Temporary Housing and Community Organization during a Disaster:Experiences before and after the Great East Japan Earthquake

Yasunori Saito
A large-scale disaster inevitably gives rise to the problem of housing reconstruction. Disaster victims usually movefrom shelters to temporary housing to permanent housing. These relocation processes not only displace them from
where they lived, but also sever their pre-disaster neighborhood relationships, which sometimes negatively affects
their mental health. Disaster studies in the US have tended to focus on pre-disaster social inequalities such as class,race, and ethnicity, which can affect post-disaster housing reconstruction. In Japan, unattended deaths in temporary
housing after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995 were seen as characteristic not only of existingsocioeconomic differences, but also of the future of Japan’s aging society. During reconstruction after the Great East
Japan Earthquake in 2011, disaster-affected local governments tried to move the same community into the same
temporary housing complex in order to avoid harming pre-disaster neighborhood relationships. However, at the sametime, the large-scale utilization of rental housing as temporary housing isolated many victims, cutting them off fromboth relief supplies and information at the beginning. Through a brief review of disaster literature in the US andJapan regarding temporary housing, this paper focuses on the post-disaster social processes of temporary housing
in terms of the decision-making of local governments regarding temporary housing management, the networking
between volunteer groups and nonprofit organizations for improved support and coordination, and the organizationof tenants’ associations for autonomous activities. I introduce three cases from Sendai, a city in Miyagi Prefecture,
in a latter section of this paper because Sendai was not only an area substantially affected by the tsunami, but also
the destination of many victims who evacuated from other areas. Because municipalities of a certain size, such as
Sendai, receive an inflow of evacuees in various situations, they will likely face similar problems in the event of largescale disasters in the future.

1 Disaster reconstruction and housing
It goes without saying that food, clothing, and housing are essential to everyday life-1-(Hayakawa 1997). However, when a serious natural disaster occurs, people in disasteraffected areas are deprived of these necessaries. Food and clothing are provided for freeby local governments or volunteer groups within a few days, and this is an important
aspect of the post-disaster gift economy (Nagamatsu 2008). In this phase, altruistic
activities such as volunteering and making donations complement the suspension of
productive activities by private companies.
On the other hand, repairing and/or rebuilding houses takes a long time, so
disaster victims have to stay in evacuation shelters for several days to several weeks,
and sometimes even several months. These shelters are used as schools or civic centersin normal times, and thus have limited individual living space. Therefore, due to a lackof privacy, some people choose to leave shelters and stay with their friends or relatives.
Local governments begin to build temporary housing soon after a disaster. Victims
are exempted from rent payments so that they may resume their household economic
activities. As for recent disasters in Japan, the average duration of stay in temporary
housing after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake was 5 years, and many victims of theGreat East Japan Earthquake are still in temporary housing as of this writing, 5 years
after the disaster.
In this way, victims move from shelters to temporary housing, and then from
temporary housing to permanent housing. Here I present three issues in relation totemporary housing by briefly reviewing some disaster literature from the US.
First, the above-mentioned transitional phases were explained in detail by
Quarantelli (1982), who divided the patterns of shelter/housing into the following four
categories: emergency shelters; temporary shelters; temporary housing; and permanent
housing. Among these, temporary housing includes mobile homes built by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, and rental apartments, for which victims are assistedwith federal housing aid. A similar system was also introduced on a large scale in Japanafter the Great East Japan Earthquake.
As Quarantelli pointed out, these phases are only ideal types for scientificconceptualization, and are not always followed in a linear, sequential fashion by thevictims. However, these conceptual phases function practically as a normative model of-2-housing reconstruction. Therefore, if victims opt out of this form of “single track housing
reconstruction” (Shiozaki 2009), they become latent and cannot be sufficiently
supported by local governments or volunteer groups. In relation to this, Tanami (2012)
described the living situations of victims who evacuated to outside Hyogo Prefecture
after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. Widespread evacuation after a large-scaledisaster makes victims invisible.
Second, disaster studies in the US tend to focus on social inequalities, particularly“how pre-disaster conditions affect the post-disaster recovery operation in housing”(Quarantelli 1982: 80). As for temporary housing, middle class victims tend to prefer tolive in mobile homes on their own property, while lower class victims are forced to livein mobile homes in trailer courts. On the other hand, upper class victims tend to favorliving in rental apartments. In the US, housing that is reasonable for lower class victims
is rare.
The situation is quite different between the US and Japan, but a similar income
gap was seen after the Great East Japan Earthquake between victims in temporary
housing and those in rental housing. According to an article in the Kahoku Shinpō
newspaper dated January 21, 2013, the average income of households in temporary
housing in 2011 was 2.2 million yen, while that of households in rental condos orapartments was 2.9 million yen. Therefore, victims who moved into rental housing by
themselves from the very beginning were wrongly regarded as “victims who did notneed temporary housing” because of their relatively high income.
Third, in the context of the psychosocial recovery of disaster-affected families,
Bolin (1982) showed that not only the number of times moving from shelter to shelteror shelter to housing, but also the duration of stay, might adversely affect the mental
health of disaster victims. He also pointed out that victims considered staying in trailer
courts to be a stressful experience. Gleser (1981) suggested that trailer courts should bearranged in accordance with pre-disaster neighborhood patterns in order to promoteemotional well-being and recovery while the government works to allot temporary
housing.
After the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the rapid deployment of temporary-3-housing resulted in the unattended deaths of victims. Therefore, the Japanese national
and local governments attempted to move the same neighborhood association into thesame temporary housing complex (referred to in this paper as the community-based
entry system), and sent medical and psychological professionals into these complexes to
examine the victims’ physical and mental health. Various volunteer groups and nonprofit
organizations (NPOs) also visited the victims to help them develop relationships witheach other.

2 Temporary housing in past disasters in Japan
History and system
The history of temporary housing in Japan can be traced back to the Great Kanto
Earthquake of 1923 (Maki 2012), which caused large-scale fires, especially in Tokyo
Prefecture, and led to the loss of more than 300,000 homes and the deaths of 100,000
people. After the disaster, Dōjunkai, a foundation incorporated to supply housing as anaffiliated organization of the Home Department, began to construct wooden barracks forthe victims. A total of about 2,000 barracks were built by Dōjunkai. These temporary
housing complexes were also equipped with welfare facilities such as a day care centers,
public baths, and clinics, which seemed to be influenced by social work theory andpractice that had flooded into Japan from Western countries at that time.
Temporary housing of this kind was also built during post-war reconstruction andin subsequent disasters such as the Great Niigata Fire of 1955 and the Ise Bay Typhoonof 1959. The Great Niigata Fire was the first case of adopting prefabricated temporary
housing, and the “prefab” subsequently went mainstream.
The Mt. Unzen eruption in 1991 and the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995
marked the turning point in terms of supplying temporary housing. After the Mt. Unzen
eruption, temporary housing units were provided by the government to all neighborhood
residents who were ordered to evacuate. Similarly, after the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake, all who lost their homes and wished to live in temporary housing were able
to do so, regardless of whether they were homeowners or renters before the disaster.
-4-Institutionally speaking, the supply of temporary housing is based on the Disaster
Relief Act enacted in 1947. The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW)
establishes temporary housing standards, and arrangements are handled on a prefecturallevel. In many cases, this prefectural authority is transferred to a municipality.
Temporary housing standards are as follows:(1) Temporary housing is provided to those whose home is completely destroyed
and who cannot pay for a new home by themselves.
(2) Temporary housing units have a total area of about 30 m2, and construction
costs must not exceed 2,400,000 yen per unit.
(3) Construction of temporary housing must start within 20 days after a disaster.
(4) Victims can live in temporary housing for a maximum of 2 years.

In relation to past disasters, these standards are flexible, as is their enforcement.
In addition, the following points are specifically considered. As for (1), city officials
cannot sufficiently check victims’ financial conditions and assess damage to their homes
in the confused environment after a disaster. Therefore, since the Mt. Unzen eruption,
all victims who wish to move into temporary housing are able to do so.
Regarding (2), temporary housing costs are higher in northern regions, wherecountermeasures against cold temperatures are needed. Indeed, after the Great East
Japan Earthquake, the average cost of a temporary housing unit in Miyagi Prefecture
was about 7,300,000 yen, which was about three times as much as the limit stipulated in
the MHLW standards.
Regarding (4), 2 years is considered an insufficient amount of time to finish
construction of public housing complexes or for victims to rebuild their own homes.
After the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, temporary housing deadlines were extended
three times due to delays in relocation to permanent housing. Similarly, after the Great
East Japan Earthquake, deadlines were extended several times due to delays in land
readjustment or decontamination.

-5-

Unattended death and the community
The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, a shallow 7.3-magnitude earthquake that had an
epicenter in a major urban area, struck the southern part of Hyogo Prefecture in the earlymorning of January 17, 1995. This earthquake completely destroyed 100,000 homes andled to the deaths of 6,400 people due to fires and collapsing buildings. This earthquake
was subsequently called an “inner-city disaster” because more than half of the dead were
low-income elderly living in decrepit wooden houses. The cutting off of water, electricity,gas, and traffic also made daily life inconvenient for several months. Kobe, a famous
industrial port city, the sixth-largest city in Japan, was severely damaged in thisearthquake.
Immediately after the disaster, there were 300,000 evacuees and a maximum of
1,000 evacuation shelters. Local governments quickly began to construct temporary
housing so that these shelters could be gradually closed. Although 48,000 temporary
housing units were built in Hyogo Prefecture (30,000 in Kobe), the needs of victims
were left unmet for several reasons.
First, many of the temporary housing complexes were located in the open spacesof suburbs distant from where victims used to live. In Kobe in particular, only 18 percentof the temporary housing units were built in developed areas. Second, the aged and thehandicapped were preferentially selected, and other tenants were chosen impartially. As
a result, temporary housing complexes tended to have primarily elderly populations withlow levels of social interaction, leading to a large number of unattended deaths(kodokushi).
A doctor who opened a clinic in a temporary housing complex in Kobe defined
kodokushi as the death of an elderly individual who was living alone in temporary
housing with no one to attend to them (Nukada 1999). However, this type of death was
not limited to the elderly. According to Nukada, middle-aged men living alone were also
at an increased risk of unattended death, especially when they were estranged,
unemployed, or had a chronic illness.
After the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, 233 unattended deaths occurred in
temporary housing over a 5-year period, and these types of deaths have continued in-6-disaster public housing.1 This demonstrates that people who are socially vulnerable
before a disaster become even more vulnerable after a disaster.
To resolve these problems, local governments decided to add a meeting place totemporary housing complexes, where neighborhood associations and volunteer groups
could hold exchange meetings and allow tenants to develop personal relationships witheach other. In the context of welfare administration, care workers in elderly welfare
facilities were appointed as life support advisors to consult with and provide assistanceto people in need of aid in temporary housing.
Community organization in temporary housing under these disaster-related
situations has been examined by Japanese sociologists. Shibata (1997) investigated theformation of tenants’ associations in temporary housing (kasetsu jichikai) and theirdemands for improved living environments to local governments. Based onquestionnaire surveys conducted on tenants, Noda (1997) showed that intimate
relationships were quickly made through activities in meeting places, and that the lively
activities of tenants’ associations contributed to the formation of relationships withneighborhood associations. Yamashita and Suga (2002) identified three types ofcommunity organizations taking initiatives in temporary housing: volunteer groups,
neighborhood associations, and tenants themselves.
Numerous studies have focused on early-stage relationships in temporary housing,while others have focused on the organization and development of volunteer groups.
Mitsui (2004) researched a volunteer group providing care for victims in temporary
housing 24 hours a day in order to prevent unattended deaths. Nishiyama (2005)
illustrated how handiwork by victims and volunteer groups developed into community
businesses and social enterprises by NPOs. However, few studies have focused on thetransformation of relationships among tenants in temporary housing and between tenants
and volunteer groups.

Making disaster-affected communities sustainable
The Chuetsu Earthquake struck the central mountainous region of Niigata Prefecture in
the evening of October 23, 2004. This 6.8-magnitude earthquake completely destroyed-7-

3,000 houses and killed 68 residents. Many roads were cut off by landslides, and 60
mountain villages became isolated, Yamakoshi Village in particular. The cutting off oflifelines and intermittent aftershocks caused up to 100,000 people to evacuate to shelters.
These shelters included not only public, but also private spaces such as sheds, garages,
and even cars. Evacuees living in cars led to the condition known as “economy classsyndrome” (i.e. deep vein thrombosis).
Immediately after the disaster, local governments began constructing 3,500
temporary housing units, which were subsequently in habited by 10,000 victims.
Considering the unattended deaths that occurred after the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake, local governments, focusing on pre-disaster relationships, acquired
temporary housing sites near where victims used to live, and attempted to move the same
disaster-affected community into the same temporary housing complex. This strategy
was enabled by the relatively small scale of the disaster, and the fact that it occurred ina mountainous region. Residents voluntarily offered sites for temporary housing byreconfiguring their land rights. Many of the temporary housing-related problems
experienced in 1995 were improved in the aftermath of this earthquake.
The reconstruction process from this earthquake has been described in detail, witha focus on the operation of shelters by neighborhood associations, the revitalization of
lives in mountain villages, and the dislocation from disaster-affected villages (Matsui2008). However, unfortunately, neither Matsui nor other sociologists mentioned
community organization processes in relation to temporary housing. Therefore,
medium- to long-term changes in the relationships among tenants could have been
overlooked.
Researchers in the field of urban management were the first to consider themeaning of the community-based entry system from the standpoint of personal
relationships, rootedness in the land, and the continuance of agriculture and forestry(Furuya et al. 2010). Researchers in this field also pointed out the closed nature,
exclusiveness, and mutual surveillance prevalent in community-based temporary
housing (Hasegawa et al. 2007).
Their findings are as follows. Even though complexes were located next to one-8-another, the tenants in each complex did not interact with those in others. All social
interactions were conducted within one complex. Meeting places were used exclusively
by a few groups of tenants, so it was difficult for others to form new groups. Tenants
who came from other areas tended to be isolated. Furthermore, deriving from their strong
ties, tenants worried to much about how they would be seen in the eyes of their neighbors.

3 Housing after the Great East Japan Earthquake
Complex disaster and widespread evacuation
The largest catastrophe to ever hit Japan occurred on the afternoon of March 11, 2011.
A 9.0-magnitude earthquake struck just off the Sanriku Coast, causing a tsunami morethan 10 meters high that subsequently struck the Pacific coast of Japan. The damage
from the tsunami was severe, especially in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures in
the Tohoku region. The tsunami not only killed residents along the coast, but also caused
a severe nuclear accident. A large-scale radiation leak occurred the day after the tsunami
at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant operated by the Tokyo Electric Power
Company. People living in the surrounding area were forced to evacuate, and most of
the area was declared off limits. This is why the Great East Japan Earthquake is called a“complex disaster.”In this disaster, 400,000 houses were completely or partially destroyed, and morethan 18,000 people were killed or missing. The cutting off of lifelines in many parts ofEastern Japan resulted in up to 400,000 evacuees. As of this writing, according to theReconstruction Agency, more than 180,000 people are still living as refugees, and they
will continue living in temporary housing for the foreseeable future because land
readjustment and decontamination projects are still in progress.
One of the main characteristics of this disaster was the evacuation of victims towidespread municipalities and prefectures. Many victims moved from stricken to nonstricken areas, primarily from coastal to inland areas. In several towns and villages inFukushima Prefecture, all residents were forced to evacuate to outside theirmunicipalities after the nuclear accident (Yamashita & Kainuma eds. 2012). For example,-9-many residents and the town office in Okuma Town relocated to Aizuwakamatsu City in
Fukushima Prefecture, while those in Futaba Town relocated to Kazo City in Saitama
Prefecture. However, due to the scale of the disaster, evacuees relocated to numerous
locations throughout Japan.
Widespread evacuations over prefectural and municipal borders were mostfrequently seen in tsunami-affected areas. Kesennuma City in Miyagi Prefecture decided
to construct temporary housing for its residents in neighboring Ichinoseki City, Iwate
Prefecture, because large flat lands suitable for housing construction were insufficientaround Kesennuma City.

% 0

-20

-40

Hirono
Kuji
Noda
Fudai
Tanohata
Iwaizumi
MiyakoYamadaŌtsuchi
KamaishiŌfunatoRikuzentakata
Kesennuma
Minamisanriku
Ishinomaki
Onagawa
Higashimatsushima
Matsushima
Rifu
Shiogama
Shichigahama
Tagajō
Sendai (Miyagino)
Sendai (Wakabayashi)
Natori
IwanumaWatari
Yamamoto
Shinchi
Sōma
Minamisōma
Namie
FutabaŌkuma
TomiokaNarahaHirono
Iwaki

20

-60

-80

-100
2005-20102010-2015

Source: National Census (2005, 2010, 2015)

Figure 1. Rate of population change in tsunami-affected municipalities

The large-scale utilization of rental housing as temporary housing contributed
greatly to widespread evacuation behaviors. In other words, as was the case withtemporary housing, victims could live in rental housing through public financeexpenditures. Consequently, they migrated into prefectural capitals because these areas
had a large supply of vacant housing; this largely contributed to the accelerated- 10 -

depopulation of disaster-affected municipalities (Figure 1).2

New trends in temporary housing
A total of 52,543 prefab temporary housing units were used after the Great East Japan
Earthquake (13,984 in Iwate, 22,095 in Miyagi, and 16,464 in Fukushima). Similar topast disasters, these units were mainly ordered from the Japan PrefabricatedConstruction Suppliers and Manufacturers Association (purehabu kenchiku kyōkai), a
general incorporated association composed of major housing manufacturers. However,unlike past disasters, a new trend that occurred after this disaster is that orders were also
placed with local construction companies that made wooden units using local lumber.
Though less than 7,000 units of this type were ordered among all three prefectures, thesewooden temporary housing units were more popular than prefab units among evacuees
due to their higher perceived livability.
Regarding the social aspects of temporary housing, reconstruction from the Great
East Japan Earthquake was said to have drawn on lessons learned from past disasters.
Post-disaster temporary housing policies were no exception. For example, supportive
officials from local governments that had faced serious disasters in the past advised
officials in disaster-affected municipalities to make use of pre-disaster neighborhood
associations and to form similar associations in temporary housing complexes. In
addition, in order to prevent unattended deaths like the ones that had occurred after theGreat Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the Democratic Party of Japan of the day establisheda governmental policy of moving the same disaster-affected community into the same
temporary housing complex, which had also been attempted after the Chuetsu
Earthquake.
It is true that tenants’ associations were organized in over 90 percent of temporary
housing complexes nine months after the earthquake, but the situations were quite
different between small fishing villages and large urban areas. For example, in the caseof Ishinomaki City in Miyagi Prefecture, which is famous for its fishing industry, close
relationships that existed before the disaster could be maintained because small coastal
villages such as Ishinomaki City were moved as a whole into small housing complexes.
- 11 -

On the other hand, large-scale complexes were composed of more than 1,000
housing units in urban areas, and tenants were chosen impartially by lot. This is partly
because city-dwellers had fewer pre-disaster relationships than villagers, but mainly
because city officials placed more importance on impartiality among the victims(interviewed in October 2014). Even if tenants’ associations were formed in suchcomplexes, they would typically lack collective unity.
As mentioned above, after this earthquake, victims who left shelters could enter
rental condos or apartments as well as prefab temporary housing. This system is called“minashi kasetsu,” meaning that these rental housing units were later regarded as
temporary housing units, or “kariage jūtaku,” meaning that victims could move into
rental housing units rented in advance by local governments. In March 2012, there werea total of 54,774 of these types of units in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures(Table 1).

Table 1. Characteristics of temporary housing after past earthquake disasters
Year

Prefab temporary housing
Number%Rental housing
Number%

The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake

1995

48,300

99.7

139

The Chuetsu Earthquake

2004

3,460

95.2

174

0.3
4.8

The Chuetsu Offshore Earthquake

2007

1,222

99.8

2

0.2

The Iwate-Miyagi Inland Earthquake

2008

73

77.7

21

22.3

The Great East Japan Earthquake

2011

52,54349.0

54,77451.0

Source: the Board of Audit (2012)

This was not the first time that rental housing had been used as temporary housing
after a disaster in Japan, but it was the first time that rental housing had been used onsuch a large scale. The number of units used after the Great East Japan Earthquake wassubstantially higher compared with past disasters. This was particularly true in Sendai
City, where the number of rental housing units reached 9,800, accounting for 80 percent
of all temporary housing in the city. This is largely because Sendai City was a primarydestination of evacuees from Iwate and Fukushima Prefectures, and therefore many
rental housing units were needed to accommodate this large inflow.
- 12 -

Such large-scale utilization of rental housing is planned for future disasters suchas a Tokyo inland earthquake or a Nankai Trough earthquake. The advantage of this isthat by using existing housing stock, no new sites are needed for building temporary
housing complexes, and thus housing can be supplied more quickly and efficiently tovictims. Then, what problems remain in terms of rental housing? As seen in experiences
after the Great East Japan Earthquake, it is difficult for tenants in temporary housing tointeract with each other because rental housing units scattered throughout areas caneasily become “unseen temporary housing” occupied by “unseen victims.”

NPOs and community-based welfare
After the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, 1995 came to be called “the first year of thevolunteer,” because more than 1.3 million volunteers gathered in disaster-affected areas.
Of course, not all volunteer activities in Japan started in 1995. As early as 1923, after
the Great Kanto Earthquake, university students participated in volunteer activities suchas the distribution of relief supplies and the preparation of evacuee lists; these types ofactivities subsequently developed into social work practices such as settlement
movements (Noda 1995). After World War II, some university students joined
workcamp in facilities for orphans, sick people, and the handicapped, and volunteer
associations were founded in various regions.
In spite of this history, the response to the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake wasan epoch-making phenomenon where a great many young people who had not been
involved in such activities began to take part in supplying food and water, teaching
children and helping them with their schoolwork, and providing mental care to victims
in shelters and temporary housing. Several researchers have described these activities asa “volunteer wave” or “volunteer revolution.”
Under these circumstances, in December 1995, the Japanese government
amended the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures with the following phrase:“development of disaster prevention activities by volunteers.” The government alsodecided in the middle of the 2000s that disaster volunteer centers should be set up bymunicipal social welfare councils in disaster-affected areas. Such institutionalization of- 13 -

volunteer activities has both positives and negatives; although it may be efficient to
prepare manuals for managing volunteer centers or to form networks beforehand in caseof disasters, face-to-face relationships between victims and volunteers in the disaster site
could be lost (Atsumi 2008).
Another way volunteer groups and civil activities were institutionalized was the
Act to Promote Specified Non-Profit Activities in 1998. Some groups from the National
Institute for Research Advancement (sōgō kenkyū kaihatsu kikō) and members from the
Coalition for Legislation to Support Citizen’s Organization (shimin katsudō o sasaeru
seido o tsukuru kai) had started to research public interest activities by citizens from thefirst half of the 1990s. The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake accelerated this movement,
leading to discussions with the Liberal Democratic Party regarding the legislation ofcivil activities.
After this act came into force, the number of NPOs steadily increased year by year,
eventually exceeding 40,000 in 2010. In addition, the government reformed the public
interest corporation system in 2008, and existing corporations/foundations became
general/public

incorporated

associations/foundations.

Both

NPOs

and

associations/foundations such as these played a major role in reconstruction after theGreat East Japan Earthquake.
The change of power to the Democratic Party of Japan in 2009 promoted
collaboration between government, companies, and citizens under the name of the “NewPublic.” This notion, influenced by the concept of New Public Management, implies thatcitizens are not only consumers, but also providers of public services. The Great East
Japan Earthquake led to an increase in the amount of subsidies and grants to NPOs, after
which, more than a few NPOs shifted from being charity-oriented to being businessoriented. It can be said that community businesses and social enterprises that attempt tosolve social problems utilizing a business model are currently in their heyday.
Meanwhile, because of not only the Long-Term Care Insurance System, but also
the newly enacted Social Welfare Act, the year 2000 marked a turning point in the sphereof social welfare. The Social Welfare Act attempted to shift welfare in facilities towelfare in communities, stating in the introduction that it would promote social welfare- 14 -

through community-based welfare.
Of course, this does not literally mean that community-based welfare began in
2000. Keeping in step with the aging society in Japan, from the 1980s to the 1990s,
welfare commissioners and neighborhood associations in various regions started
working on visitation activities and exchange meetings for the elderly in need of care,people with disabilities, and mothers raising children. Physical and mental conditions
known through prior visits were shared with professionals such as public health nurses
and welfare workers, and subsequent meetings included tea parties, lunch dates, andrecreational activities.
These social support networks were created within school districts, so the main
agents were neighborhood associations. However, participation in this type oforganization was steadily declining due to an increase in the number of elderly and twoincome households. Therefore, NPOs that engaged in welfare services and community
development gradually came to play an increasingly important role in these grassroots
activities as a pillar of the local community.

4 Case study: Temporary housing in Sendai City

- 15 -

Figure 2. Map of Sendai City

Coordination of support activities
The Great East Japan Earthquake caused serious human and material losses in the Sendai
metropolitan area, which is composed of 14 municipalities and has a population of morethan 1.5 million. Sendai is the capital city of Miyagi Prefecture and the largest city in
the Tohoku Region. It is home to numerous branch offices and subsidiary firms. In
Sendai alone, the tsunami after the Great East Japan Earthquake killed more than 900
people and completely destroyed about 8,000 houses in rural coastal areas in Miyagino
and Wakabayashi Wards (see Figure 2). The tsunami severely affected agriculture in the
Sendai Plain, one of the top rice farming areas in Japan.
In this section, I present a case study of Sendai City to examine the decisionmaking process of local governments and (support) activities for/by victims in
temporary housing.3 This case is particularly important because reconstruction processes
depend largely on regional characteristics and disaster situations, and because “just as
there is little understanding of the relationship of temporary sheltering to temporary
housing, there is a similar lack of knowledge about the connection of temporary to- 16 -

permanent housing” (Quarantelli 1982: 77).
Soon after the earthquake, the city government drew up the “Sendai City
Earthquake Disaster Reconstruction Plan,” and started construction of eight temporary
housing complexes in Miyagino Ward, nine in Wakabayashi Ward, and one in Taihaku
Ward. These complexes were to comprise 1,505 housing units. Based on experiences in
the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and the Chuetsu Earthquake, city officials worked
to enable the same tsunami-affected community to move into the same complex. The
city government initially chose tenants using a community-based entry system, but othertenants were later chosen from individual households. Therefore, the community-based
entry system was not used exclusively in this city as it was in other municipalities.
According to the city government, the number of temporary housing peaked at
12,009 in March 2012, comprising 1,346 prefab units, 825 public housing units, and9,838 rental housing units (Sendai City 2016). The reason why rental housing occupied
such a large majority of temporary housing in this city was that many people evacuatingfrom other areas moved into rental housing. The number of tenants in temporary housing
has gradually decreased due to their relocation to permanent housing (Figure 3).

14,00012,000825
789

10,000

737
711

680

8,000
6,000

390
9,838

9,140

8,476

7,714

4,000

7,201

350
251

6,264

5,815
4,214

2,000
0

1,346

1,263

1,170

1,086

1,020

843

771

March October
2012
2012

April
2013

October
2013

April
2014

October
2014

April
2014

Prefab temporary housing

Rental housing

192
3,746

544
402
October January
2014
2015

Public housing

Source: Sendai City (2016)

Figure 3. The number of temporary housing units in Sendai City

- 17 -

In Sendai City, each ward adopted a different principle of supporting victims in
temporary housing complexes. In Miyagino Ward, support activities were coordinatedby tsunami-affected neighborhood associations. In Wakabayashi Ward, two new
networks for supporting victims were organized through cooperation between volunteer
groups, NPOs, and government officials. On the other hand, in Taihaku Ward, which islocated in the inland and had no tsunami-affected areas, support activities werecoordinated by an NPO at an early stage, as services for tenants were outsourced by thecity government.
Let us now look at the case of Wakabayashi Ward. After the disaster, Sendai City
assigned six officials to Wakabayashi Ward to support the formation of tenants’
associations in temporary housing and the rebuilding of houses in tsunami-affected areas.
In addition, the ward government employed 10 part-time staff members and stationed
them in shelters and temporary housing complexes as caretakers. Their formal tasks
were limited to acting as liaisons with the ward government, overseeing the maintenanceof temporary housing units, and coordinating activities in meeting places; however, inpractice, they provided informal support to tenants’ associations and care to people inneed.
In addition, the Department of Community Development in this ward helped
volunteer groups and NPOs form a network called Rokugō Shichigō Comi-Net. Rokugō
and Shichigō are names of tsunami disaster-affected districts, and Comi-Net is acombination of community and network. From May 2011 to March 2015, this network
coordinated offers of support activities from groups in other areas, held exchange
meetings in temporary housing, and published booklets regarding history and tourism inthese districts (Saito 2015).
The Wakabayashi Ward Social Welfare Council also established “Roundtable
Meetings for Reconstruction (Fukkō no Wa Mītingu)” with volunteer groups, NPOs,
welfare commissioners, and welfare service suppliers, in which methods for supporting
victims in temporary housing, caring for tsunami-affected children, and promoting
community development around temporary housing complexes are discussed bi-monthly.
The reason why both Wakabayashi Ward and the Wakabayashi Ward Social- 18 -

Welfare Council created such a network was because from their standpoint, the Great
East Japan Earthquake and the subsequent emergence of numerous volunteers and NPOs
marked a turning point in regional revitalization and community-based welfare.
Therefore, these two public institutions became involved in organizing networks withthe expectation that they would become agents of community development in the near
future.
This leads to the following question: Were activities in temporary housing
complexes well-coordinated by officials, caretakers, associations and networks? Below
I summarize the trends among 3,101 activities that were carried out in temporary housing
complexes in Wakabayashi Ward from July 2011 to December 2012. These data wereoriginally compiled by caretakers in complexes in a report submitted to the ward office,so I analyzed it with ward officials. Although these data were not acquired through asociologically structured format, they do provide useful information regarding mediumterm changes in activities carried out in temporary housing complexes.
First, substantially more activities were carried out in large complexes than insmall ones, and in community-based complexes than in household-based ones.4 As
shown in Table 2, the number of activities per month was 64.6 in A complex and 54.0 in
B complex (both A and B were large-scale, community-based complexes). On the other
hand, the number of activities per month was 14.0 in C complex and 23.9 in D complex(both C and D were medium-scale, household-based complexes). As shown in Figure 4,
the number of activities steadily decreased in A complex, while the number of activities
in F complex remained at a low level. Unfortunately, insufficient data were collectedfrom the early stage for D complex, but the number of activities in D was thought tohave decreased, similar to the trend observed in A complex.

Table 2. Types of temporary housing and number of activities in Wakabayashi Ward

- 19 -

Maximum numberof households

Entry system

Number of activities
per month

A complex

197 community-based

64.6

B complex

194 community-based

54.0

C complex

95 household-based

14.0

D complex

92 household-based

23.9

E complex

90 mixture

19.0

F complex

24 mixture

2.9

G complex

19 household-based

1.7

H complex

15 mixture

2.3

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

A complex

D complex

F complex

Figure 4. Number of activities in selected temporary housing complexes from July
2011 to December 2012

Second, comparing activities in 2011 with those in 2012, changes were seen inboth the temporary housing activity content and providers. As shown in Figure 5, theproportion of “health exercises or consultations” and “hobby activities” increased, whilethat of “distribution of relief supplies” and “teaching children” decreased. The increaseof “health exercises or consultations” represents tenants’ concern with unattended deathsin temporary housing, and that of “hobby activities” means the development of personal
relationships among tenants. Regarding providers, an increase in the percentage of“tenants themselves” seemed to complement the decrease in “volunteer groups/NPOs”(Figure 6). It can be said that activities by the outside of temporary housing promote- 20 -

those by tenants themselves.

0%

20%

2011

11%

15%

2012

12%

11%

40%

10%

11%

60%

16%

10%

80%

20%

100%

17%

29%

7%

4%1%6%

10% 2% 8%

Atonomous activities

Yearly events

Distribution of relief supplies

Health exercises or consultations Teaching children

Exchange meetings

Hobby acitivities

Disaster/fire prevention

Other

Figure 5. Types of activities in temporary housing

0%

20%

2011

17%

2012

21%

40%

9%

12%

60%

80%

100%

41%

17%

16%

30%

25%

12%

Local governments

Private companies

Tenants themselves

Other

Vounteer groups/NPOs

Figure 6. Activity providers in temporary housing

Problems in rental housing
As mentioned above, this was not the first time that rental housing had been utilized as
temporary housing. Some 170 units were provided for victims after the Chuetsu
Earthquake in 2004. Since then, a number of prefectures entered into agreements withthe real estate industry regarding the utilization of rental housing in the case of a largescale disaster. These agreements included items such as the provision of information on- 21 -

and the free intermediation of rental properties.

Table 3. Temporary housing in the disaster-affected prefectures
Prefab temporary housing
Number%Rental housing
NumberPublic housing%

Number

Total%

Iwate Prefecture

13,984

73.8

3,722

19.6

1,236

6.5

18,942

Miyagi Prefecture

22,09544.5

26,050

52.5

1,507

3.0

49,652

Fukushima Prefecture

16,46438.1

25,002

57.9

1,746

4.0

43,212

Total

52,54347.0

54,774

49.0

4,489

4.0

111,806

Source: the Board of Audit (2012)

After the Great East Japan Earthquake, the MHLW issued several notifications
regarding the flexible enforcement of the Disaster Relief Act. They expanded thenumber of rental housing units that could be used as temporary housing and declaredthat rental housing entered arbitrarily could be retroactively regarded as temporary
housing. In the beginning, the disaster-affected prefectural governments of Iwate,
Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures thought that rental housing could be used tocomplement temporary housing in case of delays in the construction of temporary
housing. However, contrary to the expectations of officials, rental housing eventuallyaccounted for over half of all temporary housing in the three prefectures (Table 3).
In Sendai City in particular, rental housing accounted for almost 80 percent of all
temporary housing because abundant rental condos and apartments were available.
However, the city government was late in assigning these 9,800 units as rental housing.
In fact, it was not until 6 months after the earthquake that the headquarters for disasterreconstruction in Sendai City knew the complete picture.
At the time, inequalities in support between victims in temporary housing andthose in rental housing became evident. What was the nature of these inequalities? In
temporary housing complexes, tea parties and recreational activities were held weekly,
and necessities such as food and clothing were distributed free of charge by NPOs andother companies. The meeting places for those in temporary housing were stationary
bases. On the other hand, even though NPOs and companies also wanted to support
victims in rental housing, they were unable to do so because they did not know where- 22 -

such victims were located. This is the problem mentioned above of “unseen victims in
unseen temporary housing” (Saito 2014).

A victim who lived in rental housing looked back on those days as follows:“…(n)eighborhood relationships were quite changed by my moving into a
rental housing unit. When I went to a tea party in a temporary housing
complex, a tenant said to me, ‘This event is only for tenants in this complex,
not for people in rental housing.’ Tenants in the complex looked united, so
I hesitated to join their groups.” (interviewed in March 2014)

Similarly, another victim said:“…(v)ictims in rental housing seemed rejected by those in temporary
housing. No one from temporary housing has ever asked me to ‘Please join
our tea party.’ People sometimes say that wealthy people prevented othersfrom moving into rental housing, but they are mistaken. There were plentyof relief supplies in temporary housing. I wanted to go there to get some,but I couldn’t.” (interviewed in September 2011)

To address this situation, the city government conducted a door-to-door survey on
the needs of victims in rental housing, and requested that the Sendai City Social Welfare
Council, an organization affiliated with the city government, develop a support program.
As a result, the Sendai City Social Welfare Council, which was subsidized by thegovernment and employed about 40 staff members, established the Community Mutual
Support Center (Chiiki Sasaeai Sentā) in December 2011.
The role of this center included providing information on the distribution of relief
supplies and visiting activities to the elderly, the handicapped, middle-aged individuals
living alone, and single-parent families in rental housing. Therefore, in Sendai City, theCommunity Mutual Support Center was put in charge of supporting tenants in rental- 23 -

housing, while each ward government was put in charge of supporting those intemporary housing.
In addition, in cooperation with welfare commissioners, neighborhood
associations, volunteer groups and NPOs, the Community Mutual Support Center held
monthly tea parties for the elderly living in rental housing in various locations of the city.
It also held specialized exchange meetings for evacuees from a certain area, for example,
a tea party for the former residents of Kesennuma City, Minamisanriku City, andFukushima Prefecture. This was because widespread household-based evacuees fromthese areas needed a place where they could be acquainted with one another.
In contrast, tenants in rental housing lacked stationary bases that could be used asmeeting places for activities, and therefore seldom formed groups of their own. In a few
cases, the formation of groups was the result of organization by women’s pre-disaster
networks. It seems evident that all-purpose organizations such as neighborhood
associations had difficulty in seizing the initiative in coordinating the different needs
between victims in temporary housing and those in rental housing.
Here, I take up the case of Wakamatsukai, a group founded in September 2011 by
women in their 40s and 50s who had lived in the Arahama area, Shichigō District, andentered rental housing for fear that their children and the elderly in poor health would
cause trouble to others in temporary shelters. Limiting its membership to victims living
in rental housing, they held weekly study sessions for children and tea parties for theelderly with support from NPOs and private companies. The number of members grew
to about 150, and membership was expanded to evacuees from other areas. The leadersof WakamatsuKai said, “We wanted to hold events similar to those in temporary housing
complexes” (interviewed in February 2014).
While the activities in temporary housing were to a certain degree managed by
officials and caretakers, the tenants in rental housing still had to manage activities bythemselves. Although they received some subsidies for their activities from the ward
government, these funds were not enough to rent a stationary base. This represented aconstraint condition for victims in rental housing in that they lacked a venue for their
publically assisted activities.
- 24 -

Victim-designed care system and public housing
The first temporary housing complex in Sendai City was completed in Taihaku Ward inlate April 2011, which was as early as a month and a half after the earthquake. Taihaku
Ward itself had no tsunami-affected areas, but a large-scale open space, named “Asuto
Nagamachi,” had been reserved for urban redevelopment. City officials decided to build
the first complex there due to convenient transport and the proximity of largecommercial centers.
However, at the beginning, the Asuto Nagamachi Temporary Housing Complex
was “unattended temporary housing” because it was located right in the middle of anurban redevelopment area, so tenants could not depend on neighborhood associations
for support, and because officials in Taihaku Ward, divided between the city and ward
governments, were behind the curve on the improvements required for temporary
housing environments.
At first, similar to other complexes, tenants were selected using the communitybased entry system; however, contrary to the expectations of city officials, the number
of applicants for this complex was very small. Moreover, in spite of the communitybased entry system, relationships were not rooted in pre-disaster communities, but
fostered in evacuation shelters. The number of community-based households waslimited to 37, while the remaining 200 households did not know each other's faces until
the entry into temporary housing.
As a result, relationships became unstable more or less because wealthy people
who had more stable lives and poor people who had problems such as social withdrawal
and mental disorder came to live together in this complex. Trouble seemed to occur
between next-door neighbors one after another. The chairman of the tenants’ association
reported that, “This complex looked like a slum at that time” (interviewed in December2013).
Facing these troubles, people who moved into the complex through thecommunity-based entry system took the initiative in organizing a tenants’ association.
The formation of numerous hobby groups such as the exercise club, the karaoke club,- 25 -

and the handicraft club, contributed greatly to this organization process. Eventually,
more than 10 clubs were organized in this complex, all of which were made by theirwills or based on the advice of outside volunteer groups; the number of members
belonging to each club ranged from five to 20.
By naming these groups “clubs,” leaders of the association attempted to makeactivities in temporary housing visible to those who had not joined, and to make thesesmall groups related to one another. The informal organization of hobby groups
complemented the formal organization of the tenants’ association, which reminds us of
Granovetter’s famous proposition, “the strength of weak ties” (Granovetter 1973).
The tenants’ association, named the “Asuto Nagamachi Temporary Association,”
officially launched in March 2012. It was rare after the Great East Japan Earthquake that
this kind of association was organized by the initiative of tenants rather than by theactivities of the local government or the utilization of pre-disaster neighborhood
associations. The chairman of the association promised its members that unattended
deaths in the complex would be prevented, and that the path from temporary topermanent housing would be determined. These two declarations became the primary
missions of the association (Saito 2016).
First, from the beginning, services were provided for tenants by an NPO
composed of support groups for the handicapped and homeless. Utilizing the Emergency
Job Creation Program of the MHLW, this NPO, which aimed to support victims’
livelihoods through employment, enlisted 50 victims to work as temporary housing
complex supporters. These supporters visited victims’ homes and checked theirconditions every day. These services enjoyed a good reputation among the tenants.
However, as is often the case with civil activities, this NPO gradually changed its
direction from supporting victims’ livelihoods to supporting the employment of needy
people in general, so the number of supporters and their visits to victims’ homes
gradually decreased beginning in 2012. To compensate for the reduction in these
activities, the leaders of the association had to construct a care system on their own.
Through consultations with medical and psychological professionals, they set up a healthcounseling program, including mental health, in cooperation with local hospitals and- 26 -

universities. They also began holding a monthly care conference on the physical andmental conditions of tenants with officials from the Taihaku Ward Healthcare Center.
Second, leaders of the association started to consider where victims would live
after they left temporary housing, as more than 70 percent of the residents were 60 yearsof age or older, and 40 percent in the Asuto Nagamachi Complex were single elderly
individuals. In addition, more than 50 percent of the residents were unemployed (Arai2015). Judging from their social and economic stratifications, their choices of residence
after temporary housing were limited solely to disaster public housing. According to thechairman, their slogan was “Let’s move into disaster public housing together.”At the same time, some evacuees from other areas wanted to maintainrelationships through the activities of the hobby groups mentioned above. This isbecause they could not return to where they had lived before disaster due to delays inland readjustment or decontamination. However, after the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake, tenants in disaster public housing were selected by lot, and relationships intemporary housing were cut off. Therefore, the leaders began to discuss the ideal
conditions of disaster public housing complexes in consideration of the decision processof tenants.
Usually, officials from the Department of City Planning make a plan for public
housing after a disaster based on the Act on Public Housing, so it was unusual in thiscase that the victims did so themselves. This is because the city government only
proposed a method for part of the disaster public housing complex, and decided topurchase complexes constructed by private companies.
Supported by architectural professionals in local universities and design offices,
some 90 tenants in the complex discussed layouts of public housing dwelling units anda meeting place for half a year or longer, and then submitted to the city government their
original plan, which considered the formation of face-to-face relationships from thestandpoints of those who had lived in temporary housing for a few years.
Though their proposal was not ultimately accepted, it was decided that threedisaster public housing complexes would be built in the Asuto Nagamachi area near theirtemporary housing complexes by private companies. The tenants’ group therefore- 27 -

changed their policy from the planning of disaster public housing to the decision processof tenants, requiring city officials to allow groups composed of several households in
temporary housing to enter the same disaster public housing complex together. As aresult of their organization and the subsequent introduction of a community-based entry
system, similar to that used in temporary housing, more than 60 households moved into
three complexes in Asuto Nagamachi.

5 Conclusion
Temporary housing became a social problem in Japan in the 1990s after a seriesof unattended deaths occurred in the aftermath of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.
In these serious situations, disaster-affected local governments placed staff such as life
support advisors in temporary housing complexes, and volunteer groups started visiting
activities and exchange meetings. These systems and practices were also successful indisaster public housing complexes.
Other local governments facing subsequent disasters took advantage of theselessons as a model of supporting victims in temporary housing. They even went further
and made it possible for disaster-affected neighborhood associations to move into thesame complexes, in an attempt to maintain the continuance between pre- and postdisaster communities. However, unattended deaths in temporary housing still occurred
after the Great East Japan Earthquake, numbering as many as 200 over a 5-year period.
The above-mentioned cases in Sendai City seem to raise some questions aboutcommunity organization in temporary housing.
First, it is impossible for local governments to fully implement a communitybased entry system, particularly in urban areas. Hence, complexes composed ofhousehold-based evacuees inevitably appear. Even if a community-based entry system
is implemented, cases in which multiple communities in the same complex come into
conflict with each other over rules such as trash disposal and automobile parking willarise, and in turn, the solidarity of pre-disaster communities will deteriorate because ofdifferences toward the way of housing reconstruction. From this standpoint, the- 28 -

community-based entry system is no more than a presupposition.
It is true that many problems can occur in a large-scale complex, but this does notmean that a small-scale complex is without problems. Large-scale complexes tend tohave many more activities than small-scale complexes because volunteer groups andNPOs are more inclined to visit large-scale complexes. Then, do tenants in small-scalecomplexes feel isolated because they have limited opportunities for interaction with eachother? Even though support activities by volunteer groups and NPOs are coordinated by
officials, caretakers, and support networks, there is a limit to this coordination because
it is not easy to change the targets of support activities.
Second, the Japanese government plans to utilize rental housing on a large-scalein future disasters because urban areas have many vacant apartments but space available
for the construction of temporary housing is limited. However, conflict did occur
between victims in temporary housing and those in rental housing over the unequal
distribution of relief supplies after the Great East Japan Earthquake. Evacuees from otherareas were, in a sense, forced to be “refugees” because they had neither relationships nor
information in an unfamiliar place. Therefore, countermeasures for these types ofconflicts and problems in temporary housing need to be examined in advance.
In addition, a controversy regarding “performance in kind or cash benefits” beganwith the utilization of rental housing as temporary housing. This is partly because
administrative processes were delayed in Miyagi Prefecture due to the enormous number
of applications from victims, and partly because housing aid to needy people came to be
discussed. However, the question remains whether rental housing supplied to disastervictims and housing aid given to needy people should be discussed in relation to one
another.
Third, regarding the community-based entry system, what exactly does“community-based” mean? Does it refer to post-disaster associations or groups formedin temporary housing, as well as pre-disaster neighborhood associations? If so, it is also
necessary to consider using the community-based entry system for disaster public
housing complexes. It is true that victims live in temporary housing just temporarily, butthey live not only in housing, but also in a local community in which their housing is- 29 -

located. Although disaster public housing tenants are impartiality selected by lot in manycases, policies should be implemented that encourage the maintenance of relationships
fostered in temporary housing.
By the way, in the evening of April 14, 2016, a big earthquake occurred in
Kumamoto Prefecture, the middle part of Kyushu region. In this area, earthquakes arewrongly thought to be infrequent regardless of existence of active faults, so houses andbuildings got behind in earthquake-resistant construction. A 6.5-magnitude foreshock
and a 7.3-magnitude main shock hit mountainous villages as well as residential suburbs.
This Kumamoto Earthquake severely damaged more than 10,000 houses and killed 50
residents as of this writing. The latter figure includes deaths by “economy classsyndrome” seen in the Chuetsu Earthquake in 2004.
In disaster-affected areas, disaster volunteer centers were set up by municipal
social welfare councils, and a lot of volunteers and nonprofit organizations are heading
there to support victims’ lives. Because of the delayed construction of prefab temporary
housing (which is scheduled to be completed in the middle of June), Kumamoto
Prefecture decides to provide victims with rental housing for free as in the Great East
Japan Earthquake in 2011, and some prefectures of Western Japan with their public
housing. The estimated number is: 2,100 prefab temporary housing units, 2,100 rental
housing units, and 2,700 public housing units (of course, this figure is in flux).
It is certain that victims had better move from shelters to temporary housing assoon as possible under the intermittent aftershocks. However, at the same time, I'm afraidthat these ad hoc housing reconstruction policies would accelerate widespread
evacuation of victims and harm their pre-disaster neighborhood relationships. After theGreat East Japan Earthquake, those who evacuated from other areas could easily become“unseen victims” in unfamiliar places or scattered rental housing, and constructing
relationships between them and their supporters demanded a large amount of time. We
should remember that the number of disaster-related deaths is larger than that of deaths
directly by disaster in Fukushima Prefecture in the context of the widespread evacuation
after the nuclear accident.

- 30 -

Notes1

Disaster public housing is a kind of public housing, but the eligible for moving in it arelimited to disaster victims. The rent of disaster public housing is lower than that of public
housing in general.
2

Due to the nuclear plant accident, Namie Town, Futaba Town, Ōkuma Town, Tomioka

Town, and Naraha Town were designated as restricted area, the rate of population change
from 2010 to 2015 recorded -100.0%. In Naraha, residents started to return to theirhometowns since September 2015.
3

My fieldworks in Sendai City started in June, 2011, including community work intsunami-affected areas as well as research and study about the social process of disasterreconstruction. The following case study is based on them.
4“Household-based” means that victims evacuating from various areas individually

moved into temporary housing, not collectively.

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- 34 -