Housing Recovery Patterns of the 1995 Kobe Earthquake victims:
results from 1999 Hyogo random sampled
Reo KIMURA, Haruo HAYASHI, and Shigeo TATSUKI
Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Japan
Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, Japan
Department of Social Work, Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan
reo@drs.dpri.kyoto-u.ac.jp, hayashi@drs.dpri.kyoto-u.ac.jp, tatsuki@gold.ocn.ne.jp

Abstract
Based on a Random sampling Survey on the “Individual Recovery Processes from the 1995
Kobe earthquake disaster”, people in the impacted area can be divided into four subgroups
depending on the severity of housing damage and their life stages. An 80% of the victims
whose own housing were severely damaged or collapsed were forced to relocate to various
kinds of temporary housing arrangements before they could eventually come home. At 10thhour , about half of those who lost their houses evacuated to emergency shelters , then asked
their family and relatives for the provision of temporary housing arrangements at the 100thhour. At the 1,000th hour, company own housing facilities (In-Hyogo) and private rental
housing units(Out-Hyogo) became more popular housing arrangements. and the usage ofgovernment-supplied free temporary housing was as low as just 3 %. The need for
information regarding housing damage peaked at the first one week after the earthquake, andnearly half of the victims made up their minds with regards to where they live within one
month after the earthquake.
Introduction
In Japan, mitigation has traditionally been the major focus of disaster reduction until the 1995
Kobe earthquake disaster. Mitigation is a strategy that prevents damages by means offorecasting natural hazard, elucidating its mechanism, and constructing disaster-resistant
structures. However, the Kobe earthquake disaster revealed that Japanese mitigation
programs were not good enough to prevent the society from severe damages. As a result,Preparedness has been receiving increasing attention since the 1995 Kobe Earthquake

Disaster for effective emergency response, relief, and recovery. Preparedness is a strategy
that minimizes the resulting damages by increasing community resilience.
In order to improve preparedness, disaster researchers, management practitioners andpolicy makers need to shed light on the nature of societal vulnerability and resilience along
the course of disaster process.
To make human behavior under the extreme conditions more intelligible, researchers needto start with accumulating tacit knowledge about disaster processes among the people in theimpacted area after disaster. Then we analyzed and synthesized these accumulated tacitknowledge to transform them into explicit knowledge in a form of coherent theoreticalframework concerning human behavior and societal reactions following disaster. Thisapproach is Disaster Ethnography (Hayashi and Shigekawa, 1997).
As a result obtained from ethnographic researches of the 1995 Kobe earthquake, it was
found that the people would experiences several qualitatively different phases along with thechronological development after the event (Aono et al., 1998; Tanaka et al., 1999).
The first phase may be characterized as "Disorientation" phase, where the people in theimpacted area could barely grasp what happened to them right after the event, which lasted
for the first 10 hours. The second phrase may be called as the phase where the systematic
response and recovery processes start, which lasted for the first 100hours after the event.
The fourth phase may be characterized as “Reconstruction” phase.
It should be noted that there are phase boundaries at the 10th, 100th, and 1,000th hour after
the event. In summary, the People would experience qualitatively different phases alongwith the logarithmic time development.
purposeThis questionnaire was designed to be a test of those hypotheses derived from ethnographic
study of the 1995 Kobe earthquake to provide the quantitative estimates for next majordisaster.
In particular, this paper deals with four major questions with regard to factors determining
the patterns of changes in residence among the victims of the 1995 Kobe earthquake. Thoseare 1) what factors, such as demography, housing, economic, and occupational damages,
played a major role in determining changes of residence; 2) when, to where and how many
people change their residence; 3) when people needed the information about the safety for
dwelling and/or about repair or reconstruction options; and 4) when people actually makedecisions with regard to repair or reconstruction plans. In order to answer the above
questions, a random sample mail survey was conducted in March of 1999.
Methodsubjects

Table 1. Sample subjects

Building Damage
Fully Damaged-Burned
Half Damaged-Burned
Partially Damaged
No Damage

In-Hyogo-Prefecture Residence(N=2,500, or 0.3% of total
population, 741,261 households)

Out-of-Hyogo-Prefecture
Residence (N=800, or 13.6% of total
population, 5,866 subscribers)

Random Samplingfrom 250 points
with a seismic intensity of 7andwith a more than two month
cut-off from the city gas
supplyRandom Samplingfrom the subscriber's list
for a newsletter aimed
for Out-of-Hyogo residing
earthquake disaster victims

Table 2. Flame of the questionnaire
10 hours

100 hours

1000 hours

Ⅰ

Ⅱ

Ⅲ

Ⅳ

Disorientation

Cognition of
the new realities
created by thedisasterFormation of
the provisionalsociety

Reentry to
the routinesof everyday life

On that day
Jan. 17, 1995

Few days
after
Earthquake

SARIN gas attack
on TOKYO subways
on Mar. 20

The first
summer after
Earthquake

When, which phase, and to where di d you change in residence ?
When did you need the information about the safety for dwelling and/or about repair
or reconstruction options ?
When did you actually make decisions with regard to repair or reconstruction plans ?

A random sample mail survey was conducted with 3,300 earthquake disaster victims (the headof a household) who experienced severe life difficulties due to the 1995 Kobe earthquake.
We sampled our subjects as widely as possible from the 1995 Kobe Earthquake Disastervictims to obtain scientifically valid knowledge about the patterns of changes in residence andsocio-economic rehabilitation of individual disaster victims.
The sample consisted of two groups, as Table 1 shows. One group consisted of those whostayed within Hyogo prefecture after disaster (In-Hyogo Group): A total of 2,500 In-Hyogo
residents were sampled based on two-step stratified random sampling method from thoseresidents of the areas with JMA(Japanese seismic intensity scale) 7 or those with the cut-off
of city gas supply for more than two months.
The another group consisted of those who left Hyogo prefecture after the earthquake(Out-of-Hyogo Group): A total of 800 Out-of-Hyogo sample were randomly selected fromthe subscribers' list for the Hyogo Government newsletter targeted for Out-of-Hyogo
earthquake victims.
The data from the In-Hyogo group can provide quantitative estimates about the volumes of
emergency management services because this group is a representative sample of the allheavily damaged areas due to the earthquake and its secondary influence.
In contrast, the data from the Out-of-Hyogo group should be interpreted with caution
because of the possible biases that we could get the access only to those newsletter
subscribers who tend to keep their wishes to come back to Hyogo prefecture if possible.
QuestionnaireThis questionnaire was designed to be a test of those hypotheses derived from ethnographic
study of the 1995 Kobe earthquake to provide the quantitative estimates for next majordisaster. These time points were found to correspond with critical boundaries, which
segmented phases of the disaster victims' behavior.
Based on the findings from ethnographic study of the 1995 Kobe earthquake victims, thisquestionnaire was designed to inquire about how the people in the impacted area chose theirplace and type residence in their recovery at each of phases segmented by the 10th, 100th, and1000th hour as well as at the six months after the event. Table 2 shows the framework of thisquestionnaire.
On March 3 in 1996, we mailed a questionnaire, and accepted the responses by March 23 in
1996. A total of 993 (683 In-Hyogo and 313 Out-of-Hyogo) responses were returned, and 623
In-Hyogo (25.7%) and 292 Out-of-Hyogo residents (37.1%) were used for further analysis.
Results and Discussion
Three different types of subjects
As shown in Table 3, the demographic characteristics of In-Hyogo group are significantly
different from that of Out-of-Hyogo group in the following three aspects.
First, the majority of In-Hyogo subjects were male in their 40's and 50's living with morethan 2 family members. On the other hand, Out-of-Hyogo tends to reflect single female intheir 20's, or 60's and more. Second, a 54.8% of In-Hyogo group lived in own land and own
housing or government-owned housing, while a 59.6% of Out-of-Hyogo group lived in rental
land and own/rental housing or private rental housing apartment. Third, residential damage
was much severer for Out-of-Hyogo group than In-Hyogo group.
A correspondence analysis revealed the existence of three different types of subjects asshown in Figure 1. These three groups can be characterized by two factors: 1) priority ofdecision, and 2) selection of residential location.
In the first quadrant, it revealed that young people tended to relocate to out of impactedarea based on their job requirement. Those respondents in their 20's who lost theiremployment with less than 3 year job seniority and were pulled out of Hyogo prefecture. In
the second quadrant, it revealed that middle aged people tended to remain in the impactedarea even though they were severely damaged mainly because their job requirement. Thosesubjects who kept their jobs and their 30's, 40's and 50's living with three to five family
members tended to stay in Hyogo prefecture. In the fourth quadrant, those elderly inner-city
single dwellers and elderly couples, who lost houses, were eventually pushed out from
Hyogo.
In summary, depending on both the life stage at which the people experiences disaster andTable 3. Sample Characteristics
Sample size
Sex
Male
FemaleSex & Age
Male & under 30
Male & 30-39
Male & 40-49
Male & 50-59
Male & 60-69
Male & 70 and overFemale & under 30
Female & 30-39
Female & 40-49
Female & 50-59
Female & 60-69
Female & 70 and overThe number of family members
Single2
3-5
6 and over
Kinds of pre-disaster housing
Own land and housing
Condominium
Crown corporation housing
Public housing
Company housing
Rental land and own housing
Rental land and housing
Private rental housing (apartment)
Housing damage
Fully damaged
Fully burned
Half damaged
Half burned
Partially damaged
No damage
Safety of family members
Dead
Critical injured and illness
Little injured and illness
No member of family was injured

Total
915

In-Hyogo
623 ( 100 )Out-of-Hyogo
292 ( 100 )

χ2

687
226

510 ( 81.9 )
112 ( 18.0 )

177 ( 60.6 )
114 ( 39.0 )11.95 **
7.06 **

19
72
122
176
187
111
5
20
30
49
55
67

10
52
101
148
133
66
1
11
19
28
25
28

( 1.6 )
( 8.3 )
( 16.2 )( 23.8 )( 21.3 )( 10.6 )( 0.2 )
( 1.8 )
( 3.0 )
( 4.5 )
( 4.0 )
( 4.5 )

9
20
21
28
54
45
4
9
11
21
30
39

( 3.1 )
( 6.8 )
( 7.2 )
( 9.6 )
( 18.5 )( 15.4 )( 1.4 )
( 3.1 )
( 3.8 )
( 7.2 )
( 10.3 )( 13.4 )

154
262
451
39

68
167
352
34

( 10.9 )( 26.8 )( 56.5 )( 5.5 )

86
95
99
5

( 29.5 )( 32.5 )( 33.9 )( 1.7 )

40.59 **

352
95
32
41
37
50
108
198

282
70
28
38
21
26
43
113

( 45.3 )( 11.2 )( 4.5 )
( 5.0 )
( 6.1 )
( 4.2 )
( 6.9 )
( 18.1 )

70
25
4
3
16
24
65
85

( 24.0 )( 8.6 )
( 1.4 )
( 1.0 )
( 5.5 )
( 8.2 )
( 22.3 )( 29.1 )23.43 **

291
19
192
2
320
89

92
6
130
1
306
86

( 14.8 )( 1.0 )
( 20.9 )( 0.2 )
( 49.1 )( 13.8 )

199
13
62
1
14
3

( 68.2 )( 4.5 )
( 21.2 )( 0.3 )
( 4.8 )
( 1.0 )

111.68 **33.37 **

21
32
187
665

10
15
102
492

( 1.6 )
( 2.4 )
( 16.4 )( 79.0 )

11
17
85
173

( 3.8 )
( 5.8 )
( 29.1 )( 79.0 )4.05 *
6.63 *
15.78 **
10.64 **

12.13 **
20.74 **

5.32 *

12.97 **
21.32 **

20.60 **
6.54 *

5.55 *
11.41 **
5.96 *
39.73 **
11.06 **
178.15 **11.66 **

Note: Number (Percentages: N/623*100, In-Hyogo and N/292*100, Out-of-Hyogo)
Only significant coefficients are shown: **p<.01, *p<.05 (test of goodness of fit, Chi-square test)

the degree of housing damage, people tends to respond differently, and accordingly different
considerations might be needed for each of these different sub-groups.

Item
IN Pref.
OUT of Pref.
Male
Female20's〜80's
Death
Crtcl Injr
Lite Injr
All safe
1Fam〜6+Fam
OwnLnd+Hs
RentLndOwHs
RentHs
CrwnCrpHs
CompHsPublicHs
PriRentHs
Detached
SemiDtchd
LowRiseHs
Mid+HiRise<¥100K<¥1Mil<¥3Mil<¥5Mil<¥10Mil<¥30Mil¥30Mil+<10%Incm<30%Incm<50%Incm<70%Incm<99%Incm<2*Incm<3*Incm
3*Incm+Explanation
In-Hyogo prefecture
Out-of-Hyogo
Male
FemaleAge 20's〜80's
Dead person
Critical injured and illness person
Little injured and illness person
No member of the family was injured
The number of the family members
Own land and housing
Rental land and own housing
Rental land and housing
Crown corporation housing
Company housing
Public housing
Private rental housing
Detached housing
Semi-detached housing
Low-rise housing
Middle-and-High-rise housing
the amount of damage (¥) less than 100,000
less than 1,000,000
less than 3,000,000
less than 5,000,000
less than 10,000,000
less than 30,000,000
30,000,000 and overthe percentages of annual income less than 10%
less than 30%
less than 50%
less than 70%
less than 100%less than 200%less than 300%
300% and over

Item
Explanation
RedTagHs
Fully damaged
YelTagHs
Half damaged
GrnTagHs
Partially damaged
FullyBurned
Fully burned
HalfBurned
Half burned
NoPhyDmg
No damageHouse demolition Teared down housing
No demolition
Not teared down housing
Evacuated
Evacuated on that day that the EQ occured
NoEvactn
Not evacuated on that day
WishToMove
Wish to move from here
WishToStay
Wish to stay here
ToTheSame
Wish to move to the same place before the EQ
ToTheSouthto the south of Hyogo: seriously impacted area
ToHyogoOSH
to Hyogo except the south area
ToKansaito Kansai area except Hyogo
ToOutKNSI
out of Kansai area
NotSameJob
Not same job before the EQ
RetiredRetiredSameJob
Same job before the EQ
ChngJobErthq
Changed job because of the EQ
ChngJobNEQ
Changed job not because of the EQ
Work30y+Work for more than 30 years before the EQ
Work˜29yfor less than 30 years
Work˜9yfor less than 9 years
Work˜3yfor less than 3 years
WrkPlcAffctedWork place affected by the EQ
WrkPlcNotAff
Work place not affected by the EQ
Note1: there are two points in the figure near "No Financial
Damage". Because one is item of the amount of damage(¥) andthe other is that of the percentages of annual income.
Note2: there are two points in the figure near "No Jobs".
Because one is item of jobs after the EQ and the other is before
the EQ.

Comparing between IN Pref. And OUT of Pref. Residing Victims

Work‑Based Decision
1.5

Middle-Aged Families

Single 20's
20's

5 Fam Mem<¥0.1Mil<10%Incm
Job <29yr

Sol2

Stay in Hyogo

Pub.Housing

-1.5

30's

Job<9yrCompany<¥1 Mil<¥3MilHousing
0.5<30%Incm
Mid&Hi Rise
<50%Incm

Job Contd

40's
50's

4 Fam Mem

LowRisePrvt
Rntl Hs

3 Fam Mem

Job<3yr

ToSouthHyg<70%Incm

To Kansei
ToOutside

QuitPrvJob
Lite Injry
Yellow Tag
Evacuated
To Non-Hanshin
SingleFam.
<¥5Mil.
<2*Incm

0 ChngJob<99%Incm
WrkPlc All Safe-1
-0.5
0 (NERQ)
0.5 FEMALE
NotAffct
Work30yr+
CrownCorp.
<¥10Mil
IN
Pref.
MALE
Houseing
60's 2 Fam Mem.
WishToStay
No Evctn.
6+Fam -0.5
Mem.
House &
Land Owned

ToTheSameArea

WishToMove
RntlHsGreen TagNo Demolition

Chng Job due to ERQ
Not the Same Job as before

OUT of Pref.

SemiDtchd

Hvy Injry

Red TagHouse Demolition

1

House Owned
Land Rented<¥3Mil

Fully Burned

Detached House

3*Incm+<3*Incm Death of Fam. Mem.

No Phys.Dmg

-1

70's

¥30Mil+No Jobs

No Financial Damage-1.5

No Damage

Elderly Couples

80's
HalfBurnd-2
Sol1

Housing‑Based Decision

Figure1. Classification of Respondents Characteristics & Dimensions of Residence Decisions

1.5

o
g
o
y
H
e
v
a
e
L

WrkPlcAffctd

1

Fully Damaged&

Half Damaged&

Partially Damaged

In-Hyogo

Out-of-Hyogo

Burned (n=310)

Burned (n=194)(n=320)(n=623)(n=292)

Ⅰ on that day

Ⅰ on that day

Notevacuated

No response

16.5%

1.6%

NE
40.2%

NR

NR

E

NR

0.5%

1.6%

23.4%

0.5%

NR

NE

E

2.7%

18.8%

36.1%
NE

Time

Evacuated

Ⅱ Few days

NE

E
59.3%

63.4%

Ⅲ

E

75.0%

78.4%

81.9%

No response
At home
3.9%

Ⅱ Few days
NR

Home

NR

NR

44.8%

2.1%

4.7%

NR

3.9%

Away
34.2%

19.4%

Home

5.1%

18.8%

Away from
home
76.8%

Away

Home

Away

Home

53.1%

70.9%

24.4%

62.0%

76.0%

Ⅲ Two months

Ⅲ Two months
Home
14.8%

NR
5.5%

NR

NR
4.1%

NR

Away

Home

Away

59.8%

34.0%

NR

NR

7.4%

6.7%

16.5%

76.1%

23.6%

Home
15.1%

7.9%

Away

81.9%

72.4%

NR
4.1%

Away
27.8%

Home
65.5%

77.1%

Home

Ⅳ Six months

Away

Away

Home

Away
79.7%

NR
4.0%

14.1%

6.2%

Home

Away

Away
9.7%

Ⅳ Six months
Away
15.2%

NR
5.5%

Home

NR
7.5%

12.7%

Home
86.3%

Away
79.8%

Home
79.3%

Figure 2. Changes in Residence among Housing Damage & In/Out-of-Hyogo PrefectureAll(n=915)Ⅰ On that day

Ⅱ Few days
No
response
4.3%

No
response
1.2%
Evacuated
49.6%

Not
evacuated
49.2%

At home47.5%

Ⅲ Two months
No
response
5.2%
Away from
home
48.2%

At home54.1%

Away from
home
40.7%

Ⅳ Six months
No
response
6.1%

Away from
home
35.8%

At home
58.0%

100
90

Within Pref. Move（％）

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

10hr

100hr

1000hr6 month010

Out of Pref. Move（％）

20
30
40

Emergency Shelters

50

Kin House

60
70
80
90
100

Neighbor and Friends' house
Company Facilities
Rented Apartment

Note: 100%: The number of subjects who evacuated on that day

Public Temporary Housing
Other

Figure 3. Changes in Residence (when, to where and how many people change their residence)Patterns of Changes in residence caused by disaster
Patterns of residence location change were drastically different between those with severe
house damage and with light damage as shown in Figure 2. About 80% of those who lost
houses evacuated to shelters at the 10th hour, and remained to stay at shelters at the 100th hour,and moves to temporary residential arrangement by the 1000th hour and stayed at the 6thmonth after the earthquake.
In comparison, only 24 % of whose houses were lightly damaged evacuated to shelters at
the 10th and 100th hour, but gradually returned to their home to 14% at the 1000th hour and to
10 % at 6 months after the earthquake. Obviously, the pattern of residence change of
Out-of-Hyogo group were quite similar to those with heavy house damage.
Selection of residential accommodations
Figure 3 reports that when, to where and how many people actually change their residence.
At 10th hour period, about half of those who left their houses rushed to emergency shelters.
At 100th hours, still 30% of them stayed in shelters. Asking help for temporary dwellingthrough their families and relatives peaked at the 100th hours, then declined thereafter.
Provision of housing arrangements by the companies they worked for became prevalent at the
1,000th hours, especially for In-Hyogo group.
In contrast, renting new housing arrangement outside though their own expenses outside
the impacted area for Out-of-Hyogo group after the 1,000th became. It should be noted that astrikingly small proportion of victims (2.8% all subjects, 3.6 % In- and 2.1 % of
Out-of-Hyogo residents) relied upon the publicly supplied temporary housing units 6 months
after the event.
The point here is that disaster researchers, management practitioners and policy makers
should pay more attention not only to those who chose public temporary housing but also to
those who reconstruct their life by renting apartments. To realize distributive fairness among
the people in the impacted area, local governments make more use of commercial housing
stocks by alleviating the costs needed for relocation.
Information needs for housing damage
We addressed the timing when people needed the information about the safety of theirhousing by ascertaining that their house was either repairable or to be demolished.
As shown in the left side of Figure 4, more than 50% of those who suffered housing
damage to some degree needed for the information regarding the degree of housing damage
within the first week after the event except for No housing damage residents. Furthermore,such need was highest for those who suffered seemingly light damages to their houses during
the first several days after the earthquake. On the other hand, as to the information need for
housing reconstruction policy adopted by the local government, those who suffered theseverest housing damage was the highest.
As shown in the right side of Figure 4, nearly half of the victims made up their minds withregard to the recovery policy about their own housing within the first month after the event.

100%
90%
80%

(n = 3 0 0 )B re akdo wn
P ro po rtio n

Proportion70%

De c isio n
Fu lly Dam age d- Bu r n e d(n = 3 0 0 )

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%

20%
10%
0%

80%
70%
60%

(n = 3 0 7 )

2 mo.
3 mo.

100 hr1,000 hr

10 hr

De c isio n
No Dam age

2 mo.
3 mo.

1 mo.

(n = 8 4 )100 hr1,000 hr

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

10 hr

3 mo.

2 mo.

1 mo.

100 hr1,000 hr

Proportion(n = 8 4 )10 hr

Proportion

T im e （ x = lo g H , H ： h o u r s ）In fo r m atio n
No Dam age

T im e （ x = lo g H , H ： h o u r s ）

1 mo.

50%
40%
30%
20%

T im e （ x = lo g H , H ： h o u r s ）

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

3 mo.

De c isio n
Par tially Dam age d

10%
0%

2 mo.
3 mo.

1 mo.

100 hr1,000 hr

Proportion(n = 3 0 7 )10 hr

Proportion

100%
90%

In fo r m atio n
Partially Dam age d

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

2 mo.

T im e （ x = lo g H , H ： h o u r s ）T im e （ x = lo g H , H ： h o u r s ）

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%

2 mo.
3 mo.

(n = 1 8 8 )

1 mo.

2 mo.
3 mo.

10 hr

10%
0%

1 mo.

50%
40%
30%
20%

De c isio n
Half Dam age d- Bu r n e d

100 hr1,000 hr

Proportion(n = 1 8 8 )

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

10 hr

In fo rm atio n
Half Dam age d- Bu r n e d

100 hr1,000 hr

Proportion

80%
70%
60%

1 mo.

T im e （ x = lo g H , H ： h o u r s ）T im e （ x = lo g H , H ： h o u r s ）

100%
90%

100 hr1,000 hr

10 hr

0%

2 mo.
3 mo.

10 hr

10%

1 mo.

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%

Cu m u lative
P ro po rtio n

In fo rm atio n
Fu lly Dam age d- Bu rn e d

100 hr1,000 hr

Proportion

100%
90%
80%

T im e （ x = lo g H , H ： h o u r s ）Figure 4. Information Needs and Decisions Regarding Dwelling

Conclusion
In summary, it is found that setting the policy for their own housing was a quite urgent
business for those who suffered housing damages to some extent. It is suggested that there
may exist two kinds of crucial time limits for effective housing recovery program: 1) theevaluation as to the degree of housing damage, or what would be the most cost-effective way
to deal with their damaged houses, should be provided within the first week after the event as
the basis for planning the individual recovery plan, and 2) the whole picture of housing
recovery program provided by local government should be made available for those who
suffered the severest housing damage within the first month after the event before themajority of them would make up their own policy for their own housing.
Obviously, the provision of abovementioned services by the local government at the time of
the 1995 Kobe earthquake disaster was much later in time than the ideal timing describedabove. This, these results suggest that there would be lots to be upgraded for disaster
response and relief activities to be effective from the victims’ point of view.

References
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