Name: Steve DelBianco

Organization: ICANN Business Constituency

Submission ID: 92

The ICANN Business Constituency (BC) submits the attached comment on the IANA
Stewardship Transition Proposal.

This comment was drafted by Aparna Sridhar, Andrew Harris, Ellen Blackler, StephenCoates, Steve DelBianco, and Claudia Selli.

It was approved in accordance with the BC charter.

—Steve DelBianco
Vice chair for policy coordination
ICANN Business Constituency

Public Comment in Response to Proposal to Transition the Stewardship of the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) Functions from the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and1
Information Administration (NTIA) to the Global Multistakeholder Community
Background
This document is the response of the ICANN Business Constituency (BC), from the perspective of business users
and registrants, as defined in our Charter:
The mission of the Business Constituency is to ensure that ICANN policy positions are consistent with thedevelopment of an Internet that:
1. promotes end-­‐user confidence because it is a safe place to conduct business2. is competitive in the supply of registry and registrar and related services
3. is technically stable, secure and reliable.

General CommentThe BC previously provided comments on ICANN’s Cross-­‐Community Working Group to Develop an IANA
Stewardship Transition Proposal (CWG-­‐Stewardship)’s first and second draft proposals for transition of the naming2
related functions. Earlier in 2014, the BC commented on ICANN’s proposed process for designing the IANA
3transition.
The BC thanks the CWG Stewardship for effort put into developing a proposal to transition the naming
function. As indicated in previous comments, the BC supports the transition of the IANA functions to themultistakeholder community, provided that such a transition is accompanied by sufficient improvements toaccountability, and we believe the IANA Coordination Group’s (ICG) proposal contains the building blocks that,with completion of additional details, could result in a workable post-­‐transition plan.
Because important details that would add precision and operational confidence in the Accountability
proposal are still under development and will have an impact on the final ICG proposal, the BC welcomes the NTIA
announcement on 17-­‐Aug to extend the IANA contract until 30-­‐Sep-­‐2016. This will give the community the time tofinalize critical details necessary to satisfy the NTIA criteria for transition.
Below, we offer several targeted comments that either request clarification or seek refinement of particular
aspects of the proposal.
1.

1

While the BC Supports the Creation of a Post-­‐Transition IANA (PTI) as a Separate Legal Entity, PTI Should
Have a Limited Remit and Should Be Clearly Accountable to the ICANN Board.

ICG public comment page, at https://www.ianacg.org/calls-­‐for-­‐input/combined-­‐proposal-­‐public-­‐comment-­‐period/

2

See BC Comment on CWG Draft Proposal for Transition of Naming-­‐Related Functions, 22-­‐Dec-­‐2014, available at
http://www.bizconst.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/01/BC-­‐comment-­‐on-­‐CWG-­‐proposal-­‐for-­‐transition-­‐of-­‐naming-­‐related-­‐functions.pdf; BC Comment on CWG 2nd Draft Proposal for Transition of Naming-­‐Related Functions, 20-­‐May-­‐2015, available at
http://www.bizconst.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/05/BC-­‐on-­‐CWG-­‐2nd-­‐Draft-­‐Proposal.pdf
3

See BC Comment on Draft Principles and Process to Develop a Proposal to Transition NTIA's Stewardship of the IANA Function,
8-­‐May-­‐2014, available at http://www.bizconst.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2014/07/BC-­‐Comment-­‐on-­‐IANA-­‐Transition-­‐Process.pdf.

1

In its previous comments, the BC advocated that the CWG-­‐Stewardship should define a post-­‐transition(PTI) IANA board with a limited remit—the operational oversight of IANA naming functions. At that time, we notedthat this approach is critical in ensuring that PTI does not become a place to re-­‐litigate policy decisions. We
continue to believe that ensuring a limited remit and ultimate accountability at the ICANN level are fundamental tothe success of PTI.
While the ICG’s proposal notes that the PTI board should provide “oversight of the operations of PTI inorder to ensure that PTI meets, at a minimum, applicable statutory requirements under California public benefit
4corporation laws and, importantly, fulfills its responsibilities under the IANA functions contract with ICANN,” itnd
does not explicitly limit either the PTI board’s functions or PTI’s remit. We note that the CCWG 2 draft imposes
limits on ICANN’s mission in paragraph 168:
The Mission of The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") is to coordinate, atthe overall level, the global Internet's systems of unique identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stableand secure operation of the Internet's unique identifier systems.
and in paragraph 187:ICANN shall have no power to act other than in accordance with, and as reasonably appropriate toachieve its Mission. Without in any way limiting the foregoing absolute prohibition, ICANN shall not
engage in or use its powers to attempt the regulation of services that use the Internet's unique identifiers,or the content that they carry or provide.
These limitations on ICANN’s actions will be enforceable via binding Independent Review Process (IRP) proposedby the CCWG. However, BC Members seek clarification that these limitations are also enforceable for actions orinactions of a wholly-­‐owned ICANN subsidiary such as the PTI.
Moreover, a limited remit should be embodied in the CWG’s proposed set of guiding principles for PTI’sservice level expectations. We urge ICANN to use the contracting process to ensure these limits are established.
For similar reasons, the BC Members continue to believe that the post-­‐transition IANA board should bedrawn from the broader ICANN board, rather than including three employees of ICANN or PTI and two
5independent directors, as is currently proposed. Employees of PTI would not necessarily provide the requisite
level of accountability, and the appointment of independent directors creates confusion as to who is ultimately
responsible for carrying out the IANA functions. In sum, the proposed structure raises the risk that each board canattempt to avoid responsibility for any operational shortcomings by seeking to hold the other board responsible. Ifthe ICG insists on this PTI board structure, then that choice only makes it more important to explicitly scope andlimit the PTI’s activities.

4Internet Assigned Numbers Authority Coordination Group, Proposal to Transition the Stewardship of the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions from the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA) to the Global Multistakeholder Community 42 (July 2015) (Proposal).
5Id. at 42.

2

2.

The Proposed Separation Review Should Include a Standard for Determining Whether Separation isAppropriate.

While the BC understands the need to plan for potential separation of IANA functions from ICANN, wereiterate our hope that ICANN's board would remedy problems with IANA operations before separation becamenecessary. The unprecedented process of separating IANA functions from ICANN could invite intergovernmentalorganizations to demand "their turn” once ICANN had proved unsatisfactory. Moreover, the BC believes that thestrong measures proposed by CCWG-­‐Accountability give the community significant leverage to correct ICANN
deficiencies before having to begin a separation process.
The BC supports the inclusion of a separation review in the overall transition plan. However, the ICG
should clarify the escalation processes necessary to invoke separation, and adopt a standard for determining whenseparation may be considered. The current discussion of escalation merely notes the kinds of processes that willneed to be developed to accommodate the separation process, and it does not suggest that following all of these
6processes is mandatory. The discussion of separation contained in Annex L of the CWG-­‐Stewardship’s does notclearly explain the processes for attempts to cure deficiencies in operation before the separation process istriggered.
Put another way, the current separation process describes steps that the community must take to ensurethat there is community agreement on the need to separate, but it doesn’t clearly describe the efforts thecommunity must take to fix any issues through discussion with ICANN or PTI before resorting to separation.
Because moving the functions to a new operator would be fundamentally destabilizing, a requirement to engage
with PTI and/or ICANN before commencing the separation process should be written into Annex L.
Similarly, Annex L notes only that a separation process can be commenced “if the I[ANA] F[unctions]
7
R[eview] determines that a separation process is necessary,” but provides no guidance as to when such a
determination would be appropriate.
We recommend that the CWG-­‐Stewardship establish a substantive standard for separation of the naming
functions. For example, the proposal could specify that separation can only take place if the IANA Functions
Review team finds that keeping the functions with the current operator raises significant concerns regarding thesecurity, stability, and resiliency of the functions and the security, stability, and resiliency of the domain namesystem overall. The Separation Cross-­‐Community Working Group would have to make a finding with a higher
threshold to invoke separation, and that finding should be specifically endorsed by any community mechanism
endorsing separation. Allowing separation for reasons unrelated to security, stability, and resiliency of the IANA
functions risks destabilizing the broader domain system in an attempt to solve unrelated problems—an outcomethat should be disfavored.
The mechanisms for initiating the SCWG also need additional consideration. The ICG requires
supermajority approval by the GNSO and ccNSO, followed by approval by the Board “as well as a community
8mechanism derived from the CCWG-­‐Accountability process.” The CCWG proposal acknowledges this request andagrees to inclusion of bylaws to allow for such community approval, but it defers the specifications to the CWG-­‐
Stewardship. As the ICG report is presently open ended on the specifics of this community approval process, webelieve the ICG should, therefore, work with the CCWG-­‐Accountability to develop the specifications for thiscommunity power.

6See id. at 110.
Id. at 108.
8Id.
73

The CCWG’s proposed Community Mechanism as Sole Member may not be the right body to launch aSeparation Working Group, since the protocol community (IETF) may not be represented. We suggest that theICG specify that a Separation Working Group, if ever needed, would include the IETF, regardless of whether thatgroup was participating in the Community Mechanism.
Once the ICG or the CWG-­‐Stewardship finalize the grounds for separation and the process for invoking it,
the CCWG-­‐Accountability should propose accompanying bylaws amendments to implement the ICG’s proposal.
3.

The Proposal Should Provide Additional Clarity Regarding the Process for Authorizing Root Zone Changes
After the Transition.

The ICG’s proposal recognizes that NTIA will not authorize changes to the root zone after the transition.
It also suggests “investigat[ing] whether there is a need to increase (and if so, how) the robustness of theoperational arrangements for making changes to the Root Zone content to reduce or eliminate single points of
10failure” and recommends that major architectural and technical changes be granted by the ICANN board upon
11
the “recommendation of a standing committee of [various technical experts].” The process for conducting therobustness study needs to be clarified further, and the ICG must more clearly explain the kinds of changes thatwould be subject to standing committee review.

9The final proposal should include a non-­‐exclusive list of examples of root zone changes that would be
subject to standing committee review, to improve clarity on the minimum number of areas that require thisprocedural protection. In addition to these process improvements, as a substantive matter, the standing
committee should also be required to specifically report on its findings that major operational changes would
improve the security, stability, and resiliency of the DNS or of performance of the IANA functions. These details
will be critical for transparency, and community review of these critical decisions.
We further believe that the transition plan should explicitly establish which entity will be chosen as RootZone Maintainer after transition.
The ICG also acknowledges that that a new agreement is needed between the Root Zone Maintainer(RZM) and IFO when NTIA withdraws from the Root Zone Management process, and NTIA has subsequently
12
announced such an agreement. The proposed approach appears reasonable.
In particular, we support the three month testing period with monthly reports documenting activities
performed and also the final ICANN and Verisign joint written report detailing the outcome of the testing of theRoot Zone Authentication (RZA) mechanisms and the transition plan.
However, the BC notes that NTIA is not submitting this proposal for public comment. Given the criticalityof root zone management, the BC believes that the ICG should request the Security and Stability Advisory
Committee (SSAC) to review NTIA’s proposal to ensure the approach is technically sound and compatible with theICG proposal.
4.

The ICG should request community approval regarding the potential for division of the IANA functions
among multiple operators.

9Id. at 48.
Id.
11Id. at 48-­‐49.
12
See Verisign/ICANN Proposal in Response to NTIA Request, available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/root zone administrator proposal-­‐relatedtoiana functionsste-­‐final.pdf
104

The design of the ICG work plan, in which the three distinct communities developed plans for theperformance of the various functions, has led to the possibility that the performance of those functions could one
13
day be divided among three distinct operators. Each community provides for the opportunity to find a new IFO
should the need arise, but because the ICG has not addressed whether the three proposed separation processes
are dependent upon the views of the entire community, it seems possible that three distinct IFOs could one day
exist. The Business Constituency supports the principle of severability of the IANA functions, and we are notnecessarily opposed to a future in which the three functions are performed separately. We do note, however, thatthe latter is a subject that has not been explicitly agreed upon by the community. We believe the ICG should
clarify the dependencies among the three separation processes and ask for affirmative community approval if its
intent is indeed to allow for the possibility of separating the three primary IANA functions.
5.

Before the Transition Takes Place, the ICG Should Explain More Clearly How the Naming, Numbering, andProtocol Parameter Proposals Fit Together.

The BC appreciates that each community—naming, numbering, and protocol parameters—developed andsubmitted proposals to the ICG separately. However, the BC urges the ICG to harmonize the proposals further
before they are implemented. In particular, the BC seeks clarification regarding how the numbering and protocol
parameters communities will interact with the new PTI entity. While explication of these relationships need notdelay the transition, they should be spelled out in greater detail to allow each community fuller understanding of
how the post-­‐transition landscape will look as a whole.
6.

Changes in Stewardship Must Be Accompanied by Improvements to ICANN’s Accountability.

Finally, the BC emphasizes that the acceptability of the ICG’s proposal is fundamentally contingent onensuring that improvements to ICANN’s framework for accountability are adopted in parallel. The two proposals
are interlinked and depend on each other on various important elements such as: ICANN and IANA budget;
community empowerment mechanisms; IANA Functions Review; the Customer Standing Committee; the creationof appeal mechanisms relating to the IANA functions, and the clarity concerning when such appeal mechanisms
would be available; establishment of fundamental bylaws, etc.
The CCWG-­‐Accountability process is progressing well, but as with the ICG proposal, there remainimportant areas that require detailed resolution. As Assistant Secretary Lawrence Strickling has specifically
14
recognized, the two processes must go hand-­‐in-­‐hand, and the BC agrees.

-­‐-­‐This comment was drafted by Aparna Sridhar, Andrew Harris, Ellen Blackler, Stephen Coates, Steve DelBianco, andClaudia Selli.
It was approved in accordance with the BC charter.

13

Proposal at 108, 158, 187.

14See Lawrence Strickling, Remarks at The Media Institute, 29-­‐Sep-­‐2014 (as prepared for delivery) (“The two work streams on
the IANA transition and enhanced accountability are directly linked and NTIA has repeatedly said that both issues must beaddressed before any transition takes place.”), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/2014/remarks-­‐assistant-­‐
secretary-­‐strickling-­‐media-­‐institute5