Name: Rafik Dammak
Organization: Noncommercial Stakeholders Group, ICANN GNSO
Submission ID: 114

hi,
I am submitting on behalf of NCSG the comment regarding the consolidated IANA
stewardship proposal.
Best Regards,Rafik Dammak
NCSG Chair

IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal ­ Public Comment Form
Disclaimer: The ICG will not use the information collected for any purpose other than analyzing publiccomments. Submitters’ names, affiliations, and comments will be public.

Identifying Information
The Non­commercial Stakeholders Group (NCSG) is the vehicle for representation of civilsociety organizations, nonprofits, and public interest advocates in ICANN’s Generic Names
Supporting Organization. Our two constituencies and approximately 500 individual andorganizational members appreciate the opportunity to comment on the CCWG proposal.
First Name ​Rafik*
Last Name ​Dammak*
Email Address REDACTEDCountry/Economy: GlobalOrganization: Non­commercial Stakeholders Group, ICANN GNSO

Questions Concerning the Proposal as a Whole1)

Completeness​and clarity: Is the combined proposal complete? Each of the operational
community proposals contains aspects to be completed in the future when the proposal isimplemented. Is the combined proposal specified in sufficient detail such that it can beevaluated against the NTIA criteria?

With the exception of the following the combined proposal appears to be complete:
A. As noted by the ICG, the names proposal is dependent upon the work of the CCWG on
enhancing ICANN’s accountability which is currently out for public comment. In addition to thepublic comment on the Accountability proposal there are ongoing substantive discussions
between the CCWG and the ICANN Board which are characterized by significant differences ofopinion as to the model by which the community powers post transition would be exercised.
The outcome of this requires careful monitoring, as the CCWG’s proposal must fully andeffectively meet the dependencies outlined in the CWG proposal. It is critical that the final
product of the CCWG comprises credible community empowerment and accountability
enhancing measures including improved redress mechanisms. Anything less will not be
acceptable given the concentration of IANA­related powers in ICANN under the CWG’sproposal. The viability of the names transition proposal from the CWG is dependent as a wholeon the full and unreserved endorsement of strong and empowering accountability proposal fromthe CCWG.

B. There is still some implementation detail to be resolved regarding the IANA trademarks anddomain names. The numbers community made it a requirement that these assets should not beheld by any individual IANA functions operator, as this would help to reduce switching costs inthe event there was a need to change the IFO. The protocols community expressed noobjection to that proposal. The ICANN board also seems to have no objection to this. Thenames community agreed with the principle of not having the assets in the hands of ICANN or
its IFO, but was ambiguous about its acceptance of the IETF Trust as the holder of the assets. It
seems there is some implementation detail to be worked out. The NCSG supports the way
forward suggested by the Internet Society:
Given the experience of the IETF Trust in holding, maintaining and licensing certain existing andfuture intellectual property and other property used in connection with the Internet standards
process and its administration, we believe that the IETF Trust has the competency and legitimacy toserve as this independent entity. The licensing policy considerations that would accompany atransfer of the IPR for the operations of IANA are substantive in nature; it will be important to carryout a process to identify the concerns of the parties and for achieving community consensus on
these matters."1

C. The future status of the NTIA­Verisign Cooperative Agreement, and more importantly therelationship between ICANN, PTI and Verisign, is not clear from this proposal.
2)Compatibility and interoperability: Do the operational community proposals work together in a​single proposal? Do they suggest any incompatible arrangements where compatibility appears
to be required? Is the handling of any conflicting overlaps between the functions resolved in aworkable manner?
See point B above.
3)

Accountability: Do the operational community proposals together include appropriate and​properly supported independent accountability mechanisms for running the IANA functions? Are
there any gaps in overall accountability under the single proposal?

A. The ICG correctly states that “The names community proposal is expressly conditioned on
the implementation of ICANN level accountability mechanisms proposed by the Cross
Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG).” If the CCWG
Accountability proposal does not adequately satisfy these dependencies it is unclear whatrevisions the CWG would be able to put in place that would satisfy the overall accountability
requirements of moving the IANA functions to ICANN. From our perspective, the CWG proposal
is entirely dependent upon a satisfactory CCWG proposal that delivers all of the mechanisms
required by the CWG and an effective and appropriate community empowering model as1http://www.internetsociety.org/news/internet­society­comments­iana­stewardship­transition­proposal​defined by the community in a bottom up process, that allows for the effective use andimplementation of such mechanisms for the immediate and foreseeable future.
B. While we believe that the legal separation of PTI and ICANN is an important reform thathelps to provide greater accountability, we are concerned about the possibility that thisseparation will end up being purely nominal. PTI offices should be physically separated fromICANN offices and it should not be using the same information infrastructure and should have
logical separation on all critical business line systems such as ERP, HRM, ITSM etc, in order tofacilitate independence from its parent entity.
4)

Workability: Do the results of any tests or evaluations of workability that were included in the​operational community proposals conflict with each other or raise possible concerns when
considered in combination?
Questions could be raised about the workability of the separation process. It involves asignificant amount of administrative overhead, multiple entities, and an extended time frame.
Whether such a complex, expensive and time consuming process can effectively deliver thesimple result of a rebid contract remains to be seen.

Questions Concerning NTIA Criteria5)

Do you believe the proposal supports and enhances the multistakeholder model? If yes, please​explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe arenecessary.
Yes, as long as the NTIA­Verisign­ICANN relationship is amended appropriately, the proposal
eliminates the unilateral authority of the U.S. government and turns the DNS and IP address
governance over to the global multistakeholder community. A ‘yes’ answer also depends onwhether there are credible, effective and community­empowering accountability measures inplace at ICANN. Any concentration of powers of steward, contracting party and operator for theIANA functions without a significantly empowered and effective multistakeholder community tohold ICANN accountable would not satisfy this criterion.

6)

Do you believe the proposal maintains the security, stability, and resiliency of the DNS? If yes,​please explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe arenecessary.
Yes. Elimination of the NTIA authorization role and the ability to authenticate changes before
they are published constitute improvements in security, stability and resiliency. As before, thisdepends on whether there are credible, effective and community empowering accountability
measures in place at ICANN. Any concentration of powers of steward, contracting party andoperator for the IANA functions without such accountability measures could be inherentlyde­stabilizing.

7)

Do you believe the proposal meets the needs and expectations of the global customers and​partners of the IANA services? If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why and what
proposal modifications you believe are necessary. Please indicate if you are a customer orpartner of the IANA services.
Yes. The global customers and partners of the IANA functions played a major role in developing
this plan. The numbers registries (RIRs) have expressed satisfaction with the outcome of theCRISP proposal, and so do the protocol parameter registries via the IANAPLAN proposal. The
names registries (TLD registries, ccTLD registries, etc.) took longer time to reach an agreement
on a structure, but the plan does respond to their needs as expressed in the proposal
development process.

8)

Do you believe the proposal maintains the openness of the Internet? If yes, please explain why.
​If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe are necessary.
Yes, but if and only if there are credible, effective and community empowering accountability
measures in place at ICANN. Any concentration of powers of steward, contracting party andoperator for the IANA functions without a significantly empowered and effective multistakeholder
community to hold ICANN accountable, transparent and open would not satisfy this criterion.

9)

Do you have any concerns that the proposal is replacing NTIA's role with a government­led or​inter­governmental organization solution? If yes, please explain why and what proposal
modifications you believe are necessary. If not, please explain why.
No. The ICG proposal successfully situates stewardship for the different IANA functions in therelevant non­governmental operational communities.

10)

Do you believe that the implementation of the proposal will continue to uphold the NTIA criteria​

in the future? If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal
modifications you believe are necessary.
We have some concerns about the actual degree of separation between PTI for names­IANAand ICANN. If IANA becomes locked in to ICANN and the review and separation process
proves to be too cumbersome, the ability to uphold the NTIA criteria may degrade.

Questions Concerning ICG Report and Executive Summary11)

Do you believe the ICG report and executive summary accurately reflect all necessary aspects​of the overall proposal? If not, please explain what modifications you believe are necessary.

Yes.

General Questions12)​ ​Do you have any general comments for the ICG about the proposal?
Contrary to some commentators, we believe that the three proposals were developed in an
open and inclusive manner. In particular, the discussion of the various models in the names
community's work was comprehensive and resulted in a model that while not perfect manages
to accommodate most stakeholder needs while satisfying the various criteria.