Journal of Global Resources
Volume 5
July 2017
ISSN: 2395-3160 (Print), 2455-2445 (Online)

Page 90-100

12
THE ROLE OF CLIMATIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN FARMERSPASTORALISTS’ CONFLICTS IN DRYLANDS OF NIGERIA AND NIGER REPUBLIC
Adamu I. A.1 and Umar A. 2
1

Department of Geography, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, Nigeria
Email: adanmalam@yahoo.com
2

Department of Geography, Federal University, Birnin-Kebbi, Nigeria

Abstract: Understanding the fundamental causes of West Africa’s farmers-pastoralistsconflicts’ (F-P-C) in ameliorating the menace is crucial. However, most of F-P-C researches
in dry lands of Nigeria and Niger republic could not see the primacy of looking into theseconflicts from the perspective of climatic and environmental change in the dry lands ofNigeria and Niger; two climatic continuum and ecologically complementing neighbors. Thereis need for a holistic approach in conducting research on conflicts essentially the one that
focuses on the conflicts causality, generalizability and prediction which will help in proffering
effective mitigation measures. The aim of this paper is to review and synthesize fragmented
F-P-C works in dry lands of Nigeria and Niger with a view of establishing trends in climatechange, ecological marginalization and F-P-Cs as-well-as causality, generalizability andprediction of F-P-Cs. The review has established an evidence of climate change (specificallydroughts) in the study area from 1970s to 1980s and 1990s. These trends coupled withecological degradation and helped by political and socio-economic systems decay
culminated into ecological marginalization which threaten the survival of pastoralists and tosome extent farmers who prior co-existed in a symbiotic living. These factors were
responsible for the increasing trend in F-P-Cs as a mal-adaptive strategy from farmers andpastoralists to deteriorating environment. Finally we recommend that addressing ecologicalmarginalization; increasing pastoralists’ access to land, empowerment rural dwellers
enhancing their participation and curbing corruption are some strategies of ameliorating the
F-P-Cs in the study area.
Key words: Climate change; ecological degradation; ecological marginalization; pastoralist
Background of Study
Climate change and ecological degradation are major threats to the livelihoods and survivalof millions of people in Africa especially in the dry land zones (Cline 2007; Lobell et al.,2008). Since the middle of the 20th century, extreme weather events have been more
frequent and their frequency wills likely increase throughout the 21st century in the SubSaharan Africa which is generally agreed to be one of the regions that are most vulnerable
to such climate impacts (IPCC, 2012). Droughts are the most common environmental
challenge in the continent, and have affected millions of people in the last three decades(UNEP, 2012). These droughts have resulted in the loss of lives and livelihoods, the erosionof assets, mass migration and conflict. The West-African dry lands from Latitude 10 to 18(figure 1), a transition zone between the Sahara desert and the humid zone, have been amajor farming and pastoral production zone in Africa for centuries (Dong et al, 2011) andtogether with the humid West Africa, is one of the dominating regions for livestock rearing on
the continent, corresponding to 25 per cent of the cattle, 33 per cent of the sheep and 40 per
90

cent of the goats in all sub-Saharan Africa (SWAC-OECD, 2007). Animal production systemin the region is characterised by seasonal and cyclical migration of varying degrees between
complementary ecological areas. Though farmers and pastoralists in the Northern Nigeria
and Niger republic had a long term coexistence of symbiotic relationships, climatic andenvironmental change combine threaten the livelihood of pastoralists more than that of the
farmers (Challinor et al. 2007).
This bio-physical vulnerability of the region combines with population growth andsocio-economic/political challenges culminate into ecological marginalization which
threatens the survival of both pastoralists and farmers and precipitates into so many conflicts
and civil strife. Clashes between the two groups are becoming more frequent (Moritz, 2010)
corroborating the thesis that diminishing resources and unequal resource access resulting
from climate and environmental degradation act in various combinations to increase thescarcity for certain population groups, of vital resources such as: cropland, water, forests,
and fish which manifest as deprivation conflicts (Homer-Dixon and Blitt, 1998).
Studies (such as Homer-Dixon and Blitt, 1998; Campbell et al, 2007; Boko et al,2007; Obioha, 2009) have confirmed the role of climate change in creation of ecologicalmarginalization conditions and subsequently leading to violent conflicts globally particularly
in developing countries who have less capacity to prepare for and adapt to climate change,
where hazards such as drought are capable of causing instability and unrest. It is also
documented how this environmental change coupled with decay in political and socioeconomic systems enhanced pastoralists and farmers clashes in Nigeria and Niger. There is
paucity of research that look at this problem from the organic (or systemic) inter-linkage ofdry lands of Northern Nigeria with that of its neighboring Niger republic. This study posit thatviewing farmers-pastoralists diminishing environmental resources induced conflicts in
Nigeria or Niger separately without taking into cognizance of the background and linkage of
its other neighbour is not an holistic approach.
Annan, (2014) emphasized the relevance of understanding of the fundamental causes ofWest Africa’s violent conflicts and civil strife in ameliorating the menace. Therefore, the aimof this paper is to (through a literature review) synthesize and establish the nexus that exist
between climate change, environmental change and farmers-pastoralists conflicts (F-P-C) inthe dry lands of Nigeria and Niger; two areas that are climatically continuum and ecologicallycomplementary. The objectives of the paper are:a) To provide updated information on environmental change in the dry lands of Northern
Nigeria and Southern Niger with the view of establishing trends in climate change
and ecological degradation in the area;b) To review most relevant existing literature on socio-economic and political profile offarmers-pastoralists livelihoods in the study areas;c) To synthesize findings from the reviewed studies to establish causality, andgeneralization on F-P-C in the study area;d) To offer possible suggestions on how F-P-C could be tackled.
But the paper does not attempt to give a complete exhaustive literature review on climate /environmental change or F-P-C in the study area.

91

Figure 1 West African Dry lands (Modified after Robison and Brooks. 2010)

Nigeria-Niger Ecological BackgroundIn both Nigeria and Niger, rural livelihoods in the countries are dominated by smallholder crop
cultivation and transhumance pastoralism. Though Nigeria has a variety of ecosystems
ranging from forests in the south through moist savannas in the central parts to dry landsavannas in the north (figure 1), Niger republic is a land locked country with the Sahara zone(<150 mm of rainfall per year) occupying 74% of country’s total area (table 1) and theSudanian zone (> 600 mm) covering only around 1% of the country’s area. 80% of Niger’s
total population is settled in the Sahelian and Sudanian zone representing 11% of the total
area of the country. These conditions have push and pull effects on transhumant livestock
herders especially in the arid and semi-arid dry lands of Niger republic and some part ofNorthern Nigeria to move several hundred kms toward the more humid south each year
following the rains and the grazing pasture.
Table 1 Ecological Background of Nigeria and Niger
Ecological BackgroundNigeria
Niger
Swamps and the rain forest 10% of the total land0%
Woodland
10% of the total land0%
Guinea Savanna
50% of the total land0%
Sudan Savanna
25% of the surface area
8% of the country’s areaSahel
5 - 10% of the surface area 8 % of the total land
Saharo-Sahel
0%
10%
Sahara zone
0%74% of total surface area
Source: FMENV, 2001, CIPSDR, 2004

92

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Dry landas hotspots for Conflicts
Dry lands are arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas where rainfall is scarce, highlyvariable or confined to short seasons of the year (Mortimore, et al., 2008). These areas arecharacterized with inter-annual coefficient variation of 25 to 35 %. It is however estimatedthat globally only 10% of the dry lands surface suffered ecological degradation (Lepers,
2003; Mortimore, et al., 2008). Also despite this challenge, dry lands agro-ecosystems
possess a diverse mix of food, fodder and fiber crops; vegetables, rangeland and pasturespecies; fruit and fuel-wood trees; medicinal plants; livestock and fish (CGIAR, 2011). As will
be explained in a while, being an environmentally constrained area where competitions for
scarce environmental resources take place, dry lands of Nigeria and Niger are poised to beconflicts hotspots especially they are one of the World hotspot for degradation from 19822006 (UNEP, 2012).
Environmental Resources-Conflicts Conceptualizations
This work is guided by a conceptual framework selected from two schools of thought that
hinge on the environmental resources conflicts namely: (i) the Neo-Malthusians School and(ii) the Cornucopians School (Gleditsch, 2003, Kolmannskog, 2009). Thomas Homer-Dixon,
who championed the Neo-Malthusians, posited that population growth and resource
scarcities result in violent competition (Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994, Homer-Dixon and Blitt,1998). The Cornucopians, on the other hand who among them are: Gleditsch (1998); Ross,(1999);Gleditsch and Urdal, (2002); Gausset, Whyte and Torben, (2005); Halvor, Moene andTorvik, (2006) hold the “resource curse” thesis which claims that it is abundance rather thanscarcity of resources that often leads to conflict – because according to Gleditsch, (1998)
rebel groups draw funding from the exploitation of natural resources and/or it is a conflict
about the control of valuable resources. They believe that conflicts arise because theirperpetrators wants reach the procambial “honey pot”.
The notion of “eco-violence “maxim put forward by the Neo-Malthusian scholars views“shrinking resource pie” as a trigger of violent civil conflict through irritating strained social
relationships among different groups competing common natural resources is very apt in
explaining the plight of both pastoralists and farmers who experience ecologicalmarginalization due to climatic and environmental change. Thus this theory forms theconceptual framework of this study. The marginality we are referring here has been
described as a phenomena that occur at biophysical limits of any kind which may begeophysical boundaries, environmental thresholds, or habitats that are not (or threaten tobe) well suited for particular species or populations (Leimgruber 2004). Pastoralists andsome farmers in the study area are increasingly being marginalized due to their lack ofaccess to resources as a result of unfavorable (geographical) location (as for instancepastoralists in arid part of Niger) or generally restrictive local biophysical conditions(pastoralists and farmers in Nigeria) (Gatzweiler et al. 2011).
Causality and Generalization of F-P- Cs
F-P-Cs has persisted since early beginning of agriculture in Africa and climate change andecological degradation have been implicated as the principal causes in majority of studies.
These “climate-conflict alarmists” such as Burke et al, (2009) would argue that if
93

temperatures continue to rise, we can expect an additional 393,000 battle deaths by the year
2030 in sub-Saharan Africa. Such scholars(Burke, et al, 2009; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012;
Raleigh and Kniveton 2012) reported that there is some agreement that either increased
rainfall or decreased rainfall in resource-dependent economies enhances the risk of
localized violent conflict, particularly in pastoral societies in Africa. However, it is pertinent topoint that that the relationship between climate change / ecological degradation and conflicts
is complex and depends on the social characteristics of the regional settings or that therelationship is nonlinear across multiple regions and livelihood zones (O’Loughlin et al.,2012, Raleigh and Kniveton, 2012, Sterzel, et al. 2014).
Wide body of scientific literature on Sub-Saharan Africa including the study area has
consistently acknowledged the historical symbiotic co-existence of farmers and herders(Ingawa, et al, 1999; Blench, 2010). Other works (such as Fratkin, 1997, Seddon andSumberg 1997, Abbass, 2011) acknowledge the long historical record of fluctuating conflicts,
competition and co-operation between settled farmers and pastoral or transhumant herders
in the continent. The most convincing explanations on the causes of F-P-C in the study area
had been primarily linked to utilization of environmental resources- range lands, water pointsetc.(Ingawa, et al. 1999; Blench, 2003; Nyong and Fiki (2005); Blench, 2010; Abbass, 2011,
farmers encroachment into marginal lands that had been the traditional pasture routes forthe cattle blocking of transhumant corridors (labi orburtali) and obstruction of traditional
access rights to communal grazing and water resources by the individual tenureship ofarable farmers (Blench, 2010; Tukur, 2013).Intensification of agriculture in riparian areas
known as fadama cultivation, increase in crop production to meet increasing demand,damage to crops of farmers by the pastoralists have been cited by some works (Watkinson
and Ormerod 2001; de Haan, 2002; Adisa, 2011; Olabode and Ajibade, 2010; Blench, 2010;
Bello, 2013). Other causes are: increasing commercialization of the crop-residues and poor
management of the existing grazing reserves which result into a significant reduction inavailable livestock feed resources, migration and spread of cattle infectious diseases to hostcommunities (Blench, 2010).
Climate Change and Ecological Degradation as a Cause of F-P-C
Since more than 60% of the reported cases of conflicts in the study area occurred during thedry season and the conflicts, more often than not, are concentrated around the resourceendowed locations like the fertile flood plains, river valleys and other water points (Tukur,2013), the role of climatic and environmental change has been the major cause especiallythat all the causes cited in section 3.0 are directly or directly associated with climate change
and ecological degradation. This has been confirmed by (Watkinson and Ormerod 2001;
Marshall and Hildebrand, 2002) who highlighted these threats that pastoralism faced in the
Sahel despite its well adaptability to the ecological and sociological conditions thatcharacterize the region.
The Sahelian zone of the study area is characterized with recurrent drought episodes
throughout history with early records to the 1640s (UNEP, 2012). Annual rainfall across thisregion fell by between 20 and 30 per cent between 1930s -1950s and 1970s -1990s (Hulme,2001), or according to Nicholson et al. (2000) 15% to 40% lower than during the period
1931–60. McCarthy et al., (2001); IPCC (2001); Claussen et al. (2003) also reported that arainfall decrease of 29 to 49 percent have been observed in the 1968 to 1997 period
compared to the 1931 to 1960 base line period within the region. The magnitude and94intensity of these droughts were on the increase towards the end of the last century(Batterbury and Warren, 2001; Hulme, 2001, Nnoli, 2004 and Nnaji, 2001, Masih et al, 2014).
According to UNEP, (2012) over the period 1930 to 2006, there has been adecline(brown to red colour in figure 3) in rainfall over the Sahel, and large parts of the coastal
regions of West Africa and that despite the recovery in rainfall sincethose droughts, rains
over the Sahel have not yet reached the levels of the 1950s.Climate in Northern Nigeria andSouthern and central Niger has been reported to display considerable temporal and spatial
shifts in its variability and change. So many researches (Hulme, 2001, Fasona and Omojola,
2005; Niasse, 2005; Obioha, 2005, Adefolalu, 2007; Ikhile, 2007; Podesta and Ogden, 2007;
Iliya and Opponkumi, 2011; Abdulkadir et al., 2013) acknowledged the area suffers fromclimate change -induced drought, and desertification. It is observed that the decreasing
rainfall and intensity of the droughts in the West African Sahel from the 1970s to the 1990s,
and the extent of the downward trend in rainfall (see figure 3), are the most significant recent
climate change recognised by climatologists (Dai et al. 2004, Batter bury and Mortimore,2013).
The declining rainfall trend in the study area couple with resource degradation suchas: over-grazing, human induced soil degradation, bush burning, soil compaction, overcultivation, deforestation, and excessive use of chemical fertilizers combine uncomfortably
with delicate climate conditions in creating ecological degradation with its great
consequences on the people and their livelihoods (FAO, 2000; Abdulkadir et al., 2013).
Gonzalez (2001) reported that long term decrease in rainfall from 1970s has caused a 25 to
30 km southward shift in the Sahel, Sudan and Guinean ecological zones of West Africa.
This according to ECF and Postdan Institute, (2004) has resulted in the loss of grassland(acacia wood) and shifting sand dunes in the Sahel. The FGN, (2006) asserted that therecurrent droughts took place at a time the ecological degradation or desertification slowly
changed northern fringe of the Guinea savanna into the drier Sudan Savanna and the drierfringes of the Sudan savanna suffered the effects of deforestation and changed thestructure and composition into Sahel.
The threat of trend of desertification in the study area is at a very fast rateoccasioned by fast reduction in the amount of surface water, flora and fauna resources onland (FME, 2004; Obioha, 2008), that exacerbate soil and biodiversity degradation. Figure 4
shows land degradation hotspots between 1982 and 2006 using Advanced Very High
Resolution Radar (AVHRR) image. This has corroborated that the study area was the area
under the highest form of ecological degradation throughout the Sahel. This is why Murray(2007) laments the encroachment of the desert as a threat to the region. Findings showedthat approximately 3,500 square kilometers of Northern Nigerian land turns to desert eachyear, forcing both farmers and herdsmen to abandon their lands (Campbell et al., 2007).
This concurred with Oyetade (2007) who reported that in 10 northern states of Nigeria, eachyear the desert advances another 600 meters further south. According to him, this has
resulted in displacing thousands of both farmers and pastoralists from their communities.
Fasona and Omojola, (2005) also reported that in Nigeria 42.5% increase in the extent ofsand dunes/Aeolian deposit between 1976 and 1995 around the northern axis of the Country
and that desert now cover about 35% of Nigeria’s land mass.

95

The surface and underground water resources have not been spared by this change.
The rate of hydrological changes in Chad basin (a Basin shared by countries among which
include Nigeria and Niger) is unprecedented. Between 1960 and 2000, the Chad basin
region experienced one of the most substantial and sustained reduction in rainfall events
recorded anywhere in the world (IPCC, 2001). In 2003, the Lake region was classified
among the ten most water impoverished locations in the world (UNEP, 2003). In the 1960s
Lake Chad had an area of more than 26,000 km2 which shrunk from 25,000 km2 to less than
1,500 km2 between 1966 and 1997(Coe and Foley 2001). And between 1994 and 2004, thelake receded further dramatically, covering just an area of some 532 km2. In essence, thelake has shrunk by about 90% of its size in 1960 (Onouha, 2006).
In Niger, in the east of the country the Komadougou Yobé River is a tributary of Lake
Chad and forms the border with Nigeria. This river used to flow ten months per year, but inthe mid 1990’s it only flowed for six months per year. This was due to a prolonged period of
decline in rainfall (MHE-Niger, 1991). Lake Chad consists of two major basins. In its very
south-east Niger borders on the northern basin, which receives its water primarily from theKomadougou Yobé and from overflow from the southern basin. Partly as a result of greatly
diminished flow in the Komadougou Yobé, the Niger part of Lake Chad was dry from about
1988-1998. The desiccation caused very large parts of it to be invaded by Prosopis juliflora
shrubs (MHE-Niger, 1991; Mullié, 1994).
Socioeconomic/ Political Causal Factors of F-P-C
The foregoing review is pointing to the fact that ecological deterioration of study area has
been worsening and highly capable of endangering conflicts going by the postulates of ourconceptual framework of the “eco-violence “maxim which states that “shrinking resource pie”
fuels violent civil conflicts by aggravating strained social relationships among different
groups sharing common natural resources. Thus, Blench and Dendo, (2003) observed that
ecological degradation as well as decay in political and socio-economic systems enhanced
pastoralists and farmers clashes which become the most frequent conflicts in Nigeria andNiger.
It has been acknowledged that during the pre-colonial era in Niger Republic, theconnections between pastoralists and farmers and production systems meant that farmers
and herders each had a stake in the well-being of the opposite group. Glantz (1996) and
Thébaud and Batterby (2001) stated that one of the socioeconomic/political causal factors of
F-P-C in Niger is the northward expansion of agriculture into historically marginal areas of
the Sahel set aside for pastoral usage. Other factors responsible for F-P-C include declining
productivity, rising population and the removal of lands from domestic production of grain to
the commodity production of groundnuts and cotton in Niger has resulted in a northward
movement of cultivation, beyond the "agronomic dry boundary". In addition pastoralists
themselves have begun to cultivate as a way of securing livelihoods and trying to combat
poverty (Moutari, and Tan, 2008). Other factors include the official bias against pastoralism
especially transhumance pastoralism (that constitute the most predominant livestock
agricultural system in the area) which has been viewed as anachronistic and counterproductive. All these factors led to farmers to successfully challenge herders' land rights, andhaving those challenges supported by the authorities.

96Colonial agricultural policy in both Nigeria and Niger discriminated pastoralism andfavored crop cultivation farmers (Hoffman, 2004). After gaining political independence,nationalization and privatization of land, sedentarisation of nomads (the desire of the new
independent governments to prevent herders from travelling over national borders), theestablishment of plantations and encouragement of cash crop production together withfactors such as urbanisation, demographic pressure, and increased influence of a global
market economy continued decreasing available pasture land and increasing competition for
natural resources. These undermined farmer-herder complementarities and supported theconditions that conflicts require to evolve and grow.
In Niger, in an effort to attain self-sufficiency in food production, the customary landuse rights of pastoralist given to them by the Articles 23 and 25 of Niger Code Rural andother regulations were disregarded and there were encroachment of farmers on key sites of
pastoralists. There was conversion of million hectares of forest wetlands and rangelands tofarmlands (Cleaver and Schereiber, 1994). 63.000 ha of floodplain along the river in Niger,
i.e. on average an inundation zone 570 m wide on either bank; approximately 10.800 ha offloodplain have been converted to irrigation area, mostly for growing rice (MAE-DEP, 1991;
MHE-DFPP, 1991). In Pesse, Gaya region of Niger 11 people were killed in a conflict
between herders and farmers about pasturelands occupied by farmers (AREN, 2005).
Pastoralists’ situation in Nigeria is even the worst. The Nigerian 1965 Grazing
Reserve Law, only aimed to settle herders in northern Nigeria (and discourage their centaury
old transhumance mobility) through the acquisition of ‘native land’ for gazing and definedand demarcated specified grazing areas but has not successfully defended pastoralists land
rights and pastoralists are still at the mercy of their host communities (Hoffman, 2004;
PASSEL, 2005; Sayre, 2010;). Poor demarcation and getting had made most of the grazing
areas to fizzle out. Despite the government’s effort in demarcating 415 grazing reserves orroutes, up to the present day, few attempts have been made to develop the reserve into
rangelands with watering points, veterinary services and other facilities. Also out of thisnumber, only one third is put in use, whereas 270 grazing reserves have been put into
cultivation (IRIN, 2009, Abbass, 2011).
The Nigerian National Livestock Development Project (NLDP), had undertaken a survey ofthe transhumant stock routes in Nigeria, including international routes from and intoneighbouring countries like Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin Republics and found thatsome of the routes had been beaconed but demarcation had not been easy (CIEL,
2006).This happened despite the ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol which granted herders
permit to move freely across borders in search of pasture in the member states. The
resultant effect of this lapse and insensitivity to the right of pastoralists has been frequent
violent clashes (Abbass, 2011).
Generalizability and Prediction of F-P-C
The US Institute of Peace, (1999) predicted that the climate of the study area is likely to see
growing shifts in temperature and rainfall throughout the 21st century and that poor adaptive
responses to the shifts could help fuel violent conflicts. Alsoas explained earlier, someclimate alarmists such as Burke et al, (2009) assert that if temperatures continue to rise,
conflict will skyrocketed by the year 2030.Change in rainfall and environmental degradation
have been established to have high toll on conflicts particularly at lower level ofviolence(Hauge and Ellingston, 1998;Hendrix and Sarah, 2005; Buhaug, and Theisen,97

2012). Because of this, scholars of agricultural systems in West Africa are equally
pessimistic about the future of pastoral systems (Bruijin and Dijk, 1995; Nori, et’al, 2005;
Warren 2005). And this by itself means astronomical increase in the rate of F-P-C as theenvironmental change makes rain-fed farmers to expand their farms into designated grazing
land/ routes allocated to pastoralists, which brings about displacement of pastoralists andculminates into violence (Catterson, 1990; Sayre, 2010). Indeed the trend in F-P-C has
assumed unprecedented dimensions in recent years (Fasona and Omojala, 2005, Abbass,
2011, Tukur, 2013).
However, it is pertinent to point out that climate anomalies and environment
degradation on their own do not cause conflicts but they combine with other vulnerabilities toprecipitate into to environmental scarcity or ecological marginalization. It is observed that
resources scarcity acts in conjunction with a complex blend of economic, social, political andinstitutional factors that eventually breed violence (Martins, 2009, O’Brien et al., 2007,
Buhaget et al, 2008,Benjaminsen et al 2012; Koubi et al, 2012, O’Loughlin et al., 2012;
Raleigh and Kniveton, 2012; and Sterzel, et al. 2014).Studies were able to makegeneralization that socio-economic and ecological context interacts with many contextual
factors to contribute to violence in the study area. The relationships between farmers andherders have always been multi-dimensional and like most social relationships they have
involved both cooperation and conflict (Turner, 2004). These relationships have beencharacterized by ups and downs or increase and decrease in intensity and frequency (ofviolent conflicts) dictated by prevailing ecological conditions of the environment and socioeconomic/political situations (Assal, 2006, Abbass, 2011).
This complexity in the causal relationship between F-P-C and ecologicalmarginalization is evident in the pastoralists-farmers relationships in the study area whichfrom time immemorial had been predominantly cordial and symbiotic. The farmerspastoralists interactions in area have been interactions that in most of the time involve
cooperation; complementarities and healthy competition over diminishing resources andthreatening environment. In recent decades farmer-herder conflicts in the study area have
escalated into widespread violence, loss of property, massive displacement of people andloss of lives (Abbass, 2011). Though so many times the relationships spontaneously
changed from that of complementarily and trust to hostility, violence and wars, however,there is an increasing understanding among scholars that the above relationships cannot be
generalized and depicted as dichotomous “polarized opposition” (Abduljalil, 2008).
This has been demonstrated by efforts of some Fulbe pastoralists’ groups who havecreated social structures geared towards minimizing conflicts with farmers and preserving
the overall harmony between these groups that was necessary for their production
symbiosis. An example is the role of the Ruga in Niger and Nigeria. The Ruga is an elected
official who regulates the grazing and pasture use of his group. He is in charge of selecting
migration routes and deciding where specific animals will graze. The Ruga is also
considered responsible for internal and external dispute management and settling conflicts
between farmers and his group (Ellwood 1995). Also in a comparative analysis of sevencase studies Moritz et al. (2009) found that West African pastoral systems were not in acrisis, despite the explained challenges there is not only an evidence of its successful
adaptation but also increases in agro-pastoral production and market value of theseproducts. The adaptations that the pastoralists were reported to exhibit took several forms
such as: their cyclic movement to and from sub-humid zones (Boutrais 1996; Bassett &98Turner 2007), intensification (Adriansen 2006), and an intensification of livestock production
and its integration into agricultural systems (Moritz, 2010). Also based on a comparative
study of four villages in Northeast Nigeria, Mortimore and Adams, (1998) have buy-in theidea of intensification of the production of livestock and to integrate it into agricultural
systems by feeding cattle with farm-produced fodder. However, the researchers lamented
that the intensification and integration route is available only to agro-pastoralists who alreadyhave title to lands; mobile pastoralists without land titles will have to move elsewhere toincreasingly scarce pastoral areas (Mortimore & Adams 1998).
Conclusion and Recommendations
This review has established evidence of increasing trend in climatic and environmental
change in the study area generally especially from 1970s to 1980s and 1990s. This declined
in rainfall coupled with human mismanagement of environmental resources and helped bypolitical and socio-economic systems decay and etc. has culminated into ecologicalmarginalization which seriously affects the livelihoods of pastoralists and in some extent
farmers, as well, who prior to these changes co-existed in a co-operative symbiotic living.
These factors were responsible for the increasing trend in violent conflicts of farmers andpastoralists as mal-adaptive survival strategies to deteriorating environment. Unless thismenace is tackled the F-P-C trend will continue to be on the increase. Thus, this review
suggest as follow:i.
Efforts should be exerted in addressing drought and ecological degradation as
strategies of ameliorating the F-P-C in the study area. For instance rejuvenating oflake Chad through inter-basin water transfer will immensely enhance Chad Basin
communities livelihoods which will curb environmental scarcity and deprivation;ii.
The Nigerian Federal Government National Agricultural Policy of 1988 which offer aregulation that twenty percent (20%) of the fadama flood plains would need to be set
aside for grazing should be enforced;
iii. Grazing Land Reserve and Cattle Routes (labi or burtali) should be gazette andprotected in every state of the federation and urgent efforts should be put in place fordeveloping them with up-to-date facilities;iv.
Access to grazing rights to the pastoralists from the ECOWAS member’s statesshould be respected as it has been guaranteed by the ECOWAS Transhumance
Protocol of 1998 and the ECOWAS Protocol of Free Movement of Goods andPersons in West Africa.
v.
Modernizing the pastoralist system, through empowering herders to adopt sedentary
lifestyle and developing a private niche and habitat for their livestock which will curtailtheir frequent mobility searching for pasture that precipitate into conflicts;
vi.
The government should address socio-economic deprivation, which is most severe in
the north.
vii.
Corruption, nepotism and mismanagement should be strictly discouraged and culprits
punished as this will improve public’s confidence and hope for the government andtherefore be loyal citizens not agitators or rebels.
References
1. Abbass, I.M. (2011)”No Retreat No Surrender’: Conflict for Survival between Fulani
Pastoralists and Farmers in Northern Nigeria” accessed online at www. On 11th
September, 201599

2. Abdulkadir A., Uthman M.T., Shaba A.H. (2013) “Climate change, aridity trend andagricultural sustainability of the Sudano-Sahelian belt of Nigeria” International Journal of
Development and Sustainability Online ISSN: 2168-8662 – www.isdsnet.com/ijds
Volume 2 Number 2 (2013): Pages 1436-1456 ISDS Article ID: IJDS12092405
3. Adefolalu D.O.A. (2007) “Climate change and economic sustainability in Nigeria” Paper
presented at the International conference on climate change, Nnamdi Azikiwe University,
Awka 12-14 June 2007
4. Batterbury, S. and Warren, A. (2001) “Viewpoint on the African Sahel 25 years after thegreat drought: assessing progress and moving towards new agendas and approaches”
Global Environmental Change 11 (2001) pp1-8
5. Batterbury, S. P. J. and Mortimore M. J. (2013) “Adapting to drought in the West African
Sahel” in Boulter, S. Palutikof, J. Karoly, D. and Guitart, D. (eds.) (2013). Natural
Disasters and Adaptation to Climate Change. Cambridge University Press. pp 235-252
6. Buhaug, H. and O.M. Theisen, (2012) “On environmental change and armed conflict” In:
Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict. [Scheffran, J., M. Brzoska, H.G.
Brauch, P.M. Link, and J. Schilling (eds.)]. Springer, Berlin, pp. 43-55.
7. Cline, W. (2007) Global Warming and Agriculture: Impact Estimates by Country
Washington, DC: Peterson Institute.
8. Fasona, M.J. and Omojola, A.S. (2005) “Climate Change, Human Security andCommunal Clashes in Nigeria”, Paper at International Workshop in Human Security andClimate Change, Oslo Oct. 21-23.
9. Gausset, Q., Whyte, M. A. and Torben, B. (2005) Beyond Territory and Scarcity:
Exploring conflicts over Natural Resource Management. Nordic Africa Institute, 2005.
10. Gleditsch, N P, (1998) “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature”
Journal of Peace Research 35(3): 381–400.
11. Gleditsch, N.P. & Urdal, H. (2002) “Eco violence? Links between Population Growth,
Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict” Journal of International Affairs 56 (1)12. Gleditsch, N.P., (2012) “Whither the weather? Climate change and conflict” Journal of
Peace Research, 49(1), 3-9.
13. Gonzalez, P. (2001) “Desertification and Shift of Forest Species in the West African
Sahel” Clim Res 17:217-228
14. Halvor, M., Moene, K. and Torvik, R. (2006) "Institutions and the Resource Curse" The
Economic Journal 116, no. 508 (2006): 1-20.
15. Hendrix, C.S. and I. Salehyan, (2012) “Climate change, rainfall, and social conflict inAfrica” Journal of Peace Research, 49(1), 35-50.
16. Ingawa, S. A., Ega, L.A. and Erhabor, P.O. (1999) “Farmer-Pastoralist Conflicts in theCore States of the National Fadama Development Project”, Abuja, Federal Agricultural
Coordinating Unit
17. Lepers, E, (2003) Synthesis of the main areas of land cover and land use change.
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
18. Lobell, D. B., M. B. Burke, C. Tebaldi, M. D. Mastrandrea, W. P. Falcon, and R. L. Naylor(2008) “Prioritizing Climate Change Adaptation Needs for Food Security in 2030”
Science, 319 (5863): 607-610.
19. Obioha, E. (2009) “Climate variability, environmental change and food security nexus in
Nigeria” Journal of Human Ecology, 26(2):107-121.
20. Podesta, J. & Ogden, P. (2007) “Global Warning: The Security Challenges of Climate
Change “Retrieved from: http://www.americanprogress.org.
21. Ross, M. L. (1999) "The political economy of the resource curses." World politics 51, no.
02 (1999): 297-322.
22. Turner, M. (2004) “Political ecology and the moral dimensions of “resource conflicts”:
The case of farmer-herder conflicts in the Sahel” Polite Geogr 23(7):863–889.
23. UNEP (2003) Draft Desk Study Version 1 on the Lake Chad Basin. Report prepared by
UNEP AEO, GIWA, UNEP DEPI, Micheal, T.C and the Lake Chad Basin Commission.
Department of Early Warning and Assessment (DEWA), UNEP: Nairobi, Kenya.
100