Kenya andSouth Sudan.7 The search for fossil fuels could escalate questions of access to andownership of the disputed lands.

7 The Ilemi Triangle is found on the border areas between Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan.

23

The weak presence of the respective states in the cluster contributes to insecurity in thevalley. State structures and representatives have limited presence. This means that
communities tend to protect and arm themselves, leading to the persistence of a ‘gun
culture’, which further undermines peace and stability. Regional initiatives have attemptedto address this situation, but are often undermined by insufficient inter-state coordination.
Some NGOs are attempting to promote greater resource sharing in an effort to reduce
conflict, however these need to be combined with innovative governance, development andresource management structures.
Cluster 2: Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia
Clan dynamics are a key driver of instability in this cluster, as clans compete over land,
water, political power and trade. In Mandera county, the Garre, Degodia and Murule havebeen fighting periodically since the 1920s. In Gedo, factional fighting amongst different
groups, and sub-sub clans of the Marehan has been a feature of local politics since the1990s. In the much more stable and secured Doolow district of Ethiopia, the insurgency by
the Ogaden National Liberation Front continues to pose a security risk. The most common
conflict occurs between clans within Mandera county and at times, clans on the Kenya–
Somalia border.
Conflict and instability has led to fatalities, injury and mass displacement. Fighting between
Garre and Murule at El Wak (near the Kenya-Somalia border) between December 2004 andMarch 2005 left 90 people dead and displaced 30,000 more. Another conflict at El Wak, thistime between the Garre and the Marehan, displaced a further 17,000 people between April
and July 2005. In 2013, fighting broke out across the area between the Garre and theDegodia. It spread to the Murule and Marehan clans and led to further mass displacement.
In 2015, violent conflict between the Murule of Mandera and the Marehan of Gedo Somalia
left a dozen dead on both sides.
Conflict and instability amongst clans is traditionally driven by competition over water andgrazing lands for their livestock, generally during dry seasons. Population increase andclimate change have also contributed by further straining natural resources. Increasingly,
however, political dynamics and participation are adding a new dimension to longstanding
clan rivalries and animosity. Devolved county governance in Mandera county has seen
majority clans or alliances monopolising power and resources to the detriment of minority
clans. In August 2014, this led to violent clashes, which reportedly displaced over 18,000
households. Macro-level politics further escalates inter-clan dynamics.
Al-Shabaab is another driver of instability in the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster. In Somalia,
the group was dislodged from major towns in Gedo in 2014, but continues to control vast
rural areas in the region including areas very close to the Kenyan border near Mandera. In
retaliation for the Government of Kenya’s decision to deploy troops in Somalia, Al-Shabaablaunches regular attacks inside Kenya. They are facilitated by the porous nature of the
Kenya-Somalia border. In 2014, Al-Shabaab members shot dead 28 non-Muslims travellingon a commuter bus from Mandera town to Nairobi. The following week, they killed 36
Christian quarry workers at Koromey, 15 Km away from Mandera town. The Mandera
24

County Governor has been the target of a number of Al-Shabaab attacks. In contrast,
Ethiopia has been more successful at securing its border and its frontier districts with
Somalia and prevent Al-Shabaab infiltration. Since the Garissa University college attack, theGovernment of Kenya has embraced a new community-led security approach. This has had
some success in dismantling and disrupting Al-Shabaab cells in the north-east. Nevertheless ,Kenyan villages and towns close to the Somalia border remain vulnerable, especially thosealong the border between Mandera and Wajir counties and along the Mandera-ArabiyaLafey-Elwak road.
In addition to carrying out physical attacks, Al-Shabaab generates instability by creating
suspicion and divisions among communities in the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster. The
group counts on a network of long-standing supporters in the area. For youth, the groupoffers the promise of a paying job in one of the poorest areas of the Horn. For clans andsub-clans, tactical affiliation with Al-Shabaab has been a useful means of countering adominant rival. Al-Shabaab has successfully exploited local clan and other grievances to thisend.
Cluster 3: Western Ethiopia-East Sudan
On the Sudanese side of this cluster, ongoing civil water in Blue Nile State has caused
widespread instability and negatively impacted people’s quality of life and livelihoods .
According to UNOCHA, an estimated 60,000 people have fled their homes in Blue Nile statesince 2015.8 Approximately 24,000 of them were relocated, 26,000 returned home, andabout 10,000 people in the state remain displaced. This protracted conflict is taking place
between the troops of the Sudanese government and rebel forces of the Sudanese People
Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N). Centre-Periphery relations are at the root of theconflict, according to informants from the Blue Nile region, manifested in the unequal
distribution of economic, political and social opportunities between them. Other factorsthat have sparked anti-government sentiment include a shortage of jobs and employment
opportunities, a lack of access to quality education, and limited livelihood opportunities. The
presence of other rebel movements, such as the Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement(BPLM), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ginbot 7 can also generate instability.
Large scale migration is also undermining local stability. The large influx of labour migrants,
irregular migrants and refugees (see section below for more details) is altering the
population and changing local dynamics. For example, the population of Assosa hasreportedly more than doubled in the past few years, and the radius of the town has
expanded to include the resettlement centres which used to surround it. New settlements
have also appeared. This influx is also placing a serious strain on local resources, which cangenerate instability and conflict between competing groups. Research found that schools
and health centres were increasingly overcrowded, and that communication, water andelectricity facilities were overburdened. There have also been increasing incidents ofcompetition over land.

8 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

25

Broadly speaking, however, there is reportedly generally a good relationship between
indigenous ethnic groups, including those across the border in Sudan, which could
otherwise be a source of conflict and instability. While there have been political rivalries
between the two main indigenous groups (Bertha and Gumuz), these have not turned
violent. This can be partly explained by the fact that many of these groups live on both sidesof the border; for example, the Gumuz, Berta (called Funj in Sudan) and Komo ethnic
groups. This facilitates cross border relations for such groups, and leads to intermarriage
and seasonal migration.
Cluster 4: Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea
Instability is also a feature of the Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea cluster. This isindicated most notably by the ongoing stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and therecent (and ongoing) unrest occurring in nearby Gonder and Bahir Dar. These protests
centre around claims of unfair land and other resource allocation. A principal area ofcontestation involves the allocation of land historically under the control of Wolkait andAmhara farmers and investors in Northwest Ethiopia to Tigrayans. This is a process thatbegan with the redrawing of regional boundaries following the overthrow of the Derg
government in 1991 to reflect a policy of ethnic federalism, but opposition to it has
intensified more recently. Nevertheless, research found that issues of interstate conflict andinsecurity were less heightened in this cluster than in the other study areas, and there aresome positive examples in terms of reducing and, or mitigating conflict particularly between
Ethiopia and Sudan.
For instance, in contrast to clusters 1 and 2, water resources are being successfully sharedacross borders. There were no reports of localised or regional conflicts associated withwater and the River Tekeze/Atbara. In spite of dam construction and irrigation practices,which have the potential to raise tensions, both sides of the Sudan-Ethiopia border continue
to have access to sufficient water.
Localised and sporadic conflict has arisen when farmers have crossed over the border andcultivated land on the other side. Nevertheless, these conflicts are not common and do not
usually escalate beyond an individual or household level to include a wider group. What’smore, they have usually been contained by government interventions and an agreement
between both sides met. Generally speaking, the intervention of actors other than thegovernment in resolving conflict is not common. Land disputes between farmers andpastoralists is also reportedly common, particularly where commercial farms have expanded
to obstruct nomadic corridors. Furthermore, research conducted in Metema highlighted
violent attacks associated with travelling groups of seasonal migrant labourers, who areoften armed and have been known to fight with rival groups or local populations.
A strong indicator of the stability of the region is the considerable level of culturaltransaction. Sudanese foods are available in almost all snack houses in Humera, andrestaurants often include dishes cooked according to Sudanese tastes and spices. Languages
are also shared, and some Humera residents are able to communicate in Arabic, while many
Sudanese migrant labourers and traders are seen trying to speak Amharic and/or Tigrigna.
26

This exchange and adoption of social and cultural traits contributes to the peaceful coexistence of the two neighbouring people.
The only security issue reported in Ethiopia is that of possible infiltration of terrorist groups.
To mitigate against this risk, a joint security taskforce has been set up by the governmentsof Ethiopia and Sudan. This includes representatives from the police, security, customs,
army, and local administrations. The taskforce meets on a quarterly basis, and regularly
shares information and intelligence. In addition to having a security focus, the taskforce isalso said to deter illegal migration and trafficking in persons, although it is not clear to what
extent it is successful in achieving this.

3.2.2. Migration and its drivers
Migration occurs across the research areas, but in different ways, involving different people
and to differing extents. Generally speaking, migration was more prevalent in clusters 2, 3
and 4 than in cluster 1, which has ceased to be an important migratory corridor since 2012.
Since then, most migratory patterns in the Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya cluster
have tended to stay within national borders and predominantly involve the seasonal
movements of people and livestock in search of water and pasture. Transhumance is also afeature of the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster, where pastoralism is a major livelihood
activity.
Labour migration occurred in all clusters, and the seasonal migration of farm labourers wasparticularly prevalent in the Western Ethiopia-East Sudan and Eastern Sudan-Northwest
Ethiopia-Eritrea clusters, where large influxes of Ethiopian and Sudanese workers migrated
to work on commercial farms during the peak harvesting seasons. Irregular migration was a
feature of most areas, and active trafficking and smuggling networks were identified in all
clusters except for Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya. Forced migration anddisplacement as a result of conflict and natural disaster were also common across the threeclusters. In the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster, inter-clan fighting has displaced tens of
thousands of people (as described in the previous section). Sudanese, South Sudanese, andEritrean refugees were also present in the Western Ethiopia-East Sudan and Eastern SudanNorthwest Ethiopia-Eritrea clusters. In addition, the researchers identified other forms of
migration, including migration for education and health purposes, family reunification,
politically motivated migration, migration for flood retreat agriculture and community
resettlement.
In this context, the drivers of migration are multiple and often overlapping. They include:
resource scarcity, development projects, conflict, natural disaster, coercion, unemployment,a lack of basic services, culture of migration, political participation, and so on. Contrary to
popular assumptions, poverty and unemployment are not always the main drivers of
migration and, in the Sudan-Ethiopia-Eritrea cluster, many migrants came from families with
sufficient income to pay the large amounts requested by the smugglers. Research in thiscluster found that, having failed to enrol in University, young people preferred to migrate to27

Europe in search of a better life than to engage in low-level or menial employment. Whilemigrants and their backgrounds, age, gender and resources varied across the study areas,
the research found that labourers, young people and pastoralists typically made up the
majority of those moving.
A number of specific migratory routes were identified by the researchers. In the KenyaSomalia-Ethiopia cluster, two principle routes were identified from Ethiopia into Somalia
and Djibouti on towards Yemen and the Gulf, and from Somalia into Kenya on towards
South Africa, Europe or North America. Four specific routes were discovered in the SudanEthiopia-Eritrea cluster from Humera into Sudan, with the most common route being
Humera-Rawayan-Mai Kadra-Lugdi (which has an asphalt road)-Khartoum. In the majority ofcases, however, routes varied and changed, and many migrants adopted circular itineraries
and engaged in secondary migration.
Cluster 1: Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya
In contrast to the other areas studied, this cluster is not currently a major corridor for
migration. This has not always been the case; in the past, there were two waves of largescale, often irregular, migration: (i) in 1991, following the downfall of the Derg; and (ii) 2010
– 2012 when Ethiopians migrated in large numbers to South Africa in search of better
economic opportunities. Some informants blamed insecurity and killings in Omorate town
and in Turkana, as well as the hardships faced by migrants en route to South Africa, for the
reduction in migratory flows. Others credit the Government of Ethiopia for rooting out
illegal smuggling and trafficking networks, although the Moyale transit corridor remains abusy and well-utilised route.
In this context, most migration and mobility in the Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenyacluster stay within national borders, and are characterised by:xTranshumance: this comprises agro-pastoralists moving in search of better pasture
and water during dry seasons.

x

Flood retreat agriculture: a relatively localised migration, in terms of the distancecovered, is also practiced by groups wanting to access flood retreat agriculture
lands.

x

Labour migration: workers move to take advantage of the employment
opportunities associated with various public infrastructure projects and commercial
farms occurring in the cluster, in particular, the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation and the
LAPSSET Corridor. Interviews with local and central government sources suggested
that hundreds of thousands of workers are expected to move to the area fromacross Ethiopia and beyond to take up new jobs provided by these projects.

x

Community resettlement: target communities have been moved and resettled aspart of the Government of Ethiopia’s villagisation scheme.
28

In this context, resource scarcity is once again a major factor in understanding theSouthwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya cluster, and represents the main driver of migration;
the migration patterns of agro-pastoralists are underpinned by the constant need to adjust
to local resource dynamics and search for ‘greener pastures’. A lack of available farmland
and the appeal of large-scale development projects are also key drivers that explain why
people move for work.
Cluster 2: Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia
In contrast to cluster 1, the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster is a major migratory corridor
where migration, involving both people and animals, takes many different forms andmeans. In this context, the drivers of migration are many, and include: search for water andgrazing lands, conflict and drought-induced displacement, forced evictions and politicalviolence, unemployment, an absence of basic social services, and family reunification.
The following types of migration occur in the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster:x

Transhumance is the oldest and one of the main forms of movement. In recent
years, it has been negatively impacted by environmental degradation, water scarcity,
climate change and an increase in human settlements, which are forcing pastoralists
to move further and for longer periods of time in search of pasture and water.

x

Irregular migration is another main form of mobility, and the cluster functions as apoint of departure and transit for irregular migrants. This migration is generally
driven by unemployment and/or displacement caused by natural disaster or conflict.

x

Human trafficking and smuggling are major business activities that occur from, via
and to the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster. Data is limited, but two main routes havebeen identified: (i) from Ethiopia into Somalia and Djibouti on towards Yemen and
the Gulf, and (ii) from Somalia into Kenya and on towards South Africa, Europe, orNorth America. Smugglers and traffickers are often well known, however as
remittances associated with out-migration are important to the local economy,
there is little community incentive to cooperate with law enforcement efforts tocrack down on these networks.

x

Displacement: Fighting between clans has led to widespread and ongoingdisplacement of local communities over the years. For example, between December
2004 and March 2005 fighting between the Garre and Murule clans displaced 30,000
people at El Wak. Between April and July 2005, conflict between the Garre and the
Marehan displaced a further 17,000 people. In 2013, fighting broke out across thearea between the Garre and the Degodia and spread to the Murule and Marehanclans, leading to further mass displacement.

29

xLabour migration is another form of migration that occurs in the Kenya-SomaliaEthiopia cluster. Non-Somali Kenyans, mainly highland Kenyans, travel to Mandera
town to take up government positions. Ethiopians also commonly migrate from
Suftu and Doolow Ado to Mandera town in search of temporary manual labour
opportunities.

x

Migration for education occurs when Ethiopian and Somali nationals enrol in schoolsin Mandera county, where facilities are comparatively better. Due to a lack of
employment opportunities in Somalia, many Somalis remain in Kenya once
completing their education. Some Kenyan Somali college graduates seek work in
Ethiopia, where the comparative skill level is lower. There are also reports of
Kenyans migrating to Ethiopia to take advantage of lower fees and entrance
qualifications at colleges and universities located there.

x

Migration for health occurs when residents of Suftu (Ethiopia) and Beled Hawa
(Somalia) travel to Mandera county to take advantage of better quality healthservices. Somali citizens also rely on Ethiopian health services, although thismovement is undermined by restrictions on the Ethiopia-Somalia border.

x

Migration for political purposes has occurred when clans seek to strengthen theirvoting numbers or their fighting capacity by importing clan members from across theborder.

Cluster 3: Western Ethiopia-East Sudan
The border between Sudan and Ethiopia in this cluster area is generally flat, open andporous with many crossing points, including Guba, Sedal, Sherkole, Kumruk, Assosa , and
Mao Komo. As a consequence, migration is common to this cluster, takes many different
forms, and flows in both directions. In this context, the drivers of migration are diverse andmany, and include political, environmental and economic – although the majority seem tomove for economic factors, namely: unemployment, livelihood insecurity and the search fora better life. These migration dynamics are outlined in more detail below.
x

Irregular migration is common across the cluster. Many irregular migrants make useof cross border market days when free movement is permitted once a form of ID is
deposited at the border. This ID is returned upon re-crossing the border, however
irregular migrants continue with their journey and leave behind their documents.
Ethiopian migrants who enter Sudan irregularly reportedly hand themselves in backat the border. Once their identity is verified, they are allowed to return to Ethiopia
regularly.

x

Labour migration: people, mainly youth, from other parts of Ethiopia move to thearea in search of employment in farming, mining, informal trade and service sectors.
The supply of jobs does not, however, match demand, and many people engage insecondary migration to Sudan and beyond.
30

x

Seasonal farm labour migration has been a very common form of movement in thecluster since the rise of mechanised commercial agriculture in the 1960s . On the
Ethiopian side of the border, an estimated half a million workers are said to be
employed on commercial farms during the peak production of sesame, corn andcotton. Most of these workers come from outside the area – from Amhara, Oromia
and SNNPR. While data is limited, a large number of Ethiopians are also known to be
employed in Sudan on agricultural farms, as well as on construction sites,
restaurants and as domestic workers.9 The research uncovered a circular dynamic toseasonal labour migration, as many migrants move backwards and forwards
between Ethiopia and Sudan to take advantage of the different agricultural seasons.

x

Smuggling: These movements are often controlled by the so-called 'Salug', former
labourers turned brokers who make a living facilitating employment of farm workers
in Sudan and Ethiopia. Salug are said to have links to criminal gangs. The journeysof irregular migrants can be arduous; for example, en route from Almah (a transit
point on the Ethiopia-Sudan border), irregular migrants must hide from security
officials and make the 16-hour journey on foot through the desert to the farms.

xTrafficking: While official data is lacking, anecdotal evidence suggests that trafficking
is occurring in the area.10 There are reports of internal trafficking of children on the
Ethiopian side of the border, including girls for domestic labour or commercial sex
work, and boys for the production of khat and peanuts, and cattle herding.
Trafficking and other forms of irregular migration are facilitated by weak
enforcement of the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) laws, gaps and challenges in the legal
and justice sectors, and poor collaboration between police departments.

x

Refugee movements: Ethiopia hosts more than 50,000 refugees from Sudan andSouth Sudan, as well as over 150,000 Eritrean refugees (UNHCR). An additional
112,000 Eritrean refugees were estimated to be living in Sudan as of the end of 2015
(ibid). Refugees often choose to leave camps and engage in income generation
activities, such as agricultural labour and gold mining. Sudanese refugees have also
been known to settle in Ethiopia without notifying the authorities or passing throughthe formal screening and refugee status determination (RSD) procedures. Thisirregular migration is generally facilitated by close ties with Ethiopians, who may befamily members or friends. In addition, there are reports that some Eritrean
refugees (exact numbers are not available) are recruited from camps in northern
Ethiopia and sent to work on commercial farms in Ethiopia and Sudan. Eritreans also
migrate irregularly to South Sudan. While conflict and instability there have deterredsome from migrating to South Sudan, the borders are not closely controlled, and the

9 In a joint border meeting of Sudanese and Ethiopian officials, it was estimated in January 2016 that there

were at least 3 million Ethiopian migrants in Sudan.
10 In one study, 85% of respondents from Guba, Pawe, Mandura, Kurmuk, Sherkole, Assosa, Mao Komo andBambasi believed that human trafficking was taking place in their respective Woredas.

31

country continues to represent an important destination and/or place of transit for
Eritreans. The preferred exit point from Ethiopia for most Eritrean migrants isthrough Mao Komo and, in some cases, Abramo-Assosa, both in Benishangul-Gumuz
Region.
x

Resettlement: Indigenous communities have been forced to move to make way forcommercial farming activities and large-scale development projects. The
Government of Ethiopia’s villagisation programme has also led to the resettlementof indigenous groups. In addition, construction of the Grand Ethiopian RenaissanceDam (GERD) has seen the resettlement of 1,245 households in Guba Woreda.

x

Migration for health purposes: with the renewal of war in Blue Nile State, people on
the Sudanese side are crossing the border to take advantage of health care,
especially for child birth, and also cheaper medicines in Ethiopia.

x

Family visits and reunification: people have family and kin on both sides of theborder, and move to visit these relatives.

Cluster 4: Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea
Migration is a common characteristic of this cluster, especially through Metema and thenearby crossing points. Two main forms of migration have emerged from the research:irregular out-migration, and seasonal labour migration to commercial farms.
x

Irregular out-migration
Large-scale irregular migration is taking place in Cluster 4, often facilitated throughsmuggling and trafficking networks. The research identified four principle routes
through Humera: The first, and most common, is the Humera - Rahwyan - Mai Kadra- Lugdi route, which has an asphalt road, up to Khartoum. The second is the Humera- Bereket - Digdema route, which has only a gravel road. A third is the Humera Dima - Hamdite route. And the fourth, and least frequented, is the Humera - Rawyan- Tsebel route.
Ethiopian migrants intending to pass through to Sudan come to Humera from acrossthe region, but mainly via Addis Ababa to Gonder. The movements of irregularmigrants are often facilitated by smugglers, who use a range of tactics to move
migrants across the border. Crossings are nearly always attempted at night. Briberyof border officials is also reported to be common. On some occasions, migrants will
be obliged to cross the border on foot, before being met by a vehicle. Other times,
they will cross the border by truck, often concealed inside or underneath the vehicle.
Crossings may be made on a particular day when smugglers know the border official
on duty, or when police presence is lower, such as during heavy rain or when a moreurgent issue or event is occurring.

32

Most of these migrants are young (aged between 18 and 30 years) and literate. Data
collected on irregular migrants intercepted at Metema showed that 66% of thesemigrants were aged between 18 and 30 years, 29% were under the age of 18, andonly 5% were aged over 30 years. In terms of gender, 36% were female and 64%
were male. Data on the numbers of irregular migrants passing through Humera was
not available. However, it was reported that men far outnumber female migrants.
Contrary to popular assumptions, poverty and unemployment are not the only
drivers of migration. In many cases, migrants come from families with sufficient
income to pay the large amounts requested by the smugglers. Research found thatmany of these migrants were young Ethiopians who had failed to graduate fromschool and enrol in University. Not content to engage in low level or menial
employment, these migrants opt to try to travel to Europe in search of better
opportunities. Social and cultural factors, pressure from parents and peers and thepresence of trafficking and smuggling networks, were also key drivers of migration in
the Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea cluster.
Smuggling and trafficking networks are well organised with stations across theregion. In addition to facilitating migration of people wanting to move, smugglers
also actively recruit new migrants, often targeting young and vulnerable people.
Reportedly, Eritreans are more likely to be trafficked than Ethiopian or Sudanesemigrants, because traffickers believe they are more likely to have family in thediaspora who can pay large ransoms. Most of the people involved in trafficking andsmuggling are originally from the border towns, and can therefore make use of their
good local knowledge and contacts. According to informants, networks throughHumera tend to start from Addis Ababa and then follow two principle routes: (i)Addis Ababa - Bahir Dar - Gonder - Humera, and (ii) Addis Ababa - Mekele, Shire Humera.
x

Seasonal labour migration linked to commercial farms
Thousands of labourers come to work on large-scale farms during peak agricultural
seasons, such as weeding and harvesting. There are more than 400 large-scale farms
in the area, mainly producing sesame, which is labour intensive and requires large
numbers of seasonal workers. Exact figures do not exist, but this form of migration isestimated to attract around 200,000 people each year. Migrants stay in the region
for a number of weeks or months before returning home or migrating somewhere
else. Informants noted that the exceptionally high prevalence of HIV infection in thearea is, at least partially, attributed to this influx of labourers. Due to a shortage of
agricultural labourers in Sudan, many Ethiopian labourers also cross the border andwork on Sudanese farms. Sudanese workers also regularly come to work on
Ethiopian farms during the peak agricultural season.

Beyond the two main forms of migration outlined above, a number of other types of
movement occur to a lower degree in the Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea:
33

x

Refugee movements: Eritreans find it easier to pass into Ethiopia than Sudan. They
tend to cross the border into Ethiopia and hand themselves over to the border policeor the army, who will direct them to one of four refugee camps in northern Ethiopia.
Having obtained refugee status, Eritreans will either wait to be resettled to a third
country or use the remittances received from relatives abroad to pay smugglers toengage in secondary migration to another country; this is how many people begin
their journeys towards Europe. Refugees from Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia, among
others, pass through the Humera and Metema corridors on a regular basis. In
Metema, police informants suggested that a minimum of 200 Eritrean refugees
irregularly migrate to Sudan through Metema per week.

x

Family visits and reunification: an estimated 600,000 Ethiopians and Eritreansmigrated from Tigray to Sudan during the 1984 famine. Most, but not all, of theserefugees repatriated starting from the early 1990s (most remaining in communities
near the Sudan Border, at Ada Bai, Rawayan, Mai Kadra, Bereket, and other border
settlements). Many people in Humera retain relatives in Sudan, whom they areentitled to visit provided they can produce the necessary paperwork. Nevertheless,some migrants who travel to Sudan for this purpose choose not to stay in Sudan, butrather migrate onwards towards Europe through Libya, Tunisia or Egypt.

x

Business migration: Ethiopian businesspeople cross the border into Sudan and travel
to Khartoum to carry out business transactions. In order to make this border crossing
legitimately, they must provide the Humera immigration office with a letter from the
Humera woreda administration, which states that they are law abiding citizens witha valid reason for travelling to Sudan. This migration flows both ways, and many
Sudanese businessmen and visitors visit the Ethiopian side, mainly at Mai Kadra
and/or Humera towns.

3.3. Cross border interventions
3.3.1. Existing initiatives in the areas
Cluster 1: Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya
The research identified 44 NGOs working in this cluster (24 in Ethiopia and 20 in Kenya). Fewof these organisations are working on cross-border or parallel programming initiatives.
Within Ethiopia, most of their programmes focus on livelihoods and resilience, and include
interventions such as rangeland management, agriculture and water and sanitation.
Projects dealing with conflict and instability are less common, perhaps as a result of theCharities and Societies Proclamation (No.621/2009), which has severely restricted NGO
activities in these thematic areas. In Kenya, international donors and the Government of
Kenya are collaborating on a number of large-scale projects designed to strengthen anddiversify livelihoods, promote resilience and develop local markets. For a full summary of
the region’s initiatives and interventions, consult the individual field report.
34

IGAD is also active in the area. In the past, its main focus was on collection, analysis anddissemination of conflict early warning information. It is also involved in two regional
projects: (i) the Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project (RPLRP) and (ii) the Drought
Resilience Sustainable Livelihoods Project (DRSLP), which focus on natural resource
management, markets, livelihoods and disaster risk management. In spite of the regional
focus of these projects, the present research suggests a weak collaboration between Kenya
and Ethiopia, with little evidence of joint planning and consultation.
Cluster 2: Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia
The research identified 24 interventions currently being implemented in this cluster. Mostof these fall under two broad categories; (i) those that focus on resilience, especially climatechange and drought, and their impacts on livelihoods, and (ii) those that focus on peace,security (especially border-security) and conflict-resolution. The majority of responses fallunder the first category, perhaps as resilience is less politically charged than questions ofpeace and security, and therefore easier to implement. The fact that violent extremism has
only spiked in recent years may also be a factor.
The majority of interventions occur within national borders; however, a few are being
implemented across the cluster. These include the Climate Resilient Water Resources
Development Projects, and the Community Sensitive Border Security and Management in
the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster. Some aid programmes, such as the Transition Initiative
for Somalia (TIS) program (implemented by DAI) and the work of PACT in the Kenya borderareas have also encouraged the sharing of cross-border facilities as part of an effort tostrengthen local commitments to peace in border zones.
It should also be noted that, as a result of the increased threat posed by Al-Shabaab,international organizations are finding it increasingly difficult to operate in the region,
especially on the Gedo side, but also in Mandera county, where they prefer to keep a low
profile and often opt to engage local NGOs as implementing partners. Security challenges
have caused some NGOs to reduce their operations, or even relocate to other areas
altogether.
Government responses in the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia cluster tend to be driven by a focus
on security (instability and conflict) rather than migration and displacement. This has
certainly framed the Government of Kenya’s interventions, which include official closure of
the Kenya-Somalia border, increased military protection of government offices andinstallations, erection of a perimeter wall, and plans to established well -policed bordercrossings. While the Government of Ethiopia has securitised its border with Somalia, it has
also sought to modernise rural livelihoods and economies through, for example, themechanization of agriculture, and (usually) subtle discouragement of pastoralism.
Cluster 3: Western Ethiopia-East Sudan
The research identified 17 interventions in the cluster area. It was found that, with the
exception of IOM, organisations tended to prioritise refugees, and were less focused on
35initiatives for local people and hosting communities, and the issue of irregular migration.
Furthermore, most international organisations did not implement their programmes withcross border operations or coordination in mind. The only exception was the ICRC, whichcollaborates with its Sudanese counterpart in locating lost or separated family members.
In contrast, the governments of Sudan and Ethiopia seem to be making greater progress inaddressing the cross border issues of migration and instability. This includes:
x Establishment of cross border trade through shared market days on both sides ofthe border (see above for more details).
x The Government of Ethiopia established a Regional Council to prevent trafficking,which, whilst lacking in capacity, is taking steps to raises awareness of the dangers
of irregular migration among young people.
x The Ethiopia-Sudan Joint Border Commission, which has economic, political andsecurity elements. Structured at a national, regional and local levels, there areregular meetings between counterparts.
Cluster 4: Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea
The governments of Ethiopia and Sudan have also been active in implementing responses tocross border issues, such as security and irregular migration. These include:x A joint security taskforce with representatives from the police, security, customs,
army and local administrations (see above for more details).
x Mediation during occasional cross border conflicts involving, most often, farmers
that have encroached on the land of another (see above for more details).
x Income generating activities launched by the Humera Town Administration, under
the assumption that unemployment is the main cause of irregular migration ofyoung people. These initiatives include the provision of training and loans, andgeneration of job opportunities through public works such as cobblestone laying
projects. Generally, however, these efforts did not have much impact on levels of
migration. Similarly, local Administration Offices in Metema collaborated to provide
employment opportunities for unemployed youth from migration prone locations inNorth Gonder and Wollo.
x Community-based task forces, known as Community Discussion Forums, have been
set up in 400 locations in Amhara, Tigray, Oromia, and in the SNNP regions. Theirmain purpose is to conduct public awareness campaigns to reveal the hazards ofhuman smuggling and trafficking, and the need to provide information to local police
and security agencies on these activities. Nevertheless, these activities have been
undermined by poor coordination, accountability and data collection.
x In Metema, the Emergency Migrant Response Centre (EMRC) provides basic
healthcare, food, shelter, sanitation, counselling and transportation to irregular
Ethiopian migrants. This is a good example of a multi-stakeholder initiative as it
brings together a number of partners including the town administration, Office ofLabour and Social Affairs (OoLSA), Office of Administration and Security (OAS),
police, Metema Youth Association and International Organization for Migration(IOM). Nevertheless, the centre does not involve Sudanese counterparts, and only36

extends as far as Ethiopian nationals, meaning that foreign irregular migrants cannot
benefit from these same services.
The number of non-state actors operating in the cluster area is very small, and none have afocus on migration. This represents a missed opportunity, as the social problems associatedwith irregular migration, including trafficking and the high prevalence of HIV and TB , arecommon. In this context, local authorities were unable to name any NGOs or their projects.
The main NGOs operating in the area include: Organization for Social Services, Health andDevelopment (OSSHD), Mums for Mums (MfM), Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) Holland,
ZOA Relief/Hope/Recovery and the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY).

3.3.2. Best practice and lessons learned
Across the study area, Initiatives and activities that have achieved the best results havetended to be those that:x

Adopt a cross-border approach. Given the cross border nature of the research areas,interventions that focus on one side of the border risk missing the wider dynamics
and interrelationships of people and their social connections, economic activities,
resources and movements. A cross-border approach is particularly relevant when it
comes to interventions that focus on natural resources, and how best to sharethem, and livestock. Where a cross border approach is not feasible, interventions
should seek, as far as possible, to offer parallel programming, so that similar
services and activities are carried out on both sides of the border.

x

Adopt a conflict-sensitive approach. All interventions should take into account theunderlying conflict, instability and security issues of the area. Linked to this, steps
should be taken to make sure that interventions themselves do not generate further
instability or conflict through their activities, selection of beneficiaries andrecruitment.

x

Involve and build on traditional institutions and practices . For example, in theSouthwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya cluster, the traditional practices of rangeland
management have worked well in regenerating degraded pasturelands.

xBalance commercial interests and community needs. While the Government ofEthiopia’s villagisation scheme has received much criticism, it has reportedly been
more successful in Salamago Wereda, in Bodi. This is mainly because of theprovision of free irrigation water for the village residents from the facilities of thesugar corporation. The Bodi have joined the villages, successfully produced two
harvests of maize, and are expected to benefit through membership of thesugarcane outgrower scheme. It should be noted, however, that other groups in the37

area, such as the Mursi, have not enjoyed these benefits, and there are concerns
about land being taken from some groups to be given to others.
xIntegrate peacebuilding. It is important to integrate peacebuilding into development
works. This will help to ensure that projects are developed in a conflict sensi tive
manner and make use of early warning information, and conflict resolution andtransformation tools. Involvement of non-state actors in peacebuilding initiatives
and peace dialogue is an advantage.

x

Take a market focus. For example, market integration of agro-pastoralists has
worked well on the Kenyan side of the cluster.

x

Support already existing mechanisms, especially informal cross-borderarrangements between government or communities on issues such as disease
surveillance and border security. Efforts to formalise and strengthen sucharrangements would be very welcome.

38

4. Recommendations on Potential Opportunities for the EU
Based on their observations and interviews in the field, the researchers recommended thefollowing programme interventions and implementing partners (as detailed in the tables
below). For many of these interventions, the researchers also suggested that IGAD and/or
relevant governmental ministries and line agencies assume an important role in terms ofregional coordination and oversight.
It should be noted, that the researchers are not programme design or delivery experts, andthat these interventions are suggestions only, which would require more detailed analysis,planning and stakeholder engagement by experts in programme design and delivery.
Furthermore, as migrants (in many cases) do not originate from the cluster areas,interventions that seek to target migrants themselves may need to be implemented in areasof origin outside of the clusters themselves.
Cluster 1: Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya
Suggested Intervention
1. A detailed, systematic and participatory
land and water resource mapping
exercise for the entire cluster.
2. Integrated
water
management
interventions at local, national andinternational levels to ensure fair andsustainable access to water sources, andthereby build resilience, strengthen
livelihoods and reduce instability.
3. Integration of peacebuilding intodevelopment
works
throughmechanisms such as early warning
information, field monitors, conflictindicators, conflict resolution andtransformation tools, and dedicatedstudies into conflict prevention andresolution.
4. Rehabilitation of rangelands in agropastoral lowlands, through enclosuresand greater reliance and use of local
knowledge and customs.
5. Creation of a joint fishing zone in theborder area to promote livelihood
diversification,
economicinterdependence and greater resource
sharing.

Potential Implementing Partners
Horn of Africa Regional Environmental
Centre/Network (HoAREC/N)
Ethiopia: AFD, Catholic, GTLI, VITA, Farm
Africa and EPaRDA
Kenya: Catholic Diocese, Regal IR program,
UnitedStatesAfricanDevelopment
Foundation and ACTED
Ethiopia: PDC and PACT
Kenya: Raim Raim, PACT Kenya, Mercy
Corps, and KCCP

VSF

Ethiopia: Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries
Resources Development; Regional and Zone
LivestockandFisheries
Resources
Development Bureau and Department; Omo
Micro-Finance; and the Zone’s Youth and39

Suggested Intervention

Potential Implementing Partners
Sport Department.

Kenya: Ministry of Fisheries Development,
and NGOs (such as Oxfam GB and SI).
6. Promotion of a sustainable regional N/atourism sector though infrastructuraldevelopment (especially roads andhotels)andtraining
for
local
communities in services and guiding.
7. Integration of commercial agriculture Ethiopia: AFD, Farm Africa, and VITA
and agro-pastoralism through job
creation and targeted CSR activities.
Kenya: Regal IR program, US African
Development Foundation, PACT, Mercy
Corps, Oxfam-GB, SI, SAPCONE and the FAO.
Cluster 2: Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia
Suggested Intervention
1. Peace building activities that build on thestrengths and capacities of local actors.
2. A cross border livestock disease control
and surveillance programme to counterthe spread of transboundary animal
diseases and promote better crossborder control.
3. Recurrent and increasing drought are
reducing herd sizes and undermining the
local pastoral-based economy. In thiscontext, interventions that target
livestock are required to strengthen
pastoralists’ livelihoods and build
resilience.
4. Integrated
water
management
interventions at both a localised andregional level in order to reduce resource
tensions and promote fair andsustainable access to water sources.
5. Renewable energy projects that tap into
the natural resources to generate agreen and sustainable energy supply, inparticular solar and wind energy.
6. Support to Government of Kenya’s plans
to establish a technical training institutePotential Implementing Partners
IGAD, Pact, Red Cross, Danish Demining
Group, AECOM and Interpeace.
IGAD and relevant Government Ministries inSomalia, Kenya and Ethiopia, with support
from agencies and NGOs such as FAO, VSF,
EPAG-K.
IGAD, FAO, RACIDA, Save the Children,
EPAG-K, Lifeline Gedo and Red Cross.

IGAD and relevant Government Ministries
and line agencies in Somalia, Kenya andEthiopia, with support from agencies such as
FAO (SWALIM), RACIDA and AgWA.
N/a

Kenyan Ministry of Education, Science andTechnology, and relevant line agencies.
40and a teachers training college in
Mandera County. These will build local
capacity and reduce heavy reliance on
workers from other parts of Kenya.
Youth from neighbouring Somalia andEthiopia would also benefit from thescheme.
7. Irrigation schemes to decrease farmers’ FAO (SWALIM), Islamic Relief,reliance on canal-based irrigation and RACIDA and Aga Khan Foundation.
improve productivity and diversity.
Support to agricultural marketing andcapacity building of farmers is also
required.

AgWA,

Cluster 3: Western Ethiopia-East Sudan

1.

2.

3.

4.

Suggested Intervention
Projects that discourage young people
from engaging in dangerous irregularmigration
throughcommunications
campaigns, job creation, technical andvocational training and business loans.
The research identified livestock farming,fishing and gold mining as potential
income generating opportunities foryoung people.
Support to community resilience bysafeguarding their rights, environment
and food security from issues such aslarge-scale
development
projects,
climate change and land degradation.
Also, increasing the productivity andprofitability of local economic activities.
Finally, by ensuring the hosting
communities,
notjustrefugeepopulations,aresupportedbydevelopment interventions.
Support to victims of irregular migrationand trafficking through humanitarianassistance and a passage home tostranded migrants, and, once home,rehabilitation and training initiatives.
Capacity buildingof government

Potential Implementing Partners
Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs; Bureau
of Youth and Sport; Bureau of Education;
Bureau of Agriculture; Bureau of Energy and
Mines; Youth Associations; Regional MicroFinance Institution; Norwegian RefugeeCouncil;Boro-Shinasha
Development
Association; and Civil Society Support
Programme.
Bureauof
Agriculture;
BureauofEnvironmental
Protection,
Land,
Administration
andUse;
AssosaEnvironmental
Protection
Association;
Benishangul-Gumuz
Development
Associations Network (BGDN); World Vision
Assosa; Administration for Refugees andReturnees Affairs; UNHCR; International
Rescue Committee; Norwegian RefugeeCouncil.
International Organisation for Migration(IOM) and the Red Cross.

Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs; Regional
41

Suggested Intervention
institutions in migration managementand data collection, and support to the
opening of regional Labour and Social
Affairs bureaus.
5. Enhanced cross border cooperation
through better equipping of police force.
Cross border interventions could also
include joint socioeconomic initiatives
linked to livestock, health andagriculture.
6. Peacebuilding
activities
betweenrefugees and hosting communities, andbetter integration of refugee and local
development projects, in order to reduce
tensions and pressures between the twogroups.

Potential Implementing Partners
Police; Bureau of Justice.

Police officers, health and agriculture
departments located at the border areas;
civil society organisations.

Administration for Refugees and Returnees
Affairs; local elders; local government
officials; refugee committees.

Cluster 4: Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea
Suggested Intervention
1. Public awareness campaigns to raiseawareness of the dangers of irregularmigration amongst migrants andespecially the youth.
2. While not all people migrate because ofpoverty and unemployment, these arecertainly a major push factor for many. In
this context, interventions should foster
employment
opportunities
andeconomic empowerment, whilst also
strengthening livelihoods and building
community resilience.

3. Support to state infrastructure andcapacity to ensure
the proper
implementationofpoliciesandregulations
designedtocombattrafficking, smuggling and irregular

Potential Implementing Partners
Organization for Social Services, Health andDevelopment (OSSHD); Mums for Mums
(MfM).
Line agencies under Ministry of Labour andSocial Affairs and Ministry of Youth andCulture; Bureau of Agriculture; Rural Land
Administration Trade and Investment; youth
and women associations; TdH Netherlands;
ANPPCAN Ethiopia; Mahberehiwot for Social
Development (MSD); World Vision; Action
Aid; WABI; PADET; FSCE; CHADET;
Organization for Social Services, Health andDevelopment(OSSHD);
ZOA
Relief/Hope/Recovery;
The
EthiopianEvangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY);
Mums for Mums (MfM).
IOM, ERCS, UNODC, Ministry of Labour andSocial Affairs, Federal and Regional Police,
Immigration Authorities, Members of the
Cross
BorderJoint
Commission,
Administration and Security offices.
42

Suggested Intervention
migration. This could include: tailored
training programmes, provision of
essential equipment; creation of joint
investigation teams; and establishmentof specialised police units at Zone andRegional levels to handle trafficking andsmuggling cases. Any interventions
should be preceded by a detailed
assessment of existing capacities andgaps.
4. Promotion of national and transnational
cooperation and joint, cross-borderinterventions to tackle issues ofsmuggling and trafficking. This could
involve financial and technical support,
awareness campaigns and stakeholder
engagement.
5. Regularisation of the employment andmovement of farm labourers in order tobetter protect the rights of workers,
reduce employer-employee tensions,and capitalize on the benefits accrued byforeign employment exchange services.
This could involve legislative reform,
bilateral agreements, creation of an
employment
exchangeunit,
andestablishment of information recording
and sharing systems.
6. Intercepted or stranded migrants should
be provided with protection and support
services. Interventions could include
expansion and replication of theEmergency Migrant Response Centre(EMRC); psychosocial, training, skills,
technical and financial support for
stranded and vulnerable migrants; andestablishment of a formal referral system
to facilitate the identification andprovision of comprehensive services tovictims of trafficking.

Potential Implementing Partners

ILO; UNWOMEN; IOM; TdH Netherlands;
ANPPCAN Ethiopia; Mahberehiwot for Social
Development.

International Labour Organisation (ILO); line
agencies under Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; EthioSudan Joint Border Commission; IOM; andRed Cross and Crescent societies.

IOM; TdH Netherlands; ANPPCAN Ethiopia;
Mahberehiwot for Social Development;
Organization for Social Services, Health andDevelopment(OSSHD);
ZOA
Relief/Hope/Recovery;
theEthiopianEvangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY);
Mums for Mums (MfM).

43

Annex 1: Terms of Reference (TOR)
EUROPEAN EMERGENCY TRUST FUND FOR STABILITY
AND ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION ANDDISPLACED PERSONS IN AFRICA (EUTF)

CROSS-BORDER ANALYSIS AND MAPPINGTERMS OF REFERENCEBACKGROUND INFORMATION
Partner countries
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, IGAD11
Contracting Authority
EU Emergency Trust Fund Research and Evidence Facility
Regional background
For many years the Horn of Africa has been facing the challenges of extreme poverty,
internal conflict, demographic pressure, environmental stress, weak institutions andinfrastructure, and insufficient resilience to food crises. In some places this has led todisplacement, criminality, radicalisation and violent extremism, as well as to irregularmigration, trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of migrants. The security
challenges have been increasingly linked to terrorist groups and illicit trafficking of all kinds,
and the crisis has been exacerbated by the situation in Libya and Yemen, as well as by theinternal conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, and the Al-Shabaab insurgency.
The result is an ever-increasing forced displacement of people, within the region and beyond,with enormous humanitarian consequences. The economic environment in many parts of theHorn of Africa is deteriorating as economic activity and local and foreign investment
decreases. Unemployment is rising, especially among young people. Growing inequality,
lack of protection for vulnerable people, as well as limited rights and opportunities areproducing a widespread sense of exclusion.
The region has a high population growth rate of 3% (with the total population doubling every
23 years) and an increasingly young population (over 60% of the estimated 242 million
people in the region are young). If properly harnessed, this could represent a significant
demographic dividend for the region, but must also be seen as an increased pressure on
resources. However, the absolute number of poor people is increasing, while the number ofpeople living on less than $1 a day is only marginally declining.
Approximately 60-70% of the overall land area in the region consists of the remote andperipheral cross-border areas which have traditionally suffered from under-investment,
11 Intergovernmental Authority on Development

44

although they are often the most vulnerable to instability. These are often arid or semi-arid
areas, scarcely populated (estimated 30% of the overall population), where there are few
government controls, and where criminal networks of traffickers and smugglers operate. The
lack of equitable distribution of wealth to the detriment of peripheral areas and borderlands
has resulted in a growing alienation between them and the central areas where power
structures are concentrated. This tension between centre and periphery is at the root of themultiple political, economic, social and environmental vulnerabilities afflicting the region,
whose effects transcend and spill over borders.
On 27 October 2015, the Council adopted the Regional Action Plan for the Horn of Africa
and agreed to give priority to five groups of actions in the period 2015-2020, namely:
regional security and stability, migration and forced displacement, counter-radicalisation andviolent extremism, youth and employment, and human rights, rule of law and democratic
governance. It also recognised that addressing these challenges will require interventions inperipheral regions and across borders, and will demand a better synchronised approach tothe political, development, economic, migration, gender-based and security aspects of theseissues.
The EU Trust Fund strategic orientation document for the Horn of Africa emphasises theneed for a new approach to peripheral and cross border areas, providing a more targeted
response to tackle the main determinants of vulnerability (marginalisation, exclusion,
destitution) and targeting populations at risk (particularly youth) in particular where
instability, forced displacement and irregular migration are playing out.

Current situation in the sector
At present, our knowledge of the cross-border and peripheral areas described above islimited, and we know very little about the security, political, economic, social, environmental
and migration dynamics that affect them.
The European Commission wishes to explore the possibilities for a major project of around€80 million targeting up to four specific cross-border areas. These terms of reference set out
the analysis that needs to take place, to provide us with the evidence on which to base across-border project proposal, and in particular to justify carrying out activities on a crossborder basis, i.e. using cross-border infrastructure, taking into account joint management of
natural and other resources, working with areas under the jurisdiction of more than one local
authority on both sides of the border. The EU does not wish to prejudge the analysis, but inthe interests of providing a steer to the Expert Team, we can indicate that we would beinterested to see a proposal that addresses resilience in some form – particularly in terms of
the role that cross-border transactions and resource management play, especially in relation towater resources, in strengthening – or undermining - community resilience.
This analysis will form a discrete project for the purposes of the current exercise, but willalmost certainly be the subject of further updating and possible expansion to other clusters in
the future. Our long term objective will be to establish a greater knowledge of borderlands inthe region, to help us respond operationally to the prevailing challenges.

45

The Research and Evidence Facility will assemble an Expert Team to undertake this study.
As the eventual project proposal12 must be in line with the aims and objectives of the EU
Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF), the Expert Team should keep these objectives clearly inmind when identifying opportunities for future interventions. It will respond to the evidence
obtained from this analysis and the collation of existing research; it should therefore be multifaceted, addressing multiple vulnerabilities whose effects are of direct interest for the stability
and development of the region, and for the EU. It will address factors contributing toinstability and the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa, throughe.g. the creation of economic opportunities, the promotion of resilience, improving migration
management and tackling overall governance deficiencies. The project should be
implemented chiefly at local level.
A workshop took place in Nairobi in January 2016 to discuss the cross-border areas
envisaged for an EU comprehensive stabilisation intervention, and engagement on three maincross border areas was considered relevant (Sudan-Ethiopia, Sudan-Ethiopia-Eritrea andSomalia-Ethiopia-Kenya). The EU Delegation in Addis Ababa subsequently made a study of
six cross-border areas:
Sudan-Ethiopia-Eritrea cluster; Ethiopia-East Sudan (Amhara
cluster); Ethiopia-Somalia/Somaliland-Djibouti (Dikhil cluster); Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia(the Mandera cluster); Uganda-South Sudan-Kenya-Ethiopia (Karamoja cluster); and South
Sudan-Ethiopia (Gambella cluster). There is also interest in the area where the Omo rivercrosses the Ethiopia-Kenya border (South Omo cluster).
We would like to focus the analysis at the beginning on a limited number of clusters, in viewof the complexity of managing cross-border activities, the heavy management required tocoordinate activities and stakeholders in different sides of the border, and our own lack of
direct experience of cross-border interventions. However, we would also like to introduce
sufficient flexibility in the design of the project so that it could be scaled up in the future
through the introduction of additional clusters based on experience drawn during
implementation.
At this stage, we have selected the following four clusters to be the focus of this study:x

Sudan-Eritrea-Ethiopia;x

Mandera (Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia);x

Amhara (Ethiopia-East Sudan);xSouth Omo (Ethiopia-Kenya).

NB other clusters will be included in future studies.
Related programmes and other donor activities
USAID has conducted a number of activities in both clusters, amongst others a review oftrades and markets relevant to food security in two of the clusters (2007); it has also
conducted a conflict analysis of the Mandera cluster (2005), and implemented a number of

12 The design of the interventions themselves will be the joint work of the European Commission (EUTF

team

and EU Delegations) together with partner countries46

projects on conflict mitigation (PEACE I and II), as well as some cross border pilot
livelihoods profiles (2009). The reports of these activities can be found on the internet.
The above information is only partial, and a more thorough collation of existing research
conducted and programmes implemented in these four clusters is necessary.
Under the EUTF, a project worth €12 million was approved on 28 April 2016 to addressstability through greater economic and livelihood opportunities in the North Eastern part of
Kenya, Coastal Kenya and urban settings around Nairobi. Particularly in North East Kenya,
the counties identified for the implementation of activities are: Garissa, Mandera, Wajir andIsiolo.
IGAD intends to establish a cross-border development facilitation and coordination unit inMoroto, Uganda, to serve as a pilot for the Karamoja cluster.
The World Bank is also planning a new Initiative on Pastoralism and Stability in the Saheland the Horn of Africa (PASSHA) which will enhance monitoring and evaluation systems andknowledge on the link between pastoralism development and stability for regionalorganisations and programmes.
All countries in the region have EU-funded programmes that include conflict resolution either as part of resilience programmes targeting diversified livelihood, food and nutrition
security and natural resource management, or in specific livestock support projects.

OBJECTIVE, PURPOSE & EXPECTED RESULTS
Overall objective
The overall objective of this contract is as follows:x

To undertake, as a preliminary step in pursuit of a comprehensive mapping of theHorn of Africa area, a mapping and analysis exercise that will provide evidence foran €80 million intervention in support of greater resilience in four cross-border areas:
the Sudan-Ethiopia-Eritrea cluster; and the Mandera (Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia),
Amhara (Ethiopia-East Sudan) and South Omo (Ethiopia-Kenya) clusters.

PurposeThe purposes of this contract are as follows:x To gain a better understanding of the drivers of instability and irregular migration, and thesources of resilience; other dynamics affecting the areas, such as strategic, security-andcrime-related, economic, political etc; and potential future scenarios;
x To catalogue the responses already provided by other donors, non-governmental and civilsociety organisations, IGAD, and partner state governments to address the dynamics
referenced above; to assess what is working well, including activities carried out under
existing protocols and working arrangements that span national borders, particularly
where official cooperation is constrained; and to identify risks and constraints;47

x To map and assess potential partners (including locally rooted organisations);
x To identify potential opportunities for engagement (and the baseline information that willneed to be developed).
Results to be achieved by the Contractor
The Research and Evidence Facility should provide, in a single document:
x an in-depth analysis of the drivers of instability and irregular migration and otherdynamics affecting the four locations, as well as an analysis of the size and profile of thetarget population;
comprehensive information on potential partners (including locally rooted organisations), andthe areas in which they are able to operate;
recommendations on potential opportunities (and the associated risks) for productive
engagement by the European Commission, where the EUTF would bring added value inthe form of innovative measures, specific cross-border elements, actions targeting specificpopulations. NB these recommendations will be taken into account for the designing a
project13 , to be submitted to the EUTF Operational Committee towards the end of 2016.
The current exercise will not be expected to produce concept notes or more detailed
project plans;
identification of the baseline information and indicators that will need to be developed during
the project formulation phase, to enable efficient monitoring of progress 14 ;an assessment of best practice and lessons learned from existing interventions (including
what has worked and what has not worked, especially in terms of existing cross-bordermechanisms), risks and potential mitigating measures against them.
as an annex, a catalogue of interventions by other donors, IGAD and partner states that
address the dynamics in the four cluster areas.

ASSUMPTIONS & RISKS
Assumptions underlying the project
The Expert Team selected by the Research and Evidence Facility to carry out the analysis andmapping exercise will have the local knowledge, contacts and experience to fulfil the termsof reference, and would be able to do so even if there is a deterioration in security.
Partner governments at both national and regional level will facilitate access to the targetedareas.

13 Idem footnote 2

14 As different

options for interventions could be proposed, the Expert Team is only expected
to provide general formulation of indicators and baselines, which will have to be further
refined in the project design phase48

RisksThis is a research and evidence-gathering project, not a project designed to bring change, andso risks are assessed as low.
The Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute may prevent official cooperation on the Sudan-EthiopiaEritrea cluster, although local, inter-village cooperation already takes place. Problems arelikely to be posed by the closed border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, difficulties over getting
travel permits to the border areas, and over data collection in Eritrea, and the suspension ofEritrea from IGAD. Nevertheless, this cluster represents an area of strategic interest for theEU, and so it is important for us to try to gain a better understanding of the local context.
In the Mandera (Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia) cluster, there could be repercussions from the
proposed closure of Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya and/or due to insecurity in the area.
Researchers will need to be vigilant to security conditions on the ground and adaptations may
have to be made to conduct the research to avoid giving the impression that the research is in
any way associated with the discussions involving the Kenyan and Somali Governments and
UNHCR about accelerated repatriation.
Recent reported fighting along the Eritrea-Ethiopia border may also preclude research insome relevant areas of that cluster.
A deterioration in security overall would hamper and possibly slow the work, but notnecessarily prevent it.

SCOPE OF THE WORK
GeneralProject description
As appropriate, but with a recommended maximum of 40 pages, excluding annexes.
Geographical areas to be coveredx

Sudan-Eritrea-Ethiopia;x

Mandera (Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia);x

Amhara (Ethiopia-East Sudan);xSouth Omo (Ethiopia-Kenya).

Target groups
See 4.2
Specific work
See section 2 above.

49

The Expert Team will consider all possible drivers of instability and irregular migration
affecting the four clusters, including but not limited to:x

Prevalence, causes, manner and actual and intended destination of irregular migrants
and other displaced people, including information on individuals’ ability or desire to
return home; data on migrant demographics, including wealth profile and use ofremittances, ethic/tribal/regional origins, educational levels, and if possible on extent
and format of trafficking and smuggling networks;x

Prevalence, causes and effects of marginalisation and exclusion in general;x

Prevalence and reasons for conflict and violence including violent extremism, conflictover natural resources and the effects of climate change; socio-economic activities
such as agriculture, fisheries and pastoralism, and other traditional systems

The Expert Team will also make an assessment of best practices and lessons learned fromexisting interventions (including what has worked and what has not worked), risks (including
the attitude and intentions of the governments concerned) and potential mitigating measuresagainst them.
It will also map and assess potential partners (including local organisations) and opportunities
for engagement, as well as catalogue the responses already provided by other donors, IGAD,
and partner state governments to address the dynamics; to assess what is working well; risks
and constraints and options for future engagement.
The Expert Team will also consult the relevant EU Delegations and EU Member States, local
NGOs and CSOs, other donors, IGAD, and partner state governments on responses currently
being provided, as well as drawing information from local early warning systems, ACLED(the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project), RMMS (Regional Mixed Migration
Secretariat) and UN or other migration reports.
On the basis of the information and evidence acquired, the Expert Team will make ananalysis of the overall situation, and will identify potential partners and opportunities forengagement by the European Commission that take full account of the four main areas ofintervention.
Project management
Responsible body
EU Emergency Trust Fund Research and Evidence Facility
Management structure
The contractual relationship with the Expert Team will be established by the research andEvidence Facility, in accordance with the provisions of the contract between the Facility andthe European Commission15 . The Research and Evidence Facility will submit for approval of
the EUTF HoA Team details of the Expert Team proposed for the assignment. The Expert
Team should have appropriate experience and local knowledge to carry out the assignment.
15 Paragraph 4.3.3.

of the terms of reference of the Research and Evidence Facility

50

The Research and Evidence Facility will be responsible for setting the terms of reference for
the Expert Team, in line with this document, for determining fee levels, approving the CVs ofteam members, arranging or approving support services, and quality controlling the final
product for presentation to the European Commission. There will not be a contractual
relationship between the Expert Team and the European Commission.
The overall Expert Team will be made up of 2 researchers per cluster (total 8 researchers).
One Research Coordinator (based in Nairobi) will be responsible for compiling and writing
the final report and liaising between the field teams. Another Research Coordinator will also
be assigned in Addis Ababa to provide logistical support to the teams while they are in thefield (including facilitating passage across border and/or access to field sites), to gather
information from organisations in Addis Ababa, and to report on the findings of fieldresearch for incorporation into the final report.
The Research Coordinator, Migration and Development Key Expert and REF Team Leader
will work together closely to ensure that the team is clear about their assignment, to develop
the detailed workplan for research, and to develop the research guides for the teams (toensure harmonisation of results between the three teams).
Each team will be deployed for a total of 40 days’ research time including travel. They will
spend another 5 days writing up the results of their fieldwork into individual reports, which
will be drawn from in the composition of the final report.
Fieldwork will be completed by 15 August, and the final report will be completed by 31
August for submission to DEVCO for feedback.
Contingencies have been included in the budget for delays that are not foreseen and forinternational flights if direct border crossings by land are not allowed.
Facilities to be provided by the Contracting Authority and/or other parties
The Research and Evidence Facility will provide the Expert Team with access to any relevant
literature or information available to it.

LOGISTICS AND TIMING
Location
The work is likely to require extensive travel by the Expert Team to the geographicallocations identified above, but the Expert Team may be based in the region or in Europe,
wherever seems most appropriate.
Start date & period of implementation
The intended start date is 1st July 2016 and the period of implementation of the contract will
be two months from this date.
A draft report is required by 20th August, and a final report by 31st August 2016.

51

Annex 2: Research Guide
EUROPEAN EMERGENCY TRUST FUND FOR STABILITY
AND ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN
AFRICA (EUTF)

CROSS-BORDER ANALYSIS AND MAPPINGRESEARCH GUIDENB: This Research Guide should be read together with the complete Terms of Reference for the Study, which
has been made available to all teams.

Questions to address

In general terms, the study teams are charged with gathering information relating to thesecurity, political, economic, social, environmental and migration dynamics that affect the
peripheral and border areas that they are assigned to. The purpose of this research is to
identify and explore the possibilities for activities that can be proposed to be implemented ina cross-border or parallel way in border areas. The total amount to be committed for these
activities (across all of the four clusters) is €80 million.
General
1. What is the size, population and ethnic composition of the border area? Specify theexact size and location of the border areas being studied.
2. What infrastructure is available on each side of the border? What cross -borderinfrastructure is available (e.g. roads, shared facilities, etc.)
3. How are resources managed and are there any joint or shared resource
management mechanisms?
4. What economic activities are practiced in the border areas? What economic andsocial connections exist between communities on both sides of the border?
5. With reference to water resources specifically, what kinds of water management
systems are in place, and are there any shared cross border systems or ways inwhich water management on each side of the border comes into contact with theother side (including in generating conflict)?
6. What are the sources of vulnerabilities in the border areas? – e.g. unemployment(how high is unemployment), high numbers of female headed households, limited
land or landlessness, population pressure, insecure or irregular access to water,52

fluctuating food or transport prices, irregular availability of waged labour
opportunities, conflict with surrounding communities, etc.
7. What security concerns, if any, need to be considered?
Migration and Stability
1. What are the forms of migration in the area (displacement due to what? Labour
migration? Seasonal migration for pastoral grazing or agricultural practices?
Resettlement? Migration as a result of environmental change, Etc.
2. Is irregular migration (exit without authorisation, displacement, engagement insmuggling or trafficking networks) going on in this cluster? What information can begathered about this? Are the numbers and frequency of migration known? Who ismigrating? From where to where? Are the moves likely to be temporary or
permanent?
3. What are the reasons that people move or migrate?
4. What are the principle causes of instability or conflict? Who are the main sources of
instability/tensions that affect people in the area? How do these relate to dynamics
across the border?
Actors/Activities
1. What responses are already provided by other donors, non-governmental and civilsociety organisations, IGAD, and partner state governments to address migration,
displacement and instability? The team should map who is working in the area, oneach side of the border. Any cross border activities should be noted. The activities ofeach actor should be noted, and a brief summary of what is known about eachactivity should be provided.
2. What priorities does IGAD identify for each cluster? What activities might be
implemented there?
3. Please include activities carried out under existing protocols and working
arrangements that span national borders, particularly where official cooperation isconstrained. Also identify risks and constraints to implementing such activities.
4. What activities would you recommend be undertaken in these areas? What
additional information may be needed to carry out the activities?
5. Please provide an assessment of best practice and lessons learned from existing
interventions (including what has worked and what has not worked, especially interms of existing cross-border mechanisms), risks and potential mitigating measuresagainst them.
53

Information needed from Addis Ababa and/or Regional capitals:
1. Relevant area-based development plans or policies
2. IGAD IDRSSI plans/policies
3. Any programme evaluations, needs assessments, or analyses of ongoing or pastwork conducted in the area.
4. Discuss with EC Delegations priorities for programming, what the interests are interms of finding information that can inform programming
5. Possibly discuss with line ministries (water, livestock and fisheries, agriculture, etc.)
about needs in the selected areas.
13 July 201654

Annex 3: Cluster Area Maps
Cluster 1: Southwest Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya

55

Cluster 2: Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia

56

Cluster 3: Western Ethiopia-East Sudan

57

Cluster 4: Eastern Sudan-Northwest Ethiopia-Eritrea

58