Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 29, Number 2, 2007, pp53-61

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Restoration after the Sumatra Earthquake Tsunami in Banda Aceh:
Based on the Results of Interdisciplinary Researches by Nagoya University
Makoto TAKAHASHI1, Shigeyoshi TANAKA1, Reo KIMURA1, Masatomo UMITSU1,
Rokuro TABUCHI2, Tatsuaki KURODA1, Masataka ANDO3 and Fumiaki KIMATA1
1
Graduate School of Environmental Studies, Nagoya University, Japan
2
Faculty of Human Sciences, Sophia University, Japan
3
Institute of Earth Sciences, Academia Sinica, Taiwan(Received for 31 May., 2007 and in revised from 6 Feb, 2008)

ABSTRACTThis paper is based on the results of research by the Sumatra Earthquake Interdisciplinary or Integrated
Research Team, Graduate School of Environmental Studies, Nagoya University. This research shows: (1) the
Sumatra Earthquake tsunami disaster damage in Banda Aceh can be divided into four areas; (2) the tsunami action
was directed left and right by the Banda Aceh topography; (3) within which District I saw total destruction of
housing, a high death rate, and the collapse of families; (4) with the high death rate due to a lack of earthquaketsunami association; (5) that even in the core of housing reconstruction, the pace is slow; (6) there are four main
obstacles to housing reconstruction; (7) the slow pace of the reconstruction is a function of social causes related tothe size of the tsunami, the lack of established adjustment mechanisms for aid groups, the slow pace of the reconstruction in society overall, and the failure of market functions; (8) that in the case of large scale disasters, with theloss of life and home, as well as infrastructure, the collapse of society as an entity occurs as well.

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper, based on the results of research by the Sumatra
Earthquake Research Team, Graduate School of Environmental
Studies, Nagoya University (Graduate School of Environmental
Studies, Nagoya University, 2005, 2006, 2007; Kimata et al.,2006), investigates the reconstruction process in the two-year postSumatra Earthquake period focusing on Banda Aceh and its surrounding region, Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (hereinafter, NAD), Indonesia. This team has thus far conducted four
field surveys, which include interviews of local residents and relevant agencies, a questionnaire survey (described herein), and thecollection of statistical data from just one month after the tsunami
onward.
First is a description of the characteristics of the tremendous
damage brought to Banda Aceh due to the tsunami that accompanied the Sumatra Earthquake. In concrete terms, this includes an
explanation of the nature of the tsunami wave itself, which brought
destruction of structures and loss of human life, resulting in thecollapse of the family. In addition, in explaining the background to
this human catastrophe, the lack of a conceptualization of a tsunami following an earthquake, which is to say the lack of an earthquake-tsunami association, is pointed out.
Next, focusing on the reconstruction of housing, the investigation examines in detail the gaps between the reconstruction
schemes presumed by the governments and aid providers, bothrecovery and reconstruction, and the reality, and social causes forthe gaps. In this regard, four area-types of material and humandamage can be identified, each with its own reconstruction characteristics to address and each offering an example of why the reconstruction objectives were not met. Finally, the investigation offers
various factors of the Aceh context in explaining the slow pace ofreconstruction.
2. THE STATE OF DAMAGE
2.1 Topographical Conditions and the Characteristics ofDamageThe Banda Aceh Plain is an alluvial plain resulting from thedeposition of sand and soil mainly from the Aceh River, flowing
northward on a graben which was formed by movement of theSumatra Fault (Fig. 1). Focusing on the downstream areas, theplain is characterized by deltaic and tidal lowland in the westernpart of the Drainage Canal of Aceh River, and by distinct rows ofbeach ridges and swales in the eastern part. The elevation of theplain is 1-3 meters above sea level in the former, except for thehigher parts of natural levees along the present and abandoned
river channels, while the latter is low-lying, with a small sand dune
alongside beach ridges of 1-2 meters above the swale. This delta
emerged mainly as a wide tidal area spreading over the 1-2 kilometers to the coast, which, based on the topographical map made in
the 1940s, had given over to a widespread mangrove forest.
The older villages for the most part are located on slightly
higher places as natural levees, beach ridges and sand dunes. The
city of Banda Aceh was originally developed in an area with natur-

KEY WORDS: housing reconstruction, earthquake-tsunami association, disaster aid, reconstruction and prevention systems, interdisciplinary research,
Banda Aceh

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M. TAKAHASHI, S. TANAKA, R. KIMURA, M. UMITSU, R. TABUCHI, T. KURODA, M. ANDO AND F. KIMATA

Fig. 1 Topographical Diagram of the Banda Aceh Plain
The solid and lined frames indicate the extents of Figures 2 and 3, respectively
Drawn by Umitsu based on SRTM-DEM Data

al levees being bordered on the north by the tidal flats. However,as the land surrounding Banda Aceh City has continued changing,urbanization and sprawl into the flood plain and tidal flats hasbrought cutting of the mangrove forest and diversions in economic
activities such as pond cultivation and salt farming.
Based on Umitsu’s (Umitsu et al., 2007) estimation of thedirection and height of the tsunami by tracing marks of the waves
on the remaining structures, there is evidence of four specific characteristics of the three surges of the tsunami that began around 8:15
A.M. (see Fig. 2). The first is notable for the run-up flows that areconjectured to have caused more substantial damage than the backwash flows leaving little evidence. The second is based on themain tsunami run-up flows from the Benggala Straits, oriented
from a northwest to southeast direction. A nine-meter tsunami
advanced at the estuary of the Lhobi River through the Ulee Lheue
area, causing inundation 2-3 kilometers upstream in the city area ofBanda Aceh and leaving traces as far inland as 4-5 kilometers. The
third characteristic is the ease with which the tsunami ran upstream
for long distances, estimated as far as 8 kilometers, on the Aceh
River and the associated drainage canal. The fourth characteristic
focuses on the collision of water in the western part of the Aceh
Plain that occurred with another tsunami flow reaching from thewest coast of Lho’nga, through a 3-5 meter-high valley plain.
Looking at these traces in more detail, there is a slight difference that can be noted in the action of the tsunami reflecting thevaried conditions of the land between the western and the easternparts of the plain. Which is to say, in the western part of theDrainage Canal of Aceh River, the low-lying areas of fish/shrimp
ponds and lower-rise residences could not reduce the relatively
direct northwest to southeast wave action, and there was little
decrease in the height of the tsunami up to the very vicinity of thedowntown of Banda Aceh. On the other hand, in the eastern part,
there are numerous examples in which some beach ridges andremaining mangrove forests provided an obstacle to the tsunami,
reducing the wave height and breaking up the direction of flow.
2.2 The Geographical Differences in Tsunami Damage
Therefore, in terms of the human and material damage due tothe tsunami the geographical characteristics are such that a relatively larger area of damage can be noted in the western part of theplain (see Fig. 3). Overall, based on the statistics of the city government, approximately 71,000 of the registered population of
264,000 were dead or missing in Banda Aceh, with approximately
14,000 units of buildings totally destroyed and another 7,000 partially destroyed.
Assessing the damage to structures allows for a partitioning of
the region into four areas. Namely, there is a coastal area in which
virtually all buildings were almost completely destroyed, with partly-eroded land having disappeared (District I), an area facing
inland in which many if not most destroyed houses could be seen,
but where most of the structures remain (District II), an area thatwas inundated by water, without serious damage to buildings(District III), and an area that had no water due to the tsunami, andin which neither buildings nor humans were affected (District IV).

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Fig. 2 Directions and Heights of the Tsunami Flow in the Banda Aceh Plain
Drawn by Umitsu based on the field surveys

Fig. 3 Human and Material Damage due to the Tsunami Banda Aceh City
Based on the statistics of the city government of Banda Aceh

Specifically, the areas of greatest damage correspond to those thatwere being used in the form of fishing villages on coastal andriverside areas, and low-lying areas that had undergone urbanization developing residential districts.
It is difficult if not impossible to draw clear territorial boundaries of the area-types in the nature of complicated interrelationships between tsunami flows, local-scaled geographical conditions
including land uses and building structures, and degrees of damage.

As seen in Fig. 3, the extent of the heavily damaged area (DistrictI) corresponds approximately to the deep inundation area.
Meanwhile, the shallow inundation area that corresponds to theflood area represented also in several maps of the United Nations,and in which the water depth is estimated to be less than 3 meters
or so, seemingly contains both Districts II and III. In the built-up
areas of Banda Aceh City, for example, there is evidence that thelower the water depth was, the more easily the flow was decayed56

M. TAKAHASHI, S. TANAKA, R. KIMURA, M. UMITSU, R. TABUCHI, T. KURODA, M. ANDO AND F. KIMATA

by densely built structures including walls, buildings and embankments as well as micro-topographies, which subsequently saved thehuman lives behind them. As such, Districts II and III have intricate boundaries with each other, being subject to localized geographical conditions, even though it is conceptually possible todelimit them.
The tsunami height for these areas can be surmised as approximately three meters and over for District I, approximately 1-3
meters for District II, and less than 1 meter for District III. In addition, the human cost reveals an 80-plus percent death rate for thecoastal areas, countered by a gradually decreasing rate inland, withDistrict II having a 10-20 percent death rate, and almost no deaths
recorded for District III. Thus, the degrees of human damage, andmaterial damage as well, seem to decrease progressively with distance from the coast, with a key height of the water being 3 meters.
Furthermore, the damage that did occur in inland areas, especiallyin the vicinity of central Banda Aceh, was based on the locality ofthe descriptions of the characteristics provided above (for details,
see Umitsu and Takahashi, 2007).
2.3 Lack of Earthquake-Tsunami Association
According to the United Nations, the human loss due to theSumatra Earthquake totaled 165,000 lives in NAD Province. The
magnitude of this loss can be attributed not only to the size of thetsunami, but also to the lack of a disaster subculture that is associated with tsunamis. The notion of earthquake-tsunami
association (Tanaka et al., 2006), which is to say that after anearthquake, a tsunami is likely, is clearly not evident in local residents’ action. Tsunami, rendered as big wave in the Acehnese
language, Ie Beuna, had been largely forgotten. For this reason,
evacuation activity began only after the tsunami was witnessed byindividuals or confirmed by nearby cries of water is coming.
Furthermore, there were no community mechanisms for disaster
response. This is a critical cause of the increase of human loss. In
order to improve future disaster response, in addition to the introduction of tsunami warning systems and beach embankments andbuffering forests, the cultivation of a tsunami disaster subculture isimportant.
The processes of early evacuation lifestyle, recovery andreconstruction differed on the basis of the scale of damage. For themost part, the inundation damage sustained to structures in District
III allowed for comparatively rapid reconstruction, whereas inDistricts I and II, the region-wide destruction was in large partassociated with the disappearance of the land itself. Due to this,the survivors in Districts I and II, while unable to remain andrebuild on the site of their housing, were obliged to move temporarily to another area of undamaged land. For this reason, most
moved to evacuation shelters or IDPs (Internally Displaced
Persons) sites constructed on public lands in the southeast area ofthe city.
Each original community constructed its own tent village.
Although there were many inhabitants who evacuated to their relatives in distant locations, nevertheless, this option was unfeasible in
the long term and they came together in tent villages of originalcommunity members. Most evacuees also evacuated with nothing,
and therefore were totally dependent on the aid from outside organizations for a long period. In many cases, as Yamamoto (2007)
points out, some community leaders temporarily established an

emergency information site (Posko) to call in and arrange this aid,
which functions as a reception for outside organizations, and as an
information center for refugees. In this situation, contingent contact between voluntary associations and community leaders played
an important role in the tent villages.
The occurrence of family collapse brought by the loss of thekinship network destroyed the capability of self-help especially inDistrict I. Over the past thirty years, which is to say the period of
the Aceh Conflict, there has been a decline in the governing function of the local government, which, combined with the death fromthe tsunami of the mayor of Banda Aceh City and the governor of
NAD Province and the fact that government buildings also sustained tsunami damage, meant that government mechanisms did
not respond sufficiently. In this, the limited governmental aid forthe disaster was suspended, and the emergency provisions andmedical services provided by UN organizations, overseas governments and international NGOs emerged as fulfilling a vital role.
2.4 Damage Emerging in Families
In order to investigate how the geographic differences in thedamage affected the differences among social groups, a questionnaire survey was undertaken in December 2005, one year after thedisaster. The survey targeted four areas in District I sustaining relatively heavy damage (Ulee Lheue, Gampong Pie, Gampong
Blang, Lampulo) and three areas sustaining relatively light damage(Kueramat, Laksana, Punge Blang Cut), locations of which are
shown in Fig. 3, using the quota-sampling method, with one individual per household sampled, followed by an interview visit,
resulting in 127 responses. However, it must be noted that the estimation of the human damage is limited on the basis of such a small
sample-size available for those living at the time of the survey. In
some cases, all family members were casualties of the disaster or
had evacuated at the time of the survey.
Looking at differences in the scale of human damage on thebasis of gender and age, while there was no statistical difference
found on the basis of gender, there was a statistical difference indeath rates on the basis of age, with the 20-30 year old age grouphaving the lowest rate and the over-60 year old age group alongwith the under-10 year old age group having the highest rates.
Which is to say, death and harm is most prevalent among theyoungest and the oldest. In addition, the four areas of highest damage revealed a pattern of loss in family members in which the lossof a spouse was cited by 38 percent, whereas the loss of a child, aparent or a sibling was cited by 66 percent, 95 percent and 86 percent, respectively. These results show that changes in family scale
follow the severity of the disaster, as average family size in the
low-damage areas changed little, from 5.7 members to 5.0, whereas
in the areas of heavy damage, average family size decreased from
9.1 to 4.4. This dramatic reorganization in family structure andscale in these areas suggests the difficulty in securing the reemergence of the family unit as the fundamental unit in social life on the
one hand, while on the other the difficulty in securing private aid
from one’s kinship network in the restoration process. In thissense, the survivors in the heavily damaged areas face a two-folddeprivation (Table 1).

RESTORATION AFTER THE SUMATRA EARTHQUAKE TSUNAMI IN BANDA ACEH: BASED ON THE RESULTS OF INTERDISCIPLINARY

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Table 1 Changes of Family Structure before and after Tsunami.
Based on the Questionnaire Survey conducted in December 2005

Fig. 4 Changes in the Dwelling Places in Banda Aceh
Based on the Questionnaire Survey conducted in December 2005

3. RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS

3.1 Damage to Housing and Rebuilding as Restoration Process
The paper turns now to the Banda Aceh restoration process,focusing on consideration of the housing rebuilding process.
The housing reconstruction process after a disaster in the casewhere the house is totally destroyed usually follows a course thatbegins with emergency shelters, progresses to temporary housing,and finishes with reconstructed (permanent) housing. This processprogressed quite differently in the present case.
In the Sumatra Earthquake tsunami, in NAD Province andIsland Nias (hereinafter, Aceh and Nias), 500,000 people lost houses, meaning that from 80,000 to 110,000 new houses needed to bereconstructed (BRR, 2005). Just a few months after the disaster,
approximately 50,000 families were in temporary housing, with
67,500 families unavoidably living in tents.

3.2 One Year after the Tsunami
One year after the tsunami, despite the fact that it was estimated that 110,000 houses were needed (the BRR report of 2005
referred also to 120,000 houses), just 16,200 new houses wereavailable, with an addition 13,200 houses under construction,bringing the total to 29,400 housing units in Aceh and Nias.
As mentioned in the survey results, from the start of the disaster, few respondents were able to live in their own houses that had
been destroyed or inundated by the tsunami. Directly after theearthquake, those that had evacuated to mosques moved withinseveral days to the houses of relatives. However, two months after
the disaster, while some had returned to their homes, others werestill in tents, emergency temporary housing or rented housing.
However, looking at Fig. 4, with only 10 percent of demand for
emergency temporary housing having been met according to
respondents, the housing supply in this disaster response was insufficient. Although the results of this survey cannot be directly com-

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M. TAKAHASHI, S. TANAKA, R. KIMURA, M. UMITSU, R. TABUCHI, T. KURODA, M. ANDO AND F. KIMATA

pared, one year after the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake inJapan, nearly 80 percent of people had returned to their own
homes, with rental housing accounting for just 9.9 percent andemergency temporary housing just 6.3 percent, indicating that the
housing reconstruction in the Sumatra tsunami case was grossly
late (Kimura, 2006).
3.3 Regional Differences in Reconstruction Two Years after
the Tsunami
The scheme for earthquake reconstruction initiated after thedisaster, as shown in Fig. 5, shows that progress in infrastructuralprovision and housing reconstruction along with lifestyle and production activity-related reconstruction should be the focus of activity for the one to two-year period after the disaster.

Looking at the response after two years, according to the BRR
report (2006a), temporary housing accounts for 14,637 units, with
51,682 permanent housing units completed in Aceh and Nias. At
the beginning, 110,000 housing units were estimated as necessary,
thus two years after this prerequisite was established, and efforts
are 58,682 units short.
In the Banda Aceh case, what is notable is the regional configuration of housing reconstruction, as shown in Fig. 6. As could be
expected, in the areas that sustained large tsunami damage, there
are many houses constructed, however, it is necessary to consider
the overall progress. According to the BRR-RAN database, twoyears after the tsunami, Banda Aceh’s construction plan of 11,505
housing units has been yielding 8,777 houses, a progress rate of
76.3 percent. Looking at this figure in terms of the above figures

Fig. 5 Sequencing of Emergency and Recovery Effort (schematic)
Cited from BRR (2005: 8)

Fig. 6 Current Situation of Housing Reconstruction in Banda Aceh City
Based on BRR-RAN Database

RESTORATION AFTER THE SUMATRA EARTHQUAKE TSUNAMI IN BANDA ACEH: BASED ON THE RESULTS OF INTERDISCIPLINARY

showing approximately half the completion rate reveals an inconsistency, in which the city area of Banda Aceh has a high completion rate, whereas Aceh and Nias has an overall completion rate ofjust 48.3 percent. In September 2007, the housing construction
advanced to a progress rate of 79.9 percent in 13,900 planned housing units within the whole city. Although many areas of heavy
damage had come close to their goals, nevertheless, there wererather widened regional gaps in the progress.
A further problem is occupancy. According to our field surveys at Banda Aceh, in reality, the constructed houses appear complete from the outside. However, there are many empty houses
across the severely affected areas, and in some places the flooring,
windows and doors, electricity and sewers are not complete, contributing to the non-occupancy rates.
Based on classification of the tsunami damage into the four
districts, housing reconstruction process can be viewed as shown in
Fig. 7. Clearly, as time passes, the disaster areas represented inDistricts I, II, and III reflect large differences in reconstruction
processes.
3.4 Reasons for the Lateness of Reconstruction
What are the reasons for the slow pace of the reconstruction as
outlined above? This consideration is important in thinking about
the disaster reconstruction of developing countries in the future.
Four reasons can be outlined. The first reason, the magnitudeof the damage, is straightforward. In the case of Banda Aceh, theapproximately ten-meter tsunami occurred, in the face of whichhouses not built to Japanese earthquake resistant standards, such as
steel-reinforced concrete and block construction, were destroyed,
not to mention the loss of land mass. With this, prior to the reconstruction of housing, land boundaries, property rights and eligibility as well as inheritance and succession must be reestablished. In
addition to being an area where few records were kept, in this dis-

59

aster, the storage facilities for such records were inundated withwater, meaning that these tasks were unavoidably settled based oncompliance with customary law. At present, two years after thetsunami, while boundaries in 17,390 places have been establishedofficially (BRR 2006), the loss of community leaders who know
customary law means that this has taken longer than expected.
The second reason originates in the problem of the agent related to restoration. In the history of disasters, none is as large as theSumatra Earthquake in terms of international aid. Numerous countries around the world announced aid equaling in total 2.26 billion
US dollars (in reality, this came to 1.9 billion dollars), with nongovernmental aid equaling 4.2 billion dollars (Giradet, 2005: 2223). Along with this, overseas aid organizations centered on Banda
Aceh numbered 535 registered groups, according to, for example, a2005 April registration by UNOCHA office. Joining theIndonesian central government were United Nations organizations,foreign governmental aid organizations, and domestic and international NGOs of various sizes, all representing various sectors in
beginning aid operations in communities. The result, for example,in Lampulo Village, a site in District I, was 15 groups (foreign
governmental aid organizations: 3, UN organizations: 1, international NGOs: 10, private enterprises: 1) providing aid in supporting
efforts in restoration work on housing, infrastructural preparations,health and sanitation, and education (Suhirman, 2007). In thismanner, governments, United Nations, international NGOs, andother aid organizations each with different characteristics, scaleand objectives, besiege one community. This results in what canbe referred to as an aid bubble, particularly in the first year, andbrings difficulties in the regulations of these organizations.
Another problem is the collapse of regional government organs andthe resulting incomplete functions, meaning that the regulation
mechanism does not work in communities struck by large-scale
damage (Takahashi, 2007). The result is that in spite of the abun-

Fig. 7 Degree of Damages and Housing Reconstruction Process

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M. TAKAHASHI, S. TANAKA, R. KIMURA, M. UMITSU, R. TABUCHI, T. KURODA, M. ANDO AND F. KIMATA

dant aid resources that exist, from the point of view of intensive
and comprehensive reconstruction planning, there is confusion
about the process of determining appropriate measures.
The third reason is related to the lack and wasteful duplicationof reconstruction plans for the housing along with the lack of necessary resources. While reconstruction planning at the beginning
was a fixed, top-down master plan paralleled by an action plan for
implementation, there was a lack of core organizations andunavoidable changes in policy. This was then converted toCommunity-Driven Development at the community level.
Furthermore, in addition to complications in the reconstruction
plan, one dimension of the government related to main trunk lines
and roads, harbors and water and sewage service was not requestedof foreign aid or was requested too late. With this, external conditions could have little effect. Two years later, in severely damaged
residential areas within the city of Banda Aceh, internationalNGOs continue to supply water via water pump trucks.
The fourth reason is caused by market mechanisms.
Confronted with abundant finance provided by international aid
organizations for housing reconstruction came a steep rise in theprices of building materials, difficulty in securing housing materials, and freight congestion of import sites, as well as difficulty insecuring construction workers, and an increase in contract illegality
and abandonment. With this, cases of abandonment of construction partway are not uncommon, with many cases in which thetransfer is hardly completed between a constructor and an aidgroup. As a result, despite some progress in housing construction,
many cases of non-occupancy have arisen. As is common in casesof large-scale disasters, directly after the event, price gouging andfraud are frequent, but usually government organs are empowered
to monitor and the public sector is able to exert control over thismarket. However, in this case, one year after the disaster, prices
have increased 41 percent (BRR, 2006b), meaning these controls
have not been effective. Most likely, in addition to the non-functionality of government mechanisms, originally, a lack of publicbuilding standards and land use restrictions that are often seen indeveloping countries and avoidance of governmental intervention
into the market may be a compounding factor.
The background for the four direct reasons outlined above
point to a more fundamental problem. That is that along with theregional society and physical dimensions to the Sumatra tsunami
were also economic, social, governmental and cultural subsistencefoundations that collapsed. The tsunami disaster brought inDistrict I a breakdown of the family along with the destruction ofland and houses. With many cases of entire families perishing or
losing one or two members, it was not only that the family as a unit
was broken, but the wider network of relatives that the family waspart of was temporarily broken up (Tabuchi, 2006). Under this circumstance the autonomous and internal economic resources of thefamily for restoration are lost. As for the community as well, withstructural foundations such as mosques damaged and over 80 percent of the membership perished, community leaders could only reorganize the remaining members of their original village in the
shelter. Several months were necessary to realize the restorative
power again. Furthermore, as noted in this disaster, over 5,000
public servants of Aceh and Nias died, among them the mayor andthe governor. With the first floor of government facilities flooded,
many government documents were lost. The disaster collapsed

government structures capable of re-integrating the potential coherence of Acehnese society, and consequently there was little public
control to redistribute the economic capability of half the city area
(District IV) through market functions, for example. On the other
hand, GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka: Free Aceh Movement),
which had operated in the area of the Sumatra earthquake, and thegovernment were able to forge a peace agreement, ending a longcontinuation of hostilities and bringing a new formation of government organizations. In this way, with regional government organization collapse, the central government affiliated reconstruction
organization BRR (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi: Agencyof the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction for the Region andCommunity of Aceh and Nias) was established in April of 2005. It
is thus not difficult to see this emergency reorganization of regional society as an ideal example of the influence of cultural structured
coherence.
4. CONCLUSION
This research has shown: (1) the Sumatra Earthquake tsunami
disaster damage in Banda Aceh can be divided into four areas; (2)the tsunami action was directed left and right by the Banda Aceh
topography; (3) within which District I saw total destruction of
housing, a high death rate, and the collapse of families; (4) with thehigh death rate due to a lack of earthquake-tsunami association; (5)that even in the core of housing reconstruction, the pace is slow;(6) there are four main obstacles to housing reconstruction; (7) theslow pace of the reconstruction is a function of social causes related to the size of the tsunami, the lack of established adjustment
mechanisms for aid groups, the slow pace of the reconstruction insociety overall, and the failure of market functions; (8) that in thecase of large scale disasters, with the loss of life and homes, as wellas infrastructure, the collapse of society as an entity occurs as well.
This research has shown that while the focus in disasters is onsocial damage such as deaths and loss of homes, in the future, theaspect of social collapse must be a consideration of focus as well.
The reason is, in large-scale natural disasters in which a catastrophic breakup of the continuous relationship between society and thenatural environment occurs, the collapse of society must bringfocus on the disaster reconstruction and the process of reconstruction as a foundation in the re-emergence of a nature-society relationship.
In future, Japan’s function in developing countries, especiallyin Asian countries in which the establishment of disaster aid,
reconstruction and prevention systems will be of increasing importance. This means that interdisciplinary disaster research that comprehensively accounts for long-scale reconstruction processes in
addition to natural hazard itself, along with methods of foreign aid
is necessary in Japan.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We acknowledge the financial support of the Graduate Schoolof Environmental Studies and Nagoya University. We are also
grateful to Mr. Suhirman (Institute of Technology Bandung), Dr.
Helmi and Mr. Didik Sugiyanto (Syiah Kuala University) for theirassistance in the field.

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