The International Emergency Management Society
2014 Annual Conference, October 20-23, 2014, Niigata, Japan

Comparative Analysis of Earthquake Emergency Response in China & Japan
Based on Timeline——311 Earthquake vs 512 Earthquake
DU Xiaoxia1, ZHANG Jun, XU Jianhua, HE Zhuan，LAI Junyan2
KIMURA Reo3, HAYASHI Haruo4, HOSOKAWA Masafumi5, SAKURADA Yukihisa6
1

Senior Engineer, National Earthquake Response Support Service CEA, Beijing, China
2Engineer, National Earthquake Response Support Service CEA, Beijing, China
3
Associate Professor, School of Human Science and Environment, Hyogo University, Himeji, Japan
4
Professor, Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
5
Group leader and Senior Researcher, Earthquake and National Disaster Laboratory, National ResearchInstitute of Fire and Disaster, Tokyo, Japan
6
Researcher, Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
Email: duxx_bj@126.com
ABSTRACT:A devastating earthquake with magnitude Ms 8.0 occurred in Wenchuan County, Sichuan Province of China on
12th May 2008, and another destructive earthquake of magnitude Mw9.0 occurred near the east coast of Miyagi
Prefecture of Japan on 11th March 2011. For the two earthquake disasters, the national and local governments ofJapan and China had taken emergency response measures rapidly and effectively after the earthquake occurred,both gained some invaluable experience and learned some lessons. In order to compare the detailed emergency
response measures during the earthquake disasters and share the experience and lessons between Japan and
China, this paper adopts timeline analysis method, mainly focusing on the level of Sichuan Province and Miyagi
Prefecture, to summarize the key emergency responses measures on the aspects of establishment and running of
emergency command organization, deployment and dispatch of rescue forces, emergency refuge andresettlement of victims, report and release of disaster information according to the time sequence, then analyzes
and sorts the implementation body and time comparatively, and studies the similarities and differences of thetwo earthquakes. Furthermore the advantages and disadvantages of emergency response measures during thetwo earthquake catastrophes between Japan and China are analyzed, considering the background of emergency
management system in Japan and China. The paper aims to share the experience and provide reference mutuallyfor the earthquake disaster emergency response work of the two countries in the future, so that the two countries
could improve the abilities and make progress together in the field of earthquake response.
KEYWORDS:
Timeline, Earthquake, Emergency Response, Comparative Analysis
1. BACKGROUND
A magnitude 8.0(Ms) earthquake with a focal depth of 14 km occurred in Yingxiu Town, Wenchuan County,
Sichuan Province of China (31.0°N,103.4°E) at 14:28 CST on May 12th , 2008. The earthquake caused 69,227
deaths, 374,643 injured, and 17,923 missing (as of October, 2008), with the affected area of 440,400 km2 anddirect economic losses up to 845.1 billion Yuan. After the disaster, the Chinese government got widely
recognized by society for taking rapid and effective measures on command and coordination, rescue andassistance, resettlement and information release. However, the shortcoming of lacking awareness andpreparations for disaster prevention and mitigation was exposed.
A powerful 9.0 magnitude earthquake occurred around 130km off the Pacific coast of Tōhoku of Japan (38.1°N,
142.9°E) at 14:46 JST on March 11th , 2011, with a focal depth of 24km. The earthquake triggered powerful
tsunami waves, both combined, causing 15,776 deaths, 4460 missing and 5,927 injured (by August 31, 2011).
Direct losses caused by the Earthquake were reckoned to amount to 16.9 trillion yen. The tsunami caused flood,ports damage and massive power stations breakdown, including the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant

The International Emergency Management Society
2014 Annual Conference, October 20-23, 2014, Niigata, Japan

leakage. During the whole disposal process, the Japanese central and local governments kicked off emergency
response in time and conducted rescues in a systematic way, which made the world impressive about its disaster
relief efforts. Meanwhile, late disclosure of nuclear leakage, especially the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant
leakage, imposed severe challenges upon the Japanese society.
During the two catastrophes, China and Japan suffered from tremendous losses, but they also accumulated
precious experience in emergency response. To compare specific actions taken by China and Japan incatastrophe emergency response and to learn from each other’s experience, this paper focuses on the two
Earthquakes, adopts the timeline analysis method, selects the Sichuan Province and the Miyagi Prefecture as
study objects to sort out specific responding measures taken by the two governments in time sequence including
establishing and running Emergency Operation Command Center, allocating and dispatching rescue forces,
providing shelters and resettlement for victims, reporting and releasing information. The body and time of
emergency response measures are compared and analyzed, and common points and differences of the twoearthquakes are studied. Based on these information, taking into consideration differences in emergency
management systems in China and Japan, this paper analyzes advantages and disadvantages of the two
governments in catastrophe emergency response and provides experience and references for future earthquake
emergency response, so that both countries could make progress in dealing with earthquakes.
2. METHOD
This paper adopts timeline analysis, case study and comparative study to analyze and explore important
emergency response measures in the Wenchuan Earthquake and the Great East Japan Earthquake. According toresearches, emergency response processes of earthquakes are characterized by timeline. Emergency response
work and tasks vary greatly in different post-earthquake stages, which should be prioritized based on actual
needs of disaster areas. The timeline analysis method sorts out the whole emergency response process after theearthquake according to time sequence and relates each task with owners and implementation time and displaysthem in lines and tables, then analyzes emergency response tasks in different time slots and conducts
comparative analysis on tasks and actual needs of disaster areas and requirements of emergency plans, so as toprovide references and guidance for future emergency response and improve disaster disposal. The case study
method mainly focuses on the two earthquakes, first conducting intra-case study to understand emergency
response process, characteristics, experience and lessons of each earthquake and master details and key factorsof the whole earthquake emergency response process; then conducting cross-case study to conclude experienceand lessons of earthquake emergency response, study models and characteristics of emergency response under
different backgrounds. The comparative analysis method compares key measures during the two earthquake
emergency response processes to explore universal and special rules to deal with earthquakes catastrophes.
3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EARTHQUAKE EMERGENCY RESPONSE
After the Wenchuan Earthquake occurred, the governments and relevant departments at all levels in China
responded quickly to establish respective Earthquake Relief Command Center, organized and dispatched rescue
forces to rescue and relocated victims, provide health care, recover lifeline, maintain security, release
information and depose barrier lakes, etc. After the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred, the Japanese
governments at all levels and relevant agencies responded quickly to set up Disaster Countermeasures
Headquarters, took emergency measures in the aspects of life rescue, shelters and settlements, infrastructure
repair, media report, and nuclear leakage disposal, etc. The comparative analysis of emergency response
measures in the aspects of the establishment and running of Emergency Operation Command Center, theallocation and dispatch of rescue force, the emergency shelter and resettlement of victims, and the report andrelease of public information were as follows.
3.1. Establishment and Running of Emergency Operation Command Center
Strong and effective Emergency Command System is critical to make timely, viable and effective emergency
decisions and disposal operations when responding to earthquake catastrophic. After the Wenchuan Earthquake
occurred, from central government to central departments, from army to local government, a strong emergency
command system was built in a few hours and running speedily. After the East Japan Earthquake, from theThe International Emergency Management Society
2014 Annual Conference, October 20-23, 2014, Niigata, Japan

Cabinet to the prefectures and municipalities, Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters was established quickly
and organizing disaster relief operations according to the disaster plan. The details about the establishment andrunning of Emergency Operation Command Center in Sichuan Province and Miyagi Prefecture during theWenchuan Earthquake and East Japan Earthquake are as follows in Table 1.
Table 1 Comparison of establishment and running of Emergency Operation Command Center
512 Wenchuan Earthquake
311Japan Earthquake
Task（Sichuan Province）(Miyagi Prefecture)
10 minutes after EQ, Provincial HQs set up and When EQ occurred, The Prime Minister's
emergency meeting held
Residence HQs set up
10 minutes after EQ, HQs of Chengdu Military Region When EQ occurred, Prefecture Disaster
Countermeasures HQs set up
Set up set up
Details
4 minutes after EQ, Defense ministry set up
8 hours after EQ, National HQs established
Disaster Countermeasures HQs
In the evening of 12th May, Provincial Field Command 28 minutes after EQ, Cabinet set up Disaster
Post set up
Countermeasures HQs
40 minutes after EQ, Commander rushed to the 16 minutes after EQ, HQs request rescue
affected area and made 7 relief work instructions on assistance from SDF
the way
24 minutes after EQ, HQs held the liaison meeting
8 hours after EQ, HQs issued an emergency noticeabout disaster relief work
44 minutes after EQ, HQs held 1st meeting
From 2 days after EQ, HQs held Press Conference 50 minutes after EQ, HQs request the State todispose rescue teams from
Running daily, routine meeting twice a day
Details 2 days after EQ, HQs held a meeting to carry out 2 hours after EQ, HQs held 2nd meeting
important instructions of State Council and issued a 3 hours after EQ, General Affairs Department of
notice on donation activity
HQs transferred
3 days after EQ, HQs issued an emergency notice on 1-2 days after EQ, HQs held 4 meetings per day
disease control and donations statistics
3-4 days after EQ, held 3 meetings totally
4 days after EQ, HQs ordered to implement traffic
5 days after EQ, held 2 meetings per day
control of some roads
3.1.1 Establishment of Emergency Operation Command Center
In Wenchuan Earthquake, the government of Sichuan Province established Emergency Operation Command
Headquarters in Chengdu City and Field Operation Command Post in Dujiangyan City, which divided into 8groups including HQs office, medical group, transportation group, communication group, water conservancy
group, relief supplies group, media group and foreign rescue coordination group. The “Worst-hit Area Frontline
Command Posts” were established in the six worst-hit cities, which were responsible for command andcoordination of relief operations. In the later period after earthquake, housing resettlement group, partner
assistance coordination group, recovery and reconstruction planning group, production recovery group andsupervision and inspection group were added according to the actual needs, which implement corresponding
work. While in East Japan Earthquake, the government of Miyagi Prefecture established the Disaster
Countermeasures Headquarters at the first time, which divided into operation group, strategy group, informationgroup, communication group, media group and general affairs group, emergency rescue group, helicopter group,
shelter group, liaison group. Then relief supplies raise group, relief supplies group and relief supplies allocationgroup were added to carry out the corresponding work. Also Field Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters was
set up in 16 hours after the earthquake, to organize and command the relief operations.
3.1.2 Running of Emergency Operation Command Center
In Wenchuan Earthquake, some basic working rules and regulations were set up and implemented when theThe International Emergency Management Society
2014 Annual Conference, October 20-23, 2014, Niigata, Japan

headquarters established to ensure the smooth command process, including 24 hours emergency duty, daily
routine meeting, information collecting and reporting, major issues consultation, daily working briefing as wellas other temporary rules. After the headquarters established, the commander issued a directive requiring all theprovincial leadership divide into 3 batches: 1 batch work at the six Worst-hit Area Frontline Command Post,
1batch work at the Field Operation Command Post in Dujiangyan, and 1 batch stay at the Emergency Operation
Command Headquarters in Chengdu. The provincial headquarters hold regular meetings twice a day tocoordinate and arrange relief work, and also established mechanisms of close relation, communication andcoordination, quick disposal with military forces, police and other command center, to ensure the command
system running smoothly, orderly and effectively. In East Japan Earthquake, Disaster Countermeasures
Headquarters of Miyagi Prefecture rapidly implement disaster relief operations in accordance with theprovisions of the local disaster prevention plan and the related laws and regulations. In the initial stage after theearthquake, the HQs quickly collected disaster situation, timely contacted and requested for assistance, released
the announcement of shelter and organized field rescue operation. On 11th March, the headquarters hold 4
meetings and transfer the General Affairs Department to the suitable place according the actual needs.
Meanwhile, the routine meeting and press conference system was established, Self-defense Forces Contact andCoordination Center was set up, and also liaison and coordination system with SDF, police, fire protection, andother headquarters was build up. All the relief forces communicated and coordinated through participating
headquarters meeting and sharing information, then implemented relief operation jointly.
3.2. Allocation and Dispatch of Rescue Force
After the Wenchuan Earthquake and the East Japan Earthquake, governments from two countries mobilized allavailable resources, deployed military forces and USAR teams carrying numbers of rescue equipment to rescue
lives. Due to the difference in national administrative system and emergence response mechanism, the rescue
operations from China and Japan have different features. The comparison between the rescue resources andefforts in the seriously stricken areas, like Sichuan Province and Miyagi Prefecture, are as follows.
3.2.1 Military rescue force
After the Wenchuan Earthquake, military forces were immediately mobilized for relief operation, including
almost all military units. They were deployed into the affected area through airplane, railway, highway, ship, etc,
and collected disaster situation, repaired road, evacuated victims and assisted victims, playing tremendous andirreplaceable role in the relief operation. After the east Japan earthquake, Japan government mobilized anddeployed police, self-defense forces and maritime security headquarters etc, to collect disaster situation, rescue
victims, search the missing and assist the victims. During the two earthquakes, the military rescue forces and therescue operation in Sichuan Province and Miyagi prefecture are listed in Table 2.

Time

0-2h
after EQ

2h-24hafter EQ

Table 2 Comparison of rescue situation of military forces of two countries
512 Wenchuan Earthquake
311Japan Earthquake（Sichuan Province）(Miyagi Prefecture)
After EQ, the Central Military Commission
4 minutes after EQ, Self-defense Department set
immediately mobilized the military forces
up Disaster Countermeasures HQs
8 minutes after EQ, Chengdu military area
deployed about 6100 persons to the hit area
and commanded the reserve militia to act

15 minutes after EQ, SDF transmitted disastersituation video through helicopter

44 minutes after EQ, SDD held 1st meeting
Established military steering group and set up 59 minutes after EQ, maritime SDF collected
Field Joint Command Center
disaster situation along the coast by airplane
7 hours after EQ, 150 armed forces were 3 hours after EQ, Disaster Dispatch Order of
deployed with 7 large-duty loader
Large Scale was issued. Air rescue forces was set
10 hours after EQ, nearly 20,000 PLA and up and deployed
armed forces arrived at the hit area, HQs of 4 hours after EQ, Dispatch Order was issued in
General Staff issued command of disaster response to the nuclear accident.

The International Emergency Management Society
2014 Annual Conference, October 20-23, 2014, Niigata, Japanrelief and mobilized 34,000 forces

24h after
EQ-theend ofrescue8 hours after EQ, the order of reinforcement wasissued16 hours after EQ, 22 persons small group
24 hours after EQ, SDF deployed 20,000 people,
arrived at the epicenter-Yingxiu.
190 airplanes and 45 warships
2 days after EQ, deployed 30,000 armed 2 days after EQ, Joint Mission Team was build up,
forces equipped with tools and appliances
land, sea and air of SDF began joint rescue
3 days after EQ, the troops arrived at all the 3 days after EQ, established Coordination Officestricken towns for relief. More than 30,000 between Japan and USA to conduct joint
reservemilitia
in seriously
hit area
4 days after
EQ,rescue
100,000
armed forces
worked operation.
in the hit area
6 days after EQ, recruit reserve SDF, and set up
the liaison & adjustment officeThroughout the whole relief period, the Since April, several focused searches were
military dispatched 150,000 people covering carried out to search the missing victims.
20 branches of army services.
Up to July, SDF deployed 1,058 million people,
50,000 helicopters and 4,900 warships

3.2.2 Professional rescue force-USAR teams
In Wenchuan Earthquake, professional rescue forces are comprised of three parts: national and local earthquake
USAR teams, fire brigade and police rescue teams, and Mine & HazMAT Rescue team, with total disposal ofmore than 20,000 people. These professional teams are more capable and efficient which enables them to rescue
trapped victims who the other rescue forces cannot access. Although the number of rescued victims was lessthan that of other forces, they played a very important role in rescue operation. In East Japan Earthquake,professional rescue forces consist of land and air branches of fire institutions around the country. These forces
divided into local firefighting HQs, firefighting mission, firefighting supporting unit, emergency firefighting
team, and air forces to take important actions in the affected area, including investigating the disaster situation,
conducting evacuation mobilization and saving the lives of victims. During the two earthquakes, theprofessional rescue forces dispatched in Sichuan province and Miyagi Prefecture are listed in Table 3.

Time

0-2h
after EQ

Table 3 Comparison of professional rescue forces in seriously hit area after the quake
512 Wenchuan Earthquake
311Japan Earthquake（Sichuan Province）(Miyagi Prefecture)
5 minutes after EQ, Chengdu firefighting branch When EQ occurred, 12 local firefighting HQsof 800 persons was deployed
took action
9 minutes after EQ, Sichuan USAR teamconvened and were ready to deploy
12 minutes after EQ, Mianyang firefighting branch
deployed 75 persons for SAR operation
17 minutes after EQ, Deyang firefighting branch
deployed 180 people for SAR operation

14 minutes after EQ, Sendai firefighting air
forces conducted rescue in Sendai city.
44 minutes after EQ, Sendai firefighting bureau
requested for emergency rescue
50 minutes after EQ, Miyagi firefighting Rescue
Coordination HQs was set up

72 minutes after EQ, CISAR was deployed

54 minutes after EQ, firefighting rescue teams
2 hours after EQ, Sichuan Safety Monitoring deployed
Bureau issued rescue order to Mine & HazMAT 77 minutes after EQ, Internal Affairs Ministry
Rescue team
deployed Sapporo rescue team
2h-24hafter EQ

7hours after EQ, Sichuan General Fire Brigade
deployed forces to reinforce Beichuan
8 hours after EQ, CISAR team of 184 people
arrived and headed to Dujiangyan for rescue

7hours after EQ, Tokyo Fire Department
Command rescue team arrived and acted
10 hours after EQ, 12 local firefighting HQs
deployed 2664 people for rescue operation

The International Emergency Management Society
2014 Annual Conference, October 20-23, 2014, Niigata, Japan

8 hours after EQ, 6 Mine & HazMAT Rescue
teams of Sichuan were deployed
11 hours after EQ, 4 Mine & HazMAT Rescue
teams deployed to Shifang, Mianzhu, etc.
12 hours after EQ, Ministry of Public Security
Fire Department mobilized 1,182 people
20 hours after EQ, the third batch of Mine &HazMAT Rescue teams arrived.
1.5 days after EQ, Ministry of Public Security
Fire Department mobilized the second batch of
rescue forces including 5070 persons
24h after 2 days after EQ, Chengdu USAR team of 50
EQ-the members and 3 dogs arrived at Beichuan
end ofrescue 2 days after EQ, 7718 professional rescue crewof firefighting departments all arrived
2.5 days after EQ, Ministry of Public Security
Fire Department mobilized the third batch

10 hours after EQ, all firefighting mission
deployed 11,728 people for rescue operation
15 hours after EQ, firefighting team of Toyama
arrived at Natori for rescue
17 hours after EQ, Sapporo firefighting
command rescue team arrived
24 hours after EQ, firefighting department
deployed 363 teams, 30406 persons andrescued 4094 victims in total
2 days after EQ, firefighting teams of Kanagawa,Shimane, Mie arrived at Miyagi
5 days after EQ, firefighting team of Kumamoto
prefecture arrived
Up to the end of May, firefighting departments
deployed 297,604 people in total and rescued
6,679 survivors, including land forces and airforces

3.2.3Foreign rescue force
After the Wenchuan Earthquake, Japan, Russia, South Korea and Singapore deployed USAR teams to theaffected areas. Hongkong, Macau and Taiwan also dispatched rescue forces to the stricken area. Altogether,
there were 218 foreign rescuers working in the affected area of Sichuan Province to implement USAR
operations and medical aid etc. The details about the foreign rescue forces and operations are listed in Table 4.
After the East Japan Earthquake, China, South Korea and other countries deployed international USAR teams to
the affected area. Altogether, there are 668 professional USAR team members from 12 countries carrying withsearch dogs and rescue equipments and conducting rescue operations in the worst affected area. The details ofinternational rescue teams are displayed in Figure 1.
TeamsHong Kong

Macao

TaiwanJapan
Singapore
South
Korea
RussiaTable 4 Rescue operations of foreign teams in Wenchuan Earthquake
Operations
On May 14, Hong kong deployed 3 USAR and Medical teams, etc. The USAR teamarrived in Hanwang to rescue on May 15; Air service team arrived on May 17 andtransported casualties with helicopter, hunted for the trapped victims inmountainous area, carried rescuers and materials. They were sent out for 26
times, rescued 96 victims and transported 119 rescuers.
On May 23, Medical Aid team of 20 volunteers arrived and provided medical
service in Chengdu; on June 10, the second medical team and supplies arrived at
Chengdu and headed to Nanchong for rescue
On May 16, Red Cross Rescue team arriveed in Chengdu, and then headed to
Mianzhu and Hanwang for rescue on the next day; on May 20, the Red Cross
Medical team of 37 people deployed to Deyang
As the first arrived international USAR team, more than 60 memebers rescued at
Qingchuan County and Beichuan county
On May 16, the team arrived in Chengdu and deployed to Hongbai town on thenext day for rescue operation
41 team members conducted USAR operation in Hongda Chemical Factory of
Yinghua town and rescued 16 bodies of victims
on May 16, the team arrived at Chengdu and deployed to Hanwang Town for

EffectTotally, 281
foreign rescue
forces carriedout USAR andmedical aid
operations in
Qingchuan,
Beichuan,Mianzhu,
Shifang andDujiangyan,
and rescued 1
survivor and76 bodies.

The International Emergency Management Society
2014 Annual Conference, October 20-23, 2014, Niigata, Japan

rescue. Then they arrived at Dujiangyan in the morning of May 17 and rescued one
survivor

Figure 1 Distribution of international aid team in Japan earthquake
Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that the dispatch time of rescue efforts during the twoearthquakes are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 Comparison of rescue development during the two earthquakes
3.3. Emergency Refuge and Resettlement of Victims
After Wenchuan Earthquake and Great East Japan Earthquake, the refuge and resettlement of massive victims
became an extremely difficulty. The two governments adopted various measures to evacuate and resettle victims.
The following part will compare and analyze the measures and specific actions taken by the Sichuan Provinceand Miyagi Prefecture from the aspects of emergency refuge & resettlement and relief goods transportation.
3.3.1 Emergency refuge and resettlement
After the Wenchuan Earthquake, emergency refuge and resettlement was mainly carried out locally and nearly:
tents were built in town areas; public facilities including sports stadiums, cultural centers, educational places
and parks were opened to resettle victims in urban areas; shacks were built in rural areas. Except for 26 shelters
in Chengdu City, the Jiuzhou Stadium of Mianyang City was also taken as a temporary shelter; but theseshelters were far from enough to meet the actual needs. Massive people could not be resettled locally and nearly,

The International Emergency Management Society
2014 Annual Conference, October 20-23, 2014, Niigata, Japanso they had to resettle by themselves, which required a huge amount of tents. In relatively concentrated tent
shelters, provisional management committees were set up based on population scale. The committee took
responsibility of registering and issuing videos and various goods, collecting needs and suggestions. However,these resettlement sites were densely populated, lack of living facilities, unhealthy in management andorganization, unlivable and not standardized and could not last long. For special groups such as the senior who
lost their children, the junior who lost their parents and people are dysfunctional and lost their families,
government authorities organized special resettlement for them.
During the Great East Japan Earthquake, there were a lot of shelters for survivors, most of which were locatedin schools and stadiums. The Miyagi Prefectural Office also became a place of shelter, disaster relief commandand lodging. The supporting activity of arranging shelters and victims was supposed to be carried out by the
Local Administration Division. However, the office building and staff of the Local Administration Divisionwere affected by the disaster, thus paralyzing its administrative function. Therefore, the county government tookcharge. Up to March 14, the number of emergency shelters reached 1,183 and refugee population reached
320,885. Supporting activities included food and water supply, relief goods offering and bathroom building.
People in shelters and volunteers made onigiri and box lunches and distributed them to refugees. Moreover, as
time went by, refugees’ needs changed. About one week after the disaster, supports were mainly providing food,drinkable water, blankets, medicines and other essential life-supporting goods; after settling down, people had
increasing needs on necessities, underwear, personal tastes and bath. Therefore, the government organizedpeople to survey needs of refugees so as to provide better supports.
3.3.2 Transportation of relief supplies
The severe fact of insufficient and simple storage of relief goods had imposed a huge pressure on emergency
resettlement. In both earthquakes, problems including serious shortage of relief goods storage in the primarystage, excessive relief goods and unsmooth distribution in the middle stage occurred. During the Wenchuan
Earthquake, the Mianyang Repository had only 200 quilts, less than 200 tents, while 600,000 tents were needed.
Facing such big gap, the Civil Affairs Department allocated and transported goods from other repositories. But
the gap was not narrowed. Therefore the central government had to ask enterprises to speed up to produce tents.
By the middle stage of disaster relief, massive instant noodles, drinkable water, cookies and other food piled up
in the Dujiangyan area, which imposed pressures on management and storage, while many other disaster areas
were lack of necessary relief goods. To ensure timely collection, safe allocation and storage and fair distributionof relief goods, systems of goods reception, storage, inspection, distribution and supervision were set up. The
Sichuan Provincial Department of Commerce established an Earthquake Relief and Goods Protection Group,
which was divided into goods source group, allocation and transport group and reception group to take charge ofgoods arrangement, allocation and transport and reception respectively; which provided great support forresettlement and victims’ lives.
During the East Japan Earthquake, the government allocated emergency goods by coordinating with the Miyagi
Coordination Combined Union and coordinated with convenience stores to allocate and supply food and asked
for rice allocation and supply from senior levels. In the primary stage after the earthquake, there was a serious
shortage of relief goods; moreover, due to communication and road damage, large range of stricken areas andscattering victims, relief goods could not be distributed to victims in time. Especially due to insufficient fuel,vehicles could not run in disaster areas and it was difficult for victims to warm themselves. Such situation lasted
for a long period. 5 days after the earthquake, staff of the government took charge of collecting victims’ needs
and goods allocation, commanding at logistic bases, entrusting the truck association to transport goods fromlogistic bases to the goods distribution center of local administration divisions and classifying, managing anddistributing relief goods. In addition, the Self Defense Forces also took responsibility of transporting goods from
distribution centers to shelters. Through these mechanisms, efficiency of transporting relief goods to shelters
was improved a lot, which guaranteed that needs of disaster victims were met. The emergency refuge andresettlement of the Sichuan Province and the Miyagi Prefecture during the two earthquakes were in Table 5.

Time

Table 5 Comparison of Emergency Refuge and Resettlement during the Two Earthquakes
512 Wenchuan Earthquake
311Japan Earthquake（Sichuan Province）(Miyagi Prefecture)

The International Emergency Management Society
2014 Annual Conference, October 20-23, 2014, Niigata, Japan

1st day afterEQ

2nd to 4thdays afterEQ

5th to 7thdays after
EQ

After EQ, governments instantly organized victims totake refuge in open areas

12 minutes after EQ, sent written orders oftaking refuge used satellite wireless fax

Department of Civil Affairs of Sichuan urgently
allocated 3,500 tents
National Development Reform Commission, State
Administration of Grain and Ministry of Finance jointly
issued notices to use the goods of Chengdu subsidiaryof Central grain reserve to support disaster relief.

28 minutes after EQ, sent orders of refuge
again used satellite wireless fax
The government collected information about
the use of schools and stadiums as shelters.

On May 13, Mianyang Jiuzhou Stadium as a temporary
shelter to resettle people of as much as 380,000 per
day.
On May 14, the first batch of rescue helicopters carried
relief goods to Wenchuan
On May 14, National Light Industry Council advocatedenterprises to ensure sources and supplies of relief
goods.
On May 15, Central Military Committee mobilized
military strategic reserves and transported goods andequipments
Up to May 15, Ministry of Railway arranged 179 special
trains to transport relief goods.
Up to May 16, China National Petrol Corporate sent
over 3,000 tons of petroleum products to heavily
stricken areas

On March 12, Consumer Society collected
emergency goods and supplied to each cities
and towns; applied to provide fuels for urban
lifeline institutions; started to allocate goods
supply by coordinating with stores

The government accepted homeless victims
and provided them with food.

Up to May 17, Department of Civil Affairs allocatedover 100,000 tents, 220,000 quilts, and 170,000
cotton-padded clothes; the Ministry of Commerce sent
2.16 million boxes of water, 290,000 boxes of instantnoodles. 290 tons of cookies, 60 tons of ham, 5,000
tents, 210,000 lanterns.

On March 12, Ministry of Health, Labor andWelfare issued notices on expenditures of
welfare facilities and people who need nursing
in shelters
On March 12, government entrusted
commodity house trading association toprovide vacant house information.
On March 12, with the support of Niigata, 2,420
provisional toilets were provided
On March 14, government applied to the
Assembling Building Association. for building
10,000 provisional houses
On March 15, Truck Association put forward
relief goods transport proposals according to
the convention; shelters took proper care of
the disabled and release name lists of victims;
asked for grazed rice supply from Ministry ofAgriculture, Forestry and Fishery,

Up to May 19, the Red Cross allocated 18,510 tents,
National Development Reform Committee andDepartmentof
Civil
Affairsorganized
75
tent-producers in 18 provinces & cities to speed up to
produce tents

On March 16, nutrient food provided by food
manufacturers was distributed to each local
administrative division.
On March 17, sent psychological consultants
On March 18, started to supply fuels

3.4. Report and Release of Public Information
During the two earthquakes, the government and media reported and released public information timely,
comprehensively and systematically, on the situation of earthquake, disaster, and rescue progress. Below aresome representative measures of reporting and releasing in two earthquakes within the first 30 hours (Table 6).
Time
Before EQ
EQTable 6 Comparison of public reporting and release of two earthquakes
China
Japan
Released early warning on EQ and tsunami.
All TV stations halted original broadcastingThe International Emergency Management Society
2014 Annual Conference, October 20-23, 2014, Niigata, Japanoccurred
30m
after EQ

1h
after EQ

2hafter EQ

3h
after EQ

4h
after EQ

6h
after EQ

8h
after EQ

10h
after EQ
14h
after EQ
16h
after EQ
18h
after EQ
24hplan and started reporting earthquake.
CEIC released EQ information to the world through Japan Meteorological Agency issued warning
the Xinhua News Agencyof tsunami to 37 coastal municipalities
NHK issued tsunami warning to the world inJapanese, Chinese and English
CCTV reported EQ with rolling sub-titles
NHK reported disaster situation by 24 hours
CNR and CCTV immediately interred cut the EQ East Japan Railway Company announced that
information, live broadcasted program and all new main lines were closed
connected the affected areas by telephone.
CEA held a press conference to confirm the EQ NHK announced that the earthquake hadmagnitude.
already caused huge casualties.
Xinhua network posted news about the important
instructions of the Sate Council
CCTV reported the event around the clock
CEA held 2nd press conference to dispelled the Prime Minister held 1st press conference andearthquake rumor
called on the public to watch government
National Tourism Administration issued the information from the media
Emergency Notice on Banning Tourism in the
Al Jazeera reported that at least 8 deaths had
affected Areas
been confirmed.
Xinhua network reported 107 deaths and 34 injuries Asahi Shimbun reported the breakdown ofaccording to Ministry of Civil Affairs
No.1,.2 reactor of Fukushima Daiichi for fear of
nuclear leaking.
China Meteorological Administration initiated Level Prime Minister delivered a speech on TV that
II emergency response; National Meteorological part of nuclear plants had stopped running
Center of CMA broadcasted showery rain.
automatically and no leaking of radioactive
materials had been found.
rd
CEA convened 3
press conference and Failing to confirm the existence of nuclear
reconfirmed the EQ magnitude and denied the EQ leaking, Premier issued Announcement on
rumors in Beijing and other areas.
Nuclear Emergency, persuading residents in 2
km radius of No.1 nuclear plant to refuge
The number of deaths climbed to 59
The Transportation Bureau of the Ministry of Public Foreign Minister met the journalists, asking
Security issued emergency notice on the emergent the US military in Japan for assistancemanagement of road traffic.
Kyodo News Agency reported the deaths
might exceed 1000.
Sichuan HQs released 8533 deaths partly estimated Asahi Shimbun quoted the statistics ofPremier arrived in the affected areas and instructed National Police Agency of Japan that theto recovery communication, traffic, and electricity death number were 133, 530 people were
missing and 722 injured.
as early as possible
Press conference held to brief on situation
about EQ, disaster and relief measures
Premier ordered and recommended theresidents in 10km to refuge
Kyodo News Agency quoted the news frompolice that 217 deaths and 681 missing
Premier declared Announcement on Nuclear
Sichuan HQs issued emergency notice and required
Emergency for Fukushima No.2 nuclear plant
to implement relief workand recognized the nuclear leaking
Sichuan Earthquake Bureau held 1st press

The International Emergency Management Society
2014 Annual Conference, October 20-23, 2014, Niigata, Japanafter EQ
26h
after EQ
28h
after EQ
30h
after EQ

conference
National HQs held press conference to releasedisaster situation and relief work.
Sichuan HQs held 1st press conference and released HQs refuted rumors on the Internet anddisaster situation and relief workordered media to report information actually
Press conference held in Prime Minister 's
Residence

3.4.1 The time of information release and report
In East Japan Earthquake, the government issued the early warning of earthquake and tsunami 73 seconds
before the actual strike of earthquake. When earthquake occurred, NHK’s report of the disaster basicallycoincided with the earthquake and it broadcasted the scenes of trembling only in the next 17 seconds of the
breaking out. While in Wenchuan Earthquake, there was no early warning system of earthquake in China, thefirst release of the news was 17 minutes after the earthquake and it was one hour later that connection with theaffected area by telephone was possible. Therefore, in terms of the time of news release and report, it is slightly
later in China than in Japan. During the East Japan Earthquake, NHK, as a public media institution and a legal
reporting institution specified in the laws, had nine bases equipped with dozens of helicopters. When theearthquake occurred, NHK helicopters took off immediately and sent back the first-hand information. Besides,
the complete disaster-warning system in Japan provided time for the publicity of the early warning information.
While during Wenchuan Earthquake, Xinhua News Agency and CCTV, as representatives of mainstream mediagroups, played a good role in shaping public opinion. But the media would to earn time for information release
and report in the case of catastrophes, it needs to accumulate experience of effective response to major
calamities and draw on the practices of reporting disasters in Japan to improve related systems and mechanisms.
3.4.2 The report and publicity of casualties
Timely and accurate release of the casualties is a demonstration of the national capacity of public information
reporting. During Wenchuan Earthquake, there was sporadic statistics and reports about casualties within thefirst 30 hours and the two official reports in Table 6 were rolling broadcasting by all types of media. Since thesecond day after the earthquake, the State Council released the latest data of casualties to the public honestly
through TV, networks, newspapers, broadcasting and text messages in a timely, authoritative and credible
manner every day. While during the East Japan Earthquake, there were dozens of reports about casualties within
the first 30 hours, in which six times of reporting cited the most were listed in Table 6. From the data, it can beconcluded that the report by Japanese media differs a lot from that by Japanese police. It’s even fair to say thatwithin the first 30 hours, the government lacked unified and authoritative publication of casualties throughout.
Besides, the earthquake led to powerful tsunami which made it difficult to collect the number of casualties andmissing people timely. However, under the circumstances of incomplete and incorrect information, thegovernment should consider the issue of speaking with one voice when it came to information reports.
3.4.3 The convening of press conferences
The press conferences are the authoritative way of information releasing. From Table 6, we can see that bothgovernments in China and Japan attached great importance to press conferences from the fact that within the 30
hours after the earthquake, the Japanese government held 4 press conferences to respond to the public’s
concerns and the Chinese government held 6 of those at multiple levels. As to the time of press conferences, theChina Earthquake Administration’s first press conference came two hours after the seism and it took theJapanese three hours to do the same thing. But with regards to the levels, the government held one press
conference about 26 hours later. About the contents, the three conferences within the first six hours mainly
focused on the determination of the magnitude and the denying of rumors. It was not until the afternoon of May
13, more than 24 hours after the quake, that the government convened two press conferences respectively,
covering detailed introduction to the disastrous situation, impact scope, general disaster relief measures andassistance from all parties. By contrast, the Japanese part briefed on detailed information more than basic

The International Emergency Management Society
2014 Annual Conference, October 20-23, 2014, Niigata, Japandisastrous situation and related measures 14 hours after the catastrophe. Obviously, Japan was quicker inmaking information public. Yet it relatively fell behind China in dealing with rumors.
4. CONCLUSION
4.1. Establishment and running of Emergency Operation Command Center
The establishment of the Emergency Operation Command Center during the two earthquakes was relatively
quick. In East Japan earthquake, the establishment and running was more normative and procedural, in strict
accordance with the provisions of laws and regulations, which was also adjusted according to the experiences ofhistoric earthquakes. Based on the cooperation agreements in normal times, the emergency command process ofthe disaster relief operation was smooth and orderly. In Wenchuan earthquake, the Emergency Operation
Command Center was established quickly and running orderly, which played an important role in the wholedisaster relief operations. Although the responsibilities of the different levels command centers were ambiguous,and the coordination and cooperation among the command centers were deficient at the beginning, thecommand process became more effective and orderly through building up communication, cooperation andcoordination mechanisms. Therefore, the emergency command system should be enhanced in the aspects ofstandardization and normalization.
4.2. Allocation and Dispatch of Rescue Force
Rescue operations of the two earthquakes show that, the military and professional rescue teams are irreplaceable
forces when responding to an earthquake catastrophe. In terms of military rescue forces, the ability of Japan
Self-defense Forces to collect disaster situation using helicopters rapidly is laudable. It is worth learning that
rescue requests for assistance and dispatch orders for rescue teams are standard and procedural in Japan. While
the rescue forces were well organized, with higher flexibility, discipline and fighting capacity in China, which
provided powerful, support during the disaster relief operations. About the professional rescue forces, theprofessional technology and equipments were still the weakness of USAR teams in China, especially for themechanisms of mobilization and dispatch need to improve the efficiency and speed. As to the foreign rescue
forces, the USAR teams arrived late and played a limited role in Wenchuan Earthquake. While in East Japan
Earthquake, all the international USAR teams arrived at the first three days and played a certain role in relief
operations. Therefore, the mechanisms of international assistance acceptance and coordination should be built
up and strengthen in the future, in order to make the international USRA teams, who have advanced rescue
equipments, skills and rich experience, play a greater role.
4.3. Emergency Refuge and Resettlement of Victims
The Chinese and Japanese governments had taken various measures to evacuate and resettle the affected people
timely and orderly during the two earthquakes. The experiences about emergency evacuation and resettlement inJapan are worth learning and reference, especially for the evacuation instructions issued in the first time after theearthquake, the instructions and signs of evacuation routes, the opening and running of shelters, etc. Due to thecomprehensive shelter system established in Japan, most affected people were resettled in the shelters after theearthquake and did not need too much relief tents. However, the shelters in the affected areas during theWenchuan earthquake were not sufficient, and most victims could not be resettled locally and nearly, so lots ofrelief tents were needed. In addition, the problems that the reserves of relief supplies were insufficient in theinitial period after the earthquake and the relief supplies were too excessive to distribute in the middle period
after the earthquake should be avoided in the future. The transportation and distribution of relief supplies shouldbe implemented through appropriate measures and based on the requirements of victims.
4.4. Report and Release of Public Information
The governments and media of China and Japan played an important role in the report and release of public
information during the two earthquakes. About the time of information reporting and releasing, it is slightly
later in China than in Japan. The difference is mainly attributable to the usual disaster reporting mechanisms andThe International Emergency Management Society
2014 Annual Conference, October 20-23, 2014, Niigata, Japanthe quality of media to report emergency. Besides, the disaster warning system in Japan provided support for thetimely release of information. As to the release of casualties, a good relationship of cooperation between
Chinese government and the media was established, and the information release is open and transparent, timely
and accurate. While in the initial period after earthquake, the Japanese government lacked unified andauthoritative release of casualties. In terms of press conference, the Japanese government held press
conference more quickly in the initial period after the earthquake. The press conference about the overall
disaster situation and relief developments held by the Chinese government was a little later. However, theChinese government was more quickly and efficiently in the news release about responding to and dealing withthe rumors. In addition, it is worth learning that the application and experience of the new media during the East
Japan earthquake. More attention should be paid to new media in the disaster information report and release in
the future and the application should be enhanced.
4.5 Suggestions on the construction of disaster prevention and mitigation
Through the comparison between the two countries of China and Japan in the area of disaster cases analysis, as
we can see, no matter how the specific national conditions, in the face of strong earthquakes catastrophe,
disaster prevention and mitigation system construction has much in common. First of all, it should be in theform of legal regulation, emergency disposal of each link, clear in the process of crisis handling, in the form ofgovernment departments at all levels to establish and fulfill the responsibility. Establish monitoring and early
warning mechanism, doing a good emergency preparedness, including emergency supplies, teams, shelters,
exercise, information, coordination of each other and so on. Promoting the construction of government
emergency command system, the formation and docking and each department contact, connectivity, information
sharing, resource sharing of modern emergency command system.
ACKNOWLEDGES: This paper is supported by Strategic Japanese-Chinese Cooperative Program on“Earthquake Disaster Mitigation” No. 2012DFG20510.
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