JIIA Forum Presentation Summary
December 13, 2011
Venue: Hotel New Otani

John AikenberryProfessor, Woodrow Wilson Graduate School of Public Policy, Princeton University“US Strategy – Preserving Global Liberalism Even While Facing
Hegemonic Decline”

The rise of China in recent years has sparked major changes in that country’s relations with
its Asian neighbors, and the US, which has contributed to the security of this region, cannot
remain aloof from the changing relations between rising China and neighboring states.
With the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan having been toned down a notch, the Obamaadministration’s interest has turned towards Asia. In this report I will discuss how theglobal order constructed by the US following World War II is continuing to undergo change.
Above all, I will discuss the near-term outlook for this global order with a focus on US
strategy in Asia and the transformation of international relations in the region.
We often hear talk today of “the end of the existing order,” but we need to examine exactly
what this order has been heretofore.

The US formulated a liberal global order following

World War II, an order that was systematized on a foundation of partnerships with othercountries in accordance with open rules. The US put more effort into systematizing theglobal order than had any other country in history. International institutions such as theUnited Nations, the IMF, and the World Bank were the products of this effort. The US
exerted its own power in formulating regimes and rules, and other countries accepted andsupported these regimes and rules as generally fair and appropriate. This liberal global
order generated wealth, ensured safety and promoted new forms of cooperation.
What will happen to the liberal global order constructed in the postwar period when USpower suffers a relative decline? Will the world become less liberal when it becomes lessAmerican? What kind of open order can be established to replace this liberal order? In
response to these questions, I would like to assert that not only is the liberal order alive andwell but that the base of support for an order based on open rules will expand. I believe theemerging countries now on the rise will not challenge the principle of building a liberal order.

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While the existing order and its regimes have taken firm root in the developed countries, itperhaps cannot be said that they are universally accepted. As the US sees its relative
power wane and non-European countries gain strength, these emerging countries will likely
push their own interests to the forefront. China at times acts as if it does not accept theexisting system, but even China must not forget that its growth owes much to the blessings
afforded it by the existing system. China should take particular note of the fact that it isseeking to increase its say within a global order systematized by the US.
It is easy to participate in the liberal global order but difficult to overturn it. Even the rapidly
rising China would find it difficult to put together an order to replace the liberal order, as it
would face opposition from a variety of countries in any bid to upset the existing liberal order.
The US and numerous other large and small countries participate in this order, and China
itself is just another participant. Given that the emerging countries on the rise have not yet
formed a political bloc, it must be said that overturning the existing order would be quitedifficult.
The US continues to transform its Asia strategy in light of China’s rise. By developing
alliance relationships with Asian countries, the US has traditionally establishedhub-and-spoke security ties with itself as the hub and adopted an exclusionary policy toward
China. However, China’s cooperation is essential in resolving the global-scale issues thathave appeared in recent years, e.g., global economic stability, environmental issues,
economic disparities, and communicable disease control.

The US has broadened its

dialogue with China to include these new issues in addition to the long-standing topics ofTaiwan, North Korea and Tibet, and is seeking to deepen bilateral relations.
Prompted by the rise of China and India, Asia as a region is also moving away from theconventional US-centric hub-and-spoke relations and toward approaches in which countries
operate in mutual and closer cooperation. A dual hierarchy is taking shape in Asia. Asian
countries are developing close ties in an economic framework with China at the top and asecurity framework with the US at the top. It should be noted at the same time, though,that the countries of Asia are not choosing either the US or China. Whether or not this dual
hierarchical structure is stable will likely become the focus of future analyses.
As Asia continues to form this dual hierarchy, the US would be well advised to adopt astrategy of remaining engaged with China and not over-reacting. A harsh containment
policy directed against China will not only provoke China unnecessarily and inevitably lead2

to unexpected outcomes, but will also not enjoy the support of other Asian countries.
Nevertheless, the US must remain adequately committed to Asia’s security.

The US

needs a China strategy featuring a balance of deterrence and engagement.
The US and China must in future agree that cooperation would be to their mutual benefit
and must develop their relationship to this end.

With both economic and security

interdependence now growing on a global scale, a mechanism is needed that enablescountries to work together for their mutual benefit and safety.

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