BRIEFING PAPER

APRIL 2023

CHALLENGING JAPAN'SPROMOTION OF AMMONIA
CO-FIRING FOR COAL POWER
GENERATIONLEO ROBERTS, HANNA HAKKO, YOKO MULHOLLAND,KATRINE PETERSEN , CAMILLA FENNING, AND
CHRIS LITTLECOTTThe Japanese government and industry are championing cofiring of ammonia in coal-fired power plants as a supposed
climate mitigation solution. This approach promotes uncertain
future technology options with limited feasibility, while delaying
the clear-cut policy actions required now to phase out coal
power plants. Ammonia co-firing in coal plants is inconsistent
with pathways to keep global temperature rise below 1.5 °C, andrisks undermining the clean energy transition in Japan andSoutheast Asian countries.
This briefing gives an overview of the detrimental climate and economic impacts
of co-firing ammonia with coal for electricity generation. It identifies thearguments used by pro-coal interests to promote the technology and provides
recommendations for robust response.

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CHALLENGING JAPAN’S PROMOTION OF AMMONI A CO-FIRING FOR COAL POWER
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Summary Co-firing of ammonia in coal-fired power plants has limited emissions
reductions potential, cost competitiveness and technical feasibility. It ishighly unlikely to be deployable at sufficient scale, speed, cost, and carbon
intensity to contribute materially to the decarbonisation of the power sector
and limiting emissions in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement. Its active
promotion by Japan risks delaying deployment of existing commercialised
and scalable zero-emissions options, including wind and solar.
 Ammonia co-firing is unlikely to contribute to Japan’s key objective ofimproving its energy self-sufficiency by reducing its heavy reliance on
imported fossil fuels for power generation. Due to the high price of domestic
ammonia production, Japan would still need to depend heavily on imports.
 Japan’s promotion of ammonia co-firing risks delaying increased deploymentof renewables and the necessary phase-out of coal power generation.
Instead, it focuses attention on incremental emission reductions that allow
incumbent private sector stakeholders to continue operating existing coal
power plants, while seeking to maintain markets for legacy technology
exports and service contracts.
 The focus on ammonia co-firing is the latest stage of Japan’s long-term
promotion of so-called “clean coal” technologies. This approach has
repeatedly pursued pilot scale projects for technologies that will at best offer
incremental reductions in emissions. These projects serve as a delaying tactic
by proclaiming a potential alternative technology future instead of pursuingstringent policy requirements to reduce emissions in line with the Paris
Agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5 °C.
 Promotion of ammonia co-firing risks extending the operational lifetime ofcoal plants and increasing their life cycle emissions in Japan and Asia,
especially in the absence of firm policies to impose emission reductions orclose coal plants.

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CHALLENGING JAPAN’S PROMOTION OF AMMONI A CO-FIRING FOR COAL POWER
GENERATIONHeadline recommendations
 Ammonia co-firing should not be considered an effective emission
abatement technology. Definitions of abatement1 should be maintained asinterventions that substantially reduce the amount of greenhouse gas
emissions emitted throughout the life cycle, such as carbon capture andstorage (CCS) capturing 90% or more CO2 emissions from power plants, as
defined by the IPCC.2
 Given the limitations and risks of pursuing the approach, governments
should act early to rule out ammonia use in co-firing with coal.
 If countries still pursue the approach despite its risks, strong regulatory
frameworks are necessary to ensure any potential consideration of ammonia
for co-firing includes an assessment of the lifetime emissions from coal
power plants and the life cycle emissions of ammonia production fromdifferent feedstocks, as well as its transport and storage, and that these arealigned with the Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5 °C.
 Co-firing should be excluded from the scope of multilateral financing tools
for the power sector. Safeguards must be put in place to ensure any co-firing
retrofits do not lengthen the operational lifetime of the targeted power plantor expand its life cycle emissions.
 Due to the high costs of producing green ammonia, its use should be
strategically prioritised for those sectors where it can have the greatest
climate benefit. The promotion of ammonia for co-firing creates furtherpressure on the ammonia supply chain and risks slowing down emissions
reduction in other sectors.
 To ensure that any production and utilisation of ammonia is aligned with
1.5 °C goals, governments and international institutions should instead workto establish robust standards, including:•

Focusing international cooperation around green ammonia on sectors
where it can provide greater proven climate benefit than in co-firing, suchas to decarbonise fertiliser production and hard-to-abate sectors.

•

Ensuring that robust carbon intensity standards are created for ammonia
production and supply chains, incorporating full life cycle emissions.

1 E3G, 2021, Explained: what does ‘unabated coal’ mean?
2 IPCC, 2023, Synthesis Report of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6)3CHALLENGING JAPAN’S PROMOTION OF AMMONI A CO-FIRING FOR COAL POWER
GENERATION

Japan’s co-firing promotion: domestic context
 The Japanese government promotes ammonia as a fuel for “zero-emission
thermal power” and a route to carbon neutrality. It subsidises technology
development by domestic utilities and power plant manufacturers, many ofwhom have then included co-firing in their decarbonisation strategies. Thishas been met with criticism from local civil society organisations andresearch institutions.3
 Japan has long promoted “clean coal” technologies, such as IGCC (integrated
coal gasification combined cycle), CCUS (carbon capture, use, and storage)
and USC (ultra-supercritical) coal power technology. Out of these, only USC
power plant technology is in wide use today. These “high efficiency” power
plants emit 15–30% less CO2 per kWh generated than a subcritical coal power
plant.4 The Japanese government and industry emphasise the supposed
benefits of this increased efficiency improvement, but do not consider the
lifetime emissions of CO2 from coal power plants – the ultimate metric thatmatters for climate impact.
 These technologies have not realised Japan’s goals of reducing emissions
from power generation. Instead, Japan’s national greenhouse gas
inventories have attributed most of its emission reductions in the power
sector to the deployment of renewables and nuclear power, and reduced
power demand by improved energy conservation.5
 Coal plays a key role in Japan’s energy security policy. Japan relies onimported fuels for 84.8% of its energy needs6 and considers coal as having
the least geopolitical risk. This belief perpetuates (despite the consequencesof Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for coal supply chains) and has not
significantly shifted towards the need for greater domestic power
generation. However, ammonia co-firing is unlikely to support Japan’s
energy self-sufficiency. Due to the high price of domestic ammonia
production, Japan would need to depend heavily on imports, which presents
energy security risks in volatile international markets.7

3 Kiko Network, 2021, Hydrogen and ammonia co-firing in the power sector: Japan is choosing to expand

fossil-fuel extraction and perpetuate coal and LNG
4 IEA, 2020, The role of CCUS in low-carbon power systems.
5 National Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan, 2022, Japan’s National Greenhouse Gas Emissions in

Fiscal Year 2020 (Final Figures)
6 METI, 2022, 2021 – Understanding the current energy situation in Japan (Part 1)
7 BloombergNEF, 2022, Japan’s Costly Ammonia Coal Co-Firing Strategy

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CHALLENGING JAPAN’S PROMOTION OF AMMONI A CO-FIRING FOR COAL POWER
GENERATION There is a pervading view in parts of Japan’s leadership that the country has
limited potential for renewables and thus will continue to need fossil fuels.
However, several well-grounded studies show Japan can replace coal withcleaner solutions by 2030 or 2035. Notably, a recent study from Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory demonstrates Japan can achieve 90% clean
power in 2035 by focusing on renewables and nuclear while phasing out
coal.8
 Japan’s recent Green Transformation (GX) Basic Policy statements onammonia co-firing do not currently set out regulatory frameworks thatdefine which ammonia feedstock will be used or how life cycle emissions will
be assessed. Nor is there consideration of how ammonia co-firing will reduce
emissions in line with Japan’s commitment, through the G7, to achieve “afully or predominantly decarbonised power sector by 2035”, or its own net
zero emissions target for 2050. It would be necessary for Japan to establish
strong regulations to manage life cycle emissions of ammonia in the power
sector in order to ensure climate benefits.

Japan’s 2023 G7 Presidency: promotion of ammonia co-firing
met with pushback from G6 governments
Japan has promoted ammonia co-firing through its G7 Presidency including
seeking text in support of ammonia and hydrogen in the G7 Climate, Energy
and Environment Ministers’ Communiqué. During the negotiation of thetext other G6 governments pushed back on this pro-ammonia promotion,
particularly the UK, Canada and France.9,10 Ultimately, this resulted in
explicit caveats and restrictions regarding the potential use of ammonia in
the final communiqué.
The discussion of ammonia in the communiqué starts by stating thathydrogen and ammonia should be used where “impactful as effective
emission reduction tools to advance decarbonization across sectors andindustries, notably in hard-to-abate sectors in industry andtransportation.” The other members of the G7 included this example tounderline that they do not see ammonia co-firing as an effective use.
8 Shiraishi, Park, Abhyankar, Paliwal, Khanna, Morotomi, Lin, Phadke, 2023, The 2035 Japan Report:

Plummeting Costs of Solar, Wind, and Batteries Can Accelerate Japan’s Clean and Independent Electricity
Future9 Nikkei Asia, Japan’s Coal Tech for Asia Questioned by U.K. and Canada, 2023
10 Reuters, G7 Ministers to Offer Cautious Backing of Japan’s Climate Strategy, 2023

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CHALLENGING JAPAN’S PROMOTION OF AMMONI A CO-FIRING FOR COAL POWER
GENERATIONThe communiqué then states that countries exploring the use of “hydrogenand its derivatives” (which includes ammonia) to achieve “zero-emission
thermal power generation” will only do so if “this can be aligned with a
1.5°C pathway” and the G7’s “collective goal for a fully or predominantly
decarbonized power sector by 2035”.11 This places stringent requirements
on any potential use of ammonia for co-firing with coal by Japan, as amember of the G7.
Additionally, the communiqué reaffirms “the importance of developing
international standards and certification including for a GHG calculation
methodology for hydrogen production.”
Despite these conditionalities, Japan’s post-Ministerial press releases haveframed the reference to ammonia for the power sector as a win for theirpromotion of the approach.12,13
The discussion of ammonia co-firing in the G7 negotiations highlights how
strongly Japan is seeking to promote it as a supposed decarbonisation
option, and that other governments needed to be proactive in pushing backagainst its misuse as a delaying tactic. Similar efforts will likely be requiredin other diplomatic forums.

Japan’s co-firing promotion: shaping Asia’s
decarbonisation pathway through equipment exports>

Internationally, Japan is actively promoting ammonia co-firing as adecarbonisation strategy for Asian countries. It argues that the region has alarge and young fleet of coal power plants that will continue to be required
for reliable baseload power,14 given perceived limitations in renewables
potential and poor grid connections. However, International Renewable
Energy Agency (IRENA) modelling shows that Southeast Asia has vast

11 G7, G7 Climate, Energy and Environment Ministers’ Communiqué, 2023
12 Sankei Shimbun, 2023, Coal-fired power generation, G7 adopt joint statement without specifying whento end, 2023 (In Japanese)
13 DW, 2023, G7 Ministers Pledge to Speed Up Clean Energy Transition
14 Nikkei GX, Interview with Chairman of the Federation of Electric Power Companies, 2023. Note: theChairman stated that “Considering that we are a member of Asia, fossil fuel-based thermal power, including
coal, is highly important.”

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renewable resources and that, with significantly upscaled investment andpolicy,15 a majority renewables-based power system is feasible.
>

Japan is supporting its industry to shape power sector decarbonisation in
Asia. Through its Asia Energy Transition Initiative (AETI), the government has
committed 2 trillion yen ($15.2bn) to develop and export new energy
technologies, including for ammonia co-firing.16 Many public and private
MoUs have been signed to study and implement ammonia co-firing incountries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand, Viet Nam, the Philippines,
Laos, Malaysia, and India. A few projects have also been started outside Asia,
such as Morocco and Chile. Japan’s promotion of ammonia co-firing inSoutheast Asia risks increasing fossil fuel lock-in in the region.

>

The promotion of co-firing benefits Japanese industry interests, such as
those of boiler manufacturers Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and IHI, by
creating a market for their co-firing equipment and justifying the lifetime
extension of existing coal power plants which use their technologies, thereby
resulting in continued contracts for servicing and maintenance.

>

Japan uses high-level diplomatic engagement to promote its co-firing
strategy. In March 2023, Prime Minisher Kishida’s Asia Zero Emissions
Community (AZEC) initiative convened ASEAN (minus Myanmar) andAustralian ministers, who released a joint statement that “hydrogen andammonia can play a significant role in decarbonising thermal power
generation”, and announced 28 new MoUs between Japanese and Southeast
Asian businesses on technology development, including for ammonia.17,18

 The promotion of co-firing aims to facilitate Japanese industry leadership in“new” technology markets, as an alternative to the renewables market
where Japan has so far not established itself as a major force.19 However,Japan has a major opportunity to become a global leader in renewables
deployment. The Global Wind Energy Council expects the country to become

15 IRENA & ACE, 2022, Renewable energy outlook for ASEAN: Towards a regional energy transition (2nded.), International Renewable, Energy Agency, Abu Dhabi; and ASEAN Centre for Energy, Jakarta
16 METI, 2021, Minister Kajiyama announced the Asia Energy Transition Initiative (AETI)
17 METI, 2023, Asia Zero Emission Community Joint Statement, 4 March 2023
18 METI, 2023, List of MOUs (AZEC Public Private Investment Forum)
19 Recent announcements show the Japanese private sector is not only looking to export expertise andequipment on the co-firing process itself, but also on the wider ammonia supply chain, including shipping,storage and production. See Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, 2023, MOL Concludes MoU on Building Clean
Hydrogen/Ammonia Value Chain in Thailand and Splash 247, 2023, Mitsubishi Joins the Japanese Rush to
Develop Ammonia Bunker Vessels for examples

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one of the world’s top markets for floating offshore wind,20 and Japanesecompanies are building up expertise to deliver on renewables targets.21
Prioritising a positive regulatory environment for renewables would provide
greater opportunities for Japanese industry as well as much greater climate
benefit for Japan than pursuing co-firing of ammonia.
>

Despite joining the 2021 G7 commitment to end international finance tounabated coal power, Japan’s public financial institutions remain open tofinancing co-firing related projects overseas. If this support materialises, itwould run counter to Japan’s G7 commitment.

Prioritising the use of green ammonia>

Ammonia production today is a highly emissions-intensive process. The
current global production of 185 Mt of ammonia is responsible for 1.3% of
CO2 emissions from the energy system, as almost all of it is produced using
coal or gas. Around 70% of ammonia is used for fertilisers, and the rest forindustrial applications such as in plastics. The IEA Ammonia roadmap
highlights that it is one of the most emissions-intensive commodities
produced by industry; nearly twice as intensive as crude steel production,and four times more than cement, on a direct CO2 emissions basis.22 As such,the priority for any investment in green ammonia production (producedwith renewable electricity) should be replacing current fossil-basedammonia to meet existing demand.

 Beyond decarbonising existing ammonia demand, green ammonia represents
a considerably more cost-effective pathway to emissions reductions in nonpower sectors than for use in co-firing. Green ammonia can replace fossil
fuels in hard-to-abate sectors where electrification may be challenging, suchas heavy industry like cement, steel or plastics, shipping and aviation.23 For
example, ammonia could be used in industrial furnaces, or as fuel for
maritime transport.24 Technology development for green ammonia use could
be effective in these hard-to-abate sectors where other low-emission options
are limited and costly.

20 Global Wind Energy Council, 2022, Floating Offshore Wind – A Global Opportunity
21 Reuters, 2023, Japan's JERA to buy Belgium's top offshore wind company for $1.7 bln
22 IEA, 2021, Ammonia Technology Roadmap Towards more sustainable nitrogen fertiliser production
23 TransitionZero, Coal-de-Sac: the role of advanced coal technologies in decarbonising Japan’s electricity

sector, 2022, p.16
24 The Royal Society, 2020, Ammonia: zero-carbon fertiliser, fuel and energy store

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CHALLENGING JAPAN’S PROMOTION OF AMMONI A CO-FIRING FOR COAL POWER
GENERATION Japan’s promotion of ammonia for co-firing would lead to increased
demand for ammonia, which would make it more challenging to decarbonise
existing production and prioritise its use in hard-to-abate sectors. Analysis by
IGES estimates that Japan would need 20 million tons of ammonia toimplement 20% ammonia co-firing in all its existing coal plants, equal to thetotal amount of ammonia currently traded internationally.25

Technology challenges of co-firing coal with ammonia
 Co-firing in power production can involve various fuel combinations, forexample coal and biomass, or gas and hydrogen. Ammonia is touted as a“low-carbon fuel” because it does not result in direct carbon emissions at the
point of combustion.26
 Co-firing 20% ammonia with 80% coal is seen as technically feasible, butcurrent projects are still in the demonstration phase and not yet
commercially operational. The most well-known is Japanese utility JERA’s
government-supported pilot project, which aims to introduce 20% ammonia
co-firing in its Hekinan 4 coal power unit in 2023.27 In the future, Japan aims
to demonstrate 50% co-firing rates, and ultimately 100% ammonia power,
but the economic and technical feasibility of this is questionable.
 The IEA sees negligible potential for ammonia co-firing to contribute toemission reductions from the global coal fleet. In its analysis, emissions cuts
will instead be achieved by a combination of repurposing coal power plantsfrom baseload to peaking operation; early retirements; replacement withclean energy; and to a small extent continued operations following the
integration of CCS (carbon capture and storage) retrofits.28

25 IGES, 2022, Japan’s Coal “Fade-out” and Decarbonisation Policy
26 TransitionZero, 2022, p.12
27 JERA, 2022, JERA and IHI Move Up the Start of Large-Volume Co-firing of Fuel Ammonia in the

Demonstration Project at Hekinan Thermal Power Station
28 IEA, 2022, Coal in Net Zero Transitions, p.66

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Emissions implications of ammonia co-firing
 The life cycle emissions implications of ammonia co-firing depend on:
I. the feedstock used to produce ammonia
II. the availability of abatement methods for both carbon dioxide andmethane emissions (in the case of fossil-derived feedstock)
III. the co-firing ratio of coal and ammonia in the electricity generation phase
IV. the potential extension of the operational lifetime of the power plant tocover the cost of investment.
 Ammonia can be sourced from various feedstocks and processes. However,the production process can result in significant carbon emissions. The main
production process involves combining hydrogen and nitrogen using thehighly energy intensive Haber–Bosch process, where the hydrogen can derivefrom different feedstocks. Most ammonia currently produced is grey
ammonia, derived from hydrogen produced from fossil gas. Blue ammonia isalso made using gas-based hydrogen, but with integrated carbon capture andstorage (CCS). Green ammonia is produced using hydrogen resulting fromelectrolysis of water powered by renewable electricity.
 Blue and green ammonia are often discussed as equivalent low-carbon fuels,
however upstream methane emissions leakage from fossil gas production
may mean blue ammonia would still be responsible for significant
emissions. International standards for green and low-carbon hydrogen andammonia do not yet exist.29
 The direct emissions reductions of ammonia co-firing in electricity
generation are extremely limited compared to replacing coal withrenewables, or zero emission flexibility solutions such as battery storage orsmart demand response. The IEA’s 2021 Net Zero scenario assumes gridemissions must be below 138 gCO2/kWh by 2030 globally, but co-firing fails
to bring emissions even close to this level. A coal plant with 20% ammonia
will emit five times more (693 gCO2/kWh), and even a plant with 50% cofiring would emit three times (434 gCO2/kWh) the IEA NZ benchmark.30
According to analysis by Bloomberg NEF, a coal power plant retrofitted to

29 APEC, 2022, Low-Carbon Hydrogen International Standard – Post-Workshop Report
30 TransitionZero, 2022, p.8

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co-fire ammonia at 50% or lower blend rates still emits more CO 2 than anatural gas-fuelled combined cycle power plant.31
 Any potential marginal emissions reductions from ammonia co-firing are
insufficient in both scale and speed to contribute to the timely pursuit ofpower sector decarbonisation. Ammonia co-firing should not be consideredan effective abatement option in the absence of a regulatory frameworkthat would guarantee sufficient emissions reductions and rule out theextension of power plant lifetimes.
 The full life cycle emissions of ammonia co-firing must be accounted for inany plans to deploy it. The life cycle emissions of ammonia production vary
greatly depending on the feedstock used. For example, grey ammonia
produced from unabated coal contains embedded emissions equivalent todouble the emissions associated with the direct combustion of coal.32 Even
with the use of blue or green ammonia, the production process of ammonia
and carbon-intensive maritime transport and storage could still result infurther increases in life cycle emissions.33,34 The high energy content losses
involved in the different stages of the conversion process and combustion
also mean any ammonia use for producing electricity is highly inefficient.35
 If ammonia is produced using currently common fossil-based methods, themarginal emissions reduction achieved in Japan at the point of combustion
would be more than negated by increased emissions in ammonia-producing
countries like Australia, constituting an export of emissions.36
 Decarbonising the power sector requires the phase-out of unabated coal
power in OECD countries by 2030 and globally by 2040, and of unabated gas
by 2035, bringing emissions from the power sector to net zero, to be in linewith IEA’s Net Zero scenario.37 Promoting ammonia co-firing in coal plants

31 BloombergNEF, 2022, Japan’s Costly Ammonia Coal Co-Firing Strategy’, p.1
32 TransitionZero, 2022, based on IEA, 2021, The Role of Low-Carbon Fuels in the Clean Energy Transitionsof the Power Sector
33 The combustion of ammonia may also increase nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions. While initial simulation

studies suggest this could decrease as the ammonia share rises, above 40% co-firing unburned ammonia can
produce PM2.5 when it reacts with sulphur dioxide (SO2).
34 TransitionZero, 2022, p.21
35 TransitionZero, 2023, Japan’s Toxic Narrative on Ammonia
36 Stocks, M., Fazeli, R., Hughes, L. and Beck, F. J., 2022. Global emissions implications from co-combusting

ammonia in coal fired power stations: An analysis of the Japan-Australia supply chain, Journal of Cleaner
Production, Volume 336.
37 IEA, 2021, Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector

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increases the risk these plants stay online beyond these timelines, without
any regulatory requirements to reduce emissions or shut down.
 A 20% or 50% ratio of co-firing achieves much less emission reduction thandirect use of CCS in power generation, which typically aims to remove 90%
or more of the emitted CO2.38 The UK government has recently consulted on
proposals to amend the capacity market to require gas power plants to meetan emissions level of 100g/kWh from 2034 onwards, to deliver power sector
decarbonisation objectives. The UK calculates that this would be achievablewith a minimum capture rate of 73%.39 Power plants in receipt of financial
incentives for CCS would aim for substantially higher levels of CO2 capture.
 The effective deployment of CCS at scale would be an essential prerequisite for developing low-carbon ammonia from the most commonly usedfossil fuel feedstocks. CO2 has been captured from ammonia production sites
since the 1980s, principally for use in enhanced oil recovery.40 However, the
IEA notes that permanent storage of the CO2 is not yet widely adopted.41 In
Japan, a recently announced project aims to pilot the production of ammonia
with CCS from 2025, but would produce just 500 tonnes of ammonia a year. 42

The poor economics of ammonia co-firing
 Recent BloombergNEF analysis found that co-firing with high ratios of blue
or green ammonia is more expensive than renewables. Making cleanammonia co-firing at a 20% blend rate economically viable would require acarbon price of at least $300/tCO2 in 2030.43 The Japanese government isplanning to adopt a carbon levy for power producers from 2028 as part of its
GX policy, estimated to be in the range of $8–12/t CO2.44 If Japan persists in
implementing carbon pricing at such slow pace and low price level, it will not
impact sufficiently on incumbent emitters to drive a change in approach.
 TransitionZero similarly found that shifting from conventional coal power to
20% ammonia co-firing would double fuel costs, even when using the
38 MIT, 2021, How efficient is carbon capture and storage?
39 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy,

2023, Capacity Market 2023: strengthening security of supply and alignment with net zero
40 Bellona, 2016, Why deeply decarbonising fertiliser manufacture needs CCS
41 IEA, 2021, Ammonia Technology Roadmap
42 Ammonia Energy Association, 2023, Small-scale CCS ammonia in Japan
43 BloombergNEF, 2022, Japan’s Costly Ammonia Coal Co-Firing Strategy, p. 11
44 Influence Map, 2023, based on REI, 2022. Policy overview: carbon taxes and levies, Diamond Online(2022).

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cheapest ammonia (grey).45 They estimate that, overall, grey ammonia costs
four times as much as coal, and green ammonia 15 times as much. In
addition, using green electricity directly is much more efficient thanconverting it into hydrogen or ammonia and then back into electricity.
 Ammonia co-firing is promoted with a claim that it would only require limited
retrofitting to convert existing coal units. However, differing plantconfigurations can change the economics of projects considerably.46
Japanese power companies often cite the ability to use existing coal assets asa reason for pursuing co-firing,47 which can be seen as an attempt to avoid
stranded assets. However, in scenarios where the majority fuel use remains
coal, there would also need to be consideration of CCS retrofit in order toachieve sufficient emission reductions. Industrial interests promoting
ammonia co-firing are in part seeking to avoid the cost and complexity of CCS
retrofits.

Recommendations
 Ammonia co-firing should not be considered an effective emission
abatement technology. Definitions of abatement48 should be maintained asinterventions that substantially reduce the amount of greenhouse gas
emissions emitted throughout the life cycle, such as CCS capturing 90% ormore CO2 emissions from power plants, as defined by the IPCC.49
 Given the limitations and risks of pursuing the approach, governments
should act early to rule out ammonia use in co-firing with coal.
 If countries still pursue the approach despite its risks, strong regulatory
frameworks are necessary to ensure any potential consideration of ammonia
for co-firing includes an assessment of the lifetime emissions from coal
power plants and the life cycle emissions of ammonia production fromdifferent feedstocks, as well as its transportation and storage, to ensure any
co-firing policies are aligned with achieving the goals of the Paris of limiting
warming to 1.5 °C. Co-firing should be excluded from the scope ofmultilateral financing tools for the power sector, along with other fossil fueloptions. In cases where its inclusion is unavoidable, safeguards must be put
45 TransitionZero, 2022, p.19
46 TransitionZero, 2022, p.22
47 JERA, 2022, Corporate Profile
48 E3G, 2021, Explained: what does ‘unabated coal’ mean?
49 IPCC, 2023, Synthesis Report of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6)13CHALLENGING JAPAN’S PROMOTION OF AMMONI A CO-FIRING FOR COAL POWER
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in place to ensure the co-firing retrofits do not lengthen the operational
lifetime of the targeted power plant or expand its life cycle emissions.
 Due to the high costs and energy intensity of producing green ammonia, its
use should be strategically prioritised for those sectors where it can havethe greatest climate benefit. These include decarbonising existing ammonia
demand for fertilisers, which is currently highly emissions intensive, anddecarbonising hard-to-abate sectors. The promotion of ammonia for co-firing
creates further pressure on the ammonia supply chain and risks slowing
down emissions reduction in other sectors.
 To ensure that any production and utilisation of ammonia is aligned with
1.5 °C goals, governments and international institutions should instead workto establish robust standards, including:•

Focusing international cooperation around green ammonia on sectors
where it can provide greater proven climate benefit than in co-firing, suchas to decarbonise fertiliser production and hard-to-abate sectors.

•

Ensuring that robust carbon intensity standards are created for ammonia
production and supply chains, incorporating full life cycle emissions.

About E3GE3G is an independent climate change think tank with a global outlook. We workon the frontier of the climate landscape, tackling the barriers and advancing thesolutions to a safe climate. Our goal is to translate climate politics, economics
and policies into action.
E3G builds broad-based coalitions to deliver a safe climate, working closely withlike-minded partners in government, politics, civil society, science, the media,
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More information is available at www.e3g.org
Copyright: This work is licensed under the Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 License. © E3G 2023

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