Report on the 2004 Sumatra Earthquake
and Tsunami Disaster

Edited by

Kimiro MEGURO
International Center for Urban Safety Engineering
Institute of Industrial Science
The University of Tokyo

ICUS Report No.8
September 2005

International Center for Urban Safety Engineering
Insititute of Industrial Science, The University of Tokyo

Report on the 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster
Edited By
Kimiro MEGURO
International Center for Urban Safety Engineering
Institute of Industrial Science
The University of Tokyo

ICUS Report No. 8, September 2005
Preface
Triggered by a M9.0 earthquake that occurred along the Sunda Trench, OffSumatra, at 07:58 (local time), on December 26, 2004, a huge and devastatingtsunami hit the Indian Ocean Rim countries, causing unprecedented disaster withover 300,000 dead and missing persons. The International Center for Urban Safety(ICUS) would like to extend our deepest sympathies and condolences to thevictims of this terrible disaster. This event reminded us that in spite of our efforts
to make our societies disaster resilient, there are still more works to be done andlessons to be learnt.
Aware of this situation, the ICUS compiled this report which discusses topics
related to the December 26, 2004 earthquake and tsunami, such as infrastructuredamage, disaster response, relief and recovery efforts, economic effects, etc. indifferent countries along the Indian Ocean Rim. The preparation of this volume
was possible thanks to the contributions of four experts in the field of disastermitigation: Mr. Teddy Boen (Indonesia), Dr. Pennung Warnitchai (Thailand), Dr.
Srikantha Herath (Sri Lanka), and Dr. Fumihiko Imamura (Japan). The ICUS
would like to express its grateful recognition to their efforts.
The December 26, 2004 tsunami showed us that natural disasters do not
distinguish country boundaries and can cause devastation over vast areas.
Therefore, we need to work together, establish common systems and shareexperiences in order to minimize future losses. With these ideas in mind, I propose
a new concept on tsunami disaster mitigation system suitable for Indian Ocean rim
countries in the last article of this volume. We hereby commit ourselves tocontinue investigating and assisting on the recovery and reconstruction processesof the devastated regions.

International Center for Urban Safety Engineering

CONTENTS

F. IMAMURA−

Lessons Learnt from The 2004 Sumatra Tsunami Disaster and Future Research Directions
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................1
2. Current Status .............................................................................................................2
3. Features of This Disaster .............................................................................................2
4. Issues .................................................................................................................6
5. Directions of The Research ...........................................................................................6
6. Necessary Points and Themes of The Research .............................................................7

T. BOEN−The 26 December 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster in Indonesia

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................92. “Water, Water from The Sea”... An Early Warning ............................................................10
3. The Tsunami Curse Throughout The Coast ................................................................12
4. Disaster Episodes .....................................................................................................13
5. The Fate of The Ruin City .......................................................................................17
6. The Ruined Infrastucture Facilities ....................................................................................54
7. Emergency Response and Needs after Disaster .............................................................81
8. Risk to The Indonesian Economy ..............................................................................83
9. Last Drop: The Local Impacts .............................................................................84

P. WARNITCHAI−

Lessons Learned from the 26 December 2004 Tsunami Disaster in Thailand
1. A Chaotic Moment before The Arrival of Tsunami Waves ........................................86
2. Overaii Impact of Tsunami Waves .............................................................................86
3. Post-Tsunami Reconnaissance Survey .............................................................................87
4. Lessons Learned ...................................................................................................87
5. Concluding Remarks...................................................................................................99

S. HERATH−

The 26 December Tsunami Disaster and Recovery Challenges in Sri Lanka
1. Introduction...............................................................................................................101
2. Event and The Immediate Response...................................................................................103
3. Disaster Losses.....................................................................................................................111
4. Economic Losses.................................................................................................................113
5. Physical Characteristics of Tsunami Inundation...............................................................121
6. Recovery and Reconstruction Challenges...............................................................125
7. Towards A Safer Future.................................................................................................127

K. MEGURO and M. TAKASHIMA−

Proposal of a Sustainable Tsunami Disaster Mitigation System for the Indian Ocean Region
1. Introduction...............................................................................................................129
2. Proposal of The New Tsunami Disaster Mitigation System.............................................131
3. Establishment of The Proposed Tsunami Disaster Mitigation System...............................132
4. Concluding Remarks............................................................................................................133

LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE 2004
SUMATRA TSUNAMI DISASTER AND
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Fumihiko IMAMURA
Disaster Control Research Center
Graduate School of Engineering
Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan

ABSTRACTThe Sumatra Earthquake and following Tsunami has left a greatchallenging task for us; and Japan, as a disaster experienced country, could
take responsibility on scientific and technical support like: Tsunami
Warning System from JMA, Community-based Disaster Mapping, Disaster
Education and Disaster Facilities Technology, etc.
From the site survey by the International Tsunami Survey Team it wasrecorded that the tidal surge had reached 40 m height and 5 km inland in thenorthern Sumatra. The East and South Coast in Sri Lanka had been totally
damaged; and roads of the capital city Male of Maldives were totally
flooded. People observed some phenomena when the tsunami was coming,
like: various sounds, blast, etc. Seawater configured with a long horizontal
tidal wave and showed its “abnormality”; but people could not understand.
If this “abnormality” could have been evaluated and classified as atsunami, warning information could have been circulated, the danger
recognized, and the people evacuated. Considering the facts and findings,
this paper focuses on the direction of research, its system and the respective
solutions necessary for Japan to actively contribute to the world tsunami
disaster reduction.

1. INTRODUCTION
The damage caused by the 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami was
extended to all over the coastal areas of the Indian Ocean Rim countries; it
was so severe that, it became the ever-largest disaster taking more then
300,000 human lives. It is for the first time that an earthquake of such alarge scale M9 happened in this region, though the earthquakes of M8
magnitude, which also caused tsunamis, occurred in the past. Anotherearthquake of magnitude M8.7 occurred on March 28, 2005, (local time: 11:
09: 36 PM) with its hypocenter in the south, causing a lot of damages. So, it
is necessary to clarify: why these two earthquakes of such large magnitudes
happened and when the following earthquake will take place.

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This tsunami disaster raised many problems that should be examinedthoroughly over a long period of time. The strong ground motion due toearthquake of magnitude M9 and tsunami caused huge damage over thewhole area of the Indian Ocean. It struck local residents and other visitors
like tourists. In fact, the international rescue operation teams had to reach tothe victims of millions of people. This catastrophe has also left numerous
lessons for countries, such as Japan, where the tsunami disaster is being
forgotten.

2. CURRENT STATUS
There are various organizations and groups from many countries of theworld who have been executing field investigations aggressively and a lot of
results are being achieved. However, there are still many remaining
problems because the surveys have been conducted over a wide area withinvery limited time. Furthermore, the experts and specialists in theconventionally existing fields of research, such as science, engineering,sociology, etc., are investigating independently over their respective matterin their own manner. Therefore, the investigations on the overall aspects arefew. Moreover, with the passing of time, rescue and recovery activities at thestricken areas will shift to restoration; therefore, continuous surveillance
studies are needed.

3 FEATURES OF THIS DISASTER
3.1 Damage description
The severest affected area of Indonesia is the northern part of Sumatra,
and it is reported that the coastal areas are completely destroyed by thestrong shake and sudden large tsunami attack. Inland inundation marks were
found up to 5 kilometers from the coast, and there were a lot of debris
carried out by the tsunami wave into the center of the city, which increases
the destructive power of the tsunami. It was observed that the tidal surge
reached over 40 meters-height on the hilly area where the tsunami run over
the top of the peninsula with a saddle shaped hill. The nature of damages by
this earthquake is similar to that of the great earthquakes with magnitude
over 8 which will occur within 30 to 50 years in Japan along the Nankai
Trough Trench with epicenters very close to the land. They will generatestrong ground motion and great tsunami.

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In Thailand and Malaysia, many sightseeing spots were damaged
seriously and a large number of foreign visitors became victims of thetsunami disaster. This is a serious issue to mitigate tsunami damage in the
coastal area because each nation has its knowledge, and response to anatural disaster.

Damage in Banda Aceh, Indonesia

In addition, India and Sri Lanka were seriously damaged. Especially, in
Sri Lanka, the death toll raised to nearly 40,000. The east and south coast in
Sri Lanka were totally damaged. Besides Colombo, the south-west of Sri
Lanka was damaged too, even though the coast is not located directly on thetsunami propagation path from the source. In the coastal areas, thecommunity villages were totally destroyed. A stopped train was used bypeople to observe the tsunami passage. Unfortunately, it was toppled by thetsunami wave and more than one thousand people inside it drowned.
In the Republic of Maldives, the tsunami attacked at 9:00 AM on 26th
December. Maldives is a group of about 1,200 coral islands, and its
maximum height is only 1.8m. Almost all the roads in the capital city Male
were flooded. There were no vacancies in hotels because it was Christmas
season. Therefore, the tsunami caused severe damage. There was no tsunami
warning system in the Indian Ocean. In some coastal areas, people could not
feel the ground motion, so, the inhabitants were suddenly attacked.

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The damage in the area of Kahawa, Sri Lanka

3.2 Tsunami predecessors went unnoticed
The video images recorded at resorts in Thailand have shocked us. Not
only did the tsunami attack, but also the tourists and local people recorded it
on video. They did not evacuate or did not take any other action because
they did not recognize that a tsunami was approaching to the beach. It is
understandable that people did not evacuate because they did not know
about tsunamis, and there was no tsunami warning system. It should be
investigated why they did not notice the tsunami attack and if it was very
hard to circulate.
According to a victim, the tsunami at offshore, initially, had thefollowing features:
Roar like a jet engine, or sound like rumbling of the earth
Rumble of the ground
Strong wind/blast
There are some phenomena that precede a tsunami, and the soundintensity is different for different =tsunami types. There is a research on thetsunami generated sound by Shuto (1993). The sound type has several
variations which are caused by the wave breaking offshore, current of thestrong waves, wave breaking at seashore, wave which collides at otherbeach, etc. Sometimes, ground shake and sound occur simulteneously.
Besides, when a tsunami like a stair figure occurs, it is almost the same as awide wall of a tidal wave coming with high speed. So the atmosphere or4

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wind which is in front of the wave is pushed forward, and a strong blast
occurs. This blast can be felt by hearing and feeling with the help of human
five senses.
In addition, man has the sight and sense of smell. In case of Papua
New Guinea Earthquake in 1998; a strong smell came when the tsunami
occurred. It is not similar for the other cases; it is thought that this is not ausual case. On the other hand, everyone should be able to recognize thesituation in which an abnormal water level raised and white-crested waves
raid straight. However, in the video, people saw the tsunami coming, butpeople did not r un away because they could not understand this"abnormality".
There is a possibility that this observations have changed greatly by the
position of the person who see the coast. Many people who saw from hotels
and higher places, acknowledged the mass of huge seawater in thehorizontal scale and its configuration with a long tidal wave, and felt theabnormality. On the other hand, people on the coast and at the beach did not
see the back side of the tsunami wave. In addition, a distant object looks
smaller in the coast region by the scenery of the panorama character, and theheight of a perpendicular direction object looks smaller with respect to its
real scale. People could not realize the height because there was no object
for comparison of the wave-height. (In Kao Lack, a patrol boat served as
reference.) In such a situation, it is difficult for people to obtain enoughsight information.
Views which were taken at the Indian Ocean Tsunami could beconsidered as important basis for tsunami prediction. If we can evaluate andclassify “anything unusual, or abnormal’’ in case of a tsunami attack, we canrelease tsunami warning information, or we can recognize a danger; andpeople could manage to escape. It is meaningful to research relationships
between tsunami types and the character of pre-tsunami phenomena fromnow on.

An episode from the video footage in Kao Lack, Thailand(Source: THAI NATIONS)

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4. ISSUESThe real images of the total earthquake and tsunami disaster are notclear yet. Also, reliability of the enormous data is not confirmed; and it isneither compiled in a database, nor shared with others fact-findings data.
Because of co-existence of different related organizations and foreign aidgroups in the disaster areas, the on going recovery activities are not unified
and defined. Especially, the drafting and promotion of comprehensive
disaster countermeasures -which should be implemented by combining the
hardware and the software-, drafting of the town plan for disaster reduction
by matching the environment with a long term basis plan and making use ofvegetation such as mangrove, have not yet been done. Because of slow
recovery of educational functions and facilities like schools, there is a delay
in mental recovery and other important recovery activities such as trainingof responsible persons.
In Japan, we have a world-leading performance on research of
subduction-zone earthquakes on the Pacific coast and the Japan Sea.
Japan also leads the world in knowledge sharing about subduction-zone
earthquakes predicted to occur in seas close to Japan. It has also goodprediction technology on earthquake probability, for example the Tokai,
Tonankai and Nankai Earthquakes. And Japan is leading the research on
tsunami and establishing tsunami warning systems. It has advanced
performance in research on earthquake prediction and source process, andcommunity-based tsunami research and countermeasures. Japan isleading the world in this area therefore the affected countries may havedemand on scientific and technical support like tsunami warning systemfrom the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA), Community-based
disaster mapping, Disaster education and other Technologies for disaster
reduction.

5. DIRECTIONS OF THE RESEARCH
Under this situation, we give the directions of research and its
environment which we think are necessary from now on.
We need to establish a new system which will support recovery andreconstruction of affected areas systematically and constantly. The
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA); which provides a
lot of international support, should play an important role in thisnew system. We also need to develop an organization which will
adjust and cooperate with international development divisions indomestic ministries, government off ices, expert groups andacademicians.
We consider the output of these activities to be the core of diplomatic
strategy and international support, and technological cooperation ofJapan.

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ICUS Report 8Internationally, the UNESCO meeting on tsunami warning system wasconducted. The “Natural Disaster Mitigation” group of Inter-Academy
Panel (IAP) and the International Council for Science are planning“Ad-hoc Scoping Group for an International Program on Natural and
Human-Induced Environmental Hazards”. We need to organize thesystem by which Japan can participate there.
Japanese researchers in earthquake, tsunami and disaster reduction
should cooperate and propose countermeasures for future disaster
reduction due to great earthquakes in Sunda fault.
First, we need to analyze the nature of this tsunami and earthquake at
the Sumatra trench, and then give technical advice for disaster reduction to
the affected countries. And, through an international symposium, weshould propose and appeal the tsunami warning and disaster reduction
system, and a new city planning for proper reconstruction in order tominimize the damage due to future earthquakes and tsunamis by securing
the leadership in the field of earthquake, and tsunami disaster prevention
in Asia.

6. NECESSARY POINTS AND THEMES OF THE RESEARCH
6.1. Necessary points for future researches
The followings are the necessary points that we should consider when
we do earthquake and tsunami disaster researches.
Partnership with the Asian countries.
Strong cooperation with institutes in Asian countries, such as:
Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, etc., which suffered a great damage by
Sumatra Earthquake.
Strong cooperation between many related institutes in various field,
like: Science (hazard mechanism), Engineering (countermeasures),
Social science (recovery and reconstruction), etc.
6.2 Essential research theme
Followings are the themes that we should take from now.
Mechanism of huge earthquake and tsunami like Sumatra type.
Mechanism of damage and disaster due to huge earthquake andtsunami.
Technology development for disaster reduction.
Effective uses of Tsunami Warning System and Information
Recognition, and Evacuation system as well.
Effective uses of Tsunami Warning System and Information
Recognition, and Evacuation system as well.
Recovery and reconstruction policy and plan; and a new city plan
improving built environment for disaster reduction.

Lessons Learnt from The 2004 Sumatra Tsunami Disaster and Future Research Directions

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Collection of basic data from wider areas and establishment of its
archives.
Training and education system for the capacity building against
earthquake and tsunami disaster.

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Report on the 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami DisasterTHE 26 DECEMBER 2004 SUMATRA
EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI DISASTER
IN INDONESIATEDDY BOEN
Teddy Boen Consultant P. T.
Jakarta, Indonesia

ABSTRACTOn December 26, 2004, an earthquake of M 9.0 occurred and was
followed by a devastating tsunami that hit Indian Ocean countries, such as
Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, etc.
Among these countries, damage in Indonesia was the worst. Due to bothstrong ground motion and killer tsunami induced by the great earthquake,many infrastructure, buildings and houses, were destroyed and washed away
in North Sumatra. The World Bank has reported that 128,000 were killed in
Banda Aceh only and at least another 37,000 people became missing. The
total reported death toll is likely to exceed 165,000. Over 550,000 of thesurvivors became homeless. This was the worst natural disaster experienced
in their history. Hereinafter, a quick survey report giving the overall
information on damages to the engineered and non-engineered buildings
with references to infrastructure damages in Indonesia is presented.

1. INTRODUCTIONOn Sunday morning Dec 26, 2004 Banda Aceh was holding a 10 K
marathon and approximately 1000 residents were doing their daily exercise
at Blang Padang square, where the Suelawah plane monument is located.
The city was crowded by the 10 K participants in their sports gears andsome participants had reached the finish line, when at that time 07:58:50
WIT (Western Indonesia Time) the earth was shaken by a strong earthquake.
Almost everybody was panic and lay down on the ground. Some could
watch the most popular hotel in Banda Aceh, the Kuala Tripa hotel shookand settled and subsequently the lobby story collapsed. People at Blang
Padang did not run because it was an open field. After the earthquake
shaking stopped, people start wandering in the city watching some collapsedbuildings. A TV reporter even toured the city to check damaged andcollapsed buildings. At around 08:42 WIT, the first tsunami wave reached
the coastlines of Banda Aceh and according to eye witnesses, the first wave
was not so powerful and caused flood from the coastal area to the “center”
part of Banda Aceh and some people start shouting: “water, water from thesea” and many people start running towards the center of the city. However,at around 08:53 WIT, the second more powerful wave swept the coastal area
and caused significant destruction and many people still running on their
way to higher ground were swept and cascaded by debris of collapsed

9September 2005

Figure 1: Main Shock and After Shocks within one day of
the Sumatra Earthquake, December 26, 2004, USGS

buildings and died instantly. Some made it to higher ground; many were
dragged by the flood several km.
At around 09:15 WIT, the third and most powerful wave swept throughthe coastal area up to a distance of approximately 4 km inland and brought
destruction along their path. Most of the buildings that collapsed were nonengineered buildings and were subjected to the tsunami forces such asbattering, scouring, impact and buoyancy. Many fishermen boats and cars
were dragged from coastal areas to the city by buoyancy of the tsunami
flooding and ramped buildings in its way. Almost all buildings along thecoastal areas were literally disintegrated by this tsunami and the debris wasdumped into the city up to approximately 4 km from the coastal area. The
total destruction by the tsunami was within an area of approximately 15
sq.km from the East to the West of Banda Aceh and along a distance of 2
km inland. After the third wave, Banda Aceh was inundated up to a heightof approximately 2 m for approximately 30-40 minutes within an area up to
4 km inland and subsequently water start flowing back to the sea and ataround 11:00 WIT the water level was approx 30-40 cm (note: the timing of
the arrival of the tsunami waves was obtained from an amateur video, but
the video camera was not available for verification).

2. “WATER, WATER FROM THE SEA”... AN EARLY WARNING.
As mentioned earlier, the first tsunami wave came approximately 40
minutes after the M 9.0 earthquake and people on the coastal areas saw thatthe sea level subsided from the beach and also saw a huge wave wasapproaching the coast. Subsequently some people started shouting andissued warning that a flood was coming and started running towards thecenter of the city. However, most of the coastal areas occupants were not“trained” to immediately evacuate upon hearing the “early warning”. Most

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Report on the 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster

ICUS Report 8of them do not have the idea what a tsunami wave could do to them until it
was too late. Due to this “early warning”, approximately 30 % of the coastal
area population survived the tsunami and some 70 % of them were literally
wiped out together with their houses.The coastal area is a highly populatedarea and approximately 100 thousand were living in that area. Therefore, theestimated casualties from that area only are approximately 70 thousand. The
rest are from the “inland” areas that were inundated by the tsunami “flood”.
Similar “early warning” procedure was also practiced in Meulaboh.

Figure 2: Banda Aceh, People were running to higher grounds
after the first wave.

Figure 3a: Meulaboh, People were running to higher grounds
after the first wave.

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Figure 3b: Meulaboh, People were running to higher grounds
after the first wave.

Sites surveyed

3. THE TSUNAMI CURSE THROUGHOUT THE COAST
In general there are two zones affected by the tsunami, Zone 1 is thecoastal areas which were destructed by the tsunami forces such as battering,scouring, impact and buoyancy. In Banda Aceh this zone goes up to 3 km
inland. Zone 2 was only inundated, where the tsunami force is already

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reduced and only caused flooding, dumping mud and debris. This area isapproximately 0.5 to 1.5 km further inland.

Damaged & Inundation Zones in Banda Aceh
(Source of map: OYO International)

4. DISASTER EPISODESIn areas where the beach is gently sloped, the tsunami waves were very
powerful and this is evident in places like Lhok Nga, Ulhue Lhe, Krueng
Raya and Meulaboh. The destruction by the tsunami in those areas was very
severe. The damage was mostly caused by the battering and scouring forcesof the tsunami. This is evident from the timber debris originating fromframes of timber houses which were practically disintegrated into building
components. For masonry construction, walls were shattered into pieces ofalmost equal size and RC columns ripped off from the foundations andbeam column connections severely damaged.
In places where there is a harbor with deep water, the tsunami wave
strength was reduced and the dominant force is buoyancy. This could beobserved at Lhok Nga cement factory jetty, Malahayati harbor and Ulhue
Lhe harbor. In the case of Ulhue Lhe harbor, the tsunami waves came fromthe North and its buoyancy effect cause damage to the Harbor buildings.
The jetty was protected by breakwater walls.
In areas close to the center of the city of Banda Aceh, the damage
caused by impact force could be observed. The impact force was caused byfloating of fishermen’s boats and also by cascading debris in mud. The

The 26 December 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster in Indonesia

13September 2005

impact force was exaggerated by the density of mud which is larger thanwater. It was observed that the tsunami traveled through rivers upstream andlagoons and subsequently spilled over into landward areas. It was also
observed that, in hilly areas, tsunami waves were able to run up much higher
elevation along hill slopes and valleys than those in plain areas but thestrength was reduced.
Various reports define the tsunami heights and are not exactly thesame. The tsunami heights observed were from measurements of water leveltraces on walls from the ground level is approximately as follows:
Meulaboh (Western Coast) about 4 m
Lhok Nga (West of Banda Aceh) about 15 m (run-up height against
hillside)
Banda Aceh about 8 m in coastal areas (zone 1) and 2-3 m in zone 2
Krueng Raya (North Coast) about 6 m (watermark on coastal side wallof the Mosque)
The different tsunami heights in different locations have almost thesame destructive powers as can be seen in the pictures. Another observationis that trees, buildings, roads, hills, valleys and deep water seemed to reduce
the tsunami force, apparently because those “obstacles” break up thetsunami energy.
Inundation Height in Banda Aceh

Inundation height observed in walls of a one story buildingin Banda Aceh

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Inundation height observed in walls and buildings in Banda Aceh
The 26 December 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster in Indonesia

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Inundation height observed in walls of buildings and trees in Banda Aceh
Tsunami Run-Up Height in Lhok Nga

Tsunami wave run-up to higher land in Lhok Nga
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Inundation Height in Meulaboh

Inundation height inside the house (above) and flood affectat surrounding areas of Meulaboh(bottom)
5. THE FATE OF THE RUIN CITY
Two types of buildings affected:
a. Engineered Buildingsb. Non-Engineered Buildings
5.1 a. Engineered Buildings consist mostly of Reinforced Concrete
Structures
Almost all “engineered” buildings in Banda Aceh were unaffected bytsunami but some collapsed by the shaking of the Dec 26, 2004 earthquake
The causes of typical damage of reinforced concrete engineeredbuildings during the Sumatra earthquake in Banda Aceh were mostly due tovertical irregularities in certain RC buildings creating abrupt changes in
stiffness and strength that may concentrate forces in an undesirable way.

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Also poor quality of concrete and detailing contributed to the collapse of
those engineered buildings.
Right after the M 9.0 occurred, some high-rise buildings were damaged
and a couple collapsed. The most obvious damage occurred to Kuala Tripa
hotel, a 5 story RC building. It suffered a “first soft story” collapse. The
second and third floor was severely damaged because of the impact but thebuilding as a whole did not collapse. The collapse was caused by poor
detailing and most probably it was analyzed as 2-D structures, therefore
overlooking the first soft story effect. Another visible collapse was a threestory supermarket, the Pante Pirak. The collapse was due to poor quality of
construction. Another building that partially collapsed was the office of thedepartment of f inance. One of the wings suffered a pancake type ofcollapse. From the damaged columns it can be seen that the detailing waspoor. This building suffered partial damage when shaken by a moderate
earthquake in 1983. One other engineered building that collapsed was theextension of the Governor’s off ice, which collapsed while underconstruction. From the damage it was evident that the concrete quality was
low and the detailing was not in accordance with requirements forearthquake resistant construction. There were few other buildings such as
two stories shop house buildings that were damaged by the earthquake
shaking, however, most of those buildings were poorly designed as well as
poorly constructed. In general, it can be said that very few buildings
collapsed or were damaged by the Dec 26 2004 earthquake shaking because
the epicenter was some 240 km away from Banda Aceh. Even thesubsequent aftershocks with an epicenter distance of approximately 100 km,
did not cause any further damage to those buildings as well as otherbuildings.

Damage of Kuala Tripa Hotel: entry side

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Exposed reinforcement after structural damage of Kuala Tripa HotelThe other view: Ill faith of Kuala Tripa Hotel

The 26 December 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster in Indonesia

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The Pante Pirak Supermarket crushed down to the ground

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The gigantic Department of Finance office faced falling down
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Extension Building of Governor’s Office, the other example
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5.1 b. Non Engineered Buildings consist of:i. Burnt Brick Masonry with sand and cement mortar.
ii.Timber buildings
The majority of the buildings that collapsed in Banda Aceh city, andvillages in Lhok Nga, Krueng Raya, and Meulaboh city, are non engineeredbuildings consisting of two types. The first type is a one or two stories
buildings made of burnt brick confined masonry using sand and Portland
cement mortar. The roof mostly consists of galvanized iron sheets. All thosebuildings used RC “practical” columns and beams as confinement. The
second type is timber construction consisting of a timber frame and also
timber planks walls and usually use galvanized iron sheets as roof.
Almost none of the people’s housing, one to two story masonrybuildings collapsed by the shaking, even though some had cracks in thewalls. The destruction was caused by the tsunami forces.
Buildings damage by battering and impact in Banda Aceh at Zone 1

Banda Aceh: Zone 1; Building damaged by battering and impact
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Banda Aceh: Zone 1; buildings damaged by battering and impact
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Banda Aceh: Zone 1; Buildings damaged by battering and impact
Most of the buildings in the coastal areas consist of non-engineered
timber structures and confined masonry structures. The ratio of those two
types of structures is estimated to be 30 % to 70 %. The epicenter of theM9.0 earthquake is approximately 240 km SW of Banda Aceh, therefore theshaking was not too significant and timber structures are reasonably built
and could withstand the M9.0 earthquake shaking. Masonry structures werealso reasonably built. In Indonesia, in almost all rural as well as urban areas, a good earthquake resistant design feature can be identified, namely almost
all masonry buildings were built with reinforced concrete framing,
consisting of the so called “practical columns and beams”. They did notcollapse by the M9.0 earthquake shaking. Such type of masonry
construction has become a new culture in Indonesia and, from pastearthquakes, it is evident that provided they were built with good quality

The 26 December 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster in Indonesia

25September 2005

materials and good workmanship, they survived the most probable strongest
earthquake in accordance with the Indonesian seismic hazard map. In
Indonesia, the damage and collapse of the new culture “non-engineered”
masonry buildings are mostly caused by the poor quality of materials andpoor workmanship, resulting in, among others poor detailing, poor concrete
quality, and poor brick lying.
The reconstruction period is a good momentum to start making quality
control a culture to improve the performance of such buildings when shaken
by earthquakes.

The damage along the road from Banda Aceh to Krueng Raya

Banda Aceh: Zone 1; Building foundation scoured by tsunami
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Banda Aceh: Zone 1; Building moved from original location
by translation

Banda Aceh: Zone 1; Overturning

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Banda Aceh: Zone 2; Debris and mud dumped up to 4 km inland

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Banda Aceh: Zone 2; Debris and mud dumped up to 4 km inland

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Banda Aceh: Zone 2; Debris and mud dumped up to 4 km inland
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Banda Aceh: Zone 2; Debris and mud dumped up to 4 km inland
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Banda Aceh: Zone 2; Boats dragged by floating / buoyancy
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Banda Ache: Zone 2; Building damaged by impact

The 26 December 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster in Indonesia

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Banda Ache: Zone 2; Building damaged by impact
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Banda Aceh: Zone 2; Building collapsed due to earthquake shaking
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Building Damage by Battering Impact in Ulhue Lhe at Zone 1
Tower in the photo(right)isthe same structure shown int h e c i rc l e i n a s a t e l l i t eimage(bottom).

Source: Digital GlobeIn Ulhue Lhe: Zone 1; Building damaged by battering/ impact
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In Ulhue Lhe: Zone 1; Building damage by battering/ impact
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In Ulhue Lhe: Zone 1; Building damage by battering/ impact
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In Ulhue Lhe: Zone 1; Building damage by battering/ impact
The 26 December 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster in Indonesia

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In Ulhue Lhe: Zone 1; Building damage by battering/ impact
Foundation Scoured by Tsunami in Ulhue Lhe at Zone 1

In Ulhue Lhe: Zone 1; Foundation scoured by tsunami
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Lhok Nga: Zone 1; Boats, piece of rock and concrete wave
protection walls dragged by floating / buoyancy
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Damaged by Battering / Impact in Lhok Nga at Zone 1

In Lhok Nga: Zone 1; Damaged by battering / impact
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In Lhok Nga: Zone 1; Damaged by battering / impact
The 26 December 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster in Indonesia

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In Lhok Nga: Zone 1; Damaged by battering / impact

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In Lhok Nga: Zone 1; Damaged by battering / impact
Lhok Nga Coastal Areas Damaged by Scouring in Lhok Nga at Zone 1

In Lhok Nga: Zone 1; Coastal damage by scouring

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In Lhok Nga: Zone 1; Coastal damage by scouring
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In Lhok Nga: Zone 1; Coastal damage by scouring

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In Lhok Nga: Zone 1; Coastal damage by scouring

Oil Depot Tanks Dragged by Floating / Buoyancy in Krueng Raya at
Zone1

Krueng Raya: Zone1; Oil depot tanks dragged by floating /buoyancy
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Damaged by Battering / Impact in Krueng Raya at Zone 1

In Krueng Raya: Zone 1; Damaged by battering / impact

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Damaged by Battering / Impact in Meulaboh at Zone 1

In Meulaboh: Zone 1; Damaged by battering / impact
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In Meulaboh: Zone 1; Damaged by battering / impact

Debris and Mud in Meulaboh at Zone 2

In Meulaboh: Zone 2; Flooding water with debris and mud
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In Meulaboh: Zone 2; Flooding water with debris and mud
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In Meulaboh: Zone 2; Flooding water with debris and mud
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6. THE RUINED INFRASTUCTURE FACILITIES.

As was the case with buildings, most of the damage of infrastructures
was caused by the strong force of tsunami and not by shaking.
6.1 Roads
Some roads in Banda Aceh were scoured by tsunami but the majority
was still in tact. Most of the main roads in zone 1 were covered by hugeamount of tsunami debris. Several parts of the road from Banda Aceh to
Meulaboh were washed away by tsunami.

Map showing the road from Banda Aceh
Damage to Roads and Bridges from Banda Aceh to Meulaboh

Unbelievable damage to roads and bridges
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Washed out Roads and Bridges: An account from Banda Aceh to Meulaboh
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Another damaged Road with its Bridge along Banda Aceh to Meulaboh
Roads Scouring in Banda Aceh

Banda Aceh – Scouring

Ulhue Lhe – Scouring

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Lhok Nga Road - Scouring

Meulaboh – Roads along the Coast damaged by Scouring
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6.2 Bridges
In Banda Aceh, several bridges were destroyed, one at Jl Iskandar
Muda and another leading to Lhok Nga. The Lhok Nga Bridge has a main
span of 20 m and secondary span of 10 m made of galvanized steel frames.
Both were dumped into the river. Along the road from Banda Aceh to
Meulaboh (distance approx 270 km), several bridges were washed away bytsunami.

Bridges washed away by tsunami battering and impact forces
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Bridge-span washed away by tsunami battering and impact forces

6.3 Ports
Generally, jetties and wharf of ports in Banda Aceh and in Kreung
Raya as well as the jetty of the cement factory Lhok Nga were slightly
damaged but could still function. Part of the platform of the jetty in
Meulaboh was washed away by tsunami, but the supports were still in tact.
The main building of the Ulhue Lhe harbor in Banda Aceh was damaged
and only the frame remained.

Fishermen Jetty in Ulhue Lhe is not damaged

Lhok Nga Cement Factory Jetty is intact;slightly damaged by impact of boat
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Lhok Nga Cement Factory Jetty is Intact; Slightly damaged
by impact of boat

Part of Jetty: Meulaboh Harbor

Jetty: Malahayati Harbor

6.4 Power supply
Main Power generating plant in Banda Aceh was not affected by theshaking or tsunami. However, many distribution poles and wires indevastated areas collapsed.

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Electric cables poles toppled by battering, underground cables
damaged by scouring and substation inundated
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Electric cables poles toppled by battering, underground cables
damaged by scouring and substation inundated
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6.5 Telecommunication
Some mobile phone antennas towers were dismantled by the tsunami
and dragged up to 500m from its foundations. Many telephone junction
boxes were practically destroyed.

Telecommunication antennas swept by battering and dragged
as far as 500 m
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Telecommunication antennas swept by battering and dragged
as far as 500 m
6.6 Water supply
Water Treatment plant in Banda Aceh was not affected by neither theshaking nor the tsunami, however, the underground piping systems weredamaged by scouring and above ground piping damaged by battering andimpact of the tsunami.

Water pipes unearthed and severed
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Water pipes unearthed and severed

6.7 Industrial
A cement factory located at beach side in Lhok Nga district was
severely damaged.
Oil depot in Kreung Raya (East of Banda Aceh) was damaged andseveral storage tanks were dragged up to 1 km. The tanks were
submerged by about one-third of its height.

Cement Factory, Lhok Nga, damaged by battering,
impact and buoyancy

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Cement Factory, Lhok Nga, damaged by battering, impact and buoyancy
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Cement Factory, Lhok Nga, damaged by battering,
impact and buoyancy

Pertamina Oil Depot, Krueng Raya

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Pertamina Oil Depot, Krueng Raya

Poor Detailing

Poor detailing of buildings caused its structural damages into pieces

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The poor detailing: a major cause of damage
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Unbelievable damage mainly due to poor detailing70

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Damage due to poor detailing
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Damage due to poor detailing

The Importance of Restraints (Vegetation or Buildings)

Vegetation: An ecological balance with building protection

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With vegetations, buildings, at least have some protection against direct hit,
but without it, face a direct blow
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The self explanatory images with and without vegetations
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The importance of restraints (vegetation or buildings)
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The painful stories with the images
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The importance of restraints (vegetation or buildings)
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The importance of restraints (vegetation or buildings)
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The importance of restraints (vegetation or buildings)

MosqueThe surrounding of Mosque at Ulhue Lhe

Mosque in Lhok Nga
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Mosques along the road between Banda Aceh and Krueng Raya
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Mosques along the road between Banda Aceh and Krueng Raya
MeulabohMosques in Meulaboh

7. EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND NEEDS AFTER DISASTER
The mega tsunami that devastated Aceh was extraordinary and almost
half of the 4 million population of Aceh were directly as well as indirectly
affected. One or several of their family members are missing or died during
the tsunami, therefore, since the second day, almost no local people were

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participating in the search and rescue because they must take care of theirown family first. This resulted in the management of the deceased is very
slow and until 7 days after the M 9.0 earthquake, many dead bodies werestill scattered in streets and under debris. Only the Red Cross and the army
were taking care of the deceased. Also, telecommunication broke down
totally, making communication and coordination between the local and thecentral government very slow and difficult, resulting in the late managementof logistics, such as food, medical supplies, gas etc. Electric power was also
switched off inspite of the fact that the power generating plant was notaffected by the earthquake or tsunami. Electric poles and wires in certain
areas were damaged by the tsunami. The telecommunication was only
partially restored after almost two weeks and this created panic for survivorsin trying to contact their relatives and also in updating the central
government about the facts on the ground. Electric power was also partiallyrestored after two weeks.
The management of debris and rubble created by the tsunami was alsolate and resulted in the late start of the “recovery” process. Subsequently,
after assessing the situation, the central government brought in additionalarmy battalions from outside Aceh and also volunteers from various
provinces started pouring in to take care of the complex problems arisingfrom the tsunami. The “outside” people were not affected by the tsunami
and could therefore concentrate on the assignments given to them. The
Emergency Response Medical volunteers that came from a various
provinces did a very good job in managing the tsunami victims andsubsequently with the foreign armies’ medical teams managed to control theoutbreak of various communicable deceases.
Right after any disaster, it is essential to RESTORETELECOMUNICATION immediately. This will make emergency responseeasier and faster and reduce panic among the community.
In general, multinational armies and volunteers arrived in Aceh one
week after the earthquake and tsunami and they were immediately involvedin the emergency response, however, many foreign armies started to build
field hospitals which in a tsunami case might be needed but not that muchsince the urgency was not there. As is known, a tsunami caused more deadvictims than injured ones. Also, as a common case, many foreign countries
sent medical supplies labeled in their own language and these are usefulwhen used by their medical staff who really understands what is written in
the labels, but not so for the local staff except those written in English.
The challenges in the recovery is not to repeat mistakes from pastdisasters , among others on how to prevent NGOs, local as well as foreignfrom bringing in all sorts of “alien” materials and products such as
knockdown houses which are not compatible with the local culture. All
Government officers and community leaders and donors are discussing
about the recommendation to relocate the destructed villages and almost allof them are relying on NGOs/donors who have shown willingness to“adopt” certain villages. Appropriate planning and analysis shall be made82

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ICUS Report 8prior to recommending implementing post earthquake disaster relocation.
Efforts must be emphasized on how to make such masonry houses
earthquake resistant and information dissemination on how to appropriately
build masonry houses, meaning the enhancement of the current practice toproduce good quality buildings as a culture. Earthquake resistant should beinterpreted as resistant if shaken by an earthquake and not if subjected totsunami, particularly to cater mega tsunamis such as the Dec 26, 2004 one.
It is considered impractical to design buildings having adequate strength forresisting extreme tsunami loads, such as: hydrostatic pressure, buoyancy,
battering, impact, and pulsating water, translation, scouring, andoverturning. Extreme pressures were exerted on all surfaces of structuresduring the Aceh tsunami. Such pressures resulted in cracking, displacement,
and collapse of walls, floors and framing of structures. In some areas, timber
as well as masonry houses were totally disintegrated by the tsunami.
Coordination by the Indonesian government during the first weeks ofthe disaster was not well managed resulting in the uncoordinated locationsof foreign armies’ activities and facilities. Also the flow and storage of somany food as well as medical supplies was not well organized.
During the multi national presence, everything seemed to be relatively
easy to get, free of charge, particularly healthcare and some medical supply
as well as food. If the free medical care and particularly free food supply isprovided for too long, it can create an over expectation on the displaced
people and cause envy among the people unaffected by the tsunami.

8. RISK TO THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY
It is predicted that the Aceh tsunami of Dec 26, 2004 will not have asignificant effect towards the Indonesia economy and the 2005 national
growth is still predicted as 5-6%. It is also predicted that the tsunami will
not cause negative effects towards the expectation and risk perception on theIndonesian economy and will not disrupt investment plans as well as theperformance of the exchange rate.
That statement was issued by the Bank of Indonesia, Directorate of
Economic Research and Monetary policy. In addition the report also statedthat if the flow of emergency supplies can be handled smoothly, thepossibility of inflation could be minimized.
The effect of tsunami towards the Banking sector will also not be too
significant because the role of banks in Aceh is small, below 1% of thenational banking.
The role of Aceh economy towards the GNP is relative small,approximately 2%. It is predicted that the main Aceh economy activity in2005 will be in the construction sector due to the reconstruction of thedevastated areas. The effect of the tsunami towards export/import is also

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relatively small. The main export of Aceh is dominated by oil and gas
products and the facilities for that purpose is not affected by the tsunami.
The main import is chemical products and raw materials for both industry
and this also will not be disrupted because the tsunami did not affectindustries. However, the overall annual growth will be lower than thepreviously predicted 3.5%.

9. LAST DROP: THE LOCAL IMPACTS
In spite of the fact that the tsunami most probably will not disrupt theIndonesian economy, the loss of jobs could be crippling at the local level.
Even though the damage of agricultural land is only 10%, it will take many
years to recover. Farmers lost their livestock and equipments. The
aquaculture losses were quite substantial.
Apart from all those, as mentioned earlier, the tsunami also swept anddestroyed many roads, bridges, drainage systems, water piping, electricallines, and telecommunication towers.
The repair and rebuilding of those all and the resettlement of displaced
people will take many years and will need a substantial amount of fund,maybe a substantial percentage of the gross domestic product of the country.

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LESSONS LEARNED FROM
THE 26 DECEMBER 2004
TSUNAMI DISASTER
IN THAILANDPENNUNG WARNITCHAI
School of Civil Engineering,
Asian Intusitute of Technology
Bangkok, Thailand

ABSTRACT
Triggered by a massive earthquake (Mw = 9.3) in the area off theWestern Coast of Northern Sumatra, a series of destructive tsunami waves
propagated throughout the Indian Ocean and devastated communities
along thousands of kilometers of exposed coastline. In Thailand, allprovinces facing Andaman Sea were seriously damaged by tsunami
waves, where the total reported death toll including the missing people
exceeded 8000 including the missing. An international survey team,comprising members from Thailand, Japan, and USA, has spent four days
from 8 to 11 January 2005 in several hard-hit areas to collect information
on tsunami inundation, building damage characteristics, ground andfoundation failures, and associated data from eyewitnesses and survivors.
The areas investigated include Khao Lak (Phang-Nga), Phi Phi Island,and Phuket Island. Many lessons have been learned from this posttsunami reconnaissance survey, and they are briefly summarized in thispaper.

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1. A CHAOTIC MOMENT BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF TSUNAMIWAVESIn the morning of 26 December 2004, at around 8:15 am while I
was having my breakfast at home in Bangkok, I got several phone callsfrom friends and colleagues, reporting that many tall (30 to 50-storied)
residential buildings in Bangkok had been shaken so violently, causing
panic among the building occupants. Many of them said that the levelof shaking was the highest compared to what they had experienced in
the past, and the duration of shaking was very long-about 5 minutes oreven longer. The water in swimming pools in several buildings was alsosloshed and splashed out of the pools. Recognizing these as signs of avery large scale earthquake occur ring somewhere far away from
Bangkok (Reference 1), I then turned on the Radio and TV and learned
that the earthquake epicenter was located around the Northern Sumatra,
and the earthquake magnitude initially estimated by different agencies
ranged from 6.4 mb to 8.0 M s (a more accurate magnitude M w of 9.3
was reported about one week after the event). At that time no one
mentioned or even thought about a possibility of destructive tsunami
triggered by the earthquake.
Hearing about a chaotic situation in a 24-storied hospital building,where about 400-500 patients and medical staffs went into panic by thebuilding's vibration and were evacuating from the building, I thenrushed out to join a team of experts including the Bangkok Governor to
conduct a quick safety inspection of the buildings. The building was
found to be safe without observing any signif icant damage; so, theevacuation was cancelled. At about 10:15 am, while I was still at thebuilding, a friend phoned me and told that “gigantic sea waves” had hit
Patong beach in Phuket Island and killed about 10-20 people. and about
100 cars were either overturned or destroyed. At first, I thought it was arather exaggerated story, but shortly afterward similar stories about
gigantic sea waves in various other sites in Phuket, Krabi, and PhangNga Provinces were also reported on Radio. The total death tollreported in these southern provinces increased rapidly to about 60 atnoon, 120 in the late afternoon, and continued to increase. I thenrealized that we were experiencing a great tsunami disaster for the firsttime in the history of Thailand.

2. OVERALL IMPACT OF TSUNAMI WAVES
Triggered by the massive earthquake (Mw = 9.3) in the area off theWestern Coast of Northern Sumatra, these series of destructive tsunami
waves propagated throughout the Indian Ocean and devastatedcommunities along thousands of kilometers of exposed coastline.
Along with Thailand, deaths by this ocean-wide tsunami have beenreported in 10 other countries: Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Maldives, Bangladesh, Somalia, Tanzania and Kenya. The
total death toll including the missing people is more than 280,000. It

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can be ranked as one of the world's most catastrophic events in recent
times.
In Thailand, all provinces facing the Andaman Sea were attacked
by tsunami waves. The death tolls including missing in Phang-Nga,
Phuket, Krabi, Ranong, Trang, and Stool provinces are 6026, 921, 1384,
171, 6, and 6; the numbers of severely damaged buildings are, 4615,
1235, 632, 349, 165, and 57 respectively. These statistics are provided
by Department of Disaster Mitigation and Prevention, Ministry ofInterior, Royal Thai Government, on 24 January 2005. Nearly half ofthe confirmed dead and half of those missing were foreign tourists, whowere spending their holidays in the resort areas.

3. POST-TSUNAMI RECONNAISSANCE SURVEY
An international survey team, comprising members from Asian
Institute of Technology, Chiba University (Japan), EDM/NIED (Japan),
JICA, MCEER (USA), GISTDA (Thailand) and Thai Meteorological
Department, was formed to collect information on tsunami inundation,building damage characteristics, ground as well as foundation failures,
and associated data from eyewitnesses and survivors. The team,coordinated by myself, spent four days from 8 to 11 January 2005, inseveral hard-hit areas, such as Khao Lak (Phang-Nga), Phi Phi Island,and Phuket Island. Many lessons have learned from this post-tsunami
reconnaissance survey, are briefly summarized in the following
sections. In addition, 11 hours of geo-referenced digital video footage
were recorded along the survey route, and about 1,500 GPS-locateddigital photos were also collected by the team, and were linked tosatellite images (IKONOS, Quickbird). It is envisioned that these georeferenced data will be invaluable for future research in evaluating
damages from tsunami waves. Fur ther details about these georeferenced data and their possible applications could be found in
References 2 and 3.

4. LESSONS LEARNED
Among several beaches in Phuket Island, the impact of tsunami
was reported to be the highest in Kamala and Patong Beaches. The
maximum height of tsunami waves above the tidal level at that time wasabout 4 to 5 meters, while the inundation depth was about 2 meters. The
first sign of tsunami attack was the withdrawal of the sea the pushingbackward of the sea water. Many people were surprised and went to see
the exposed seabed. Many of them were killed or seriously injured as
the sea withdrawal was shortly returned with a high tsunami wave. At
Kamala Beach, three tsunami waves struck the shore at 9.54, 10.14 and10.57 am respectively; and the 2nd and 3rd waves were higher than the 1st
wave.

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A series of photos-Fig. 1(a) to (c)-taken by an eyewitness from the
3rd floor of a beach-front reinforced concrete building in Kamala beach,shows clearly that the tsunami wave swept inland at high velocity as asheet of water. The depth of the flow in Kamala beach area was about 2
meters or less, so only the first story was flooded as shown in Fig. 2.
But the flow-velocity was roughly estimated to be about 3 to 4 m/s orhigher. Hence, a lateral hydrodynamic pressure greater than 5.0-8.0
kN/m 2 was exerted on buildings and obstacles by the high-velocity
water.
After the water had receded, a great amount of debris floating
during the tsunami flooding, finally deposited on ground (Fig. 3), also
water marks could be observed on building walls. The damage seemed
disproportionately severe compared with that would be expected from anormal flooding of similar height. The high hydrodynamic pressure due
to high velocity water and the collisions of floating debris appeared tobe the main causes of the severe damage.
Tsunami wave heights at various sites shown in Fig. 4 were
measured by a Japanese team led by Professor Matsutomi (Reference 4)
and a Thai team led by Dr. Nakhorn Poovarodom of Thammasart
University.

(a)

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(b)

(c)
Figure 1 (a) to (c): A series of photos taken during the tsunami impact
in Kamala Beach.

Figure 2: Tsunami flooding in Kamala Beach
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Figure 3: A scene in Kamala Beach after the water has receded

The heights vary considerably from site to site, and the maximum
height occurred at Khao Lak in Phang-Nga Province. This area has many
luxurious hotels and was quite popular for foreign tourists, especially thosefrom Europe.
Water marks in the form of stripped roof tiles on the 2-storiedbuilding in Fig. 5 indicates that the flow depth in Khao Lak area was ashigh as 7 to 8 meters. The flow velocity in this area was estimated to beabout 6 to 8 m/s, and hence a very high hydrodynamic pressure of about 20
to 30 kN/m2 was exerted on buildings and obstacles by tsunami waves. Dueto these extremely high flow depth and pressure, Khao Lak was the hardesthit area with the largest death toll. Most of the resorts surveyed sustained
heavy to complete damage.

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Figure 4: Tsunami wave height distribution

Figure 5: Maximum flow depth of about 7 to 8 meters in Khao Lak

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91September 2005(a) Kuk-kak Beach(b) Khao Lak Princess Resort
Figure 6: Examples of completely destroyed buildings in(a) Kuk-kak Beach and (b) Khao Lak Princess Resort
As shown in Fig. 6, a reinforced concrete building facing Kuk-kak
Beach in Khao Lak was completely destroyed by tsunami impact (Fig. 6(a)),
while another concrete building in Khao Lak Princess Resort (Ban Bang
Sak) was overturned (Fig. 6(b)). These are few examples out of many
completely damaged buildings in this area.

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ICUS Report 8(a) Khao Lak(b) Phi Phi Don Island
Figure 7: Breaking of masonry infill walls by wave impact in(a) Khao Lak and (b) Phi Phi Don Island
One damage pattern commonly found in RC frame buildings is thebreaking of frame-infill masonry walls: Fig. 7(a) and 7(b). These walls are
generally 100 mm thick. They are much weaker than RC frame members,
and they could not withstand high hydrodynamic pressure or impact ofmajor floating debris carried by the strong current. Breaking of infill
masonry walls, particularly in the first story, could be found in many sites
where the flow depth was about 2 m. or higher. As shown in Fig. 7(b), theflow height did not reach the second story of a two-storied building, but it
was able to demolish all infill masonry walls at the first story.

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We observed that in general RC frames, in which infill walls had
been completely ripped away were still in good condition-no damage or
major cracks found in RC columns, beams, and beam-column joints.
The breaking of inf ill walls seemed to help saving the RC frame
structures by reducing the lateral pressure load on the structures.
Therefore, to improve the safety of RC frame buildings in the tsunami
affected areas, the infill masonry walls in the first story (and the second
story in some areas) might be replaced by weaker (and lighter) panels
that could be easily ripped away by the water. These observations andconcept of design improvement are well in line with those made by theseveral investigators of past tsunami disasters (Reference 5).

Figure 8: Floating foundations of a building in Phuket
Another type of damage frequently observed to buildings in tsunami
affected areas is the severe scouring of supporting sand underneath of
spread footings of the buildings, leading to foundation failure as shown in
Fig. 8. This severe scouring was caused by highly turbulent and strong
tsunami-induced currents.
We have also found severe scouring of roads (see Fig. 9) and wall
foundations in many sites, particularly in beach front areas. Another type of94

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failure associated with shallow spread footings is shown in Fig. 10. Here,several buildings at Ton Sai Bay were floated and displaced from their
original positions.

Figure 9: Severe scouring of road in Kuk-kak Beach

Figure 10: Displaced buildings at Ton Sai Bay in Phi Phi Don Island
As spread footings were commonly used for low-rise buildings in
Phuket and many Southern provinces of Thailand, this issue was widely
discussed among design engineers in several forums. Many engineers
suggested that the use of spread footings for buildings in tsunami hazard
prone areas should be forbidden, and that pile foundations should be used to
improve the resistance to scouring, undercutting, and flotation effects.

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Figure 11: Debris deposited on the beach in front of
Khao Lak Princes Resort
One important feature of tsunami flooding, we have learned from thissurvey is that strong-current tsunami waves carried with them a greatamount of debris including cars and boats. Figure 11 gives us a clear idea
about the extent of debris carried by tsunami waves during the tsunami
flooding. We found pieces of wood, furniture parts, refrigerators, trees,
metal (zinc) roof sheets, sand and mud in the debris. High-density debris in
tsunami waves is certainly one of the key factors that are responsible for alarge number of tsunami victims.

Figure 12: A car on the roof of a building in Phakarang Cape
Many cars were rolled, pushed around, hit by floating debris, or thrown
against buildings (Fig. 12) and obstacles. Many fishing boats were pushedfrom the shore toward the land and crashed into buildings. One patrol boat

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was forcefully transported into as far as 1.2 km. inland at Ban Bang Neing
in Khao Lak area. The largest object that was displaced by tsunami waves isa battleship of Royal Thai Navy as shown in Fig. 13. The ship was tossed on
to the shore in front of a naval base at Tab-lamu pier in Phang-Nga.

Figure 13: A battleship was tossed on to the shore at Tab-lamu Pier
While the Southern and central parts of Phang-Nga have several resort
hotels, the Northern part is still a rural area with fishing and agriculturalvillages. In a populated fishing village named Ban Nam Khem, more than athousand of residents were killed, and most RC residential buildings andmasonry structures for shrimp farming suffered heavy damage. The survey
team also visited one fishing village named Ban Pak Jok in Phra-thong
Island?a small island, located just off the Northern coast of Phang-Nga (seeFig. 4). In this village, all wooden fisherman houses and small light-frame
concrete buildings were completely wiped out as shown in Fig. 14. All
survivors were evacuated from the island and resettled in the Northern coastof Phang-Nga.

(a) Devastated fisherman houses
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Figure 14: (a) Devastated fisherman houses, and (b)school buildingsin Phra-thong Island
We saw evidences in this village and in many other sites (such as
Phakarang Cape) that wooden houses, compared with normal RC framebuildings, are much more vulnerable to tsunami impact. At sites where RC
buildings were lightly or moderately damaged, the wooden houses had been
severely damaged or completely destroyed. The findings suggest that woodconstruction should be as much as possible avoided in tsunami prone areas.
In Ban Pak Jok village, only one structure was left intact: an RC watertank tower. It reminded us of a tsunami tower in Japan, in which people caneasily evacuate from low-lying ground to its high-level platform during thetsunami flooding (Fig. 15).

Figure 15: Water tank tower & Tsunami tower98

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Since the whole area of Phra-thong Island is very flat and surroundedby sea, it would be very difficult to find a safe (high-level) ground for theevacuation in considering the next tsunami event. Hence, RC tsunami towers
seem to be a practical solution in this case.

Figure 16: Sand belt area in Phi Phi Don Island was attacked
by tsunami waves from both sides
By interviewing several eyewitnesses and survivors, the survey teamlearned that tsunami waves at some sites were quite complex. These sites
include Phi Phi Don Island, which was among the worst affected areas.
Looking from the tsunami source area, this island is located outside theshadow of Phuket Island, and thus was hit by large tsunami waves of about 5
to 6 m maximum height (see Fig. 4). The number of casualties in this island
was 691 and that of missing was 951. Most of them were tourists andresidents in a highly populated sand belt between two bays as shown in Fig.
16. The elevation of this sand belt area is only 2 to 3 m above the sea level.
When the first tsunami wave attacked from Loh Dalum Bay, people were inpanic and they tried to escape by running to Ton Sai Bay on the other side.
However, by the time they reached Ton Sai Bay, a much larger tsunami wave
was also arriving in this bay, and then swept across the whole sand belt area
killing a large number of people.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Prior to this event, a tsunami disaster of this scale was considered by
the Thai public to be impossible. This general belief was simply based on
the fact that such a disaster had never happened before in the history ofThailand. They also believed that the risks from other natural disasters (suchas earthquakes) were also very low, and limited to a small scale. Most
decision makers in the government did not pay much attention to planningand preparation in mitigating the risks, or supporting more scientificresearches to understand the risks. The emphasis was only placed on
emergency response measures.

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After the event, the attitude of the general public and government
officials towards natural disasters has changed significantly. They are now
much more interested to learn about these natural disasters and theirpotential impacts. Also, they are more ready to invest their money in making
and ensuring a safe environment. Of course, it was an unwanted blow, but it
is true that the Thai public has learned a very important lesson from thistsunami disaster.

REFERENCES
Warnitchai, P. (2004), “Development of Seismic Design Requirements for
Buildings in Bangkok against the Effects of Distant Large
Earthquakes”, Proceedings of the 13th World Conference on
Earthquake Engineering (13WCEE), Vancouver, B.C., Canada, August
1-6, 2004, paper No. 744.
Yamazaki, F., Matsuoka, M., Warnitchai, P., Polnga, S. and Ghosh, S.
(2005), “Tsunami Reconnaissance Survey in Thailand Using Satellite
Images and GPS”, Asian Journal of Geo-informatics (under review)
Vol.5, No.2, May 2005
Ghosh, S. et al. (2005), “Post-Tsunami Urban Damage Survey in Thailand
Using
the
VIEWS
Reconnaissance
System”,
http://mceer.buffalo.edu/research/tsunami/Tsunami032505.pdf
Matsutomi, H. et al. (2005), “The December 26, 2004 Sumatra Earthquake
Tsunami, Tsunami Field Sur vey around Phuket, Thailand”,
http://www.drs.dpri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/Sumatra/Thailand/phuket_survey_e.html
Wiegel, R. L. (1970), “Chapter 11: Tsunamis”, Earthquake Engineering,edited by Wiegel R. L., Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, USA.

100

Report on the 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami DisasterTHE 26 DECEMBER 2004
TSUNAMI DISASTER
AND RECOVERY CHALLENGESIN SRILANKA
SRIKANTHA HERATH
Environment and Sustainable Development Programme
United Nations University
Tokyo, Japan

ABSTRACTWith over 31,000 lives lost, which translates to more than 1800 persons
killed per every 1 million inhabitants, and an economic loss estimated to be
between 6-8% of GNP, the Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster in 2004
December is the worst natural disaster experienced in Sri Lanka. In relative
terms it is among the most damaging natural disasters faced by a country.
While early warning and evacuation systems would be the most effective
responses for mitigating future Tsunami disaster losses, the present tragedy
highlighted the lack of an adequate disaster management structure to
respond to the diverse extreme events the country has faced in the recent
past. The immediate concern is to rebuild the coastal areas addressing not
only the future safety but also alleviating the widespread poverty. The report
describes the impact and the immediate damages to various sectors of theeconomy and infrastructure by the Tsunami and the challenges that lie
ahead for 'Preparing for the Unforeseen'.

1. INTRODUCTION
The 26th of December 2004 goes down in history as the day Sri Lanka
experienced its worst natural disaster. The massive earthquake registering
9.0 on the Richter scale that struck off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia at 00
59 GMT was followed by a series of more than 67 aftershocks, the largest ofwhich occurred approximately three hours after the first earthquake andregistered 7.1 on the Richter scale. A series of tsunami waves triggered by
the earthquake radiated through the Bay of Bengal at a rate of more than 500
kilometers per hour, reaching coastal areas of Bangladesh, India, Indonesia,
Kenya, Malaysia, the Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, Reunion, Seychelles,
Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Thailand from about 15 min in Indonesia,
2 hours in Sri Lanka and 14 hours in Cape Town, South Africa.
Sri Lanka was one of the hardest hit countries in terms of loss of life,
infrastructure and assets. Between two to three hours after the f irst
earthquake, waves reached more than two thirds of the coastal area of Sri
Lanka. Current estimates stand at more than 35000 lives lost, over 5000

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Figure 1: Distribution of dead and missing persons(source: Department of statistics and census, Sri Lanka)

Figure 2: Distribution of displaced persons on Jan 07 and April 05(source: Department of statistics and census, Sri Lanka)
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missing and 1 million affected. Almost half of the affected lost theirlivelihoods. According to the CRED database, Sri Lanka with 1809 persons
killed per 1 million inhabitants had the highest number of per capita
casualties from all natural disasters in the world in 2004. Indonesia, theworst affected from the Tsunami had 759 people killed per million. Figure 1
shows the distribution of the deaths and Figure 2 shows the distribution of
displaced people. The estimated economic losses varies from around 6.0%of the national GDP (by ADB/JBIC/World Bank) to 8% (by TAFREN)
These are staggering numbers for any country, but especially so in Sri Lanka
when they are compared in relative terms and the capacity to recover.
This ar ticle provides an overview of the event, impacts andreconstruction challenges in the aftermath of the Tsunami tragedy.

2. EVENT AND THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE
2.1 Experience
The tsunami tragedy could not have happened at a worst time. The
year-end school holidays generally start at the beginning of December andlasts till the end of the month. In 2004, December 25, 26 and 27 also
happened to be public holidays commemorating both Christian and Buddhist
events. Not only all the government organizations were closed, almost all thebeach resorts were full of local and foreign tourists who flocked to sunnybeaches for the holiday season.
From eyewitness accounts, the Tsunami experience was varied fromplace to place. The only common factor was that it appeared without any
warning claiming the biggest casualties from coastal cities, mostly from
Sunday market gatherings. In Galle, located in southwest of Sri Lanka, atowering wave hit the coastal area. In Hambantota, located in the southern
Sri Lanka, a first wave came about half a meter high and while it wasreceding, before the water was completely drained, second wave rushed in.
In some areas, as in Galle, a high wave, composed by the duel funnelling
effects of the bay and sea coast rise, rushed ashore whereas in Hambantota,
the first wave was reported about 0.5 m high but the second wave has kept
on rising up, steadily going over rooftops in the beach area. In Kalutara, near
Colombo, seawater kept on rising slowly but steadily with each ordinary
wave. While one could walk away from the incoming wave, nothing wouldstop it as it bore down sweeping and pushing away beach benches, boats andwhat ever that stood in its way.
The run-up had been as high as 8-9 meters in some places, but mostly
the range was 4-5 m. Inundation length from the coast varies according to
the elevation, but was observed up to about 1 km length. The penetration ofwater had been greatest along the watercourses and in many areas retreatingseawaters took people and dragged buildings down. Up to 5 waves wereexperienced at different parts of the country at varying intervals. In many
areas of East and South, the two waves came very close to each other.
Tsunami heights have been measured by various teams, USGS,The 26 December Tsunami Disaster and Recovery Challenges in Sri Lanka

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The Tsunami strength has been altered very much by the local
conditions. Pockets of complete devastation adjoining partial
damage as well as unaffected stretches as in this village, wascommon along the South West Coast line between Colombo andGalle.

Figure 3: Run-up heights measured in the field

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Japanese, Korean and UNU in collaboration with partners from Sri
Lanka. A composite map of wave heights from most of these observations isshown in Figure 3.

Boats taken ashore was a common site along the road from
Colombo to Galle

Yala sanctuary, in the Eastern coast, a popular destination forboth local and foreign tourists had full of holiday makers when
the Tsunami struck at its peak force. It had completely
demolished the holiday homes and carried vehicles hundred ofmeters inland.(Source: CNO)

A colleague was driving his car towards the central bus stand awayfrom the old fort in the coastal town of Galle. His only recollection was a

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black wall of water suddenly appearing and tossing his car inland. He
managed to leave the car and escape unhurt. A lady from the further south
town of Matara recounted the horror of the day. She lived about 100 m fromthe coastal line and was alerted by the commotion on that Sunday morning.
As she came out she could hear the voice of her sister who lived closer tothe sea shouting them to run as the sea is coming. The head started helping
her escape without injury although they lost all of their property and she was
grateful to the fact that she lived at least some distanse away from thecoastal line.
Further down south, in Hambantota city, where many lives were lost in
the thin strip or land between the sea and the lagoon, the survivors were stilldazed, unable to come in to terms with the experiences of the day. A man in
his later forties recounted how his family started moving towards the highgrounds after the first wave came in, which was around 0.5 m high. Halfway, his wife decided to come back to lock the door. She would have arrived
at their house just as the second wave came in. Later her body was
discovered on the other side of the lagoon. Further down the road, I talked toa man who was standing in front of a new two-story house carrying a smallchild. The kitchen, toilet and the storage rooms at the back of the housefacing the sea were damaged, but the main building was not damaged. I
assumed the family could escape the tsunami impacts as the water level
came to only about 50 cm. on the second floor. Unfortunately, this was not
so. The family had some small business next to the house, and on the day of
the Tsunami, they were on the ground, by the house. Until the waves struck
them, they had no idea of the incoming wave. The husband, wife and thefarther of the husband were swept away, and the baby was left on a mattressinside the house. The husband could mange to cling to a tree, but he othermembers of the family were not so lucky. Inside the house, the mattress rosewith the rising water level with baby on the mattress. Although the waterlevel rose above the first floor level of the house, an air pocket formed
between the first floor roof and the rising water just leaving enoughbreathing area for the baby to survive. Tsunami had caught them all by
surprise, as the high density of buildings along the narrow coastal strip
completely covered the sea and they had no idea of the incoming wave. He
believes that in the future we need to give more space to the sea, and keep
the coastal belt as open as possible, so that that communities would be lessvulnerable to variation of sea level and it would be easy to notice changes tosea waves or wind patterns.
2.2 Response
When Tsunami ar rived, most of the responsible governmentorganizations were closed for the holiday. Whenever information reachedresponsible personnel, it has been fragmentary. One of the major difficulties
had been to piece together reports arriving from different parts of thecountry to form a coherent picture. It was not until the information of themassive earthquake and the Tsunami was broadcasted on international TV,
that it was realized high waves observed in different parts of the country waspart of a single phenomena.

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The Tsunami impact in the East Coast, Yala Sanctuary(source: CNO)
The immediate response to the Tsunami tragedy was magnificent. It
was a spontaneous solidarity provided by ordinary citizens, volunteer
organizations, armed forces, government and private organizations from all
corners of the country. Refugee camps were set up immediately, and major
NGO’s have prepared extremely detailed needs assessments at each refugee
camps that were passed to government authorities and volunteer
organizations.
Sri Lanka has a National Disaster Management Centre, under theministry of welfare and women empowerment, which was primarily
involved in relief operations in the past. NDMC has been involved in thedevelopment of a disaster plan for Sri Lanka to establish a larger disastermanagement unit with a broad mandate. The proposed action plan had notbeen ratified in the parliament at the time of Tsunami. In the aftermath of
the Tsunami disaster, the gover nment immediately appointed acommissioner general in charge of essential services. Soon after, on
December 28 the president has appointed 3 Task Forces to be in charge ofdifferent aspects of relief and reconstruction.
The first Task Force was for Rescue and Relief operations (TAFRER)
also known as Center for National Operations (CNO), which had the
mandate to coordinate all initiatives taken by government ministries,
agencies and other institutions relating to relief efforts. The highest priority
was given by CNO to assess relief needs and direct resources to maximise
the effectiveness of relief efforts. It played an extremely valuable and visible
role in collecting analyzing and tabulating data related to affected
population as well as needs assessments in all sectors. It also had the task of
coordinating all international donor assistance, voluntary services and NGO
support.

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The second Task Force was empowered to coordinate logistics of relief
work. Its main task was to ensure the availability of essential goods andservices to victims. The task force also was responsible for law, order andsecurity in the affected areas.
After the initial phase of the rescue and relief work which largely
depended on the voluntary support, responsibilities of TAFRER andTAFLOL were transferred to one body termed TAFOR, which was mainlymanned by government servants. The relief packages for victims wereintroduced under TAFOR.
The third task force TAFREN that stands for Task Force for Rebuilding
the Nation, was established to coordinate and assist government agencies
and institutions in their efforts at reconstruction and rehabilitation. Its mainfunctions are to car ry out damage assessment, development of acomprehensive plan for reconstr uction and the coordination andimplementation of the plan. The task force also coordinate all donor
assistance; fund raising and other financial aspects related the reconstruction
plan. The task force is required to draft a parliament bill to setup an
Authority to carry out the reconstruction tasks as a successor to TAFREN
over a period of 3-5 years.

Camps for displaced persons were set up by various local and foreign
NGO’s. They came in different sizes, colors and forms. In the first week ofJanuary 2005, there were 608 camps providing shelter to over 330,000
persons.

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Volunteers, armed forces, police government officials and clergy
carried out most of the initial relief and rescue operations. From thegovernment the Ministry of Social Welfare has been involved in the

Figure 4: The variation of number of camps set up for the affected people(source: National Disaster Management Center, Sri Lanka)

Figure 5: Number of camps in each city during the period
from December 29 2004 to January 6 2005

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distribution of food and other essential items to affected areas. Private
individuals and organizations during the initial period distributed most of
the relief supplies. For the displaced persons 53 camps were setup on the dayof the disaster, which peaked to 835 on the 1st of January and has gradually
reduced and reached the number of 273 by April. Figure 4 shows thevariation of camps with time.
The majority of the refugee camps were set up in Galle which had thehighest population of severely affected cities. Figure 5 shows the number ofcamps for each city during the first few days after the Tsunami.
Soon after the initial relief and rescue phase, the government
announced a relief package consisting of (a) Rs. 15,000 per person for
funeral expenses, (b) Rs. 2500 per person to purchase kitchen utensils, (c) acast grant of Rs. 200 and (d) ration coupons worth Rs. 175 that can be used
to purchase food, per person per week for a period of six months and a (e)Rs. 5,000 settlement allowance per family. The total value of this relief
package amounts to about USD 108 million. For a family of 4 the above
package excluding the support for funeral amounts to about USD 84 or
about Rs. 8400 per month. This figure is considered sufficient to provide
adequate nutrition. In fact the reason to make the aid package a combinationof food and cash is to guarantee an adequate nutrition intake. Further,
women usually prefer food aid rather than cash as the effectiveness of cash
aid has proven to be less than that of in kind because of high incidence ofalcoholism that also contribute to the poverty in the coastal areas.

Table 1: Shift of displaced persons from camps to live with friends
and relatives

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The government also introduced a scheme of financial assistance torelatives or friends who would accommodate those displaced by the
Tsunami until temporary and permanent housing are prepared. This was aneffective measure as many displaced persons have found the cramped life in
the tents to be difficult. Table 1 shows the distribution of displaced people
who are staying with families and relatives, and those who are staying at thecamps on the 07th of January and 05th of April. As can be seen, although
the total number of displaced persons have not changed much during thosefour months, there is a marked shift in the distribution of them from thecamps to among friends and relatives.

3. DISASTER LOSSES
3.1 Loss of life
The greatest damage from the December Tsunami was the immense
loss of life along the coastal cities. The latest figures from the National
Center for Disaster Management put the death toll at 31,229 with 4,600
people missing. The detailed distribution of deaths by province and cities are
given in Table 2.
It is difficult to get a complete picture of the number of injured. The
situation report for the of January 7 2005 by the NDMC, listed the numberof injured persons as 16,760 according to the figures submitted by theprovincial officials. The actual figure could very well be much above that
number.
Table 2: Loss of life from the Tsunami (source: National Disaster
Management Centre)

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3.2 Affected
The Center for National Operations (CNO) statistics on the 20th ofJanuary 2005 has put the affected number of people as 1,095,880 which
stands at 42% of the population of the affected administrative units. Nearly
all the affected population (95%) is distributed in 56 administrative divisionsin 12 districts along the coastal belt. Out of the affected areas, Westernregion, where the Capital Colombo is located, is relatively rich followed bysouth-west region which is a popular tourist destination. Southern, Easternand Northern regions are poorer by comparison. East and North areespecially vulnerable after prolonged ethnic conflicts that had 65,000 killed
and over 800,000 displaced during the past two decades. Soon after the
Tsunami, the World Food Programme (WFP) had carried out an immediateneeds assessment survey with ILO supported by UNICEF and FAO. The
survey covered 1863 households and 42 community key persons and has
focused on livelihoods, food consumption, needs perception and others. The
survey has reported the following findings. A large number of affected
people, 35% of the total, depended on fishing as the primary occupation. In
mid-January, this has dropped to 2%. Agriculture provided income for 9%,
which dropped to 4%. About 35% of the population was engaged in theservice sector which mainly comprised of tourism and retail trade. Morethan half of this group still had an income. Table 3 shows the summary ofmajor livelihood distribution in the affected areas.
Table 3: Major livelihood changes after Tsunami

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4. ECONOMIC LOSSES
4.1 Total damage
Soon after the Tsunami, a joint team of Asian Development Bank,Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the World Bank made apreliminary damage and needs assessment for the country during the period
from January 10-28. Similarly, CNO has made damage estimates of thevarious sectors through direct consultations with officials in charge. The
following is a summary of damage estimated through these studies andaccessible sources.
The overall damage estimated varies from 1 billion direct asset losses
and 0.33 billion in output losses (ADB/JBIC/World Bank) to around 1.8
billion USD (TAFREN). The total investment needs for reconstruction isestimated similarly between 1.6 billion (ADB/JBIC/World Bank) to 2.2
billion (TAFREN) USD. In terms of national GDP the economic losses
translate to between 6-8%. The figures show that human suffering as well as
economic damage inflicted by 2004 December Tsunami disaster is one of
the highest in the world and the worst in the history of Sri Lanka.
4.2 Sectoral damage
4.2.1 Housing

Damage to buildings at Kinniya, Trincomalee was mainly due to foundation
failure as the sands were washed away by the receding water. The waterheight varied here from about 3 m to less than a meter at the coast.
However, extensive damage to houses could be seen due to foundation
failure.

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The statistical department of the government of Sri Lanka has recently
completed a survey on the residential and non-residential structures.
According to the survey made available on May 2005, 5900 non-residentialbuildings were completely or severely damaged while 5125 non-residentialbuildings are considered as partially damaged. Of the residential buildings
about 50,000 are either completely damaged for heavily damaged and needs
to be replaced. Around 38,500 houses are partially damaged and may berepaired and used. Table 4 outlines the damage to residential buildings in theaffected areas. Considering the current sub-standard housing and thedamage caused to the existing housing the government has announced theintention to construct construction of 100,000 permanent houses for affected
population. While the permanent housing construction is expected to takeabout 1.5 - 2 years, 20,000 temporary housing units will be constructed tosupplement the existing camps and other temporary shelters. The annual
new housing construction in Sri Lanka is between 4000 - 5000 units. The
construction target of more than 20 times of that amount requires carefulplanning to avoid scarcity of raw materials and skilled labour.
Table 4: Damage to residential buildings

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Nothing remains in this once dense residence area ofHambantota, now occupied by camps for displaced persons.
For the reconstruction, the government has adopted the following
policy guidelines.
All families within 100m and 200m Coastal Zone whose houses havebeen completely damaged will be provided with safe houses outside
the Conservation Zone by the Government.
Those who are willing to construct their own houses outside 100m and
200m zone on their lands will be paid Rs 250,000 financial assistanceand if necessary concessionary loans by state banks.
Those who are willing to construct their own houses outside 100m and
200m zone will be provided with lands (04 to 10 perches dependingon the availability of land), financial assistances and if necessary
concessionary loans by State Banks.
Minimum size of a house will be 500sq.ft. which will cost about
Rs.400,000. These houses will be provided with all the basic
infrastructure facilities such as access road, water, electricity, sewerageetc.
All housing will be planned as Settlements. Play grounds, Recreation
Areas, Commercial facilities and other basic services will be provided.
The following types of houses are recommended:
Single story detached houses on individual land plots.
Single story attached houses with individual gardens.
Two storied attached terraced houses with individual gardens - Town
Houses.
Multi story (Ground + 02 or 03) Walk-up Apartments

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The construction density guide lines for each type of houses are shownin Table 5.
Table 5: Recommended housing types and density

4.2.2 Fishery

Nearly 60% of the country’s fishing boats and gear weredestroyed in the Tsunami

Approximately 200,000 fishermen and 50,000 people employed in the
sector make their livelihood from fishing in Sri Lanka. The fishing fleet isapproximately estimated at 29,500 boats. Due to the Tsunami, about 7500
fishermen have lost their lives and around 18,100 boats have been destroyed
and a further 4,200 damaged. In addition to the boats fishing gear such asnets, out board motors, ice storages were heavily damaged. Marine

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structures including equipment at harbours were destroyed. The total
damage to the sector is estimated at around USD 100 million.

A Boat repair facility set up by a Norweigian group had their hands full.
4.2.3 Agriculture
The agriculture sector has not suffered as heavily as the other sectors.
Mainly the paddy and other crop f ields along the coastal belt weredestroyed. A total of about 2300 ha of paddy land, 590 ha of other crops 470
ha of vegetable cultivation and 200 ha of fruit crops were reported as
destroyed. No large scale livestock farming was carried out along the coastal
area, but the small number of animals owned by many of the poor families
along the coastal belt constituted a significant asset of each family. The
heavy salinity caused by the tsunami was a significant concern as it was notclear how long it would take to naturally flush away the salinity by the rain.
However, recent heavy rains have indicated that this would not be a major
problem. Considerable amount of salinity has been already flushed away.
The damage to the sector is estimated to be around USD 3 million.
4.2.4 Water Supplies and sanitation
A large number of wells had to be abandoned either due to damage
from the Tsunami waves or from salt-water intrusion. More than 50,000
wells were estimated as abandoned. In addition, salt water intrusion into
coastal aquifers, through wells, or from inland pond, flushing by rainwater,etc., has made long term impacts on the water supplies to the coastal region.
Of the water supply systems, the major damage was to the coastal pipe lines
for central water supply systems. Almost all damaged houses have lost
individual latrines. Of major infrastructure, a pump house at a sewerage
plant near Colombo sustained damage. Government is planning immediate
rehabilitation of pipe borne water supply to all Tsunami hit areas andcomprehensive water and sanitation development plan for the coastal belt
affected by Tsunami.

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4.2.5 Roads Sector

Roads adjacent to water courses have sustained heavy damage.
(Source: CNO)
Roads in Sri Lanka are classified as National (Class A and B),
P r ov i n c i a l ( C l a s s C , D a n d E ) a n d L o c a l G ov e r n m e n t r o a d s .
Approximately 690 km, 700 km and 1100 km of roads of each class havebeen damaged. This represents 5% of national roads, and 2% of provincial
and local government roads. Major damages were inflicted on coastal
bridges(Figure 6). The total damage has been estimated as about USD210
million for the road sector, that includes an estimate of 120 million USD
for the road reconstruction.

Figure 6: Almost all the bridges along the coast line water
course have been damaged by the Tsunami. Temporary works
have been done and the bridges made passable within a few
days by the government organizations. (Source: CNO)

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4.2.6 Health
Health sector in the Tsunami affected area was under severe pressure
to provide support for this unprecedented disaster with its facilities damaged
and many of the sector personnel killed by the Tsunami. A total of 72
hospitals 149 peripheral units and 363 other units such as Dental, Child
Clinics and Central dispensaries, were damaged. The estimated damage tothe sector was USD100 million. With the support of donor agencies andcountries more than 80% of the rehabilitation work has commenced.
4.2.7 Education
Table 6: Summary of Damage to Schools by Tsunami (Source: CNO)

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The Tsunami has damaged 161 schools, affecting 80,000 students andover 3,000 teachers. Additionally, 4 universities and 18 vocational training
and industrial training centers were affected. The details of damage toschools is given in Table 6 which shows the biggest impact was on the East
coast with Amparai (38 schools) district suffering the most followed by theBatticalo (33 schools) and Trincomalee (27 schools). About 91 schools,
which are located too close to the sea will be relocated to inland highground. The damage to the sector is estimated as about US$ 26 million.
4.2.8 Environment
Most of the significant environment impacts are expected to be marine
related such as for the Coral reefs and the marine eco systems. Inland, themajor hazard is the salt-water contamination of shallow aquifers that would
take quire some time to recover, rendering most of the dug wells unusable.
There are number of methodologies that can be used to flush out the saline
water from the shallow aquifers. However, as the government has alreadyadopted a plan for pipe borne water supply in the coastal area, it may not be
required to embark on such schemes.
The areas protected by sand dunes and vegetation had little impact
from the Tsunami. Based on that, a number of programs have been proposed
to establish such protection through out the coastal belt. However, several
breaches of such protection works were also witnessed, especially aroundweakened points such as openings for drainage, leading to extensive damagearound those areas. Therefore, maintenance of these works must be taken
into consideration prior to embarking on constructing them.
4.2.9 Railway
Table 7: Damage to railway sector (Source: CNO)

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The southern bound railway line, which transfers 78,000 passengers
daily, and transfer cargo from Colombo to Galle and Matara had been
severely affected. The reconstruction is being carried out locally and the line
is expected to resume operations within the year. The Eastern railway belt
has not been affected severely and has resumed operations. The total
damage to the railways estimated by TAFREN is USD 497 million.
4.2.10 PowerThe power sector sustained damages around USD 67 million, mainly totransmission lines and distribution systems. All power lines have now been
restored. The main damages were due to loss of supply wires and meters,
which stood at 62,540 units at the initial estimate. This was followed bysignificant losses in LT lines amounting to 390 km and HT lines of 42 km.
4.2.11 Telecommunication
The total damage to this sector is estimated at USD 18 million. The
bulk of the losses were to the main career, Sri Lanka Telecom whichsuffered about 84.6% of the total lost, followed by the operators, Suntel(7.2%), Mobitel (4.2%) and MTN (3.98%). The main damage to the Sri
Lanka Telecom was from the damage to exchange facilities located inSouthern, Eastern and North - Eastern coastal cities.

5. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TSUNAMI INUNDATION
5.1 Inundation and Run-up at Galle
Soon after the Tsunami, United Nations University has coordinated afield survey in Sri Lanka carried out by 3 international and 15 Sri Lankan
teams to map the building damage, inundation and the run up in three
coastal areas. The objectives of the survey was toTo carry out a rapid reconnaissance survey to prepared a basic hazard
map to assist the medium and long term reconstruction process
Understand the Tsunami mechanism and impacts
The survey was carried out in the towns of Galle, Hambantota andTrincomalee located in South and North Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka as
shown in Figure 7. Primary data collected were the elevation data preparedby compilation of existing elevation information improved with Kinematic
GPS improvements, followed by building damage estimation and the wave
run-up and inundation information. Following data were collected during thefield survey.
Elevation Data: Kinematic GPS were used to collect high resolution
data points to generate DEMs for the three cities. Additionally Total Station
surveys were performed to improve coastal area data improvement. Existing
1:5000 Survey Department digital data were assimilated to the new data.

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Other existing elevation maps were digitized and converted to elevation data
points to enhance the existing datasets.
Land use data: sets were created from existing digital data of 1:5000
maps and additional information obtained from Satellite Images.
Wave Load: Structural damages were analyzed for over 80 buildings orwave heights structural components to derive relationship between wave
impacts and Building Damage.
Building Damage: Kinematic GPS surveys were conducted to record
the degree of damage to buildings. The information consisted of location,level of damage (completely destroyed, heavy damage, moderate damage,slight damage), construction material (buildings were classified up to 10
types) orientation, foundation failure, number of floors.

Figure 7: The cities where field surveys had been conducted

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Figure 8: The Land use map of GALLE at 5 m grid resolution withinundation distance shown in blue circle

Figure 8 shows the land use map of Galle City overlain by theinundation map measured on field. The Blue circles show locations Tsunami
has reached. The maximum distances in Galle were about 800m.
The Figure 9 shows the 3-D view of the Galle city with inundated area
draped in blue colour. The effect of topography on the inundation distance isclearly shown in the figure.

Figure 9 Inundation map of Galle City, overlaid on DEM withland use features.

5.2 Inundation at Hambantota
Figure 10 shows the 3D view of the Hambantota City with the
distribution of buildings. As can be seen from the figure part of the city is

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located on the high ground to the west side and extends to the low lying area
between the lagoon and the sea to the salt mines. Sand dunes around 4-5 mheight and a thick vegetation belt on it provide a natural protection to the

Figure 10: Both left and right side of Hambantota city isprotected by sand dunes and a vegetation belt. The
most vulnerable location, strip of land between thesea and the lagoon was the worst affected.
area except for the narrow strip between the sea and the lagoon which had
been highly populated. The survivors explained the experiences on that
fateful day and many in general agreed on the sequence of events. The firstwave had taken all by surprise, and many were in the Sunday market on thehigh ground towards the western side. The water height was about 0.5 m in
the lower valley portion of the city. As it was receding, the second wave
started to come in. Unlike the first wave, the second wave had kept on rising,A sand dune and thick vegetation protected much of the area
along the coast of Hambantota city. However, it had breached insome locations as in the next photo.

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The protective sand dune was breached here. A cutting to pumpout water from the lagoon seen behind the vehicles gave way anda large stretch of sand dune and the protective vegetation waswashed away.
soon surpassing the height of the buildings. It is most likely that the firstwave has provided a smooth surface for the second wave to ride and connect
to the lagoon on the other side of the landmass. The funnelling effect of the
Tsunami according to the shape of the location, coupled with the restraining
effect of the sand dune and vegetation layer must have concentrated thewave to the opening at the valley where it grew to a giant wave that
demolished every thing that stood in its way. The sand dune and vegetation
has provided protection to most parts of the coastal area in Hambantota but
had been breaching of the sand dunes where it was weakened due todrainage lines.

6. RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION
The Tsunami disaster in Sri Lanka is not only unprecedented in thehistory of Sri Lanka, it is also one of the biggest disaster to affect acountry. As mentioned before the economic damage estimated to be
between 6-8% of GNP put this disaster among the worst disasters in theworld. In addition, the death toll of over 1800 per 1 million of population
puts the human losses at the very high impact category. About 1 millionof the population has been affected and an estimated 450,000 have losttheir livelihoods.
Figure 11 shows the household income distribution obtained by the
WFP-ILO survey mentioned in the opening section. According to thesedata about 80% of the population spends less than Rs. 100,000.00 (USD100) a month, which is less than a dollar per day per person for a familyof 5 members. The official poverty line is about Rs. 1500 per person /month, which is required to ensure required nutritional intake, which
would translate to a Rs. 7500 /month for a family of four. Most of the

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Figure 11: Income of affected people (source: Survey of WFP)
coastal areas were poor even before the Tsunami. 30% of the population
spent only Rs. 5000 / month which put the family members below poverty
line. The cost of food is relatively high in Sri Lanka, and people spent alarge fraction of their income on food. The survey also found that about
30% of the population spent more than 75% of their income on food. The
low earning and high food costs can easily lead to under nourishment andto safeguard against such situations, current support package of thegovernment for the displace persons include cash support as well as foodstamps which can only be used to purchase food items. Due to thegeneral poverty of the region, there is very little resilience and economic
surplus in the region and government support and leadership is essential
for the recovery of the affected communities.
There are several issues the government has to respond immediately
and effectively. Providing houses has the priority among the issues as it
bring back the families together and provide opportunity for them to start
their livelihoods. There are two basic problems in building new houses
for those who lost their houses. On the average 4000-5000 new housing
units are built annually in Sri Lanka. The need to build 100,000 new
houses within a span of 1-2 years puts heavy pressure on construction
materials and technicians required for the job. Acquisition of land has
become a major problem. After the Tsunami the government has declared
a 100m no construction zone in the West and Southern regions and a 200
m free zone in the East. However, there had been severe opposition to thiszoning by many f ishermen as well as the main opposition party. To
implement the zoning, it was necessary for the government to obtain land
from inland areas to move the current residents who had their houses very
close to the sea falling within the no-construction zones. This has proved
to be a slow process where available land and people’s requirements haveto be matched.
However, the major challenge for the government is to reducepoverty in the affected areas through the reconstruction process. Given

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the very high percentage of population living close to or below poverty
line, the reconstruction strategies should be geared towards poverty
alleviation. For example, multi-purpose safety centres which can be usedas evacuation centres in a future tsunami or other disasters can act ascommunity and social development centres during the normal times
providing training and education to enhance income generating capacity
to the residents. Similarly redevelopment of roads and other infrastructure
should be geared for the economic development of the poor.

7. TOWARDS A SAFER FUTURE
The Tsunami disaster has shown the need to overhaul Sri Lanka’s
institutional structure for preparedness against natural disasters. Currently
Sri Lanka has a National Disaster Management Center, under the
Ministry of Social Welfare and Women Empowerment. NDMC has
drafted a national act, which had not been ratified in the parliament until
the Tsunami. After the Tsunami the national disaster mitigation plan has
been adopted and it is expected the necessary institutional framework
could be established soon. At present it is difficult for Sri Lanka to have astrong program for disaster reduction due to several reasons. On one hand
the relevant organization having the expertise and capacity to deal withnatural disasters are distributed across several ministries and the absenceof a framework make it difficult to develop a unified approach against
natural disasters. Secondly, the natural disasters faced by Sri Lanka
makes it necessary to have a multi-disciplinary team with very hightechnical capability to make dedicated efforts to strengthen the preventive
capacity, especially early warning capacity, against natural disasters. The
reason for this becomes clear if an analysis is made of recent major
natural disasters in Sri Lanka. In 1992, there had been an exceptionallyhigh rain (estimated as 1:1000 yr return period) that caused flooding in
Colombo, which lasted for more than 10 days due to inadequate drainage.
The extraordinary rainfall has been confined to Colombo city, but if it
had extended over to the Kelani River catchment area, and a breach of theRiver embankment could have made catastrophic losses in the capital.
Recently, in 2003, May 11-19, a tropical storm caused 247 deaths, thedisplacement of 200,000 persons, and heavy damage to the infrastructure,
economy and livelihoods of the South-Western Sri Lanka. The maincause of the deaths was the landslides in the central and southern parts ofthe country Sri Lanka, triggered by the heavy rainfall. In the past, there
had not been a historical record of a cyclone in May in Sri Lanka. It wasalso rare that a cyclonic storm whose centre was 700-1500 km away andwhich was relatively weak could cause such damage.
Sri Lanka faces few regular recurrent disasters. Its major losses arefrom extreme events for which people are not prepared and hence“Preparing for the Unforeseen” is the challenge for disaster management
in Sri Lanka. The developments in Science and Technology in disastermanagement should be fully utilized for this task. A high level
coordinating organization where officers from various departments can

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come and work together for a few years on disaster related themes todevelop national monitoring, forecasting and warning capacities shouldbe established. A sustained effort in these technologies would be
beneficial not only for preparing for the extreme cases but also for the
day to day management of environment and natural resources.

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Report on the 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami DisasterPROPOSAL OF A SUSTAINABLETSUNAMI DISASTER MITIGATION SYSTEMFOR THE INDIAN OCEAN REGIONKIMIRO MEGURO1) and MASASUKE TAKASHIMA2)
1)
International Center for Urban Safety Engineering
Institute of Industrial Science, The University of Tokyo, Japan
2)
Collage of Environment and Disaster Research
Fuji Tokoha University, Fuji, Japan

ABSTRACT
Triggered by a M9.0 earthquake that occurred along the Sunda Trench, OffSumatra, at 07:58 (local time), on December 26, 2004, a huge anddevastating tsunami hit the Indian Ocean Rim countries, causing
unprecedented disaster with over 300,000 dead and missing persons. The
analysis of other potential tsunami scenarios in the region has revealed that
1.3 million dead and missing people may be expected, at worst. Therefore,
an effective and sustainable framework against tsunami disaster is
indispensable in this region.
Land use control, i.e. preventing people from residing next to the shore,is one way to mitigate tsunami disaster if people follow it. However, this is
not always a proper option in the Indian Ocean Rim region where theeconomic activities, e.g. fishing, tourism, take place directly next to theseaside. For this case, a New Tsunami Disaster Mitigation System bycombining a reliable warning system and proper evacuation facilities is
proposed. Important characteristics of this system are its simplicity,
economical efficiency and daily-usability.
This paper introduces the New Tsunami Disaster Mitigation System,
highlighting its strengths and the works necessary for its implementation.

1. INTRODUCTION
Triggered by the M9.0 Earthquake that occurred along the Sunda
Trench, Off-Sumatra, at 07:58 (local time), on December 26, 2004, a hugeand devastating tsunami hit the Indian Ocean Rim countries, causing
unprecedented disaster with over 300,000 dead and missing persons. The
tsunami was triggered by one of the possible earthquake scenarios along the
Sunda Trench. Four other potential earthquake events along the trench havebeen identified and the expected number of casualties in case they occur has
been estimated. As a result, it was revealed that 1.3 million dead andmissing people are expected, at worst, as shown in Figure 1. This number isseveral times larger than the observed in the December 26, 2004 event,showing that an effective and sustainable framework against tsunami
disaster is indispensable in this region.
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Figure 1: Estimated damage based on numerical tsunami simulation
with possible fault scenarios along the Sunda TrenchSome countries along the Indian Ocean Rim have established atsunami disaster mitigation system based on land use, i.e. prohibiting people
inhabiting next to the seaside. Others are planning to adopt similar
measures. Land use control is an efficient measure if people follow it.
However, this is not always a proper option in case activities such as fishingand tourism, which are the pillars of the region economy, take place directly
next to the shore. Under these conditions, it is inapplicable to implement
land use control policies.
In the Pacific Ocean Rim region, tsunami disaster mitigation relies ona sophisticated warning system, which is used not only for disastermitigation but also for earth science research. This system is costly in termsof both installation and maintenance. Furthermore, it requires a great deal ofknowledge to operate it. Although it is very useful and appropriate for thisarea, where countries with financial and technological resources such as US
and Japan are located, it is not applicable for the Indian Ocean region(Figure 2).
Taking the above mentioned points into consideration, a New Tsunami
Disaster Mitigation System which combines a warning system suitable for
the Indian Ocean region and proper evacuation facilities in terms oflocation, strength and sheltering capacity is proposed. With this system there
is no need to relocate the people living along the seashore; therefore, there is
no impact on the local economies. The proposed system is simple,
economically efficient and daily-usable.
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Figure 2: Comparison between conventional and newly proposed
tsunami warning systems

Figure 3: Concept of proposed tsunami warning system composed of
networked simple multi-purposes observation buoys installed
locally and internationally

2. PROPOSAL OF THE NEW TSUNAMI DISASTER MITIGATIONSYSTEM
Our proposed New Tsunami Disaster Mitigation System combines areliable warning system and proper evacuation facilities. As mentioned
earlier, a warning system such as the one available in the Pacific Ocean Rim
region is not suitable for the Indian Ocean region which has fewer
technological resources, researchers and experiences of tsunami disasters.
For this reason, We are proposing to use simple multi-purpose observation
buoys, which in addition to serve as a tsunami warning system, would
record temperature, current velocity, wave height, moisture, etc. on a daily
basis. This information can be used for weather forecasting, safetyassessment, f ish catch prediction, etc. which are useful for the local
businesses (Figure 3(a)). Our proposal is to use numerous and simple

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131September 2005

stations so that the system is redundant and easier/cheaper to sustain. The
minimum unit of the proposed system would be one or two multi-purpose
observation buoys operated and maintained by hotels/resorts or beachsocieties in the area. These businesses will benefit from the daily collected
information.
It is expected that many beach societies install the system and join themulti-purpose observation buoy network beyond the administrative orinternational boundaries (Figure 3(b)). In this way, it may be possible togather daily maritime information over a wider area and eventually forecast
a transoceanic tsunami. A system for transferring this information between
associations, domestic and foreign, already exists.
The installation of the proposed buoy system could have additional
advantages. After the December 26, 2004 tsunami, the tourism industry has
suffered greatly not only due to direct impact of the tsunami in theinfrastructure but also due to the unscientific rumors. Visitors that used tocome to resort facilities in the region started avoiding these destinations forfear that a new disaster may occur. In order to recover the tourists’ trust, theinformation collected by the buoy system can be very useful. It is also
known that buoys may become the center of marine ecosystems which could
be an attraction for scuba divers.
Proper evacuation facilities in terms of location, strength and sheltering
capacity are also part of the proposed system. In the region, it is common toobserve temples, churches and shrines located along the coastal line.
Therefore, We are proposing to use similar community centers as evacuation
facilities. This scheme has two main advantages. Because worship centers
are permanently used by the people, their location is well known so that incase an evacuation notice is released, everybody can easily access them.
Additionally, because the people feel strong commitment with thesefacilities, they take active participation in their building and maintenance.

3. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROPOSED TSUNAMI DISASTER
MITIGATION SYSTEM
In order to establish the proposed system, several works are needed asshown in Figure 4 and the reconnaissance team, which One the authors,
Prof. Meguro, headed, carried out them.
1) Structural damage survey
2) Tsunami numerical simulation
3) Topographical survey4) Questionnaire/Interview survey5) Evacuation numerical simulation
The f irst three activities are closely interrelated and their main
objective is to design the configuration and location of evacuation centers.
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corresponding damage. With this information, the relationship between
tsunami wave load and wave height/velocity can be obtained. With tsunami
numerical simulations using potential earthquake scenarios, it is possible toestimate the wave height and velocity and the tsunami inundation area due
to future tsunami hazards. These data enable us to properly determine
location and structural design criteria for evacuation facilities.

Figure 4: Establishment of the proposed tsunami disaster mitigation system
In order to guaranty that the evacuation centers are fully functional,
their location should be selected so that when the expected tsunami occurs
they will not be washed away. For this purpose, it is indispensable to carryout a topographical survey. Real-time kinematic GPS and laser total stations
are powerful tools for this purpose.
Questionnaire and interview surveys are useful to gather datanecessary for the evacuation behavior simulation. Relationships between
human evacuation velocity and water depth, which are needed for this study,
have already been proposed. The simulation will confirm whether theescape routes and proposed evacuation centers are suitable. Because theproposed tsunami disaster mitigation system heavily relies on theparticipation of regional organizations, the interviews are also helpful toassess the level of acceptance of the system among the people involved.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKSThis paper presents a New Tsunami Disaster Mitigation System for the
Indian Ocean Rim region, which combines a reliable warning system andproper evacuation facilities. The warning system consists of multi-purpose
observation buoys operated by local organizations such as hotels and beach

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associations. The system is not only used for tsunami warning but also tomonitor temperature, current velocity, wave height, moisture, etc.,
information which can be used on a daily basis for the economic activities of
the region.
The proposed evacuation facilities are designed taking into
consideration: sheltering capacity, location, and structural strength. Location
is especially important to prevent that the structures are washed away by thetsunami and to guaranty an easy access for the evacuees.
In order to verify the suitability of the proposed system, tsunami andevacuation simulations are recommended. Actually, the research teamheaded by one of the authors, Prof. Meguro, has already perform this type ofstudy with some selected areas in Japan and Sri Lanka and proved thesystem effectiveness. The strong points of the proposed system are its
simplicity, economy and daily usability, which makes it a sustainable option
for the region.

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