Our path to a nuclear-free Japan: an interim report
Executive Summary

Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE)
October 2013
The full report in Japanese is available at: www.ccnejapan.com

Introduction
The following document — Our Path to a Nuclear-Free Japan — is an interim report, summarising key
issues and providing an account of the results of our discussion and research up to this point. We
expect this report to serve as a catalyst for generating opinions and comments from experts andconcerned citizens within Japan and abroad, and we hope to incorporate their constructive feedback in

Policy Outlines for a Nuclear Phaseout, a final report scheduled for publication in March 2014.

0.1 The severity of the Fukushima disaster: ten characteristics of the Fukushima nuclear
accident
The nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station caused by the Great East Japan
Earthquake of March 11, 2011 has caused damage on an unprecedented scale. The following ten points
describe the key characteristics of the tremendous damage inflicted by this accident.

1. Seismic-nuclear disaster – a complex disaster became a reality.
2.

Multiple reactor unit explosions resulted in widespread and severe radioactive contamination.

3.

Many nuclear accident-related deaths occurred.

4.

Many individuals are being exposed to radiation and experiencing health effects.

5.

Inland areas suffer serious radioactive contamination.

6.

The marine environment suffers serious and expanding radioactive contamination.

7.

Stabilisation of the situation is not on the horizon.

8.

Stabilisation of the accident requires a large number of workers who are inevitably exposed toradiation.

9.

Financial losses alone are totalling hundreds of billions of dollars.

10. Various forms of social conflicts and divisions have arisen.

Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE) | Interim Report 2013 | Executive Summary

0.2 The case for a nuclear-free society
Since its initial development in the 1950s, great expectations have been placed on nuclear power
generation for its capacity to supply energy at extremely low costs. Under the nationwide expansion
plan, operators greatly benefited from the protection and political support of the central government.
These generous provisions followed from the fact that the development of nuclear power was alignedwith Japan’s economic, political, and diplomatic motivations. Yet despite government support, nuclear
power remained a high-risk venture for power companies due to several economic and managerial
shortcomings, including risk of severe accidents, treatment and disposal of nuclear waste, and huge
capital investments. Through a comprehensive evaluation of policy options, it becomes clear thatJapanese society should choose to enact legislation to abolish nuclear power. However, before opting toabolish nuclear power it is imperative to examine whether this would create possible power shortages
and whether the added cost of alternative energy systems would be socio-economically viable. In thelate 2000s, nuclear energy accounted for around 10% of Japan’s total supply of primary energy and it
is expected that energy consumption will naturally decline in the future due to population decline.
Furthermore, there is considerable potential for expanding both energy efficiency and renewableenergy, and this will go hand in hand with fostering a sense of empowerment and self-determination incitizens by firmly placing energy production and consumption decisions in their hands. All things
considered, achieving a nuclear-free society will not be as challenging as it may at first appear. It isclearly necessary to advocate for a nuclear phaseout.

0.3 Creating the political conditions for a nuclear phaseout
Several stages can be observed in the recent German history of adopting nuclear phaseout policies. The
first was that political parties in favour of a nuclear phaseout took office and enacted relevant laws.
The second was that even the government of Prime Minister Merkel, which once opted for extending
the life span of the country’s nuclear power plants, quickly reversed these plans immediately following
the Fukushima disaster.
In Japan the key political conditions for achieving a nuclear phaseout are the formation of a politicalregime determined to seek a nuclear-free future and tenacious adherence to nuclear phaseout oriented
policies. However, any future regime aiming to phase out nuclear power will need to neutralise andovercome three key political obstacles. First is the resistance of special interest groups fully
entrenched in the political structure and the centralised administration governing nuclear power inJapan. The second obstacle is the alliance between Japan and the United States, and particularly thelatter’s insistence that Japan continue to rely on nuclear power for both politico-economic andtechno-developmental reasons. The third obstacle is the resistance from the local governments thathost nuclear power plants and nuclear processing facilities. Whatever the difficulties, Japan mustovercome these three obstacles and achieve a nuclear energy free society. The devastating experienceof the Fukushima nuclear accident demands that Japan play this role in the international community.

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0.4 Policy Outlines for a Nuclear Phaseout – process from here to the Final Report
Since nuclear power generation has tremendous impacts on individuals and society, nuclear power
related decisions must be conducted in a way that reflects the consensus of the people. However,decisions on nuclear power policy in Japan have been overwhelmingly led by individuals andorganisations directly involved with nuclear power development. Nuclear policy decision-making has
to be fundamentally re-structured, and the Citizen’s Commission on Nuclear Energy aims toincorporate the views of a broad array of citizens’ voices into nuclear phaseout policies. To that end,
not only science and technology, but also the viewpoints of the humanities and social sciences need to
be incorporated. Moreover, in order to design policies on the basis of accurate scientific knowledge, it
is important to ensure the autonomy of ‘science forums’. It is also imperative to be aware of the domainof “trans-science”, i.e. questions that cannot be answered with science alone but which must be to left
to public opinion.
Technological and economic rationality has so far been the main criterion of debate on nuclear policy.
By contrast, we propose that policies ought to be evaluated in the light of the following four criteria.
Together, these four criteria make up what can be referred to as “social reasonability”
1.

Safety: avoiding the health impacts of radiation and environmental pollution should be the top
criterion.

2.

Social Equity: it is desirable for benefits and burdens to be evenly distributed both spatially andtemporally across generations.

3.

Fairness: all stakeholders have the right to voice their opinions and the right to take part indecision-making; disclosure and sharing of information are also essential.

4.

Sustainability: the current system of production and consumption requires moderation and weshould not pass the accumulation of pollutants and resource depletion on to future generations.

As the late Jinzaburo Takagi, renowned nuclear chemist who warned us of the danger and the unethicalnature of nuclear power, once pointed out, “we must make the possibility of absolute destruction
absolutely zero.” The prerequisite for securing safety and prosperity in the future must be to apply
lessons learned from the Fukushima seismic-nuclear disaster and to choose the path to a nuclear freesociety.

1

The full extent of the damage and restoration of damaged lives

This chapter gives an overview of the disaster triggered by the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident. It
also illustrates the varying aspects of the damage, which is on-going and expanding. It will then discuss
potential ways – principles and directions – to rescue victims and restore affected areas. Shortcomingsof the current public administration and its policy measures are pointed out. In our research, we attach
particularly high value to the following: “freedom from exposure”, basic human rights, the-3-

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precautionary principle, no underestimation of potential damage, thorough investigation of all who are
involved and of onsite situations, and the need for legislation. In the course of the possibly protracted
process of addressing various disaster-related issues, adhering to these principles will pave the way
toward “Restoration of Humanity” in this process.

1.1 The reality of the Fukushima nuclear accident and unanswered questions
Prior to the accident, both the government and TEPCO were optimistic in their assessment of the risk
from large earthquakes and tsunamis; their lackadaisical attitude resulted in inadequate emergency
planning. When the accident occurred, radiation exposure among local residents was inevitably severe,
as contingency plans hardly worked at all. The accident was a clear case of a manmade calamity.
In December 2011, the Japanese government declared, “The nuclear reactors are stable”. However, thereality was, and still is, different. The accident is ongoing and radioactivity continues to travel beyond
the plant site. Workers are forced to struggle relentlessly on site. Inside the reactor buildings, theradiation level is too high to conduct any inspection on important facilities. With situations notallowing investigation on damage caused to equipment and pipe systems, it has been impossible togather information that could be used to prevent future accidents. In sum, the situation remains grave.
Other persisting matters include groundwater influx into the reactor buildings, highly radioactive
discharges, and leaks of contaminated water from storage tanks into the groundwater and to the ocean.

1.2 The full extent and the nature of the Fukushima nuclear disaster
Underestimation of the harm caused led to delays and cursory countermeasures, and concealing of
information is exacerbating anxiety and mistrust among people. Furthermore, a one-sided approach todecision-making in which actual victims are unable to voice their opinions means the effectiveness ofthe policy measures devised is markedly diminished. Radioactive contamination spread over a wide
area is causing physical, social, and psychological impacts. The truth is that the contamination has
spread across a wide area and that it will last for an extended period of time. The government does not
acknowledge the multi-layered and intricate nature of the damage, and attempts to “restore” thesituation by partial measures or compensation. This is only causing even more profound harm topeople and communities.

1.3 Countermeasures against widespread contamination
At this point, radioactive contamination of the ecosystem has not been examined fully. Further data
analyses will be carried out and possible measures considered. The findings will be incorporated into
our Policy Outlines to be published in March 2014.
Countermeasures will be considered for the following:1) contamination of forests-4-Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE) | Interim Report 2013 | Executive Summary2) issues related to the forest industry and forestry products
3) impact on wild flora and fauna4) contamination of freshwater systems5) contamination of estuaries and the ocean
Information sharing regarding forests and water systems is lagging. As things stand now, a number ofgovernment institutions and research institutions are conducting radiation monitoring, but in a
uncoordinated manner. We expect that there will be a need for enacting a fundamental law clearlysetting out the aim of radiation monitoring, as well as the establishment and use of a common database
to facilitate this.

1.4 Protecting health – “the right to freedom from radiation exposure”
Avoiding unnecessary radiation exposure is a fundamental human right. We propose specifically that
this right consists of 1) the right to evacuate, 2) the right to avoid or reduce radiation exposure in
everyday life, and 3) the right to receive regular medical check-ups and appropriate medical care andconsultations.
The annual additional dose of 20 millisievert (mSv/pa) – which is currently set as the threshold forevacuation directives – needs to be reviewed and a new and safer evacuation criterion should be set.
People should not be forced to return home until the annual additional dose falls below 1 millisievert(mSv/pa). Necessary compensation and support should be provided until this dose level is achieved.
The Japanese government’s claim that doses of up to 100mSv should not be a health concern has noscientific basis. Instead of making such consolatory claims, the following practical measures can andshould be taken:
provide medical and health support to prevent health hazards;



improve and expand systems for children’s radiation detox, such as periodical retreats andshort-term school relocation;establish long-term health monitoring systems including the issuance of health cards; andset, devise and operate systems aligned with the local conditions and needs.

A permanent national institution should be set up in order to provide medical health support to theaffected people and to manage various health-related data in an integrated manner.

1.5 Food safety and the reconstruction of agriculture and fisheries
Diffusion of radioactive substances across the nation has been jeopardising the sustainability ofagriculture and fishery. The belief that “rumor is controlled” by ensuring risk communication and-5-

Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE) | Interim Report 2013 | Executive Summary
providing other relevant information is obsolete. It guarantees neither job security, occupational safety,
nor food safety. In order to protect farmers from radiation, it is imperative to conduct careful radiation
monitoring. Measures regarding food inspection and production management must be strengthened
not only in Fukushima but also in other neighbouring prefectures, such as Iwate, Miyagi, Ibaraki,
Tochigi, Gunma, and Chiba – all prefectures where radioactive contamination of lands and waters havebeen verified. Other nation-wide arrangements that should be made include development of afundamental law on food radiation control and substantial investigation of supply chains.
Further urgent practical measures are the following: conducting multi-layered radiation inspection onfood products; creating a database on transfer factors of radionuclides; and advancing radiation
measurement, mapping and zoning of farming lands and other environments associated with theprimary industry. To induce synergistic effects among these measures, a systematic and long-term
approach is desirable. As for radiation measurements carried out voluntarily by citizens, there is awelcome advancement in the establishment of networks and databases, aided by rapid progress intechnology. Such data may eventually be used to complement and/or verify data from public
inspections.

1.6 Support for reconstructing livelihoods and communities
A support system must be put in place to rebuild evacuees’ lives. This system must consider the realitythat victims face at its core, and be distinguished from indemnity. Measures and policies on this mattermust reflect the philosophy embraced in the “Nuclear Disaster Victims Relief Law”. However, the basic
principles relating to the implementation of this law1 are flawed, and must be reviewed.
It is harmful to assume that the only way to restore evacuees’ life is “early return home”. Residents’opinions must be given substantial weight in determining when to lift the “evacuation directives”. Anyforced lifting of the directives is undesirable. Besides support for individuals, support measures aiming
at the restoration of communities and municipalities should also be discussed.

1.7 On compensation
The official guideline of the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensationneeds a thorough review so that it fits the real picture of the damage incurred. The guideline for the
Dispute Tribunal simply sets out the minimum conditions for which compensation can be made.
TEPCO should be aware of this standard setting and should not reject compensation requests for thereason that the said request is not mentioned in the guideline.
The Nuclear Damage Compensation Dispute Resolution Centre (Alternative Dispute Resolution Centre:
ADR Centre) should be independent from the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage
Compensation. The statute of limitations regarding the Fukushima nuclear accident should be
reviewed, or even abolished. (See Chapter 3 for an account of Japan’s Nuclear Liability Laws.)
1

Announced by the Reconstruction Agency in August 2013

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1.8 Policy on decontamination and waste
Decontamination plans of both national and local government are behind schedule. Moreover, only
limited reduction in radiation dose has been observed. Localised decontamination and surface
remediation should be seen as being distinct from each other, and the aim, methods, and priority in thedecontamination process should be re-examined. Furthermore, the fact that there are decontaminationplans should not be used to justify anybody from being denied their “right to evacuate/relocate”.
Every effort should be made to reduce radiation exposure of workers engaged in decontamination
work. Supervision must be strengthened to monitor illegal acts, including exploitation of salaries byintermediaries through multiple subcontracting. How to store radioactive wastes resulting fromdecontamination works and where to build such facilities must be discussed with and agreed byconcerned regions. Waste from decontamination work should be carried out based on “social
reasonability” (see 0.4), and this principle should also apply to the management of any otherradioactive waste.

1.9 Workers’ health management and reduction of radiation exposure
On-site at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants, approximately 3,000 workers per day continue
to engage in demanding operations, exposing themselves to high radiation doses. Over 80% of thoseworkers are subcontractor workers. In the two and a half years since the accident, approximately
30,000 workers have worked at the Fukushima Daiichi. Their collective dose during this period alreadyamounts to as much as 10% of the total collective dose of all workers at all nuclear power plants inJapan over the 40 years prior to the accident. This calculation does not include the doses of people who
were most likely exposed to a very high level of radiation during emergency operations in March 2011
– such as fire-fighters, rescue workers, and SDF personnel.
There are multiple problems concerning radiation protection and working environment (safety, health,and employment conditions) of the workers at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, andfundamental improvements are necessary in all aspects. On top of all these, it seems that a serious
shortage of manpower is currently being experienced and is expected to continue in future, due to theamount of work that is and will be required to bring the situation under control and to decommission
the plants. This labour shortage is serious and we demand immediate solutions.

2

Treatment and disposal of radioactive waste

This chapter focuses on radioactive waste in general, including nuclear substances associated with theso-called “back end” of the nuclear fuel cycle. If we aim for a society without nuclear power plants, thenuclear fuel cycle policy will be unnecessary and useless. Consequently, spent nuclear fuel, separated
plutonium produced through reprocessing, and reprocessed uranium would all become nuclear waste.
Recommendations are also made with regard to the waste resulting from the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear accident, including radioactive substances scattered beyond the premises. However, it does not-7-

Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE) | Interim Report 2013 | Executive Summary
deal with policies related to contaminated soil, treatment, and disposal of debris, as they were alreadycovered in Chapter 1.
We define basic principles regarding the treatment of radioactive waste as follows:1.

Minimisation of environmental pollution: to minimise environmental degradation caused byradioactive materials in inland and marine areas.

2.

Minimisation of radiation exposure: this includes minimisation of workers’ exposure toradiation, as well as minimisation of radiation exposure among the public throughenvironmental release of radioactivity.

3.

Minimisation of the burden placed on taxpayers: the burden on taxpayers should be minimised,without compromising the abovementioned principle on minimising radiation exposure.

Based on these principles, this chapter puts forward recommendations on the matters below.

2.1 Constructing “forums” for debate and consensus-building
There is a need for different stakeholders to come together, all with a clear sense of ownership, and withthe shared premise of achieving a phaseout of nuclear power. Important in this dialogue process are
steady efforts to deepen discussion, to decide on measures to be taken, and to build consensus. We
recommend creating such a “platform” for building consensus.

2.2 Treatment of the Fukushima Daiichi reactors and disposal of accident-derived waste
To manage the radioactive water issue (a top-priority issue at present) an entity taking charge ofdecommissioning should be established. At the core of this entity should be the Project Management
Office (PMO) as is usually the case with large-scale/long-term projects of combined plant construction.
TEPCO is currently discussing a mid- and long-term road map on decommissioning and waste disposal.
However, the prematurity of these plans demonstrates the compelling need for a fundamental revisionof their approach. An ideal plan would need to be far-sighted, and include measures such as a“sarcophagus” over the reactor buildings.

2.3 Change the reprocessing policy
An immediate decision should be taken to stop reprocessing irradiated fuel. Neither should
reprocessing be commissioned overseas. Radioactive waste at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant shouldbe put in interim storage. Repository sites should be identified based on the principle of fair burden.
Measures should be taken to abolish the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (Rokkasho Village, Aomori) andthe Tokai Nuclear Complex (Tokai Village, Ibaraki). Liquid HLW accumulated to date must be solidified,stored, and managed until disposal methods are agreed upon. In order to minimise radiation exposure
during the reactor dismantling process, it is recommended not to aim to rapidly return the sites togreenfield status.

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Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. (JNFL) should withdraw from the reprocessing business and proceed with thenecessary procedures required for debt disposal. The government should clearly indicate that it will
shift its policies on nuclear fuel reprocessing and promptly apply all appropriate measures.

2.4 Risk reduction for spent nuclear fuelSpent nuclear fuel (including spent MOX fuel) is currently stored in wet pool storage. However, it should
be swiftly relocated to dry cask storage, where the spent fuel will be safely managed until it is disposedof as HLW. Further technical consultations will be required if it is judged that this temporary storage
will last for more than a few hundred years.
At the moment, the most reasonable policy would be to make it a basic principle to keep the fuel within
the plant site, where the spent fuel originated, and in dry cask storage. Nuclear fuel tax (including tax on
spent nuclear fuel), which is a local discretionary tax, should continue.

2.5 Plutonium treatment and disposal policy (including pluthermal)
Plutonium should be seen as radioactive waste and its disposal method should be discussed. Plutonium
from reprocessing facilities in the UK and France may be exchanged with other radioactive waste.
Alternatively, returning it to the respective utilities as contracted could be considered, but only after
applying all possible safety measures. Whether MOX utilisation should be allowed as a way of
consuming plutonium may be discussed.

2.6 Permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste (HLW)
The Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan (NUMO) has led the establishment of the current
system concerning permanent disposal of HLW. A new policy framework must be established based on
thorough debates involving the entire population. HLW will have to be kept at the current sites for thetime being; in the meantime, construction of temporal storage facilities in each plant site should beconsidered as a practical choice. This is especially cogent from a “fair burden” perspective.
Responsibility of those involved in the production of HLW through the use of nuclear energy must be
taken seriously. Time should be taken to find acceptable measures, while advancing research on systemdesigns and other technical matters

In addition to the issues above (2-1 to 2-6), the final report in March 2014 will also include moredetailed elaboration on the matters below (2-7 to 2-10).

2.7 Fast breeder-reactors (FBR)
Plans to develop fast breeder reactors should be abolished immediately. Likewise, the plan to use theprototype FBR Monju as a fast-neutron reactor for the transmutation of long-lived radionuclides should-9-

Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE) | Interim Report 2013 | Executive Summary
be abandoned forthwith. Halting basic research using the experimental FBR Joyo should also be
considered.

2.8 Low-level radioactive waste (LLW) treatment
The most appropriate ways to treat and dispose of various kinds of low-level radioactive waste (LLW)
should be clearly indicated, based on the aforementioned three principles.

2.9 Treatment and disposal of decommissioned nuclear facilities
In the past, it was conventional to assume that nuclear power plants and other facilities related to the
nuclear fuel cycle would be fully dismantled and returned to greenfield conditions. However, hasty
implementation of such procedures may have adverse impacts. As such, it is recommended thatconsideration be given to leaving the facilities as they are for an extended period of time.

2.10 Nuclear security and non-proliferation
Nuclear facilities for uranium enrichment and reprocessing, as well as Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR), areinextricably linked to a high risk of diversion to military use. The same applies to nuclear materials, suchas plutonium and MOX fuel. All possible measures to protect nuclear facilities and nuclear materials
must be discussed.

3

Steps to a nuclear-free society

3.1 An outline of the steps necessary for achieving a nuclear-free society
Given the Fukushima Nuclear Accident and the many shortcomings found in Japanese civil nuclear
policies, Japan – under national consensus - should make it a national virtue to ban the use of atomic
energy for power generation and to achieve a society free of nuclear power. A “society free of nuclear
power” here means a status where decisions have been taken to decommission all existing nuclear
reactors and the process of decommissioning has begun.
In order to achieve a shift towards a sustainable energy system, a Fundamental Law on Energy Shiftshould be enacted. Further, administrative and financial reform should be carried out with the aim to
overcome all the past problems associated with energy policies.

3.2 Review of nuclear liability regime
The current compensation scheme for nuclear damage is defective and therefore should be reformed.
There is a need for a new system to provide sufficient compensation for the damage caused by nuclear
accidents and to provide relief for all the accident victims.
The Nuclear Liability Law should be amended so that nuclear operators are liable for all damage- 10 -

Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE) | Interim Report 2013 | Executive Summarycompensation, thus factoring the risk of nuclear accidents into market calculations.
As for compensation for damage caused by the disaster at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi plant, the aim
should be full compensation, with aid in the form of active government involvement to deal with thecurrent crisis as an exception.

3.3 An energy system for a sustainable society
Existing energy policy should be radically reviewed, with a view to shifting the energy system to one
that will lead to a sustainable society.
An energy shift should be strongly promoted through policies concerning both supply and demandsides of power generation. This shift should have the following objectives:
1.

Achieve a total shutdown of all nuclear power plants: speedily establish a society that canflourish without any nuclear power plants.

2.

Mitigate climate change: mitigate climate change because of its long-term and catastrophic
consequences; bring energy policy in line with long-term measures on global warming.

3.

Achieve energy self-sufficiency (both at the national and regional levels): reduce dependence ofJapan’s energy supply on other countries and achieve national energy security; promote theuse of local distributed energy, and strive to achieve energy independence at the local level.

3.4 Easing impacts on electricity supply and on the economy
In the course of phasing out nuclear power, appropriate measures should be applied to alleviate
short-term impacts on power supply. In order to meet current electricity demand without nuclear
power generation, use of fossil fuels has increased. However, it is desirable that serious efforts be madeto reduce absolute power demand. To this end, a power-saving plan with clear targets combined withvarying electricity prices depending on the consumption rate should be considered.
It is often argued that two factors are pressing the management of electric utilities: increasing cost of
procuring fossil fuel, and costs related to nuclear power plants – for maintenance and safety
precautions. By phasing out nuclear power, the latter cost will no longer be incurred. Adverse impacts
on the economy can be further alleviated with policies promoting electricity saving and theintroduction of renewable energy.
To recapitulate, the vision is twofold: on the one hand, power consumption will be curbed with serious
power-saving plans; while on the other hand local distributed renewable energy business will
stimulate the local economy.
To ease economic impacts on municipalities with nuclear power plants and other affiliated industries,
it is important to understand the reasons why those local authorities hosted nuclear power plants inthe first place. A good understanding of such matters will be the key to effectively facilitating support- 11 -

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policies that can revive primary industry (agriculture, forestry and fishing), that make full use ofresources available in the regions, and that promote local-led energy policy, especially focusing on
renewable energy sources.

3.5

Decommissioning of nuclear stations and liquidation of electric utilities and related

nuclear energy companies
The following proposal is offered in regard to the “decommissioning process” and management issues
associated with electric power companies. It is addressed to TEPCO and the eight other general electricutilities2 operating nuclear power plants in Japan.
Generally, taking responsibility for mismanagement ultimately implies going bankrupt. The electric
power industry is a public-utility industry. In Japan, however, private companies have been in charge ofthis industry. As long as the electric companies are private enterprises, they cannot avoid taking
responsibility as private businesses.
Therefore, the responsibility of each party involved in promoting nuclear energy needs to be clarified.
Based on this, special legislation should be introduced to facilitate TEPCO’s legal liquidation. The
government must take responsibility for all remaining matters related to the financial burden, crisis
management, and decommissioning.

3.6 Nourishing national consensus on a nuclear phaseout
Nuclear policy and energy policy are associated with the most fundamental aspects of people’s life.
Therefore, any review of these policies requires efforts to bring together the various stakeholders(industry groups, consumer organisations, local governments, civil society organisations (CSOs),
experts, victims of the nuclear accident, and the general public).
It is necessary to devise a mechanism that can not only absorb but also incorporate opinions from awide range of people. Such a mechanism must ensure that public concerns are incorporated in thefollowing four stages: 1) policy discussion and co-ordination; 2) provision of information; 3)organisation of “nation-wide debate”; and 4) a process to reflect the outcome of the “nation-wide
debate”.

3.7 Nuclear export and Japan’s global responsibility
Japan should suspend export of nuclear power plants – this is the responsibility Japan bears to theinternational community. Japan’s efforts towards creating a society free of nuclear power must be
linked with international efforts to break with nuclear power generation.
The experience of seismic-nuclear disaster at Fukushima must be considered as a worldwide wake-up

2

Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chubu, Hokuriku, Kansai, Chugoku, Shikoku and Kyusyu Electric Power Companies in respective
regional monopoly; In Japan, Okinawa Electric Power Co. alone is nuclear free.

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Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE) | Interim Report 2013 | Executive Summary
call to re-examine the use of nuclear power. The Japanese government, private corporations, and civilsociety all have obligations to tell the world about their experience. Japan should give up all plans andnegotiations associated with the export of nuclear power plants. Existing bilateral nuclear a greements
and safety standards require fundamental reviews.

In addition to the issues above (3-1 to 3-7), the final report in March 2014 will also include moredetailed elaboration on the matters below (3-8 to 3-10).

3.8 Comprehensive review of international treaties and agreements (including bilateral ones)
3.9 Utilisation of nuclear reactors other than light water rectors (LWR) (e.g., thorium molten
salt reactors (MSR), nuclear fission)
3.10 Information disclosure, publicity, and education on the issue of atomic power

4

Nuclear safety and regulation

4.1 Is nuclear safety achievable? – The role and limits of nuclear regulation
When compared with other technologies, nuclear technology is unique in entailing the risk oflarge-scale accidents (severe accidents) resulting in widespread radioactive contamination. Hence, thesafety (or danger) of nuclear power plants cannot be discussed by probability-based risk evaluation.
The “safest and most secure” option would be to immediately close down all nuclear power plant. We
believe that the decision to have or not to have nuclear power plants should be a fair and collective one,with the greatest focus being on safety.
Regulation standards should be based solely on safety. Regulation should mean applying all possible
measures with technologies available at any given point in time.
In the case of nuclear power plants, the scale of potential accidents is too vast. As such, any decision tooperate nuclear power plants should be accompa nied by stringent regulation criteria.
Lastly, neither “safety” nor “security” is possible without public trust in electric utilities and thenuclear regulatory authority. Transformation of these entities is imperative.

4.2 Structural defects in the New Regulatory Standards
Structural defects in the New Regulatory Standards include:
1.

Evaluation of the design earthquake was not reviewed, despite the fact that this forms
the basis of plant design. Furthermore, “residual risks” do not receive enoughconsideration (see 4.3);- 13 -

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2.

Site evaluation, which examines the appropriateness of nuclear power plant siting, isomitted (see 4.4);

3.

It still adheres to “design-basis (DB)” safety standards which only take into account asingle failure criterion, as opposed to assuming the case of multiple machines breaking
down simultaneously and/or accumulation of successive human errors (see 4.5);

4.

Severe accident countermeasures are insufficient. There are no effective measuresindicated against potential destruction caused by aircraft crash, terrorism, or wars.
Moreover, a five-year deferment period is given to the installation of “specific safety
facilities (SSFs)” (see 4.6); and5.

There was no review of NSC’s “Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Classification ofImportance of Safety Function of Light Water Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities" (August1990).

4.3 Issues related to earthquake-resistance in regulatory requirements
Despite the dire need for strengthening reactor siting requirements, the New Regulatory Standards
removed the Governmental Guidelines on Reactor Site Evaluation, which is of utmost importance andtherefore used to precede any other evaluation for nuclear power projects.
The New Regulatory Standards no longer mention “residual risks”, which recognise severe accidents
caused by earthquake ground motions beyond the design basis. They replaced this with “Severe
Accident Countermeasures”. Changing the regulation for the worse, by shifting the policy from taking
into account the “possibility of accidents” to “managing when accidents happen”, is unacceptable.
The New Regulatory Standards indicate that inspection should not be conducted while reactors areoperating; instead, the reactors should be switched off for inspection. It is also mentioned that aback-fitting system – authorising enforcement of the latest regulatory requirements on alreadylicensed facilities – will be introduced. This must be executed.
Safety evaluation of nuclear power plants must consider residual risks and siting guidelines, and local
communities must be able to exercise the right of veto regarding the decision to resume operation of
nuclear power stations.

4.4 The consequences of not applying site evaluation
The drafters of the New Regulatory Standards decided not to apply “site evaluation” which examines
whether the site would “cause radiation injury to the general public living in the vicinity in the case of alarge-scale accident” and requires that “In case of a hypothetical accident, the site should not causeradiation disaster.” Giving up an evaluation that was formerly applied is an obvious change for theworse.

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Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE) | Interim Report 2013 | Executive Summary
Instead, it is mentioned that “the discharge of Cesium-137 (Cs-137) will be controlled to be below 100
Terra-Becquerels by installing a filtered venting system.” However, this implies that exposure to allother types of radioactive materials (e.g., inert gases, iodine) that are released to the air via the filteredventing system will not be regulated. Site evaluation examining all nuclear substances should be
carried out.

4.5 The need to reform the ‘design basis’
It still has not been fully determined what exactly triggered the Fukushima accident. After ascertaining
the cause of the accident, the design basis should be revised accordingly.
The current design basis assumes the most common design basis event to be a loss of coolant accident(LOCA), and requires the introduction of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), which can only
cope with accidents induced by a “breakdown of a single machine”. To allow for effective managementof cases where accidents are caused by the simultaneous failure of multiple machines or by anaccumulation of human errors, suitability of the ECCS requirement should be fundamentally
re-evaluated.
Fundamental re-designing of reactor vessels and reactor containers is necessary.

4.6 The ‘countermeasures against severe accidents’ of the New Regulatory Standards will notstabilise the accident
The cause of any severe accident is unknown. Moreover, since what would happen in nuclear disasters
caused by catastrophic accidents cannot be ascertained, it is not possible to decide on practicalthresholds or methods to be applied to counter such calamities. As such, there is no guarantee that the
new safety standards would successfully stabilise the reactors and contain radioactivity.
At the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, core meltdowns of all three reactors could not be
prevented. Once in core meltdown, it becomes extremely difficult to know the situation inside thenuclear reactors and containment vessel, and preventing further development of the accident becomesvery challenging.
The standards do not set any requirements to counter Beyond Design Basis Accidents (B-DBA), causedby beyond design basis earthquakes or tsunamis. Much more thorough countermeasures should be
devised so that damage caused by large earthquakes and tsunamis can be minimised.
It is wrong to rely on filtered venting systems in reactor buildings to suppress radioactive discharge.
Appropriate measures are required for potential aircraft crashes and subversive activities.
Setting a five-year deferment period for specific safety facilities (SSFs) and filtered venting system forpressurised nuclear reactors goes against the safety principle. They should be installed immediately.

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Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE) | Interim Report 2013 | Executive Summary

4.7 The unreliability of technologies related to nuclear power plant operations
Gauges that can resist the environmental conditions of severe accidents are indispensable. The types ofgauges that are most pressingly needed include Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLS) andthermometers inside and outside of reactor pressure vessels – all of these became dysfunctional during
the Fukushima Accident.
To enhance reliability of power supply systems, it is recommended that either external power sources
with the highest seismic resistance be prepared, or emergency power source systems be diversified sothat at least one is always operational.

4.8 Problems with contingency planning and the range of local governments that should be
involved in siting and restart decisions
All local municipalities within the UPZ of 30km radius should be consulted on matters such as power
plant siting and operation of nuclear reactors; and decisions should not be made without theirconsensus.
Nuclear Disaster Control Guidelines should be fundamentally reviewed, placing at their core thereduction of radiation exposure among residents in disaster situations. The possibility of aseismic-nuclear disaster – nuclear accidents induced by large natural disasters like earthquakes andtsunamis – must be incorporated in the Guidelines and relevant municipalities should objectively andrealistically re-evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of the contingency plans.

4.9 Ageing reactors and the controversy over life extensions
Under the revised “Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law”, the operation life-time of nuclear reactors islimited to 40 years. However, the law is such that the reactors can be given a one-time legal permission
to extend their operation for another 20 years when the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) standards
are applied. This is a de facto watering down of the law. We recommend that nuclear reactors be
decommissioned after 40 years of operation with no extension and without exception.
“Special inspections” to be implemented in applying for the abovementioned extension are designed sothat existing reactors would be positively assessed. In other words, the standards are biased towards
electric power companies. Life extension of reactors must not be based on such partial “special
inspections”.

4.10 Nuclear regulation and judicial review
Nuclear regulation and judicial review should be based on the shared understanding that severe
accidents like the Fukushima Nuclear Accident must never be repeated. Any decision taken must also
recognise that there is ample room for improvement in regard to the issues raised above (4.3 to 4.7).
Nuclear facilities are high risk facilities and the potential damage resulting from severe accidents is- 16 -

Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE) | Interim Report 2013 | Executive Summary
vast. Further, our knowledge on security precautions is far from impeccable. Therefore, dueconsideration should be given to minority viewpoints. When risk cannot be eliminated, instalment oroperation of nuclear facilities should not be allowed.
As for the safety of nuclear power plants, the ultimate burden of proof must be borne by thegovernment and electric power companies.

Conclusion of Chapter 4
Piecing together the arguments presented in this chapter, it is clear that resuming the operation of
nuclear reactors under the current nuclear regulation is out of the question. Moreover, considering therisk associated with nuclear technology, we believe that there is only one path to choose – the path
towards immediate nuclear phaseout. “Safety” precedes everything.

Coda
We hope that this Interim Report will serve as a catalyst for generating opinions and comments frompeople from various fields, thereby giving us the basis on which to finalise the report Policy Outlines

for a Nuclear Phaseout by March 2014. To that end, in the months to come, we will be extending ouractivities to hosting discussions and briefing sessions, enhancing our data archive, and fosteringcross-border dissemination and exchange of information.

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Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE) | Interim Report 2013 | Executive Summary

Acronyms
B-DBA

beyond-design-basis accident

Cs-137

cesium-137

CSO

civil society organisation

DB

design basis

DBA

design basis accident

ECCS

emergency core cooling system

FBR

fast breeder-reactor

HLW

high-level radioactive waste

JNFL

Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.

LLW

low-level radioactive waste

LOCA

loss of coolant accident

LWR

light water rector

MOX

mixed oxide (i.e., mixture of plutonium oxide and uranium oxide)

MSR

molten salt reactor

NSC

Nuclear Safety Commission (of Japan), predecessor of NRA

NRA

Nuclear Regulation Authority (of Japan)

NUMO

Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan

PMO

project management office

RVLS

reactor vessel level indication system

SDF

Japan Self-Defense Forces

SSF

specific safety facilities

TEPCO

Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.

UPZ

urgent protective action planning zone

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Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE) | Interim Report 2013 | Executive Summary

Table of Contents of the full report
Introduction
0.1

The severity of the Fukushima disaster: ten characteristics of the Fukushima nuclear
accident
0.1.1

Seismic-nuclear disaster – a complex disaster became a reality

0.1.2 Multiple reactor unit explosions resulted in widespread and severe radioactive
contamination
0.1.3

Many nuclear accident-related deaths occurred

0.1.4

Many individuals are being exposed to radiation and experiencing health effects

0.1.5

Inland areas suffer serious radioactive contamination

0.1.6

The marine environment suffers serious and expanding radioactive contamination

0.1.7

Stabilisation of the situation is not on the horizon

0.1.8

Stabilisation of the accident requires a large number of workers who are inevitably
exposed to radiation

0.2

0.3

0.4

1

0.1.9

Financial losses alone are totalling hundreds of billions of dollars

0.1.10

Various forms of social conflicts and divisions have arisen

The case for a nuclear-free society
0.2.1

The drawbacks of nuclear energy

0.2.2

Policy formation based on comprehensive comparative evaluation of policy options

0.2.3

Need to evaluate electricity supply and demand pressures

0.2.4

Increased cost due to early decommissioning

0.2.5

A nuclear-free society is possible

0.2.6

Towards energy democracy

Creating the political conditions for a nuclear phaseout
0.3.1

The political conditions required for advancing a nuclear phaseout

0.3.2

The three key political obstacles to achieving a nuclear phaseout

0.3.3

The role of Japan in the international community

Policy Outlines for a Nuclear Phaseout – process from here to the Final Report
0.4.1

Drafting process

0.4.2

Comprehensive approach

0.4.3

Ensuring the autonomy of scientific inquiry

0.4.4

The importance of an ethical perspective in policy-making

The full extent of the damage and restoration of damaged lives
1.1

The reality of the Fukushima nuclear accident and unanswered questions
1.1.1

What happened?

1.1.2

What is ongoing?

1.1.3

What remains to be discovered?

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Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE) | Interim Report 2013 | Executive Summary

1.2

The full extent and the nature of the Fukushima nuclear disaster
1.2.1

Evaluation of the damage and flawed countermeasures

1.2.2

Wide-ranging damage

1.2.3

The damage to socio-ecological systems

1.2.4

Why focus on the Fukushima nuclear accident in Chapter 1?

1.3Countermeasures against widespread contamination

1.4

Protecting health – “the right to freedom from radiation exposure”

1.5

1.4.1

Implications of the right to freedom from radiation exposure

1.4.2

The controversy over how to evaluate the risk of low-dose exposure

1.4.3

Towards an effective and reliable health management system

Food safety and the reconstruction of agriculture and fisheries
1.5.1

Ensuring the safety of radiation-exposed workers

1.5.2

Fourfold monitoring—systematic check systems from entrance to exit

1.5.3

Strengthening the monitoring system

1.5.4

Recognition of damage – attention to the impact on “stock”

1.5.5

Legislation and reorganization and strengthening of research institutions and themonitoring system

1.5.6
1.6

Fisheries and related matters

Support for reconstructing livelihoods and communities
1.6.1

Distinguishing between reparations and support for repairing life and livelihood

1.6.2

Problems caused by the ‘Return Home Quickly’ policy and the need to respect thevoices of the affected

1.6.3

Problems with the Act on the Protection and Support for the Children and other
Victims and the draft Basic Principles

1.6.4
1.7

Rebuilding local communities and local government

On compensation
1.7.1

Guidelines of the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage
Compensation

1.7.2

The need for the Nuclear Damage Compensation Dispute Resolution Centre to be
more autonomous

1.8

1.9

2

1.7.3

Statute of limitations for civil damages suit

1.7.4

Other issues

Policy on decontamination and waste
1.8.1

Drastic review of decontamination, support for relocation and long-term evacuation

1.8.2

Approaches to disposing of radioactive waste from decontamination work

Workers’ health management and reduction of radiation exposure

Treatment and disposal of radioactive waste
2.1

Constructing ‘forums’ for debate and consensus-building

2.2

Treatment of the Fukushima Daiichi reactors and disposal of accident-derived waste- 20 -

Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE) | Interim Report 2013 | Executive Summary3

2.3

Change the reprocessing policy

2.4

Risk reduction for spent nuclear fuel

2.5

Plutonium treatment and disposal policy (including pluthermal)

2.6

Permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste (HLW)

2.7

Fast breeder-reactors (FBR)

2.8

Low-level radioactive waste (LLW) treatment

2.9

Treatment and disposal of decommissioned nuclear facilities

2.10

Nuclear security and non-proliferation

Steps to a nuclear-free society
3.1

An outline of the steps necessary for achieving a nuclear-free society
3.1.1

The significance of achieving a nuclear phaseout

3.1.2

Nuclear phaseout as a fundamental national principle to be achieved under national
consensus

3.1.3
3.2

The political, administrative, and fiscal system for achieving an energy shift

Review of nuclear liability regime
3.2.1

Full compensation and relief for damages caused by the Fukushima nuclear
accident

3.2.2

Establishing a system for dealing with potential accidents at other nuclear power
plants

3.3

3.4

3.5

An energy system for a sustainable society
3.3.1

Achieving a society free of nuclear power

3.3.2

Compatibility with climate change policies

3.3.3

Means of achieving an energy shift

3.3.3.1

Energy efficiency

3.3.3.2

Expansion of renewable energy

3.3.3.3

Use of fossil fuels and prevention of global warming

3.3.3.4

Reconstruction of energy infrastructure

Easing impacts on electricity supply and on the economy
3.4.1

Short-term measures to cope with electricity demand

3.4.2

Easing impacts on the economy

3.4.3

Economic impact on local municipalities and affiliated industries

Decommissioning of nuclear stations and liquidation of electric utilities and related
nuclear energy companies

3.6

3.5.1

Managerial problems of electric power companies

3.5.2

Legal proceedings against TEPCO

3.5.3

Other nuclear operators

Nourishing national consensus on a nuclear phaseout
3.6.1

On policy discussions

3.6.2

Provision of information- 21 -

Citizens’ Commission on Nuclear Energy (CCNE) | Interim Report 2013 | Executive Summary

3.7

3.6.3

Holding nation-wide debates

3.6.4

Incorporating outcomes of nation-wide debates

Nuclear export and Japan’s global responsibility
3.7.1

Japan’s obligation to lead the international movement to phase out nuclear power

3.7.2

Responsibility to convey the lessons of Fukushima to the world

3.7.3

Halting nuclear export plans and nuclear-co-operation negotiations

3.8

Comprehensive review of international treaties and agreements (including bilateral ones)

3.9

Utilisation of nuclear reactors other than light water rectors (LWR) (e.g., thorium molten
salt reactors (MSR), nuclear fission)

3.10

4

Information disclosure, publicity, and education on the issue of atomic power

Nuclear safety and regulation
4.1

Is nuclear safety achievable? – The role and limits of nuclear regulation

4.2

Structural defects in the New Regulatory Standards

4.3

Issues related to earthquake-resistance in the regulatory requirements
4.3.1

Historical shifts in seismic regulation

4.3.2

Re-examining the New Regulatory Standards based on ‘residual risks’4.4

The consequences of not applying site evaluation

4.5

The need to reform the ‘design basis’

4.6

The ‘countermeasures against severe accidents’ of the New Regulatory Standards will notstabilise the accident

4.7

4.8

The unreliability of technologies related to nuclear power plant operations
4.7.1

The need to install monitoring devices able to withstand sever accidents

4.7.2

The need to improve the reliability of the on-site power supply

Problems with contingency planning and the range of local governments that should be
involved in siting and restart decisions
4.8.1

Agreement of local municipalities post-Fukushima

4.8.2

Nuclear Disaster Control Guidelines and contingency planning

4.9

Ageing reactors and the controversy over life extensions

4.10

Nuclear regulation and judicial review
4.10.1

The judiciary – an accomplice to the nuclear accident

4.10.2The Fukushima accident – the failure of nuclear regulation

4.10.3

Ensuring the autonomy of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA)

4.10.4

Consideration of minority viewpoints

4.10.5

Ultimate burden of proof to be borne by the government and electric companies

Conclusion of Chapter 4

Coda- 22 -